

# Canadian Philosophical Reviews Revue Canadienne de Comptes rendus en Philosophie

## Editor • Directeur

*Roger A. Shiner*  
Department of Philosophy  
University of Alberta  
Edmonton, Alberta  
Canada T6G 2E5

As a rule, C.P.R. publishes only invited reviews. However, we will consider for publication submitted reviews of new books in philosophy and related areas. Reviews must be a maximum of 1000 words and will be accepted in either French or English.

En général, R.C.C.P. ne publie que les comptes rendus qui sont explicitement invitées. Néanmoins, nous prendrions en considération la publication de comptes rendus soumis, si les auteurs traitent de livres philosophiques (ou de livres sur un sujet apparenté) qui viennent de paraître. Les comptes rendus devraient être de 1000 mots au maximum, et le manuscrit rédigé en français ou en anglais.

## Subscription prices for a volume of twelve issues

<i>Institutions</i>	<i>Individuals</i>	<i>Students</i>
\$88 (Canadian)	\$44 (Canadian)	\$32 (Canadian)
US\$82 or \$98 Cdn (Foreign)	US\$45 or \$54 Cdn (Foreign)	US\$28 or \$42 Cdn (Foreign)

## Prix de l'abonnement à un volume de douze numéros

<i>Institutions</i>	<i>Individus</i>	<i>Etudiants</i>
\$88 (Canadian)	\$44 (Canadian)	\$32 (Canadian)
US\$82 or \$98 Cdn (Foreign)	US\$45 or \$54 Cdn (Foreign)	US\$28 or \$42 Cdn (Foreign)

Subscriptions should be sent to the publisher:  
Les abonnements peuvent être pris chez l'éditeur:

## Academic Printing & Publishing

P.O. Box 4834, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada  
T6E 5G7

Second Class Mail Registration No. 5550

ISSN 0228-491X  
c 1990 Academic Printing & Publishing

Table of Contents · Table des matières

<b>William P. Alston, <i>Divine Nature and Divine Language: Essays in Philosophical Theology</i></b> .....	301
Jay Newman	
<b>E.E. Benitez, <i>Forms in Plato's Philebus</i></b> .....	303
Samuel Scolnicov	
<b>Geoffrey Brown, <i>The Information Game: Ethical Issues in a Microchip World</i></b> .....	306
Mary B. Williams	
<b>John Martin Fischer, ed., <i>God, Foreknowledge, and Freedom</i></b> .....	309
Linda Zagzebski	
<b>Jonathan Glover and others, <i>Ethics of New Reproductive Technologies</i></b> .....	311
Elisabeth Boetzkes	
<b>Nelson Goodman and Catherine Z. Elgin, <i>Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences</i></b> .....	313
Douglas Arrell	
<b>David Granfield, <i>The Inner Experience of Law: A Jurisprudence of Subjectivity</i></b> .....	316
Joseph Boyle	
<b>David L. Hull, <i>The Metaphysics of Evolution</i></b> .....	319
William A. Rottschaefer	
<b>Wolfgang Iser, <i>Prospecting: From Reader Response to Literary Anthropology</i></b> .....	322
Margaret M. Van de Pitte	
<b>Raymond Martin, <i>The Past Within Us: An Empirical Approach to the Philosophy of History</i></b> .....	326
Steve Fuller	
<b>Lynne McFall, <i>Happiness</i></b> .....	328
Peter Miller	
<b>John L. Pollock, <i>Technical Methods in Philosophy</i></b> .....	331
Paul K. Moser	
<b>Jenny Teichman, <i>Philosophy and the Mind</i></b> .....	332
Karl Pfeifer	
<b>Robert Ware and Kai Nielsen, eds., <i>Analyzing Marxism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume 15</i></b> .....	334
Tony Smith	

<b>Norbert Waszek, <i>The Scottish Enlightenment and Hegel's Account of 'Civil Society'</i> . . . . .</b>	<b>336</b>
Manfred Kuehn	
<b>L. Wittgenstein, <i>Lectures on Philosophical Psychology 1946-47. Ed. P.T. Geach</i> . . . . .</b>	<b>339</b>
J.F.M. Hunter	
<b>Richard M. Zaner, ed., <i>Death: Beyond Whole-Brain Criteria</i> . . . . .</b>	<b>341</b>
Glenn G. Griener	

**William P. Alston**

*Divine Nature and Divine Language:  
Essays in Philosophical Theology.*

Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1989.  
Pp. 279.

US \$34.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8014-2258-2);

US \$12.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8014-9545-8).

This volume brings together twelve previously published papers by an American philosopher who has contributed extensively to the analytical philosophical literature in epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of religion. There are five papers on talk about God and four on the nature of God, and the volume concludes with pieces on God's action in the world, the Holy spirit, and the divine command theory of ethics. Alston also has provided a brief introduction that attempts to give the reader insights into where Alston is coming from, where he stands, and how his approach to problems of philosophical theology differs from certain other fashionable approaches.

In his first paper, which sets the tone, methodologically and thematically, for the entire collection, Alston argues against a mixed bag of theologians that, 'though irreducible metaphors seem to promise a way of combining the denial of any literal predication in theology with the preservation of significant theological truth claims, this fair promise dissipates on scrutiny ...' (37). The second essay attempts to strengthen the case for the position that we can speak literally about God. In the next paper, Alston argues that, 'a functional approach to psychological concepts makes it possible to start with human psychological concepts and create psychological concepts that literally apply to God, thus generating theological statements that unproblematically possess truth-values' (80). The fourth paper concerns the 'hard literal core to our talk about divine action' (102), and the last piece in the first set of papers shows the importance of 'direct reference' in talk about God.

In Part II, Alston begins by attempting to reconcile what he takes to be the best insights of Aquinas's and Hartshorne's competing conceptions of God. He does this by contrasting two sets of Divine attributes. A related paper concludes that a timeless omniscient God can 'enter into genuine dialogue with human beings in prayer,' although, 'God has achieved this capacity by forgoing the complete determination of His creation' (160). The remaining essays in this part

consider the classical problem of Divine foreknowledge and human freedom and the inappropriateness of attributing beliefs to God.

In Part III, Alston begins with a paper that concludes that, 'we can think of God's action in the world as pervasive, if not all-pervasive, whether or not anything ever happens outside the ordinary course of nature,' and in any case, it is appropriate to 'pick out some small class of happenings to be taken as divine action in a special way' (221-2). Alston offers a semi-theological reflection on sanctification, and concludes the volume with an attempt to get around familiar problems raised in Plato's *Euthyphro*.

Alston feels that we should know that he is 'a Christian of a relatively conservative cast' (5), that he thinks that unlike many other philosophical theologians he takes the Christian tradition 'very seriously' (5), that he takes an 'uncompromisingly realistic interpretation of religious belief' (6), and that he holds that there are 'multiple sources' of religious knowledge (7). He regards his positions as 'moderate' and his aims as 'modest' (10).

The essays in this volume consider several basic and important issues in philosophical theology, and as a general rule they shed helpful light on those problems. All of the essays are admirably clear, carefully crafted, and well organized. Alston is at his best when he makes use of his sophistication in philosophy of language to illuminate issues related to theological language. His piece on Hartshorne is one of the most balanced appraisals of that author's work that I have encountered. Even when Alston's arguments are not persuasive, he at least gives us some idea of the rough sort of conceptual framework that a certain kind of Christian might want to bring to certain modes of reflection.

Most of Alston's arguments seem to me to begin with rather arbitrary conceptions and assumptions. Although Alston sees himself as a defender of a 'traditional' Christian commitment, he does not give us much reason to believe that he has a special insight into what tradition in general or Christian tradition in particular involves. In several important ways, Alston has cut himself off from tradition. The narrowness of his approach is quite pronounced. He clearly has little time for most European thought, classical or contemporary. Though an admirer of Aquinas, he seems unfamiliar with relevant developments in Roman Catholic philosophy. He makes no use of the relevant insights of theologians, even 'conservative' Protestant ones, or of phenomenologists, or of Jewish or other non-Christian philosophers of religion. And for someone who is committed to

analytical philosophy, his quick dismissal of Hume ('with his absurd theories'), Wittgenstein ('with his deliberately cryptic utterances'), and Quine ('with his paradoxical and often counterintuitive positions') (10) is particularly curious. While I can sympathize to some extent with Alston's disillusionment with 'liberal' religious thinkers (6), I suspect that Alston would benefit from a closer and more generous approach to much of their work, particularly on issues related to pluralism. Insofar as he professes to be unsympathetic to those philosophers who treat the standard issues in philosophy of religion as purely theoretical philosophical problems (8), Alston would do well not to confine himself to dialoguing with narrowly trained cronies.

**Jay Newman**

University of Guelph

**E.E. Benitez**

*Forms in Plato's Philebus.*

Assen: Van Gorcum 1989. Pp. x+159.

Dfl42.50. ISBN 90-232-2477-9.

This book is based on Benitez's 1985 doctoral dissertation at the University of Texas. It consists of a discussion of the ontological passages of the *Philebus*. Benitez examines the relevant passages in the order they appear in the dialogue. He starts with the one-many problems of 14c-15c, and argues that 'the solution Plato presupposes for the trivial one-many problems employs the theory of forms.' He argues that 'Plato does not raise the serious one-many problem in order to criticize a theory he no longer holds, but to scrutinize one he is interested in maintaining' (5). Although the general point is, as I believe, well-taken, B.'s account of the way the Forms are distinguished from their sensible 'namesakes' is hardly 'uninterpreted' (3-4).

Benitez maintains that Plato thinks that Protarchus' one-many problem referring to the sensibles is easy because it can be solved by appeal to the theory of Forms, as it was in the middle dialogues. The 'serious problem' of 15b1-8 is new, and B. sides with those who refer it to *Parmenides* 131a-c. There is a careful discussion of this disputed passage in the *Philebus*, leading to its interpretation as

comprising three questions (24-30). The proposed emendation of *homōs* at 15b4 is, however, unnecessary.

Ch. 2 examines the so-called 'Heavenly Tradition' of 16b-19a, 'that things that are ever said to be consist of one and many; moreover, they have limit and unlimitedness inherent in them'. It is argued that this is identical with the method of division according to kinds, as known from the *Phaedrus* and the *Sophist*. B. thinks that the method does not solve the one-many problem but provides persuasive reasons for maintaining the existence of Forms, and, more importantly, that science and wisdom are possible only on such an assumption. In this context, one misses a discussion of the view of Cherniss, picked up by Trevaskis (*Phronesis* 1960), that the method is *not* primarily aimed at definition.

B.'s conclusion is that 'the unit Form and all its species [or determinants] comprise the limited part of the set of things named after them. The sensible instances of those Forms comprise the unlimited part of that set' (56). But his dismissal of the interpretation which sees the referent of *tōn aei legomenōn einai* at 16c9 as the sensibles and Forms separately seems to me too hasty. If sensibles are also said to be (as B. recognizes at p. 17), one is entitled *prima facie* to expect that the problems of one and many would beset them too (and then *aei* = 'ever', not 'always').

Ch. 3 discusses the four categories of 23b-31b: limit, unlimited, the mixture and the cause. B. argues for the compatibility of the 'Four-fold Classification' with the theory of Forms as logical causes. After examining all the relevant passages, B. classifies in the class of limit 'numbers and measures, and things that are of a limit-like nature, e.g. law, order, and possibly also Fineness and Truth' (80). His description of the *apeira* as 'the materials out of which sensible things are formed' (76) depends on the analogy with the *khōra* of the *Timaeus* (74-5). But the identification of the 'place' (*hōra*) with matter is itself problematic, and the relation of, say, the (limited) pitch to the higher and lower is one of determined to determinable, not one of things to their materials. In the mixed class B. collects all sensibles, excluding 'only excessive things and excessive states' (83). The fourth category, cause, is, not surprisingly, minds, both cosmic and human, as agents, while Forms, located in the class of the limit, are *logical* causes (87-90).

