

Optional Ⓐntology of Anarchism

Grigory Komlev*

Introduction

When the topic of anarchism arises, and if this discussion doesn't merely skim the surface, aiming to jump straight into action, but instead lingers and delves deeper into the word itself, then the rapid and fleeting cry: 'Anarchism is powerlessness,' might be replaced by the question: 'How does 'arche' become 'kratos'?'

There is a significant difference between "arche," as the beginning and foundation, and "kratos," as power. But this does not mean that when anarchism is spoken of as statelessness, a mistake is being made. Of course, "powerlessness" is a correct definition of anarchism, and it is conceptual. It was developed as a concept by those who called themselves anarchists, and it would be too provocative to claim that, when speaking of anarchism, they did not mean "powerlessness."

But there is also that side of anarchism, which, although it can be discarded, can, on the contrary, be looked at more closely. We are talking about a literal reading: "anarchism" is beginnigless/groundlessness. This side of anarchism seems more philosophical, because it is philosophy (at least in the time of its ancient origin, we are not talking about its true and only birth) that loved to talk about beginnings.

And then the side that shines with the slogan of 'powerlessness' will be the political side, while the 'beginnigless' will be the philosophical side, since the discussion of 'without a beginning' is included in the discussion of 'beginnings'.

*Tbilisi-based Grigory Komlev, is an independent philosopher, poet and writer

It would be a regrettable omission not to pay attention to the fact that “power” itself can be the subject of philosophical inquiry. However, “the philosophy of power” is not ontology (and it is precisely about ontology that we want to talk), just as it would be wrong to read epistemological treatises as if they were talking about something other than our cognitive abilities (does Kant tell us what the world is really like?), except in those cases when we say that “everything is power” or “everything is our cognitive abilities.” We would like to move away from such logic of generalization.

It should be noted that by using the pronoun “we” as the subjectivity of our text, we are not so much following academic tradition as we are advocating for a thesis that is significant to us, namely that “Self” is a becoming multiplicity, not a stable point. I am a group. And let traditionalists say “and their name is legion,” to which we will respond that the multitude is not a herd, but rather that which radically opposes it.

The philosophy of power proceeds from the assumption that power is its central concept. Beginningless ontology— $\text{\textcircled{A}}$ ntology, has no center. But this does not mean that it does not speak of power. Power is present in it as an object of thought, but not as a center, but as one of many.

Perhaps we should agree that the power with which political anarchism works (and there is no other, it just has different sides, different plateaus on which its flags unfold) is different from the vague discursive concept of power that permeates the vast space of all sorts of theories and practices, for example those that will seriously fight against the fascinating “power” of cinema.

Our task is precisely to escape from generalization, from the close scrutiny of power and repressiveness in every look, action and thought. But we, deeply corrupted by the post-structuralist “acritic” discourse, will try to escape from it not by another analysis of political power (there are already many wonderful works about it, and there are probably even too many works devoted to scattered discursive power), we will try to talk about what is in anarchism on the side

of “arche.” We speak of “arche” as an ontological category and about what ontology the threads of thought reach when we say—anarchism. And such ontology turns out to be for us—@ntology.

It is worth noting that, while being carried away by the political side, the philosophical side can be missed, even the side of ‘political philosophy.’ The political side allows practical-political anarchists to perceive the ‘beginningless’ component as the non-obligation of philosophy. It is unlikely that a politician who speaks on the square about being will be successful.

“If anarchism implies freedom, then I must have the freedom to ‘not know’” - will say the one who is in a hurry to act, and forgets that thought is also an action. And we will be alien to the approach that reads ‘anarchism’ as a complete rejection of ontology, as a literal negation of ‘arche’ - an-arche, where ‘arche’ will be precisely the thread leading to ontology as such. The point is not that behind every being there is its ontology, but that any being, or ‘almost any being’ inevitably has one ontology or another, as its constituent, which may not be manifested on the surface, but tightly wrapped in essential expressiveness. If we say ‘demons are tearing me apart’ or ‘I follow an unconscious desire’, then, even if these words are not carefully considered for us, but are only used as cultural metaphors, then, nevertheless, if we begin to think them through, then, sooner or later, we will start talking about ontology. Having said ‘soul’, it is difficult to refrain from starting to think about what it is, and how being is arranged, in which the soul exists. And what kind of soul? There are many souls.

To refuse philosophy for us would not be a liberation of anarchism, but another dead end.

It’s not that we need a beginning, but that if we think about what lies behind anarchism, the beginning, as an ontological category, then perhaps some of the dead ends of anarchism will turn out to be dead ends that hide secret exits.

If we try to formulate the imaginary dead end that our thought runs into, then, clothed in words, it looks like this: “what ontology or ontologies are hidden behind anarchism, and is some kind of anarchic coexistence possible without the reflection of the subjectivities themselves on their own ontologies?.” Moving further, we can ask the question differently: “is anarchic coexistence possible at all, if the subjectivities that divide it are subjectivities of different ontologies?”

Thus, such a question implies many missed assumptions, however, it seems quite real to reveal them. Partly, this disclosure will be devoted to our work.

11

If ontologies are different and multiple, and by ontology we will understand not just a model of description, not ‘the science of’, but directly the way of being itself, and if the subjectivities of such ontologies themselves are different, to the point of the inapplicability of the concept of ‘subjectivity’ to some assemblages, then the question inevitably arises as to where the question itself sounds, or even the desire? Where does the desire for the possible or impossible coexistence of such ontologies, called \textcircled{O} ntology, come from? Answer: from anarchism.

We are discussing the potential inapplicability of the concept of ‘subjectivity’ in relation to a specific ontology, but we acknowledge that, despite this, the concept of ontology itself will remain relevant. Ontology, in our understanding, is about how something is, how it occurs, and we assert that not only are the events different, but the very occurrences are not equal to one another. To be and to be are not the same.

