Border in Globalization Review (BIG_Review) provides an open-access forum for academic and creative explorations of borders in the 21st century. Our interest is advancing high-quality original works in the Arts, Humanities, and Social Sciences, exploring various aspects of borders in an increasingly globalized world. The journal is committed to double-blind peer review, public access, policy relevance, and cultural significance.

BIG_Review welcomes submissions from all disciplines and backgrounds, including scholarly submissions and artistic submissions (see About the Journal and For Contributors online and at the end of the issue).

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BIG Announcements

Call for Submissions

*Borders in Globalization Review* is now calling for academic and artistic submissions for its SECOND ISSUE, due out in spring 2020.

*BIG_Review* is bi-annual, multi-disciplinary, open-access, and peer-reviewed, providing a forum for academic and artistic explorations of borders in the 21st century. In addition to *scholarly work* (academic articles, review essays, research notes, book reviews, and film reviews) we publish a range of *artistic work* (photography, painting, poetry, short stories, and more). The journal is committed to quality research, public access, policy relevance, and cultural significance. We welcome submissions from all disciplines and backgrounds.

**Scholarly submissions** should engage with the research literature on borders, including, for example, borderlands, borderscapes, and bordering processes. We are interested in studies that go beyond the ‘land image’ by exploring borders as non-contiguous, aterritorial, globalized, mobile, electronic, biometric, functional, etc. We are equally interested in border studies from Indigenous perspectives, along with questions of sustainability, climate change, colonialism, and subnational and transnational identities. Research questions might include: What are contemporary challenges to borders, internally and externally? How are borders adapting? What challenges do borders pose for communities and for people in transit or seeking asylum? How are cultures shaped by borders, and vice-versa? How are technologies shaping borders? We encourage innovative theoretical work and explorations of borders widely construed, as well as empirical and quantitative research. Articles should be between 7000 and 10,000 words in length. Research notes should be between 750 and 1200 words. Book and film reviews should be between 500 and 1000 words, and essays between 1000 and 4000 words.

**Artistic submissions** should pertain to borders (borders understood broadly as political, social, cultural, metaphorical, personal). Borders can capture the popular imagination and inspire creative works. Artwork can reflect and influence the cultures that shape borders. We promote portfolios and individual works, including original poems, photos, paintings, short stories, creative essays, film and literature reviews, artistic commentaries, and other forms of art. Artists retain copyright of their work and benefit from increased exposure at no cost to them.

Our distribution model makes contributors’ work widely and freely available to the general public in open-access format. This is possible by (a) utilizing far-reaching networks established in association with the multi-year research program, Borders in Globalization; (b) focusing on electronic rather than print copies (though paper editions may be ordered); and (c) shifting administrative costs from public users to academic institutions and scholars’ research funds (grants, etc.). The one-time $250 Cdn fee applies to academic articles and essays that have been accepted for publication, and helps cover the costs of at least two double-blind expert peer reviews, production, and distribution. All other approved submissions—book reviews, film reviews, and non-scholarly works—are published at no cost to contributors.

Academic submissions must be previously unpublished and not simultaneously under other publishers’ consideration. Submissions are not guaranteed approval. *BIG_Review* reserves the right to reject submissions on any grounds.

The second issue prints this spring. Submit soon!

For complete submission guidelines and more information about the journal, visit our [website](#).

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Dear Reader,

Welcome to the inaugural issue of *Borders In Globalization Review*.

*BIG_Review* is a different kind of journal, traversing disciplinary boundaries and integrating the Arts, Humanities, and Social Sciences. Our aspiration is to make widely available academic and artistic explorations of borders in the 21st century. We seek to better understand the changing meanings, structures, and functions of international boundaries, borders and frontiers. These are no longer strictly territorial. Rather, they are increasingly noncontiguous, fragmented, mobile, and often attached to individuals and goods as they move through and between regulatory frameworks. We ask how, why, and what borders are fundamental. How do they impact people’s lives and the world we live in? These questions are increasingly important, with humankind altering global climate in ways that cannot be contained by borders, and at a time when more people than ever are on the move as migrants and asylum seekers.

Hence the primary goal of *BIG_Review* is to advance critical understandings of borders in globalization through new research and creative works of art. All articles and essays are double-blind peer reviewed and may be comparative, theoretical, multi-disciplinary and policy relevant; artwork includes painting, drawing, photography, poetry and fiction. Our contributors, along with our Editorial Board members, are based around the world. And the entire journal is free and available online in a variety of electronic formats as an open-access publication (CC BY-NC 4.0). We are committed to public access, quality research, policy relevance, and cultural significance.

Our inaugural issue displays this broad mandate. The following research articles explore transborder governance, identity, culture, precarity, and conflict in borderlands across the world, including the Aegean, Eastern Europe, sub-Saharan Africa, the Arab Gulf, indigenous Latin America, and more. The issue also includes academic essays on border-wall graffiti, ater-ritorial borders, and French thinker Paul de La Pradelle. We also feature a range of artwork, including an artist’s portfolio that imagines boundary lines and movement onto canvas, plus original verses from three poets on themes and sentiments related to borders. Book and film reviews round out the first issue.

*BIG_Review* has been made possible by *Borders in Globalization* research program (BIG), a Partnership Grant supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC) and by the Erasmus+ programme of the European Union (see Funding and Support). *BIG_Review* results from teamwork and would not have been possible without the contributions of Nicole Bates-Eamer, Benjamin Perrier, Edwin Hodge, Noah Laurence, and Chris Chan. We are also obliged for the expert blind reviews of our Editorial Board members. We are grateful to all our contributors—academics and artists who submitted works to *BIG_Review* 1(1), 1(2), and 2(1). Thanks, are also due to Inba Kehoe and colleagues at the University of Victoria Libraries for hosting the journal online and providing technical support.

Please enjoy, and share as widely as you can!

Sincerely,

Emmanuel Brunet-Jailly, Chief Editor
With Michael J. Carpenter, Managing Editor

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Between 2015-2016 more than 1.3 million refugees and migrants crossed the Mediterranean Sea in search of safety and opportunity in Europe (IOM 2015, 2016). The vast majority came through Greece, and the Eastern Aegean islands of Lesvos, Kos, Chios and Samos (UNHCR 2016a, 2016b). Although pathways of irregular migration into Europe have periodically shifted between the sea and land borders of Greece (Bernardie-Tahir & Schmoll, 2014), the number of maritime arrivals has steadily increased since the early 2000s.

The vast increase in refugee arrivals through Greece’s sea borders during 2015 and 2016 put Lesvos ‘on the global map of the great disaster sites of the 21st century’ (Papataxiarchis 2016, p. 9) particularly given the island’s relatively small size and population. While these developments attracted unprecedented, although short-lived, global attention to the perilous refugee journeys to Europe (Giannakopoulos 2016), they also obfuscated the Aegean islands’ centuries-old history as well-established sites of departure, arrival, co-existence, and resistance for the forcibly displaced (Giannuli 1995; Tsimouris 2001; Karachristos 2006; Hirschon 2007; Myrivili 2009). Textual traces across Lesvos, however, tell a different story, speaking to contemporary border policies through the lived experiences of people who have confronted them through the years. It is to those texts and symbols—
This paper argues for the empirical and conceptual importance of collecting, studying and interpreting art and graffiti in studying borders diachronically. In doing this, it offers a conceptual framework for interpreting the borderscape of Lesvos through the practice of graffiti writing by ‘borderlanders’. The term ‘borderlanders’ is hereafter not used as an umbrella term that indiscriminately lumps together discrete populations and persons, but as a descriptive term denoting the people that are, or have been present, within specific critical border sites. Those are people who, for whatever reason, happen to inhabit, transit through or operate within such border spaces, synchronously or at different times, under many capacities (encompassing not only migrants and refugees, but also activists, locals, and others alike). In this research, these borderlanders are brought together by their choice to leave textual markings in public spaces as testimonies of their experiences of, and perspectives on, borders, which reflect the struggles over the meaning of borders, as perceived by the various groups that are affected by them.

As a critical location of migration and border enforcement, Lesvos has played a significant role in the construction of official and vernacular imaginaries of contemporary borders as humanitarian/securitized spaces. While official narratives around borders attempt to moderate and mediate their securitized spaces. This plurilocal and plurivocal border work (Mignolo 1995, p. 15) is undertaken locally by multiple actors in this geo-politico-cultural space (Perera 2007, p. 206), turning the Aegean borderscape, with Lesvos at its epicentre, into ‘a landscape of competing meanings’ (Rajaram & Grundy-Warr 2007b, p. xv) and contrasting affects between the various groups that cross or inhabit it. Attentiveness to borders’ and state’s affective composition along the Greek-Turkish border are then laid out, along with the empirical material’s presentation and analysis according to the five themes identified in our data. The concluding section focuses on the experiential topography of the Aegean borderscape, highlighting border graffiti’s importance in challenging hegemonic discourses on borders and migration and communicating how the highly securitized border landscape of the Aegean Sea has been being experienced, confronted and negotiated diachronically from below.

Analytical Framework

Critical border scholars have shown how borders cannot merely be understood as fixed territorial lines of separation at the edge of the nation-state (Balibar 1998), but rather as a ‘complex choreography of border lines in multiple lived places’ (Gielis & van Houtum 2012, p. 797). Borders do not ‘simply exist’, but are rather ‘performed into being through a range of practices and rituals’ (Parker & Vaughan-Williams 2012, p. 729). Read through these practices, borders derive their meaning from social interactions and become recognizable through struggles over belonging and non-belonging (Rajaram & Grundy-Warr 2007a, pp. xxvii–xxix). To capture these struggles, we employ the notion of the borderscape, which embraces a ‘mobile, perspectival, and relational’ study of borders (ibid., p. x), and draw on recent borderscape conceptualisations, which incorporate performative, participatory and senseable dimensions of borders (Brambilla 2014; Brambilla et al. 2015).

Such an approach thus grounds the abstract notions of borders and borderscapes on specific practices (i.e. top-to-bottom ones, such as surveillance and controls as well as bottom up insurgent ones, such as trespassing and rescuing), materialities (i.e. fences, walls and documents) and affects (i.e. fear, hope, indignation), and renders perceptible diverse situated experiences, negotiations and representations of/at territorial borders by different actors. The importance of a multiperspectival approach to border studies is thus underlined. This entails ‘studying borders differently’ and ‘acknowledging the alternative boundary narratives’ (Rumford 2012 p. 889), thereby foregrounding the importance of the visible and invisible work of those that inhabit border spaces. This plurilocal and plurivocal borderwork (Mignolo 1995, p. 15) is undertaken locally by ‘multiple actors in this geo-politico-cultural space’ (Perera 2007, p. 206), turning the Aegean borderscape, with Lesvos at its epicentre, into ‘a landscape of competing meanings’ (Rajaram & Grundy-Warr 2007b, p. xv) and contrasting affects between the various groups that cross or inhabit it. Attentiveness to borders’ and state’s affective composition...
and geography (Laszczkowski & Reeves 2015; Navaro-Yashin 2012; Reeves 2011) gives rise to the notion of affective borderscapes, within which the top-down bordering processes, as well as their bottom-up contestation are exerted not only practically but also affectively, and can be tracked through their human and material traces in space.

Upon the territory of Lesvos, marked deeply by shifting patterns of human migrations and the changing discourses and practices around them, the microgeographies of migrant arrival, incarceration and inhabitation are being continuously reinscribed. Among other public discursive terrains, the island’s walls offer ample space for unmediated, interactive expression on borders in the form of graffiti. The inscribed messages reveal the clash or correlation of experiences, perceptions and interpretations of global bordering processes, and their local effects on individuals.

Graffiti, in its broadest sense, is the practice of unauthorized mark-making in the form of written expressions and drawings, which are scribbled, etched or painted on various surfaces, often anonymously or pseudonymously, usually within public view. It is a complex and inherently spatial practice whose exact delimitation remains problematic due to the multiple definitions and typological categorizations attributed to it (Brighenti 2010). General perceptions of graffiti range from unauthorized artistic expression, at best, to a public order violation and an act of transgression, at worst. Graffiti has also been described as an unobtrusive indicator of values and attitudes not just at a personal but also at a social level (Stocker et al. 2009), especially with regard to beliefs and sentiments that lie outside the margins of acceptable norms of ordinary social life (Gonos, Mulkern, & Poushinsky 1976). It is a liminal practice not only socially, but also spatially, as it mostly occurs in ‘transitional areas where social boundaries are blurred and normal rules of conduct and role expectations are held in abeyance or even in opposition’ (Blake, 1981 p. 95). As a liminal practice, this transgressive and ritualized communicative process is suspended ‘betwixt and between’: it is situated between visual and verbal expression, pictorial and textual inscription, anonymity and identity reclamation, artistic expression and defacing.

Graffiti has been widely studied within anthropology, linguistics, arts, history, archaeology, criminology, psychology, gender studies, sociology and urban geography, among other disciplines (Bloch 2012; Burnham 2010; Dax 2015; Frederick 2009; Giles & Giles 2010; Klingman, Shalev, & Pearlman 2000; Lachmann 1988; Leong 2016; Otta et al. 1996; Philips 2015). Within the field of border and migration studies graffiti has been approached from perspectives that emphasize its significance as an aesthetic and artistic expression around/about borders (Al-Mousawi 2015; Alvarez 2008). However, it still remains largely under-researched regarding its content and semiotics. A few notable exceptions refer to inscriptions of border-crossing migrants in highway box culverts across the US-Mexico border (Soto 2016); border graffiti as a contestation of national border policies and an attempt at recapturing an alternative sense of belonging (Madsen 2015); the feelings and experiences of intercepted migrants as revealed through the messages left on the walls of a Belgian police station (Derluyn et al. 2014); and tagging made by immobilized stateless people on the West Bank wall (Fieni 2016).

In the Greek context, urban public spaces have had central role in the manifestation of social struggles and the expression of popular discordance. The country’s turbulent political past dating back to the period of the rise of the military junta of 1967-1974 and its fall (Metapolitefsi)2, and the toleration with which such unauthorised public writing has generally been dealt with by the authorities and citizens alike have been conducive to the pervasiveness of the phenomenon. These longstanding practices of public expressions of discordance have commonly taken place through politicized street art and slogan writing, which have utilized urban landscapes to engage publics in dialogues about contemporary social conditions (Avramidis 2012; Tsilimpoundi 2015; Tsilimpoundi & Walsh 2010). In recent years, the corrosive effects of the enduring financial crisis, paired with the increasing influx of migrants and refugees, have reinforced sociopolitical discontent and have entrenched a sense of pervasive social injustice. Human rights’ encroachment, intensification of socioeconomic precariousness and marginalization are conditions nowadays experienced not just by migrant populations, but by large segments of the violently reshuffled Greek society as well.

The magnitude and pervasiveness of contemporary social discontent has gradually extended the writing of political graffiti, as a form of non-mediated communication, beyond large Greek urban centers, such as Athens. In towns all over Greece, such as Lesvos’ capital Mytiléne, the formerly kempt, white-washed walls are nowadays saturated with graffiti, stencils, posters and stickers, and the palimpsest of narratives produced by the social realities and struggles in Greece, and beyond, as it has also been documented in previous research (i.e. Karathanasis and Kapsali 2018).

The concept of border graffiti in our work encompasses textual and pictorial communication related to border experiences and practices occurring in spaces related with, but not necessarily in, close proximity to territorial state borders. Such border graffiti is created by various actors who occupy,
pass through and experience borderland space from contrasting positions. Border graffiti thus provides an ephemeral roadmap to navigate of borders’ multiplicity and the juxtaposed meanings invested in them by different people (Sohn 2016). Messages often seem to be inscribed by any available means on any accessible surface, sometimes upon the very walls that comprise the infrastructure anchoring political borders in space. As walls become dialogic interfaces between borderlanders and other audiences, border graffiti (re)writes the frontier’s narrative: it inscribes personhood, sketches perceptions, and intertwines experiences and memories from one’s past and present, while carving out a sense of emplacement or dissociation in the midst of securitized spaces of existential erasure.

Similarly to other forms of public writing, we suggest that border graffiti can be seen as a medium for individuals and groups to challenge authority and contest existing policies (Moreau & Alderman 2011) as well as a way of exercising agency, self-determination and reclaiming one’s identity in the context of sociospatial exclusion (Bruno & Wilson 2002), while being used as a means to cope with trauma (Klingman et al. 2000), or a testimony of immediate life experiences, such as concerns with one’s self-identity, interpersonal relations, feelings and sentiments, clashing cultural understandings, as well as religious and political beliefs (Lucca & Pacheco 1986).

In crisis contexts, landscapes often become direct communicative devices in themselves—their various elements turning into message boards filled with statements of reclamation and survival (Bass, 2006 p. 6). Within the enduring crisis of migration management and the protracted humanitarian disaster on the outskirts of Europe, border graffiti and the messages of hope, heed or support that they convey trace the contours of the affective geographies that the EU’s (supra)national border regimes have given rise to through the years.

**Data Collection & Analysis**

Our research draws upon a large collection of nearly 1000 images of graffiti photographed by the authors over several visits to three locations on Lesvos island. During our analysis, this dataset was consolidated into a collection of approximately 300 paradigmatic and highly illustrative images, a smaller selection of which is presented in this paper. The first set of photographs from the defunct (since 2009) Reception Facility of Pagani was collected in summer of 2012. Pagani is a one-story building with a small courtyard, located in the industrial area about 3 km northwest of Mytilène town. No migrant reception facilities existed on Lesvos prior to Pagani’s opening. Before its commissioning to house detained ‘illegal entrants’ between 2004-2009, Pagani’s premises stored animal fodder and were, therefore, unsuitable for human habitation. Pagani inmates (up to 1200 at a time) were confined indoors 24/7 in five overcrowded halls separated by makeshift plywood walls, with insufficient ventilation and hygienic facilities, and little to no privacy or personal space at all times. The quality of migrant reception ranged from severely deficient to inhumane throughout the facility’s operation (Alberti 2010, p. 139; Cabot & Lenz 2012, p. 166; UNHCR 2009). Violent riots erupted in the autumn of 2009, which were preceded by the disruptions caused by the NoBorder Camp to the border’s and the detention centre’s function (Kasparek & Speer 2013, p. 261), leading to the eventual closing of Pagani.

The messages found on the rotting plywood walls in 2012 remained silent witnesses of the deplorable conditions within the detention center. Detainee inscriptions were more closely photographed in the one of the two accessible ground floor halls, and in the women’s and children’s section on the first floor. Photographs of inscriptions found within the third ground floor hall, which remained locked, were taken through its door and window grills, and through holes dug by detainees through the decaying wood fiberboard. To the best of our knowledge this is the only collection of inscriptions of such breadth from this location, adding to its historical and evidential importance.

The downtown area of the capital of Lesvos, Mytilène, was the second location of graffiti inscriptions’ collection over multiple fieldwork visits between 2012 and 2016. The picturesque town is the administrative capital of the island of Lesvos, and of the prefecture of North Aegean. The refugee ‘crisis’ has been attracting a broad range of individuals, from activists and volunteers to world-renowned artists. Alongside locals, they have left their marks on public walls, defunct telephone booths, bus stations, shop windows etc., which are inundated with various types of graffiti. This heterogeneity of authors diversifies significantly the content of the border/refugee-related graffiti. Local and international activist messages are mixed with purely artistic creations, such as the murals of the month-long ‘Symbiosis Lesvos Art Festival’ that took place in the summer of 2016 (Symbiosis Lesvos 2016).

The collected material is analytically fragmented not only regarding the internal taxonomies of graffiti as a communicative medium, but also concerning the differentiation of their authors’ motives and the classification of their content. To address this conundrum, graffiti categorised as purely aesthetic expression is purposefully excluded from this
analysis, and we focus was placed on predominantly textual messages discursively oriented towards border and refugee politics and affects instigated by them.

The registration center/camp of Moria, located 6.5 km northwest of the town of Mytilène is the third location of graffiti collection. The premises of Moria were part of the disused military base ‘Paradellis’ of the Mechanized Infantry of the Hellenic National Guard and functioned as a center for First Identification of asylum seekers since 2013. Its operation proved insufficient and dysfunctional ever since arrivals started picking up in early 2015: throngs of asylum seekers squatted the nearby olive groves awaiting their registration. On October 16th, 2016 an EU ‘hotspot’ was inaugurated within the premises of Moria amidst the steep increase of asylum seekers (up to 5-10,000 arrivals daily). On the same day, Andrea Rigoni, Italian MP and rapporteur of the Migration Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) gave a new dimension to EU borders and their functional logic upon inspecting the facilities of Moria with his statement: ‘Our impression is that this is Europe’s new frontier – in this center. Outside this center, we are outside Europe’ (Amna.gr 2015).

Soon after the EU-Turkey Statement on the return of inadmissible asylum seekers to Turkey was implemented on the 18th of March 2016, the remaining asylum seekers’ settlements in the adjacent fields were violently cleared out and Moria became a closed registration center overnight. The living conditions of asylum seekers, however, have remained extremely challenging throughout Moria’s operation to this day (Rozakou, 2017a p. 40). Several NGOs, such as Human Rights Watch, have reported how the ‘lack of police protection, overcrowding, and unsanitary conditions create[s] an atmosphere of chaos and insecurity in Greece’s razor-wire-fenced island camps’ (2016, para. 2).

During our September 2016 visit, unauthorized entry to the camp was prohibited. We roamed the former settlement’s scattered remnants on the nearby hillside, where traces of the olive grove squat still existed. We photographed inscriptions written with pens and markers on trees and street signs; bold spray-painted slogans on concrete walls; verses etched on moss and lichen, names carved on once wet cement. A few images of graffiti from the hotspot’s inaccessible interior were also taken from the street.

Analysis began with the large photographic collection’s consolidation and selection of approximately 300 illustrative items. The graffiti’s deterioration due to weather exposure, wall dilapidation and other interventions often called for the photographs’ digital enhancement to aid readability. Minimal correction of the images’ exposure, sharpness and colour were made to this end. Names and personal information have been partially redacted prior to publication to ensure anonymity. An inductive and iterative qualitative content analysis was then undertaken. Each photograph often depicted multiple instances of graffiti, written in nine identified languages and dialects (English, French, Arabic, Greek, Farsi, Pashtun, Urdu, Somali and Sinhala). Each graffiti instance was then categorized as a separate entry and was individually reviewed based on its form (text or image), language, and location of retrieval.

Each photograph was then catalogued with a brief description of its content, its transcription, an English translation, if necessary, obtained with the help of translators, and some reflective comments based on our interpretive reading. Despite the numerous inherent epistemological and methodological issues around translation across languages, which often remain unaddressed in cross-cultural research (Temple & Young 2004) the use of culturally-aware translators was indispensable in this research as the inscriptions’ content would have otherwise been inaccessible to us.

The resulting double translation and representation of the empirical material (first by the translators from languages that the authors do not have command of, and, secondly, by the authors during the writing process) imposes additional limitations on the validity and reliability of the analysis, even more so in the absence of the messages’ original authors (Twinn 1997). As explained below, however, the importance and rarity of the empirical material justified our analytical approach, and our eventual decision to consult translators.

Wishing to remain faithful to the linguistic and cultural content of the graffiti, we initially consulted native speakers of the inscriptions’ languages, some of whom had been previously detained in Pagani or Moria, sourced through our personal contacts. Translators provided textual and, occasionally, cultural interpretation of the writings, which occurred during informal conversations. They were shown high-resolution photographs of the border graffiti and were asked to identify any texts they recognised, translate them into English, and briefly reflect on them if they wished to. In this way we attempted a ‘crossing [of] research borders’ and engaged interpreters, often with asylum-seeking background, as research collaborators (Hennink 2008, pp. 30-32; Temple & Edwards 2002). Their responses and interpretations were later verified with the help of independent, academically-affiliated native speakers.
The most prominent themes emerging from border graffiti’s analysis were: identity and agency (re)clamation and inscription in a state of liminal waiting, encouraging and advising others in similar position, coping with border-induced embodiment and affects, and resisting border politics. These interrelated tropes appeared persistently to varying degrees, despite the spatial and temporal variation of this research across three fieldwork locations and over many years.

This type of research poses numerous limitations. Firstly, images for this study cannot possibly reflect the entire range of expression of borderlanders in Lesvos: open-ended as graffiti writing might be, it is still a selective practice, allowing expression only to those possessing the means and ability to articulate their thoughts in writing. Moreover, the selectivity of this process is exacerbated through the serendipitous process of the inscriptions’ discovery. Conclusions cannot be considered authoritative, either, as all information available to us was imparted through the inscriptions in the absence of their authors. The disambiguating of motives, affects, thoughts and meanings is particularly difficult after-the-fact and necessarily based on assumptions. Every effort was made from the authors’, however, to remain true to their meaning, including focussed discussions with former Pagani detainees and the assistant translators to contextualize and comprehend the graffiti’s form and content.

**Writing Affective Geographies on the European Border Wall**

**Inscribing and reclaiming identity in liminal waiting**

A striking observation made while studying the photos from Pagani was its walls’ inundation with inscriptions. Texts of varying sizes mottled every writable surface: from sprawling Persian calligraphy in intricate patterns and block letters in moisture-blotted red marker, to hidden ball-point pen scribbles and faint pencil jots. Like a towering diary of passage, the makeshift detention centre’s high walls formed a message board of survival, overflowing with testimonies of people locked into transit.

Migration and refugee passage are liminal states, often forcing people into sociospatial limbo for extended and externally-set time periods, while the outcome of their waiting (release, deportation or the extension of detention) remains unpredictable (Boer 2015; Nousia & Lyons 2009; Papoutsi, Painter, Papada, & Vradis 2018). Deceleration or total arrest of migrants’ journeys are, thus, not mere side effects of this process, but different means of states’ ‘frontier praxis’ in themselves. The active usurpation of irregular migrants’ time by the authorities reveals the complex economics of illegality, which go hand in hand with the existing biopolitical dimensions of Europe’s border management (Andersson 2014a, p. 795). Temporality is, therefore, a crucial parameter of the ways migration experiences are organized – where experiences of waiting are, as Conlon (2011, p.353) argues, both ‘imbued with geopolitics’ as well as ‘actively encountered, incorporated and resisted’ throughout the spaces that migrants and refugees inhabit. Pagani graffiti indicates the centrality of time-keeping in detained migrants’ life, through their individualised methods of tracking the duration of their imprisonment (Figure 1). Most commonly, time-spans were marked textually by writing one’s date of arrival (to Greece/Lesvos) or the date of their imprisonment, and their predicted day of eventual release, or ‘liberation’ (Figure 1c). Some marked days with rows of lines or crosses (Figures 1b, 1e), while others used pictographic methods of time-keeping. The calendars’ format indicates that the detention period’s anticipated duration (around 30 days) was often known to the migrants in advance. Subsequently, they drew countdown matrices of fixed duration, such as columns or rows of outlined circles, which were later filled in as days passed (Figure 1d). This time-keeping method indicates an attempt to reinstate a sense of predictability in the migrants’ uncertain temporality of passage, while maintaining a future-oriented perception of time and an impression of onward progression of their journey. Differences in the recorded length of imprisonment indicate the prevalent arbitrariness of living and administrative conditions faced by migrants, of which detention is but one.

Unlike the anonymity that customarily characterizes graffiti messages, Pagani detainees strived to retain their eponymity (Figure 2). People’s names and detailed biographical information were shared on the walls – often down to their town and neighbour-
hood of origin (Figures 2d, 2e), email addresses and phone numbers (Figures 2a, 2b, 2c), as well as nicknames and different self-ascribed identity markers (e.g., ‘Ghetto Boss’, ‘Djolof 4 Life’ – not pictured here).

The practice of sharing such personal and potentially compromising information publicly stands in direct opposition to the essence of the correctional spaces where they were found, where migrants would often conceal or falsify their personal details deliberately to obtain paperwork with more favourable information in the hope of further supporting their future asylum claims (Derluyn et al. 2014, p.7).

In this case walls featured as message boards of emergency communication where one could mark themselves as ‘safe and well’, restore lost links with family and travel companions or forge new ones, and reaffirm their personal identity.

Contrary to the inscriptions in Pagani, graffiti found around Mytiléne and Moria did not contain migrants’ personal information. The only exception was a collection of stencils in Greek (Figure 4) identifying three migrants who had died between 2014 and 2015 in the Amygdaleza detention center near Athens (Morfis 2015). Probably spray-painted by local activists in an alleyway near the Mytiléne port, these stencils indicate how struggles against border-induced violence suffered by migrants span across Greece, while commemorating the dead and bringing awareness to the conditions of their, largely unreported, deaths.

Encouraging and advising others

Another central trope commonly observed in many messages inside Pagani was the detainees’ expres-
sion of solidarity to other intercepted migrants, as well as offering advice, encouragement and wishing success to those coming after them. Gestures and expressions of camaraderie can alleviate the spatial and social isolation experienced by detainees and help the construction of a discreetional communal identity around their life stage they share at the time.

Courageousness is one of the main themes expressed in such messages and is often presented as a prerequisite for earning one’s freedom (Figure 5a), along with the importance of resilience and fearlessness despite danger’s or death’s imminence (Figure 6d). Total strangers are warmly saluted as ‘brothers’ (Figure 5b), implying links of affinity growing between people affected by similar hardships. The significance of supporting each other and fostering unity and collaboration in the face of adversity is highlighted (Figure 5d), lest misfortune and defeat would come upon them. The advice to avoid detention in Pagani at all costs as it is worse than being lost in the desert is offered elsewhere, warning unsuspecting newcomers for what is to come (Figure 5c).

An excerpt from old Arabic poem of disputed authorship (Wikisource.org 2017) found inside Pagani (Figure 5e) highlights the significance of maintaining one’s dignity and pride, and not resorting to self-pity and despair despite the degree of betrayal from one’s given life circumstances. ‘Pride is of great importance for an Arab and land is so as well. To be uprooted and then imprisoned by a foreigner (a westerner) is a great insult. It calls for self-pity and for pain. The lion is the prisoner, the migrant, the refugee, the undocumented and unwelcomed. The dog is the prison guard, the authority, etcetera.’ (Salim, 27 years old, Syria, translator from Arabic). Despite their fatalism, the verses carry an implicit consolation to their imprisoned readers: ‘Do not feel sorry because this is how life usually goes. Although defeated for now, you remain superior to your captors’.

Figure 4: Stencils commemorating the deaths of three migrants imprisoned at the Amygdaleza detention center (Mytilène 2016). Photo by Ioanna Wagner Tsoni. Sayed Mehdi Ahbari / 23 years old / Amygdaleza / 10.02.2015; Mohamed Asfak / 24 years old / Amygdaleza / 02.11.2014.

Figure 5: Messages of brotherhood and encouragement (Pagani 2012) Photos by Ioanna Wagner Tsoni. 5a: Liberty, courage. 5b: Courage my brother. 5c: You might get lost in the desert but you should never enter this camp [Detention in Pagani is worse than being lost in the desert]. 5d: United we stand, divided we fall. 5e: Do not lament the treachery of time; long have dogs danced over the carcasses of lions [Do not be sorry about life’s bad turns].

Figure 6: Border affects while in detention (Pagani 2012) Photos by Ioanna Wagner Tsoni. 6a: Only god’s justice is perfect and absolute (faith, hope). 6b: We are afraid (fear). 6c: Drawing of frightening face (fear). 6d: Do not [be] fearful [even though] death [is] around a corner (courage, determination).
Messages of support and solidarity, however, are not only exchanged between migrants. Locals and activists often write in support of migrants near spaces of incarceration and other public areas, holding ground against the advent of xenophobia and claiming pockets of public space as safe for the newcomers as demonstrated below (Figures 9 and 10).

Border embodiment and affect

As it has been empirically indicated so far, bordering processes are constituted not just through their more tangible aspects, such as the legal, infrastructural and political dimensions of borders (Andersson 2014b) but also through feelings, emotions, embodied experiences and affective dispositions by a variety of actors (Navaro-Yashin 2012; Reeves 2011). By paying attention to the border-encountering bodies and their sensory and affective experiences we observe how complex emotional geographies of borders unfold in practice. Through the wall inscriptions, fragments of the visceral and affective synthesis of the borderscape are offered: vulnerability and discouragement are revealed; mental resilience and group solidarities are shaped, and encouragement is offered in an effort to maintain hope throughout the challenges of life in transit and detention. Inside Pagani, feelings of despondency, anguish and fear in the face of life-threatening dangers are expressed through writings and drawings (Figure 6). Religion plays a very important role throughout the entire migration trajectory and especially during times of distress and emotional and physical trial (Dorais 2007; Gozdziak & Shandy 2002; Hagan & Ebaugh 2003). Writings across Lesvos—scribbled prayers, religious symbols and invocations to God—found in Pagani, support this claim (Figure 6a, 7h).

Expressions of love, affection and longing are also widespread. People profess love for their home countries, family members or beloved ones with words or symbols (Figure 7). Others imply how their support to dissident ideologies and those who express them remains unwavering, despite being part of what forced them to flee. A Somalian detainee in Pagani, writes of his love for Hadrawi—a prominent Somali poet and songwriter who penned notable protest works (‘I love Hadrawi’, Pagani 2012—not pictured here). Nostalgia, homesickness and deep longing for freedom, are also expressed both in words and symbols, such as birds in flight, footsteps walking away, a broken heart with its right side made of brick wall, and a sunrise over an open field on its left (Figure 7).
Complex emotional entanglements are sometimes revealed, such as feelings of betrayal and abandonment by one’s country/continent of origin, which sets off the migratory journey in search of justice, safety and self-realisation (Figure 8b), while the moment of border-crossing and rescue by the coastguard is experienced as rebirth (Figure 8a). Contrary to what previous research indicates about male-designated locations (Ferris 2010; Soto, 2016; Yogan & Johnson 2006), no textual or visual obscenities were observed in Pagani, nor insults or defacement of others’ messages and/or religious symbols.

As previously discussed, political graffiti in Greece is a prevalent communicative and expressive medium and a ubiquitous part of the urban landscape (Avramidis 2012; Tsilimpoundi 2015; Tsilimpoundi & Walsh 2010). Much like in other Greek cities, writings around Moria and Mytilène often express political indignation and anger (Karathanasis and Kapsali 2018). The writings that this paper focuses on were directly related to migrant arrivals and the refugee crisis and used explicit language against authorities and institutions involved in the EU border regime, decrying their policies and condemning their practices (see Figures 9, 10 and 15).

**Resisting borders and border politics**

Most documented inscriptions from Mytilène and Moria are politically informed slogans that contest current border policies (Figures 9 and 10). Some chastise the workings of the European Union’s border regime, proclaim a different vision for immigration rights and border management and question whether certain foundational principles of both the Greek and European identity remain tenable in the light of the border and migration policy mishandlings.

Calls for borders’ abolishment and the cessation of deportations are common, as is the expression of indignation towards the role of humanitarian NGOs and the ‘refugee rescue industry’ (Figure 9a). Many messages demand the abolition of borders, safe passage, the fair processing of asylum claims and the supplementation of documents to the newly arrived (Figures 9d and 9f). Others speak against the illegalization and criminalization of migration (Figure 9c). Some messages address widespread populist and xenophobic discourses, dismissing the purported negative effect of migration on the labour market (Figure 9e). Some inscriptions deconstruct the division between locals and migrants, indicating common struggles faced by Greeks and migrants, and the need for joint action against the compounded crises they are subjected to: the financial one, and that of refugee reception and asylum (Figure 9b).
Calls to an ever-more restricted freedom of movement, as both a universal human right and one of the central EU policy pillars, are spray-painted on the container dwellings inside Moria (Figures 10a and 10b). Others expose the illusion that the EU is an area of safety and prosperity, debunking the myth of ‘the European dream’, with which the forcefully displaced are violently faced upon the continent’s doorstep (Figure 10c). Scattered graffiti elsewhere comments on human rights’ infringements such as one’s right to life, liberty, security and equality in dignity and rights. Another alludes to the concealment efforts regarding the humanitarian crisis’ magnitude on the island to safeguard the tourism industry and keep holiday-makers undisturbed (Figure 10d). Tourists’ and migrants’ wellbeing is valued differently, according to the graffiti, and the experiences of their differentiated bodies are worlds apart, encountering the same landscape either as a holiday resort, or a ‘death camp’. Migrants and tourists on Lesvos exist on two parallel, asymptotic planes, which, as in other beachfront border zones, prohibit encounters and meaningful engagement (Al-Mousawi 2015). Criticism is expressed towards the widespread discounting of Greece’s long-standing migratory and refugee history, and the erosion of philoxenia (hospitality). Greece’s dominant cultural code of dealing with alterity (Rozakou 2017b), indicated in graffiti such as these: ‘Our grandfathers were refugees, our parents were migrants, us racists?’, Mytiléne; ‘No detention can be hospitable’, Mytiléne—not pictured here.

Besides political graffiti, poem verses were also encountered (e.g., ‘No one leaves home unless home is the mouth of a shark, you only run for the border if the whole city is running as well’, Moria 2016); proverbs on loss and longing for a homeland (e.g., ‘Our only homeland is our childhood dreams’, Moria 2016), and excerpts from the Quran (not pictured here). Even such instances of less personal graffiti, however, assert one’s right of be/coming ‘here’ despite prohibitions and perils; urge migrants and activists to sustain hope in the face of adversity, and call out for solidarity with those affected by displacement and migration politics.

As Lesvos has turned into an emblematic example of the EU border regime’s workings, aside from its prominent national administrative and symbolic stature, it now sets a global paradigm on practices of, and attitudes towards migration management. The messages expressed across its public spaces and at locations of critical importance—such as the Moria hotspot, the city hall, the coastguard building, the central square and the port facilities among others—indicate a microgeography of resistance and solidarity that includes border struggles across time and space, as well as across lines of gender, class, and nationality. They reassert the right of newcomers to life, dignity, safety, personhood and presence as well as free mobility.

Their content resonates with questions raised by individuals, solidarity movements and researchers elsewhere in Greece and in the world, calling for a just and humane resolution to the currently untenable migrant and refugee reception system both on Lesvos and elsewhere. As such, they echo wider political movements and discourses currently at play, and have, therefore, the potential to bring about broad and lasting sociopolitical effects. On the other hand, the almost absolute monopolization of public expression by locals and activists in the island’s urban space—even though migrants and refugees roam the same spaces daily—indicates the persistent relegation of migrant voices into the margins of crucial discourses concerning their lives. As a result, an inadvertent process of rebordering takes place in the current debate on border politics.

Conclusion

The spaces of migrant and refugee arrival, transit and containment are rife with inscriptions that often remain unnoticed. Whether condemning contemporary migration and asylum policies, voicing solidarity with refugee struggles, expressing one’s innermost feelings while in detention, or piecing together a wavering sense of identity, this paper suggests that such border graffiti can offer important insights about the ways hegemonic discourses on migration are being experienced, negotiated and confronted from below in more (or less) obtrusive ways.

The messages inscribed by various people and groups that inhabit or cross borders trace the experiential topography of the borderscape, telling us of the myriad ways the northern Aegean maritime frontiers can be ‘experienced, lived as well as reinforced and blocked but also crossed, traversed and inhabited’ (Brambilla 2015, p. 17). These inscriptions often express the complexities of identity construction and social belonging within localities embedded in the epicentre of national and international border policy contexts. In doing so, the actors engaging in border graffiti open up the question of ‘de-essentializing the border landscape and reframing imaginaries that cope with the growing securitization of international limits’ (Dell’Agnese & Amilhat Szary 2015, p. 9). The ‘writings on the wall’ that we have recorded in this paper speak directly to the ways in which borders are in many ways ‘landscapes of competing meanings’ (Rajaram and Grundy-Warr 2007b, p. xv). As such, these inscriptions can also be perceived as bordering practices in themselves through which the border is ‘performed into being’ (Parker & Vaughan-Williams 2012 p. 729).
Whereas our analysis has departed from a close reading of these fleeting ‘writings on the wall’, the application of this phrase goes beyond its literal meaning to encompass its metaphorical dimensions. As such, the inscriptions serve as bearers of portentous, yet overlooked, notations of borders’ incipient essence, which lies partly in their capacity to legitimize violent, exclusionary and discriminatory practices that dehumanize irregular border-crossers (Jones 2016). Border graffiti cues to the silenced genealogies of individual and collective frontier struggles and of the multiple transgressions transpiring within the Aegean borderscape, as told by those whom the workings of contemporary border regimes have relegated into the margins of society and discourse.

The presence of the border graffiti, much like that of the border crossers themselves, is fleeting. The messages of resilience and contestation of the current migration policies that they express, however, remain constant and congruent with border struggles in Greece and elsewhere in the world. Despite the silencing or marginalization of the voices that try to raise awareness and condemn the longstanding complicity of national and European authorities in the current bleak—if not downright outrageous—picture of refugee reception in Greece and the EU, these voices persist. They call out the systematic violations of human rights and expose the lack of basic provisions and the human suffering inside camps run by national and EU authorities.

Contrary to contemporary depictions, the border graffiti chronicled in this paper gives evidence that the smuggled migrants’ presence on Lesvos had been as pervasive as it had been overlooked and deliberately unaccounted for since the late 1990s and early 2000s. Up until their recent explosive increase, the migrants’ pre-sunrise arrivals and their trudging roadside convoys, their urban huddles and their squalidly incarcerated packs were an open secret among the local as well as inter/national authorities and publics. Little was said and even less was done for the remediation of the conditions they faced, similarly to what successive waves of displaced populations arriving at or departing from Lesvos’ shores following centuries-old pathways experienced. In spite of the diachronic apathy to their plight, however, and the concerted efforts at effacing their traces, their inconsolable writings offer us a counterhistory of passage today.

Despite attempts at haphazard prettifying of the physical and communicative space around refugee settings, highlighted by the rushed figurative, and quite literal, whitewashing of the reality on the ground, those unsolicited, spontaneous forms of expression still manage to seep through the surface. The wall outside Moria’s old entrance, now a locked gate on a side street, bears witness to the layers of ongoing discourse around migration management and the constant whitewashing of the authorities’ failure to protect and upholding refugee rights (Figure 11).

Figure 11: Whitewashing the bordering practices of the EU outside Moria (Moria 2016). ‘EU shame on you’ Photo by Ioanna Wagner Tsoni.

Notes

1 To grasp the magnitude of the phenomenon relative to Lesvos’ geographical and population size (1,639 km2 and 86,500 inhabitants as per the latest National Census of 2011), according to Hellenic Coast Guard data, 502,433 unauthorised entries were officially recorded on Lesvos in 2015 alone (Rontos, Nagopoulos and Panagos, 2019).

2 Metapolitefsi (Greek, translated as “polity/regime change”) marks a period in modern Greek history after the fall of the military junta of 1967–74. It is the longest period of political and social stability in the modern history of Greece and includes the transitional period from the fall of the dictatorship to the 1974 legislative elections and the democratic period immediately after these elections until the present.

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Bordering the Future? The ‘Male Gaze’ in the Blade Runner Films and Originating Novel *

Kathleen Staudt **

Philip K. Dick (1928-1982), author of numerous science fiction narratives from the 1950s-1980s, some of which Hollywood made into films, grappled with the nature of reality, the meaning of humanness, and border crossing between humans and androids (called ‘replicants’ in the films). The socially constructed female and male protagonists in these narratives have yet to be analyzed with a gender gaze that draws on border studies. This paper analyzes two Blade Runner films, compares them to the Philip K. Dick (PKD) narrative, and applies gender, feminist, and border concepts, particularly border crossings from human to sentient beings and androids. In this paper, I argue that the men who wrote and directed the films established and crossed multiple metaphoric borders, but wore gender blinders that thereby reinforced gendered borders as visualized and viewed in the U.S. and global film markets yet never addressed the profoundly radical border crossing notions from PKD.

