

# Canadian Philosophical Reviews

## Revue Canadienne de Comptes rendus en Philosophie

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### Academic Printing & Publishing

P.O. Box 4834, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada  
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Second Class Mail Registration No. 5550

ISSN 0228-491X  
c 1990 Academic Printing & Publishing

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**Norman E. Bowie, ed.**

*Equal Opportunity.*

Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1988.

Pp. viii+200.

US \$35.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8133-0567-5);

US \$15.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8133-0568-3).

The jacket of this book announces that 'equal opportunity is crucial both to democratic theory and to the United States' sense of its own national purpose.' The essays in *Equal Opportunity* confront the problems of definition and application that must be addressed if a coherent conception of equal opportunity is to be produced.

The first two essays tackle the global concept of equal opportunity. In the second, Brian Barry develops an argument he finds in chapter 2 of Rawls's *A Theory of Justice*. Barry argues that Rawls's difference principle can be interpreted in three stages which 'embody increasingly stringent notions of equal opportunity' (25). He calls the stages natural liberty, liberal equality and democratic equality. The move from the first stage to the second involves supplementing exchange in a free market with social provision of important opportunities like education. However, once such social contingencies are corrected, it seems unfair not to consider adjusting natural abilities, i.e., genetic endowments, which after all, affect distributions substantially. Barry's conclusion is that one must resist the mistaken idea that all differences in attainment are morally arbitrary. This allows for the adoption of a more refined version of liberal equality.

In the first essay, Fishkin points out that any social theorist addressing equal opportunity will face an irreconcilable trilemma, 'a forced choice among three principles: Merit, Equality of Life Chances and The Autonomy of the Family' (16). Fishkin shows that in implementing any two of the ideals a society will find it impossible to redress the third.

The remaining essays in the collection narrow the scope of the inquiry by considering equal opportunity with respect to a particular group, issue or context. Christopher Jencks confronts the reader with a problem that any provider of services must face, e.g., how should a teacher divide his time and effort between individual students? He discusses five conceptions. Moralistic Justice rewards virtue and punishes vice. Humane Justice stresses the previously disadvantaged, while Myopic and Enlightened Utilitarianism recommend overall welfare. Finally Jencks outlines an egalitarian conception. Even without

a more detailed statement of the various conceptions, the reader will appreciate that the teacher faces difficult, and perhaps insoluble, problems of allocation of opportunity.

Jennifer Hochschild in her extensively documented essay considers what has happened historically to blacks with different kinds of opportunity. She shows that for many areas of social concern, e.g., family income, education and employment, studies reveal that, while the situation of blacks improved for a time, in the 80s it has fallen back, although not to the levels of the 60s. She effectively develops the contrast between providing an 'equal box of tools' and 'the skills needed to exploit the tools' to expose weaknesses in the provision of opportunity for blacks. She points out that if blacks have been given the same external means, but are emotionally unable or do not know how to use them, 'a philosophically responsible argument must then consider whether that formal provision of tools suffices or whether recipients should be retrained to use their tools effectively' (96).

In his essay George Sher argues that opportunities in employment and education should be awarded to those best qualified. At the heart of Sher's positive argument lies the idea that selection on the basis of merit is both connected at a deep level to the concept of agency, and strongly affirms 'internal connections' with the aims of education and employment. Sher does allow that preferential treatment could be justified in some cases, e.g., where individuals 'were prevented by past discrimination, or by its effects, from developing their skills' (125).

Both Mansbridge and Beitz are interested in the conditions that must be satisfied for all to have equal opportunity to exercise political power. Their insightful essays expose complexities arising within that topic.

Owen M. Fiss examines equal opportunity for speech by exploring the 'Free Speech Tradition' First Amendment Cases decided in the United States Supreme Court. The Tradition has its origins in the protection of the soapbox-corner speaker criticising government. Fiss believes that the Tradition has misled the Court in other situations, e.g., choices made by the media between broadcasting 'Love Boat' in prime time as opposed to 'a critique of Reagan's foreign policy.' Because the Tradition emphasises the autonomy of the speaker there is a reluctance to interfere with the media. If however, one recognizes a 'rich public debate' as crucial and perhaps dominant, for free speech to fulfill its social role, one would be prepared to require the media to air public issues in prime time hours. The implications for equal

opportunity would be that not all speakers would be treated equally and indeed should not be.

Because it is impossible to do justice to the essays in a short review, it is important to point out some general virtues of the text. It should have wide appeal because, as the editor Norman Bowie points out in his fine introductory essay, 'the traditional view of equal opportunity has been described, and the objections against it clearly raised. If we are to expand the notion, the difficulties that face us are known' (12). When one adds that ample bibliographies are included with a number of the essays, and that some of the essays are parts of books published, this volume would be useful for university courses. Finally, because each essay can be read independently, interested general readers can spend a stimulating and informative hour reading any one of them at their leisure.

**Jack Iwanicki**

University of New Brunswick

**Robert Cummins**

*Meaning and Mental Representation.*

Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1989.

Pp. xii+180. US \$20.00. ISBN 0-262-03139-6.

Theories of mental representation are all the rage these days. There are causal co-variation theories (Dretske and Fodor), teleological theories (Millikan and Papineau), functional role theories (Field and Block), and theories inspired by the causal theory of reference (Devitt and Sterelny). There are single factor theories (Harman), multiple factor theories (McGinn), and a profusion of variations on all of these themes. It is hard to find a current volume of a major journal that does not have at least one article offering an argument against someone's theory of mental representation. But although there is no shortage of heated debate, there is an acute shortage of careful reflection on what all this debate is *about*. Almost no one pauses to ask what a theory of mental representation is supposed to *do*, or what would count as getting the theory *right*. One of the many virtues of Cummins's exciting and provocative book is that it starts out by tackling these questions head-on.

They are the sort of questions that one kicks oneself for not having asked long ago, for as soon as they are asked it becomes obvious that there are various different projects to pursue, and that at least some of the disagreement may be traced to the fact that different theorists are actually pursuing different goals. One project aims to analyze the concept of *intentionality* that is embedded in commonsense psychology. Another cluster of projects try to give accounts of the concepts of representation that are invoked in one or another part of science. It is often uncritically assumed that these efforts must be intimately related, but Cummins argues that this is quite wrong. His goal is to describe the sort of representation that is invoked in computational theories of cognition, of the sort that are all but ubiquitous in cognitive science – or were until the very recent flourishing of connectionism. This sort of representation, Cummins argues, is not the intentionality presupposed by commonsense psychology, nor does it hold much promise of contributing to an analysis of the commonsense notion.

Early chapters of the volume are devoted to a lucid and useful survey of some traditional and contemporary accounts of mental representation. None of these, Cummins argues, provide an adequate analysis of the notion of representation that is used in the computational theory of cognition (CTC). Representation in the CTC abstracts from history – it treats a pair of computationally identical organisms the same, no matter how they got into their current computational configuration. It follows that no evolutionary account of representation (of the sort advocated by Millikan, Papineau and others) will work for the CTC, since in all such accounts the content of a representational state is a function of its history.

Any account of the notion of representation used in the CTC, and, indeed, any account of the commonsense notion of intentionality, must also allow a robust notion of *misrepresentation* – it must be possible for a system to be radically mistaken. And this requirement, Cummins argues, is the Achilles heel of many traditional and modern accounts of representation. It scuttles analyses based on similarity as well as those based on causal co-variation. Contemporary advocates of co-variation accounts, like Dretske and Fodor, are, of course, well aware of the problem posed by misrepresentation, and have already published modified versions of their theories designed to deal with objections similar to those Cummins sketches.

At the heart of Cummins's book are the chapters in which he sets out his own account of the explanatory strategy of the CTC, and the

notion of representation used in that strategy. As Cummins portrays it, the CTC is built on a basic explanatory analogy: 'The CTC proposes to explain cognitive capacities by appeal to representation and computation in exactly the way that arithmetical capacities of calculators ... are standardly explained by appeal to representation and computation' (89). A familiar hand-held calculator is a physical object; if you hit certain buttons in the right pattern, a visual display will appear. But the calculator does more than produce displays in response to button pressings. It also *adds*. To see the physical device as an adder, we need an *interpretation function* – a systematic mapping of physical states or processes onto abstract mathematical objects like numbers and arithmetic functions. Under that mapping, the calculator *simulates* the mathematical function of addition, and the button pressings and displays *represent* numbers. To make clear that this sort of representation is a technical notion, Cummins labels it *s-representation*.

The fact that the calculator simulates addition is something that needs to be explained. And typically this explanation is provided with the help of the notion of *computation*. In producing the display that s-represents 12 in response to the sequence of button pressings that s-represents  $7+5=$ , the device will pass through a series of steps. With the aid of the interpretation function, these steps can be seen as a computation of the answer, where 'computing reduces to program execution' (91).

'The CTC,' according to Cummins, 'is just the thesis that what works for addition will work for cognition' (111). In the case of cognitive processes, typically the interpretation function will map the input and the output of the processes to propositions or similar entities. Moreover, to count as a cognitive system at all, the output must be 'cogent, or warranted, or rational relative to its inputs ...' (108). These 'epistemologically constrained' (110) processes provide the explanandum for the CTC. Just as we can ask how the calculator can succeed in adding, so too we can ask how the cognitive system succeeds in being cogent. How does it pull off the trick of producing reasonable or warranted outputs? 'The CTC's proposal is that cognitive systems are computational systems' (109). They compute their cogent output by executing a program.

There is no shortage of problems with this picture, many of which Cummins forthrightly acknowledges. Perhaps the most obvious problem is that the notions of interpretation and s-representation seem overly permissive; they make representation too cheap. Consider the

calculator. Under one interpretation it is 'simulating' the function  $x+y$ ; but under another interpretation it is simulating  $2\pi(x+y)$ . 'The obvious moral is that the only really interesting interpretation is what we might call *direct* interpretation.' But, Cummins continues, 'I must confess that I don't know how to define *directness*' (104-5).

