Canadian Philosophical Reviews
Revue Canadienne de Comptes rendus en Philosophie

As a rule, the editors publish only invited reviews. However, they will consider for publication submitted reviews of new books in philosophy and related areas. Reviews must be a maximum of 1000 words and will be accepted in either French or English. They should be submitted to the francophone or an anglophone editor as appropriate.

En général, les rédacteurs ne publient que les comptes rendus qui sont explicitement invitées. Néanmoins, ils prendraient en considération la publication de comptes rendus soumis, si les auteurs traitent de livres philosophiques (ou de livres sur un sujet apparenté) qui viennent de paraître. Les comptes rendus devraient être de 1000 mots au maximum, et le manuscrit rédigé en français ou en anglais. Les manuscrits devraient être envoyés au rédacteur francophone ou à un rédacteur anglophone selon le cas.

Subscription prices
for a volume of twelve issues

Institutions	*Individuals*	*Students*
$88 (Canadian)	$44 (Canadian)	$32 (Canadian)
US$82 or $98 Cdn (Foreign)	US$45 or $54 Cdn (Foreign)	US$28 or $42 Cdn (Foreign)

Prix de l'abonnement
à un volume de douze numéros

Institutions	*Individus*	*Etudiants*
$88 (Canadian)	$44 (Canadian)	$32 (Canadian)
US$82 or $98 Cdn (Foreign)	US$45 or $54 Cdn (Foreign)	US$28 or $42 Cdn (Foreign)

Subscriptions should be sent to the publisher:
Les abonnements peuvent être pris chez l'éditeur:

Academic Printing & Publishing
P.O. Box 4834, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada
T6E 5G7

Second Class Mail Registration No. 5550

ISSN 0228-491X

Volume IX, No 1
January · janvier 1989

Table of Contents · Table des matières

Mailed in April 1989

John Cleary, ed.
Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, Vol. III
Lanham, MD: University Press of America
1987. Pp. xxxi+398.
US$34.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8191-6809-2);
US$19.75 (paper: ISBN 0-8191-6810-6).

This volume contains nine papers, each with comment, presented at the prestigious Boston Area Colloquium series during the 1986-87 academic year, and ranging in topic from Socrates to Plotinus.

In 'Socrates' Evil Associates and the Motivation for his Trial and Condemnation,' Thomas Brickhouse and Nicholas Smith consider why Socrates in the course of his defense never tried to explain his association with Critias and Alcibiades, given the ancient tradition according to which their infamy was the primary motive for the trial. What the authors propose is that Socrates understood the charges (impiety and corrupting the youth of Athens) to refer primarily to old prejudices which he attempts to refute by describing why he has lived his life as he has. This argument is problematic, since, as Maud Chaplin's commentary points out, we do not know whether Plato intended the *Apology* to be an exact account of Socrates' speeches or, say, a literary tribute 'true to the substance of Socrates' (74).

Paul Woodruff's persuasive 'Expert Knowledge in the *Apology* and *Laches*: What a General Needs to Know' addresses the priority of definition. If, as Socrates claims, knowledge requires knowing a definition, then the search for that definition by examination of proposed definitions, counterexamples, and the like is undermined. Moreover, how can Socrates, without knowledge, guide his interlocutor through a disproof of alleged knowledge claims? Woodruff proposes to distinguish expert knowledge, grounded in an ability to provide a definition, from nonexpert knowledge. He argues that Socrates believes expertise is reserved for gods as it is only by looking to the Good that one could know what makes brave actions brave and thereby know, unrestrictedly, which actions are brave (95). Nevertheless, lacking that, we can know that these (or even these sorts of) actions are brave and, even while knowing that none of us can know what bravery is, search as best we can (107).

If Woodruff is right, the challenge his view raises is not dissimilar to one familiar from contemporary epistemology. If it is conceded that

the highest standard for knowledge, namely, refutation of global skepticism, cannot be met (if I cannot establish that I am not a brain in a vat or deceived by an evil demon), then interest shifts to what disqualifies knowledge claims in a context – or to what qualifies them, that is, to degrees of justification. Likewise here. How are examples known? In what ways is Socrates' nondefinitive (nonexpert) claim that courage is knowledge of things to be feared and dared more justified than Nicias' same (nonexpert) claim? Nicias is refuted because he does not embrace its consequences, but his view, arguably Socrates' view (113), is not. So Socrates is consistent – and modest. Yet Socrates seems not just to teach but to inquire. What can his seeking come to? What, beyond consistency and modesty, can Woodruff suppose Socrates expects of himself?

Aryeh Kosman's 'Divine Being and Divine Thinking in *Metaphysics* Lambda' is a complicated and important paper. Kosman argues that what counts as substance is a mode of being of entities (not the entities themselves) and that seeing that this is so enables one to understand the relation between general and special metaphysics because the divine mode of being is the paradigm for substance, which is in turn focal with respect to other modes of *per se* being (173). Kosman also attempts to make sense of Aristotle's claims that divine being – pure activity – is thinking (awareness) and that thought and the object of thought are the same.

The discussion of divine being is quite helpful, but the claim that substance is, for Aristotle, a category of the being of entities rather than a category of entities (173) is disputable. Kosman's basis for his view is Aristotle's claim that the being of a white human being and the being of a human being are not the same (and that only the latter is substance). Christopher Shields, the commentator, objects that if Aristotle denies the substitutivity of identity there's 'something seriously wrong with his ontology' (193). Yet there seems to be evidence that Aristotle's 'is one and the same' does not conform to Leibniz's Law (see Gareth Matthews' 'Accidental Unities,' in *Language and Logos*, eds. Schofield and Nussbaum [Cambridge 1982] 223-40, or my 'Referential Opacity in Aristotle,' *History of Philosophy Quarterly*, forthcoming 1989). Nevertheless one wishes Kosman had said more about what he means by 'modes of being'. If modes of being are modes of being *of entities*, and if entities have the determinateness Aristotle requires of substances, how are modes of being ontologically fundamental?

By 'belief-relative sciences' Terry Penner in 'Socrates on the Impossibility of Belief-Relative Sciences' means those activities such as rhetoric, literary interpretation, cookery, and cosmetology which involve beliefs whose truth or falsity is irrelevant to the science (266). (Of course there are relevant truths about how to cook an egg. The irrelevant truths concern the good; the idea is that pseudosciences involve believing something is good, without regard to whether it is so.) Penner's explanation of Socrates' view is that Socrates thinks one cannot understand a claim unless one knows whether what is claimed is true or false (289).

Penner uses his hypothesis to discuss three texts: Socrates' proposal in the *Ion* that Ion cannot know what Homer says unless he knows what Hesiod says when Hesiod says the same thing as Homer, the arguments of the *Gorgias* leading ultimately to the conclusion that the rhetorician has no power, and Thrasymachus' claim in the *Republic* that the doctor *qua* doctor never errs. As Penner proceeds, his explanation of why understanding a claim requires knowing whether it is true seems to shift. Penner's main contention is that belief-relative sciences require propositions (the content of statements which makes them meaningful, regardless of their truth) and that Socrates denies their existence (268, 274). Yet Penner also proposes that belief-relative sciences are undertaken for purposes which ignorance on the part of their practitioners frustrates (307). It is difficult to see the connection between these claims; indeed the latter seems sufficient to explain Socrates' rejection of such sciences. Tyrants will not achieve their real goal (self-advantage) unless they have knowledge, not just knowledge of how to persuade. (That they, having knowledge, would not use it to harm others involves substantive Socratic-Platonic claims about the good.) The *Ion* too suggests the value of knowledge. Moreover if Socrates thinks that learning moral truths about the gods, war, etc. is the point of reading literature (315), then if Ion, having read Homer, understands these matters, there *is* a sense in which he does know what Hesiod said (if Hesiod says the same), even if he does not know that Hesiod said it. From this perspective Penner's claim that Socrates rejects propositions (with attendant difficulties, pointed out by Daniel Shartin, about the meaningfulness of false statements) is unmotivated.

This highly recommended collection, dedicated to the memory of Joan Kung (d. 1987), also includes significant papers by David Konstan ('Points, Lines, and Infinity: Aristotle's *Physics* Zeta and Hellenistic Philosophy'), Diskin Clay ('Gaps in the 'Universe' of the

Platonic Dialogues'), Lloyd Gerson ('Aristotle's Polis: A Community of the Virtuous'), Sarah Waterlow Broadie ('The Problem of Practical Intellect in Aristotle's *Ethics*'), and John Dillon ('The Mind of Plotinus').

Lynne Spellman
University of Arkansas, Fayetteville

Alan Donagan
Choice: The Essential Element in Human Action
New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall.
Pp. x+197. US$32.50. ISBN 0-7102-1168-6.

What any philosophical trend periodically requires to remain identifiable is a clear definition of the orientation of its contemporary proponents towards each other and its current detractors. This able and elegant book fulfils this need for a trend in the philosophy of action, with appropriate reference to Plato, Aristotle, and medieval Aristotelians thrown in. Contemporaries between whom it mediates include Anscombe, Kenny, Searle, Chisholm, Stoutland, and Bratman with Davidson functioning from outside as a disciplinary counter-irritant.

For a start it vindicates propositional attitudes, e.g., those of belief, desire, wish and intention, as basic to the understanding of action against the psychological revisionism of Churchland (Paul) and Stich. A later chapter investigates the truth-conditions for ascriptions of these attitudes. It defends a Fregean semantics as revised by Dummett and Linsky against Davidson's alternative. As a condensation of the semantic issues here at stake this chapter shines on its own as a gem. Here, however, its purpose is to clear Anscombe's claim that an action is intended (or chosen) only under a description from some not very clearly articulated suspicion of inconsistency. This concern perhaps is provoked by the Chisholm/Goldman view that distinguishable event-descriptions must differentiate distinguishable events. But Donagan disposed of that in a preceding chapter. That A is on the far side of B with respect to C but not to D can be under-

stood as consistent without a theory of spatial relationships. Why, then, shouldn't the claim that Oedipus intended to strike Laius under the description of striking an offensive old stranger, and not that of striking his father, be similarly understood without invoking a theory of semantics? In either case the obvious lack of contradiction is what theory must lump.

For its main focus the book takes that much-cited, disjunctively too simplistic, difference between your raising your right arm (an action) and your right arm just going up (a 'mere' event). The difference for Donagan, as for many others, lies in a form of explanation – intention or choice being conceived as primarily explanatory in function. He accepts more specifically from Davidson that intentions are mental events which cause actions, but with two provisos. First, he agrees with Searle that intentions are essentially self-referential, i.e., that the description under which what you intend is intended must refer to what you intend as explained by your intention. This self-reference is used not only to explain why it has to be under the description of an action, not just of a mere event, that an action is intended, but also to dispose of Davidsonian difficulties arising from deviant causal chains between intention and action. Second, Donagan adopts from Anscombe, Stoutland and Searle the rejection of an exclusively nomological conception of causality.