There are traditions of thought that do well without ontology, and, for example, Jacques Lacan insisted on the principled non-ontological nature of his psychoanalysis. But the fact that psychoanalysis does not directly answer the question of how, why and what “is” and what it means to “be”, does not mean that these questions are invalid in relation to psychoanalytic reality; it means that if a psychoanalyst

honestly and openly spoke about how he imagines the structure of his picture of the world, if he spoke about how the world is arranged, then this would hinder psychoanalysis itself, as a practice, it would destroy the myth of the necessary neutrality of the analyst. Psychoanalysis has outlets in anarchism, but there are also obvious obstacles to this. In its “best” outcome, psychoanalysis produces an analyst, but not an anarchist. And, including, realizing this problem, we, in turn, would like to take a closer look at schizoanalysis, as an area of practice and theory that, at a superficial glance, precisely releases the anarchic components of psychoanalysis, does not abandon philosophy, and discards those components that do not allow psychoanalysis to become an anarchist practice of “self-care.” We say “self-care” with full awareness of the failure of this concept in our context, but we are forced to resort to it so that you can at least understand us. Perhaps if we said it differently, the way we would like to say it, we would not understand ourselves either. This once again reminds us that the function of expression is far from the most suitable function for language. Speaking of ontology, we are talking about the fact that something is, but something can be in completely different ways. Let us recall that for us being and being are not the same thing. Such a distinction allows us to speak of ontologies as a multiplicity, conditionally outlined by a movable boundary $\text{\textcircled{A}}$ ntology, as an anarchic ontology, including both the multiplicity of ontologies and a single ontology, as one of the types of ontology. That is, the multiplicity of ontologies, although it contradicts the fact that there is one single true ontology, but we are talking about the fact that there is also one single true ontology and a multiplicity of ontologies, true and not, each of which “really” exists, because we admit that the ontology in which we exist does not imply the immutability of the “law of contradiction.”

So, we will try to answer the questions raised in the previous part or trace the thoughts from which they arise.

Anarchism, as a current, flow, force, idea, and much more multiplies; it is known that even in its most formal sense - there are many anarchisms. But the division that interests us now lies where anarchism splits into “powerlessness” and “beginninglessness,” “acrataia” and “anarchism,” and our task is to take a closer look at the aspect of beginning and beginninglessness in its relation to anarchism. We have already talked about the fact that arche is the beginning, the beginning or the foundation. Thus, arche itself splits and appears in different ways. And there are more than two of them. But we will only stop at them - at the beginning and the foundation.

A striking example of philosophical thinking about the beginning will be the concept of Anaximander - apeiron / boundless, which can be turned into a statement: “everything is apeiron.” Like any statement claiming universality, this statement is nothing more than a statement about the beginning of things, about what is everything “in reality.” Such a beginning in its meaning, perhaps, is closer to the side of the foundation, while the beginning itself will be the entrance from the side of time. “In the beginning was...” “Was” is no longer “is”, which is enclosed in the statement about the foundation. “Was” sets the movement of time. Chronological time. Time that has a beginning and an end. There is a time of the birth of the universe, there are times of the beginning of the creation of the world in different myths and religious views. But at the same time, traditional thought, although it often has a myth about the beginning, about the origin of the world, from sacrifice or from some divine act, nevertheless, already there, the beginning itself is smoothed out due to the ring-shaped, eonic structure of time. It is the time of Christ-Chronos (but not only him) that launches the arrow, which has the beginning of its flight, and the goal of its end. Anaximander’s boundless, not the most solid foundation, elusive, boundless, anarchic? We cannot say so. “Apeiron” is the beginning, in its most fundamental sense, even if it affectively knocks the ground out from under its (without)limitation. The limit of “apeiron” in its universality.

Beginning and infinity, God as the foundation, laws of physics, atoms, monads, substance, subject, progress, process... There are many beginnings and foundations, including war, which is the father of all, if we believe the fragments of Heraclitus.

Anarchism, as a beginningless and groundless concept, is not nihilism, which can overthrow all foundations and reject all beginnings; its practice will rather involve the deterritorialization of these foundations by revealing their ontological equal importance. However, this equal importance does not imply equivalence at all. The place of their forced reterritorialization will be $\text{\textcircled{A}}$ ntology.

There is no beginning and no foundation (as a single one), since there are many of them. But then the question inevitably arises: what does this multitude stand on? What is the space on which the action of all these so different and logically incompatible forces and systems unfolds? One thing is certain - such a universal is not something that precedes and is initially laid down in the multitude. Thus, the film on the screen does not precede the shooting, but is a certain independent 'generalization' of them.

Any ontology in the $\text{\textcircled{A}}$ ntological approach is real, but nevertheless none of them can claim a monopoly on its truth. This beginninglessness does not cancel their urgency, because, again, the effect and/or product of production determines what and who its producer is. If a particular ontology has its effects, its existing extensities, then it exists, and it is not for us to judge its truth if we do not belong to it. It is not for us to say that the illness of a member of the tribe was not cured by the shaman, but by a series of coincidences that only coincided with the shaman's activities.

If we assume that there is a certain post-principle of generalization, one that guarantees the co-possibility of all ontologies, then its place and time of location is rather somewhere between and/or after the meeting of the ontologies themselves, but does not precede them. This place is similar to the one that Deleuze assigns to meaning itself in "The Logic of Sense." That is, the condition of the co-possibility of worlds, we might say, is the meaning that is able to arise when they

meet. Meaning or subject, sometimes claiming the same place. Such meaning is bodiless and in itself is not some ontology, it is the boundary of ontologies, a bodiless “non-existent.” However, one should not assign a central place to meaning (subject). They are not united by meaning. And not from meaning, and not even from the desire for meaning, do the multiple ontologies themselves arise. Already when we have met (produced) meaning, meaning that tells us about multiplicity, multiplicity opens up to us, and thus the beginning is not at all where the historian or chronographer would like to place it. The beginning is a multitude of beginnings, each of which arises when meeting with this or that meaning. The world of cinema begins for each subjectivity with a specific film, where subjectivity meets, and at the same time understands and produces a certain specific cinematic meaning, the group “film-viewer+.” This is where the history of cinema begins for this subjectivity. And these will most often be different films, although some may become such beginnings more actively than others. We can see the same effect in the history of cinema from the point of view of its technical formation. We will never find the first movie camera. We cannot say that cinema began with this or that machine. It is neither the Lumiere machine, nor the Muybridge machine, nor the Edison machine, nor even the machine-subject of modern times, existing as “cinema”, where there is its consciousness as a viewer, and an extended substance, as a film. Then can we say that Descartes invented cinema? Yes! As did Edison, and the Lumiere brothers, and many others.

