

# Canadian Philosophical Reviews

## Revue Canadienne de Comptes rendus en Philosophie

### Editors/Directeurs:

Robert Burch  
Department of Philosophy  
University of Alberta  
Edmonton, Alberta  
Canada T6G 2E5

Roger A. Shiner  
Department of Philosophy  
University of Alberta  
Edmonton, Alberta  
Canada T6G 2E5

J. N. Kaufmann  
Département de Philosophie  
Université du Québec  
à Trois-Rivières, C.P. 500  
Trois-Rivières, Québec  
Canada G9A 5H7

As a rule, the editors publish only invited reviews. However, they will consider for publication submitted reviews of new books in philosophy and related areas. Reviews must be a maximum of 1000 words and will be accepted in either French or English. They should be submitted to the francophone or an anglophone editor as appropriate.

En général, les rédacteurs ne publient que les comptes rendus qui sont explicitement invitées. Néanmoins, ils prendraient en considération la publication de comptes rendus soumis, si les auteurs traitent de livres philosophiques (ou de livres sur un sujet apparenté) qui viennent de paraître. Les comptes rendus devraient être de 1000 mots au maximum, et le manuscrit rédigé en français ou en anglais. Les manuscrits devraient être envoyés au rédacteur francophone ou à un rédacteur anglophone selon le cas.

### Subscription prices for a volume of twelve issues:

Institutions: \$78.00 (Canada)	US\$72.00 or CDN\$88.00 (Non-Canadian)
Individuals: \$40.00 (Canada)	US\$36.00 or CDN\$50.00 (Non-Canadian)
Students: \$28.00 (Canada)	US\$25.00 or CDN\$36.00 (Non-Canadian)

### Prix de l'abonnement à un volume de douze numéros:

Institutions: \$78.00 (Canada)	US\$72.00 or CDN\$88.00 (Hors-Canada)
Individus: \$40.00 (Canada)	US\$36.00 or CDN\$50.00 (Hors-Canada)
Etudiants: \$28.00 (Canada)	US\$25.00 or CDN\$36.00 (Hors-Canada)

Published twelve issues yearly / douze par an numéros.

Subscriptions should be sent to the publisher:

Les abonnements peuvent être pris chez l'éditeur:



**academic printing & publishing**

P.O. Box 4834, South Edmonton, Alberta,  
Canada T6E 5G7

Second Class Mail Registration No. 5550

ISSN 0228-491X

©1987 Academic Printing and Publishing

# TABLE OF CONTENTS / TABLE DES MATIÈRES

Vol. VII no. 8 August / août 1987

Robert B. Ashmore, <i>Building a Moral System</i> (Neil W. MacGill) . . . . .	305
Robert C. Berwick, <i>The Acquisition of Syntactic Knowledge</i> (Merrie Bergman) . . . . .	307
David Braybrooke, <i>Philosophy of Social Science</i> (W.E. Cooper) . . . . .	309
A. Pablo Iannone, ed., <i>Contemporary Moral Controversies in Technology</i> (Carl Mitcham) . . . . .	311
Barry S. Kogan, <i>Averroes and the Metaphysics of Causation</i> (E.M. Macierowski) . . . . .	313
Helen Fay Nissenbaum, <i>Emotion and Focus</i> (Stephen R. Leighton) . . . . .	315
Kenneth F. Rogerson, <i>Kant's Aesthetics</i> (Theodore E. Uehling, Jr.) . . . . .	317
Holmes Rolston III, <i>Philosophy Gone Wild: Essays in Environmental Ethics</i> (Robert Elliott) . . . . .	319
Jean-Paul Sartre, <i>The Freud Scenario</i> (R.P. Nicholls) . . . . .	322
Carl Schmitt, <i>Political Romanticism</i> (Arnd Bohm) . . . . .	324
Calvin O. Schrag, <i>Communicative Praxis and the Space of Subjectivity</i> (Stephen Galt Crowell) . . . . .	326
Georg Simmel, <i>Georg Simmel: On Women, Sexuality, and Love</i> (Deena Weinstein) . . . . .	329
R.W. Sleeper, <i>The Necessity of Pragmatism: John Dewey's Conception of Philosophy</i> (H.S. Thayer) . . . . .	331
Mervyn Sprung, <i>The Magic of Unknowing: An East-West Soliloquy</i> (Alan R. Drengson) . . . . .	333
Peter G. Stillman, ed., <i>Hegel's Philosophy of Spirit</i> (Martin Donougho) . . . . .	337
Hao Wang, <i>Beyond Analytic Philosophy: Doing Justice to What We Know</i> (A.C. Genova) . . . . .	339





## **Ancient Philosophy from A.P.P.**

### **Justice, Law, and Method in Plato and Aristotle**

*Edited with an Introduction by Spiro Panagiotou*

A volume of original essays. The essays discuss obedience to law in the *Crito*, Glaucon and Adeimantus in the *Republic*, justice and method in the *Statesman*, and the topics of Corrective Justice and Equity in Aristotle.

*Contributors:* Brian Calvert, Spiro Panagiotou, Reginald E. Allen, Thomas M. Robinson, Michael C. Stokes, Brad Inwood, Kenneth Dorter, David L. Hitchcock, Ernest J. Weinrib, Wilfrid J. Waluchow, Constantine Georgiadis, Roger A. Shiner.

180 pp Cloth **\$35.95** 0-920980-18-X Paper **\$17.95** 0-920980-20-1

### **Aristotle Today**

*Edited with an Introduction by Mohan Matthen*

A collection of previously unpublished essays at the forefront of contemporary scholarship.

*Contents:* Francis Sparshott, 'Aristotle's World and Mine'  
Jonathan Barnes, 'An Aristotelian Way with Scepticism'  
Montgomery Furth, 'Aristotle on the Unity of Form'  
S. Marc Cohen, 'The Credibility of Aristotle's Philosophy of Mind'  
Alan Code, 'Metaphysics and Logic'  
Mohan Matthen, 'Substance as Hylomorphic Complex'

Annotated index of passages discussed in detail; index locorum; index nominum; index topicorum.

170 pp Cloth **\$36.95** 0-920980-17-1 Paper **\$18.95** 0-920980-19-8

### **APEIRON: a journal for ancient philosophy and science**

*Executive Editor:* Roger A. Shiner

*Editorial Board:* Richard N. Bosley, John King-Farlow, Mohan Matthen,  
Francis Jeffry Pelletier, Janet D. Sisson, Martin Tweedale

A journal for high-quality scholarly research in the philosophy and science of the classical period.

**APEIRON** is now edited by members of the Department of Philosophy, University of Alberta, and published by **A.P.P.** At present two issues are published per volume.

Subscription price for Volume XX (1987)

All subscriptions: Cdn\$22.00 (Canadian)

US\$22.00/Cdn\$29.00 (non-Canadian)

Order from: **Academic Printing & Publishing**

P.O. Box 4834

Edmonton, Alberta, Canada T6E 5G7

or from your usual bookstore or subscription agent.

ROBERT B. ASHMORE. *Building a Moral System*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall 1987. Pp. xi + 175. US\$16.95. ISBN 0-13-086265-7.

This is an introductory textbook in ethical theory. As the title suggests, the issues are presented as a developing series of questions that confront anyone who tries to come to terms with the problems of ethics in a systematic way. This approach gives the book a coherent structure that leads the reader on from chapter to chapter like a whodunit. It also involves the reader from the start in the process of self-questioning and practical reasoning that is essential to a true understanding of the subject.

The book begins by examining some of the attitudes towards ethics that are not uncommon amongst students. Chapter One argues the need for a moral system by looking at the concept of the amoralist: a need that is made more immediate by raising the issue of 'partial amorality,' the claim that morals have no place in business or in politics, in sports or in war. Ashmore does a good job bringing out all sides of the questions he discusses, yet he is not afraid to argue for a specific position when he feels it is justified — in this case the need for changes in the social environment which will support the individual's attempt to do what is right in these unfashionable contexts.

Chapter One concludes with the issue of moral agenthood and patienthood, which is illustrated with a dialogue on the moral status of the foetus in abortion. Throughout the book, Ashmore often discusses one specific issue in some detail to illustrate the practical relevance of a theoretical question. Chapter Two considers the relations of morality to law, religion and scientific fact, the latter topic leading on to the question of moral relativism in the third chapter. Here Ashmore shows the need to base philosophy in fact by quoting evidence from anthropology (41).

Chapter Four is about Egoism. Ashmore does give some space towards the end of this chapter to a Hobbesian self-interest theory (64), but, rather than pursuing very far this fashionable but psychopathic approach to ethics, he devotes most of the chapter to questioning both the factual truth of egoism, and the psychological accuracy of the supposed conflict between it and altruism. Here again Ashmore looks at the scientific evidence (54-9) and goes on to use



Aristotle's discussion of friendship as 'a paradigm of the mature human being' (60). This emphasis on the social nature of the self leads on to the examination of Utilitarianism in Chapter Five, which concludes with a discussion of the apparent conflict between justice and utility (82-90), introducing us naturally to Chapter Six and the alternative of Deontological Ethics, including Intuitionism.

In contrast to these theories, with their emphasis on right action or its consequences, the next chapter deals with 'The Life of Virtue.' Aristotle plays a fully acknowledged role in this discussion, and, in view of Ashmore's remark that his 'own orientation is eudaimonistic' (x), it is probably no accident this chapter is almost as long as the previous two combined. The final chapter of the book is entitled 'Presuppositions of a Moral System.' These, including the question of freedom, are extracted from earlier discussions.

Each chapter is followed by a dozen or more Review Questions which, as the term implies, are designed to remind the reader of points that have been made in the text rather than to suggest their application to new issues. This is no bad thing, since the text itself is already full of such suggestions. The United Nations' 'Universal Declaration of Human Rights' is printed in full as an appendix. It is not clear why, since the concept of rights is relatively neglected in the rest of the book, but it does provide an abundance of examples on which a moral system can be tested. The bibliography is not annotated, and only lists works that are referred to in the book. Consequently it does not provide any additional or systematic advice on further reading, which would be useful in a book of this kind. The index of names and subjects is fairly detailed.

Ashmore writes clearly and concisely, with little decoration. While I find his style enjoyable, I fear that the beginning philosopher for whom the book is intended may find it very demanding. Points are certainly illustrated with examples, but often these are stated rather tersely, so that the inexperienced may miss the connection. There are plenty of references to other philosophers, both historical and contemporary, giving a good sense of the ongoing continuity of philosophical enquiry. This is enhanced by the provision of dates for most of those named, though I am unsure of the principle on which these are granted or withheld. Being dead helps, but not Heraclitus or Dewey. On the other hand Skinner gets one date, with a convenient space left for the second one (147). And it must be said that history is badly served when Hume is described as English (102)!

NEIL W. MacGILL

University of New Brunswick

ROBERT C. BERWICK. *The Acquisition of Syntactic Knowledge*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1985. Pp. xii + 368. US\$27.50. ISBN 0-262-02226-5.

How, out of a candidate space of possible grammars, does a child learn the correct grammar for her linguistic community? This book sets out to answer that question with a computer program that models the acquisition process, starting with initial information about the form that a grammar can take and, on the basis of sample sentences, ending up with base and transformational rules for a subset of English. The model is intended to be psychologically real, incorporating initial 'innate' knowledge that is consistent with current linguistic theory and receiving as input the minimal amount of evidence a child might use to fix a grammar: positive-only evidence. Moreover, Berwick argues, the model acquires rules in much the same order as children do. Finally, the model establishes a close connection between grammar constraints that make for efficient parsing and constraints that aid syntactic acquisition. The news is exciting, but be forewarned: reading Berwick's presentation can be an exercise in frustration.

The acquisition program has two major components: parsing machinery, including a set (initially empty) of grammar rules, and the acquisition procedure. Acquisition is failure-driven: the program attempts to parse each input sentence using its current set of grammar rules; when no known rule applies the acquisition procedure steps up and attempts to construct a single rule to account for the data. If one can be constructed, it is added to the parser's rule-set (after possible generalization with other rules) and parsing continues. If not, the parser moves on to the next sentence. There is a filtering component here: sentences that are too complex to be analyzed at any point are simply ignored.

Because the 'evidence' that Berwick's model uses is restricted to syntactically correct sentences (it cannot be corrected if it goes astray), the model's success depends on strong built-in constraints as well as use of thematic information that accompanies the input stream. The program's parsing component is based on the 'Marcus parser' (Mitchell Marcus, *A Theory of Syntactic Recognition for Natural Language* [Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1980]) with significant modifications. For one, grammar rules are quite restricted in form: they uniformly mention local left and right context as triggering conditions and each rule performs exactly one of four possible actions. For another, Berwick adopts a uniform X-bar template for phrase structure: every phrase consists of a head and optional specifier(s) and complement(s), and within a language the order in which these components can occur is fixed across all base phrase types. Feature bundles and feature 'percolation' classify specific phrases. These modifications are intended to aid acquisition. The procedure has a restricted space of rules and feature specifications to choose from, and fixed constituent order entails that '... one binary decision, Verb-Object order [abstractly, HEAD-COMP], cements a whole set of developmental patterns ... This redundancy in information compresses the amount of information need-



ed to learn a grammar. Instead of having to learn separately the rules for Verb Phrases, Noun Phrases, Prepositional Phrases, and so forth, there is just a single binary choice to make' (6-7).