Ch. 4 compares the ontology of the *Philebus* with that of the middle dialogues and maintains (*pace* Owen, Crombie, Sayre and others) that Plato did not abandon the ontological distinction between Forms

and sensibles. In examining the expressions *genesis eis ousian* (26d8) and *gegenemenēn ousian* (27b8), B. argues that Plato's distinction between Forms and sensibles never implied denying being to sensibles but only that sensibles are not fully real. B. shows, plausibly enough, that, in this context, *ousia* is to be understood as denoting permanence as against emergence as implied in *genesis*.

Ch. 5 deals with some epistemological aspects of the *Philebus*. It is maintained that the discussion of recollection in the *Philebus* is consistent with the earlier doctrine of the middle dialogues (which the author takes to be the same throughout); that the distinction between knowledge and opinion of *Republic V* reappears in the *Philebus*; and that the classification of knowledge in 55c-59d parallels the classification of knowledge of *Republic IV* and *VII*. On the distinction between knowledge and opinion, I am afraid I cannot find in the text sufficient support for B.'s interpretation of 476b10 *gnōnai hōs ekhei to on* as referring to the ability to give an account of what one knows (121) (cf. my *Plato's Metaphysics of Education* [New York: Routledge 1988], 84-6).

Benitez's conclusion is that '[the] evidence strongly suggests that Plato maintains the Theory of Forms in the *Philebus*' and that 'if the *Philebus* is a late dialogue, as is generally agreed, my conclusions indicate that Plato neither abandoned nor significantly revised the Theory of Forms' (132). But then B. can be reasonably expected to show what is the point of the new conceptual apparatus which Plato so elaborately develops in this dialogue.

The book suffers sometimes from over-schematization, as, e.g., at p. 5, where the *Philebus* is envisaged as possibly (a) positively supporting, or (b) compatible with, the Revisionist thesis, or (c) compatible with, or (d) positively supporting, the Unitarian thesis. Similarly at pp. 32, 39, and elsewhere. The rigidity of such an approach causes B. now and then to miss the implications of the dialogical situation, as when he claims too confidently that Socrates has no answer to the one-many problem (34, 36, 57), or attempts to establish too strict a parallelism between the Four-fold Classification and standard platonic ontological entities.

In balance, this is a well-researched and competently argued book. The bibliography is helpful and the text gives a good review of the main interpretive positions. I found a number of printing errors (51, 74, 86, 147) and a somewhat graver mistake at p. 87.

**Samuel Scolnicov**

The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

**Geoffrey Brown**

*The Information Game:*

*Ethical Issues in a Microchip World.*

Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press  
International 1989. Pp. ix+163.

US \$39.95. ISBN 0-391-03575-4.

This superb discussion of the ethical issues surrounding computers is at once a philosophical achievement in its clarification of the issues and a lucid introduction to these issues suitable for philosophers, computer professionals, or students. Brown's deep knowledge of computers (he is apparently a computer professional as well as a philosopher) allows him to illuminate the extent to which properties intrinsic to computers determine the effects of computerization, and then to delineate the ways in which constraints determined by human nature and by culture influence these effects. He is, ultimately, optimistic that if we have a clear understanding of the interaction among computer nature, human nature, and culture, then we will be able to find and follow the policies needed to allow computerization to be a positive force in the pursuit of human fulfillment. His purpose in this book is to further such understanding.

Bringing insight from social and political philosophy to an area that has been dominated by normative ethics, Brown shows how our worries about computerization are shaped by our culture's philosophical assumptions. One such assumption, our Augustinian bias, gives power to the fear that computerization will dangerously enhance the power of government. 'In the Augustinian tradition the state is chiefly an imposition on humanity, restricting human nature in its freedom rather than enabling it to fulfill itself' (48). Brown contrasts this with the Aristotelian tradition that political order is an expression of human nature, necessary for the well-being and fulfillment of human beings, and points out that the Augustinian, but not the Aristotelian, would be likely to see any enhancement of government power as dangerous. Brown argues that since 'the present-day climate of political thought is overwhelmingly Augustinian in its bias' (48), we are biased toward a pessimistic view of computerization.

Putting this bias aside, Brown looks at facts about the nature of human beings and the nature of computers to investigate whether computerization actually is likely to dangerously enhance governmental power. He argues that the enormous increase in the ease of storing, processing, and retrieving information brought about by com-

puterization will enhance the power of government. Then, considering the possible dangers of this enhancement of power, he argues first that computers will not, in the short term, lead to the establishment, in a non-pathological society, of a totalitarian regime; 'the manipulation of information technology is something which is more likely to be an effective strategy for staying in power than for achieving power in the first place' (45). Over the long term, however, there are dangers:

All I need to assume is the existence of a government or governing class composed of fallible, vulnerable human beings with the ordinary kinds of motivations – remaining in office, doing the best for their party and their country, trying to control crime, impressing their colleagues, and so on. Add to this the temptation to take a line of least resistance, to opt for what is possible and easily available rather than what is really appropriate though difficult to attain, and it is not difficult to see how the slide into authoritarianism can occur without anyone necessarily actively desiring it. (54)

This scenario does not, however, leave Brown pessimistic, for his delineation of the way in which culture, human nature, and the nature of computers interact to shape the effects of computerization provides guidance toward how to prevent this situation. He concludes that the policies necessary to avert 'the potentially harmful consequences of the new technology are the same as those necessary for ensuring a free and fair form of social organization in general: openness, accountability, cooperation' (145).

I have tried in the preceding two paragraphs to give some idea of how Brown weaves together insight into the various components of the problems of computerization to give both understanding and guidance. This book does not lend itself to being summarized, so I will convey some of its flavor by mentioning a few points that Brown makes about other topics that he discusses.

*How can rights to computer programs one has written, or to information about oneself, be protected?* Brown suggests that a major problem that we have had in dealing with these areas, particularly the first, comes from our cultural assumption that ownership rights are the only kind of rights one might have over such things.

*Are computers particularly prone to dangerous errors?* No. But 'computerization makes it more simple than ever to pass the blame on until it reaches something which cannot usefully be blamed' (65).

Systems must be set up so that the proper people are held accountable for errors.

*Are computers a serious threat to our privacy?* Yes, unless controls are instituted. After discussing the nature of privacy, Brown suggests four principles to protect data privacy. These principles 'are weighted in favor of a presupposition that personal information gathered and stored for one purpose must not, without some strong overriding reason, be used for another' (84).

*Might future intelligent computers possess consciousness and be moral agents?* Pointing to the standard problem of other minds, Brown notes that it would be impossible to demonstrate that a machine possessed consciousness, since we can't even demonstrate that other people do.

As an introduction to the area the book has two minor problems which are worth mentioning. First, although it covers most of the standard issues, it does not discuss the issue of the effects of computerization on employment; the possibility of such effects is dismissed in a short unconvincing argument. This is unfortunate, not only because the issue is important, but also because Brown's approach is particularly relevant to it; an examination of our fears of massive unemployment in the light of our assumptions on the nature of the good life would be a definite contribution to the contemporary discussion. The second problem is that, although the book is in general very accessible to non-philosophers, one early section (on truth versus usefulness) is not; this section seems to be aimed at protecting the author from philosophical attack rather than at advancing the reader's understanding. Fortunately this section can easily be skipped.

I recommend this slim, readable, and insightful book very highly. In fact, I plan to use it, together with a book of readings, in a computer ethics course for computer science majors. It will be an excellent introduction for the novice and the source of new insights for the expert.

**Mary B. Williams**

*(Center for Science and Culture)*

University of Delaware

**John Martin Fischer, ed.**

*God, Foreknowledge, and Freedom.*

Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press  
1989. Pp. 351.

US \$34.50. ISBN 0-8047-1580-7.

This book is a collection of twelve recently published papers on the dilemma of divine foreknowledge and human free will, together with a lengthy introduction by the editor and a substantial bibliography. Most of the papers propose and criticize the most sophisticated versions of the Ockhamist strategy for solving the dilemma. There are no papers on either of the other two major traditional solutions – the Boethian (timelessness) solution, and the Molinist (middle knowledge) solution, although Fischer briefly discusses the former in the introduction.

As anyone who has seriously investigated the foreknowledge dilemma knows, the literature on this topic is enormous. It would be impossible to bring together all the important papers on this issue in one volume. Fischer has attempted instead to give the reader a good understanding of one particular influential approach, and he has done this well.

The collection begins with Nelson Pike's seminal 1965 paper, 'Divine Omniscience and Voluntary Action', which presents a very strong argument for the incompatibility of divine foreknowledge and human free will. This 'incompatibilist' challenge is followed by Marilyn Adams's well-known paper, 'Is the Existence of God a 'Hard' Fact?' and a critique by Fischer, 'Freedom and Foreknowledge'. The Adams paper inspired a string of attempts to bolster the Ockhamist solution to the foreknowledge dilemma by refining the distinction between facts about the past which are wholly and truly about the past ('hard' facts) and those which are only partly or nominally about the past ('soft' facts). The point of this distinction is that the Principle of the Fixity of the Past may not apply to all of the 'soft' facts about the past, so if God's past beliefs about the future are soft, it is at least arguable that they lack the fixity which generates the incompatibility between past divine beliefs and future human free acts. This distinction is pushed far in the papers by Eddy Zemach and David Widerker ('Facts, Freedom, and Foreknowledge'), Joshua Hoffman and Gary Rosenkrantz ('Hard and Soft Facts'), and Alfred Freddoso ('Accidental Necessity and Logical Determinism'). A critique of this approach is given by William Hasker in 'Hard Facts and Theological Fatalism'.

A different Ockhamist approach appears in Alvin Plantinga's paper, 'On Ockham's Way Out'. This paper bypasses the distinction between hard and soft facts and defines accidental necessity (the necessity of the past) directly in terms of the counterfactual power of agents. A critique of this and related strategies is given by William Hasker in 'Foreknowledge and Necessity'.

Fischer's introduction covers a wider territory than the papers he has included in the volume. He begins by presenting three versions of what he calls the Basic Argument for the incompatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom. He then distinguishes this argument from similar but less threatening ones such as the argument for logical fatalism and the argument for the incompatibility of human foreknowledge and free will. He proceeds to consider a few strategies that weaken the concept of omniscience generating the dilemma. One strategy is to deny that future contingent propositions have a truth value (the approach of Geach); another is to deny that future contingents are knowable, while conceding that they have a truth value (the approach of Swinburne). Fischer rejects both of these and I think he is right to do so. Next he discusses in detail the Ockhamist approach as presented in the papers in the collection, and then makes a few comments on the Boethian-Thomistic solution, a solution which has had a strong following to this day. The introduction concludes with a brief discussion of William Alston's thesis in 'Divine Foreknowledge and Alternative Conceptions of Human Freedom' that compatibilists and incompatibilists about foreknowledge are using different senses of 'can' when they ask whether we can do otherwise given that God foreknows our acts.

