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Aufsätze — *Articles*

ON THE BACKGROUND OF CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHICAL LOGIC

Edited by Risto Hilpinen

Herausgeber — *Editor*

Prof. Dr. Rudolf Haller, Institut für Philosophie, Universität Graz, Heinrichstraße 26, A-8010 Graz, Österreich/Austria.

Ernst Bloch
The Utopian Function of Art and Literature: Selected Essays.
Translated by Jack Zipes and Frank Mecklenburg. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1986. Pp. xlii+310.
US$25.00. ISBN 0-262-02270-2.

This volume is comprised of a selection, in translation, of Ernst Bloch's essays on art, literature, theatre, film, and architecture written between 1918 and 1972. Also included is a 1964 discussion between Bloch and Theodor W. Adorno on 'The Contradictions of Utopian Longing.' The selection is designed to enable the reader to form a comprehensive picture of the author's aesthetics.

In no recognizable sense is the book a formal or systematic treatment of aesthetics as that subject is currently understood. Virtually all the essays are dense with cultural reference and are idiosyncratic in the ways they associate, combine, or permutate historical and cultural *facta*. As a cultural critic, Bloch is simply *sui generis*, and his many writings fuse an astonishing range of deeply assimilated cultural experience with a profound eschatological humanism, a feat that sets him apart from any contemporary thinker, with the possible, but qualified, exceptions of Theodor Adorno and George Steiner. If his coruscating prose is reminiscent of any twentieth-century figure, that person, I think, would be Oswald Spengler. These essays are invariably a pleasure to read, but the reader who expects a detached, 'professional,' philosophically academic inquiry into the arts will, in all likelihood, be disappointed. Bloch's writing is passionate, insistent, and exhortative in tone, richly nuanced and allusive, and always revelatory of the 'forward dream,' the guiding concern of his life. One is never left with the impression that any of these essays, indeed any of his voluminous writings, need not have been written. We are the better for the belated and heroic effort to translate Bloch into English and it is unlikely that the institutions of culture in the latter part of the twentieth century will produce a critic remotely comparable to him.

Bloch is polymathic and culturally voracious in ways not uncharacteristic of European intellectual life before the second world war but seldom to be found in a fully devloped form since then. He is the tireless advocate of *Vor Schein*, the 'forward dream' which is fueled diversely and incessantly by art, an activity which he sees as imper-

ative for cultural transformation, hence the special role it plays in his critique of culture. He is the sworn enemy of the bourgeois appropriation and ossification of culture, and in his chiliastic Marxism, which empowers the superstructural factors in historical life to transform the 'material base,' the role of art and aesthetics is necessarily a crucial one. For him, it is 'in art' that 'the resistance of the empirical world is eliminated' and in art that the image of emancipated man as such, that is, the 'image of Greek man, the citizen, was first delineated,' inaugurating true humanism. And architecture, according to Bloch, 'first creates real space against the obstacles with which the earth is full,' thereby moving humanity toward the utopian 'not-yet.' 'True art,' he writes, 'is always a clarion call and a challenge' and all forms express this perennial function in some way.

The humanistic task of modern art is to fill the *Hohlraum* created by the collapse of bourgeois culture and for him the cultural phenomenon of montage in the late bourgeois period 'is the empty space of the bourgeois world.' A prevailing characteristic of Bloch's writing style is the metaphorical use of montage technique to 'shock' his latter-day bourgeois reader into some awareness of the 'true' relation between art and the possibilities of history. For him, the raison d'être of art is to raise the 'not yet conscious.' The indissoluble connection between the power of the imagination and the 'principle of hope' enables literary activity to become a 'special form of dream work.' Indeed, the ground of all our reading, viewing, and listening is hope for the *novum*. The various genres of art and literature 'result from different means artists use to break conventions and form anew.' With respect to *Vor Schein*, there are no hierarchies among or within the forms of art and literature. Fairy tale, circus, detective novel, classical music, cartoons: they all contribute to 'forward dreaming.' For him, however, fairy tales, with their 'auroral feature' of 'wish image,' and 'wish landscape,' appear to constitute the substratum of all utopian art. Bloch's cultural criticism is a hermeneutic of search for the 'anticipatory illumination' that would restore and complete the human estate.

The essay 'Art and Society' focuses on 'the production of culture' and rehearses familiar Marxist themes by using an astonishing array of examples from the history of art which warrant our attention because of 'the dimension of their profundity and hope.' 'Art and Utopia' is a fascinating and wide-ranging formal and historical account of how the 'artistic illusion' functions eschatologically as the 'visible anticipatory illumination,' which is the utopian element in all true

art. 'Marxism and Poetry' is a brief essay which describes how 'meaningful poetry makes the world become aware of an accelerated flow of action, an elucidated waking dream of the essential,' and by so doing promotes that 'forward dreaming' which is the constitutive project of humanity.

Bloch's brilliant analysis of the temporal dimension of the fairy tale in 'The Fairy Tale Moves on its Own Time' probably provides the best illustration of how he understands the utopian character of all true art. Since the fairy tale 'moves on its own time,' it liberates us from the constraints of present time and enables us to live imaginatively in all conceivable times. 'Better Castles in the Sky at the County Fair and Circus and Colportage' explores some conventions of the fairy tale in order to uncover the repressed utopian content in bourgeois culture.

In 'Building in Empty Spaces,' Bloch displays his extraordinary knowledge of architecture and architectural theory and argues that all great constructions were built 'into the anticipation of a space adequate for human being,' so the 'meaning' of architecture is irreducibly humanistic. In the essay 'On Fine Arts in the Machine Age' his emphasis is again consistently on the possible, the inventive, the 'not-yet,' rather than on the artistic dishonesty and triviality of the kitsch which permeates contemporary cultural life.

'On the Present in Literature' investigates the ways in which the depiction of the historical present, the 'now-time' in European literature from the eighteenth to the twentieth centuries always reveals a relation to the 'forward-dream.' Bloch sees theatre as 'a paradigmatic institution' within which defiance and hope can always be the decision for the future, and his philosophical interpretation of the detective novel centers on the role that suspense, unmasking, discovery, evidence, and reconstruction play in such literature.

This selection of Bloch's essays provides a stimulating and accessible introduction to his thoughts and will probably incline a reader to try one of his more baroque experiments in intellectual montage, such as his masterpiece *The Principle of Hope.*

Charles F. Breslin
University of Louisville

Charles Butterworth, trans. & comm.
Averroes' Middle Commentary on Aristotle's Poetics.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1986. Pp. xvi+161.
US$22.50. ISBN 0-691-07302-3.

Charles Butterworth has translated the middle commentary of Averroes (Ibn Rushd) on the *Poetics* of Aristotle from the critical Arabic edition that he has done recently with Ahmad Haridi. The book includes a translation with notes, glossary, bibliography, and index, a preface, and an introduction. While the introduction begins in a general fashion, the bulk of it (11-46) consists of a running commentary on the content of the translation.

The book seems to be aimed at Orientalists and students of literature more than at philosophers. The notes on the translation concern mainly the translation of certain Arabic words and the sources of the poetry, mostly Arabic, quoted by Averroes in his commentary, along with frequent comparisons with Aristotle's *Poetics*. Butterworth does not devote much attention in his notes to discussing antecedents of Averroes' views, be they Islamic or Greek ones after Aristotle. In fact, there is not even much discussion of the poetical theory of Avicenna (19 n. 17) and Alfarabi (46). Nor does Butterworth always note philosophical doctrines relevant to the text; e.g., Aristotelian doctrines of the philosophy of mind relative to the notion of imaginative assent (66; 69). To be sure, in the introduction, Butterworth spends a good deal of time giving a general summary of Plato's view of poetry (7-11), and concludes that this view is inadequate or at best incomplete (11). However, many scholars of ancient philosophy may find Butterworth's discussion at best incomplete, as he does not discuss the treatment of poetry in the *Laws* nor in the *Phaedrus* where, some have argued, Plato changes his views of poetry. I conclude, then, that this book is not intended for philosophers primarily.

Indeed, Butterworth's translation is well suited for a general audience. His introductory remarks are usually helpful. However, I find his view on Averroes' position on the place of melody in poetry to be stated quite obscurely (22), although later (43) his meaning becomes clearer. The translation reads well, though it does depart somewhat from the phrasing of the original text – a necessity, if the translation is to run smoothly (xiii).

I do have some hesitations about the worth of the translation for the scholarly specialist. Butterworth has earlier edited the Arabic text of this commentary in a separate volume. It would have been more useful, if an agreeable publisher could have been found, for the original text and the translation to appear in the same volume. Again, the scholarly apparatus of his translation seems somewhat skimpy – if we make a fairly obvious comparison with the recent translation of Avicenna's commentary on the *Poetics* by Dahiyat, or even with Butterworth's early translation of Averroes' short treatises on the *Topics, Rhetoric*, and *Politics* of Aristotle. But these are minor qualms relative to the worth of the book, and perhaps Butterworth intentionally cut short the scholia so as to appeal to a wider audience.

So his translation of the commentary of Averroes on the *Poetics* of Aristotle should have interest for a wide audience: not only for specialists of Islamic philosophy and Aristotelianism, but more generally for those interested in literature, comparative culture, and such problems in philosophy as cultural relativism. The main reason I see for the wide appeal of Averroes' commentary lies in its being an interpretation of a theory of Greek literature from the perspective of a radically different cultural tradition. Averroes, like other Islamic philosophers writing on the *Poetics*, had no acquaintance with Greek literature, in the original nor in translation. Nor was there much in the way of Islamic theater. The result followed that Averroes had to work from the text of the *Poetics* without having knowledge of what the *Poetics* was talking about. Now such a situation might incline us to dismiss Averroes' commentary as insignificant, as was done (ix) – just as, on much weaker grounds, the whole of Islamic philosophy has been commonly dismissed because of the misattribution of some neo-Platonic works to Aristotle and hence the supposed confusion of Plato and Aristotle. Shadows of Quine's doctrine of the indeterminacy of translation may also impel us to abandon serious consideration of such a commentary. For after all, if any type of human speech is bound inextricably with its native culture and language, surely it is the poetic. But then it seems ludicrous for an Islamic philosopher to try to understand the poetry and its theory from another culture, distant from him in time and space.

Yet we might instead take a more positive approach. Why not be empirical about our claims about cultural relativism? To what extent can in fact cultural traditions be transported and understood in alien terms? For Averroes is attempting to interpret a view of the significance of ancient Greek poetry and theater in terms of a culture

with quite different traditions and orientations (though with some Greek influence), and, indeed, with a language that is not even Indo-European. So, it appears to me to be of general interest just what an intelligent person like Averroes could accomplish in such an enterprise.