To further guide rule acquisition, Berwick relies upon a principle for learning from positive evidence only, the Subset Principle: '... such learning is guaranteed just in case for all target languages  $L_i$  of a family of recursive languages, there exists an (effective) procedure that can enumerate positive examples  $S_1, S_2, \dots$  such that (i)  $S_i \subseteq L_i$ ; and (ii) For all  $j > i$ , if  $S_i \subseteq L_j$ , then  $L_j \not\subseteq L_i$ ' (37-8). Berwick's model 'realizes' the principle by acquiring rules as conservatively as is consistent with the evidence so far, hypothesizing the narrowest possible covering language. Initial rules mention specific lexical items as well as associated feature bundles and are only generalized when warranted; verb phrase objects are assumed obligatory until examples prove otherwise and, more generally, base phrase structure order is assumed until evidence for transformations (e.g., passive sentences) is encountered.

The principles of the model seem clear enough in the abstract; but the chapters (3 and 4) that describe the program in action are a huge disappointment. While some examples are detailed and clear, some are too breezy to be illuminating and some just don't jive with the surrounding text. Mysterious things happen — for example, the program's identification of phrase heads. We are told that, at the outset, words marked +N-V and -N+V (nouns and verbs) are projected as phrase heads because they are known as Objects (+N) and Actions (+V) respectively; that a determiner, marked -V-A, is not projected as a head because 'it is not marked as either an argument [+A] or a predicate [+P]' (147); and that a preposition, marked -N-V does get projected as a head — even though, like the determiner, it is not marked as either an argument or a predicate. Is there a guiding principle here? (Occasional remarks suggest a HEAD indicator in the input stream, which would remove the mystery, but this is not explicitly stated.) And one issue that gets raised early on is not satisfactorily settled: to what extent does the thematic information in the input stream clinch decisions for the acquisition procedure? In Chapter 1, Berwick says that 'too much thematic information "gives away" the problem [of discovering syntactic rules] by indirectly encoding the syntax of sentences ... we avoid this problem by using thematic role information only for simple [nonembedded] sentences ... Eventually, the system can use its syntactic knowledge to infer thematic representations, rather than the other way around' (24). The exoneration is difficult to evaluate because Berwick's examples of the model in action rely heavily and often upon thematic representations to choose the correct move.

The book in general is not an easy read. The text frequently gets dense, often with no clear contribution to the whole, and some of Berwick's linguistic claims are puzzling ('[There] enters into agreement with its Verb and Object ... There was a riot on Tuesday; \*There were a riot on Tuesday.') while others are supported by unpublished manuscripts and dissertations that are difficult to reconstruct from Berwick's exposition. Nevertheless, the issues that

the book addresses are exciting and the conclusions that Berwick draws from his model will undoubtedly fuel future research on linguistic knowledge.

MERRIE BERGMANN  
(Computer Science)  
Smith College

---

DAVID BRAYBROOKE. *Philosophy of Social Science*. Scarborough, ON and Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall 1987. Pp. xi + 133. Cdn\$22.95; US\$14.95. ISBN 0-13-663394-3.

Braybrooke's *Philosophy of Social Science* replaces Richard Rudner's similarly-named text in Prentice-Hall's high profile *Foundations of Philosophy Series*. It is a worthy successor, maintaining but modulating the naturalistic or 'positivistic' spirit of the earlier volume. It is pedagogically superior, setting up a drama about the relationship between naturalistic, interpretative, and critical methodological approaches in the social sciences. Critical theory is reduced to the other two approaches and the remaining two are shown to support and mutually presuppose each other. It's a well-told tale. Others who share Braybrooke's outlook, including Rudner, tend to be less successful than representatives of the interpretative and critical schools, such as Winch and Habermas, in making stimulating initial contact with students of philosophical issues about the social sciences. But Braybrooke has the right touch.

The first chapter sketches the three models. The interpretative view of social science 'consists wholly in bringing to light what the actions that people do signify' (2). The naturalistic view 'prefers questions that according to it invite treatment by methods taken over from the natural sciences' (3). The critical view has 'so little sympathy with the naturalistic view that they incline to think of social science insofar as it answers to their view as doing a better job of what the interpretative approach begins' (4). Braybrooke organizes his argument around the question of the relationships amongst these models, but the book's genius resides in the decision to leaven the discussion by continuous reference to three actual specimens of the models at work: Leon D. Epstein's 'A Comparative Study of Canadian Parties,' representing the naturalistic model; Elliot Liebow's *Tally's Corner*, for the interpretative model; and Jürgen Habermas's *The Legitimation Crisis*, for the critical view.

The second chapter focuses on the naturalistic model, beginning in an orthodox way with an account of the covering law account of explanation, but



quickly veering away from orthodoxy in a spirited defense of the scientific credentials of loose generalizations, superficial connections, and transitory laws. It is evident here that Braybrooke is 'at home' in the social sciences, unlike many exponents of the naturalistic model who would count physics as home territory. He defends the quantitative methods of social scientists, losing at one point the even-handed *sangfroid* that otherwise characterizes the book, saying of the advocates of the interpretative view, 'They are typically innumerate — indeed, antinumerate — to a degree that would have shocked Plato, for whom the ascent to wisdom lay through the study of mathematics' (35). The chapter concludes with the reasonable thought that science is not an all-or-nothing affair but a matter of degree, and color is added to the idea with a graphically illustrated and suggestive 'scale of scientificity.'

The third chapter is about the interpretative model, and especially about the key notion of a rule. Braybrooke sees a continuum of diminishing intentionality in the phenomenon of rule-following, 'moving from rules very different in conception from natural regularities to rules hardly distinguishable from such things' (57). So as to capture diminished intentionality Braybrooke opts for an 'as if' understanding of what a rule is: 'To say that a rule exists in a given society is to say (in part) that the people who belong to that society act as though certain forms of words had been communicated to them and they had acted accordingly' (48). It is as if we had been told to shift from one sound of *s* to another when we use the word 'house' as a verb and as a noun, and this 'as if' warrants the linguist to speak of rule-following even when a speaker is innocent of directives about how to behave, linguistically speaking. Braybrooke also emphasizes in this chapter that 'the interpretative side of social science lends itself to quantitative methods hardly less readily than the naturalistic side ... What, for example, is a regular provider but someone who considerably more often than not brings home pay for the week or month sufficient to support his family?' (62) (Braybrooke's point, which is embedded in a longer discussion with more sophisticated examples, is that the interpretative fact that one is a 'regular provider' is underpinned by facts which admit of quantitative analysis.)

The fourth chapter is about critical social science, and it aims at showing that it may be reduced to the other two. Marxist critique of ideology, for one thing, is interpretative work, exposing unrecognized aims and activities which can be captured and expressed in systems of rules. It will criticize economists, for example, who serve unawares the interests of the people who profit from the present social system, 'as if' this service had been communicated to them. Yet 'what the critique of ideology is saying cannot be appreciated without giving due attention to its naturalistic side ... [for] whenever a theory of ideology — that is to say, a theoretical explanation of its origin and career — is invoked in the tradition of thought to which critical theory belongs, it is basically Marx's theory that comes forward. That theory is firmly causal' (76). Braybrooke credits critical theory's claim that its concern with human emancipation distinguishes it from other attempts at social science, but he maintains that a naturalistic approach to people as 'objects subject to causes' is



compatible with an emancipatory interest in them. Braybrooke tests his reductive approach against theses advanced by Habermas having to do with 'internal colonization,' 'fragmented consciousness,' and 'the ideal speech situation'; in confirmation of the approach it is shown that, apart from the last mentioned, these theses can be rendered as mixtures of interpretative and naturalistic claims. (The theory of the ideal speech situation is said to belong more to philosophy than to social science, so it is not a counter-example to the reductive claim, which limits itself to reduction of critical social theory as social science.)

The fifth chapter maintains the interdependence of the naturalistic and interpretative sides of social science, emphasizing that they are comparable in their 'scientificity.' Beyond that Braybrooke detects a rhythm or typical shift in perspective in good social science from one side to the other: 'Inquiries on one side always present the other side with occasions for raising questions congenial to the second' (94). Interpretative social science's description of a rule-governed institution sets up naturalistic social science's investigation of unintended consequences of the institution, for instance.

In the final chapter Braybrooke attempts to deepen his case for the unity of social science, arguing that 'the key idea of one side presupposes the key idea of the other, and vice versa' (110). For the key idea of interpretative social science is the idea of rules, and the idea of rules presupposes the idea of regularities; but also the regularities that naturalistic social science studies are nested in a social context in such a way that they presuppose the existence of settled social rules.

I think Braybrooke is right to employ the three-sides view, which he takes from Brian Fay and J. Donald Moon. I have found it a very helpful heuristic device, enabling students to assimilate and organize information in a rapid and fruitful way. And Braybrooke employs the view masterfully, clothing it in richly described specimens of the three models and avoiding the partisanship that can make unfavored models look like refuges for fools. I don't know of a better book for an introductory course in philosophy of social science.

W.E. COOPER

University of Alberta

---

A. PABLO IANNONE, ed. *Contemporary Moral Controversies in Technology*. Don Mills, ON and New York: Oxford University Press 1987. Pp. xv + 336. Cdn\$19.50; US\$11.95. ISBN 0-19-504125-9.

This is quite a good textbook — although, from a scholarly perspective, it is also somewhat exasperating. Two things that contribute to making this text-



book a good one are its conceptual emphasis and the actual set of articles it reprints. The editor rightly notes that in the discussion of ethical issues related to technology the 1980s have witnessed a shift from questions of individual choice to those of public policy. Instead of focusing solely on questions having to do with workers' rights in the industrial setting or personal information and safety in consumer use, there has been a growing concern about how alternative institutional policies (in both the public and private sector) affect technological development, environmental pollution, and private consumption. Ethically this entails discussions of the conflicting claims to legitimacy of various technology policies.

The editor provides — with the adaptation of distinctions from Marcus Singer's *Morals and Values* (1977) — a workable philosophical framework for this shift in emphasis by distinguishing between the ethics of an individual (personal beliefs) and of a group (beliefs shared by a number of individuals). The ethical analysis of issues related to this latter category of what the editor terms social or institutional ethics bear on 'questions of justifiability in policies, practices, or institutions' (4-5).

The resultant discussions are, in this text, approached not from the perspective of professional philosophers but from those of the scientific, technical, and managerial communities. In consequence they are 'organized according to the categories used by professionals in the field' (vii). The book contains, for instance, one section on moral controversies in technology assessment and another on moral issues in technology transfer. The largest of the six sections, however, concerns moral controversies in technology management, with subsections on the management of information, gene-splicing, health care, space, energy, and materials technologies. This one super-section contains 18 of the 34 collected articles.

The articles themselves come from *Technology Review* (5 articles), *Technology In Society* (4), *Science, Technology, and Human Values* (3), and a diverse group of other periodicals. Two are also statements by governmental agencies (Office of Technology Assessment and the National Science Foundation), and another is by the Union of Concerned Scientists. It might have been good in at least one instance (the subsection on energy technology) to have included a position paper from the nuclear power lobby. But the collection of articles is nevertheless of high quality, and it serves to indicate where some of the real thinking about technology is going on today. All articles are from the 1980s.

It is important to note that professional philosophy journals are conspicuous by their absence. Despite the recent 'applied turn' in philosophy, philosophers still have some way to go to deal with the world as the technical community actually experiences it. For instance, Peter Burton Hutt's 'University/Corporate Research Agreements' (from *Technology In Society*, 1983) — in a section on moral controversies in technology research and development — provides the kind of overview needed by the philosophical community.

The exasperating character of this text is that it does not make more of a contribution to bridging the gap between the technical and the philosophi-

cal communities — from the philosophical side. At the most rudimentary level, the references and bibliography simply fail to call attention to high quality philosophical works which can and have been of importance to those practically engaged with technology. Although the bibliography lists Jacques Ellul's *The Technological Society* (incorrectly dated as 1967 — it was 1964) and Egbert Schuurman's *Technology and the Future* (1980), it fails to include any reference to books by Hans Jonas, Langdon Winner, Stephen Unger, Albert Borgmann, etc.

But on a deeper level the exasperation is with the philosophical categories employed by the general introductions (there are two) and those to each section. Repeatedly the editor argues that there is a relatively small set of considerations central to the sound moral analysis of controversies in technology. This set is limited to questions of consequences, rights, and pressures to act. Utilitarianism, deontologism, and pragmatism — each interpreted in an unnecessarily restricted sense — are the only theoretical frameworks brought to bear on the discussion. It may well be that the technical community and the body politic are currently limited to such frameworks, but a bolder text would have said more about other viewpoints — and certainly should have mentioned how technology policies must often contend with differently formulated arguments (as in the appeals to natural law and to divine law put forth by diverse religious bodies in regard to a spectrum of technologies ranging from birth control to nuclear weapons).

CARL MITCHAM

(*Philosophy & Technology Studies Center*)

Polytechnic University (New York)

---

BARRY S. KOGAN. *Averroes and the Metaphysics of Causation*. Albany: State University of New York 1985. Pp. xi + 348. US\$39.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-88706-063-3); US\$14.95 (paper: ISBN 0-88706-000-0).

Kogan's five-chapter monograph helps to introduce a major Islamic philosopher, who was decisively influential in medieval Latin and Hebrew circles, to the modern English-speaking public. Chapter 1.0 introduces the 'theory of causal efficacy' in three sections. Section 1.1 offers six marks to distinguish 'causal efficacy': (1) 'Particular causes produce their effects and can be known to do so'; (2) 'what ultimately counts as a cause is any particular entity or substance that can meaningfully be called an agent'; (3) 'certain



kinds of causes have certain kinds of effects, but not others'; (4) 'once an efficient cause exists, all things being equal, its characteristic effect must occur'; (5) 'causes are always in some sense prior to their effects'; and (6) 'causes can be known to produce their effects as well as to explain them.' *Remarks*: Point (2) seems to exclude material, formal, and final causality (cf. p. 274, n. 38, on what is *not* quoted from *Metaphysics* Δ); this restriction of scope focuses on what would be of most interest to post-Humeans. As to point (3), the term 'law,' which connotes a species-neutral universality (e.g., the first law of thermodynamics or the law of gravitation) as opposed to a kind-relative universality (e.g., man generates man), is not indexed; does Averroes himself ever refer to 'universal laws' (3) or 'scientific laws' (4)?