This collection and its bibliography should be useful to those undertaking a study of the foreknowledge dilemma. In addition to these papers, however, a reader should be aware that since this volume appeared, several book-length studies of the problem have been published that take the investigation beyond the level of the papers in this collection. William Hasker gives a thorough discussion of contemporary Ockhamist accounts along with the most persuasive defense of the incompatibilist position I have seen yet in his book, *God, Time, and Knowledge* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1989). J.R. Lucas argues for a view which weakens God's knowledge of future contingents in *The Future* (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell 1989). Edward Wierenga devotes Chapters 3 to 5 of his book, *The Nature of God: An Inquiry into Divine Attributes* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1989) to a discussion of foreknowledge and middle know-

ledge, siding with the compatibilist position. I defend a compatibilist position in my book, *The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge* (forthcoming, Oxford University Press). Finally, the middle knowledge solution is gaining adherents and the first place to look for an account of this approach is Alfred J. Freddoso's introduction to his translation of *On Divine Foreknowledge: Part IV of the 'Concordia'* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988).

**Linda Zagzebski**

Loyola Marymount University

**Jonathan Glover and others**

*Ethics of New Reproductive Technologies.*

DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press

1989. Pp. ix+159.

US \$23.00. ISBN 0-87580-147-1.

The Glover Report is another in a series by multi-disciplinary committees set up to study the ethical and social issues raised by the new reproductive technologies. Like the British Warnock Report and the West German Bunda Report, this book examines such topics as artificial insemination, in vitro fertilization, surrogacy, embryo research, foetal tissue transplant, and genetic manipulation. But unlike the others, the purpose of this Report is not primarily to recommend legislation, since the commission represents a number of legally autonomous European countries. Rather, it is an exercise in consciousness-raising and discovery. It is an attempt to discover whether there are pan-European community standards and, if so, how they might apply to the perplexing ethical problems raised by the new reproductive technologies. The consciousness-raising aspect is the attempt to expose the fundamental questions of value and tentatively explore the European response to them.

There are six parts to this book: an introduction, conclusion, and intervening chapters dealing separately with the substantive issues. In the introduction some of the fundamental value problems are set out: the value of privacy and intimacy in sexuality; the value of the family, and the dangers of separating biological and social parenting;

the dangers of paternalism, and of the commercialization of reproduction; the need to consider the rights and interests of all parties, both for the present and in shaping our future society. This brief foretaste of the kinds of issues to be considered is followed by a discussion of the theoretical framework to be used in the book.

This discussion is brief and appears at the beginning of Part Two. The Report considers a Utilitarian and then a Kantian approach, and sets out the familiar drawbacks of each. Recognizing an ineluctable pluralism in our moral outlook, it opts for what Glover calls a 'convergence' view, finding this an adequate tool for exploring particular issues, and attempting to achieve a Rawlsian reflective equilibrium with respect to each. One wonders why, at this point, there is no reference to Aristotelean 'virtue ethics' – an obvious candidate for accommodating a possible pluralism of values as well as any commonality in our notions of well-being. Nor does a feminist ethical approach appear, despite the unique immediacy of these issues to women. Passing references are made to feminist points of view, but unlike in other reports, these references are isolated rather than systematically presented.

This 'convergence' approach, once settled upon, is then applied to the issues with, in my view, evidence of much careful research, fair representation of interests, and balanced reasoning, although all too often judgment is suspended pending further empirical research. The approach is liberal and cautiously progressive – considering sympathetically, for example, the plight of childless gay couples and, for another, the desire of couples to determine the gender of their children – 'We may find that *not* all happy families are alike,' it says (63), *contra* Tolstoy! It is also alert to the negative consequences of a naive embrace of these new technologies, for example in the danger to women of the creation of a market for foetal tissue or live babies. It shuns commercialization and advocates fairly strict public control of these innovations and experimentations, arguing that, although this constitutes some loss of individual liberty, such an approach, though less acceptable in an American setting, is quite consistent with European communitarianism. However it resists recommending the criminalization of, for instance, private surrogacy arrangements, on the grounds that children should not have to begin life under a cloud of criminality.

Although an admirably thorough and sensitive discussion, the Glover Report, I feel, is deficient in three respects. The first I have mentioned – its failure to give a systematic voice to feminist per-

spectives. Second, it mentions only in passing the problem of the distribution of health care funds – a problem so real that any discussion of, for example, who should be afforded reproductive help, or what sorts of genetic research should be pursued, is ungrounded outside the context of competing claims for resources. Finally, there is no discussion, though again there is passing reference, to the problems of patenting and ownership. The Commission's modest mandate notwithstanding, questions of patenting and ownership, especially in relation to embryo research, have as much to do with *responsibility* as with rights, and would therefore have been appropriate given the communitarian tone of the Report.

The Glover Report rejects the 'technological imperative' that what can be done should be done. It suggests that we take control of technological development in reproductive research and techniques, and is useful in demonstrating how difficult the wise appropriation of control will be. As a first step towards this goal, it is well worth examining.

**Elisabeth Boetzkes**  
University of Alberta

**Nelson Goodman and Catherine Z. Elgin**  
*Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts  
and Sciences.*

Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company  
1988. Pp. xiv+174.

US \$21.50. ISBN 0-87220-052-3.

Like most of Goodman's other books, *Reconceptions in Philosophy* is a collection of essays which has been structured in such a way as to give the book the semblance of an argument, albeit in this case a particularly loose one. The essays were written for a wide range of different contexts, ranging from symposia for non-philosophers to a French encyclopedia of philosophy to *Critical Inquiry* and *Synthese*. Hence, there are abrupt shifts in levels of discourse, and considerable repetition as Goodman outlines his familiar intellectual premises at the beginning of each essay. None the less, as unsatisfactory as this

format is, one is very grateful to have Goodman's recent work collected in one place, especially as a not inconsiderable portion of it appeared in non-English publications, and many of the individual essays are as provocative, amusing, infuriating and challenging as Goodman fans could desire.

The book is, of course, a collaboration; according to the preface, it is 'developed, intensively discussed, and fully subscribed to by the two authors' (viii). Although individual essays are signed by one or, in a few cases, both of the authors, these attributions indicate only 'primary responsibility for putting these chapters in shape.' In her book *With Reference to Reference*, Elgin appeared as a very devout disciple of Goodman, primarily an explicator and to some degree an extender of his thought. Most of the essays here seem to bear the strong imprint not only of Goodman's views, but also of his philosophical style and rhetorical strategies; Elgin's presence is felt largely as a moderating and clarifying influence. In one essay, however, 'The Epistemic Efficacy of Stupidity', one feels that Elgin is speaking much more in her own voice; the essay is dryly humorous in tone and insightful about the details of other people's theories in a way that Goodman rarely is.

The essays may be roughly divided into two groups. One group concerns the epistemological issues that have largely engrossed Goodman since *Ways of Worldmaking*; the other may be regarded as a collection of footnotes to *Languages of Art*. Among the latter are a discussion of how buildings refer when they are functioning as works of art, and how variations – primarily in music, but also in other arts – refer to their theme. An article for *Critical Inquiry* deals with the issue of whether a new interpretation of a text in effect creates a new work; Goodman and Elgin argue that it does not, that the text itself is the work and that all interpretations, no matter how disparate, of the same text are interpretations of the same work. Goodman's most famous theory – that pictorial representation is a form of denotation – is touched upon in some detail in two essays. One discusses 'pictorial competence' – our ability to recognize what a picture, even an unfamiliar one, represents. The other in effect replies to the quibble raised by some critics that Goodman's theory that pictures belong to 'analog' schemes – symbol schemes that are syntactically undifferentiated – is refuted by the fact that pictures can be created from patterns of dots which are entirely differentiated. In neither essay does Goodman show any sign of having repented his controversial view of pictorial representation.

The epistemological essays touch on a number of familiar concerns. In an essay on mental images, Goodman tries to argue that they may be treated by the same manoeuvre that he previously used to deal with fictive objects; just as there are no unicorns but only unicorn-pictures, so Goodman argues that there are no mental images but only image-pictures or image-descriptions. Other essays deal with the distinction between fact and convention and (the essay by Elgin cited above) with various contemporary attempts to save the concept of knowledge from the skeptic's attacks.

The central topic of the first and last essays, and the one which seems to be the authors' dominant preoccupation at the moment, is that of judging worlds – how to tell whether a world is genuine or spurious, to use Goodman's own terms (11). While not completely repudiating the notion of truth, Goodman and Elgin wish to subordinate it to a broader concept of 'rightness', which includes such factors as consistency, constancy (i.e., the world to be judged should do minimal violence to the most entrenched categories of our other worlds), relevance to our purposes, and productiveness of new insights and significant discriminations. Presumably worlds which have these qualities are to be judged valid or valuable, while worlds deficient in them are to be rejected.

One might expect that in his old age Goodman would be gloating about the fact that philosophy is finally catching up with him. His pluralism and anti-foundationalism, which once earned him the status almost of a maverick, have now in the recent thought of philosophers like Rorty and Putnam and in the popularity of continental theorists like Derrida and Gadamer moved into the mainstream. In fact, however, one senses in this book that Goodman is increasingly alarmed by the recent trend, and concerned to distance himself from it. He no longer refers to himself as a radical relativist, and indeed attacks the extreme relativism of the deconstructionists (45) and of Rorty; of the latter he says, 'For philosophers like Rorty, Kuhn, and Feyerabend, loss of *the* world results in a skepticism that despairs of distinguishing between what is true and what is false, and reduces all science and other inquiry to idle conversation' (51). By holding on to the concept of truth, and by embroidering his concept of rightness, Goodman hopes to avoid relativism. But rejecting as he does both a priori truth and truth as correspondence to reality, he cannot mean by truth anything other than relative truth – or, as he calls it, 'immanent truth' (164) – which is not truth in any meaningful sense at all; it is, moreover, easy to imagine highly spurious worlds

that have all the virtues of 'rightness' that Goodman hopes will save him from skepticism. Try as he will, Goodman cannot evade the conclusion that under his view the work of the arts and sciences is simply idle world-spinning.

**Douglas Arrell**

*(Department of Theatre and Drama)*

University of Winnipeg

**David Granfield**

*The Inner Experience of Law:*

*A Jurisprudence of Subjectivity.*

Washington D.C.: The Catholic University  
of America Press 1988. Pp. vii+300.

US \$39.95. ISBN 0-8132-0657-x.

This book is an argument for a form of natural law jurisprudence and moral theory. The argument is developed from the internal, subjective perspective of those who experience the law as a reality related to their personal and social activity. Granfield articulates this internal perspective by applying and augmenting the philosophical method of Bernard Lonergan, the influential Canadian Jesuit.

According to Lonergan, philosophical understanding develops from each person's appropriation of the basic cognitional and volitional structures which are operative in all human inquiry and responsible action. Since these structures are operative whenever people know and choose, they are available to the reflection of self-conscious people, and, since they are fundamental to all knowing and action, they are invariant, and are related formally to the particular things people know and do. Thus, the philosophical knowledge acquired by appropriation of one's cognitional and volitional structures is not hypothetical and revisable in the way empirical knowledge and the practical knowledge needed for particular decisions and policies are.

This difference between 'transcendental' philosophical knowledge and 'categorical' knowledge is strategic in Lonergan's thinking. Two of its implications are especially important for Granfield's analysis: (1) this distinction allows Lonergan to accept and develop the 'turn

to the subject' which characterizes much of modern philosophy, and to do that without surrendering key metaphysical and epistemological claims of Thomistic philosophy; and (2) the distinction provides a ground for Lonergan's response to what he regards as a crucial shift in worldview, namely, the shift from a classical conception of knowledge as priori, certain and deductive to a modern conception as empirical and historical, revisable and inductive. For the revisability and historically conditioned character of categorial knowledge takes place within a transcendental framework which provides a basis for rejecting historicism and skepticism.