Another problem grows out of Cummins's insistence that the function a cognitive system simulates must be 'independently specifiable' (111). In the case of the calculator, our explanandum is the fact that the device, under the appropriate interpretation, simulates the function  $x+y$ . Analogously, for cognitive systems our explanandum must be the fact that the system simulates some specific rational or 'epistemologically constrained' function. But just what function is it that we simulate when we recognize people's faces, or judge the appropriateness of a certain way of deressing for a certain occasion? Cummins dubs this 'the specification problem' (111) and he views it as 'the hardest part of the program'. But there is reason to suspect that Cummins has simply misdescribed the CTC program. For even in domains where the program has been most successful – chess-playing, for example, or speech-processing – there is no independent specification of the function that the cognitive system simulates.

A third problem is one which Cummins does not explicitly acknowledge. On his account, the fact that an object simulates a function is to be explained by appeal to computation. Moreover, 'computing reduces to program execution,' and 'program execution involves *steps*'; it is 'disciplined step satisfaction' (91-2). But surely there must be more to be said. The program being executed must not merely succeed in simulating the appropriate function, it must do so in some comprehensible way. Unless the program gives us some *insight* into how the function is being calculated, it provides no explanation at all. But that leaves us with the problem saying which programs provide insight into the process they simulate, which do not, and why?

Cummins's book is a major contribution to the philosophy of psychology. It pursues a sophisticated project, offers a wealth of original and important proposals, and raises new and difficult problems. What more could you ask?

**Stephen P. Stich**  
Rutgers University

**Laurence R. Horn**

*A Natural History of Negation.*

Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1989.

Pp. xxii+637.

US \$75.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-226-35337-0);

US \$34.95 (paper: ISBN 0-226-35338-9).

*A Natural History of Negation*, while written by a linguist, is the first book any philosopher seriously interested in negation in natural language should read. This scholarly book not only comprises a comprehensive survey of the linguistic, logical, philosophical, and psychological literature on the topic, but also presents a convincing theoretical account of many facets of this puzzling, yet fascinating, feature of natural language.

The crux of the book is that the adverb 'not' is ambiguous in at least two ways. Identification of the first ambiguity is said by Horn to have been anticipated by three other authors: Grice, who, in his *Logic and Conversation*, pointed out that negation in English can be used to reject either the truth of a sentence or its assertability; Dummett, who, in his *Frege's Philosophy of Language* (cf. pp. 328-30), distinguished between negation being used to assert the contradictory of a sentence and negation being used to express an unwillingness to assent to it; and DuCrôt, who, in his *Dire et ne pas Dire*, coined the term 'metalinguistic negation' to apply to the second kind of usage. Horn, pursuing the distinction in great detail and with an abundance of evidence, distinguishes descriptive negation, used to express the simple contradictory of a sentence, from metalinguistic negation, used to reject any of a number of features of a sentence, including its phonetic or syntactic form, its focus, its register, and its implicata – just to mention a few. The latter usage is illustrated below in example sentences adapted from Horn (Chapter 6.2).

- (1) You did not catch two mongeese; you caught two mongooses.
- (2) Ben is not a black man; he is a man who is black.
- (3) Some men are not male; all men are male.
- (4) This was not written for piano and violin; it was written for violin and piano.

Each sentence in the paradigm above consists in a pair of clauses: the first is an appropriate form of the negation of a sentence containing material considered by the speaker to be objectionable; and the second is a sentence in which the material considered objectionable

has been replaced with suitable, unobjectionable material. As Horn notes, the objectionable material and its reformulation receive contrastive stress.

This distinction overcomes the following otherwise puzzling fact. Consider the sentence:

- (5) There are not twelve eggs in the refrigerator; there are thirteen.

This sentence is not usually interpreted as a self-contradiction, though clearly it can be so interpreted. After all, if there are thirteen eggs in the refrigerator, which is asserted by the second clause above, then there are twelve eggs in it, which is denied by the first clause. So, how is the non-contradictory interpretation, which is the more salient one, possible? Horn's distinction between two kinds of negation provides a solution. If the negative adverb 'not' is taken in its metalinguistic sense, then there is no contradiction, since the adverb 'not' is not being used to exclude the truth of the sentence 'there are twelve eggs in the refrigerator', but to exclude the implicature of such a sentence, an implicature to the effect that there are only twelve eggs in the refrigerator. Note that the non-contradictory reading of the sentence in (5) is salient when 'twelve' and 'thirteen' receive contrastive stress, the usual phonological concomitant of metalinguistic negation in English.

The second form of ambiguity broached by Horn accrues to the syntactic configuration in which the adverb 'not' finds itself, when situated between an auxiliary verb and the auxiliary verb's main verb. Horn, who traces the identification of this ambiguity to Aristotle and his distinction between predicate negation and predicate term negation, analyzes the syntactic configuration in terms of the views of Gazdar, Pullum, and Sag, set out in 'Auxiliaries and Related Phenomena in a Restrictive Theory of Grammar' (*Language*: v. 58). He maintains that the adverb, when it occurs after an auxiliary verb, forms a constituent either with both the preceding auxiliary and the succeeding verb, or with just the succeeding verb. The former configuration yields a reading analogous to sentence negation, which Horn calls 'predicate denial', and the latter a reading analogous to verb phrase negation, which he calls 'predicate term denial'. The adverb, when contracted to 'n't', becomes part of the word to which it is attached, and, like all lexicalized items, has fewer predictable variations in interpretation. Its canonical reading, according to Horn, is predicate denial, exemplified by 'can't' and 'couldn't'; though it is liable to a non-canonical reading, namely predicate term denial, exemplified by 'mustn't' and 'shouldn't'.

- (6.1) You can't beat the system.  
(6.2) You mustn't beat the system.

The discussion of the adverb's pragmatic and syntactic ambiguity, in the sixth chapter ('Metalinguistic Negation') and the seventh chapter ('Negative Form and Negative Function') respectively, is preceded by a synopsis of the two and a half millennia of attempts by linguists, logicians, philosophers and psychologists to come to terms with the evasive, yet pervasive, phenomenon of negation in natural language. In the first chapter, 'Negation and Opposition in Classical Logic', thinkers from Aristotle to Frege are surveyed. This chapter even includes an excursus into the work of Indian and Chinese thinkers as well. In the next chapter, 'Negation, Presupposition, and the Excluded Middle', Horn turns his attention to the literature on future contingents, non-referring singular terms, and category mistakes, which form the *locus classicus* of many of the recent attempts to model negation in modern logic.

One feature of negation, observed in the West at least as early as Aristotle, is that negative expressions are less informative than their positive counterparts. Horn, in his third chapter, 'Markedness and the Psychology of Negation', critically examines the psychological literature pertaining to this feature of negation, and concludes that to the extent that negative expressions are less informative, it is found in positive expressions as well, both instances yielding to an independently motivated theory of pragmatic inference. Indeed, as Horn goes on to argue in the next chapter, 'Negation and Quantity', his theory of pragmatic inference not only secures the square of opposition, as a semantically sound observation, from a variety of well-known, countervailing considerations, but also situates it as a specific case of a generalized square, applicable to a whole variety of scalar expressions. He also shows that properties of being monotone increasing and monotone decreasing, attributed by Barwise and Cooper to some quantified expressions in natural language, are attributable to any of their counterparts found among other cases of scalar expressions.

Further issues in the pragmatics of negation are pursued in the fifth chapter, 'The Pragmatics of Contra(dicto)ry Negation.' First, Horn turns his attention to the ebb and flow of contrary and contradictory readings for words with affixal negation. Then, he probes such rhetorical devices as double negation, litotes, and irony. He also broaches the puzzle presented by clausally complex sentences, wherein an embedded clause is interpreted as negated, even though

a negative particle occurs, not in the embedded clause, but in the embedding clause. Thus, the sentence,

- (7) Fred does not think [ that Bill's decision is wise ]

is usually construed to mean that Fred thinks that Bill's decision is not wise. Horn seeks to bring each of these phenomena within the orbit of his theory of pragmatics. It is with this theory of pragmatics that Horn comes to argue, in his sixth and seventh chapters, for the two forms of ambiguity discussed above.

As comprehensive as Horn's treatment of negation is, all the relevant issues are not exhausted. There is, for example, no treatment of the syntax of the adverb 'not', beyond its syntactic configuration when it occurs between an auxiliary verb and the auxiliary verb's main verb. At the same time, as persuasive as Horn's account is of those aspects of negation which he does treat, there is room for further discussion, which, unfortunately, can not be pursued within the limited space allotted for this review.

**Brendan S. Gillon**

University of Toronto

**Peter Johnson**

*Politics, Innocence and the Limits  
of Goodness.*

New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall  
1989. Pp. 283.

Cdn \$42.00: US \$35.00 ISBN 0-415-01046-2.

All of a sudden, or so it seems from the European perspective, politics has become both exhilarating and dangerous: the old, post Second World War certainties are gone; who are our friends and who are our enemies is a new puzzle. Or perhaps we should say that this very question is now quite out of date. We are now in a situation which challenges us to think anew about the nature of politics, what the political arena is and what political action requires of individual agents. What, if any, are the moral limits to political action? Thus, purely by chance, Peter Johnson's book is a timely one, since it poses

such questions, or rather, through the discussion of moral innocence in relation to politics will surely lead the reader to these wider questions.

To say of a book that it raises more questions than it answers should not be taken as a sign of some failure in the work but, as in this case, a genuine sign of its virtue. A book in philosophy which does not raise more questions, which does not prompt the reader to more thought and exploration, is a very poor thing indeed. If reading philosophy can in any way be seen as a form of conversation, then this book should make for good philosophical conversation; for it addresses a familiar issue, the relation between politics and morality, in a new and thoroughly interesting way. Certainly, those who have come to political philosophy through the works of traditional political theory might well be startled by the central role which literature plays in the development of the central theme. But, as well as prompting philosophical thought, this book might also prompt one to re-read the works which Johnson discusses. Literature and philosophy would thus both be well served.