The finer distinction between intention and choice follows Bratman's conception of the former as 'Janus-faced', i.e., as facing simultaneously the end intended and what is for the latter's sake. As with Anscombe, intentions which do not have this means-end structure are dismissed as limiting (as distinct from less complex) cases. This places more emphasis on the phenomenon of deliberation in the analysis of action than I think it deserves. But, however that may be, choice is now defined by Donagan as 'intention to perform a specific action as the immediate step to be taken in the carrying out of a plan ... that is directed towards a wished for end' (132). (Wish has earlier been distinguished from desire as, unlike the latter, not involving feeling [42]. Has Donagan never wished from the bottom of his heart? Would it not be better to mention that desires unlike wishes cannot be directed at the past?) Donagan then goes on to argue that the deliberative processes involved in choice presuppose a belief on the part at least of the agent that the choice made is insufficiently predetermined by antecedent causal conditions.

Like some others who have gone this way he embraces the concept of agent causation. The need to do so turns out, however, to be

less than urgent, for he takes its proper function to be one of summary rather than elucidation. In this capacity, he says, it analyses agency in terms (1) 'of having power to choose between options presented by deliberation' and (2) 'of being such that when what one presupposes in choosing is true, one's choosing self-referentially causes the happening of what is chosen' (172). But this is whitewash. Whatever its eventual watered-down form, the concept would never have got on the road had it not been for a confusion of the sort of narrative responsibility that one has as the person who has done something with responsibility of an explanatory sort. Here the customary appeal to antiquity is specious. Aristotle did recognise the sculptor as a cause, and in an explanatory sense, but only as the cause of the statue sculpted, not of the sculpting.

As for what the concept is now supposed to summarise, I have no quarrel with a libertarian interpretation of (1). On the other hand, there is a neater alternative to (2) which Donagan, like Searle, overlooks. Its basis is that events are not like biscuits stacked in a box, but *occur*, i.e., change from not yet to no longer. The intentions to which certain events owe action-status can then be taken as self-referential by representing themselves not as antecedent causes of the actions intended, but rather as logically necessary conditions of these actions being about to occur, where the presupposition is that the necessary opportunity-and-capacity conditions for these actions are causally underdetermining. Thus the antecedence of an intention to what it intends is simply that of the action's conditional being about to occur to its later occurring (see further my 'The Non-Causal Self-Fulfilment of Intention,' *APQ* [1972]). This alternative is sufficiently like (2) to do the job that the latter does in distinguishing intentional actions from other types of events while solving difficulties posed by deviant causal chains. Furthermore, it is explicit as to the category difference between intending and actions intended where (2) is murky.

Regrettably, to leave room for my final comments I have had to pass over the anti-compatibilist elbow-jousting against Dennett in Donagan's last few pages. Perhaps it is enough to cheer.

Kenneth Rankin
University of Victoria

Peter Galison
How Experiments End
Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1987.
Pp. xii+330.
US$39.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-226-27914-6);
US$14.95 (paper: ISBN 0-226-27915-4).

Typically, texts which contribute to the history and philosophy of science are concerned with the character and evolution of scientific ideas. So scientific revolutions are standardly treated merely as conceptual revolutions. Treating science this way leaves wholly out of account any reference to experiments and the laboratories where they take place. And so it is that important aspects of scientific activity tend to get ignored.

Galison has done a sterling service to the history and philosophy of science by providing an excellently written and researched text concerning the issue of the connection between laboratory practice and experimentation on the one hand, and the development of scientific ideas on the other. All too often when philosophers discuss experiments and the evidence they yield, it is as an afterthought – as icing on the cake of theory. This is not an attitude which will survive a reading of Galison's book. And as if this were not enough, Galison has discussed these important issues in connection with developments in recent particle physics. For a number of years now texts have been available which seek to popularize issues in contemporary particle physics, but such texts are often not written with an eye for historical accuracy and the subtlety of the process by which ideas and experiments symbiotically develop in tandem. Galison's book fills an important gap by addressing just these types of issue.

P.G. Wodehouse's fictional butler Jeeves recommended his master to attend closely to the psychology of the individual. A modern day Jeeves would point instead to the sociology of the group. In connection with the development of particle physics, Galison does just this. By presenting contemporary experimental particle physics as a large-scale group activity, Galison enables us to appreciate the naivety of the individualist myth which pictures the working scientist as a sort of academic Shane – the heroic loner pitted against problems in the immediate laboratorial environment. This sort of individualist picture of scientists engaged in science may have been appropriate in connection with Newton and his prisms or Galileo rolling balls down inclines. However, it no longer serves a useful func-

tion in the realm of 'big physics' with its billion dollar budgets, administrators and guiding committees. Newton once said he had seen so far only because he had stood on the shoulders of giants. In 'big physics' the giants are still there but the terrain ahead is surveyed from corporate heights.

Chapter one provides an overview of the main issues to be dealt with in the text. Galison's main concern is with the development of the physics of the microcosm. So the text does not present a view of physics as a whole, rather it deals with issues in an important chapter of the development of modern physics. Chapters two, three and four deal with the physics of the microcosm from three distinct perspectives. Chapter two concerns experiments based on macroscopic forces and effects as ways of learning about the denizens of the microcosm. This was the approach which recommended itself to investigators in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

In this approach to the physics of the microcosm one tries to discover microscopic entities and their properties on the basis of the macroscopic phenomena they give rise to. For example, Roentgen, the discoverer of X-rays, observed that certain crystals fluoresced when his cathode ray machine was in operation. From this macroscopic effect he was led to a consideration of the microphysical character of radiation.

Galison discusses the macroscopic approach to the physics of the microcosm in connection with James Clerk Maxwell's analysis of experimental activity according to which, '... experiments involved the macroscopic transport and transformation of energy that was detected when it displaced a constrained system of ponderable matter over a macroscopic distance' (27). Such experiments would thus reveal the cumulative effect of a vast multiplicity of microscopic phenomena.

Physics in the twentieth century has shifted away from the Maxwellian picture of experimental activity, and Galison has much of interest to say about the consequences of this shift for the logic of contemporary experimental argumentation.

In chapter three the concern is with experimental investigations into cosmic rays and radioactive materials. In these experiments individual microscopic objects are subject to analysis rather than large statistical aggregates of such objects. As the community of microphysicists became a hunter-gatherer culture, the emphasis was on Geiger counters and cloud chambers as devices to detect and measure individual microphysical interactions. As was true of macroscopic

investigations into the microcosm, the apparatus employed at this stage of the development of particle physics was relatively cheap, it was medium-sized and fairly easy to manipulate. These factors allowed investigators to redesign experiments and vary experimental conditions with relative ease.

In chapter four the concern is with large-scale, complex, high-cost particle accelerator-based experiments. Here a consideration is given to the experimental physicist as an industrial producer and farmer of the objects of his investigations. Considerations of cost, size and complexity make the redesigning of such experiments and the varying of experimental conditions problematic. Particle accelerators are devices whose cost can run into billions of dollars and whose size can be measured in kilometers rather than mere meters. It is in the context of these large-scale experiments that the Maxwellian picture of experimental activity is seen to be particularly inadequate. This picture of experimental activity makes no reference to the computer-assisted data analysis and simulation which has now become an integral part of microphysical investigations.

In chapter five Galison discusses the theoretical constraints on experiments and their interpretation. Galison proposes a tripartite division of these theoretical constraints. The long-term constraints consist of general principles, including metaphysical perspective, current in the scientific community. The medium-term constraints consist of research programmes, and where these tend to be linked to specific people and institutions. The short-term constraints consist of the particular theories current at the time of experimentation. Galison discusses how these theoretical constraints shape experimental expectations, behaviour and decisions concerning the end of experiments.

Chapter six is devoted to a discussion of the consequences of the increasing scale and complexity of microphysical investigations. In particular, Galison has much of interest to say about the role of computer simulations in contemporary microphysical investigations. Because the redesigning of experiments and the varying of experimental conditions has become prohibitively expensive, '... the computer simulation allows the experimentalist to see, at least through the eye of the central processor, what would happen if a larger spark chamber were on the floor, if a shield were thicker ...' (265).

Galison's overall lesson – or at least an important part of it – seems to be that experimental activity is something which cannot be separated from the beliefs, theoretical and practical, which

surround that activity. It is these vast constellations of belief which surround experimental activity that, so to speak, ground experimental activity in reason. It is perhaps this, more than anything else, that highlights the poverty of Oxford philosophy's view of the experimenter as a passive twiddler of knobs and reader of dials!

Niall Shanks
Southern Methodist University

Jean-Yves Goffi
La philosophie de la technique
Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1988. Pp. 127. FF28. ISBN 2-13-041777-9.

Although not yet as well-recognized as the philosophy of science, the philosophy of technology is an increasingly important discipline. The volume under review, a deft contribution to the well-known 'Que sais-je?' series, is further indication of its coming of age, in Europe as well as North America. As with all maturations, however, this one too entials the separation from certain attachments and fears of childhood.

In his introduction, Goffi notes both an attachment and certain fears. He distinguishes, for instance, between the perennial fear of technics in general and the modern fear of scientific technics or technology, suggesting that both point toward the need for a philosophy of technics. Indeed, 'les idéologies technophobes, d'autant plus redoutables qu'elles semblent avoir quelque fondement dans la réalité, formet un stock de lieux communs' that require critical reflection (11). 'Vivre dans la nostalgie d'un monde prétechnique ou, au contraire, se lancer tête baissée dans n'importe quelle aventure du moment qu'on la qualifie de technique, sont peut-être les moindres bévues que l'on puisse commettre faute d'une philosophie de la technique' (11-12). For Goffi, then, the philosophy of technology begins with the observation that 'les techniques sont à la fois omniprésentes et inaperçues' and the attempt to avoid concomitant child-like attitudes.

> Il faudra donc, puisqu'elles son omniprésentes, éviter de faire de toute réalité une réalité technique. Mais il faudra aussi, puisqu'elles sont inaperçues, éviter de négliger des éléments essentiels de la réalité technique. (12)

Against this background, the first chapter, relying on Max Weber and F. von Gottl-Ottlilienfield, develops the notion of technics as a general aspect of human life, but one with many dimensions (individual, social, intellectual, material, etc.). It further distinguishes between technics and technology as scientific technics, and considers certain conceptual, epistemological, and psycho-sociological problems associated with such a distinction.

The second chapter provides an overview of the history of the philosophy of technology. This 'archéologie des philosophies de la technique,' which is set in smaller type (apparently to conserve space or indicate subsidiary status), includes presentations of the thought of Plato and of Aristotle on *techne*, and the distinction (derived from Plato) between three levels of philosophical analysis of technics: ontological, anthropological, and ethical evaluation. There are also interpretations of medieval ideas on work and mechanics associated with Benedictine monasticism and Hugh of St. Victor. Analyses of the views of Francis Bacon and René Descartes are followed by discussions of the French Encyclopedists, August Comte, Saint-Simon, and the idea of technocracy. A table neatly summarizes differences between ancient and modern conceptions of technics.

Chapters three through five review contemporary philosophies of technology in terms of the three levels of analysis provided by Plato. Here Goffi considers the approach, first, of those he terms ontologists and phenomenologists. These include the kinematicist Franz Reuleaux, the mecanologist Jacques Lafitte, and the metaphysician Friedrich Dessauer. More thorough attention is accorded to the more sophisticated mecanology (i.e., phenomenology of machines) provided by Gilbert Simondon, to the early Martin Heidegger's existential analysis of the relation between *Dasein* and technics, and to Don Idhe's mapping of relationships between technics and the world. Each, 'd'une façon ou d'une autre, remplacent l'antique problème des rapports naturel/artificiel par celui des rapports entre l'objet technique et la réalité humaine' (71) – a transformation which is even more obvious in Karl Marx's analysis of technology.