The 'turn to the subject' provides the basic dialectical context for Granfield's analysis. Although modern philosophy has made this turn, the conception of the human subject remains incomplete and undeveloped. In particular, prevailing jurisprudential theories presuppose a thin and inadequate conception of the subject with the result that many today find both theoretical elaborations and lived experience of the law to be absurd. In response to this situation, Granfield develops in stages an account of the general conditions which underlie people's experience of moral values, interpersonal transactions, and community relationships. These conditions provide the outlines of a normative theory and jurisprudence, and a partial answer to the feeling that the law is absurd. They also point beyond themselves to the only adequate response to that experience: the existence of an ultimate source of meaning and value, namely, God.

The details of Granfield's story are too complex and wide-ranging to recapitulate, but, although often in need of analytical development, the story's overall lines are plausible enough, and some of its parts are rich and helpful. For example, the chapter on rights is tightly connected with current discussions and argues effectively that in their deepest structure rights do not include the confrontational, litigious and individualist elements which often characterize current 'rights talk'.

The upshot of Granfield's analysis is a novel and effective argument against legal positivism and various reductionist accounts of the law. For the conditions necessary for people to act intelligently and responsibly are shown to be the conditions for law's being anything more than an abstraction in people's lives. Law structures and facilitates people's basic human concerns – concerns which are both diverse and themselves morally structured.

Granfield regards these general conditions of responsible practical thinking and decision making as providing the central content

of the natural law. His account of natural law closely follows Aquinas': there are basic human goods which define the contours of the basic interests which people can have. Authentic decision making is based on a rational concern for these goods. At this point, the second of Granfield's Lonerganian concerns takes over: the principles of the natural law are to be applied not in accord with the deductive, classicist model of knowing explicitly endorsed by Aquinas, but according to the more contextualized methods of moral reasoning suggested by Aristotle's notion of practical wisdom, and developed in the work of Catholic 'proportionalists' who have developed a modified form of consequentialism. Thus, the natural law is not the basis of a deductive system of morality and jurisprudence but a framework of values to be approximated in moral decisions and legal enactments.

Granfield also follows Aquinas in understanding the natural law in a theological context. Like Aquinas he sees natural law as a human participation in the 'eternal law' by which God governs the universe. Granfield does not seem to hold that theological premises are necessary to know the truth of the norms which comprise the natural law, but rather that the same drive towards objectivity and responsible action which reveals the natural law points beyond it to a source of meaning and truth which grounds the objectivity and value of all finite judgments and decisions.

In spite of this theological conclusion, this is a book of jurisprudence, and not disguised natural theology. Thus, it should be of interest not only for those concerned to explore the applicability of Lonergan's methods, but for philosophers and lawyers concerned with the ongoing debate about the normative foundations of the law.

**Joseph Boyle**

St. Michael's College

University of Toronto

**David L. Hull**

*The Metaphysics of Evolution.*

Albany: State University of New York Press  
1989. Pp. viii+331.

US \$73.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-0211-8);

US \$24.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-0212-6).

Philosophy of biology has come into its own in the last half of the twentieth century. As a distinct subdiscipline with its own community of investigators and its own distinctive problems, it is making significant progress in helping us to understand the central theories and concepts used by biologists to make sense of the living world and thereby aiding us in grasping that world itself. In addition, it is providing us with insights into the distinctive nature of the biological disciplines. These achievements are increasingly allowing it to contribute to the wider philosophical dialogue about the nature of reality and knowledge. As such, philosophy of biology is part of a larger naturalistic movement within philosophy which rejects a priori, intuitive and exclusively conceptual methods and seeks to build its claims on the empirical sciences. Naturalistic philosophers relinquish their assumed position of privilege as practitioners of a foundational discipline and take their place as co-workers in the community of investigators of reality and knowledge. This shift includes approaching philosophy of science as part of a multidisciplinary study of science. Science studies include philosophers, historians, sociologists, anthropologists, and psychologists of science working in collaboration to understand science's multiple aspects and implications.

David Hull is a first-generation member of this mature community of philosophers of biology. Beginning his professional work in the mid 1960s, he has made significant contributions to the current flowering of philosophy of biology. His most recent major contribution is the monumental *Science as Process: An Evolutionary Account of the Social and Conceptual Development of Science* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 1988. [SP]). *The Metaphysics of Evolution (ME)* is a collection of previously published essays representing the lineage of Hullean views from early work in issues of systematics to theories concerning the entities and processes of biology and scientific knowledge.

Hull characterizes his own views about both nature and science as hard-nosed organicism. He has sought to find a unity in the entities and processes involved in biological and conceptual change. *ME*

illustrates well his efforts. Hull eschews the term epistemology because of its close links with foundationalist approaches which he rejects. (See his 'Author's Response' to comments on his 'A Mechanism and Its Metaphysics: An Evolutionary Account of the Social and Conceptual Development of Science', *Biology and Philosophy* 3 [1988] 123-273 [MM]). Nevertheless, *ME* traces not only the evolution of Hull's metaphysical views but also outlines the development of his own naturalized epistemology of conceptual change.

In *SP* Hull has proposed a general theory of selection to account for biological, social and conceptual change. In chapter 6 of *ME*, he lays out the definitions of the key entities of his theory and illustrates their role in selection processes on various levels of the biological hierarchy. These entities are replicators, interactors and lineages. A replicator is an 'entity that passes on its structure largely intact in successive replications' (96). An interactor is 'an entity that interacts as a cohesive whole with its environment in such a way that this interaction causes replication to be differential' (96). And a lineage is 'an entity that changes indefinitely through time either in the same or an altered state as a result of replication' (106). Selection is defined as 'a process in which differential extinction and proliferation of interactors cause the differential perpetuation of the relevant replicators' (96). Genes, organisms and species are but one set of instantiations of these types of entities. Genes, genomes, organisms, colonies, populations and species may be either replicators or interactors in evolutionary change. Another central feature of both the general theory and its particular applications is that lineages, which are the consequences of selection processes, are individuals, not natural kinds. Hull argues for the thesis that biological species are individuals in Chapters 1, 5, 7, 9, 13. Although perhaps counter-intuitive to both ordinary and classical philosophical understandings, Hull contends that his thesis is strongly supported both by evolutionary theory and the cladistic classificatory theory in systematics. He also argues that this thesis is fruitful for understanding issues about both biological and conceptual change (Chs. 5 & 13), classification in systematics (Ch. 9) and human nature and ethics (Ch. 1).

Hull illustrates the more general fruitfulness of the claim that lineages are individuals in Chapter 11 where he argues that all the historical sciences, including cosmogony, geology, paleontology, and human history, make use of lineages which are central subjects in historical narratives. These central subjects are individuals the parts of which are interrelated in such a way that the entity exists through time.

In Hull's view, individual people, species, nations, and ideas are all examples of central subjects. Hull goes on to examine the role of central subjects in historical narratives and the way in which scientific theories and laws function in the reconstruction of past events and the identification of central subjects. Hull contends (Ch. 12) that the use of central subjects in historical narratives, as well as the need to communicate with contemporary audiences, requires a form of 'presentism' in historical methodology, that is, the assumption of current meanings, modes of reasoning, and the correctness of current scientific theories.

With respect to conceptual change, Hull argues that such changes in science are best understood by tracing the conceptual lineages manifested in the links between term-tokens and finding the particular selective processes that have led to their differential reproduction. Although none of the essays in *ME* contain Hull's more fully worked out theory, several of them, especially Chapter 13, give us a good sense of it. Since selection processes can occur on many levels, an adequate account will refer to a number of different selective factors. Both the internal, rational factors of reason, argument and evidence and the so called irrational, external factors of personal recognition and prestige, reward, age, etc. are operative. Hull uses episodes from the history of systematics (Ch. 10), Darwinism (Chs. 2-4, 15) and sociobiology (Chs. 15, 16) to make his points. By extending in an analogical fashion the results of sociobiology concerning cooperation and competition, Hull elaborates (Ch. 14) some of the theses he develops more fully in *MM* and *SP* concerning the structures of institutional science which, in his view, engage the egoistic behaviors of individual scientists for the promotion of the cognitive goals of the institution.

I have only been able to hint at the riches in these essays. I recommend *ME* very highly not only to all those interested in David Hull as a central subject but also to those who seek an understanding of the roles of recent philosophy of biology, philosophy of science and naturalistic philosophy as central subjects in, what from this viewer's perspective, is a momentous period in the evolution of these lineages and that of philosophy.

**William A. Rottschaefter**  
Lewis and Clark College

**Wolfgang Iser**

*Prospecting: From Reader Response  
to Literary Anthropology.*

Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University  
Press 1989. Pp. ix+316.

US \$29.95. ISBN 0-8018-3792-8.

Iser offers here nine previously published essays, and four new ones, which together provide an overview of his peculiarly rich version of a reader response theory of literature, show the power of the theory in its application to specific texts, answer some of the principle objections to it, and show how it opens up on a literary anthropology which will, ideally, provide a grounding for the methodological pluralism that now prevails in literary criticism.

The first essay is a compact introduction to reader response theory as presented in Iser's influential book, *The Act of Reading: A Theory of Aesthetic Response* (English version, 1978). The central idea is that 'the indeterminate elements of literary prose ... are the switch that activates the reader into using his own ideas to fulfill the intention of the text' (28). The early version of the theory caused two concerns: what objective limits might there be on interpretation if what is *not* said, the gaps in meaning, are the basis of interpretation?; second, if, as Iser claimed, contemporary fiction has as its function to maximally frustrate the reader's expectation of sense, then why read? The subsequent two essays address the first matter. The book as a whole is intended as a response to the second. The second essay allays fears about the radical subjectivity of interpretation by indicating how the author/text manipulate the reader into meaning construction. This account is further developed in the last part of the expository section, which consists of an exchange between Iser and three celebrated reader orientated literary theorists, Norman Holland, Wayne Booth, and Stanley Fish. Holland in fact holds the view sometimes attributed to Iser that readings are *sui generis*, and that it is the task of the theorist to account for these specifically literary, i.e., idiosyncratic meanings. He wishes to push Iser to this position, claiming that it is supported by scientific data. Iser's response fills in his position on text and reader interaction and shows that philosophy has as much of a role to play in establishing a framework for assessing actual reader responses as does psychology. Wayne Booth objects to the fact that Iser confines himself to the cognitive dimension of reader response, whereas Booth is interested in all aspects,

especially the ethical. Iser argues that Booth's concerns are not incompatible with the more limited framework that Iser has chosen to explore. The exchange with Fish discloses Iser's debts to Gestalt and Social Psychology, General Systems Theory, and Phenomenology.

In the second section Iser illustrates his theory at work in Spenser's *Arcadia*, Shakespeare's *As You Like It*, Joyce's *Ulysses*, and the works of Beckett. The discussion of *Arcadia* shows pastoral poetry as anything but escapist; rather its best examples prefigure the novel by effecting in a refractory medium the characteristic function of literature of subtly presenting a multiplicity of perspectives among which the reader is invited to choose. Iser reads out of Shakespeare's comedy a rich and plausible account of the nature of language, of the ways in which we use language to deceive ourselves and others, of how we both constitute and limit reality by the attitude we take toward what is said, and of how we use language to say the unsayable.

The essay on *Ulysses* radically distinguishes traditional and contemporary literature and deftly demarcates the literary criticism appropriate to each. Traditional criticism gets at determinate meanings and aesthetic values by way of an analysis of the rules of literary production. Contemporary literature, of which *Ulysses* is paradigmatic, characteristically obscures or destroys meaning, obliging critics to focus on reader's strategies for coping with texts, rather than on author's intentions, textual meaning, or aesthetic value. *Ulysses* uses failed projection to disabuse the reader of the belief that literature represents, and ultimately to challenge the traditional philosophic uses of the concept of representation. At the same time that *Ulysses* destroys the view that the novel is a copy of a (or the) world, it makes thematic the problem of access to the world. This is an anthropological notion, the sense of which progressively deepens in the remainder of the book.

