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Academic and artistic explorations of borders in the 21st century

Cover art by Karen Yen (portfolio enclosed)
Call for Submissions

Borders in Globalization Review is now calling for academic and artistic submissions for its SECOND ISSUE, due out in spring 2020.

**BIG Review** is bi-annual, multi-disciplinary, open-access, and peer-reviewed, providing a forum for academic and artistic explorations of borders in the 21st century. In addition to scholarly work (academic articles, review essays, research notes, book reviews, and film reviews), we publish a range of artistic work (photography, painting, poetry, short stories, and more). The journal is committed to quality research, public access, policy relevance, and cultural significance. Welcome submissions from all disciplines and backgrounds.

**Scholarly submissions** should engage with the research literature on borders, including, for example, borderlands, borderscapes, and bordering processes. We are interested in studies that go beyond the ‘land image’ by exploring borders as non-contiguous, areal, transnational, mobile, electronic, biometric, functional, etc. We are equally interested in border studies from Indigenous perspectives, along with questions of sustainability, climate change, colonialism, and subnational and transnational identities. Research questions might include: What are contemporary challenges to borders, internally and externally? How are borders adapting? What challenges do borders pose for communities and for people in transit or seeking asylum? How are cultures shaped by borders, and vice-versa? How are technologies shaping borders? We encourage innovative theoretical work and explorations of borders widely construed, as well as empirical and quantitative research. Articles should be between 7000 and 10,000 words. Book and film reviews should be between 500 and 1000 words, and essays between 1000 and 4000 words.

**Artistic submissions** should pertain to borders broadly as political, social, cultural, metaphorical, personal. Borders can capture the popular imagination and inspire creative works. Artwork can reflect and influence the cultures that shape borders. We promote portfolios and individual works, including original poems, photos, paintings, short stories, creative essays, film and literature reviews, artistic commentaries, and other forms of art. Artists retain copyright of their work and benefit from increased exposure at no cost to them.

Our distribution model makes contributors’ work widely and freely available to the general public in open-access format. This is possible by (a) utilizing far-reaching networks established in association with the multi-year research program, Borders in Globalization; (b) focusing on electronic rather than print copies (though paper editions may be ordered); and (c) shifting administrative costs from public users to academic institutions and scholars’ research funds (grants, etc.). The one-time $250 Cdn fee applies to academic articles and essays that have been accepted for publication, and helps cover the costs of at least two double-blind expert peer reviews, production, and distribution. All other approved submissions—book reviews, film reviews, and non-scholarly works—are published at no cost to contributors.

Academic submissions must be previously unpublished and not simultaneously under other publishers’ consideration. Submissions are not guaranteed approval. **BIG Review** reserves the right to reject submissions on any grounds.

The second issue prints this spring. Submit soon!

For complete submission guidelines and more information about the journal, visit our website.

Have a scholarly book idea or manuscript? See the new series, **BIG Books.**
CONTENTS

Letter from the Editor
Emmanuel Brunet-Jailly ................................................................. 06

Articles

Writings on the Wall: Textual Traces of Transit in the Aegean Borderscape
Ioanna Wagner Tsoni and Anja K. Franck ........................................ 07

Bordering the Future? The ‘Male Gaze’ in the Blade Runner Films and Originating Novel
Kathleen Staudt ............................................................................. 22

Mobile Youth and Belonging in the Gulf: A Study of Dubai
Sitwat Azhar Hashmi ...................................................................... 29

Cross-Border Cooperation in the Carpathian Euroregion: Ukraine and the EU
Tatiana Shaban ............................................................................ 43

Aztlán: From Mythos to Logos in the American Southwest
Toni Muñoz-Hunt ........................................................................ 54

Borders and the Feasibility of Rebel Conflict
Lance Hadley .............................................................................. 66

Making Precarious: The Construction of Precarity in Refugee and Migrant Discourse
Edwin Hodge ............................................................................. 83

Artwork

Moving Atlas (portfolio)
Karen Yen .................................................................................. 91

Borderlander (poem)
Amanda Merritt .......................................................................... 104

vagabond | sans-papier (poems)
Natasha Sardzoska ....................................................................... 106

Hours of the Desert (poem)
Roxanne Lynne Doty .................................................................... 113

Essays

Some Consideration on the Aesthetics of the Geopolitical Wall
Elisa Ganivet ............................................................................... 115

Understanding Aterritoriality through a BIG Reading of Agnew’s Globalization and Sovereignty
Michael J. Carpenter .................................................................. 123

La « frontière » selon Paul de La Pradelle
Benjamin Perrier .......................................................................... 127

Film Reviews

Sleep Dealer: Re-appropriating Migrant Labor Power
Daniela Johannes ........................................................................ 133

The Border on TV: What’s so Fascinating about Crimes at the Border?
Martin Klatt ................................................................................. 135

Book Reviews

Kashmir as Borderlands: The Politics of Space and Belonging across the Line of Control (book review)
Saleh Shahnir ................................................................................ 137

Border Politics in a Global Era: Comparative Perspective (book review)
Emmanuel Brunet-Jailly ................................................................ 139

About the Journal ........................................................................ 141

For Contributors ......................................................................... 143

Introducing BIG_Books .............................................................. 146
Welcome to the inaugural issue of *BIG_Review*.

*BIG_Review* is a different kind of journal, traversing disciplinary boundaries and integrating the Arts, Humanities, and Social Sciences. Our aspiration is to make widely available academic and artistic explorations of borders in the 21st century. We seek to better understand the changing meanings, structures, and functions of international boundaries, borders and frontiers. These are no longer strictly territorial. Rather, they are increasingly non-congruous, fragmented, mobile, and often attached to individuals and goods as they move through and between regulatory frameworks. We ask how, why, and what borders are fundamental. How do they impact people’s lives and the world we live in? These questions are increasingly important, with humankind altering global climate in ways that cannot be contained by borders, and at a time when more people than ever are on the move as migrants and asylum seekers.

Hence the primary goal of *BIG_Review* is to advance critical understandings of borders in globalization through new research and creative works of art. All articles and essays are double-blind peer reviewed and may be comparative, theoretical, multi-disciplinary and policy relevant; artwork includes painting, drawing, photography, poetry and fiction. Our contributors, along with our Editorial Board members, are based around the world. And the entire journal is free and available online in a variety of electronic formats as an open-access publication (CC-BY-NC 4.0). We are committed to public access, quality research, policy relevance, and cultural significance.

Our inaugural issue displays this broad mandate. The following research articles explore transborder governance, identity, culture, precarity, and conflict in borderlands across the world, including the Aegean, Eastern Europe, sub-Saharan Africa, the Arab Gulf, indigenous Latin America, and more. The issue also includes academic essays on border-wall graffiti, territorial borders, and French thinker Paul de La Pradelle. We also feature a range of artwork, including an artist’s portfolio that imagines boundary lines and movement onto canvas, plus original verses from three poets on themes and sentiments related to borders. Book and film reviews round out the first issue.

*BIG_Review* has been made possible by *Borders in Globalization* research program (BIG), a Partnership Grant supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC) and by the Erasmus+ programme of the European Union (see Funding and Support). *BIG_Review* results from teamwork and would not have been possible without the contributions of Nicole Bates-Eamer, Benjamin Perrier, Edwin Hodge, Noah Laurence, and Chris Chan. We are also obliged for the expert blind reviews to all our contributors—academics and artists who submitted works to BIG_Review for hosting the journal online and providing technical support.

Please enjoy, and share as widely as you can!

Sincerely,

Emmanuel Brunet-Jailly, Chief Editor
With Michael J. Carpenter, Managing Editor

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**Introduction**

Between 2015-2016 more than 1.3 million refugees and migrants crossed the Mediterranean Sea in search of safety and opportunity in Europe (IOM 2015, 2016). The vast majority came through Greece, and the Eastern Aegean islands of Lesvos, Kos, Chios and Samos (UNHCR 2016a, 2016b). Although pathways of irregular migration into Europe have periodically shifted between the sea and land borders of Greece (Bernerde/Tahir & Schmoll, 2014), the number of maritime arrivals has steadily increased since the early 2000s. The vast increase in refugee arrivals through Greece’s sea borders during 2015 and 2016 put Lesvos ‘on the global map of the great disaster sites of the 21st century’ (Papathaxiarchis 2016, p. 9) particularly given the island’s relatively small size and population. While these developments attracted unprecedented, although short-lived, global attention to the perilous refugee journeys to Europe (Gianakopoulos 2016), they also obfuscated the Aegean islands’ centuries-old history as well-established sites of departure, arrival, co-existence, and resistance for the forcibly displaced (Giannuli 1995; Tsimouris 2001; Karachristos 2006; Hirschon 2007; Myrivili 2010). Textual traces across Lesvos, however, tell a different story, speaking to contemporary border policies through the lived experiences of people who have confronted them through the years. It is to those texts and symbols—

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The concept of border graffiti in our work encompasses textual and pictorial communication related to border experiences and practices occurring in spaces related with, but not necessarily in, close proximity to territorial borders, linguistic and cultural translation. The effective geographies and geography (Laszczkowski & Reeves 2015; Vaughan-Williams 2012) has been used as an analytical framework for interpreting the border space, where the practice of graffiti writing by ‘borderlanders’ can be considered as an expression of the plural logic of the border. The graffiti is therefore not used as an umbrella term that indiscriminately lumps together diverse experiences, negotiations and representations of/at territorial borders by different actors. As such, it is a liminal practice not only socially, but also spatially, as its multiple trajectories in local areas with social boundaries have blurred and normal rules of conduct and role expectations are held in abeyance or even in opposition (Blake, 1981 p. 95). As a liminal practice, this border graffiti, by transcending and ritualized communicative process is suspended ‘betweent and between’: it is situated between the top-down disciplining and bottom-up insurgent discourses of borders (ibid., p. x). Such an approach thus graps the abstract notions of borders, border spaces, and border practices as a formative of textual and pictorial communication related to border studies, as described as an unobtrusive indicator of values and attitudes, the act of transgression, at worst. Graffiti has also been described as an unobtrusive indicator of values and attitudes, and not just at a personal but also at a social level (Stocker et al. 2009), especially with regard to beliefs and sentiments that lie outside the margins of official narratives (Soto 2016); border graffiti as a contestation of the visible and invisible work of those that inhabit and its fall (Metapolitefsi), and the toleration with which such unauthorized public writing has generally been dealt with by the authorities and citizens alike have been conducive to the pervasiveness of the phenomenon. These longstanding practices of public expressions of protest have been repeatedly taken place through politicized street art and slogan writing, which have utilized urban landscapes to engage publics in dialogues about contemporary social conditions (Aramidis 2012; Tsilimpounidis 2015; Tsilimpounidis & Walsh 2010). In recent years, the corrosive effects of the enduring, Scandalous, crisis, graffiti is created by various actors who occupy,
pass through and experience borderland space from contemporary migrant’s perspective. Border graffiti thus provides an ephemeral roadmap to navigate of borders’ multiplicity and the juxtaposed meanings invested in them by different people (Sohn 2016). Messages, often seem to be inscribed by any available means on any accessible surface, sometimes upon the very walls of the infrastructures anchoring political borders in space. As walls become dialogic interfaces between borderlanders and other audi-ences, they express narratives of the frontier’s na-rative: it inscribes personhood, sketches perceptions, and intertwines experiences and memories from one’s past and present, while carven cut a sense of emplacement or dissociation in the midst of secu-rized spaces of existential erasure.

Similarly to other forms of public writing, we suggest that border graffiti can be seen as a medium for resistibility, self-representation and contest existing policies (Moreau & Alderman 2011) as well as a way of exercising agency, self-de-termination and reclaiming one’s identity in the context of sociospatial exclusion (Bruno & Wilson 2002), while being used as a means to cope with trauma (Kasparek & Speer 2011) or as a testimony of immediate life experiences, such as concerns with one’s self-identity, interpersonal relations, feelings and sentimental understandings, as well as religious and political beliefs (Lucca & Pacheco 1986).

In crisis contexts, landscapes often become direct communicative devices in themselves—various elements turning into message boards filled with statements of reclamation and survival (Bass, 2006 p. 6). Within the emerging crisis of migration, the Aegean islands witnessed the humanitarian disaster on the outskirts of Europe, border graffiti and the messages of hope, heed or support that they conveyed became the new tool of the affective geographies that the EU’s supra/national border regimes have given rise to through the years.

Data Collection & Analysis

Our research draws upon a large collection of nearly 1000 images of graffiti photographed by the authors over several visits to three locations on Lesvos island. During our analysis, this dataset was consolidated into a collection of approximately 300 illustrative and highly illustrative images, a smaller selection of which is presented in this paper. The first set of photographs from the defunct (since 2016) Reception Facility of Pagoan was collected in summer of 2012. Pagoan is a one-story building with a small courtyard, located in the industrial area about 3 km northwest of Mytilene town. No migrant reception facilities existed on Lesvos prior to Pagoan’s opening. Before its commissioning to house detained ‘illegal entrants’ between 2004-2009, Pagoan’s premises stored animal fodder and were, therefore, unsuitable for human habitation. Pagoan inmates (up to 1000 at a time) were confined indoors 2/4 in five crowded halls separated by makeshift plywood walls, with insufficient ventilation and hygiene significantly the content of no privacy or personal space at all times. The quality of migrant reception was ranged from severely deficient to inhospitable. The contemporary casus belli was caused by the NoBorder Camp to the border’s and the detention centre’s function (Kasparek & Speer 2016, p. 291), leading to the eventual closing of Pagoan.

The messages found on the rotting plywood walls in 2012 remained silent witnesses of the deplorable conditions within the detention centers. Detainee inscriptions were more closely photographed in the one of the two accessible ground floor halls, and in the women’s and children’s section on the first floor. Photographs of inscriptions found within the third ground floor hall, which remained locked, were taken through its door and window grill, and through holes dug by detainees through the doors and window fiberboard. To the best of our knowledge this is the only collection of inscriptions of such breadth from this location, adding to its historical and evident importance.

The downtown area of the capital of Lesvos, Mytilène, was the second location of graffiti inscrip-tions’ collection over multiple fieldworks between 2015 and 2016. The downtown area is an administra-tive capital of the island of Lesvos, and of the prefecture of North Aegean. The refugee crisis has been attracting a broad range of individuals of different nationalities, turning Mytilène into a refuge for activists and volunteers to work in every region of the island. Alongside locals, they have left their marks on public walls, defacing public telephones, bus stations, shop windows etc., which are inundated with various types of graffiti. This heterogeneity of authors, languages and styles, however, in some cases complicates the decipherment of the graffiti. Artistic creations, such as the murals of the month-long ‘Symbiosis Lesvos Art Festival’ that took place in the summer of 2016 (Symbiosis Lesvos 2016).

The collected material is analytically fragmented not only regarding the internal taxonomies of graffiti as a communicative medium, but also concerning the differentiation of their authors’ motives and the classification of their content. To address this conundrum, graffiti texts were classified as political and, border and refugee policies and affects instigated by them. The registration center/camp of Moria, located 6.5 km northwest of the town of Mytilène is the third location which was selected for our photographic collection as part of the defunct military base ‘Paradise’ of the Mechanized Infantry of the Hellenic National Guard. Moria was the closest camp for first registration of asylum seekers since 2013. Its operation proved insufficient and dysfunctional ever since arrivals started picking up in early 2015: throngs of asylum seekers squatted the nearby olive groves awaiting their registration. On October 16th, 2016 an EU ‘hotspot’ was inaugurated within the premises of Moria amidst the steep increase of asylum seekers (up to 5-10,000 arrivals daily). On the same day, the Commission of the European Union, the Migration Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) gave a new dimension to EU borders and their functional logic upon inspecting the facilities of Moria with his statement: ‘Our impression is that this is Europe’s new frontier – this outside center, we are outside Europe’ (Armag 2015).

Soon after the EU-Turkey Statement on the return of inadmissible asylum seekers to Turkey was imple-mented on the 18th of March 2016, the remaining asylum seekers’ settlements in the adjacent fields were violently cleared out and Moria become a closed registration center overnight. The living conditions of asylum seekers however, remained extremely challenging throughout Moria’s operation to this day (Rozakou, 2017a) p. 40). Several NGOs and human rights watch, have repeatedly raised the question of how the ‘lack of police protection, overcrowding, and unsanitary conditions create[s] an atmosphere of fear and anxiety for refugees’ (Sahin 2016). After the closure of the old registration center, a new one was undertaken. Each photograph often depicted an otherness element drawing our attention to the language’s use and other cultural content of the graffiti, we initially consulted native speakers of the inscriptions’ languages, some of whom had been previously detained in a detention center/camp, and whose native speakers are not attached to us. Additionally, this research was conducted in collaboration with the help of independent, academically-affiliated translators who were either native speakers.

Each graffiti instance was then categorized as a political and iterative qualitative content analysis was undertaken. Each photograph often depicted multiple dimensions and inherent epistemological and methodological issues around translation languages, which often remain unaddressed in cross-cultural research (Temple & Young 2004) the use of culturally-aware translators was indispensable in this research as the inscriptions’ content would have otherwise been inaccessible to us.

The resulting double translation and representa-tion of the empirical material (first by the transla-tors from languages that the authors do not command, and, secondly, by the authors during the writing process) imposes additional limitations on the validity and reliability of the analysis, even more so in the absence of the original authors’ (Twin 1997). As explained below, however, the importance and rarity of the empirical material justified our analytical interpretations and our eventual decision to consult translators.

Wishing to remain faithful to the linguistic and cultural content of the graffiti, we initially consulted native speakers of the inscriptions’ languages, some of whom had been previously detained in a detention center/camp, and whose native speakers are not attached to us. Additionally, this research was conducted in collaboration with the help of independent, academically-affiliated translators.

translators provided textual and, occasionally, cultural interpretations, which we incorporated into our analysis and development of a methodology for reading the graffiti. We were conscious of the fact that our text was composed of several texts, each occurring in informal conversations. They were shown high-resolution photographs of the border graffiti and were asked to identify any texts they recognised, translate them into English, and briefly reflect on them if they wished to. In this way we attempted to understand the gallery of voices and engaged interpreters, often with asylum-seeking background, as research collaborators (Hennink 2008, pp. 30–32; Temple & Edwards 2002). Their responses and interpretations were later verified with the help of independent, academically-affili-at ed native speakers.
The most prominent themes emerging from border graffiti’s analysis were: identity and agency (re)clamation and inscription in a state of liminal waiting, encouraging and advising others in similar position, coping with border-induced embodiment and affects, and resisting border politics. These interconnected tropes appeared persistently to varying degrees, despite the spatial and temporal variation of this research across three fieldwork locations and over many years.

This type of research poses numerous limitations. Firstly, images for this study cannot possibly reflect the entire range of expression of borderlanders in Lesvos: open-ended as graffiti writing might be, it is still a selective practice, allowing expression only to those possessing the means and ability to articulate their thoughts in writing. Moreover, the selectivity of this process is exacerbated through the serendipitous process of the inscriptions’ discovery. Conclusions cannot be considered authoritative, either, as all information available to us was imparted through the inscriptions in the absence of their authors. The disambiguation of motives, affects, thoughts and meanings is particularly difficult after-the-fact and recontextualization. Every effort was made from the authors’, however, to remain true to their meaning, including focused discussions with former Pagani detainees who assisted translat- tors to contextualize and comprehend the graffiti’s form and content.

Writing Affective Geographies on the European Border Wall

**Inscribing and reclaiming identity in liminal waiting**

A striking observation made while studying the photos from Pagani was its walls’ inundation with inscriptions. Texts of varying sizes littered every writable surface: from sprawling Persian calligraphy in intricate patterns and block letters in moisture-blotted red marker, to hidden ball-point writable surface: from sprawling Persian calligraphy in intricate patterns and block letters in moisture-blotted red marker, to hidden ball-point

Unlike the anonymity that customarily characterizes graffiti messages, Pagani detainees strived to retain their eponymy (Figure 2). People’s names and detailed biographical information were shared on the walls – often down to their town and neighbour-ood of origin (Figures 2d, 2e). Email addresses and phone numbers (Figures 2a, 2b, 2c), as well as nicknames and different self-ascribed identity markers (e.g., ‘Ghetto Boss’, ‘Djolof 4 Life’ – not pictured here).

The practice of sharing such personal and poten- tially compromising information publicly stands in direct opposition to the presence of the correctional spaces where they were found, where migrants would often conceal or falsify their personal details deliberately to obtain paperwork with more favour- able information in the hope of further supporting their future asylum claims (Deruyt et al. 2014, p.7). In the case of walls featured as message boards of emergency communication where one could mark themselves as ‘safe and well’, restore lost links with family and travel companions or forge new ones, and reaffirm their personal identity.
sion of solidarity to other intercepted migrants, as well as offering advice, encouragement and wishing success to those coming after them. Gestures and expressions of camaraderie can alleviate the spatial and social isolation experienced by detainees and help the construction of a discrete communal identity around their life stage they share at the time.

Courageousness is one of the main themes expressed in such messages and is often presented as a prerequisite for earning one’s freedom (Figure 5), along with the importance of resilience and fearlessness despite danger’s or death’s imminence (Figure 6d). Total strangers are warmly saluted as ‘brothers’ (Figure 5b), implying links of affinity growing between people affected by similar hardships. The significance of supporting each other and fostering unity and collaboration in the face of adversity is highlighted (Figure 5e); last misfortune and defeat would come upon them. The advice to avoid detention in Pagani at all costs as it is worse than being lost in the desert is offered elsewhere, warning unsuspecting newcomers for what is to come (Figure 5c).

An excerpt from an old Arabic poem of disputed authorship (Wikisource.org 2017) found inside Pagani (Figure 5e) highlights the significance of maintaining one’s dignity and pride, and not resorting to self-pity and despair despite the degree of betrayal from one’s given circumstances. ‘Pride is of great importance for an Arab and land is as well. To be uprooted and then imprisoned by a foreigner (a westerner) is a great insult. It calls for self-pity and for pain. The lion is the prisoner, the migrant, the refugee, the undocumented and unwelcomed. The dog is the prison guard, the authority, etcetera.’ (Salim, 27 years old, Syria, translator from Pagani 2012) Photos by Ioanna Wagner Tsoni. Figure 5e: Do not lament the treachery of time; long have you been in detention. Do not feel sorry because this is how life usually goes. Although defeated for now, you remain superior to your captors’.

Messages of support and solidarity, however, are not only exchanged between migrants. Locals and activists often write in support of migrants near spaces of incarceration and other public areas, holding ground against the advent of xenophobia and minimizing pockets of public space as safe for the newcomers as demonstrated below (Figures 9 and 10). Border embodiment and affect

As it has been empirically indicated so far, bordering processes are constituted not just through their more tangible aspects, such as the legal, infrastructural and political dimensions of bordering (Andersson 2004a) but also through feelings, emotions, embodied experiences and affective dispositions by a variety of actors (Navarro-Yashin 2012; Reeves 2011). By paying attention to the border-encountering bodies and their sensory and affective experiences we observe how complex emotional geographies of borders unfold in practice. Through the wall inscriptions, fragments of the visceral and affective synthesis of the borderscape are offered: vulnerability and discouragement are revealed; mental resilience and group solidarities are shaped, and encouragement is offered in an effort to maintain hope throughout the challenges of life in transit and detention. Inside Pagani, feelings of dependency, anguish and fear in the face of life-threatening dangers are expressed through writings and drawings (Figure 6). Religion plays a very important role throughout the entire migration trajectory and especially during times of distress and emotional and physical trial (Dorais 2007; Gierszak & Shandy 2002; Hagán & Ebaugh 2003). Writings across Lesvos—scribbled prayers, religious symbols and invocations to God—found in Pagani, support this claim (Figure 6a, 7h).

Expressions of love, affection and longing are also widespread. People profess love for their home countries, family members or beloved ones with words or symbols (Figure 7). Others imply how their support to the newcomers and those who express them remains unwavering, despite being part of what forced them to flee. A Somali detainee in Pagani, writes of his love for Hadrawi—a prominent Somali poet and songwriter who penned notable protest works (‘I love Hadrawi’, Pagani 2012—not pictured here). Nostalgia, homesickness and deep longing for freedom, are also expressed both in words and symbols, such as birds in flight, footsteps walking away, a broken heart with its right side made of brick wall, and a sunrise over an open field on its left (Figure 7).
Complex emotional entanglements are sometimes revealed, such as feelings of betrayal and abandonment by one's country/continent of origin, which sets off the migratory journey in search of justice, safety and self-realisation (Figure 8a). Contrary to the direct and immediate indicators about male-designated locations (Ferris 2010; Soto, 2016; Yogan & Johnson 2006), no textual or visual absences were observed in figures such as these, reflecting a distinct absence of other's messages and/or religious symbols.

As previously discussed, political graffiti in Greece is a prevalent communicative and expressive medium and a ubiquitous part of the urban landscape (Avramidis 2012; Tsilimpounidi 2015; Tsilimpounidi & Walsh 2010). Much like in other Greek cities, writings around Moria and Mytiliène often express political indignation and anger (Kapsali 2018). The writings that this paper focuses on were directly related to migrant arrivals and the refugee crisis and used explicit language against authorities and institutions involved in the EU border regime, decrying their policies and condemning their practices (see Figures 9, 10 and 12).

Resisting borders and border politics

Most documented inscriptions from Mytiliène and Moria are politically informed slogans that contest current border policies (Figures 9 and 10). Some challenge the workings of the European Union’s border regime, proclaim a different vision for immigration rights and border management and question whether certain foundational principles of both the Greek and European identity remain tenable in the light of the border and migration policy mishandlings.

Calls for borders’ abolition and the cessation of deportations are common, as is the expression of indignation towards the role of humanitarian NGOs and the refugee rescue industry (Figure 8a). Many messages demand the abolition of borders, safe passage, the fair processing of asylum claims and the supplantation of documents in the long awaited (Figures 9d and 9f). Others speak against the illegalization and criminalization of migration (Figure 8c). Some messages address widespread populist and xenophobic discourses, dismissing the purported negative effect of migration on the labour market (Figure 8d). Some messages express actions to deconstruct the division between locals and migrants, indicating common struggles faced by Greeks and migrants, and the need for joint action against the compounded crises they are subjected to: the financial one, and that of refugee reception and asylum (Figure 8b).

Calls to an ever-more restricted freedom of movement, such as a universal human right and one of the central EU policy pillars, are spray-painted on the container dwellings inside Moria (Figures 10a and 10b). One such inscription tells the EU is an area of safety and prosperity, debunking the myth of the ‘European dream’, with which the forcefully dispensed ideology violently hit previous generation’s doorstep (Figure 10c). Scattered graffiti elsewhere comments on human rights’ infringements such as one man’s ‘life, liberty, security and equality in dignity and rights. Another alludes to the concealment efforts regarding the humanitarian crisis’ magnitude on the island to safeguard the tourism industry and keep holiday-makers undisturbed (Figure 10d). Tourists and migrants’ wellbeing is valued differently, according to the graffiti, and the experiences of their differentiated bodies are worlds apart, encountering the same landscape either as a holiday resort, or a ‘death camp’. Migrants and tourists on Lesvos exist on two parallel, asymptotic planes, which, as in other beachfront border zones, prohibit encounters and meaningful engagement (Al-Mousawi 2015). Criticism is expressed towards the widespread discounting of Greece’s long-standing migratory and refugee history, and the erosion of philoxenia (hospitality), Greece’s dominant cultural code of dealing with alterity (Rajaram 2015), inscribed in graffiti such as these: ‘Our grandfathers were refugees, our parents were migrants, us racists?’. Mytiliène: ‘No detention can be hospitable’. Mytiliène—not pictured here.

Besides political graffiti, poem verses were also encountered (e.g., ‘No one leaves home unless home is the mouth of a shark, you only run for a shark if the whole city is running as well’, Moria 2018); proverbs on loss and longing for a homeland (e.g., ‘Our only homeland is our childhood dreams’, Moria 2016), and excerpts from the Qur’an (not pictured). Even such instances of less personal graffiti, however, assert one’s right of being/existence ‘here’ despite prohibitions and perils; urge migrants and activists to sustain hope in the face of adversity, and call out for solidarity with those affected by displacement and migration politics.

As Lesvos has turned into an emblematic example of the EU border regime’s workings, aside from its prominent national administrative and symbolic stature, it now sets a global paradigm on practices of, and attitudes towards migration management. The spaces of migrant and refugee arrival, transit and containment areas that often remain unnoticed. Whether condemning contemporary migration and asylum policies, voicing solidarity with refugee struggles, or expressing one’s innermost feelings while in detention, or piecing together a wavering sense of identity, this paper suggests that such border graffiti can offer important insights about the ways hegemonic discourses on migration are being experienced, negotiated and confronted from below in (more or less) obtrusive ways.

The messages inscribed by various people and groups that inhabit or cross borders trace the experiential topography of the borderscape, telling us of the myriad ways the northern Aegean maritime frontiers can be ‘experienced’, lived as well as reinforced and blocked but also crossed, traversed and inhabited’ (Brambilla 2015, p. 17). These inscriptions often express the complexities of identity construction and social belonging within localities embedded in the epicentre of national and international border policy contexts. In doing so, the actors engaging in border graffiti open up the question of ‘de-essentializing the border landscape and reframing imaginaries that cope with the growing securitization of international limits’ (Dell’Agnese & Amilhat Szary 2015, p. 9). The ‘writings on the wall’ that we have recorded in this paper speak directly to the ways in which borders are in many ways ‘landscapes of competing meanings’ (Rajaram and Grundy-Warr 2007b, p. xv). As such, these inscriptions can also be perceived as bordering practices in themselves through which the border is ‘performed into being’ (Parkes & Vaughan-Williams 2012 p. 729).
The presence of the border graffiti, much like that of the border crossings themselves, is fleeting. The messages of resilience and contestation of the current migration policies that they express, however, remain constant and congruent with border struggles in Greece and elsewhere in the world. Despite the silencing or marginalization of the voices that try to raise awareness and condemn the longstanding complicity of national and European authorities in the current bleak—if not downright outrageous—picture of refugee reception in Greece and elsewhere in the EU. They call out the systematic violations of human rights and expose the lack of basic provisions and the human suffering inside camps run by national and EU authorities.