In Philip K. Dick’s (PKD) science fiction novel, Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?, characters performed as gendered beings, even in stereotyped ways, but they displayed androgynous behaviors; female protagonists played markedly different and stronger roles, unlike in the films. PKD’s not-so-cool-sounding central male ‘bounty hunter’ was renamed ‘blade runner’ in the Hollywood films. And for PKD’s novel, empathy is the key characteristic separating human from android, whatever and whomever designed or birthed these creatures in their hybridized worlds. In the novel, empathy with living and sentient beings, including animals, is the essence of humanness. Real animals are celebrated and valued, in contrast to the less valued android (electronic) animals. The common thread in the novel and films involves answers to a foundational question long asked in spiritual, anthropological, and philosophic deliberations: What does it mean to

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be human? To clarify even more, we also need to ask whether humanness is gendered. The use of literary and graphic metaphors in alternative universes permits us to engage in “thought experiments,” as science fiction pacifist-anarchist-feminist Ursula LeGuin would call them (LeGuin 2017). This paper does not cover the enormous ground possible—the field of science fiction and film is huge—in analyses of science fiction, gender, and borders, but rather examines this fertile soil in two visually startling high-profile films and a novel.

Feminist theorist and critic of binary dualisms, Donna Haraway wrote in “A Cyborg Manifesto” that we are all “chimeras, theorized and fabricated as hybrids of machine and organism... the relation of which has been a border war” (1991: 292). She draws from Taylorism to the integrated circuits of contemporary technology, in the name of defense, of “male appropriation of women’s bodies in a masculinist orgy of war” (1991: 295) or as fearless human kinship with machines, animals, multiple identities, and contradictions. Her position is the latter, but she gave the first Blade Runner film a “pass” in a lone sentence perhaps not recognizing the power of film visual imagery to reinforce the former, the “masculinist orgy of war.” In Practices of Looking, now in its third edition, Marita Sturken and Lisa Cartwright offer an expansive text on the increasing importance of the visual compared to the narrative, including popular culture such as films and television series. Indeed, feminist and film theorists and their readers probably exercise minuscule impacts on sizeable global audiences compared to blockbuster films like iterations of Blade Runner.

The paper is divided in three sections. The first provides conceptual and theoretical perspectives. In the second, I recap the films, focusing on gender and exaggerated femininity and sexuality among somewhat minor female characters. After that, I contrast PDK’s novel with the films, but more pointedly in the third section on the novel and films. The concluding section ties ideas and the argument together, with reference to theorists and foundational science fiction.

I. Conceptual and theoretical perspectives

Here, I make brief reference to concepts as I use them in my recap the various borders that are crossed or maintained in the films and novel: bordering, rebordering, debordering, co-mingling, mental maps, and hybridized societies along with the beings who move back and forth from the categorical borderlands including alienated, co-existent, interdependent, and integrated. Territorial and identity lines (bordering) range from hardening or increasing, often with surveillance and controls, to softening or lessening (de-bordering) and re-bordering in response to threat and/or new identities. With the contact that comes with interdependence and integration, co-mingling can occur in ways not immediately clear to viewers and readers. Readers, film directors, writers and viewers, just like many geographically minded border scholars, engage in mental mapping of these powerful visual images that may or may not coincide with territorial or physical maps.

Gender is a social construct that manifests itself differently in historical time and place. Among the earliest to challenge the near-ubiquitous gendered borders was prolific science fiction writer, the late Ursula Le Guin (1929-2018) (with whom PKD communicated) who wrote The Left Hand of Darkness in the same era as PKD wrote Do Androids... In Left Hand..., confusion sets in during a male galactic diplomat’s long-term visit to a planet where ambi-sexual non-gendered people enter a fertile “kemmering” period in monthly cycles, in just one-fifth of each month. The visitor always brought assumptions to encounters with his stereotyped perceptions of men and women. Thus, both PKG and Le Guin employed gender themes and Le Guin transcended gender, although she used male pronouns and regretted that as she wrote later in her Redux to “Is Gender Necessary?” yet planted some surprising phrases, such as “the king was pregnant” (2017). BR-I and II not only imposed firm, heavily controlled bordered gender constructs on characters, but sexualized most of the women; and in BR II, deviated from the foundation to make male impregnation and female reproduction the sine qua non of the defining feature of humanness. These directors reinforced and exaggerated gender constructs.

The body of the paper culminates in my contrast of the films with PDK’s book, raising questions about those who direct and script-write films in the way they respect, fantasize, and/or even reinforce hardened gendered borders as they cross borders from novels to films. As British feminist film theorist Laura Mulvey wrote in her 1975 “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema,” later in her book (1989), those who direct, write, and fund representations of historic large-scale Hollywood film productions often brought a “male gaze” of voyeurism and narcissism to the process for an assumed predominately male audience, and I would add, heteronormative (Mulvey 1989). With their particular gaze, and whether intentional or not, the effect of these powerful directors, script-writers, and producer-funders shaped the minds of millions of viewers, not only in the United States but in exports to a global film audience. While BR-I initially flopped in...
1982, it grew to gain a cult status reputation and was reissued in 2007 and subtitled *The Final Cut*. BR-II cost $150 million to make, and from [www.th-numbers.com](http://www.th-numbers.com), we learn that domestic (US) and international sales generated $258 million, the majority of it outside the U.S., thus reinforcing the global impact. While DVD and rental sales are unknown, those additional sales surely magnify the impact. Countless numbers of global Netflix viewers can instantly stream the films in their homes.

In film studies, Auteur (author) Theory focuses on the directors, their backgrounds, and the baggage they bring to their powerful role. Even now, over 80% of major generously financed film directors are white men. Despite the recent acclaim given to directors like Ava DuVerney, Guillermo del Toro, Patty Jenkins, Alejandro González Iñárritu, and Alfonso Cuaron.

Let us reflect momentarily on these white men who directed BR films. Ridley Scott, an Englishman born in 1937, is a generation older than the French-Canadian Denis Villeneuve, born in 1967. Although Scott pays homage to PKD in film credits, he thought the novel too complex: On the Independent Movie Data Base site for BR-I, Scott is quoted as saying that he couldn’t get through it ([www.imdb.com](http://www.imdb.com)). I find this shocking and amazing, given the continual reference to PKD in the credits. Both Scott and Villeneuve directed multiple films, including those with women protagonists (who did more than talk to other women about men, the so-called Bechdel Test). Scott directed *Alien* (1979) and its sequels with a strong, sexualized woman at the center who led a corporate-run space ship named Ripley (similar to Ridley). After a male officer, attacked (raped [?] in his chest) by an alien monster, another monster painfully emerges. Was that birth? It was “owes her one,” as he said so won’t gun her down, perhaps this was a cue that she was “asking for it”). Deckard kisses her, but she initially walks away like it. He says, “now you kiss me,” and she replies “I can’t.” He says “I want you” and “say you want me.” And the rest is history.

Several Nexus 6 replicants, gendered in appearance as male and female and designed to last four years, rebelled and returned to earth. They looked like humans and worked to respond to bio-metric tests of their quick response to cultural/linguistic contextual questions. They were androids, yes, but they were crossing, became hybridized, and developed feelings about exploitation, love, and anger.

Set in both 2019 and 2049, the monopoly Tyrell Corporation ruled the world; its CEO and staff constantly sought to advance android technology while simultaneously to pursue harsh re-bordering strategies to control populations with drones, blade runners, and technology. In the analytic descriptions below, we can see some contrasts, deviations and perhaps advances, from one film and one director to the next film and director, namely in the re-bordering and hybridization occurring between humans and androids. The contrasts with PKD and the absence of animals as sentient beings, following the film critique below, are more striking.

### Blade Runner-I

In BR-I, only a 117-minute film, we view few female parts (10 talking men, 3 talking women). At its core, the film is Blade Runner’s adventure; he is loner individual Deckard tracking down remaining super-strong replicants (2 men and 2 women), but a love story is born. Corporate giant Tyrell introduces Deckard to Rachael, a beautiful and intelligent replicant longing to be human. She is dressed and coiffed in non-sexualized 1940s style, complete with shoulder pads and furs. Like other replicants, she had memories implanted in her brain to make her think she was human. After she saves Deckard’s life (a Nexus 6 was beating him to death), he not only “owes her one,” as he said so won’t gun her down, but also seems to fall in love with her. However, the two-minute scene (minutes 102-4) to consummate sex looks like rape (although she lets her hair down; perhaps this was a cue that she was “asking for it”). Deckard kisses her, but she initially walks away perhaps trying to escape; he then grabs her and pushes her against the wall. Is she crying? It looks like it. He says, “now you kiss me,” and she replies “I can’t.” He says “I want you” and “say you want me.” And the rest is history.

In the DVD’s special features, four production-process narrators comment on the beauty of the scene, as sexy saxophone music plays in the background. One of the men narrators said that Kate (associated with production) thought the scene lacked tenderness, but the consensus was that Harrison Ford (who played Deckard) “played it rough” and so they went with it. The scene exemplifies the male gaze in filmmaking, designed by mostly men for what
was assumed to be a mostly male audience. In BR-I, women are white except for brightly lit sexualized Asian female images on the walls of skyscrapers.

**Blade Runner-II**

In the longer (164 minutes) BR-II, viewers learn of technological advances that the new Tyrell Corporation CEO Niander Wallace developed with this more gender-balanced cast of characters (7 women, 7 men). Several, but not all women are sexualized including, in intersectional terms, a responsive hologram with a Spanish accent played by the only actress with a Spanish surname. Set 30 years after the first film, viewers learn of an even bleaker world: no vegetation, slug farming for protein, mass devastation, and child-labor slaves at a factory-orphanage. More advanced replicants now populate the earth—signifying perhaps reordered, integrated borders—with some professionals, technicians, and even a major assistant to corporate mogul Wallace, the ruthless Luv, stronger and smarter than Nexus 6 models from the past. She kills an equally ruthless human female, Lt. Joshi the police chief to whom K, the Blade Runner (actor Ryan Gosling), reported, played by Robin Wright. As Chief Joshi orders K to find replicants, she says in border metaphors “The world is built on a wall…. It separates kinds… Tell either side there’s no wall and you bought a war or a slaughter.” K is reluctant to kill (remember the euphemism ‘retire’) “something born before, [evoking the human-android reproductive border trope] because to be born is to have a soul.” Religious and reproductive imagery pervades BR-II: a “child is born,” leading to a surprising climax, (which I will not spoil for readers), perhaps a savior (to androids) reminiscent of other films *Children of Men* (2006) (a book originally written by P.D. James in 1992) and of *Matrix* (2006).

The *sine qua non* of BR-II is the search for a female replicant who may have given birth; her skeletal remains show her replicant serial number. Police Chief Joshi wants the evidence destroyed, but at Tyrell, Wallace and his agent Luv want to find the offspring to further develop the procreative technology to make cheap disposable replicant labor. Was Rachael the mother and Deckard the father? Is K the offspring? Is the offspring even male? Does the cameo appearance of Harrison Ford as Deckard really matter? No spoiler alerts here! However, several interesting features of BR-II involve the male-gaze advances in sexualizing women and the use of gendered intersectional constructs. K’s live-in partner, Joi, is a devoted Spanish-accented hologram who can cook dinner, change clothes within seconds, and respond to K’s every whim. In a most unusual pre-sex scene, she invites Mariette, a white sex-worker, to blend with in order for K to experience embodied sex. Once he is on the run from law enforcement, Joi’s parting gift of love is to invite him to “delete her” and their memories so that he can escape without detection.

Viewers may be in for a sequel, as a hopeful pre-closure emerges with the visibility of a revolutionary force, led by Freysa, played by Palestinian actress Hiam Abbass. She urges K (now called Joe) to join revolutionaries because a replicant “baby means we are more than slaves. More human than humans.”

**III. Philip K. Dick, author, *Do Androids dream of Electric Sheep?***

PKD’s novel is an almost-androgynous portrayal of a post-environmental disaster society which made most animals extinct and intellectually deteriorated humans (a hybrid of their former selves?). The story line and themes portray a far-different version of the male-gazed Hollywood fantasies of BR-I and II.

Set in 2021, (not 2019 like Ridley’s film), the book begins with Rick Deckard, an underpaid bounty hunter who retires/kills androids to supplement his income. He is married to Iran who chides him for his killing work, but apparently she brings in no income in this still-gender-bordered household world. Their goal is to get enough bounty money to buy a highly valued authentic and real sheep, traded in for the electric (android) sheep that grazes on the roof of their apartment building. Their seemingly contented life is modulated by the mood-altering device in which they can dial up feelings, such as Dial 594 which a wife dials to display “pleased acknowledgment of husband’s superior wisdom in all matters,” PKD’s clever critique of patriarchal props. PKD sets the grim, post-war (WWT, i.e. World War Terminus), stage in Chapter 1, a society in which people dread war and its damaging environmental consequences: much animal extinction, foul odors, sunlessness, and dust that gradually destroys people, making them “biologically unacceptable.”

Reverence for animals appears in all twenty chapters, an absence in the BR films with no concern for animals or their extinction, though cooked slugs served as protein in BR II. Occasionally, viewers see an owl in BR-I. In an open-air market, I thought I saw a sheep (android or real?) for 10 seconds, (perhaps an editing mistake?). When K meets up with Deckard in the last part of BR-II, Deckard throws liquor on the floor for his dog, but when K asks about the dog, Deckard says he doesn’t know if the dog is real or android.

Both bleak films differ from the world described in the novel, *Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?*. In PKD’s Chapter 2, we learn more about earth society—one in which there IS community in the San
Francisco, CA, Nob Hill apartment complex where neighborly connections exist. Nevertheless, people live in a dark and dying planet from which they leave for colony planets, incentivized by U.N.-managed provisions of “android servants.” PKD introduces readers to the “theological and moral structure of Mercerism,” which shapes the meaning of humanness: the capacity for empathy.

In Chapter 2, we are introduced to John Isidore for whom the poisonous pollution gradually destroyed him biologically; he is unfit for reproduction, so much so he is nicknamed a waste product (chicken head). Isidore uses the “black empathy box” (television) to watch a prophet-like Wilbur Mercer struggle to get up a hill only to fall back. Isidore felt the struggle and experienced the pain in this empathetic fusion process. Later in another chapter, a populist figure on the television raises questions about whether Mercer is fake. Is Mercer a hoax? An opiate of the masses? Mercer’s existence is open to interpretation. Border crossing language might offer insights on human-to-semi-human biological deterioration or technology to acquire human essence—empathy—and fuse (co-mingle) with the spiritual being. In the films, Mercer and Mercerism go unmentioned, as does empathy.

On his way to work, the novel begins with Deckard passing a pet shop, longing for a real animal with a price he could afford and making a down payment based on the contract money he will receive from retiring replicants. In his office we read dialogue from male bosses and women secretaries, titled by gendered statuses of Miss and Mrs. We hear more on the true test of humanness: empathy, not intelligence, as measured in the Voigt-Kampff Empathy Test, an instrument shaped by Mercerism. “Empathy evidently existed only within the human community;” whereas intelligence is found in everything including plants. “The empathetic gift blurred the boundaries [my emphasis] between hunter and victim, between the successful and the defeated.” Totally contrasting with the book, the BR-I and BR-II films portray a high-tech, violent world of radical individualism; empathy is nowhere to be found.

Only 75% into the novel (I have a Kindle!) does the intimate, but instrumental scene emerge between Deckard and Rachael Rosen (Chapters 16 and 17). She had offered to help him ‘retire’ three remaining replicants, (Roy and ‘his wife’—a gendered possessive status)—plus Pris, whom Rachael thought she resembled), an offer Deckard initially refused. Gradually, he realized he needed her help. They arranged to meet in a hotel. Wearing a fish-scale coat and underwear, she brought a valuable pre-war bourbon bottle and seduced him, neither vice versa nor a rape, as in the voyeuristic BR-I gaze/fantasy. Part of Rosen Associates, Rachael was sent on the mission (an intimate mission she had embarked on nine times before with others), but she claimed love for Deckard and wondered if and what childbearing would be like for an android. Rachael, characterized as intelligent and proactive, neither succumbed to Deckard nor longed to be with him. Her outer appearance was gendered; her behavior, androgynous.

By the novel’s end, we learn of Deckard’s remarkable achievement in killing six replicants in one day and thus acquiring the money necessary to pay off the real goat that he longed to care for, grazing on his roof. Yet we are horrified to learn that a woman in a fish-scaled coat (remember Rachael!) pushed the goat off the roof. Deckard traveled to the Oregon wasteland, struggled like Mercer to climb a hill, and found what he thought was a real toad (considered extinct), but upon return to San Francisco, Iran found the electric system in the toad’s belly: still better than nothing, but in capitalist calculation, worth less than half the price of a real toad.

So Rachael was not the sweet and clinging love as characterized in BR-I, but behaved in a non-empathetic way, as did replicants who stayed in Isidore’s apartment who wantonly pulled off four of a spider’s eight legs (to Isidore’s horror). Thus, the end of PKD’s novel is sad and wistful, still emphasizing empathy with living beings, including animals, but why not androids? How human can Deckard be? Readers do not know if androids dream of electric sheep, but those few in the book did not dream, unless PDK wrote Deckard as an android all along.

Reflection and closure

In this paper I have compared two visually powerful blockbuster films with the novel from which they are based, using border, feminist, and gender concepts. While the writers and directors constantly engage with border and boundary themes, they did not transcend the limitations of contemporary gender constructions but rather fostered the spectacle: “masculinist orgy of war” of men who appropriated women’s bodies (to use Haraway’s previously cited words).

My point in this paper was to emphasize both the gendered worlds in film and book and the difference between the films with their “male gazes” compared to Philip K. Dick, certainly a writer trapped by his own gendered time and space, but one who shared the following key understandings. He:

- was obsessed with human and animal life;
- saw empathy as key to humanness in a spirituality called Mercerism;
- highlighted community, neighborliness, and family;
• abhorred violence and wrote no gratuitous violence in the narrative (though ‘retirement’ exists); and
• gendered his characters, but allowed the fusion of stereotypically masculine and feminine in androgynous or perhaps better called human behavior. However, androids are sometimes referred to as “it” in official reports (pronouns matter!).

In contrast, the directors and script-writers of BR-I and II, Ridley Scott and Denis Villeneuve

• gave no reverence or attention to animal life or extinction, except as undermining the food supply;
• highlighted no overarching moral code or spirituality, Mercerism or otherwise;
• emphasized radical individualism and sexualized both androids and holograms (with one exception in BR-II), using technology and gratuitous violence, such as Wallace slitting the uterine sack, then stabbing and bleeding out a beautifully bodied adult female replicant who had been birthed whole; and
• gendered their characters, but turned males and females into hegemonic masculine figures and a biological human female (one exception: the possible conception of a hybrid human-replicant).

Clearly, thirty years later, director Villeneuve made some advances compared to Scott, such as an integrated human-android borderland, co-mingled behaviors, and possible conception between androids or humans and androids—a reproduction trope to de-border and hybridize formerly bordered lines. Yet the gratuitous violence and the sexual playmates for K were nowhere be found in PKD. No doubt a BR-III sequel will eventually be made, given the profitable enterprises thus far with even more fully developed border crossings between humans and androids. Will reproductive issues be resolved? Will gender disappear? Will men give birth to hybridized beings? Will new directors use different mental maps? What would that world look like?

Directors have taken many liberties with PDK to use their own “mental maps.” Recently, Amazon Prime produced an instant-stream ten-part series titled Electric Dreams (2017) each a different story line, different director and script-writer. Supposedly, PDK’s novels and short stories inspired each one. One of PDK’s daughters authorized the title of the series, but seemed to exercise little control over the adaptations, just as Hollywood filmmakers took liberties with their adaptations with BR-I and BR-II. Two of the ten in the series stand out for me as reflecting a gender-balanced nuanced quality: Human Is and Kill the Others. Not knowing the directors and screen writers in advance, I checked their names to find that they were the only two productions with both women at the helm of the direction and the script.

As far back as the 1970s, various types of feminist authors wrote dazzling science fiction, a genre that has grown to embrace all the complexities of the intersections among class, race/ethnicity, and language. One might point to Charlotte Perkins Gilman, who wrote Herland (1915) about three hopefully stereotyped men who traveled to an idealized women’s world, or even to pioneering science-fiction writer Mary Wollstonecraft Godwin Shelley who wrote Frankenstein (1818) and the warped multiple adaptations of her novel on Hollywood films. On the century anniversary since Shelley’s death, Muriel Spark criticized “stripping out nearly all the sex and birth, everything female” from the films. While Haraway views cyborgs as “creatures of a post-gender world,” her one-sentence reference to the first Blade Runner film seems to give it a pass, for in my view, as analyzed in this article, his film reinforces masculinist control imagery. The films use powerful visuals to reach an exponentially larger audience than specialized feminist and film theorists.

In this paper, I am not pursuing an essentialist biological dead end, as most feminists rightly critique, but rather an interest in complex visual productions that have the potential to engage and unpack the gendered borders in our world—a world in which women’s experiences—whether in reproduction or non-reproduction—become part of the story rather than some Alpha Male version of humanness that glorifies violence or a biological incubator for hybrid offspring. Border studies allow us to think outside the “territorial traps” of the nation-state (as political geographer John Agnew so eloquently analyzed). So also do science fiction stories and their metaphoric societies allow us to imagine and think outside the boundaries of gender and our contemporary world. To join border studies with the analysis of a science fiction novel and its imperfect (gendered, even violently warped) adaptation into films allows us to interrogate mental maps and male gazes in the world ahead.

Notes

1 Androgyny is a dated concept from the 1970s and 1980s which refers to combined masculine and feminine behaviors that reflect time and spatial stereotypes. A spate of studies by Sandra Bem reported on the Bem Sex-Role Inventory, a survey instrument based on identification with multiple adjectives, most of them obviously stereotyped, that coded respondents from feminine and near feminine to androgynous to near
masculine and masculine. At the time, my score put me at ‘near-masculine,’ a not surprising identifier given my socialization in a heavily male-dominated discipline like political science.

2 I am not celebrating or psychologizing author PKD who underwent numerous stages in his paranoid and troubled life, (over)use of amphetamines, visions, and religious delusions in several years before death. The 2008 documentary repeats several times that he dwelt on the death of his female twin, who died less than two months after his birth and that it put him in touch with what friends called his ‘feminine side.’

3 In PKD pictures posted on the Internet, he often positions a cat next to his face.

4 Oscar Martinez developed these categories in Border People, University of Arizona Press, 1994. Films have rarely been analyzed with a borderlands gaze, but see Staudt, 2014.

5 For a discussion of bordering, de-bordering, and re-bordering, see the introduction by Kathleen Staudt and David Spener in the Spener and Staudt, ed The U.S.-Mexico Border: Transcending Divisions and Contesting Identities and the later, updated border studies concepts and theories in Staudt, 2017. The concept ‘co-mingling’ comes from Herzog and Sohn in their analysis of the San Diego-Tijuana borderlands, moving from an interdependent and integrated borderland.

6 When love partners enter kemmer, hormonal changes occur that allow them to either impregnate or conceive and give birth. If pregnant, the person’s hormonal production is prolonged through lactation. Nevertheless, Le Guin used male pronouns for people, regretted later (p. 1043).

7 See Christine Etherington-Wright and Ruth Doughty, Understanding Film Theory (NY: Palgrave Macmillan 2011), Chapter 9 and 11; Harry M. Benshoff and Sean Griffin, America on Film: Representing Race, Class, Gender, and Sexuality at the Movies (London: Blackwell-Wiley 2009, second edition) with the running theme throughout the book that the U.S. was “founded on and still adheres to the dominant ideology of white patriarchal capitalism” p. 9; and <https://womeninfil.htm/ffl (> with contrasting percentages of women directors in 2002 and 2014: 1.9% (top 100 films) to 26.9% (Sundance, consisting of more experimental, innovative films).

8 For the Bechtel Test: <http://bechdeltest.com/>

9 In the documentary, Philip K. Dick: The Penultimate Truth (Kultur 2008), the 89 minute film featuring interviews with PKD’s friends, psychiatrist, co-authors, and several of his five wives, viewers learn that PDK friend Kevin Wayne Jeter published several sequels to Blade Runner, including Blade Runner 3: Replicant Night (1996) which developed the idea of a replicant giving birth (see later section of this paper on the reproduction theme in BR-II), yet Jeter was not credited as one of screen writers <www.imdb.com> in that or the earlier film.

10 Muriel Spark is quoted in Lepore 2018, p. 88, who draws parallels between the nameless “monster” once conscious of his construction and the injustice—ie like the autobiography of a slave—and the writing of Frederick Douglass.

11 Haraway has one line on BR-I, referring to Rachel (sic) and the cyborg culture’s image of “fear, love, and confusion” (1991, p. 313). I believe Haraway missed the opportunity to critique Scott’s construction of female cyborgs. I thank Asha Dan’el for alerting me to Haraway’s relevance for this paper.

Works Cited


Nevertheless I long — I pine, all my days —
to travel home and see the dawn of my return.
And if a god will wreck me yet again on the wine-dark sea,
I can bear that too, with a spirit tempered to endure.
Much have I suffered, labored long and hard by now
in the waves and wars. Add this to the total —
bring the trial on!
— The Odyssey, Homer

Introduction

Home. Belonging. Identity. These are some of the
most common words one encounters in every
migrant’s story. Words that appear so simple but
prove rather complex upon closer examination.
Words that change and take shape with the migrant
through the duration of their journey as the migrant
simultaneously changes through them. Home no
longer remains a physical, still, entity. It comes to
life through the journey, stretching and expanding
from the physical into the outward — it becomes
mobile; grounded yet changing (Ralph & Staeheli
2011, 518; Zhang 2004, 104). Such are the homes of
the children born to the life of mobility; children who
involuntarily cross borders at birth or preadoles-
cence, forming identities and a sense of belonging
around cultures, languages and places that are not
a part of their ‘home’. What happens then, when
such individuals are forced by their circumstances
to go back to their perceived origins — to go ‘home’
leaving behind their adopted ‘home’?

The rapid economic growth in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) region has
enticed flocks of expatriates from all over the world to the region in hopes of
attaining a better quality of life. These expats often migrate with their spouses
and children in tow bringing to light a new challenge for the Arab world: mobile
youth. This research aims to find if the journey ‘home’ (repatriation) plays a role
in developing these mobile children’s sense of belonging to a ‘home’, and if so, to
which ‘home’. In order to do this, the research will conduct a theoretical analysis
of these mobile youth born or raised within the Gulf by analysing one-on-one
structured interviews through the lens of the theory of belonging, and the study
of language and culture. This research concludes that in fact, mobile youth build
their sense of belonging in relation to multiple ‘homes’ and not just to their
‘adopted’ or ‘parental’ home.

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enticed expatriates from all over the world to the region in hopes of attaining
a better quality of life. These expats often migrate with their spouses and children in
tow bringing to light a new challenge for the Arab world: mobile youth. Though the migration of expats in
the region is not new, and has garnered a fair bit of academic interest around the topic, yet, arguably the most vital aspect of the expatriate’s journey in the region remains overlooked in research — the final phase of an expatriate’s journey: repatriation. The process of repatriation is especially made more complicated when it centers itself around children who not only migrate involuntarily but are also made to repatriate involuntarily (usually by the will of their parents).

**Definition**

Due to a sharp increase in transnational identities around the world, migration studies today provide us with several theoretical lenses to analyse the economic, political, and social ties forged by migrants across various borders. Scholars like Rouse (1991), Guarnizo (1997), and Kyle (2000) believe that a mobile relationship between ‘man’ and ‘soil’ provides a mobile migrant with ‘bifocality’, ‘dual frame of reference’, or ‘bionationality’, all of which are created and maintained by the migrant himself. Their host nations and nations of their ‘origins’ create a push and pull force of cultures, traditions, and everyday life practices that cause the migrant to be influenced by both places instead of just one. Thus, making it difficult for them to accept a single place (soil) as their absolute ‘home’.

This interpretation of home challenges the previously held perceptions of ‘home’ as a bounded and still presence. Instead, it portrays ‘home’ as a mobile, unclear and often, chaotic entity. Therefore, as migrants travel, their identities are caught up in a continual push and pull of their ‘new’ and ‘old’ worlds, leading to the formation of their composite belonging to multiple ‘homes’.

Rooted in these definitions is our concept of ‘home’ in relation to the mobile youth of the Gulf, or more specifically, Dubai, the focus of this study. As they trek through countries, they station and un-station themselves several times (often across continents) throughout their lives. Often times, they stop and ponder over homes lost and built and lost and re-built over time. Pondering still, over building a home, or journeying home only to find that home, or vice versa, or possibly both. It hopes to explain why mobile youth face difficulties when forming a sense of belonging and rootedness towards a single state due to the transnational nature of their identities. The research would also like to uncover the manner in which these youth form their sense of belonging to a ‘home’ in the first place, as they live in a continuous state of nostalgia for their origins, while searching for a ‘home’. In short, this research hypothesizes that in fact, mobile youth build their sense of belonging in relation to multiple ‘homes’ and not just to their ‘adopted’ or ‘parental’ homes.

**Aims & Hypothesis**

This research aims to find if the journey ‘home’ (repatriation) plays a role in developing mobile youth’s sense of belonging to a ‘home’, and if so, to which ‘home’. It hopes to find whether repatriation increases the mobile children’s sense of belonging to their parental ‘home’ over their adopted ‘home’, or vice versa, or possibly both. It hopes to explain why mobile youth face difficulties when forming a sense of belonging and rootedness towards a single state due to the transnational nature of their identities. The research would also like to uncover the manner in which these youth form their sense of belonging to a ‘home’ in the first place, as they live in a continuous state of nostalgia for their origins, while searching for a ‘home’. In short, this research hypothesizes that in fact, mobile youth build their sense of belonging in relation to multiple ‘homes’ and not just to their ‘adopted’ or ‘parental’ homes.

**Research Design**

This research seeks to uncover a link between repatriation and mobile youth’s formation of their sense of belonging to a ‘home’. To do this, the research will be conducted as a theoretical study of two independent groups of mobile youth. Group A, will consist of mobile youth currently residing in the Gulf who have at least made one journey home since they started living in the Gulf. They must have had resided in the region since the ages of 0-10 years, or may have been born there. Group B, on the other hand, will consist of mobile youth who once resided in the Gulf and have either repatriated to their parental ‘homes’ or migrated to another country outside of the Gulf. They must also have had been residing in the region since the ages of 0-10 years, or may have been born there.

**The Sample**

To further control variables and to ensure as reliable and credible a result as possible, all participants were confirmed to have been currently residing or to have had previously resided in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), specifically in Dubai, and that they all shared similar cultural backgrounds as their ‘origin’ with the exception of only three (further discussed under the ‘identification’ sub-section). Furthermore, only participants between the ages of 18 years and up were selected for this research. It is also important to note that all participants taking part in this research shared similar educational and socio-economic backgrounds, i.e. they all came from expatriate families and international schooling. It was also ensured that any repatriations that took place within the participants of Group A and Group B were not state-endorsed, rather done so voluntarily or undertaken due to the wishes...
of their parents (guardians). All interviews were conducted in English only, and the questions of the interviews were kept from the participants until the commencement of the interview itself, where they were made aware of the questions as they were being interviewed.

**Case Selection**

Dubai is a coastal territory of the UAE, located on the southeast coast of the Persian Gulf that shares a southern border with Oman (Figure 1). I have selected Dubai as my case study as it is part of one of the most progressive and developed countries in the Gulf that also currently holds the world’s strongest passport. Dubai is also highly metropolitan and as such, is a melting pot of ethnicities, races, nationalities, religions, and cultures. Its total population currently stands at over 1.6 million, and is expected to reach 3 million by 2030. Across the UAE, the total of Emirati citizens only make-up for less than 20% of the total population; 83% of the population consists of expatriates from Asia, Africa, Australia, Europe and North America. This, according to the International Organization for Migration, makes Dubai the world’s most cosmopolitan city in the entire world.

Dubai, being one of UAE’s seven emirates, is also a compelling study in the context of migration due to the implementation of their unique citizenship and naturalization laws in the region. UAE citizenship may be acquired by virtue of law, or through citizenship or naturalization procedures as set by law according to the Federal Law No.17 of 1972 on Nationality and Passports, amended by Federal Law No. 10 of 1975 and Decree Law No. 16 of 2017. One may apply for naturalization at the General Directorate of Residency and Foreigners Affairs (GDRFA) of their relevant emirate (2019).

However, the naturalization avenues available to expatriate families, akin to those addressed in this paper, are minimal as the Emirati naturalization laws are heavily based around the lawful union of a foreigner to a national through the act of marriage. These naturalization applications are reviewed and processed by an advisory committee referred to as the Federal Authority for Identity and Citizenship (ICA), consisting of seven members representing each of the seven emirates of the UAE (2019).

It is important to note that in the broader context of the Gulf citizenship laws, citizenship is regarded as

![Figure 1. Map source: University of Texas Library, Perry-Castañeda Library, Map Collection](image-url)
a privilege (a gift) and not as a right of its residents. The UAE is no exception to this. Under the citizenship and naturalization laws of the UAE, a foreigner born in the UAE to foreign parents has no right to the Emirati nationality. The only exceptions to this are the following:

i. A child born in the UAE whose origins and parents are unknown may have the right to attain an Emirati nationality, or

ii. In accordance to a decree issued by the President of the UAE, an ‘exceptional’ migrant may be granted the Emirati nationality (given that the ‘exceptional’ migrant is willing to renounce their existing nationality(ies)).

Given these facts, Dubai would make for a decidedly interesting case study on transnational identities in a region that is currently not being studied or researched for the effects of repatriation on its transnational residents.

Method, Data Collection & Operationalization

The first step in data collection was to review secondary articles from various databases to scour prior research on the themes of repatriation in relation to the formation of a sense of belonging to a ‘home’. This step identified theories of belonging that helped to perform a theoretical analysis of the data gathered in the second step.

In the second step, information was gathered through interviews. The method utilized one-on-one interviews, entirely conducted via Skype video calls (with the exception of one that was conducted only as a Skype audio call) where the reactions, expressions, body language and the tone of voice of the participants were clearly recorded and observed. These interviews were then archived through screen recording software, as well as audio recording devices, and were then transcribed. First in short-hand as the interview took place, and later transcribed digitally in full. The method utilized was open-ended structured questions in order to generate relevant information without losing track of the conversation and allowing interviewees to elaborate upon their answers. Furthermore, previously scripted questions and structured interviews helped to establish constant variables during the interviewing process so that the interviews could then be compared and contrasted with one another in a fair and credible manner (Schaffer 2006, 187).

The interviews also looked to engage the participants in a conversation where the participants were given the opportunity to express themselves fully in terms of language. The language itself will be looked at and analyzed in its use as well as its context so as to not take anything away from its meaning. In order to motivate the participants to share their opinions freely, use of judgement questions was made as judgement questions require the interviewee to share their opinions and make clear judgements that help to reveal their position on a topic at hand. Furthermore, elaboration prompts, example prompts, cultural logic questions and restatement questions were also largely utilized to encourage the participants to give more information or to clarify their position with examples and explanations without trying to steer their opinion or position on the matter. Additionally, direct questions were also utilized throughout the duration of the interview to ensure that the participants fully understood what it was that was being asked of them in the interview (Schaffer 2006, 187). Typically, the interviews lasted somewhere between 30 and 45 minutes.

Furthermore, all participants of the research are referred to with pseudonyms in this paper to protect their identity and confidentiality since the topic concerns sensitive, personal, and at times controversial, data. Their pseudonyms will be, Leyla, Arjun, Lulu and Noha, under Group A; and Basil, Remy, Hachim, and Fynn under Group B.

Literature Review: The Politics of Belonging

There are two main schools of scholarly thought on the topic of belonging, or more specifically, on the formation of the sense of belonging towards a physical and metaphorical ‘home’ among migrants in relation to repatriation. Both camps acknowledge repatriation as being a fundamental step in an expatriate’s journey when assessing their formation of a sense of belonging to a place. They also view ‘home’ as a mobile being that shifts, grows, and changes with the migrant throughout their journey. Despite these similarities, the two camps disagree in a number of other ways when interpreting the effects of repatriation in relation to a migrant’s sense of belonging to a ‘home’, parental or adopted.

The first camp of scholars understands repatriation as being not only the most important part of an expatriate’s journey but also see it as being the most traumatic part of an expatriate’s journey (Chiang, et al. 2017, 2). They see the sense of belonging as being an emotional attachment that not only makes you feel like a part of the community but also makes you feel safe as a result of belonging to that community (Yuval-Davis 2006, 197). As such, repatriation becomes the process through which mobile youth are separated from their familiar surroundings and thrown into the unknown. This results in a loss of the mobile youths’ sense of belonging towards their parental ‘home’ while simultaneously increasing their sense of belonging towards their
adopted ‘home’. Studies have shown that individuals shape their identities and sense of belonging through the process of “being and becoming and belonging and longing to belong” (Yuval-Davis 2006, 202), thus, constantly changing and adapting to the culture and social norms of their adopted ‘home’ in the pursuit of wanting to fit-in. Due to this, repatriation then makes the individuals aware of the loss of the familiar and aware of their own foreignness that is created due to them assimilating in their adopted ‘home’ country (to become a part of the ‘us’), making them the other (‘them’) in their parental ‘home’ country. Thus, severing the sense of belonging towards the parental ‘home’.

Furthermore, related to the previous position of the camp, belonging is perceived as being a performative act undertaken by the migrant within a specific social and cultural space where certain traditions and practices are repeated to form a linkage between the individual and the collective behavior (community) to form identity narratives and construct attachments to the community (Yuval-Davis 2006, 203). Thus, this camp of thought believes that it is due to this emotional component of feeling like belonging to a place that leads to reverse culture shock among repatriates upon repatriation. That is, when the emotional components of a migrant’s identity are threatened by the social and cultural space of their parental ‘home’, the repatriate feels less secure amidst the unfamiliar. Thus, once again being made aware of their own strangeness within their assumed social and cultural space of origin (Yuval-Davis 2006, 202). This loss of ownership over their presumed origin leads to the migrant losing their sense of belonging to their parental ‘home’ as a consequence.

The model and theory of belonging under this camp, formulated by Paul Jones and Michał Krzyzanowski (2008), further explains this by describing the relationship between identities, attachment and belonging (Figure 2). They argue that the migrant forms their identity in two parts, internal and external. Internally, the migrant constructs an identity through the “(re)presentation” of their self and through positioning themselves in relation with others. Externally, the migrant is able to construct an identity through the channels made available by the “institutional gatekeepers” who put in place a formal threshold criterion that outlines the requirements for gaining membership to a group through formal methods (like citizenship requirements) or through informal methods (such as “symbolic” social prerequisites of the day-to-day life) (2008, 44-45). The model further explains that it is through the relationship between attachment and belonging (represented in the figure through arrows) which helps to identify how individuals become part of collective identities. Therefore, when there is a lowered sense of attachment (i.e. lessened number of arrows to match the lessened feelings of attachment) to a social and cultural sphere (in this case that of the parental ‘home’), the expatriate then feels a lowered sense of belonging towards that sphere (2008, 46).

![Figure 2. Source: Jones & Krzyzanowski 2011, 45.](image)

In addition to that, this model also helps to show how beyond the threshold criteria exists a second (informal) set of gatekeepers: the people. Without the recognition and acknowledgement of the repatriate by the collective identity (the community), the repatriate is unable to gain full ‘membership’ to it. Thus, upon repatriation mobile youth fail to gain this recognition in the parental ‘home’ due to having had severed their attachments to it in order to belong to their adopted ‘home’. In so doing, they lose ‘membership’ to their parental ‘home’ collective identity which directly affects their sense of belonging to it as the relationship between ‘membership’ (formal or informal) and belonging is recurrent.

Additionally, this loss of a sense of belonging that the migrant experiences due to attachment is made worse when perceptions of home are fantasized (unrealistic attachments) by the repatriate as they learn of their origins (‘home’) through biased sources (i.e. parents, grandparents, etc.) who recall a nostalgic version of the parental ‘home’. It is only upon repatriation that it dawns on the migrant that the ‘home’ from their memories no longer exists and will never exist as it was only ever a snapshot of the past. It is the realization that the attachments they tied to a sense of belonging were rooted in a false attachment. This loss of ‘home’ as it had been remembered then, Edward Said (2001) would say, is what makes the repatriate aware of their state of living in a form of exile as they no longer have a ‘home’ to return to causing a further loss in their sense of belonging to it. The individual is left expelled from their ‘home’, dreaming of a lost...
paradise that no longer exists due to the shift in space and time.

Finally, scholars under this camp also cite growth and social and economic developments as additional reasons that may contribute to a loss of belonging among migrants upon repatriation. They argue that the expatriate is unaware of the ways in which s/he changes over the duration of his expatriation and that it is only upon repatriation that the expatriate comes to realize just how much they have changed versus how little their parental ‘home’ has changed (Chiang et al., 2017, p.17-18). This discrepancy paired with the expatriate returning to a country that is less economically and socially developed than the one they are returning from, can exacerbate feeling the loss of one’s sense of belonging to the parental ‘home’ as it no longer provides the emotional, social or economic comfort required for the migrant to feel at ‘home’ (Chiang et al. 2017, 15-16).

The second camp of scholars also agrees that repatriation is an important part of an expatriate’s journey, however, they differ on their inferences of the effects of repatriation on the migrant. Firstly, they believe repatriation can give an individual an increased sense of belonging to their parental ‘home’ over their adopted ‘home’ as they enjoy more legal rights in their parental ‘home’ over their adopted ‘home’ as they are elevated to the status of a citizen (gaining full formal and informal membership) instead of being a mere expatriate or a migrant. This not only gives ease of access to the individual in terms of opportunities (social and economic), it also gives them an increased sense of self-esteem as the shame and burden of being a migrant, a foreigner, and a ‘thief’, in another country (their adopted ‘home’) is lifted off of their shoulders (Ralph & Staeheli 2011, 55; Minh-ha 2010, 30). Thus, making the individual feel more at home in their parental ‘home’ country over their adopted ‘home’ as they enjoy more legal rights in their parental ‘home’ over their adopted ‘home’.

Scholars under this camp recognize that for many returnees their parental ‘homes’ represent their ancestral lands and a stable and fixed identity. However, this idealization of the parental ‘home’ soon fades away as the individual comes to the realization that their self-identities have turned both into the outsider and insider of their parental ‘home’ (Ralph & Staeheli 2011, 522-523). This discrepancy in the individual’s identity is precisely what it means to be multicultural. Migrants, through repatriation claim ownership of more than one social and cultural sphere where they are able to navigate between the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ with ease (Ralph & Staeheli 2011, 521). Scholars in this camp do not view this ability of cultural and social code-switching as a negative effect of repatriation, in fact, they view it as a good thing. They believe a migrant’s identity is considerably strengthened and their ties to multiple places, deepened. Thus, resulting in an increase in the migrant’s sense of belonging towards their parental ‘home’ and their adopted ‘home’.