Section 1.2 treats of the situation that provoked Averroes' work. The Ash'arite theologian and jurist al-Ghazālī (d. 1111) attacked the philosophies of Al-Fārābī (d. 950) and Avicenna (d. 1037) in his *Incoherence of the Philosophers* (*Tabāfut al-Falāsif*) on two fronts — 'philosophic' and 'legal.' The 'legal' charge of 'unbelief in the teachings of Islam,' if sustained, rendered one 'liable to capital punishment'; accordingly, Averroes wrote a 'legal defense of philosophy, the *Fasl al-Maqāl* or *The Decisive Treatise Determining the Nature of the Connection between Religion and Philosophy*' (7). Averroes answered the 'philosophic' charges in the 'three-tiered' *Incoherence of the Incoherence* (*Tabāfut at-Tabāfut*), which 'first ... summarizes the positions of al-Fārābī and ... Avicenna,' 'second presents al-Ghazālī's critique,' and 'third offers Averroes' analysis... reformulations... and suggestions' (8). Kogan's own inquiries (Section 1.3) 'focus mainly on Discussions Three and Seventeen of the *Tabāfut at-Tabāfut*' (13), 'about Divine agency and necessary causal connections' (5), though 'passages from elsewhere' will be brought in; his 'interest is primarily philosophical rather than exegetical,' i.e. the 'character, justification, and overall adequacy' of 'causal theory' (13).

The program (13-15) of the sequel runs thus: in chapter 2, 'on the Logic of Agents and Acts,' 2.1 examines 'the literary character of the *Tabāfut*' (17-25), while 2.2 turns 'to the problem of causal efficacy itself' (25-69); chapter 3 'on Necessary Connection: Causes, Effects, and the Missing Link' (71-164) raises the central problem of nature in sections on 'Necessary Connection and the Problem of the Miraculous' (71-86), 'Empirical Evidence and the Case for Causal Efficacy' (86-99), 'Metaphysics and the Case for Causal Efficacy' (100-35), 'Nature vs. the Habitual Course of Events' (135-42), and 'Malleable Natures vs. Stable Natures' (142-64); chapter 4 'Spheres, Cycles, and Celestial Intelligences: The Celestial Links in the Causal Chain' (165-201) discusses 'The Sphere System and the Problem of Continuous Change' (165-79) and 'Celestial Animation and the "Kinetic" Code' (180-201); chapter 5, 'Divine Causation and the Doctrine of Eternal Creation' (203-55), treats 'The World as an Eternal Creation' (203-21), 'Eternal Creation by Will or Intellect?' (221-9), 'Causal Knowing and the Theory of Emanation' (229-48), and 'Did Averroes Subscribe to the Theory of Emanation?' (248-55). A conclusion (255-65) answers to the program. The notes (267-311) offer clear translations and informative remarks; the bibliography (313-27) is blemished by unexecuted instructions to the printer



(on pp. 314 and 317) and a few typographical errors. There is an index (329-48). The binding weakens about half-way through a first reading.

Kogan emphatically claims that in the *Tabâfut* Averroes 'is not written for his fellow philosophers' (20) and quotes Averroes' directions ' "to inquire about these questions ... in the books of demonstration..." ' (21). Yet Kogan focuses on the Third and Seventeenth Discussions of the *Tabâfut* (13) and only incidentally appeals to the 'esoteric writing,' i.e., the Aristotelian texts (24); the concentration of such citations increases noticeably toward the central chapters of his beautiful book. Why not also write another book, using the commentaries not obliquely but directly? Or is exotericism simply necessary?

E.M. MACIEROWSKI

Christendom College

---

HELEN FAY NISSENBAUM. *Emotion and Focus*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1986. Pp. iv + 156. US\$8.95. ISBN 0-318-20040-6.

This work analyzes emotion's object-directedness, and a significant subset of emotion. The first section concerns the commonplace that emotions, like thoughts but unlike twinges or pains, have and must have objects. Nissenbaum sets forth a number of diagnoses of object-directedness: 1) a relation between emotion and some item in the world; 2) intentionality in which there is no reference to a concrete relatum, but an abstract object which marks the state as intentional; 3) a linguistic condition in which structural features of certain sentences mirror the structure of emotion's object-directedness; 4) an explanatory function in which citing the object helps explain the emotion. Nissenbaum then reviews, in a way somewhat too tailored to her purposes, the views of various philosophers, illustrating their adherence to these positions, and discussing the merits and defects of each position and their combinations. Her project is to disband as misguided the search for an encompassing account of object-directedness, arguing that philosophers are talking at cross-purposes, analyzing distinct phenomena. Object-directedness is defused into a number of issues, including the state of the individual, a relation between the one having the emotion and a concrete item in the world (focus), a relation to a property, concrete items that bear on an emotion without being the focus of emotion and can be used as explanatory factors.

The second section is a study of a significant subset of emotion, including love, hatred, anger, jealousy. Nissenbaum claims that traditional analyses of



these emotions embody two theses: emotions are (1) intrinsic and (2) occurrent features (properties) of the individual. Nissenbaum maintains that these emotions are a dispositional relation between the subject and an individual, rather than intrinsic, episodic properties. They are patterned dispositions (with constraints) in which relevant episodes are pieces of the pattern emotion rather than occurrences of the emotion. Emotion covers various episodes (feeling, thinking, acting) at a more abstract level. A surge of feeling may be an episode in the pattern fear, but is not itself an occurrence of fear.

Whether or not one is persuaded by Nissenbaum's considerations, they are suggestive and important. She scrutinizes the notion of object-directedness in a way not before accomplished; her proposals on how to understand emotion in a non-occurrent manner, without denying the importance of occurrences, are ingenious and provide an intriguing way to think about the emotions.

In the first section, Nissenbaum does show that at times dispute about object-directedness is at cross-purposes. The power of the arguments, however, is diminished by a failure to survey fully the territory. At least some of the work she does is disbanding the projects of others by distinguishing different sorts (levels) of objects (e.g. Kenny, Lyons, and Scruton). Why it is misguided (if it is) to use, say, Scruton's distinctions between real, vs. notional, vs. formal, vs. intentional objects to do much of the same work, warrants comment. Nissenbaum's reflections on the extent to which we have two projects at odds rather than different ways of speaking of the same things is important, but inadequately developed. Similarly, although Nissenbaum does mention considerations that are to replace object-directedness, her own development is limited, and fails to exploit the work of others, e.g. Aristotle, Broad and de Sousa. A fuller understanding of these considerations would be helped by the assistance of such theorists, and could help dispel the suspicion (if it is to be dispelled) that object-directedness has arisen under new guises. Again, the issue of object-directedness in emotion parallels disputes about cognitive states, but little mutual enrichment is offered.

In the second section, Nissenbaum's claim of near universal agreement to the two theses (above) is dubious. The internal feature claim (1) does not do justice to many, including Aristotle, Bedford, and perhaps de Sousa and Taylor. All those who build external causal conditions into the analysis of emotion or who take emotion to necessarily involve an object which they understand, at least in part, to be something beyond their own conception do not endorse an internal conception of emotion. Further, the occurrent claim (2) doesn't do justice to analyses in the tradition of Bedford or Kenny. Moreover, although many traditional analyses have not been as clear about the relationship between occurrences and dispositions as is desirable, the best understanding of the position is that the focus on occurrences arises through the methodological priority in analysis of occurrences over dispositions, rather than an ontological view of emotions as just occurrences (cf. Alston and Lyons). Hence the 'traditional model' challenged (and to be replaced) does not represent the spectrum of conceptions at hand.

Some arguments offered involve a worrying move from the sentences with which we speak of emotion to emotion and the concept of emotion. One argument seems to rest on the assumption that on traditional views statements such as 'I love you' must function to speak of occurrences. But it seems to me that such statements can be (and are) used in a variety of ways, and often used ambiguously between occurrences and dispositions. Since 'traditional views' need not deny this, the problem generated for them and the motivation for a different conception fades.

The thesis that occurrences are occurrences relevant to emotion but not occurrences of emotion is too sweeping, even for the relevant subset. To burst with jealousy or love, to be saddened by music may (or may not) be pieces in larger patterns, but they themselves are straightforwardly episodes of fear, love, and sadness, standing non-defectively (cf. p. 116) on their own. That said, a pattern analysis is of extreme interest, offering a fascinating conception of emotion and a plausible way to circumvent certain debates about emotion's constituents. We should be thankful to Nissenbaum for her original and significant contributions to questions concerning emotion's nature; great benefit will be had from studying them.

STEPHEN R. LEIGHTON  
Queen's University

---

KENNETH F. ROGERSON. *Kant's Aesthetics*. Lanham, MD: University Press of America 1986. Pp. viii + 171. US\$22.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8191-5660-4); US\$11.00 (Paper: ISBN 0-8191-5661-2).

Rogerson provides us with a useful and, at times, stimulating addition to the growing body of contemporary literature on Kant's *Critique of Aesthetic Judgment*. His work, which is subtitled 'The Roles of Form and Expression,' has for its overall aim 'to show that the early "formalistic" sections [of the *Critique*] as well as the later "doctrine of expression" are needed to justify judgments of taste' (9). According to Rogerson, Kant's justification of judgments of taste requires both the arguments through paragraph 40, in which Kant attempts to show that a necessary condition for a judgment of taste is a universally communicable feeling of pleasure in response to a freely achieved (i.e., not cognitively directed) free play of the imagination and understanding, and the arguments contained in paragraphs 43-60, in which Kant may be attempting to show (or, perhaps, 'suggest') that a sufficient condition for demanding



that everyone feel the pleasure in question is that the aesthetic object express aesthetic Ideas. That pleasure as a response to free harmony is a necessary but not sufficient condition for judgments of taste would not be found controversial by most contemporary commentators; that a sufficient condition for demanding agreement in matters of taste is that an aesthetic object must express aesthetic Ideas is controversial. Rogerson's argumentation for the sufficiency of this condition is his most original move.

A central part of Rogerson's argumentation focuses on his attempt to clarify the meaning of subjective universal validity, for which the universal communicability of pleasure is a necessary condition. He attempts to show that neither Kant's arguments through paragraph 40, nor their reconstructions by contemporary commentators, establish subjective universal validity. With regard specifically to one of the reconstructions (presumably, Paul Guyer's), Rogerson claims that a crucial error is made in reading 'expecting' universal agreement and 'demanding' universal agreement as expressing logically distinct theses (see, for example, paragraph 7 of the *Critique*). What Rogerson contends is that 'a legitimate demand to everyone's agreement is what Kant means by the universal validity of judgments of taste' (80). Hence, he must do away with the distinction between 'expecting' and 'demanding.' In his attempt to accomplish that task, Rogerson commits an interesting but non-fatal error.

What is at issue is Rogerson's argumentation on pp. 80-91. Some of this argumentation appeared in Rogerson's paper 'The Meaning of Universal Validity in Kant's Aesthetics' in the *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 40 (1982) 301-8. His case against a philosophically significant distinction between expecting and demanding agreement rests primarily on an appeal to the German text, with an initial focus on the text of paragraph 7. He argues that both *muten*, sometimes translated as 'expects,' and *fordern*, usually translated as 'demands,' 'would seem to indicate nothing more philosophically important than a *façon de parler* used to make a single point about judgments of taste' (86). Rogerson's error occurs in his next move: 'After stating that judging something as beautiful amounts to expecting (*muten*) agreement, Kant seems to think that it follows without further argument ("hence") that we can demand (*fordern*) agreement from everyone, even criticize them for lack of taste if they fail to agree' (86). But Kant, in moving from 'expects' to 'demands' does offer 'further argumentation,' as I hope to show.

Preceding the term 'hence' in paragraph 7, Kant asserts a conditional, the antecedent of which is 'if he declares something to be beautiful.' This antecedent has a compound consequent: (1) 'he expects the very same pleasure of others, [and (2)] he judges not solely for himself but for everyone, and [(3)] then (*alsdann*) speaks of beauty as if it were a property of things.' The first part of the consequent states an expectation of the universality of the pleasure which the beautiful object occasions; this expectation Kant warrants by his view that an epistemic condition for an object to be judged beautiful is a non-rule directed harmony of imagination and understanding. Aesthetic pleasure is a response to this freely achieved harmony. The second part (2) of the



consequent should be read as '[because of (1)], he judges not solely for himself, but for everyone.' That is, the epistemic condition together with the doctrine of common sense provides the factual justification for universality. The third part (3) of the consequent follows from the first two; the justifiability of speaking *as if* beauty were a property of things hinges on the general character of aesthetic judgments as universal. Judging, then, that 'the thing is beautiful,' which follows 'hence,' implies that the judge demands that others agree as if the judgment had objective truth conditions.