The co-possibility world does not cease to exist if it is not included in the production of meaning, since the person you “did not understand” will not go anywhere, but he becomes meaningless from the side of the one who could not produce meaning. And how terrible these words will sound: one person is meaningless to another. Obviously, no film or creative act is meaningless in itself, only our abilities, our productive forces are able to create meaning or fail. It can be said that the inability to understand can be the cause of the inability to co-exist. And, among other things, from this point of view, we can once again insist that the reflection of anarchism on its own ontology can make sense. But note that understanding will not equal agreement.

33

We are talking about the fact that there are different ontologies, literally different forms of unfolding of being, right down to those that do not exist within the framework of the oppositions of being and non-being, and the mere fact that we cannot imagine this should not tell us that there is nothing to say here. Note that being itself is not at all an obvious category, but, in turn, a certain effect of the work of multiplicities. “To understand what being is (and ‘understand’ in this case will mean rather ‘invent’) may not even be possible for every graduate of a philosophy university. And, moreover, few philosophers will say what being is. Perhaps this is a problem exclusively for philosophers. For a non-philosopher, being may be much clearer.

This situation is different from the one in which we could say that a person’s inability to understand certain physical laws does not at all exempt him from these laws. But being is not a physical category; it is a metaphysical category. And we can quite easily imagine a non-ontological metaphysics, the meta-effect of which (in this case, “meta” means that which is before, and not “behind,” like that which is in front of the camera, and not behind it) will be something different from being and non-being. This is possible.

But the question of physics, and not only of it, as well as the question of the ontologies themselves, which agree in some beingness, leads us to another question: why do we still speak of ontologies as different, if they are all united by being itself? Even if we say “being and being are not the same,” but both are “being.” And why do we say that all ontologies exist in their difference, if the functioning of the laws of physics, and far from only it, can be fixed within practically any ontology?

However, before talking about similarity, let’s say more about the difference.

To resolve this issue, we will have to make several statements, two apophantic and one cataphatic, the grounds for which you may not even look for.

We cannot claim that another subjectivity that we encounter is a subjectivity that completely coincides with our ontology; if our world is created by God and “I” is soul and body, then no matter how obvious it is to us, we have no way to make sure that the one who is in front of us is organized in a similar way. We can only see him as a subjectivity perceived by us, in the conditions of our ontology.

Or, if we do not observe any measurable effects in the actions of a particular practitioner, as, for example, in the work of the same psychoanalyst, this only means that our methods of measurement are incompatible with the ontology of psychoanalysis. This means that there is no meaning between us and psychoanalysis, but this does not mean that another ontology does not exist.

Being is finite. And since being is finite, the place where it ends is the place of transition to another ontology. Perhaps, the finiteness of being will be our cataphatic and most unfounded statement and therefore, at the same time, the most valuable.

But why don't we say that where being ends, there it begins again? Perhaps because there is nothing that in its return would be the same. Everything repeats, but repeats as something else, and following the law of contradiction, we also abandon the law of identity, and with it, any equivalence, substitution, and expression. We have already abandoned it, stating that being and being are not the same. But, at the same time, it would not be in our spirit to say that there is no ontology in which the repetition of the same is possible. Most likely, such an ontology exists and works perfectly, perhaps it even works too well, because in a sense, it is precisely such logic that will oppose any other ontologies, being the ontology of war, which is the father of everything ... But that's what Heraclitus said. And us? Do we agree? There is that which is measured, there is that which is repeated hypothetically in all ontologies. Their finiteness or certain fragments of their structures. How often do we hear words about the fact that reflections on freedom are empty without economic and physical factors that claim to be identical. You can talk as much as you like about independence, but until you are financially independent, you are simply ridiculous. You can fight against different types of violence as

much as you like, for example, oppose the repressive order of libraries or conservatories, but this is empty compared to the violence that the state is capable of committing against a person. But is there anything scarier than violence committed by one person against another? Yes, precisely where the rapist acts on behalf of the authorities.

Do you really want to tell us that in your 'other' ontology you are free from hunger and alienation, when you are hungry and alienated? Yes and no, we will say in response. And specifically for you, we will emphasize where we are, of course, not free. We are not free exactly where you are. Where we have a body, where the laws of physics exist, where we are repressed by the state monopoly on violence. Isn't it obvious? But we want to point to something else. We want to point out that the existing coincidences cannot be convincing arguments in favor of the existence of only one true ontology. Because, in addition to the meaning-possibility, which allows one ontology to meet another, even if it ultimately destroys it, there are also transversal intersections between ontologies. We want to say that there are ontologies, perhaps many, that are not closed, that is, being only one ontology. And we will be wrong if we think of them like bubbles, where each contains all its contents. The fact that the shaman speaks with spirits does not negate the fact that if the shaman takes a step from the cliff, he will most likely fall.

44

The filling of the ontology is scattered and blurred. And what is part of one ontology can easily hide in the folds of another, and even many.

We do not deny the existence of physical laws subject to the methodology of scientific knowledge, but we want to say that the effects that correlate with these laws are part of one of the ontologies that is scattered through many. And as part of one ontology, it can be part of the subjectivity of another and other ontologies. This does not mean that something similar is repeated in different ontologies. We will clarify that we are not talking about the possible identical repetition of the same thing in different ontologies, we are talking about the fact

that what can be grasped as similar in different ontologies is one of the ontologies, the extensivity of which we are. We want to say that the subject does not necessarily have to be the subject of one ontology out of many. Besides the fact that he may not be a subject at all or simply not be, he can also be a subject or subjectivity, which will be more accurate, immediately a set of ontologies. Maybe the subjectivity of a set of ontologies is what we call a person?