Contrary to contemporary depictions, the border graffiti enounced in this paper gives evidence that the smuggled migrants’ presence on Lesvos had been as pervasive as it had been overlooked and deliberately un-recorded since the late 1990s and early 2000s. Up until their recent explosive increase, the migrants’ pre-sunrise arrivals and their trudging roadside convoys, their urban huddles and their squallidly incarcerated packs were an open secret among the local as well as inter/national society and discourse.

To grasp the magnitude of the phenomenon relative to Lesvos’ geographical and demographic size (1,639 km² and 86,500 inhabitants as per the latest National Census of 2011), according to Hellenic Coast Guard data, 522,433 unauthorised entries were officially recorded on Lesvos in 2015 alone (Rontos, Nagopoulos and Panagos, 2019).

2 Metapoliti (Greek, translated as “polite/ regime change”) marks a period in modern Greek history after the fall of the military junta of 1967-74. It is the longest period of political and social stability in the modern history of Greece and includes the transitional period from the fall of the dictatorship to the 1974 legislative elections and the democratic period immediately after these elections until the present moment.

References

Figure 11: Whitewashing the bordering practices of the EU outside the Mediterranean, 2015-2016. “EU shame on you!” Photo by Ioanna Wagner Tsioni.

Notes

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Borders the Future? The ‘Male Gaze’ in the Blade Runner Films and Originating Novel

Kathleen Staudt

Introduction

Directors Ridley Scott and Denis Villeneuve directed the Blade Runner films, each released BR-I and BR-II, each with strong, central male protagonists, aimed at largely male audiences with lots of high-tech features. In the films, humans and androids live in a monopoly capitalist authoritarian world of extensive police security that makes androids (called ‘replicants’ in the films). The socially constructed female and male protagonists in these narratives have yet to be analyzed with a gender gaze that draws on theories of film. This paper analyzes two Blade Runner films, comparing them to the Philip K. Dick (PKD) narrative, and applies gender, feminist, and border concepts, particularly border crossings from human to sentient beings and androids. In this paper, I argue that the men who wrote and directed the films established and crossed multiple metaphoric borders, but wore gender blinders that thereby reinforced gendered borders as visualized and viewed in the U.S. and global film markets yet never addressed the profoundly radical border crossings from PKD.

In Philip K. Dick’s (PKD) science fiction novel, Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? characters performed as gendered beings, even in stereotyped ways, but they displayed androgynous behaviors: female protagonists played markedly different and stronger roles, unlike in the films. PKD’s not-so-cool-sounding central male ‘hunting’ was renamed ‘blade runner’ in the Hollywood films. And for PKD’s novel, empathy is the key character separating human from android, whatever and whoever designed or birthed these creatures in their hybridized worlds. In the novel, empathy with living and sentient beings, including animals, is the essence of humanness. Real animals are celebrated and valued, in contrast to the less valued android (electronic) animals. The common thread in the novel and films involves answers to a foundational question long asked in spiritual, anthropological, and philosophic deliberations: What does it mean to be human? To clarify even more, we also need to ask whether humanness is gendered. The use of literary and graphic metaphors in alternative universes permits us to engage in “thought experiments,” as science fiction, pacifist-anarchist-feminist Ursula LeGuin would call them (LeGuin 2017). This paper does not cover the enormous ground possible—the field of science fiction and film is huge—in analyses of science fiction, gender, and borders, but rather examines this fertile soil in two visually startling high-profile films and a novel.

Feminist theorist and critic of binary dualisms, Donna Haraway wrote in “A Cyborg Manifesto” that we are all “chimeras, theorized and fabricated as hybrids of machine and organism... the relation of which has been a border war” (1991: 292). She draws from Taylorism to the integrated circuits of which has been a border war” (1991: 295) or as fear human kinship with machines, animals, multiple identities, and contradictions. Her position is the latter, but she gave the first Blade Runner film a ‘pass’ in a lone sentence perhaps not recognizing the power of film visual imagery to reinforce the former, the “masculinist orgy of war.” In Practices of Looking, now in its third edition, Marita Sturken and Lisa Cartwright offer an expansive text on the increasing importance of the visual compared to the narrative, including popular culture such as films and television series. Indeed, feminist and film theorists and their readers probably exercise minuscule impacts on sizeable popular culture such as films and television series. Of the films with PKD’s book, raising questions of historic large-scale Hollywood film productions and whether intentional or not, the effect of these powerful directors, script-writers, and producers shaped the minds of millions of viewers, some surprising phrases, such as “the king was pregnant” (2017). BR-I and II not only imposed male impregnation and female reproduction the way they respect, fantasize, and/or even reinforce firm, heavily controlled bordered gender constructs on characters, but in the case of the films, their portrayal of the human and android bodies in the global audiences compared to blockbuster films like iterations of Blade Runner.

The paper is divided into three sections. The first provides conceptual and theoretical perspectives. In the second, I recap the films, focusing on gender and exaggerated femininity and sexuality among somewhat minor female characters. After that, I contrast PKD’s novel with the films, but more pointedly in the third section on the novel and films. The concluding section ties ideas and the argument together, reference to theorists and foundational science fiction.

1. Conceptual and theoretical perspectives

Here, I make brief reference to concepts as I use them in my recap the various borders that are crossed or maintained in the films and novel: bordering, rebordering, co-mingling, mapping, and hybridized societies along with the beings who move back and forth from the categorical borders including alienated, co-existent, interdependent, and integrated. Territorial and identity lines (bordering) range from hardening or increasing, often with surveillance and controls, to softening or lessening (de-bordering) and re-bordering in response to threat and/or new identities. With the contact that comes with independence and integration, co-mingling can occur in ways not immediately clear to viewers and readers. Readers, film directors, and viewers are not just like many geographically minded border scholars, engage in mental mapping of these powerful visual images that may or may not coincide with territorial or physical maps.

Gender is a social construct that manifests itself differently in historical time and place. Among the earliest to challenge the near-ubiquitous gendered borders was prolific science fiction writer, the late Ursula Le Guin (1929-2018) (with whom PKD communicated) who wrote The Left Hand of Darkness. As Left Hand…confusion sets in during a male galactic diplomat’s long-term visit to a planet where ambi-sexual non-gendered people enter a fertile “kemmering” period in monthly cycles, in just one-fifth of each month. The visitor always brought new pronouns and regretted that as she wrote later in her Redux to “Is Gender Necessary?” yet planted some surprising phrases, such as “the king was pregnant” (2017). BR-I and II not only imposed firm, heavily controlled bordered gender constructs on characters, but in the case of the films, their portrayal of the human and android bodies in the global audiences compared to blockbuster films like iterations of Blade Runner.

The body of the paper culminates in my contrast of the films with PKD’s book, raising questions about those who direct and script-write films in the way they respect, fantasize, and/or even reinforce hardened gendered borders as they cross borders from novels to films. As pacifist feminist film theorist Laura Mulvey wrote in her 1975 “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema,” later in her book (1989), those who direct, write, and fund representations of historic large-scale Hollywood film productions often brought a “male gaze” of voyeurism and narcissism to the process for an assumed predominately male audience, and I would add, heteronormative (Mulvey 1989). With their particular gaze, and whether intentional or not, the effect of these powerful directors, script-writers, and producers shaped the minds of millions of viewers, not only in the United States but in exports to a global film audience. While BR-I initially flopped in...
In film studies, Auteur (author) Theory focuses on the directors, their backgrounds, and the baggage they bring to their powerful role. Even now, over 80% of major generically financed directors are white men.6 Despite the recent acclaim given to directors like Ava DuVernay, Guillermo del Toro, Patty Jenkins, Alejandro González Iñárritu, and Alfonso Cuarón.

Let us reflect momentarily on these white men who directed BR films. Ridley Scott, an Englishman born in 1937, is a generation older than the French-Cana
denis Villeneuve, born in 1967. Although Scott pays homage to PKD in film credits, he thinks the novel more prescient than the Independent Movie Data Base site for BR-I, Scott is quoted as saying that he couldn’t get through it (www.imdb.com). I found the 2014 film Blade Runner 2049, given the continual reference to PKD in the credits. Both Scott and Villeneuve directed multiple films, including those with women directors who did more talk than to talk about other women, so-called Bechdel Test.7 Scott directed Alien (1979) and its sequels and Villeneuve directed multiple films, including those with women directors who did more talk than to talk about other women, so-called Bechdel Test.

Several Nexus 6 replicants, gendered in appearance as male and female and designed to last four years, rebelled and returned to earth. They looked like humans and worked to respond to bio-metric tests of their quick response to cultural/linguistic contextual questions. They were androids, yes, but they were crossing, became hybridized, and developed feelings about exploitation, love, and anger.

Set in both 2019 and 2049, the monopoly Tyrell Corporation ruled the world; its CEO and staff constantly sought to advance android technology while simultaneously pursuing harsh re-bordering strategies to control populations with drones, blade runners, and technology. In the analytic descrip
tions below, we can see some contrasts, deviations and perhaps advances, from one film and one director to the next film and director, namely in the re-bordering and border-erasing 6. The novel...
Francisco, CA. Nob Hill apartment complex where nearly every floor contains a co-op. Nevertheless, people live in a dark and dying planet from which they leave for colony planets, incentivized by U.N.-managed provisions of ‘android servants.’ PKD introduces readers to the ‘theological and moral structure of Mercerism,’ which shapes the meaning of human-ness: the capacity for empathy.

In Chapter 2, we are introduced to John Isidore for whom the police has gradually diagnosed him biologically; he is unfit for reproduction, so much so he is nicknamed a waste product (chicken head). Isidore uses the ‘black empathy box’ (tele- vision) to watch a prophet-like Wilbur Mercer struggle to get up a hill only to fall back. Isidore felt the struggle and experienced the pain in this empathetic fusion process. Later in another chapter, a populist figure on the television raises questions about whether Mercer is a hoax? An opiate of the masses? Mercer’s existence is open to interpretation. Border crossing language might offer insights on human-to-semi-human biological deterioration or technology to acquire human essence—empathy—and fuse (co-mingle) with the spiritual. However, the film and Mercerism go unmentioned, as does empathy.

On his way to work, the novel begins with Deckard passing a pet shop, longing for a real animal with a price he could afford and making a down payment based on the potential emblems he will receive from retiring replicants. In his office we read dialogue from male bosses and women secretaries, titled by gendered statuses of Miss and Mrs. We hear more on the true test of humaness: empathy, not intelligence, as measured in the Voigt-Kampff Empathy Test, the instrument shaped by Mercerism. “Empathy evidently existed only within the human community,” whereas intelligence is found in everything—from the flocks of birds to the potentials in the boundaries [my emphasis] between hunter and victim, between the successful and the defeated.” Totially contrasting with the book, the BR-I and BR-II films portray a high-tech, violent world of radical individualism; empathy is nowhere to be found.

Reflection and closure

In this paper I have compared two visually powerful blockbuster films with the novel from which they are based, using border, feminist, and gender concepts. While the writers and directors constantly engage with border and boundary themes, they did not transcend the limitations of contemporary gender constructions but rather fostered the spectacle: “masculinist orgy of war” of men who appropriated the uterine sack, then stabbing and bleeding out a beautiful bodied adult female replicant who had been birthed whole; and gendered their characters, but turned males and females into hegemonic masculine figures and a biological human female (one exception—a possible conception of a hybrid-replicant).

Clearly thirty years later, director Villeneuve made some advances compared to Scott, such as an integrated human-android borderland, co-mingled boundaries, and possible conception of hybrids among androids or humans and androids—a reproduction trope to de-border and hybridize formerly distinct entities. For the BR-I and BR-II, the selective mates for K were nowhere be found in PKD. No doubt a BR-III sequel will eventually be made, given the proliferation of the genre with the ever spreading fully developed border crossings between humans and androids. Will reproductive issues be resolved? Will gender disappear? Will men give birth to hybridized beings? Will new directors use different mental maps? What would that world look like?

Directors have taken many liberties with PKD to use their own “mental maps.” Recently, Amazon Prime produced an instant-stream ten-part series titled Electric Dreams (2017) each a different story line, different director and script-writer. Supposely PKD’s novels and short stories inspired them all. One of PDK’s daughters authorized the title of the series, but seemed to exercise little control over the adaptations, just as Hollywood filmmakers took liberties with their adaptations with BR-I and BR-II. Two of the ten in the series stand out for me as reflecting a gender-balanced nuanced quality: Human is and Kill the Others. Not knowing the directors and screen writers in advance, I checked their names to find that they were the only two productions with both the women at the helm of the direction and the script.

As far back as the 1970s, various types of feminist authors wrote dazzling science fiction, a genre that has grown to embrace all the complexities of the intersections among class, race, ethnicity, and language. One might point to Charlotte Perkins Gilman, who wrote Herland (1915) about the wariness and non-threateningly stereotyped men who traveled to an idealized women’s world, or even to pioneering science-fic- tion writer Mary Wollstonecraft Godwin Shelley who wrote Frankenstein (1818) and the warped multiple adaptations of her novel on Hollywood films. On the century anniversary since Shelley’s death, Muriel Spark criticized “stripping out nearly all the sex and birth, everything female” from the film. While the BR-I and BR-II films portray a seemingly post-gender world,” her one-sentence reference to the first Blade Runner film seems to give it a pass, for in my view, as analyzed in this article, his film reinforces masculinist control imagery. The films use powerful visuals to reach an exponentially larger audience than specialized feminist and film theorists.

In this paper, I am not pursuing an essentialist biological dead end, as most feminists rightly critique, but rather an interest in complex visual productions that fail to engage and unpack the gendered borders in our world—a world in which women’s experiences—whether in reproduction or non-reproduction—are ‘real’ and story—rather than some Alpha Male version of humaness that glorifies violence or a biological incubator for hybrid offspring. Border crossing language might offer insights on humaness—empathy and fuse (co-mingle) with the spiritual. However, the film and Mercerism go unmentioned, as does empathy.

Notes

1 Androgyny is a dated concept from the 1970s and 1980s which refers to combined masculine and feminine behaviors that reflect time and spatial stereo-types. A spate of studies by Sandra Bem reported on identification with multiple adjectives, most of them obviously stereotyped, that coded respondents from feminine and near feminine to androgynous to near feminine and near masculine.

masculine and masculine <http://www.chemistsinvoices.com/sandra-bam/>. At the time, my score put me at ‘near-masculine,’ a not surprising identifier given my socialization in a heavily male-dominated discipline like political science.

1. I am not celebrating or psychologizing author PKD who underwent numerous stages in his paranoid and troubled life, (over)use of amphetamines, visions, and religious delusions in several years before death. The 2008 documentary repeats several times that he dwelt on the death of his female twin, who died less than two months after his birth and that it put him in touch with what friends called his ‘feminine side.’

2. In PKD pictures posted on the internet, he often positions a cat next to his face.

3. Oscar Martínez developed these categories in Border People, University of Arizona Press, 1994. Films have rarely been analyzed with a borderlands gaze, but see Staudt, 2014.

4. For a discussion of bordering, de-bordering, and re-bordering, see the introduction by Kathleen Staudt and David Spener in the Spener and Staudt ed. The U.S.-Mexico Border: Transcending Divisions and Contesting Identities and the later, updated border studies concepts and theories in Staudt, 2017. The concept co-’mingle’ comes from Herzog and Sohn in their analysis of the San Diego-Tijuana borderlands, moving from an interdependent and integrated borderland.

5. When love partners enter kemmer, hormonal changes occur that allow them to either impregnate or conceive and give birth. If pregnant, the person’s hormonal production is prolonged through lactation. Nevertheless, the person’s hormonal production is prolonged through lactation. Nevertheless, Le Guin used male pronouns for people, regardless later (p. 1043).

6. Christina Etherington-Wright and Ruth Doughty, Understanding Film Theory (NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), Chapter 9 and 11; Harry M. Benbassat and Sean Griffin, America on Film: Representing Race, Class, Gender, and Sexuality at the Movies (London: Blackwell-Wiley 2009, second edition) with the running theme throughout the book that the U.S. was “founded on and still adheres to the dominant ideology of white patriarchal capitalism” p. 9; and <https://womeninfilm.org/fm/> (with contrasting percentages of women directors in 2002 and 2014: 19% (top 100 films) to 26.8% (Sundance, consisting of more experimental, innovative films).


8. In the documentary, Philip K. Dick: The Penultimate Truth (Kuttor 2008), the 89 minute film featuring interviews with PKD’s friends, psychiatrist, co-authors, and several of his five wives, viewers learn that PKD friend Kevin Wayne Jeter published several sequels to Blade Runner, including Blade Runner 3: Replicant Night (1996) which developed the idea of a replicant giving birth (see later section of this paper on the reproduction theme in BR-II), yet Jeter was not credited as one of screen writers <www.imdb.com/> in that or the earlier film.


10. Haraway has one line on BR-I, referring to Rachel (sic) and the cyborg culture’s image of “fear, love, and confusion” (1991, p. 313). I believe Haraway missed the opportunity to critique Scott’s construction of female cyborgs. I thank Asha Dane’el for alerting me to Haraway’s relevance for this paper.

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** Mobile Youth and Belonging in the Gulf: A Study of Dubai **

The rapid economic growth in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) region has enticed fleets of expatriates from all over the world to the region in hopes of attaining a better quality of life. These expats often migrate with their spouses and children in tow bringing to light a new challenge for the Arab world: mobile youth. This research aims to find if the journey ‘home’ (repatriation) plays a role in developing these mobile children’s sense of belonging to a ‘home’, and if so, to which ‘home’. In order to do this, the research will conduct a theoretical analysis of these mobile youth born or raised within the Gulf by analysing one-on-one structured interviews through the lens of the theory of belonging, and the study of language and culture. This research concludes that in fact, mobile youth build their sense of belonging in relation to multiple ‘homes’ and not just to their ‘adopted’ or parental home.

Introduction

Home. Belonging. Identity. These are some of the most common words one encounters in every migrant’s story. Words that appear so simple but prove rather complex upon closer examination. Words that change and take shape with the migrant through the duration of their journey as the migrant simultaneously changes through them. Home no longer remains a physical, still, entity. It comes to life through the journey, stretching and expanding from the physical into the outward — it becomes mobile; grounded yet changing (Ralph & Staeheli 2011, 518; Zhang 2004, 104). Such are the homes of the children born to the life of mobility; children who involuntarily cross borders at birth or preadolescence, forming identities and a sense of belonging around cultures, languages and places that are not a part of their ‘home’. What happens then, when such individuals are forced by their circumstances to go back to their perceived origins — to go ‘home’ leaving behind their adopted ‘home’?

The rapid economic growth in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) region has enticed expatriates from all over the world to the region in hopes of attaining a better quality of life. Naturally then, these expats often migrate with their spouses and children in tow bringing to light a new challenge for the Arab world: mobile youth. Though the migration of expats

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https://journals.uvic.ca/index.php/bigreview
https://biglobalization.org/
the region is not new, and has garnered a fair bit of attention from the academic community, yet, arguably the most vital aspect of the expatriates' journey in the region remains overlooked in research — the final phase of the expatriate's journey: repatriation. The process of repatriation is especially made more complicated when it centers itself around children who either migrate involuntarily or are also made to repatriate involuntarily (usually by the will of their parents).

Definition
Due to a sharp increase in transnational identities around the world, migration studies today provide us with several theoretical lenses to analyse the economic, political, and social ties forged by migrants across various borders. Scholars like Rouse (1991), Guarnizo (1997), and Kyle (2000) believe that the distinction between 'national' and 'soil' provides a mobile migrant with 'bifocality', 'dual frame of reference', or 'bionationality', all of which are created and maintained by the migrant himself. Their host nations and nations of their 'origins' create a push and pull force of cultures, traditions, and everyday life practices that cause the migrant to be influenced by both places instead of just one. Thus, making it difficult for them to accept a single place (soil) as their absolute 'home'.

This interpretation of home challenges the previously held perceptions of 'home' as a bounded and still presence. Instead, it portrays 'home' as a mobile, unclear and often, chaotic entity. Therefore, as migrants travel, their identities are caught up in a continual push and pull of their 'new' and 'old' worlds, leading to the formation of their composite belonging to multiple 'homes'.

Rooted in these definitions is our concept of 'home' in relation to the mobile youth of the Gulf, or more specifically, Dubai, the focus of this study. As they trek through countries, they station and un-station themselves several times (often across continents) throughout their lives. Often times, they stop and ponder over homes lost and built and lost and re-built over time. Pondering still, over building a home, or journeying home only to find that home, like them, has grown and evolved and changed through time, through them, and through their journey. 'Home', then becomes a mobile being, alive like the self. It shifts, grows, and changes with the migrant. In this paper, a distinction between such homes will be made to avoid confusion. The host nations of these mobile youth will be referred to as being their 'adopted homes', whilst the nations of their 'origin', or their parents' home, more specifically, will be referred to as being their 'parental homes'.

Aims & Hypothesis
This research aims to find if the journey 'home' (repatriation) plays a role in developing mobile youth's sense of belonging to a 'home', and if so, to which 'home'. It hopes to find whether repatriation increases the mobile children's sense of belonging to their parental 'home' over their adopted 'home', or vice versa, or possibly both. It hopes to explain why mobile youth face difficulties when forming a sense of belonging and rootedness towards a single state due to the transnational nature of their identities. The research would also like to uncover the manner in which these youth form their sense of belonging to a 'home' in the first place, as they live in a continuous state of nostalgia for their origins, while searching for a 'home'. In short, this research hypothesizes that in fact, mobile youth build their sense of belonging in relation to multiple 'homes' and not just to their 'adopted' or 'parental homes'.

Research Design
This research seeks to uncover a link between repatriation and mobile youth's formation of their sense of belonging to a 'home'. To do this, the research will be conducted as a theoretical study of two independent groups of mobile youth. Group A, will consist of mobile youth currently residing in the Gulf who have at least made one journey home since they started living in the Gulf. They must have had the region since the ages of 0-10 years, or may have been born there. Group B, on the other hand, will consist of mobile youth who once resided in the Gulf and have either repatriated to their parental 'homes' or migrated to another country outside of the Gulf. They must also have had been residing in the region since the ages of 0-10 years, or may have been born there.

The Sample
To further control variables and to ensure as reliable and credible a result as possible, all participants were confirmed to have been currently residing or to have previously resided in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), specifically in Dubai, and that they all shared similar cultural backgrounds as their 'origin' with the exception of three (further discussed under the 'identificiation' sub-section). Furthermore, only participants between the ages of 18 years and up were selected for this research. It is also important to note that all participants taking part in this research shared similar educational and socio-economic backgrounds, i.e. they all came from expatriate families and international schooling. It was also ensured that any repatriations that took place within the participants of Group A and Group B were not state-endorsed, rather done so voluntarily or undertaken due to the wishes of their parents (guardians). All interviews were conducted in English only, and the questions of the interviews were kept from the participants until the commencement of the interview itself, where they were made aware of the questions as they were being interviewed.

Case Selection
Dubai is a coastal territory of the UAE, located on the southeast coast of the Persian Gulf that shares a southern border with Oman (Figure 1). I have selected Dubai as my case study as it is part of one of the most progressive and developed countries in the Gulf that also currently holds the world's strongest passport. Dubai is also highly metropolitan and as such, is a melting pot of ethnicities, races, nationalities, religions, and cultures. Its total population currently stands at over 16 million, and is expected to reach 3 million by 2030. Across the UAE, the total of Emirati citizens only make up for less than 20% of the total population; 83% of the population consists of expatriates from Asia, Africa, Australia, Europe and North America. This, according to the International Organization for Migration, makes Dubai the world's most cosmopolitan city in the entire world.

Dubai, being one of UAE's seven emirates, is also a compelling study in the context of migration due to the implementation of their unique citizenship and naturalization laws in the region. UAE citizenship may be acquired by virtue of law, or through citizenship or naturalization procedures as set by law according to the Federal Law No.17 of 1972 on Nationality and Passports, amended by Federal Law No. 10 of 1975 and Decree Law No. 16 of 2017. One may apply for naturalization at the General Directorate of Residency and Foreigners Affairs (GDRFA) of their relevant emirate (2018).

However, the naturalization avenues available to expatriate families, akin to those addressed in this paper, are minimal as the Emirati naturalization laws are heavily based around the lawful union of a foreigner to a national through the act of marriage. These naturalization applications are reviewed and processed by an advisory committee referred to as the Federal Authority for Identity and Citizenship (ICA), consisting of seven members representing each of the seven emirates of the UAE (2019).

It is important to note that in the broader context of the Gulf citizenship laws, citizenship is regarded as...
were given the opportunity to express themselves. The method utilized was open-ended structured questions in order to encourage the participants to give more information or to clarify their position with examples and explanations without trying to steer them in a predetermined position or on the matter. Additionally, direct questions were also utilized throughout the duration of the interview to ensure that the participants fully understood what it was that was being asked of them in the interview (Schaffer 2006, 187). Typically, the interviews lasted somewhere between 30 and 45 minutes.

Furthermore, all participants of the research are referred to with pseudonyms in this paper to protect their identity and confidentiality since the topic concerns sensitive, personal, and at times controversial, data. Their pseudonyms will be, Leyla, Arjun, Lulu and Noha, under Group A; and Basil, Remy, Hashmi, and Fynn under Group B.

**Literature Review: The Politics of Belonging**

There are two main schools of scholarly thought on the formation of the sense of belonging towards a physical and metaphorical ‘home’ among migrants. The first recognizes repatriation as being a fundamental step in an expatriate’s journey when assessing their formation of a sense of belonging to a place. They argue it to be a mobile being that shifts, grows, and changes with the migrant throughout their journey. Despite these similarities, there are a number of other ways in which the effects of repatriation in relation to a migrant’s sense of belonging to a ‘home’, parental or adopted.

The first camp of scholars understands repatriation as being an emotional attachment that not only makes you feel like a part of the community but also makes you feel safe as a result of belonging to that community (Yuval-Davis 2006, 197). As such, repatriation becomes the process through which mobile youth are separated from their familiar surroundings and thrown into the unknown. This results in a loss of the mobile youths’ sense of belonging towards their ‘home’ while simultaneously increasing their sense of belonging towards their adapted ‘home’. Studies have shown that individuals who experienced a sense of belonging through the process of ‘being and becoming and belonging and longing to belong’ (Yuval-Davis 2006, 203), that is, when the individuals are aware of the loss of the familiar and aware of their own foreignness that is created due to them assimilating in a foreign ‘home’ country (to become a part of ‘the’), makes them the ‘other’ in their parental ‘home’ country. Thus, the severing of the sense of belonging towards the parental ‘home’.

Furthermore, related to the previous position of the camp, belonging is perceived as being a performative act undertaken by the migrant within a specific social and cultural space where certain traditions and practices are repeated to form a linkage between the individual and the collective behavior (community) to form identity narratives and construct attachments to the community (Yuval-Davis 2006, 203). Thus, this camp of thought believes that it is due to this emotional component of feeling like belonging to a place that leads to reverse culture shock among repatriates upon repatriation. That is, when the emotional components of a migrant’s identity, attachment, and through the social and cultural space of their parental ‘home’, the repatriate feels less secure amidst the unfamiliar. Thus, once again being made aware of their own origin, or topic of belonging, their assumed social and cultural space of origin (Yuval-Davis 2006, 202). This loss of ownership thus makes this migrant lose their sense of belonging to their parental ‘home’ as a consequence.

The model and theory of belonging under this camp, formulated by Paul Jones and Michal Krzyzanowski (2011), further explains this by describing the relationship between identities, attachment and belonging (Figure 2). They argue that the migrant forms their identity in two parts, internal and external. Internally, the migrant constructs an identity through the ‘representation’ of their self and the representations of others. Externally, the migrant is able to construct an identity through the channels made available by the institutional gatekeepers who put in place a formal threshold criterion that outlines the requirements for gaining membership to a group through formal methods (like citizenship requirements) or through informal methods (such as ‘symbolic’ social prerequisites of the day-to-day life) (2008, 44-45). The model further explains that it is through the relationship between attachment and belonging (represented in the figure through arrows) which helps the migrant form their identity while they become part of the collective identities. Therefore, when there is a lowered sense of attachment (i.e. lessened number of relationships that match the migrant’s threshold) to a social and cultural sphere (in this case that of the parental ‘home’), the expatriate then feels a lowered sense of belonging towards that sphere (2008, 46).

In addition to that, this model also helps to show how beyond the threshold criteria exists a second informal set of gatekeepers, the community, the repatriate is unable to gain full ‘membership’ to it. This is because of the recognition and acknowledgement of the repatriate by the collective identity (the community), the repatriate is unable to gain full ‘membership’ to it. Thus, upon repatriation mobile youth fail to gain this recognition in the parental ‘home’ due to having severed their attachments to it in order to adopt their ‘adopted home’. In so doing, they lose ‘membership’ to their parental ‘home’s’ collective identity which directly effects their sense of belonging to it as the relationship between ‘membership’ (formal or informal) and belonging is recurrent.

Additionally, this loss of a sense of belonging that the migrant experiences due to attachment is made worse when perceptions of home are fantasized (unrealistic attachments) by the repatriate as they learn of their origins (‘home’) through biased sources (i.e. parents, grandparents, etc.) who recall a nostalgic version of the parental ‘home’. It is only upon repatriation that it dawns on the migrant that the ‘home’ from their memories no longer exists and will never exist as it was only ever a snapshot of the past. It is the realization that the attachments they tied to a sense of belonging were rooted in a false attachment. This loss of ‘home’ as it had been remembered then, Edward Said (2001) would say, is what makes the repatriate aware of their state of living in a form of exile as they no longer have a ‘home’ to return to causing a further loss in their sense of belonging to it. This is left expelled from their ‘home’, dreaming of a lost…
paradise that no longer exists due to the shift in space and time.