As Averroes has no first-hand acquaintance with Greek poetry, he wisely avoids the quixotic approach of Avicenna, who, in his earlier commentary on the *Poetics*, had relied heavily on late, spurious, inaccurate, indirect accounts of what Greek poetry was like. Instead, Averroes tries to find parallels in Islamic culture for tragedy and comedy, and offers eulogy and satire. These were developed forms of Arabic poetry. (This trend of looking for Arabic parallels was not novel; Avicenna had done the same in discussing versification.) Then Averroes proceeds to comment upon and explain Aristotle's texts through the use of illustrations from Arabic poetry. I, like Butterworth (ix; 41), find this section of the text (90-116) to be quite original and interesting. Those familiar with Averroes might be surprised just how far Averroes departs from Aristotle's text in this middle commentary. Indeed, it is interesting that Averroes has a low opinion of the moral content and technique of most Arabic poetry; of course, with the exception of the *Qu'ran*.

I offer here no evaluation of the success of Averroes' enterprise. I want only to defend the worth of his commentary, even from a modern, ahistorical perspective. Surely it is of general interest to determine just how large the hermeneutical circle of understanding can be.

Allan Bäck
Kutztown University

Edward S. Casey
Remembering: A Phenomenological Study.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press
1987. Pp. xiv+362.
US$47.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-253-34942-7);
US$18.50 (paper: 0-253-20409-7).

This book is the second by its author on a phenomenological theme. The first was a critical analysis of the imagination, which took the

subject one step further than the pioneering efforts of Sartre to bring the phenomenological methodology to bear upon 'that most free of the human faculties.' From the Sartrean 'image,' Casey brought our attention to the activity of imagining. He does the same thing here for remembering.

To establish the need for the book, the author reminds us that remembering has been forgotten, as, in our distance from Plato, anamnesis seems to have faded away into contemporary amnesia. There are many such verbal jabs as this one, but the point is legitimate: a thoroughgoing phenomenological analysis of human memory had as yet not been published.

The argument spans four separate parts, each dedicated to a different phase of the phenomenon: the mentalistic aspects, given a Husserlian treatment in Part I; and a scanning of the various mnemonic modes in Part II, preceded by a prologue and followed by a coda; Part III introduces the bodily aspects of memory, based upon the foundation of corporeal subjectivity bequeathed the phenomenological movement by Merleau-Ponty and the social dimension of commemoration accessible through our being-with others in a shared world; Part IV attempts to reassemble the bits of the argument into a reasonable conclusion rather optimistically entitled 'Remembering Re-membered.'

My reaction to the whole was not unlike that of Henry James to the novels of Tolstoy: 'loose, baggy monsters,' he called them, indicating his dissatisfaction with their formal structure, yet without dissimulating his respect and admiration for the profundity of their message. Casey is a competent phenomenologist; he has returned to the things themselves and enlightened his readers by his analyses. But the looseness – the bagginess – of his form, seems to this reader to stem from his having attempted too much. In a word, the book betrays a lack of authorial, methodological restraint. Does he really have to refer to William James, Whitehead, Freud, Bergson, and all the others to make *his* descriptive points? I hope not. Where the author does isolate a phenomenal characteristic of human experience, he usually succeeds in describing it; where he borrows from the theories of others, he usually ends up obfuscating the matter under discussion. His descriptions of erotic bodily remembering are sharp, apt, and aptly convincing, as they are personal, and honestly recalled.

Except for their loose, baggy structures Casey's applications of the phenomenological methodology would be exemplary – milestones,

even, demonstrating the fact that phenomenology has at last become a movement in American philosophy. The days of bridge-building with the analytics can now be forgotten.

E.F. Kaelin
Florida State University

Joseph Catalano
A Commentary on Jean-Paul Sartre's
Critique of Dialectical Reason,
Volume I: Theory of Practical Ensembles.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press
1987. Pp. xi+282.
US$40.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-226-09700-5);
US$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-226-09701-3).

The massive tome on which the present work is intended as a commentary was first published in French in 1960 and first published in English translation in 1976, with the exception of its separate but related introductory essay, *Search for a Method*, which had already appeared in a 1963 translation by Hazel Barnes. (The English version of the *Critique* proper does not include *Search* ..., but the present *Commentary* does.) Despite the passage of time since its original appearance and the fact that many articles and several books have already been devoted to summarizing it, while numerous others have been devoted to developing certain of its themes, the *Critique*, Volume I, still remains *terra incognita* to, no doubt, most students of twentieth-century philosophy. Catalano's work is an effort to redress this state of affairs.

The reason for his feeling that it was important to do this was his conviction, which I share, that the Sartrean work in question is of great importance, not only because of its historical place as a monument to the 'social turn' taken by one of the mid-century's best-known philosophers, but also because it is a major, original contribution to thought. But to specify just how and why this jagged, unfinished, often too little edited piece of prose should be so regarded is not easy. During earlier years of its public existence, the natural tendency was to

follow a course strongly indicated by Sartre himself at the beginning of *Search for a Method* and to situate it within the ambit of neo-Marxism. Another, not necessarily opposed, tendency was to treat it as a development out of existentialism, a movement with which Sartre still identified himself. But both of these labels have since lost much of their former, more precise significance; Sartre himself, for example, explicitly abjured the 'Marxist' label in at least two or three recorded interviews prior to his death. Recognizing this changed situation, Catalano very seldom refers to 'existentialism,' except in his historical background chapter, and deals with Marx's philosophy only to the extent, comparatively minor, to which it is necessary to do so in order to elucidate a few of Sartre's contentions beyond his initial assertion of close compatibility with Marxism in *Search for a Method*. Rather, Catalano presents the *Critique* as a relatively autonomous work of philosophy.

What is this philosophy? As Catalano rightly warns us (10), 'no sentence or paragraph can summarize a philosophical view; a certain degree of commitment and effort is needed.' Catalano's preferred characterization of Sartre's thought in the *Critique*, which he sees as continuous in most of its main lines with, though of course different in much of its subject-matter from, *Being and Nothingness*, is 'dialectical nominalism.' He brings out very well Sartre's constant but comparatively little-emphasized criticism of all claims that certain universals 'really' exist, whether these claims come from the side of '*philosophia perennis*' and concern alleged value constants or from the side of modern scientific or orthodox Marxist 'realism' and concern alleged constancies in 'Nature,' considered apart from the human beings who have constructed that concept. Catalano contends that the philosophical perspective common to both the ontology of *Being and Nothingness* and the social philosophy of the *Critique* is one of phenomenologically 'describing the world from the perspective of the human organism "down" to animals, trees, and other material entities' (17). This systematically anthropomorphic approach, according to the author, preserves the uniqueness of human individuals and avoids the hidden idealism of all of the various philosophical perspectives that attribute a high degree of independent existence to mere concepts.

Collective social entities, or 'practical ensembles,' are from this perspective less real than individuals but more real than either aggregates or concepts (48); it is to the complex analysis of such entities

that Sartre dedicates his main efforts in Volume I of the *Critique*. His methodology is dialectical, which means, *inter alia*, that the initial claims about the nature of social reality must be gradually validated (or invalidated) in the course of the inquiry itself; they cannot simply be demonstrated at the outset. So, for example, the existence and role of social classes, such as the proletariat, which is a significant object of inquiry in later parts of Sartre's book, cannot be assumed as a starting-point. Instead, classes must be examined and comprehended as the complex constructs of human praxis under certain real but not preordained material and historical conditions (scarcity, capitalism). In fact, says Catalano interpreting Sartre's position on this point, 'it is dubious, that there is one viable concept of the [i.e., *the*] proletariat' (255-6). Similarly, the idea that human history is (or is becoming) ultimately intelligible as one vast 'totalisation,' upon which the never-completed Volume II was to have concentrated, can only be validated or invalidated in the course of lengthy dialectical exploration, not assumed *ab initio*.

The bulk of this commentary consists, as advertised, of a synopsis of the sections and sub-sections of the *Critique*: from the methodological discussions with which it starts; on through the story of human praxis working on inert matter in a milieu of scarcity and forming ensembles often characterized by passive, impotent 'serial' structures; to the later creation of organised 'groups' that struggle to achieve their objectives and then, if successful, tend to try to preserve their achievements from hostile threats through the taking of mutual pledges that are in fact initial steps in the direction of institutionalization, rigidification, and new forms of social passivity. Needless to say, Catalano does not pretend to be reproducing all the details of Sartre's lengthy studies, but he quite deftly manages to locate every sub-section within the context of the overall Sartrean project as he interprets it and, through occasional footnotes (*real* footnotes, not endnotes!) that do not interrupt the ongoing summary itself, to relate his text to other secondary literature and to current and recent political events and practices. The net result is a splendid, challenging epitome of this landmark work, evoking its dominant spirit of philosophical quest for intelligibility, while not neglecting those socioethical undertones of the *Critique* that make it at the same time an expression of 'hope [for] a better humanity than we now possess' (268).

William Leon McBride
Purdue University

Lorraine Code
Epistemic Responsibility.
Hanover, NH: University Press of
New England 1987. Pp. xi+272.
US$25.00. ISBN 0-87451-407-X.

Code develops a novel approach to epistemology according to which epistemic responsibility is central to justified belief. Epistemic responsibility is not so much a matter of accepting those beliefs which one has good reason to believe true as it is one of exercising intellectual virtue in the activities which give rise to and maintain one's beliefs. The primary concern of epistemology becomes examining the character traits which allow human beings to function well intellectually rather than stating and defending criteria of truth or principles of evidence concerning the logical relations among beliefs, or the experiential sources of belief, which are relevant for justification.

Her descriptions of epistemic practice and displays of virtue and vice within it are generally insightful and well worth studying. She rejects the 'persistent thrust in epistemology toward classifying' (11) and thus 'oversimplifying' 'what happens when real human beings try to make sense of their experience' (12). Neither foundationalist nor coherentist criteria help us understand Edmund Gosse's real epistemic dilemma and failings in trying to reconcile his religious beliefs with his natural science. The former lead us to think neither creationism nor evolutionism very reasonable; the latter that each is equally coherent but incompatible. (Have these positions been 'oversimplified'?)

Moreover, since virtuous conduct must express a firm and stable character, one's virtues depend on how one conducts one's life as a whole. Thus any systematic attempt to state general principles about what features of particular situations, including virtues exercised, are relevant to justification will fail. However, the conclusion does not seem to follow unless we identify virtues with the conditions possibly relevant for assessing their possession or with conditions necessary for their development. Systematization *will* fail if epistemic responsibility at a time always supervenes on past epistemic facts about what one justifiably believed. However, then Code can't also maintain that epistemic justification supervenes on nonepistemic features including virtues exercised (42).

Responsibility is a virtue because intellectual activity involves structuring experience in ways which, though limited by previous personal and communal cognitive history, current forms of human experiencing, and the objects experienced, are also alterable by future experience and structuring. Thus we must realize how we structure experience and be willing to 'let things speak for themselves' rather than ordering experience simply from a 'desire to impose one's structuring on the world' (132). This 'normative realism' requires 'openness' to criticism and conflicting experiences. Epistemically responsible believing then flourishes only in an epistemic community in which truthfulness, openness, and integrity are qualities we can expect in our fellows.