The question arises: if we are talking about the finiteness of being, and about the fact that where one ends, another begins, can we admit that the subjectivity of multiplicity can outlive the finiteness of one being, but remain the subjectivity of others or one, another being? Of course it can! Won't you tell us yourself: "Come on, try to continue to dream in your dreams when your tooth hurts!"? To which we will remember how, falling from toothache to the floor, we continued to think about Ferdinand de Saussure. But this is just a little joke. Of course it can. Of course, subjectivity can outlive the finiteness of a multitude of ontologies and be reduced to any one-dimensional form, even to a rough material substance on a surgeon's table, we will simply say that such a "reduction" will not necessarily amount to such a reduction, and subjectivity can easily become atman. We can imagine the finiteness of materialistic ontology and subjectivity that has outlived it, for example, George Berkeley. We will simply remind you once again that if your objection to Berkeley is based on the fact that for you Berkeley still remains a material subject, then this does not say anything other than that you yourself are "including" a subject of materialistic ontology or sympathize with it. Such a Berkeley will be your intentional phenomenon, no more, and we do not deny that one ontology or another can respond to the intentionality of another ontology, if it is capable of intentionality, turn to it with the side most compatible with it. Things are given to us in such a way that we can do something with them, but this does not mean that things are like that. Another substance of another ontology in the intentional act of another ontology directed at it can be very similar to the essence of the first ontology, but the fact that something is similar to what we know does not allow us to make a hasty statement about identity. Until we understand that the same is not equal to itself, we will not be able to enter @ntologia.

To pursue differences, one can stumble upon the fact that, by producing differences ad infinitum, we will not be able to say anything about anything, we will constantly change, strive to change, losing everything we acquire. Maybe this is not a problem, but there are stopping points that can continue to be thought of as differences, but not to deny them what they have become. To become is very good, but it is not bad to become, for the time being. And when something has become something, for example, a person, we cannot deny the other in that it has also become a person, but at the same time, we can preserve the difference. Man is not equal to man. Will such a statement be a statement that contradicts the anarchist discourse, as it seems to the one who advocates for equality? No. Anarchism is not “equalization.” Anarchism in its ontological dimension is an affirmation of the multitude, a multitude of differing open elements, even if they are too similar to each other. For such a distinction, it is not necessary to find new concepts as soon as possible to name the other, but one can think of the same name as the other. We are able to think of two people with the same names as different.

In this case, we may be talking about the confrontation of two psychotic camps, which Deleuze and Guattari wrote about in *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. There are paranoids and there are schizophrenics. We will not even touch on neurosis here, since neurosis will be for us - the slavery of the signified, and our goal is to remain faithful to the overthrow of the domination of the signified, to talk about ontology, and not about how we describe something. Neurotic language is the language of description. Psychotic—the language of being. For us, through the prism of various discourses and our own limitations of thought, a paranoid is one who cannot think of difference, as a separation of a name from a thing. Such logic can be found in a child. Imagine a child who learned the name of his mother, and suddenly another person enters his life, bearing a similar name. When the child is introduced to this person, he has the right to say: “no—this is not ‘name’, because ‘name’ is my mother.” And it seems like there is nothing wrong if these are the words of a child, but what if these are the words of a person who has a monopoly on violence? Or what if

it's just an adult, but actively advocating for the triumph of "truth"? If something is called by the wrong name, then this may be sufficient reason for such a person to use violence, especially if words are not just words for him, but a language given by God.

Thus, paranoid psychosis manifests itself when a war is waged over names and the supposedly corresponding "true" connections to things. The libertarian (schizo)psychosis will oppose paranoid psychosis. That is, one in which the word becomes so free that its meaning can change infinitely, and moreover, its meaning may not have any substantial referent at all, but be nothing more than another word. Of course, even here, at its limit, such a libertarian can make a fatal mistake—calling themselves what they will not become (and such is possible). But they may come to believe that they are becoming what they call themselves, that by naming themselves as someone, they instantly acquire all the qualities of the named. Try it yourself, and you will find out whether being is indeed finite. Perhaps you will discover this too soon.

What is schizophrenia? An outdated-fashionable concept? A terrible disease? Of course, both, but also something more. Ronald Laing, in his book *The Divided Self*, makes one important assertion for us. He says that a schizophrenic is someone who experiences ontological uncertainty. And perhaps partly for this reason, the 20th century becomes the century of schizophrenia, especially its second half. Structuralism, post-structuralism, traditionalism, and some other important discourses of that time, and even our time, are indeed born as reactions to the ontological uncertainty that has crept into the construction of many subjectivities. Some raise it on banners, declaring the collapse of meta-narratives, while others urgently invent themselves "centuries-old" foundations, gathering them from everything that comes to hand, like many modern New Age and neo-pagan groups.

But we want to say that ontological uncertainty did not leave us with the 20th century. The first quarter of the 21st century has only strengthened it. We cannot believe in anything or anyone. We do not believe in governments, we do not believe in the media, we do not

believe in religions, science, or the sincerity of authority. We cannot believe in anything, we cannot truly know anything, and only this brings us back to faith, as believing makes sense only in what does not exist. This is roughly how we can briefly formulate the positions emerging in contemporary new religious projects, “Re-orthodoxy” by V. Rubsky or “Dark Theology” by A. Shishkov, and somewhere around will fly the thousand-eyed angel V. Shallar, possibly, unlike the aforementioned, believing that from his many eyes, one of them can still peek somewhere beyond. It is not for us to judge whether this is so or not.

However, speaking of contemporary reformations of theology, we are running far ahead. We spoke of ontological uncertainty, of the fact that, hand on heart, almost no one can say what would be the true foundation of the universe for them. Or can they? Perhaps someone can, but not us.