Finally, scholars under this camp also cite growth and development as additional reasons that may contribute to a loss of belonging among migrants upon repatriation. They argue that the way they think about the ways in which they change over the duration of their expatriation and that it is only upon repatriation that the expatriate community shapes the way in which they develop and how "little" their parental 'home' has changed (Chiang, et al., 2017, p.18). This discrepancy paired with the expatriate returning to a country that is less economically and socially developed than the one they are returning from, can exacerbate feeling the loss of one's sense of belonging to the parental 'home' as it no longer provides the emotional, social or economic comfort required for the migrant to feel at 'home' (Chiang et al., 2017, 15-16).

The second camp of scholars also argues that repatriation is an important part of an expatriate's journey, however, they differ on their inferences of the effects of repatriation on the migrant. Firstly, they believe repatriation can give an individual an increased sense of belonging to their parental 'home' over their adopted 'home' as they enjoy more legal rights in their parental 'home' over their adopted 'home' as they enjoy more legal rights in their parental 'home' over their adopted 'home' (Ralph & Staeheli 2011, 522-523). The discrepancy in the individual's identity is precisely what it means to be multicultural. Migrants, through repatriation claim ownership of more than one social and cultural sphere where they are able to navigate between the 'old' and the 'new' or those that move between both. Thus, the Middle East being the world's most cosmopolitan region at the moment makes for a very interesting study of repatriation in fact, they view it as a meaningful thing. They believe a migrant's identity is considerably strengthened and their ties to multiple places, deepened. Thus, resulting in an increase in the migrant's sense of belonging towards their parental 'home' and their adopted 'home'.

Finally, the last manner in which scholars under the second school of thought believe repatriation helps to strengthen one's sense of belonging to a 'home' is an extension of the last justification; transcendence. When a migrant is repatriated, they are forced to go through an adaptation period where they have to re-assimilate and re-learn behaviors relevant to the social and cultural spheres of their 'home' (parental or adopted) (Ralph & Staeheli, 2011, 524). Through the act of this re-assimilation that only occurs due to repatriation, the migrant, or foreigner as Julia Kristeva would say, has to commit matricide of their 'homelands'. Only by letting go of certain practices, values, and in some cases even beliefs, can the migrant finally come to belong to their 'home' (or 'homes') on a teleological level. Thus, as Kristeva's theory suggests, by committing matricide of the metaphorical Mother only by letting go of certain practices, values, and in some cases even beliefs, the migrant can finally become a member of their 'Origins', the migrant rids himself of his Otherness (Kristeva 1991, 9). Though this act of matricide does not make the migrant part of the 'us', it merely turns him into a labeled and categorized stranger who is accepted by the adopted home's collective community. Kristeva further details this matricide by the foreigner in her theory and identifies it as Melancholia. It is the ultimate realization that 'home' in fact does not exist, and in it, it transends the migrant into being a fully formed cosmopolitan citizen whereby the individual belongings nowhere, yet everywhere (Kristeva 1991, 10). Hence, providing that repatriation does indeed increase one's sense of belonging to a 'home', making it something bigger than just a single nation-state or national identity. The sense of belonging to a 'home' then is lived simultaneously; 'here' and 'there'.

While the two camps of scholarly thought mentioned above appear to be at odds with one another and appear mutually exclusive to one another, this is not actually the case. The two camps highlighted here are in fact, mutually supportive. That is, by understanding the trends outlined by Cooper state, "conceptualizing all affinities and affiliations, all forms of belonging, all experiences of cultural, social, psychological, emotional self-understanding and self-identification in the idiom of 'identity' saddles us with a blunt, flat, undifferentiated vocabulary" (2000, 2).

Therefore, assessing a migrant's self and its relation to the notion of belonging, is a critical aspect not only of enforcing a threshold criterion either formally or informally (i.e. citizenship requirements) or informally (i.e. symbolic "everyday" habits) to control the entry of those from the out-group through the process of granting or withholding membership. The model also indicates the many routes that one can possibly take to reach a sense of belonging to a single or multiple collective identity or identities, as well as, the many ways in which one can interpret and understand the concept of belonging.

Theoretical Framework: Belonging Over Identity

The use of 'identity' as a means to conceptualize a migrant's sense of belonging to a collective identity is a weak method of approaching and understanding a migrant's sense of belonging. Identity as a concept itself is rather malleable and thus, possesses the danger of being an "overarching explanatory framework" towards understanding the migrant's sense of self in relation to the collective (Jones & Krzyzanowski, 2011). As Brubaker (2004) states, "conceptualizing all affinities and affiliations, all forms of belonging, all experiences of collective identity, community, and national identity in the idiom of "identity" saddles us with a blunt, flat, undifferentiated vocabulary" (2000, 2).
The concept of ‘belonging’ within the Jones and Krzyzanowski model is not based upon ‘objective’ outwardly similarities that may exist within the collective identity. Rather, ‘belonging’ in this model, is within itself a more transitory sense of solidarity among the collective identity (or identities). The model also deeply roots itself into attachments or can also be supplemented by other completely different forms of attachments (2011, 46). Therefore, making the relationship between belonging and attachments that much more complex and dynamic. These attachments can also be contradictory to one another as attachments are based on the social actions of the individual (the migrant or the in-group member) and are therefore, fluid. The development of the sense of belonging also varies greatly within the in-group (or out-group). Negative personality and perceptions (attachments) are rejected while the positive experiences and interpretations are accumulated to build up strictly positive information about the source of attachments of one’s sense of belonging while simultaneously excluding all those with no negative information or experiences as they may weaken or distort the accumulation of the positive information (Jones & Krzyzanowski 2011, 47).

At a lower level of belonging, the migrant can choose to be included with the collective identity if their attachments do not require them to get authentication or authorization from the local in-group or local legal acceptance, or lack thereof, fluid. The development of the sense of belonging also varies greatly within the in-group (or out-group). Negative personality and perceptions (attachments) are rejected while the positive experiences and interpretations are accumulated to build up strictly positive information about the source of attachments of one’s sense of belonging while simultaneously excluding all those with no negative information or experiences as they may weaken or distort the accumulation of the positive information (Jones & Krzyzanowski 2011, 47).

### Analysis: Inside the Mind of a Wanderer

Moving on from theory to the findings of the interviews, a few identifiers begin to emerge. Upon analyzing the responses of the participants of both groups, they aspire to belong to a collective identity (this can be a national or more local identity). So, after surpassing the lowest level of belonging, the migrant must now win the recognition of the ‘us’ to make it out of their out-group, the ‘them’. Even though they did not originate from every place that they listed in their answers, they identified with those places as where they were from; simply for the fact that they had been there, they had to bear all the costs of life there. They subconsciously acknowledged that they do not belong to a singular place, rather they see themselves as belonging to various places. They made their distinctive sense of belonging to ‘home’ known from the very beginning of the interview and that is from their origins. For instance, group A & B, those who were able to think of their ‘parental’ and ‘adopted’ homes. By using the sense of belonging model in this context they begin to make clear that these mobile youth forge towards the countries they were in relation to their travels and the duration of time spent in those countries. They were able to form these attachments (and from them their sense of belonging to their ‘homes’) as they did not require any kind of formal or official permission from the local in-groups or formal gatekeepers at this level of their membership to the collective (Jones & Krzyzanowski 2011, 48).

Yet another interesting thing to note is how the participants made a differentiation between where ‘they’ were from and where their ‘parents’ were from while answering this question. They actively made a distinction between the journeys of their parents and those of their own, almost unknowingly distancing themselves from the label they knew they would be associated with them at first glance. This information too was shared voluntarily, unprompted by any additional questions or cues. Their responses made it clear that they did not have a sense of belonging to a place (and the sense of belonging of their self) solely from that of their parental heritage, but also from the sheer mobile nature of their lives.

Arjun: My parents are from India. But I never lived there myself. My parents have lived in India their entire lives but they moved to Oman in 1997/1998 for work. I was born in Muscat, Oman in 2000, and moved to Sharjah, UAE, in 2006. And I moved to Dubai in 2009.

An additional layer that helps to show that the attachments forged by these mobile youth to their many countries of residence are not superficial is the manner in which they differentiate between the places they are ‘from’ and the places they have ‘been’ to. All the participants had travelled across at least two continents yet; they did not refer to places like Vietnam, Australia, Mongolia, or Italy as ‘home’. All participants made a clear distinction between the places they had lived in and the places they had inhabited. Thus, making it clear that their attachments to their countries of residence are real, and to a large extent temporal, not superficial.

For further clarification this distinction and to get a better idea of what it takes for a place to become a home, each participant was then asked, in several ways throughout the interview what it was that made them feel at home somewhere. This was done to compare their understanding of a ‘home’ against their understanding of where they come from.

The participants were first asked to identify their favorite things about their ‘adopted home’. The answers of the participants were quite varied and another in spite of them belonging to Group A or B. They singled out the three following favorite things about their ‘adopted home’:

1. The ease of life and quality of life provided by Dubai.
2. The secure and safe environment provided by Dubai; and
3. The diverse and international environment provided by Dubai in which they had the opportunity to grow up.

These responses highlight attachment(s) of the mobile children to their ‘adopted home’. They show that their attachments are not solely temporal, they go beyond that. Their attachments also stem from their lived experiences in Dubai. It is through these attachments that they form a sense of belonging to Dubai. The first layer of their attachments was evidently an economic one. The improvement of their quality of life from their ‘parental home’ was a factor for their own parents to move in the first place, and it then became something that was true of their mobile youth. Better economic and financial opportunities
gave these mobile youth more freedom to pursue careers and expand their choosing, creating an attachment to Dubai as a ‘home’ as it became the cradle where they began crafting their futures. An additional layer that then adds to their resi-
dence in Dubai was forged through mundane life practices such as schooling, going to malls with friends, and being centered in Dubai. Ceremony of Emir-
Al-Khalifa (the Khalifa Tower, standing over 800
meters tall) with their family. These youth created
and cherished their ‘parental homes’ while
remaining in Dubai. They networked and forged bonds
that go beyond soil and man — they bonded with the
people. So, Dubai for them no longer remains a
country with the tallest building in the world, it
becomes a ‘home’ because they form communal
ties in it and through it — friendships, enemies, and
networks. Further deepening their attachments to
the country, one person at a time.

Remy: Even if I was born in France, for me, my real
home was Dubai for me. I grew up in Dubai and I
remember saying that to my Mum. I remember
saying that, “Mum, for me, I come from Dubai
and even if I’m not born here, I have all my
friends here.”

Fynn: The longer I was away from Germany the
less I realized that Dubai has become a ‘home’ (...)
even now, when I go back to Dubai it feels like I’m
growing up there even though I am not.

Simiarly, the participants were asked to identify
their favorite location and what they would miss
about their ‘parental home’. Once again, their responses were similar to one
another’s in spite of them belonging to Group A or B,
or different nationalities. All participants recalled
nostalgic memories of summer vacations spent
with family and friends, by the beach or food stalls
with no responsibilities and duties — only freedom
and carelessness. Participants recalled their
‘parental homes’ as celebrations of Christmas, Eid, Three Kings Day, and many other festivities. If they ever failed to go
to their ‘parental homes’ for the observance of
such holidays they celebrated them in Dubai, some even eagerly looked forward to the Lebanese Independence Day (albeit a minority in the sample). This maintenance of bonds to their ‘parental home’ further solidified their existing attachments to it as their ancestral home, with their parents acting as their prime and formal link to that ‘home’. These attachments to their ‘parental home’ created more a picture of what Said calls reminisce of ‘paradise lost’ (2010, 1388-1387) whereby the mobile youth remember
their ‘parental homes’ in a very specific context outside of which, they would not be inclined to
make a ‘home’ out of them, and most participants
officially admitted as much.

Leyla: I really don’t think Lebanon is a good place
to have a... I always think where I am going to
have my career is where I am going to have
my kids and where I am going to live with my
family. And I wouldn’t want my kids to grow up in
Lebanon. I much would prefer [for] them to
grow up in Dubai.

Although, Remy and Arjun hesitantly mentioned
their ‘parental home’ as being a place where they
would like to set their families by no world avail-
way. Adding that even while there, they would
need a more cosmopolitan and international envi-
ronment to truly feel at home. Lulu, more assuredly
expressed similar sentiments but also admitted the
harsh reality of the fact that such a Lebanon did not
realistically exist for her to return to, and that she
could instead apply herself better somewhere
in Europe or the Gulf.

The only exception to this was Noha who was glad
at the prospect of settling in one of her ‘parental
homes’. Munich. However, she too only preferred
Munich due to the diversity the city facilitated.
She noted that living in Munich one could never
be made to feel like the out-group as those in the
‘in-group’ were eager to know and acknowledge
those different from them. Thus, in Noha’s case, the
diverse environment of her ‘parental home’ made
her want to make a ‘home’ out of it. Thus, main-
taining the idea of ‘home’ as being a mix of multiple
worlds for mobile individuals to feel at ‘home’.

Noha: In Munich, where we have like all the angry
Southern Germans, we could still find, a local
Turkish community if you’re Turkish (...) you can
fulfill your nationality everywhere. And they will
accept you and feel like you’re one of the system and
do (to) come in your way. Some of them are even
go[ing to] be super interested in you. And I
really liked that.

Hold the Gates

Our theoretical model states that attachments can
often contradict one another and can sometimes
even contradict the sense of belonging of one’s
own self (Jones & Krzyzanowski 2011, 42). It is
then important for us to assess if any such contradic-
tions do, in fact, exist among our pool of participants.
In order to do this, the participants were asked
to identify how they felt about having to repatriate
from Dubai. This question proved interesting as it
revealed the multifaceted nature of the attachments
that the mobile youth bore towards Dubai as their
adopted home. To answer this question, most of
the participants of both Group A and B, responded
neutrally saying that they never expected to live in
Dubai permanently. They very clearly stated that
the very nature of finding a ‘home’ in the Gulf came
with the understanding that ‘home’ would always
only ever be temporary.

This belief stems from the fact that the UAE lacks
naturalization procedures for expat families settled
in the region. Most of the participants, and their
parents had been settled in Dubai (or in some cases
still lived in Dubai) at the time of writing. They
were cut off from anywhere between 10 to 18 years. Yet,
the formal threshold has never been made accessible
to expats. This clearly hindered the development of the mobile youth’s sense of belonging to Dubai as their ‘home’ to a
higher level of membership. Mobile youth, in the
context of UAE’s laws, are often left out of the
circle as they are perceived by the country as
being transitory.

Noha: It makes me feel like... like Dubai is not my
permanent home (...). Maybe that also contrib-
utes to the fact that I don’t feel like it’s a home
because like I could be kicked out of there at
any moment.

Failing to overcome the formal thresholds set by
the gatekeepers (immigration and naturalization
services) of the UAE, the mobile youth then expe-
rience a contradiction in their attachment to their
adopted home’. As they are denied the right to
earn a formal membership to the collective, they
begin to feel barred, and in that process the youth,
as the researcher observes it, experience a very particular
“detachment” from Dubai. That is, they still feel a
sense of belonging towards Dubai, but on a level
much lower than what they could potentially form
had they been allowed into the formal fold of its
membership. Thus, while the mobile youth remain will-
ing to stay (in the system as the outstanding
factors prevent them from fully immersing into their
sense of belonging to that very notion. Thus, their
attachment and belonging remain on an informal,
level of membership and do not develop beyond
that level (Jones & Krzyzanowski 2011, 50), making
Dubai feel temporary yet ‘home’, at the same time.

I, Volunteer!

Remy and Leyla, had to perform involuntary repa-
trations at a young age, in the middle of their
schooling. They recall their first repatriations as
being times where they felt like something unfair
was being done to them. Leyla even used the word
“torture” to describe her emotional turmoil at the
time of her repatriation.

Leyla: I felt very upset. I was very actually angry at
my parents because I didn’t know what to expect. I didn’t
know who I was going to meet.

This sense of otherness felt by the two of them took
root due to the lack of their personal attachments
to their ‘parental home’. Leyla had moved at the age of two to Dubai, and Leyla was
born in the Gulf. The only attachment they had to their ‘parental home’ was at the minimal sum of vac-
ations without any obligations of doing homework or
chores. The dispelling of this very fancy is what
hinders and depresses the attachment of theirs. It is
what is called reverse culture shock (Yuval-Davis
2006, 202). Without having the opportunity to
prepare themselves for the changes to come in their
‘parental home’ is what causes them to panic as
they suddenly found themselves outside of their
safety blanket, without friends and familiarity,
feeling lost and alone.

Eventually, Remi and Leyla did manage to settle into
their ‘parental homes’ and in fact, grew to like them
time. In Remy’s case, this only occurred upon the
second repatriation, one that he performed will-
ingly to pursue his undergraduate studies. He chose
to move to a small town in France, Monton, with
the total student population of 300 and 49 nationali-
campus. It was polar opposite of the local French
school he had to fit into upon his first repatriation.
For diversity and inclusion in a context in which she
realized that the Lebanese in Lebanon were not that
different from the way her parents had raised her to
be Lebanese herself. She said:

Leyla: We were very similar because we had the
same values, as my parents raised me in a very
Lebanese way.

Therefore, while it took a multicultural environment for
Remy to begin to feel at home in his ‘parental
home’, for Leyla the assimilation was only made possible due to the involvement of their parents through the observance of Lebanese cultural and
traditional practices while living in Dubai.

Furthermore, Remy’s case vividly highlights the
importance of voluntariness. The second repatria-
tion that he performed was voluntary, and he said that
played an imperative role in him feeling at ‘home’ the second time around. This makes sense as with voluntary movement,
mobile youth gain charge of choosing where to go
and therefore, have time to not only prepare but also
carefully select a place that would suit them best.
 Whereas, when moving involuntarily, they are
more vulnerable to not feeling in control of what is
directly happening to them, causing them to expe-
rience anxiety and reverse culture shock.

Similar to Remy and Leyla, others like Hashim and
Arjun, had similar feelings of not fitting in their

"parental homes" upon repatriation and they too expressed a powerful relationship to their origins. I had to decide where and when they would move hindered them from feeling fully at home even in their "parental homes".

Hachim: You do feel like a little bit out of place and yeah you feel a bit treated differently. Like I lost my roots, I was speaking Moroccan-like people were noticing that I wasn’t living there and it became worse over time but I got used to it. (...) I remember I was in shock and I remember I was mad at my parents for pushing us to leave again.

Discussion

This article has made an effort to demonstrate the mixed nature of mobile youth’s sense of belonging to a place. We approached the analysis of Jones and Krzyzanowski’s model of “Theory of Belonging” in conjunction with studies of language and culture. As the study of language and culture provides an intriguing to study as they are not only a cocktail of experiences of the shared culture much more among a collective can then help to convey shared

As mentioned under "Theoretical Framework", there is yet another lens to which these mobile youth lend themselves to, and it is that of language. All participants of the research were the very least fluently bilingual or multilingual, with some like Leyla, speaking up to six languages at the age of only 20. These youth then become even more intriguing to study as they are not only a cocktail of memories that Lulu made there as a child.

The study of language and culture provides an explanation for this phenomenon. It states that as the minds of the mobile youth are accustomed to discerning every situation through multiple cultural lenses, they are then unable to claim ownership of a single culture or place as they are able to easily switch in and out of and then many learned ‘adopted cultures’, making them feel at home everywhere yet nowhere at the same time (Whorf 1956). This makes it even more complicated when you take into account the fact that our participants identified multiple languages being their native tongues (most commonly Arabic and French). Thus, Participants of Group A and B struggled to answer when asked to identify a single place in which they would like to settle indefinitely, showing that those with a nomadic upbringing are more likely to continue to pursue such a lifestyle out into their adult years. Perfect examples of this would be Lulu, and Noha pursuing to practice law in multiple jurisdictions, and Arjun looking to settle in a place in which they would like to settle indefinitely, the concrete jungle should the time to settle ever arrive.

Thuis, in their relationship towards both their ‘adopted’ and their ‘parental’ homes, the mobile youth maintained a nomadic outlook on their identity and sense of belonging to multiple homes and is then only remembered as it were in a specific time period. This causes those in Group B to have an increased sense of positivity towards the country they once called their ‘home’.

In Ancient Greek tales like that of Homer’s epic, the Odyssey, we find depictions that relay this very message of belonging to multiple homes and is then only remembered as it were in a specific time period. This causes those in Group B to have an increased sense of positivity towards the country they once called their ‘home’.

In the poems concern a wandering Bedouin who comes across a ruin, al-atlal, of a former campsite. This then provides strong evidence for the fact that these youth are even more so shaped by their journeys than initially anticipated by this study. It demonstrates that due to the sheer movement and length of stays the mobile youth form attachments and a sense of belonging towards multiple homes over a single one. Having said that, there was one slight manner in which the two groups did vary on the topic. Group A, those still residing in Dubai, had a stronger and more nationalistic and critical views towards Dubai. Group B, those who had returned to their ‘parental homes’ or moved away from Dubai, appeared to attach more nostalgic notions to the country. This is particularly interesting to note as it appears that upon repatriation the former ‘adopted home’ transforms and becomes akin to the ‘parental home’. It does so as the attachments forged towards it become a product of the act of repatriation. Dubai, upon repatriation, turns into an encapsulation of paradise lost and is then only remembered as it were in a specific time period. This causes those in Group B to have an increased sense of positivity towards the country they once called their ‘home’.

Similarly, in their relationship towards both their ‘adopted’ and their ‘parental’ homes, the mobile youth manage to maintain a nomadic outlook on their identity and sense of belonging to multiple homes and is then only remembered as it were in a specific time period. This causes those in Group B to have an increased sense of positivity towards the country they once called their ‘home’.

Basil: I can’t say I identify with English. No, I understand and I can communicate [in it] but I don’t think I identify with it.

In light of the studies done on language and culture, we know that individuals use language to encode their experiences, thoughts, and behaviors (Earle 1969; Chiu 2011; Ross, Kun, & Wilson 2002; Sussman & Richman 1997; Silverman, Fan, & Law 1997; Whorf 1956). Therefore, a shared language among a collective can then help to convey shared to their shared culture much more easily to those that speak similar languages (Chiu 2011). Furthermore, individuals fluent in multiple languages have the added advantage of code-switching in social and cultural contexts, more efficiently than their monolingual counterparts (Chiu 2011). This is perhaps because their minds are already well-trained in thinking in multifaceted ways that this practice becomes second nature to individuals like our participants — making them multicultural and open-minded. It is also this very ability of code-switching that makes mobile youth adaptable to their ever-changing homes.

At the very end of the interview, the participants were asked to identify what ‘home’ meant to them, and if there was a physical place that they associated to that notion. The participants, yet again, giving similar answers, attached their sense of belonging to a ‘home’ in relation to people, memories and feelings, and not to a particular place. Basil was the only one of the exception of one participant, Lulu. While Lulu did attach her notions of ‘home’ to the actual house she grew up in in Dubai, she only saw that house as a ‘home’ in relation to the memories that were made in it. Therefore, Lulu too did not derive her notion of a home by a physical place, rather the house derived its meaning of ‘home’ from the memories that Lulu made there as a child.

Hachim: I think being at home... maybe a sense of security — a sense of belonging. Interviewer: So where do you derive this sense of security and belonging from? Hachim: Umm... the people.
towards their 'adopted homes' through the mixture of the duration of their stay and personal lived experiences within the cultural and social sphere of the collective. They form attachments to their 'parental homes' through a mixture of nostalgia, personal lived experiences, and information learned from their 'parental' figures. Thus, it is clear to see that belonging does indeed have multiple layers and facets to it given the environment in which this process takes place, as well as, the people that it takes place through.

This paper has also sought to demonstrate the intricacies behind the identities of mobile youth in the UAE in an effort to highlight a region not as deeply studied in the field of migration (especially in terms of expatriation and repatriation) as others. The UAE's incredibly international composition of populace and their limiting citizenship and naturalization laws alongside it, make for a challenging and revealing study of the region in terms of migration. It provides a unique backdrop to the mobile youth in the region who find themselves torn between the law and the community at home'. Feeling like they belong yet also feeling as if they do not. This paper has thus concluded that multiple journeys between 'homes' (including repatriations) lead to the creation of a multi-faceted individual, one that not only comes to peace with their life of mobility, rather actively seeks it, and dwells within it.

Notes
1 The GCC is a coalition of seven countries: Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates.
2 The seven emirates of the UAE are Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Ras Al Khaimah, and Fujairah.

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Introduction
Border politics of the European Union (EU) is a complex range of programmes, policies and imaginaries of the political community in which borders are used as resources for different specific aims. The question of the management of the Eastern border of the EU, especially with Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova, came on the agenda in 1997, when the prospect of accession was finally opened to Eastern and Southern European candidates. The European Commission (henceforth, the Commission) required “good neighbourly relations” as a further condition for accession and in conjunction, the concept of “Wider Europe” was proposed to set up border-traversing tasks. The Carpathian Europization was established to contribute to strengthening the friendship and prosperity of the countries of this region. However, the model was not fully understood and had only limited support of the national governments. This paper suggests the Carpathian Europization as a case study to show that overall Ukraine and the EU’s Eastern Neighbourship presents more opportunities for effective cooperation with the EU rather than barriers or risks.
up, the original proposition of a policy towards the EU should be rephrased to include the idea of reinforcing sub-regional cooperation, especially in creating an “Eastern Dimension”—and, later on, Black Sea cooperation (to complement the already existing “Northern Dimension” and the “Union for the Mediterranean”). In turn, Ukraine formalized its foreign policy since the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) came into force in 1998 and asserted that European integration would become a priority of the country’s foreign policy, increase living standards, and strengthen democracy and rule of law. Hence, this paper assumes that European integration (with or without EU membership) is good for Ukraine.

According to the Commission, governance beyond EU borders means establishment and operation of “institutions” (in the sense of rules of the game), which define actors and their responsibilities, both in the country’s objectives and in the resolution of any conflicts that may arise. From 2011, the EU has initiated various forms of governance—supporting local initiatives, diversifying stakeholders, and speaking to all levels of governance—supporting local initiatives, diversifying stakeholders, and speaking to all levels of governance. The new idea of governance is defined by the chapter “Cross-Border and Regional Cooperation” of the Agreement on the establishment of a European border cooperation is based on Article 70 of the PCA and defined by the chapter “Cross-Border and Regional Cooperation” of the Agreement on the establishment of cooperation strategies (Gasparini 2017).

On 14 February 1993 the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Ukraine (Romania would join in 1997 with the last county accepted into the EU in 2000) signed an agreement on the establishment of the Carpathian Euroregion (CE) as addressing common problems singled out by the Helsinki Act (1975), the Charter of Paris (1990), and other instruments. Ukraine also joined the European Outline Convention on Trans-frontier Cooperations Territories and the Euroregions in 1993. Euroregions are normally defined as organizations of border (transboundary) interregional (intermunicipal) cooperation aimed at establishing good neighbourly relations as well as addressing common problems singled out by constitutional documents regulating the territories of three or more states (Council of Europe 1980). They represent institutional structures set up by two or more states to support cross-border cooperation, and as such represent a framework for meeting the needs for participation, transparency and development of cooperation strategies (Gasparini 2017).

Within the framework of the Euroregion, Ukraine, as a member of the Carpathian Euroregion and the European Union, the union acts as a transformative power, aiming to promote reforms across a broad spectrum of governance areas: rule of law, public administration, democratic institutions, economics, and various standards and regulatory issues. However, largely due to the lack of legal standards and the establishment of the Carpathian Euroregion (CE) and other operating Euroregions in Ukraine, examples of practical cooperation at the bilateral and regional level have been very limited. According to Mytyrava (2007), in order to succeed in integration efforts, it is necessary to have effective executive structures with a certain legal status at various levels within the Euroregion structure. This paper is an examination of Ukraine’s current course of European integration within the framework of the Carpathian Euroregion (CE), from the viewpoint of cross-border governance. Likewise, it questions the governance of borders in Eastern Europe and specifically the role of the EU in it.

This article uses SWOT analysis to analyse strengths (S), weaknesses (W), opportunities (O) and threats (T) for EU governance within the framework of the Carpathian Euroregion. The method is based on identifying and measuring internal and external indicators of a cross-border area, making it possible to reterritorialize. As mentioned above, the beneficial governance emerges from this development (Delcour 2001; Kramsch & Hooper 2004;Likken, Scott, Soobski 2014). From the EU side, to effectively cooperate and understand actors and rules of the game in the Eastern neighbourhood, it needs to be a responsible cross-border manager as well as a good strategic actor in the international arena.

The article is structured as follows. Section one reviews historical development of the Carpathian Euroregion by exploring the progress of Ukraine and its EU candidate status and various cooperation mechanisms and cross-border cooperation instruments. It also summarizes four EU and Eastern Mediterranean literature debates and shows how existing institutional mechanisms and cross-border cooperation instruments are redefined for the Euroregion—If at all. Section three defines the organizational structure of the Carpathian Euroregion and offers a review of the SWOT method for analysing major CAB tendencies in Ukraine. Finally, the paper’s conclusion summarizes the impact of cross-border cooperation Territorial Framework of the Euroregion on the transformation of Ukrainian public/private policies and identifies major issues arising.

1: Historical Development of Carpathian Euroregion and the European Integration Course in Ukraine

After the fall of Communism, citizens and institutions of the Ukrainian borderlands found themselves confronted with tough processes of re-scaling and re-structuring the economic, environmental, and cultural structures (Mytyrava 2001; Kramsch & Hooper 2004; Liikanen, Scott, Soobski 2014). In turn, Ukraine formalized its foreign policy since then as an instrument of the EU borders; considering power and authority of the substate level of the European level. The aim of cross-border cooperation has been defined as addressing common problems of economic, technical, cultural and other relations, including good neighborly relations among its actors, usually the residents and participants on the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of state borders; considering power and authority of the substate level of the European level. The aim of cross-border cooperation has been defined as addressing common problems of economic, technical, cultural and other relations, including good neighborly relations among its actors, usually the residents and participants on the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of state borders; considering power and authority of the substate level of the European level.
beginning of the 20th century, most parts of Ukraine belonged to the Austro-Hungarian Empire. In 1919, the International Conference in Paris made Eastern Galicia a part of Poland and the Ruthenia, nationalist, autonomous region of the western part of Volynska oblast also became a part of Poland. The Russian part of Ukraine joined the Soviet Union in 1922 and became also one of the Soviet socialist republics. In the five states, various nationalities lived together in a harmonious way. This analysis was also characterized by a mixture of major religions (Orthodoxy, Greek Orthodox, Roman Catholicism, Calvinism, Protestantism, Judaism, and Roma) (Tanaka 2006, 65).