Epistemic community and 'the networks of shared trust' (178) that maintain it can be understood as (a) an epistemic contract, (b) a form of life, and perhaps most importantly, (c) an epistemic practice in so far as it typically involves forms of 'socially established cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards which are appropriate to and partly definitive of the practices' (183). There is an unresolved tension between (a) and (c). Contracts have ends independent of the contract relative to which the contract can be evaluated – an epistemic contract, epistemic ends. However, a practice has no goods or ends external to the practice relative to which the worth of the practice is to be measured (194).

Epistemically responsible practice in a theologian differs from that in a biologist. Yet epistemic responsibility as a feature emerging from a whole life would seem to require 'openness' throughout one's practices, however different its forms. Thus assessment of justification requires seeing lives as narrative unities and avoids an excessive relativism. (Is it all that clear that the degree to which one is responsible and thus justified in one's judgments within a practice is a function of the degree to which one isn't dogmatic in other practices?)

Code doesn't seem to take seriously the possibility of radical conflict between epistemic practices. Since 'intellectual goodness consists ... in conducting one's moral and intellectual life so as to contribute to the creation and preservation of the best possible standards appropriate to the practices within which one lives' (193), assessing it wouldn't help much in assessing how a person resolves radical epistemic dilemma. (Nor would the epistemic imperative 'Be open!'

be much use to the person.) Thus, for Code, Gosse's epistemic failure is not that he forsook evolutionary theory for Genesis rather than Genesis for evolutionary theory but that he didn't (try hard enough to) see religion and evolutionary theory as different ways of understanding experience which, properly understood, did not conflict but enriched life (33-4, 135-6, 161-2).

The oft-condemned fundamentalists, behaviourists, and materialists suffer, it seems, from faulty philosophy, denying the epistemic nature of truth (121) and methodological pluralism. Are they and their views being judged vicious by their metaphysics instead of their character? Isn't the resolution of the religious scientist's dilemma rather too simple now? Code provides little detailed argument, fresh or stale, for either of these positions other than citing their proponents (Wittgenstein, MacIntyre, Putnam, Rorty, Foucault). The exception is her interesting account of literature which, she argues, gives knowledge by disclosing in an intuitive way what is 'true to life' rather than 'truths of fact' which our experience makes plausible or which cohere with other truths (210-11). More work has to be done to elucidate the distinction and to assess its validity.

Code struggles to accommodate the intellectual credentials of the epistemic rebel who defies the wisdom, prudence, and responsibility of established epistemic practices. (Traditional epistemologies face less difficulty.) First, rebels may establish 'intellectual credibility' by poking holes in positions so that 'other [?] responsible thinkers need to take notice' (56). Yet this only makes them tools to be consulted by 'serious' thinkers who wish to be responsible, not epistemically justified believers themselves. Second, rebels may be intellectual *characters* – recognized models of intellectual life in a culture – emulation of whom, along with characters of normal intellectual goodness, is sanctioned and supported. However, unlike the normal, the only appropriate persons for the emulation of radicals are the radical characters themselves. (Cf. the character of the 'warrior queen' in a society in which the standard female characters are models of domesticity. The only woman who may act like the warrior queen is the warrior queen herself, however praised and honoured *she* may be.) How could it be any other way for a practice to exist?

Epistemic Responsibility is a welcome and heartily recommended contribution to epistemology, whether or not it represents the most promising approach to a virtue-based epistemology.

Bruce Hunter
University of Alberta

David Copp, ed.
Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence and Disarmament.
Calgary: University of Calgary Press 1986.
Pp. xiv+269.
$14.00. ISBN 0-919491-12-X.

This volume consists of nine essays, a very useful editorial introduction and a memorial to Steven C. Patten (one of the contributors).

It is a question worth pondering how much philosophy is involved in the problems associated with the nuclear threat. In general, they are not particularly philosophical problems and if they form problems in ethics it is primarily in *applied* ethics. The non-philosophical nature of some of the problems is exhibited in the collection. Chomsky's cynical polemic, bolstered with unfailing erudition and analytical acumen, is not really philosophy but rather a study in the dynamics of recent history which, he claims, makes the arms race rational in the short term for the parties really in control of it. The paper is interesting and contentious but it does not raise any special philosophical questions nor does it apply any peculiarly philosophical insights to its topic (not that I would very much want to claim that there are such).

Also, one occasionally gets a certain sense of *déjà vu* when one reads through the collection. Michael Dummett's article follows very closely his contribution to *Objections to Nuclear Defence: Philosophers on Deterrence* (Nigel Blake and Kay Pole, eds. [London: RKP 1984]). He vehemently maintains the irretrievable evil of threatening innocent lives to protect one's own *except* when one of two conditions is fulfilled: first, that one is bluffing or, second, that one knows that one cannot fulfil the threat. Since these conditions are not fulfilled in the real world case of nuclear deterrence the threat which that policy imposes is completely immoral.

Dummett's position is attacked in Narveson's paper, but in a constructive manner that might be considered a natural refinement of Dummett's view. Narveson's view is that if threatening innocents is the *only* way one can prevent evil by another then no blame falls on one for imposing the threat. Even if deterrence fails, moral blame ought to fall on the attacker rather than the retaliator. This is certainly questionable. For example, what if the threat can be fulfilled not only in response to aggression but possibly by accident? A lot of

weight must fall on the 'only' in Narveson's condition. But grant him that and one can see how this could be a sort of extension (and, it must be admitted, a softening) of Dummett's position. For Narveson will permit only the minimum threat necessary to achieve deterrence; any further threat would be wrong for roughly Dummettian reasons (not to mention being fiscally insane). However, if Narveson's view is a correct analysis of the present situation, just what is going on? Why is there an arms race? In a short postscript he espouses a 'bureaucratic' answer which points towards Chomsky's view that, crudely, the internal dynamics of the now international military-industrial complex demand the continuation of the arms race.

Russell Hardin's paper is perhaps the most 'meta-ethical.' He tries to show how the problem of nuclear deterrence highlights the most basic disagreements between consequentialist and non-consequentialist ethical theories, to the advantage of the consequentialist.

James Sterba argues that deterrence is justified only if the threat is a bluff. *Déjà vu* strikes again for this is something of a reprise of his contribution to a collection he edited, *The Ethics of War and Nuclear Deterrence* (Encino, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Co. 1985). Sterba extends and bolsters his argument (for what is intrinsically a somewhat fantastic position) by an interesting appeal to Rawls' 'veil of ignorance.'

Alan Gewirth presents a complex and long paper which carefully analyses, from the standpoint of his own Kantian-style moral theory, the claims of rationality and morality that a defender of deterrence could make. I found the upshot somewhat disappointing, however, as Gewirth concludes that deterrence policy is 'unacceptable as an adequate long-range policy' (159). This proposition is, I would have thought, dead obvious.

Steven Patten, to whom the volume is dedicated, focuses on the responsibility of the individual but his conclusion is also rather weak: that the individual has a responsibility to do something about altering current nuclear policy using appropriate political means. Such a conclusion is especially weak for a Canadian or, in general, the citizen of any country that has no direct say in nuclear policy. In light of this, the more interesting part of Patten's paper lies in the discussion of the theoretical grounds of assigning individual responsibility for national activities.

In contrast to the concentration on the individual's actions in Patten's paper we have Onora O'Neill's contention that political ag-

gregates are the central moral sources of action in this problem. Her paper is dense and not altogether clear. But her anti-reductionist claim that political institutions can rightly be ascribed intentions, beliefs and be rightly held responsible for their actions is worthy of attention. In the end, however, she echoes Patten's demand for individual action but for *second-order* actions which seek to transform the institutional agents actually controlling nuclear policy. So, does her view come to anything very different from Patten's or Chomsky's, in which the individual is enjoined to do what he or she can to change institutions, whether or not these are conceived of as agents?

Finally, Ian Hacking's paper is only tangentially related to the ethical issues involved in nuclear deterrence. But, arguably, he makes the deepest philosophical claim in the collection: that the very form of our knowledge is shaped by the arms race. Exactly what this comes to is hard to say. A form of knowledge is taken to be a set of sentences along with methods of verification for its elements. Modern science is such a form and it has, as a matter of historical fact, been shaped by weapons research. The crucial questions here are: how would science have been different – would it have been different in any significant way – if science had not been sent in search of weapons, how does this shaping operate, and is the fact that weapons research figures prominently among the shapers of knowledge-forms particularly significant. After all, more science has been undertaken for personal advancement or fame than for the discovery of weapons. Does any pervasive motivation alter the attendant form of knowledge? If so, down what especially dark path has weapons research taken the very structure of our knowledge?

William E. Seager
University of Toronto

Norman Daniels
Am I My Parents' Keeper? An Essay On Justice Between the Young and the Old.
Don Mills, ON and New York:
Oxford University Press 1988.
Pp.+194.
Cdn$29.95: US$19.95. ISBN 0-19-505233-1.

With this book Daniels enters a dispute that has been going on for some time, especially in the U.S., whether the old unjustly consume resources at the expense of the young: it is estimated, for example, that 30% of the children born in 1980 will have been on welfare at least once before they are 18, while poverty among the aged has been reduced far below expectations. Daniels seeks to replace the current competitive view with a different conception, which he calls the 'prudential Life Span Account.' If we took this approach, the problem would no longer be seen as one of 'finding a just distribution between "us" and "them" – between groups' – but would be one of 'finding a prudent allocation of resources for each stage of our lives' (18).

This lifespan approach, Daniels thinks, would give a rational foundation for the allocation of benefits to the elderly: if we thought of ourselves as individually endowed with a certain limited amount of resource, e.g., for health care, to last for a lifetime, and if we had to decide on the distribution early on, we would deny ourselves certain expensive and heroic measures at the end of our lives to insure sufficient funds at an earlier time, so that we could reach old age in the first place. We might thus decide (behind a veil of ignorance, of course) to deny ourselves hemodialysis after the age of seventy to make sure that we can meet the costs of earlier medical emergencies.

Daniels rightly makes a distinction between divisions and discriminations by age, colour, gender, ethnic origin, etc. and distinctions by age. The former are fixed for life, but we live through all ages: the young will become the old. Rationing by age is therefore different from discrimination by sex, etc. Thus 'treating the young and old differently, may not mean treating people unequally. Over a lifetime, such differential treatment may still result in our treating people equally. From the perspective of institutions that operate over our lifespan, transfers *between* age groups are really transfers *within* lives. Transfers that look like subsidies by the young of the old are transformed into a type of savings, (63).