The central argument of the book is that '... certain moral dispositions exclude politics, are deeply incompatible with it, and in fact endanger it' (249). In particular Johnson cites the moral disposition which we call 'innocence'. The point is to see *how* such a disposition is incompatible with politics. The first task, however, is to characterise it, and to understand it. Here Johnson makes clear that it is to be distinguished from other forms of moral goodness, like saintliness or heroism, which are themselves characterised as forms of absolute moral virtue. So, 'innocence as moral purity implies an inability to inflict harm. It trusts in its vision of the world as good and pure ... they behave well not from an astute recognition of the virtue of doing so, but because they are incapable of envisaging moral conduct in any other way' (10). The morally innocent are selfless; what is not clear is whether they are selfless not just in a moral sense, but in the sense of having no content to the self. This is not a question raised by Johnson, but it does suggest itself in connection with at least one of the literary examples which he discusses: *Billy Budd*.

The most favoured theories of political morality, contractarian and utilitarian, cannot, Johnson argues, encompass moral innocence and thus can give no account of the conflict between politics and innocence. One obvious explanation of the conflict, manifested in the case of absolute moral virtue of the heroic kind as well, is that politics demands compromise. If political ends are to be achieved, then we

must sometimes be prepared to get our hands dirty. Politics is, as one British political commentator is fond of saying, 'a rough old trade'. In order to do what is politically right we are sometimes required to do what is morally wrong. In these cases doing what is morally demanded will result in political disaster. The standard discussions of the conflict take it that politics is a consequential matter; Johnson argues, however, that it is not as simple as that. The very nature of the disaster will depend upon different moral and political characters of the individual agents concerned. His discussion of Hegel, Nietzsche and Arendt are intended to show that politics does not have to be seen as simply consequential, but even on their views moral innocence is inimical to politics. The conflict here becomes one of the public in opposition to the private realm. More discussion of this distinction would have been useful; it is not clear to me that the political is identical with the 'public': but the crucial point for Johnson is that the conflict between politics and moral innocence must be seen as an internal one, and not merely a contingent one. How this is so is given in the discussion of three literary examples: Shakespeare's *Henry VI*, Melville's *Billy Budd* and Pyle in Greene's *The Quiet American*. What seems to make for the incompatibility in each of these cases is that feature of innocence which is most difficult to characterise: the inability to grasp the nature of the political game. This inability comes not from intellectual weakness but from the very commitment to the good itself. The failure to comprehend evil is something which cannot sustain a genuine politics. These innocents, from the perspective of politics and perhaps from ordinary morality, look either weak, stupid or even mad. One question not tackled in this book is why, in that case, we should still admire moral innocence, or why we should view its loss with sadness. That may be a matter for further discussion of the moral sphere.

In this book Peter Johnson has covered a wide range of topics, his argument is intense and sometimes rather condensed, so not always easy to read. Readers would, in any case, be advised at least to glance at the literary texts before reading Johnson's account of them. This is not because his account is unreliable, but because what he offers is an interpretation which some familiarity with the text will help the reader to understand. One thing of which I am now convinced is that when the political chips are down we are better off with the Captain Veres of this world than we ever would be with the Billy Budds.

**S. E. Marshall**

University of Stirling

**Michael H. Mitias**

*What Makes an Experience Aesthetic?*

Atlanta, GA: Editions Rodopi 1988. Pp. 155.

US \$50.00. ISBN 90-5183-047-5.

Mitias is clear at the outset about the purposes of the book. They are 'to show that (1) it is reasonable to speak of 'aesthetic experience', and (2) what makes an experience aesthetic is the 'actualization of the aesthetic qualities which are potential in the art work during the activity of aesthetic perception' (1).

The first chapter defends the possibility of aesthetic experience, and Mitias considers the view that 'the whole concept of aesthetic experience is confused, muddy, and perhaps untenable' (12). This view is advanced by John Hospers in *Understanding the Arts* (Prentice-Hall 1982). Mitias contends Hospers' principal objection to aesthetic experience is that the notion of aesthetic in aesthetic experience 'does not denote a quality, or a complex of qualities, which is common to the sort of experience which we usually have when we approach and perceive art works for the sake of enjoyment and criticism' (16). Mitias argues against this view, and for the possibility that there may be some condition or conditions which serve to unify and identify experiences as aesthetic.

Having argued that the notion of aesthetic experience is coherent, Mitias turns to the question of what conditions are involved in the identification of such an experience. He considers first the view defended by Kingsley Price ('What Makes an Experience Aesthetic?', *British Journal of Aesthetics* 19, [1979]) that aesthetic experience is properly identified and understood in terms of the object of perception. Mitias rejects this view, and argues that 'from the fact that an experience is not a thing like a pumpkin from which certain properties can be abstracted it does not necessarily follow that we cannot account for the uniqueness of an aesthetic experience' (40). This, in conjunction with Mitias' view that it is wrong to view aesthetic perception as a passive process, leads Mitias to conclude that the correct focus of the inquiry is questions like 'under what conditions can one perceive an object as an aesthetic object? Or, under what conditions can one actualize the aesthetic qualities potential in the object in a process of aesthetic perception?' (45).

Given that aesthetic experience is a coherent notion, and its locus is not the object of experience, Mitias concludes that it must be the experience itself which defines and qualifies an experience as aesthetic.

Exploring this issue in the third chapter, Mitias considers an exchange between George Dickie ('Beardsley's Phantom Aesthetic Experience', *Journal of Philosophy* 62 [1965]) and Monroe Beardsley ('Aesthetic Experience Regained', *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 28 [1969]). Siding with Beardsley, Mitias contends that aesthetic experience is properly portrayed as a mental event.

Chapter four is an explication and discussion of the view that aesthetic experience is a mental event. Mitias proposes that in 'this experience the attention of the percipient is totally given to the objective properties of the aesthetic object, i.e., to the lines, colors, sounds, words, marble, motion, etc., which present themselves as a *significant form*' (74). Besides the active character of aesthetic perception and experience, Mitias emphasizes the unified character of aesthetic experience.

It is certainly possible, Mitias contends, 'to perceive an aesthetic object, e.g., an art work or a beautiful scenery, without necessarily having an aesthetic experience' (91). This gives rise again to questions about what criteria serve to distinguish aesthetic experience from other kinds of experience. Mitias formulates this concern in terms of needing a 'principle of *aesthetic distinction*' (91). The chief aim of chapter five is to argue that this principle is not found in the aesthetic attitude. Mitias' contention is that the aesthetic attitude 'is simply a general *orientation*, and *as such* it does not have specific content' (105). And without such content it cannot serve as the principle of aesthetic distinction.

Mitias proposes that 'the principle of aesthetic distinction is aesthetic quality: an object is aesthetic in so far as it possesses aesthetic quality' (107). If the principle of aesthetic distinction resides in aesthetic qualities, questions immediately surface about how to understand these qualities. The contention is that 'although aesthetic qualities do not literally, ontologically, 'exist' in a work of art, they nevertheless *belong* to the work. The ontological locus of these qualities is what I call "aesthetic situation", the event in which the aesthetic object comes to life in the aesthetic experience' (119). Such a construal of aesthetic qualities rests in the view that 'aesthetic qualities are not given in aesthetic perception or ready made realities but as potentialities for realization' (119).

Several concerns surface in light of this construal of aesthetic qualities. Mitias maintains it is possible to perceive an aesthetic object without having an aesthetic experience, and despite his attempts to come to grips with these issues, concerns remain about whether the

aesthetic object is given in perception or created by the spectator. These concerns also surface with respect to the objectivity of aesthetic values and judgements. Mitias seems sensitive to these concerns, and contends that his analysis 'provides an objective ground for the judgement of aesthetic value, since the meaning to which the judgement refers is the realization of a relatively stable structure, viz., form, which the artist creatively imposes on his material medium' (145).

This response, however, only serves to highlight related concerns. Mitias' account largely depends upon his analysis of 'form', and the discussion of this notion (108-17) is in need of expansion and elaboration. Also, it seems peculiar that Mitias appeals to Clive Bell's notion of 'significant form' in support of an account of aesthetic experience that Bell would find unacceptable because of the place it allows content. It is also worth noting that Mitias treats 'what is art?' as a question that is easily dealt with and thereby in need of little consideration. Since much of his discussion seems to depend upon some satisfactory synthesis between versions of expressionism and formalism, this is unfortunate.

Mitias' book is rich in terms of structure and detail. Its richness has only been hinted at here, and it deserves a much fuller treatment than is presently possible. *What Makes an Experience Aesthetic?* is interesting and useful reading for anyone interested in the issues surrounding aesthetic experience.

**Doug Simak**

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**Jeffrie G. Murphy and Jules L. Coleman**  
*Philosophy of Law.*

Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1989.

Pp. xvi+240.

US \$44.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8133-0847-X);

US \$18.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8133-0848-8).

This is a revised edition of a text which first appeared in 1984. This edition has a new publisher, appearing in Westview's Dimensions of Philosophy Series. The 1984 edition is well known and was justifiably

well received. This review will assume familiarity with the first edition and concentrate on the authors' revisions. Note first a discrepancy between the (publisher's?) claim on the dust-cover and the (authors'?) claim in the 'Note on the Revised Edition' within the text itself as to the extent of those revisions. The dust-cover would have it that the authors have, *inter alia*, 'strengthened their treatment of natural law theory, criminalization and the law of torts'. The 'note' is considerably more modest, claiming that 'most of the changes ... are fairly minor – e.g., some updating of references and bibliography' (xvi). The note identifies two more significant revisions which will be discussed *infra*. The note is the more reliable guide to the extent of the revisions. No substantive changes have been made to either Murphy's discussion of natural law theory or Coleman's treatment of tort – each has lost a paragraph or two and had the odd word changed.

The layout of the book is unchanged from the original edition. Murphy has contributed the first three chapters: *The Nature of Law*, *Moral Theory and its Application to Law*, and *Crime and Punishment*. The last two chapters, *Philosophy and Private Law* and *Law and Economics*, are written by Coleman. Coleman's chapters are substantially unchanged (a section on game theory has been omitted from the last chapter). They were good in the first edition and remain so.