The attempt of the psyche to cope with ontological uncertainty produces delusions that serve to fill the terrifying voids created by uncertainty, and the horror of delusion begins at the moment when, trying to protect its disappearing “self,” it begins to claim totality, believing that the existence of another delusion, another ontology, encroaches upon its own existence.

It seems logical to eliminate the primacy of the concepts of “Self,” “personality,” “integrity of the person,” and “subject” in Western thought. In the East, they have been laughing at the “Self” for millennia.

There is no need to defend what is not there or what is called an enemy. We were so afraid of losing the “Self” that we got rid of it. But time goes on — and the ontological uncertainty, which has given rise to many clinical cases and nihilists, besides this, also produces another effect. This effect we will call $\text{\textcircled{O}}$ ntology. As a joke, we will say that this is the effect of accepting ontological uncertainty, as an obvious temporary given, and a cataphatic view of this situation. If we are not able to accept one ontology as true, unique and real, and the experience of being inevitably tells us that ontology exists, then, following

this reasoning, we are talking about the fact that there are different ontologies, and due to the fact that we do not have any universal method for verifying the truth of different ontologies, and there are reasons to record the existence of at least some ontology, then we are ready to accept all ontologies that declare themselves as real. (Again, accept for the time being, no one forces us to believe that this is the case, that this will be forever. And moreover, to accept does not mean to let them do whatever they want). It is important that one ontology, which may even want to destroy another, exists, and it is not necessarily false. It is different. Ontologies are equal in their existence, except for those that do not include existence in their attributes, but we will not deny them either. Ontologies are not equivalent, and they are not equivalent through the principle of existence, but precisely through the establishment or absence of the possibility of establishing the meaning-co-possibility between them.

Value is a type of relationship building between ontologies and, of course, within certain elements of each ontology within itself. We will not deceive ourselves by saying that an ontology that does not include existence in its attributes will be valuable to us, but we will not deny that it can “be”, such as we cannot imagine it, since in our ontology there are difficulties in thinking without using the existential “be.” “Do you mean to say that there is something that is not?”—you will ask us. Yes, we will say, because there is God.

66

But how do we navigate within the @ntology? How do we understand what relates to us and what does not, what ontology are we the subject of? An example from the psi-sphere comes to mind. Different psychological concepts offer different ontologies, even if they don't talk about it and even if they don't reflect on it, and even if they consciously reject any ontological nature of their position, like Lacan. And we will say that someone will be helped by Lacanian psychoanalysis, and someone by Jungian, someone by Gestalt therapy, and someone by cognitive-behavioral therapy. And it's not that these are different methods of working with the same thing, but that these are different practices within different ontologies, more compatible with

the subjects of these ontologies and less co-possibility with others. “When someone says that everyone is talking about the same thing just in different words, then you can be sure — you are being recruited into a sect,”—once in the 90s said priest A. Kuraev.

No, everyone is talking about different things, even if they are saying the same thing, we add. But still, how can we understand which ontology we belong to, and how plastic are we to change ontologies, if it is even possible? Let’s set the scene, and again remember the children. Imagine that you, playing with a child, interact with the world that he imagines. Here is a carpet in the center of the room, and this is not a carpet, but a pool filled with lava, and any contact with this lava is dangerous, painful and potentially deadly. You understand that this is a game. But if you see lava, and if you are really burned when you step on it, then you are already in another ontology. What are we getting at? If you go to a Jungian therapist and work with your archetypes, look at the obviousness that does not deceive you. Do you see a carpet or lava? If you have lava in front of you and you get burned, then Jungianism can help you, but if you see a carpet, but continue not to step on it, entering into Jungian analysis, maybe you are playing, but if you are playing, then how much are you willing to pay for this game? And what are your goals?

We would not want our words to be read as a certain attitude towards Jungian analysis; let’s say that he just fell under our hot lava hand.

And it seems that now, when we ourselves have caught ourselves in the trap of the psi-sphere, it’s time for you to ask, do we not think that, talking about different ontologies, we are so gracefully trying to escape from saying that there is nothing but subjective representations of reality, which, naturally, can be different? Why do we talk about different ontologies, not different points of view? Partly, we have already given an aphoristic answer to this question. Because we are not recruiting you into a sect. To say that everyone is talking about the same thing, but in different ways, means to say that there is some kind of single total reality, the foundation and beginning, which lies behind the whole world given to us in sensations. But, being ontologically insecure, being schizophrenics, being @ntolo-

gists, it is in this very foundation, in this very single beginning, that we will be unsure in the first place. But we will remind you of what we have already said—@ntology implies a “contradictory” possible coexistence of different ontologies, including the one that is total. Yes, there is such an ontology that gives the world as something unified, but it is not the only one. We are not saying that everything is subjective, precisely because we do not put the subject at the center of our @ntology. There are subjects, and there are non-subjects and non-objects, there are worlds and there are beings, there are objects and there are subjectivities, and there is what we are not able to imagine. You can say that everything is subjective, but in this way you will only designate your subjective ontology. You will say that you are the subject or subjectivity of that ontology in which everything is subjective. How much have you said by this. But not everything that is is a subject, and not even everything that is is an object, contrary to the absolutely wonderful and not alien to us project of G. Harman, but something is, and something is not. And what is, we call ontologies, and we admit those ontologies in which there is no attribute “is.” There are ontologies, and whether they include subjects, objects, both or neither, that is their business.

77

Ontologies are not chosen, they are created, they are created or discovered. If we have found ourselves, then we have found ourselves ontologically, but what is this ontology in which we have found ourselves? We never start from the beginning, and even if ontology is created, it is not created from nothing, it is created from the elements that fill it, which produce it, outlining blurred boundaries. The elements of ontology are presented as evidence. And these evidences are different. But evidences, in turn, are not immutable, they are only those initial elements from which we begin, or rather, from which we starting. And from these evidences much is built: ontology, epistemology, ethics...