The point of this analysis is that there is 'further argument' in Kant's move from 'expecting' to 'demanding,' and that this further argument shows that Kant commits an apparently serious error, namely, in suggesting that the possibility of agreement (with its root in common sense) is a sufficient condition for aesthetic demands. In other words, Kant suggests that the requirements for taste are a sufficient condition for requiring taste. Rogerson's analysis obscures this difficulty, and may be responsible for his not emphasizing Kant's distinction between 'requirements for' and 'requiring' as that occurs in the paragraphs through number 40. But, on the other hand, his analysis tends to focus our attention on a possible sufficient condition for demanding agreement in matters of taste. Although I do not necessarily agree that 'expressing an aesthetic Idea' is the final word on a sufficient condition, Rogerson argues his position with clarity and force. The issue of a sufficient condition for aesthetic demands is of unequalled importance in analyses of the *Critique of Judgment*. Rogerson contends that 'expression of Ideas is required for the very comprehensibility of the formalist position' (162), and this thesis invites further analysis.

Rogerson's book is sanely organized and makes for both enjoyable and instructive reading. I would not hesitate to recommend it to either undergraduates or graduates undertaking Kant's *Aesthetic Judgment* for the first time; chapters two and three, quite apart from Rogerson's argumentation relevant to his thesis, contain trustworthy exegesis. But, in addition, those with a purely scholarly interest in Kant's aesthetics ought not to ignore this important book.

THEODORE E. UEHLING, JR.  
University of Minnesota, Morris

---

HOLMES ROLSTON III. *Philosophy Gone Wild: Essays in Environmental Ethics*. Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books 1986. Pp. 269. US\$19.95. ISBN 0-87975-329-3.

The essays which constitute this book have all been previously published. However, they do combine to offer a powerful statement of an environmen-



tal ethic and it is good to have them collected together. They are grouped under four headings: 'Ethics and Nature' (four essays), 'Values in Nature' (three essays), 'Environmental Philosophy in Practice' (three essays) and 'Nature in Experience' (five essays).

The first group begins with one of the great landmarks of environmental ethics, 'Is There an Ecological Ethic?' This essay has set the agenda for much of the philosophical discussion about the ethical significance of wild nature which has taken place in the last decade and a half. It broaches themes which are further developed in the other essays of the first three groupings and provides a philosophical lens through which the essays of the fourth group, which are essays in nature appreciation, may be viewed.

The essay begins by distinguishing between ethics which are primarily, non-derivatively ecological and those which are ecological in only a secondary, derivative fashion. An ethic might enjoin us to desist from policies which lead to the extinction of species. However, it might do this because it presupposes the factual belief that species elimination is likely to have adverse consequences for humans. For example, the elimination of some predator species might lead to widespread crop destruction, or the elimination of some spectacular species might deprive future persons of a certain range of aesthetic pleasures. Here the environmental values are ultimately cashed in terms of the satisfaction of human interests. By contrast, an ethic which is ecological primarily and non-derivatively assigns disvalue to the elimination of species independently of concerns about how best to satisfy human interests.

Rolston goes on to indicate some of the values which he thinks are possessed by wild nature in virtue of which it is morally considerable, independently of its impact on human interests. Among these are 'unity, harmony, interdependence, stability' (19). The idea is that these are features of the natural environment which are uncovered and described by the ecological sciences and that they have value. Their presence constitutes a strong moral reason for preserving wild nature. Rolston does not merely assert that wild nature displays unity, harmony, etc. The essays are full of specific examples which make the case incontrovertible and which must sway the reader towards a positive evaluation of wild nature. The fourth group of essays constitutes a sustained defence of the claim. It is worth remarking on the eloquence and erudition of Rolston's writing about nature. His knowledge of the ecological sciences is extensive and his intellectual and affective commitment to an ecological ethic is always obvious, although never oppressive.

A second issue which Rolston broaches in the opening essay, and to which he frequently returns in subsequent essays, is the relationship between fact and value. He seems to think that fact and value are in some sense not distinct: 'the values seem to be there as soon as the facts are fully in' (20). What is not sufficiently clear is the sense in which Rolston believes they are not distinct. In fact one general complaint I have is that, at certain points, Rolston's philosophy displays insufficient analytic precision and care. Too often philosophical points which demand clarification are lost before they are properly resolved.



There are at least two ways of understanding the remark quoted just above. First, it might be taken to mean that most of us are affectively constituted in such a way that we cannot, as a matter of fact, help but see value in wild nature once we become aware of those of its features described by the ecological sciences. The values come with the facts because we are disposed, through enculturation or innately, to respond positively to facts of those kinds. This is an empirical claim which I am inclined to believe is false. There do seem to be some who grasp the facts, who perceive the unity, harmony, etc., but who do not make the positive evaluation. However, I must say the psychologies of such people strike me as quite alien. And I cannot imagine how anyone could fail to be moved by the power of Rolston's prose to value positively wild nature. Second, the comment might be taken as suggesting that the facts uncovered by the ecological sciences strongly necessitate, either logically or metaphysically, the values. This would be an interesting claim but, while something along its lines is what Rolston apparently favours, there is little argument for it.

A third issue which receives some treatment in the first group of essays but which is more thoroughly treated in the second group is the metaphysics of environmental value. In the essay, 'Are Values in Nature Subjective or Objective?', Rolston appears to argue that value is contained in wild nature independently of the attitudes, sentiments, preferences and the like of valuers. There is some degree of uncertainty that this is his claim. This is another point at which philosophical clarity is a little lacking. Certainly crude subjectivism about values is something Rolston rejects but it is not clear that Rolston's own account cannot be seen as a version of subjectivism.

In the essay, 'Philosophical Aspects of the Environment,' Rolston remarks that 'human valuation of nature ... is drawn from environmental intercourse, not merely brought to it' (59). This highlights the fact that the attitudes, sentiments, preferences, etc. which we come to have are shaped by our encounters with the natural environment as well as with the social environment. Moreover the discriminatory powers which we employ in our perception of wild nature will, hopefully, be developed in the context of interactions with the natural environment. Such interaction will often be mediated by information and theoretical frameworks provided by the ecological sciences. What all this means is that the valuational points of view from which we make our moral judgments are developed through commerce with the world around us. We do not have these points of view independently of that world. However, it does not follow from this that values are objectively located in nature itself. They may well be projected on to nature but such projections have a causal history which may assign a large role to our past and continuing interactions with nature. And subjectivism does not deny that it is objective features of wild nature which engage our valuational capacities. Nor is it impossible for a sophisticated subjectivism to permit the assignment of positive value to states of affairs which do not contain or even never contain valuers. This is because projections may be made from one point in time to all other points in time and from the actual world across the range of possible worlds.



There is much else in Rolston's book which deserves comment. It adds up to a fine contribution to environmental ethics and should be taken seriously by all who have an interest in the area. The views which it presents are not definitive; hopefully, it will provide the impetus for much useful further discussion.

ROBERT ELLIOT

University of New England

JEAN-PAUL SARTRE. *The Freud Scenario*. Quinton Hoare, tr. and J.B. Pontalis, ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1987. Pp. xviii + 549. US\$24.95. ISBN 0-226-73513-3.

It is never possible to review a work of genius satisfactorily, but the task of giving a meaningful synopsis of Sartre's dramatic work on the period of creative discovery in Freud's life must seem particularly futile. The work defies aesthetic categorization; although it was commissioned in 1958 by director John Huston as a filmscript, Sartre was clearly not interested in attempting to create something cinematographically workable. The *Scenario* reads like a protracted dramatic biography, manifesting far more concern with inward subjective disposition and intention than with plot or action, and yet every facet of the piece is inundated with that poignant sense of the dramatic that Sartre's stage plays justifiably have been recognized as possessing. Circumstantial incidents which surround the work, such as its final incompleteness, the perceived failure of the film Huston created on the basis of a reworked version of Sartre's script, the 'Freudian' overtones which came to characterize the relationship between Huston and Sartre, however interesting, pale in the light of the extant material the reader confronts, because beyond the myriad number of leitmotifs woven into the fabric of this portrait of the creator of psychoanalytic theory, Sartre is able expressively and continuously to instantiate one of the fundamental tenets of his own thought, viz., that explanatory theoretical models, no matter how complex or revolutionary, are not logically possible abstractions which gain their force through parsimony or coherence, but are first and perhaps most significantly the discovery of ideas which are existentially lived.

The work may be seen this way: as a deliberate debunking of one of the most mendacious myths surrounding scientific discovery and scientific methodology. Freud is not a demi-god of moral neutrality nor a paragon of objec-



tivity: he is a compulsive neurotic whose procedure resembles the most inept trial and error empiricism, a man plagued with personal insecurity and deep-seated guilt concerning his most intimate relationships, with his father, his wife, his children, relationships which, after probing scrutiny motivated by the passion for self-knowledge, become the paradigms and partial confirmations for his theories concerning phobias, ego-defense mechanisms, repression, transference; he is the acrimonious Jew whose life-long disgust with anti-Semitism casts him as an outsider contemptuous of the hypocrisy of the bourgeoisie, as a warrior battling the hegemonic oligarchy which proscribes scientific legitimacy, yet a man so blindly strapped by dutiful respect for the moral law of Moses that he finds the revealed sexual proclivities of the human unconscious repugnant. What Sartre has captured with fascinating existential insight and depth is the lived experience of discovery, the genesis of Freud's thought as it unfolds from his early refusal of the one-dimensional positivism of neurophysiology and his interest in hypnotism, through his nascent speculations concerning the role of sexuality in hysteria and repression, to the fully developed theory of the Oedipal complex and the psychoanalytic method. But this genesis emerges as the frustration and despair over seemingly insurmountable impasses, the struggle to break with mentors such as Breuer, and as the loneliness arising from the inevitable disavowal of the theories of his one close friend. Moreover, none of the major incidents surrounding discovery are contrived or artificial: the situations with each of the important analysands are developed with autonomy and complexity, so that Karl and Dora and Cacilie each as characters possess personalities of such idiosyncratic and opaque natures that the facile myth of step by step progression toward certain conclusion is supplanted by the ambiguity of genuine encounter with subjective otherness, the complexity of recurring explanatory incompleteness, and the enigmatic role of factual contingency when it is overdetermined by the symbolizing of wish-fulfilment and the abyss of human sexual desire. Perhaps nowhere is the lived experience of discovery more evident in its subjectivity than in Sartre's dramatization of Freud's own dreams: in one sense, these dreams are the apotheosis of the script, for here burgeoning symbolism, repressed latent content, and the demand for theoretical objectification and account, are wedded inextricably to the life of this man, Freud. These dreams are, above all else, testimony to Freud's own 'illness,' an illness which gave birth to its own account of dis-ease and cure, but not just as self-healing, rather as that universal explanation which is the legacy of what is unquestionably one of the most profoundly innovative and revelatory personal and scientific quests for the 'healing' of the madness that is human sanity — and now as Sartre's dramatic biography, no longer the acrid, abstruse theoretical architectonic to which unimpassioned psychometricians aver, nor the sacrosanct, clinical objectivism policing insanity from out of the myth of a scientific rationalism detached from human existence: rather, the existential truth of lived thought. It is not ironic that such be captured in a work of art.

Two questions which cannot be answered with any kind of completeness here concern the importance of this work for Freudian scholarship and for



Sartrean scholarship. It is extremely unlikely that Sartre's *Scenario* will play any role in Freudian scholarship, for it adds nothing new to our knowledge of either Freud's theories or his biography. Much more important is its significance for Sartrean scholarship: the work is artistic, not theoretical, although it is undoubtedly philosophical. The philosophical work of art, which has been central to Sartre's thought since *Nausea* and *The Roads to Freedom*, and perhaps more generally the relation between philosophy and art, would need to be discussed if any aesthetic categorization of the work were to be attempted. But none is required. In its insistence that thought be encountered existentially within the context of human weakness and greatness, there may be fruitful comparison with Sartre's work on Flaubert. With respect to Sartre's genius for the dramatic and his unswerving commitment to human freedom and dignity, very rich comparative analyses might involve plays such as *No Exit* and *The Devil and the Good Lord*. Finally, the work possesses its own autonomy and uniqueness, setting it apart from anything else Sartre wrote. One of the most constant themes of the script is that of the quest for self-knowledge, genuine self-knowledge which seeks to question every motive, to deny self-deception and false consciousness, to bring into the light all that is dark and hidden in the human psyche. Much might be said about this for our time, but Sartre's obvious understanding and appreciation for this moment of Freudian analysis make his criticisms in *Being and Nothingness* appear more ambivalent, and may perhaps lead to more discussion of the relation between his own Existential Psychoanalysis and the classical Freudian perspective.

R.P. NICHOLLS

University of Alberta

---

CARL SCHMITT. *Political Romanticism*. Guy Oakes, trans. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press 1986. Pp. xxxviii + 177. US\$20.00. ISBN 0-262-19252-7.

This translation of Carl Schmitt's *Politische Romantik*, which was first published in 1919 and then in revised form in 1925, appears in the series *Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought*, under the general editorship of Thomas McCarthy. The only possible justification for introducing this useless book to the English-speaking reader is the weak argument of completeness, since two of Schmitt's other works are included in the series. Those works represent Schmitt's expertise as one of the most influential political jurists and

philosophers of constitutional law of the Weimar Republic. But his foray into the history of ideas is as unconvincing today as it was sixty years ago.

The argument has the simplicity of reductionist approaches. After rejecting some definitions of Romanticism, Schmitt offers his formulation: 'Romanticism is subjectified occasionalism' (17). By this he means that the Romantics simply reacted to events and circumstances, rather than pursuing a consistent plan of action. They could no longer have a programme because they did not seek to ameliorate the post-Cartesian antitheses of self and other, referring them instead to an unquestioned higher instance, such as God. The Romantics did not pursue ultimate causes, but were content with responding to accidental events. In the realm of politics, this produced a thoroughgoing opportunism: 'As long as the Revolution is present, political romanticism is revolutionary. With the termination of the Revolution, it becomes conservative, and in a markedly reactionary restoration it also knows how to extract the romantic aspect from such circumstances' (115). Schmitt rejects such opportunism and with it political romanticism 'because no society can discover an order without a concept of what is normal and what is right' (161).