The subject matter of the first chapter is standard fare. Murphy takes the reader through classic natural law theory, legal positivism, legal realism, and Ronald Dworkin, whose theory is presented as a 'reemergence of natural law' and, implicitly at least, as the state of the art in legal theory. Much more attention is given to Dworkin's criticisms of his predecessors than is given to possible criticisms of Dworkin. Some at least will find this unsatisfactory. One of the bona fide revisions to the original edition is the addition to this opening chapter of a section on Critical Legal Studies and Feminism, the latter being presented as an instance of the former. CLS believes, according to Murphy, that 'once one fully understands the causal origins of values (as an outgrowth of power relations), one will no longer take value claims seriously and will thus not see them as an obstacle to the pursuit of one's own political agenda' (52). Murphy gives a good deal of the credit for this scepticism to Nietzsche, and includes a one paragraph summary of Nietzsche's moral theory. I am somewhat sceptical as to the value of the appeal to Nietzsche here. Putting aside philosophical concerns (of the 'the roots of moral scepticism run deep' variety), for one thing so little detail is given of Nietzsche's moral theory that the specific appeal to that theory is of little help, and for

another, the appeal seems to disguise the debt CLS owes not so much to philosophers versed in Nietzschean moral theory, as to legal academics familiar with conflicting trends in legal material. Duncan Kennedy's classic 'Form and Substance in Anglo-American Law' comes to mind here, and one might also cite Mark Tushnet's influential work in constitutional law, and any number of other foundational studies in the CLS movement. I would have liked to have seen more attention given to this aspect of CLS. It is perhaps worth adding that such an emphasis might have allowed Murphy to draw attention to connections between CLS and Legal Realism that remain unnoted in the text as it stands. Indeed there is almost no attempt to integrate the new section into the preceeding discussion at all. In short the new section has all the hallmarks of a bare add-on. A more thorough revision would have been more valuable.

Murphy discusses the 'utmost resistance' requirement in the common law of rape and the feminist critique of that requirement as an example of the CLS approach. The idea is that the requirement is the result of a patriarchal jurisprudence, and that the feminist critique proceeds from the appreciation that that jurisprudence can claim no objective grounding. All of this is plausible enough. Murphy concludes however that the CLS critique fails. His most sweeping criticism is the suggestion that 'the radical value relativism and scepticism' promoted by some advocates of CLS and feminist jurisprudence undercuts their attempts to push positive substantive concerns. All of this is familiar enough and Murphy's points are well made. It seems to me however that Murphy might properly have pointed out that many recent feminist legal theorists are concerned to distance themselves from CLS for just the sorts of reasons he mentions. Indeed there seems to be some consensus that CLS is waning, and that the various 'interest group' legal theories (including but not only feminist jurisprudence) are more properly aligned with post-CLS legal theory (or indeed with a reemergent natural law theory).

In the first edition Murphy closed the third chapter, on the criminal law, with a detailed consideration of the question 'Is death cruel and unusual?'. The other bona fide revision in the second edition is the replacement of that consideration in favour of what Murphy describes as 'a more general discussion of criminal sentencing'. Most of that discussion consists of Frankel J's opinion in *US v Bergman* 416 F. Supp 496 (1976) which is reproduced more or less in full. The inclusion of Frankel J's opinion is I think a good move. As Murphy indicates, it gives a 'hands-on' illustration of the issues discussed in

the more theoretical parts of the chapter. But the revision to the original edition has an interesting consequence. There is a fairly strong Kantianism implicit throughout the second and third chapters of both editions. Murphy suggests that neither the criminal law itself nor punishment can be justified 'by simply trotting out the common slogans, either utilitarian or Kantian' (112). In the end he opts for a mixed account, with Kantian considerations constraining utilitarian justifications. In the first edition the Kantian underpinning to all of this became quite explicit in the discussion of the death penalty. The result of dropping that section is that Murphy's Kantianism is now much less obvious. That of course may not be a bad thing. At the very least it lessens the appearance of a tension between Murphy's apparent support both for an objectivist ethics and for a Dworkinian coherentism.

None of this should be taken to deny that this is a good book. The features that make it a good book were present in the first edition and nothing in the second edition detracts from that status. Those who own a copy of the first edition will find little here to justify purchasing the second (unless they are trying to get the full *Dimensions of Philosophy Series*). Those who do not own a copy of the first edition will find few better examples of the kind. Prospective purchasers should take the 'Note on the Revised Edition' as their guide rather than the remarks on the dust-cover.

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**Matthew H. Nitecki, ed.**

*Evolutionary Progress.*

Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1989.

Pp. viii+354.

US \$42.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-226-58689-8);

US \$16.95 (paper: ISBN 0-226-58693-6).

This volume is the result of the 1987 Spring Systematics Symposium held at the Field Museum in Chicago where researchers from several disciplines met in an effort to understand the historical, conceptual,

and empirical foundations for the belief in evolutionary progress. The introduction by Nitecki 'Discerning the Criteria for Concepts of Progress' presents the contributions dividing them into three blocks: philosophical, historical, and empirical studies.

In the first section, David L. Hull argues that European biologists understood that the Darwinian theory saw biological evolution as progressive, although Darwin himself referred to progress on a few occasions and always emphasized its untestable character. Present-day evolutionists have substituted the concept of progress for directionality, but Hull does not think that the fossil record reveals any directionality. He sees the belief in progress as arising from an internal need that will not be fulfilled by scientific analysis. William B. Provine argues that there is an imposition of one's subjective hopes upon evolution as was the case in J. Huxley's belief in evolutionary progress. He argues against using evolution to give meaning to humankind's existence or one's personal life since modern evolutionary thought implies a rejection of any purposive mechanism in the evolutionary process. Francisco J. Ayala claims that the axiological standard of reference required by the concept of progress need not be a moral one. He strives to give a precise definition of progress as 'directional change towards the better,' and analyzes different proposals according to this standard. Michael Ruse makes it clear that evolutionary theory before 1966 tended to be a progressionist doctrine and that, more surprisingly, biologists like Edward O. Wilson, Richard Dawkins, and Stephen Jay Gould also believe in some notion of progressive directionality.

In the historical studies, a paper by Robert J. Richards defends the thesis that Darwin took natural selection as a mechanism leading to biological progress and moral perfection; thus, the usual confrontation between Spencer and Darwin on this topic is misguided. Robert C. Richardson and Thomas C. Kane analyze the concept of orthogenesis in the neo-Lamarckism of the 19th Century, concluding that authors like Alpheus Hyatt and Edward Cope were not progressionists. Robert C. Dunnell's contribution centers on a set of explanatory systems known in social science as 'Cultural Evolution' which originated from the works of H. Spencer. Cultural Evolution sees progress not only as a result, but also as the cause of history. In 'Morpho-Physiological Progress', Adam Urbanek analyzes the work of the Russian comparative anatomist and evolutionary biologist Alexei Nikolaevich Severtsov (1866-1936), thus contributing to the important task of making Soviet biological thought more widely known.

The empirical studies' section opens with a paper by John Maynard Smith. He differentiates several levels – from replicating molecules to groups with cultural inheritance – according to the complexity in the organization of their genetic material. Each one of these levels represents a higher degree of complexity and, in this sense, there have been various revolutions in the history of life regarding how genetic information is organized. In another paper, William C. Wimsatt and Jeffrey C. Schank defend the existence of a systematic change or tendency towards an increase in the possibilities for, and capability of producing and maintaining a larger variety of complex adaptations. Approaching the evolutionary process from the point of view of instructional information, E. O. Wiley's paper defends the idea that the direction of evolution is the direction of increasing entropy and increasing organization. Nevertheless, the observed increase in organization is merely a by-product of the historical constraints. David M. Raup shows how the positive results of progress when testing the fossil record can be an artifact of the way we analyze it. A markovian time series looks directional, and certain time-dependent biases in the fossil record that he calls the 'Pull of the Recent,' bias the result. Stephen J. Gould claims that we should replace the concept of progress with that of directionality. There may be patterns in the history of life and searching for temporal asymmetry is a task properly 'scientific' since it is 'definable, tractable, testable, and quantifiable' (334).

I agree with what I see as the rallying point of this volume, namely, that we have to abandon the search for progress, where this presupposes that evolution is preprogrammed to reach a certain endpoint of perfection. Any concept of progress which implies orthogenesis, finalism or the existence of a predestined path has to be banished from evolutionary biology, as well as any belief in progress that results from the need of discerning 'meaning' in the history of life. Life is not ascending because there is no ladder on which life is placed. Now, I do not think that implies that the question about the progressive character of evolution is illegitimate. The search for patterns in the natural world and their interpretation has been a constant of scientific thought. Thus, the search for patterns in the history of life is also a legitimate aim of inquiry. There are no unscientific questions. It is in the search for an answer that we run into problems on the issue about progress. We need to look for patterns in a way that they do not result as artifacts of the methods used and/or of the interpretation of the data. To decide whether these patterns show a progressive trend, we need a non-vacuous and non-circular concept

of progress. Here, I do not think the papers presented make an important contribution. Some of the papers present very local definitions of progress that do not help to answer the general question about the evolutionary process being progressive. The only global definition, Ayala's 'changes for the better' will not do, since the main problems arise when one has to specify the notion of good, and therefore, of improvement that is adequate. Another move, that of substituting progress for direction has two problems: the obvious one is that since direction is not a sufficient condition for progress we leave the question about the latter unanswered; a second problem is that, depending which notion of direction we use, it can be fairly uninformative. For example, all processes that start at '0' can only go in one direction. Thus, the characterization of evolution as directional because there is an increase in the variety of forms of life may be correct, but it does not enlighten our understanding of the evolutionary process.

Another point that I do not consider sufficiently clarified in the papers is the one regarding the subject of the progressive process. That is, what is it that would be progressing if evolution was progressive? Evolution is not a process, but the result of the intertwining of many processes. These processes are of different types, act at different levels and are more or less influenced by different physical and structural constraints. It is one question, then, whether the products of these processes – evolution as a result – yield a necessarily or contingently progressive pattern. It is another question whether the history of life – what Maynard Smith calls 'the evolution of evolution' (209) – is progressive. At both levels, clarification is needed to specify what it is that progresses when a population evolves.