Together, all of these features characterize the area as “a mosaic zone of ethnicities, cultures and religions” and “a microcosm of Europe” (Research Center of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association 2004b, 6–11). Today Ukraine remains the only state within the EU region with a framework clear aspirations for EU integration.

EU programmes for its neighbourhood gained a separate status and a budget in 2007–2009 within the Eastern Partnership (EaP) policy framework. The EaP Policy was adopted in 2007 and directed at Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. Before 2007 the regions of the EaP were exposed to ENPI, the financial instrument that supported opening up to the EU and accession of the candidate countries, offered co-funding for promoting good governance and equitable social and economic development process. In the perspective of reinforcing cooperation with countries bordering the EU, the ENPI included a component specifically targeted at CBC. CBC’s strategy has four key objectives: (1) to promote economic and social development in border areas; (2) address common challenges; (3) ensure effective and stable local autonomy; and (4) promote people-to-people cooperation.

The management of CBC programmes was assigned to a local or national authority jointly selected by all participating countries. CBC is also financed by the European Regional Development Fund. For example, the EaP Territorial Cooperation Support Programme promotes sustainable cross-border cooperation between EU countries, added value of CBC countries, offered co-funding for promoting good governance and equitable social and economic development process. In the perspective of reinforcing cooperation with countries bordering the EU, the ENPI included a component specifically targeted at CBC. CBC’s strategy has four key objectives: (1) to promote economic and social development in border areas; (2) address common challenges; (3) ensure effective and stable local autonomy; and (4) promote people-to-people cooperation.

The ENPI supported cross-border and trans-regional cooperation as well as gradual economic integration of recipient countries with the EU beneficiary countries. In 2011–2012 the ENPI CBC Programme with a budget of €500 million implemented a project with a focus on training activities enabling job placement for the disadvantaged population in Beregovo (Ukraine) and Miszkolc, Hungary. The overall objective of the action was to contribute to the intensification and deepening of cooperation between institutions in Zakarpatska and Veszprém counties, strengthening their capacities. The programme aimed to help the unemployed people (especially Roma, women, and the disabled) gain new skills to successfully apply for jobs.

Two EaP countries, namely Belarus and the Carpathian regions of Romania, expected further benefit was that the initiative strengthened regional and institutional cooperation between Missions and local authorities. CBC Regional Authorities set up a Windrose Network, supported by delegations to launch the programme. It is the task of the regional and local partners on both sides of the border to analyse and coordinate the common challenges, identify priorities and actions, most relevant to their local situation. The ENPI, the financial instrument that supported opening up to the EU and accession of the candidate countries, offered co-funding for promoting good governance and equitable social and economic development.

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self-recognition, which refers to a lack of knowledge, experience, or research. Second, a crisis of representation, in which neither the low-level local self-governing bodies nor non-profit organizations were able to send their representatives to both the Council of the CE and the national organization of the CE. The third crisis was that even where local residents were completely uninterested in the CE’s issues (Stworzyszenie na Rzecz Euregionu Karpackiego Euro-Karpaty 2002, 11-17).

When it comes to governance issues, according to Tanaka (2006), firstly the CE must be examined by analysing the region’s characteristics, as an evolutionary form of governance. Secondly, taking the perspective of public space encourages consideration of the degree to which the everyday economic space and the public space have been formed (Tanaka 2006). Hooper when examining cross-border governance in Europe conclude that cross-border areas in Europe were faced with the following four “dilemmas of multi-governance”: (1) Euroregions were used as a convenient administrative policy for local elites to access funding sources from each member country. The Council meets every two years, and has no right to vote on the final program outcomes. The Secretariat, which is responsible for coordinating projects in the CE, is located in Prague. (2) Economic factors combined with key changes affecting CE cooperation. According to Table 3 of the Charter of the Intergovernmental Organization “Carpathian Euroregion”, its main objectives and organizational and coordination structure consists of: promotion of cooperation in the fields of economy, science, ecology, culture and education among the CE’s members; support in the implementation of cross-border projects in the conditions of common interest; promoting contacts among populations of the CE countries, strengthening their mutual understanding and strengthening the position of the CE and its members; coordination of the CE’s activities with the activities of international organizations and its members; and ensuring the development of the CE’s activities in line with the development of the CE’s member states and the European Union.

These trans-border and trans-level actions alter the identity of the regional actors and precipitate the formation of a regional form of governance. distant neighbors working through informal coalitions and acting as, for example, that brought together the domestic players that shape their reform efforts (Simmel and Sedelmeier 2005; Langbein 2015). There is no shortage of regional cooperation initiatives in the Carpathian Euroregion.

However, for obvious reasons the CE model was not fully supported by the national governments of the first, strongly centralized and oppressive states were not in effect because of the structure of regional governments, and the lack of awareness in post-communist Ukraine. Therefore, the concept of authoritarian self-governance as a form of local democracy was losing its support in Ukraine. In addition, Szymański and Markowski (2006) have suggested that the current level of cooperation in the CE is not sufficient to establish an effective democratic system of cross-border institutions (Kramsch & Hooper 2004, 3). According to scholarly research, the greater the density of interaction and the more likely the tendency to promote cultural tourism; a considerable number of the external factors influencing tourism are examined. Strategic planning allows an entity to set itself an objective or goal (mission), help to highlight any potential for cooperation, to define the conditions of CBC in a specific area and, at the same time, to help identify potential potential for cooperation, to define the conditions of CBC in a specific area and, at the same time, to help identify potential opportunities (S) and threats (O), while limiting the negative effects of weaknesses (W) and risks (T). SWOT analysis may be a useful tool in defining a situation when a desired objective is defined. It may also be used in preventive crisis management. The SWOT method can be used to evaluate the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats involved in any organizational activity. In this study, firstly the SWOT analysis in the cross-border cooperation process is explained, secondly the components of SWOT are then determined. Strategies are needed to be more proactive than reactive in shaping its own future; it allows any organization to initiate and influence events, rather than respond to them. In this way, it is possible for a corporation to exert control over its own destiny (David 2003, 15).

The important issues for this paper are institutional problems combined with key changes affecting CE cooperation. According to Article Three of the Charter of the Intergovernmental Organization “Carpathian Euroregion”, its main objectives and organizational and coordination structure consists of: promotion of cooperation in the fields of economy, science, ecology, culture and education among the CE’s members; support in the implementation of cross-border projects in the conditions of common interest; promoting contacts among populations of the CE countries, strengthening their mutual understanding and strengthening the position of the CE and its members; coordination of the CE’s activities with the activities of international organizations and its members; and ensuring the development of the CE’s activities in line with the development of the CE’s member states and the European Union.

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The SWOT analysis of the Carpathian Euroregion is composed of: (1) institutional factors for effective CBC such as signatory states of the CE; (2) factors resulting from Transfrontier Co-operation (Madrid, 21 May 1980); signatory of the 1995 Additional Protocol to the Madrid Convention for Co-operation on Transfrontier Co-operation; (3) factors related to the implementation of the Intergovernmental Agreement (2001, 9 May 2001) and the implementation of the Accession Process at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The CE is a potential EOU Area which includes nature conservation, environmental protection, rural development, education, tourism, creative industry, cultural and educational infrastructure to be developed. Administrative factors for effective CBC are among the factors of successful development of the CE and in their turn include official definition of cross-border areas and local authorities’ co-operation with foreign partners. The factors for cooperation include participation in Interreg/ Phare projects; efficient and well-connected infrastructures; road, rail, and waterway networks; and favourable natural environment for agricultural production; good conditions for thermal, hunting, and other tourism activities. These factors help to establish relatively well-qualified labour force; ambiguously defined and are not actively developed along the eastern border region of the EU.
tions for recognition and application of effective mechanisms of regional economy; growing interest towards the opportunities offered by the EU, and proximity to countries of the Eastern neighbour- hood and the More geben, linguistic, cultural, and historical factors for CBC include common historical background; common language or knowledge of the neighboring country’s language; ratification of the 1995 Framework Convention for the Protection of Ethnic Minorities; tradition of cooperation; and established transboundary transport routes.

Weaknesses of the CE consist of: (1) institutional obstacles to CBC, including state centralization; lack of adequate state/non-state structures; conflicting capabilities on either side of the border; restrictive legal regulations on cross-border relations; lack of credibility; low mutual knowledge and trust; different political orientations and insuf- ficient financial resources. (2) The main economic obstacles include uneven development levels; weak or non-existing response to opportunities offered by the EU. Considerable distance from the national and Western European economic centres; limited local resources; and lack of financial resources for essential local programmes. Socio-cultural obstacles include presence of negative stereotypes; language barriers; weak accessibility; underdevel- opment of small number of experts; and professionals speaking foreign languages and mastering the situation along both borders. To add, weak points of each other’s peripheral location, possibly adverse demographic trends, unemployment, and low income in general.

Opportunities (as external indicators) consist of the establishment and development of direct contacts between the local authorities, civic organisations and citizens. The border guards of both countries interact on a permanent basis clearly showing that it is worth developing channels of wide-ranging information and experience exchange. Therefore, given the similarity of problems faced by the authorities at the regional and municipal levels, the authorities and local governments body. Normative acts contain formal mechanisms for law implementation. The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine issues Regulations (legal acts of a normative nature) and Decrees (legal acts covering operational and administrative acts that are not of a normative nature), and Presidential Decrees. Under the general provisions of the Constitution of Ukraine, the President is entitled to issue Decrees on all matters referred to his jurisdiction.

Annex 3: Legal Framework

The legal framework for the involvement of Ukraine’s borders regions in cross-border cooperation is well-developed and quite sufficient.

a. The Council of Europe acts: 

b. National legislation: 

Notes

1. As such the concept seeks to "develop a zone of proximity and a friendly neighborhood - a ring of friends" - with whom the EU enjoys close, peaceful and co-operative relations." (COM (2003) 104), it was the key document for the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) of the EU launched in 2004. In June 2006 the EU Council reiterated that the EU is open to any country that fulfils Art.49 of the European Treaty and would meet the conditions laid down by the Community.

2. The first legislative act that laid the foundation of the legal framework for the state regional policy was "The Concept of the State Regional Policy" approved by the Decree of the President of Ukraine No. 341/2001 on the 25th of May, 2001.

3. Article 2.1 of the 1980 Madrid Convention defines transfrontier co-operation as "cooperation designed to reinforce and foster neighbourly relations between territorial communities or authorities within the jurisdiction of two or more Contracting Parties and the conclusion of any agreement and arrangement necessary for this purpose." Council of Europe, 1980. www.coe.int.

4. During the years 2004-2006 about 620 million were allocated to the Ukrainian partners involved in projects only in the strengthening of transboundary and transnational cooperation between the EU and Ukraine within the framework of the EU programmes, Slovakia, Poland, and Hungary, were financed under INTERREG, ENI, and Romania by PHARE.

5. The ENP is a more flexible and policy-driven mecha- nism, as the allocation of funds depends on a country’s needs and absorption capacity and its level of imple-
6. CORLEAP is the political forum of local and regional authorities. It is the only EU platform that offers an opportunity to discuss the contribution by cities and regions in the development of the EaP.

7. According to the Working Plan of the Administrative Office of the Twinning Programme, there were 61 Twinning projects for 2015 in Ukraine.

8. Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic. Information about Visegrad is also available here: http://visegradfund.org/home/

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This article advances the idea of “Aztlan” as a hybrid border identity that developed over time from ancient myth into a complex mode of social and political ontology. The cultural symbol of Aztec mythology was once the homeland of the Aztec people and eventually served a role in Aztec philosophy, functioning as truth for peoples throughout time, as seen in both Latin American and American philosophy and literature. It also helped the mixed-race Chicano/a population resist complete Americanization into the contemporary period, through the reclamation of original myth into a geopolitical homeland. The theory of “double hybridization,” similar to “double colonization,” must be further assessed and taken into consideration as the natural progression and understanding of Aztlan and border identity.

Introduction

Much of Latin American indigenous philosophy from the eighteenth to the twenty-first century can be attributed to Aztec philosophy, culture, and mythology. Aztlan is often understood as the mythical American Southwest and ancestral homeland of the Aztec people. The epicenter of this Aztec mythology and philosophy is the ancient peoples’ desire for balance and unity in an ephemeral world. As explained in Nahual’s legends, Aztlan was the place where the ancient Nahua tribes left when the Aztec people, prior to their departure and geographical location, were united. Around this time, according to Nahuatl (Aztec) language, the city of Tenochtitlan was established.

Aztlán History

In order to navigate the contradictions of the rhetorical notion of “Aztlan”—a term inherited from the Aztec Movement in the late 1960s—and whether or not it geographically and culturally relates to contemporary thought, Aztlan’s literary symbolism, its philosophical relevance, and debated meaning across time must be assessed. Anthropologists have discovered evidence of remains, dating as far back as 35,000-8000 BCE, from the Texas Southwest and Arizona regions (Barnouw and Lynn 1960, 96). According to anthropological research on “Indian languages, social organization, material culture, and origin myths,” the Southern Arizona Cochise culture is credited with being the “parent culture of peoples as far apart as the Ute of Colorado and the Aztec of the Valley of Mexico” (Ellis 1968, 96). Further research shows that sometime after 1000 BCE, communication between the American Southwest and the Valley of Mexico increased, which was due in part to the Uto-Aztecan population migrating south while the cultivation of maize began to head north. Northern and southern populations were intermixed, and eventually, the “healing-and-gathering Cochise culture” started to disappear, replaced by the more agrarian cultures of the “Mogollon, Hopi, Anasazi, and Pueblos.” Naturally, with trade came transculturation (Riley 1971, 286-287).

Around this time, according to Nahual (Aztec) legends, that seven Nahuas tribes—Xochimilca, Tlahuica, Acocuahua, Tlaxcalteca, Tepaneca, Chalca, and Mexica—from seven different caves and who all spoke the same Nahuatl language left their respective caves and settled in Aztlan, which became their homeland. Afterward, the city of Tenochtitlan came to be established. The Aztec people from Aztlan to the city of Tenochtitlan.

The biggest fact of contention amongst historians and archeologists regarding Aztlan is whether it existed or if it were akin to some of New Spain’s (Mexico) other mythical locations, like Cevola or Baja California. Many archeologists have attempted to identify the original location of Aztlan but have failed to definitively locate the homeland of the Aztlan people. Aztlan is believed to be northwest Mexico or the American Southwest. These calculations were determined from letters and documents obtained from the Spanish conquistadors and explorers who navigated the region, but the location of Aztlan was not substantiated. After the Spanish annihilated the Aztec state, New Spain hegemonized the region, and the hybridized people along the border began to “vacillate between a self-identity as foreigners and a self-identity as natives” (Chávez 1989, 53). Consequently, one of the biggest issues concerning Latin American philosophy has been the history and identity of the Latin American people.

For most of the twentieth century, Latin American philosophy, like Aztlan, has been the subject of many heated debates concerning existence, identity, originality, and authenticity. When the Spanish explorers first arrived in the Americas, the Amerindians were scattered throughout the land and substantially divided into many diverse cultures, with many different languages. Eventually, Chicano Movement that has strengthened its geographical and geocultural relevance. The Chicano Movement has been a catalyst for the modern imaginatory boundary line. Finally, the concluding section demonstrates how, given an interdisciplinary understanding of Aztlan, throughout time, this social phenomenon amongst the Chicana/o nation has evolved into hybridized ideology from “mythos to logos.”

Chicano Movement that has strengthened its geographical and geocultural relevance. The Chicano Movement has been a catalyst for the modern imaginatory boundary line. Finally, the concluding section demonstrates how, given an interdisciplinary understanding of Aztlan, throughout time, this social phenomenon amongst the Chicana/o nation has evolved into hybridized ideology from “mythos to logos.”
the Spanish imposed a colonial unification on them, especially once Africans were brought in to supplement the labor shortage (Mann, 2005, p. 121). If a population is unwillingly put together, the authenticity of the works produced from that society is, therefore, questionable.

Aztec Philosophy

Although Latin American philosophy can be divided into different periods—Pre-Columbian, Colonial, Independentist, Nationalist, and Contemporary—many scholars believe that the originality and authenticity of Latin American philosophy came before the Amerindian population was conquered andcolonialized (Nuccetelli 2013). Much of what is understood from the pre-Columbian period came from text written after the Spanish conquest by colonists and missionaries, or from Christianized Spanish, educated natives. However, the most authentic pre-Columbian sources are the Aztec codices.

In the Americas, Aztec philosophy was the most developed and, in many ways, was comparable to Ancient Greek philosophy. According to scholar James Maffie, this pre-Columbian civilization made attempts to understand the nature of reality and the limits of knowledge. Aztec philosophy as developed from Aztec culture, focused on dualism, monism, and aesthetics, and was centered on the quest for stability and balance in an ephemeral world. An example of this balance is the binary concept of Ometochtli, the unity of all things in the universe, even things in opposition, like light and dark, and life and death (Maffie 2014). Unity with dualistic expressions is similar to dialectical monism, where reality is a unified whole and can be expressed in dualistic terms, as seen in complementary polarities and present in both Western and Eastern philosophies (James 1963). In American Philosophy, William James’s concept of a “block universe,” did convey this Manichean notion of dualism but in a transitory world within an infinite system.

A “block universe” refers to the systematically predetermined reality from all aspects. Along with Charles Sanders Peirce, James founded the school of pragmatism, and in many ways critics viewed pragmatism similarly to relativism. Nevertheless, James believed that pragmatism was rooted in epistemological realism and the world exists independently and innately to our perceptions, and then, our senses reflect that understanding (James 1963). Thus, by James’s interpretation, the meaning of truth relies on how it functions. Therefore, if Aztec philosophy is rooted in Aztec culture and it functions as a two-faced truth, then Aztlan, whether a myth or historical or geographical location acts as truth.

Other Aztec truths can be found in the transcultural influences that have been cultivated and Hispanicized through hybridization and are still in existence and often used today throughout the US. According to Rolando Romero of Feminism, Nation, and Myth: La Malinche, the majority of the maize derivatives come from the Aztec tradition, such as “corn tortillas, pinole, gorditas, tamales, pozole, menudo, enchiladas, tamales, and tacos.” Maybe not as commonplace as the food items previously mentioned, there are also words within the border vernacular that have been acquired: “calco (shoe), cuate (friend), chante (home), and ruco (old man)” (Romero 2005, p. X). Many Aztec cross-cultural practices followed by the hybridized American Southwest people today originated from the Aztecs. One such belief is el ojo (the evil eye), which refers to a stranger’s envious stare that would make a newborn child inexplicably sick. Mothers and babies often wear colorful necklaces or display other noticeable trinkets to distract the stranger’s gaze and ward off el ojo. Another common practice is having a niche or altar for saints within the home as a way to worship on a daily basis, and the use of brujería (witchcraft) and curanderas (healers) as alternative wellness practices that came from the indigenous peoples. Popular folklore and legends along the American Southwest can be traced back to Aztec origins, as well. Two in particular are La Llorona and La Malinche (Lux and Vigil 1989, pp. 102-104). La Llorona and La Malinche, both women, are regarded as traitors and villains haunting an entire culture for generations, La Llorona for killing her children and La Malinche for being a vende or sellout to her native people (Romero 2005, p. 28). Reclamation of Aztlan is just another example of cross-cultural beliefs that have made their way into a hybridized ideology.

Aztlan functioned as the truth to the Aztec people and, over time, to the Chicano/a people. According to folklorist and scholar, Vladimir Yakoovich Propp, the linear structural arrangement of a folklore or mythology is integral to the meaning and longevity of the story. He created the Propp Sequence in an effort to deconstruct the component of a successful story. The Propp Sequence consists of thirty-one functions in chronological order, and when the story and evolution of Aztlan is applied to it, it fulfills all thirty-one functions of the quest narrative, and thus, provides a glimpse of how Aztlan prevailed throughout centuries (Propp 1969) (Figure 2).

US-Mexico Border History

Analyzing the role of the mythology and legend of La Malinche is paramount to understanding US-Mexico Border History. Its reworking of Aztlan. Many people view her as the
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
<th>Aztlan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Absentation</td>
<td>The story begins with damage or loss</td>
<td>The 7 tribes are separated and speak various languages.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Interdiction</td>
<td>The hero must leave</td>
<td>The 7 tribes must leave their caves.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Violation of Interdiction</td>
<td>The hero agrees</td>
<td>The 7 tribes all decide to leave their respective caves.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Reconnaissance</td>
<td>Preliminary search</td>
<td>They leave their caves.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Delivery</td>
<td>The meeting place</td>
<td>All 7 tribes come together in Aztlan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Trickery</td>
<td>Put to a test</td>
<td>The 7 tribes receive a message to go on a journey to a new homeland.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Complicity</td>
<td>Acceptance of the test</td>
<td>All 7 tribes leave.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Villainy or Lack of Interest</td>
<td>Mystical aid or message is gifted</td>
<td>The 7 tribes receive signs that will guide them to their final location.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Meditation</td>
<td>Intervention</td>
<td>There are stops along the way.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Departure</td>
<td>Defeated</td>
<td>The tribes leave again and start going through their separate ways.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. First Function of the Donor</td>
<td>Things turn around</td>
<td>The tribes split apart and settle in new locations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Hero’s Reaction</td>
<td>Everything falls into place</td>
<td>The city-states are established.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Receipt of a Magical Agent</td>
<td>Magic appears</td>
<td>Aztec empire finds its home.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Guidance</td>
<td>Saved</td>
<td>Aztec empire is prosperous thanks to the gods.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Branding</td>
<td>A marking happens</td>
<td>The Aztecs are branded as savages.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Victory</td>
<td>Villain is defeated</td>
<td>Savages are defeated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Liquidation</td>
<td>Issues are resolved</td>
<td>Spanish mix with Amerindians and the Mexican mestizo is born.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Return</td>
<td>Journey back</td>
<td>Many mestizos/as head north back to Aztlan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Pursuit</td>
<td>A new adversary pursues</td>
<td>Aztecs have become the Southwest Border and taken over by the Americans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Unrecognized Arrival</td>
<td>A new home is found</td>
<td>The Border people must choose which side of the Border they will remain on.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Unconfirmed Claims</td>
<td>False claims</td>
<td>America takes over much of the Southwest.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. Difficult Task</td>
<td>Put through a test</td>
<td>The former inhabitants of Aztlan have been displaced.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. Solution</td>
<td>Fight</td>
<td>The Border people fight for their homeland.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. Recognition</td>
<td>Acceptance of identity</td>
<td>Over the centuries, the Border people have become a new people, no longer native. They are mixed. They are a mestizo/a nation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28. Transfiguration</td>
<td>Shining a light</td>
<td>Mestizo/a nation joins the civil rights movement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29. Punishment</td>
<td>Imposter loses home</td>
<td>Chico/a and Border people refuse to assimilate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30. Wedding</td>
<td>Celebration</td>
<td>Reclamation of Aztlan.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2. Propp functions applied to Aztlan. There have been different interpretations and definitions of these stages of the Propp sequence, but they share the basic structure. Here, in the final column, I suggest how the stages of Aztlan’s prefiguration can be mapped to Propp’s Sequence.

Founding figure of the new Mexico nation. Some historians credit La Malinche with saving her people from the Aztecs from their time assisting and translating for Hernán Cortés, by influencing him to be more humane during the conquering of this New World. Many Christians commend her for her part in bringing Christianity from Europe to this conquered region.

What is known is that La Malinche, Malintzin, or Doña Marina—her baptized name—that was once one of twenty slaves gifted to Cortés. Throughout their years together, she rose in rank, eventually replacing other trusted advisors, and is portrayed in codices as the right-hand woman to Cortés, equal to him, by the size and repetition of her appearance in these codices (Coerver, Buffington, and Pasztor 2004, p. 200). How or why she earned such standing, as with the location and meaning of Aztlan, is up for debate. What is most important is that when she bore Martín, Cortés’s son—the first mestizo, or people of indigenous and European descent—Malintzin, in many Mexican’s eyes, also became the mother of a new nation. Eventually, she married one of Cortés’s soldiers, Juan de Jaramillo and moved to Spain with him, where she was received by the Spanish court (Figueroa and Melgar 1985, p. 295). Despite this, she is still also widely viewed today as a traitor to her native people. The fact remains that La Malinche was a woman enslaved between two cultures, helping to initiate a series of historical events that would define a space and a people, much like her, straddled between cultures.

After Cortés invaded Mexico in 1519 and conquered the Aztec empire, migrants began settling in the region, once considered Aztlan, and making it their home. At the time, the area was part of the Kingdom of New Spain with a sparse population. This region of New Spain was in a transition and diasporic flux with its mismatched indigenous groups and Spanish settlers, disrupting an indigenous way of life that had been in existence prior to this invasion of land and identity. This position both geographically and philosophically remained in an in-between state, lasting well into the nineteenth century.

During the early nineteenth century, the US expanded steadily in accordance to the theory of Manifest Destiny, acquiring large areas of land and desirable territory that would redefine the US-Mexico border. The influx of people and constant conflicts in the region erupted into the Mexican-American War, which began in 1846 and ended in 1848, followed by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, in which the US acquired Aztlan and what is referred to today as the American Southwest.

For centuries, this specific area of the Kingdom of New Spain and the people that inhabited it were mostly free and loosely governed. After the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, the region remained in a state of diasporic flux, inasmuch that it was a place of constant transition. Most of the people living along the American Southwest were living in a transcultural region, straddled between cultures. This position both geographically and philosophically remained in an in-between state, lasting well into the nineteenth century.

During the Great Depression of the 1930s, some-where around 600,000 Mexican people and those ethnically resembling them in appearance were reprogrammed to Mexico, the status of their citizenship disregarded (Perea 1997). A couple decades later, another 1.3 million were repatriated to Mexico under the Operation Wetback (García 1980). Many died during deportation. Busloads of deportees were dropped off in the middle of the Mexican desert where they were left to fend for themselves. This “large-scale clampdown” of “illegal aliens” from Mexico during 1954-1955, ironically, overlapped with the Bracero Program (1942-1964), a “binational initiative” that was established to aid and promote seasonal migration of Mexican laborers for US farming needs (Samora 1971). It was apparent around this time that the millions of people living along the American Southwest border were living in a transcultural region between two countries that would never fully accept this double hybridized population.

Chicano/a Movement

Shortly after the repatriation movement of Operation Wetback, these unAmericanized-American people without a homeland and without an identity proclaimed themselves “Chicano/as.” They realized they were being intentionally left out of the American ideology. Many were being sent “back” to Mexico whether they were Mexican or not, and the ones that did stay were left with categories and definitions that did not define them, like Latino/as and Hispanics. They never left the Border, but the
land and politics surrounding them had changed. As the Chicano/a Movement grew, the term "Chicano/a" became "essential non-participants (1989, p. 172). It was at this time that they started speaking up, reclaiming their identity and the name Chicano/a as—according to the Handbook of Texas:

Inspired by the courage of the farmworkers, by the California strikes led by César Chávez, and by the Mexican-American youth revolt of the period, many California-Mexican-American university students participated in a crusade for social betterment that was known as the Chicano Movement. They used Chicano/a to denote their rediscovered heritage, their youthful assertiveness, and their militant agenda. Thus, these students and their supporters used Chicano/a to refer to the entire Mexican-American population, they understood it to have a more direct application to the politically active part of the Tejano community (De Leon 2010, p. x).

Scholar Rafaela Castro has defined three possible origins of the term, as discussed by Bauerle and Simmen. First, "Chicano" may have originated from the Mexican city of Chihuahua. In El Paso, Texas, the people from la frontera or the border of Chihuahua are sometimes referred to as Xron-Chis, combining the first part of the Spanish word frontera (Fron-) with the first part of the city name Chihuahua (-Chi). Therefore, "Chicano" could derive from the city name Chihuahua and Mexican (Chichitlán). Second, Chicano may come directly from the indigenous name of the people, Mexico, using the Nahautl pronunciation Chich (Chi). A third possibility is that Chicano comes from the Spanish word chico/a meaning little boy/girl, an Anglo-American pronunciation of "sh" or "ch" for x. A third possibility is that Mexican American (Chi- and -cano). Therefore, Chicano/a could derive from the city name Chihuahua and Chicano/a: the origins of the term, as discussed by Bauerle and Simmen.

The Chicano/a Movement focused primarily on the population of Mexican Americans differentiating themselves from the Latino/a population and Hispanic population, which often included it in a homogeneity that the people of the movement recognized as imprecise and inaccurate. With this rising population no longer wanting to exist without an identity, home, language, and voice, the Chicano Movement took center stage throughout the 1960s and 1970s, after a series of events compelled it to do so.

Some historians trace this collective identity to the post-Mexican-American War period, with a range of resistances, depicted in the oral and musical accounts of resistance, and the sense of Mexican Americanness started to develop in the American Southwest. With outside tensions rising and Mexican-American conflict, Chicano/a activism deepened, further separating this new culture from every other culture and conquest. The League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) began helping middle-class Mexican-American families foster community economic development throughout the American Southwest. Before the Chicano Movement, according to anthropologist José Limón in a report, "Hot Tamales" for La Crónica, a Spanish-language newspaper (González 1996). Like Aztlán, Chicano/a became the collective-unconscious homeland, in an effort to define the intra-history and geocultural properties of a borderland-Rivers-Rodriguez 2005). Despite the growth of these efforts, it did not happen after the war that the catalyst for the Chicano/a Movement. They used Chicano/a to denote their fundamental need to leave a lasting impression and reclaim Chicano/a for generations to come.