The first of the Beckett essays shows what his negativity means for language, meaning, communication, fiction, human being and human action. Iser, who concurs without giving reasons with Beckett's negative perspective, sees a positive side to it. Negativity is the obverse side of freedom, of our being as infinite possibility. The rub is that we are *merely* infinite possibility; none of the possibilities will be actualized. Human projections are empty projections, issuing at best in fictions which shield us from understanding our desperate ontological status as 'nowhere men in a nowhere land' (150). Iser's reader speculates here about the anthropological efficacy of embracing a Beckettian perspective, and about the ethics of an author or critic

who proselytizes for a perspective which, dreariness aside, cannot in terms of its own presuppositions presume to be true.

Iser's belief in the correctness of the Beckettian worldview suffuses also the second essay on Beckett. An analysis of Beckett's 'art of failure' discloses how Beckett manipulates his audience to 'mirthless laughter', the ultimate form of which is a sign of the viewer's non-cognitive experience of the senselessness and futility of human existence. One might query the assumption that Beckett's comedies are paradigmatic of the genre, and indicate that placing 'comedy' and 'anti-comedy' under the same rubric will likely generate theoretical difficulties parallel to those following upon the identification of 'art' and 'anti-art'.

The first of the five essays in the final section shows that Iser's anthropological turn came with his recognition of the futility of the claim that art is autonomous. Even the 'purest' art does something – is put to the service of some cause, changes the individual or society, whether or not the artist intended it do so. To finally understand art is to discern its most basic functions, those which promote the good of the individual and of the species. Hence the necessity of an anthropological approach. Literature's functions include: obliging the individual to confront herself; instigating a reaction to reality; this in turn instigates an interpretation which in its turn opens up new dimensions of reality. Disclosing this hermeneutical character of reality is literature's most basic function. In selecting out its reality by its interpretative act, the hermeneutical human animal implicitly constitutes the alternative realities rejected in its choice of meaning. Literature sustains these alternative meanings, keeping them viable as future choices. It does so by using images to generate 'the illusion of a perception, so that the inconceivable may gain presence ...' (212). We need anthropology to understand this decentered animal's interest in the inconceivable.

The next essay neatly lays out the interrelation between theory and method, discusses the assets and liabilities of popular methods and of methodological pluralism, and argues for the merits of a reader response approach. Iser asserts that the concept of the imaginary must become predominant if methodological pluralism is not to stagnate, and argues that anthropology provides the best chance for a clear account of the imaginary.

The following essay on representation as a performative act, rather than as mimesis, presents the relations between representation and fiction, theoretical and aesthetic fictions, acting, staging, and

play, and reading and dreaming, among others. It characterizes traditional and contemporary literature in terms of their anthropological functions. Traditional literature gives us the illusion of having the humanly impossible identity and completeness that, as a matter of anthropological fact, we crave. Contemporary literature presents the fruitless desire itself, and raises the (unanswerable) questions of its origin and nature. Unlike traditional literature, which will date because it is historically conditioned, contemporary literature will endure because it addresses directly the tragic/ludic impossibility of the human situation. One worries about Iser's presumption of the inherent interest of contemporary literature, in that there seems to be but a single theme to be endlessly kicked about.

Iser has recast 'representation' on the model of Nelson Goodman's 'ways of worldmaking' theory, which leads him to explore in the next essay the appropriateness of using 'play' rather than 'representation' as the basic concept in a theory of the textual process. But a focus on play and on illusion make it more pressing to answer the anthropological question: Why bother with literature? Iser adds to the earlier suggestions the quite Kantian ideas that literature provides us with a new form of self-understanding by virtue of noting the unaccustomed operations of our understanding in the literary experience, and that this unusual activity affords us considerable pleasure.

The final essay is a very cautious and abstract sketch of a literary anthropology. To do more, to say why we need literature, to articulate the ways in which it permits us to extend ourselves, will require more than the theorizing we have had here. It will require the analysis of individual texts from an anthropological perspective. Iser's suggestion, backed up by his strong scholarship and often brilliant critical studies, is worth pursuing.

**Margaret M. Van de Pitte**

University of Alberta

**Raymond Martin**

*The Past Within Us: An Empirical  
Approach to the Philosophy of History.*

Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press

1990. Pp. xi+163.

US \$25.00. ISBN 0-691-07341-4.

This is one of those books that aspires to 'leave the world alone', which, of course, is Wittgensteinian code for an intent to change philosophical practice. The 'world' that concerns Martin is that of the practising historian, a frequent target of methodological criticism by analytic philosophers. By contrast, Martin believes that philosophers can help historians the most by bringing to self-consciousness their already successful practices. This is what he means by pursuing an 'empirical', rather than a 'conceptual', approach to the philosophy of history. Martin demonstrates this approach by analyzing three debates that have caused many historians to mobilize a wide range of evidence and arguments: How to explain the Fall of Rome, how to explain the disappearance of the Mayan Civilization, and how to explain the authorship of the Gospels. According to Martin, the complexity of the issues raised in the course of these debates should not obscure the fact that historians have drawn a limited range of inferences from the evidence, and, in some cases, have even reached closure on what must have been the principal causal factors. Martin then proceeds to explicate the form of reasoning that he finds implicit in the historians' arguments. It turns out to be an appeal to causal weighting based on the evaluation of the relative plausibility of counterfactual scenarios.

As has already been suggested, Martin is quite sensitive to the difference between what is explicit and implicit in historical discourse. Lack of such sensitivity engendered the many fruitless debates that the positivists had with practicing historians over the relevance of covering laws to historical explanation. In brief, Martin grants the positivists (rightly, I think) that covering laws are implicit in historical discourse, but he agrees with practicing historians that it is not their business to develop or even articulate those laws. Martin thinks that the positivists are best supported by the heavy reliance of historians on appeals to counterexamples when arguing with their colleagues. This would seem to suggest that, at least in matters of explanation, historians make progress by challenging generalizations that function as implicit warrants for conclusions about particular

events. However, all the historian shows by such a challenge is that the generalization in question is not applicable to the case, not that the generalization is false. Again, this latter judgment lies outside the historian's purview.

Martin is at his best when he follows his own advice and puts positivism in its place by revealing the argument patterns of practicing historians. However, this only covers the first half of the book. The second half is a much less successful attempt to defend what many historians have touted as the irreducibly 'subjective' character of their judgments. The reader can smell trouble ahead as Martin increasingly abstracts from the practice of historians and makes too much out of subtle distinctions between 'empirical' and 'conceptual' versions of subjectivity, as well as virtually inscrutable discriminations between the 'actual' and 'necessary' subjectivity of historical accounts. Contrary to the book's advertisement, I doubt that practising historians will be able to make much practical sense out of what Martin is doing here. In fact, philosophers may not find Martin's motives completely transparent, either. For example, I could only find one reason why a historian would *want* to claim the uniquely subjective character of her judgment – a reason that Martin attributes to the American historians Carl Becker and Charles Beard: namely, that a completely 'objective' history would be a mere chronicle, which trivializes the actual complexity of the historian's reasoning. Though interesting, this reason probably trades on a construal of the subjective-objective distinction different from the one that Martin actually tackles. For the most part, Martin accepts at face value the avowed subjectivism of historians.

And what ultimately grounds this subjectivism? Somewhat anticlimactically, Martin observes that historians generally reach closure in their arguments, not because they have followed a common path of reasoning explicitly, but rather because they have reached the same intuitive judgments. These judgments are not subject to further scrutiny, but are instead the basis on which further arguments are conducted. Martin seems to believe that it would not be possible to scrutinize these intuitions because they represent fundamental assumptions about how human beings work, which if challenged would undermine our entire ability to make sense of one another. I must confess to being unmoved by such thinly veiled transcendental arguments, though I am willing to grant Martin that it might well represent the implicit philosophy of the practising historian. However, it is one thing to philosophize about the implicit practices of the historian,

but quite another to practise the historian's implicit philosophy. This book would have been better, had Martin respected this distinction more consistently.

**Steve Fuller**

*(Center for the Study of Science in Society)*

Virginia Polytechnic Institute

**Lynne McFall**

*Happiness.*

New York: Peter Lang Publishing 1989.

Pp. xi+129.

US \$27.50. ISBN 0-8204-0711-9.

There is much wisdom in the pages of this slim volume, which contains the author's prize-winning doctoral dissertation. McFall seeks to disentangle and reconstruct several related conceptions of happiness. We need more than one conception, she argues, because of ambivalence and ambiguities in our ascriptions of happiness. Particularly problematic are those who are 'pig-happy', i.e., satisfied with their lives despite the fact that many would judge them to be personally defective in some crucial respect. Can genuine human happiness belong to a 'happy' idiot?; – to an incompetent whose overriding considered goal in life is to amass the world's largest collection of bottlecaps?; – to one 'happy', but completely deluded, in love?; – to a successful immoralist?; – to an impossible idealist wedded to a noble, but unrealizable ideal?

Our conflicting intuitions about these matters are best explained by identifying three distinct conceptions of the happy life as one that is (1) contented only; (2) contented and affirmed; or (3) contented, affirmed and justified. (McFall identifies other senses of 'happy' that pertain to occurrent feeling, behavior, or relations.) Happiness as contentment is merely a Benthamite preponderance of satisfactions in one's life regardless of whether any other standards have been met. All of the pig-happy meet this minimum conception of happiness. Happiness as affirmation, however, requires that the experience of satisfaction with one's life shall rest on a judgment that one's life is good.

People too retarded or crazy to make such a judgment about their lives would be incapable of this type of happiness, but the deluded and wicked might find satisfaction in affirming the goodness of their lives even though such affirmations were unjustified. These latter would not possess, however, happiness as justified affirmation, which requires that the important values one has realized in life which form the basis for satisfaction are also justified. There is thus a hierarchy of conceptions of happiness.

Why are affirmation and justification essential to the higher kinds of happiness? They are because they reflect features of persons that are important to persons. This leads McFall to consider the question: What is a person? Her brief answer is that 'persons are beings who have noninstrumental second-order volitions: they hold "internal" ideals, ideals concerning their own motivational states; they want to want certain things because they believe that being motivated by certain second-order desires is of noninstrumental worth. In short, to be a person is to value being a certain sort of person' (36-7). Having such internal ideals is prerequisite to judging one's life to be good, and thus to affirming one's life, since they provide the standards for making that evaluation.

Justification becomes important for our self-affirmations when we remind ourselves that we are the self-reflective arbiters of what is important and that to be rationally self-reflective and justified in one's judgments (i.e., make them for the right reasons) is one of the internal ideals of persons. An adequate standard of justification requires coherence amongst one's values and between one's values (desires judged good) and motives. It also requires the possibility that one could rationally justify one's ideals. Having defended such standards of justification, M then argues that persons could not coherently defend or justify the sufficiency of either a strictly hedonic or a merely affirmational ideal of personal happiness. Reflective persons who try to justify their personal ideals will necessarily include amongst their ideals the ideal of rationality for their ideals as a standard that must be satisfied for personal happiness.

Thus M finds important internal connections between the three varieties of happiness. A person seeking happiness as satisfaction finds that, because of her internal ideals, she cannot find satisfaction (of her internal ideals, which are second-order desires) without also being able to affirm her desires as good. And because rationality is one of her internal ideals, she cannot affirm her desires as good without believing her internal ideals, the standards by which her

desires are judged, to be rationally justifiable. By this route, reflective persons should eventually be led to conclude that to be truly happy, in a fully personal way, one must be able to find satisfaction in a justified affirmation of one's life as a whole. That affirmation in turn must be based upon the satisfaction of our most important desires, and these must also be consistent with our rational internal ideals.