Finally, the last manner in which scholars under the second school of thought believe repatriation helps to strengthen one’s sense of belonging to a ‘home’ is an extension of the last justification; transcendence. When a migrant is repatriated, they are forced to go through an adaptation period where they have to re-assimilate and re-learn behaviors relevant to the social and cultural spheres of their ‘home’ (parental or adopted) (Ralph & Staeheli 2011, 524). Through the act of this re-assimilation that only occurs due to repatriation, the migrant, or foreigner as Julia Kristeva would say, has to commit matricide of their metaphorical Mother. Only by letting go of certain practices, values, and in some cases even beliefs, can the migrant finally come to belong to a ‘home’ (or ‘homes’) on a teleological level. Thus, as Kristeva’s theory suggests, by committing matricide of the metaphorical Mother[land] representing a migrant’s ‘origins’, the migrant rids himself of his Otherness (Kristeva 1991, 9). Though this act of matricide does not make the migrant part of the ‘us’, it merely turns him into a labeled and categorized stranger who is accepted by the adopted home’s collective community. Kristeva further details this realization by the foreigner in her theory and identifies it as Melancholia. It is the ultimate realization that ‘home’ in fact, does not exist, and in that it transcends the migrant into being a fully formed cosmopolitan citizen whereby the individual belongs nowhere, yet everywhere (Kristeva, 1991, 10). Hence, proving that repatriation does indeed increase one’s sense of belonging to a ‘home’, making it something bigger than just a single nation-state or national identity. The sense of belonging to a ‘home’ then is lived simultaneously; ‘here’ and ‘there’.

While the two camps of scholarly thought mentioned above appear to be at odds with one another and appear mutually exclusive to one another, this is not actually the case. The two camps highlighted here are in fact, mutually supportive. That is, only by applying the trends under both the camps of belonging can we holistically analyse and
understand the concept of belonging in the context of transnational individuals.

The current research has largely studied the effects of repatriation on mobile youth coming from or living in the West. The research is severely lacking in the context of the Eastern mobile youth who are from the East or those that move within it. Thus, the Middle East being the world’s most cosmopolitan region at the moment makes for a very interesting study of these youth in a previously unstudied context. This article looks to fill this gap in the field by analyzing the concept of ‘home’ among mobile youth growing up in a part of the world that does not perceive ‘belonging’ as a migrant’s right, rather sees it as privilege. It strives to see how in such an environment then, transnational individuals form their identities and attachments to ‘home’, more specifically to which ‘home’ (adopted or parental). In short, do mobile youth feel more attached (or detached) to a ‘home’ over the other or do they simply have different attachments towards their ‘homes’?

In addition to that, this article also hopes to find if prior research findings can be generalized to the Middle Eastern context as well, and vice versa.

By making use of the model provided by Jones and Krzyzanowski (2011), one can easily assess the various patterns of a migrant’s sense of belonging as the model allows us to assess how these patterns are constructed, and where the migrants position themselves in relation to both their ‘parental home’s’ and their ‘adopted home’s’ collective identities and societies. Through this model we will be able to analyse an array of attachments, preferences, memberships, and feelings to analyse how they collectively add to the sense of belonging of the migrant. This model also makes it possible for us to account for cultural, symbolic and nostalgic dimensions of what may be responsible for holding a collective identity together (2011, 44). Furthermore, the theory of belonging outlined within the model theorizes that identities are both internally and externally formed. Internally, migrants are able to position their self in relation to both their ‘parental home’s’ and ‘adopted home’s’ collective identities and societies. By making use of the model provided by Jones and Krzyzanowski (2011), one can easily assess the various patterns of a migrant’s sense of belonging as the model allows us to assess how these patterns are constructed, and where the migrants position themselves in relation to both their ‘parental home’s’ and their ‘adopted home’s’ collective identities and societies. Through this model we will be able to analyse an array of attachments, preferences, memberships, and feelings to analyse how they collectively add to the sense of belonging of the migrant. This model also makes it possible for us to account for cultural, symbolic and nostalgic dimensions of what may be responsible for holding a collective identity together (2011, 44). Furthermore, the theory of belonging outlined within the model theorizes that identities are both internally and externally formed. Internally, migrants are able to position their self and the “(re)presentation” of their self in alignment with those present around them in their collective identity. Externally, the migrant positions their self and sense of belonging within the bounds constituted by an institutional gatekeeper who is capable of enforcing a threshold criterion either formally (i.e. citizenship requirements) or informally (i.e. symbolic “everyday” habits) to control the entry of those from the out-group into the in-group through the process of granting or withholding membership. The model also indicates the many routes that one may take to reach a sense of belonging to a single or multiple collective identity or identities, as well as, the many ways in which one can interpret their understanding of said collective identities (Jones & Krzyzanowski 2011, 45-46).
The concept of ‘belonging’ within the Jones and Krzyzanowski model (2011) is not based upon ‘objective’ outwardly similarities that may exist within the collective identity. Rather, ‘belonging’ in this model bases itself within a more transitory sense of solidarity among the collective identity (or identities). The model also deeply roots itself into attachments that strengthen or weaken one’s sense of belonging to a collective identity. But under this model, old attachments can be replaced with newer attachments or can also be supplemented by other completely different forms of attachments (2011, 46). Thereby, making the relationship between belonging and attachments that much more complex and dynamic. These attachments can also be contradictory to one another as attachments are based on the social actions of the individual (the migrant or the in-group member) and are therefore, fluid. The development of the sense of belonging also mimics a similar pattern. Negative information and perceptions (attachments) are rejected while the positive experiences and interpretations are accumulated to build up strictly positive information about the source of attachments of one’s sense of belonging while simultaneously excluding all those that stand to be seen as negative information or experiences as they may weaken or distort the accumulation of the positive information (Jones & Krzyzanowski 2011, 47).

At a lower level of belonging, the migrant can choose to be included or aligned with the collective identity if their attachments that do not require them to get authentication or authorization from the in-group itself. Migrants aspire to be part of a collective identity (this can be a national or more local identity). So, after surpassing the lowest level of belonging, the migrant must now win the recognition of the ‘us’ to make it out of their out-group, the ‘them’. Even within the members of the in-group there often exist varying levels of membership (residence permits, permanent residence, citizenship, etc.) which further underlines the differences present within the in-group itself that is often portrayed as being a collective of stable and comprehensible identities. However, denial by the in-group of the recognition sought out by the migrant can lead to discrimination or exclusion of the migrant from the in-group’s collective identity. Failure to gain membership into the in-group’s collective can also have substantial effects on how the migrant then comes to understand their identity and sense of belonging in relation to the identity of the collective itself. While migrants may share similar backgrounds, circumstances, and environments, they may still form two opposing senses of belonging to the collective in question (Jones & Krzyzanowski 2011, 48-50).

In addition to this model, studies done on the relationship between language and culture will also be made use of briefly to analyze and assess the data collected. Many studies (Earle, 1969; Chiu 2011; Ross, Xun, & Wilson 2002; Sussman & Rosenfeld 1982; Trafimow, Silverman, Fan, & Law 1997; Whorf 1956) on language and culture show, time and again, that people use language as way to encode their experiences, thoughts, and behaviors. As a result, when migrants share a language with the in-group, it allows the migrant to become a part of the in-group much more easily compared to those that do not share the language with the in-group. This is because language encodes in it experiences, and a shared language then conveys shared experiences of the culture more easily to those that speak it as each language has distinct lexis that helps to communicate certain experiences rapidly, consistently, and precisely (Chiu 2011, 8). Those that speak more than one language are also able to effortlessly code-switch socially and culturally compared to those who are monolingual as they code their experiences and thoughts in various languages (Chiu 2011, 9). Given that all participants of this research were at least (fluently) bilingual, this additional lens will only help to deliver a better and more thorough analysis of the interviews when used in conjunction with Jones and Krzyzanowski’s theory of belonging.

Analysis: Inside the Mind of a Wanderer

Moving on from theory to the findings of the interviews, a few identifiers begin to emerge. Upon analyzing the responses of the participants of both Group A and B, the following identifiers surfaced, making the participants’ dissociative sense of belonging to ‘home’ tangible:

i. An informal sense of belonging stemming from the ‘duration’ of time spent in the adopted or parental ‘home’
ii. A formal sense of belonging (acceptance from locals and legal acceptance), or lack thereof, formed in the adopted or parental ‘home’
iii. The degree of voluntariness of the participants’ movement within the ‘homes’, and
iv. Spoken languages

These identifiers and their impact on the formation of a sense of belonging towards a ‘home’ will be analyzed in this section in that order to better understand the mobile youth and their belongingness to ‘home.’

Where are you from?

Arguably, the most difficult question for a mobile child to answer is one strung together by four seemingly simple words, “Where are you from?”. I chose to open my interviews with this very question to see
how the participants would react without having any context to the question. This resulted in lengthy answers instead of straightforward ones as anticipated. Instead of simply saying, "I am French", "I am Belgian-Lebanese", "I am Indian", the participants chose to explain in detail who they were in relation to their unique journeys, even though none of them were ever asked to do so. For a simple question with no context before it, they gave extensive answers to a complete stranger, and did so without knowing the pretext of the research being conducted either. They detailed the durations of their time spent in a particular place, and even made notes of repatriations that took place along their journeys.

**Leyla:** I am Lebanese but I was born in Kuwait. And I lived there until 2005. And then I moved to Dubai, till 2014. So, I stayed in Dubai from 2005 until 2014. And then I moved to Lebanon. From... like I spent a year in Singapore in 2015. And in 2015 I moved back to Lebanon. And then, once I came to France, like for my university, my family then moved back to Dubai.

Even though they did not ‘originate’ from every place that they listed in their answers, they identified with those places as where they were from; simply for the fact that they had been there, they had lived there, and grown up there. They subconsciously acknowledged that they do not belong to a singular place, rather they see themselves as belonging to various places. They made their disassociative sense of belonging to ‘home’ known from the very beginning of the interview by answering a question regarding their ‘origins’ with a mixed mention of their ‘parental’ and ‘adopted’ homes. By using the sense of belonging model in this context then, it becomes clear that the mere attachments that these mobile youth forge towards the countries they have inhabited. Thus, making it clear that their attachments are not solely temporal, but also from the sheer mobile nature of their lives.

**Arjun:** My parents are from India. But I never lived there myself. My parents have lived in India their entire lives but they moved to Oman in 1997/1998 for work. I was born in Muscat, Oman in 2000, and moved to Sharjah in UAE, in 2006. And I moved to Dubai in 2009.

An additional layer that helps to show that the attachments forged by these mobile youth to their many countries of residence are not superficial is the manner in which they differentiate between the places they are ‘from’ and the places they have ‘been’ to. All the participants had travelled across at least two continents yet, they did not refer to places like Vietnam, Australia, Mongolia, or Italy as ‘home’. All participants made a clear distinction between the places they had travelled to and those that they had inhabited. Thus, making it clear that their attachments to their countries of residence are real, and to a large extent temporal, not superficial.

To further clarify this distinction and to get a better idea of what it takes for a place to become ‘home’, each participant was then asked, in several ways throughout the interview what it was that made them feel at home somewhere. This was done to compare their understanding of a ‘home’ against their understanding of where they come from.

The participants were first asked to identify their favorite things about their ‘adopted home’, Dubai. The answers of the participants were similar to one another in spite of them belonging to Group A or B. They singled out the three following favorite things about their ‘adopted home’:

i. The ease of life and quality of life provided by Dubai.

ii. The safe and secure environment provided by Dubai; and

iii. The diverse and international environment provided by Dubai in which they had the opportunity to grow up.

These responses highlight attachment(s) of the mobile children to their ‘adopted home’. They show that their attachments are not solely temporal, they go beyond that. Their attachments also stem from their lived experiences in Dubai. It is through these attachments then that they allot a sense of belonging to Dubai. The first layer of their attachments was evidently an economic one. The improvement of their quality of life from their ‘parental home’ was a factor for their own parents to move in the first place, and it then became something that was translated down to the mobile youth.

Better economic and financial opportunities...
gave these mobile youth more freedom to pursue careers and education of their choosing, creating an attachment to Dubai as a ‘home’ as it became the cradle where they began crafting their futures. An additional layer that then stems from their residence in Dubai was forged through mundane life practices such as schooling, going to malls with friends, or seeing the opening ceremony of Burj-Al-Khalifa (the Khalifa Tower, standing over 800 meters tall) with their family. These youth created and collected memories during their residence in Dubai. They networked and forged bonds that go beyond soil and man — they bonded with the people. So, Dubai for them no longer remains a country with the tallest building in the world, it becomes a ‘home’ because they forge communal ties in it and through it — friendships, enemies, and networks. Further deepening their attachments to the country, one person at a time.

**Remy:** Even if I was born in France, for me, my real home was Dubai for me. I grew up in Dubai and I remember saying that to my Mum, I remember saying that, “Mum, for me, I come from Dubai and even if I’m not born here, I have all my friends here.”

**Fynn:** The longer I was away from Germany the less it felt like home and the more Dubai had become home (...) even now, when I go back to Dubai it feels like I am going home even though I am not.

Similarly, the participants were asked to identify their favorite things about their ‘parental home’. Once again, their responses were similar to one another’s in spite of them belonging to Group A or B, or different nationalities. All participants recalled nostalgic memories of summer vacations spent with family and friends, by the beach or food stalls with no responsibilities and duties — only freedom and carelessness. Participants recalled their ‘parental homes’ as celebrations of Christmas, Eid, Three Kings Day, and many other festivities. If they ever failed to go to their ‘parental homes’ for the observance of such holidays they celebrated them in Dubai, some even celebrating the Lebanese Independence Day (albeit a minority in the sample). This maintenance of bonds to their ‘parental home’ further solidified their existing attachments to it as their ancestral home, with their parents acting as their prime and formal link to that ‘home.’ These attachments to their ‘parental homes’ then paint more a picture of what Said calls reminiscing of ‘paradise lost’ (2010, 1386-1387) whereby the mobile youth remember their ‘parental homes’ in a very specific context outside of which, they would not be inclined to make a ‘home’ out of them, and most participants openly admitted as much.

**Leyla:** I really don’t think Lebanon is a good place to have a... I always think where I am going to have my career is where I am going to have my kids and where I am going to live with my family. And I wouldn’t want my kids to grow up in Lebanon. I would much prefer [for] them to grow up in Dubai.

Although, Remy, and Arjun hesitantly mentioned their ‘parental home’ as being a place where they would like to settle were no worldly obstacles in their way. Adding that even while there, they would need a more cosmopolitan and international environment to truly feel at home. Lulu, more assuredly expressed similar sentiments but also admitted the harsh reality of the fact that such a Lebanon did not realistically exist for her to return to, and that she could instead apply herself better somewhere in Europe or the Gulf.

The only exception to this was Noha who was glad at the prospect of settling in one of her ‘parental homes’, Munich. However, she too only preferred Munich due to the diversity the city facilitated. She noted that living in Munich one could never be made to feel like the out-group as those in the ‘in-group’ were eager to know and acknowledge those different from them. Thus, in Noha’s case, the diverse environment of her ‘parental home’ made her want to make a ‘home’ out of it. Thus, maintaining the idea of ‘home’ as being a mix of multiple worlds for mobile individuals to feel at ‘home’.

**Noha:** In Munich, where we have like all the angry Southern Germans, we could still find, a local Turkish community if you’re Turkish (...) you can find your nationality everywhere. And they will accept you and the other groups aren’t go[ing to] come in your way. Some of them are even go[ing to] be super interested in you. And I really liked that.

**Hold the Gates**

Our theoretical model states that attachments can often contradict one another and can sometimes even contradict the sense of belonging of one’s own self (Jones & Krzyzanowski 2011, 42). It is then important for us to assess if any such contradictions do, in fact, exist among our pool of participants. In order to do this, the participants were asked to identify how they felt about having to repatriate from Dubai. This question proved interesting as it revealed the multifaceted nature of the attachments that the mobile youth bore towards Dubai as their ‘adopted home’. To answer this question, most of the participants of both Group A and B, responded neutrally saying that they never expected to live in Dubai permanently. They very clearly stated that the very nature of finding a ‘home’ in the Gulf came...
with the understanding that ‘home’ would always only ever be temporary.

This belief stems from the fact that the UAE lacks naturalization procedures for expat families settled in the region. Most of the participants, and their parents had been settled in Dubai (or in some cases still remain settled in Dubai at the time of writing) from anywhere between 10 to 18 years. Yet, the formal threshold has never been made accessible to them or their families by the gatekeepers. Thus, hindering the development of the mobile youth’s sense of belonging to Dubai as their ‘home’ to a higher level of membership. Mobile youth, in the context of UAE’s laws, are often left out of the picture as they are perceived by the country as being transitory.

Noha: It makes me feel like... like Dubai is not my permanent home (...). Maybe that also contributes to the fact that I don’t feel like it’s a home because like I could be kicked out of there at any moment.

Failing to overcome the formal thresholds set by the gatekeepers (immigration and naturalization services) of the UAE, the mobile youth then experience a contradiction in their attachment to their ‘adopted home’. As they are denied the right to earn a formal membership to the collective, they begin to feel barred, and in that process the youth, as Leyla phrases it, experience a very particular “detachment” from Dubai. That is, they still feel a sense of belonging towards Dubai, but on a level much lower than what they could potentially form had they been allowed into the formal fold of its membership. Thus, while the mobile youth remain willing to see Dubai as a ‘home’ the system in place prevents them from fully immersing into their sense of belonging to that very notion. Thus, their attachments and belonging then, remain on an informal level of membership and do not develop beyond that level (Jones & Krzyzanowski 2011, 50), making Dubai feel temporary yet ‘home’, at the same time.

I, Volunteer!

Remy and Leyla, had to perform involuntary repatriations at a young age, in the middle of their schooling. They recall their first repatriations as being times where they felt like something unfair was being done to them. Leyla even used the word “torture” to describe her emotional turmoil at the time of her repatriation.

Leyla: I felt very upset. I was very actually angry at our parents that they were doing this to us.

Remy: I was sad and scared of going back to France because I didn’t know what to expect. I didn’t know who I was going to meet.

This sense of otherness felt by the two of them took root due to the lack of their personal attachments to their ‘parental homes’ at the time. Remy had moved at the age of two to Dubai, and Leyla was born in the Gulf. The only attachment they had to their ‘parental homes’ were perfect summer vacations without any obligations of doing homework or chores. The dispelling of this very fantasy is what hindered their adjustment upon repatriation. It is what is called reverse culture shock (Yuval-Davis 2006, 202). Without having the opportunity to prepare themselves for the changes to come in their ‘parental home’ is what caused them to panic as they suddenly found themselves outside of their safety blanket, without friends and familiarity, feeling lost and alone.

Eventually, Remy and Leyla did manage to settle into their ‘paternal homes’ and in fact, grew to like them with time. In Remy’s case, this only occurred upon the second repatriation, one that he performed willingly to pursue his undergraduate studies. He chose to move to a small town in France, Menton, with the total student population of 300 and 49 nationalities on campus. It was polar opposite of the local French school he had to fit into upon his first repatriation. For Leyla, the assimilation finally sunk in when she realized that the Lebanese in Lebanon were not that different from the way her parents had raised her to be Lebanese herself. She said,

Leyla: We were very similar because we had the same values, as my parents raised me in a very Lebanese way.

Therefore, while it took a multicultural environment for Remy to begin to feel at home in his ‘parental home,’ for Leyla the assimilation was only made possible due to the link preserved by her parents through the observance of Lebanese cultural and traditional practices while living in Dubai.

Furthermore, Remy’s case vividly highlights the importance of voluntariness. The second repatriation that he performed was done so willingly by him and he admitted that that played an imperative role in him feeling at ‘home’ the second time around. This makes sense as with voluntary movement, mobile youth gain charge of choosing where to go and therefore, have time to not only prepare but also carefully select a place that would suit them best. Whereas, when moving involuntarily, they are more vulnerable to not feeling in control of what is directly happening to them, causing them to experience anxiety and reverse culture shock.

Similar to Remy and Leyla, others like Hachim and Arjun, had similar feelings of not fitting in in their
‘parental homes’ upon repatriation and they too expressed that losing the power to decide where and when they would move hindered them from feeling fully at home even in their ‘parental homes’.

Hachim: You do feel like a little bit out of place and yeah you feel a bit treated differently. Like I lost my accent when I was speaking Moroccan like people were noticing that I wasn’t living there and it became worse over time but I got used to it (...). I remember I was in shock and I remember I was mad at my parents for pushing us to leave again.

**Speaking in Tongues**

As mentioned under “Theoretical Framework”, there is yet another lens to which these mobile youth lend themselves to, and it is that of language. All participants interviewed for this research were at the very least fluently bilingual or multilingual, with some like Leyla, speaking up to six languages at the age of only 20. These youth then become even more intriguing to study as they are not only a cocktail of journeys in terms of the physical distances that they have amassed but also because they unknowingly become keepers of cultures that they do not always have full ownership of.

Basil: I can’t say I identify with English. No, I understand and I can communicate [in it] but I don’t think I identify with it.

In light of the studies done on language and culture, we know that individuals use language to encode their experiences, thoughts, and behaviors (Earle 1969; Chiu 2011; Ross, Xun, & Wilson 2002; Sussman & Rosenfeld 1982; Trafimow, Silverman, Fan, & Law 1997; Whorf 1956). Therefore, a shared language among a collective can then help to convey shared experiences of the shared culture much more easily to those that speak similar languages (Chiu 2011, 8). Furthermore, individuals fluent in multiple languages have the added advantage of code-switching in social and cultural contexts, more efficiently than their monolingual counterparts (Chiu 2011, 9). This is perhaps because their minds are already well-trained in thinking in multifaceted ways that this practice becomes second nature to individuals like our participants — making them multicultural and open-minded. It is also this very ability of code-switching that makes mobile youth adaptable to their ever-changing ‘homes’.

At the very end of the interview, the participants were asked to identify what ‘home’ meant to them, and if there was a physical place that they associated to that notion. The participants, yet again, giving similar answers, attached their sense of belonging to a ‘home’ in relation to people, memories and feelings, and not to a particular ‘physical’ place — with the exception of one participant, Lulu. While Lulu did attach her notions of ‘home’ to the actual house she grew up in in Dubai, she only saw that house as a ‘home’ in relation to the memories that were made in it. Therefore, Lulu too did not derive her notion of ‘home’ from a physical place, rather the house derived its meaning of ‘home’ from the memories that Lulu made there as a child.

The study of language and culture provides an explanation for this phenomenon. It states that as the minds of the mobile youth are accustomed to discerning every situation through multiple cultural lenses, they are then unable to fully claim ownership of a single culture or place as they are able to easily switch in and out of their many learned ‘adopted cultures’, making them feel at ‘home’ everywhere yet nowhere (Whorf 1956, 257). This is made even more complicated when you take into account the fact that our participants identified multiple languages as being their native tongues (most commonly Arabic and French). Thus, Participants of Group A and B struggled to answer when asked to identify a single place in which they would like to settle indefinitely, showing that those with a nomadic upbringing are more likely to continue to pursue such a lifestyle well into their adulthood. Perfect examples of this would be Lulu, and Noha pursuing to practice law in multiple jurisdictions, and Arjun looking to settle in a diverse and cosmopolitan concrete jungle should the time to settle ever arrive.

Thus, in their relationship towards both their ‘adopted’ and their ‘parental’ homes, the mobile youth maintained a nomadic outlook on their identity and sense of belonging to not just one of those two homes, rather to all homes that they have had the occasion to traverse. This also explains why then these youth prefer the lifestyle of wandering over settling as their entire thought process has been rewired (Chiu 2011, 13) to better suit a mobile lifestyle, giving rise to their complex understanding of ‘home’ as ‘homes’.

Basil: Home now, the definition... and that’s why I believe I have many homes... it’s not about a place in particular and I think it’s rare to have a place... home is really where your heart is, in the broader sense of things. I believe that everywhere where I have people that I care for can somewhat qualify as my home.

Hachim: I think being at home... maybe a sense of security — a sense of belonging —

Interviewer: So where do you derive this sense of security and belonging from?

Hachim: Umm... the people.
Discussion

This article has made an effort to demonstrate the mixed nature of mobile youth’s sense of belonging to a ‘home’ through the application of Jones’ and Krzyzanowski’s model of “Theory of Belonging” in conjunction with studies of language and culture. As we have observed in the analysis above, mobile youth from both Group A and B bear striking similarities despite their differences in terms of repatriation and even nationalities. This then provides strong evidence for the fact that these youth are even more so shaped by their journeys than initially anticipated by this study. It demonstrates that due to the sheer movement and length of their stays the mobile youth form attachments and a sense of belonging towards multiple homes over a single one. Having said that, there was one slight manner in which the two groups did vary on the topic. Group A, those still settled in Dubai, appeared to hold more skeptical and critical views about Dubai. Whereas Group B, those who had returned to their ‘parental homes’ or moved away from Dubai, appeared to attach more nostalgic notions to the country. This is particularly interesting to note as it appears that upon repatriation the former ‘adopted home’ transforms and becomes akin to the ‘parental home’. It does so as the attachments forged towards it become a product of the act of reminiscing. Dubai, upon repatriation, turns into an encapsulation of paradise lost and is then only remembered as it were in a specific time period. This causes those in Group B to have an increased sense of positivity towards the country they once called their ‘home’.

In Ancient Greek tales like that of Homer’s epic, The Odyssey, we find depictions that relay this very meaning and relationship between man, journey and ‘home’ (soil). Throughout his 20-year long journey, Odysseus endures the consequence of many a mistake and equally as many adventures, all to get to Ithaca — to his son and wife. Only, the epic never stops upon Odysseus’ arrival at Ithaca. Instead, Homer concludes with a chapter in which Odysseus begins yet another journey. It is as if the nostos “homeland” is carved from the word “nostalgia”, the unyielding desire of wanting to return ‘home’ as one remembers it. Thus, it is only upon his ‘homecoming’ that Odysseus (the Voyager) realizes that ‘home’ no longer exists, at least not in the form he reminiscenced. Hence, at the very end of the epic, Odysseus sets sail in search of ‘home’, yet again. Homer through his epic seems to be claiming that people at their very core are “nomads”, wanders and mobile by nature. As time passes, and more and more journeys are undertaken by the voyager, civilization will eventually espouse a new sense of ‘home’.

On the other end of the same spectrum, the Arabs told a tale similar to that of the Greeks. The Arabs, also with the use of poetry, demonstrated a tragic, yet powerful relationship between ‘home’ and man with poems that not only recognize change, but also grieve and adapt to loss in relation to recurrent departures. Al-Wuquf ‘Ala Al-Atlal translating to, “Standing by the Ruins of the Encampment”, is a time-old tradition among Arab poets preluding the poems of the Jahiliya times (the ‘Age of Ignorance’ preceding Islam).

In these poems, poets describe the pain of watching caravans of a beloved’s tribe depart. The motif of the poems concern a wandering Bedouin who comes across a ruin, al-atlal, of a former campsite and is overcome by the memories of what once was ‘home’. The word wuqhf has dual meaning, “standing” or “stopping”, depending on the context it is used in. In this context, it is intentionally used in a way that it carries both its meanings simultaneously to depict that this part of the poem reflects the pondering of the Bedouin in his moment of stillness — in his moment of remembrance of ‘home’. Hence, he “stops” and “stands” as he ponders over what once existed at that campsite. This tradition arose from the nomadic nature of the Arabs who were accustomed to setting up camps in the desert; un-pitching them, and pitching them elsewhere and then repeating the process throughout their nomadic journeys. Hence, the nod to recurrent departures in the poems. This reminiscing is not one only of sadness, rather it is merely just that — reminiscing — a state of nostalgia of a “once upon a time”; a meditative sate of reflection for the wanderer (Cooper 2018).

Similarly, in their relationship towards both their ‘adopted’ and their ‘parental’ homes, the mobile youth manage to maintain a nomadic outlook on their identity, and sense of belonging to not just one of those two homes, rather to all homes that they have had the occasion to traverse. Much like Odysseus and the Bedouin, these voyagers too only stop to ponder before they move on in search of another home. Not to replace the ones before it, rather to expand and grow their roots as far and wide as their travels would allow them to (Ralph & Staeheli 2011, 519).

Basil: I don’t see how it could make me anxious, just a feeling of growing. If you have more homes, you’re growing bigger, in terms of where you are in the world.

Conclusion

This paper has aimed to highlight evidence to support the hypothesis that mobile youth build their sense of belonging to multiple homes and not a singular home. They form their attachments
towards their ‘adopted homes’ through the mixture of the duration of their stay and personal lived experiences within the cultural and social sphere of the collective. They form attachments to their ‘parental homes’ through a mixture of nostalgia, personal lived experiences, and information learned from their ‘parental’ figures. Thus, it is clear to see that belonging does indeed have multiple layers and facets to it given the environment in which this process takes place, as well as, the people that it takes place through.

This paper has also sought to demonstrate the intricacies behind the identities of mobile youth in the UAE in an effort to highlight a region not as deeply studied in the field of migration (especially in terms of expatriation and repatriation) as others. The UAE’s incredibly international composition of populace and their limiting citizenship and naturalization laws alongside it, make for a challenging and revealing study of the region in terms of migration. It provides a unique backdrop to the mobile youth in the region who find themselves torn between the law and the community at ‘home’. Feeling like they belong yet also feeling as if they do not. This paper has thus concluded that multiple journeys between ‘homes’ (including repatriations) lead to the creation of a multi-faceted individual, one that not only comes to peace with their life of mobility, rather actively seeks it, and dwells within it.

Notes

1 The GCC is a coalition of seven countries: Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates.

2 The seven emirates of the UAE are Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Ras Al Khaimah, and Fujairah.

Works Cited


Cross-border cooperation among the Eastern neighbours of the European Union can be understood as a new approach to public policy and border governance in the region. There was no border cooperation strategy between communist and European countries during Soviet times. The question of the management of the Eastern border of the EU, especially with Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova, came on the agenda in 1997, when accession to the union was finally opened to Eastern and Southern European candidates. With the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement that came into force in 1998, Ukraine signalled its foreign policy orientation as European, asserting that Western integration would help modernize its economy, increase living standards, and strengthen democracy and rule of law. The European Commission required “good neighbourly relations” as a further condition for accession and in conjunction, the concept of “Wider Europe” was proposed to set up border-transcending tasks. The Carpathian Euroregion was established to contribute to strengthening the friendship and prosperity of the countries of this region. However, the model was not fully understood and had only limited support of the national governments. This article uses the Carpathian Euroregion as a case study to show that overall Ukraine and the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood presents more opportunities for effective cooperation with the EU rather than barriers or risks.

Introduction

Border politics of the European Union (EU) is a complex range of programmes, policies and imaginaries of the political community in which borders are used as resources for different specific aims. The question of the management of the Eastern border of the EU, especially with Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova, came on the agenda in 1997, when the prospect of accession was finally opened to Eastern and Southern European candidates. The European Commission (henceforth, the Commission) required “good neighbourly relations” as a further condition for accession and in conjunction the concept of “Wider Europe” was proposed to set up border-transcending tasks. The overall objective of the policy was to draw both old and new neighbours closer into the EU’s political, economic and cultural realm, short of full membership. It implied increasing openness and inclusionary politics where the neighbourhood could be jointly negotiated between the EU and its regional partners. The first financial instruments, including the European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI), in the framework of the ENP, additionally suggested that “Wider Europe” aimed at blurring the EU’s external borders. In the post Cold War context, Wider Europe was seen to represent a new spatial imaginary that went beyond the old East-West divide (Liikanen, Scott & Sotkasiira 2016, 2). To sum
up, the original proposition of a policy towards the EU’s neighbours was very much linked to the idea of reinforcing sub-regional cooperation, especially in creating an “Eastern Dimension”—and, later on, Black Sea cooperation (to complement the already existing “Northern Dimension” and the “Union for the Mediterranean”). In turn, Ukraine formalized its foreign policy posture as European since the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) came into force in 1998 and asserted that European integration would help modernize its economy, increase living standards, and strengthen democracy and rule of law. Hence, this paper assumes that European integration (with or without EU membership) is good for Ukraine.

According to the Commission, governance beyond EU borders means establishment and operation of “institutions” (in the sense of rules of the game), which define actors and their responsibilities, both in cooperation towards society’s objectives and in the resolution of any conflicts that may arise. From 2011, the EU has initiated various forms of governance—supporting local initiatives, diversifying stakeholders, and speaking to all levels of society (Casier et al. 2013). Therefore, the change that is occurring in governance policy cannot be fully grasped without considering the importance of border governance and its impact on the local border communities outside the EU.

In Ukraine, the regional topic remains a prominent feature of the state’s policy since the country gained its independence in 1991. Ukraine has only existed in its present boundaries since World War II. Before, the current territory of western Ukraine had no experience of Soviet rule and had never been a single state within the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, which was established in 1922. Western Ukraine (Eastern Galicia, Volyn’ and Northern Bukovina regions) was annexed by the Soviet Army in 1939 based on the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact with Zakarpattia or Transcarpathia region added to Ukraine in 1946. As a result, regional political, economic and cultural disparities became one of the biggest problems for independent Ukraine. Moreover, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Eastern Ukrainian economic and cultural links inherited from Soviet times remained very strong and heavily dependent on exports to Russia (Kolossov & L. Van Well 2016). Last but not least, Ukraine, torn between two region-building projects of the EU in its Eastern neighbourhood and Russian Federation in its post-Soviet space, experienced Russian military intervention in the Donbass region of Ukraine in the last decade.

Ukraine’s movement toward European integration emphasized cross-border cooperation (CBC). This referred to joint action aimed at developing economic, social, scientific, technical, environmental, cultural and other relations between local communities and their representative bodies, local executive authorities and relevant authorities of neighboring states within competences defined by respective national legislation (Law of Ukraine 2004, 2015). The Law of Ukraine on CBC defines its basic concepts, purposes and principles, as well as organisational and governmental forms of support. Local municipalities and regional authorities become responsible for assisting enterprises to develop external economic links and export potential, as well as international cooperation, including the establishment of joint ventures. Likewise, the Concept of the State Regional Policy in Ukraine directly influences CBC by stipulating that the powers of local authorities need to be strengthened. The legal basis of Ukraine-EU dialogue on regional development, regional and cross-border cooperation is based on Article 70 of the PCA and defined by the chapter “Cross-Border and Regional Cooperation” of the Association Agreement. It has been argued that CBC activities contribute to transforming the operation of power across the various levels of governance and a “new mode” of governance emerges from this development (Delcourt 2001; Kramsch & Hooper 2004; Liikanen, Scott, Sotkisiira 2016). From the EU side, to effectively cooperate and understand actors and rules of the game in the Eastern neighbourhood, it needs to be a responsible cross-border manager as well as a good strategic actor in the international arena.

On 14 February 1993 the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Ukraine (Romania would join in 1997 with the last county accepted in 2000) ratified a declaration in the Hungarian city of Drebecen, stating that the establishment of the Carpathian Euroregion (CE) would greatly contribute to strengthening the friendship and prosperity of the countries of this region and would guarantee active application of the principles of the Helsinki Act (1975), the Charter of Paris for a New Europe (1990), and other instruments. Ukraine also joined the European Outline Convention on Trans-frontier Cooperation between Territorial Communities or Authorities in 1993. Euroregions are normally defined as organizations of border (transboundary) interregional (intermunicipal) cooperation aimed at establishing good neighbourly relations as well as addressing common problems singled out by constitutional documents regulating the territories of three or more states (Council of Europe 1980). They represent institutional structures set up by two or more states to support cross-border cooperation, and as such represent a framework for meeting the needs for participation, transparency and development of cooperation strategies (Gasparini 2017).

Within the framework of the Euroregion, Ukraine and EU member states are also reaching general European level. In the case of Ukraine, which is
implementing the Association Agreement and Deep Cooperation and Free Trade Agreements with the EU, the union acts as a transformative power, aiming to promote reforms across a broad spectrum of governance areas: rule of law, public administration, democratic institutions, economics, and various standards and regulatory issues. However, largely due to the lack of strategic vision for the development of the Carpathian Euroregion (CE) and other operating Euroregions in Ukraine, examples of practical cooperation at the EU level have been very limited. According to Mytryaeva (2007), in order to succeed in integration efforts, it is necessary to have effective executive structures with a certain legal status at various levels within the Euroregion structure. This paper is an examination of Ukraine’s current course of European integration within the framework of the Carpathian Euroregion (CE), from the viewpoint of cross-border governance. Likewise, it questions the governance of borders in Eastern Europe and specifically the role of the EU in it.

This article uses SWOT analysis to analyse strengths (S), weaknesses (W), opportunities (O) and threats (T) for EU governance within the framework of the Carpathian Euroregion. The method is based on identifying and measuring internal and external indicators of a cross-border area, making it possible to evaluate them as positive or negative, according to the intensity of their presence.

The article is structured as follows. Section one reviews historical development of the Carpathian Euroregion by exploring the progress of Ukrainian integration with the EU. Section two reviews relevant literature debates and shows how existing institutional mechanisms and cross-border cooperation instruments influence the European integration course of Ukraine—if at all. Section three defines the organisational structure of the Carpathian Euroregion and offers a review of the SWOT method for analysing major CBC tendencies in Ukraine. Finally, the paper’s conclusion summarizes the impact of cross-border cooperation in the context of the Euroregion on the transformation of Ukrainian public/state policies and identifies major issues arising.

1: Historical Development of Carpathian Euroregion and the European Integration Course in Ukraine

After the fall of Communism, citizens and institutions of the Ukrainian borderlands found themselves confronted with tough processes of re-scaling and re-territorializing. As mentioned above, CBC policy with the EU is a reasonably new policy for Ukraine. The aim of cross-border cooperation has been defined as the development of social, economic, academic, technical, cultural and other relations, including good neighborly relations among its actors and participants on the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of state borders; considering power and authority of the subjects of CBC during conclusion of relevant agreements; coordinated removal of political, economic, administrative and other obstacles for mutual cooperation (Article 2, Law of Ukraine for “Cross-Border Cooperation”). Ukrainian bordering territories enter into four Euroregions\(^3\) at the same time: the largest of these is the Carpathian Euroregion (CE) which unites territories of four EU member states as well as the Transcarpathia, Lvivska, Ivano-Frankivska, and Chernivetska regions of Ukraine. Mytryaeva (2007) envisions Euroregions as an instrument of external policy of sovereign countries, which aspire to establish and maintain good neighbourly relations on a regional (municipal) level. According to her observation, it was due to activity within the framework of the Euroregions that territories of the Eastern Carpathians, at the watershed of the Tisza river, were not turned into a conflict zone. In fact, at present, the Carpathian region is one of the most stable regions in Eastern Europe. Transcarpathia also made its first successful steps by using Euroregions as an integration instrument.

The CE was founded as a mechanism of cross-border regional cooperation between several post-communist countries—Poland, Slovakia, Ukraine, Hungary—which signed an agreement on the formation of the international association named the Carpathian Euroregion in 1993, with Romania joining in 1997. It was the only Euroregion in Europe which included the bordering territories of five post-communist states characterized by different economic development and with heterogeneous ethnic, religious, and cultural structures (Mytryaeva 2007, 126). In the 20th century, this area was governed by six successive entities (the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, the Soviet Union, and Ukraine) with occasionally shifting borders. At the
beginning of the 20th century, most parts of Ukraine belonged to the Russian Empire, and the rest to the Austro-Hungarian Empire. In 1919, the International Conference in Paris made Eastern Galitza a part of Poland. In 1921, according to the Riga Agreement, the western part of Volynska oblast also became a part of Poland. The Russian part of Ukraine joined the Soviet Federative Socialist Republic in 1922 and became one of the Soviet socialist republics. In the five states, various nationalities lived together in a heterogeneous area that was also characterized by a mixture of major religions (Orthodoxy, Greek Orthodox, Roman Catholicism, Calvinism, Protestantism, Judaism, and Roma) (Tanaka 2006, 65). Together, all of these features characterize the area as “a mosaic zone of ethnicities, cultures and religions” and “a microcosm of new Europe” (Research Center of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association 2001a, 6–11). Today Ukraine remains the only state within the Carpathian Euroregion framework with clear aspirations for EU integration.

EU programmes for its neighbourhood gained a separate status and a budget in 2007-2009 within the Eastern Partnership ( EaP) policy framework. The EaP policy of the EU was adopted in 2007 and directed at Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. Before 2007 the regions of Ukraine (Volynska, Lvivska, Transcarpithia, Ivanofrankivska, Chernivetska, and Odeska) were subject to the TACIS programme. In 2007 the ENP began to replace earlier EU programmes to intensify CBC between its border and neighbouring regions and improve resource allocation to allow local communities to advance more efficiently. An important element of coordination between Ukraine and the EU was the involvement of Ukraine’s regions on a regular basis in activities of European regional associations, in particular the Assembly of the European Regions, Council of European Municipalities and Regions, Conference of European Regional Legislative Assemblies, Association of European Border Regions, Conferences of Peripheral Maritime Regions, European Association of Elected Representatives from Mountain Areas, and EUROCITIES.

Depending on the nature of specific projects, the EaP initiative allocates funds to various beneficiaries. Comprehensive Institution-Building projects, public administrations of partner states, EU member states, and EU institutions use specific instruments in training and other institutional reform programmes: Twinning, Technical Assistance and Information Exchange (TAIEX), and EU advisory missions. For Pilot Regional Development Projects, beneficiaries include public administrations of partner states, local authorities, small and medium enterprises, and non-governmental organisations. Funding, foreseen in the amount of €75 million, started in 2012 from the 2012/2013 ENPI budget of €62 million. As preparatory steps, EU missions were organized to five EaP countries, except for Belarus, in April–May 2011, to inform stakeholders about the concept, and a seminar was organized in Brussels in June with representatives from partner countries and EU Delegations to launch the programme. It is the task of the regional and local partners on both sides of the border to analyse their common needs and to identify priorities and actions, most relevant to their local situation. The ENPI, the financial instrument employed for ENP and addressed to ENP partner countries, offered co-funding for promoting good governance and equitable social and economic development process. In the perspective of reinforcing cooperation with countries bordering the EU, the ENPI included a component specifically targeted at CBC. CBC’s strategy has four key objectives: (1) to promote economic and social development in border areas; (2) address common challenges; (3) ensure efficient and secure borders; and (4) promote people-to-people cooperation.

The management of CBC programmes was assigned to a local or national authority jointly selected by all participating countries. CBC is also financed by the European Regional Development Fund. For example, the EaP Territorial Cooperation Support Programme promotes sustainable cross-border cooperation between border regions of EaP countries by building the capacities of local and regional authorities to effectively manage cross-border programmes in the region. The time frame of the period between 2012–2015 had a budget of €5.5 million (Regulation of the EP and of the Council on ENPI, 2006; Executive Summary of the ENPI CBC Strategy Paper, 2007). CBC used an approach largely built on Structural Funds principles such as multiannual programming, partnership, and co-financing, adapted to take into account the specificities of the Community’s external relations rules and regulation. One major innovation of the ENPI CBC lied in the fact that the programmes involving regions on both sides of the EU border shared one single budget, common management structures, and a common legal framework and implementation rules, giving the programmes a fully balanced partnership between the participating countries.