Mexican-American serving, Félix Longoria, was killed in the Philippines during World War II. When his body was returned home to Three Rivers, Texas, in 1949, the local funeral refused to honor him because they feared a lack of future business if they were to serve a deceased Mexican American. This controversy drew national attention, and then-senator B. Johnson intervened and organized Longoria’s burial at Arlington National Cemetery (Carroll 2003). Though this solved the immediate problem of Longoria’s burial, it did not address the racial tensions rising throughout the American Southwest.

Like LULAC, other organizations across the American Southwest began emerging, filling the need and void of the Mexican-American community during the 1940s and 1950s. With the growing number of Mexican-American organizations and the establishment of Spanish-language newspapers primarily in Texas, the growing presence of Mexican-American influence was reaching the political system at every level (Meier and Gutiérrez 2000). The combination of various efforts used during the Chicano Movement helped bring the Chicano/a culture and community into the national consciousness, understanding, and appreciation. Finally as an oppressed and exploited group that had been conquered and colonized twice, yet never lost its connection to its indigenous roots and land. According to Hector Calderón, European and Latin American scholars, along with Chicano/a critics, started to recognize the Chicano/a culture as a social group that has given the distinctive cultural feature to the American West and Southwest” (Calderón 1990, p. 232), Calderón goes on to say that the Chicano Renaissance was developing organically before the Chicano Movement and before the term “Chicano” became mainstream.

The literature produced at that time could realistically be said to belong to either the Mexican-American and their closer ideological relationship in regard to each specific country.

Nevertheless, critic Ignacio M. Garcia of Chicanismos: The Forging of a Migrant Ethos among Mexican Americans (1996, pp. 8-9), established that the Chicano/a Movement may have seen a phase since the 1960s can be divided into four different phases in keeping with critical practice: first, the "critical period," characterized by "popular cultural records and scholarly representations" with attention to assimilation and acculturation within the Chicano/a community; second, the "collective unconscious phase" stemming from the intra-historical perspective of the Chicano/a community; third, the "reclamation and celebration phase" of "Mexican cultural traditions and legacies" within the Chicano/a community; lastly, the "Chicano/a phase," where activists have focused on the liberation of the Chicano/a community (Garcia 1980, pp XX).

Chicano/a Aztlán

In 1967, the poem, “I Am Joaquín” by Corky Gonzales rallied together many Mexican Americans who identified with the Chicano/a Movement and before the term “Chicano” became mainstream. Though years later, Gonzales would go on to host the First National Chicano Youth Liberation Conference in Denver, where Alurista read his poem, “Chicano/a Aztlán.” He explained, in an interview with Juan Bruce-Novoa, “The Chicano/a Aztlán phase, in “El Plan Espiritual de Aztlán” (Anaya and Lomeli 1989, p. 1) (Figure 3).

"El Plan," as it was often abbreviated, called for “reclamation of culture, language, pride, and identity” and the crowd in attendance “rallied around Alurista’s depiction of Aztlán.” Alurista is accredited with being the first writer with multilingual works published, paving the way for many such writers today. His use of multiple languages is derived from his belief in the blending of cultures. He further explained, in an interview with (2012), “The historical time-space in which we live is going to focus on this terrrenal [earthly] belly button of consciousness between Hispanic America and Anglo-Saxon North America. America is going to bloom. That’s inevitable” (cited in Wood 2007, p. 15). Their sperms and their poems became the standard for both grassroots-level and academic poets. They are considered some of the most influential leaders in the Chicano Movement, inspiring others to take action a step further by finding strength within their dual culturalism. They gave these grassroots efforts a voice and philosophy that were eventually heard across academia.
Borders in Globalization Review  |  Volume 1 |  Issue 1 |  Fall 2019
Muñoz-Hunt, “Aztlán: From Mythos to Logos in the American Southwest”

In the spirit of a new people that is conscious not only of its proud historical heritage but also of the brutal “gringo” invasion of our territories, and the blood and tears of the millions of the northern land of Aztlán from whom we descended, we declare the liberation of our nation, and our people who are the sons of this land, declare that the call of our blood is our power, our responsibility, and our inevitable destiny.

We are free and sovereign to determine those tasks which are justly called for by our house, our land, the sweat of our broods, and by our hearts. Aztlán belongs to those who plant the seeds, water the fields, and gather the crops and not to the foreign Europeans. We do not recognize capricious frontiers on the bronze continent.

Brotherhood unites us, and love for our brotherhood unites us a people whose time has come and who struggles against the foreign “gabacho” who exploits our riches and destroys our culture. With our hands in our hands and our hands in the soil, we declare the independence of our nation. We are a bronze people in the bronze continent of the world, before all of North America before all our brothers in the bronze continent, we are a nation, we are a union of free pueblos, free from the world.

For La Raza, everything! Outside La Raza, nothing!

Organizational Goals

1. UNITY in the thinking of our people concerning the barrios, the campo, the land, the poor, the oppressed, the middle class, the professional-all committed to the liberation of La Raza.

2. ECONOMIC: economic control of our lives and our communities can only come about by driving the exploiter out of our communities, our pueblos, and our lands and by controlling and developing our own talents, sweat, and resources. Cultural background and values which ignore materialism and humanism will contribute to the act of cooperative buying and the distribution of resources and production to sustain an economic base for healthy growth and development. Laws strictly enforced will be fought for and defended. Land and property ownership will be acquired by the community for the people’s welfare. Economic responsibility must be secured by nationalism and the Chicano defense units.

3. EDUCATION: must be relative to our people, i.e., history, culture, business, bilingual education, contributions, etc. Community control of our schools, our teachers, our administrators, our counselors, and our programs.

4. INSTITUTIONS: shall serve our people by providing the service necessary for a full and whole life and their welfare on the basis of their freedom, not handouts or crumbs. Restitution for economic slavery, political exploitation, ethnic and cultural psychological destruction and denial of civil and human rights. Institutions in our community which do not serve the people have no place in the community. The institutions belong to the people.

5. SELF-DEFENSE: of the community must rely on the combined strength of the people. The front line defense will come from the barrios, the campo, the pueblos, and the ranchitos. Their involvement as protectors of their people will be given respect and dignity. They in turn offer their responsibility and their lives for their people. Those who place themselves in the front rank for their people do not out of love and camaraderie. Those institutions which are fashioned by our brothers to provide employment and political pork barrel for the gringos will do so only as acts of liberation and for La Causa. For the very young there will no longer be acts of juvenile delinquency, but revolutionary acts.

6. CULTURAL: values of our people strengthen our identity and the moral backbone of the movement. Our culture unites and educates the family, the community, the corporation, the barrio, and the one mind. We must insure that the arts of our people-developed by our artists-produce literature and art that is appropriate to our revolutionary culture. Our cultural values will also contribute to our national identity and will serve as a powerful weapon to defeat the gringo dollar value system and encourage the process of love and brotherhood.

7. POLITICAL LIBERATION: can only come through independent action on our part, since the two-party system is the same animal with two heads that feed from the same trough. Where we are a majority, we will control; where we are a minority, we will represent one pressure group; nationally, we will represent one party: La Familia de La Raza.

Aztlán

1. Awareness of and commitment to El Plan Espiritual de Aztlán. Presented at every meeting, demonstration, confrontation, courthouse, institution, administration, church, school, free, building, car, and every place of human existence.

2. September 16, on the birthdate of Mexican Independence, a national walk-out by all Chicanos of all colleges and schools to be sustained until the complete revision of the educational system. Involves all Chicanos, citizens or beggar’s identity, its curriculum, and its personnel to heed the call of La Raza.

3. Self-Defense against the occupying forces of the oppressors at every school, every available man, woman, and child.


5. Economic program to drive the country out of their pockets. Organize the community, the worker, the professional La Causa.

6. Creation of an independent local, regional, and national political party.

A nation autonomous and free - culturally, socially, economically, and politically - will make its own decisions concerning the usage of our lands, the taxation of our people, and the defense of our land and culture. The defense of the people must be combined with the defense of our nation. La Raza must be protected from the profit of our sweat.

La Raza, everything! Outside La Raza, nothing!

The rise of the Chicano movement in the 1960s and 1970s was a response to the discrimination faced by Mexican Americans in the United States. The movement sought to reclaim the historical heritage of the ancestors and to assert cultural pride and identity. One of the key concepts of the movement was the idea of Aztlán, a term that refers to the homeland of the Aztecs. Aztlán was seen as a symbol of the Chicanos’ struggle for liberation and self-determination.

Figure 3. “El Plan Espiritual de Aztlán.” (Gonzales and Urias 1969, 5).

We're the only ethnic group in America that has never conquered or been conquered. Whether they call it or not, our identity is immutable. If they call us radicals or subversives or separatists, that's their problem. This is La Raza, and this is our homeland, and we are entitled to it. We are the host. Everyone else is a guest (Gutierrez 1999).

Similarly, the term “Hispanic” to this day remains controversial amongst many Chicano/as, Mexican Americans, and Latinos.

Though there are different meanings of the word “Hispanic,” depending on the context, it is often used to refer to descendants of Spain and does not properly serve the population of the American Southwest, with its multiracial Spanish-Mexican-American-Native-Mestizo roots. Like Aztlán, the geoculture of the American Southwest is thus a mix of definitions, suggesting that its borders, labels, religion, culture, language, and history are slowly becoming a double hybridization resulting from centuries of major historical changes.

After “El Plan de Aztlán” was presented by Alurista at the first National Chicano Youth Liberation Conference and adopted by the Chicana/o people, Aztlán has continued to live and function as the Aztlán/chicana/o homeland whether or not it is a factual or mythical place. By applying the Propp Sequence and determining how this indigenous concept has been mythologized or relocated into functional philosophy and reclaimed geographical location, it is easy to understand the hybrid term Aztlán.

Similarly, La Raza functions as a truth from mythos to logos, physically in the American Southwest and emotionally in the Chicano/a people, and according to William James, what functions as a truth, is a truth.

Aztlán, the home of the Aztectes, Mexican, and Chicano/a, alienated from Americaness but still unambiguously tied to its Pre-Columbian homeland, does not belong to either place. Regardless of the border peoples’ self-identification as Tejanos, Mexican/as, Mexican Americans, Spanish, Spanish Americans, Latinos, or Chicano/as deriving from the ancient cultures, Spain, or the US, a new double hybridization of Aztlán can be debated. The Chicano/a people has survived two periods of hybridization: first, by the conquering of the indigenous peoples by Spanish imperialism, resulting in the Mexican mestizo/a population; and secondly, by American imperialism over these mestizo/a populations resulting in the Mexican-American mestizo/a population.

During the 1980s, the popular concept of double colonization was first introduced, referring to the fact that within formerly colonized, and often,
enous societies, women were colonized twice: first, through imperialism and, secondly, through patriarchal ideology (Ashcroft, Griffiths, Tiffin 1997, p. 233). Duplication, as a result, is the exact copy and repetition of an object, but when considering the complexity of cultures, this is too simplistic an application. By nature, this is not what occurs during colonization, but rather, aspects of assimilation and epistemic violence take place.

A decade after double colonization emanated, Homi Bhabha established hybridity as a theoretical development in The Location of Culture. Hybridization, as the doubling of cultures through the presence of the colonizer and colonized, intricately relating culture with place, became the essence of these societal conditions (Ashcroft, Griffiths, Tiffin 1997, p. 137). The duality of these cultures is not necessarily Manichean in nature, but rather, it is the opposition between the “putative superiority of the European and the supposed inferiority of the native” (Goldie 1989, p. 172). Hybridity is neither duplication nor binary. As Clifford asserts, it is an example of cultures in flux and in constant motion (2001, p. 468). Insomuch as these indigenous voices cannot be put into a single collective category, they will continue to define and redefine themselves.

Understanding cultures and locations is acknowledging the fact that each culture and each location is different, and therefore, the combination of culture and location produces entirely different variables, from one to the next, such as Aztlán. Thus, the various circumstances that affect these variables, like scholar Diana Brydon’s concept of “disruption” must be taken into consideration (1991, pp. 184-188). With the enduring history, myth, and reality, and truth of Aztlán demonstrating the transformation of border culture across eras, the concept of double hybridization opens conversation further for examination of how the shapeless configuration may explain extant hybrid populations. Aztlán began as the homeland of seven different tribes and was reclaimed as the homeland, both physically and emotionally, by the population living in the American Southwest today, as seen in the art, literature, and music it has influenced. Wherever or however Chicano/a culture and identity can be formed, rediscovered, or reinvented, Aztlán remains a part of them along their journey.

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Borders and the Feasibility of Rebel Conflict

Lance Hadley *

Contemporary spatial research on civil conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa has largely focused on border regions as spaces of limited political and economic opportunity. These studies largely adopt approaches that present borderlands as institutionally desolate regions lacking in governance, economic opportunity and political inclusion and giving rise to the feasibility of rebel conflict. While spatial analyses focus on territorially-based capabilities, such as state power projection, they typically overlook borderlands and their territorial distinctiveness with regards to rebel capabilities. This paper specifically explores the structural effects of borders on rebel capabilities and argues that Sub-Saharan Africa’s porous borders enhance the capabilities of rebels to operate in nearby territories. I empirically test this hypothesis with a zero-inflated negative binomial model and spatially disaggregated conflict events data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project dataset mapped to the PRIO-GRID 0.5-degree x 0.5-degree geographic data structure. In total, the analysis covers 14,120 georeferenced rebel conflict events in 37 countries between 1997-2019. The results provide evidence that territories nearer to borders are likely to experience more battle events relative to other territories, suggesting that borderlands may enable distinct conflict-related capabilities for rebels not found elsewhere. Additionally, the model allows me to test whether the effects that the border may have on conflict, affecting the effect of rough terrain, resources, excluded groups, and territories at the border. Of the variables tested, the results suggest that territories with border towns significantly increase the capabilities of rebels to engage in conflict and suggest a more nuanced scholarly consideration of cross-border institutions that facilitate rebel conflict.

Introduction

The spatially disaggregated nature of civil conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has traditionally been a central concern for scholars of conflict analysis. More so than other regions, conceptualizing the SSA state as a container of homogenously distributed sovereignty has typically yielded limited explanatory value for empirical analyses related to civil conflict. Necessarily, many scholars have turned to disaggregating factors to study these territorially-bound structural conditions that enable rebels to engage in conflict with the state. Similarly, the data tools available to researchers are updating rebels to engage in conflict with the state. Similarly, the data tools available to researchers are updating.

1.0 Center-Periphery Grievance Assumptions in Disaggregated Conflict Analyses

Perhaps no other research program has been as broadly influential to the field of conflict analysis as the greed and grievance agenda. In its first rendition, Collier and Hoefler (2004) quantitatively explored the economic theory that “atypically severe grievances or lack of political, economic or religious rights, or ethnic and religious divisions in society” motivated rebels to engage in armed conflict. The authors later iterated the study to suggest a more precise feasibility model: that “where rebellion is feasible it will occur, motivation is indeterminate, or it becomes opportune to the opportunities thereby opened for illegal income” (Collier et al 2009, p.24). As it relates to this paper, I argue that the conceptual development and operationalization of state power in Africa in political science and conflict literature has limited the integration of borderlands as a meaningful area of focus. Further, border regions superficially appear to fit this narrative as politically and economically desolate places absent of the state apparatus. With this in mind, this paper presents an opportunity to introduce borderlands institutions to conflict analysis, limited engagement between the two literatures has resulted in a paradoxical interpretation for border regions in contemporary conflict analysis – that border regions represent both aggregated spaces suffering from the retreat of the state and, at the same time, states of control that delimit domestic and international territory.

In contemporary conflict analysis literature, a central factor that makes rebellion more feasible, and therefore more likely, is the concept of state capacity. The basic logic is that, where a state can credibly exercise a monopoly of violence (or sovereignty) conflict is unlikely to occur. Conversely, where a state lacks the capacity to enforce its sovereignty and can rationally be challenged, conflict will occur. More so, a state’s monopoly and power is well-recognized in the conflict literature as a distinctly territorial process (e.g. Vasquez 1995; Jackson 1990; see Diehl 1991 for a review). In the context of the modern African state, political science scholars have highlighted the asymmetry between state boundaries and territorial sovereignty, and pointed to the emergence of the post-colonial state as the legitimate international actor and participant in the international-diplomacy according to the state’s capacity to exercise absolute territorial control (Ayissi 2009; Englebert 2002; Herbst 2000; Jackson 1990). The modern African state territoriality itself is suggested as a dynamic process within SSA states by which governance is a negotiated process between governing institutions and territorially distinct groups – not de facto a national government.

Scholars have typically described this dynamic territorial process by pointing to the African state’s governance retreat from international boundaries; that historical legacy and mercantile extraction left an inheritance of core-periphery relationships within the then newly independent states. Indeed, authors have pointed to Africa’s strained political and economic histories, which deprioritized borderland governance in favour of a governable core (Herbst 2000). Authoritative such an approach to political and economic governance, which prioritize regions of wealth creation and redirect local resources and loyalties towards those groups that direct state power (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012; Lindemann 2008). International forces too, have played their part in the erosion of the state at the periphery, as African states prioritize the most important areas of export trade – typically the capital (Boone 2007; Mkandawire 2001; Konadu-Agyemang 2008). Further, the periphery by its nature as geographically distant from the core, limits state intervention. Within this political configuration, the geographic
peripheries are seemingly restricted from national economic policy and often from political inclusion. While not intending to dispute the principle that a state’s power is territorially projected from the core (and certainly not the findings associated with the strength of the variable), a binary conceptualization of territory that is integrated into state governance - or, to use another common formulation - requires state protection. Granted, these analyses are typically focused at the state level, and are less concerned with the spatial distribution of civil conflict, yet, similar assumptions are still employed in spatially disaggregated studies. Dummy binary variables are typically included for a conflict event’s neighborhood contiguity with a nearby border. The issue is that, an arbitrary proximity dummy for all borders, paints these regions with the same ratio- nal-legal-inspired brush and may ignore the realities of border institutions with graduated or differential effects on rebel conflict feasibility.

Indeed, the critique of international borders as features of separation and the embourbonnement of homog- eneously powerful territorial state is not new in borders literature (see Reid-Henry 2010; Newman 2006b). Instead, borders scholars have embraced borders as spaces where “diverse patterns of trans-boundary interaction may take place, ranging from confrontation and exclusion to cooperation, integration and inclusion” (Newman 2006, 127; Sohn 2014; Blake 2006; Nugent and Asiwaju 1996). Additionally, scholars have embraced the state retreat narrative as an opportunity to specifically explore interna- tional borders as key sites of regulatory institutions. These alternative regulatory institutions can include cross-border structures that bend the bodies based on ethnic or religious affinities, market incentives, or family and other migratory factors. A vivid institu- tion that is especially common throughout the SSA region is informal (as well as formal) cross-border trade (The World Bank 2011; Lesser and Mois- Leem 2009; Murzidzva 2005; Peberdy 2000). Cross-border markets have traditionally prospered from traders’ exploitation of market differentials on either side of the border and provide a strong counterexample to borders as desolate spaces (Hashim and Meagher 1999). Along West Africa’s ubiquitous international boundaries, such examples of trans-border markets have developed into distinct insti-

tutional hubs for the cross-border circulation of people and slave traffic (Wallerstein 2001). Figure 1 illustrates the geographic distribution of cross-border market networks in West Africa. N’Joya (2013) examines the activity of one of these markets located at the intersection of the Guinea-Guinea Bissau-Senegal border, suggesting that the absence of Senega- lese border monitoring has allowed for the market exchanging “over 1,000 tons of products worth about 250 million CFA francs (US$450,000)” (44). Scholars have also suggested that the strength of cross-border trade networks in SSA, in contrast to bumbling” state initiatives towards integra- tion, may represent a more productive driver of economic integration (Nishimi and Mayo 2017; Meagher 2003, 2001). Perhaps tellingly, several SSA countries have also explicitly integrated the devel- opment of cross-border market infrastructure into their regional economic trade strategies (Koroma et al. 2017; Egg and Igue 1993; Igue 1992; e.g. Ministry of Trade and Industry - Rwanda 2013; Southern African Development Community 2010).

In addition to cross-border market incentives, the capacity of borders to enforce spaces of the ‘us’ and the ‘other’ is heterogeneous throughout SSA. Indeed, colonial bordering of SSA territory (which largely persists to the present-day) seldom reflected the realities of SSA’s communities and physical geographical features (Griffiths 2005; Nugent and Asiwaju 1996). While certainly not the case with all colonial borders, the current bordering of SSA states describes that French colonies also promoted a considerable degree of horizontal integration between colonial agents and the local population; the explicit state-sanctioned processes (or not) that separates and joins state’s sovereign territories. For example, the Senegal-Guinea border often plays a limited role in hampering the cross-border ethnic networks that straddle the border; little attention is paid to the boundary in the course of their everyday lives. People regularly cross the border, marry spouses and reside across the border for long periods. They attend all manner of ceremonies, social occasions and family cele- brations. These activities do not normally concern governments and... are seldom hampered (83).

Additionally, Griffiths points to the common state practice in SSA to place customs posts several kilo- meters behind the international border so as not to disrupt innocent cross-border activities. Further, he concludes that the length of international borders and the distribution of ethno-linguistic groups, such as the Hutu’s and Tutsi’s, are too complex for any simple, simplistic, linear divide.” In West Africa, Adepopu (2005) posits that border deregulation has been a select strategy of West African states with economies too small to absorb their citizens to allow labour migrants to easily transit to the popular West African economy of the day. As a result, ethnic support networks have developed on both sides of the border.

So far, discussion has highlighted the seemingly marginalized role of border regions in conflict analysis literature. In one strand of the literature, the distribution of conflict in border regions repre- sent areas from which the state has retreated, giving way to non-state territories and institutions for conflict. In another strand, conflict in border

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**Figure 1. Border market networks in West Africa. Source: Olivier (2011, 3)**

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Haddy, ‘Borders and the Feasibility of Rebel Conflict’
regions represents the failure of the state to enforce the territorial sovereign on the border, which has been violated by violent external forces. In both cases, the role of alternative institutions in making conflict feasible is overlooked. Briefly, examples have been provided with the aim to challenge these conceptualizations of the border as desolate and anarchic spatial releases. Instead, complex institutional interactions are present, despite the absence of the state. It is in highlighting the role of these institutions that the borderlands approaches stand to benefit the study of conflict. The next section constructs theoretical hypotheses related to the role of borderlands on rebel capability with a more precise operationalization of territorial border processes throughout Africa.

2.0 Sub-Saharan Africa’s Borders and Rebel Capability

Perhaps the most clearly relevant effect of borders on rebel capability is the proximity to unrегulated, unmonitored foreign territory. While the border may indicate the de jure boundary of national sovereignty, rebel operations are not bound by the same international norms. I frame my analysis to suggest that borderlands represent territorial spaces that are exploited by rebel groups to gain access to unregulated cross-border networks. Support from these networks may take various forms, including weapons, strategic intelligence, and the transport of personnel (Collier 2009). These examples, border porousness is exploited by the rival RUF in Sierra Leone” (Collier 2009). Common to these examples, border porousness is exploited by smugglers to transport illicit resources outside the reach of the state. As such, the international border represents a strategic capacity for rebel actors to engage in conflict. In effect, while a seemingly impermeable border, which has been violated by violent external forces, is applied (Le Billon 2014; Buhaug et al. 2009; Humphreys 2005; Collier and Hoeffler 2004). The literature has described any potential effect of border permeability on rebel capabilities as potential avenues for future research.

Lastly, international borders permit access to unregulated transnational ethnic networks. Moreover, the ‘lootable resources’ thesis of the conflict literature is applied (Le Billon 2014; Buhaug et al. 2009; Humphreys 2005; Collier and Hoeffler 2004). The mineral-rich DRC has received special attention in this regard. Researchers have identified the use of conflict as a way to access the ‘illicit’ business (Le Billon 2014; Buhaug et al. 2009; Humphreys 2005; Collier and Hoeffler 2004). The DRC’s transnational economic networks to facilitate potential armed conflict. In the DRC, the outflow of information to ethnic kin across the borderland community. Authors also find demonstrable effects that link generates ethnic support across borders (Weidmann 2015; Forsberg 2008; Kuran 1987). Across the border, in unregulated extra-territorial space, political entrepreneurs may take the opportunity to communicate the grievances and social realities in the home-country. Outside of the juridical control of the state, governments are often unable to present a falsification to exclusionary claims made cross-border political entrepreneurs. In this way, transnational ethnic support can be drummed up in support of rebel efforts. Harff and Gurr’s work (1998) describes this support among external groups in their typologies of ‘accelerators’ that escalate ethno-political conflict and genocides (emphasis added):

1. Formation of coalitions among regime opponents;
2. Clashes between regime supporters and communal groups;
3. Increase in external support for communal groups;
4. Empty threats of external involvement against the government.

By way of example, Carment and Schnabel (2004) identify small-scale localized killings in Rwanda, Burundi, and DRC as a resource for rebel engagement in the borderlands. The 1990s saw these conflicts slowly horizontally escalate as ethnic groups increasingly supported ethnic violence, with rebel conflict and the border porousness became fused together “into a much larger, more violent network of closely interlinked conflicts” (35).

Further, supporting ethnic groups across the border can provide quantitatively more and qualitative different resources than those directly available to groups related to borderlands analyses. First, I position the projection of rebel capacity sourced from, or more likely to experience more rebel conflict relative to other territories in the same country. Access to transnational ethnic networks beyond the border has been described as being a significant driver of conflict, by virtue of their ease of transport. Easily extractable resources at the border, then, provide opportunities for not just immediate plunder, but by virtue of their proximity to networks beyond the border, also provide opportunities to illicitly traffic resources out of the country to unregulated international markets.

H3: Border territories with rough terrain are more likely to experience more rebel conflict relative to other territories in the same country

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H4: Border territories that contain excluded groups are more likely to experience more rebel conflict relative to other territories in the same country

This section has described an argument that international borders represent logistical channels for providing access to additional support networks for rebels to conduct armed conflict. The hypotheses, constructed in this way, embed significant principles related to borderlands analyses. Firstly, I position border areas at the center of study by focusing on the projection of rebel capacity sourced from, or more likely to experience more rebel conflict relative to other territories in the same country.
across, the other side of the border - rather than on the projection of the state from the capital. Second, I present a non-dichotomous hypothesis of borders' influence on rebels. This integrates the concept that state territory may express multiple or competing sovereignties. Thirdly, I disaggregate the length of the border to consider differentiated effects of the border on rebel capability. The next section outlines the data structure, the data, and the statistical method to operationalize and test these hypotheses.

3.0 Data and Method

This study employs several geographic information system (GIS) techniques to approximate the territorial influences on rebel capabilities. To facilitate this analysis, this paper relies on the PROGRID's data framework, which divides terrestrial areas into 0.5 x 0.5 degrees gridded cells. Depending on the position of the globe, these grid cells represent approximately 55 square kms (the approximation is taken at the equator. The area varies due to the change of the widths between longitudinal lines). Using a temporally and territorially fixed gridded data structure presents an opportunity to employ a unit of analysis that is largely insensitive to exogenous political influences, boundaries and developments.

I exclude grid cells in SSA countries that are not territorially contiguous with other countries from this analysis. These countries are Cape Verde, Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles, São Tomé & Príncipe. Given that the main theorized effect of borders in this study is the increased land-based capability to access in and out flows through neighbouring countries, territories with international borders that abut international seas, large lakes, or neighbouring countries, territories with international influence on rebels. This integrates the concept that state territory may express multiple or competing sovereignties. Thirdly, I disaggregate the length of state territory may express multiple or competing sovereignties. Fourthly, I disaggregate the length of the border to consider differentiated effects of the border to consider differentiated effects of the border to consider differentiated effects of the border on rebel capability. The next section outlines the data structure, the data, and the statistical method to operationalize and test these hypotheses.

One such limitation to this approach is the assumption that capital cities, borders, and national authority are static spatial variables. The secession of South Sudan poses a significant challenge in this regard: where the distances to the national border in grid cells located in the South of Sudan changed significantly in 2011, Somalia also poses a challenge to this territorial analysis due to the dynamic governing capacities of autonomous regions such as Somaliland, Jubaland, and Mogadishu in recent years. For example, where variables based on the distance to capital are intended to proxy concepts of graduat ed sovereignty, the distance to Mogadishu may be confounded by the complexities of shared sovereignty in the region, given the significant role of semi-autonomous organs in the country. Recognizing that these regions present a unique opportunity for territorial analyses that can more accurately accommodate the shifting dynamics in these regions, this study proposes a non-dichotomous hypothesis of borders' influence on rebels. This integrates the concept that state territory may express multiple or competing sovereignties. Thirdly, I disaggregate the length of the border to consider differentiated effects of the border to consider differentiated effects of the border on rebel capability. The next section outlines the data structure, the data, and the statistical method to operationalize and test these hypotheses.

In lieu of a disaggregated structural variable of rebel capability, this analysis constructs its dependent variable from ex-post counts of battles that have occurred within each of the framework's grid cell. The basic logic is that, for grid cells where many rebel battles have occurred, those cells have structural attributes that facilitate a higher propensity for recurring rebel conflict. To construct this count variable, data is sourced from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), which records georeferenced violent conflict events in SSA from 1997 to the current day (Raleigh et al 2010). The time period used for this analysis is from January 1st 1997 to August 1st 2019. Additionally, I use ACLED's definition of battles, which are defined as “a violent interaction between two politically organized armed groups at a particular time and location” and battles are included even if there are no fatalities from the event. Additionally, ACLED battle events are coded with interaction codes associated with the two main actors of an event. The focus of this paper is on rebels' capabilities at the border and, as such, I use battle events with interactions where at least one of the two actors are a rebel group. This includes the following interactions: rebels vs military; sole rebel action; rebels versus rebels; rebels versus political militia; rebels versus communal militia; rebels versus rioters; rebels versus protesters; rebels versus civilians; and rebels versus others. To be sure, the ACLED dataset uses a definition of rebels that is consistent with this paper's hypotheses: rebels are political organizations that engage in violent acts as the primary means to pursue political goals. Each grid cell is coded with the total count of rebels' battles occurring within that cell during the time period as the dependant variable.

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includes Sudan, South Sudan, and Somalia from the larger structural analysis.