We cannot choose ontology, but this does not mean that within one ontology there cannot be polar ethical views on the same evidence. If we live in an ontology in which the existence of alienation is obvious

to us, this does not mean that we must have a certain ethical attitude towards alienation. And you will object to this, saying: “How can it be that if alienation is obvious to you, then its harmful role must also be obvious to you! Is this evidence not obvious only through a long, sometimes, movement of thought and understanding?” And this is not entirely true. If you say so, then you think of yourself as someone who has a specific beginning, but I tell you that your beginning is where you discover yourself in evidence each time anew. Of course, if you are a subject of @ntology, and I think that not everyone is, then you can think that such a picture represents the history of a subject who was a subject of one ontology, and later moved to another, but ontologies are not gloves that can be changed, but hands, and we do not know how many hands we have. Is it obvious to you that you have two? What about you? What about you, working with four hands? Subjectivity is not limited to the body of one individual or one point of perception. Subjectivity can include any number of elements. “Self”, a film, a factory, workers, artists, philosophers, so how many hands does the subjectivity you are right now have? As A. Smulyansky once joked, Jung is Freud’s naughty phallus. We do not change ontologies, we discover that we are subjects of many ontologies, some of which may have been hiding behind our backs. Why? Maybe unconsciously? Behind the puppet of materialism, a dwarf of theology often hides, but not always. Evidence is our basic connection to our ontology or ontologies, because evidence can contradict each other. “It is obvious to me that I have a soul.” “And it is obvious to me that I am synapses and nothing more.” “And it is obvious to me that one does not negate the other.” “And to me...” “And to me...” “And to me...” We must trust our evidence, but we must not equate it with total truth, we must not generalize everything with our subjective view. It is precisely because we do not seek to generalize everything with our subjectivity that we speak of the fact that not everything is subjective. Ontologies are not subjective points of view on being. These are unfoldings of beings, of which there are many, and they are different, possible, impossible, singular, collected in groups, scattered, existing and do not existing.

But you want specifics, you want practice (for those who don't believe that thinking is also practice), you want more examples, especially those that will allow us to return to anarchism, and not only to its philosophical dimension, but also to that very political one that we separated earlier.

88

We want to talk about the unconscious. The unconscious is perfect for our purposes, as it is a clear distinguishing element within ontology. The unconscious is not included in all ontologies. And not everyone has an unconscious. "Strict" psychoanalysts will generally speak of the presence of the unconscious only within the analytical session, within the office, while "non-strict" ones will engage in cultural studies, looking for the unconscious in works of art; some, obviously no longer psychoanalysts, will completely deny the unconscious, while others will dissolve it and erase the boundaries between consciousness and the unconscious (as if towards the second), like schizoanalysis.

I feel a sharp tension that runs through anarchism when it comes to the unconscious. Or even so, the unconscious acts as that which splits anarchism into "right" and "left" (not only anarchism, but we will limit ourselves to it, since the rest is less valuable to us). What does the unconscious tell us in its simplest understanding? That we do not own ourselves. And the more the unconscious becomes collective, and the idea of the collective unconscious is not as terrible as it is customary to speak of it in the environment of certain psychoanalysts, it is simply not total and does not really have its negative consequences if it is used to work with subjects who do not belong to the ontology of the collective unconscious. The more the unconscious is collective, the more we have grounds for being "left", and the more we doubt the right to private property, since even our desires are not ours at all. "Desire is the desire of the Other."

The more we deny the unconscious (and not the psychoanalytic denial that hinders analysis, being part of the analysis, but the ontological absence of the unconscious), the more we are forced to think of ourselves as conscious, self-aware at 1000%. We are Atlanteans, able to take control of everything that enters our consciousness. And if we are able to pick up a stick from the ground and make it our own, what can we say about such simple things as thoughts. In the world of a person who lacks the unconscious, it is impossible to offend anyone; there you can only be offended, and it is this logic, again in its exaggerated form, that can come from “right” anarchist areas, areas of anarcho-capitalism. What we are saying does not mean that the radical left should be irresponsible and unconscious. We are talking about the fact that its boundary does not run along its flesh, since through the unconscious it stretches to the other.

I want to clarify, if we are talking in the logic of ontology, then we are not talking about the fact that we need to decide whether there is an unconscious or not, and if there is, what kind it is, individual, collective, “cultural”; we need to assume that there are those who do not possess the unconscious, and Lacan spoke about such people, even if jokingly (today we remembered many jokes and maybe we will joke some more), and about those who are full-fledged subjects of the unconscious. Look at any dispute between an anarcho-socialist and an anarcho-capitalist through this lens, and it will become obvious to you what I am talking about. It is important to say that we are absolutely not interested in what they will say about themselves, they can both be those who deny the unconscious, but, denying it, it is precisely some intuitive logic of its presence that will support the socialist. If the boundaries of my mind are unshakable, if besides my mind, there is nothing else in my psyche, consciousness - then nothing but my rational choice can be the reason for my connection with another, one will say. While the unconscious is much more intersubjective, and therefore much more disposed to the other. “Self am Self”, the anarcho-capitalist will say. “Self am the Other”, the socialist will say.

It seems that here we should gather everything said above and make a final push. We are talking about the fact that in our view, anarchism needs its own ontology, a constant philosophical reflection on itself. Not only at the political and economic levels (and this is necessary, and let those who understand this better deal with it). We are talking about the philosophical dimension and its necessity, but this necessity is not at all obligatory, it is necessary for us, and therefore we speak.

But the anarchism that we think cannot imply a single ontology, this would contradict the very spirit of anarchism, because if someone started talking about how the world really works, and sincerely believed in it, then he would be forced to bring others under his truth. Is this anarchism? Therefore, we are talking about the fact that the ontology of anarchism can only be \textcircled{A} ntology, which is a multiple ontology, and at the same time we are not talking about the fact that \textcircled{A} ntology is the truth of being. We are talking about the fact that this is a certain temporary situation in which we find ourselves. And you? Thus, with another chord, already pre-final, we will continue to answer the questions posed by us somewhere there, far away, a few pages earlier: is some kind of anarchist coexistence possible without the reflection of the subjectivities themselves on their own ontology?