The ENPI supported cross-border and trans-regional cooperation as well as gradual economic integration of recipient countries with the EU beneficiary countries. In 2011–2012 the ENPI CBC Programme with a budget of €500,000 implemented a project with a focus on training activities enabling job placement for the disadvantaged population in Beregovo (Ukraine) and Miskolc, Hungary. The overall objective of the action was to contribute to the intensification and deepening of cooperation between institutions in Zakarpatska, Ukraine and Hungary. As a result, unemployed people (especially Roma, women,
and the disabled) gained new skills to successfully apply for jobs in Miskolc and Zakarpatska regions. A further benefit was that the initiative strengthened regional and institutional cooperation between Miskolc and Beregovo. CBC also set up a network of civil society organizations in the EU and partner countries. EU assistance in this area provided administrative and financial support for cooperation across the region and sub-regions between various civil society organizations. The Conference of Regional and Local Authorities (CORLEAP) was established by the Committee of the Regions (CoE) in 2011 to bring a regional and local dimension into the EaP. It brought together thirty-six regional and local elected representatives from the EU and EaP countries. President of the European Committee of the Regions and CORLEAP co-chair Ramón Luis Valcárcel Siso stressed that an important factor enabling multi-level governance to function effectively was greater political and fiscal autonomy for regional and local authorities. The three EaP priorities of public administration, fiscal decentralization, and regional cooperation were addressed in a report submitted at the CORLEAP meeting in Lithuania in November 2013. CORLEAP members stressed that decentralization and territorial cooperation were key to a successful implementation of the Association Agreements and economic, political, and social development. According to Michel Lebrun, a CoR President and CORLEAP co-chair, “decentralisation reforms and more cross-border cooperation” can lead to “greater legitimacy of policies on the local level and provide concrete solutions to problems for people living on both sides of a frontier” (the Annual Meeting of the CORLEAP, 2014).

The well-known EaP instruments for institution-building also supported the authority’s administrative capacity to implement CBC policies at both local and national levels. They included TAIEX, Twinning, Support for Improvement in Governance and Management (SIGMA) for the European Neighbourhood region, and recent comprehensive institution-building programmes. The EaP obviously created new multilateral institutions in EU policy towards the East (Delcour, 2011). However, in parallel it drew the line for reinforcement of bilateral cooperation at various levels, i.e., of the contractual relations with the neighbours through the negotiation of Association Agreements, Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements, visa liberalization, cooperation in the field of energy, support to social and economic policies, and finally assistance aimed at strengthening institutional capacities in order to meet the requirements of negotiated agreements.

2: Literature Review

As an international association, the Carpathian Euroregion is defined as a consultative and coordinating body directed at the expansion of transboundary cooperation of its member states and between different stakeholders at local, regional, cross-border, national, and supranational levels. The Ukrainian bordering territories enter into the four euroregions. The Carpathian is the largest; it unites the territory of four member states as well as Transcarpathia, Lvivska, Chernivetska and Ivano-Frankivska regions of Ukraine. Scholarly literature analyses the Carpathian Euroregion as an evolutionary form of governance, meaning that the established institutions can produce bottom-up initiatives in the border region and as an EU integration mechanism: a border regime or a builder of bridges. The bordering states to the east of the EU were actively involved in various transboundary projects of a bilateral and multilateral nature. In 2004 the EU Task Force, which comprised representatives of Ukraine, Central European neighbours, and EU experts, started ENP cooperation projects, among them Poland–Ukraine–Belarus, Hungary–Slovakia–Ukraine, and Romania–Ukraine. However, according to Mytryaeva (2007), the Lvivska region, for example, was cooperating more or less actively with Polish regions mostly on a bilateral level. Therefore, she concluded that Euroregions did not live up to the set expectations, directed at transboundary cooperation, due to established structures which were functioning on a community project basis (Mytryaeva 2007, 122–136).

Ukraine was involved in a smaller number of project applications compared to Poland and Hungary. Being EU members, Poland and Hungary applied for thirty-to-forty projects every year, whereas Ukraine applied for only two or three. Sotnikov and Kravchenko (2013) argue that Euroregions did not use their full potential as organizational forms of CBC whose task was to facilitate obtaining funds for cross-border co-financing projects from structural funds and other international financial institutions. However, they point out that cross-border industrial zones represented the main component of institutional innovation and an investment model for economic development not only of border areas but in the region as a whole.

Hungarian researcher Ludvig (2003) shows a number of negative factors affecting Carpathian Euroregion development: (1) differences in the context of the CE; (2) the size of the participating areas; (3) its structural institutional problems; (4) financial matters; (5) ambiguity of the division of labour between the district/local government and the central government; (6) historical inheritances; and (7) problems related to the introduction of the Schengen Acquis Communautaire. Likewise, the Polish agency of the CE (CE Secretariat) recognized that it faced three types of crises: first, a crisis of...
self-recognition, which refers to a lack of knowledge, information, and consciousness; second, a crisis of representation, in which neither the low-level local self-governing bodies nor non-profit organizations nor private enterprises were able to send their representatives to both the Council of the CE and the national organization of the CE. The third crisis related to participation where local residents were completely uninterested in the CE’s issues (Stworzyszenie na Rzecz Euroregionu Karpackiego Euro-Karpaty 2002, 11-17).

When it comes to governance issues, according to Tanaka (2006), firstly the CE must be examined by analysing the region’s characteristics, as an evolutionary form of governance. Secondly, taking the perspective of public space encourages consideration of the degree to which the everyday economic space and the public space have been formed (Tanaka 2006). Kramsch and Hooper when examining cross-border governance in Europe conclude that cross-border areas in Europe were faced with the following four “dilemmas of multi-governance”: (1) Euroregions were used as a convenient administrative policy for local elites to access funding sources from Brussels; (2) ties among economic actors were not developed automatically in the borderlands; instead, extensive economic relationships at the national and global levels outdid those of cross-border areas; (3) public awareness of cross-border initiatives was decreasing among locals of the Euroregion; and (4) it remained difficult to establish an effective democratic system of trans-boundary institutions (Kramsch & Hooper 2004, 3).

These trans-border and trans-level actions alter the identity of the regional actors and precipitate the formalization and Europeanization of cross-border regions themselves. Takahashi (2006) emphasizes that although the boundary of the Euroregion was determined by the EU, the motivations and solutions of Euroregion participants vary depending on issues, resulting in an amorphous form of governance. However, by disregarding bottom-up initiatives of the region, the institutionalization of the Euroregion causes a problem. Van Kersbergen and Van Waarden (2004) note that in recent decades shifts in governance have occurred not just in the private, semi-private, and public spheres, but at (and in-between) the local, regional, national, transnational, and global levels. According to these authors, such changes take place in the forms and mechanisms of governance, the location of governance, governing capacities, and styles of governance. Overall, analysis of recent scholarly research on CBC and organizational-economic mechanisms shows that problems of development of interregional and transborder cooperation have received substantial attention. However, public space with multiple layers and multiple issues is not actively developed along the eastern border region of the EU.

According to scholarly research, the greater the density of interaction, the more likely it will generate behavioral change on the part of domestic actors, with outsiders working through informal coalitions and acting as the glue that brings together the domestic players that shape their reform preferences (Schimmeleffenig and Sedelmeier 2005; Langbein 2015). There is no shortage of regional cooperation initiatives in the Carpathian Euroregion. However, for obvious reasons the CE model was not fully supported by the national governments. First, strongly centralized and oppressive states were not effective in pursuing policies and delivering public services. Second, Soviet legacy in Ukraine has long remained clearly visible in both the structure of local governing arrangements and in people’s expectations of their authorities, as well as their lack of trust in the process of governing. This explains the strong sentiment that the state, rather than the community, should take care of people’s needs. Third, ineffective unchanged governance processes triggered apathy and lack of responsibility in post-communist Ukrainian society. Therefore, the concept of autonomous self-governance as a form of local democracy was losing its support in Ukraine. In addition, citizens of Ukraine have little knowledge of local self-government, preferring either to passively wait for the resolution of their problems by local authorities with state support, or to solve the problems by themselves with no consideration for the wider community (UNDP 2008, 29-30). All of these factors combined presented a key challenge for the effective delivery of EU programmes and initiatives directed at its Eastern neighbourhood.

3: Organizational Structure of the Carpathian Euroregion and SWOT Analysis

The CE is an organization for cross-border regional cooperation among 18 border autonomous units at a similar level (region, province, county) belonging to five East European countries (Makowski 1993; Rebisz 2003, 35-43 cited in Tanaka 2006, 67). According to the agreement, Interregional Association Carpathian Euroregion goals are to organize and coordinate activities that promote cooperation in the fields of economy, ecology, culture, science, and education with assistance in elaborating concrete projects, and to promote various contacts at different levels along with good neighbourly relations. The CE is composed of four parts: the Council with Presidium and Chairman, Secretary General, National Offices (Agencies), and Working Commissions. The supreme body of the CE is the Council, which consists of three representatives from each member country. The Council meets every six months. It discusses and unanimously accepts common projects and makes decisions on important topics relevant to cooperation (appoint-
ment, budget, and organizational changes). The Chairman is elected every two years to manage the session, representing the Council to the outside. The Secretary General (Executive Director) as well is elected every two years, has authority to present bill drafts to the Council and conducts daily cooperation activities. The CE has a network of national offices, each of which has the responsibility to maintain regular contact with the Council, dealing with all the cooperation initiatives and taking charge of one Working Commission’s works.

Specific work is performed by Commission for Regional Development (its coordinator at the Hungarian side); Commission for Tourism (coordinator at the Polish side) and Environment (coordinator at the Hungarian side); Trade Development (coordinator at the Romanian side); Commission for Prevention of Natural Disasters (coordinator at the Slovak side); Commission for Social Infrastructure (coordinator at the Ukrainian side); and Audit and Control Committee (coordinator at the Hungarian side. Working Commissions have five fields of activity: regional development, environmental protection and tourism, social infrastructure development, trade exchange development, and auditing (Rebisz 2003, cited in Tanaka 2006). Every national party contributes an equivalent of 35,000 USD a year to the CE budget (Helsinki 1999, cited in Tanaka 2006, 67–68).

The important issues for this paper are institutional, including challenges of improving efficiency. According to Article Three of the Charter of the Interregional Association “Carpathian Euroregion”, its main objectives are: coordination and organization of joint activities; promotion of cooperation in economy, science, ecology, education and culture among its members; support in the implementation of cross-border projects in the conditions of common interest; promoting contacts among population of the territories included in the Euroregion, promotion of good neighborly relations among its members; cooperation with international institutions and organizations. At the beginning of the European integration, Slovakia launched National Conventions for European Integration in Moldova and Ukraine and the Centre of Transfer of the Slovak Experiences from the Accession Process at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Bratislava. Using standard tools and additional financial capacity, the International Visegrad Fund\(^8\) started with flagship projects aimed at the promotion of the Slovak Democratization and Transformation experience, development of regional cooperation, and support of civil society.

**SWOT Analysis of the Carpathian Euroregion**

The development strategy of the Carpathian Euroregion contains clearly defined priorities. It benefits from favorable natural and ecological conditions, a significant amount of relatively well-qualified labor force and most importantly, positive cooperative attitude with a strong desire of partnership with neighbouring states towards its western border. Major geopolitical challenges of the CE include its role in the Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine. The SWOT analysis method is based on identifying internal indicators of a cross-border area, as well as external ones. It is vital to subsequently measure indicators by making it possible to evaluate them as positive or negative, according to the intensity of their presence. Through complex data processing, SWOT analysis made it possible to define the conditions of CBC in a specific area and, at the same time, helped to highlight any potential for cooperation by working on the existing elements (Gasparini & Ferluga 2005) so as to emphasize strengths (S) and opportunities (O), while limiting the negative effects of weaknesses (W) and risks or threats (T). SWOT analysis may be used in any decision-making situation when a desired state objective is defined. It may also be used in preventive crisis management. The SWOT method can be used to evaluate the ‘strengths’, ‘weaknesses’, ‘opportunities’ and ‘threats’ involved in any organizational activity. In this study, firstly the general position of SWOT analysis in the cross-border cooperation process is explained, secondly the components of SWOT are examined. Strategic planning allows an entity to be more proactive than reactive in shaping its own future; it allows any organization to initiate and influence, rather than just respond to, activities and thus to exert control over its own destiny (David 2003, 15).

**Strengths** of the Carpathian Euroregion consist of: (1) institutional factors for effective CBC such as signatory of the European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation (Madrid, 21 May 1980); signatory of the 1995 Additional Protocol to the Madrid Convention; signatory of the 1998 Second Protocol to the Madrid Convention; internationally recognized borders; good institutional and legal framework (based on EU requirements). The CE is a potential EU Objective area which includes nature conservation, environmental protection, rural development, ethnic groups in a backward situation, educational infrastructure to be developed. Administrative factors for effective CBC are among the factors of successful development of the CE and in their turn include official definition of cross-border areas and local authorities’ co-operation with foreign partners. (2) Economic factors for cooperation include participation in Interreg/Phare projects; efficient and well-connected infrastructure: road, rail, and waterway networks; and favourable natural environment for agricultural production; good conditions for thermal, hunting, and cultural tourism; a considerable number of the cheap relatively well-qualified labour force; ambigious.
tions for recognition and application of effective mechanisms of a market economy; growing interest towards the opportunities offered by the EU; and proximity to countries of the Eastern neighbourhood and their markets. (3) Linguistic, cultural, and historical factors for CBC include common historical background; common language or knowledge of the neighbouring country’s language; ratification of the 1995 Framework Convention for the Protection of Ethnic Minorities; tradition of cooperation; and established transboundary transport routes.

**Weaknesses** of the CE consist of: (1) institutional obstacles to CBC; including state centralization; lack of adequate state/non-state structures; conflicting capabilities on either side of the border; restrictive legal regulations on cross-border relations; lack of credibility; low mutual knowledge and trust; different political orientations and insufficient financial resources. (2) The main economic obstacles include uneven development levels; weak or non-existing response to opportunities offered by CBC; considerable distance from the national and Western European economic centres; limited local resources; and lack of financial resources for essential public expenditures. (3) Socio-cultural obstacles include presence of negative stereotypes; language barriers; weak accessibility; underdevelopment of tourism; and the small number of experts and professionals speaking foreign languages and mastering the situation along both borders. To add, weak points of the CE include its peripheral location, possibly adverse demographic trends, unemployment, and low income in general.

**Opportunities** (as external indicators) consist of the establishment and development of direct contacts between municipalities, local authorities, civic organisations and citizens. The border guards of both countries interact on a permanent basis clearly showing that it is worth developing channels of wide-ranging information and experience exchange. Therefore, given the similarity of problems faced by the authorities at the regional and municipal levels, it should be possible to introduce joint programmes and projects in the fields of personnel training.

Common **threats** (as external indicators) comprise illegal trafficking and organized crime in the cross-border region; traffic jams and smuggling and corruption on the border. There is also strong migration in the border area, which may affect not only area’s demographic structure but also its occupational skills structure. Additionally, central government bureaucracy hinders local agencies and authorities from launching their own cross-border projects and programmes. Therefore, participation of Ukraine (and other members of the CE) in the Schengen Area makes cooperation less dependent not only on national governments but also on various international arrangements. As a further threat, the falling of the CE behind the central regions of the member countries is increasing and a peripheral situation is mounting with marginalization problems where possibilities for self-government are becoming limited. Additional threats include increase of isolation due to the deterioration of accessibility; worsening of the state of public roads and the further loss of the role of railways. The website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine provides only a few examples of practical cooperation: presentation of Dnipropetrovsk region in Brussels in April 2012 and presentation of Vinnytsya region in Brussels on 15 September 2011. There is no significant foreign capital in the region in following years, therefore, prospects for investment and practical cooperation are limited. Thus, the function of the CE as an international bridge can be lost.

**Conclusion**

This article aimed to identify mechanisms, and benefits of cross-border cooperation in the form of Carpathian Euroregion in Ukraine. It intended to show how existing institutional mechanisms and instruments of CBC influence the European integration course of Ukraine. It highlighted potential strategies and policies that the EU adopted to make its role in the region more effective. However, largely due to the lack of strategic vision for the development of the Carpathian Euroregion, examples of practical cooperation at the EU level have remained limited. EU regional programmes address matters which do not fully correspond to Ukrainian national priorities. This reduces the effective partnership and limits its ownership by the ENP partners. The EU’s contribution to strengthening its governance through regional programmes is also rather limited, reflecting the scarce resources allocated to these areas of cooperation.

It is not clear where the limits of the EU regional influence actually lie. Assuming that regional cooperation and increasing economic interaction are among the most important prerequisites for stability in the post-Soviet era, an important lesson can be drawn that the EU vision of regional partnership can thrive through a mutually shared vision of political, social, economic and cultural engagement in neighbouring countries. To conclude, the role of the bordering territories of the Carpathian Euroregion in international cooperation is of great significance from governance perspectives, and in relation to the European integration course of the Ukrainian state. However, its further development needs fundamental institutional changes. This means greater EU attention to security sector and judicial reform, policing, infrastructure, energy, customs and border control, and the fight against corruption, as well
as conflict mediation, democratization, reviving the economy and the formation of more effective strategy and mechanisms for cooperation with European structures.

Annex 1: Abbreviations

AA: Association Agreement
CBC: Cross-Border Cooperation
CE: Carpathian Euroregion
CoE: Council of Europe
CoR: European Committee of the Regions
CORLEAP: Conference of Regional and Local Authorities
DCFTA: Deep Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement
 EaP: Eastern Partnership
 ENI: European Neighbourhood Instrument
 ENP: European Neighbourhood Policy
 ENPI: European Neighbourhood policy Instrument
 EU: European Union
 INTERREG: cooperation programmes between regions funded by the European Regional Development Fund.
 PCA: Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
 PHARE: Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their Economies
 SIGMA: Support for Improvement in Governance and Management (for European Neighbourhood Region)
 SWOT: Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats.
 TACIS: Technical Assistance for Commonwealth Independent States
 The Ukrainian SSR: The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic

Annex 2: Data Collection

Content documentary analysis is applied to various categories of primary documentary sources, as follows.

Ukrainian legislation: The Constitution of Ukraine has the highest legal force. Laws and other normative legal acts are adopted on the basis of the Constitution of Ukraine and shall conform to it; laws and legal acts of the Ukrainian Parliament (Verkhovna Rada); by-laws where laws are supplemented by so-called normative acts - regulations, instructions, decrees, and orders. These documents are issued by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine (the highest executive authority), ministries, public bodies and committees, and local government bodies. Normative acts contain mechanisms for law implementation. The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine issues Regulations (legal acts of a normative nature) and Decrees (legal acts covering operational and ongoing issues that are not of a normative nature); and Presidential Decrees. Under the general provisions of the Constitution of Ukraine, the President is entitled to issue Decrees on all matters referred to his jurisdiction.

Annex 3: Legal Framework

The legal framework for the involvement of Ukraine's border regions in cross-border cooperation is well-developed and quite sufficient. It includes:

a. The Council of Europe acts: European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Cooperation between Territorial Communities or Authorities (ratified by the Decree of Verkhovna Rada of 14 July 1993) and European Charter of Local Self-Government (Ratified by the Act of Ukraine of 15 July 1997).

b. National legislation: Act of Ukraine on Local Self-Government (adopted 21 May 1997); Act of Ukraine on Local State Administrations (adopted 9 April 1999); Act of Ukraine “On Transfrontier Cooperation” (adopted 24 June 2004 and defining the objectives and principles of the national policies in the field of transfrontier cooperation; powers of Ukrainian entities involved in transfrontier cooperation; and the principles and methods of the government support to transfrontier cooperation including the national funding); Decree by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine “On the Measures to Implement the Concept of the State Regional Policy” (adopted 13 September 2001); Decree by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine “On Some Issues of the Development of Cross-border Cooperation and the Euroregions” (adopted 29 April 2002). The Law of Ukraine “On Fundamentals of State Regional Policy”. 5 February 2015. No. 156-VIII.

Notes

1 As such the concept seeks to “develop a zone of prosperity and a friendly neighbourhood - a ‘ring of friends’ - with whom the EU enjoys close, peaceful and co-operative relations” [COM (2003) 104]. It was the key document for the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) of the EU launched in 2004. In June 2006 the EU Council reiterated that the EU is open to any country that fulfils Art.49 of the European Treaty and would meet the conditions for membership.

2 The first legislative act that laid the foundation of the legal framework for the state regional policy was “The Concept of the State Regional Policy” approved by the Decree of the President of Ukraine No. 341/2001 on the 25th of May, 2001.

3 Article 2.1 of the 1980 Madrid Convention defines transfrontier co-operation as “any concerted action designed to reinforce and foster neighbourly relations between territorial communities or authorities within the jurisdiction of two or more Contracting Parties and the conclusion of any agreement and arrangement necessary for this purpose.” Council of Europe, 1980. www.coe.int.

4 During the years 2004–2006 about €20 million were allocated to the Ukrainian partners involved in projects directed at the strengthening of transboundary and transnational cooperation between the EU and Ukraine within the framework of the EU programmes. Slovakia, Poland, and Hungary were financed under INTERREG, and Romania by PHARE.

5 The ENPI is a more flexible and policy-driven mechanism, as the allocation of funds depends on a country’s needs and absorption capacity and its level of imple-
mentation of agreed reforms. As from 2014, the ENPI was replaced by the European Neighbourhood Instrument, which provides increased support to 16 partner countries to the east and south of the EU’s borders.

6 CORLEAP is the political forum of local and regional authorities. It is the only EU platform that offers an opportunity to discuss the contribution by cities and regions in the development of the EaP.

7 According to the Working Plan of the Administrative Office of the Twinning Programme, there were 61 Twinning projects for 2013 in Ukraine.

8 Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic. Information about Visegrad is also available here: http://visegradfund.org/home/

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The Ukrainian Concept of the State Regional Policy. 2001.


Introduction

Much of Latin American indigenous philosophy from the eighteenth to the twenty-first century can be attributed to Aztec philosophy, culture, and mythology. Aztlán is often understood as the mythical American Southwest and ancestral homeland of the Aztec people. The epicenter of this Aztec mythology and philosophy is the ancient peoples' desire for balance and unity in an ephemeral world. As explained in Nahuatl legends, Aztlán began when seven tribes from seven different caves came together before their migration to modern day Mexico City. Almost a thousand years later, Aztlán has traversed from its origins and mythos to a philosophy and logos. It was adopted as the Chicano/a homeland in the middle of the twentieth century during the Chicano/a Movement in the Civil Rights Era, after Alurista’s acclaimed manifesto, “El Plan Espiritual de Aztlán,” which advocated for Chicano/a nationalism and self-determination.

The article has four main sections. The first section explores the semiotic and philosophical significance of Aztlán as a mythical homeland to the Aztec people, prior to their departure and peregrination many centuries ago, to its reclamation during the 1960s into a geographical, geocultural, and geopolitical location between—but still separate from—the United States and Mexico (called the American Southwest). Through an interdisciplinary approach of anthropology, postcolonial theory, and mythology discourse, the second section examines how the diasporic flux of this indigenous population has interwoven a cultural and genetic tapestry of a mixed population as seen in its Aztec history and philosophy, and its evolution as a functioning myth through disruption, colonization, and hybridization. The third section analyzes Aztlán’s integration from a historical and literary approach to the US-Mexico border and the eventual reclamation during the...
Chicano Movement that has strengthened its foundations on either side of the modern imaginary boundary line. Finally, the concluding section demonstrates how, given an interdisciplinary understanding of Aztlán throughout time, this social phenomenon amongst the Chicano/a nation has evolved into hybridized ideology from “mythos to logos.”

Aztlán History

In order to navigate the contradictions of the rhetorical notion of “Aztlán”—a term rebirthed from the Chicano Movement in the late 1960s—and whether or not it geographically and geoculturally relates to contemporary thought, Aztlán’s literary symbology, its philosophical relevance, and debated meaning across time must be assessed. Anthropologists have discovered evidence of remains, dating as far back as 35,000-8000 BCE, from the Texas Southwest and Arizona regions (Barnouw and Lynn 1960, 186). According to anthropological research on “Indian languages, social organization, material culture, and origin myths,” the Southern Arizona Cochise culture is credited with being the “parent culture of peoples as far apart as the Ute of Colorado and the Aztec of the Valley of Mexico” (Ellis 1968, 96). Further research shows that sometime after 1000 BCE, communication between the American Southwest and the Valley of Mexico increased, which was due in part to the Uto-Aztecan population migrating south while the cultivation of maize began to head north. Northern and southern populations were intersecting, and eventually, the “hunting-and-gathering Cochise culture” started to disappear, replaced by the more agrarian cultures of the “Mogollon, Hohokam, Anasazi, and Pueblos.” Naturally, with trade came transculturation (Riley 1971, 286-287).

Around this time, according to Nahua tl (Aztec) legends, that seven Nahua tribes—Xochimilca, Tlaxcuicu, Acolhua, Tlaxcalteca, Tepaneca, Chalca, and Mexica—from seven different caves and who all spoke the same Nahua language left their respective caves and settled in Aztlán, which became their homeland and a place for unification. Together, they became the “Mexicas” as they migrated south in search of their promised land. As interpreted from Aztec codices, their southwest peregrination began around 1064 CE and ended when they encountered their prophetic vision of “an eagle, perched on a cactus, devouring a snake” in present-day Mexico City. Although most historiography focuses on the actual migration and establishment of city-states, the exact meaning of Aztlán is debated and has proven to be of great importance to indigenous peoples as indicated throughout time in various maps and codices. Some experts believe Aztlán means “place of white herons,” while others interpret it more simply as a “place of whiteness” (Pina 1989, 19-28). Bob Hodge’s and Vijay Mishra’s article “Aboriginal Place” views the desert in Peter Skipper’s cartographic painting, Jila Japingka, as partly absent owing to purposely chosen negative colors and the lighter color depicting a place of “abundance” (1991, 363). According to Walter Mignolo, in Mapa Sigüenza, the “spatial narrative of the Aztec peregrination from Aztlán to the Valley of Mexico” (1995, 368) is indicative of the negative and positive depictions often seen in indigenous maps during the pinturas period, or first period, which took place from 1540-1560. Mignolo explains that the geographical imprecision has been interpreted in the negative (1995, 368). The negative is reflective of what the Amerindians did not possess, versus the positive, which was reflective of what they did possess. It may be possible that Nahua people saw Aztlán, as a “place of whiteness,” in the positive as a place of abundance and a place they possessed.

Whether Aztlán is a mythical or historical fact, it functioned as aww truth to the Aztec people, evidenced by the extensive Boturini Codex, now housed at Mexico’s National Institute of Anthropology and History (Figure 1). It is one of the most important and longest surviving chronicles of the Mexica people from Aztlán to the city of Tenochtitlán. The biggest fact of contention amongst historians and archeologists regarding Aztlán is whether it existed or if it were akin to some of New Spain’s other mythical locations, like Cevola or Cibola, and the Seven Cities of Gold. Many archeologists have attempted to identify the original location of Aztlán but have failed to definitively locate the homeland of the Nahua people. Aztlán is believed to be northwestern Mexico or the American Southwest. These calculations were determined from letters and documents obtained from the Spanish conquistadors and explorers who navigated the region, but the location of Aztlán was not substantiated. After the Spanish annihilated the Aztec state, New Spain hegemonized the region, and the hybridized people along the border began to “vacillate between a self-identity as foreigners and a self-identity as natives” (Chávez 1989, 53). Consequently, one of the biggest issues concerning Latin America philosophy has been the history and identity of the Latin American people.

For most of the twentieth century, Latin American philosophy, like Aztlán, has been the subject of many heated debates concerning existence, identity, originality, and authenticity. When the Spanish explorers first arrived in the Americas, the Amerindians were scattered throughout the land and substantially divided into many diverse cultures, with many different languages. Eventually,
Figure 1. The Boturini Codex, housed at Mexico’s National Institute of Anthropology and History. “The Boturini Codex is one of the most important surviving chronicles of the history of the Mexica people. Specifically, it details the journey of the Mexica from their mythical homeland of Aztlán, from which they were expelled, and the subsequent journey to the Valley of Mexico. This is where they eventually founded the city of Tenochtitlán (today Mexico City) and started their empire. The Boturini Codex is one of the most important surviving sources of this story. Considering the subject matter, it is also known as la Tira de la Peregrinación, the strip (of long paper) of the pilgrimage” (Boturini Codex [1530-1541])
the Spanish imposed a colonial unification on them, especially once Africans were brought in to supplement the labor shortage (Mann, 2005, p. 121). If a population is unwillingly put together, the authenticity of the works produced from that society is, therefore, questionable.

Aztec Philosophy

Although Latin American philosophy can be divided into five different periods—Pre-Columbian, Colonial, Independentist, Nationalist, and Contemporary—many scholars believe that the originality and authenticity of Latin American philosophy came before the Ameridian population was conquered and colonialized (Nuccetelli 2013). Much of what is understood from the pre-Columbian period came from text written after the Spanish conquest by colonists and missionaries, or from Christianized, Spanish, educated natives. However, the most authentic pre-Columbian sources are the Aztec codices.

In the Americas, Aztec philosophy was the most developed and, in many ways, was comparable to Ancient Greek philosophy. According to scholar James Maffie, this pre-Columbian civilization made attempts to explore the nature of reality and the limits of knowledge. Aztec philosophy as developed from Aztec culture, focused on dualism, monism, and aesthetics, and was centered on the quest for stability and balance in an ephemeral world. An example of this balance is the binary concept of Ometeotl, the unity of all things in the universe, even things in opposition, like light and dark, and life and death (Maffie 2014). Unity with dualistic expressions is similar to dialectical monism, where reality is a unified whole and can be expressed in dualistic terms, as seen in complementary polarities and present in both Western and Eastern philosophies (James 1963). In American Philosophy, William James’s concept of a “block universe,” did convey this Manichean notion of dualism but in a transitory world within an infinite system.

A “block universe” refers to the systematically predetermined reality from all aspects. Along with Charles Sanders Peirce, James founded the school of pragmatism, and in many ways critics viewed pragmatism similarly to relativism. Nevertheless, James believed that pragmatism was rooted in epistemological realism and the world exists independently and innately to our perceptions, and then, our senses reflect that understanding (James 1963). Thus, by James’s interpretation, the meaning of truth relies on how it functions. Therefore, if Aztec philosophy is rooted in Aztec culture and it functions as a truth, then Aztlan, whether a myth or historical or geographical location acts as truth.

Other Aztec truths can be found in the transcultural influences that have been cultivated and Hispanicized through hybridization and are still in existence and often used today throughout the US. According to Rolando Romero of Feminism, Nation, and Myth: La Malinche, the majority of the maize derivatives come from the Aztec tradition, such as “corn tortillas, pinole, gorditas, tamales, pozole, menudo, enchiladas, tamales, and tacos.” Maybe not as commonplace as the food items previously mentioned, there are also words within the border vernacular that have been acquired: “calco (shoe), cuate (friend), chante (home), and ruco (old man)” (Romero 2005, p. X). Many Aztec cross-cultural practices followed by the hybridized American Southwest people today originated from the Aztecs. One such belief is el ojo (the evil eye), which refers to a stranger’s envious stare that would make a newborn child inexplicably sick. Mothers and babies wear colorful necklaces or display other noticeable trinkets to distract the stranger’s gaze and ward off el ojo. Another common practice is having a niche or altar for saints within the home as a way to worship on a daily basis, and the use of brujeria (witchcraft) and curanderas (healers) as alternative wellness practices that came from the indigenous peoples. Popular folklore and legends along the American Southwest can be traced back to Aztec origins, as well. Two in particular are La Llorona and La Malinche (Lux and Vigil 1989, pp. 102-104). La Llorona and La Malinche, both women, are regarded as traitors and villains haunting an entire culture for generations. La Llorona for killing her children and La Malinche for being a vendee or sellout to her native people (Romero 2005, p. 28). Reclamation of Aztlan is just another example of cross-cultural beliefs that have made their way into a hybridized ideology.

Aztlan functioned as the truth to the Aztec people and, over time, to the Chicano/a people. According to folklorist and scholar, Vladimir Yakovlevich Propp, the linear structural arrangement of a folklore or mythology is integral to the meaning and longevity of the story. He created the Propp Sequence in an effort to deconstruct the component of a successful story. The Propp Sequence consists of thirty-one functions in chronological order, and when the story and evolution of Aztlan is applied to it, it fulfills all thirty-one functions of the quest narrative, and thus, provides a glimpse of how Aztlan prevailed throughout centuries (Propp 1969) (Figure 2).

US-Mexico Border History

Analyzing the role of the mythology and legend of La Malinche is paramount to understanding US-Mexico Border history and the ultimate reworking of Aztlan. Many people view her as the
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
<th>Aztlán</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Absentation</td>
<td>The story begins with damage or loss</td>
<td>The 7 tribes are separated and speak various languages.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Interdiction</td>
<td>The hero must leave</td>
<td>The 7 tribes must leave their caves.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Violation of Interdiction</td>
<td>The hero agrees</td>
<td>The 7 tribes all decide to leave their respective caves.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Reconnaissance</td>
<td>Preliminary search</td>
<td>They leave their caves.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Delivery</td>
<td>The meeting place</td>
<td>All 7 tribes come together in Aztlán.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Trickery</td>
<td>Put to a test</td>
<td>The 7 tribes receive a message to go on a journey to a new homeland.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Complicity</td>
<td>Acceptance of the test</td>
<td>All 7 tribes leave.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Villainy or Lacking</td>
<td>Mystical aid or message is gifted</td>
<td>The 7 tribes receives signs that will guide them to their final location.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Mediation</td>
<td>Intervention</td>
<td>There are stops along the way.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Beginning Counteraction</td>
<td>Encounter an adversary</td>
<td>The tribes encounter Coxcoxtli.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Departure</td>
<td>Defeated</td>
<td>The tribes leave again and start going their separate ways.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 First Function of the Donor</td>
<td>Things turn around</td>
<td>The tribes split apart and settle in new locations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Hero’s Reaction</td>
<td>Everything falls into place</td>
<td>The city-states are established.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Receipt of a Magical Agent</td>
<td>Magic appears</td>
<td>Aztec empire finds its home.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Guidance</td>
<td>Saved</td>
<td>Aztec empire is prosperous thanks to the gods.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Struggle</td>
<td>A villain comes</td>
<td>Spanish Conquistadors come.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Branding</td>
<td>A marking happens</td>
<td>The Aztecs are branded as savages.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Victory</td>
<td>Villain is defeated</td>
<td>Savages are defeated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Liquidation</td>
<td>Issues are resolved</td>
<td>Spanish mix with Amerindians and the Mexican mestizo/a is born.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Return</td>
<td>Journey back</td>
<td>Many mestizo/as head north back to Aztlán.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Pursuit</td>
<td>A new adversary pursues</td>
<td>Aztlán has become the Southwest Border and taken over by the Americans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Rescue</td>
<td>Salvation</td>
<td>The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo defines the Border.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Unrecognized Arrival</td>
<td>A new home is found</td>
<td>The Border people must choose which side of the Border they will remain on.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Unfounded Claims</td>
<td>False claims</td>
<td>America takes over much of the Southwest.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Difficult Task</td>
<td>Put through a test</td>
<td>The former inhabitants of Aztlán have been displaced.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Solution</td>
<td>Fight</td>
<td>The Border people fight for their homeland.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Recognition</td>
<td>Acceptance of identity</td>
<td>Over the centuries, the Border people have become a new people, no longer native. They are mixed. They are a mestizo/a nation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Exposure</td>
<td>Shining a light</td>
<td>Mestizo/a nation joins the civil rights movement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 Transfiguration</td>
<td>Become anew</td>
<td>Mestizo/a nation identifies themselves as Chicano/a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Punishment</td>
<td>Imposter loses home</td>
<td>Chicano/as and Border people refuse to assimilate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Wedding</td>
<td>Celebration</td>
<td>Reclamation of Aztlán.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 2.** Propp functions applied to Aztlán. There have been different interpretations and definitions of these stages of the Propp sequence, but they share the basic structure. Here, in the final column, I suggest how the stages of Aztlán’s peregrination can be mapped to Propp’s Sequence.
founders of the new Mexico nation. Some historians credit La Malinche with saving her people from the Aztecs during her time assisting and translating for Hernán Cortés, by influencing him to be more humane during the conquering of this New World. Many Christians commend her for her part in bringing Christianity from Europe to this conquered region.

What is known is that La Malinche, Malintzin, or Doña Marina—her baptized name—was once one of twenty slaves gifted to Cortés. Throughout their years together, she rose in rank, eventually replacing other trusted advisors, and is portrayed in codices as the right-hand woman to Cortés, equal to him, by the size and repetition of her appearance in these codices (Coerver, Buffington, and Pasztor 2004, p. 200). How or why she earned such standing, as with the location and meaning of Aztlan, is up for debate. What is most important is that when she bore Martin, Cortés’ son—the first mestizo, or people of indigenous and European descent—Malintzin, in many Mexican’s eyes, also became the mother of a new nation. Eventually, she married one of Cortés’ soldiers, Juan de Jaramillo and moved to Spain with him, where she was received by the Spanish court (Figueroa and Melgar 1985, p. 295). Despite this, she is still widely viewed today as a traitor to her native people. The fact remains that La Malinche was a woman enslaved between two cultures, helping to initiate a series of historical events that would define a space and a people, much like her, straddled between cultures.

After Cortés invaded Mexico in 1519 and conquered the Aztec empire, migrants began settling in the region, once considered Aztlan, and making it their home. At the time, the area was part of the Kingdom of New Spain with a sparse population. This region of New Spain was in a transition and diasporic flux with its mismatched indigenous groups and Spanish settlers, disrupting an indigenous way of life that had been in existence prior to this invasion of land and identity. This position both geographically and philosophically remained in an in-between state, lasting well into the nineteenth century.

During the early nineteenth century, the US expanded steadily in accordance to the theory of Manifest Destiny, acquiring large areas of land and desirable territory that would redefine the US-Mexico border. The influx of people and constant conflicts in the region erupted into the Mexican-American War, which began in 1846 and ended in 1848, followed by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, in which the US acquired Aztlan and what is referred to today as the American Southwest.

For centuries, this specific area of the Kingdom of New Spain and the people that inhabited it were mostly free and loosely governed. After the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, the region remained in a state of diasporic flux, insomuch that it was a place of constant transition. Most of the people living along the American Southwest never left throughout the acquisitions and transitions of this territory—New Spain, Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, California, and Mexico. According to scholar and historian James Clifford, “there is no natural shape to configuration” (2001, p. X) Clifford postulates that there are some indigenous populations that have remained in one place and the environment has changed around them, and these deep histories cannot be denied by “urbanization, habitation, reindigenization, sinking roots, moving on, invading, and holding on” (2001, p. 183). The mestizos—Spanish and American Indian mixed-race individuals—of Mexico and America were trying to figure out their new space, culture, and language, without abandoning their inner-home-land—their Aztlan—that once joined these two areas. The succession of events that followed challenged the Treaty’s promises and the people along the border for the many decades to come, as they went through another major transition and what may be understood as a double hybridization.

During the Great Depression of the 1930s, somewhere around 600,000 Mexican people and those ethnically resembling them in appearance were repatriated to Mexico, the status of their citizenship disregarded (Perea 1997). A couple decades later, another 1-1.3 million were repatriated during Operation Wetback (García 1980). Many died during deportation. Busloads of deportees were dropped off in the middle of the Mexican desert where they were left to fend for themselves. This “large-scale clampdown” of “illegal aliens” from Mexico during 1954-1955, ironically, overlapped with the Bracero Program (1942-1964), a “binational initiative” that was established to aid and promote seasonal migration of Mexican laborers for US farming needs (Samora 1971). It was apparent around this time that the millions of people living along the American Southwest border were living in a transcultural region between two countries that would never fully accept this double hybridized population.

Chicano/a Movement

Shortly after the repatriation movement of Operation Wetback, these unAmericanized-American people without a home and without an identity proclaimed themselves “Chicano/as” They realized they were being intentionally left out of the American ideology. Many were being sent “back” to Mexico whether they were Mexican or not, and the ones that did stay were left with categories and definitions that did not define them, like Latino/as and Hispanics. They never left the Border, but the
land and politics surrounding them had changed. As Terry Goldie asserts, these types of populations became “essential non-participants” (1989, p. 172). It was at this time that they started speaking up, reclaiming their land and identity—as Chicano/as—according to the Handbook of Texas:

Inspired by the courage of the farmworkers, by the California strikes led by César Chávez, and by the Anglo-American youth revolt of the period, many Mexican-American university students participated in a crusade for social betterment that was known as the Chicano Movement. They used Chicano to denote their rediscovered heritage, their youthful assertiveness, and their militant agenda. Though these students and their supporters used Chicano to refer to the entire Mexican-American population, they understood it to have a more direct application to the politically active parts of the Tejano community (De Leon 2010, p. X).

Scholar Rafaela Castro has defined three possible origins of the term, as discussed by Bauerle and Simmen. First, “Chicano” may have originated from the Mexican city of Chihuahua. In El Paso, Texas, the people from la frontera or the border of Chihuahua are sometimes referred to as Fron-Chis, combining the first part of the Spanish word frontera (Fron-) with the first part of the city name Chihuahua (-Chihuahua (-Chi)). Therefore, “Chicano” could derive from the city name Chihuahua and Mexicano (Chi- and -can). Second, Chicano may come directly from the indigenous name of the people, Mexica, using the Nahuatl pronunciation of “sh” or “ch” for x. A third possibility is that Chicano comes from the city name Chihuahua and Mexican (Chi- and -c)-cano. Therefore, “Chicano” could derive from the city name Chihuahua and Mexicano (Chi- and -can). Second, Chicano may come directly from the indigenous name of the people, Mexica, using the Nahuatl pronunciation of “sh” or “ch” for x. A third possibility is that Chicano comes from the Spanish word chico/a meaning little boy/girl, an Anglo-American term primarily used in the American Southwest in an effort to degrade a Mexican American (Simmen and Bauerle 1969, pp. 225-230). The last explanation might suggest why older Mexican Americans were reticent to adopt the term, although the term “Chicano” is now commonplace.

Much like La Malinche and Aztlán, the origins of the term have been widely debated. Today, Chicano/a is a widely accepted neologism and the direct result of a history of transculturation, migration, conquest, hybridization, and double hybridization that transpired over hundreds of years. Originally, like De Leon mentions, it was a term to describe the working-class Mexican Americans. In the beginning of its reclamation, the term became a generational divide amongst Mexican American students, activists, and the older Mexican American generation, and further separated Mexican Americans from other Latino/a groups. Overall, the goal for self-proclaimed Chicano/as was to organize and recast its people and homeland.