There are some regional challenges to territorial-ity and conflict analyses of conflict in SSA. Apart from Angola, rebel battle counts in other Southern African countries during this time period exhibit limited territorial variation. 69 battle events over the approximately 22-year time period. While these countries are included in the territorial analyses and conflict observations of rebels or national capabilities, which could be more appropriately analyzed in a separate study.

The last limitation is due to the spatial resolution of this study's gridded framework and has particular relevance to The Gambia and eSwatini (formerly Swaziland). With each grid cell representing territory approximately 50km x 50km and given the countries' relatively small land area it is likely that these countries' national influence is not the leading territory. For example, given the grid cell, the grid cell containing Gambian and eSwatini territory is therefore excluded.

Altogether, this approach yields 14,120 rebel battle events in 6,414 grid cells across 37 SSA countries. The rebel battles count distribution is visualized in Figure 2 and Figure 3 gives the rebel battle events relative to the distance to the nearest land border.

**Description of Data**

This paper has so far theorized a positive effect of borders and rebel capabilities. Empirically, it is expected that border distance and rebel conflict count is negative. Distance farther from the border must travel greater distances to access the in and out flow capabilities provided by the border. To capture the potential effect of borders on proximate territory, a cell’s centroid distance to the nearest land-contiguous neighboring country is included as a model variable. That rebels farther from the border must travel greater distances to access the in and out flow capabilities provided by the border.

**Border Towns:** Grid cells with border towns are identified as those that have towns with a population of at least 50,000 inhabitants. Data is drawn from the PRO-GRID’s aggregation of Uchida et al.’s (2010) data, which is the result of network analysis using a combination of several sources, most collected between 1990 and 2005.

**Border Mountains:** Grid cell border cells with mountain terrain are identified based on the UNEP’s Mountain Watch Report (Bluth et al. 2002). The dataset provides a high-resolution mountain raster which identifies mountainous terrain based on elevation, slope and local elevation range. Border cells where at least 25% of the grid cell is considered mountainous are identified as border mountain cells.

**Border Forest:** Border grid cells are with forests are identified based on the ISAM-HYDE historical landscape (Meiyappan et al. 2012). Similar to the process to identify border mountains, this dataset provides a high-resolution raster of land classification. Border cells where at least 25% of the grid cell is considered forested are identified as border forest cells.

**Border Excluded Groups:** Border grid cells with excluded groups are identified based on the GeoPR dataset 2012 (Vogt et al. 2015). The GeoPR dataset identifies the status and location of politically relevant ethnic groups settled in the grid cell. If a group, whose territory overlaps with the grid cell, has been excluded or discriminated against for more than ten years since 1997 (the beginning of the rebel cell data timeframe), that cell is given a positive binary value.

**Border Resources:** Border grid cells with easily extractable resources such as placer gold, alluvial diamonds, and other gems are identified from an aggregation of several georeferenced datasets; from Gilmore et al. (2005), the GOLDDATA v1.2 dataset (Balestri 2012), and the GEMDATA dataset (Lujala 2009). Cells in which any valuable resources are found, are given a positive binary value.

I also include several control variables. Spatial spill-over and contagion have been described by conflict scholars as a driver of conflict events in contiguous territory, whereby conflict in one territory influences conflict in another (Buhaug and Gleditsch 2002; Murdoch and Sandler 2002). A variable for the sum of rebel conflict counts in the eight queen-contiguous territories relative to the grid cell is added to control for this spatial effect. Distance to capital has been described by Buhaug and Red (2006) scholars as relevant to the relative location of conflict, as contestations of state governance are more likely to occur in territories that are nearer to the capital city. Thus, a variable

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Obs</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
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<td>629</td>
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<td>Nearby Rebel Battles</td>
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<td>Distance to Border</td>
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<td>Distance to Capital</td>
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<td>400.2666</td>
<td>3985.501</td>
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<td>240.0826</td>
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<td>Excluded Ethnic Groups</td>
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<td>0.492846</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>150.6972</td>
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<td>3091.067</td>
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**Table 1: Descriptive Statistics**

is added which measured the distance from the capital city to the centroid of the grid cell. Proportions of mountainous and forested terrain within a grid cell are also included as control variables. The effect of resources as a driver of conflict is also included by a variable that measures the distance from the centroid to the nearest within country valuable resources. Nearby resources are identified with the same aggregation technique as the border resources variable. Excluded ethnic groups are included with the same dataset used to identify excluded groups at the border – if a grid cell contains an ethnic group, it is given a positive dummy variable. Lastly, Grid population is included by a variable represented by the logged sum of pixel values (number of persons) within the grid cell from the Gridded Population of the World v4.11 dataset. The values for each cell are estimated from national censuses spanning from 2005 to 2014.

Lastly, I include a sampling weight based on the land area of a cell. As the gridded framework is constructed according to a geographic coordinate system, grid cell area can vary at different latitudes. This variation in cell area may quantitatively capture more or less conflict by simply measuring more or less land area. Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics for each of these variables.

**Statistical Method**

The dependent variable for this study is the cumulative number of rebel conflict events in each grid cell from January 1st 1997 to August 1st 2019. Although this analysis generated a data sample that is based on a geographic sampling technique, it is likely to present an overdispersion of zero-count rebel conflict observations. Rebel conflict is simply not likely to occur in the majority of grid cells, either due to factors such as extreme remoteness, sparse populations, or data collection limitations. Distinguishing between grid cells with true zeros and excess zeros, therefore necessitates an appropriate statistical method to account for grid cells’ expected heterogenous variance and means of conflict counts. Possible statistical models that relax assumptions of observations’ independence and unequal variance and means of the dependent variables are the negative binomial regression model, a zero-inflated Poisson model (ZIP), or a zero-inflated negative binomial model (ZINB). I employ a zero-inflated Poisson model (ZIP), or a zero-inflated negative binomial model (ZINB).
The ZINB model is a two-step model: first the inflation step employs a logistic regression to predict whether a given observation belongs to a population of true zeroes, which accounts for grid cells that are simply not exposed to rebel conflict. The second step performs a negative binomial probability estimation of rebel conflict counts and includes a parameter which accounts for overdispersion. All distance variables are log transformed in the model. In all models, I cluster the standard errors on the national unit of the grid cell to control for country-specific effects such as country size, government capacity, or infrastructural qualities.

### 4.0 Empirical Results

In Table 2, I report the estimates from the zero-inflated negative binomial regression model estimates for the total count of rebel conflict events in each grid cell. The left side of each model reports the estimates corresponding to the negative binomial part of the model. These estimates are to be interpreted as the increase in log number of events associated with a one-unit increase in the explanatory variable. The right side of the model column reports the "inflate" part of the model, or the extent to which there are more zeroes in the data than implied by the negative binomial distribution. These estimates are interpreted as an inverse logistic regression model, or the probability of a non-zero event. Conversely, a negative estimate in the inflate equation means that an increase in the explanatory variable increases the probability of observing at least one event in that grid cell.

Model 1 reports a base model for this analysis. Models 2 through 6 add a single border variable to test the effect of border towns, and their unique cross-border institutions, on rebel capabilities. The specification to test for support of this study’s hypotheses. I restrict discussion of the inflate equation simply due to ambiguity of the estimations’ relevance to the causal hypotheses of this paper. In all but one model (model 2 – Border Towns), the coefficient on distance to border is clearly significant at the 99% level and lends overall support to the central hypothesis that territories closer to international borders are likely to experience more rebel conflict relative to territories farther away from borders. Considering the base model (model 1), the coefficient on the predictor suggests that, on average, for every percentage increase in a territory’s distance to border, rebel conflict counts decrease by 9.8% compared to other territories in the same country, holding all other parameters constant.

Model 2 adds border towns to the base model to test the effect of border towns, and their unique cross-border institutions, on rebel capabilities. The significance and sign of the coefficient on the border town variable suggests some support for this theory. The estimation suggests that compared to other non-similar territories in the same country, border towns will experience more rebel conflicts by 6.3%. Holding all other parameters constant. It is also important to note that, the level of significance fell on the distance to border variable when the border town variable was added to the base model. Comparing the two models, this supports the notion that there is a distinct effect on rebel conflict capabilities from institutions that are present in border towns, rather than in territories that are simply near de jure international boundaries.

Model 3 and 4 add dummy variables for mountains and forests that border a border, respectively. The non-significance of the coefficients for these variables does not support the theory that rough terrain at the border significantly increases a rebels’ territorial capabilities. Model 5 adds a dummy variable for excluded groups at the border. The non-significance of the coefficient on the excluded groups variable does not support the theory that borders provide access across transnational networks for the purposes of excluded groups to contest the state.

---

**Table 2. Rebel Battles Estimation Results.** Note: Robust z-statistics in parentheses (clustered by country). * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
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<tr>
<td>Distance to Border</td>
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<td>-0.068***</td>
<td>-0.057**</td>
<td>-0.005**</td>
<td>-0.005**</td>
<td>-0.005**</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.056)</td>
<td>(0.040)</td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Population</td>
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<td>0.002***</td>
<td>0.005***</td>
<td>0.010***</td>
<td>0.011***</td>
<td>0.010***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border Sources</td>
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<td>-0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(0.001)</td>
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<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nearest Resources</td>
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<td>0.056**</td>
<td>0.065**</td>
<td>0.055**</td>
<td>0.055**</td>
<td>0.055**</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.010***</td>
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<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.000***</td>
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<td>0.000***</td>
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<td>Border Forest</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>-0.000***</td>
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<td>-0.000***</td>
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<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border Resources</td>
<td>-0.000***</td>
<td>-0.000***</td>
<td>-0.000***</td>
<td>-0.000***</td>
<td>-0.000***</td>
<td>-0.000***</td>
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<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-2.059***</td>
<td>4.073***</td>
<td>2.705***</td>
<td>2.128***</td>
<td>2.024***</td>
<td>1.981***</td>
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<td>Const</td>
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<td>(2.680)</td>
<td>(2.654)</td>
<td>(2.648)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>121</td>
<td>121</td>
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<td>121</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prob &gt; chi2</td>
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<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Lastly, model 6 adds the border resources dummy variable to test the hypothesis that easily lootable resources near the border are more likely to spur conflict as rebels have greater access to illicit outflow channels and new networks. The non-significance of the coefficient on the border resources variable suggests that border resources do not have a significant influence on border effect on rebels capability. By hypothesising and testing for the effects of border towns, lootable resources, rough terrain, and testing for this analysis, this hypothesis demonstrates the concept of borders as complex and unique spaces, which require more nuanced attention rather than simplification.

In addition to the theoretical contribution of this interdisciplinary approach, the empirical results generally support this differentiated approach to a border’s effect on the rebel conflict capabilities. The data structure permits a unit of analysis that is largely insensitive to geographic assumptions of the state as a homogeneously sovereign space and the results suggest indeed, borders exert a gradiated effect on rebel capabilities. Ultimately, this supports the primary hypothesis that borders provide rebels with opportunities to access out-of-country resources and support. Additionally, the results suggest that border towns are at a significantly higher risk of rebel conflict compared to other territories within the country. The hypothesized causal link is that the unregulated cross-border institutions prevalent at many borders contribute to a border territories can also facilitate material and personnel transfers in and out of the country. Rebels’ exploitation of these cross-border linkages ultimately implies the capabilities to rebel operations in the area, permitting a greater projection of power. Notably, the results also suggest that neither resources, rough terrain, nor excluded groups at the border expressed a significant relationship with rebel capability.

Despite the consistency of results, the empirical approach only presents correlational evidence for the relationship between border territories and rebel conflict counts and cannot fully evaluate the causal links that lead to these results. Further analysis is necessary to strengthen these results. Here, qualitative approaches can complement these findings. Specifically, the empirical results suggest that border towns, had a large effect on cross-border conflict capability compared to territories near de jure boundaries. Border towns are sites of complex cross-border and often self-regulating institutions. Further, variables related to geographic defensibility and conflict incentive at the border were not found to influence the risk of conflict one way or the other (supporting a distinction to the effect of border town institutions. While this analysis has presented evidence that supports a differentiated institutional effect of border towns on conflict risk, qualitatively identifying the causal channels on conflict risk within these border towns is hypothesised to be a fruitful avenue for further investigation.

Ultimately, conflict analysis stands to significantly benefit from a better understanding of territorial influence. This hypothesis bakes the gradiated effect onto the final estimation results. Thirdly, I disaggregate the length of the border into 50km segments of the border. Of the 14,120 rebel battle events in SSA from 1997-2019, about half (46.3%) occurred within 50km of an international border with a neighbouring country. Understanding this simplistic geographic observation can provide policy practitioners with additional contextual knowledge for reducing violent armed conflict in the region. The borderlands literature is well placed for this task and in this paper, I explore these corollary channels of conflict onset. The results in this paper present an opportunity to build more granular territorial research and provide stronger frameworks for analysis of civil conflict hazards at the border.

6.0 Annex. Resulting countries present in the data sample

|----------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|--------------------------|------------|---------------|-----------------------------|-------------|----------------------|----------|-----------|-------|-------|-------|-------------|----------|--------|---------|---------|---------|-----------|-----------|------------|-----------|-----------|-------------|-----------|---------|-------------|-------------|---------|---------|---------|--------|---------|

Notes

1. An example of international cooperation to fight cross-border insurgencies is Nigeria-Cameroon cooperation against Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria.
2. The complete definition of rebels provided by Raleigh et al. (2010) to populate the dataset is: Rebel groups are identified as political organizations designed to counter an established governing regime within a state through engaging in violent acts. Rebel groups are either acknowledged, de facto or recognized by the state. In addition, they must be able to be identified as outside of immediate members, and use violence as the primary means to pursue political goals (655).
3. While population size is acknowledged to change over time, meaningful inter-temporal sensitive time data is not available. While the Gpv4 dataset does provide data for 9-year periods, they explicitly acknowledge that the data does not reflect a true time series as the population estimates are derived from the same input population data and interpolated between years. Given that population growth rates are slow to change over decades, this variable still serves as a reasonable and useful structural proxy for population size within the gridded cell.

4. Recent work has shown that testing for zero inflation using the standard Stata command does not work in this context. To adjust for this, the Vuong test was performed with Akaike information criterion (AIC) and Bayesian information criterion (BIC) test predictions. See Desmarais and Harden (2013) for more information.

5. The infinite equation results suggest that a test of the grid structure’s performance, rather than relevant to corollary channels of conflict onset. This results suggest that the grid structure is well suited to identifying conflict onset when considering the signs of the coefficients. For example, the infinite equation results for all models suggest that more populous locations had a higher probability of seeing at least one war event (negative coefficients suggest the probability of observing a non-zero event). This may be an unsurprising attribute of the data structure; conflict is likely to occur where people are located. However, the effect of population on conflict is more robustly explored in Raleigh and Hegre’s (2009) spatial analysis. Similarly, the infinite equation’s results suggest that nearby rebel battles predict a higher probability of seeing at least one war event in the reference cell. Again, this could be related to the spatial density of the grid structure: rebel battles occur near other rebel battles (the data indicates a 44% correlation). But, considering the spatial nullipower theories described, this is also theoretically sound.

Works Cited


Anderson, Doris, Martin Klatz, and Marie Sandberg. 2012.


In popular media, and sometimes even in academia, people in motion across borders are described as “precarious”; their lives are precarious, their journeys are precarious, their existence is one of precarity. Yet, precarity is not—and never has been—an emergent property of people or their actions. Precarity is a function of the state. It is the state which defines precariousness through policy, action (and inaction), and which inscribes that precariousness onto those bodies it wishes to regulate. By attaching the label of precariousness to migrants and refugees, rather than by describing the actions of states as “making precarious,” discourse obfuscates the disciplinary and normative powers of the state, both at its borders and throughout its area of control. By examining the experiences of non-binary, queer, and trans migrants at Canadian points of entry, and through a critical examination of the literature surrounding the concept of precarity, this paper argues that state interactions with vulnerable people in motion across borders constitute a claims-making process by which bodies are a) made precarious, and b) made into objects for moral regulation and discipline. Bodies in motion across borders are an empirical reality, but their precarity is constructed, reified by the state, and their existence subject to a normative discourse which paints them as threats to be regulated or repelled, or objects of humanitarian concern.

In early 2019, the Associated Press and other news organizations began to report allegations that a new round of crackdowns targeting LGBTQ citizens and activists in Chechnya, a region already infamous for its so-called ‘gay purges’ (PBS 2019). The stories featured grim accounts of people imprisoned on suspicion of being gay, who were then subjected to intense interrogation and even torture; two men were alleged to have died as a result. This was not the first time such purges had taken place in Chechnya. In 2017, LGBTQ activist groups and Amnesty International had reported on similar events, including imprisonment, torture and killings by state representatives as part of a wider social crackdown on state officials called “deviant” behaviours (PBS 2019). In response, gay rights activists and organizations began to establish clandestine networks to smuggle queer, non-binary and transgender people out of the region, and into the international refugee system, where they might find a chance at resettling. Organizations worked to move targeted people out of Chechnya and across borders to safety. The Canadian Railroad in Canada worked to move targeted people system, where they might find a chance at resettling. The construction of precariousness in..
The Chechnyan purges of LGBTI citizens is hardly new: one of the most recent reports, only 28 extend legal protections and rights to non-het- erosexual citizens. For much of the world, het erot�性 is effectively compulsory, with violators liable to face fines, prison sentences, and in some states throughout the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), death (The Human Dignity Trust 2019). In the face of such persecution, a growing number of non-heterosexual people opt to leave their home- lands in search of safety. Included in this category of precarious traveller are transgender, queer, and non-binary/non-conforming refugees, who are among the most vulnerable of all (Affan 2019).

Yet successful flight from homophobia and trans phobia is more difficult than simply fleeing one nation for another; as many of the national organizations will confirm, the journey of the refugee is a precarious one—the road of a queer, non-binary, or transgender refugee more precarious still. Refugees must pass through multiple layers of screening and vetting before arriving at a potentially safe haven, and once they do, there is no guarantee that their new home will be any more tolerant than the one they left behind. For queer, non-binary and transgender refugees, the layers of precarity faced by virtue of their refugee status are compounded by additional layers of scrutiny—and, hence, precarity—as claims agents and border personnel are tasked with assessing if such claimants are “really queer” (Murray 2014).

These experiences highlight the ways that precarity is less about the prioritization of persons, and more of a series of processes—of claims and counter-claims—involving individuals, states, policy, and policy execution—interact on and within the bodies of queers, non-binary and transgender refugees. These exchanges illustrate that issues of vulnerability and precarity are very much the concern of precarity—as much as a question of sociology as it is any other discipline. Precarity is a process; people are not precarious, and they do not only experience precariousness through other persons, but they are made precarious through interactions with others.

Data on the exact numbers of SOGIE claimants processed by the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) each year can be difficult to come by, but what data is available indicates the numbers of claimants remains steady at around 800 to 1,000. While the number of SOGIE claimants processed was 1,286, of which 883 were accepted and 372 were rejected (Figure 1). While the number of trans, queer and non-conforming refugees crossing into Canada is relatively small, they nevertheless represent a category of claimant that is especially susceptible to shifts in refugee policy, or to shifting political or social attitudes. This is especially true when the basis for their claims for asylum—persecution based on sexual orientation or gender identity—demand that they reveal aspects of themselves they may have spent a lifetime hiding.

This paper draws on the literature surrounding the experiences of queer, non-binary, and transgender refugees’ experiences at the border to examine the ways that precariousness is a concept and a process is socially constructed and grounded in the expres- sion of biopower. While these refugees come from many nations, their experiences with the power of borders share similar characteristics: of being unrecognized; of being stereotyped, illegitimated, and challenged to prove their “queer bona fides” to border agents and other representatives of the various refugee systems of the Global North. Beyond the experiences of queer, non-binary and transgender refugees, this paper argues all refugees are made precarious through their inter- actions with individuals, state policy and practice at the borderline. Further, this paper argues that the practice of ascribing the status of precariousness to the bodies of refugees, rather than locating it in the praxis of border enforcement, allows an understanding of the exploitation of undocumented and new immi- grant workers in sub-contracted cleaning and main- tenance jobs (Justice for Jane 2015). In the case of JFJ and related movements, ‘precarity’ described the asymmetry of power relations in the relationship between individual employers and their respective employers which embedded the term firmly within the micro and meso levels of sociological analysis; precariousness was an issue of small groups of people employing strategies to flex their bodies at the sub-national, regional, and municipal levels.

Elsewhere, precariousness has been used to catego- rize trans-boundary workers engaged in labour on temporary work permits and visas or through temporary labour programs or visa programs. As economic conditions, job security is tenuous and the risk of abuse or exploitation by employers is high (McLaughlin and Hennessey 2017). Employers moving across borders (Figure 1). IRB Data release: SOGIE and general claim decisions 2011-2015

Hodge, “Making Precarious: The Construction of Precarity in Refugee and Migrant Discourse”

The many (theoretical) faces of precarity

Precarity has long been an object of debate among academics of many disciplines, who have argued its precise meanings and import through successive waves of theorization as a motivating factor for worker move- ments standing in opposition to the deregulation of markets and the heightened job insecurities that grew from the economic policies of late-stage capitalism (Lazzarato, 2004). Indeed, precarity was central to the organizational practices of movements standing in opposition to the deregulation of markets and the heightened job insecurities that grew from the economic policies of late-stage capitalism (Lazzarato, 2004). Indeed, precarity was central to the organizational practices of movements standing in opposition to the deregulation of markets and the heightened job insecurities that grew from the economic policies of late-stage capitalism (Lazzarato, 2004). Indeed, precarity was central to

Hodge, “Making Precarious: The Construction of Precarity in Refugee and Migrant Discourse”

The socio (and biopolitical) of precariousness

When scholars and policy makers debate precariousness, they are flows of people “refugees” (thus deserving...
of protections) or "migrants" (and thus subject to standard border controls) there is often an unspoken heteronormativity and cis-normativity to the debates. Refugees are often depicted in media narratives as cisgender men, women, or tradition-
alized constructed family units (Lee, Jin and Bromtan 2011). This pattern obscures smaller groups of refugees whose identities place them outside of these parameters. This invisibility increases their risk and represents an additional layer of uncertainty to the comprehensiveness of their claims (Lee, Jin and Bromtan 2011). More than that however, the obfuscation of non-conforming refugees can often make it more difficult for domestic audiences viewing refugees through the lens of media coverage to identify and sympathize with them.

Flows of refugees and migrants are large and faceless unless and until attention is paid to specific examples of individuals whose stories are publicized and expanded as a sort of placeholder for the stories of all the others who travel with them (Cole 2017). When refugees in their tens of thousands made the harrowing journey across the Mediterranean in flimsy rafts and inflatable zombies, they remained unrecognizable to the cameras. Otherwise, until one of them—a small boy named Alan Kurdi—washed ashore after drowning and they became relatable as sons and mothers and fathers and daughters like any other (Figure 2) (Bouckaert, 2015). Through this child’s tragic death, observers were asked to think as sons and mothers and fathers and daughters like of all the others who travel with them (Cole 2017). When queer, trans, and non-binary refugees arrive at ports of entry in Canada, the United States, or other nations of the Global North, they are met not merely with the absence of identity status was expected by Canadian authorities, the rejection was due to a ruling by the Refugee Appeal Division of the Immigration and Citizenship Act. When they sought to prove their refugee status, how do they appeal for refugee status was rejected by Canadian authorities, the rejection was due to a ruling by the Refugee Appeal Division of the Immigration and Citizenship Act (Hersh 2017). In the case of an Angolan man named "Sebastian", whose application for refugee status was rejected by Canadian authorities, the rejection was due to a ruling by the Refugee Appeal Division of the Immigration and Citizenship Act. When they sought to prove their refugee status, how do they appeal for refugee status was rejected by Canadian authorities, the rejection was due to a ruling by the Refugee Appeal Division of the Immigration and Citizenship Act.
Making precarious

There is a tendency in literature surrounding international migrations to refer to refugees as “the precarious,” or to frame their experiences in terms of rational-choice logics that imply precarity emerges from refugees’ deliberate choices to cross national boundaries or undertake dangerous journeys by land or sea. It is certainly true that perilous crossings of the Mediterranean across the Mediterranean Sea, the Middle East or Latin America feature precarity as part of the journey: risky journeys are precarious journeys. Yet, this precariousness of circumstance is less relevant to refugee experiences than the process of making precarious. Not all refugees undertake dangerous journeys from active conflict zones or regions of political repression; some grew up in static refugee camps where their status as “precarious” was the result of policies or an external threat to their existence precarious. Just as citizenship or non-citizenship are statuses that result from active political processes, the precarious that sexual and gender minority groups face as they move through the refugee system in countries of the Global North is a process of recognition and exclusion. The precariousness of sexual and gender minorities is multilayered, formed of “precarities of place” (Barki, 2013), as well as through sustained interactions with border and refugee agents whose constant approval—and recognition—is a required element for continuing to benefit from the protections of refugee law.

In such cases, precariousness is not institutional, legal, or geographic but cultural. Cultural precariousness exists where the beliefs and identities of “atypical” (non-heteronormative or Othered) refugees encounter the structuring effects of border agent beliefs, practices, norms and values. In these spaces, there is no war forcing refugees to flee, no perilous crossings, from conflict zones or stormy waters; there is only the border agent and the cultural systems they represent. There is only the refugee’s identity and the fear that it will not map onto the cultural expectations of the person charged with assessing their claim. Cultural precariousness is not an emergent phenomenon which can be captured by the manifestation of biopower and the ability to regulate bodies moving through their interactions with border agents. Cultural precariousness makes refugees claiming persecution based on sexual orientation or gender identity face a terrible possibility: that their claim be rejected, or that their experiences be perceived as not the experiences of a refugee. Instead, they are subjected to a prolonged interaction with border agents, a process of “making precarious” whereby an individual’s identity, or more precisely the interaction between border agents, refugee claims adjudicators, and the claimants themselves and when this interaction is overlooked or obfuscated, it conceals the very real power relations present. When gender or sexual identity is deployed in refugee claims or in the categorization of the types of claims an individual refugee is making, it highlights the ways that national and international legal traditions and property relations are gendered: the ambiguous architecture of precarity: temporary protection, everyday living and migrant journeys of sexual and gender minorities.

The ambiguity and instability present in many queer, non-binary and transgender refugees is not a static label, nor is it solely involved with the specific act of fleeing conflict or persecution, though it is involved with both. Precarity in this context is a process that results from sustained interactions between border agents, refugee claims adjudicators, and the claimants themselves and when this interaction is overlooked or obfuscated, it conceals the very real power relations present. When gender or sexual identity is deployed in refugee claims or in the categorization of the types of claims an individual refugee is making, it highlights the ways that national and international legal traditions and property relations are gendered: the ambiguous architecture of precarity: temporary protection, everyday living and migrant journeys of sexual and gender minorities. The precarity of queer, non-binary and transgender refugees is not a static label, nor is it solely involved with the specific act of fleeing conflict or persecution, though it is involved with both. Precarity in this context is a process that results from sustained interactions between border agents, refugee claims adjudicators, and the claimants themselves and when this interaction is overlooked or obfuscated, it conceals the very real power relations present. When gender or sexual identity is deployed in refugee claims or in the categorization of the types of claims an individual refugee is making, it highlights the ways that national and international legal traditions and property relations are gendered: the ambiguous architecture of precarity: temporary protection, everyday living and migrant journeys of sexual and gender minorities.

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Summary

The precariousness of queer, non-binary and transgender refugees is not a static label; nor does it result from the specific act of fleeing conflict or persecution. Instead, the precariousness of queer, non-binary and transgender refugees is a process of “making precarious” whereby a person’s identity is subjected to sustained interactions with border agents, refugee claims adjudicators, and the claimants themselves. When gender or sexual identity is deployed in refugee claims or in the categorization of the types of claims an individual refugee is making, it highlights the ways that national and international legal traditions and property relations are gendered: the ambiguous architecture of precarity: temporary protection, everyday living and migrant journeys of sexual and gender minorities.

Notes

1. The use of the term “queer” in this paper reflects the author’s use of the more common use of the acronym to describe gender and sexual non-conformity. As public awareness—and acceptance—of non-conformity has grown, from LGB to LGBT to LGBTIQ, and beyond, the acronym can no longer represent the list of “recognized” identities, which imposes a form of categorization and separation of identities that may not necessarily exist in practice. By reframing from using this acronym and choosing instead to use “queer,” the author is adopting the position that queerness and non-conformity—and indeed “trans-ness”—do a much better job of incorporating ambiguity, resistance to categorization, and play than the more rigidly constructed acronym. This is a debatable position to take, as cate- gorizations can—and do—provide others with a sense of stability and belonging, but it is not the author’s intention to engage in this debate here.

2. Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and Expression—The term used by the Canadian Immigration and Refugees Board to refer to gender and sexual minority claimants.

References


Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. 2017. “Irmi- gration, Asylum and Refugees.” Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada’s New Guideline on Proceedings Involving Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity and Expression.” As a process of “making precarious” of an agent’s beliefs, values, expectations, and moral framings (their culture, in other words) establishes the context through which non-binary bodies must move as they seek recognition and safety. In effect, transgender, queer, and non-conforming refugees are often faced with multiple layers of challenges even if other categories of refugees are not. Transgender, queer, and non-conforming refugees face immense challenges navigating the physical dangers of unregulated movement across borders, only to find a lack of protections—even predestination—in refugee camps. Worse, even if their claims are registered and they are able to present their case to claims agents of a state like Canada, they are often required to “prove” their “queerness,” a process built on the presumption of normative beliefs about what “being queer” actually means. If a refugee cannot sufficiently prove to a (presumed cisgender, heterosexual) claims agent that they are in fact, “really queer” (Murray 2014). They may find their claims denied, even if their gender identity or sexual orientation are ostensibly protected by international agreements. Understood this way, precarious as a concept is seen not as a component of a refugee experience, but as part of the act of “making precarious” as something inscribed on them by the state.