The rational deliberators then 'must seek principles to govern the design of institutions that distribute basic resources over the lifespan... [They must also know that] the basic goods being distributed constitute a fair or just share, that is, that more general principles of distributive justice already solve problems of distribution between persons. Third, [they] must assume that they will live through each stage of life' (67). They must also be aware of certain salient demographic facts about their society, for instance that longevity has been increasing at certain rates (75). Daniels thinks that the age rationing used by the British National Health Service is in general, if perhaps not in detail, correct. The principles governing it certainly contrast favorably with the American system, where large sums tend to be spent on elderly patients close to death, instead of providing them with better long term nursing care before they are *in extremis*.

Daniels then addresses the problem of income support in old age. It is well known that the present pay-as-you-go system in Social Insurance and Social Security yields different rates of return, depending on the calendar year in which one retires. People retiring now do rather well, while those who do a few decades hence will fair rather badly, unless the rate of taxation on the working population is raised. Daniels' prudential lifespan account does not, as such, yield a specific solution to this problem, but at the very least it puts one in the frame of mind to seek for stable institutions that provide a decent and equitable level of support over a lifespan. 'The Prudential Lifespan Account avoids [the] competitive perspective between generations' (131).

In a last chapter, Daniels reminds us that the Prudential Lifespan Account is 'an *ideal* or general-compliance moral theory' (139). But the world is a messy place. Irrational policies are in place and must be changed, many people have already suffered disadvantages from them that should be redressed, and special interests always interfere. In this last chapter Daniels discusses various half-way measures that are informed by his principles, and might in time lead to a more rational and juster system: 'In this chapter the reader has been reminded how difficult it is to use theory to guide practice – but also how difficult it is not to do so' (154).

This must rate as one of the best books on the subject. It is informed by cogent and transparent principles, based on an extensive, almost encyclopedic, knowledge of medical and demographic facts, guided by a humane spirit and written with exceptional clarity. It will guide,

and perhaps dominate, the discussion of these matters for some time to come. At least this reviewer hopes that it will, and that the field is not left to those who, like Daniel Callahan (in his *Setting Limits: Medical Goals in an Aging Society* [New York: Simon and Schuster 1987]) oppose this liberal individualistic approach and advocate the setting of a limit to a 'full life' (communally defined), after which life extending medical care should be denied on principle, even if resources are available.

Rolf George
University of Waterloo

J.P. Day
Liberty and Justice.
Wolfeboro, NH: Longwood Publishing Group (for Croom Helm) 1986. Pp. iv+232.
US$43.50. ISBN 0-7099-4523-X.

Twelve of these thirteen essays appeared earlier (1970-86). Some titles not discussed below are 'Threats, Offers, Law, Opinion and Liberty,' 'Retributive Punishment,' and 'The Indefeasibility of Justice.' The essays are said to make a book, having been composed to have a unity; this is as accurate as expected. Subject- and author- indexes are helpful; the dust-cover is a mix of jarring colors and bad photographs. See *Choice* (September 1987, glowing) and *British Book News* (March 1987, favorably mixed) for review notes.

Memory suggested Day was, roughly, an ordinary-language logician. My expectations were confirmed by the book's first paragraph: 'The Philosophies of Justice and of Liberty occupy accordingly the same sort of dominant position in Ethics and Social Philosophy as the Philosophy of Probability occupies in Epistemology and Philosophy of Science. Thus, Justice is conceptually connected with the following leading ideas among others: Law, Compensation, Intention [twenty-two more items follow]. Similarly, Liberty ... [fifteen items follow].' The following suggests the positions argued for and the historical tradition influencing Day (103): ' "[F]ree" is univocal and the nega-

tive concept is the only concept of liberty. The creator of the negative concept of individual liberty was Hobbes.'

Day's writing has a kind of clarity and a kind of rigor. But the approach has vices, exacerbated by the fact that this is not a book. While a number of narrower points are repeatedly attacked using selected claims about what we say and believe, large issues receive inadequate or no treatment. Despite repeated readings I found no sustained statement or defense of a consistent, general position of political morality.

Consider 'Compensatory Discrimination.' Day describes a medical school admitting a female rather than a higher-scoring male on the grounds that the society's sexism undercuts women's confidence, thus lowering their exam performances. He responds (91): 'Here, being female is regarded as a disadvantage of the same sort as being born incurably blind. But we need to notice that non-preventable disadvantages may cease to be such. Thus, it may become possible to control the sex with which an infant is born.' No act of omission or commission made her female, '[h]ence, being female is [her] misfortune [bad luck] not any person's ... fault.' '[T]his is not to say that nothing should be done ... But if she is given the place on this ground, it is [not a matter of compensation] ... whereas compensation is a right to which there exists a correlative obligation of reparation, relief and charity are not rights to which there exist correlative obligations. If charity were an obligation, it could be enforced, as can e.g. compensation. But "enforced charity" is not charity.' People too often blame others for their bad luck.

This discussion is offensively simplistic. It appears inconsistent with Day's claim ('Fairness and Fortune,' 34-5) that if a competition's organizers make unfair rules or arrangements the competition is unfair: Might it be unfair if admissions policies ignore a society's immoral, debilitating treatment of half the population? But Day employs parts of some political theory, apparently a relativistic form of libertarian contractarianism, which undercut such an *ad hominem*. (The extent of the relativistic dimension is unclear. See 94-5 and 108. My interpretation is confirmed by Nozick-like aspects [105-6, 108-9] of 'Individual Liberty,' but the later 'Prof. Taylor on Liberty and Justice' [e.g., 225] and 'Economic Liberty and Economic Justice' [e.g., 215] seemingly present a different view or views. My confusion about 'ELEJ' is exacerbated by repeated references to its third section, which seems to have been deleted [perhaps seven pages] without specific warning.)

Hayek is quoted (94): 'though the order of society will be affected by actions of government, so long as it remains a spontaneous order, the particular results of the social process cannot be just or unjust.' Day continues, apparently holding one can only appeal for redress against so-called social injustice where society has organized a government and that government, as constituted, clearly and explicitly recognizes a relevant duty. 'But if, as is usual, the society in question is one which is largely free, and which has no such responsibility, then [Day refers to another case] [this] is bad luck, like being female. And ... there is no right to compensation for misfortune. The use of the vague word "society" in this connection obscures the vital point, which is whether the society in question is organised in the relevant respect, or free.'

But grant Day's assumptions from Hayek about the tradition-relative nature of rights, and accept his often repetitive, often unconvincing arguments about freedom and 'freedom' – e.g., it is a univocal term, it is only an interpersonal relation, it is only a negative right. Day's argument still fails, for he misunderstands the Anglo-American tradition. Contrary to what is suggested (109 and note 29), the following run very deep: i) we as a society owe much to each other; ii) the major oganizations of society, including government, are appropriately used in discharging those obligations; iii) property rights are not even close to absolute. Contrary to what is suggested by note 29, these do not enter the culture of England in some sixteenth-century legislation and in the works of a few minor (Paine, Godwin) late eighteenth-century figures: a) On the anti-libertarian thrust of English and North American tradition and law (especially on property) see Forest McDonald's *Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution*. b) When Locke (*First Treatise*, 42 [1689-90]) speaks of the poor's 'title' to charity, he is reaffirming and defending the anti-libertarian thrust of his Christian tradition. (For antidotes to Nozick's bastardized version see Peter Laslett, Alan Ryan or John Dunn on the real Locke.) c) For centuries governments collected tithes for the Church for helping others. d) Positive rights are of course central to the Judeo-Christian tradition – consult Deuteronomy on duties to help. So *if* tradition rules out principles of social or political morality, why not dismiss as minor historical aberrations the isolated pockets of libertarianism?

Day's essays contain many competent, but often unconvincing, discussions of relatively minor points. His treatments of basic issues are not obviously consistent, and they employ undeveloped and largely

unsupported statements of a nearly rootless libertarianism and false claims about human nature. I suspect friends of libertarianism would profit more from substantive works which clearly develop and defend a single position. Potential buyers should inspect Day's journal articles before contracting to purchase this collection. *Caveat Emptor.*

Wayne Wasserman
University of Nebraska-Lincoln

Marcia Eaton
Basic Issues in Aesthetics.
Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Co. 1988. Pp. xii+154.
N.p. ISBN 0-534-08256-4.

Anne Sheppard
Aesthetics: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Art.
Don Mills, ON and New York: Oxford University Press 1987. Pp. 172.
Cdn$42.95: US$22.95
(cloth ISBN 0-19-219180-2);
Cdn$14.95: US$6.95
(paper: ISBN 0-19-289164-2).

There have been very few introductions to basic issues in contemporary aesthetic theory until the appearance of these two volumes. Both are written from the perspective of the Anglo-American philosophical tradition, and survey almost exactly the same range of issues. Deconstructionists and other post-structuralists will be unsatisfied with the few paragraphs afforded to their views. (That, notice, is a prediction about certain people's reactions, not an evaluative remark about the books themselves.) Eaton's book is part of a series of introductory books Wadsworth is in the process of producing on basic problems of philosophy, and Sheppard's is part of Oxford's Opus series which provides introductions to topics in the humanities and sciences. Both are eminently accessible to those unfamiliar with aesthetics in particular or philosophy in general.

Though the two books are by no means twins, one desirable feature they share is a judicious use of carefully selected examples to show how philosophical problems arise in relation to the arts. Eaton, for example, uses Carl Andre's *Stone Field*, which consists of a set of thirty-six boulders arranged in a public park, to introduce the issue, 'What is art?' and she quotes a marvelous paragraph of catalogue copy on a Jan Steen painting to illustrate the interrelations of form, content, and symbolic significance of a painting. Most of Sheppard's examples by far are from literature, and from music. Both authors exhibit a sensitivity to how the plausibility of a solution to a particular problem varies with different media. For example, Eaton and Sheppard both have chapters devoted to whether art has its own language, what art means, and whether we can learn anything true about the world from it. Sheppard discusses these issues only with respect to the literary arts, which are of course the art forms in which they most obviously arise. Eaton, on the other hand, has separate discusses of how one might address such issues in literature, music, and painting, illustrating each with examples from that medium.

In fact, this is symptomatic of the respective approaches of the two authors. Eaton tends to cover more ground in sketchier fashion, whereas Sheppard's discussions have more depth without trying to distinguish and categorize as many different views. Her coverage is consequently at a more sophisticated level, and it is a volume philosophers who are non-aestheticians might want to read to get an overview of the basics of the field. Eaton's discussion is at a much more elementary level, and would even be accessible to high-school students and art educators without a background in philosophy who are interested in philosophical perspectives on the arts.

Even though both authors defend common-sensical, middle-of-the-road positions on the various issues discussed, neither volume is a source of well-developed original theorizing. After separate discussion of Dickie and Danto's institutional theories of art (though not enough is said about the latter's notion of the 'is' of artistic identification to give any idea whatsoever of what Danto is saying), Eaton develops her own 'Theory of Art within Traditions.' She argues that a work of art is a work of a particular kind, to be identified by the kinds of properties 'that we associate with' the particular art form (95), and which the culture determines are worthy of attention. E.g., 'Color or rhyme matter to us; they may not matter in another cultural context' (96). And, within those kinds of properties considered worthy

of attention, good works have properties which create a positive response and bad art does not (95).