A second set of contemporary philosophies of technology constitute explicit anthropologies of the relationship between technics and

human nature. Here Goffi notes Ernst Kapp's initiation of the distinctly modern discussion. With regard to this relation there are two basic positions: the theory of a fundamental continuity between organic and technical reality and the theory of a break or discontinuity between biology and technology. Proponents of the former include Oswald Spengler, Henri Bergson, and André Leroi-Gourhan. To exemplify the latter theory Goffi uses the Marxist idea of human beings as the producers of their own existence. He might also have appealed to the thought of José Ortega y Gasset, whose absence is the single greatest oversight of this text.

To complete the three levels of philosophical analysis of technics in its modern form, chapter five turns to contemporary assessments of technology presented in the works of Lewis Mumford, Jacques Ellul, Gilbert Hottois, and the later Heidegger. Here Goffi notes a fundamental difference between perennial and contemporary fears of technology; the former were concerned with the problem of imitation, the latter with that of power. Today

> ce qu'on craint dans la technique, c'est son pouvoir de déchaîner des forces incontrôlables, voire innommables. La hantièse est d'être dépassé par une création que l'on a soi-même opérée. (96)

(Here it would have perhaps been useful to make reference to work by Langdon Winner and Hans Jonas.) The coming of age of the philosophy of technology, although it entails some separation from the fears of childhood, does not necessarily imply the simple renunciation of such fears. It can involve their emergence from fantasy into rational articulation.

A brief conclusion restates the importance of the philosophy of technology. The transformation of technics into technology constitutes a major historical revolution in which science and technology, not just their fears, have become ideologies while 'les technologies donnent l'impression d'avoir dépassé, dans leur développement et dans leurs conséquences, toute possiblité de contrôle' (119). Traditional technics were subject to a long process of trial-and-error selection that is no longer feasible given the powerful consequences of contemporary makings. And yet such makings appear ever more economically necessary.

> Si le mot d'ordre du pur technicien est: 'Tout est possible', c'est aussi le mot d'ordre de tous les totalitarismes. On devrait d'ailleurs préciser: 'Tout est possible à condition d'y mettre le prix' ... (123)

The implication is that if control is to be realized, if the contradiction between economic interest and ethical restraint is to be transcended, it will depend at least in part on the kind of understanding and awareness brought about through philosophy, that is, through the philosophy of technology.

There is a too brief bibliography, which nevertheless accords James Feibleman's *Technology and Reality* (1982) and Charles Susskind's *Understanding Technology* (1981) more credit as philosophy than they deserve.

This book demonstrates conversance with both European and North American literature as well as a command of the major issues in the philosophy of technology. Goffi's use of the anthropological studies of Claude Lévi-Strauss and André Leroi-Gourhan especially introduce new perspectives not common in English-language discussions. It is a commendable introduction to an increasingly important field.

Carl Mitcham
(Science, Technology, Society Program)
Pennsylvania State University

Carol C. Gould
Rethinking Democracy: Freedom and Social Cooperation in Politics, Economy, and Society
New York: Cambridge University Press 1988. 363 pp. US$39.50. ISBN 0-521-35048-4.

The central idea of this full-bodied contribution to democratic theory is that since each human is equally possessed of the ability to make free choices, each is also equally entitled to access to the conditions required for the exercise of this capacity in jointly pursued activity (chapt. 1, summarized at 316). Around this claim is constructed a 'quasi-foundationalist' theory prescribing the democratization of social, political, and economic life. The endeavour is foundationalist in that its prescriptions are to follow deductively from proven premises; it departs from foundationalism in eschewing an essentialist view which takes people to have 'a fixed and innate essence or nature' (27).

Early chapters provide an analysis of positive freedom (as 'self-development') and defend the claim about equal rights to the conditions for such freedom. Subsequent chapters are progressively concrete, as Gould applies her foundations to a prescription for a workers' self-managed economy, a politics combining direct citizen participation with representation, and a social order providing at the very least for democratically administered universal welfare, the promotion of a 'democratic personality', democratization of authority and of expertise, and the integration of national self-determination with international co-operation. Arguments for these conclusions are advanced against the background of succinctly summarized mainstream positions in political philosophy in ways that should make the book a useful text (if, that is, it is put into paper or otherwise made financially accessible to students).

Viewed from a medium distance, the conclusions articulated in this work express what might well be a coalescing consensus among European and North American democratic socialists. This does not mean that there is no room for controversy among such theorists viewed at shorter range. One virtue of the book in this connection is that at nearly every point its author calls attention to her differences with otherwise like-minded theorists – C.B. Macpherson, Carole Pateman, Michael Walzer, Mihailo Marković, Jürgen Habermas, and many others – over such questions as: when material inequality is permissible; how constrained a market should be; which economic decisions should be made by the whole society and which left to workers' self-managed firms; the extent to which representative democracy is acceptable; or how 'property' is to be defined or valued. That Carol Gould advances her own views on these topics in a tone of unabashed confidence should not be taken, nor do I think she wishes them to be taken, as beyond continuing debate. By and large agreeing with the book's political prescriptions, at least at medium distance, I shall conclude this review by expressing a misgiving about its characterization of democracy and with some reflections on its methodology.

The 'principle of democracy' Gould defends is that 'every person who engages in a common activity with others has an equal right to participate in making decisions concerning such activity' (84). Depending on their interpretations each of 'participation' and 'common activity' in the statement of this principle is problematic. If the notion of engaging in a common activity is taken broadly enough to encompass people with otherwise differing goals striving to stay alive and prosper in a shared society, then it is not problematic; but, in

subsequent characterizations (89, 107), Gould seems to mean that common activity requires more specific shared goals. In this case the scope of democracy is narrowed to interactions among people who are in agreement over ends. This is problematic, since it is just in cases of conflict over ends that democracy is both the most important to secure and the most difficult to sustain. Similarly, it is relatively unproblematic to think of the possession of an equal right to participate as meaning that no person engaged in a common activity may be denied some appropriate kind or measure of participation in determining how it is pursued. However, if this means that anyone in a shared activity has a right to the same kind and measure of participation, then such things as weighted voting or according partial rights to children (both arguably sometimes democratically justified) are ruled out.

I suspect that Gould's quasi-foundationalism will draw fire from those contemporary radical democratic theorists (perhaps the majority) who think foundationalism wrong-headed and pernicious. Remaining agnostic about the feasibility and the desirability of foundational approaches to political philosophy, I feel confident only to remark that Gould's approach has the possibility of escaping anti-foundationalist charges (or at least the politically motivated ones) provided (a) it retains room for political-philosophical pluralism and (b) it consistently avoids essentialism. *Rethinking Democracy* would fail in respect of (a) by demanding that any sincere and rational democrat must agree with its axioms, i.e., that there is no other way to justify the sorts of prescriptions in the book. I do not see that Gould's theory need be taken this way. Rather (and here its deductive method becomes an asset) it can be viewed as recommending a point of view favouring universal self-development and drawing out the democratic and workers' self-managerial implications of adopting it.

Consideration (b) raises more complex issues. Gould thinks she can avoid essentialism by prescribing that people have an equal right to both negative and positive freedom without specifying the content of choices they must make in order to be free (e.g., 132). By itself, this seems to me a good way to avoid essentialism. It becomes problematic when conjoined with Gould's argument for her central foundational claim that people have an equal moral right to freedom. She maintains that anybody who makes a choice must not only normatively value the choice he or she makes but also, by 'reflexive affirmation', normatively value his or her own ability to make choices; once it is realized that this ability is part of what it is to be human,

one must also recognize the normative legitimacy of everyone having the equal ability to make choices. I am sceptical that this argument (presented in the book, at pp. 56 and 130-1, almost as tersely as this summary) can be adequately explicated without specifying more in the way of what constitutes human nature than the anti-essentialists allow.

These observations are advanced to illustrate the sorts of theoretical debates *Rethinking Democracy* invites. In my view such debate, along with the earlier-mentioned more practically oriented debates, are of the most healthy sort. They are, indeed, the order of the day for politically engaged philosophers in an era offering both severe challenges and new openings to democracy and to socialism.

Frank Cunningham
University of Toronto

William Horosz
Search Without Idols
Norwell, MA: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers
1987. Pp. xi+394.
US$109.50. ISBN 90-274-3327-8.

In this book William Horosz proposes an alternative to the traditional view of transcendence as an undivided, unitary human power. For Horosz, human transcendence does not function unitarily but bimodally. The first mode, called 'self-1', is a finite, positive, 'directional' awareness controlled by the ego. It is the 'finite quest for wholeness' whereby we fulfill our 'finite lives with meaning ... (without) transform(ing) their finitude by infinitude' (101). The other mode, 'self-2', is a negative, infinite, and 'separate' awareness which is free of the ego's controls and constraints. It is a 'runaway transcendence' whereby we seek to deny our finitude by reaching beyond ourselves toward some otherness, be it a deity or some metaphysical totality. In so far as this is a denial of our limitations, it is a project of bad faith. According to Horosz, this bimodal theory, in which the person is said to have the power of both positive and negative transcendence, has at least two advantages over the traditional theory: 1) by distinguishing

between self-1 and self-2 we see that transcendence is not always infinite and alienating, since alienation is now properly located in self-2; 2) by recognizing self-1 as the authentic mode of transcendence we can begin the project of 'de-alienation' by guarding ourselves against self-2.

Indeed, Horosz believes that de-alienation is no easy feat in a culture which consistently promotes bad faith by offering its members an endless array of eternal totalities as objects of transcendence. Functioning deceptively as the ultimate solution to the human predicament of finitude, these totalities promise false security against life's insecurity. Everywhere we are encouraged to move beyond the finite search for wholeness to assimilate with some greater ontological scheme, to become part of a grand cosmic order, part of God's plan. As Horosz observes, 'the drive for totalities is part of the great heritage of intellectuals in our western tradition,' which really amounts to a 'fallacy of the elite' (64). Among the greatest culprits are theologians and philosophers, from the theists (Niebuhr, Tillich, Kierkegaard) to the 'secular projectionists' (Feuerbach, Marx, Freud), to the phenomenologists (Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre). So powerful is the drive toward totalism that thinkers who are suposedly reacting against totalities are offering but alternative totalities. Kierkegaard, for instance, 'keeps one foot in existence the whole time he explores eternity' (19). But Horosz warns that *all* totalities, whether they are theistic, secular, or ontological, are 'false eternals' and 'idolatrous beings' (61). Making non-human claims to power, the totalist alienates us from the proper finite search for wholeness.

Part II of the book focuses on two major trends of totalism in contemporary thought: Marxism and phenomenology. The Marxists endorse a kind of negative transcendence when they subordinate the person to a historical totality. 'Marx,' says Horosz, 'is a master in utilizing the power of infinite transcendence for the cause of his sociohistoric totality' (210). The same holds for the phenomenologist. Husserl, for instance, divests people of their power when he goes 'beyond the context of human directionality and purposiveness in seeking for absolute knowledge ... (which, as a) totalization of meaning is ... a serious defect' (278). The book ends in much the same way it begins – with a sweeping attack on the various totalisms which commanded the history of philosophy.