The fundamental flaw in Schmitt's analysis is that it violates his own declared interest in the history of Romanticism, in 'the historical distinctiveness of the movement' (5). He concentrates primarily on two figures, Adam Müller and Friedrich Schlegel, with occasional references to a bevy of other writers. Names dance like butterflies, but where did they come from, where were they going? If Romantic political thought is to be assessed for its coherence or practical viability, then it would have to be studied in actual contexts. For example, the establishment of the University of Berlin in 1810 was in many regards a fusion of Prussian political aims with the ideals of Romanticism. Conversely, the cultural politics of Ludwig I of Bavaria sheltered Romanticism within Catholic conservatism. There is not a word of such actual consequences here, any more than there is a systematic consideration of the connections between Romanticism and the Young Hegelians. Nor, and this alone should raise many doubts about the basis of Schmitt's history, is there any trace of Ludwig Börne or Heinrich Heine, two of the most influential writers of their age.

The mention of Börne and Heine raises, as it must, the question of Schmitt's own notorious political shift, when he lent the Nazis the weight of his authority on constitutional law. In an apologetic introduction by translator Guy Oakes, the problem is waffled: 'In spite of his support for the Republic, his criticism of the Nazis, and his ties to prominent Jews, in both academia and the government, Schmitt managed to execute a brilliant and astonishingly smooth transition from Weimar to the Third Reich' (xi). The phrase 'in spite of' implies a contradiction between Schmitt's earlier and later positions, but this contradiction did not in fact exist. Vittorio Hösle has just demonstrated (*Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift* 61 [1987] 1-34) that Schmitt himself was an occasionalist in his legal philosophy. Thus, *Political Romanticism* may have some value as an autobiography, as a chronicle of a betrayal foretold. Whose was the 'delight



in secret, irresponsible, and frivolous power over human beings' (79) ascribed by Schmitt to the Romantics?

The translation will not win any awards. Often it is uneasy or clumsy and sometimes quirky (*Vormärz* is hardly 'the reactionary period'). The decision to leave out many of Schmitt's footnotes went in entirely the wrong direction; most readers would need much more information about names (Haller, Ruge, J.J. Wagner), titles of books, and allusions (e.g. to the Christian German Dinner Club or *Deutsche Tischgesellschaft*). And finally, the attempt by Oakes to offer Norman Mailer as an example of a political romantic is far-fetched and unconvincing.

ARND BOHM

(Department of German)

Carleton University

---

CALVIN O. SCHRAG. *Communicative Praxis and the Space of Subjectivity*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1986. Pp. ix + 219. US\$27.50. ISBN 0-253-31383-X.

What form can philosophy adopt in the wake of the deconstruction of metaphysics and the dethroning of epistemology? Calvin O. Schrag's latest book seeks to answer this question by showing how contemporary criticisms of philosophical 'foundationalism' — in Heidegger, Derrida, Foucault, and Rorty among many others — leave room for a *retrieval* of traditional notions such as meaning, truth, subjectivity, and humanism by way of an 'anti-foundational' reflection on the 'texture of communicative praxis.' This is a timely project, and Schrag's suggestions for overcoming impasses in the current self-conception of philosophy are often suggestive even if, finally, elusively general. Here I will describe only the basic indicators of Schrag's own position, setting aside his criticism of the Cartesian tradition and exegesis of other thinkers which fill much of this volume.

Schrag elucidates communicative praxis by way of a 'hermeneutic' or 'sociopragmatic posture' (7). This stance, both interpretive and descriptive, is solicited by communicative praxis itself, which is called a 'texture' to distinguish it from kindred notions such as the phenomenological 'field' of intentionality and the deconstructionist's 'textuality' — both instances of useful metaphors which have been 'overextended,' thus concealing the phenomenon at issue. Resisting any form of reductionism (avoiding especially such tradi-

tional categories as inner and outer, subjective and objective), Schrag invokes the texture of communicative praxis as a 'holistic space' encompassing spoken and written discourse, intentionalities of individual action, and the 'historically effective life of institutions' (24). Discourse, action, and institutions, in synchronic and diachronic perspective, are seen as strands of an 'original' phenomenon which, however, may not be taken as an epistemological foundation since communicative praxis is 'at once a revealing and a concealing, a showing and a not-showing of itself' (106). The modest 'ontology of experience' (108) projected upon this phenomenon will not 'begin with the Being-question' but will, following Ricoeur's idea of the 'long road' to ontology, 'back into it through an exploration of the forms of communicative praxis' (110) as these display themselves in particular forms of life.

The primary aim of this book however is not ontology, but the recovery of meaning, subjectivity, and humanistic ethics as aspects or implications of communicative praxis. Schrag first discusses two interwoven dimensions of meaning, viz., 'expressive' and 'signitive' meaning. Expressive meaning is what is 'made manifest' in ordinary pre-reflective speech and action. Through critical discussions of speech-act theory, structuralism, and versions of the phenomenology of action, Schrag argues that expressive speech and expressive action display meaning as at once a novel individual event and a gearing-in to the historical system of language and the tradition of social practices informing expression in its facticity (46).

Signitive meaning arises out of expressive meaning through our capacity to *reflect* on what we are about and so 'distantiate' ourselves from immediacy in order to criticize it. Reflection involves a certain 'ideality' of meaning enabling us to 'talk about various particularized configurations of expressive speech and expressive action as being in some sense the same' (54). Such ideality is not grounded in an epistemological *Wesensschau*, but in the capacity for 'recollection' and 'repetition' whereby the hermeneutic referent of expressive meaning (the 'something *as* something') is made explicit. With this bipolar concept of meaning Schrag charts a path through the thickets of the long-standing debate over 'understanding and explanation,' arguing that both are modes of interpretation having 'their common origin in the play of communicative praxis' (73).

Communicative praxis is essentially communication *about* something, *by* someone, *with* another. Having established through his analysis of meaning the threads of communicative praxis which constitute its 'aboutness,' Schrag has a platform from which to address the question of *who* is speaking, writing, and acting. Despite the post-modern critique of the *epistemological* subject, we cannot be said to be 'done with the subject in every sense you please' (120). A proper account depends on seeing the subject as a 'hermeneutical implicature' of communicative praxis. The subject is neither an epistemological origin, nor a mere effect of the text, but rather 'an event or happening that continues the conversation and social practices of mankind and inscribes its contributions on their textures' (121). This 'decentered' subject is 'temporal' (no field of pure presence), 'multiple' (a space of varied interests whose iden-



tity is an achievement, not a given), and 'embodied' ('at the world and in the social practices' [152]).

But above all such a subject is 'dialogical.' Consciousness is not to be understood as a monological source of meaning and intention, nor even as 'transcendental intersubjectivity,' but rather as a 'dialogical event' (170) which 'borrows its being from the praxial history of speaking and acting subjects as they respond to the speech and action of others' (172). The 'facticity' (or finitude) of this dialogue allows Schrag to account for the mutual understanding present in the 'conversation of mankind' as well as for the 'distortions' of discourse which may encumber it, requiring a 'depth hermeneutics' in the manner of Ricoeur or Habermas (173-5).

This theory of the decentered subject informs Schrag's approach to the third aspect of communicative praxis, viz., that it is 'with' someone. In two excessively condensed chapters Schrag explores the connection between the resurgence of rhetoric and his own de-transcendentalized notion of reason and rationality. 'Deformalizing' both rhetoric and philosophy, he sees both as aspects of the hermeneutics of communicative praxis. A 'new notion of philosophical truth' (188) emerges as a 'process of disclosure' which, neither purely persuasive nor purely rational/argumentative, aims at invoking 'in our hearers and readers a sense of that which is appropriate for our thought and conduct' and, as appropriate, thus also 'in some sense' reasonable (192). This sense of appropriateness yields an ethics of 'the *fitting response*' — neither deontological nor utilitarian, but a hermeneutic of the moral significance permeating 'the fabric of discourse and action that limns the space of *ethos*' (202).

There is, of course, much here that one might quarrel with. I am not convinced, for example, that Schrag fully succeeds in distinguishing 'communicative praxis' from an eclectic *deus ex machina*, and so I remain unclear about the status of his proposals concerning truth and a non-foundational 'ontology.' And why no discussion of Levinas, who surely has much to contribute to a re-thinking of subjectivity and ethics? Still, such difficulties are not unique to Schrag. His book, informed by deep familiarity with contemporary positions, provides a useful map of the terrain upon which the future of philosophy is being debated.

STEVEN GALT CROWELL

Rice University

GEORG SIMMEL. *Georg Simmel: On Women, Sexuality, and Love*. Guy Oakes, ed. and trans. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 1987. Pp. viii + 194. US\$7.95. ISBN 0-300-03934-4.

This book is a collage composed of diverse elements, some sociological and others philosophical, which do not cohere by virtue of thematic unity. It is a sampler of several methods and perspectives that Georg Simmel used in his more ambitious works, and is indicative of their strengths and limitations. The four essays included range from neo-Hegelian cultural criticism, through neo-Kantian formal sociology, to Nietzschean vitalist philosophy. At each turn Simmel is himself, experimenting with systematizations, drawing original insight from them, and sometimes going overboard in applying them.

The first essay, 'Female Culture,' analyzes the relationship between the objective culture of the society at large and the subjective culture of women. Simmel's discussion addresses the 'modern women's movement,' raising issues that resonate with another instalment of that movement sixty years later. He observes that the 'objective elements of our culture' have a 'masculine character,' initially skirting the question of whether this results from the 'inner nature of the sexes or is a consequence of male dominance.' But as he proceeds his position in the nature-nurture debate becomes clear and it is typically Simmelean. For example, in analyzing sexual differences pertaining to the individual's relation to space he states that the woman's diversity from the man 'may be just as much a consequence of her transhistorical psychophysical character as of the historical limitation of her sphere of activity to the home' (84).

Simmel's understanding of female culture is kindred to that of Simone de Beauvoir. He holds that of the two fundamental human tendencies, becoming and being, the first is emphasized in men and the second in women. In *La Deuxième Sexe* de Beauvoir makes the same point in terms of the doublet transcendence-immanence.

Much of the similarity in de Beauvoir's and Simmel's reflections can be traced to the influence of German idealism, which is particularly strong in the volume's second essay, 'The Relative and Absolute in the Problem of the Sexes.' Although Simmel wrote many works referring to Kant and Schopenhauer, the first two essays in this volume show marked Hegelian tracings. He appeals to the master-slave dialectic as a 'gross' paradigm for 'the historical relationship between the sexes' and then argues that 'the man requires from the woman what is pleasing to him in his capacity as a self-interested party and in his polar relationship to her. It does not signify a self-sufficiency and self-contained character' (103). Indeed, 'the male nature arrogates to itself the category of the absolute, and thus dominates the entire relativity of which it is also a part' (127). Here Simmel anticipates de Beauvoir's analysis of the woman as 'Other' which forms the basis of her dialectical analysis.

The third essay, 'Flirtation,' exemplifies Simmel's formalist sociology, which is more in Kant's than in Hegel's line. His analysis expands upon a few



paragraphs of his well-known essay, 'Sociability,' in which he describes 'play' or 'pure' forms of sociation, which are interactions that are engaged in for their own sakes rather than for the natural goal of gratifying some desire.

Flirtation is a relation between a man and a woman in which the woman 'awakens delight and desire by means of a unique antithesis and synthesis: through the alternation or simultaneity of accommodation and denial' (134). Her actions inseparably combine 'consent and refusal'; that is, in flirtation the woman has the power to consent or to refuse, and 'once she has decided in either direction, her power is ended.' Flirtation is a means of enjoying the power of suspended commitment 'in an enduring form' (141). Here, in Simmel's formal sociology, the male-female relation is not bound to ontological categories, as it is in his more Hegelian philosophy of culture, although by confining flirtation to women he draws upon that philosophy.

Finally, in 'On Love (A Fragment)' we encounter the Nietzschean strain in Simmel's thought. Simmel understands love as a feeling which displaces and misrepresents 'the objectively admissible picture of its object' (159). Love does not emanate from a characteristic of a perceived object but from a change in a subject: 'It is as if love came from its object, whereas in reality it proceeds to it' (163). Here Simmel returns to the 'vital lie' which so fascinated turn-of-the-century thinkers: we love our projection onto the beloved. It is worth noting that this interpretation of love is in stark contrast to Simmel's treatment of friendship, in which the essence of that relation is found in full acknowledgment of the independent individuality of each by the other.

Oakes's introduction to this collage of essays fails to provide any guidance in understanding their different perspectival and methodological bases, and their place in Simmel's larger thought. He concludes that Simmel eschews 'careful analysis and detailed argument in favor of pregnant example and glittering insights.' But this rather facile judgment obscures the more serious issues in Simmel's thought. A closer inspection of Simmel's works shows that he is a systematic thinker who never adheres to a single system because he does not believe that any can fully embrace the variety, paradox, and contradiction of life under a unitary principle. He is willing to experiment and then draw back and go at the same issue from another starting point. Sometimes, as in the first two essays of this volume, he goes to excess along one of his lines.