This is not a high point in aesthetic theorizing. The same properties may evoke a positive response in some perceivers and not in others, even within the same culture: hardly anything could be more obvious. She does not seem prepared to admit the extreme relativism implied by this view of what constitutes good art (as she *does* seem prepared to admit the relativism implied by her view of what art is). The absence of any exploration of what defines a cultural or social practice is very unfortunate, especially since she focuses on the criticism of Dickie's view that his characterization of what constitutes the artworld is so loose that we can never determine whether 'the status of being a candidate for appreciation' has been conferred on an artifact, and hence whether it is an artwork.

Sheppard, but not Eaton, devotes a chapter to the aesthetics of nature. However, her approach is curious. She begins by taking the three theories of art discussed at the beginning of the book – art as imitation, as expression, and as form – and examines whether each helps us understand our aesthetic interest in nature. But why should one think they would do that, unless we consider nature, or parts of it, as a work of art? Should we then consider nature, or parts of it, as a work of art? She then considers three theories of beauty, defined and discussed to a degree of abstraction uncharacteristic of other parts of the book: beauty as a simple quality, as analyzable in terms of other aesthetic qualities, as analyzable in terms of non-aesthetic qualities. All of these fall to objections, she says, so we should analyze what sort of judgment we make in judging something to be beautiful. This launches her into a discussion of Kant, and the concept of disinterestedness. It is symptomatic of the different levels at which the two books are pitched that Eaton never mentions Kant.

Sheppard's discussion of Kant is amazingly lucid, though not without its gaffes. To say that the basis of a judgment that a particular tulip is beautiful is 'how this particular tulip strikes me at this moment' (66) is flat-out wrong. On Kant's view, the pleasure results from the judgment, not vice versa, otherwise we could not explain the claim to universal validity which a judgment that 'this is beautiful' expresses. It is true that Sheppard's claim occurs within a context where she is also discussing judgments that something is pleasant as well as judgments that something is beautiful, but the net effect is to confuse the critically important distinction between them in regard to the basis of each sort of judgment.

Kant's insistence that judgments of beauty are not governed by rules provides the springboard for Sheppard's discussion of criticism, evaluation, and interpretation (various aspects of which occupy the second half of the book). She also explores, as Eaton does not, relationships between an actor's or musician's interpretation of a role or piece of music in a performance, and interpretations readers make of a novel or short story. Aside from this, common themes dominate: the interconnectedness of description, interpretation, and evaluation, the possibility of rationally defending interpretations or value judgments, and the purposes of criticism. Eaton's discussion of criticism is unfortunately marred by the fact that she offers three different definitions of 'criticism' in the course of a single chapter: the evaluation or assessment of something (105), giving reasons for saying something is good or bad (113), and critical writing or writing that is done by critics (114). This progression is not insignificant, for it is only under the last of these definitions that Eaton can discuss whether critics actually do give and defend evaluations of works of art, or whether they are engaged in some other practice such as 'getting us to see' *the work in a different way.*

Both books include as their final chapter a discussion of, as Sheppard puts it, 'Why bother about art?' Once again Sheppard contains more detailed discussion of particular points of view, including summary descriptions of Plato and Tolstoy, several variants of Marxist aesthetics, Matthew Arnold, and F.R. Leavis. Sheppard's book gathers momentum towards the end, and one feels the accumulated weight of her sensible descriptions of so many views which impart a significance to art as a cultural, spiritual or moral expression, and possibly as having effects on the values and attitudes of readers. Her own view is that good literature can help us understand not only ourselves, but also, more importantly, what different kinds of people are like, and different ways in which one might view the world. The study of art, she concludes, requires 'imaginative flexibility and intellectual discipline.' While arguing against any simple-minded view that having these mental attributes will make us morally better people, she also argues that these are not mere 'armchair virtues,' since if we really can learn to understand people better by entering imaginatively into their psychological lives, there is at least some chance we will treat them more kindly and fairly.

Eaton's book, on the other hand, ends rather flatly. Discussion of the distinction between inherent and consequentialist theories of aesthetic value is unlikely to stir anyone's soul, and she ends with her

own definition of the aesthetic in terms of its intrinsic features and their capacity to evoke pleasure. It builds on her earlier account of aesthetic value, and is such a distilled version of ideas she has developed more fully elsewhere that most of the motivation for the view is lost. More interestingly, however, Eaton also includes in her final chapter a short discussion of two issues under the rubric, 'Applied Aesthetics.' The very term is controversial. Is there anything aestheticians or philosophers of art can contribute to debates over public policy decisions which are made about the sort of artworks to be purchased and displayed with the use of public funds, or about what parts of our environment should be preserved for *aesthetic* reasons? Eaton raises many questions and canvasses several arguments, while also relating these issues to more traditional concerns such as the relation between art and morality and what kind of enhancement aesthetic pleasure provides for our lives. After a long drought, we are fortunate to have two books which, with a high degree of fairness and accuracy, present a survey of the kind of thinking which is done on aesthetics and philosophy of art from the perspective of at least one philosophical tradition.

Susan L. Feagin
University of Missouri-Kansas City

Guy Haarscher
Philosophie des droits de l'homme.
Bruxelles: Éd. de l'Université de Bruxelles 1987. 150 p.
ISBN 2-8004-0926-6.

D'aucuns se demandaient il n'y a pas longtemps si les droits de l'homme pouvaient constituer une politique (e.g. Claude Lefort, 'Droits de l'homme et politique,' in *Libre*, n° 7, 1980). Le co-directeur du Centre de philosophie du droit de l'Université de Bruxelles se demande pour sa part s'ils ne peuvent pas constituter une philosophie, d'où le titre de son livre. La question centrale de l'ouvrage est la suivante: 'y a-t-il une philosophie des droits de l'homme et, dans l'affirmative, quelle est-elle?' (47). *Or une telle philosophie existe bel et*

bien, mais 1) enfouie sous une histoire encore insuffisamment éclairée ou connue, 2) embrouillée par la sollicitation partisane de gauche ou de droite et par suite 3) affectée d'un certain manque de définition et d'assurance qui déteint sur les combats qui s'en réclament. La tâche s'impose donc de considérer enfin cette 'philosophie des droits de l'homme' pour elle-même, de dessiner plus nettement ses contours et identifier ses éléments. Car si nos 'combats les plus légitimes' s'appuient sur la philosophie des droits de l'homme, c'est, nous dit Haarscher, 'sans en avoir testé la résistance, la solidité' (106). *Philosophie des droits de l'homme* constitue une riche, stimulante et passionnante contribution à ce 'test' et hisse son auteur au rang des interlocuteurs importants de la philosophie juridico-politique actuelle.

C'est en somme à une clarification juridico-politique que procède – et nous invite – Haarscher car 'en matière de libertés fondamentales, répète-t-il, la confusion sert toujours les despotes' (43). Son livre est en lui-même une protestation contre le 'manque de culture civique ou politique' de nos intellectuels, manque qui 'peut avoir des conséquences redoutables' (8), comme en témoigne en notre siècle l'aberration totalitaire. 'Le combat pour les droits de l'homme est sûrement trop sérieux, trop urgent aussi, pour être abandonné soit à la récupération politicienne (quelle qu'elle soit), soit à la naïveté bon teint des grandes proclamations humanistes, inefficaces par excès de généralité et inflation de grands sentiments' (8).

'L'une des tâches les plus urgentes de la philosophie politique contemporaine, [est de] tenter une sorte de "*Critique de la raison contractualiste*" ' (106). Si l'élaboration de la philosophie des droits de l'homme passe ainsi aux yeux de Haarscher par le réexamen 'critique' du contractualisme, c'est qu'il situe ce dernier au fondement desdits droits. Pour mieux asseoir ces droits et, partant, mieux résister tant aux assauts dont ils sont la cible de la part de leurs 'ennemis' qu'aux abus auxquels leur mauvaise compréhension donne lieu de la part de leurs 'amis,' il faut prendre à tâche de 'penser les droits de l'homme' (titre du ch. 6). Cela veut dire repenser leur fondement: dégager les caractéristiques du contractualisme (chez Grotius, Pufendorf, Hobbes, Locke *et alii*) tout en épurant ce dernier d'une certaine inflexion 'métaphysique' aujourd'hui gênante. Car tel quel, le modèle contractualiste apparaîtra comme 'naïf' et 'simpliste' (19, 21, 47) et son éventuelle reconduction aujourd'hui devra tenir compte des réserves d'une certaine modernité 'anti-métaphysique' ainsi que des questions concrètes soulevées depuis par la pratique même des droits de l'homme et de la 'démocratie' (19, 106 suiv.). Ce contractualisme, coulé dans

le rationalisme des XVII[e] et XVIII[e] siècles, devra notamment se souvenir des leçons d'humilité données à la Raison par Hume et par Kant (ch. 5, § 4) – sans tomber pour autant dans l'anti-rationalisme heideggerien. (Si le présent ouvrage traite des critiques 'positivistes' – humienne et kantienne – et 'romantiques,' l'auteur annonce un autre ouvrage 'à paraître prochainement' qui traitera des critiques anti-rationalistes contemporaines inspirées surtout de Heidegger – 111.) Sous ce rapport, la quête haarschérienne ressemble à celle d'un Luc Ferry qui, contre le retour pur et simple aux Anciens (M. Villey, L. Strauss, E. Voegelin) et contre les 'post-modernistes' plus ou moins installés dans le sillage de Heidegger, explore les 'conditions de possibilité d'une modernité non historiciste,' les conditions de possibilité d'un 'humanisme non métaphysique' (*Philosophie politique*, P.U.F., 1984, t. 1). *Philosophie des droits de l'homme* s'inscrit ainsi dans l'effort de notre modernité tardive pour tirer les leçons de ses propres outrances tout en préservant ses principes ou à ses acquis.