The ideal of rationality and the psychological and social conditions for pursuing it are instances of a broad category of 'value-constitutive goods,' i.e., goods without which there can be no value. Thus, whatever else one may prize, a rational individual ideal should contain these value-constitutive goods. Moreover, McFall, like Plato, argues that in addition to the more abstract requirements of rationality, a rational person should include the just treatment of others amongst her internal ideals, since justice is indeed (on the whole, in all probability) more profitable than injustice.

This is an impressive book, which imaginatively and instructively tackles a range of themes in philosophical psychology and ethics as they pertain to its central topic. At places the line of argument was not entirely clear to this reader, but the major theses were, on the whole, illuminating and often compelling. A major complaint is that prescriptions for happiness that flow from her study are onesidedly abstract and rationalistic, although she recognizes that other virtues, like justice, might also be shown to be required for happiness. M makes the case that rationality should be amongst a person's ideals, but even if her argument is successful, that still does not indicate what relative strength this ideal should have in relation to other ideals. Our ideal standards are met only in part. How much time, energy, and resources ought we to devote to achieving ever more cogent justifications for our inner ideals? A philosopher might devote a lot to this task, but can we justifiably prescribe for others a comparable level of devotion to rationality as a condition for morality, happiness, or the good life? I think not. Yet, in the absence of other ideals, rationalistic programs like this one run the risk of making the personality type of many philosophers the norm for personhood.

**Peter Miller**

University of Winnipeg

**John L. Pollock**

*Technical Methods in Philosophy.*

Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1990.

Pp. x+126.

US \$33.50. ISBN 0-8133-7871-0.

*Technical Methods in Philosophy* introduces some technical tools and notions important to certain advanced work in philosophy. Its two chapters focus on some fundamentals of set theory and the predicate calculus. The chapter on set theory briefly discusses some basic concepts (e.g., membership, union, intersection, subsets, power sets), relations and properties, functions, recursive definitions, and the Peano-Dedekind axioms for the arithmetic of the natural numbers. Pollock's presentation of set theory is largely nonaxiomatic. The chapter on logic outlines model theory up through Gödel's incompleteness theorems. The book concludes with a few pages on higher-order logic, where quantifiers range over relations and properties as well as individuals.

Overall, the book is demandingly concise in its presentation; it omits all unnecessary details. For instance, the predicate calculus is set forth in about twenty pages, recursive definitions are presented in about six pages, and Gödel's theorems get about fifteen pages. So this is obviously not a book for students new to the field. Pollock apparently regards his primary audience as graduate students preparing for exams in logic. So it's probably best to regard this book as an outline of set theory and logic intended for philosophy graduate students in need of a review. The book can, I suspect, usefully serve this purpose. Students in need of a detailed review of metatheory in logic will, however, have to look elsewhere, for instance, to Geoffrey Hunter's *Metalogic* (Berkeley 1971) or Richard Grandy's *Advanced Logic for Applications* (Boston 1977).

Readers should not expect any review or discussion of the relevant philosophical issues about logic and set theory in Pollock's book. The book is strictly logical; it consistently avoids the surrounding philosophical issues. Nor should readers expect anything surprisingly new by way of logical lessons. The substance of the presentation is standard. Pollock's aim is to present standard notions and theses, not to argue for any novel thesis about set theory or the predicate calculus.

Philosophy graduate students still need, then, a book that illustrates the actual *applications* of set theory and model theory to certain philosophical problems. Neither Pollock nor Hunter nor Grandy

nor anyone else fills this need. Pollock is clearly capable of filling this need, and I wish he had done so in a second part to this book. I know of no textbook that illustrates philosophical applications of set theory and model theory, but we have a number of books by philosophers that settle for a survey of logical notions useful to philosophers. Pollock's book is one of the latter. If you need a *very concise* review of some of the fundamentals of set theory and model theory, Pollock's book is for you.

**Paul K. Moser**

Loyola University of Chicago

**Jenny Teichman**

*Philosophy and the Mind.*

Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press;  
Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell 1988.

Pp. 136. Cdn \$62.50: US \$34.95

(cloth: ISBN 0-631-15752-2);

Cdn \$24.95: US \$12.95

(paper: ISBN 0-631-15753-0).

This book belongs to the difficult-thought-made-easy genre. I don't say this disparagingly; there is a place for such books and this one is good of its kind. It doesn't break any new ground; it is simply a critical sketch of post-WW II philosophy of mind. However there are nuggets scattered throughout – plainspoken, no-nonsense arguments, examples, assessments, and asides that bear the stamp of the author's personality and wit. The text does read like it has descended from lecture notes; the style is telegraphic and the message units are often about the length of what would fit on a file card or two. But again this is not a criticism; indeed it may make the book easier to lecture on, or from.

There are four parts to the book. Part I, Materialism, contains chapters called Behaviorism, Physicalism, and Functionalism. Physicalism has a short but lucid discussion of contingent identity and Kripke's opinion of that. Functionalism incorporates discussion of Block's group minds, Searle's Chinese Room, pain (including Lewis's Martian pain), and general worries about the notion of function. Part II, Linguistic Analysis, contains a chapter each on Wittgenstein and

Ryle, the former emphasizing philosophical methodology more than philosophical psychology.

Part III – French Philosophy of Mind – is there ‘in order to demonstrate that not all philosophy of mind is proceeding in Anglo-Saxon directions’ (3). Yet the chapter on Merleau-Ponty shows that once we get past the system-building theory-of-everything packaging of his opuses we find embedded therein a philosophy of mind that speaks to many of the same issues as English-speaking philosophy of mind. Indeed Davidson, Nagel, Wittgenstein, Strawson, and Ryle are all mentioned by Teichman in this regard. The other chapter on the structuralism of Lévi-Strauss does however indicate a marked difference of direction – so different in fact that ‘changing the subject’ might be a more appropriate characterization. For structuralists, it seems, are more interested in the social products of the mind, especially the classificatory systems it creates, than in how it works. But perhaps this could be an antidote for some of our ills. As Teichman remarks, ‘a strict diet of Anglo-American functionalism can create the impression that the most important workings of the human mind consist in operations like seeing red patches and believing things about cats on mats’ (84).

Part IV, Mind, Science, and Explanation, returns us to the English-speaking mainstream. A chapter called Varieties of Dualism, wherein discussions of Davidson’s anomalous monism and Nagel’s critique of materialism occur, addresses various issues of intertheoretic reduction and levels of description and explanation. Another called The Study of Matter and its Laws gives us highlights of Hempel, Kuhn, and Feyerabend on the nature of science, the suggestion being that theories of mind are only as viable as the conceptions of science they rely on. The last chapter, The Study of Mankind, continues with problems of science and reduction, wrapping up with a section on properties and bridge laws. Teichman then closes on a mugwumpian note.

This book (with some omissions) could be used in a full-year Introduction to Philosophy course in which philosophy of mind is not taught until late in the year. It could also be used for a half-year 200- or 300-level Introduction to Philosophy of Mind class, although a fair bit of supplementation would be needed.

**Karl Pfeifer**  
University of Saskatchewan

**Robert Ware and Kai Nielsen, eds.**

*Analyzing Marxism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume 15.*

Calgary AB: University of Calgary Press  
1989. Pp. 549.

Cdn \$25.00; US \$21.00. ISBN 0-919491-14-6.

This book will be of great interest to all those interested in recent debates within Marxist theory. The papers in it can be grouped under four headings. First there are papers by writers who accept the framework of rational choice Marxism articulated by Elster and Roemer. Little argues that popular political action cannot simply be deduced from class exploitation. The explanation of popular collective action must invoke micro-foundations specifying the mechanisms whereby some exploited classes engage in collective action and some do not (regarding political culture, leadership abilities, organizational resources, strength of opposing forces, and so on). Shaw attempts to specify the micro-mechanisms that explain why it is that the ideas of the ruling class tend to be the ruling ideas. Shaw's list ranges from the ruling class's control of the means of mental production to the fact that ideas of the ruling class tend to be reinforced in everyday life. Van Parijs employs analytical techniques in a careful conceptual analysis of the concept 'abundance'. He argues that both fairness and efficiency mandate that abundance be defined in terms of an adequate universal grant sufficient to cover everyone's needs.

Another set of articles vehemently reject the methodological assumptions of rational choice Marxists. Mandel makes a convincing case that social phenomena cannot be completely explained by means of a reduction to the psychology of individual agents. McCarney concentrates on Elster's claim that Marx remains of interest primarily due to uncovering cases in the social realm exemplifying the fallacy of composition. He establishes that what is really at stake in Marx's discussions has to do with casual mechanisms in the empirical world, rather than instance of logical errors. McCarney also dismisses Elster's rejection of methodological collectivism, arguing that the scope Elster himself grants for classes to operate as class conscious strategic actors is in practice all his opponents require. Schmitt traces methodological individualism back to psychological individualism, the view that our relation to others is not part of our identity. He argues that this perspective cannot adequately account for the social dimension of language or of rational activity, and that it continues

the social ontology of patriarchy. Ripstein objects to rational choice theory on the grounds that it is too exclusively consequentialist. It thus cannot account for social action undertaken because agents wish to be certain sorts of persons, regardless of the consequences of those acts. This gives us reason to hope that difficulties in collective action stressed by analytical Marxists may be surmountable.

A third set of papers explores the debate about exploitation set off by Roemer. In Roemer's own paper he introduces a number of relatively minor changes in his definition of exploitation in order to avoid counter-examples raised against his earlier definitions. For example, given earlier definitions it might be possible to say that children exploited their parents. This is no longer the case.

Four papers present criticisms of Roemer's approach. Christie argues that Roemer's standard for assessing exploitation, the strict equalization of utility, is not cogent. Schweickart replies to the claim made by Roemer (and other analytical Marxists) that a corn theory of exploitation is as valid as the labor theory of exploitation. In a mathematically rigorous fashion Schweickart shows that any exploitation of the owners of corn ultimately rests upon the exploitation of labor power. Reiman argues contra Roemer that exploitation in Marx's sense is not primarily a matter of the distribution of things (productive assets), but of social relations; that it inherently involves an exercise of force; and that it exclusively concerns production. Dymski and Elliott do not so much criticize Roemer as show him to be incomplete. In their view he has correctly defined one sort of exploitation. But his ahistorical assumptions that labor is unforced and that the labor/labor power distinction is irrelevant prevent him from recognizing other sorts of exploitation, even more important for an understanding both of Marx and of capitalism. Laycock's paper is directed against Marx himself, and not Roemer. Laycock believes that while the means of subsistence purchased by the laborer have value, labor power does not. Since the Marxian notion of surplus value depends on assuming labor power has a value, that notion is incoherent.

Another group of essays discusses the relationship of Marxism and morality. Norman argues that the most important aspect of the Marxian legacy is its implicit normative dimension, based on an egalitarian interpretation of traditional humanist values. In contrast, for Sayers ethical evaluations are secondary, being derived from a theory of stages in historical progress. Satz puts the normative dimension much closer to the heart of historical materialism, insisting that Marx had two distinct standards of progress: productive advance, and

the increasing institutionalization of objective values. The collection closes with a long Afterword by Nielsen that is mostly devoted to this debate. Nielsen holds that there are certain objective normative values (such as egalitarianism), and he evaluates various articles in the collection based on this perspective.

Finally there are three papers that do not fit under these headings. Ware provides an introductory overview of the collection. Levine insists that the thesis that classes are the agents of structural change, a core thesis in Marxism, remains empirically defensible. Cunningham intervenes in the debate between those who insist on an appreciation of tradition and those who demand a critical orientation to it. He argues that a commitment to democracy captures the truth of both perspectives.