As its title suggests, Horosz proposes that we abandon our project of negative transcendence and instead attempt an authentic, finite search for wholeness without the aid of idolatrous totalities – indeed,

a search without idols. It would be a 'directional search of the self through human awareness. ... The message is: live the partial life to the full; there is no other' (103). But in what way is this finite search a positive form of *transcendence*? Horosz's bimodal theory encounters a serious conceptual problem here. If we agree with him that any form of going-out-toward (which in fact is part of the traditional definition of transcendence) is a separate and alienating awareness, we would have to assume that, in positive transcendence, the ego must move beyond itself (i.e., transcend) without going outside of itself. But are we still talking about transcendence here? It strikes me that Horosz cannot formulate his idea of positive transcendence without changing the meaning of transcendence altogether, or contradicting himself: a finite search, as he understands it, would have to be a 'transcendence' which requires precisely that the ego does not transcend, at least not in the ordinary sense of the word.

Horosz's treatment of traditional thinkers as totalists in some cases reflects a misinterpretation, in other cases it creates serious problems. For example, he claims that Feuerbach espouses a 'transpersonal humanism' when he replaces religion with a '*horizontal* totality of *species-being*' (125), which, like religion, is a kind of 'human fulfillment through the need of otherness' (141). Aside from the question of accuracy, this reading of Feuerbach raises suspicions as to whether there is any merit in 'de-alienation' at all. In this case, to reject totality is to reject any universal claim about the human species. It is to give up any attempt to establish knowledge about human nature, since such knowledge is seen as an alienating 'otherness'.

To be sure, Horosz is not concerned with knowledge, certainty, or objectivity, as is evident when he reproaches Husserl for 'flee[ing] finite particulars ... in order to gain ... certainty about knowledge' (165). But to fault Husserl for buying into a totality is to ignore his more important goal of unifying the field of human perception on a firm, objective foundation. Here, as in Feuerbach's case, Horosz has not convinced the reader that *all* totalities are alienating.

Furthermore, in condemning the traditional 'system-builders', Horosz is not simply attacking totalities but the very *nature* of reason itself. Our reasoning process is like a game of building blocks, in that we organize our data systematically, from the bottom up, so as to grasp them as a unified, coherent whole. In short it is a totalizing process. We don't just throw out random thoughts and leave them disconnected; we pull ideas together, we build systems. This is how we assert ourselves in the world: we have the need to put things in

order so as to see them as an intelligible unity. Observing this need for totality, John Shea once said, 'if we don't find it, we'll create it.' To ask us to resist all totalizing efforts is to ask us not to be human! And that, to be sure, is the most alienating proposition of all.

Constance L. Mui
Loyola University of New Orleans

Wolfgang Iser
Walter Pater: The Aesthetic Moment
New York: Cambridge University Press 1987. Pp. xi+212.
US$34.50. ISBN 0-521-30962-X.

Meiklejohn, when embarking upon his translation of Kant's *Kritik der Reinen Vernunft* more than 150 years after its original publication, commented that he considered his role as that of one endeavoring to make intelligible to English readers a work that was clumsy, repetitious, and overlaid with syntactic confusions, an attempt that had never before been made by anyone with adequate acquaintance with either the language or the subject matter. Nevertheless the work already had a lasting impact upon English language philosophy. No one had to question why the project should have been initiated.

In 1960, Wolfgang Iser published *Walter Pater: Die Autonomie des Asthetischen*, a work in no way characterized by the notorious Kantian stylistic weaknesses, yet one which for over a quarter of a century had had little impact on English audiences ill-prepared to read it in German. It was, of course, not one of those rare revolutionary works, like the *Kritik*, so the publication of the volume might occasion a *why* or two. It is an old book, unrevised, without even an updated bibliography, and it is difficult at this distance to determine how much, if any, of a stir it caused when it first appeared. Is there justification for publishing such a work, and would it be worth reading? There are a number or reasons for giving a *yes* answer, even an enthusiastic one, to the question. Pater scholarship has increased at an astonishing rate recently, and when half a dozen new books appeared in the space of the last few years, the decision by Cambridge

University Press to offer this work as the first volume of an ambitious program to provide translations of German texts previously unavailable in English (a dozen are already under contract) makes a good deal of sense. The timing is right, the text worth reading, and the translation by David Henry Wilson is admirable.

The book was written in another era of literary criticism. After World War II the New Criticism, with its exclusive focus on the work itself, became for a while the thinking man's substitute for the excesses of a criticism which not only tolerated, but insisted upon the importance of biographical, historical, psychological, anthropological, intentional, and other external evidences in the interpretation of literary works. History shows how short-lived that alternative was, but in 1960 Iser found himself compelled to work his way out of the perplexities of such polar alternatives. Perhaps Walter Pater, that transitional figure between Romanticism and Modernism, might, in capturing the intensity of the moment, make art and life again hold hands ('as it were, under the table,' Iser notes) and rescue interpretation through hermeneutic principles alien to the reigning critical theories of the 1950s.

Of course the resolution of the problem could not lie in a return to the old positivistic theories, and Iser's influential later writings in which the meaning of a text rests heavily upon the reader's power of imagination in filling in the plentiful gaps which characterize every text show how far from the old New Criticism the conclusions of these formative years have taken him. One has to believe that taking Pater seriously had lasting effects upon Iser's later views about reading, and that is another good reason in support of the publication, and the recommendation for those interested in contemporary literary theory to read this very readable book carefully.

Iser's handling of Pater underscores the suspicion that Pater truly anticipated many of the problems of today's criticism, and that a great many issues in twentieth-century aesthetics and in other disciplines concerned with the aesthetic life are prefigured, although hardly with prescient awareness, in his books. Pater was incapable, of course, (fortunately, his admirers may say) of thinking like Wolterstorff or Goodman about possible worlds, for instance, but the aesthetic life is lived, he insisted, in radical opposition to this real world. How then can this life be sustained? Pater's struggle with an ontology adequate to that problem in a time of conceptual transition is fascinating, and Iser's analysis is keen and perceptive.

Iser's study focuses properly on the legitimation of the autonomy of art. The controlling interpretive principle is to read Pater through his own hermeneutic guidelines: Pater interpreted through Pater. It has advantages, yet sometimes leads to a reader's frustration. Pater is not placed in the history of theorists of autonomy, which would have provided an enriching perspective. One small reference to Gautier, but no one else, and not a word about Kant in the entire book. It is not as if the work is non-historical. There are scores of references to Plato, to Kierkegaard, to Hegel. Now it may be that Pater's brand of aestheticism which guarantees his inclusion in every catalogue of 'art for art's sake' theorists is indeed so unique as to make any comparative account misguided, but if so, we need more evidence.

The study does not and cannot escape history, for art draws its life from the alternating movement of the Classic and the Romantic in history. 'History sanctions Pater's idea of art.' The treatment of art and history from Pater's point of view, with its proper emphasis on Plato and especially on Hegel is rigorous. Iser is no stranger to philosophy. His parallel treatment of cult and ritual and chthonic myth is patently less philosophical, because Pater was seeking something more than a rational system of explanation. Both history and myth are central to the understanding of art for Pater, for history demonstrates the reconciling power of art, while myth, the maker of worlds, exhibits the role that art plays in that creation. Each falters at the crucial moment of legitimation, however. Each is flawed by the strigency of its inherent restrictions. His acknowledgement of these severe limitations underscores the integrity of Pater, who was not seeking a quick fix, but wrestled with the problems of the aesthetic until his death.

That ceaseless struggle with the instabilities and contradictions of the aesthetic life makes any ultimate legitimation out of the question, and even denies the essential comforting factors which make a life in opposition to reality bearable and sustainable. Satisfying? No. Rewarding? Indeed, argues Iser, for Pater shows us how, in the aesthetic moment, longing, nostalgic attachment to the past can be transformed into an active appropriation, and how the aesthete copes with the moment when Romanticism yields to Modernism. In the language of a philosophy with which he is most comfortable, Iser honors Pater's writing as 'a substantial contribution to human self-understanding.' Than may just be

more appropriate homage than what Yeats did in trying to make Pater's prose into poetry for *The Oxford Book of Modern Verse.*

John Fisher
Temple University

Mark D. Johnston
The Spiritual Logic of Ramon Llull
Don Mills, ON and New York: Oxford University Press. Pp. xii+336.
Cdn$96.25: US$65.00. ISBN 0-19-824920-9.

Ramon Llull (1232-1316) was a Catalan nobleman from Mallorca who, after undergoing a religious conversion in 1263 or 1264, devoted the rest of his life to travelling around the Mediterranean area with the three-fold aim of founding schools to teach missionaries non-Western languages, especially Arabic, promoting crusades, and writing books to prove Christian doctrines. He had some success with the first scheme, little with the second, and questionable success with the third. Despite a lack of formal education and rather a limited, superficial knowledge of contemporary logic and philosophy, Llull wrote almost 300 books in Latin, Arabic and Catalan, some 240 of which are still extant. They include poems, religious romances, notably the *Libre de Blanquerna*, and other purely religious works, but they also include the logical works which are the subject of the present study.

Johnston's book is divided into three parts. There is a short introduction in which the reader is introduced to Llull's life, background, and the various redactions of his encyclopedic *Art* which includes his notorious *ars combinatoria*, a method for generating combinations of terms applicable to God and to being in general. Part 1 takes up Llull's early writings to 1303, including his first Summa of logic, the *Compendium Logicae Algazelis*. Part 2 considers Llull's later writings to 1316, including the *Logica Nova*. This division is justified by the presence of changes in Llull's views, and by his apparently increased knowledge of Scholastic doctrines. Johnston also provides an extensive bibliography and a full index.

The reader who expects to find logic in any normal sense in Llull's works will be disappointed. Johnston writes (2): 'As a system of argument, the *Art* of Ramon Llull is neither material nor formal in any recognized logical sense, but rather spiritual in a broadly theological sense of "speaking about God".' He emphasizes his point by a constant use of the term 'moralizing' to describe what Llull is doing. Llull seems to have been uninterested in the formal conditions of validity for arguments; he also seems to have been uninterested in the notion of logic as a series of informal strategies for persuasion, or as an examination of conceptual relationships, or as a study of the ways in which words can be used to refer or signify in different contexts. Instead, he made a series of basically Neoplatonic assumptions about the need for illumination in knowledge, the reality of universals, the hierarchical structure of being, with particulars flowing from universals, and the supreme position of God as the most universal and most perfect being in whom all others participate and from whom all others flow, apparently by a kind of necessary emanation (see, e.g., 177-8). All the logical doctrines touched on by Llull, from the Tree of Porphyry to the syllogism, are described against this metaphysical and surely often heretical background; and they are presented as ways of enunciating truths which all who wish to be saved must accept.

Johnston makes a heroic attempt to understand Llull's strange mixture of theological, metaphysical and pseudo-logical claims; and he provides copious references to both Aquinas and Peter of Spain in order to set Llull's views against a standard background. However, his presentation of Llull's doctrines does not always succeed in clarifying the issues. For instance, in his later period Llull placed great emphasis on what he called 'contradictory syllogisms', apparently regarding them as offering a new mode of demonstration. In a long Latin quotation on p. 260 (left untranslated like all the other Latin quotations), Llull offers the following as a syllogism to be established: 'The divine goodness is highest [*optima*]. Every being which exists as the highest goodness, exists and acts in the best possible way [*optime*]. God is the highest goodness; therefore God exists and acts in the best possible way.' Llull then takes each constituent proposition, negates it, and argues that since the resulting syllogism is false and erroneous, the initial syllogism was true and necessary. While Johnston had earlier warned the reader that Llull does not always construct 'formally perfect syllogisms' (258), he makes no attempt to analyze the complicated and interesting structure of such obviously non-syllogistic arguments as the one presented here. Nor does he note

that since no standard syllogism with only negative premisses can be valid, Llull's contradictory syllogisms are bound to be 'erroneous' whenever his starting point is a standard syllogism, whether valid or not. Indeed, Johnston seems to want to relate Llull's method of contradictory syllogism to Aristotle's reduction to impossibility, itself a method of impeccable formal validity. To say the least, such a comparison is unhelpful.