Many points are still in need of further discussion. However, what does become clear from reading this volume is that communication between historians, biologists and philosophers, such as the one exemplified in the Symposium which gave rise to this book, will lead to progress in our understanding of the natural world.

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**Jan Österberg**

*Self and Others.*

Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers  
1988. Pp. xi+263.

US \$69.00. ISBN 90-277-2648-5.

Henry Sidgwick observed that while in conflict the claims of both morality and of egoism appear reasonable. This apparent duality of practical reason provides Ö. with his focus of inquiry into the rational acceptability of ethical egoism. This work is a doctoral dissertation in the analytic tradition and exhibits all the charm of the genre. Nonetheless it is an articulate survey and critique of the varieties of ethical egoism that especially late in this century have emerged as more or less respectable candidates for the position of fundamental normative principle. Given Ö.'s stress on modern British and American writings one might conclude that egoism is an Anglo-Saxon vice. But this lack of any serious historical dimension is forgivable since Ö. in common with the theorists he discusses and indeed with foundational approaches generally, assumes the historical immutability of philosophical claims.

The question of ethical egoism arises from a few 'common sense' assumptions, viz. that one acts rationally only if he does that which will maximize the satisfaction of his preferences and that one ought to act rationally. But for a normative principle to be the fundamental moral principle it must be universal. This is to say that a theory to be a moral theory cannot arbitrarily prescribe favouring some person (e.g., oneself) differently from other people. Only ethical universalism is acceptable. Herein lies the intuitive implausibility of ethical egoism. Ö., after assessing an extensive array of kinds of egoism which not surprisingly parallels the varieties of utilitarianism, settles on what he considers to be the most plausible form, – strong non-ideal egoism, i.e., 'Any person ought always to act so as to maximize the satisfaction of his present second order preferences as to which of his first order preferences should be satisfied' (68).

Ö. notes the asymmetry between arguments for and arguments against ethical egoism observing that as a proffered fundamental principle it is less likely to be argued for than against. Rather it is normally held as a self-evident conviction by its adherents, indeed as the only rational principle. The chief philosophical task of the egoist is answering objections rather than grounding his own position. To someone unsympathetic to ethical egoism the normative, semantic,

and pragmatic arguments arrayed against it might appear to be massive over-kill. Thus, Ö.'s subtle critique of the objections in which he shows none to be absolutely unanswerable is a *tour de force* of philosophic analysis. To take but one familiar example, G.E. Moore argues that ethical egoism is self-contradictory because according to it a number of different things are *each* of them the only good thing there is. Ö. observes that this is sound only on the assumption that there must be a certain state of affairs which is *the* ultimate end at which *everyone* ought to aim, i.e., only on the assumption of ethical neutralism. Further he claims a parallel argument can be constructed showing that if ethical egoism is true then ethical neutralism is self-contradictory. It's a nice question why Moore's position, formerly so compelling, is today readily dismissed. Undoubtedly it's for the same reasons that the naturalistic fallacy is not given serious attention. One might have thought that such a dramatic conceptual shift deserved some comment, but in the present work and in most contemporary studies of foundational ethics such questions are passed over in silence.

The upshot of Ö.'s detailed analysis is that even the most plausible form of egoism is untenable though many of the arguments against it are invalid and none is rigorously conclusive. The general objection to ethical egoism is its failure to satisfy the universality provision. It is just because of the prevailing individualist maximizing conception of rationality that doubt lingers as to the validity of any final rebuttal of egoism. This doubt finds expression in a section of Ö.'s thesis which I take to be its core, the assessment of David Gauthier's constrained maximization account of rational action. Ö. interprets Gauthier's proposal as an alternative to the claim that to act as an ethical egoist is to act rationally. Although this seems correct I think that Gauthier's position is best described not as an outright rejection of egoism but as a subtle modification so that it satisfies the moral requirement of universality. Gauthier argues that in interdependent contexts characterizable in terms of the 'Prisoner's Dilemma' it is rational to constrain one's maximization of utility in accordance with agreements made. This is to say that in order to maximize one's interest in society overall *anyone* should agree to moral constraints such as keeping promises. Gauthier argues that on the assumption that one is able to choose his conception of rationality such a choice would be rational only if the chosen conception were self-supporting. This is to say that it is rational to choose a conception of rationality only if, given that conception, it is rational to choose

it. It seems that without some such notion as self-supporting rationality the entire project of foundational ethics is called into question. Moreover, on the face of it no notion of reason is self-supporting without circularity. Additionally the very idea of choosing one's conception of rationality is murky to say the least. Nonetheless Ö. accepts this, to me, bizarre 'existentialist' assumption. He contends that Gauthier has failed to show that straightforward maximization is not self-supporting and that the morally legitimate notion of constrained maximization is. He has only shown, however, that in some settings it is straightforwardly rational to constrain one's utility-maximization. In so arguing Ö. has challenged the essentially Hobbesian line that we can develop the moral point of view from rationally following out the implications of the central tenet of egoism. Doubtless ingenious supporters of Gauthier's proposal can be expected to respond to Ö.'s arguments. The virtue of the present work is that it ensures the continuation of the internal debate in foundational ethics and practical rationality.

**Brian Keenan**

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**Charles Sampford**

*The Disorder of Law: A Critique of  
Legal Theory.*

Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press;  
Boston: Basil Blackwell 1988. Pp. x+302.  
Cdn \$68.95: US \$49.95. ISBN 0-631-15495-7.

Charles Sampford's *The Disorder of Law* examines and challenges one of the most widely held assumptions of contemporary legal thought, viz., that law can be accurately portrayed as a system. Sampford examines the role that the assumption plays in the leading theories of law. In each case, he argues, the premise that law is systematic distorts and falsifies the picture of the law provided by the theory. Among the theories which Sampford subjects to critique are those of Hart, Raz, Harris, Dworkin, and Luhmann.

Sampford argues that law lacks the order and structure that would be needed to conceive of it as a system. The reality of law in contemporary societies is that it is a disorderly melee of conflicting and competing elements. Sampford seeks to reinforce his conception of law as unstructured by arguing that human society is likewise unstructured. The disorder of law reflects the disorder of society: 'like society, law is partially organized into institutions, but it does not have an overall structure ... These institutions are part of the social melee' (261).

The main line of Sampford's argument consists of enumerating the many ways in which legal officials and legal institutions diverge from the patterns which the systematizers seek to impose on the law. For example, in Hart's view, the systematic character of law derives largely from the rule of recognition, a second-order rule supposedly shared by all legal officials that identifies the legally valid primary rules in society. Sampford argues that there is no such rule of recognition. Different judges use different criteria in recognizing authoritative sources of rules, and judges will often avoid relying on a 'valid' rule if it is a serious affront to their substantive values. Other positivist theories, such as Raz's, dispense with Hart's idea of a single rule of recognition, but the consequence is an inability to provide any convincing description of the allegedly systematic character of the law.

Dworkin's nonpositivist account fares no better. It acknowledges the evaluative elements of judging but cannot guarantee law's systematic character for several reasons. There are cognitive limitations that make it impossible for judges to systematize all but a small portion of the law; judges often deliberately treat cases in an ad hoc manner; and the values of judges differ, thus yielding different (partial) systems of law, one for each judge, rather than an overall system.

Moreover, even if one could develop an accurate systematic account of judging, that would be far from providing a systematic account of the law. The law consists of much more than what judges do. Sociological theories of law, such as functionalism, recognize as much, but they too fail in their efforts to describe law as a system. For example, functionalism runs afoul of the fact that there is no consistent set of social purposes that law serves: the behavior of officials and institutions must be explained in terms of diverse and conflicting personal, institutional, and social ends.

By the time we reach the end of Sampford's critique of the reigning theories of law, we have gone through an extensive catalogue of ways in which the actual behavior of legal officials and institutions diverges from patterns that the systematizers attribute to the law.

Sampford seeks to reinforce the point by offering an account of why such a divergence from any presumed pattern is to be expected.

The account relies on the ontological premise that law consists ultimately of human individuals, their thoughts, actions, and interactions. This apparently innocuous premise has potent implications, in Sampford's view; it leads one to expect that the law will be unstructured and so nonsystematic. The reason for this stems from the idiosyncrasy of individuals and of the way they understand and think. Legal texts, rules, norms, and relations are understood quite differently by different individuals. Given such individual idiosyncrasies, there is every reason to expect that the thinking and behavior of the persons who make up legal institutions will fail to conform to any consistent set of patterns.

Sampford's case that legal institutions and actors behave in a much more disorderly manner than the main contemporary theories suggest is a strong one. Moreover, the book contains insightful accounts of social power and social relations which show how the recognition of the disorder of law and society illuminates important social facts, such as why law is a very limited instrument for social change. Yet, Sampford goes too far in claiming that the law has no structure and so is nonsystematic.

All of his reasons for claiming that law is unstructured could be applied *mutatis mutandis* to argue that no natural language has a structure. Any systematization of a natural language will be vulnerable to exactly the sorts of counterexamples that Sampford uses to defeat the theories of Hart, Raz, Dworkin etc. For the actual speakers of a language notoriously diverge from the syntactic and semantic rules in terms of which linguistic systematizations are couched.

Yet, it is implausible to describe a natural language as an unstructured *melée*. No adequate account of meaning is possible without the premise that natural languages are structured to a considerable degree. As Saussure argued, the meanings of linguistic terms are a function of their relations to other terms, and thus it is the overall structure of a language that gives its elements significance. A natural language does not have the precise structure of a formal language, but structure it has. A natural language is much more like a formal language than an unstructured hodgepodge of noises. Similarly, the law is much more like a system of sources, rules, and principles than it is an unstructured hodgepodge of texts, decisions, and actions. Its structure is what makes the law a serviceable instrument for the regulation of human conduct. The reigning theories of law may exaggerate

its systematic character and thereby lead to inflated estimates of how well law can regulate conduct or bring about social change. Sampford provides a valuable corrective to such views. Yet, I fear he goes too far in the opposite direction.