Après avoir provisoirement déterminé le concept des droits de l'homme et repérer les composantes essentielles du modèle contractualiste, base de toute l'argumentation (ch. 1), l'ouvrage passe à la définition de ce que l'auteur appelle les finalités 'formelle' (ch. 2) et 'substantielle' (ch. 3) des droits de l'homme. La finalité formelle veille à garantir contre l'aribitraire du pouvoir; la substantielle, à réaliser certaines valeurs (individualisme, justice sociale, etc.). Selon lui en effet, l'aspect 'formel,' 'négatif' (afférent essentiellement à la sûreté), pour absolument nécessaire et fondamental à la définition des droits de l'homme qu'il soit, n'est pas suffisant et n'en saurait limiter le catalogue (32). Les droits de l'homme 'servent des fins plus larges que celle du combat contre l'arbitraire' et il faut donc introduire dans leur définition 'des éléments substantiels, autrement dit des valeurs déterminées, qui doivent gouverner la formation des règles positives' (34). C'est à la recherche de ces valeurs que l'auteur s'emploie en passant en revue les trois 'générations' des droits de l'homme: 1[re] génération: sûreté, liberté, etc., XVIII[e] siècle (35-8); 2[e] génération: droits 'socio-économiques' comme le droit 'au travail,' XIX[e] siècle (39-41); 3[e] génération: droits 'vagues' invoqués depuis quelques années tels le droit 'à la qualité de la vie,' 'à la paix,' etc. (42-6). Le reste du livre (ch. 4, 5 et 6), entre dans le 'vif philosophique du sujet' en retraçant la genèse de la philosophie des droits de l'homme depuis ses prémices grecques (Socrate-Platon, stoïcisme) jusqu'à sa disqualification marxienne, en passant par l'apport chrétien (augustinisme, thomisme, Réforme). Il s'agit au fond ici de justifier cette 'substantialité' des

droits de l'homme. Prise dans son ensemble, la démarche se déploie donc en deux grands mouvements: d'abord, les trois premiers chapitres cernent 'un certain nombre de points de repère: individualisme, état de nature, contrat social, droit naturel, rationalisme, irréversibilité du temps juridique, *freedoms from, freedoms to* et "nouveaux droits de l'homme" '; tandis qu'ensuite les trois derniers cherchent à les 'articuler à l'intérieur d'une problématique philosophique générale' en se demandant 'à quelles philosophies traditionnelles celle-ci emprunte ses ressources majeures' et 'si cet ensemble théorique s'avère aujourd'hui consistant' (47).

Les traits constitutifs du modèle contractualiste sont parmi les 'points de repère' cités. Ce sont l'"état de nature' (12-13), le 'droit naturel' (13-16), le 'contrat social' proprement dit (16-20) et le 'rationalisme' (20-1). Ce modèle contractualiste, 'idéal-typique,' vise à 'présenter les articulations majeures de la philosophie qui a tenté, ces deux derniers siècles, de fournir une assise théorique à la revendication des droits de l'homme' (21). C'est ce modèle que la suite du texte s'efforcera de 'tester' et de 'spécifier plus avant' (21) pour aboutir à terme, comme nous le disions, à une sorte de contractualisme amélioré.

Ce livre fournit des aperçus souvent neufs et structurants. Il fourmille d'hypothèses qui aiguisent l'esprit, illuminent avec bonheur telle ou telle question. Mais la méthode synthétique adoptée a l'inconvénient de sa vertu. En conjuguant de grandes entités telles le contractualisme, l'individualisme, le rationalisme, etc., elle sert fort utilement – et en l'occurence remarquablement – la problématisation, mais au détriment parfois de certaines interrogations ou 'détails' plus ou mains grinçants laissés sous bénéfice d'inventaire. Il faut le dire non pour décourager mais pour encourager la lecture de cette importante contribution du penseur belge. Car ne reprochons pas de ne pas être définitif à qui a le mérite de répondre à des préoccupations si actuelles, ni de ne pas jeter toute la lumière à qui en jette une si indispensable et dans un domaine qui en a tant besoin.

Richard Gervais
Université Laval

Christopher Kelly
Rousseau's Exemplary Life:
The 'Confessions' as Political Philosophy.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1988.
Pp. xiv+262.
US$29.95. ISBN 0-8014-1936-0.

Rousseau's *Confessions*, although described by Rousseau himself as a work 'precious for philosophers,' receives little attention from those who study philosophy or political theory. Kelly's book shows why this is the case and why it should not be the case. It is the success of the *Confessions*, the 'revolution' in our thinking about ourselves effected in part by the *Confessions*, that is responsible for its being neglected by our contemporaries. The understanding of human life as radically individual, the primacy of feeling and imagination in our views about the distinctively human, are so much a part of our self-consciousness that the *Confessions* must appear to us as simply autobiography.

Kelly shows clearly that Rousseau's *Confessions* is in fact an 'exemplary life' and that it is an important part of Rousseau's presentation of his political philosophy. Kelly begins with the claim that the *Confessions* must be interpreted in two (related) ways: as serving a practical, moral purpose and as expressing a philosophical account of the good life. In Chapters 1 and 2, he makes a very strong case for the view that Rousseau deliberately wrote the *Confessions* as an exemplary life. The moral purpose is best served by a work in which general and abstract truths are 'wrapped' in the rich narrative detail of a fable so that they may be 'felt' by those who would not be easily reached by philosophical argument. At this level, the *Confessions* is a form of poetry (17). The genre of exemplary lives is the one best suited to education for political life.

The three exemplary lives which Rousseau finds wanting and which the *Confessions* replace are those of Cato (the citizen), Socrates (the philosopher) and Jesus (the Christian life). Cato must be replaced because Cato began with corrupt men and cured their corruption. Socrates, who seems to be the exemplar of natural freedom and independence, is the most complicated case because Rousseau often traces the philosophical life not to nature but to artificial amour-propre. The life and the revolution of Jesus must be replaced by a new life and a new revolution because the Christian revolution destroys the social

spirit; it merely redirects and does not abolish the qualities that make men unsuited for citizenship.

Rousseau presents his own, new exemplary life as 'a life that simultaneously is a product of civilization and meets the natural standards' (73). Rousseau is not a virtuous man but he is 'an exemplary figure within the reach of other corrupt civilized humans' (70). As a moral fable, the *Confessions* aims neither to produce entirely de-natured citizens (Cato) nor to bring about the complete rejection of politics (Jesus). Rather it presents a view of happiness on the fringes of political life.

Kelly begins his commentary on the *Confessions* with a detailed examination of Book I. He sees portrayed in this Book Rousseau's early departure from nature, a departure which is due in part to his reading and the imagination awakened by that reading. The central stories of Book I are linked by the effects these events have on Rousseau's imagination. Natural independence and wholeness are lost, especially through the manner of development of the passions of sexual desire, anger, pride, and vanity. In some sense, the rest of the *Confessions* is a 'working out in [Rousseau's] own life of the conflicting tendencies arising out of his imagination' (115).

Books II through VI of the *Confessions* show us the young Rousseau as he attempts to deal with the de-natured self of artificial passions and an imagination which keeps him living outside himself. He discovers the creative powers of this imagination and their ability to transport him out of his real, conventional 'place' in the social order where he is not at home. In Book V, he achieves a kind of 'sub-political social wholeness' in community with Mme de Warens and Claude Anet until the latter dies. Part One of the *Confessions* culminates in a restoration of natural wholeness brought about by Rousseau's belief that he has little time left to live. His imagination and his artificial passions are quiet, and this state is actually superior to the pure state of nature because, unlike the savage, Rousseau is conscious of this quiet. But Rousseau cannot remain in this peaceful state. He goes off in search of a cure for the very malady that brought about his peace and returns to find his place with Maman taken by another man. The attempt to achieve happiness and wholeness has failed, in part through accident and in part through Rousseau's own deliberate actions.

Kelly interprets Part Two of the *Confessions* in terms of the questions of the rediscovery of nature and the possibility of a return to nature. In Book VII, Rousseau tells the story of his venture into

political life as secretary to the French ambassador to Venice. Here he is brought face to face with the problem of nature and convention, especially in his encounter with the prostitute Zulietta. But it is only on the road to Vincennes (Book VIII), when he sees 'another universe' and becomes 'another man,' that Rousseau understands his experience with Zulietta as the experience of the contradiction between nature and the social order. Rousseau has now rediscovered nature but he has not therefore returned to nature. He writes the *First Discourse* as 'Citizen of Geneva.' He feels the 'most noble pride' (Cato), a desire for independence (Socrates) and for future glory as he imagines himself the cause of 'a revolution in the universe' (Jesus).

The rediscovery of nature actually has the effect of making Rousseau a celebrity, and this, in turn, meets with its own reversal, the conspiracy against him which dominates Books X and XI. Kelly claims that 'the real issue raised by the conspiracy is what it means that Jean-Jacques is susceptible to such a belief' (217). It means that he is still in the grip of the civilized passion of the hope for glory. Since the conspiracy is directed at the success of his writings, Rousseau's overwhelming preoccupation with the conspiracy shows that he is concerned with his reputation; a concern that is dependent on the imagination. The hope for glory must be abandoned and his imagination limited, then, if Rousseau is to return to the nature he has rediscovered. Book XII, the last Book of the *Confessions*, seems at first to promise this return in the form of his exile to St. Peter's Island. But again, the conspirators succeed and he is forced to leave. His worst fears are realized, but the abandonment of hope has the effect of making him somewhat immune to the influence of the conspiracy. 'The return to [natural] wholeness is revealed as partial and temporary' (235). Indeed, 'a simple return to the state of nature is impossible for any civilized human whose passions and imagination have developed' (232).

Kelly concludes that Rousseau is both an exemplary natural man and an exemplary unnatural man: he shows us that 'the effects of the imagination can be overcome by means of the imagination' (247). Civilized human beings cannot really desire or seek to return to nature. The *Confessions* displays an exemplary life on the fringes of the corrupt social life described at the end of the *Second Discourse.*

Anyone interested in the origins and the history of modern self-consciousness as revealed in philosophy, political thought, or literature should find this book worth reading. Rousseau scholars will find it very helpful for understanding the epistemological foundation of

Rousseau's system. And those interested in the *Confessions* itself will find it indispensable. For the latter, the following are some of the strong points of Kelly's interpretation which are not made explicit above. First, Kelly deals with the whole of the *Confessions* and makes sense of the Books in the order in which Rousseau wrote them. Second, he places great emphasis on the 'punishment stories' of Book I and especially on the 'central digression' of Book VII, which he rightly regards as the heart of the *Confessions*. Third, his interpretation of the meaning of the conspiracy (one of the most troublesome aspects of the *Confessions*) avoids the extremes of previous interpretations, and it makes sense. Finally, all of his readers will be grateful for his clear writing. In my view, Kelly succeeds admirably in showing that the *Confessions* is an 'exemplary life' and that it is an integral component of Rousseau's political philosophy.

But in spite of Kelly's very coherent account, or perhaps because of it, two questions have to be raised. First, does Rousseau really succeed in 'the daunting task of showing that a life that takes its bearing by nothing higher than itself need not be a base one' (250)? *Could* such an attempt succeed? And second, in the last analysis, what *is* Rousseau, the author of the *Confessions*? Or put somewhat differently, what in Rousseau's view is the best human life? If creativity is 'the highest human activity' (119), then is Rousseau a philosopher or a poet? And if he is both, why *must* he be both (xi)? The ingredients for an answer to this second question may be present here (119, 120, 167, 169, 171-2, 188, 198-9, 226, 229-30), but a complete account of the *Confessions* should address this more directly.