Of course no single collection can ever offer a complete overview of the terrain. With the exception of Schmitt, no author argues from an explicitly socialist feminist standpoint. And the work of Habermas is only mentioned once in an aside, despite the fact that authors such as Reiman and Satz defend positions substantially identical to his. Nonetheless, this anthology can be recommended highly. Most of the papers in this volume would be accessible to the non-specialist. The papers are of uniformly high quality, and a number make seminal contributions to the field.

### **Tony Smith**

Iowa State University

### **Norbert Waszek**

*The Scottish Enlightenment and  
Hegel's Account of 'Civil Society'.*

Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers  
1988. Pp. xiv+286.

US \$87.50. ISBN 90-247-3596-3.

This work is primarily a study of Scottish influences upon Hegel's political philosophy. Its author attempts to show that Hegel's account of the Market Economy, his 'libéralisme interventioniste' and his account of the division of labour presuppose an intimate knowledge of

the works of Adam Ferguson, Henry Home (Lord Kames), David Hume, Francis Hutcheson, Adam Smith and James Steuart, and that his views on these topics can therefore be properly understood only against the background of eighteenth-century Scottish philosophical and economic thinking. Waszek essentially delivers what he promises. Thus, in chapter 4 (142-79) he shows convincingly and in great detail that Hegel's views on human needs, labor, exchange, and social classes are dependent in various ways on Ferguson, Hume, Smith, and Steuart. Chapter 5 (180-204) demonstrates not only the shortcomings of such older interpretations (as that of Ernst Bloch, for instance) that confuse the economist James Steuart with the later philosopher Dugald Stewart, but also that a better knowledge of the theories of Smith and Steuart is essential for an understanding of Hegel's qualified acceptance of a liberal market economy. And in chapter 6 (205-28) Waszek makes clear how Hegel's views on the division of labour are dependent on the Scots. Though I am not as sure as Waszek that 'Hegel emerges as *the* philosopher of the modern world' from this study, I believe he is quite correct in claiming that the evidence he provides lends 'qualified support to the 'liberal' interpretation of Hegel' (230). His detailed investigations show that any attempt to exclusively relate 'Hegel's political thought to the contemporary conditions in Prussia' is wrong, and that 'the notorious charge that Hegel accomodated his views to repressive political circumstance' is therefore without foundation (231). Hegel was well informed, and it is significant he was 'strongly ... influenced by ... Scottish philosophers, who thought and wrote amidst the social developments which made Great Britian the leading industrial and commercial nation' (232). He wrote indeed 'on the basis of wide *European* political and social developments and experiences' (232), and it is good that Waszek again reminds us of that.

The book is not exhausted by these investigations of particular issues in Hegel. In order to make his case for a Scottish influence upon Hegel, Waszek also feels it necessary to examine 'the very wide topic of the Scottish Enlightenment in Germany' (56-83), and to discuss the evidence for Hegel's knowledge of the Scottish enlightenment. (84-179). His account of the Scottish influence in Germany remains somewhat sketchy. He only scratches the surface of this 'very wide topic,' and his bibliographical account of this topic would have to be considered misleading, if it were viewed as being complete. However, it does achieve its objective within the context of the book. Waszek shows that the theories of the Scots were sufficiently well known and

widely discussed in Germany so that Hegel can be assumed to have been acquainted with their works from very early on. While this part of his work ultimately is – in spite of some interesting finds and pertinent observations – disappointing, his discussion of Hegel’s knowledge of English, and of Hegel’s study of British authors in general and the Scots in particular makes for fascinating reading. He shows that Hegel knew some English at least since 1791, or his years as a student at the University of Tübingen, and that he probably perfected his reading skills during the Bern period, when he had access to a substantial library at the Tschugg residence of the Steiger family. This discussion should provide a good starting point for a fuller discussion of Hegel’s indebtedness to the civilization of Great Britain. As Waszek himself points out, a full examination of the relationship between Hegel’s aesthetic views and those of Home (Lord Kames) could very well prove to be rewarding (102, 102n). His bibliographical lists of books by British authors in Hegel’s own library as well as those in the Tschugg library should provide useful tools for such a discussion (282-86). However, the book would have been still more useful, if it had an index.

It is also somewhat disappointing that Waszek makes no attempt at placing his results into the wider context of Hegel’s view on the state, or to discuss their significance for Hegel’s view in general. He finds that in ‘the end, no doubt, Hegel’s intellectual labour with regard to the Scottish Enlightenment will reveal the well-known stages of the Hegelian ‘*Aufhebung*’: (a) an assimilating acceptance (‘conserve’); (b) a precise criticism (‘negare’); a raising to a higher level (‘tollere’)’ (231). Perhaps this so. But is it so without any doubt? I think that there would have been room for a more critical attitude. In any case, Waszek restricts himself to the stage of assimilating acceptance, or ‘*neutrale Einzelforschung*,’ as he calls it, following Pöggeler (33). He is right in claiming that he has shown that Hegel’s view of the state is dependent upon the views of the Scottish enlightenment thinkers, but I believe he owes us not only a characterisation of Hegel’s particular *Aufhebung* of Scottish philosophy, but also an account of what are the significant consequences for our understanding of Hegel that follow from his results.

**Manfred Kuehn**  
Purdue University

## L. Wittgenstein

*Lectures on Philosophical Psychology*

1946-47. Ed. P.T. Geach.

Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1988.

Pp. 368. US \$39.95 ISBN 0-226-90428-8.

Three sets of notes were available to the publishers, those of P.T. Geach, K.J. Shah and A.C. Jackson, and it was decided, rather than melding them into one, to print all three just as they came, with whatever minor editorial changes seemed obviously desirable. This does not limit the interest or the usefulness of the volume as much as one might expect, because so very often the note-takers would either record different parts of the discussion of any one topic, with different arguments and examples, or convey different impressions of what was going on in the same part.

Geach's and Shah's notes were taken in class, and were as verbatim as could be expected from people who, lacking full-fledged shorthand, could record only parts of what kept pouring forth. Jackson made his notes from memory on the evening of the day a class was given, and he only claims to have reproduced the sense or the gist of the discussions. Oddly enough each set of notes came out in the published volume at the same number of pages (113).

The lectures come across in all three accounts as having been very rambling, with Wittgenstein moving along from one topic to another and back, and as far as I can see, rarely saying anything he had not said before at least once and often many times, in other airings of a given topic. In spite of that, there were a great many places where he said something in a new way, and I was often able to confirm interpretive theories, and also sometimes was left quite worried about possibly having been all wrong about a suggested interpretation.

Some features I found quite interesting:

1. Several times (200, 214, 308) Wittgenstein said of one or another sentence or expression, 'That is an utterance.' The word 'utterance' is sometimes used in philosophy as a neutral way of alluding to someone's saying something, without calling what was said a question, an order, an assertion, etc. When that is its sense, one does not *assert* that something is an utterance. This concept of an utterance was new to me, and my best guess about its meaning is that anything described as an utterance in this sense is (like 'Damn!' or 'Oh good!' or 'What rotten luck!') – an expression (rather than a report) or annoyance, pleasure or sympathy. (Jackson, I think, got something

wrong here. 'I'm ready to cry' is called an utterance, and Wittgenstein goes on to say that one might describe how exactly a person who said that was feeling. Jackson has Wittgenstein continuing 'but to this one says "so that's what happens when you're ready to cry"'. However the word 'but' seems to have no place here, and also it is false that 'one' says 'so that's what happens (etc.)'; but it is both true and uses 'but' appropriately, to say 'but no one says "so that's what 'I am ready to cry' reports"'.)

2. There is a lot more about 'signals' than I had seen elsewhere. In *PI* §180 Wittgenstein says we might call the words 'Now I know how to go on' a signal; and I am not sure what is meant by this, but he contrasted signalling with describing mental states; and that, taken together with his calling the signal 'Now I know how to go on' a glad start (in *PI* §323) might suggest that giving this signal is like an expression of pleasure: it may show what state we are in, but it is not a report of that state. If there is anything in this line of thinking, it could all be got from the *Investigations* and I did not find anything in the remarks on signals in these lectures that either confirmed or disconfirmed the suggestion I have just made.

3. There was also much discussion of what Wittgenstein called the specificity of feelings, colours, smells and some other things. This is another topic to which he frequently returns, and also one I never feel sure I have understood; but I suspect Wittgenstein is groping for a way of handling the problem that arises when we are dissatisfied with calling orange 'orange', or the smell of coffee 'the smell of coffee', and want to, but find we cannot, refer people to experiences, to explain what the words mean. I suppose other examples of this would be Locke's saying, after giving several explanations of what solidity is, that if you want to know what it is, hold a football between your hands and try to bring them together; or Hume's saying that words like 'lively', 'solid' and 'steady' could never capture the peculiar feel of an idea when it is a belief, and to know this feeling, you only need to believe something. It is certainly intriguing what makes us want to say such things, or what is wrong with doing so; but I have never found the mystery unravelled by any of Wittgenstein's airings of it.

Some of the endearing things I noticed were: 'Suppose I say to a Martian, "On earth we measure time" – [and she replies] "What, time too?"' (24; see also 141.) 'We draw a conclusion unconsciously.' 'Shut up!' (208) 'Suppose someone says: "I am comparing my words to my thought." Should we take his word? "He is a reliable man."' (248)

'The question is: What is the method? The answer is: No method. It's an interesting fact. Don't try to make it uninteresting by explaining it – you won't anyhow.' (255)

'(This question will follow you around for years, if you follow it around.)' (257)

My prize for the student most in need of Wittgenstein's help goes to someone called Hyjab, who said, apparently in all seriousness, that being in pain is just like knowing, only more intense.

**J.F.M. Hunter**

University of Toronto

**Richard M. Zaner, ed.**

*Death: Beyond Whole-Brain Criteria.*

Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers  
1988. Pp. x+276.

US \$69.00. ISBN 1-55608-053-0.

The development of effective respiratory support technology confounded those who have the task of deciding when a patient has died. In the sixties, physicians began claiming that the ICU's machines can create the appearances of life (heartbeat, rhythmic movement of the chest, warm skin) long after death has occurred. The improvement of organ transplantation techniques in the seventies gave good reason to declare death even while the appearances of life remained; and there ensued wide public discussion of the need to redefine death. These discussions reached closure in North America with the publication in 1981 of two government reports: Law Reform Commission of Canada, *Criteria for the Determination of Death (Report 15)*; and U.S. President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, *Defining Death*. Both of these documents recommended the adoption into law of 'whole-brain criteria' mentioned in this book's title. In the LRCC's words, 'a person is dead when an irreversible cessation of all that person's brain functions has occurred' (*Report*, 25). On the consensus view of these reports, an individual whose whole brain has irreversibly ceased functioning is dead; and he should be declared dead even if the team maintains a heartbeat, proper temperature and so forth in the body.

But if either the brain stem (which controls 'vegetative' functions such as spontaneous respiration and temperature regulation) or the neocortex (which controls mental operations) continues to function, then the individual is alive. Thus, the patient in persistent vegetative state (PVS), who has lost the ability to think or feel but who breathes spontaneously, is alive.