**Andrew Altman**

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**F.W.J. Schelling**

*The Philosophy of Art*, trans. Douglas W. Stott: Foreword David Simpson.

Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press  
1989. Pp. 1v+342.

US \$45.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8166-0000-0);

US \$17.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8166-1684-1).

Douglas Stott has provided us with a splendid translation of Schelling's lectures on the philosophy of art. Schelling, who in the English-speaking world generally has a reputation for being the most obscure or, indeed, confused of the idealists, is revealed through this translation as the literary master that German readers have long known him to be. The language is characterized by both conceptual lucidity and an impelling musicality that serves to set Schelling apart as a thinker who, like Plato, accomplished the most sublime fusion of poetry and philosophy.

While Schelling himself never sought the publication of these lectures, they do constitute a good introduction to his thinking. In fact, as David Simpson argues in the foreword to this edition, the lectures retain a genuine contemporary appeal. In a word, Schelling displays an openness to non-Christian cultures that both sets him apart from his more famous contemporary, Hegel, and makes him appealing to the pluralistic mood that prevails today.

While Simpson is undoubtedly correct in his hints that Schelling's work will be of interest to post-modernistically inclined literary theorists, his observations are well supplemented by the translator's introduction, insofar as Douglas Stott does greater justice to Schelling's systematic intent. But what both commentators ignore is the degree

to which the philosophy of art accomplishes an important *transition* in Schelling's thinking, a transition from his overly formalistic philosophy of identity (which Hegel so effectively parodied in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*) to the profoundly *historical* metaphysics of the *Ages of the World* and of the late phase of his philosophy in general. A reference to the 1807 oration on *The Relationship between the Plastic Arts and Nature* would have been particularly helpful since that work actually accomplishes the transition to which I refer. It accomplishes this, moreover, in the context of Schelling's most profound and original reflection on the nature of art.

The lectures in the present translation were first delivered in 1802-03 at a time when Schelling's assistant and collaborator was Hegel. This is the period in which Schelling was most inclined to interpret all aspects of nature and history in the light of their immediate internal identity with the Absolute. Even so, his lectures are still based on the historical antithesis between the ancient and the modern. This antithesis is presented, however, in the form of a fixed polarity, the relationship between the real and the ideal. This one relationship underlies such oppositions as those between classic and romantic, naive and sentimental, symbol and allegory, and sublimity and beauty. These oppositions enabled Schelling to incorporate the most advanced aesthetic theories of his day and transform them into confirmations of his own systematic view. One can turn to his work as a commentary on Kant, Schiller, and the Schlegels – and find in it as well interpretations of Sophocles and Shakespeare, Dante and Goethe, Homer and Cervantes, Phidias and Raphael, that are remarkably fresh and illuminating.

What is, however, most important in Schelling's lectures is the evidence that, precisely through the confrontation with art, he was brought to consider the possibility of reversing the long established metaphysical claim that asserts the priority of actuality over potency. In his later philosophy he was to insist upon this reversal and, on its basis, carry out a critique of Hegel that was pivotal for the Young Hegelians and thereby largely responsible for the dramatic 'existentialist' turn that characterizes Post-Hegelian thinking in general. A number of themes in his lectures on the philosophy of art suggest that this turn was already prepared in his early thinking. We thus find Schelling appealing to his principle of identity as interchangeable with the deep abyss and eternal night out of which the world of gods first arose (42). The 'ideal' he portrays as arising and

articulating itself against the foundation of the pre-existing 'real'. Form unfolds, that is, out of chaos (34).

This view enables Schelling to anticipate Nietzsche's distinction between the Dionysian and the Apollonian principles in art. This provides the basis for a reflection on the very nature of art as an incomprehensible fusion of mutually exclusive principles. But, even more, it serves to underscore the profoundly historical nature of the realm governed by absolute identity. Not only does Schelling appeal to the transitions between mythological epochs governed by Uranos, Kronos, and Zeus, but he asserts that Christianity itself must be grasped as transitory (76), for history will one day reconstitute the primacy of the real, that is, of nature and of its representation in polytheistic mythology. Polytheism represents a much more powerful form of pluralism than that which prevails today. Contemporary pluralism, by dispensing with the notion of the Absolute, has the effect of obliterating hierarchies and thereby flattening everything out. Against this, Schelling regards art as the visible manifestation of a real world of divinities whose 'determining law ... is strict separation or limitation on the one hand, and equal absoluteness on the other' (36). 'We demand that nothing in the universe be constrained, purely limited, and subordinated. We demand for every single thing a particular and free life. Only the understanding subordinates. Within reason and the creative imagination everything is free and moves about in the same realm without crowding or chafing. For each is within itself the equal of the whole' (37).

Yet at the same time, Schelling occasionally appeals to the categories of the most rigid metaphysical essentialism. 'The infinite,' he asserts, 'follows immediately from the idea of God' (24). He never develops the full implications of this claim, which a decade later served as the foundation of Hegel's *Logic*. The late Schelling directed his critique of Hegel against precisely this idea, insofar as he rejected both the ontological proof of God's existence and the kindred claim that the creation follows with necessity from the nature of the Absolute. In other words, while Schelling's immediate intent is indeed systematic, the real innovative moment in the *Philosophy of Art* is what later impelled Schelling beyond Hegel into his so-called *positive* philosophy. This moment is represented by the profoundly receptive and affirmative nature of his interpretations of art and literature. He clearly looks to art not merely as an object that demands philosophical explanation, but as an independent

source of insight and understanding. Unlike Hegel, Schelling does not relegate art to the past, for he recognizes that it not only awakens but simultaneously resists the power of reflection.

**Joseph P. Lawrence**

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**Hugh J. Silverman and Donn Welton,**  
eds.

*Postmodernism and Continental Philosophy.*

Albany: State University of New York Press

1988. Pp. 259.

US \$59.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-88706-521-X);

US \$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-88706-522-8).

Hugh Silverman and Donn Welton's new collection of postmodernist papers offers an opportunity to survey again the field of this daunting, often inaccessible, but still fashionable, philosophical literature. Silverman's introduction explains the genesis and the development of the problems discussed at a succession of 'historic' academic conferences.

Here at the outset, we are given notice of the context in which post-modern thought is to be located and understood. The discussions do not come out of current issues such as the painful confusion of contemporary family and sexual relations, or the frustrations of post-industrial working experience, or the problematic response of socialism to changes in Eastern Europe. Silverman makes it clear that regardless of the misunderstandings of American literary critics, post-modern thought is firmly rooted in a particular intellectual tradition, continental Philosophy. The founding fathers of this tradition are evident from the subjects of the papers Silverman and Welton include in their anthology: First and far back in the past, the ancestors, Plato, progenitor of all philosophers, Descartes, the heroic inventor of modern thought. Next the grandfathers: Hegel, Husserl, and Heidegger, along with the maverick Uncles: Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty. Finally the renegade fathers, prophets of the final breakdown of Descartes' rational subject and his Enlightenment world of science and progress: Lacan, Derrida, Foucault, Lyotard.

The major themes of this tradition are well represented in this collection. Maneuvers in the 'prison house of language' take first place with discussions of the problematic relation of systems of signs to objective and subjective reality. Alfonso Lingis, in a cryptic but suggestive few pages, ('Substitution',) situates the motto, 'man is a sign' with reference to the theories of language of Husserl, Hintikka, Heidegger and Lacan. M. C. Dillon reviews the relation between language and desire as described by Hegel, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty. David Farrell defends Merleau-Ponty's embodied consciousness as an antidote to Derrida's textuality.

In these pages, Heidegger's influence and authority is pre-eminent. A long section is devoted to exegesis of his work, the clarification of his relationships with other continental thinkers, and the correction of misguided interpretations of his positions. His contention that the modernity established by Descartes amounts to the reduction of the world to a representation is explored by Dalia Judovitz. His critique of Hegel's idealism is compared to Derrida's by Deborah Chaffin. His prophetic version of the history of metaphysics is explained by Dorothea Olkowsky. A minor defect in his history of philosophy is exposed by Dick White. Finally, his kinship with Nietzsche is restored by Richard Taft.

In another series of papers, there is an attempt to recover Derrida's deconstruction from its popularizers and establish its grounding in continental philosophy. Christie McDonald rereads *Grammatology* in the context of the 'founding discourses of semiology and structural anthropology.' Alan Schrift establishes deconstruction's intellectual 'antecedents' in Nietzsche's 'genealogy' of morals and Foucault's critical philosophy. In a concluding section, the future of postmodernism is considered in two articles that investigate its characteristic mood of despair and its experience of a 'schizophrenic constellation of images', (Andrew McKenna, 'postmodernism: its future Present') and Wilhelm Warzer, 'Postmodernism's Short Letter'.)

Reading these papers, it is hard not to agree with John O'Neill that this is a family affair. In his deconstructive tour de force 'Deconstructing, Fort/Derrida', O'Neill ironically describes the conventions of postmodern philosophical practise as a revolt by the sons (daughters are mentioned once and then dropped) against the 'father-texts.' Commentary on Derrida, or Husserl, or Hegel, he suggests, is really a desire to kill off the father in the hope that the sons can themselves become fathers. Underneath it all, O'Neill hints, may be the lost object of all men's longing: reason=God=desire=woman. Certainly the

plot of such a conflict can be seen in the characteristic themes of the papers in this collection, the struggle of self against other, Lacan's law of the Father, Kristeva's fusional maternal semiotic.

Also in evidence is the archetypal status of the scenario. In question are not real individual fathers and sons, but the universal father, the universal sons, Freud's, Lévi-Strauss's, Lacan's sons, who found human culture in their revolution against the primordial patriarch. When a historical moment is considered, such as in Barbara Freeman's poststructuralist feminist reading of Plato's *Symposium* ('Rewriting Patriarchal Texts'), there does not need to be any reference to actual events. Freeman does not investigate the historical status and authority of the Mantinean priestess, Diotima, who appears as Plato's mentor or her actual teaching which is quite different from Plato's. Instead Diotima takes her assigned place in the eternal drama, in which women appear only as spokespersons for men or sexual entertainment. Similarly, Craig Vesey in his critique of Luce Irigaray's claim that logic is masculine, ('Logic and Patriarchy') speaks of Logic and masculine thought, but never of specific logics, of which there have been many, or of the historical circumstances of different logicians and the concrete effects of logic on women's lives.