Ann Hartle
Emory University

Eva Kittay
Metaphor: Its Cognitive Force and Linguistic Structure.
Don Mills, ON and New York: Oxford University Press 1987. Pp. x+358. Cdn$104.95: US$57.00. ISBN 0-19-824935-7.

Among the recent spate of scholarly books on metaphor there have been few relatively well-developed philosophical theories about the topic. This book helps fill that lacuna. Kittay manages to capture much of what is philosophically worrisome (hence interesting) about metaphor, and in an enlightening and generally rigorous fashion.

Kittay realizes that a sound theory of metaphorical meaning must be grounded in a sound theory of literal meaning. The 'relational' theory of literal meaning she advocates crucially exploits semantic field theory. More controversially, it claims that literal meaning, contrary to most accounts, depends heavily on context. As a result Kittay radically re-draws the traditional semantic/pragmatic distinction. One implication of this new semantic/pragmatic distinction for theory of metaphor is that it permits Kittay to propose as the unit of metaphor not just the word or sentence, but 'any unit of discourse in which some conceptual or conversational incongruity emerges' (24). The complex 'perspectival' theory of metaphor that emerges from this groundwork draws from basic set theory and predicate logic, semantic field theory (again), and the 'interactionist' tradition deriving from I. A. Richards and Max Black, emended along Fregean and Saussurean lines.

Having included traditionally pragmatic matters (viz., contextual considerations) in her general semantic account, Kittay posits an interesting 'first-order/second-order meaning' distinction, 'a distinction that cuts across the semantic-pragmatic divide' (42), as a means for delineating the metaphorical from the literal. A second-order meaning is a function of a first-order meaning adopted by the hearer or reader whenever 'features of the utterance and its context' indicate *to her that a first-order meaning is 'either unavailable or inappropriate' (42). Metaphorical meaning is then characterized as one (salient)* type of second-order meaning.

Kittay explains what she means by calling her theory 'perspectival' in terms of metaphor's 'double semantic content': '[O]ne expression supports two contents: one is a content the expression supports literally, *the other is a content the expression supports only in the given*

metaphor' (24). '[B]oth the expression level and the content level bear content, and thus the new meaning of the metaphor emerges from some interrelation between the vehicle and the topic' (28).

To help elucidate this somewhat puzzling concept of a double semantic content, Kittay adduces the (equally puzzling?) notion of a 'connotative semiotic.' This 'permits the two components not to be conflated but to be held in a tensive relation. In a connotative semiotic, the expression level itself consists of an expression and a content' (28). Thus, '[O]ne component of the metaphor can be used as a way of organizing or conceptualizing the other. The meaning of the metaphor is the result of the perspectival juxtaposing of two ideas. ... [A] metaphor involves two conceptual contents which function as two simultaneous perspectives or categories in which some entity is viewed' (29).

While agreeing with Black that the two interacting components involved in metaphor are 'systems,' Kittay proposes that these systems be understood as semantic fields. She then explicates metaphorical transfers of meaning as transfers 'from the field of the vehicle to the field of the topic of the relations of affinity and opposition that the vehicle term(s) bears to other terms in its field. More precisely, in metaphor what is transferred are the relations which pertain to a second, distinct content domain. That, in short, is how I characterize metaphor' (36).

Black held that only the 'topic' is part of a system. But Kittay holds that both 'topic' and 'vehicle' are parts of systems to be construed as semantic fields, or at least content domains. While the vehicle is always part of a semantic field, often (namely, whenever the metaphor is a novel one) the topic will only be part of an 'unarticulated' content domain awaiting 'articulation' by the vehicle's semantic field. Thus, in novel metaphor an articulated content domain, i.e., a semantic field, produces a new semantic field by articulating a previously unarticulated content domain.

Kittay considers her theory 'cognitive' for at least three reasons. First, its proposed justification of analogical and metaphorical thinking is their ability to predict and explain, which are cognitive functions (3-4). Second, as 'perspectival' the theory 'provide[s] a perspective from which to gain an understanding of that which is metaphorically portrayed. This is a distinctively cognitive role' (13-14). Third, Kittay views theory of metaphor at the semantic or linguistic level as logically and conceptually prior to a theory of metaphorical thought (15).

Kittay insists that the semantic intentions of individual speakers 'are neither necessary nor sufficient for determining that an utterance is metaphorical' (14). She claims this irrelevance of speakers' intended meanings is due largely to the fact that 'the metaphorical use of language depends on systematic semantic features of language. It is this which allows them to be understood independently of speakers' intentions' (46).

Unfortunately Kittay's use of 'determine' in the p. 14 citation (and elsewhere) can be taken either objectively or subjectively. Does she mean that speakers' intentions play no role in the conceptual account of what metaphor is (the objective 'determine'), or that they play no role in our everyday psychological processes used in identifying the metaphors in ordinary speech and writing (the subjective 'determine')? (I personally believe that 'determining' a metaphor's meaning, in both senses, requires reference to the speaker's intended meanings.) This failure to distinguish these two senses of 'determine' eventually leads Kittay to conflate metaphorical meanings with metaphorical interpretations. And this threatens to vitiate her insistence that the theory is a conceptual, non-psychological account (40). Other problems include the possibility that the heavy reliance of literal meaning on contextual considerations may imply a denial of the principle of compositionality, the notion of unarticulated conceptual domains, and especially the theory's metaphorical account of metaphorical truth.

Despite these difficulties Kittay's theory of metaphor ranks at the highest level of current work in the field. Kittay includes many actual metaphors from literature, science, mythology, and contemporary spoken English to illustrate her main points. The theory is detailed, sophisticated, and conversant with a great deal of current philosophy of language and work on cognition. This is state-of-the-art philosophical work on metaphor.

Timothy A. Deibler
Rice University

Robert G. Meyers
The Likelihood of Knowledge.
Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Press 1988.
Pp. xi+188.
US$49.00. ISBN 90-277-2671-X.

This book defends fallibilism but not scepticism. Unlike the sceptic, the fallibilist does not deny that no one knows anything but that no one knows anything for certain. 'Certain' is here taken in 'the strict and philosophical' use and not in its use in ordinary language. In the former use, says Meyers, 'S is certain at *t* that *p* if and only if S directly knows at *t* that he knows that *p*' (15). Moreover, if S directly knows that he knows, then S cannot be mistaken about *p* in the sense that S need not investigate any evidence against *p* since S just sees that he knows. Thus, if certainty entails directly knowing that one knows then it is clear that certainty that *p* implies being incapable of being mistaken that *p* where 'incapable of being mistaken that *p*' is defined as being justified in disregarding any counterevidence to *p*.

The infallibilists' classical candidates for certainty are considered and it is denied that any one of them gives certitude. These are: (1) logically necessary truths, (2) our own existence and (3) propositions describing our sensations, ideas or sense-data. As regards (1), the fact that a proposition *p* is necessary shows only that it is logically impossible that *p* is false. But this has nothing to do with whether *p* is known by anyone, much less with whether *p* is certainly known by anyone. Those who think it does mistakenly make 'certain' synonomous with 'necessarily true.' Then certainty becomes a property of propositions independently of persons with the result that necessary propositions are certain whether they are known by anyone or not. 'Necessarily true' is a modal concept and 'certain' is an epistemic concept and the two should not be confused. Otherwise, it must be countenanced that some propositions (necessary ones) are certain even though no one is certain about them. To be sure, if *p* is necessary then a person cannot be mistaken in believing *p*. In this sense necessary truths are incorrigible. But belief and incorrigibility (in the modal sense) are not enough to give certainty. Otherwise, a person can be certain of *p* without evidence or with mediocre evidence. Certainty requires incorrigibility in the epistemic and not in the modal sense and in the epistemic sense incorrigibility involves reference to persons. Incorrigibility, or one's not being able to be mistaken

that *p*, is in the epistemic sense defined as one's being justified in disregarding any counterevidence to *p*.

As regards (2), certainty cannot be claimed for the proposition 'I exist' either. When I assert that I exist I am not asserting that some self or other exists but that J.P. exists or that the person who is writing a review of book X for journal Y exists. The 'I' stands in the place of either a name or a definite description. But since I may be mistaken that I am J.P. or that I am the person writing a review of book X for journal Y, it follows that 'I exist' is corrigible. The person I think is J.P. or the person I think is writing a review of book X for journal Y may be a figment of my imagination. If to evade this the infallibilist denies that the 'I' is susceptible of any description in the first place, then the 'I' cannot express something which can be known to be true since it is then empty and contentless. The infallibilist is thus forced to choose between saying 'I exist' is an uncertain proposition and 'I exist' is an ingenuine proposition.

As regards (3), certainty cannot be claimed for propositions about sensations (basic propositions) either. As such propositions always classify particular sensations, the possibility of misclassifying a sensation cannot be ruled out. When I judge that this looks white to me, I subsume my sensation under the general notion of 'looking white' which applies to *other* experiences as well. Thus, as my judgment goes beyond the present experience, I can always take the experience to have a feature it lacks. We can be unsure not only about how to call a certain sound, for example, or about the source of the sound but also about the sound itself. We can ask ourselves, 'what kind of a sound is it?' But if we can be unsure in this way about the sound itself we can misclassify it and thus be mistaken about it.

The infallibilist may reply that knowledge of one's sensations is acquaintance rather than propositional knowledge and it is only about the latter that one can be mistaken. But sensations cannot be mistaken only because there is nothing to be mistaken about, so that the question of error does not even arise. But the fact that we cannot be mistaken about sensations in this sense does not justify the claim that they are certain. For just because sensation is acquaintance rather than propositional knowledge, sensation does not admit of certainty. Certainty can only be claimed for propositions.

Turning to the positive task of explaining what knowledge without certainty is (ch. 4), Meyers holds that to have knowledge a person S must have a certain kind of ability. In inferential knowledge S must be able to offer an argument that provides a good reason (a

'justifying' argument). Here the distinction between the genesis and the justification of a belief is preserved. Whether S is justified in accepting a proposition *p* has nothing to do with how S comes to believe *p*; it has to do with whether S has the ability to defend *p*. In non-inferential knowledge, S's belief that *p* is justified only if S is a reliable judge of the subject-matter (e.g. birds, wines, etc.). In other words, S must have the ability to distinguish objects of one type from confusing instances. Here, the central notion is reliability and the ability to give good reasons is not involved. Here too, the distinction between genesis and justification collapses.

In inferential knowledge a proposition *p* is justified by S only if S has a structured as opposed to an unstructured disposition to provide adequate evidence for *p* provided only that S wants to do so. In general, S has a structured disposition to bring about something *e* if and only if S will do *e* provided only that the normal cause for doing *e* is present. The difference between a structured and an unstructured disposition can be shown by this example: an unmagnetized bar has an unstructured ability to attract iron filings but a magnetized bar has a structured ability to attract iron filings. Analogously, a person S who has adequate evidence for *p* but who lacks the ability to marshal or arrange that evidence in such a way that it proves *p* has an unstructured disposition to prove *p*. But another person R who has adequate evidence for *p* but who can marshal or arrange that evidence in such a way that it proves *p* has a structured disposition to prove *p*. To have a justification of *p*, then, it is not enough to have adequate evidence for *p* given that other necessary conditions are met. One must have the *ability* to bring that evidence to bear upon *p*.