On the one hand, it is certainly possible, but this is not our side. It seems to us that if we do not understand how our ontology or ontologies are structured, we do not understand how we ourselves are constructed, as subjects, subjectivities or other “predicates” of these ontologies, then all our attempts to agree, on which any anarchism, both right (if it is anarchism at all), and left, places such high hopes, will inevitably crumble to dust. And what can we offer in such a case?

Let's say, firstly, that we do not offer our \textcircled{A} ntology to everyone, and we do not even offer it to all anarchists, but we will make the assumption that if this offer is passed by, then we are unlikely to be able to move anywhere. And yet, we say that our \textcircled{A} ntology is optional, but necessary for us and, perhaps, for anarchism. But what are we talking about? We are not just calling for thinking that everyone is different,

a great achievement ... Where will it lead us? We are talking about the fact that those subjectivities that think of themselves ontologically can have another card up their sleeve. And this card is schizoanalysis.

In our time, work on schizoanalysis and anarchism is no longer uncommon (perhaps), although in the Russian-speaking space, from which we speak, it is rather rare, and at the moment we have not encountered a full-fledged Russian-language elaboration of this issue. This text does not claim to be complete. We speak out of surprise, out of childish delight, the delight of a child who has discovered how wonderfully one thing comes out of another.

00

So, schizoanalysis.

We will not elaborate here on everything that schizoanalysis represents. Moreover, we will say that schizoanalysis is something that has yet to be invented, as it cannot be a finished practice with a crystallized methodology. It must be situational, open, and variable. Schizoanalysis, as Félix Guattari writes in his *Schizoanalytic Cartographies*, is a project of metamodelling.

This is a project of transversal redistribution of desire flows among different groups-subjectivities, but at the same time, the production of new subjectivities. The meta-modeling of schizoanalysis does not claim to be a universal machine for explaining anything whatsoever, but rather that it always turns out to be somewhere in between, transitions from one to another, creates connections, destroys connections, creates new subjectivities, decodes desire flows, redistributes them and prevents getting stuck, totalitarianism and fascism. Practices of schizoanalysis come out of offices, come out of the oppositions of doctor and patient, schizoanalysis itself is skeptical of the distinction between conscious and unconscious, and these practices always need to be reinvented. We could say, of course jokingly, that the ideal anarchist society is the “La Borde” psychiatric clinic, which was run by Guattari, but, fortunately, we are not interested in the ideal. And we are not saying that schizoanalysis is how we need to organize

society. We are saying that schizoanalysis, along with all its potential practices, which we need to create, is a very suitable practice for anarchists who are alien to the psychoanalytic approach of the power of Oedipus and the Signifier with the becoming of a psychoanalyst, as the “best” outcome.

Schizoanalysis is that practice that can help in creating a certain anarchist group, subjectivity, and can help this group function in a state of ontological uncertainty and multiplicity of ontologies. Schizoanalysis, more precisely its practice, can be the meaning that establishes the co-possibilities and impossibilities of ontologies. But it should not be a judge. Schizoanalysis is capable of becoming a practice of ontological subjectivities, allowing them to better understand themselves, the absence of themselves, the presence and absence of others and how they are constructed. And it seems that without such work, eternal disputes within binary oppositions will remain eternal. To the question of whose property the land is, schizoanalysis will not give a direct answer, rather it will suggest that everyone do something on this land, do what they want, and in the process of doing, a certain obviousness may arise, with which no one from the group will argue. Or maybe everyone will draw their own conclusions, but these conclusions will be practical, not just theoretical. And if there is a dispute, let it be, but it is worth remembering that it is not truth that is born from a dispute, it is the state that is born from a dispute.

What is schizoanalysis, how does it work, how to use it? How can it become an optional but meaningful practice of anarchism? That cursed anarchic “self-care” we talked about. Let’s be honest, in “self-care” we are not so much concerned with “care” as with the “self” that tries to cling to us. What self are we talking about? What is it? Is it really there? Does it really concern everyone? Let’s try to say it differently. Schizoanalysis can be a suitable practice for becoming an ontological anarchist subjectivity, which is open to co-possibilities, open to others. And we will be happy for you if you do not have problems with this, and you do not need schizoanalysis. We have already said, it is not necessary for everyone. Just like our ontology.

Brief presentation of the case of schizoanalytic dissociation

In conclusion, we would like to offer one example. This is a specific case of anarchist-schizoanalytic practice, which, again, is not total, but in our eyes is a very vivid illustration of what we are talking about. Here we do not claim to describe schizoanalysis in detail, however, we very much hope that we will be able to continue this work in subsequent theoretical texts. Just as we hope that existing anarcho-schizoanalytic works and thoughts will reach our “Speranza” (as Robinson called his island in the novel *Friday or the Pacific Limbo* by Michel Tournier), and maybe they will shatter our unfounded positions into dust. Let it be so. This will only make our subsequent texts “better.”

Let’s move on to the “case.” We are talking about assembling what we call schizoanalytic dissociation. And in this particular case, we are talking about a film group. But, of course, not just any film group, but one that exists outside of “industrial” production. And moreover, about one specific film group that existed at a certain point in time. We are talking about a group of people whose desire is united in making a film and this creation is valuable in itself for them, and may even be much more valuable than the effects they will get if they finish the film, but we are not saying that these effects are less significant, and we are not saying that the desire to make a film is limited to the film. We want to emphasize the “creation” itself. But the film is not a metaphor. Such a film is made without a definite initial concept in the form of a script written by a single author and is not an expression of a pre-created idea, is not an expression as such. It is becoming.

This film does not have a director, as a central figure who controls the entire process, establishing a monopoly on ideas, power and staging.

Each element of the group, each subjectivity participates in the formation of the film on all plateaus of its formation. It can be simultaneously, or it can be in turn. It is not about the fact that there is no director here, but about the fact that everyone becomes a director, and sometimes at different times. And everyone can show their power. We have already talked about the fact that there is a difference between power, as a monopoly on violence, and “power”, as the position of a director.