Simmel argues in the widely-read 'Metropolis and the Mental Life' that the awful problem of modern life is the effect of specialization and the ensuing fragmentation of social life on the individual's ability to maintain a coherence of personality, to experience an integrity of being. Yet in the essays under review Simmel ascribes to men a natural aptitude for specialization, omitting any resulting problems, and to women a basic incongeniality to it. Just as Hegel hardened contingent differences into ontological distinctions, Simmel transforms an historical dichotomy into a fixed duality, seeming to doom women to a pre-modern mode of being and implying that men have always been modern. Yet the modern mentality was, for Simmel, a natural outgrowth of experiencing the overwhelming stimuli engendered by specialization. The inherent contradiction here is a sign that Simmel sometimes got carried away



with a philosophical method and failed to limit its uses in accordance with his more persistent convictions.

The essays making up Oakes's collage are far from Simmel's best and most trenchant. They should be read in the light of his more thoughtful reflections as interesting and not always representative footnotes to a far greater work.

DEENA WEINSTEIN

(Department of Sociology)

DePaul University

---

R.W. SLEEPER. *The Necessity of Pragmatism: John Dewey's Conception of Philosophy*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 1986. Pp. ix + 236. US\$21.50. ISBN 0-300-03538-1.

In recent years there has occurred a new interest in John Dewey's philosophical thought. Sleeper's book is an exceptional instance of the trend and a promising portent of the direction which this revival of interest in Dewey might take.

Sleeper's essay contains eight chapters. Each is accompanied by a critical commentary and pungent observations on a limited selection of literature relating to Dewey and the subject of the chapter and to themes of concern to Sleeper. These bibliographical addenda are helpful in giving us a sense of alternative views that have been taken on aspects of Dewey's theorizing; they attest as well to Sleeper's firm grasp of a very diverse literature on topics ranging from logic and the philosophy of science to ethics and social philosophy.

The eight chapters form a sequence in a carefully developed order of increasing subtlety and depth concerning the nature of the problems as Dewey conceived them, his engagements with them and the conclusions to which he came. The discussions of the problems and development of ideas and their implications are nicely supplemented by accounts of the historical genesis and factors shaping the direction and stages (early and late) of Dewey's work and outlook.

The first chapter is on difficulties of interpreting Dewey. The second focuses on Dewey's conception of philosophy. Sleeper argues that the theme of philosophic necessity was one Dewey pursued 'for the rest of his life' (40). Chapter three is devoted to Dewey's early logical theory in which he began critically reconstructing idealism and realism and some of the pragmatic doctrines of Peirce and James. The next chapter treats 'Dewey's Aristotelian Turn,' that is, the development of a theory of functional realism — of thought and



things interpreted as kinds of functional activities — in contrast to Russell's logical atomism and allied forms of realism. (The discussion of the critical intellectual tension between Dewey and Russell errs in overlooking a significant acknowledgement by Russell in 1909 of an article by Dewey in *Mind*, 1906.) Chapters five and six are concerned with Dewey's metaphysics as centered in *Experience and Nature*, and with his philosophy of language, logic and truth. The last two chapters are directed to Dewey's theory of intelligent behavior and his 'meliorism,' his view of experimental inquiry as a means of criticism and transformation of culture.

Such in desiccated outline is the design of this ambitious, richly textured, original and deeply thoughtful study. Sleeper's scholarship and philosophic understanding of Dewey deserve high praise. At the outset (6), he introduces a cardinal principle of interpretation and analysis that is utilized with illuminating results throughout the book. He delineates what he terms Dewey's 'logic of experience' and 'metaphysics of existence.' These represent distinct but functionally interdependent philosophic subject matters. Logic has an ontology and ontology a logic; thought and things are causally linked in a circuit of existential transactions. It is the main purpose of this book to explore and elucidate precisely what this means as the substance of Dewey's novel, occasionally difficult, but always penetrating analyses and argumentation.

Dewey's theories of logic and metaphysics, like their respective subject matters, complement and implicate one another. Sleeper finds an underlying unity here and the core of Dewey's philosophy to consist of a theory of language. This is a theory of communication, of how communication is possible and what existential and logical activities comprise and control its occurrence and uses. Communication is the existence and supreme art of culture. Communication and culture, then, Sleeper regards as providing the nexus of the various and many strands of Dewey's philosophic work.

Sleeper is at pains to impart not only an understanding of Dewey but to enable us to appreciate the value and merits of Dewey's method of re-seeing and resolving long entrenched problems in philosophy and reconstructing tradition. Accordingly, this essay is not merely or only expository. Sleeper defends his interpretation of Dewey's efforts and argues for the insights and suggestions they reveal and what we might learn from them. A considerable number of philosophic issues receive attention in these pages. One notable discussion (ch. 6) deals with problems of arriving at adequate accounts of induction, causality, and the relation of mathematics to existing objects. Dewey's profoundly suggestive work on these matters is contrasted here with that of Frege, Russell, Carnap and others; some close coincidences with the later Wittgenstein are also sketched. We are also made aware of how, while he was indebted to Peirce and James in some important respects, Dewey was moving in critically independent ways of his own.

Sleeper's book concentrates on the historical growth and progressively integrated mature expression of Dewey's philosophy in *Experience and Nature* and *Logic: the Theory of Inquiry*. He says of his penultimate chapter that it 'sketches the consequences of this mature philosophy for value theory, religion,

aesthetics, and politics' (2). The discussions are excellent. But if a criticism is to be made, it is that these other vital subjects remain relatively condensed as 'sketches.' There is hence an imbalance in the presentation of a philosophy which, as Sleeper emphasizes, is to be studied and appreciated as a fundamentally coherent and comprehensively unified whole. Pragmatically this criticism is in effect a compliment: it is a call for more.

There are some minor flaws. It is not very clear how Sleeper construes the idea of 'rigid designator.' Sometimes the notion of 'extension' and of 'existential' are used as if they are equivalent and membership equated with inclusion (e.g., 147-8). The Index is inaccurate in a few of its page references to items that do not exist (e.g., under 'rigid designator' and 'modal logic').

This essay comes as an important corrective of much that has been written about Dewey. It is certain to affect future scholarship on Dewey's work and the reassessment of his thought. It is unquestionably the best book written on Dewey's logic and among the very best studies of his philosophy.

H.S. THAYER

City College,

City University of New York

MERVYN SPRUNG. *The Magic of Unknowing: An East-West Soliloquy*. Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press 1987. Pp. 159. Cdn\$18.95. ISBN 0-921149-08-5.

Mervyn Sprung's book takes a literary approach to philosophy, not because its subject-matter and content are incapable of being approached in essay form, but rather because the author chose the literary style of soliloquy as a way of breaking the hold of what he is critically rejecting. His approach is more demanding on the reader, and requires a large background of knowledge. The audience will be mostly comparative philosophers, one suspects. But this need not be the case, since the Eastern elements in the book are ones which Sprung manages to shake loose from the esoteric symbolism and other heavy cultural elements in which much Eastern philosophy comes dressed. He does this by using the sceptical tradition in Western philosophy as a unifying centre from which to make the comparisons he is after. The 'Brother from Elis' that figures in the text, as one with nearly the age and perspective of the father, Aristos (Aristotle), is none other than Pyrrho from Elis, whose scepticism was not totally negative or destructive, but was designed to free the mind of dogmas



and untrue opinions and delusions, so that the human person could realize his or her fullest aliveness and happiness.

There is an honourable tradition in the West of scepticism used as a means for cleansing the mind of the 'enthrallments of knowledge,' as Sprung likes to call them. People who are aware of the uncertainty of their own beliefs are less apt to try to force their 'truth' on others. A great deal of mischief in the world is caused by well meaning people trying to force others to 'share' their particular enthrallment. The search for knowledge becomes a battle, a campaign; the language of philosophy becomes sprinkled with adjectives suggesting competition and engagement in a military campaign or a prize fight. Arguments are marshalled, positions defended or assaulted, philosophers are divided into hostile camps, and so on. The quest for a foundational theory has been a major preoccupation. The conception of philosophy as primarily a field of knowledge, and of the occupation of philosophy as primarily research comparable to the natural sciences, has tended to dominate academic philosophy. And part of the 'enthrallment' of this has been a desire for power and control, not necessarily wisdom. Some believe that philosophy cannot be carried out, at least not respectably, without argument and debate, and yet we all know that too often little light is shed by debates, and also how, beneath the surface of our logic, there can lurk (or even seethe) the hot passions of unreason.

Sprung seeks by means of scepticism — what might be called the way of enlivened scepticism — to lay bare the problems inherent in our attempts in philosophy to arrive at a foundational theory for all human efforts at knowing and living. As Sprung sees it, the aim which we have pursued was set long ago by Aristotle. Aristotelian philosophy gave rise to the idea that wisdom can be gained via a pursuit of knowledge deemed scientific, and organized by logical methodology. The dream was that we would be able to develop a metaphysics which would undergird all our efforts at knowing, whether in the arts, the humanities or the sciences. This foundation for (and in) knowledge would make our lives better. Sprung concludes that this approach fails to fulfil the aim of living better lives in improving societies. Such knowledge might increase our power, but it does not necessarily increase our moral wisdom or happiness.

Sprung also thinks that our recent encounter with Eastern philosophy, along with the rise of antifoundationalism (which he never names in the book), have brought us to a genuinely revolutionary state. Many who are now writing, especially younger philosophers, would agree with him. Some of the most vital areas of philosophy today are those which involve applied philosophy, where application requires critical examination of our everyday assumptions, decisions, and actions. Whether it be philosophy of technology, medical ethics or environmental philosophy, philosophers challenge the prevailing paradigms and theories of the world through inquiries which scrutinize our most fundamental conceptions of ourselves as persons, as communities, as cultures, as humans, and as philosophers. Our relationships to nature, to use an example from environmental philosophy, are said to be characterized by an inher-



ent anthropocentrism, and the aim of many environmental philosophers is to ferret out and eliminate such anthropocentrism from their own thinking and feelings, in order to better understand and relate harmoniously to nature as it is in itself. In the area of sexist attitudes the same sort of activity is going on; additional examples could easily be supplied. All of this might look, to the person steeped in tradition, like an assault on the very foundations of Western culture. In some ways it is. However, it is also within the sceptical traditions of Western philosophy, and it is pursued with motives which have been present throughout Western history, such as the drive for understanding, and for a sense of value in life, for *sophia*, wisdom not as a theory, but as an empowerment to live the best and most fulfilling human life.

*The Magic of Unknowing* is organized around a fictional meeting of the offspring of Aristos (Aristotle). In this meeting, they discuss where their philosophical undertakings, inspired by their father, have led. Each of the brothers who speaks represents a major figure in the history of Western philosophy. They are: René (Descartes), Immanuel (Kant), David (Hume), Friedrich (Nietzsche), Ludwig (Wittgenstein) and The Brother from Elis (Pyrrho). They each present the results of their philosophical inquiries, and as they each talk it becomes plain that the Aristotelian (their father's) dream is being slowly eroded. In fact, the first section, where this takes place, is called 'Erosion from Within.' The Brother from Elis (Pyrrho) speaks last precisely because they eventually seem to arrive at the same position that he found many centuries earlier, but Aristotle (with whom he overlapped) set the tone and direction of Western thought, not he. So we arrive back where we started, but in many ways much wiser for having made the journey.

The progressive result of this survey of these prominent thinkers is that philosophy as the search for a coherent, fully-grounded theory of knowledge and reality has come to an end. It has been undermined by the logic of its own pursuits. It has turned in on itself in such a way that it returns to its own source through scepticism. You might say that the main theme of the book is that scepticism is a way to *sophia*, not understood as theoretical knowledge, but as a way of living (Sprung's word) engagement. The aim of philosophy then becomes a search for a way of living (a practice) that leads us to see through our delusions and illusions, and to realize that there is within us a source of insight for living in a balanced way, a source which can be given no satisfactory theoretical account, for it is that which produces our theories; it is that which shines through them to illuminate our larger engagements. However, the realization that this source-awareness is the still centre of our lives does not come through the Western soliloquies alone, but emerges in the comparative ferment brought about by the Eastern soliloquies that follow those of the West. The Eastern soliloquies are given by Chang (representing the Taoism of Chuang Tzu) and by Nagaraj (representing the great Indian Buddhist philosopher Nagarjuna). Chang helps to bring the Western philosophers to see philosophy as a way to understand or live in the unity of Tao, the source. Nagaraj completes the unmasking of the enthrallment of knowledge (in the Aristotelian mode) as our main preoccupation. He shows that all articulated



accounts are limited perspectives and that there is no one, fundamental, or bedrock, description of the world to which all others must, or can be reduced. A tree is many things to many persons and non-persons. It can be described and appreciated in many ways. It is not right to say it is all of these, for it is all of these and more; and it is also none of these and nothing. Nagaraj's negative dialectic leads our philosophic family to a metamorphosis.