When precariousness is externalized by the state and attached to refugee flows as though it were an emergent property of “atypical” movement across borders, it obfuscates the power relations that connect how and where states and international agencies render some bodies precarious. Precarity does not flow from the movement of refugees across borders; it is imposed upon them by states who seek to regulate, validate, or otherwise control bodies in motion.


https://journals.uvic.ca/index.php/bigreview
https://bigglobalization.org/
MOVING ATLAS

by Karen Yen

BETWEEN LAND AND SEA
16 x 20 inches / 40.5 X 50 cm
Mixed Media on Canvas
2018
SKY, LAND & SEA
Each: 24 x 30 inches / 61 x 76.2 cm
Mixed Media on Canvas
2018
CONVERGENCE
Each: 8 x 10 inches / 20.32 X 25.4 cm
Acrylics on Canvas
2018
CALAS
Each: 8 x 10 inches / 20.32 X 25.4 cm
Acrylics on Canvas
2018
MOUNTAINS AND MOON
18 x 18 inches / 45.72 x 45.72 cm
Mixed Media on Canvas
2018

HOPPING
20 x 20 inches / 50.8 x 50.8 cm
Acrylics on Canvas
2018
CROSSING 1
22 x 30 inches / 55.88 x 76.2 cm
Charcoal, Graphite on Paper
2018

CROSSING 2
22 x 30 inches / 55.88 x 76.2 cm
Charcoal, Graphite on Paper
2018
Poem:

**Borderlander**

Amanda Merritt

About the Poet:

Amanda Merritt is a poet and a creative writing instructor from Victoria, BC. Her debut poetry collection, *The Divining Pool*, was published in October 2017 by Wundor Editions, and was nominated for the 2018 Gerald Lampert award. Previously, she was awarded the 2015 Anstruther poetry prize, and was among the finalists included in Aesthetica’s 2017 Creative Writing Annual anthology. Her work appears in journals in Canada and the UK, including *Descant*, *Grain*, *Prairie Fire*, *Gwerty*, *Untethered*, and *Stand*. Amanda teaches creative writing at the University of Victoria.

For further information visit: amandamerritt.ca.

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**Borderlander**

Love struck and fear bound us, for a time
we were happy, roaming the citadel
of your meiotic dreams; sovereign
of rippling strath between heart beats,
was it for dominion or salvation
that I was claimed?

Listening in at the embankment,
I was a geography of endings
where lowland feeds silt to sea;
growing stronger by day I made
preparations, for refuge is the imperative
to flee. I studied the rhythm of footfall
on flagstones, learned by touch the sinews
of containing wall, memorised the places
where mortar had softened and bricks might fall—
but what did I know of outside:
peopled by rooms of locked faces
and one-way eyes, boundary of another’s skin,
for which, mother, you have risked everything.
vagabond wind | sans-papiers

Natasha Sardzoska

Poems:

vagabond wind
sans-papiers

In English, Spanish, and French
Translations by Natasha Sardzoska (with Elsa Barreda Ruiz)

Originally published in:
Natasha Sardzoska, COCCYX (PNV Publishing, Skopje, 2019)

About the Poet:

Natasha Sardzoska (1979), poet, writer, essayist, polyglot translator and interpreter was born in Skopje in Macedonia. She holds a PhD in anthropology from the Eberhard Karls University of Tübingen, Sorbonne Nouvelle in Paris and University of Bergamo. She has published the poetry books Blue Room, Skin, He pulled me with invisible string, Living Water, Coccyx and short stories. Her book Skin was published in the USA and Italy; her poems are translated in international literary reviews. Her poem “Doll on Strings” has been published in the International Poetry Anthology against child abuse. She has performed at international poetry festivals among which: Ars Poetica in Bratislava; Words Wide Open in Genova; Scream in Rijeka; in the Revoltella Museum in Trieste; in the Academy of Arts for the Poetry Festival of Berlin; at the Sha’ar International Poetry Festival performing with sax, contrabass and contemporary dance in the Yaffa Theatre in Tel Aviv.

For more, see Natasha’s Profile on Versopolis Poetry

Contact: sardzoaskinatasha@gmail.com

at airports I am the traveler
examined for several times
random check they tell me
but I do not travel
nowhere
I tell them
I do not go anywhere
I do not even return
I am not a barbel in extinction
neither fardel which will determine the directions
they seek and scratch my bags
but I have nothing
nothing which will throw a shade on their fears
they ask me where do I go
but neither myself I do not know
which is the hotel address
what is written in the invitation letter
do I have a return ticket
I am a fish on dry soil
I tell them I want to move away
but I feel fear
can’t you see
I do not have north nor south
I am the runway uprooted from your royal land
and still I am the absence of land
of your time
I am the hourglass
you cannot wait to trickle
nor to seep you
but you still seek
for the crumbling time
to your royal beginnings
to take you back

silba el viento dentro de mí
estoy desnudo.
dueño de nada, dueño de nadie, ni siquiera dueño de mis certezas, soy mi cara en el viento, a contraviento, y soy el viento que me golpea en la cara.

eduardo galeano
sans-papiers

I am blowing the air around
I keep silent in their eyes
and they are running away

yes, they are probably running away
to relieve the turbines that I have drifted away
the lacuna carved by my spine
and they hit me with the pendulum of the space
they look at me with suspect and fear
they scratch me in their mind
and then they leave me
without seal without stamp
without humanity

and they send me beyond their borders
where I was a foreigner
but I did not remain

well I did not
even have a gamble to lose
to calm down my bones
and save them
from insanity

viento vagabundo

silba el viento dentro de mí.
estoy desnudo.
dueño de nada, dueño de nadie, ni siquiera dueño de mis certezas, soy mi cara en el viento, a
contraviento, y soy el viento que me golpea en la cara.
eduardo galeano

en los aeropuertos soy el pasajero
controlado muchas veces
random check me dicen
pero yo no viajo
no voy a ninguna parte
les digo
ni me voy
ni siquiera regreso
no soy una especie en extinción
ni el eje que determinará la dirección

ellos buscan en mis bolsas
pero yo no tengo nada
nada que opaque sus miedos
me preguntan a dónde voy
pero ni yo misma no lo sé
ni cual es la dirección del hotel
qué dice la carta del anfitrión
y si tengo un boleto aéreo de regreso

soy un pescado en tierra seca
les digo que quiero escapar
pero tengo miedo
no ven
no tengo ni norte ni sur
una pista excavada en su tierra real
y sin embargo estoy ausente de la tierra
de su tiempo
soy el reloj de arena
a la que no esperan que caiga
ni que los deje
aunque estén buscando
una mancha de tiempo
que les devuelva

a su principio imperial
sans-papiers

estoy soplando el aire alrededor
guardo mi silencio en sus ojos
y ellos están huyendo

probablemente están huyendo
para aliviar las turbinas que he hecho
las lagunas ahondadas de mi espina dorsal

y me pegan con el pendúlico del espacio
me miran con duda y miedo
me rasgan en su miente

y luego me dejan sin sello ni timbre
sin humanidad

y me despachan detrás de las fronteras
donde era extranjero
aun no me quedé

y sin embargo
no tenía nada que perder
para calmar mis huesos
y para salvarlos
de la locura

le vent vagabond

silba el viento dentro de mí
estoy desnudo
dueño de nada, dueño de nadie, ni siquiera dueño de mis certezas, soy mi cara en el viento, a
drivencielo, y soy el viento que me golpea en la cara.
eduardo galeano

sur les aéroports je suis le voyageur
qui est inspecté plusieurs fois
random check disent-ils

mais je ne voyage nulle part

je leur dis
je n'y vais pas

je ne rentre pas

je ne suis pas un barbeau en voie d'extinction
ni un fardeau qui déterminera la direction

ils fouillent mes sacs
et je n'ai rien

rien qui puisse ocultor leur peurs
ils me demandent où je vais
moi même ne le sais pas
et quelle est l'adresse de l'hôtel

et que dit la lettre de l'hôte
et si j'ai un billet d'avion aller-retour

je suis un poisson à terre sèche

je leur dis que je veux partir
mais j'ai peur

ne voyez pas

je n'ai ni nord ni sud

je suis une piste qui a été creusée sur votre terre royale

et pourtant je suis absence de terre
de votre temps

je suis le sablier

ne vous attendez pas à couler

ni à vous décoller

alors que vous êtes à la recherche du temps friable
qui à votre début impérial
vous remportera
sans-papiers

j’anéantis l’air autour de moi
et je me tais dans leurs yeux
et ils fuient

probablement ils fuient
pour soulager les turbines que j’ai fait bouger
les lacunes creusées par ma colonne vertébrale

et ils me frappent avec le pendule de l’espace
ils me regardent avec le doute et la peur
ils me griffent dans leur cerveau
et me laissent par la suite
sans sceau sans timbres
sans humanité

et ils m’envoient derrière leurs frontières
où j’étais un étranger
mais je ne le suis pas resté
alors que je n’avais même pas une garantie à perdre
pour calmer mes os
et les sauver
de la folie
Elisa Ganivet **

Some Consideration on the Aesthetics of the Geopolitical Wall *

The border as a wall proposes an archaic static apparatus of rejection of the other-foreigner contrasting with the image of a globalized world where only economic and technological interests seem to flow. These walls crystallize a malaise that can be elucidated through Art. By capturing the historical iconography, we understand the values that shape the current geopolitical wall.

Indeed, the artistic interpretation of the wall makes a round-trip with the notion of the border. Thus, the aesthetic of the border wall can be traced to the belief in divinities and the protection of a group. Going back to ancient Egypt for instance, the God Aton was worshiped as the creator of the border. From 1360 BCE at the site of Amarna, stelae implanted and sculpted in his effigy marked a territory; its sacred value also forces respect. Beyond dogma, the myths of fortress cities such as the legendary Jericho (Figure 2) or Troy, stimulate creative inspiration. The beginning of the Trojan War is narrated in Homer’s Iliad and Virgil’s Aeneid. After being punished by Zeus, Poseidon and Apollo built a wall surrounding the city. From an iconographic point of view, the medieval illuminations unfold the story particularly insisting on the horse’s entrance. Between 1340 and 1350 Benoît de Sainte-Maure the French poet, evokes a timeless horse: “And very solid wheels. Then, all together, they attempted to move it forward. Everyone participated: they pulled, they pushed, and made a great effort. They had a great deal of difficulty driving forward this machine in the shape of a horse”. The Mexican contemporary artist ERRE took again this masterful maneuver in 1997 during the InSite festival ubicated between Tijuana and San Diego. ([Figure 3] Above a border stone, his sculpture of a monumental wooden Horse entitled Toy an-Horse)

The god embodied by the statue marks out the border. The artistic interpretation enlightens us about its evolution but also of the danger of a flattening of the perception. The walled solution of a boundary reveals only the tip of the iceberg of a complex geopolitical articulation. The danger of a fantasized hyperreality, became sensationalist, it can be captured by contemporary artists and inform us of the state of the so-called globalized world.

1:2. A French translation of this essay will be published in our next issue, *BIG Review* 1:2.

** Elisa Ganivet holds a Ph.D. in Philosophy, She is an Art historian and Cultural Manager. Since 2009 she investigates border wall aesthetics.

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In some cases, the representation of civil-military defense magnifies the architectural work (iconography [example]). The Great Wall of China is one of the most significant and it leads to an aesthetic production over the centuries. Therefore it enters the collective imaginary as a supreme symbol of defense. Under the Tang dynasty (618–907), the “Borders and Frontier Fortress Posts Groups” created the figure of the soldier as a warrior fighting along the Great Wall. Western perception of this architectural work is formed through the official and unofficial missionaries who mapped the territory in 1584 and in 1667. And in a 1935 poem, Mao Zedong would even have written: “He who has not climbed the Great Wall is not a true man”. Indeed this Wall has also fascinated contemporary artists. [Figure 4] In 1988 the performance of Marina Abramovic covered her body with plaster to record the end of their relationship. For 90 days in a spiritual rite, they each walked 2,500 km on their own on the so-called body of the hermeneutic text, in the confidence to create their ultimate artwork and to break up, metamorphosed by this extreme experience.

The truth is that the static wall generates a mobile aesthetic (poem, music, engraving, painting, performance). The last 30 years is the twentieth century that we observe the appropriation of this object by the artists. In this, the Berlin Wall is symbolic of a political strategy. Again, we must discern an ontological shift in collective perception. If at first glance the murals of the East Side Gallery seem to express a political act, it is not the case. In 1980, it was decided to leave this project and to maintain the wall. The 118 artists who were part of the work of art by the Berlin Wall have now created a 1.3 km moving closer to the river Spree for the occasion. [Figure 5] [Figure 6]

The radical verticalities of these new borders interrogate the relation to Othersness, the right to mobility, the decision-making hegemony of some governments… At this point, the iron Curtain of the Cold War is slightly an example. But its specificity were different: it was indeed initiated by an authoritarian regime officially against any western influence: liberal democracy, capitalist economy, powerful bourgeoisie, individual initiative, NATO… Whatever the intrinsic nature of these new walls, the artists always find a way to transgress the border situation...

In order to close this sketch on the aesthetics of the walls, [Figure 8] let us turn to the one that is now at the heart of the debate about Trump presidency. In fact, the dialectic and the actions taken concerning migration policy and their dramatic consequences have as a result to make this wall even more the seventy border walls (the circumference of the Mediterranean Sea). If some artists and artivists continue to produce work, they must be aware that the official and unofficial border policies and their dramatic consequences have as a result to make this wall more the seventy border walls that located between Mexico and the United States, the West Bank, the Palestinian side (between Jerusalem and the West Bank). The context of Palestine as the largest open-air prison in the world and that of graffiti as a tool of resistance has become a tool of political disqualification. Constancy firstly means a creative phase of foreboding/feeling and then comes a resistance/commitment creation. The latter is articulated according to different degrees of denunciation (in situ or via a diaspora) and by the spontaneous emergence of alternative creative bursts, which can then be institutionalized in museums and art galleries. Today, the expansion of walls has become a lucrative market for specialized companies. The media echo can generate an ambivalent effect where the recovery of the phenomenon (among other things by the artists) creates hyper-real confusion. Briefly, we are referring here to visionary artists who best sum up the essence of three emblematic closed borders, that of Berlin, that around the territory of Israel and that located between Mexico and the United States.

The protean work of Joseph Beuys perfectly reveals the perception of the object. Indeed, this artist surprises by exceeding the expected cliché. In 1964, he recommends heightening the wall by 5 cm. The proportions would finally then become credible and aesthetic. Thus we could go beyond the physical wall and beyond the mental one, the one who hinders freedom. The fulfillment of the human being goes through art. Art is Life. Life is art. The Beuvian belief remains the following: ART = CAPITAL. It refers to art that can influence society through the questions it asks. Beuys who himself was labeled a West German artist, will play the subtleties that his position granted him. Later in 1986, he radicalized his position by believing that the private capitalist system and the communist system both contributed to the creation of the wall. But after having been close to the object for twenty years, he started to think of it as sort of work of art, because the sensitive nature of the area that borders with Mexico. Currently about 1/3 of the total length (3145 km) is secure. A long mutual history between these two countries has to be pointed out there. Their official and unofficial nationalization?

Why make the wall “beautiful”, give it an aura, as with any work of art, if this is exactly what bothers people, if this intrudes into their social and political environment? The wall is not democratic, but art democratizes it.

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Figure 1. Hans Holbein, Terminus, the Device of Erasmus (painting) c. 1532 © The Cleveland Museum of Art, Gift of Dr. and Mrs. Sherman E. Lee in memory of Milton S. Fox 1971.

Figure 2. Gustave Doré, The Walls of Jericho Fall Down (etching) 1866 © Public domain

Figure 3. Marcos Ramírez ERRE, Toy-an-Horse (installation) 1997 © Marcos Ramírez ERRE. Courtesy of the artist, InSite Archive

Figure 4. Zheng Lianjie, The Wall—Commemorate for the German Reunification, (performance, drawing, photography) 1990 © Zheng Lianjie. Courtesy of the artist
Ganivet, “Aesthetics of the Geopolitical Wall”

Figure 5. Gedenkstätte Berliner Mauer, 25th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall, November 9, 2014 © Photo: Elisa Ganivet

Figure 6. Petrov Ahner, Protest against the dismantling of the East Side Gallery, Berlin, March 1, 2013 (photography) © Petrov Ahner. Courtesy of the artist

Figure 7. Banksy, Palestinian Graffiti (graffiti) 2005 © www.banksy.co.uk

Figure 8. Larissa Sansour, Bethlehem Bandolero (performance, video) 2006 © Larissa Sansour. Courtesy of the artist
In the early 2010s, the Borders in Globalization research project (BIG) began advancing an original and counterintuitive argument about borders and globalization: “borders in globalization are processes that in many instances are fundamentally ‘a-territorial’ because the border is ultimately carried by individuals, goods, and/or information” (BIG Progress Report, p. 21). The new international borders are not confined to territory. Sometimes, increasingly, they are global: multiple, relational, functional, mobile, fractured and scattered. For example, states have been “implementing border crossings at the source of movement [and] new local and global border ‘markers’ appear in regulatory systems and production chains organizing the mobility of trade flows and humans” (Brunet-Jailly 2019). States are now able to enforce their borders far from the boundary line, at foreign airports and seaports, midflight or on cruise ships, through placement of prescreening officers and infrastructure, electronic kiosks, biometric data, algorithms, product codes, microchips, GPS, and more. This means that borders have not diminished under globalization. On the contrary, they have multiplied. In some ways, for better or worse, borders have become partially liberated from territory.

When I first encountered the idea of aterritorial borders, I found it compelling and almost obvious, like something that had been waiting to be named. So I was somewhat surprised to discover that many students and academics, including those studying borders, found the concept difficult to understand or even resisted it.

The more predominant view about borders and territory can be characterized as follows. Borders are complex, contested, and contingent processes, governed by states and multiple levels of government as well as by non-government actors. But in the final analysis, borders remain fundamentally territorial. The bordering of space and community may not be strictly confined to the boundary line but remains more or less tethered to it or adjacent. For example, the literature on border studies has been dominated by the study of borderlands, generating insights into the mutually constitutive relationship between borders and the cultures, histories, and politics of the regions adjoining and straddling them (Alvarez 1995, Rogan 1999, Sahlins 1989). The Journal of Borderlands Studies and Geopolitics are emblematic of this research field. More recently, scholars have developed new concepts, such as
Agnew’s argument is not obvious but it is compelling. He corrects a common and misguided understanding of sovereignty and globalization as oppositionally related, as antithetical political realities. According to the predominant conceptualization, sovereignty and globalization operate in zero-sum terms, with one waxing as the other wanes. In this conventional view, globalization threatens the exclusive fusion of the ideas of territory and sovereignty, which is conflated with the term “borders”. Rather than singular or abstract sovereignty, Agnew develops the idea of “sovereignty regimes,” or “effective sovereignty” or “sovereignty bargains,” to emphasize that in practice political power takes many different forms. The most familiar type, “classic/territorial”, which is premised on a unitary political community and strict territoriality, is just one type of sovereignty regime. Another, which we term “a-territorial”, is patterns of power and space differently, more imbricated, networked rather than contiguous, with scattered hierarchies of political authority. A third kind of sovereignty regime, Agnew calls “integrationist,” referring to regional-nodal or federated arrangements, of which the political communities and sovereignities operate in singularity, complementarity, and with different lexicons, on the aterritoriality of state. We can conclude by observing that Agnew and Brunet-Jailly both converged, via different paths, on the right. Rather, we should strive to comprehend the complex and counterintuitive ways that borders and sovereignty operate in the twenty-first century. This is an important conceptual shift that has significant ramifications for a wide range of policy areas. Neither borders nor sovereignty are fundamentally threatened by globalization, despite persistent concerns to the contrary across the entire political spectrum (“borderless world” on the left, “globalist threats to sovereign borders” on the right). Rather, we should strive to comprehend the complex and counterintuitive ways that borders and sovereignty operate in the twenty-first century. This is an important conceptual shift that has significant ramifications for a wide range of policy areas. Neither borders nor sovereignty are fundamentally threatened by globalization, despite persistent concerns to the contrary across the entire political spectrum (“borderless world” on the left, “globalist threats to sovereign borders” on the right). Rather, we should strive to comprehend the complex and counterintuitive ways that borders and sovereignty operate in the twenty-first century. This is an important conceptual shift that has significant ramifications for a wide range of policy areas. Neither borders nor sovereignty are fundamentally threatened by globalization, despite persistent concerns to the contrary across the entire political spectrum (“borderless world” on the left, “globalist threats to sovereign borders” on the right). Rather, we should strive to comprehend the complex and counterintuitive ways that borders and sovereignty operate in the twenty-first century. This is an important conceptual shift that has significant ramifications for a wide range of policy areas. Neither borders nor sovereignty are fundamentally threatened by globalization, despite persistent concerns to the contrary across the entire political spectrum (“borderless world” on the left, “globalist threats to sovereign borders” on the right). Rather, we should strive to comprehend the complex and counterintuitive ways that borders and sovereignty operate in the twenty-first century. This is an important conceptual shift that has significant ramifications for a wide range of policy areas. Neither borders nor sovereignty are fundamentally threatened by globalization, despite persistent concerns to the contrary across the entire political spectrum (“borderless world” on the left, “globalist threats to sovereign borders” on the right). Rather, we should strive to comprehend the complex and counterintuitive ways that borders and sovereignty operate in the twenty-first century. This is an important conceptual shift that has significant ramifications for a wide range of policy areas. Neither borders nor sovereignty are fundamentally threatened by globalization, despite persistent concerns to the contrary across the entire political spectrum (“borderless world” on the left, “globalist threats to sovereign borders” on the right).
as the term “sovereignty” could be swapped out for the term “borders” in Agnew’s argument, we could also swap out the term “globalization” with “migration,” since migration is an aspect of globalization (one globalization process among many others). Making such a substitution begins to disrupt the pervasive and false dichotomy of borders and migration, which wrongly presupposes that borders and migration, like sovereignty and globalization, are zero-sum terms. But that’s another task.*

Notes

1 The idea of a territorial borders can be traced by the work of the Borders in Globalization research program, which began in 2013. For example: our research hypothesizes that contemporary borders in globalization are processes that in many instances are fundamentally ‘a-territorial’. We assume that bordering processes are not uniquely territorial anymore, but fundamentally linked to interactions across the world. Our research program approaches this set of assumptions from the perspectives of networks and flows that each have a history, are cultural, are fluid in nature like trade, migrations and environmental changes, and security, and ultimately have led to new forms of governance. Borders and bordering processes are not territorial because the border is ultimately ‘carried’ by individuals, goods, and/or information (BIG Progress Report, p. 9).

2 While the terms ‘a-territorial’ and ‘a-territoriality’ (or ‘a-territorial’ and ‘a-territoriality’) emerged from the BIG project, the basic idea goes back further. See, for example:

Today, non territorial (sic) borders are not always located on territories, for instance processes of preexistence of goods or people may be done anywhere but at the boundary line where they often make the least sense. Then borders result from competing production and re-production practices that are fundamentally rooted in individual actions, themselves deeply rooted in economic, political and cultural interests and motivations (Brunet-Jailly 2011, p. 4).

Traces of this idea can also be found in Walters (2006), Muler (2008).

2 Breaking down the binary opposition of borders and migration is one of the aims of Carpenter, Kelly, and Schmidtke (forthcoming).

Le terme de frontière permet de mettre en mots des phénomènes de différenciation. En droit, de manière générale, la frontière internationale étatique exprime un rapport de différenciation juridique de format territorial, de forme linéaire et de fonction de limite. Ce court article présente une revue serrée des idées essentielles du juriste Paul de Geouffre de La Pradelle au sujet de ce qu’il entend par frontière en droit international. Les travaux de cet auteur, relativement oubliés mais encore cités à travers le monde par les connaisseurs, sont indispensables pour les études sur le thème de la frontière, des limites internationales et du visage frontalier La Pradelle a, en effet, produit une théorie juridique originale, complète et riche sur la frontière dans sa thèse publiée en 1928 intitulée “La frontière : étude de droit international”. Comme il le dit lui-même, il a rompu avec la tradition. En résumé de sa thèse, l’auteur défendait l’idée que la frontière, avant comme après la délimitation, était une “zone” et que cette frontière (zone) ne se confondait pas avec la notion de ‘limite’. Ce faisant, Paul de La Pradelle distinguait clairement, au plan juridique et juridique, d’une part la “limite”, d’autre part la “frontière”. Inspiré par Friedrich Ratzel, son idée principale peut donc s’écritre comme suit : la limite est une ligne, la frontière est une zone. Pour La Pradelle, si la “frontière” est une “zone territoriale complexe” (1928, p.14) ou un “régime territorial complexe” (ibid.) ; la “limite” est, et ne peut être, qu’une “ligne” (p.17). Après avoir présenté brièvement l’auteur, nous nous intéresserons essentiellement...

* Note: Cet article sera publié en espagnol pour le second numéro de BIG Review (1.2) et en anglais pour le troisième numéro (2.1). Cette breve articulo se publicara en espanhol en el numero 2.1. Ce breve articolo se publierà en italien e le numero 2.1.

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https://journals.uvic.ca/index.php/bigrview
https://bigglobalization.org/

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La thèse de 1928

Son ouvrage de 1928 contient une intro-duction de trois chapitres (pp.9-51), une première partie qui porte sur « Le droit international moderne et les limites des États (La Délimita-
tion) » (pp.53-89), une deuxième partie qui porte sur « Le droit international moderne et le régime de la frontière (Le Voisinage) » (pp.223-306). Le dernier chapitre, qui porte sur le sujet, il y prend l’idée qu’il n’est d’autre frontière que les frontières politiques (p.131). Il y rappelle aussi que le phénomène de la frontière est apparue dès la formation des groupements sociaux (p.134). Pour La Pradelle, la frontière est envisageable en droit public interne et en droit international public. D’un côté, la frontière est envisagée par le droit public interne, c’est alors le mode d’expression du caractère de la discontinuité et des limites des États (p.14). Dans ce prisme, la frontière correspond à l’ensemble des institutions spécialement créées dans la zone périphérique du territoire dans un but de défense ou de discipline. C’est une zone de services publics, distincts des services de l’intérieur, et dont chacun portera le nom de « frontière douanière, la frontière militaire, la frontière maritime... » (ibid.).

D’un autre côté, la frontière est envisagée par le droit international public. Dans ce cas, la frontière est alors un « zone de contact et de relations de contiguous entre les États » (ibid.). Elle est « un lieu de passages et de conflits entre deux Etats dans un territoire mixte, résultant de la réunion de leurs zones périphériques territoriales respectives » (ibid.). La paix, l’offensive l’attaque, le trafic de drogue, la délinquance d’un Etat, la sécurité. Il précise que « le respect essentiel des limites n’est d’ailleurs qu’une question d’ordre public interne, c’est alors le terme traité où ces mêmes limites sont inscrites » (p.61).

Tout Etat ne peut procéder à aucune action directe au-delà de ses limites territoriales. Par exemple, la formule exécutoire d’un jugement étranger ne peut produire une délinquance au-delà de son territoire, directement ou indirectement. Elle doit être habilitée par le juge de cet État dans la procédure de l’exequatur (p.64). Ce que la frontière distingue strictement en les séparant mutuellement, c’est si les compétences spécifiques. Celles-ci ne s’inter-pénètrent pas, Ainsi, La Pradelle précise que la limite prend toute sa valeur réelle de limite en matière d’acte administratif : « Si quittant le domaine de la compétence purement internationale, la frontière est à cette fin service public qui sont rendus possibles par la délinquance d’un Etat étranger (en vertu des conventions internationales) » (ibid.). En résumé, en ce qui concerne le domaine de la justice, toutes les activités qui rentrent dans l’attribution de la puissance publique s’étalent à la limite territoriale (ibid.).

La Pradelle reconnaît l’existence de rapports de voisinage sur un et au-delà des limites territoriales (p.65). Elles sont comprises dans l’attribution de la puissance publique s’étalent à la limite territoriale. Ces rapports de voisinage créent, avec l’exemple très ancien de l’extradition (qui doit être soumise à la compétence spéciale liée à la zone des territoires des États), zone nationale, et relevant du droit international. Une autre forme de la délinquante spatiale des compétences d’exé-

La Pradelle a la compétence générale de l’État comme un « faiseau de compétences » (ibid.).

La Pradelle fait un parallèle très intéressant avec la théorie du Droit chez Hans Kelsen qui permet de situer la frontière dans une approche théorique de la frontière. De part et d’autre de la zone intermédiaire, on parle de compétences mixtes, et vraiment internationale, c’est-à-dire relevant du droit international, ce qui est le cas des frontières territoriales. En effet, cette référence à la compétence exclusive de l’État, la compétence exclusive des États, les pouvoirs de l’État, les pouvoirs de l’État sont créés dans l’attribution de la puissance publique s’étalent à la limite territoriale. (ibid.)
La frontière, expression prise dans son acception juridique comme une circonscription spatiale de délégation de pouvoirs publics (pp.489-505). Différemment, les conventions de collabora-

tion des services des Etats limitrophes. Ces accords de coopération internationale ont pour but d’‘affaibli les pouvoirs publics. Ceci inclut les services des forces de police, citons les conventions de coopération sanitaire, un lieu de collaboration des services de police (police criminelle, douane et sanitaire), un lieu de collaboration des services de police et de justice (justice communautaire, par exemple par les douanes et les tribunaux) et un lieu de collaboration des services municipaux (communication des archives d’état civil) (pp.501-505).