This collection raises again the question: what interest might there be for a woman in a form of life and thought in which it seems she can have only a token inclusion? At its best, as in O'Neill's spoof of academic conferences, the self-reflective style of postmodernism can give a sudden revealing insight into masculine practise. The deconstructive skills of careful and innovative textual analysis can give a deeper understanding of turning points in thought, as in Dalia Judovitz's masterful dissection of the subtle transition from Descartes' *Rules* to his *Discourse*. The focus on representation can help us to assess how little of nature and how much of symbolic meaning there is in popular culture, as in Iris Young's 'Women Recovering Our Clothes, Perhaps.'

Something, not worthless. But it is hard not to yearn for more. For a fresh approach to the pressing problems of postmodern existence – the possibility of social justice, the equalization of gender relations, the reconceptualization of the divine, the relation between human beings and nature – an approach that is not just another ambivalent worship of/revolt against the fathers, but that begins again from the facts of human experience, female and male, to mark out new ways of thinking about the world.

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**William C. Starr and Richard C. Taylor,**  
eds.

*Moral Philosophy: Historical and  
Contemporary Essays.*

Milwaukee: Marquette University Press  
1989. Pp. 200.

US \$12.95. ISBN 0-87462-476-2.

This volume is the proceedings of a conference at Marquette University in 1985. Of the ten papers, those by Nicholas P. White (on Plato), John M. Cooper (on Aristotle), Vernon J. Burke (on Augustine), Ralph McInerny (on Aquinas), Bruce Aune (on Kant), and Fred R. Berger (on Bentham and the Mills) are designated as 'historical'. The remaining four, by Richard Brandt (defending 'indirect utilitarianism'), Germain Grisez (summarizing his natural law theory), Marcus G. Singer (clarifying the 'Generalization Principle') and James D. Wallace (on 'virtue ethics') are designated as 'contemporary'.

All of the authors are summarizing, revising or defending influential work published elsewhere at length, so the volume cannot fail to be of interest as a survey of recent work in moral philosophy. It is not so clear, however, that the volume is unified in any interesting way. The editors say its purpose is 'to show the continuity that is at the base of the relationship of contemporary moral thought and its historical traditions' (v). I take it that part of what is intended here is that work in contemporary moral philosophy and work in the history of the subject are of interest and use to one another. To what extent do the papers in the volume flesh out and support this claim?

With one exception, the papers can be placed in groups which invite consideration in light of the editors' thesis. Thus there is an 'historical' and a 'contemporary' essay on utilitarianism, and similarly on Kantian concerns. In addition there are four essays, two historical, by Cooper and McInerny, and two contemporary, Grisez and Wallace, in the Aristotelian tradition. Bourke's essay is also closely related to this group. That leaves just one essay largely unconnected with the others in the volume, the essay by White, in which he defends Plato's claim that the just man is always happier than the unjust man.

The historical and contemporary essays on utilitarianism do not, it seems to me, strike any sparks off one another. Berger defends Bentham and the Mills, and Brandt his own version of indirect utilitarianism, against recent criticisms. Berger takes up two criticisms, one having to do with distributive justice, and the other with the claim

that utilitarianism is 'person neutral' and ignores moral integrity. Brandt says he has nothing new to say about the issue of distributive justice. He does provide a more thorough discussion of the second criticism than Berger. Neither do the essay by Aune on Kant and Singer's essay on the 'Generalization Principle' complement one another in an interesting way.

By contrast, the essays in the Aristotelian tradition, together with Bourke on Augustine, give some substance to the editors' claim about the unity of the volume. All of these raise the question whether there is a single good which constitutes human happiness or fulfillment. In what I think is the best historical paper in the volume, Cooper says his main purpose is to generate insight into Aristotle's ethics, 'looking for what is unique or specially distinctive about them, without special reference either to contemporary theory or ... the subsequent history of ethics' (23). He takes up a problem which he had addressed, with different results, in his earlier writing: Is Aristotle's account of happiness as a life of morally good action in the early books of the *Nicomachean Ethics* compatible with Book X, where he seems to say that happiness consists in 'contemplative activity, carried on for a complete lifetime' (28)? He argues that for Aristotle the life of contemplation identified with happiness in Book X is 'a life devoted to the exercise of all the human virtues but with special emphasis on the virtues of the theoretical intellect' (43).

The Aristotelian view, so interpreted, has much in common with Grisez's account of 'integral human fulfillment'. Although Grisez does not place special emphasis on contemplation, he holds, like Cooper's Aristotle, that human fulfillment includes participation in a variety of irreducibly different goods.

Both Grisez and Cooper's Aristotle are at odds with Bourke's advice that contemporary moralists should adopt Augustine's doctrine that all goods are ordered to a single *summum bonum*: 'it seems to me that this is still applicable today. To say that a person, or a human action, is ethically good must have a univocal, not a polyvalent, meaning. In the long run some unique standard of ethical judgment is required' (58). Bourke is diametrically opposed to Cooper also in his methodology. Where Cooper tries to generate insight into what is distinctive of Aristotle's ethics, without special reference to contemporary moral philosophy, Bourke's avowed purpose is to seek out elements in Augustine's ethics which 'have some relevance to the doing of ethics in the present day' (51). The result is a paper whose historical claims are not carefully worked out and

whose advice to contemporary moralists is not always clear and never well supported by argument.

The relations of the foregoing views to the paper by McNerny are more complex. He defends Aquinas against the charge that he distorted Aristotle's ethics. He points out that for Aquinas, as for Aristotle, the imperfect happiness available in this life involves contemplation as well as other forms of morally good action, and also that for Aquinas, perfect happiness in heaven consists of contemplation alone (76). If Cooper is right, there seems to be a tension between Aristotle's and Aquinas's notion of perfect happiness, setting aside the question of whether perfect happiness is attainable. There is a similar tension between Aquinas's notion of heaven as the Beatific Vision and that offered by Grisez, as 'an unending marriage feast' (139).

Wallace's rich essay also seems to espouse the view that human goodness comprises a number of irreducibly different goods. Thus, opposing his own version of 'virtue ethics' to the 'fixed-goal' theory of practical reasoning, he argues that 'the obvious candidates for important human goods' cannot be fitted together into a single picture of an ideal human life, or subordinated to a single overarching goal (175). Here he sounds a good deal like Grisez and like Cooper's Aristotle.

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**Kerry S. Walters**

*The Sane Society Ideal in Modern  
Utopianism.*

Queenston, ON and Lewiston, NY:

The Edwin Mellen Press 1989. Pp. 324

Cdn \$59.95/US \$59.95. ISBN 0-88946-331-X.

Cet ouvrage porte sur la genèse et sur le développement d'un idéal culturel moderne, celui de la 'société saine', qui a été véhiculé surtout par une littérature qui se prétendait utopique. Walters décrit

la 'société saine' comme étant cette forme idéale dans laquelle les irrégularités économiques et la dissidence auront été supprimées, par l'application aux structures sociales des méthodes qui ont fait leurs preuves dans les sciences physiques (1). C'est la société de rêve qui séduit l'esprit technicien: rationalisée, mécanisée, efficace, purgée de la subjectivité perturbatrice, elle apparaît comme le bienfait ultime que les hommes devront à la raison instrumentale. Walters se refuse cependant à considérer les écrits apologétiques de la 'société saine' comme des utopies authentiques. Se référant à Mannheim, il préfère y voir des constructions idéologiques déguisées, et il essaie de montrer en quoi de telles constructions reflètent les valeurs et les intérêts de la classe socio-économique dominante.

Après une introduction dans laquelle il pose le problème et dévoile ses intentions, Walters consacre son premier chapitre aux concepts d'idéologie et d'utopie. Il expose les thèses de Mannheim, qu'il reprend à son compte (66-72). Alors que, selon Mannheim, les formes idéologiques sont trompeuses parce qu'elles se cachent à elles-mêmes leur nature véritable, en se présentant comme des reflets fidèles du réel et en prétendant être universellement valables, les utopies sont quant à elles des essais délibérés et conscients visant à transcender la réalité. Elles sont réformistes ou révolutionnaires d'une manière authentique, en ce qu'elles explorent des modèles alternatifs, proposent des innovations et contribuent à miner le statu quo que protègent les idéologies. C'est sur cette distinction que s'appuie Walters pour nier que le modèle de la 'société saine' soit une forme utopique authentique.

Quant à ce modèle, s'il n'a pu s'exprimer dans toute sa plénitude qu'au XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle, on en trouve l'origine chez Francis Bacon, dont la pensée fera l'objet du second chapitre. D'après Walters, Bacon représente en effet le véritable père de la pensée technicienne, condition sine qua non du genre littéraire prétendument utopique du XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle. Avec le Nouvel Organon, la raison spéculative perd toute valeur au profit de la raison instrumentale, susceptible de faire progresser les arts mécaniques. La manipulation de la nature au service de l'industrie devient la seule fin légitime, à laquelle Bacon apporte par-dessus le marché une justification théologique. Et la raison instrumentale parachève son oeuvre dans la rationalisation intégrale des relations sociales, décrite dans *The New Atlantis*. Cette pseudo-utopie, écrit Walters, constituait le prototype du modèle de la 'société saine' qui fleurira ultérieurement (143).

Dans son troisième chapitre, Walters examine la nature générale du modèle de la 'société saine' au XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle. A partir d'une analyse

précise et détaillée des conditions socio-économiques, mises en rapport avec les valeurs véhiculées par le modèle, il cherche à montrer que les utopies du XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle sont en fait des formes idéologiques déguisées (148), ainsi que l'était *The New Atlantis*. Les valeurs et les postulats sous-jacents (apothéose de la raison instrumentale, conquête totale de la nature, rationalisation des relations sociales, élimination de la subjectivité, mécanisation de l'homme, conformisme) non seulement reflètent l'idéologie bourgeoise dominante, mais la renforcent en se présentant frauduleusement comme révolutionnaires. Walters consacre ensuite son quatrième chapitre à l'illustration de cette thèse, en examinant trois utopies qu'il considère comme représentatives: *Looking Backward: 2000-1887* de Bellamy, *The Milltillionaire* d'Hovorre, et *Red Star* de Bogdanov.