The meeting of East and West leads to a ferment that changes both, and it brings us to glimpse a genuinely new beginning. This new beginning is only dimly characterized, hinted at, gestured to, but perhaps some idea of it can be obtained by considering the shift in terminology that is suggested, and, perhaps, by considering the different senses of unknowing and magic that emerge. Also, one should be mindful of the fact that the assembled speakers sit in the presence of a tree and weather that reflect their emotions. The tree is presented with reflections of its own. The world is 'reenchanted' and the magic of unknowing is the magic of scepticism as a practice which gives us a sense of life that is not devoid of meaning, but alive with mystery and wonderment. This sense of life is not something that can be adequately described in any final theoretical way. It is something that can only be realized in the process of seeing through the delusions of the enthrallments of knowledge. Sprung states this in the following passage:

We can approach all traditions with one question uppermost. We can enquire what presumptions lie buried in their insights and arguments. We can enquire what it is that allows their conclusions to appear selfevidently relevant and sensible. We can trace the thinking in each case back to its genitive scope: its way of grasping what the source was trying to say to it. From this pursuit we can learn more about the human quest for vivial sense than from any other kind of study. It will enable us to compare the enthrallments of the different traditions with a view to grasping more clearly how hidden enthrallments inspire vivial exploration. What a privilege: to be humble participants in the unearthing of the great hidden thoughts from the past, to be alive in this time of transition to a radically new era of vivial exploration. (156)

Given the style of Sprung's book, it is not easy to evaluate the adequacy or accuracy of its scholarship. His representation of the views of the major philosophers he addresses is certainly adequate to his task. One might object that the sketches he offers are caricatures, but this is beside the point, for what he is after is not a detailed recounting of their views, but the sceptical implications of the way in which their critical undertakings can be understood. One might object to the language he fashions to convey the new way of proceeding. Such words as 'transparenting,' 'vivial,' and 'source-awareness,' perhaps leave something to be desired. Nevertheless, given the context he develops, they make sense, and help to get us to think of the philosophical calling in a different way. Sprung does not claim that the way of vivial scepticism (enlivening scepticism) is the only way to realize the bond between the everyday and the source. As the tree reflects at the end of the book, there are more ways than scepticism to realize this.

This is an exceptionally well written book, on a subject of fundamental importance. It was a pleasure to read.

ALAN R. DRENGSON

University of Victoria

---

PETER G. STILLMAN, ed. *Hegel's Philosophy of Spirit*. Albany: State University of New York Press 1987. Pp. xii + 223. US\$39.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-88706-476-0); US\$12.95 (paper: ISBN 0-88706-477-9).

This volume comprises papers and comments delivered at the 1984 meeting of the Hegel Society of America. By their nature such collections resemble a macedoine: success depends on intrinsic interest of the ingredients, whether they are in season, and how well they are prepared and blended — but one hardly expects either a heavy meal or uniformity of treatment. The chosen topic — Hegel's philosophy of spirit, in his system situated between philosophy of nature and logic, and articulated into subjective, objective and absolute divisions — is certainly broad enough to allow for interesting variety, whether from outside or inside the Encyclopaedia proper. And in the main the contributors do a good job, even if none is outstanding.

Let me just list the contents in order, before summarily going through them — 1. Robert Williams, 'Hegel's Concept of *Geist*'/comment by Richard Dean Winfield: 2. Eric von der Luft, 'The Birth of Spirit out of the Travesty of Medicine'/Quentin Lauer: 3. Leo Rauch, 'From Jena to Heidelberg: Two Views of Recognition'/Samuel Assefa: 4. John Sallis, 'Imagination and Presentation in Hegel's Philosophy of Spirit'/Daniel J. Cook: 5. Murray Greene, 'Natural Life and Subjectivity'/John McCumber: 6. Harry Brod, 'The "Spirit" of Hegelian Politics: Public Opinion and Legislative Debate from Hegel to Habermas'/Florindo Volpachio: 7. Presidential Address — Merold Westphal, 'Hegel on the Religious Foundations of the State': 8. William Desmond, 'Art as "Aesthetic" and as "Religious" in Hegel's Philosophy of Absolute Spirit'/Donald Phillip Verene: 9. Martin De Nys, 'Speculation and Theonomy at the Close of Hegel's System'/Louis Dupré.

Both Williams and Rauch take spirit as 'recognition' (*Anerkennen*) for their theme, and both understand it in the light of Habermas' and Theunissen's suspicion of Hegel's mature system. Williams argues that the alternative principles of intersubjectivity (the 'I that is also a We') and absolute selfhood are 'equiprimordial'; Winfield sharply rejects seeing the former as grounding either



knowledge or the articulation of the system. Attending precisely to Hegel's turn away from intersubjectivity, Rauch displays a preference for Hegel's earlier formulation. He is taken to task by Assefa, who does what a good commentator should, clarifying terms and identifying overemphases and omissions. Rauch is shown to have exaggerated the rôle of recognition qua love (as opposed to the recognition of formal autonomy): what is absent in the Jena *Realphilosophie* is not struggle, but only the master/slave scenario.

Van der Luft looks at Hegel's thematizing of phrenology in the *Phenomenology* (object of a fine 1972 essay by MacIntyre, here not given its due). As reflecting the transition from animal to spiritual, it displays (he argues) Hegel's 'holistic' or 'hierarchical' rather than 'reductionist' model of science.

John Sallis has a careful explication of Hegel's 'psychology' (part of subjective spirit), comparing it explicitly with Aristotle, and implicitly (as Cook perceives) with Heidegger and a critique of presence. (Cook might have added the name of Derrida, whose seminal essay 'Le puits et la pyramide' Sallis oddly fails to mention.) Sallis asks whether representation (*Vorstellung*) need be subordinated to reason, dark imagination to daylight presence of thought. Aware of the stakes, Cook argues that this is a strong reading, indeed distortion, of Hegel.

Murray Greene's close explication of the transition from animal to human life also uses a comparison with Aristotle, and ends with a neat apothegm: 'The asexual mask of the genus is the creature's own death mask' (112). It elicits from McCumber a response broader and indeed more challenging than the original paper. He asks how a systemically mandated metatheory bears upon empirical sentences which may well be falsified as science advances; these sentences are 'carried over' by metaphor into the theory as so many 'likely stories.'

Harry Brod takes up Habermas' '*Öffentlichkeit*' — not the same thing as public opinion, incidentally — in order to show the importance of institutions like Estate or corporation in Hegel's political theory. He argues that Hegel balances recognition and consent, i.e., Burkean and liberal principles. Volpachio counters that 'publicity' in the legislature has more to do with education, even ideological ratification, and that the public sphere proper is for Hegel to be found in the corporation, through which he hoped to curb the excesses of private interests in civil society. Yet (he adds) Hegel could not anticipate what was to become Habermas' problem, viz., that *all* social life is now prey to these particularizing interests — a loss of freedom that would have disturbed Hegel deeply.

Jumping to absolute spirit, we have discussions of art and of religious representation. Desmond argues (much as in his recent book) that for Hegel art and religion are complementary, as are Romantic creativity and classical mimesis — though such a relation (it seems to me) is hardly dialectical. Finally, De Nys has an illuminating exposition of religious *Vorstellung* in Hegel, especially as it appears in 'revealed religion.' He argues (i) that representation itself moves beyond its own terms towards reason as such, a shift that speculation then recapitulates in thought, and (ii) that such a 'theonomic reason'



(Tillich) explains (contra Tillich) how theology can point to the symbolism of religious language without remaining either trapped within or banished from its figurative mode. Dupré responds to the first point, wondering whether Hegel, in speculatively reenacting *Vorstellung*, does not also transform a transcendent and legitimizing content, and in effect give in to the forces of *Entzauberung*.

Included too is the Presidential address; and here Westphal proves typically responsive to both the occasion and the times, in a contribution at once graceful and provocative. Fixing his sights on the Scylla of secularism (from the Enlightenment to the permissive 60s) and the Charybdis of a reactionary theological politics (e.g., the Moral Majority), he tries manfully to steer Hegel between them: religion and politics neither coincide nor fall externally apart.

One small cavil, also about modernism: that is, the practice of using computers in typesetting, with close to barbaric results. In this case too the price of progress is not small.

MARTIN DONOUGH  
University of South Carolina

---

HAO WANG. *Beyond Analytic Philosophy: Doing Justice to What We Know*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1986. Pp. xii + 273. US\$17.50. ISBN 0-262-23124-7.

An adequate philosophy should be comprehensive, unified and appropriately structured. It should begin with what we presently know and believe, and how we feel, and accord with our most prevalent and enduring intuitions. It should include a reflective component concerned with metaphilosophical discourse about the nature of philosophy and seek a world view that accommodates other kinds of human experience than the cognitive. It should, in a reasonable way, achieve a comprehensive view of how things hang together and assimilate the significant insights expressed in fundamentally different philosophical approaches, from so-called analytic philosophy, continental philosophy, Indian philosophy and Chinese philosophy. A philosophy that conforms to these guiding principles will be a 'phenomenography' in the sense of a descriptive phenomenology which, unlike Husserl's, for example, does not begin with subjectivity or seek synthetic a priori foundations. We are to begin with what is objectively known and be satisfied with contingency. This broad and optimistic outlook, subject to appropriate constraints, will provide the basis for



the satisfactory liberation from and refutation of the brand of linguistically oriented, exclusively empiricist, and logically preconditioned analytic style of philosophy that has dominated most Anglo-American philosophy since Frege, especially as represented by the 'analytic empiricism' of Carnap and Quine. Or, if one construes analytic philosophy more broadly — as a longstanding methodology wedded to 'exact' conceptual analysis unhindered by the reductionist, therapeutic, and narrowly empiricist restrictions of analytic empiricism — then the new, liberalized phenomenography can be said to seek a rejuvenated, more rationalistic analytic philosophy, rather than merely to go beyond it. These precepts, admonitions and principles, taken conjointly, constitute the central message of Wang's book. But the reader will be disappointed if he or she expects anything specific in this volume with respect to the content or methodology of Wang's projected phenomenography.

Indeed, the present volume is just the first in a planned series of three which are essentially 'reports of work in progress' (37), the second to examine the work of Kurt Gödel (whose influence on Wang is acknowledged by the author), and the third to delineate tasks and illustrations of the new phenomenography — the whole series, in turn, to provide the preliminary basis for Wang's subsequent development of a full-fledged, systematic philosophy. The present volume, then, is primarily intended as a critical assessment of the sort of analytical empiricism attributed to Carnap, Quine, et al., that Wang claims relegates philosophy to the nonsynthetic role of logical or linguistic analysis in the service of natural science which alone can provide an image of reality (31).

Wang's central complaint against Carnap and Quine is what he takes to be their failure to provide an adequate account of logic and mathematics. This is attributed to their shared adherence to 'the two commandments of analytic empiricism': (a) empiricism is the whole of philosophy and there can be nothing (fundamental) which could be properly called conceptual experience or intuition; and (b) logic is all important to philosophy, but analyticity can only mean truth by convention (12). It is these two dogmas (obviously more important for Wang than the two more famous dogmas of analyticity and reductionism that distinguish Carnap from Quine) that ground a single type of 'scientific philosophy' that posits the unity and universality of scientific method, rejects essentialism, and limits cognitive value to a domain that excludes ethics and aesthetics. Carnap and Quine, despite their differences, remain partners in their mutual denial of any sense of autonomy for conceptual knowledge, thereby depriving logic and mathematics of any independent or unique content. But for Wang, this consequence is inconsistent with significant examples of conceptual knowledge in logic and mathematics, e.g., our logical intuition associated with the elementary principle of *modus ponens*, or our mathematical intuition of the integers involved in Dedekind's discovery of the Peano axioms (18). Thus, 'both Carnap and Quine ... fail to take logic and mathematics seriously as clear representatives of our conceptual knowledge' (18). Practically all the argument for this is given in Wang's Introduction (1-44).

The main body of Wang's book is devoted to a detailed interconnected review of the life, times and philosophical development of four major analytic philosophers: Russell and his *PM* project (ch. 1), Wittgenstein and his *Tractatus* (ch. 2), Carnap and the growth of logical positivism from the Vienna Circle (ch. 3), and Quine (ch. 4). In addition to Wang's carefully-crafted critical interpretation of these thinkers, the reader is provided with a generous supply of fascinating anecdotes and reminiscences. The best of the chapters are those on Russell and Carnap. The one on Wittgenstein suffers from an over-emphasis on the *Tractatus* at the severe expense of the *Investigations*. The one on Quine suffers (in my judgment) from a lack of an integrated understanding of Quine's position, although the brief sections on Quine's logic (177-89) are highly competent and relevant. Wang's last chapter, 'Metaphilosophical Observations,' will be an anticlimax for the reader who, perhaps mistakingly in light of Wang's extended project, anticipates learning more about Wang's phenomenography. Instead, we are given random observations about the nature of philosophy, ending with a list of eight conditions for good projects for philosophical research. Finally, Wang provides a useful chronological table in the sequel, along with a list of references and a good index.

In sum, it is very clear that it is Quine who is targeted as the *bête noire* of the sort of analytic philosophy that Wang abjures. For Wang, Quine's 'logical negativism' (indeterminacy, inscrutability, relativity, etc.) and his dogged allegiance to empiricism despite the acknowledged shortcomings of positivism, drives him 'into a structureless make-believe position which for me is a *reductio ad absurdum* of analytic empiricism ... and seems to discredit the whole analytic approach' (23, n. 20). But isn't it the other way around? Rather than seeing Quine as the ongoing paragon of an unacceptable analytic tradition stemming from the Vienna Circle, it is Quine's work, more than anything else, that has necessitated a re-examination of the foundations and presuppositions of traditional analytic philosophy.

A.C. GENOVA  
University of Kansas



# IDEALISTIC STUDIES

An International Journal of Philosophy  
Published by Clark University Press

Editor: Walter E. Wright

Issued three times a year, *Idealistic Studies* is a journal for studies of philosophical idealism. Both historical and contemporary statements of idealistic argumentation are welcomed, as are also critical studies of idealism.

Editorial Advisory Board: John P. Anton (Emory), Peter A. Bertocci (Boston), J.N. Findlay (Boston), Errol E. Harris (Northwestern), Reinhard Lauth (Munich), H.D. Lewis (London), Nicholas Rescher (Pittsburgh), Paul Ricoeur (Paris), George A. Schrader, Jr. (Yale), Charles E. Scott (Vanderbilt).

Yearly subscription rates for individuals, \$12.00; libraries and institutions, \$25.00. Single copies: \$4.00.