Here we would like to draw a parallel with how Felix Guattari organized the practice of changing the activities of the inhabitants of the “La Borde” clinic. Nurses staged plays, patients kept accounts, and doctors and artists cultivated the land, regularly changing their occupations and functions, returning to those that they considered their “original.” It is logical that the actor more often gets into the frame, but the actor can also become an operator at his own will and the will of the group.

The process of creating a film is divided into many scenes and frames, but we also remember what Guattari and Deleuze told us: “the unconscious is not a scene, it is production” (and of course, we don’t remember much of what they said, but what’s important for us is that we don’t want to repeat the schizoanalysis that Guattari and Deleuze created, we want to implement what resonates with us when we think about schizoanalysis on our own). The unconscious is not a scene, but the scene of our film is not a scene, even if the scene itself is in the frame as a place. The scene that Guattari and Deleuze opposed is the place of representation of a ready-made idea, archetype, myth, Oedipus. We discard the scene when we refuse to accept that our film is a play of something ready-made, for example, a pre-written script, an already worked-out concept. And then the scene of the film becomes a place of active production of the unconscious and each frame is an act of decoding the flows of desire.

Each member of the group has their own camera, their own perspective, their own point of view and situationally, at the will of desire and in accordance with general agreement at one point or another sets the frame and sets the form of existing extensivity in this frame.

We do not deny that in such a situation, reactionary psychologism may take place; however, practice shows that it very quickly retreats at the moment when it exhausts itself. How long will you play house when you have unlimited possibilities of cinema before you? This is not a couch.

The film goes far beyond its boundaries and the subjectivity of the film crew also leaves its boundaries. If a person has crossed the first boundary, called 'fear of the frame', then he is capable of much. On camera, a person is able to do what he would never do without it.

Having played 'house', subjectivities release multiple desires, and it is naive to assume that they are necessarily destructive. They are strange, unclear; they manifest on the film of the film being created the diversity of ontologies, the subjectivities of the participants in the dissociation. The film captured on film is the repressive function of post-generalization.

The film crew is a psychosis in which the boundaries of bodies are erased, but the ethical principles organized in the group, which can be very different, are not erased. This is a psychosis in which realities begin to gather into signs that guide the members of the group, revealing in turn those ontologies that may not belong to anyone in the group. Dissociation passes through other beings.

Relationships in the group are reoriented towards making a film, and the mutual assistance and self-sacrifice, the arrangement of values and priorities that arises in the group, sometimes amazes. It is important that the absence of a director or leading actor contributes to self-sacrifice and mutual assistance; no one cares about their neighbor in order to bring him fame for the finished project. The project of such a film in principle escapes the discourse of fame. This film may not be seen by anyone. They may forget to press "rec" on the camera.

But the camera is needed. The camera, the recording, even if it is equal to itself, the recording without saving, for example, like an on-line broadcast, is a place where meaning arises, as a co-possibility of different ontologies.

When we watch a movie, everything we see in the frame is co-possible, but that doesn't mean it's co-possible without the camera.

The film is a meeting place for different ontologies, but it itself is not an ontology, just as schizoanalysis is not a metadiscourse.

For such a film crew, the camera acts as the meaning that allows the ontologies of the group's subjectivities to coexist and coexist with subjectivities in anarchist positions.

An important question, but what prevents us from continuing when the film is shot? Why are we no longer willing to spend our last money to feed the group, or why do we no longer quit or ask for time off from work at any second, as soon as the film requires it, why are we no longer so concerned about the feelings and states of those who were with us in the group when the film is shot?

Because we are captured by capitalism and/or the state and cannot afford an indefinite vacation? Of course, yes, but not only. We didn't say that our words deny political practice, which must be carried out on many fronts. Our modest contribution is only to remind that there are many fronts, and the fronts of philosophy and psychology should not be forgotten in purely political practice. And work should not be done only on one front, all should be involved. Maybe the film crew breaks up because the film is a game? And the game cannot be a permanent state of a person. Surely not?

Yes, it is a game, but a game is a very real matter. Because a game is not a reproduction of a ready-made scheme, even if there are rules in the game. A game is primarily the becoming of another, someone who cannot become. There are many connections between a game and writing. A game is the becoming of subjectivity of another ontology, subjectivity of @ntology, a world of multiplicity or multiple worlds. And this becoming is real.

But we are not saying that such a group should exist forever. Nothing should last forever. Nothing should have to last.

We are not talking about what the world should be like under anarchism, we are talking about the fact that if there is anarchism, then it can have an ontology congenial to its positions, and one of the methodologies of such an ontology can be schizoanalysis, constantly reinvented, as a practice of establishing co-possibility, coexistence, and the work of each individual subjectivity on itself, if it feels the

need. Such a practice is not a ready-made form of social organization, but an experience.

This practice, in our opinion, contributes to the production of anarchist subjectivities. Because the fact that subjectivities can be subjectivities of different ontologies does not mean that only some should be anarchists, and for subjectivities of other ontologies, anarchism is impossible. Let's be honest, for some it is impossible.

Does the finiteness of such a group concern us? And what follows it? Is it capable of reproducing itself? The question, especially for those for whom the real and living idea is the one that is capable of self-reproduction.

Being is finite. And the group is finite. Since the group is also being, ontology, multiple and co-possible. And after finiteness follows another being.

With our work we do not create society. Before you is a text, and this text can be considered as a methodology and practice for a very specific and even small group of people, but maybe it is this group that we lacked? The text can become something that will produce a certain effect, which will become the effect of the emergence of a new group. Isn't this self-reproduction? And that's enough for us, for now. It is not the group that reproduces itself, but the groups. Even though each group is finite.

The deterritorialization of the group does not pass without a trace, it leaves its mark on subjectivities, and perhaps even a film that can be watched as evidence of this or that co-possibility. The film itself can reproduce new groups and subjectivities, but reproduce not identically, but reproduce as differences. Anarchism is possible when multiplicity is created, not when unity prevails.

And let there be a place for our $\text{\textcircled{A}}$ ntology in this multiplicity, but it is not necessary.

infinity