Besides the geopolitical use of the term, “Chicano” as an ethnonym has served a multitude of purposes throughout the American Southwest. The poet and writer Tino Villanueva traced its first use to 1911, before the Chicano Movement, as referenced by anthropologist José Limón in a report, “Hot Tamales” for La Crónica, a Spanish-language newspaper (González 1996). Like Aztlán, Chicano/a became the collective-uncconscious homeland, in an effort to define the intra-history and geocultural properties of a borderless Spanish-Mexican-American mestizo space (Simmen and Bauerle 1969, pp. 225-230). “Chicano” was used to carve out a niche without having to identify with the term and categorization of Hispanic (Spanish) or Latino (Iberian, French, Italian, or Romanian). With a new double-hybrid identification and term to serve the former people of Aztlán, it was only fitting that a new hybrid language also be adopted after two hundred and fifty years of Spanish/Anglo colonization and transculturation. Chicano Spanish slowly made its way into existence. Today, after much Americanization, it is known as “Spanglish,” a widely spoken version of mixed Spanish and English now thriving throughout the American Southwest border. In “How to Tame a Wild Tongue,” from her book Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza, Gloria Anzaldúa analyzes how Chicano Spanish further separated Chicano/as from other Latino/as:

Chicanas who grew up speaking Chicano Spanish have internalized the belief that we speak poor Spanish. It is illegitimate, a bastard language. And because we internalized how our language has been used against us by the dominant culture, we use our language differences against each other (2012, p. 38).

The Chicano/a Movement focused primarily on the population of Mexican Americans differentiating themselves from the Latino/a population and Hispanic population, which often included it in a homogeneity that the people of the movement recognized as imprecise and inaccurate. With this rising population no longer wanting to exist without a language, home, identity, and voice, the Chicano Movement took center stage throughout the 1960s and 1970s, after a series of events compelled it to do so.

Some historians trace this collective identity to the post-Mexican-American War period, with a range of resistances, depicted in the oral and musical accounts of resistance, and slowly, a sense of Mexican Americanness started to develop in the American Southwest. With outside tensions rising and Mexican-American communities increasing, a collective identity deepened, further separating this new culture from every other culture and conquest the area had known. Organizations such The League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) began helping middle-class Mexican-American
families foster community economic development through education and work ethic. In California, LULAC worked to end segregation and continued its fight to secure the opportunities that many Mexican-American World War II veterans had fought to achieve, politicizing their existence and resisting the perceived Anglo-American hegemony within the military (Rivas-Rodríguez 2005). Despite the growth of these efforts, it is what did not happen after the war that was the catalyst for the Chicano Movement to gain the fervor and momentum it needed to leave a lasting impression and reclaim Aztlán for generations to come.

Mexican-American serviceman, Félix Longoria, was killed in the Philippines during World War II. When his body was returned home to Three Rivers, Texas, in 1949, the local funeral parlor refused to host the wake because they feared a lack of future business if they were to provide service to Mexican Americans. This controversy drew national attention, and then-senator Lyndon B. Johnson intervened and organized Longoria’s burial at Arlington National Cemetery (Carroll 2003). Though this solved the immediate problem of Longoria’s burial, it did not address the racial tensions rising throughout the American Southwest.

Like LULAC, other organizations across the American Southwest began emerging, filling the need and void of the Mexican-American community during the 1940s and 1950s. With the growing number of Mexican-American organizations and the establishment of Spanish-language newspapers, radio, and TV stations, Mexican-American involvement was reaching the political system at every level (Meier and Gutiérrez 2000). The combination of various efforts during the Chicano Movement helped bring the Chicano/as culture and community into the national consciousness, understanding it finally as an oppressed and exploited group that had been conquered and colonized twice, yet never lost its connection to its indigenous roots and land. According to Hector Calderón, European and Latin American scholars, along with Chicano/a critics, started to recognize the Chicano/a culture as a “social group that has given the distinctive cultural feature to the American West and Southwest” (Calderón 1990, p. 232). Calderón goes on to say that the Chicano Renaissance was developing organically before the Chicano Movement and before the term “Chicano” became mainstream in oral and written form since the Texas-Mexican War (1836) with greater awareness of cultural differences from Mexico after the US-Mexican War (1846-48), although colonial Novohispano and Mexican cultures in this region date back to the mid-sixteenth century and beyond (Calderón 1990, p. 232-235).

The literature produced at that time could realistically belong to either Spain or Mexico because of their closer ideological relationship in regard to each specific country.

Nevertheless, critic Ignacio M. García of Chicanismo: The Forging of a Militant Ethos among Mexican Americans establishes that the Chicano Renaissance since the 1960s can be divided into four different phases in keeping with critical practice: first, the “critical phase” that takes a look at “historical records and scholarly representations” with attention to assimilation and acculturation within the Chicano/a community; second, the “collective unconscious phase” stemming from the intra-historical perspective of the Chicano/a community; third, the “reclamation and celebration phase” of “Mexican cultural traditions and legacies” within the Chicano/a community; lastly, the “Aztlan phase,” where activists have become cultural workers focused on the liberation of the Chicano/a community (García 1980, pp XX).

Chicano/a Aztlan

In 1967, the poem, “I Am Joaquin” by Corky Gonzales rallied together many Mexican Americans who identified with Joaquin and his struggle to forgo his culture for economic stability but then came full circle to understand his place not yet realized in American Aztlan. Two years later, Gonzales would go on to host the First National Chicano Youth Liberation Conference in Denver, where Alurista read his poem that located, captured, and reclaimed the Chicano/as’ homeland, Aztlan, in “El Plan Espiritual de Aztlán” (Anaya and Lomeli 1989, p. 1) (Figure 3).

“El Plan,” as it was often abbreviated, called for “reclamation of culture, language, pride, and identity” and the crowd in attendance “rallied around Alurista’s depiction of Aztlan.” Alurista is accredited with being the first writer with multilingual works published, paving the way for many such writers today. His use of multiple languages is derived from his belief in the blending of cultures. He further explained, in an interview with Juan Bruce-Novoa, “The historical time-space in which we live is going to focus on this terrestrial [earthly] belly button of consciousness between Hispanic America and Anglo-Saxon North America. Amerindia is going to bloom. That’s inevitable” (cited in Wood 2007, p. 15). These poems and their poets became the standard for both grassroots-level and academic poets. They are considered some of the most influential leaders in the Chicano Movement, inspiring others to take action a step further by finding strength within their dual culturalism. They gave these grassroots efforts a voice and philosophy that were eventually heard across academia.
In the spirit of a new people that is conscious not only of its proud historical heritage but also of the brutal “gringo” invasion of our territories, we, the Chicano inhabitants and civili-zers of the northern land of Aztlán from whence came our forefathers, reclaiming the land of their birth and consecrating the determination of our people. By the sun, declare that the call of our blood is our power, our responsibility, and our inevitable destiny.

We are free and sovereign to determine those tasks which are justly called for by our house, our land, the sweat of our brows, and by our hearts. Aztlán belongs to those who plant the seeds, water the fields, and gather the crops and not to the foreign Europeans. We do not recognize capricious frontiers on the bronze continent.

Brotherhood unites us, and love for our brothers makes us a people whose time has come and who struggles against the foreginer “gabacho” who exploits our riches and destroys our culture. With our heart in our hands and our hands in the soil, we declare the independence of our mestizo nation. We are a bronze people with a bronze culture. Before the world, before all of North America, before all our brothers in the bronze continent, we are a nation, we are a union of free pueblos, we are Aztlán.

For La Raza, everything! Outside La Raza, nothing!

Program

El Plan Espiritual de Aztlán sets the theme that the Chicanos (La Raza de Bronce) must use their nationalism as the key or common denominator for mass mobilization and organization. Once we are committed to the idea and philosophy of El Plan de Aztlán, we can only conclude that social, economic, cultural, and political independence is the only road to total liberation from oppression, exploitation, and racism. Our struggle then must be for the control of our barrios, campos, pueblos, lands, our economy, our culture, and our political life. El Plan commits all levels of Chicano society - the barrio, the campo, the ranchero, the worker, the writer, the teacher, the worker, the professional - to La Causa.

Nationalism

Nationalism as the key to organization transcends all religious, political, class, and economic factions or boundaries. Nationalism is the common denominator that members of La Raza can agree upon.

Organizational Goals

1. UNITY in the thinking of our people concerning the barrios, the pueblo, the campo, the land, the poor, the middle class, the professional - all committed to the liberation of La Raza.

2. ECONOMY: economic control of our lives and our communities can only come about by driving the exploiter out of our communities, our pueblos, and our lands and by controlling and developing our own talents, sweat, and resources. The only road to total liberation from social, economic, and cultural psychological destruction and denial of civil and human rights. Institutions in our community which do not serve the people have no place in the community. The institutions belong to the people.

3. EDUCATION: must be relative to our people, i.e., history, culture, bilingual education, contributions, etc. Community control of our schools, our teachers, our administrators, our counselors, and our programs.

4. INSTITUTIONS: shall serve our people by providing the service necessary for a full life and their welfare on the basis of restitution, not handouts or beggar’s crumbs. Restitution for past economic slavery, political exploitation, ethnic and cultural psychological destruction and denial of civil and human rights. Institutions in our community which do not serve the people have no place in the community. The institutions belong to the people.

5. SELF-DEFENSE: of the community must rely on the combined strength of the people. The front line defense will come from the barrios, the campos, the pueblos, and the ranchitos. Their involvement as protectors of their people will be given respect and dignity. They in turn offer their responsibility and their lives for their people. Those who place economic base for the healthy growth and development Lands rightfully ours will be fought for and defended. Land and realty ownership will be acquired by the community for the people’s welfare. Economic ties of responsibility must be secured by nationalism and the Chicano defense units.

6. CULTURAL values of our people strengthen our identity and the moral backbone of the movement. Our culture unites and educates the family of La Raza towards liberation with one heart and one mind. We must insure that our writers, poets, musicians, and artists produce literature and art that is appealing to our people and relates to our revolutionary culture. Our cultural values of life, family, and home will serve as a powerful weapon to defeat the gringo dollar value system and encourage the process of love and brotherhood.

7. POLITICAL LIBERATION can only come through independent action on our part, since the two-party system is the same animal with two heads that feed from the same trough. Where we are a majority, we will control; where we are a minority, we will represent a pressure group; nationally, we will represent one party: La Familia de La Raza!

Action

1. Awareness and distribution of El Plan Espiritual de Aztlán. Presented at every meeting, demonstration, confrontation, courthouse, institution, administration, church, school, tree, building, car, and every place of human existence.

2. September 16, on the birthdate of Mexican Independence, a national walk-out by all Chicanos of all colleges and schools to be sustained until the complete revision of the educational system: its policy makers, administration, its curriculum, and its personnel to meet the needs of our community.

3. Self-Defense against the occupying forces of the oppressors at every school, every available man, woman, and child.


5. Economic program to drive the exploiter out of our communities and a welding together of our people’s combined resources to control their own production through cooperative effort.

6. Creation of an independent local, regional, and national political party. A nation autonomous and free - culturally, socially, economically, and politically - will make its own decisions on the usage of our lands, the taxation of our goods, the utilization of our bodies for war, the determination of justice (reward and punishment), and the profit of our sweat.
To examine its symbology and philosophical significance, Aztlán must be viewed as a symbol as much as a myth, while simultaneously accepting that the Aztlán at the end of the Chicano Movement, the Aztlán today, is the Aztlán that has always existed. Aztlán has evolved from “mythos to logos,” from a social phenomenon manifesting itself into a persuasive movement and acceptance amongst the Chicano/a nation struggling to come to grips with their role in a new world (Pina 1989, p. 45). Aztlán became the most powerful symbolic ideology during the Chicano/a identification and unification process. It was adopted as the alternative term for the American Southwest, but more specifically, the region along the US-Mexico border. Aztlán thus became a specific geo-cultural space, a Chicano nation, positioned between but still separate from the US and Mexico. Reinforced within its own ideology and rooted in its indigenous past, Aztlán metamorphosed beyond borders, in a collective resistance to the hegemony asserted by the US. Aztlán was all-inclusive, ever since the time when the seven Aztec tribes united. Meanwhile, Aztlán rejected assimilation, racism, and the overall socioeconomic, political, and cultural insubordination that has been boiling over in the American melting pot since the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. During the Chicano Movement, Aztlán symbolized the reclamation of a sense of place and territory that has always belonged to the people along the Border (Acuna 2000). Over time, Aztlán has become a symbolical concept for a multitude of indigenous movements, not just during the reconfiguration of the US-Mexico border, but for almost the entire two centuries since the signing of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.

A couple of decades later in 2000, scholar Charles Truxillo advanced the concept of Aztlán and predicted a sovereign Hispanic nation in the American Southwest, according to historian Frank Zoreich. Though at the time, Truxillo’s beliefs seemed a bit radical, they also captured the residual mood and sentiment from some critics during this post-Chicano Movement. Today, some American Southwest people still agree with Truxillo that “Native-born American Hispanics feel like strangers in their own land” (2000, A1). One could argue that the República del Norte and Reconquista movements are all offshoots of the Chicano Movement’s Aztlán. In an interview with In Search of Aztlán, Jose Angel Gutierrez, a political science professor at the University of Texas at Arlington, further explained the reasoning behind these movements and what they hoped to gain with a sovereign Hispanic nation:

“We’re the only ethnic group in America that has been dismembered. We didn’t migrate here or immigrate here voluntarily. The United States came to us in succeeding waves of invasions. We are a captive people, in a sense, a hostage people. It is our political destiny and our right to self-determination to want to have our homeland back. Whether they like it or not is immaterial. If they call us radicals or subversives or separatists, that’s their problem. This is our home, and this is our homeland, and we are entitled to it. We are the host. Everyone else is a guest (Gutierrez 1999).

Similarly, the term “Hispanic” to this day remains controversial amongst many Chicano/as, Mxican Americans, and Latinos.

Though there are different meanings of the word “Hispanic,” depending on the source, the term is often used to refer to descendants of Spain and does not properly serve the population of the American Southwest, with its multiracial Spanish-Mexican-American-Native-Mestizo roots. Like Aztlán, the geoculture of the American Southwest is hard to define, but scholars and critics will agree that its borders, labels, religion, culture, language, and history are slowly becoming a double hybridism reconciled from centuries of major historical changes.

After “El Plan de Aztlán” was presented by Alurista at the first National Chicano Youth Liberation Conference and adopted by the Chicana/o people, Aztlán has continued to live and function as the Chicano/a homeland whether or not it is a factual or mythical place. By applying the Propp Sequence and determining how this mythical homeland and story had turned into functional philosophy and reclaimed geocultural location, it is easy to understand how Aztlán has surpassed the test of time. Aztlán functions as a truth from mythos to logos, physically in the American Southwest and emotionally in the hearts and minds of the Chicano/a people, and according to William James, what functions as a truth, is truth.

Aztlán, the home of the Aztec, Mexican, and Chicoano/a, alienated from Americananness but still umbilically tied to its Pre-Colombian homeland, does not belong to either place. Regardless of the border peoples’ self-identification as Tejanos, Mxican/j/o/as, Mexican Americans, Spanish, Spanish Americans, Americans, Latino/ as, or Chicoano/ as deriving from the ancient cultures, Spain, or the US, a new double hybrid has emerged. While the original location of Aztlán can be debated, Aztlán has survived two periods of hybridization: first, by the conquering of the indigenous peoples by Spanish imperialism, resulting in the Mexican mestizo/a population; and then secondly, by American imperialism over these mestizo/a populations, resulting in the Mexican-American mestizo/a population.

During the 1980s, the popular concept of double colonization was first introduced, referring to the fact that within formerly colonized, and often, indig-
enous societies, women were colonized twice: first, through imperial ideology and, secondly, through patriarchal ideology (Ashcroft, Griffiths, Tiffin 1997, p. 233). Duplication, as a result, is the exact copy and repetition of an object, but when considering the complexity of cultures, this is too simplistic an application. By nature, this is not what occurs during colonization, but rather, aspects of assimilation and epistemic violence take place.

A decade after double colonization emanated, Homi Bhabha established hybridity as a theoretical development in The Location of Culture. Hybridization, as the doubling of cultures through the presence of the colonizer and colonized, intricately relating culture with place, became the essence of these societal conditions (Ashcroft, Griffiths, Tiffin 1997 p. 137). The duality of these cultures is not necessarily Manichean in nature, but rather, it is the opposition between the “putative superiority of the European and the supposed inferiority of the native” (Goldie 1989, p. 172). Hybridity is neither duplication nor binary. As Clifford asserts, it is an example of cultures in flux and in constant motion (2001, p. 468). Inasmuch as these indigenous voices cannot be put into a single collective category, they will continue to define and redefine themselves.

Understanding cultures and locations is acknowledging the fact that each culture and each location is different, and therefore, the combination of culture and location produces entirely different variables, from one to the next, such as Aztlan. Thus, the various circumstances that affect these variables, like scholar Diana Brydon’s concept of “disruption” must be taken into consideration (1991, pp. 184-188). With the enduring history, myth, reclamation, and truth of Aztlan demonstrating the transformation of border culture across eras, the concept of double hybridization opens conversation further for examination of how the shapeless configuration may explain extant hybrid populations. Aztlan began as the homeland of seven different tribes and was reclaimed as the homeland, both physically and emotionally, by the population living in the American Southwest today, as seen in the art, literature, and music it has influenced. Wherever or however Chicano/a culture and identity can be formed, rediscovered, or reinvented, Aztlan remains a part of them along their journey.


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Borders and the Feasibility of Rebel Conflict

Lance Hadley *

Contemporary spatial research on civil conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa has largely focused on border regions as spaces of limited political and economic opportunity. These studies largely adopt approaches that present borderlands as institutionally desolate regions lacking in governance, economic opportunity and political inclusion and giving rise to the feasibility of rebel conflict. While spatial analyses focus on territorially-based capabilities, such as state power projection, they typically overlook borderlands and their territorial distinctiveness with regards to rebel capabilities. This paper specifically explores the structural effects of borders on rebel capabilities and argues that Sub-Saharan Africa’s porous borders enhance the capabilities of rebels to operate in nearby territories. I empirically test this hypothesis with a zero-inflated negative binomial model and spatially disaggregated conflict events data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project dataset mapped to the PRIO-GRID 0.5-degree x 0.5-degree geographic data structure. In total, the analysis covers 14,120 georeferenced rebel conflict events in 37 countries between 1997-2019. The results provide strong evidence that territories nearer to borders are likely to experience more battle events relative to other territories, suggesting that borderlands may enable distinct conflict-related capabilities for rebels not found elsewhere. Additionally, the model also differentiates the effects that the border may have on conflict, testing the effect of rough terrain, resources, excluded groups, and towns at the border. Of the variables tested, the results suggest that territories with border towns significantly increase the capabilities of rebels to engage in conflict and suggest a more nuanced scholarly consideration of cross-border institutions that facilitate rebel conflict.

Introduction

The spatially disaggregated nature of civil conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has traditionally been a confounding aspect for scholars of conflict analysis. More so than other regions, conceptualizing the SSA state as a container of homogenously distributed sovereignty has typically yielded limited explanatory value for empirical analyses related to civil conflict. Necessarily, many scholars have turned to disaggregated geographic approaches to study the territorially-bound structural conditions that enable rebels to engage in conflict with the state. Similarly, the data tools available to researchers are updating too. New geocoded datasets and geographic information system (GIS) technologies are giving conflict scholars more sophisticated techniques to unpack spatial processes and more precisely identify the conditions that make armed conflict feasible in SSA.

At the same time, borderlands analyses have proliferated in recent decades and converged on a distinct thematic approach to multi-disciplinary research (Newman 2006a; Paasi 2011). Borderlands analyses have challenged concepts of traditional sovereignty creation at the juridical border, the nexus of sovereignty and territoriality beyond the border, and the state monopoly on sovereignty.
construction (e.g. Andersen et al. 2018; Côté-Boucher et al. 2014; Parker and Vaughan-Williams 2009). Especially in the African context, post-colonial approaches to the study of borders have yielded fertile discussion and insights for how social behaviour can be understood in practice relative to colonial border legacies (e.g. Flynn 2008; Mbembé and Rendall 2000; Nugent and Asiwaju 1996). Yet, despite the analytical dynamism in conflict research and territorial discourses in borderlands research, few scholars have attempted to cross-pollinate the two disciplines. This paper attempts that task in two ways: first by highlighting discrete gaps in the current direction of spatially disaggregated conflict analysis which stand to benefit from a borderlands approach; and second, by presenting an empirical analysis of spatial conflict inspired by a focus on borderlands’ institutional structures.

The article proceeds as follows: first, it highlights previous scholarly engagement with conflict and borders, with specific attention to the underlying center-periphery assumptions of contemporary conflict analyses. The second section shifts the focus of analysis to the rebel behaviours in SSA’s borderlands that exploit the border as an institution to enhance their capabilities to contest the state. This section also presents testable hypotheses, situated in a borderlands approach to conflict research. The third section outlines the framework and data for empirical analysis. The fourth section presents the model and results. This paper ultimately concludes with a discussion of the findings and potential future contributions for interdisciplinary scholars to develop this paper’s experimental objective of bridging borderlands and conflict research.

1.0 Center-Periphery Grievance Assumptions in Disaggregated Conflict Analyses

Perhaps no other research program has been as broadly influential to the field of conflict analysis as the greed and grievance agenda. In its first rendition, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) quantitatively explored the economic theory that “atypically severe grievances, such as high inequality, a lack of political rights, or ethnic and religious divisions in society” motivated rebels to engage in armed conflict. The authors later iterated the study to suggest a more precise feasibility model; that “where rebellion is feasible it will occur, motivation is indeterminate, or itself endogenous to the opportunities thereby opened for illegal income” (Collier et al 2009, p.24).

As it relates to this paper, I argue that the conceptual developments and operationalization of state power in Africa in political science and conflict literatures has limited the integration of borderlands as a meaningful area of focus. Further, border regions superficially appear to fit this narrative as politically and economically desolate places absent of the state apparatus. While the feasibility model presents an opportunity to introduce borderland institutions to conflict analysis, limited engagement between the two literatures has resulted in a paradoxical interpretation for border regions in contemporary conflict analysis – that border regions represent both aggrieved spaces suffering from the retreat of the state and, at the same time, sites of state-control that delimit domestic and international territory.

In contemporary conflict analysis literature, a central factor that makes rebellion more feasible, and therefore more likely, is the concept of state capacity. The basic logic is that, where a state can credibly exercise a monopoly of violence (or sovereignty) conflict is unlikely to occur. Conversely, where a state lacks the capacity to enforce its sovereignty and can rationally be challenged, conflict will occur. More so, a state’s projection of sovereignty and power is well-recognized in the conflict literature as a distinctly territorial process (e.g. Vasquez 1995; Jackson 1990; see Diehl 1991 for a review). In the context of the modern African state, political science scholars have highlighted the asymmetry between state boundaries and territorial sovereignty, and point to the emergence of the post-colonial state as the legitimate international actor and participant in the international legal regime, regardless of the state’s capacity to exercise absolute territorial control (Ayissi 2009; Englebert 2002; Herbst 2000; Jackson and Rosberg 1982). Given this reality, state territoriality itself is suggested as a dynamic process within SSA states by which governance is a negotiated process with other governance institutions – not de facto a national government process.

Scholars have typically described this dynamic territoriality process by pointing to the African state’s governance retreat from international boundaries; that historical legacies of mercantile extraction left an inheritance of core-periphery relationships within the then newly independent states. Indeed, authors have pointed to Africa’s strained political and economic histories, which deprioritized borderland governance in favour of a governable core (Herbst 2000). Authors point to the emergence of neo-patrimonial governance and appropriated extractive institutions, which prioritize regions of wealth creation and redirect local resources and loyalties towards those groups that direct state power (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012; Lindemann 2008). International forces too, have played their part in the erosion of the state at the periphery, as African states prioritize the most important areas of export trade – typically the capital (Boone 2007; Mkandawire 2001; Konadu-Agyemang 2000). Further, the periphery by its nature as geographically distant from the core, limits state intervention. Within this political configuration, the geographic
periiphery is seemingly restricted from national economic policy and often from political inclusion.

While not intending to dispute the principle that a state’s power is territorially projected from the core (and certainly not the findings associated with the strength of the variable), a binary conceptualization of territory that is integrated into state governance - or not - restricts meaningful analysis of alternative institutions outside the sovereign control of the state. Further, core-periphery concepts in the context of African state retreat embeds narrative tropes of the African border as the lawless ‘frontier’ and integrates assumptions of borderlands as regions of political emptiness; where the border zone represents a ‘not-yet-civilized’ region awaiting penetration from the political center (Korf and Raeymaekers 2013).

The binary conceptualization of state institutions carries over into quantitative conflict analyses too, where scholars typically include “distance to capital,” to control for the relative territorial capacity of the state (e.g. Rugerri et al. 2016; Buhaug 2010; Rustad et al. 2006). Proxying power projection from the core site of state power, regions closer to the capital are considered more “governable” and less accessible regions relative to the capital (typically border regions) are considered more difficult to effectively govern. More to the point however, methodologies for spatial conflict analysis typically embed core-periphery concepts in the methodological unit of analysis.

A growing pool of disaggregated analyses exclusively analyse conflict events to determine their ex-post conditions – after the event has occurred and been recorded. Given that conflict events can only manifest if rebels or the state have an opponent to fight, analyses will necessarily be restricted to dichotomous illustrations of the battle zone as a contest between state-controlled or rebel-controlled. This implies that all other areas are either uncontested state or rebel territories. In short, by focusing exclusively on where conflict occurs, and not where it doesn’t, these analyses tautologically operate within the dichotomy of state core / anarchic periphery, leaving little room for analysis of territorial institutions outside of the state’s capacity for making war.

An additional barrier to the study of African borderlands in conflict analyses is that rational-legal approaches to international boundaries position borders as the state’s defensive, ostensibly inviolable, line against anarchic external forces (Zureik and Salter 2013; Bigo 2006; Ackleson 2003; Agnew and Crobridge 2002; Andreas 2003; Wilson and Donnan 1998). As a politico-legal technology of the state, international borders in this literature are conceptualized as the legal line that simultaneously separates and joins state’s sovereign territories. Territorial institutions along this boundary line are explicitly state-sanctioned processes (or not) that selectively deny territorial access to cross-border forces, be it migratory, economic, or military.

One strand of civil conflict analysis has explored a similar interpretation of borders as defensive walls, which when weakened, permit clandestine activity across the border. Here, inter-state proximity, contiguity, or border length is said to provide more opportunities, or connection points, of inter-state sanctioned conflict (e.g Starr 2002; Gleditsch et al. 2006; Starr and Thomas 2002, 2005). In the state’s absence from the border, borderlands are presented as spaces of violence and perpetual conflict, again requiring state protection. Granted, these analyses are typically focused at the state level, and are less concerned with the subnational distribution of civil conflict, yet, similar assumptions are still employed in spatially disaggregated studies. Dummy binary variables are typically included for a conflict event’s neighbourhood contiguity with a nearby border. The issue is that, an arbitrary proximity dummy for all borders, paints these regions with the same rational-legal inspired brush and may ignore the realities of border institutions with gradated or differential effects on rebel conflict feasibility.

Indeed, the critique of international borders as features of separation and the embedded assumptions of a homogenously powerful territorial state is not new in borderlands literature (see Reid-Henry 2010; Newman 2006b; Agnew 1994). Instead, borderlands scholars have embraced borders as spaces where “diverse patterns of trans-boundary interaction may take place, ranging from confrontation and exclusion to cooperation, integration and inclusion” (Newman 2008, 127; Sohn 2014; Blake 2000; Nugent and Asiwaju 1996). Additionally, scholars have embraced the state retreat narrative as an opportunity to specifically explore international borders as key sites of regulatory institutions.

These alternative regulatory institutions can include cross-border structures that bind peoples based on ethnic or religious affinities, market incentives, or family and other migratory factors. A vibrant institution that is especially common throughout the SSA region is informal (as well as formal) cross-border trade (The World Bank 2011; Lesser and Mois-Leeman 2009; Muzvidziwa 2005; Peberdy 2000). Cross-border markets have traditionally prospered from traders’ exploitation of market differentials on either side of the border and provide a strong counterexample to borders as desolate spaces (Hashim and Meagher 1999). Analysis of the market destinations of cross-border traders at the Busia crossing on the Kenyan and Ugandan border, for
example, reveals an extensive cross-border trade network that fans widely across each country, connected through the border market (Hadley and Rowlatt 2019) – illustrated by Figure 1. Along West Africa’s ubiquitous international boundaries, border markets have developed into distinct institutional hubs for the cross-border circulation of people and goods (Walther 2011). Niang (2013) examines the activity of one of these markets located at the intersection of the Guinea-Guinea Bissau-Senegal border; suggesting that the absence of Senegalese border monitoring has allowed for the market exchanging “over 1,000 tons of products worth about 250 million CFA francs (US$450,000)” (44). Scholars have also suggested that the strength of cross-border trade networks in SSA, in contrast to “bumbling” state initiatives towards integration, may represent a more productive driver of economic integration (Nshimbi and Moyo 2017; Meagher 2003, 2001). Perhaps tellingly, several SSA countries have also explicitly integrated the development of cross-border market infrastructure into their regional economic trade strategies (Koroma et al. 2017; Egg and Igue 1993; Igue 1992; e.g. Ministry of Trade and Industry - Rwanda 2013; Southern African Development Community 2010).

In addition to cross-border market incentives, the capacity of borders to enforce spaces of the ‘us’ and the ‘other’ is heterogenous throughout SSA. Indeed, colonial bordering of SSA territory (which largely persists to the present-day) seldom reflected the realities of SSA’s communities and physical geographic features (Griffiths 2005; Nugent and Asiwaaju 1996). While certainly not the case with all colonial administrations, Söderbaum (2016) describes that French colonies also promoted a considerable degree of horizontal integration between colonies and thereby limiting the separating features of international boundaries. Relative to the present-day, Griffiths (2005) explains how the border often plays a limited role in hampering the cross-border ethnic networks that straddle the border;

little attention is paid to the boundary in the course of their everyday lives. People regularly cross the border, marry spouses and reside across the border for long periods. They attend all manner of ceremonies, social occasions and family celebrations… These activities do not normally concern governments and... are seldom hampered (83).

Additionally, Griffiths points to the common state practice in SSA to place customs posts several kilometers behind the international border so as not to disrupt innocent cross-border activities. Further, he concludes that the length of international borders and the distribution of ethno-linguistic groups, such as the Hutu’s and Tutsi’s, are too complex for “any simple, simplistic, linear divide.” In West Africa, Adepoju (2005) posits that border deregulation has been a select strategy of West African states with economies too small to absorb their citizens to allow labour migrants to easily transit to the popular West African economy of the day. As a result, ethnic support networks have developed on both sides of the border.

So far, discussion has highlighted the seemingly marginalized role of border regions in conflict analysis literature. In one strand of the literature, the distribution of conflict in border regions represent areas from which the state has retreated, giving way to non-state territory and institutions for conflict. In another strand, conflict in border
regions represents the failure of the state to enforce the non-permeability of the border, which has been violated by violent external forces. In both cases, the role of alternative institutions in making conflict feasible is overlooked. Briefly, examples have been provided with the aim to challenge these conceptualizations of the border as desolate and anarchic spaces between states. Instead, complex institutional interactions are present, despite the absence of the state. It is in highlighting the role of these institutions that distinct borderlands approaches stand to benefit the study of conflict. The next section constructs theoretical hypotheses related to the role of borderlands on rebel capability with a more precise operationalization of territorial border processes throughout Africa.

2.0 Sub-Saharan Africa’s Borders and Rebel Capability

Perhaps the most clearly relevant effect of borders on rebel capability is the proximity to unregulated, unmonitored foreign territory. While the border may indicate the de jure boundary of national sovereignty, rebel operational theatres are not bound by the same international norms. I frame my analysis to suggest that borderlands represent territorial resources that are exploited by rebel groups to gain access to unregulated cross-border networks. Support from these networks may take various forms. Most directly related to the conduct of rebel conflict is the transfer of easily transportable small arms across poorly controlled borders. Schroeder and Lamb (2006) describe that, UN experts investigating arms embargo violations in Somalia documented the delivery of arms to Somali militias by Ethiopian truck convoys. Similarly, Liberia’s Charles Taylor transported many of the weapons he provided to the RUF across the border in trucks. Rogue soldiers, rebels, refugees and others also walk across borders with one or two small arms at a time (71).

Alusala (2010) describes how panya routes, or informal footpaths across borders, are in most instances “of no concern to border security officials and hence remain unmanned” (18). In East Africa, these routes form common smuggling routes for the transfer of illicit resources. He adds that “Even if it were possible, it would take enormous time and long queues to search all those bicycles and mamas carrying sacks of potatoes and grains for their own consumption” (22). As such, unregulated borders provide few barriers for the inflow of personnel and materials necessary for armed insurgency.

Supporting resources available to rebels from across the border may also be available in other ways. Scholars have demonstrated that ethnic kin in neighbouring states often played an important role in mobilizing and financing insurgencies (Gleditch 2007; Saideman 2002, 1997; Davis and Moore 1997). To use the language of the conflict analysis literature, international borders permit opportunities for horizontal escalation of conflict, or the transnationalization of conflict. Specifically, the outflow of information to ethnic kin across the border can be designed to produce processes of social polarization that galvanize support for the aggrieved borderland community. Authors also find demonstration effects that link generates ethnic support across borders (Weidmann 2015; Forsberg 2008; Kuran 1987). Across the border, in unregulated extra-territorial space, political entrepreneurs may take the opportunity to communicate the grievances and social realities in the home-country. Outside of the juridical control of the state, governments are often unable to present a falsification to exclusionary claims made cross-border political entrepreneurs. In this way, transnational ethnic support can be drummed up in support of rebel conflict. Harff and Gurr’s work (1998) describes this support among external groups in their: typologies of ‘accelerators’ that escalate ethno-political conflict and genocides (emphasis added):

1. Formation of coalitions among regime opponents;
2. Clashes between regime supporters and communal groups;
3. Increase in external support for communal groups;
4. Empty threats of external involvement against the government.

By way of example, Carment and Schnabel (2004) identify small-scale localized killings in Rwanda, Burundi, and DRC as prefiguring the later genocide. The 1990s saw these conflicts slowly horizontally escalate as ethnic groups increasingly supported ethnic violence until ethnic conflicts became fused together “into a much larger, more violent network of closely interlinked conflicts” (35).

Further, supporting ethnic groups across the border can provide quantitatively more and qualitative different resources than those directly available to the aggrieved ethnic group (Lidow 2016; Salehyan 2008; Collier and Hoeffler 2004). The difficulty of a government to monitor and limit the logistical support of rebellions in countries outside its own territory makes locating bases and safe havens just across the border an advantageous strategy for perpetuating conflict. In effect, while a seemingly negligent distance for local ethnic communities, for a state, the other side of the border has a distance of its own. What’s more is that negotiating international political or military cooperation with the neighbouring country is often required for effective military counteraction to rebel hit-and-run tactics.1
Lastly, international borders permit access to unregulated transnational economic networks. Here, the ‘lootable resources’ thesis of the conflict literature is applied (Le Billon 2014; Buhaug et al. 2009; Humphreys 2005; Collier and Hoeffler 2004). The mineral-rich DRC has received special attention in this regard. Researchers have identified the use of cross-border ‘military commercialism’ in the DRC whereby a bordering state deployed its military in support of an actor in exchange for access to profits (Turner 2007; Klare 2001; Dietrich 2000). Nearly all outside parties operating in the Second Congo War engaged in military commercialist support of border communities, strategically driven by targets of economic plunder. Rwanda and Uganda specifically engaged the North East region to gain access to agricultural products, minerals, forest products, livestock and cash. Similarly, Angola supported DRC government forces in exchange for oil products and Zimbabwean support was purchased in exchange for access to timber profits. In other regions, Collier adds “diamonds funded the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) rebel group during Angola’s long civil war, as well as the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone” (Collier 2009). Common to these examples, border porousness is exploited by smugglers to transport illicit resources outside the regulatory space of the state. Subsequently, profits (such as small arms discussed earlier) can be smuggled back as a resource for border communities. As such, the international border represents a significant logistical resource for evading state and border towns have been described as sites of vibrant cross-border activity. While little literature has described any potential effect of border towns on the capabilities of rebels, I suggest that the cross-border institutions that facilitate market dynamics may also facilitate the material resources required by rebels.

H2: Towns at the border are likely to experience more rebel conflict relative to other territories in the same country

Rough terrain has been described by conflict scholars as more difficult to police and can provide a source of refuge for rebels (Rustad et al. 2006; Buhaug and Rød 2006). I extend this theory to suggest that government regulation of movement in rough terrain is limited, permitting easier access to out-of-country resources, which can be exploited by rebels for increased fighting capacities.

H3: Border territories with rough terrain are more likely to experience more rebel conflict relative to other territories in the same country

Access to transnational ethnic networks beyond the border has been described above as potentially increasing rebel’s ability to engage in conflict. I suggest that groups that are discriminated or excluded from the national government, who are nearer to borders, have better access to support networks to facilitate potential armed conflict.

H4: Border territories that contain excluded groups are more likely to experience more rebel conflict relative to other territories in the same country

Lastly, lootable resources has been described above as being a significant driver of conflict, by virtue of their ease of transport. Easily extractable resources at the border, then, provide opportunities for not just immediate plunder, but by virtue of their proximity to networks beyond the border, also provide opportunities to illicitly traffic resources out of the country to unregulated international markets.

H5: Border territories with lootable resources are more likely to experience more rebel conflict relative to other territories in the same country

This section has described an argument that international borders represent logistical channels for accessing additional support networks for rebels to conduct armed conflict. The hypotheses, constructed in this way, embed significant principles related to borderlands analyses. First, I position borders at the center of my study by focusing on the projection of rebel capacity sourced from, or
across, the other side of the border - rather than on the projection of the state from the capital. Second, I present a non-dichotomous hypothesis of borders’ influence on rebels. This integrates the concept that state territory may express multiple or competing sovereignties. Thirdly, I disaggregate the length of the border to consider differentiated effects of the border on rebel capability. The next section outlines the data structure, the data, and the statistical method to operationalize and test these hypotheses.

3.0 Data and Method

This study employs several geographic information system (GIS) techniques to approximate the territorial influences on rebel capabilities. To facilitate this analysis, this paper relies on the PRIO-GRID’s data framework, which divides terrestrial areas into 0.5 x 0.5-degrees gridded cells. Depending on the position of the globe, these grid cells represent approximately 55 square kms (the approximation is taken at the equator. The area varies due to the change of the widths between longitudinal lines). Using a temporally and territorially fixed gridded data structure presents an opportunity to employ a unit of analysis that is largely insensitive to exogenous political influences, boundaries and developments.

I exclude grid cells in SSA countries that are not territorially contiguous with other countries from this analysis. These countries are Cape Verde, Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles, São Tomé & Príncipe. Given that the main theorized effect of borders in this study is the increased land-based capability to access in and out flows through neighbouring countries, territories with international borders that abut international seas, large lakes, or large rivers are also excluded from this study.

Additionally, the focus of this project is principally on territorially structural factors that affect rebel capability. As a result, the data for this analysis is intended to proxy structural, not dynamic, processes. While structural data are useful for understanding the root causes, enabling conditions, and background factors associated with territorial conflict, structural data poorly explains specific events or patterns related to conflictual human social interaction. Additionally, structural data cannot specifically account for variations in the scope, severity, and timing of such patterns. It is not the intention of this study to explain individual dynamic conflict events, but to explore the long-term structural conditions that affect the dependent variable. As such, the selection and framing of data proceeds in such a way to identify slow-moving structural variables, transform dynamic data into structurally representative data, and limit analysis to methodologically appropriate regions in SSA.

In lieu of a disaggregated structural variable of rebel capability, this analysis constructs its dependent variable from ex-post counts of battles that have occurred within each of the framework’s grid cell. The basic logic is that, for grid cells where many rebel battles have occurred, those cells have structural attributes that facilitate a higher propensity for recurring rebel conflict. To construct this count variable, data is sourced from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), which records georeferenced violent conflict events in SSA from 1997 to the current day (Raleigh et al 2010). The time period used for this analysis is from January 1st 1997 to August 1st 2019. Additionally, I use ACLED’s definition of battles, which are defined as “a violent interaction between two politically organized armed groups at a particular time and location” and battles are included even if there are no fatalities from the event. Additionally, ACLED battle events are coded with interaction codes associated with the two main actors of an event. The focus of this paper is on rebels’ capabilities at the border and, as such, I use battle events with interactions where at least one of the two actors are a rebel group. This includes the following interactions: rebels vs military; sole rebel action; rebels versus rebels; rebels versus political militia; rebels versus communal militia; rebels versus rioters; rebels versus protesters; rebels versus civilians; and rebels versus others. To be sure, the ACLED dataset uses a definition of rebels that is consistent with this paper’s hypotheses: rebels are political organizations that engage in violent acts as the primary means to pursue political goals. Each grid cell is coded with the total count of rebels’ battles occurring within that cell during the time period as the dependant variable.

One such limitation to this approach is the assumption that capital cities, borders, and national authority are static spatial variables. The secession of South Sudan poses a significant challenge in this regard; where the distances to the national border in grid cells located in the South of the Sudan changed significantly in 2011. Somalia also poses a challenge to this territorial analysis due to the dynamic governing capacities of autonomous regions such as Somaliland, Jubaland, and Mogadishu in recent years. For example, where variables based on the distance to capital are intended to proxy concepts of graded sovereignty, the distance to Mogadishu may be confounded by the complexities of shared sovereignty in the region, given the significant role of semi-autonomous organs in the country. Recognizing that these regions present a unique opportunity for territorial analyses that can more accurately accommodate the shifting dynamics in these regions, this study
Figure 2. Rebel conflict counts in the dataset.

Figure 3. Sum of rebel battle events, by distance to border.
excludes Sudan, South Sudan, and Somalia from the larger structural analysis.

There are some regional challenges to territorially-based empirical analyses of conflict in SSA. Apart from Angola, rebel battle counts in other Southern African countries during this time period exhibit limited territorial variation; 69 battle events over the approximately 22-year time period. While these countries are included in the territorial analyses and limited variation is considered in selecting an appropriate statistical method, their exclusion is tested in robustness tests. While also tempting to include North Africa in the data sample, the geography of the region presents significant analytical challenges that are beyond the scope of this study. Specifically, while the *de jure* border may be up to 500kms South from the capital, the Sahara Desert’s prohibitive effect on travel may have confounding barrier effects or opportunities for rebel or national capabilities, which would be more appropriately analyzed in a separate study.

The last limitation is due to the spatial resolution of this study’s gridded framework and has particular relevance to The Gambia and eSwatini (formerly Swaziland). With each grid cell representing territory approximately 50km x 50km and given the countries’ relatively small land area it is likely that these countries’ national influence on it’s corresponding territories will not be accurately isolated by the grid cell. The grid cells containing Gambian and eSwatini territory is therefore excluded.

Altogether, this approach yields 14,120 rebel battle events in 6,414 grid cells across 37 SSA countries. The rebel battles count distribution is visualized in Figure 2 and Figure 3 gives the total rebel battle events relative to the distance to the nearest land border.

**Description of Data**

This paper has so far theorized a positive effect of borders and rebel capabilities. Empirically, it is expected that border distance and rebel conflict count is negative; that rebels farther from the border must travel greater distances to access the in and out flow capabilities provided by the border. To capture the potential effect of borders on proximate territory, a cell’s centroid distance to the nearest land-contiguous neighboring country is included as a model variable. This distance measurement is based on country border data using cShapes v0.4 data (Weidmann et al 2010). To be sure, interpreting specific rebel capabilities from a distance variable is challenging. To address this, additional dummy variables are included for cells that include a border to test for correlations of specific hypothesized rebel capabilities afforded by the border.