I had a number of difficulties in understanding both Llull and Johnston's exposition of Llull. Some of these related to Johnston's liking for such terms as 'moralizing' and 'analogy' which are used in such phrases as 'a fully analogical moralization of demonstration' (113) without any precise analysis of the constituent notions having been given. Other difficulties relate to Llull's use of such terms as 'first intention', 'demonstrate', 'supposition' and 'invention' which have both a pre-theoretical and a technical logical sense. Llull frequently seems to use them pre-theoretically, whereas Johnston has a tendency to place them in a technical context. This can lead to confusion. Finally, the translations of the passages from Catalan are sometimes misleading. On p. 17 n.29 a reference to form appears in the Catalan ('e la forma es primera entencio a esquardament de la forma') where the English (16) refers to matter ('and the form is a first intention with respect to the matter'). On p. 63 n.2 the word 'sens' ('without') in Catalan ('que Deus està per si sens loch') changes to 'in' in English, producing the heretical claim 'that God is by Himself in place' (63); and on p. 114 n.5 the affirmative antecedent of the Catalan 'si es sol, cové que sia dia' turns into the negative antecedent of the English 'if there is no sun, it should be day' (114).

The reader will find much of interest in this book, particularly concerning Llull's views on the relationship between faith and reason and his development of a strongly realist ontology. However, the flaws both in Llull's bizarre 'logic' and in Johnston's presentation of it make the book somewhat difficult to read and to understand.

E.J. Ashworth
University of Waterloo

Kenneth Kipnis and
Diana T. Meyers eds.
Political Realism and International Morality
Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1987. Pp. 271.
US$35.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8133-0457-1);
US$19.50 (paper: ISBN 0-8133-0456-3).

This collection of essays makes an interesting contribution to the growing literature on the philosophy of international relations. Most were selected from papers presented at the Tenth Plenary Conference of the American Section of the International Association for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy (AMINTAPHIL). They are grouped into three parts: Morality and the International Order, The Ethics of Nuclear Deterrence, and Nationalism and the Prospects for Peace. In addition to a preface by the editors, there is a short introduction by William Nelson and a postscript by Abraham Edel and Elizabeth Flower. Space does not permit a description of all the material in the volume, but the following list should provide a fair sample. The opening essay by Marshall Cohen contains a useful summary of some standard criticisms of realism in international relations. Russell Hardin's provocative essay 'Deterrence and Moral Theory' argues that nonconsequentialist moral theory is inadequate for appraising nuclear deterrence because, being agent-centered, it must portray the workings of the machinery of deterrence as a sequence of discrete actions by individual agents in the chain of command and is thereby incapable of morally evaluating the deterrence as one contiuous process. Thus, many problems, conceptual as well as moral, that would seem to plague the very idea of nuclear deterrence – such as how could any person, either rationally or in good conscience, order a 'counter-value,' retaliatory second strike – are held by Hardin to be 'remarkably wrong-headed or beside the point' (37). Jeff McMahan's 'The Ethics of International Intervention' contains some new arguments against the view that states enjoy absolute immunity against intervention. Avner Cohen's essay, 'Reflections on Realism in the Nuclear Age,' expands the thesis, stated so eloquently by Jonathan Schell in *Reflections*, that nuclear weapons have 'spoiled war,' and by spoiling war have made it impossible for international disputes between the major powers to be settled by war, nuclear or conventional. It thus becomes necessary to reappraise the realist thesis that the international milieu is fundamentally a state of war. Michael Doyle's 'Liberal Institutions and International Ethics' is a vigorous attempt to show

that Kant's vaticinations in *Perpetual Peace* regarding the inevitability of 'Republican,' i.e., liberal, states developing foreign policies that eschewed war, at least with regard to each other, has had a reasonable historical confirmation. But, as Doyle points out, liberal states often have had a 'conflicted and confused foreign policy toward the nonliberal world,' (202), a problem Kant did not anticipate. The preface, by the editors, the Introduction by Nelson, and the postscript, by Edel and Flower are helpful in tying together the various essays contained in the volume.

Haskell Fain
University of Wisconsin, Madison

David Lamb
Down the Slippery Slope: Arguing in Applied Ethics
New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall (for Croom Helm) 1987. Pp. ix+134. US$45.00. ISBN 0-7099-4166-8.

An argument commonly employed in policy disputes, and more generally throughout applied ethics, opposes policy options not on grounds that they are 'per se' objectionable, but on grounds that they will lead to further consequences which are. This argument, variously known as 'the thin edge of the wedge', or 'the camel's nose in the tent', or most commonly 'the slippery slope', is also commonly dismissed as fallacious. Thus 'the slippery slope argument' is now a standard item in the conventional informal fallacy curriculum, and is generally introduced as fallacious in courses and textbooks in Critical Thinking and Informal Logic. Lamb's main thesis is that 'the slippery slope argument' is more subtle, and deserves closer analysis and more respect than it now conventionally receives – indeed, that the need to articulate coherent policy in the context of rapidly advancing medical technology makes the 'slippery slope argument' essential to applied ethics.

Lamb develops his thesis in two related directions: first, that 'the slippery slope argument' is really not a single argument, but a cluster of arguments, whose assessment requires that they first be

distinguished from one another; and second, that the force of 'the slippery slope argument' depends on the context within which it is applied. He argues further that, when properly understood in context, the 'slippery slope argument' frequently presents a cogent objection to policy options and arguments made in their behalf.

Drawing on discussions by Rachels and Williams, Lamb distinguishes a 'logical version' from a 'psychological version' of the slope argument. According to the former, once the first departure has been taken from some operative standard of behavior there remains no rational ground on which to base limits on acceptable behavior. According to the latter, once a departure from some operative standard of behavior becomes accepted people will in fact go on to accept further and more questionable departures.

Since the crucial distinction seems to be between what is logically entailed by and what is empirically likely as a result of a given moral innovation, a much clearer terminology for this distinction would seem to be 'logical/empirical'. Moreover, Lamb's discussion of further distinctions among versions of the 'psychological argument' is somewhat confusing. In the most common version, an initial departure from operative standards of behavior will set the tone which leads eventually all the way down the slippery slope to 'horrible results', such as the abuses of Nazism. But Lamb's reconstruction of what he calls the 'arbitrary results' version, according to which an initial departure from operative standards will necessitate setting arbitrary limits on behavior, is much more reasonably assimilated to the 'logical version' of the slope argument than to the 'psychological version'. Lamb does not consider what is likely the most influential version of the slope argument, a version which clearly connects the 'arbitrary results' version to the 'logical version': namely the objection in legal contexts based on 'setting dangerous precedents'. Here the worry is that rationally defensible policy, whether formulated in strictly defined statements of principle or not, might become eroded, setting policy decisions adrift.

Lamb undertakes to defend both the logical and psychological versions against objections to be found in the literature. On behalf of the logical version Lamb maintains that the slope argument is best understood as a warning against the dangers of reasoning with indeterminate concepts. For Lamb the slope argument is a 'reminder that the finality of death demands the kind of discussion that can be formulated only in clear, definable and unambiguous terms' (5).

Lamb is surely right that wherever the boundaries of moral concepts are indeterminate, moral reasoning becomes problematic, even treacherous. But the problem of indeterminacy in moral reasoning is not so easy to avoid. Lamb seems to think that renewed respect for the slope argument would reinforce adherence to moral rules based on 'clear cut absolutes' (4), as if advances in medicine haven't shown the concepts of 'life' and 'death' themselves to be indeterminate. Arguably the crucial moral concepts (such as 'voluntary', 'deliberate', 'fully informed', 'consent', 'competent', and so on) are always at least potentially indeterminate. Lamb's Kantian leanings notwithstanding, indeterminacy seems to go with the territory.

On behalf of the 'psychological' version of the slope argument Lamb points out that, as an empirical argument involving risk assessment, it raises questions of the probability of a slide into moral degeneracy which can neither be dismissed easily nor settled in the abstract. This version of the slope argument is most forcefully couched in terms of negative outcomes so serious as to preclude controversy over their undesirability. Hence the frequency of reference to Nazi abuses in the 'horrible results' formulation. According to Lamb, simply to dismiss this argument on grounds that its dire predictions are uncertain, and that alternative and much more cheerful results are also possible, misses the point. The point of this version of the slope argument is to demand that the risks inherent in moral innovation be duly considered. Moreover it is impossible to assess these risks without close attention to the context within which the moral innovation is contemplated and proposed. The slope argument then does a considerable service in that it opens the way to these essential deliberations.

Lamb is surely right that the risks of a given innovation leading to moral degeneration (or to some other bad end like abusive accumulation of political power) depends not only on the nature of the innovation but also on the context within which it is contemplated and proposed, (as does the likelihood and viability of a given proposal for innovation). This is probably the most valuable point in Lamb's argument, as it applies generally to the assessment of arguments of the sort under consideration here. Simply to dismiss such an argument as inconclusive, or worse yet fallacious, without giving due consideration to the specific context and issue within which it is offered, does a serious disservice not only to the argument but to the context and issue as well. The teetotaling aunt's finger-wagging warning to her college-age nephew about his social drinking, 'Do you want to

end up like that homeless wino?', is probably a case of fallacious slippery slope reasoning. But the same challenge posed by the wife of a recovering alcoholic who in one week has been mugged, fired, evicted, and notified of a tax audit, and who is now contemplating his first drink in five years, is probably pretty decent advice.

But by the same token the question of whether or not experimental work in genetic engineering or the liberalization of attitudes and policy regarding euthanasia is likely to lead to abuses similar to those of Nazism raises difficult questions about the extent to which analogies between Germany after WWI and present-day societies hold up. And these questions lead to equally vexing ones about the extent to which the historical and causal conditions of the rise of Nazism are understood.

This exposes one of the most deeply problematic aspects of the 'psychological version' of the slope argument – namely that it trades essentially in the indeterminate – and at the same time exposes the most serious problem in Lamb's analysis – namely how to reconcile his respect for such a problematic argument with his Kantian leanings.

On the positive side, the book is reasonably thorough and up to date with both philosophical literature and relevant cases. And its main points, that the variety of argument lumped together under the 'slippery slope' label and the context-dependence of many such arguments each merit close analysis, are surely worth making as an antidote to oversimplification in argument assessment. On the other hand there is very little new or original insight here, and the book wastes a valuable opportunity to more deeply explore and clarify the problematic aspects and conditions of this kind of reasoning in applied ethics.

Joel Rudinow
Sonoma State University

David Lamb, Teifion Davies, and Marie Roberts, eds.
Explorations in Medicine, Vol. 1
Brookfield, VT: Gower Publishing Co., Ltd. 1987. Pp. 222. US$45.00. ISBN 0-566-05346-2.