Zaner's collection is the product of a conference which critically examined the President's Commission report. Most of the papers criticize the Commission's recommendation and argue for public policies which focus on the loss of higher-brain or neocortical function. A preliminary issue considered in passing by many of the authors is the nature of the Commission's role: was its task to redefine death or to provide new criteria for the determination of death? Most of the writers here seem to agree with Marx Wartofsky who notes that what is often described as a question about the definition of death is really 'a question concerning the peculiar human requirement that a person has to be *declared* dead ... human death, unlike animal death, is a socially constituted fact requiring a judgment' (219). A large number of important social consequences turn upon this judgment. Under current law, it determines: when certain organs can be harvested for transplantation; when wills can be read and property redistributed; when a surviving spouse is free to marry; when payment of health care insurance benefits stops and life insurance payments must begin. If death is caused by another's act, the time of death determines what criminal charges can be laid. Some assume that it is also crucial in deciding whether medical treatment can be stopped.

The number and diversity of behavioural implications of the declaration of death lead Patricia White to wonder whether any single formulation can suffice. She suggests that a number of context-dependent definitions might be preferable. This approach, however, is rejected by the other writers as unnecessarily complex. Their shared view is that one set of criteria for declaring death is needed. And these criteria must adequately account for both the biological facts and their social implications.

The defense of the criteria recommended by the President's Commission lies in the capable hands of Alexander Capron, who served as the Commission's Executive Director. He sets out four objectives which, he believes, should be used in assessing the report: its policy recommendation should be 'medically accurate, conceptually sound, accessible to the public, and free from undue complexity' (148). Capron argues that the Commission's recommendation on the declaration of

death satisfies the mixed standards well. His objection to the higher-brain oriented concepts is not that they are unsound or inaccurate; rather he criticizes them for being inaccessible to the public. In particular, he notes that the alternative formulations see death as the loss of either personhood or personal identity. This poses a problem for the policy maker since 'nothing approaching agreement exists about what things are essential to 'personhood', or about how to solve the philosophical problem of identity' (159).

Robert Veatch concedes that there is an unresolved dispute over the concept of personhood; but he does not believe that this should lead to rejection of the 'neocortically related' concept of death. While he personally favours this concept, he admits that it is far from universally accepted. The lack of broad social consensus leads him to advocate a public policy allowing individual choice: 'the choice of a definition of death should be left to individual conscience' (184).

Edward Bartlett and Stuart Youngner challenge Capron more directly in a clearly formulated attack on the conceptual soundness of the whole-brain death concept. They accuse the proponents of the whole-brain formulation of failing to take seriously enough the conceptual issue. Indeed, both the LRCC and the President's Commission suggest that the issue is an irresolvable one and that resolution is not necessary for public policy making. Bartlett and Youngner then contend that the definition which seems to be favoured by many of the whole-brain death advocates is inconsistent with the criteria for determination of death that they offer.

Few of the remaining contributors directly engage the soundness of the whole-brain formulation. Instead, they argue that the alternative formulation based only on higher-brain functions is conceptually sound, captures many of our intuitions about what is important in life, and that the adoption of this alternative would solve a number of pressing social problems. David R. Smith, for instance, notes the difficulty courts have in deciding whether it is permissible to remove artificial feeding from patients in PVS. This difficulty would dissolve if higher-brain criteria were adopted, allowing these patients to be declared dead. Roland Puccetti makes essentially the same point with an amusing story involving a dog, a publisher and carbon monoxide.

The ongoing debates over harvesting organs from anencephalic infants and over the treatment of patients in PVS ensure that this book will continue to be of interest for some time to come.


**Glenn G. Griener**  
University of Alberta

# Analyzing Marxism

**Canadian Journal  
of Philosophy**  
Supplementary  
Volume 15

Edited by  
**Robert Ware  
and Kai Nielsen**

ISSN 0229-7051  
ISBN 0-919491-14-6



New  
Essays  
on  
Analytical  
Marxism

**Canadian Journal of Philosophy**  
Supplementary Volume 15 (1999)

Price: CDN \$25.00 (in Canada)  
US \$21.00 (outside Canada)  
Please add \$1.50 for postage and handling,  
and 50 cents for each additional copy.

A collection of original essays in and on analytical Marxism, indicating the diversity, dynamism, and contentiousness of recent philosophical work on Marxism. The papers are by *Andrew Levine, Richard Norman, Sean Sayers, Ernest Mandel, Joseph McCarney, Daniel Little, Frank Cunningham, Richard Schmitt, John E. Roemer, Drew Christie, David Schweickart, Jeffrey Reiman, Gary A. Dymksi & John E. Elliot, Henry Laycock, Debra Satz, William H. Shaw, Arthur Ripstein, and Philippe Van Parijs. Robert Ware* contributes an introduction, and *Kai Nielsen* an afterword.

Order from: The University of Calgary Press  
2500 University Drive N.W.  
Calgary, AB, Canada T2N 1N4

## Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volumes

New Essays in the History of Philosophy  
New Essays in the Philosophy of Mind  
New Essays on Plato and the Pre-Socratics  
New Essays on Contract Theory  
New Essays on Rationalism and Empiricism  
New Essays on John Stuart Mill and  
Utilitarianism  
New Essays in Philosophy of Language  
Marx and Morality  
New Essays in Ethics and Public Policy

New Essays on Plato  
New Essays on Aristotle  
New Essays in Philosophy of Mind,  
Series II  
Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and  
Disarmament  
Science, Morality & Feminist Theory  
Philosophy & Biology  
Analyzing Marxism  
Canadian Philosophers

The *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* is published quarterly, in March, June, September and December. In addition to these regular issues, the C.J.P. publishes annually a supplementary volume of original papers on a selected theme of contemporary philosophical interest. This supplementary volume is free to individual and student subscribers to the journal in that year. Supplementary volumes may also be purchased separately.

Correspondence regarding subscriptions, renewals, single issues and supplementary volume orders should be addressed to *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* c/o The University of Calgary Press, University of Calgary, Calgary, Alberta, Canada T2N 1N4.

1990 volume/four issues:	<b>Canada</b>	<b>Foreign</b>
Institutions	Cdn. \$35.00	US \$36.00
Individuals	20.00	20.00
Students	13.00	13.00
Single issues	9.00	9.00
Analyzing Marxism:	\$25.00	\$21.00

plus postage and handling

The University of Calgary Press  
2500 University Drive N.W.  
CALGARY, Alberta, Canada T2N 1N4

Individual  Student  x \_\_\_\_\_  
ANALYZING MARXISM  x \_\_\_\_\_  
Postage x \_\_\_\_\_  
Please send me information on  
C.J.P. Supplementary Volumes

Name \_\_\_\_\_

Address \_\_\_\_\_

City \_\_\_\_\_

Country \_\_\_\_\_ Postal Code \_\_\_\_\_

Visa  Mastercard

No. \_\_\_\_\_ Expiry Date \_\_\_\_\_

Signature \_\_\_\_\_

# APEIRON

a journal for ancient philosophy and science

Volume 22 number 4 (December 1989)

Special issue for 1989

**Nature, Knowledge and Value: Essays in Memory of Joan Kung**

edited by Richard Kraut and Terry Penner

*Contributors* Kathleen C. Cook, Allan Gotthelf, Ian Mueller, Charles H. Kahn, Mohan Matthen, Fred D. Miller Jr, Deborah K.W. Modrak, Theodore Scaltsas, Nicholas P. White, Gareth B. Matthews, Charlotte Witt

Also available as a separate volume for \$19.95 paper, \$35.95 cloth.  
(Prices in US\$, outside Canada )

Volume 23 number 1 (March 1990)

Aristotle's Four Types of Definition

*Marguerite Deslauriers*

Aristotle and the Functional Debate

*Herbert Granger*

Speech and Thought, Symbol and Likeness:

Aristotle's *De Interpretatione* 16a3-9

*Ronald Polansky and Mark Kuczewski*

Aristotle the First Cognitivist?

*Deborah Modrak*

Volume 23 number 2 (June 1990)

Aristarchus of Samos on Thales' Theory of Eclipses

*Andrei V. Lebedev*

The 'Theology' of the Hippocratic Treatise *On the Sacred Disease*

*Ph. J. van der Eijk*

Plato, Inquiry and Painting

*Michael L. Morgan.*

Volume 23 number 4 (December 1989)

The special issue for 1990 will be:

**The Poetics of Therapy: Hellenistic Ethics in its Rhetorical and Literary Context**

edited by Martha Nussbaum

## Subscription Prices for Volume 23 (1990)

Individual: Cdn\$36.00 (Canadian)

Cdn\$46.00/US\$38.00 (non-Canadian)

Institution: Cdn\$50.00 (Canadian)

Cdn\$62.00/US\$52.00 (non-Canadian)

Subscription orders for APEIRON and orders for *Nature, Knowledge and Virtue* should be sent to the following address:

Academic Printing and Publishing  
P.O. Box 4834, Edmonton, Alberta  
CANADA T6E 5G7

Cheque, institutional purchase order, or VISA\* are accepted.

\*with a VISA order, please include card number, signature, subscriber name and expiry date.

A JOURNAL from ACADEMIC PRINTING AND PUBLISHING

## MAN AND NATURE / L'HOMME ET LA NATURE

The yearbook of the Canadian Society for Eighteenth-Century Studies

**Man and Nature / L'Homme et la Nature** consists of selected papers from the annual meetings of the Society. The contents are interdisciplinary in character, dealing with the art, literature, theatre, music and philosophy, and the economic, political, and social life of the period. Contributions are in English and French.

- |   |  |
|---|--|
| <b>Volume VIII (1989)</b>                       | <b>Nicholas Hudson and Rosena Davison, eds.</b><br>Est. 224 pp ISBN 0-920980-43-0 paperbound \$22.95                     |
| <b>Volume VII (1988)</b><br>2 b/w illustrations | <b>Marie-Laure Girou-Swidorski and John Hare, eds.</b><br>228 pp ISBN 0-920980-42-2 paperbound \$22.95                   |
| <b>Volume VI (1987)</b><br>30 b/w illustrations | <b>Kenneth W. Graham and Neal Johnson, eds.</b><br>282 pp ISBN 0-920980-21-X paperbound \$26.95                          |
| <b>Volume V (1986)</b><br>12 b/w illustrations  | <b>Richard A. Lebrun and E.T. Annandale, eds.</b><br>224 pp ISBN 0-920980-13-9 paperbound \$22.95                        |
| <b>Volume IV (1985)</b><br>5 b/w illustrations  | <b>David H. Jory and Charles Stewart-Robertson, eds.</b><br>208pp ISBN 0-920980-12-0 paperbound \$18.95                  |
| <b>Volume III (1984)</b><br>1 b/w illustration  | <b>Robert James Merrett, ed.</b><br>174pp ISBN 0-920980-04-X clothbound \$26.95<br>ISBN 0-920980-05-8 paperbound \$16.95 |
| <b>Volume II (1983)</b>                         | <b>Roger L. Emerson, William Kinsley, and Walter Moser, eds.</b><br>156pp ISBN 0-920980-36-8 paperbound \$15.95          |

The volumes differ in size and are priced accordingly. Individual volumes may be purchased as books, or a series subscription ordered on a standing basis. The issues are published in paperback, except as noted.

TO ORDER, PLEASE CONTACT:

Phone: (403) 435-5898  
VISA accepted

**Academic Printing and Publishing**  
P.O. BOX 4834  
South Edmonton, Alberta  
Canada T6E 5G7

██████████  
Editor's Note

The anglophone editor of

Canadian Philosophical Reviews  
Revue Canadienne de Comptes rendus en Philosophie

is pleased to announce the acquisition of an address for **electronic mail** on the University of Alberta's mainframe computer.

Correspondents and contributors are encouraged to use the address for replying to invitations, submissions of reviews and any other messages.

The E-mail address of CPR/RCCP is

CPRS@UALTAMTS.BITNET

Any institution's computing services department will be able to advise on how to access the address.

*R.A. Shiner*