**Border Towns**: Grid cells with border towns are identified as those that have towns with a population of at least 50,000 inhabitants. Data is drawn from the PRIO-GRID’s aggregation of Uchida et al.’s (2010) data, which is the result of network analysis using a combination of several sources, most collected between 1990 and 2005.

**Border Mountains**: Border grid cells with mountainous terrain are identified based on the UNEP’s Mountain Watch Report (Blyth et al 2002). The dataset provides a high-resolution mountain raster which identifies mountainous terrain based on elevation, slope and local elevation range. Border cells where at least 25% of the grid cell is considered mountainous are identified as border mountain cells.

**Border Forest**: Border grid cells are with forests are identified based on the ISAM-HYDE historical landuse dataset (Meiappan et al. 2012). Similar to the process to identify border mountains, the dataset provides a high-resolution raster of land classification. Border cells where at least 25% of the grid cell is considered forested are identified as border forest cells.

**Border Excluded Groups**: Border grid cells with excluded groups are identified based on the GeoEPR Dataset 2018 (Vogt et al. 2015). The dataset identifies the status and location of politically relevant ethnic groups settled in the grid cell. If a group, whose territory overlaps with the grid cell, has been excluded or discriminated against for more than ten years since 1997 (the beginning of the rebel count data timeframe), that cell is given a positive binary value.

**Border Resources**: Border grid cells with easily extractable resources such as placer gold, alluvial diamonds, and other gems are identified from an aggregation of several georeferenced datasets; from Gilmore et al (2005), the GOLDDATA v1.2 dataset (Balestri 2012), and the GEMDATA dataset (Lujala 2009). Cells in which any valuable resources are found, are given a positive binary value.

I also include several control variables. Spatial spillover and contagion have been described by conflict scholars as a driver of conflict events in contiguous territory, whereby conflict in one territory influences conflict in another (Buhaug et al. 2008; Ward and Gleditsch 2002; Murdoch and Sandler 2002). A variable for the sum of rebel conflict counts in the eight queen-contiguous territories relative to the grid cell is added to control for this spatial effect. Distance to capital has been described by Buhaug and Red (2006) scholars as relevant to the relative location of conflict, as contestations of state governance is more likely in territories that are nearer to the capital city. Thus, a variable
is added which measured the distance from the capital city to the centroid of the grid cell. Proportions of mountainous and forested terrain within a grid cell are also included as control variables. The effect of resources as a driver of conflict is also included in a distance variable that measures the distance of the grid centroid to the nearest within country valuable resources. Nearby resources are identified with the same aggregation technique as the border resources variable. Excluded ethnic groups are included with the same dataset used to identify excluded groups at the border – if a grid cell contains an ethnic group, it is given a positive dummy variable. Lastly, Grid population is proxied by a variable represented by the logged sum of pixel values (number of persons) within the gridded cell from the Gridded Population of the World v4.11 dataset. GPWv4 data values for each cell are estimated from national censuses spanning from 2005 to 2014.3

Lastly, I include a sampling weight based on the land area of a cell. As the gridded framework is constructed according to a geographic coordinate system, grid cell area can vary at different latitudes. This variation in cell area may quantitatively capture more or less conflict by simply measuring more or less land area. Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics for each of these variables.

### Statistical Method

The dependent variable for this study is the cumulative number of rebel conflict events in each grid cell from January 1st 1997 to August 1st 2019. However, this analysis’ gridded data structure, which is based on a geographic sampling technique, is likely to present an overdispersion of zero-count rebel conflict observations. Rebel conflict is simply not likely to occur in the majority of grid cells, either due to factors such as extreme remoteness, sparse populations, or data collection limitations. Distinguishing between grid cells with true zeros and excess zeros, therefore necessitates an appropriate statistical method to account for grid cells’ expected heterogenous variance and means of conflict counts. Possible statistical models that relax assumptions of observations’ independence and unequal variance and means of the dependent variables are the negative binomial regression model, a zero-inflated Poisson model (ZIP), or a zero-inflated negative binomial model (ZINB). I employ a zero-inflated negative binomial model, given the expected excessive zeros and flexibility with overdispersed count outcome variables. A significant likelihood ratio test comparing the two models and a significant z-test in the Vuong test also support selecting a ZINB model for this analysis (Pr>=0.0000 and Pr>z = 0.0000 respectively).4

### Table 1. Descriptive Statistics

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<th>Variable</th>
<th>Obs</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
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<td>2.201434</td>
<td>14.73485</td>
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<td>629</td>
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<td>Distance to Border</td>
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<td>400.2666</td>
<td>3.985501</td>
<td>1910.548</td>
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<td>100</td>
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<td>Forested Terrain</td>
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<td>0.256481</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>6,414</td>
<td>0.043187</td>
<td>0.203293</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.111636</td>
<td>0.314359</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border Resources</td>
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<td>0.025101</td>
<td>0.156445</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cell Area</td>
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<td>2980.859</td>
<td>130.6972</td>
<td>2023.274</td>
<td>3091.067</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3 The land area is calculated by the grid cell area.
4 These tests are performed using R.5
The ZINB model is a two-step model: first the inflation step employs a logistic regression to predict whether a given observation belongs to a population of true zeroes, which accounts for grid cells that are simply not exposed to rebel conflict. The second step performs a negative binomial probability estimation of rebel conflict counts and includes a parameter which accounts for overdispersion. All distance variables are log transformed in the model. In all models, I cluster the standard errors on the national unit of the grid cell to control for country-specific effects such as country size, government capacity, or infrastructural qualities.

4.0 Empirical Results

In Table 2, I report the estimates from the zero-inflated negative binomial regression model estimates for the total count of rebel conflict events in each grid cell. The left side of each model reports the estimates corresponding to the negative binomial part of the model. These estimates are to be interpreted as the increase in log number of events associated with a one-unit increase in the explanatory variable. The right side of the model column reports the “inflate” part of the model, or the extent to which there are more zeroes in the data than implied by the negative binomial distribution. These estimates are interpreted as an inverse logistic regression model, or the probability of a non-zero event. Conversely, a negative estimate in the inflate equation means that an increase in the explanatory variable increases the probability of observing at least one event in that grid cell.

Model 1 reports a base model for this analysis. Models 2 through 6 add a single border variable to

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>Inflated</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>Inflated</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>Inflated</td>
</tr>
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<td>Distance to Border</td>
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<td>-0.066*</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>-0.085***</td>
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<td>(-1.845)</td>
<td>(0.189)</td>
<td>(-2.707)</td>
<td>(1.152)</td>
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<td>0.174**</td>
<td>-0.017</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.708)</td>
<td>(-1.198)</td>
<td>(2.369)</td>
<td>(-1.033)</td>
<td>(1.848)</td>
<td>(-2.205)</td>
</tr>
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<td>0.501***</td>
<td>-1.077***</td>
<td>0.498***</td>
<td>-1.061***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(9.909)</td>
<td>(-1.577)</td>
<td>(9.949)</td>
<td>(-2.543)</td>
<td>(9.604)</td>
<td>(-6.015)</td>
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<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.004</td>
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<td>(0.131)</td>
<td>(0.657)</td>
<td>(0.161)</td>
<td>(0.104)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.000</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(-0.619)</td>
<td>(0.023)</td>
<td>(-0.635)</td>
<td>(0.054)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-0.075**</td>
<td>-0.046</td>
<td>-0.074</td>
<td>-0.048</td>
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<td>(-0.757)</td>
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<td>(-0.728)</td>
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<td>Excluded Groups</td>
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<td>0.259*</td>
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<td>(1.592)</td>
<td>(-0.575)</td>
<td>(1.645)</td>
<td>(-0.550)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
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<td>-0.162***</td>
<td>0.138**</td>
<td>-0.160**</td>
<td>0.146**</td>
<td>-0.157**</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.645)</td>
<td>(-2.590)</td>
<td>(3.551)</td>
<td>(-2.551)</td>
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<td>(-2.670)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.210</td>
<td>1.049**</td>
<td>-0.080</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.958)</td>
<td>(-0.424)</td>
<td>(0.689)</td>
<td>(2.318)</td>
<td>(-0.290)</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.210</td>
<td>1.049**</td>
<td>-0.358</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.689)</td>
<td>(2.318)</td>
<td>(-0.358)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border Forest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.345</td>
<td>0.034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(-1.222)</td>
<td>(0.995)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border Excluded</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.345</td>
<td>0.034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(-1.222)</td>
<td>(0.995)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border Resources</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.345</td>
<td>0.034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(-1.222)</td>
<td>(0.995)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-2.610)</td>
<td>(2.762)</td>
<td>(-2.680)</td>
<td>(1.234)</td>
<td>(-0.648)</td>
<td>(1.146)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inalpha</td>
<td>1.153***</td>
<td>1.140***</td>
<td>1.124***</td>
<td>1.144***</td>
<td>1.146***</td>
<td>1.151***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonzero observations</td>
<td>1.213</td>
<td>1.213</td>
<td>1.213</td>
<td>1.213</td>
<td>1.213</td>
<td>1.213</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prob &gt; chi2</td>
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<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Rebel Battles Estimation Results. Note: Robust z-statistics in parentheses (clustered by country), * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
the specification to test for support of this study’s hypotheses. I restrict discussion of the inflate equations simply due to ambiguity of the estimations’ relevance to the causal hypotheses of this paper.®

In all but one model (model 2 - Border Towns), the coefficient on distance to border is clearly significant at the 99% level and lends overall support to the central hypothesis that territories closer to international borders are likely to experience more rebel conflict relative to territories farther away from borders. Considering the base model (model 1), the coefficient on the predictor suggests that, on average, for every percentage increase in a territory’s distance to border, rebel conflict counts decrease by 9.8% compared to other territories in the same country, holding all other parameters constant.

Model 2 adds border towns to the base model to test the effect of border towns, and their unique cross-border institutions on rebel capabilities. The significance and sign of the coefficient on the border town variable suggests some support for this theory. The estimation suggests that compared to other non-similar territories in the same country, border towns will experience more rebel conflicts by 63.4%, holding all other parameters constant. It is also important to note, that the level of significance fell on the distance to border variable when the border towns variable was added to the base model. Comparing the two models, this supports the notion that there is a distinct effect on rebel conflict capabilities from institutions that are present in border towns, rather than in territories that are simply near de jure international boundaries.

Model 3 and 4 add dummy variables for mountains and forests that neighbour a border, respectively. The non-significance of the coefficients for these variables does not support the theory that rough terrain at the border significantly increases a rebels’ territorial capabilities.

Model 5 adds a dummy variable for excluded groups at the border. The non-significance of the coefficient on the excluded groups variable does not support the theory that borders provide increased access to transnational ethnic networks for the purposes of excluded groups to contest the state.

Figure 4. Border hazards identified by the model estimations’ results. Border towns identified by darker color.
Lastly, model 6 adds the border resources dummy variable to test the hypothesis that easily lootable resources near the border are more likely to spur conflict as rebels have greater access to illicit outflow channels and unmonitored foreign networks. The non-significance of the coefficient on the border resources variable suggests that border resources do not have a consistently significant relationship, one way or the other, on rebel conflict capabilities.

The control variables with significant coefficients performed largely as expected. The significant and negative sign on the coefficient for distance to capital suggests that the risk of conflict is higher in territories further from the capital, perhaps reflecting the relative strength of the national government across distances. Similarly, the positive spatial influence of nearby conflict is also well supported. Lastly, grid cell population has a positive influence on rebel battle count, perhaps due to the density of potential conflict agents, or high value targets.

A general representation of relative conflict hazards at the border can also be identified from this analysis. An equally weighted product term of neighbouring conflict, distance from the capital, and neighbouring conflict gives a simplified risk factor of territories across SSA most likely to experience more conflict. The territories with a risk factor above the SSA average and within 50kms of the border is presented on the Figure 4. Additionally, border towns are coloured darker to represent SSA border territories at extreme risk of conflict.

5.0 Conclusion

Borders in territorial analyses of conflict analysis have typically fallen into Agnew’s (1994) “territorial trap.” Specifically, borders are typically treated as legal boundaries that dichotomously delimit the domestic from the foreign. Analyses of borderlands, however, have described borders and border spaces with more nuance, complexity, and behavioural influence than is common in conflict analyses, especially in SSA. This paper attempts to bridge these disciplines by integrating principles of borderland studies into a disaggregated territorial analysis of rebel conflict capabilities in SSA.

Firstly, I position borderlands at the center of my study. Where similar location-based analyses of conflict focus on projection of government power that emanates from capital cities, I focus on the power projection sourced from, or across, the border. Secondly, my central hypothesis, that territory nearer to the border experiences more rebel conflict compared to other territories in the same country, presents a non-dichotomous effect of borders on nearby territory. The operationalization of this hypothesis with a continuous distance variable bakes the borders’ gradated effect into the final estimation results. Thirdly, I disaggregate the length of the border to consider differentiated border effects on rebel capability. By hypothesizing and testing for the effects of border towns, lootable resources, rough terrain, and excluded groups at the border, this analysis forwards the concept of borders as complex and unique spaces, which require more nuanced attention rather than simplification.

In addition to the theoretical contribution of this interdisciplinary approach, the empirical results generally support this differentiated approach to a border’s effect on the rebel conflict capabilities. The data structure permits a unit of analysis that is largely insensitive to geographic assumptions of the state as a homogeneously sovereign space and the results suggest that, indeed, borders exert a gradated influence on rebel capabilities. Ultimately, this supports the primary hypothesis that borders provide rebels with opportunities to access out-of-country resources and support. Additionally, the results suggest that border towns are at a significantly higher risk of rebel conflict compared to other territories within the country. The hypothesized causal link is that the unregulated cross-border institutions prevalent at many border towns in SSA can also facilitate material and personnel transfers in and out of the country. Rebels’ exploitation of these cross-border links ultimately lends more capabilities to rebel operations in the area, permitting a greater projection of power. Notably, the results also suggest that neither resources, rough terrain, nor excluded groups at the border expressed a significant relationship with rebel conflict capability.

Despite the consistency of results, the empirical approach only presents correlational evidence for the relationship between border territories and rebel conflict counts and cannot fully evaluate the causal links that lead to these results. Further analysis is necessary to strengthen these results. Here, qualitative approaches can complement these findings. Specifically, the empirical results suggest that border towns, had a larger effect on rebel conflict capability compared to territories near de jure boundaries. Border towns are sites of complex cross-border and often self-regulating institutions. Further, variables related to geographic defensibility and conflict incentive at the border were not found to influence the risk of conflict one way or the other, suggesting a distinctiveness to the effect of border town institutions. While this analysis has presented evidence that supports a differentiated institutional effect of border towns on conflict risk, qualitatively identifying the causal channels on conflict risk within these border towns is hypothesized to be a fruitful avenue for further investigation.
Ultimately, conflict analysis stands to significantly benefit from more disaggregated territorial studies of the border. Of the 14,120 rebel battle events in SSA from 1997-2019, about half (46.3%) occurred within 50km of an international border with a neighbouring country. Understanding this simplistic geographic observation can provide policy practitioners with additional contextual knowledge for reducing violent armed conflict in the region. The borderlands literature is well-placed for this task and conflict scholars have advantageous research tools at their disposal. Increased interdisciplinary collaborations between borderlands and conflict researchers in this regard, presents opportunities to build complementary research agendas and provide stronger frameworks for analysis of civil conflict hazards at the border.

6.0 Annex. Resulting countries present in the data sample

- Angola
- Benin
- Botswana
- Burkina Faso
- Burundi
- Cameroon
- Central African Republic
- Chad
- Côte d’Ivoire
- Democratic Republic of Congo
- Djibouti
- Equatorial Guinea
- Eritrea
- Ethiopia
- Gabon
- Ghana
- Guinea
- Guinea-Bissau
- Kenya
- Lesotho
- Liberia
- Malawi
- Mali
- Mozambique
- Namibia
- Niger
- Nigeria
- Republic of Congo
- Rwanda
- Senegal
- Sierra Leone
- South Africa
- Tanzania
- Togo
- Uganda
- Zambia
- Zimbabwe

Notes

1. An example of international cooperation to fight cross border insurgencies is Nigerian-Cameroon cooperation against Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria.

2. The complete definition of rebels provided by Raleigh et al. (2010) to populate the dataset is:

   Rebel groups are identified as political organizations designed to counter an established governing regime within a state through engaging in violent acts. Rebel groups have a stated political agenda, are acknowledged outside of immediate members, and use violence as the primary means to pursue political goals (655).

3. While population size is acknowledged to change over time, meaningful non-interpolated time-sensitive data is not available. While the GPWv4 dataset does provide data for 5-year periods, they explicitly acknowledge that the data does not reflect a true time series as the population estimates are derived from the same input population data and interpolated between years. Given that population growth rates are slow to change over decades, this variable still serves as a reasonable structural proxy for population size within the gridded cell.

4. Recent work has shown that testing for zero inflation using the standard Stata15 Vuong test may be inappropriate. To adjust for this, the Vuong test was performed with Akaike information criterion and Bayesian information criterion corrections. See Desmarais and Harden (2013) for more information.

5. The inflate equation could be considered a test of the gridded structure’s performance, rather than relevant to corollary channels of conflict onset. The results suggest that the grid format is well suited to identifying conflict onset when considering the signs of the coefficients. For example, the inflate equation’s results for all models suggest that more populous locations had a higher probability of seeing at least one war event (negative coefficients suggest the probability of observing a non-zero event). This may be an unsurprising attribute of the data structure: conflict is likely to occur where people are located. However, the effect of population on conflict is more robustly explored in Raleigh and Hegre’s (2009) spatial analysis. Similarly, the inflate equation’s results suggest that nearby rebel battles predicts a higher probability of seeing at least one war event in the reference cell. Again, this could be related to the spatial design of the grid structure: rebel battles occur near other rebel battles (the data indicates a 44% correlation). But, considering the spatial spillover theories described, this is also theoretically sound.

Editorial note – The original version of this article included a map that was reproduced without authorization of the copyright holder. The infringement was reported, the map removed, and the article adjusted.

Works Cited


In early 2019, the Associated Press and other news organizations began to issue reports alleging that a new round of crackdowns targeting LGBTQ citizens and activists in Chechnya, a region already infamous for its so-called ‘gay purges’ (PBS 2019). The stories featured grim accounts of people imprisoned on suspicion of being gay, who were then subjected to intense interrogation and even torture; two men were alleged to have died as a result.

This was not the first time such purges had taken place in Chechnya. In 2017, LGBTQ activist groups and Amnesty International had reported on similar events, including imprisonment, torture and killings by state representatives as part of a wider social crackdown on what state officials called “deviant” behaviours (PBS 2019). In response, gay rights activists and organizations began to establish clandestine networks to smuggle queer, non-binary and transgender people out of Chechnya and across borders to safety. The decision on the part of the group’s founders to name it after the Underground Railroad was in many ways appropriate as, like the American network used to smuggle slaves to freedom, the Rainbow Railroad’s intent was to help gender and sexual minorities to escape to freedom in Canada.

* Edwin Hodge (PhD), Department of Sociology, University of Victoria, Canada. Contact: edhodge@uvic.ca
The Chechnyan purges of LGBTQ citizens is hardly unique; out of 195 recognized nations, only 28 extend legal protections and rights to non-heterosexual citizens. For much of the world, heterosexuality is effectively compulsory, with violators liable to face fines, prison sentences and, in several states throughout the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), death (The Human Dignity Trust 2019). In the face of such persecution, a growing number of non-heterosexual people opt to leave their homelands in search of safety. Included in this category of precarious traveller are transgender, queer, and non-binary/non-conforming refugees, who are among the most vulnerable of all (Affan 2019).

Yet successful flight from homophobia and transphobia is more difficult than simply fleeing one nation for another; as any number of international organizations will confirm, the journey of the refugee is a precarious one—the road of a queer, non-binary, or transgender refugee more precarious still. Refugees must pass through multiple layers of screening and vetting before arriving at a potential safe haven, and once they do, there is no guarantee that their new home will be any more tolerant than the one they left behind. For queer, non-binary and transgender refugees, the layers of precarity faced by virtue of their refugee status are compounded by additional layers of scrutiny—and, hence, precarity—as claims agents and border personnel are tasked with assessing if such claimants are “really queer” (Murray 2014).

These experiences highlight the ways that precarity is less of a static categorization of persons, and more of a series of processes—of claims and counter-claims—involving individuals, states, policy, and policy execution which intersect on and within the bodies of queer, non-binary and transgender refugees. These exchanges illustrate that issues of precarity—and indeed, of the very concept of precarity—is as much a question of sociology as it is any other discipline. Precarity is a process; people are not precarious, and they do not only experience precarity, but rather they are made precarious through interactions with others.

Data on the exact numbers of SOGIE claimants processed by the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) each year can be difficult to come by, but what data is available indicates the numbers of claimants remains small. In 2015, the number of SOGIE claimants processed was 1,286, of which 883 were accepted and 372 were rejected (Figure 1) (Robertson 2017). While the overall numbers of trans, queer and non-conforming refugees crossing into Canada is relatively small, they nevertheless represent a category of claimant that is especially susceptible to shifts in refugee policy, or to shifting political or social attitudes. This is especially true when the basis for their claims for asylum—persecution based on sexual orientation or gender identity—demand that they reveal aspects of themselves they may have spent a lifetime hiding.

This paper draws on the literature surrounding the experiences of queer, non-binary, and transgender refugees’ experiences at the border to examine the ways that precarity as a concept and a process is socially constructed and grounded in the expression of biopower. While these refugees come from many nations, their experiences with the power of borders share similar characteristics; of being unrecognized; of being stereotyped, illegitimated, and challenged to prove their “queer bona fides” to border agents and other representatives of the various refugee systems of the Global North. Beyond the experiences of queer, non-binary and transgender refugees, this paper argues that all refugees are made precarious through their interactions with individuals, state policy and practice at the borderline. Further, this paper argues that the practice of ascribing the status of precarious to the bodies of refugees, rather than locating it in the praxis of border enforcement and refugee claims processing renders the biopower present in state/refugee interactions invisible.

The paper will provide a brief overview of some of the more common ways that precarity is deployed in policy and academic debates, before turning to a more focused examination of the use of the term with regards to refugee experiences. From this

<table>
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<th>Disposition Type</th>
<th>Claim Types</th>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>Negative</th>
<th>Abandoned</th>
<th>Withdrawn &amp; Other</th>
<th>Grand Total</th>
<th>Acceptance Rate</th>
<th>Rejection Rate</th>
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<td>FIN</td>
<td>Bisexual</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>37%</td>
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<td>Gay</td>
<td>481</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>675</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lesbian</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>29%</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Varied/Other</td>
<td>44</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>21%</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>883</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1,286</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1. IRB Data release: SOGIE and general claim decisions 2011-2015
point of departure, this paper will then discuss the sociology and biopower of precarity before moving finally to a re-conceptualization of precarity as an on-going process of claim and counter-claim, where claims agents’ expectations about the “correct” way to “be queer” inform their recognition (and, hence, authentication) of queer refugees’ identities and status. Throughout, this paper draws on testimonial material obtained from advocacy groups, in-depth news reports, government statistics, and academic literature from the emerging field of transgender and queer studies.

The many (theoretical) faces of precarity

Precarity has long been an object of debate among academics of many disciplines, who have argued its precise meanings and import through successive waves of interest. In the early 2000s, precarity was theorized as a motivating factor for worker movements standing in opposition to the deregulation of markets and the heightened job insecurities that grew from the economic policies of late-stage capitalism (Lazzarato, 2004). Indeed, precarity was central to the organizational practices of movements such as Justice for Janitors (JfJ) which saw social activists pressure governments to regulate what they saw as the exploitation of undocumented and new immigrant workers in sub-contracted cleaning and maintenance jobs (Justice for Janitors 2018). In the case of JfJ and related movements, ‘precarity’ described the asymmetry of power relations in the relationship between individual employees and their respective employers which embedded the term firmly within the micro and meso levels of sociological analysis; precarity was an issue of small groups of people enduring unequal employment relationships at the sub-national, regional, and municipal levels.

Elsewhere, precarity has been used to categorize trans-boundary workers engaged in labour on temporary work permits and visas or through temporary foreign worker programs where job security is tenuous and the risk of abuse or exploitation by employers is high (McLaughlin and Hennebry 2013). As economic migrations by workers moving from the Global South to the Global North increased, concerns over their precarious working and living conditions kept precarity as a concept at the forefront of public and academic debates. In these cases, ‘precarity’ is a decidedly macro-level concept, used to describe the asymmetries of power relations between states, trans-boundary organizations, and the flows of economic migrants moving across territorial boundaries in search of work (Neilson and Rossiter 2008).

Yet precarity is also a workhorse for researchers concerned with the experiences of refugees and other displaced peoples, whose very existence is one of uncertainty and risk (Malkki 1996). In this discursive space, precarity is both a descriptive as well as normative condition of the refugee. Precarity is descriptive when it is employed as part of an analysis of refugee relationships with the various apparatuses that control their movement through states, such as when researchers describe the various institutional steps vulnerable refugees or migrants must take to navigate the layers of bureaucracy that stand between them and entry to a state (Ilcan, Rygiel and Baban 2018). Precarity is normative however, when it is employed by various stakeholder groups as part of framing strategies designed to tell observers what they ought to think about refugee claims. For example, when flows of refugees fleeing political violence and war in Syria fled across the Mediterranean Sea in search of safety, many liberal media outlets within the United States emphasized the precarity of refugees in terms of their helplessness in the face of external factors outside their control; refugees’ precarity was used to invoke sympathy and to frame their journey as an example of a humanitarian crisis in desperate need of action (Tharoor 2015). Yet at the same time, stories from conservative-leaning outlets framed the precarity of the refugees in terms of threats to stability and the rule of law in the countries they were fleeing to. As part of their own coverage of the crisis, the conservative Washington Times released opinion pieces and news articles describing Syrian refugees as potential vectors for terrorism, violence, and a potential threat to American values (Richardson 2015).

In each of these articulations, precarity is as much a discussion of power as it is of individual circumstance or historical context. While precarity is used in discussions at all levels of analysis (from supra-state, state, and sub-state flows of people to regional, local, and individual relationships between employers, employees and the law), precarity is nearly always a species of claims-making between stakeholders in systems of power, regulation, and discipline. Nowhere is this more evident than in the regulation—and disciplining—of refugees and migrants whose identities fall outside of the normative boundaries of “typical” or indeed “normal” border crossers. As states make ever-increasing use of biometric forms of identification, they simultaneously center the practice of making precarity within the bodies of people; precarity in effect becomes a discourse about power relations between states, international migrant and refugee organizations, and the bodies of those caught up between them.

The sociology (and biopower) of precarity

When scholars and policy makers debate precarity—are flows of people “refugees” (thus deserving
of protections) or “migrants” (and thus subject to standard border controls)—there is often an unspoken heteronormativity and cis-normativity to the debates. Refugees are often depicted in media narratives as cisgender men, women, or traditionally constructed family units (Lee, Jin and Brotman 2011). This pattern obscures smaller groups of refugees whose identities place them outside of these parameters. This invisibility increases their risk and represents an additional layer of uncertainty to the processing of their claims (Lee, Jin and Brotman 2011). More than that however, the obfuscation of non-conforming refugees can often make it more difficult for domestic audiences viewing refugees through the lens of media coverage to identify and sympathize with them.

Flows of refugees and migrants are large and faceless unless and until attention is paid to specific examples of individuals whose stories are publicized and expanded as a sort of placeholder for the stories of all the others who travel with them (Cole 2017). When refugees in their tens of thousands made the harrowing journey across the Mediterranean in flimsy rafts and inflatable zodiacs, they remained undifferentiated in their Otherness until one of them—a small boy named Alan Kurdi—washed ashore after drowning and they became relatable as sons and mothers and fathers and daughters like any other (Bouckaert, 2015). Through this child’s tragic death, observers were asked to think of themselves as parents and thereby take on the normative role of parent as a way of tapping into the compassion and empathy that can be so difficult to authentically summon for such large flows of people (Cole 2017).

Yet these appeals highlight the challenges faced by refugees and migrants whose identities or bodies do not reflect the heterosexual and cisnormative framings of traditional appeals to sympathy or compassion. Instead, transgender, queer, and non-binary refugees remain invisible (Jordan 2009), their identities absent in calls by refugee aid organizations or activists to role-play kinship. In place of direct appeals to family (or parental) identification (“This could be your daughter, your father, your sibling...”), many aid organizations instead draw on appeals to “universal” human experiences—loving someone and being loved; wishing to live openly with your partner; simply wanting to live authentically (Rainbow Railroad 2019). Paradoxically, the appeal to “universal” desires highlights the non-universality of the experiences of transgender, queer, and non-binary refugees. Through such differences in experience we can discern the role that differentiation plays in the construction of multiple layers of precarity that intersect within queer, trans, and non-binary bodies as they move through larger refugee flows, and especially when attempting to cross the biometric borders of the state.

When queer, trans, and non-binary refugees arrive at ports of entry in Canada, the United States, or other nations of the Global North, they are met not merely with the apparatuses of biometric control: facial recognition devices, backscatter and traditional body-scanning devices, fingerprint and retinal scanners. Indeed, such devices are less crucial to the discursive processes of biopower than the conditions of expectation, recognition/credibility and respectability, which serve to “authenticate” a refugee claimant or migrant’s precarity-identity far more than matching a name and face to a passport.

Trans, queer, and non-binary identities are not unknown to border agents in the Global North; indeed, agents are often instructed to view such persons as vulnerable (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2017). Yet this knowledge is not value neutral. The identity categories recognized under Canadian law are constructed categories. In Canadian society for instance, gender as a concept is still largely articulated in binary terms; to be transgender or non-binary is constructed in resistance to traditional understandings of masculine and feminine, and this articulation informs the expectations of border agents tasked with processing refugee claims (Cantú 2009). Being a refugee is precarious enough, but it can be compounded by the double-threat of having one’s status as a precarious person itself rendered precarious due to possible “discrepancies” between an agent’s expectations about a refugee’s identity and the
facts of their lived experiences. Agents may expect trans, queer or non-binary persons to behave in certain ways, or to have experienced a certain kind of discrimination, and if they haven’t, their claim to the status and protections of being a refugee are in question (Berg and Millbank 2009).

In such cases, the precarity of the refugee exists not as a property of their irregular border crossing (their irregularity is precisely what affords them protections under international law) but rather as a process of identification and interpretation by the border agents tasked with handling their cases. If a refugee is not what an agent expects, if their gender or sexual performativities differ from the homonormative constructions of queerness or homosexuality in Canada, their “realness” as a queer, non-binary or transgender refugee might be called into question (Murray 2014). These challenges can be compounded by the often uneven application of protections that, while ostensibly guaranteed by law, are sometimes not extended to the refugee in fact. For example, while refugees entering Canada may apply for protections based on their sexual orientation or identification (i.e. based upon a claim of persecution in the claimants’ home country for orientation or identity), they may face the challenge of proving that homophobia in their home country rises to the level of ‘persecution’ according to Canadian standards (Hersh 2017). In the case of an Angolan man named ‘Sebastaio’, whose appeal for refugee status was rejected by Canadian authorities, the rejection was due to a ruling by the Refugee Appeal Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board which stated that Sebastaio’s attempts to show persecution in his native Angola were in fact merely examples of ‘harassment’ (Hersh 2017). The decision used a lack of documentation of persecution rather than an absence of evidence of persecution as the basis for its decision; Sebastaio’s claim was denied because Angola did not appear to accurately record instances of social—and state—persecution against this vulnerable minority group.

Entry controls at border crossings are not and have never been value-neutral in their construction or application. In the Canadian context, immigration regulation has long been concerned with the moral regulation of potential immigrants; in the early half of the 20th Century, potential immigrants were screened for “moral turpitude” as well as for diseases and criminality (Chan 2005). In the 21st Century, immigrants are still expected to possess “good character” (Chan 2005), but for queer, non-binary and transgender refugees, displaying good character—while also “proving” they are “really queer” (Murray 2014)—often necessitates engaging in performances of respectability to prove that a) they really are the gender or sexual identity they claim to be, and b) that identity is “normal” or otherwise palatable to Canadian society (Seidman 2001). This pattern of “respectability politics” represents another vector by which queer, non-binary and transgender refugees are made precarious; expressions of sexual and gender identity and orientation are often highly individual and play or resistance to norms is often a part of that (Berg and Millbank 2009). When crossing borders as refugees, queer, non-binary and transgender claimants are in effect expected to not only “perform” their identities on demand (which can be traumatic for people who have just arrived from regions where open performances of that sort might result in arrest or other forms of violence), they are also expected to get them “right” (Cory 2018), according to cultural expectations of sexuality or gender identity of which they may be unaware.

If, after attempting to live and act openly according to host-country expectations of gender and sexual identity and attempting to show one’s identity to be both within the expected parameters and “respectable,” a person fails to convince an adjudicator of their “realness,” their status as a refugee might be revoked. The removal of recognition of gender or sexual identity by border agents represents a third vector of precarity that has less to do with the refugee than it does with the cultural and social values, beliefs, and expectations of their interlocutors. Further, this added layer of precarity is ironic, given that the sexual and gender identity of the claimant is precisely what is supposed to be protected under Canadian law (to say nothing of international conventions). The difficulties of recognition represent a challenge to queer, non-binary and transgender refugee claimants that does not exist for other categories of refugees. When a religious refugee seeks admittance, how do they prove their religious bona fides? A curious investigator could discuss their faith with them or seek confirmation from local faith-based organizations such as churches or mosques. They may discuss a claimants’ religious history—their attendance to rites or rituals, their piety or their fastidiousness in keeping the holy days of their faith (Kagan 2010). But how does an adjudicator test the “queerness” of a claimant?

Gender and sexual identity are intensely personal, and in many cases, the “evidence” of a person’s gender or sexual identity exists nowhere outside of the bedroom or the confines of their own minds. To formally recognize a person’s identity, an adjudicator will often fall back on folk knowledge of queer “practices” or identities (Seidman 2014). Rather than experiencing precarity as a component of their flight towards safety, queer, non-binary and transgender refugees are made precarious by social and cultural constructions along the borders of their potential refuges.
Making precarious

There is a tendency in literature surrounding international migrations to refer to refugees as “the precariat” (Banki 2013), or to frame their experiences in terms of rational-choice logics that imply precarity emerges from refugees’ deliberate choices to cross national boundaries or undertake dangerous journeys by land or sea. It is certainly true that perilous crossings of the Mediterranean or overland routes from North Africa, the Middle East or Latin America feature precarity as part of the journey; risky journeys are precarious journeys. Yet, this precarity of circumstance is less relevant to refugee experiences than the process of making precarious. Not all refugees undertake dangerous journeys from active conflict zones or regions of political repression; some grew up in static refugee camps where their status as “precarious” was the result of policies that made their existences precarious. Just as citizenship or non-citizenship are statuses that result from active political processes, the precarity that sexual and gender minority groups face as they move through the refugee system in countries of the Global North is a process of recognition, expectation and challenge. The precarity of sexual and gender minorities is multilayered, formed of “precarities of place” (Banki 2013), as well as through sustained interactions with border and refugee agents whose constant approval—and recognition—is a required element for continuing to benefit from the protections of refugee law.

In such cases, precarity is not institutional, legal, or geographic; it is cultural. Cultural precarity exists where the beliefs and identities of “atypical” (non-heteronormative or Othered) refugees encounter the complex matrices of border agent beliefs, practices, norms and values. In these spaces, there is no war forcing refugees to flee, no perilous crossings over dark and stormy waters; there is only the border agent and the cultural systems they represent. There is only the refugee’s identity and the fear that it will not map onto the cultural expectations of the person charged with assessing their claim. Cultural precarity is not an emergent property of refugee bodies in motion but the manifestation of biopower and the ability to regulate bodies moving through their interactions with border agents. Cultural precarity makes refugees claiming persecution based on sexual orientation or gender identity face a terrible possibility: not that their claims as refugees based on their belonging to a persecuted identity will be rejected, but that their identities will not be recognized at all. In an interview with refugees detailing their experiences within the Canadian refugee system, one claimant related their fears about their identity being rejected by a border agent:

“I come from Arab country and I also have history of military services so it was one of the things. It was like oh God, you know, first of all, you not going to believe that is me on the passport, you know, because I look quite different then I do in my passport photograph ... And I said you know I’m transsexual man…” (Envisioning: Global LGBT Human Rights, 2015)

The ambiguity and instability present in many queer, trans, and non-conforming refugee identities presents an additional layer of uncertainty to virtually every interaction they have, as in addition to proving the validity of their claims of persecution, they must also prove their identities are valid. To obtain this level of verification, SOGIE refugees are required to provide documentation that ‘proves’ to agents the truth of their sexual orientation or gender identity. Such proof includes medical files, testimonials, and other documents that may not merely be difficult, but impossible to access—particularly if the country they are fleeing from does not recognize the existence of non-conforming gender identities or outright criminalized non-heterosexual orientations (Envisioning: Global LGBT Human Rights 2015). Even if such documentation could be obtained, there is no guarantee that it would be understood or accepted by the agents in charge of deciding refugee claims.

Summary

The precarity of queer, non-binary and transgender refugees is not a static label, nor is it solely involved with the specific act of fleeing conflict or persecution, though it is involved with both. Precarity in this context is a process that emerges from sustained interactions between border agents, refugee claims adjudicators, and the claimants themselves and when this interactional element is overlooked or obfuscated, it conceals the very real power relations present. When gender or sexual identity is deployed in refugee claims or in the categorization of the types of claims an individual refugee is making, it highlights the ways that national and international legal traditions and protections are inscribed on bodies, which are then subject to interpretation and recognition by individual agents whose understandings of non-binary bodies and identities are often informed more by culture than by policy. What emerges from these interactions is an understanding of precarity as a process of “making precarious” whereby an agent’s beliefs, values, expectations, and moral framings (their culture, in other words) establishes the context through which non-binary bodies must move as they seek recognition and safety.

In effect, transgender, queer, and non-conforming
refugees are often faced with multiple layers of challenges that other categories of refugees are not. Transgender, queer, and non-conforming refugees face immense challenges navigating the physical dangers of unregulated movement across borders, only to find a lack of protections—even predation—in refugee camps. Worse, even if their claims are logged and they are able to present their case to claim agents of a state like Canada, they are often required to “prove” their “queerness,” a process which relies heavily on the reviewing agent’s beliefs about what “being queer” actually means. If a refugee cannot sufficiently prove to a (presumed cisgender, heterosexual) claims agent that they are in fact, “really queer” (Murray 2014). They may find their claims denied, even if their gender identity or sexual orientation are ostensibly protected by international agreements. Understood this way, precarity as a concept is seen not as a component of a person’s identity or experiences, but rather as something inscribed on to them by the state.

When precarity is externalized by the state and attached to refugee flows as though it were an emergent property of “atypical” movement across borders, it obfuscates the power relations through which states and international agencies render some bodies precarious. Precarity does not flow from the movement of refugees across borders; it is imposed upon them by states who seek to regulate, validate, or otherwise control bodies in motion.

Notes

1 The use of the term “queer” in this paper reflects the author’s discomfort with the more common use of acronyms to describe gender and sexual non-conformity. As public awareness—and acceptance—of non-binary identities has grown, the acronym has grown as well, from LGB to LGBT to LGBTQ and LGBTQI and others. For some, the identities contained within the acronym might represent the list of “recognized” identities, which imposes a form of categorization—and separation—of identities that may not necessarily exist in practice. By reframing from using this acronym and choosing instead to use “queer,” “transgender,” and “non-binary,” the author is adopting the position that queerness and non-conformity—and indeed “trans-ness”—do a much better job of incorporating ambiguity, resistance to categorization, and play than the more rigidly constructed acronym. This is a debatable position to take, as categorizations can—and do—provide others with a sense of stability and belonging, but it is not the author’s intention to engage in this debate here.

2 Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and Expression—the term used by the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board to refer to gender and sexual minority claimants.

References


Hodge, "Making Precarious: The Construction of Precarity in Refugee and Migrant Discourse"
Moving Atlas (portfolio)
Karen Yen

Artist Statement: *Moving Atlas*

Using the language of maps, I take on the role of cartographer by tracing emotions, sensations, perceptions and the unchartered realms of my imagination associated with being a person of an ever changing diaspora. Using acrylic paints, paper collage and charcoal on canvas and paper, I rearticulate the practice of mapping by drawing from the landscapes of my memory and imagination. This allows me to temporarily orient myself in this vast world while venturing beyond the boundaries of geography to examine the contradictions between the nature of our imagination and physical boundaries.

About the artist:

Karen Yen is a Visual Artist whose journey began in the field of graphic design. With 20 years of experience that started in San Francisco, continuing on in New York, Barcelona, and Victoria, she has learnt to combine meaning/purpose with aesthetics by translating abstract ideas and concepts into visual forms. While visual forms in graphic design are primarily digital, recent years have found her exploring the creation of images through the craft of painting and drawing. By combining this direct, slow and laborious manner of execution with ideas, she creates a visual language that is personal, purposeful and soulful at the same time. Touching on topics such as the refugee condition, the feminine, spirituality, personal geographies and reimagining the arts and crafts movement, she navigates in a world of pictorial interpretation of thoughts, emotions and events that is expansive and lyrical.

Contact: karen@canpoeti.com
BETWEEN LAND AND SEA
16 x 20 inches / 40.5 X 50 cm
Mixed Media on Canvas
2018
SKY, LAND & SEA
Each: 24 x 30 inches / 61 X 76.2 cm
Mixed Media on Canvas
2018
CONVERGENCE
Each: 8 x 10 inches / 20.32 X 25.4 cm
Acrylics on Canvas
2018
CALAS
Each: 8 x 10 inches / 20.32 X 25.4 cm
Acrylics on Canvas
2018
MOUNTAINS AND MOON
18 x 18 inches / 45.72 x 45.72 cm
Mixed Media on Canvas
2018
HOPPING
20 x 20 inches / 50.8 X 50.8 cm
Acrylics on Canvas
2018
CROSSING 1
22 x 30 inches / 55.88 X 76.2 cm
Charcoal, Graphite on Paper
2018
CROSSING 2
22 x 30 inches / 55.88 X 76.2 cm
Charcoal, Graphite on Paper
2018
Poem:

Borderlander

(2019)

About the Poet:

Amanda Merritt is a poet and a creative writing instructor from Victoria, BC. Her debut poetry collection, *The Divining Pool*, was published in October 2017 by Wundor Editions, and was nominated for the 2018 Gerald Lampert award. Previously, she was awarded the 2015 Anstruther poetry prize, and was among the finalists included in Aesthetica’s 2017 Creative Writing Annual anthology. Her work appears in journals in Canada and the UK, including *Descant, Grain, Prairie Fire, Qwerty, Untethered* and *Stand*. Amanda teaches creative writing at the University of Victoria.

For further information visit: amandamerritt.ca.
Borderlander

Love struck and fear bound us, for a time
we were happy, roaming the citadel
of your meiotic dreams; sovereign
of rippling strath between heart beats,
was it for dominion or salvation
that I was claimed?