Dans son dernier chapitre, Walters s'intéresse à l'évolution de la 'société saine' au XX<sup>e</sup> siècle. Si l'idéal a été ébranlé par la Grande Guerre et par la dépression économique subséquente, il n'a pas pour autant été expulsé de la pensée contemporaine (260). Il a continué à vivre dans les schèmes mécanistes du néo-positivisme et du pragmatisme, et dans l'empirisme abstrait de la microsociologie. Walters nous présente les critiques pertinentes d'Horkheimer et de C. Wright Mills, avant de conclure par des considérations portant sur l'ambivalence de la technologie dans le monde d'aujourd'hui (283-93).

Le livre de Walters a des défauts de forme: longueurs, répétitions, rappels incessants, développements inutiles (sur les ambiguïtés de la conception marxienne de l'idéologie, sur le débat entre Bacon et les logiciens). Il a des défauts de fond également. Mentionnons ici le recours à des lieux communs marxistes, et le traitement insuffisant de la nature de l'utopie au plan théorique. Il existe d'autres interprétations que celle de Mannheim, qui est à certains égards discutable. En se liant exclusivement à cette approche, Walters en recueille les points forts aussi bien que les insuffisances.

L'ouvrage comporte également des qualités qui compensent en partie ses défauts. On y trouve des renseignements importants ayant trait à la genèse de la culture occidentale contemporaine. Walters maîtrise les auteurs qu'il présente, et ses analyses historiques sont instructives.

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George Wilson

*The Intentionality of Human Action.*

Stanford: Stanford University Press 1989.

Pp. xi+299. US \$34.50. ISBN 0-8047-1545-9.

Thirty years ago many held that the propositional attitudes – standardly, a desire and an instrumental belief – cited in explaining an action, viz., the agent's reason for acting, are not an efficient cause or causal condition of that action. Now, however, this view is widely rejected. The original arguments on its behalf have collapsed under scrutiny; typical explications of a supposed non-causal explanatory relation that might link one's reasons with one's actions (e.g., 'non-causal bringing about') have left everything to be desired; and Donald Davidson's work purports to show us in meticulous and tempting detail how to think of a person's reasons as causes.

Wilson's main objective in this book is, under these circumstances, a challenging one: to reinstate the anti-causalist position as at least a serious contender. It seems to me clear that he has succeeded by a wide margin. In one way or another, Wilson's discussion takes into account nearly every idea of importance to his subject to be found in recent published work in philosophy and linguistic theory. From an extremely patient systematic examination of these ideas, Wilson develops carefully and for the most part persuasively a highly specific picture of the teleological relation which, he argues, one's actions should be taken to bear to one's reasons for them. For the first time, there emerges an anti-causalist alternative that enjoys the kind of rigorous delineation and support which Davidson, Goldman and others have provided for causalism.

Wilson agrees with Davidson that the concept of (full-blown) action is intimately connected with that of intention. But the fundamental concept here, Wilson argues, is the concept of intention in action, which appears to be distinct from the concept of general (e.g., future) intention as this is usually understood, viz., as more or less a propositional attitude directed upon a proposition closed by a quantifier over events (actions). Intention in action seems to be a *property* of an action. Intention in action is present when, for example, I intend a certain particular gesture of mine as a signal. As usually conceived, ascriptions of general intention are *de dicto*, whereas ascriptions of intention in action are apparently 'act relational,' *de acto suo*. Wilson contends that, for all cases, 'A intentionally X'd' must be explicated in terms of intention in action.

This contention is not flatly inconsistent with the causalist's view that one's reason, a belief-desire pair, causes one's action. But what gives the causalist the idea that the relation here is causal? Principally the fact that one acts *because* one wants so-and-so, together with the supposition that only causation could underwrite this 'because.' But, Wilson argues with great care, the linguistic data are fully consistent with the supposition that 'A X'd because Y' has often the 'force' of 'A X'd in order to produce some type of result that is described by Y'; and in these cases 'Y', a description of the *purpose* of A's Xing (or, a description of that at which A's Xing is *directed*), describes *nothing* that *causes* A's Xing. Roughly, to say A X'd because of a relevant belief and desire is typically, Wilson holds, to say that A X'd in order to satisfy that desire by the means specified in the belief. The 'because' does not compel us to think of the belief and desire as causing the action, even if perhaps we must say that *something* causes the action.

Yet *intentions* can be cited, as well as agents' reasons, in explaining action. From Wilson's results concerning 'A intentionally X'd', it can be seen that these intention-explanations must advert to intention in action. But the causalist might grant the last, and yet suggest that intention in action is ultimately analyzable in terms of a general intention that causes the action, in something like the way in which Kaplan, for example, proposes reducing *de re* belief to *de dicto*. It would not follow that *reasons* are causes, but something close enough to the original causalist idea would be vindicated.

In response to this train of thought Wilson presses a sequence of counterexamples against the causalist's proposed analysis of intention in action. An examination of replies to these counterexamples brings out several distinct important arguments. The upshot is that, not only does there exist a respectable alternative to the overall causalist perspective, but – because that alternative makes intention in action (and thus intentional Xing) intelligible, while causalism cannot do so – the present balance of evidence favors that alternative. The book concludes with remarks that briefly relate Wilson's position to various larger issues, e.g., mechanism, supervenience, and the outline of a Wittgensteinian account of intention and action.

Wilson persuades me that the causalist perspective is substantially less attractive than I had supposed it to be. I do find a number of difficulties with particular claims and arguments that he puts forward in this connection. Even if these difficulties are genuine, however, I do not think that they disable his criticisms of causalism, for

those criticisms rest at each stage upon a large array of claims and arguments; where one bit of the exposition falters, there is usually another better bit which takes up the slack.

My more serious doubts concern Wilson's alternative to causalism. For instance, a satisfactory account of intentional Xing must not misrepresent non-basic action, i.e., cases where one X's *by* Ying. Wilson's position threatens to dictate a misrepresentation here. The claim 'Ag turned on the light by flipping the switch' is rendered as

- (7<sub>3</sub>)  $(\exists e) \{ Ag \text{ performed } e \ \& \ (\exists f)[f \text{ is a flipping of the switch} \ \& \ MH(e, f) \ \& \ (\exists g)[g \text{ is a turning on of the light} \ \& \ MH(f, g)]] \}$ . (66)

But consider a case where, instructed to move certain muscles in my face, and knowing that these muscles move when I wrinkle my nose, I wrinkle my nose. I move the muscles *by* wrinkling my nose, even though the movement of the muscles makes my nose wrinkle. The generalization of Wilson's (7<sub>3</sub>) ('MH' designates a 'made happen' relation) dictates that the wrinkling of my nose makes the muscles move, and so fails to analyze this case. Non-basic action is a more complex phenomenon than (7<sub>3</sub>) allows; it is far from obvious that there is any natural extension of Wilson's analysis of the switch-flipping case which would do justice to non-basic action in all its forms.

There are signs of a further, perhaps deeper, problem in Wilson's overall view of action. At the level at which that problem exists, Wilson's view is underdetermined by the claims and arguments explicit in the book. The exact nature of the problem is thus necessarily (for the reader) conjectural, but one of its symptoms can be traced in chapter seven, as follows.

On pp. 184-85 (*inter alia*; see, for example, pp. 49-50 for relevant further details) Wilson takes up briefly the issue of what it is to be an agent. According to him, what this is is such that when we interpret

- (14) Ag X'd because he wanted to Y (184)  
with teleological force, we get

- (15) Ag X'd in order to satisfy [for the purpose of satisfying] his desire [inclination, wish, etc.] to Y. (184)

For example, the teleological reading of

- (4) Reggie opened the window because he wanted to get some fresh air (172)

would be

- (3) Reggie opened the window in order to satisfy [for the purpose of satisfying] his desire to get a breath of fresh air.  
(171)

But Wilson holds (194) that

- (6) Ag X'd in order to Y [for the purpose of Ying] (191)

'guarantees'

- (7) Ag X'd because he wanted to Y and believed that By (X, Y). (191)

In light of this guarantee, (3) being an instance of (6), we must say that (3) guarantees

- (\*) Reggie opened the window because he wanted to satisfy his desire to get a breath of fresh air, and believed that By . . . .

It seems to follow, then, that (4) guarantees (\*).

But (4) doesn't guarantee (\*), because the two sentences specify different things wanted by Reggie. It is true that as the case is understood, Reggie's getting some fresh air guarantees his satisfying his desire to get a breath of fresh air; but it doesn't follow from my wanting A, and A's guaranteeing B, that I want B. Not only is there no guarantee here; it would be *unusual*, for most of us, to want to satisfy our desire for so-and-so in *addition* to wanting so-and-so.

Since this unacceptable result is generated by Wilson's attempt to give teleological force to (4), one might be inclined to conclude that (4) (and, more generally, [14]) does not bear a teleological reading. That conclusion would, of course, give great comfort to the causalist. I do not think, however, that this is the conclusion to draw here; the truth may well be that (4) does have a teleological reading, but that this reading is given not by (3) but, instead, by Wilson's own

- (1) Reggie opened the window in order to get [for the purpose of getting] a breath of fresh air.

Why, then, does Wilson wrongly assign (3) the role proper to (1)? His discussion on pp. 186-9 suggests that he might respond that (3) and (1) are actually interchangeable in this role, but I find this discussion unconvincing on that particular score. In my view there is an important problem here, one which is bound up in a complex fashion with Wilson's conception of agency.

Ultimately, however, much of the argument of the book either is or could be made independent of this conception. It is as a whole a powerful argument, to which any responsible version of causalism from here on must give a convincing reply. I doubt that causalists will find it easy to devise such a reply.

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Volume 22 number 4 (December 1989)  
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