The eleven essays comprising this book are: 'Criteria for morally acceptable research with human subjects' by Charles J. Dougherty, 'Justice and genetic engineering' by George J. Agich, 'Mechanism and holism in physical medicine' and 'Theories in physical and medical sciences' by E. K. Ledermann, 'Mental Illness' and giving good reason' by Bob Brecher, 'Reproductive technology and contemporary values' by Ruth Chadwick, 'Is the medical establishment a major threat to health?' by Ann Slack, 'Morality and genetic engineering' by Heather Milne, 'The need for a philosophy of health' and 'What is health? Part II' by David Seedhouse, and 'Down the slippery slope' by David Lamb.

For Dougherty the crucial moral problem in conducting medical research using human subjects is the possibility of exploiting those subjects for the benefit of others. The warrant for the appreciable risks, grounded in the ignorance presupposed by the experiment itself, is the benefits of medical care and cure.

Dividing the tests for the moral suitability of medical research into three broad categories: prior restraints on the research proposal, constraints on the subject-research relationship, and post-experiment constraints, Dougherty considers ten criteria ranging from 'conscionability' (which excludes 'morally outrageous' experiments that make death or impairment likely) to 'researcher authenticity' (which requires sincere intent to respect the human rights and dignity of the human subjects) to 'risk follow-up' (a public mechanism for treating and compensating injured human subjects). His thoughtful guidelines are to be employed reasonably and responsibly.

Agich, in a probing essay, considers three features of genetic technology (long-range consequences, predictive uncertainty, and reductive character) in relation to an attempt to justify genetic intervention in Rawlsian terms. He underscores the troublesome problems that beset an application of such an ideal of justice to genetic engineering. Focussing on phenotypes he hints that traditional, or Rawlsian justice would encounter problems in being applied to the prevention of genetic diseases, ameliorating their effects, and curing such

diseases. A Rawlsian view would apparently forbid 'doing nothing' in relation to these disorders.

In his two essays Ledermann argues for a holistic rather than a mechanistic approach, while admitting that the mechanistic approach has achieved some success. Mechanism by ignoring 'bodily wholeness' has been unable to cure degenerative diseases of the heart and other organs. The holistic perspective acknowledges that the parts of the body are internally related and recognizes that purpose accounts for the integration of human living.

In his second essay Ledermann offers cogent objections to Popper's determinist theories of body and mind and indicates inadequacies in Popper's falsifiability criterion. The falsifiability requirement fails in three ways: (1) it does not accord with current bodily medical practice that is founded upon an untestable cell theory, (2) it overlooks the reality that assertions derived from that cell theory do actually direct medical research, and (3) it assumes (contrary to actual medical practice) that medical scientists are not satisfied with statistical confirmation. Popper errs in supposing that medical science deals with a reality comparable to that considered in astronomy. Rather, medical science deals with diseases that are constructs for help in understanding and curing patients.

Undertaking a far more restricted task Brecher shows that Champlin's arguments against Szasz's view that mental illness is fraud cannot make a convincing distinction between those with mental illness and those without such illness.

Chadwick's essay discloses the values underlying 'reproductive technology' especially as these are implied in the Warnock Report. She considers various values in relation to the new technology and hints that a preference-utilitarianism rather than a deontological approach could offer a more adequate account.

In agreement with Illich's central thesis in *Limits to Medicine* Slack argues that the medical establishment is a major threat to health and that a fundamental change in values is needed.

Milne in her essay argues that there is no valid distinction between negative and positive genetic engineering. Neither utilitarianism nor a rights view can make the necessary and reliable distinction. As long as the interests of the future child are used as the criterion of defectiveness and desirability both negative and positive engineering are morally defensible practices.

In his two essays Seedhouse explores a core meaning of 'health'. At its core health requires 'the creation of the conditions necessary

for the achievement of human potential', and, on his view, all approaches to health anticipate the removal of 'impediments' obstructing this realization.

In the final essay, David Lamb, one of the three editors, explores in a significant manner what the slippery slope type of argument means in relation to 'the sanctity of life', 'beneficient euthanasia', 'voluntary euthanasia', 'cost benefit arguments', and the 'voluntary termination of pregnancy'. Essentially Lamb is responding to criticisms of this argument proposed by those opposed to the sanctity of life, those advocating beneficient or voluntary euthanasia, and those supporting cost benefit arguments for withholding treatment. Neither those who favor abortion nor those who oppose abortion can properly appeal to the slippery slope argument. The reason is that the slope argument maintains there is no significant event which marks the beginning of life and, hence, no downhill slide. The slope argument only applies where the foetus is considered a human being (219). However, the onus of justification must be placed on the shoulders of those who wish to accelerate death.

There is unfortunately more than one serious defect in the arrangement or layout used in this book. One complete essay (which begins on page 152) is differently organized from the other essays and the title of this essay does not appear in the table of contents. This irregularity in format together with dozens of typographical errors (or typesetting mistakes) suggests that the book is very poorly edited.

What would improve this and future volumes? A succinct and interesting introduction, an epilogue drawing together coherently the main ideas or arguments advanced in the essays, a bibliography of works cited, and an index of topics and persons could all be added. With these additions and the omission of certain sections of Seedhouse's essays (including diagrams and charts, pages 163-5, 195-6), a careful editing would leave the book approximately the same length and make it a highly valued addition to the scholar's bookshelf.

John Howie
Southern Illinois University, Carbondale

Alphonso Lingis
Phenomenological Explanations
Norwall, MA: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers
1987. Pp. x+112.
US$29.90. ISBN 90-247-3333-2.

The author of *Phenomenological Explanations* is one of the better-known expositors of Euro-American philosophy who himself displays a certain contrariety of style in approach. On the one side, he is a sober, perhaps overly serious, scholar of phenomenology; on the other, a somewhat wild, imaginative thinker, as in his own work, *Excesses* (SUNY Press). Both of these tendencies emerge in the present work.

The focal figures are Husserl and Merleau-Ponty but situated within a context which also refers to Heidegger, Sartre, Levinas, and Lacan. The overall framework of the book and the critical, expository work on Husserl and Merleau-Ponty display the first side of the Lingis style. This book is not for beginners; it is for careful readers of the phenomenological tradition and, for the latter, the work may be seen as the mature interpretation of both focal thinkers and of the relation between earlier transcendental and later existential phenomenology.

Lingis shows clearly how Husserl, beginning within the transcendental traditions of Modern philosophy, transforms these but remains caught within the overall concept of a Modern metaphysics of objects. But Lingis rightly and deftly shows how intentionality already points to its existential interpretations by seeing 'mind' as only corporeal. It is a 'Mind's Body' which emerges as the unique implication of even Husserlian phenomenology.

Lingis then goes on to show how Merleau-Ponty takes this insight and transforms it into a full-blown reinterpretation of perception as a kind of bodily action. What was implicit and epistemologized in Husserl becomes explicit and ontologized in Merleau-Ponty. And while none of this is new or radical as an interpretation, it is very well done within the short scope of the book. However, once that job is done, Lingis goes on to reveal his other side: the side which turns both Husserl and Merleau-Ponty in a much 'wilder' direction, with the help of Lacan and Levinas in particular. If, in effect, phenomenology in its Husserlian and Pontian forms recuperates perception and a sense of the richness of things, Lacan turns what remains a largely epistemological and ontological set of descriptions into an eroticized description of human relations. While restrained and isolated within

the text, the 'enrichment' of Lacan is taken by Lingis to be that of seeing the eye as phallic organ, thus interjecting Freud in Lacanian form into Lingis's reading of phenomenology.

Fortunately, this digression does not last, and Lingis ends with a second 'enrichment' via Levinas, who is set in a Kantian context as introducing the telos of perception as the perception of an ethical other. So, in the end, the aim of phenomenology becomes a kind of perceptual ethic – not a bad place to end.

Don Ihde
SUNY at Stony Brook

Gary Smith, ed.
On Walter Benjamin: Critical Essays and Recollections
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1988.
Pp. vii+400. US$25.00. ISBN 0-262-19268-3.

This book contains twelve critical essays covering various themes in Benjamin's works and five shorter pieces by authors who knew Benjamin personally.

Although the editor claims that this book 'reflects the contexts of Benjamin criticism on the Continent' (vii) we must note here that the most recent article (Menninghaus) dates back to 1983. Indeed, a substantial part of the critical literature was written in the last five years. Having said this, however, it must be granted that the editor did choose some representative pieces which can be said to have influenced the debates in subsequent years.

The 'critical essays' are arranged chronologically, while the 'recollections' seem to be ordered from those who knew B well (T.W. Adorno and Ernst Bloch) to those who knew him near the end of his life (Hans Sahl, Jean Selz and Pierre Klossowski). For the purpose of this review I will not focus on the biographical anecdotes found in the 'recollections' section.

T.W. Adorno's opening essay, 'Introduction to B's *Schriften*' (1955), appears to take a somewhat defensive stand (probably because it was meant to justify an extensive edition of B's works to a readership not

yet familiar with B). Adorno stresses the philosophical side of B while accounting for his own indebtedness to his thought. In this sense Adorno's essay serves as a good introduction to this collection.

Peter Szondi's essay 'W.B.'s City Portraits' illuminates important insights into B's theory of experience. Szondi demonstrates the interdependence between B's city portraits (Naples, Moscow, etc.) and the images in *Berliner Kindheit.* Via Proust's use of memory, Szondi focusses on B's use of metaphor, name, distance and past for the native-as-foreigner.

'Propaedeutics of Profane Illumination' by Hermann Schweppenhäuser originally appeared as the introduction to B's *Über Haschisch.* Schweppenhäuser points to the correspondence between B's hashish experiments (profane illumination) and some of his philosophical insights concerning imagination, cognition and experience. B is said to have viewed profane illumination as experientially close to the dialectical methodology of breaking down the subject-object barrier and thus, in Hegelian fashion, getting ' "inside things" in order to transcend them' (36).

Gershom Scholem, in 'W.B. and His Angel,' interprets the theological/metaphysical motifs in B's enigmatic piece 'Angesilaus Santander' thereby shedding light on the 'angel of history' figure in the later 'Theses'. That Scholem reads B's philosophy of history in a decidedly anti-historical materialist manner is well documented (see Habermas and Meyer – this volume).

Jürgen Habermas' essay 'W.B.: Consciousness-Raising or Rescuing Critique' has been reprinted so often (like Scholem's, for that matter) that one may assume that it has by now become a classic. Habermas gives a sober analysis of B's subject of history/subject of art (in his theory of experience) in terms of *rettende* critique over ideology critique.

Charles Rosen's essay 'The Ruins of W.B.' takes as its starting point the position that 'by the ruin of his career he ensured the permanence of his work' (136), a position which runs contrary to analyses which highlight the 'fate' of B's works at the hands of the 'little hunchback'. Rosen's assertion thereby opens up the possibility for a strong argument for B's strategic and intentional project. From this position Rosen justifies a sympathetic reading of B's early work.

Hans Robert Jauss' 'Reflections on the Chapter "Modernity" in B's Baudelaire Fragments' could be characterized as more caustic than reflective. Jauss trys to save Baudelaire from B's apparently contradictory interpretation. It is no secret that Reception theorists have

their problems with dialectical materialism. What B sees as a contradiction in Baudelaire (natural correspondences and repudiation of nature) is thrown back onto B's interpretation in order to save Baudelaire and reintroduce the affirmative 'plus' side of dominating nature.