Listening in at the embankment,
I was a geography of endings
where lowland feeds silt to sea;
growing strongter by day I made
preparations, for refuge is the imperative
to flee. I studied the rhythm of footfall
on flagstones, learned by touch the sinews
of containing wall, memorised the places
where mortar had softened and bricks might fall—

but what did I know of outside:
peopled by rooms of locked faces
and one-way eyes, boundary of another’s skin,
for which, mother, you have risked everything.
Poems:

vagabond wind

sans-papiers

In English, Spanish, and French

Translations by Natasha Sardzoska (with Elsa Barreda Ruiz)

Originally published in:
Natasha Sardzoska, COCCYX (PNV Publishing, Skopje, 2019)

About the Poet:

Natasha Sardzoska (1979), poet, writer, essayist, polyglot translator and interpreter was born in Skopje in Macedonia. She holds a PhD in anthropology from the Eberhard Karls University of Tübingen, Sorbonne Nouvelle in Paris and University of Bergamo. She has published the poetry books Blue Room, Skin, He pulled me with invisible string, Living Water, Coccyx and short stories. Her book Skin was published in the USA and Italy; her poems are translated in international literary reviews. Her poem “Doll on Strings” has been published in the International Poetry Anthology against child abuse. She has performed at international poetry festivals among which: Ars Poetica in Bratislava; Words Wide Open in Genova; Scream in Rijeka; in the Revoltella Museum in Trieste; in the Academy of Arts for the Poetry Festival of Berlin; at the Sha’ar International Poetry Festival performing with sax, contrabass and contemporary dance in the Yaffa Theatre in Tel Aviv.

For more, see Natasha's Profile on Versopolis Poetry

Contact: sardzovskinatasha@gmail.com
vagabond wind

silba el viento dentro de mí.
estoy desnudo.
dueño de nada, dueño de nadie, ni siquiera dueño de mis certezas, soy mi cara en el viento, a
ccontraviento, y soy el viento que me golpea en la cara.
eduardo galeano

at airports I am the traveler
examined for several times
random check they tell me
but I do not travel
nowhere
I tell them
I do not go anywhere
I do not even return
I am not a barbel in extinction
neither fardel which will determine the directions
they seek and scratch my bags
but I have nothing
nothing which will throw a shade on their fears
they ask me where do I go
but neither myself I do not know
which is the hotel address
what is written in the invitation letter
do I have a return ticket

I am a fish on dry soil
I tell them I want to move away
but I feel fear
can't you see
I do not have north nor south
I am the runway uprooted from your royal land
and still I am the absence of land
of your time
I am the hourglass
you cannot wait to trickle
nor to seep you
but you still seek
for the crumbling time
to your royal beginnings
to take you back
sans-papiers

I am blowing the air around
I keep silent in their eyes
and they are running away

yes, they are probably running away
to relieve the turbines that I have drifted away
the lacuna carved by my spine
and they hit me with the pendulum of the space
they look at me with suspect and fear
they scratch me in their mind
and then they leave me
without seal without stamp
without humanity

and they send me beyond their borders
where I was a foreigner
but I did not remain

well I did not
even have a gamble to lose
to calm down my bones
and save them

from insanity
viento vagabundo

silba el viento dentro de mí.
estoy desnudo.
dueño de nada, dueño de nadie, ni siquiera dueño de mis certezas, soy mi cara en el viento, a
contraviento, y soy el viento que me golpea en la cara.

eduardo galeano

en los aeropuertos soy el pasajero
controlado muchas veces
random check me dicen
pero yo no viajo
no voy a ninguna parte
les digo
ni me voy
ni siquiera regreso
no soy una especie en extinción
ni el eje que determinará la dirección

ellos buscan en mis bolsas
pero yo no tengo nada
nada que opaque sus miedos
me preguntan a dónde voy
pero ni yo misma no lo sé
ni cual es la dirección del hotel
qué dice la carta del anfitrión
y si tengo un boleto aéreo de regreso

soy un pescado en tierra seca
les digo que quiero escapar
pero tengo miedo
no ven
no tengo ni norte ni sur
una pista excavada en su tierra real
y sin embargo estoy ausente de la tierra
de su tiempo
soy el reloj de arena
a la que no esperan que caiga
ni que los deje
aunque estén buscando
una mancha de tiempo
que les devuelva

a su principio imperial
sans-papiers

estoy soplando el aire alrededor
guardo mi silencio en sus ojos
y ellos están huyendo

probablemente están huyendo
para aliviar las turbinas que he hecho
las lagunas ahondadas de mi espina dorsal
y me pegan con el péndulo del espacio
me miran con duda y miedo
me rasgan en su mente
y luego me dejan sin sello ni timbre
sin humanidad

y me despachan detrás de las fronteras
donde era extranjero
aun no me quedé

y sin embargo
no tenía nada que perder
para calmar mis huesos
y para salvarlos

de la locura
le vent vagabond

silba el viento dentro de mí.
estoy desnudo.
dueño de nada, dueño de nadie, ni siquiera dueño de mis certezas, soy mi cara en el viento, a
correviento, y soy el viento que me golpea en la cara.
eduardo galeano

sur les aéroports je suis le voyageur
qui est inspecté plusieurs fois
random check disent-ils
mais je ne voyage
nulle part
je leur dis
je n’y vais pas
je ne rentre pas
je ne suis pas un barbeau en voie d’extinction
ni un fardeau qui déterminera la direction

ils fouillent mes sacs
et je n’ai
rien
rien qui puisse occulter leur peurs
ils me demandent où je vais
moi même ne le sais pas
et quelle est l’adresse de l’hôtel
et que dit la lettre de l’hôte
et si j’ai un billet d’avion aller-retour

je suis un poisson à terre sèche
je leur dis que je veux partir
mais j’ai peur
ne voyez pas
je n’ai ni nord ni sud
je suis une piste qui a été creusée sur votre terre royale
et pourtant je suis absence de terre
de votre temps
je suis le sablier
ne vous attendez pas à couler
ni à vous décoller
alors que vous êtes à la recherche du temps friable
qui à votre début impérial
vous remportera
sans-papiers

j’anéantis l’air autour de moi
et je me tais dans leurs yeux
et ils fuient

probablement ils fuient
pour soulager les turbines que j’ai fait bouger
les lacunes creusées par ma colonne vertébrale

et ils me frappent avec le pendule de l’espace
ils me regardent avec le doute et la peur
ils me griffent dans leur cerveau
et m’assurent par la suite
sans sceau sans timbres
sans humanité

et ils m’envoyent derrière leurs frontières
où j’étais un étranger
mais je ne le suis pas resté

alors que je n’avais même pas une garantie à perdre
pour calmer mes os
et les sauver

de la folie
Hours of the Desert

Roxanne Lynne Doty

Poem:

“Hours of the Desert”

(Version 2, July 16, 2018)

About the Poet:


Contact: Roxanne.doty@asu.edu
Hours of the Desert

[Dedicated to the nearly 7000 migrants who have died crossing the U.S.-Mexico border over the past 16 years]
Published in International Times, 7/25/18

When the desert. When far from cities, but close. When Ironwood Forest and Organ Pipe and Devil's Highway. When a trail becomes a plea. Because the distance is long. When as close to god as you’ll ever get. When still an illusion.

When layover spots. Because dreams. When abandoned backpacks and love letters, books of poetry, books of prayer, empty water bottles. When shade is a black plastic bag over creosote and cactus. When the sun. When days are fire, when snakes take cover.

When a bracelet on the ground. When someone wore it. Because flesh and blood. Because someone wrote the love letters, held the books of poetry and prayer. Because a heartbeat.

When still the heat. When nothing but the heat.

When the future lies beyond mountains. When it disappears. When a mirage of water. When a man with no features. When he hides in a uniform. Behind a weapon. Inside the law. When on your knees.

When grace. When compassion. When kindness. When humanity. When lost.

When you walk again. When the dream and the prayer and grace and the snake and the man cross the same desert all unaware of each other. When over and over again.

When clusters of black dots mark places of death. Because the bones. When white crosses. When no identificado. When bodies don’t get counted. When they do. When counting doesn’t matter. When justice is a moment. Of madness. When it dies.
The border as a wall proposes an archaic static apparatus of rejection of the other-foreigner contrasting with the image of a globalized world where only economic and technological interests seem to flow. These walls crystallize a malaise that can be elucidated through Art. By capturing the historical iconography, we understand the values that shape the current geopolitical wall.

Indeed, the artistic interpretation of the wall makes a round-trip with the notion of the border. Thus, the aesthetic of the border wall can be traced to the belief in divinities and the protection of a group. Going back to ancient Egypt for instance, the God Aton was worshiped as the creator of the border. From 1360 BCE at the site of Amarna, stelae implanted and sculpted in his effigy marked a territory measuring around 25 km x 14 km on the east of the Nile. The divinized stelae proclaim the Pharaoh’s victory over a specific territory. The border thus marked and symbolized can also be found during Roman dynasties. From the establishment of Rome by Romulus (753-717 BCE) a sanctuary was originally dedicated to the God Terminus who was the protector of boundary stones. [Figure 1] Ovid praised him: “You set bounds to peoples, cities, great kingdoms: without you every field would be disputed. You curry no favor: you aren’t bribed with gold, guarding the land entrusted to you in good faith”. The god embodied by the statue marks out the territory; its sacred value also forces respect.

Beyond dogma, the myths of fortress cities such as the legendary Jericho [Figure 2] or Troy, stimulate creative inspiration. The beginning of the Trojan War is narrated in Homer’s *Iliad* and Virgil’s *Aeneid*. After being punished by Zeus, Poseidon and Apollo built a wall surrounding the city. From an iconographic point of view, the medieval illuminations unfold the story particularly insisting on the horse’s entrance. Between 1340 and 1350 Benoît de Sainte-Maure recounts it in this way: “The marvelous object that Epeius had built ... was mounted with the help of machines, ropes, and cables onto four enormous and very solid wheels. Then, all together, they attempted to move it forward. Everyone participated: they pulled, they pushed, and made a great effort. They had a great deal of difficulty driving forward this machine in the shape of a horse”. The Mexican contemporary artist ERRE took again this masterful maneuver in 1997 during the InSite festival ubicated between Tijuana and San Diego. [Figure 3] Above a border stone, his sculpture of a monumental wooden Horse entitled *Toy an-Horse*

A French translation of this essay will be published in our next issue, *BIG Review* 1:2.

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has two heads who proudly pointed towards each border. A ladder between the pedestal and the flank of the animal suggests the possible stratagem. Myth as a tool is transposed on a delicate territory. The artist then raises questions: potential incursion, undeniable interbreeding, to keep distance from the disturbed border situation?...

In some cases, the representation of civil-military defense magnifies the architectural work (iconography of Constantinople, for example). The Great Wall of China is one of the most significant and it leads to an aesthetic production over the centuries. Therefore it enters the collective imaginary as a supreme symbol of defense. Under the Tang dynasty (618-690, 705-907), the “Borders and Frontier Fortress Poets Groups” created the figure of the soldier as a warrior fighting along the Great Wall. Western perception of this architectural work is formed through the eyes of Jesuit missionaries who mapped the territory in 1584 and in 1667. And in a 1935 poem, Mao Zedong would even have written : “He who has not climbed the Great Wall is not a true man”. Indeed this Wall has also fascinated contemporary artists. [Figure 4] In 1988 the performance of Marina Abramović and Ulay defines the end of their relationship. For 90 days in a spiritual rite, they each walked 2,500 km on their own on the so-called body of the heraldic dragon. They met in the middle to create their ultimate artwork and to break up, metamorphosed by this extreme experience.

The truth is that the static wall generates a mobile aesthetic (poem, music, engraving, painting, performance, installation...). This is from the twentieth century that we observe adroit appropriation of this object by the artists. In this, the Berlin Wall is symptomatic (1961 - 1989). But here again, we must discern an ontological shift in collective perception. If at first glance the murals of the East Side Gallery seem obvious; it should be noted that this project came out after the fall of the wall and the dissolution of the GDR. It has never been a spontaneous initiative but provoked from December 1989 by the call of 118 artists to come invest a piece of remaining wall (1.3 km moved closer to the river Spree for the occasion). [Figure 5] [Figure 6]

The radical verticalities of these new borders interrogate the relation to Otherness, the right to mobility, the decision-making hegemony of some governments... At this point, the Iron Curtain of the Cold War has become an unsightly example. But its specificities were different: It was indeed initiated by an authoritarian regime officially against any western influence: liberal democracy, capitalist economy, powerful bourgeoisie, individual initiative, NATO... Whatever the intrinsic nature of these new walls, the artists always find a way to transgress the governmental will.

The artist as a sensitive sensor of his environment, is more inclined to perceive and express societal disfunction. Constancy firstly means a creative phase of foreboding/feeling and then comes a resistance/commitment phase. The latter is articulated according to different degrees of denunciation (in situ or via a diaspora) and by the spontaneous emergence of alternative creative bursts, which can then be institutionalized in museums and art galleries. Today, the expansion of walls has become a lucrative market for specialized companies. The media echo can generate an ambivalent effect where the recovery of the phenomenon (among other things by the artists) creates hyper-real confusion. Briefly, we are referring here to visionary artists who best sum up the essence of three emblematic closed borders, that of Berlin, that around the territory of Israel and that located between Mexico and the United States.

The protean work of Joseph Beuys perfectly reveals the perception of the object. Indeed, this artist surprises by exceeding the expected cliche. In 1964, he recommends heightening the wall by 5 cm. The proportions would finally then become credible and aesthetic. Thus we could go beyond the physical wall and beyond the mental one, the one who hinders freedom. The fulfillment of the human being goes through art. Art is Life, Life is Art... Indeed, the Beuysian belief remains the following: ART = CAPITAL. It refers to art that can influence society through the questions it asks. Beuys who despite himself was labeled a West German artist, will play with the subtleties that his position granted him. Later in 1986, he will radicalize his posture. He believed that the private capitalist system and the communist system both contributed to the creation of the wall. But after having been confronted with the obscene object for twenty years, he started to think of it as a sort of work of art, because the sensitive nature of the area between those two principles began to represent a sort of symbol of the possible future, a future social order. Beuys as a prophet? Within globalization, is it not clear that social order has become a continuous and rapid exchange of interests rather than a slow exchange of values? Is the increase of these separation barriers not an accomplice of this phenomenon?

Resistance to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict also involves artistic creation, including an epidermal effect against the concrete wall (8 meters high and 30 km long, 5% of the total 708 kilometers of barrier). In aesthetics, the intervention of graffiti artist Banksy is a perfect example in an inverted Orientalism form that summarizes the complexity of the geopolitical situation. [Figure 7] His first approach took place in 2005 on portions of the wall on the Palestinian side (between Jerusalem and the West Bank). The context of Palestine as the largest
open-air prison in the world and that of graffiti as a traditional medium used for denunciation, reach here the climax of a double form of illegality. The following conversation was said to have occurred as he worked:

**Old man** — You paint the wall, you make it look beautiful.

**Banksy** — Thanks.

**Old man** — We don’t want it to be beautiful. We hate this wall, go home.

The messages expressed in Banksy’s graffiti are developed along two priorities. One is related to evasion (dotted lines of a cut-out, window, ladder, balloons) and makes hope for an idyllic landscape on the other side (beach, mountain, forest...). However, this ideal projection of Banksy for the Palestinians was sometimes out of step with their realities, habits and customs. The other priority is directly related to the territory. The inscription “CTRL+ALT+DELETE” suggests the Wall should be erased. Or the metaphorical illusion to Palestinians is the silhouette of a young girl flying away with a bunch of balloons, or a girl patting down an IDF soldier (photos widely available on the Internet).

Why make the wall “beautiful”, give it an aura, as with any work of art, if this is exactly what bothers people, if this intrudes into their social and political environment? The wall is not democratic, but art democratizes it.

In order to close this sketch on the aesthetics of the walls, [Figure 8] let us turn to the one that is now at the heart of the Trump presidency. In fact, the dialectic and the actions taken concerning migration policy and their dramatic consequences have as a vector the border with Mexico. Currently about 1/3 of the total length (3145 km) is secure. A long border with Mexico. Currently about 1/3 of the total length (3145 km) is secure. It is the fulcrum of the painting, which is split in two. On the left is a Mexican landscape, and the United States is on the right recognizable by its flag, smoky chimneys of Detroit factory and high buildings. There are small electric appliances at Kahlo’s feet. We can see cables shooting under the ground like roots, in contrast with the real roots of plants and flowers planted on the Mexican side. Here the middle ground on the left side shows pre-Columbian sculptures, a skull and ends under the benevolence of the moon and the sun, by an Aztec monument streaked with lightning. The mental and physical sharing of Frida Kahlo takes the viewer to witness. Her right hand holds a small Mexican flag suggesting her territorial preference. The artist presents a hybrid identity, typical of the reality of Chicano living in the United States and fully defend the richness of this double culture. Moreover later, in the same vein, the artist Guillermo Gomez Peña who by his performances decolonizes any notion of body, language and spirit, by transgressing any aesthetic, ethnic and ethical taboo, considers himself to be a homo fronterizus by transgressing any aesthetic, ethnic and ethical taboo, considers himself to be a homo fronterizus (I am a border Sisyphus) : “I make art about the misunderstandings that take place at the border zone. But for me, the border is no longer located at any fixed geopolitical site. I carry the border with me, and I find new borders wherever I go.” Of their omniscient character is it added that of their radicalization?

It is indisputable that the border is now read in parallel with the “so-wanted” hermetic wall. Furthermore the seventy border walls (the circumference of the planet), other ramparts are perniciously instrumentalized in this way, such as the iconic Mediterranean Sea. If some artists and artivists continue to mobilize, the stakes are crucial because these kind of walls have become the unhappy display of the state of this globalized world. Thus, it seems that the public and political awareness of border tragedies can naturally go through artistic expression as long as it preserves itself from any complacency and/or gratuitous provocation. [Figure 10]

**Notes**

1 See the new dynamic of the 2017 project: <http://walledoffhotel.com/>

2 Kahlo’s painting can be viewed at Google Arts & Culture: <https://g.co/arts/tU2YteVX2pv3MCdFA>.

Ganivet, “Aesthetics of the Geopolitical Wall”

**Figure 1.** Hans Holbein, Terminus, the Device of Erasmus (painting) c. 1532 © The Cleveland Museum of Art, Gift of Dr. and Mrs. Sherman E. Lee in memory of Milton S. Fox 1971.

**Figure 2.** Gustave Doré, The Walls of Jericho Fall Down (etching) 1866 © Public domain
Ganivet, “Aesthetics of the Geopolitical Wall”

Figure 3. Marcos Ramírez ERRE, Toy an-Horse (installation) 1997 © Marcos Ramírez ERRE. Courtesy of the artist, InSite Archive

Figure 4. Zheng Lianjie, The Wall--Commemorate for the German Reunification, (performance, drawing, photography) 1990 © Zheng Lianjie. Courtesy of the artist
Figure 5. Gedenkstätte Berliner Mauer, 25th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall, November 9, 2014 © Photo: Elisa Ganivet

Figure 6. Petrov Ahner, Protest against the dismantling of the East Side Gallery, Berlin, March 1, 2013 (photography) © Petrov Ahner. Courtesy of the artist
Figure 7. Banksy, Palestinian Graffiti (graffiti) 2005 © www.banksy.co.uk

Figure 8. Larissa Sansour, Bethlehem Bandolero (performance, video) 2006 © Larissa Sansour. Courtesy of the artist
Figure 9. Teresa Margolles, Muro Ciudad Juárez (installation) 2010 © Teresa Margolles. Courtesy of the artist and Galerie Peter Kilchmann, Zurich © Photo: Elisa Ganivet, Venice Biennale, May 8, 2019

Figure 10. Christophe Büchel, Barca Nostra © Photo: Elisa Ganivet, Venice Biennale, May 9, 2019. On display, fishing boat that sank between the Lybian coast and Sicily, killing around 800 migrants on April 18, 2015.
In the early 2010s, the Borders in Globalization research project (BIG) began advancing an original and counterintuitive argument about borders and globalization: “borders in globalization are processes that in many instances are fundamentally ‘a-territorial’ because the border is ultimately carried by individuals, goods, and/or information” (BIG Progress Report, p. 21). The new international borders are not confined to territory. Sometimes, increasingly, they are global: multiple, relational, functional, mobile, fractured and scattered. For example, states have been “implementing border crossings at the source of movement [and] new local and global border ‘markers’ appear in regulatory systems and production chains organizing the mobility of trade flows and humans” (Brunet-Jailly 2019). States are now able to enforce their borders far from the boundary line, at foreign airports and seaports, midflight or on cruise ships, through placement of prescreening officers and infrastructure, electronic kiosks, biometric data, algorithms, product codes, microchips, GPS, and more. This means that borders have not diminished under globalization. On the contrary, they have multiplied. In some ways, for better or worse, borders have become partially liberated from territory.

When I first encountered the idea of aterritorial borders, I found it compelling and almost obvious, like something that had been waiting to be named. So I was somewhat surprised to discover that many students and academics, including those studying borders, found the concept difficult to understand or even resisted it.

The more predominant view about borders and territory can be characterized as follows. Borders are complex, contested, and contingent processes, governed by states and multiple levels of government as well as by non-government actors. But in the final analysis, borders remain fundamentally territorial. The bordering of space and community may not be strictly confined to the boundary line but remains more or less tethered to it or adjacent. For example, the literature on border studies has been dominated by the study of borderlands, generating insights into the mutually constitutive relationship between borders and the cultures, histories, and politics of the regions adjoining and straddling them (Alvarez 1995, Rogan 1999, Sahlins 1989). The Journal of Borderlands Studies and Geopolitics are emblematic of this research field. More recently, scholars have developed new concepts, such as...
borderscapes, borderities, and mobile borders, to further disclose the fluidity and shifting multiplicity of borderlands while also opening new vistas on critical questions about ethics, struggle, and methodology (Amilhat-Szary and Giraud 2015, Brambilla 2015, Rajaram and Grundy-Warr 2007). Yet the bordering focus remains rooted in the land image, exemplifying the logic of geography, spatially related to the line, and in that sense, still stuck in John Agnew’s famous ‘territorial trap’ (1994), or at least, more broadly, in a ‘terrestrial trap’.

In distinction, the idea of aterritorial borders opens analysis apart from territory and geography. Indeed, a helpful way to understand the timely and challenging idea is to align it with Agnew’s argument in his 2018 Globalization and Sovereignty: Beyond the Territorial Trap. Agnew’s focus in this text is not borders per se, although they are implicated, so the reader is advised for the moment to set aside the puzzle of borders and step inside Agnew’s formulation (except perhaps to note in advance that we will subsequently substitute Agnew’s notion of “state sovereignty” with our notion of “state borders,” a slight slip rather than a stretch).

Agnew’s argument is not obvious but it is compelling. He corrects a common and misguided understanding of state sovereignty and globalization as oppositionally related, as antithetical political realities. According to the predominant conceptualization, globalization and sovereignty operate in zero-sum terms, with one waxing as the other wanes. In this conventional view, globalization threatens and erodes state sovereignty, and for states to reassert themselves, they must counteract or push back the processes and structures of globalization. This is a pervasive and compelling worldview, but Agnew repudiates it as a false dichotomy.

The world is not caught or swinging between poles of globalization and sovereign retrenchment. Forces of an interconnected world are not contending against or eroding sovereign states. Rather, state sovereignty has always taken global forms to varying extents. Indeed, global processes have regularly been the devices and machinations of powerful states. The exclusive fusion of the ideas of territory and sovereignty in the nation-state in the popular imagination is relatively recent. For most of history, they were not fused, meaning sovereignty was more than territoriality. Even in the twentieth century, they were never entirely fused. Up to the present, power has often visibly transgressed Westphalian territoriality, in the form of empires, hegemony, the Church, capital, private enterprise, and organized crime, to name a few contenders. These put the lie to idealized territorial state sovereignty as compartmentalized and independent geographical units. Political authority and even sovereignty in particular have always been far more multiplistic and transversal than that.

To develop his argument, Agnew posits that the trick in understanding globalization and sovereignty is to develop a way of thinking that moves away from the either/or framework—either absolute state territorial sovereignty or a globalized world without sovereignty—in which most opinion has been trapped (2018, p. 9).

This is the challenge Agnew sets himself, to foster a different "way of thinking" that reveals the limitations of the territorial approach to state sovereignty. To do this, he identifies several alternatives and exceptions. Territorial state sovereignty is just one arrangement of political power among others. And globalization today should be understood as the latest changing configuration between geography and sovereignty. Here Agnew acknowledges (2018, p. 23) his debt to Saskia Sassen’s groundbreaking work (2006) on assemblages of territory and political authority.

Rather than singular or abstract sovereignty, Agnew develops the idea of “sovereignty regimes,” or “effective sovereignty” or “sovereignty bargains,” to emphasize that in practice political power takes many different forms. The most familiar type, “classic/territorial,” which is premised on a unitary political community and strict territoriality, is just one type of sovereignty regime. Another is “imperialist,” which arranges power and space differently, more imbricated, networked rather than contiguous, with scattered hierarchies of political communities rather than a single uniform state. A third kind of sovereignty regime Agnew calls “integrationist,” referring to multi-nodal or federal arrangements like the European Union or the United States before the Civil War, and a fourth type he calls “globalist,” emphasizing networks and flows not territorially confined, citing the post-Cold War US-led global hegemony as an example. Agnew goes on to trace this four-part typology of sovereignty regimes through two in-depth case studies: the control of global currency and exchange rates, and government responses to immigration and refugees. Westphalian or territorial sovereignty is not sufficient to understand these more global manifestations of sovereignty.

Agnew summarizes:

Sovereignty is not just one thing. Its application takes various geographical shapes. The idea of sovereignty regimes is an attempt at providing a template or schema
by which to consider the dominant shapes that sovereignty has and continues to take. The four basic types I identify—classic/territorial, globalist, integrative, and imperialist—provide a frame of reference for discussing how globalization relates to sovereignty. These are all relational forms in which sovereignty in a particular case is always established in relation to other states and actors (2018, pp. 169-170).

Therefore, to imagine sovereignty as inextricably bound to territory, or to conflate the two, is sloppy thinking, and wrong. In the face of advancing globalization, particular configurations of sovereignty and space are at stake, not the integrity or survival of states or sovereignty as such. Globalization indeed runs counter to the territoriality of states, but globalization is fully conducive to other aspects of states. Against much popular misconception, globalization is not counteracting sovereignty or states. Rather, globalization involves “the attenuation of territoriality as sovereignty’s primary mode of geographical organization” (p. 13).

The same can be said about borders. Agnew’s argument about the compatibility of sovereignty and globalization translates into a parallel argument about borders and globalization. If we accept Agnew’s arguments about sovereignty—and I think we should—then we can extend it to borders, as aspects of sovereignty, or the outer limits of sovereignty. Borders, like sovereignty itself, of which they partake, are no longer confined to territory. To drive this point home, consider again the first passage we quoted from Agnew. This time, however, replace each instance of the term “sovereignty” with the term “borders”:

the trick in understanding globalization and sovereignty [borders] is to develop a way of thinking that moves away from the either/or framework—either absolute state territorial sovereignty [borders] or a globalized world without sovereignty [borders]—in which most opinion has been trapped.

The challenge Agnew identified—to move beyond binary oppositions of sovereignty and globalization—applies equally to border studies today: to move beyond binary oppositions of borders and globalization.

This has been a research priority for the Borders in Globalization project, including two new publication streams, the book series BIG_Books and the interdisciplinary journal BIG_Review. Part of their mandate is to document and better understand the ways that borders operate aterritorially. Brunet-Jailly elaborates:

states and private sector actors are implementing data collection policies allowing for the pre-clearance of global trade flows and migration movements; individuals and objects are cleared by authorities of their place of destination prior to leaving their place of origin. Contrary to traditional states’ territorial bordering, a-territorial bordering obeys a fundamentally different logic: A logic primarily concerned with functional belonging, and driven by the development of mechanisms based on trust. This finding points towards new, yet understudied phenomena, that are continuing to transform borders in the 21st century (2019).

In this view, aterritorial borders follow the logic of function and flow more than territory or geography.

To be clear, “aterриториal” does not mean “anti-territorial” or even entirely “non-territorial.” Rather, the prefix ‘a’ implies a lack, or absence, neither strictly bound to the logic of territory nor inherently its opposite. The prefix ‘a’ is analogous to the prefix of the term “amorality.” Amorality is lacking morality but not necessarily immoral; it is ambivalent with regard to morality and immorality. Likewise, aterritorial borders are not antithetical to territory. Sometimes they are non-territorial; other times they overlap and integrate with territorial borders.

We can conclude by observing that Agnew and Brunet-Jailly both converged, via different paths and with different lexicons, on the aterritoriality of borders and sovereignty in the twenty-first century. This is an important conceptual shift with significant ramifications for a wide range of policy areas. Neither borders nor sovereignty are fundamentally threatened by globalization, despite persistent cries to the contrary from across the political spectrum (‘borderless world’ on the left, ‘globalist threats to sovereign borders’ on the right). Rather, we should strive to comprehend the complex and counterintuitive ways that borders no longer coincide with boundary lines or even remain subject to the logic of territory. Contemporary challenges to the global governance of borders—and the movement of people and things across them—demand new and better ways of seeing and thinking about the world. To leave the reader with one direction this line of thought could lead, similar arguments could be constructed about migration and borders as about globalization and sovereignty. That is, just
as the term “sovereignty” could be swapped out for the term “borders” in Agnew’s argument, we could also swap out the term “globalization” with “migration,” since migration is an aspect of globalization (one globalizing process among many others). Making such a substitution begins to disrupt the pervasive and false dichotomy of borders and migration, which wrongly presupposes that borders and migration, like sovereignty and globalization, are zero-sum terms. But that’s another task.2

Notes

1 The idea of aterritorial borders can be traced through the work of the Borders in Globalization research program, which began in 2013. For example:

our research hypothesizes that contemporary borders in globalization are processes that in many instances are fundamentally ‘a-territorial’. We assume that bordering processes are not uniquely territorial anymore, but fundamentally linked to interactions across the world. Our research program approaches this set of assumptions from the perspectives of networks and flows that each have a history, are cultural, are fluid in nature like trade, migrations and environmental changes, and security, and ultimately have led to new forms of governance. Borders and bordering processes are not territorial because the border is ultimately ‘carried’ by individuals, goods, and/or information (BIG Progress Report, p. 9).

While the terms “ateritorial” and “ateritoriality” (or “a-territorial” and “a-territoriality) emerged from the BIG project, the basic idea goes back further. See, for example:

Today, non territorial [sic] borders are not always located in borderlands, for instance processes of preclearance of goods or people may be done anywhere but at the boundary line where they often make the least sense. Then borders result from competing production and re-production practices that are fundamentally rooted in individual actions, themselves deeply rooted in economic, political and cultural interests and motivations (Brunet-Jailly 2011, p. 4).

Traces of this idea can also be found in Walters (2006), Muller (2008).

2 Breaking down the binary opposition of borders and migration is one of the aims of Carpenter, Kelly, and Schmidtke (forthcoming).

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Rogan, Eugene. 1999. Frontiers of the State in the Late Ottoman Empire. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.


Le terme de frontière permet de mettre en mots des phénomènes de différenciation. En droit, de manière générale, la frontière internationale exprime un rapport de différenciation juridique de format territorial, de forme linéaire et de fonction de limite. Ce court article présente une revue serrée des idées essentielles du juriste Paul de Geouffre de La Pradelle au sujet de ce qu’il entend par frontière en droit international. Les travaux de cet auteur, relativement oubliés mais encore cités à travers le monde par les connaisseurs, sont indispensables pour les études sur le thème de la frontière, des limites internationales et du voisinage frontalier. La Pradelle a, en effet, produit une théorie juridique originale, complète et riche sur la frontière dans sa thèse publiée en 1928 intitulée « La frontière : étude de droit international ». Comme il le dit lui-même, il a rompu avec la tradition. En résumé de sa thèse, l’auteur défendait l’idée que la frontière, avant comme après la délimitation, était une « zone » et que cette frontière(-zone) ne se confondait pas avec la notion de « limite ». Ce faisant, Paul de La Pradelle distinguait clairement, au plan terminologique et juridique, d’autre part la « limite », d’autre part la « frontière ». Inspiré par Friedrich Ratzel, son idée principale peut donc s’écrire comme suit: la limite est une ligne, la frontière est une zone. Pour La Pradelle, si la « frontière » est une « zone territoriale complexe » (ibid.) ; la « limite » est, et ne peut être, qu’une « ligne » (p.17). Après avoir présenté brièvement l’auteur, nous nous intéresserons essentielle-

* Note : Cet article sera publié en espagnol pour le second numéro de BIG Review (1.2) et en anglais pour le troisième numéro (2.1). Este breve artículo se publicara en español en el número 1.2. This Review Essay will be published in english in number 2.1

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https://journals.uvic.ca/index.php/bigrview
https://biglobalization.org/
ment à ses idées principales développées dans sa thèse de 1928 et dans son article de synthèse de 1930 (article synthétique qui est consacré exclusivement à la « frontière » au sens de La Pradelle de zone de coopération).


La thèse de 1928

Son ouvrage de thèse de 1928 contient une introduction subdivisée en deux chapitres (pp.9-51), une première partie qui porte sur « Le droit international moderne et les limites des États (La Délimitation) » (pp. 53-222) et une seconde partie portant sur « Le droit international moderne et le régime de la frontière (Le Voisinage) », (pp.223-306). Le premier chapitre de l’introduction pose le sujet. Il y exprime l’idée qu’« il n’est d’autre frontière que les frontières politiques » (p.11). Il y rappelle aussi que le phénomène historique de la frontière « est apparu dès la formation des groupements sociaux » (p.14). Pour La Pradelle, la frontière est envisageable en droit public interne et en droit international public. D’un côté, la frontière est envisagée par le droit public interne, c’est alors le « mode d’expression de l’unité et de la cohésion de l’État » (p.14). Dans ce prisme, la frontière correspond à « l’ensemble des institutions spécialement créées dans la zone périphérique du territoire dans un but de défense ou de discipline. C’est une zone de services publics, distincts des services de l’intérieur, et dont chacun porte le nom de frontières. La frontière douanière, la frontière militaire, la frontière maritime... » (ibid.). D’un autre côté, la frontière est envisagée par le droit international public. Dans ce cas, la frontière est alors « une zone de contact et de relations de contiguïté entre les États » (ibid.). Elle est « un lieu de relations, un régime de rapports entre deux États dans un territoire mixte, résultant de la réunion de leurs zones périphériques territoriales respectives » (ibid.). Il y présente aussi l’apparition successive des différents éléments de la frontière moderne (p.18). Il décrit de manière détaillée la « limite (limes) », la « frontière interne (finis) » (p.20) et la « frontière internationale (confrontatio) » (p.25). Il prend soin de circonscrire son étude de la frontière au double aspect de la délimitation et du voisinage (il écarte de son analyse le problème de ce qu’il nomme les frontières en droit interne). Pour La Pradelle, le problème de la « délimitation » répond à la question de la localisation de la limite et des procédés juridiques et techniques par lesquels cette limite sera fixée. Le problème du « voisinage » pose pour l’auteur la question de savoir « quels seront les effets de la délimitation sur le régime du territoire » (p.17).

L’approche théorique et juridique de La Pradelle comprend donc la branche de la délimitation de la limite et, ce qui l’intéresse davantage, la branche de la coopération à travers les limites. Dans sa théorie de la frontière en droit international, tout ce qui concerne la limite territoriale correspond à la branche du droit qui concerne les procédés de délimitation, de démarcation et d’abornement, et tous les actes juridiques y procédant. C’est le droit des limites territoriales des États. De l’autre côté, la pratique juridique des conventions interétatiques de coopération frontalière posent la base du fondement de son approche théorique de la frontière internationale comprise comme une frontière-zone. La Pradelle se distingue donc de tous les autres juristes pour trois raisons principales : premièrement, en ce qu’il dissocie la signification de « limite territoriale » de celle de « frontière ». Deuxièmement, en ce qu’il estime que la « frontière » est une « zone » avec un aspect interne et un aspect international. Troisièmement, en ce qu’il distingue dans sa théorie générale ; la « frontière nationale » et la « frontière internationale ». Tout ce qui concerne l’aspect délimitation fait partie du régime juridique de la « limite ». Tout ce qui concerne l’aspect collaboration à travers la limite territoriale correspond au régime de la « frontière ».

La partie 1 : la délimitation

La Pradelle définit la délimitation comme « un mode d’expression formelle et juridique de l’État » (p.55). La délimitation moderne signifie la « séparation des compétences étatiques contiguës » (p.30). Elle est un « attribut de la puissance publique » (p.56). La limite constitue un « cadre d’exercice de la puissance publique » (p.64). Les raisons qui poussent à la délimitation tiennent à « la valeur exceptionnelle attachée dans la conception moderne de l’État au sol politique » (p.57) et à « l’utilité d’une détermination spatiale de la compétence et de la responsabilité étatiques » (p.59). L’auteur identifie
trois conséquences juridiques et politiques de cette délimitation : la paix, l’affirmation de l’indépendance d’un État, la sécurité. Il précise que « le respect essentiel des limites n’est d’ailleurs qu’une conséquence du respect des traités où ces mêmes limites sont inscrites » (p.61).

Tout État ne peut procéder à aucune action directe au-delà de ses limites territoriales. Par exemple, la formule exécutoire d’un jugement étranger ne peut produire ses effets en territoire national, directement et de plein droit. Elle doit être habilitée par le juge de cet État dans la procédure de l’exécutariat (p.64). Ce que la frontière distingue strictement en les séparant mutuellement, c’est uniquement les compétences exécutives. Celles-ci ne s’inter-pénètrent pas. Ainsi, La Pradelle précise que la limite prend toute sa valeur réelle de limite en matière d’acte administratif : « Si quittant le domaine de la loi, nous envisageons le domaine administratif consacré à l’organisation et au fonctionnement des services publics ; si du domaine de la norme législative nous passons à celui de l’acte administratif, la limite prend alors sa valeur réelle de limite de compétences exécutives. Seuls sont limités territorialement les actes constituant ou assurant l’exécution des lois » (ibid.). Il rajoute : « Dès l’instant qu’il s’agit non plus de l’émission d’un ordre, mais de son exécution, la limite est le critère indispensable de la compétence étatique » (p.65). L’exercice de toutes formes de contrainte au-delà des limites territoriales est interdit pour tout État. Les actes qui ne sont pas accompagnés de mesure de contrainte peuvent être librement exécutés par l’État étranger (enquêtes, expertises) (ibid.). En résumé, en dehors du domaine de la justice, toutes activités qui rentrent dans l’attribution de la puissance publique étatique s’arrêtent à la limite du territoire (ibid.).

La Pradelle reconnaît l’existence de rapports de voisinage entre États qui sont dus aux « nécessités croissantes du commerce international » (p.65). Ces relations de voisinage entraînent des raccordements de services publics qui sont rendus possibles par des concessions mutuelles et des délégations réciproques de compétence. Ces accords de voisinage sont « autant d’exceptions au principe fondamental de la délimitation spatiale des compétences d’exécution » (ibid.). Enfin, La Pradelle propose d’analyser la compétence générale de l’État comme un « faisceau de compétences » (ibid.).

La Pradelle fait un parallèle très intéressant avec la théorie du Droit chez Hans Kelsen qui permet de situer Kelsen dans une approche théorique de la frontière. D’une part, La Pradelle rappelle que du point de vue juridique « les limites des États ont toutes le même caractère. Ce sont des lignes séparatives de compétences absolues » (p.62). Ici, il fait la fameuse distinction entre compétences législatives (inter-pénétrables) et les compétences exécutives (qui doivent demeurer indépendantes). D’autre part, il signale que « la compétence législative de l’État, considéré comme un donneur d’ordres, un émetteur de normes, n’est pas limitée par une ligne, mais par la validité de la norme. C’est en partant de cette idée, qu’on a pu élaborer une conception juridique pure de la frontière » (ibid.). En effet, cette référence à la conception de la «validité de la norme » de Kelsen fait dire à La Pradelle qu’une frontière pourrait faire l’objet d’une «conception juridique pure » (ibid.).

L’auteur précisera aussi les différentes opérations de la délimitation dans des dizaines de pages. « La procédure normale d’une délimitation territoriale importante comporte une série d’opérations qu’il est possible de grouper en trois phases : la préparation, la décision, l’exécution » (p.73). Il rajoute que « l’exécution consiste à tracer sur le terrain la limite décrite et adoptée, opération qui porte le nom de démarcation » (ibid.). Son chapitre IV passe en revue les différents types de limites (limites astronomiques ; limites géométriques ; limites orographiques ; les limites d’eau incluant les limites fluviales, lacustres et marines ; la limite de référence) (pp.172 et s.). Ce faisant, La Pradelle rappelle que « toute limite, ligne géométrique, au sens étymologique du mot, est comme toute ligne, une succession de points » et que « toute limite ainsi définie est par essence artificielle, et ne peut être conçue que comme une création de l’esprit humain. La ligne peut être un procédé topographique. Elle n’est pas une vérité naturelle » (p.172).

La partie 2 : le voisinage

A la page 226 de sa thèse, La Pradelle expose le cœur de sa représentation théorique et juridique de ce qu’il entend par « frontière ». « Il existe, à la périphérie des territoires voisins et contigus, une série de trois zones territoriales, à régime spécial, dont la combinaison constitue « la frontière » : de part et d’autre de la zone intermédiaire, zone de compétences mixtes, et vraiment internationale, c’est-à-dire relevant du droit international, se trouvent les deux zones extrêmes des territoires à compétence exclusive, que nous avons dénommées « les frontières », zones nationales, et relevant du droit interne ». Comme il l’écrit, cette juxtaposition de trois zones s’appuie sur la conception géographique de Ratzel que La Pradelle adapte à l’approche juridique (p.226). A propos de la zone intermédiaire, il mentionne l’idée d’une « zone de fusion » (ibid.). La Pradelle rappelle ensuite l’origine coutumière du « voisinage » (p.227). C’est alors qu’il situe l’éclosion d’institutions spéciales liées directement à l’état de voisinage que les frontières créent, avec l’exemple très ancien de l’extradition (p.230). Il cite aussi tout particulièrement l’activité

Dans les pages suivantes (pp.233-234-235), il justifie à la fois l’approche de la ligne-limite pour les États et la convention de collaboration frontalière signée par ces mêmes États impliqués dans leur situation de voisinage. Si pour l’État, l’établissement de la limite doit être une ligne d’arrêt, du point de vue des individus, la rigueur de la ligne doit être adoucie et s’accompagner d’une prise en compte spécifique de la situation de contiguïté. La Pradelle écrit que « la situation de contiguïté de deux territoires donne nécessairement naissance à un régime de voisinage entre États » (p.233). Au fur et à mesure du perfectionnement de l’organisation territoriale des États avec des services publics rayonnant vers la périphérie « il se produit à la frontière une pression de toutes les forces vives du pays, qui tend à forcer la limite et à la déborder » (ibid.). Ainsi, « les ramifications des services d’État tendent à rejoindre par-delà la limite celles du réseau de l’État voisin » (ibid.). Dès lors, les gouvernements limitrophes signent des conventions bilatérales fixant, d’une part, le statut spécial des individus « qui, descendant des marcomans, sont devenus les frontaliers » et, d’autre part, le « régime de collaboration des différents services publics à la frontière » (p.234). Avec l’organisation politique et juridique de ce régime général du voisinage, les États ont donc organisé la « déchéance de la conception classique de la limite infranchissable ou difficile à passer » (ibid.). A l’appui de sa démonstration, il rappelle que les formalités douanières à la périphérie du territoire sont considérées comme « une institution désuète » (p.235). La Pradelle donne l’exemple de la Convention internationale pour la simplification des formalités douanières signée à Genève le 2 novembre 1923 par trente-six États. Pour La Pradelle, le report des opérations de douane aux points de départ et d’arrivée à l’intérieur du territoire est « la solution idéale » (ibid.).