But this is not enough. To have a justification of *p* at time *t* a person S must also have the ability to eliminate any alternative to *p* that would otherwise raise a reasonable doubt that *p* is true. Thus, 'S has a justification of *p* at *t* only if: (i) S has a structured disposition at *t* to offer adequate evidence *e* for *p*, and (ii) S does not have other evidence *e'* such that *e* and *e'* does not adequately support *p*, and (iii) there is no alternative hypothesis *p'* available to S at *t* that raises a reasonable doubt about the proof of *p*.'

To handle the Gettier problem, another condition (iv) must be added to the above and that is that the essential premises in one's justification be true. But this does not commit us to holding either that the premises of a justifying argument entail the conclusion or that the conclusion is true. In this way, non-deductive inferential knowledge is allowed.

Finally, though it is propositional knowledge, non-inferential or perceptual knowledge is also based on the ability to do something, namely, to distinguish F from each of its competitors. G is a competitor of F if and only if it is commonly known that G's exist and there are instances of G's available. Thus, a person S recognizes something as a goldfinch at *t* in circumstances C only if S is able to distinguish goldfinches from each of its competitors at *t* in C. This non-inferential knowledge is 'blind' in that the knower need not be aware of either the mechanism which produces it or the kinds of discriminations of which it is capable. The mechanism can produce beliefs based on environmental factors of which the perceiver is unaware and which he or she cannot use as evidence. Thus, the perceiver knows that *p* but cannot defend *p* or even show that the mechanism which produced *p* is reliable. From this standpoint this view of non-inferential knowledge is a foundational theory, though it is not a foundational theory in the sense of accepting the concept of the given.

John Peterson
University of Rhode Island

Albert Stüttgen
Heimkehr zum Rhythmus:
Der Abschied vom Machbarkeitswahn.
München: Verlag Friedrich Pfeil 1988.
Pp. 123.
DM19.00. ISBN 3-923871-28-7.

Every page of this short, provocative book is fraught with dangers, and for this alone it deserves careful attention.

The threats come from the topic itself in three major ways, of which only two are revealed by Stüttgen's exposition. The first is the threat to the claims of reason upon the world. Repeatedly, Stüttgen, who is a Professor of philosophy at the University of Münster, insists that it is not possible to *define* rhythm, that rhythm must be experienced. Rhythm is located by Stüttgen at a fundamental level, in the proximity of Heidegger's discussions of Being. Many a reader will stumble over sentences such as: 'Wer das Grundphänomen nicht ursprünglich

erfaßt, dem mag man noch so viele mit Rhythmus zu bezeichnende Erscheinungen zeigen: er wird das, was ihnen allen als das Wesentliche gemeinsam ist, nicht verstehen' (46). The hindrance is not only in the language. Rather, it is the putative inability of reason to accord with a fundamental category of human experience which will properly be resisted. I for one am not convinced that rhythm is beyond definition, but then I also reject the sneak attacks upon the Enlightenment (e.g. 85, 99). Rather than blaming reason for the ills of the present world, it would be better to reason further about causes and remedies. And indeed Stüttgen relies upon evidence won through scientific investigation (Chapter 3) in order to help convince us that rhythm really matters.

The second threat is one indicted at length by Stüttgen, namely that the modern world is no longer dancing to a natural rhythm, but rather is out of step with the cosmic order. Of this there can be little doubt, at least for highly industrialized societies. Stüttgen sees this arrhythmia as a veritable illness, which is manifested in physical and emotional disorders (98-9). A final chapter evokes, in a measured prose, the rhythm which ought to inform our living, if we are to live well.

The third threat goes largely unremarked by Stüttgen, although he cannot be unaware of it. It is signalled by his reluctance to rely for aid upon those disciplines where the discourse on rhythm is most elaborated, primarily music and poetry. He refers to modern dance only to argue about the relationship between mind and body, not to develop insights collected by dance theorists on the problems of rhythm. The threat is that the contributions of those most knowledgeable about rhythm will be ignored during the philosophical quest for novelty. In the arts, one extremely important awareness reigns about rhythm: this is an arena for aesthetic judgments. A good rhythm will be the beautiful one, according to the prevailing standards of taste. This has at least two consequences for Stüttgen's analysis. First, it corrects his effort to make rhythm a transcendental, immutable alterity (100-2). The anthropological evidence is in fact that different cultures move to very different rhythms (consider the complexity of the Balinese case). Second, the return of rhythm to the province of aesthetics makes possible the criticism of those ugly rhythms which are so offensive in the twentieth century. Examples would be Taylorism in factories and the military march, both so ably satirized by Charlie Chaplin. We do not need permission from metaphysics to be able to mock clumsiness or to enjoy grace.

It is only by accepting aesthetics into his discussion that Stüttgen will be able to come to terms with the dubious contributions of certain twentieth-century German writers to the problems of rhythm, such as Ernst Jünger. Moral suasion has had little impact; perhaps critiques of style will make some progress. In any case, this is an important attempt to expand the contemporary philosophical conversation. It would be good for others to get the beat.

Arnd Bohm
(Department of German)
Carleton University

Mary Ellen Waithe, ed.
A History of Women Philosophers (Volume 1/600BC-500AD).
Norwell, MA: Martinus Nijhoff 1987.
Pp. xxi+229.
US$67.00 (cloth: ISBN 90-247-3348-0);
US$27.00 (paper: ISBN 90-247-3368-5).

This text, the first of four volumes on the history of women in philosophy, is the first available in-depth study in English of the writings of women philosophers who lived in the west between 600 BC and 500 AD. It gathers, translates, and analyzes crucial texts from traditional sources such as Aegidius Menagius' *Historia Mulierum Philosopharum*, Stobaeus' *Eclogarum Physicarum* and *Florilegium*, Theodoret's *De Vita Pythagoras*, Diels' *Epistolographi Graeci*, and Gregory of Nyssas' *Vita Makrina* and *De Anima et Resurrectione*. The overall editor of the series, Mary Ellen Waithe, is also the main contributor to this volume; she wrote eight of the ten chapters. The other contributors include Beatrice Zedler, Cornelia Wolfskeel, Vicki Lynn Harper, and Lloyd Waithe.

One of the attractive aspects of the book is its continual reflection on the methodology used to consider the question of the authenticity of texts by or about these ancient philosophers. Carefully moving between the two extremes of stating on the one hand that there is no reliable evidence for the existence of these ancient women philoso-

phers, and stating on the other hand that the evidence for the existence of these philosophers is irrefutable, the text considers in detail the reliability of the evidence for each philosopher and each text. Arguments by respected scholars such as Holgar Thesleff, A.E. Taylor, or Eduard Zeller are considered in the attempt to authenticate the reliability of the often obscure and complex sources. Therefore, the book as a whole provides an excellent example of contemporary scholarship in the field of ancient philosophy.

The first four chapters focus on the Pythagorean women philosophers: Theano, Arignote, Myia, Damo, Aesara of Lucania, Phyntys of Sparta, Perictione I, Theano II, and Perictione II. The primary philosophical interest of these ancient writers was the application of the Pythagorean theory of harmony to the particular situation of women. This usually entailed a focus on the practice of the virtue of temperance in the family. Waithe summarizes this aspect of the Pythagorean theory of virtue as follows: 'women, whose special virtue is temperance, bear responsibility for maintaining law and justice (or harmony) within the home' (14). The primary emphasis on the home did not imply, she argues, that women's virtues were marginal to society at large. On the contrary, 'in the Pythagorean view, women are not peripheral to social justice, they make it possible' (25).

In the fifth and sixth chapters the two women philosophers mentioned in Plato's dialogues, Aspasia and Diotima, are studied. Considerable attention is given to the question of the reliability of evidence for their existence and/or influence as philosophers. Waithe argues that the philosophy of personal identity presented by Diotima contradicts that of Plato in other dialogues; and she therefore disputes the theory that Diotima was invented by Plato to present his own views. 'Diotima *could not consistently hold* a Platonic theory of Ideas given her (incompatible) views on the immortality of the soul, transmigration, and personal identity' (113).

The chapters on Julia Domna, Makrina, Arete, Asclepigenia, Axiothea, Cleobulina, Hipparchia, and Lasthenia are primarily descriptive rather than argumentative as were the chapters on Aspasia and Diotima. The contemporary authors consider the place of the ancient women philosophers in the Stoic, Sophist, neo-Platonic and later Aristotelian traditions. Each chapter contains a detailed list of resources in footnotes, and there is an excellent bibliography of sources at the end.

The chapter on Hypatia, the director of the neo-Platonic school in Alexandria, is also worthy of mention. It contains the first English

translation of Hypatia's commentary on Diophantus' *Arithmeticorum* and should be of interest to philosophers of the history of mathematics. Waithe follows Tannery's suggestion that this commentary is the only copy to survive with a major portion of the original text included in it.

For the most part the text is free of distortion or reading back into ancient writers 20th-century expectations. However, Waithe does use the words 'feminist' and 'unfeminist' in an evaluative mode without defining their precise meaning. Another minor methodological weakness of the text is found in the unevenness of the philosophical discussion in the different chapters. In the situations where there is primary source material available (i.e. the Pythagoreans and Neo-Pythagoreans) or in which there already exists a high quality secondary source debate about issues of verifiability (i.e., Diotima), the philosophical level of analysis is quite sophisticated. In other areas where much less material is available, the chapters are primarily descriptive rather than evaluative.

There is also a lack of transition between chapters. Each appears to be independent of the others even though there is an historical continuity of context. The reader is also surprised to discover an abrupt ending of the book which contains no conclusion or summary. Even though the book is the first of a series of four which will focus on the subsequent time frames of 500-1600, 1600-1900, and 1900-present, some reflection on the significance of the first volume in the context of the whole series or in the context of western ancient philosophy in general would be welcome.

These few methodological limitations, however, do not seriously offset the significant contribution that *A History of Women Philosophers: Volume I/600 BC-500 AD* makes to the scholarly community. It is an extremely important book which brings together in one text the major contributions of women writers to early western philosophy. It is well organized, very readable, and conveys a sense of excitement about the material covered. It would be very useful to students and scholars of ancient western philosophy, and it would provide an excellent complementary text to be used in relation with the traditionally studied writings of the pre-Socratics, Plato, Aristotle, Stoics, neo-Pythagoreans, and neo-Platonists.

Sr. Prudence Allen, RSM
Concordia University



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

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Editors' Note

The anglophone editors of

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are pleased to announce the acquisition of an address for **electronic mail** on the University of Alberta's mainframe computer.

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