I was pleasantly surprised to see Hans Meyer's essay, 'W.B. and Franz Kafka: Report on a Constellation,' included among the contributions. Meyer stresses, correctly I believe, the degree to which B identified with the writer Kafka and shows that this had significant ramifications on his friendships with Adorno, Scholem and Brecht. Any subsequent interpreter must take B's fascination with Kafka into account lest s/he fall into the old trap of underlining one pole of this Marxist-Cabalist to the detriment of the other.

'W.B.: From Rupture to Shipwreck' by Pierre Missac is the one French voice in the 'critical essays' section (which is hardly enough to merit the claim that this volume reflects the views on the Continent, not to mention the unrepresented growing Italian reception). Missac's contribution, moreover, is more a review of French translations than a critical assessment of B's work. Although Missac fixes on contentious terminology (contentious because of difficulties in translation) his final recommendation is to take a stand against 'the tide of exegesis.'

Irving Wohlfarth's essay 'Resentment Begins at Home: Nietzsche, B and the University' represents a good case against Missac's exegesis-phobia. Wohlfarth gives a Benjaminian reading (commentary-critique) of a little known piece by B (written in response to the resentful figures who rejected his *Habilitations* thesis at the University of Frankfurt). From this exegetical reading arises a clear account of the parallels and contrasts in B and Nietzsche's philosophy of history.

Following in Adorno's footsteps (as editor in charge of B's collected papers) is Rolf Tiedemann's 'Dialectics at a Standstill: Approaches to the *Passagen-Werk*.' Because it was originally written as an introduction to B's *Gesammelte Schriften*, the newcomer to B's work would fare well by concentrating on this and Adorno's contribution first.

The last of the critical essays is Winfried Menninghaus: 'W.B.'s Theory of Myth.' Menninghaus, in typical Benjaminian fashion, universalizes the particular: he uses B's notion of myth to illuminate a comprehensive portrait of his work (including B's notion of myth against the context of other historical types).

The editor's preface is not clear in answering the question: 'why this particular collection at this time.' He apparently did not see it

as his purpose to include essays which are especially difficult to acquire. This is unfortunate. Two of the twelve essays were originally written in English (Rosen and Wohlfarth) and three others are otherwise easily available from earlier English editions (Szondi, Scholem and Habermas). This volume does, however, serve as a good introductory text on B (even though it is debatable whether we need yet another introduction to B only a few years prior to the hundredth anniversary of his birth). The bibliography includes a good selection of secondary sources in English. References in German only include full-scale books.

Lori Turner
(Social and Political Thought)
York University

Eric Voegelin
In Search of Order
Toronto: Scholarly Book Services; Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press 1987. Pp. 120.
Cdn$22.50: US$14.95. ISBN 0-8071-1414-6.

This is the fifth and last volume of Voegelin's *Order and History*. The first volume was published in 1956. At that time Voegelin set himself the task of developing a philosophical inquiry that would be both diagnostic and therapeutic and that would serve as a remedy 'against the disorder of the time' (xiv). He began with the claim that 'Every society is burdened with the task, under its concrete conditions, of creating an order that will endow the fact of its existence with meaning in terms of ends divine and human' (ix). In the first volume, he identified five types of order and proposed to treat these in six volumes. The first three volumes appeared on schedule as *Israel and Revelation, The World of the Polis*, and *Plato and Aristotle*. At the beginning of the fourth volume, *The Ecumenic Age*, Voegelin revised the plan. 'The conception was untenable because it had not taken proper account of the important lines of meaning in history that did not run along lines of time' (2). Volume Four presents 'the genesis of the

ecumenic problem and its complications' (56). The fifth volume was to 'study the contemporary problems which have motivated the search for order in history' (58).

Voegelin died on January 19, 1985, and so Volume Five is incomplete. In the Forward, Lissy Voegelin says, 'he let me know that he knew very well that these pages are the key to all his other works.' The pages that Voegelin wrote are augmented with an Introduction by Ellis Sandoz and an Epilogue by Jurgen Gebhardt. Both suggest that the unfinished nature of the work is appropriate because Voegelin viewed the human search for order as open-ended.

Volume Five contains two chapters. The first is 'The Beginning of the Beginning'. Here Voegelin argues that we must begin in the middle which he terms 'the complex of consciousness-reality-language' (16). This complex includes 'a consciousness with two structural meanings, to be distinguished as intentionality and luminosity' and 'a reality with two structural meanings, to be distinguished as the thing-reality and the It-reality' (16). In order to meditate on this complex of structures, Voegelin begins with Genesis I as the story that 'emerges as the symbolism that will express the awareness of the divine-human movement and countermovement in the quest for truth' (24). Voegelin suggests that this quest for truth is 'a movement of resistance to the prevalent disorder' (25). But, this resistance must not be deformative. It must not separate the moment of human narrative in the story from the story as emerging from the It-reality. 'The story that opens in Genesis I must not be construed hypostatically as a narrative told either by a revelatory God or by an intelligently imaginative human being. It is both, because it is neither the one nor the other' (26). Like all societies, our society must resist disorder. Our problem, according to Voegelin, is that much of our recent symbolism is deformative resistance. In order to rescue our symbols, and our ourselves, Voeglin suggests that we must develop a reflective distance. We must remember acts of oblivion in order to identify them as such.

Chapter 2, 'Reflective Distance vs. Reflective Identity', proposes to further explain the need for this distance. Much of this chapter is a meditation on Hegel as a deformative thinker. 'It is Hegel's irreversible achievement to have thoroughly understood the dominant deformation of symbols; it is Hegel's grandiose failure to have attempted a solution by fusing the It-reality and the thing-reality into the new symbolism of the *Sein*, a subject that unfolds its substance in the historical process 'dialectically' until it reaches its eschaton' (64).

Voegelin sees in Hegel the philosopher who understood that 'God' had become a senseless sound. He sets as his own task the restoration of 'some sense to sounds that have become senseless' (70). Voegelin approaches this task in two sections both of which focus on remembering: 'Hesiod's Mnemosyne' and 'Remembrance of Reality'. In each case, the focus is on restoring to the symbol 'god' a tension and a mystery. The last section remains unfinished. His final approved words (the editors add one paragraph found on his desk) read: 'No "principles", or "absolutes", or "doctrines" can be extracted from this tensional complex; the quest for truth, as an event of participation in the process, can do no more than explore the structures in the divine mystery of the complex reality and, through the analysis of the experienced responses to the tensional pulls, arrive at some clarity about its own function in the drama in which it participates' (106).

Voegelin's final work, like his other works, urges us to see ourselves as participants in an on-going quest for truth, to leave dogmatism behind, and to be open to 'experienced ultimacy' (107).

Patricia Altenbernd Johnson
University of Dayton

Anthony Wilden
The Rules Are No Game:
The Strategy of Communication
New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall
1987. Pp. xvi+432.
US$25.00. ISBN 0-7100-9868-5.

Terrible carnage in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was due to imperialism as geopolitical order and as psychological habit. The imperious mentality, associated with English monarchism and then American jingoism, envisioned primitive peoples as scarcely human savages to be put down violently by arms, preferably those of third parties. The heavy-handedness of militarism went hand in hand with male supremacy. Rape, the quintessential threat of violence against women, keeps them in their place in a chauvinistic world ruled by

the old-boy network. The old boys are white; therefore civilization is white, Western, masculine, and martial. The non-white majority of the world, in this worldview, are weaker, less civilized, and less worthy. The self-reinforcing image of the oppressor as benefactor is fueled by early education, popular culture, and ordinary language. Thus, the English 'public school', the Hollywood portrayal of women, and the common coin of our jokes, advertising, and news reports bespeak unquestioned presuppositions of imperialism, militarism, racism, and sexism. This mind-set is not just blind to the humanity of others; it also closes the door on powers of the soul that should be accessible to a fully human being. We are brought up to live in mental one-dimensionality, relying on a mechanical logic which separates subject from object, subject from subject, and intellect from heart. Profound self-denial is involved in the proud self-affirmation produced by the imperious mentality. That other half of us which remains to be discovered and integrated into the self is inhabited by nondiscursive imagination, affective understanding, and inter-subjective caring. Some of these resources have been associated with the feminine, the non-Western, or the nonrational, yet ironically they have been suppressed on those very grounds.

We can lay bare the principles of operation in such suppression and oppression. Thus, probing analysis accompanied by confirming documentation will expose the hydra-headed communication of such a worldview. Once we have understood its strategy of communication, we are ready to communicate our understanding so that we can correct the world by changing the worldview. A revolution in conception of the world revolutionizes the world. Let our strategy, then, for humanizing the world be the critical teaching of how the world heretofore has operated against humanity. Such teaching is itself an art of communication. It should make use not only of hardcore logical discourse but also of the other dimension of the metaphorical, visual, and personal.

This is the best I can do for Anthony Wilden in explaining the meaning of his puzzling and suggestive book. His analysis of the state of the world is on the whole accurate. His sense of injustice is appropriate. His perception of problems is keen. His overall plan is admirable. But the book is a failure.

It relies on the montage method of advancing its insights. Thus, sections and materials are juxtaposed, lacking connectedness, so that the reader has to bridge the gaps. Alas, this reader usually remained

in the gaps. Each chapter, no matter how fascinating or learned, left the question *et alors*? Repeatedly my head nodded, 'yes, that is a good point,' but accumulation of good points does not make a theory, a treatise, or even a strategy.

Several kinds of disconnected book are present here. It begins with a moving personal account of Wilden's boyhood in wartime England. I wish the whole book had been written from that direct point of view instead of whirling off into language theory, anthropology, cinematics, heraldry, and a dozen other forms of scholarly discipline. A striking but short section follows on twentieth-century war. This is promising as polemology but unfortunately it too breaks off, leaving us as survivors stuck with a piece of undigested history. The rest of the book strangely enough does not get back to making anything explicit with this opening salvo. As an 'Envoi' (read: appendix) a curious report is stuck in about a videotape the author produced on Hollywood versions of women in the chorus line. You can imagine the message is sexual exploitation. But in writing the praise of his own visual efforts, which must remain invisible to the reader, Wilden is not really adducing evidence, nor does he point out what we are to do about sexist attitudes.

The bulk of the text is an articulation of rules. These are rules of thumb, guiding principles, or operative visions that reign in the corrupt world but that may be straightened out to redeem the world. Yet the rules come raining down from every corner, watch-repairing to war-making. They are not linked as theory or ordered as strategy. These are not so much rules as a thematic conceit for attaching the looseness of Wilden's many interests.

The book is loaded with epigraphs, quotations, illustrations, definitions, allusions, charts, lists, bibliographies, and indices. Wilden proves that *un embarras de richesses* when not connected and controlled overloads the attention. There are nuggets. 'As the women say: "Pornography is the theory, rape is the practice" ' (27). While this line stands alone as a paragraph in Wilden's text, it calls for a chapter, since pornography is arguably a practice alternative to rape. 'One hundred tellings are not so good as one seeing' (Chinese proverb, 122). But I wish Wilden had shown less and argued more. Instead of a *tour de force*, Wilden has given us a forced march through unharvested fields. This is not a theory of communication but a communicative act – clever, erudite, pungent. It is a display, not a demonstration.