Les pages suivantes s’interesseront spécifiquement au régime des frontaliers (pp.236-264). Il y traitera de la question des limites de propriétés, des exploitations foncières, des droits de pâturage - avec l’exemple des conventions pastorales pyrénéennes -, des industries et manufactures, des professions libérales, des rapports d’ordre religieux et cultuel, du régime de facilités et des conditions à respecter propres aux frontaliers. La fin de l’ouvrage porte sur le régime juridique du voisinage conventionnel (la frontière, lieu de collaboration entre États) et extra-contractuel (le voisinage, créateur de droits et le voisinage, excuse d’obligations). L’article que La Pradelle a publié en 1930 reprend l’essentiel de sa thèse, présente de manière actualisée et synthétique sa théorie de la frontière et décrit l’essentiel des régimes juridiques concernant les relations de voisinage.

Son article de 1930

L’article de La Pradelle du Répertoire de Droit international de 1930 traite spécifiquement de sa « théorie de la Frontière ». Cet article est structuré en quatre chapitres. La Pradelle y parlera successivement des conventions relatives aux frontaliers (Chap.I), des conventions relatives à la collaboration des services d’État (Chap.II), des conventions relatives à l’interprétation territoriale des services d’État (Chap.III) et des différends de frontière et leurs modes de règlement (Chap.IV). « Contrairement au vocabulaire habituellement adopté par les théoriciens du droit international, nous appliquons le mot « frontière » exclusivement à la représentation d’une zone territoriale et l’opposons au terme de « limite », susceptible uniquement de représenter la ligne qui, dans la pratique territoriale contemporaine, sépare les compétences « exécutives » des États » (p.488). La Pradelle rappelle que cette distinction de la limite et la frontière n’est pas une innovation et qu’on en trouve des illustrations à la fois sous l’empire romain et au cours du moyen Age.

Dans cet article, l’auteur estime que l’expression communément employée de « frontière » correspond à un « régime complexe, dont l’analyse ressortit au droit public interne et international » (p.488). Il rappelle donc qu’il existe une frontière nationale et une frontière internationale. Après la détermination de la limite territoriale, « le problème de la frontière renait sous un aspect statique. Il consiste à effacer, dans une zone déterminée, considérée comme une zone de transition, la rigueur fondamentale de la limite pour l’individu comme pour l’État » (p.488). C’est « le régime administratif de la collaboration frontalière » (p.505).

La Pradelle rappelle les conséquences juridiques de la limite pour l’individu et pour l’État. En rapport avec l’individu, la limite politique est le « signe matériel de sa soumission à un ordre administratif, à un pouvoir de contrainte déterminé. En la franchissant, il échappe à cette contrainte. Aussi ne peut-il la franchir que sous autorisation » (p.489). On distingue clairement, ici, chez La Pradelle la sous-distinction entre la fonction légale principale de « limite territoriale », limite de valeur politique et juridique, de
la fonction légale de « contrôle du respect de cette limite » par les autorités de l’Etat. En rapport avec l’Etat, « la limite politique a en principe une valeur de séparation absolue des compétences administratives et exécutives » (p.489). Il précise que dans l’ordre des rapports de compétence entre Etats « les compétences législatives sont interpénétrées » et que « les compétences exécutives doivent demeurer indépendantes » (p.489). La « limite » assure justement cette indépendance, elle sert de ligne d’arrêt pour le fonctionnement des services publics. De manière générale « la limite politique des Etats est une limite de compétence exécutive, non de compétence impérative. C’est une limite d’efficacité, non de validité de la règle de droit » (p.510). Le fait qu’il y ait une limite stricte contribue alors à déranger à la fois la vie des individus comme la vie politique des institutions administratives. Le régime de la frontière de La Pradelle vient justement répondre à ces gênes qui naissent de la délimitation et prend la forme de conventions bilatérales aménageant la vie des frontaliers et la collaboration des services publics respectifs des Etats.

Comme on l’a dit plus haut, pour La Pradelle, la « frontière » en droit international est une zone de collaboration qui traverse la limite territoriale et se trouve à cheval sur la limite. Le régime juridique de cette frontière prend la forme de plusieurs conventions de collaboration. Premièrement, l’auteur distingue les conventions relatives aux frontaliers (conventions qui traitent de la détermination de la zone-frontière, de l’identification du statut de la limite) et priver des professions de l’autre côté de la limite territoriale, c’est-à-dire la limite politique, de l’effacement de la limite par les autorités de l’Etat. En rapport avec le régime exclusif de la « limite », considérée comme une limite de compétence exécutive, non de compétence impérative. C’est une limite d’efficacité, non de validité de la règle de droit » (p.510). Le fait qu’il y ait une limite stricte contribue alors à déranger à la fois la vie des individus comme la vie politique des institutions administratives. Le régime de la frontière de La Pradelle vient justement répondre à ces gênes qui naissent de la délimitation et prend la forme de conventions bilatérales aménageant la vie des frontaliers et la collaboration des services publics respectifs des Etats.

A propos des conventions relatives aux frontaliers, notons que l’auteur fait reposer l’existence et la légitimité de ces conventions sur le fait que l’acte de délégation trouble les exercices de l’activité individuelle. Cette délégation limitative peut effectivement venir découper « un milieu d’une certaine densité économique et sociale » et priver des professions « du rayon d’action nécessaire à leur exercice » (p.489). La Pradelle rappelle que les gouvernements étatiques limitrophes ont décidé « d’adoucir la rigueur de la limite jusqu’à l’effacer » dès les premières entreprises de délimitation (ibid.). Ce régime de facilités offert aux frontaliers remonterait aux premières années du 19e siècle. « Appliqué tout d’abord aux seuls propriétaires fonciers, il s’est étendu par la suite à la généralité des frontaliers » (ibid.).

A propos des conventions relatives à la collaboration locale des services d’Etat (pp.501-504), celles-ci servent à contrecarrer l’effet de la limite qui joue le rôle de ligne d’arrêt au fonctionnement des services publics. Ceci inclut les services des douanes comme ceux de la police, de la justice et de l’état civil. Par exemple, au niveau de la collaboration de services de police, citons les conventions sur la répression des délits forestiers, de chasse et de pêche. Au niveau de la douane, les effets négatifs de la limite territoriale et douanière étaient corrigés par une réglementation du voisinage de la frontière permettant la mise en œuvre des compétences territoriales respectives (surveillance, répression) au bénéfice de l’Etat voisin (applicable sous réserve de réciprocité).

A propos des conventions relatives à l’interpénétration territoriale des services d’Etat » (p.505), La Pradelle énonce que « le régime administratif de la collaboration frontalière n’est qu’une application du principe que la limite politique est une ligne d’arrêt pour le fonctionnement des services des Etats. Il n’a d’autre but et d’autre résultat que de mettre les compétences de chacun des Etats limitrophes au service de la réglementation locale de son voisin pour lui procurer ainsi un maximum d’efficacité » (ibid.). Effectivement, les conventions de collaboration frontalière citées n’autorisent pas les agents publics d’un Etat à procéder à un acte administratif de l’autre côté de la limite territoriale, c’est-à-dire en territoire étranger. La Pradelle énonce ensuite que plusieurs accords récents illustrent un nouveau type de rapports de voisinage, ceux-ci établissant une « interpénétration territoriale localisée » (ibid.) des services des Etats limitrophes. Ces accords instaurent donc une exception au principe de la limite et l’auteur postule que c’est l’ébauche du régime international futur de la frontière » (ibid.).

Conclusion

Avec ses différents ouvrages, Paul de La Pradelle est un théoricien incontournable pour les recherches sur les frontières-lignes et les zones frontalières. Pour l’auteur, la frontière internationale est une zone, un lieu de collaboration et non d’opposition entre États. Selon lui, le régime de la « frontière », lieu de coopération de voisinage, est le principe. Et le régime exclusif de la « limite », considérée comme une ligne infranchissable pour les services publics comme pour les particuliers, est l’exception. En dernière analyse, la thèse de La Pradelle contient une définition juridique pertinente de la frontière : « La frontière, expression prise dans son acception juridique comme une circonscription spatiale de...
droits exercés » (1928, p.11). Cette phrase contient toute l’ambivalence de la frontière qui peut se référer autant à la zone frontalière qu’à la limite internationale de territoires étatiques. Dans une historiographie de la pensée scientifique sur la frontière, elle a autant de valeur que, par exemple, la phrase de Georg Simmel « la frontière n’est pas un fait spatial avec des conséquences sociologiques, mais un fait sociologique qui prend une forme spatiale » (1908, p.623, traduction en 1999) ou celle de Guillaume De Greef, à propos de formes économiques nouvelles « qui nécessairement sont destinées à transformer les frontières territoriales et de souveraineté actuelles et proprement dites en frontières fonctionnelles » (1908, p.311). Au final, l’approche juridique des « relations de voisinage » de La Pradelle, même si elle reste au niveau inter-étatique, apparaît comme très utile pour la conceptualisation des espaces transfrontaliers qui se multiplient dans le monde et notamment sur le continent européen. En lien avec des exemples anciens de relations de voisinage à travers les frontières des Pyrénées, l’auteur Wentworth Webster avait pu parler de « conventions internationales communales » (1892). Plusieurs autres juristes ont pu écrire sur ce voisinage international (Andrassy, 1951; De Visscher, 1969; Pop, 1980). Mais entre la doctrine et la pratique étatique, il y a un gouffre. L’idée défendue par La Pradelle de frontière-zone ne sera pas retenue par la pratique du droit international subséquente. En effet, on note que la frontière est définie juridiquement comme une limite internationale de territoires d’États. Par exemple, la Cour internationale de justice a souligné « qu’établir les limites entre États voisins, c’est tracer la ligne exacte de rencontre des espaces où s’exercent respectivement les pouvoirs et droits souverains » (1978, p.35). On remarque également que la notion de « frontière zone » avait été rejetée dans une décision arbitrale : « Quant au recours à la notion de « frontière zone », il ne peut, par l’usage d’un vocabulaire doctrinal, ajouter une obligation à celles que consacre le droit positif » (1957, p.307).

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Sleep Dealer: Re-appropriating Migrant Labour Power

Daniela Johannes *

Nicholas de Genova (2002; 2005) coined the term “border spectacle” to refer to the dramatic, redundant visibility of border enforcements, including apprehension, detention, deportation: concrete state performances to ensure the discursive difference of Latino bodies. All the while, the law produces the racialized illegality of Latino immigrants in the U.S., which goes conveniently unnoticed. Illegality is perceived as an unquestioned equation for all that is Latino, while the subtraction of labor off of Latino immigrant bodies takes a humanitarian toll that remains in the shadows. Alex Rivera in Sleep Dealer (2009) poses an important question about the future of border sovereignty in a present when capital and labor become intangible. This futuristic science fiction film resembles a present-time border crisis, and one that is all too predictable: capital will always expand to pervade new spaces, and so will border security. In a cinematic future when disposessed populations have found a way to migrate to the North without having to cross any borders, border spectacles will migrate south-wards, to extend the reach of sovereignty to laboring bodies and foreign landscapes.

The film tells the story of a migrant worker, Memo, who takes off in search for work after his father dies in a drone attack. The father works as an archetype to represent Memo’s connection with the past and the link to a tradition. At the same time, he is the scapegoat of border spectacle. Back in Santa Ana del Rio, Memo’s rural hometown in Mexico, their community is being sold the water that once belonged to them. The American-controlled reservoir, now “Water Corp,” has intervened the landscape with daily surveillance, targeting the members of the community as a threat to the integrity of the U.S. firm. At home, Memo learned rustic techniques to hack a connection to the global network, but...
unwittingly intercepts the firm’s security signal. The U.S. government, seeing this as a terrorist act, sends out a predatory drone to bomb their rural home, killing Memo’s father in front of his eyes. The televised attack makes the division of reality and the virtual world a cruder event to digest, at the time it poses border spectacle as a strategic governmental politics to desensitize the population on violence against Latinos.

Accordingly, the film sheds a light on a core contradiction of advanced capitalism: virtual reality, as the terrain of the future, fails to fully cover material reality, the terrain of the past. Memo embodies the link between these two levels of meaning, as he must navigate the demands of virtual employment while maintaining his memories and his roots. The migrant worker story of Memo leads the viewer out of the countryside landscape of his childhood to enter a digital landscape at the Mexican border city of Tijuana, announced as “the city of the future.” To survive, he must work at what they call the infomaquilas (or high-tech factories) where his body is connected to machinery through nodes that access his nervous system for remote kinetic energy. His voiceover explains: “we call the factories ‘sleep dealers,’ because if you work long enough, you collapse.” In time a worker suffers from sleep deprivation, can lose the sense of reality or become blind, and in a worst-case scenario, die from a short circuit. This serves as a metaphor for an ideological labor system that only keeps count of the materiality of labor extraction while making casualties invisible and losing sight of the humanity behind the work performed. The film presents this issue in a literal sense: the American dream of the future means owning the labor without the laborers.

Memo’s trauma is met with a two-folded chance for denouement: the pilot who killed his father has made a comeback in search for forgiveness; and he has developed a new relationship with a woman who, significantly, had saved his memories as blog writer. The film presents the former as a reconciliatory proposal of the two characters as innocent participants of the same border spectacle, while the latter is connected to a deeper vindication of his origin. Most significantly, in the end he has found a middle ground for the restoration of his psychological order, as he starts a new life, far from the sleep dealers, and waters the new seeds for a woken future. He has returned to his roots without having to physically return home. The film poses an alternative representation of the digital-era subjectivity. As the characters come together to make reparation of the damage, their cooperation towards the end suggests a possible vision for the re-appropriation of their labor, against the continuation of border spectacle.

Works Cited

The Danish-Swedish co-production *Broen* (The Bridge) has created a new format of crime shows on television in two ways. It is a fictional story of a single crime spread out to ten episodes of one hour, and it plays with the border phenomenon and cross-border police cooperation. *Broen* has so far had four seasons, first aired on Danish and Swedish TV from 2011 (season 1) to 2018 (season 4), translating into four crimes. The series’ success has resulted in a direct US-Mexican and a UK-French remake and some “me-too” spin-offs as the Finnish *Bordertown* series or the German-Polish investigation team set in the real-life joint Polish-German police center on the border at Swiecko-Frankfurt (Oder) of the *Polizeiruf 110* series.

The four seasons of *Broen* have four different, outrageous crimes as their main plot but are connected to each other by side plots evolving around the main characters, the respective Danish and Swedish primary investigators of the crime. All seasons start on or in view of the iconic Øresund Bridge connecting Denmark and Sweden since 2000, the symbol of the Øresund cross-border cooperation region. It also becomes clear from the beginning that the crime committed in each of the four seasons has a cross-border dimension. Furthermore, the series is close to actual political developments in Denmark and Sweden, and it plays with the linguistic and cultural differences between the two Scandinavian countries. These are also reflected in the personalities of the chief investigators especially in seasons 1-2. Saga Norén (played by Sofie Helin) is a super-intelligent detective, but autistic, whereas her Danish partner in season 1-2, Martin Rohde, has a more untraditional approach to policework. He is played by Kim Bodnia, who usually plays the violent crook with a soft heart under the shell, for example in *In China, they eat dogs*. Rohde kills the murderer of season 2 and goes to prison. He is replaced by the more sensitive Henrik Sabroe (played by Thure Lindhardt), who is trauma-
tized by the mysterious disappearance of his wife and their two daughters some years ago. In season four, Sabroe engages in a love affair with Saga Norén, entailing a lot of funny, ironic complications. The end is happy, but not kitch: Sabroe is united with his surviving daughter. Still it is not that he, Saga and his daughter live together forever happily after. Saga frees herself from her guilt complex and quits the police force to start a new life.

The US remake *The Bridge*, screened in El Paso and Juárez, follows the Danish-Swedish plot closely in season 1, whereas plots in seasons 1 and 2 also include US-Mexican issues such as disappeared and murdered female laborers in the maquiladora industries. In the UK-French remake *The Tunnel*, episode 1 is a direct copy of episode 1 of the Danish-Swedish production, but then the story develops more independently. The Finnish *Bordertown* operates with shorter plots: the different crimes only cover 2-3 episodes. There is more focus on the development of the side plot of the Finnish detective Kari Sorjonen (played by Ville Virtanen) who transfers to the border town of Lappeenranta from Helsinki and his family. Here, his wife’s past as teenage girl-friend of the corrupt mayor and local tycoon sets a counterpoint to the eccentric detective and his methods. The cross-border element is his Russian-speaking colleague Lena Jaakola (Anu Sinisalo), who has a past in Russia’s secret police FSB and continues to use their methods. The German-Polish *Polizeiruf 110* is a German production but set in a German-Polish context in the real-life joint German-Polish police commissariat in Swiecko, located in the modern joint border control facilities on the Berlin-Warszawa highway, which became obsolete when Poland joined the Schengen area in 2007. The two main investigators Olga Lenski (a German-Russian, played by Maria Simon) and Adam Raczek (a Pole having lived in Germany for many years, played by Lucas Gregorowicz) solve cases of cross-border relevance relating to German-Polish clichés and stereotypes. The latest was about rich German landowners expropriated after 1945 attempting to regain their lands with all means. The episodes demonstrate the sensitivity of German-Polish relations: war reparations unsettled, property issues, but also the East-West differences in lifestyle and prosperity.

While *Broen*’s and *The Bridge*’s plot about cross-border police cooperation is pure fiction, far from the reality of continuing separation of national and municipal police forces, the German *Polizeiruf* stories build on the real-life German-Polish Police Centre in operation since 2007. Police cooperation within the EU is a central part of the Schengen system of open borders, which allows police officers to cross borders in action of immediate pursuit and facilitates data exchange. It also includes the instrument of the European arrest warrant obliging any EU police force to arrest people searched in any EU member state. Still, institutionalized police cooperation does not exist across all EU member state borders.

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Streaming: *Broen* and *Bordertown* can be streamed on Netflix. The French-UK remake is available on PBS in the US, the US-Mexican on Amazon Prime. Recent episodes of *Polizeiruf 110* can be streamed worldwide from the German network ARD.
In South Asia, most of the present-day borders were demarcated by the British to overcome their security anxieties. These borders, therefore, are the results of war, conflicts, and victories while sometimes they were drawn as an outcome of diplomatic efforts and administrative convenience (Tripathi & Chaturvedi 2019). The borderland of Kashmir is not an exception. Kashmir as a Borderland is perhaps the most important contribution to the literature of the South Asian border in general and the disputed border of Kashmir in particular. The significance of the book is made apparent by Bouzas’ deep and long-term personal engagement with people living on both sides of the turbulent Line of Control that characterizes the field of comparative border studies. India and Pakistan share a common border of Jammu and Kashmir, which is divided into two parts in the Himalayan region of South Asia—the India-administered Kashmir and Pakistan-governed Kashmir, with an internationally defined Line of Control. It is one of the most militarized frontiers in the region often drawing attention from the international media (Digal 2019).

The book, as stated in the Introduction, aims to analyze ‘how the Kashmir conflict is understood, lived and perceived at the border—a specific location where the ideas of statehood and belonging are particularly problematic’ (19). Bouzas has narrated the obstacles and problems faced during the field work and data collection phase of the project mainly due to the sensitive nature of the topic. The author has written an engaging, lucid, and accessible work, based on extensive and rigorous fieldwork. Its main strength derives from its comparative approach to some broad theoretical debates—bordered versus borderless world, territorial fragmentation, liberalization, border transformation, the critique of state space, sovereignty, postcolonial border making, and epistemological systems of borders—and its ability to subsequently focus and ground these debates in the empirical analysis of Kashmir borderland. Focusing on the politics of belonging with reference to the circumstances that lead people and groups to make a distinction between belonging and not belonging,
the author’s overall argument is that belonging generates a specific knowledge about how the world is (b)ordered. The book makes a thorough investigation into the issues of belonging leading to a ‘new understanding of the Kashmir borderland’ (33).

The book’s introduction sets the research frame by explaining the rationale and logic to study the Kashmir dispute from a borderland perspective. The author has conducted fieldwork that consists of interviews, conversations, the collection of local published and unpublished sources. She also mentions the problematic aspects of doing research in the contested and disputed zones of Kashmir. She was able to talk to ordinary people, lawyers, bureaucrats, nationalist leaders, former militants, local intellectuals, development organizations, cultural activists, and religious leaders. Chapter 1 lays out an analytical framework of the interplay of a plethora of inter-related issues including colonial partition, border fixing, nationalist struggles, power, politics and historiography in Kashmir’s contested borderland. Chapter 2 & 3 conceptualize and examine the ‘Kashmir issue’ based on four urban areas: Srinagar, Muzaffarabad, Kargil and Skardu. These two chapters (63-118) exemplify the main strength of the scholarship on Kashmir border. It is observed that various vested forces remain active in the borderlands of Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan since the US-led war on terror. The author cited an example of misinformation in this regard. In 2002, several Indian and international media, including the New York Times, reported the presence of a huge number of suspicious Chinese soldiers in Gilgit-Baltistan. The author examined the news from different sources including the local informants, independent sources and her personal field work. She found that the information was false. As she wrote, ‘The intentions of propagating such false news have not been disclosed, but this shows the state of security paranoia over events in the area. Security in the Kashmir borderland is not only about managing the current context of uncertainty, but also about preventing transformations that are considered undesirable from the state security’s point of view’ (67). The increasing militarization of Kashmir leads to widespread discontent. As a result, curfew, conflicts, restrictions, chauvinism, fundamentalism, and killings have become a normal affair in the border cities. The author has lucidly documented the Indian Central government’s legislative measures and interferences in the internal affairs of Jammu & Kashmir resulting in the curtailment of the border state’s autonomy guaranteed through the Article 370. Thus, she has revealed the truth by means of field data and accumulated experiences. I would like to note here that the current Hindu nationalist Modi government has recently stunned everyone by revoking nearly all of Article 370 which has been the basis of Kashmir’s complex relationship with India for some 70 years.

Chapter 4 details the issues in Skardu and Kargil—two urban areas located near the Line of Control. The primary issue in these areas is the divisive and confrontational nature of the Line of Control arising out of the hostilities between India and Pakistan. In Chapter 5, the question of locating people in the debates about borders, especially with reference to the non-demarcated Line of Control, is examined before the Conclusion is finally offered. It shows how the border is transformed over time from porous to highly fenced resulting in the regulation of cross-border movements of the populations. The bordering and ordering processes are lucidly explained. The extra-judicial killings, rapes, and disappearances of the people have been a matter of grave concern at the borderland of Kashmir.

In this regard, it would be relevant to mention the story of a recent 2019 award-winning Indian movie entitled, *Hamid*, made by Aijaz Khan. Hamid is a Kashmiri 7-year-old boy. Rehmat is missing, who is father to seven-year-old Hamid and husband to Ishrat. While Ishrat tries to find her husband, like how thousands of Kashmiri women do; by going to the police and later to the morgue, little Hamid has his own, unique and brilliant way. Hamid is told that his father has gone to Allah (God). On learning that Allah’s cell phone number is 786, Hamid tries to call him on the phone, but in vain. With this simple narrative, thus, filmmaker Aijaz Khan tells a thousand tales and conveys the unending sufferings, emotions, pains and agonies of the Kashmiri people. Moreover, in a 2019 Bengali book, Parvez (2019) has nicely documented the geo-strategic issues and ethno-political history of the nationalist movements in Kashmir.

The main contribution of the book reviewed above is a detailed case study of the troubled borderland of Kashmir. This work will pave the way for future research in the field of comparative border studies. It will certainly appeal to the growing number of specialists, particularly political scientists, sociologists, economists, anthropologists, and international relations scholars who study borders, as well as students, particularly graduate students, as it is a wonderful work of scholarship on borders.

**Works Cited**


Border Politics in a Global Era: Comparative Perspectives

Kathleen Staudt

Border Politics in a Global Era: Comparative Perspectives
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2017
Hardback, paperback, ebook
320 pages

Border Politics in a Global Era: Comparative Perspectives by Kathleen Staudt is a book that points to what borders do to us—human beings and borderlanders. This is primarily a literature survey that is very suitable to be used as a textbook. It is wonderful: both approachable and conceptually strong to engage most educated minds, students and policy makers or any individuals that would like to learn about borders and borderlanders today. It is comparative in perspective, and also forces some thinking and reflection about what borders are, what borders do, and how they affect people who cross them. Because it is a very large survey of the literature it engages with a multitude of borders worldwide and gives the reader an excellent overview of the ‘state’ of global border politics at the beginning of the 21st century.

The book is made up of 13 chapters, including an introduction and a conclusion. It is organized in four parts: concepts and history, case studies (Americas, post-colonial, Europe, and maritime boundaries), public policy (security, citizenship and migration/movement, free trade), and last, the broadly conceived and metaphorically understood borderlands that are found in arts, movies and literary productions—these are bridging borders. In the end, the agenda of nonprofits globally and locally are also reviewed and discussed.

The normative intent is to move scholarship to study equality across interdependent contiguous states with a particular focus on wages and GDP, but without discounting for environmental damage.

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https://journals.uvic.ca/index.php/bigreview
https://biglobalization.org/
and security issues. This is where Staudt suggests that investments in border-regions would contribute positively to the lessening of cross-border inequalities and would also make border policies less prone to exacerbating inequalities and in particular gendered inequalities. Indeed, there is a growing literature in border studies that confront inequality and in particular borderlands that highlight greater violence against women and children. Although Staudt does not really answer any fundamental or core questions, she makes a strong normative statement on the impact of borders on the nature of the world we live in – that is a system that organizes and rationalizes fundamental inequalities, and not only across specific contiguous countries, but worldwide.

In this regard, the third chapter offers a short and fascinating worldview. Focusing on global inequality across international boundary lines. It is a review of the border literatures discussing inequality across boundary lines from a nearly comprehensive worldwide perspective with 300 border-regions. The chapter cites the original work of Iñigo Moré (The Borders of Inequality (University of Arizona Press, 2011)), who was possibly the first scholar ever trying to present a complete set of data on border regions. However, Staudt’s chapter augments and updates the work, and in doing so sets an example of what a complete data set can do and how such exemplary scholarly endeavors can contribute to the study of borders. Although it was not Staudt’s stated ambition, this reviewer suspects that Chapter Three illustrates a different methodological approach to border studies. Indeed, it takes the reader away from the traditional and dominant case study approach to a systematic review of a single but all-inclusive question, data collection and answer – a magnificent methodological breakthrough.

Because Staudt’s concern is inequality, the book does not ask whether there is a core idea to border studies (in that sense it is not a book about theory); however, Staudt suggests that borders are social constructions and that as social constructions, borders can change, and do not have to be violent and discriminatory. In the end, Staudt’s message is that both the study of borders, and the teaching about borders can contribute to educational curriculums that lessen what she calls ‘borders in minds.’ As much as this reviewer agrees with her and admires her work he is left perplexed by the lack of discussion of the question of free trade across borders; but, indeed this is a book about people and borders, not about all borders but only the borders that capture people.
Focus and Scope

*Borders in Globalization Review* (BIG_Review) provides a forum for academic and creative explorations of borders in the 21st century. Our interest is advancing high-quality and original works in the Arts, Humanities, and Social Sciences, that explore various aspects of borders in an increasingly globalized world. BIG_Review publishes scholarship (academic articles, essays, research notes, book reviews, and film reviews) as well as artwork (photography, painting, poetry, short stories, and more). The journal is committed to academic peer review, public access, policy relevance, and cultural significance.

Our starting point is that borders offer metaphor-conceptual tools for the study of differentiation and integration. This perspective mandates a wide range of artistic, theoretical, and empirical explorations of borders. The journal is especially interested in advancing the study of the borders of globalization. New research is documenting a shift in the logic of borders from spatial and territorial to functional and aterritorial. This means that borders are increasingly detached from territory, operating as mobile and relational nodes in increasingly complex regulatory frameworks. For example, border screening often happens far from the border, and goods and people are increasingly bordered ‘on the go’ with microtechnology and biometrics. Simultaneously, global processes are increasingly straining the territorial foundations of borders, including subnational and transnational pressures, the virtual flows of global finance and big data, and the effects of climate change. These developments impact culture and politics, including understandings and contestations of identity, citizenship, law, nationalism, gender, and Indigeneity.

The borders of globalization are rapidly being established in a variety of spaces—not just in borderlands. Like a puzzle in the making, their infrastructures and institutions interlock in various geographies and modalities around world, although not always visibly. BIG_Review offers a platform to visualize, problematize, and discuss how these borders are changing and how they affect all other borders, physically, of the mind, and across cyberspace.

The journal also advances original artwork related to borders. Borders capture the popular imagination and inspire creative works. Artwork reflects and influences the cultures that shape borders. Sometimes artwork is subversive of borders. BIG_Review connects artists to audiences around the world through wide distribution networks and open-access electronic editions. Our art pages showcase individual works as well as portfolios, including photos, paintings, poems, short stories, fiction reviews, and more. All art is published at no cost to the artists.

See also submission guidelines For Contributors.

Peer Review

Academic article and essay submissions undergo at least two double-blind peer reviews, drawing on specialists in the field from our Editorial Board. The Chief Editor reserves the right to make final decisions about publication.

Open Access and Publication Fees

*BIG_Review* and BIG_Books are open-access publications. They are available online for free to readers worldwide. Each new publication is widely distributed to a recipient list of more than 1000 scholars.
and policymakers located in Canada, the United States, Mexico and in over 60 countries around the world.

Open-access publication is possible because BIG_Review shifts administrative costs from public users to academic institutions and scholars’ research funds (grants, etc.). We charge academic contributors a standard fee per accepted article or essay ($250 Cdn). There are no fees for book reviews or film reviews or for any artistic submissions.

Unless otherwise stated, all works are licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC 4.0).

BIG_Review is free for reading and sharing in electronic formats. Bound and printed copies of the publication are available for order (8.5” x 11”), printed by University of Victoria Printing Services, price to be determined, plus shipping and handling. Discounted rates will apply for print subscriptions.

Publication Frequency

BIG_Review is published in Spring and Fall.

Partnership with BIG_Books

Borders in Globalization Books (BIG_Books) shares an editorial board with BIG_Review. The focus and scope of the books are the same as the journal, except the books publish only academic content, not artistic or fictional. Learn more at BIG_Books.

History

In 2018, Borders in Globalization, a Research Lab of the University of Victoria, British Columbia, Canada established Borders in Globalization Review (BIGR/ BIG_Review) and the Borders in Globalization Book Series (BIGB/BIG_Books). Both publish online, open access, double-blind peer-reviewed manuscripts about the borders of globalization; both are interested in engaging in inter- and trans-disciplinary conversations on research works and artworks in the Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences.

Funding and Support

BIG_Review is funded and supported by the Borders in Globalization research program (BIG). BIG received funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC) Partnership Grant (Grant no: 895-2012-1022), and from the Erasmus+ programme of the European Union (the European Commission’s support for the production of this publication does not constitute an endorsement of the contents, which reflect the views only of the authors, and the Commission cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein).

In order to continue publishing high-quality and open-access work in the absence of secure, long-term funding, BIG_Review aims to become self-sustainable through publication fees for academic submissions and advertising revenue.

The Centre for Global Studies at the University of Victoria has provided office space and support.

The journal is hosted online by University of Victoria Libraries.

Publicity and Advertising

BIG_Review reserves space for paid promotional content in the social sciences, humanities, and fine arts, including advertisements for new books and other publications, special events, calls for papers, courses and programs, and more. Full and partial page insets will be made available on the inside of the front and back covers. Stay tuned for more details, or contact our Chief Editor directly.
Academic & Artistic Guidelines

*BIG_Review* publishes **scholarship** (academic articles, essays, research notes, book reviews and film reviews) as well as **artwork** (photography, painting, poetry, short stories, and more).

**Scholarly submissions** should engage with the research literature on borders, including, for example, borderlands, borderscapes, and bordering processes. We are interested in studies that go beyond the ‘land image’ by exploring borders as non-contiguous, aterritorial, globalized, mobile, electronic, biometric, functional, etc. We are equally interested in border studies from Indigenous perspectives, along with questions of sustainability, climate change, colonialism, and subnational and transnational identities. Research questions might include: What are contemporary challenges to borders, internally and externally? How are borders adapting? What challenges do borders pose for communities and for people in transit or seeking asylum? How are cultures shaped by borders, and vice-versa? How are technologies shaping borders? We encourage innovative theoretical work and explorations of borders widely construed, as well as empirical and quantitative research. We welcome scholarly submissions from all disciplines and backgrounds.

*BIG_Review* also promotes **artistic submissions** pertaining to borders (borders understood broadly: political, social, cultural, metaphorical, personal). Borders can capture the popular imagination and inspire creative works. Artwork can reflect and influence the cultures that shape borders. We promote small portfolios and individual works, including original poems, photos, paintings, short stories, creative essays, film and literature reviews, artistic commentaries, and other forms of art. Artists retain copyright of their work and benefit from increased exposure at no cost to them.

For technical submission requirements, see below.

Peer Review Process

Each academic manuscript considered for publication in *BIG_Review* is submitted to at least two members of the Editorial Board (or other qualified scholars) for double blind review. In the event of a “split” recommendation, a third (and sometimes a fourth) review may be obtained. Publication decisions are based on these reviews.

The Editor-in-Chief will notify authors as early as possible as to whether their paper has been accepted for publication. Selected manuscripts are assigned a member of the editorial team, who will work with the author to address any outstanding issues concerning style or substantive content prior to publication. Papers that do not abide by the publication’s style guide will not be accepted.

Once revisions have been completed and a final decision has been made by the Editor-in-Chief, final copyediting and formatting will be provided by *BIG_Review*.

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*BIG_Review* is an open-access publication, available online for free to readers worldwide. Each new publication is widely distributed to a recipient list of some 1000 scholars and policy makers located in Canada, the United States, Mexico and in over 60 other countries around the world.

Open-access publication is possible because *BIG_Review* shifts administrative costs from public users to academic institutions and scholars’ research funds. We charge academic contributors a standard fee of $250 Cdn per accepted article or essay. There are no fees for academic book and film reviews, or for any artistic submissions.

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Academic Submission Requirements

**Articles** (social science and humanities papers that advance academic disciplines through research, data, and theory) should be between 7000 and 10,000 words in length.

**Essays** (including literature reviews, persuasive writing, opinion pieces) should be between 1000 and 4000 words, using few references (no more than 10 references, except for literature reviews, which may include more).

**Research notes** (engaging with single concepts, terms, or debates pertaining to border studies) should be between 750-1200 words, using few references (no more than five).

**Book reviews** (summarizing and analysing academic monographs relating to borders) should be between 500 and 1000 words.

**Film reviews** (summarizing and analysing film and television relating to borders) should be between 500 and 1000 words.

Submissions must be written in English (although we also consider French and Spanish submissions).

Citation style should adhere to Chicago “author-date” manual of style. This means all references are contained inside parentheses within the text, listing author(s) last name, and the year of publication (and pagination when appropriate, especially following quotations). Complete bibliographic details of all references are contained in Works Cited at the end of the manuscript, listed alphabetically by author last name, with year of publication preceding work title.

Endnotes may be used for substantive observations but not for the purpose of citing sources. Endnotes must appear separately at the end of the body of the manuscript prior to the Works Cited. The use of footnotes is unacceptable and may result in the manuscript being returned to the author for revision.

The text is double-spaced; uses a 12-point font; employs italics, rather than underlining (except with URL addresses). Only one space between sentences (do not add a second space between sentences).

All illustrations, figures, and tables are placed within the text at the appropriate points, rather than at the end (or markers are used within the text to indicate placement).

Submission files must be Microsoft Word (.doc or .docx) file format.

All article submissions must include two documents: 1) a complete anonymous version (to be shared with prospective blind reviewers); and 2) a separate title page with all author contact and affiliation information.

The submission has not been previously published, nor is it before another journal for consideration (or an explanation has been provided in Comments to the Editor).

Submissions are not guaranteed approval. *BIG_Review* reserves the right to reject submissions on any grounds.

To submit academic work, follow the steps on our [Submit page](#).

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Our electronic platform permits a wide range of media, from print to visual, video, animation, and interactive.

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**Visual art** (photography, painting, etc.) and other visual art must be high-resolution, BMP, JPEG, or PNG, including separate captions.

**Poetry** formats may vary (length, layout, font, font size, etc). Accompanying photos and artwork are welcome.

All submissions must be previously unpublished and not simultaneously before other publishers for consideration, unless other arrangements are made with our editors.

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To submit artistic work, contact our [Chief Editor](#).

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Launching Now!

The Borders in Globalization Books series (BIG_Books) provides a forum for in-depth scholarly explorations of borders in the 21st century. We publish high-quality academic works in the humanities and social science that explores various aspects of borders in an increasingly globalized world.

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All books are available for free in PDF and other electronic formats (bound and printed copies can be ordered, cost to be determined).

BIG_Books is part of the Borders in Globalization research program and shares the editorial board of the journal Borders in Globalization Review (BIG_Review). The focus and scope of the books are the same as the journal, except BIG_Books publishes only academic content, not artistic.

Submission Guidelines

BIG_Books welcomes proposals, samples, and complete manuscripts from all disciplines and academic backgrounds. Submissions should engage with the research literature on borders, including, for example, borderlands, borderscapes, and bordering processes. We are especially interested in studies that go beyond the ‘land image’ by exploring borders and bordering processes as non-contiguous, aterritorial, globalized, mobile, electronic, biometric, functional, etc. We are equally interested in border studies from Indigenous perspectives, along with questions of sustainability, colonialism, and subnational and transnational identities. Research questions might include: What are contemporary challenges to borders, internally and externally? How are borders adapting? What challenges do borders pose for communities and for people in transit or seeking asylum? How are cultures shaped by borders, and vice-versa? How are technologies shaping borders? We encourage innovative theoretical work and explorations of borders widely construed, as well as empirical and quantitative research.

Peer Review Process

Approved submissions are submitted to an intensive, double-blind peer-review process, comprising a review board of specialists in the field. Once revisions have been completed and a final decision has been made by the Editor-in-Chief, final copyediting and formatting will be provided by the BIG editorial team.

The Editor-in-Chief will notify authors as early as possible as to whether their submission has been accepted for publication. Selected manuscripts are assigned a member of the Editorial Board, who will work with the author to address any outstanding issues concerning style or substantive content prior to publication. Submissions that do not abide by the publication’s style guide may not be accepted.

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Submission Requirements

Submissions must be written in English (although we also consider French and Spanish submissions).

Manuscripts should be between 45,000 and 55,000 words in length.

Citation style should adhere to Chicago “author-date” manual of style. This means all references are contained inside parentheses within the text, listing author(s) last name, and the year of publication (and pagination when appropriate, especially following quotations). Complete bibliographic details of all references are contained in Works Cited at the end of the manuscript, listed alphabetically by author last name, with year of publication preceding work title.

Endnotes may be used for substantive observations but not for the purpose of citing sources. Endnotes must appear separately at the end of the body of the manuscript prior to the Works Cited, or at the end of each chapter. The use of footnotes is unacceptable and may result in the manuscript being returned to the author for revision.

The text must be double-spaced with 12-point font and employ italics rather than underlining (except with URL addresses). Only one space between sentences (do not add a second space between sentences).

All illustrations, figures, and tables are placed within the text at the appropriate points, rather than at the end (or markers are used within the text to indicate placement).

Submission files must be Microsoft Word (.doc or .docx) file format.

All book proposals, samples, and manuscripts must include two documents: 1) a complete anonymous version (to be shared with prospective blind reviewers); and 2) a separate title page with all author contact and affiliation information.

The submission has not been previously published. If the submission is currently under consideration by another publisher, an explanation should be provided to the Editor.

Submissions are not guaranteed approval. BIG_Books reserves the right to reject submissions on any ground.

Submissions and inquiries can be sent to BIGReview@UVic.ca.

For more information, see BIG_Books webpage.
With the new geological age known as the Anthropocene heralding dramatic disruptions in the earth system, geopolitics needs to be fundamentally reconsidered to deal with these new circumstances. Planetary boundaries and ecological change are now the key contextualization for considering future global political arrangements.

The sheer scale of development and the growth of the global economy is not only causing local disruptions, pollution events, and resource problems, but now has begun to change how the earth system as a whole operates. We are headed into a much less stable set of geophysical circumstances than the world has known through human history, and the rivalries and geopolitical power plays of the future will increasingly play out in less predictable geographical circumstances.

Humanity has been scaling up its niche, changing the climate and the species mix around the world since the end of the last ice age and in the process generating a new geological epoch known as the Anthropocene.

Human activities occurring on a global scale are now impacting and altering boundaries that constitute the conditions under which humanity has been able to flourish over the last ten thousand years. Rapid changes in the earth system mean that old assumptions of stable borders as the basis of sovereignty have to be reconsidered. Securing the fossil fuel economy remains a policy priority, as does trying to cope with disasters on a global scale—all of which makes sustainability more difficult as geopolitical rivalries shape contemporary global policy.

The Anthropocene is thus the new context for sustainability policy in the latest phase of globalization, and both academic analysis and practical initiatives will have to incorporate its insights if they are to be effective.

Simon Dalby is a professor of geography and environmental studies at Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Ontario, where he teaches in the Balsillie School of International Affairs, and a Senior Fellow at the Centre for International Governance Innovation.

http://www.press.uOttawa.ca/anthropocene-geopolitics

World Rights | Anthropocene; Geopolitics; Globalization; Sustainability; Security
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The Centre for Global Studies (CFGS), founded in 1998, fosters research, reflection, and action on complex issues of local, national, and global importance. Located at the University of Victoria, CFGS is a collaborative community of scholars and leaders that is uniquely positioned to bridge academic research and student mentoring with innovative knowledge mobilization and effective community engagement.

As a truly interdisciplinary research centre exploring global and Indigenous perspectives, CFGS fosters exploration, discussion, and collaboration in new and unexpected ways. CFGS is an international community, purposefully designed to foster exchanges that lead to collaboration and innovation.

“CFGS provided a wonderful space to reflect deeply on my various projects. The breadth and generosity of the community enriched my reflections. The immediate gains are obvious but the long-term impact of sustained thought and collaboration are the greatest benefits that I take away with me from this experience.”

CYNTHIA MILTON, 2018-2019 CFGS VISITING RESEARCH FELLOW
PROFESSOR OF HISTORY AND CANADA RESEARCH CHAIR ON LATIN AMERICAN HISTORY AT THE UNIVERSITE DE MONTRÉAL
2019 PIERRE ELLIOT TRUDEAU FELLOW

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· Borders and migration in the 21st century
· Environmental and social policy, and ecological governance with a strong emphasis on water
· Indigeneity and reconciliation from global and local perspectives
· Social justice and participatory democracy
· Governance as an integrated process at and across scales

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One of the central objectives at CFGS is to create a community of scholars and scholarship. The CFGS hosts conferences, workshops, and speakers that promote critical citizenship in a complex and rapidly changing global environment and respond to defining events as they unfold. These events bridge the divide between academia and the community, as well as inform policy, decision makers, and citizens on important issues.

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