All communication regarding manuscripts, subscriptions, and publication should be sent to the Editor, Department of Philosophy, Clark University, Worcester, Massachusetts 01610.



## Teaching Philosophy

**Tenth  
Anniversary  
Special**

**Teaching Philosophy**, edited by Arnold Wilson of the University of Cincinnati, is celebrating ten years of publication by offering subscriptions to new individual subscribers at a special anniversary rate of only \$10 per year. The regular subscription rate is \$17 for philosophers and \$38 for institutions. Orders must be pre-paid and received by November 30, 1987 to get this special **low rate**.

\* \* \*

To help you discover the latest trends in the teaching and learning of philosophy, **Teaching Philosophy** publishes articles, discussions, reports, and reviews on these and related topics:

- theoretical issues in the teaching of philosophy
- experimental and interdisciplinary philosophy courses
- evaluation of teaching and assessment of learning in philosophy
- new books and audio-visual materials

\* \* \*

**Send orders to:** PHILOSOPHY DOCUMENTATION CENTER, Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, OH 43403-0189. ☎ (419) 372-2419

# Linguistics and Philosophy

An International Journal

Managing Editors

**Robin Cooper**, *Dept. of Linguistics, University of Wisconsin, Madison, USA*; **Richard E. Grandy**, *Dept. of Philosophy, Rice University, Houston, USA*

*Linguistics and Philosophy* is a journal for studies of natural languages and will interest philosophers as well as linguists. Contributions come in the form of articles, review articles, notes, discussions, and remarks and replies. Topics which fall within the scope of the journal include:

- Traditional areas in the philosophy of language such as meaning and truth, reference, description, entailment, speech acts;
- Traditional areas of linguistics such as syntax, semantics and pragmatics (when the studies are of sufficient explicitness and generality to be of philosophical interest as well);
- Systems of logic with strong connections to natural language: modal logic, tense logic, epistemic logic, intensional logic;
- Philosophically interesting problems at the intersection of linguistics and other disciplines: language acquisition, language and perception, language as a social convention;
- Philosophical questions raised by linguistics as a science: linguistic methodology, the status of linguistic theories, the nature of linguistic universals;
- Aspects of artificial intelligence concerned with language such as computational linguistics and natural language processing.

## Subscription Information

1987, Volume 10 (4 issues)

Institutional rate: Dfl. 216.00/US \$90.00 incl. postage/handling

Private rate: Dfl. 82.00/US \$29.50 incl. postage/handling

Special rate for students: Dfl. 76.00/US\$27.00 incl. postage/handling

ISSN 0165-0157

*Private subscriptions should be sent direct to the publishers*

## Back Volume(s) Available

Volumes 1-9 (1977-1986)

## Price per Volume

excl. postage

Dfl. 175.00/US\$63.00

**D. Reidel Publishing Company**



**Kluwer academic publishers group**

P.O. Box 989  
3300 AZ Dordrecht  
The Netherlands

101 Philip Drive  
Norwell,  
MA 02061, U.S.A.

Falcon House  
Queen Square  
Lancaster, LA1 1RN, U.K.





*An International Review on a Global Issue*

Historical and Philosophical  
Study of Natural Law and Right

1987

**TWO SPECIAL ISSUES ON CONSTITUTIONALISM,  
COMMON LAW, NATURAL LAW**

**\*Including—**

- American Constitutionalism and Natural Law
- The Constitutional Process and the Higher Law
- Law, Convention, and the Common Good
- Perelman's Methodology and Natural Law Reasoning
- Reducing Legal Realism to Natural Law
- Can Legal Semiotics Contribute to Natural Law Studies?

Plus reviews of books on legal theory and practice  
by international scholars such as Soper, Perry,  
Smith, Dworkin, Boukema, Peczenic

**\*Also in preparation these special topic issues:**

Natural Law and Natural Rights

Freedom, Oppression, Disobedience

Jurisprudence in the Natural Law Tradition

Positive Law/Natural Law Intersection:

Theory and History

Write to: Vera Lex

Virginia Black, Editor

Pace University

Pleasantville, N.Y. 10570

Twice yearly:

Individuals: \$10.00

Institutions: \$20.00

---

# Power, Gender, Value

Edited with an Introduction by

**Judith Genova**

*A volume of original essays*

In its own way, each essay attacks the myth of 'raw power.' Power is sexed; power in the history of the West has been harnessed male. The essays in this volume challenge values that tell women how to speak and write, how to conceive of women's power. Their sub-text is the question, What if power were sexed female? The papers focus on women's writing and the figuration of women in men's writing in both fictional and non-fictional texts.

Cloth **\$35.95** 0-920980-24-4

Paper **\$17.95** 0-920980-25-2

Order from: **Academic Printing & Publishing**

P.O. Box 4834

Edmonton, Alberta, Canada

T6E 5G7

or from your usual bookstore

---

---

## ANTI-FOUNDATIONALISM AND PRACTICAL REASONING

CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN HERMENEUTICS AND ANALYSIS

Edited with an Introduction by **Evan Simpson**

*A volume of original essays*

The premise of the volume is the existence of common ground between different current methodologies in their rejection of foundationalism and emphasis on the practical. The four sections of the book are Practical Philosophy, Social-Political Critique, Moral Reflection, and Legal Deliberation.

Clothbound **\$35.95** 0-920980-26-0

Paperbound **\$17.95** 0-920980-27-9

Order from: **Academic Printing & Publishing**

P.O. Box 4834

Edmonton, Alberta, Canada

T6E 5G7

or from your usual bookstore

---



# WOMEN AND Philosophy

Special Issue

## AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

Edited by Janna Thompson with the assistance of Mary McCloskey Brenda Judge San MacColl Elizabeth Gross

### ARTICLES

- Moirra Gatens ..... Rousseau and Wollstonecraft: Nature vs Reason  
 Gareth B. Matthews ..... Gender and Essence in Aristotle  
 Karen Green ..... Rawls, Women and the Priority of Liberty  
 Marion Tapper ..... Can a Feminist be a Liberal?  
 Lorraine Code ..... Simple Equality Is Not Enough  
 John Howes ..... Mill on Women and Human Development  
 Susan Parsons ..... Feminism and Moral Reasoning  
 Jan Crosthwaite and Christine Swanton ..... On the Nature of Sexual Harassment  
 Robert Pargetter and Elizabeth W. Prior ..... Against the Sexuality of Reason

### CRITICAL REVIEW

- Val Plumwood ..... Ecofeminism: An Overview and Discussion of Positions and Arguments

**PRICE:** A\$15. All correspondence should be addressed to the Editor or Business Manager, Department of Philosophy, La Trobe University, Bundoora, Victoria, 3083, Australia.

PUBLISHED BY THE AUSTRALASIAN ASSOCIATION OF PHILOSOPHY



## SPINDEL CONFERENCE 1986

### THE B-DEDUCTION

*Henry Allison* - Reflections on the B-Deduction. *Carl Posy* - Where Have All the Objects Gone? *Hoke Robinson* - The Representation of a Whole. *Paul Guyer* - The Failure of the B-Deduction. *Manfred Baum* - The B-Deduction and the Refutation of Idealism. *Ralf Meerbote* - Apperception and Objectivity. *Patricia Kitcher* - The Categorical Unity of Space and Time.

SUPPLEMENT TO THE SOUTHERN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, VOL. XXV, 1987. Individual copies \$5.00. Free with each \$10.00 annual subscription to THE SOUTHERN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, Memphis State University, Memphis, TN 38152, U.S.A.

# Wittgenstein Elegies

0-920980-16-3 / \$9.95

Jan Zwicky

Philosopher's Stone  
The Death of George Trakl  
In the Elder Days of Art  
Confessions  
Rosro, County Galway

*In these meditations on texts of Trakl and Wittgenstein  
poetry and philosophy meet thoughtfully and feelingly.*



**academic printing & publishing**

P.O. Box 4834, South Edmonton, Alberta, Canada T6E 5G7

## GRAZER PHILOSOPHISCHE STUDIEN

BAND 29

1987

VOLUME 29

### Aufsätze

- |  |                         |
|--|-------------------------|
| Truth and Some Relativists . . . . .   | Eddy ZEMACH             |
| Psychologism and the Prescriptive Function of Logic . . . . .                                    | H. PHILIPSE             |
| Das Vindizierungsargument – seine Wichtigkeit,<br>seine Wirksamkeit, seine Widerlegung . . . . . | Christian PILLER        |
| Intensional Logic and Brentano's Non-Propositional Theory<br>of Judgement . . . . .              | Lynn PASQUARELLA        |
| Wittgenstein's Concept of Knowledge . . . . .  | A. Zvie BAR-ON          |
| „Wahr“ – „Gut“ – „Gesollt“ . . . . .   | Rainer STUHLMANN-LAEISZ |
| An „Indifferent Presentation“ . . . . .  | Tim RODE                |
| A Missed Encounter: Plato's Socrates and Geach's Euthyphro . . . . .                             | A. BENJAMIN             |

### Articles

### Besprechungen

- |   |                |
|---|----------------|
| Myles BRAND: Intending and Action. Toward a Naturalized Action Theory,<br>Cambridge, Mass.: Bradford – MIT 1984 . . . . . | T. HORGAN      |
| France VEBER: Estetika, Ljubljana: Slovenska Matica 1985 . . . . .  | S. SAJAMA      |
| Desmond Paul HENRY: That Most Subtle Question (Questio Subtilissima),<br>Manchester: University Press 1984 . . . . .      | W. L. GOMBOCZ  |
| Fred WILSON: Explanation, Causation and Deduction, Dordrecht:<br>D. Reidel 1985 . . . . .                                 | Gerhard SCHURZ |
| Peter ACHINSTEIN: The Nature of Explanation, New York/Oxford:<br>Oxford University Press 1983 . . . . .                   | Gerhard SCHURZ |

### Review Articles

### Herausgeber

Prof. Dr. Rudolf Haller, Institut für Philosophie, Universität Graz, Heinrichstraße 26, A-8010 Graz,  
Österreich/Austria.

### Editor



# BIOETHICS

**Edited by Helga Kuhse and Peter Singer**

**Bioethics** is a new journal which will provide an international forum for the study of ethical issues raised by medicine and the biological sciences. It will publish rigorously argued, full-length articles on topics such as *in vitro* fertilization, experimentation on embryos, genetic engineering, limits to the use of life-prolonging medical technology and the allocation of our finite medical resources.

**Volume 1 Number 1 includes the following articles:**

Do human cells have rights?

MARY WARNOCK

The moral status of the foetus: a reappraisal

LORETTE FLEMING

Aids, gays and state coercion

RICHARD D. MOHR

Euthanasia and the active-passive distinction

BRUCE C. REICHENBACH

A good death: who best to bring it?

ROGER CRISP

**Bioethics** is published in January, April, July and October

**Subscription Rates** Volume 1, 1987

Individuals: £19.50 (UK) £23.50 (overseas) US\$37.50 (N. America & Japan)

Institutions: £40.00 (UK) £50.00 (overseas) US\$80.00 (N. America & Japan)

☐ Please enter my subscription to *Bioethics*/send me a sample copy

☐ I enclose cheque/money order made payable to Basil Blackwell

☐ Please charge my Access/American Express/Barclaycard/Diners Club/Mastercharge/Visa account number:

..... Signature .....

Card expiry date .....

☐ For payments via the National Giro Bank, the Basil Blackwell account number is 236 6053

Address .....

If address registered with card company differs from above, please give details.

Please return this form together with your payment if applicable to:

**Basil Blackwell** • Journals Subscription Dept.,  
108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK, or, Journals Dept., Box 1320,  
Murray Hill Station, NY 10156, USA.

# Hypatia

A JOURNAL OF  
Feminist Philosophy

## Special Issues

Motherhood and Sexuality, **Ann Ferguson**, U. of  
Massachusetts, Amherst  
French Feminist Philosophy, **Sandra Bartky**, U. of Illinois  
at Chicago and **Nancy Fraser**, Northwestern U.  
Feminist Perspectives on Science, **Nancy Tuana**, U. of  
Texas, Dallas  
Philosophy and Women Symposium, **Betty C. Safford**, Calif.  
State U., Fullerton

## Subscriptions:

Individuals \$20.00,  
Institutions \$40.00,  
Foreign Orders add  
\$10 airmail. \$5 surface

Editor: **Margaret A. Simons**  
*Hypatia*  
Southern Illinois University  
at Edwardsville  
Edwardsville, Illinois 62026-1437



# International Philosophical Quarterly

For Over 25 Years  
**An International Forum**  
For the Exchange of Philosophical Ideas

between  
**America and Europe**

between  
**East and West**

Sponsored by

**Fordham University**  
**New York**

**Facultés Universitaires**  
**Namur**

## SUBSCRIPTION ORDER FORM

To: **IPQ**, Fordham University Press, Bronx, NY 10458  
Please enter my subscription\* to **IPQ**:

- ☐ **Institutional:** \$30.00 (U.S.)  
☐ **Individual:** \$20.00 (U.S.)  
☐ **APA Members:** \$18.00 (U.S.)  
☐ **Student:** \$15.00 (U.S.)  
☐ **Special Rate for Asia, Africa, South America**  
(except Japan and S. Africa): \$15.00 (U.S.)  
+ \$5.00 postage.

**Please Note:** All subscriptions outside the United States and Canada please add \$5.00 (U.S.) postage.

Name \_\_\_\_\_

Institution \_\_\_\_\_

Address \_\_\_\_\_

City \_\_\_\_\_ State \_\_\_\_\_ Zip \_\_\_\_\_

\*Subscriptions are taken for calendar year only, but may begin at any time.