While learned, the book's contribution to communication studies is murky. While radical, its contribution to changing the world is ineffectual. While thoughtful, its contribution to philosophy is imperceptible. In sum, *The Rules Are No Game* is a perfect mishmash.

Robert Ginsberg
Pennsylvania State University
Delaware County Campus

the review of
metaphysics
a philosophical quarterly

MARCH 1989 | **VOL. XLII, No. 3** | **ISSUE No. 167** | **$9.00**

Individual Subscriptions $23.00 Institutional Subscription $35.00 Student/Retired Subscriptions $12.00

Jude P. Dougherty, Editor
The Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C. 20064

A JOURNAL from ACADEMIC PRINTING AND PUBLISHING

MAN AND NATURE / L'HOMME ET LA NATURE

The yearbook of the Canadian Society for Eighteenth-Century Studies

Man and Nature / L'Homme et la Nature consists of selected papers from the annual meetings of the Society. The contents are interdisciplinary in character, dealing with the art, literature, theatre, music and philosophy, and the economic, political, and social life of the period. Contributions are in both English and French. The contributors represent both the leading scholars in Canada on the eighteenth century and distinguished international guest contributors. The volumes differ in size and are priced accordingly. Individual volumes may be purchased as books, or a series subscription ordered on a standing basis. The issues are published in paperback, except as noted below. Please pass this flyer on to your Library Acquisitions Department.

Volume VIII	(1989)	Nicholas Hudson and Rosena Davison, eds.			
		Est. 224 pp	ISBN 0-920980-43-0	paperbound	$22.95
Volume VII	(1988)	Marie-Laure Girou-Swiderski and John Hare, eds.			
		Est. 224 pp	ISBN 0-920980-42-2	paperbound	$22.95
Volume VI	(1987)	Kenneth W. Graham and Neal Johnson, eds.			
30 b/w illustrations		282 pp	ISBN 0-920980-21-X	paperbound	$26.95
Volume V	(1986)	Richard A. Lebrun and E.T. Annandale, eds.			
12 b/w illustrations		224 pp	ISBN 0-920980-13-9	paperbound	$22.95
Volume IV	(1985)	David H. Jory and Charles Stewart-Robertson, eds.			
5 b/w illustrations		208pp	ISBN 0-920980-12-0	paperbound	$18.95
Volume III	(1984)	Robert James Merrett, ed.			
1 b/w illustration		174pp	ISBN 0-920980-04-X	**clothbound**	$26.95
			ISBN 0-920980-05-8	paperbound	$16.95
Volume II	(1983)	Roger L. Emerson, William Kinsley, and Walter Moser, eds.			
		156pp	ISBN 0-920980-36-8	paperbound	$15.95

PLEASE RETURN FORM TO:

☎ (403) 435-5898

Academic Printing and Publishing
P.O.Box 4834, Edmonton, Alberta
CANADA T6E 5G7

Please send me:

.... copies Vol VIII @ $22.95 $ .....
.... copies Vol VII @ $26.95 $ .....
.... copies Vol VI @ $22.95 $ .....
.... copies Vol V @ $18.95 $ .....

Subtotal $ .....

.... copies Vol IV @ $22.95 $ .....
.... copies Vol III @ $26.95 $ .....
.... copies Vol III @ $16.95 $ .....
.... copies Vol II @ $15.95 $ .....

Subtotal $ ..... + ... = $ .....

Payment with orders please.

Please pay total in **US dollars.** **TOTAL PAYABLE:** US$ _____

NAME: .....

ADDRESS: .....

.....

.....

VOLUME VI (1987) Edited by Kenneth W. Graham and Neal Johnson

Roland Mortier	Diderot entre les 'Têtes Froides' et les 'Enthousiastes'
F.M. Wilkshire	'Cher et illustre Roscius' - David Garrick's Influence on the Dramatic Theories of Diderot
Aubrey Rosenberg	The Role of Providence in Rousseau's Revelation on the Road to Vincennes
Krystyna Piechura	La Valeur sémantique du Nord, du Midi, de l'Orient, et de l'Occident chez Voltaire
Nathan Brett	Hume: Justice as Property
Patricia Brückmann	An Early Hint of Miss Bridget's Affairs, with a Parallel Note on Mr. Allworthy
Donald W. Nichol	'So proper for that constant pocket use': Posthumous Editions of Pope's*Works* (1751-1754)
Howard Erskine-Hill	The Poet and Affairs of State in Johnson's *Lives of the Poets*
Douglas Long	Bentham as Revolutionary Social Scientist
Gary Kelly	Revolution, Reaction and the Expropriation of Popular Culture: Hannah More's *Cheap Repository*
Jay MacPherson	*The Magic Flute* and Viennese Opinion
E. Roger Clark	Le Siècle des Lumières face à la torture
Henri Mydlarski	Les Moralistes et la Revolution
Monique Moser-Verrey	L'Émergence de la notion d'interêt dans l'esthétique des Lumières
Marie-France Silver	L'Étrange don du Marquis de Sade à la Revolution et à l'Empire: son théâtre
James A. Leith	Planning Space for the Masses in France 1789-1799

VOLUME V (1986) Edited by Richard A. Lebrun and E.T. Annandale

Alexandre Amprimoz	Le Roman de XVIIIe siècle: Signification de l'encadrement
Georges-L. Bérubé	A la recherche du malade dans le *Mariage de Figaro*: quel(s) sens faut-il donner à l'objet-fauteuil?
David Blewett	Robinson Crusoe, Friday, and the Noble Savage: The Illustrations of the Rescue of Friday in the Eighteenth Century
J.M. Bumstead	The 'Canada-Guadeloupe' Debate and the Origins of the Grenville Programme for America
Rosena Davison	Diderot vu par ses contemporains Italiens
Linwood R. Delong	Reflections on a Remarkable Performance of *Hamlet*: A Re-examination of the *Hamlet* Scene in Goethe's *Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre*
Kenneth W. Graham	Cinderella or Bluebeard: The Double Plot of *Evelina*
Helen Liebel-Weckowicz	Enlightened Despotism and the Resistance to Arbitrary Taxation in Southwestern Germany after the Seven Years' War
Helen O. Molitor	Modern Isms and the Lovejovian Universe
H. Mydlarski	Du moraliste classique au moraliste des Lumières ou la naissance des sciences humaines
Domenico Pietropaolo	Dante's Concept of Nobility and the Eighteenth-Century Tuscan Aristocracy: An Unknown Study of the *Convivio*
Timothy Pope	The German Enlightenment: *Literaturgeschichte* or *Theologiegeschichte*?
Gerald Seaman	An Outline of Eighteenth-Century Russian Music
David Trott	Du jeu masqué aux *Jeux de l'amour et du hasard*: l'évolution du spectacle à l'italienne en France au XVIIIe siècle
Sante A. Viselli	Le Troglodyte: image fictive du Sauvage canadien
F.M. Wilkshire	Lillo and More in France: English Influences on the Dramatic Theory of Diderot

VOLUME IV (1985) Edited by David H. Jory and Charles Stewart Robertson

Elizabeth Haigh	Vital Forces and Vital Laws in Eighteenth-Century French Physiology
John P. Wright	Matter, Mind, and Active Principles in Mid-Eighteenth- Century British Physiology
Paul B. Wood	Thomas Reid's Critique of Joseph Priestley: Context and Chronology
Knud Haakonssen	Natural Law and the Scottish Enlightenment
Melvin Delgarno	Reid and the Rights of Man
Vivian Cameron	Women, Allegory, and the French Revolution: The Case of Armed Liberty
John Stephen Martin	The Rhetoric of Grace in Jonathan Edwards' Personal Narrative
Laurent Lavoie	La vie intellectuelle et les activités culturelles à la Forteresse de Louisbourg 1713-1758
John Mackay	The Art of Medicine in Pre-Loyalist New Brunswick
David R. Farrell	'To Keep Them in Proper Subjection': Jeffrey Amherst and the Indians
Hans-Günther Schwarz	Shakespeare and Eighteenth-Century German Politics
Gary Kelly	'This Pestiferous Reading': The Social Basis of Reaction against the Novel in Late Eighteenth-Century and Early Nineteenth-Century Britain

PHILOSOPHY DOCUMENTATION CENTER

Mailing Lists

STANDARD LISTS — U.S. & Canada

The Standard Lists include 1) labels for 10,200 philosophers, price $195; 2) labels of philosophers by specialty, e.g., 1,185 philosophers specializing in aesthetics, price $45; and 3) labels for philosophy departments, e.g., all 2,100 departments, price $65; 125 departments with PhD majors, price $25, etc.

CUSTOMIZED LISTS

Custom lists of philosophers or philosophy departments can be provided for a base charge of $25 plus $20 per 1,000 labels. In addition to the standard specialties, you can request mailing labels of philosophers who are interested in any area of philosophy *or* you can request labels of all philosophers teaching in PhD and/or MA departments. Almost any combination is possible. For example, labels for philosophers in PhD departments specializing in ethics can be provided.

GUARANTEE — 100% Deliverable

The Philosophy Documentation Center will refund $.50 for each piece that was undeliverable due to an incorrect name or address. We must receive undeliverable pieces within 60 days after the labels are shipped to you.

GUARANTEE — Lowest Cost

The PDC guarantees that its prices for mailing lists are the lowest available. You can rent the List of U.S. and Canadian Philosophers for less than $20 per 1,000. Our other lists are also competitively priced.

GEOGRAPHICAL SELECTIONS — Free

All lists are generated in ZIP code order. You can request labels by state or province (up to ten states or provinces). There is no extra charge for this service.

CODING OF LISTS — Free

All lists can be run with a ten character code, which is printed on the right side of line one. There is no charge for this service.

COUNTS

Computer searches of the database to obtain counts for customized lists cost $25 each. This computer time charge is waived if you purchase a set of labels.

TYPES OF LABELS

Four-up Cheshire labels are standard and are included in the prices that are given. Add 10% to the prices for three-up self-adhesive labels.

TIME REQUIRED

Orders are usually shipped the next day. However, we guarantee that your order will be shipped within five working days.

SHIPPING & HANDLING

Orders within the U.S. are shipped U.P.S. at a cost of $5 per list. The charge for special mailing services such as overnight delivery is $20. Orders shipped outside the U.S. are sent via the best available carrier.

Shipping and handling charges will be waived if orders are prepaid and do not require special mailing services.

RENTAL AGREEMENT

All mailing lists are available for one-time rental use. Placement of orders with the Philosophy Documentation Center constitutes the renter's agreement not to 1) reuse the lists, 2) photocopy the lists for reuse, 3) allow anyone else to use the lists or part thereof, and 4) place the lists into a database for any purpose whatsoever.

COPYRIGHT

WRITE OR CALL

To order labels or for further information, please contact Mrs. Cindy Richards, Philosophy Documentation Center, Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, Ohio 43403-0189 U.S.A.; (800) 444-2419 *or* outside the U.S.A. (419) 372-2419.

Editors' Note

The anglophone editors of

Canadian Philosophical Reviews
Revue Canadienne de Comptes rendus en Philosophie

are pleased to announce the acquisition of an address for **electronic mail** on the University of Alberta's mainframe computer.

Correspondents and contributors are encouraged to use the address for replying to invitations, submissions of reviews and any other messages.

The E-mail address of CPR/RCCP is

CPRS@UALTAMTS.BITNET

Any institution's computing services department will be able to advise on how to access the address.

R. Burch
R.A. Shiner