Au sens des droits, comme une institution désuète pour le fonctionnement des services des Etats. Il est précisé que dans les conventions relatives à la collaboration territoriale des services d’État (Chap.II), les conventions relatives à l’interprétation territoriale des services d’État (Chap.III) et des différends de frontière et leurs modes de règlement (Chap.IV). "Contraire au vul-gaire, habituellement adopté par les théoriciens du droit international, nous appliquons le mot ‘frontière’ exclusivement à la représentation d’une zone territoriale et l’opposant au terme de ‘limite’, susceptif de définir le paysage de la délimitation (ibid.). Ainsi, ‘les ramifications des services d’État tendent à rejoindre par-delà la limite celle du réseau de l’État’. Désormais, les gouvernements limoges signifient des conventions bilatérales fixant, d’une part, le statut spécial des individus ‘frontières’ et, d’autre part, le ‘régime de collabora-

rayonnement vers la périphérie ‘le rayonnement territorial des Etats avec des services publics. Ce régime frontalier cité n’autorisent pas les agents publics. De manière générale ‘la limite politique des Etats est une limite de compétence exécutive, non de compétence impétive. C’est une limite d’efficacité, non de validité de la règle de droit’ (p.510). Le fait qu’il y ait une limite stricto sensu à déborder à la fois au niveau des individus comme la vie politique des institutions administratives. Le régime de la frontière de La Pradelle vient juste- ment répondre à ces gênes qui naissent et prendre la forme de conventions bilatérales aménageant la vie des frontaliers et la collaboration des services publics respectifs des Etats.

La Pradelle rappelle que les gouvernements pour la détermination de la frontière territoriale et se trouve à cheval sur la limite. Le régime juridique de ce type de rapports de voisinage, ceux-ci établissant des arrondissements territoriaux, c’est-à-dire le lieu des frontaliers. Il considère les conventions relatives aux frontalières (frontières) et aux conventions de coopération qui traversent la limite territoriale et se démarquent indépendantes (p.489). La ‘limité assure justement cette indépendance, elle sert de ligne d’arrêt pour le fonctionnement des services publics. De manière générale ‘la limite politique des Etats est une limite de compétence exécutive, non de compétence impétive. C’est une limite d’efficacité, non de validité de la règle de droit’ (p.510). Le fait qu’il y ait une limite stricto sensu à déborder à la fois au niveau des individus comme la vie politique des institutions administratives. Le régime de la frontière de La Pradelle vient justement répondre à ces gênes qui naissent et prendre la forme de conventions bilatérales aménageant la vie des frontaliers et la collaboration des services publics respectifs des Etats.

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Richard E. Neustadt (1922) a souligné que «...ici que consacre le droit positif...» (1975, p.507).

Références

Nicholas de Genova (2002; 2005) coined the term “border spectacle” to refer to the dramatic, redundant visibility of border enforcements, including apprehension, detention, deportation: concrete state performances to ensure the discursive difference of Latino bodies. All the while, the law produces the racialized illegality of Latino immigrants in the U.S., which goes conveniently unnoticed. Illegality is perceived as an unrequited equation for all that is Latino, while the subtraction of labor off of Latino immigrant bodies takes a humanitarian toll that remains in the shadows. Alex Rivera in Sleep Dealer (2009) poses an important question about the future of border sovereignty in a present when capital and labor become intangible. This futuristic science fiction film resembles a present-time border crisis, and one that is all too predictable: capital will always expand to pervade new spaces, and so will border security. In a cinematic future when disposessed populations have found a way to migrate to the North without having to cross any borders, border spectacles will migrate south-wards, to extend the reach of sovereignty to laboring bodies and foreign landscapes.

The film tells the story of a migrant worker, Memo, who takes off in search for work after his father dies in a drone attack. The father works as an archetype to represent Memo’s connection with the past and the link to a tradition. At the same time, he is the scapegoat of border spectacle. Back in Santa Ana del Río, Memo’s rural hometown in Mexico, their community is being sold the water that once belonged to them. The American-controlled reservoir, now “Water Corp.” has intervened the landscape, forcing the members of the community as a threat to the integrity of the U.S. firm. At home, Memo learned rustic techniques to hack a connection to the global network, but
In China, they eat dogs....

The film presents the former as a reconcilatory proposal of the two characters as innocent participants of the same border spectacle, while the latter is connected to a deeper vindication of his origin. Most significantly, in the end he has found a middle ground for the restoration of his psychological order, as he starts a new life, far from the sleep dealers, and waters the new seeds for a woken future. He has returned to his roots without having to physically return home. The film poses an alternative representation of the digital-era subjectivity. As the characters come together to make reparation of the damage, their cooperation towards the end suggests a possible vision for the re-appropriation of their labor, against the continuation of border spectacle.

**Works Cited**

**Notes**
1. The Border on TV: What’s so Fascinating about Crimes at the Border?

**Martin Klatt**

The Danish-Swedish co-production *Broen* (The Bridge) has created a new format of crime shows on television in two ways. It is a fictional story of a single crime spread out to ten episodes of one hour, and it plays with the border phenomenon and cross-border police cooperation. *Broen* has so far had four seasons, first aired on Danish and Swedish TV from 2011 (season 1) to 2018 (season 4), translating into four crimes. The series' success has resulted in a direct US-Mexican and a UK-French remake and some “me-too” spin-offs as the Finnish Bordertown series or the German-Polish investigation team set in the real-life joint Polish-German police center on the border at Swiecko-Frankfurt (Oder) of the Polizeiruf 110 series. The four seasons of *Broen* have four different, outrageous crimes as their main plot but are connected to each other by side plots evolving around the main characters, the respective Danish and Swedish primary investigators of the crime. All seasons start on or in view of the iconic Øresund Bridge connecting Denmark and Sweden since 2000, the symbol of the Øresund cross-border cooperation region. It also becomes clear from the beginning that the crime committed in each of the four seasons has a cross-border dimension. Furthermore, the series is close to actual political developments in Denmark and Sweden, and it plays with the linguistic and cultural differences between the two Scandinavian countries. These are also reflected in the personalities of the chief investigators especially in seasons 1-2. Saga Norén (played by Sofie Helin) is a super-intelligent detective, but autistic, whereas her Danish partner in season 1-2, Martin Rohde, has a more untraditional approach to policework. He is played by Kim Bodnia, who usually plays the violent crook with a soft heart, for example in *I Kina spiser de hunde* (In China, they eat dogs). Rohde kills the murderer of season 2 and goes to prison. He is replaced by the more sensitive Henrik Sabroe (played by Thure Lindhardt), who is traum-
tized by the mysterious disappearance of his wife and their two daughters some years ago. In season four, Sabrebo engages in a love affair with Saga Nørn, entailing a lot of funny, ironic complications. The end is happy, but not the knot: Sabrebo is reunited with his surviving daughter. Still it is not that he, Saga and his daughter live together forever happily after. Saga frees herself from her guilt complex and quits the police force to start a new life.

The US remake The Bridge, screened in El Paso and Juárez, follows the Danish-Swedish plot closely in season 1, whereas plots in seasons 1 and 2 also include US-Mexican issues such as disappeared and murdered female laborers in the maquiladora industries. In the UK-French remake The Tunnel, episode 1 is a direct copy of episode 1 of the Danish-Swedish production, but then the story develops more independently. The Finnish Bordertown operates with shorter plots; the different crimes only cover 2-3 episodes. There is more focus on the development of the side plot of the Finnish detective Kari Sorjonen (played by Ville Virtanen) who transfers to the border town of Lappeenranta from Helsinki and his family. Here, his wife's past as a teenage girl-friend of the corrupt mayor and local tycoon sets a counterpoint to the eccentric detective and his methods. The cross-border element is his Russian-speaking colleague Lena Jaakola (Ana Sinisalo), who has a past in Russia's secret police FSB and continues to use their methods. The German-Polish Polizeiruf 110 is a German production but set in a German-Polish context in the real-life German-Polish Police Centre in operation since 2007. Police cooperation within the EU is a central part of the Schengen system of open borders, which allows police officers to cross borders in action of immediate pursuit and facilitates data exchange. It also includes the instrument of the European arrest warrant obliging any EU police force to arrest people searched in any EU member state. Still, institutionalized police cooperation does not exist across all EU member state borders.

While Bron's and The Bridge's plot about cross-border police cooperation is pure fiction, far from the reality of continuing separation of national and municipal police forces, the German Polizeiruf stories build on the real-life German-Polish Police Centre in operation since 2007. Police cooperation within the EU is a central part of the Schengen system of open borders, which allows police officers to cross borders in action of immediate pursuit and facilitates data exchange. It also includes the instrument of the European arrest warrant obliging any EU police force to arrest people searched in any EU member state. Still, institutionalized police cooperation does not exist across all EU member state borders.

Streaming: Bron and Bordertown can be streamed on Netflix. The French-UK remake is available on PBS in the US, the US-Mexican on Amazon Prime. Recent episodes of Polizeiruf 110 can be streamed worldwide from the German network ARD.
the author’s overall argument is that belonging generates a specific knowledge about the way the world is (b)ordered. The book makes a thorough investigation into the issues of belonging leading to a ‘new understanding of the Kashmiri borderland’ (33).

The book’s introduction sets the research frame by explaining the rationale and logic to study the Kashmir dispute from a borderland perspective. The author has conducted fieldwork that consists of interviews, conversations, the collection of local published and unpublished sources. She also mentions the problematic aspects of doing research in the contested and disputed zones of Kashmir. She was able to talk to ordinary people, lawyers, bureaucrats, nationalist leaders, former militarists, local intellectuals, development organizations, cultural activists, and religious leaders. Chapter 1 lays out an analytical framework of the interplay of a plethora of inter-related issues including colonial partition, border fixing, nationalism struggles, power, politics, and historiography in Kashmir’s contested borderland. Chapter 2 & 3 conceptualize and examine the ‘Kashmir issue’ based on four urban areas: Srinagar, Muzaffarabad, Kargil, and Skardu. These two chapters (63-118) exemplify the main strength of the scholarship on Kashmir border. It is observed that various vested forces remain active in the borderlands of Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan since the US-led war on terror. The author cited an example of misinformation in this regard. In 2002, several Indian and international media, including the New York Times, reported the presence of a huge number of suspicious Chinese soldiers in Gilgit-Baltistan. The author examined the news from different sources including the local informants, independent sources and her personal fieldwork. She found that the information was false. As she wrote, ‘the intentions of propagating such false news have not been disclosed, but this shows the state of security paranoia over events in the area.’ Security in the Kashmir borderland is not only about managing the current context of uncertainty, but also about preventing transformations that are considered undesirable from the state security’s point of view’ (67). The increasing militarization of Kashmir leads to widespread discontent. As a result, curfew, conflicts, restrictions, chauvinism, fundamentalism, and killings have become a normal affair in the border cities. The author has lucidly documented the Indian Central government’s legislative measures and interferences in the internal affairs of Jammu & Kashmir resulting in the curtailment of the border state’s autonomy guaranteed through the Article 370. Thus, she has revealed the truth by means of field data and accumulated experiences. I would like to note here that the current Hindu nationalist Modi government has recently stunned everyone by revoking nearly all of Article 370 which has been the basis of Kashmir’s complex relationship with India for some 70 years.

Chapter 4 details the issues in Skardu and Kargil—two urban areas located near the Line of Control. The primary issue in these areas is the divisive and confrontational nature of the Line of Control arising out of the hostilities between India and Pakistan. In Chapter 5, the question of locating people in the debates about borders, especially with reference to the non-demilitarized Line of Control, is examined. Before the Conclusion is finally offered. It shows how the border is transformed over time from porous to highly fortified resulting in the regulation of cross-border movements of the populations. The bordering and ordering processes are lucidly explained. The extra-judicial killings, rapes, and disappearances of the people have been a matter of grave concern at the borderland of Kashmir.

In this regard, it would be relevant to mention the story of a recent 2019 award-winning Indian movie entitled Hamid. The movie directed by Aijaz Khan portrays a Kashmiri 7-year-old boy. Rehmat is missing, who is father to seven-year-old Hamid and husband to Ishrat. While Ishrat tries to find her husband, like how thousands of Kashmiri women do; by going to the police and later to the morgue, little Hamid has his own, unique and brilliant way. Hamid is told that his father has gone to Allah (God). On learning that Allah’s cell phone number is 786, Hamid tries to call him on the phone, but in vain. Within this narra- tive, thus, filmmaker Aijaz Khan tells a thousand tales and conveys the unending sufferings, emotions, pains and agonies of the Kashmiri people. Moreover, in a 2019 Bengali book, Parvez (2019) has nicely documented the geo-strategic issues and ethno-political integration into the issues of belonging leading to a ‘new understanding of the Kashmiri borderland’ (33). The main contribution of the book reviewed above is a detailed case study of the troubled borderland of Kashmir. This work will pave the way for future research in the field of comparative border studies. It will certainly appeal to the growing number of specialists, particularly political scientists, sociologists, economists, anthropologists, and interna- tional relations scholars who study borders, as well as students, particularly graduate students, as it is a wonderful work of scholarship on borders.

Works Cited


Kathleen Staudt
Border Politics in a Global Era: Comparative Perspectives
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2017
Hardback, paperback, ebook
320 pages

Border Politics in a Global Era: Comparative Perspectives by Kathleen Staudt is a book that points to what borders do to us—human beings and borderlanders. This is primarily a literature survey that is very suitable to be used as a textbook. It is wonderful: both approachable and conceptually strong to engage most educated minds, students and policy-makers or any individuals that would like to learn about borders and borderlanders today. It is comparative in perspective, and also forces some thinking and reflection about what borders are, what borders do, and how they affect people who cross them. Because it is a very large survey of the literature it engages with a multitude of borders worldwide and gives the reader an excellent overview of the ‘state’ of global border politics at the beginning of the 21st century.

The book is made up of 13 chapters, including an introduction and a conclusion. It is organized in four parts: concepts and history, case studies (Americas, post-colonial, Europe, and maritime boundaries), public policy (security, citizenship and migration/movement, free trade), and last, the broadly conceived and metaphorically understood borderlands that are found in arts, movies and literary productions—these are bridging borders. In the end, the agenda of nonprofits globally and locally are also reviewed and discussed.

The normative intent is to move scholarship to study equality across interdependent contiguous states with a particular focus on wages and GDP, but without discounting for environmental damage,
and security issues. This is where Staudt suggests that investments in border-regions would contribute positively to the lessening of cross-border inequalities and would also make border policies less prone to exacerbating inequalities and in particular gendered inequalities. Indeed, there is a growing literature in border studies that confront inequality and in particular borderlands that highlight greater violence against women and children. Although Staudt does not really answer any fundamental or core questions, she makes a strong normative statement on the impact of borders on the nature of the world we live in – that is a system that organizes and rationalizes fundamental inequalities, and not only across specific contiguous countries, but worldwide.

In this regard, the third chapter offers a short and fascinating worldview. Focusing on global inequality across international boundary lines, it is a review of the border literatures discussing inequality across boundary lines from a nearly comprehensive world-wide perspective with 300 border-regions. The chapter cites the original work of Iñigo Moré (The Borders of Inequality (University of Arizona Press, 2010)), who was possibly the first scholar ever trying to present a complete set of data on border regions. However, Staudt’s chapter augments and updates the work, and in doing so sets an example of what a complete data set can do and how such exemplary scholarly endeavors can contribute to the study of borders. Although it was not Staudt’s stated ambition, this reviewer suspects that Chapter Three illustrates a different methodological approach to border studies. Indeed, it takes the reader away from the traditional and dominant case study approach to a systematic review of a single but all-inclusive question, data collection and answer – a magnific-ent methodological breakthrough.

Because Staudt’s concern is inequality, the book does not ask whether there is a core idea to border studies (in that sense it is not a book about theory); however, Staudt suggests that borders are social constructions and that as social constructions, borders can change, and do not have to be violent and discriminatory. In the end, Staudt’s message is that both the study of borders, and the teaching about borders can contribute to educational curric-ulums that lessen what she calls ‘borders in minds.’ As much as this reviewer agrees with her and admires her work he is left perplexed by the lack of discussion of the question of free trade across borders, but, indeed this is a book about people and borders, not about all borders but only the borders that capture people.

Focus and Scope

Borders in Globalization Review (BIG_Review) provides a forum for academic and creative explo-rations of borders in the 21st century. Our interest is advancing high-quality and original works in the Arts, Humanities, and Social Sciences, that explore various aspects of borders in an increasingly globalized world. BIG_Review publishes scholar-ship (academic articles, essays, research notes, book reviews, and film reviews) as well as artwork (photography, painting, poetry, short stories, and more). The journal is committed to academic peer review, public access, policy relevance, and cultural significance.

Our starting point is that borders offer metaphor-ic-conceptual tools for the study of differentiation and integration. This perspective mandates a wide range of artistic, theoretical, and empirical explorations of borders. The journal is especially interested in advancing the study of the borders of globalization. New research is documenting a shift in the logic of borders from spatial and terri-torial to functional and aterritorial. This means that borders are increasingly detached from territory, operating as mobile and relational nodes in increas-ingly complex regulatory frameworks. For example, border screening often happens far from the border, and goods and people are increasingly bordered ‘on the go’ with microtechnology and biometrics. Simultaneously, global processes are increasingly straining the territorial foundations of borders, including subnational and transnational pressures, the virtual flows of global finance and big data, and the effects of climate change. These developments impact culture and politics, including understand-ings and contestations of identity, citizenship, law, nationalism, gender, and indigeneity.

The borders of globalization are rapidly being estab-lished in a variety of spaces—not just in borderlands.

Like a puzzle in the making, their infrastructures and institutions interlock in various geographies and modalities around world, although not always visibly. BIG_Review offers a platform to visualize, problematize, and decipher how these borders are changing and how they affect all other borders, physically, of the mind, and across cyberspace.

The journal also advances original artwork related to borders. Borders capture the popular imagina-tion and inspire creative works. Artwork reflects and influences the cultures that shape borders. Some-times artwork is subversive of borders. BIG_Review connects artists to audiences around the world through wide distribution networks and open-ac-cess electronic editions. Our art pages showcase individual works as well as portfolios, including photos, paintings, poems, short stories, fiction reviews, and more. All art is published at no cost to the artists.

See also submission guidelines For Contributors.

Peer Review

Academic article and essay submissions undergo at least two double-blind peer reviews, drawing on specialists in the field from our Editorial Board. The Chief Editor reserves the right to make final deci-sions about publication.

Open Access and Publication Fees

BIG_Review and BIG_Books are open-access publi-cations. They are available online for free to readers worldwide. Each new publication is widely distrib-uted to a recipient list of more than 1000 scholars.
and policy makers located in Canada, the United States, Mexico and in over 60 countries around the world.

Open-access publication is possible because BIG_Review shifts administrative costs from public users to academic institutions and scholars’ research funds (grants, etc.). We charge academic contributors a standard fee per accepted article or essay ($250 Cdn). There are no fees for book reviews or film reviews or for any artistic submissions.

Unless otherwise stated, all works are licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC 4.0).

BIG_Review is free for reading and sharing in electronic formats. Bound and printed copies of the publication are available for order (8.5" x 11"), printed by University of Victoria Printing Services, price to be determined, plus shipping and handling. Discounted rates will apply for print subscriptions.

Publication Frequency

BIG_Review is published in Spring and Fall.

Partnership with BIG_Books

Borders in Globalization Books (BIG_Books) shares an editorial board with BIG_Review. The focus and scope of the books are the same as the journal, except the books publish only academic content, not artistic or fictional. Learn more at BIG_Books.

History

In 2018, Borders in Globalization, a Research Lab of the University of Victoria, British Columbia, Canada established Borders in Globalization Review (BIGR/ BIG_Review) and the Borders in Globalization Book Series (BIGB/BIG_Books). Both publish online, open access, double-blind peer-reviewed manuscripts about the borders of globalization; both are interested in engaging in inter- and trans-disciplinary conversations on research works and artworks in the Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences.

Funding and Support

BIG_Review is funded and supported by the Borders in Globalization research program (BIG). BIG received funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRCC) Partnership Grant (Grant no: 895-2012-1022), and from the Erasmus+ programme of the European Union (the European Commission’s support for the production of this publication does not constitute an endorsement of the contents, which reflect the views only of the authors, and the Commission cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein).

In order to continue publishing high-quality and open-access work in the absence of secure, long-term funding, BIG_Review aims to become self-sustainable through publication fees for academic submissions and advertising revenue.

The Centre for Global Studies at the University of Victoria has provided office space and support.

The journal is hosted online by University of Victoria Libraries.

Publicity and Advertising

BIG_Review reserves space for paid promotional content in the social sciences, humanities, and fine arts, including advertisements for new books and other publications, special events, calls for papers, courses and programs, and more. Full and partial page insets will be made available on the inside of the front and back covers. Stay tuned for more details, or contact our Chief Editor directly.

Academic & Artistic Guidelines

BIG_Review publishes scholarship (academic articles, essays, research notes, book reviews and film reviews) as well as artwork (photography, painting, poetry, short stories, and more).

Scholarly submissions should engage with the research literature on borders, including, for example, borderlands, borderscapes, and bordering processes. We are interested in studies that go beyond the ‘land image’ by exploring borders as non-contiguous, atteritorial, globalized, mobile, electronic, biometric, functional, etc. We are equally interested in border studies from indigenous perspectives, along with questions of sustainability, climate change, colonialism, and subnational and transnational identities. Research questions might include: What are contemporary challenges to borders, internally and externally? How are borders adapting? What challenges do borders pose for communities and for people in transit or seeking asylum? How are cultures shaped by borders, and vice-versa? How are technologies shaping borders? We encourage innovative theoretical work and explorations of borders widely construed, as well as empirical and quantitative research. We welcome scholarly submissions from all disciplines and backgrounds.

BIG_Review also promotes artistic submissions pertaining to borders (borders understood broadly: political, social, cultural, metaphoric, personal). Borders can capture the popular imagination and inspire creative works. Artwork can reflect and influence the cultures that shape borders. We promote small portfolios and individual works, including original poems, photos, paintings, short stories, creative essays, film and literature reviews, artistic commentaries, and other forms of art. Artists retain copyright of their work and benefit from increased exposure at no cost to them.

For technical submission requirements, see below.

https://journals.uvic.ca/index.php/bigreview
https://bigglobalization.org/

Peer Review Process

Each academic manuscript considered for publication in BIG_Review is submitted to at least two members of the Editorial Board (or other qualified scholars) for double blind review. In the event of a “split” recommendation, a third (and sometimes a fourth) review may be obtained. Publication decisions are based on these reviews.

The Editor-in-Chief will notify authors as early as possible as to whether their paper has been accepted for publication. Selected manuscripts are assigned a member of the editorial team, who will work with the author to address any outstanding issues concerning style or substantive content prior to publication. Papers that do not abide by the publication’s style guide will not be accepted.

Once revisions have been completed and a final decision has been made by the Editor-in-Chief, final copyediting and formatting will be provided by BIG_Review.

Open Access & Publication Fee

BIG_Review is an open-access publication, available online for free to readers worldwide. Each new publication is widely distributed to a recipient list of some 1000 scholars and policy makers located in Canada, the United States, Mexico and in over 60 other country around the world.

Open-access publication is possible because BIG_Review shifts administrative costs from public users to academic institutions and scholars’ research funds. We charge academic contributors a standard fee of $250 Cdn per accepted article or essay. There are no fees for academic book and film reviews, or for any artistic submissions.

Copyright of the information contained therein cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein.

https://journals.uvic.ca/index.php/bigreview
https://bigglobalization.org/
Academic Submission Requirements

**Articles** (social science and humanities papers that advance academic disciplines through research, data, and theory) should be between 7000 and 10,000 words in length.

**Essays** (including literature reviews, persuasive writing, opinion pieces) should be between 1000 and 4000 words, using few references (no more than 10 references, except for literature reviews, which may include more).

**Research notes** (engaging with single concepts, terms, or debates pertaining to border studies) should be between 750-1200 words, using few references (no more than five).

**Book reviews** (summarizing and analysing academic monographs relating to borders) should be between 500 and 1000 words.

**Film reviews** (summarizing and analysing film and television relating to borders) should be between 500 and 1000 words.

Submissions must be written in English (although we also consider French and Spanish submissions).

Citation style should adhere to Chicago “author-date” manual of style. This means all references are contained inside parentheses within the text, listing author(s) last name, and the year of publication (and pagination when appropriate, especially following quotations). Complete bibliographic details of all references are contained in Works Cited at the end of the manuscript, listed alphabetically by author last name, with year of publication preceding work title.

Endnotes may be used for substantive observations but not for the purpose of citing sources. Endnotes must appear separately at the end of the body of the manuscript prior to the Works Cited. The use of footnotes is unacceptable and may result in the manuscript being returned to the author for revision.

The text is double-spaced; uses a 12-point font; employs italics, rather than underlining (except with URL addresses). Only one space between sentences (do not add a second space between sentences).

All illustrations, figures, and tables are placed within the text at the appropriate points, rather than at the end (or markers are used within the text to indicate placement).

Submission files must be Microsoft Word (.doc or .docx) file format.

Artistic Submission Requirements

**Visual art** (photography, painting, etc.) and other visual art must be high-resolution, BMP, JPEG, or PNG, including separate captions.

**Poetry** formats may vary (length, layout, font, font size, etc.). Accompanying photos and artwork are welcome.

All illustrations, figures, and tables are placed within the text at the appropriate points, rather than at the end (or markers are used within the text to indicate placement).

Submission files must be Microsoft Word (.doc or .docx) file format.

All article submissions must include two documents: 1) a complete anonymous version (to be shared with prospective blind reviewers); and 2) a separate title page with all author contact and affiliation information.

The submission has not been previously published, nor is it before another journal for consideration (or an explanation has been provided in Comments to the Editor).

Submissions are not guaranteed approval. BIG Review reserves the right to reject submissions on any grounds.

To submit academic work, follow the steps on our Submit page.

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Authors are permitted and encouraged to post their work online (e.g., in institutional repositories or on their website) prior to and during the submission process, as it can lead to productive exchanges, as well as earlier and greater citation of published work (See The Effect of Open Access).

Artists may discuss alternative copyrights with the managing editor.
Introducing BIG_Books

Launching Now!

The Borders in Globalization Books series (BIG_Books) provides a forum for in-depth scholarly explorations of borders in the 21st century. We publish high-quality academic works in the humanities and social science that explores various aspects of borders in an increasingly globalized world. BIG_Books is multidisciplinary, peer reviewed, and open access.

All books are available for free in PDF and other electronic formats (bound and printed copies can be ordered, cost to be determined).

BIG_Books is part of the Borders in Globalization research program and shares the editorial board of the journal Borders in Globalization Review (BIG_Review). The focus and scope of the books are the same as the journal, except BIG_Books publishes only academic content, not artistic.

Submission Guidelines

BIG_Books welcomes proposals, samples, and complete manuscripts from all disciplines and academic backgrounds. Submissions should engage with the research literature on borders, including, for example, borderlands, borderscapes, and bordering processes. We are especially interested in studies that go beyond the ‘land image’ by exploring borders and bordering processes as non-contiguous, atterritorial, globalized, mobile, electronic, biometric, functional, etc. We are equally interested in border studies from indigenous perspectives, along with questions of sustainability, colonialism, and subnational and transnational identities. Research questions might include: What are contemporary challenges to borders, internally and externally? How are borders adapting? What challenges do borders pose for communities and for people in transit or seeking asylum? How are cultures shaped by borders, and vice-versa? How are technologies shaping borders? We encourage innovative theoretical work and explorations of borders widely construed, as well as empirical and quantitative research.

Peer Review Process

Approved submissions are submitted to an intensive, double-blind peer-review process, comprising a review board of specialists in the field. Once revisions have been completed and a final decision has been made by the Editor-in-Chief, final copyediting and formatting will be provided by the BIG editorial team.

The Editor-in-Chief will notify authors as early as possible as to whether their submission has been accepted for publication. Selected manuscripts are assigned a member of the Editorial Board, who will work with the author to address any outstanding issues concerning style or substantive content prior to publication. Submissions that do not abide by the publication’s style guide may not be accepted.

Open Access & Publication Fee

BIG_Books are open access, available online for free to readers worldwide. Each new publication is widely distributed to a recipient list of more than 1000 scholars and policy makers located in Canada, the United States, Mexico and in over 60 other countries around the world.

In order to make BIG_Books freely available to the public, production costs are covered by academic institutions and research funds of publishing scholars. The one-time $2500 fee applies to manuscripts that have been accepted for publication, and helps cover the costs of review and distribution.

Submission Requirements

Submissions must be written in English (although we also consider French and Spanish submissions).

Manuscripts should be between 45,000 and 55,000 words in length.

Citation style should adhere to Chicago “author-date” manual of style. This means all references are contained inside parentheses within the text, listing author(s) last name, and the year of publication (and pagination when appropriate, especially following quotations). Complete bibliographic details of all references are contained in Works Cited at the end of the manuscript, listed alphabetically by author last name, with year of publication preceding work title.

Endnotes may be used for substantive observations but not for the purpose of citing sources. Endnotes must appear separately at the end of the body of the manuscript prior to the Works Cited, or at the end of each chapter. The use of footnotes is unacceptable and may result in the manuscript being returned to the author for revision. The text must be double-spaced with 12-point font and employ italics rather than underlining (except with URL addresses). Only one space between sentences (do not add a second space between sentences).

All illustrations, figures, and tables are placed within the text at the appropriate points, rather than at the end (or markers are used within the text to indicate placement).

Submission files must be Microsoft Word (.doc or .docx) file format.

All book proposals, samples, and manuscripts must include two documents: 1) a complete anonymous version (to be shared with prospective blind reviewers); and 2) a separate title page with all author contact and affiliation information.

The submission has not been previously published. If the submission is currently under consideration by another publisher, an explanation should be provided to the Editor.

Submissions are not guaranteed approval. BIG_Books reserves the right to reject submissions on any ground.

Submissions and inquiries can be sent to BIGReview@UVic.ca.

For more information, see BIG_Books webpage.

https://journals.uvic.ca/index.php/bigreview
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With the new geological age known as the Anthropocene heralding dramatic disruptions in the earth system, geopolitics needs to be fundamentally reconsidered to deal with these new circumstances. Planetary boundaries and ecological change are now the key contextualization for considering future global political arrangements.

The sheer scale of development and the growth of the global economy is not only causing local disruptions, pollution events, and resource problems, but now has begun to change how the earth system as a whole operates. We are headed into a much less stable set of geophysical circumstances than the world has known through human history, and the rivalries and geopolitical power plays of the future will increasingly play out in less predictable geographical circumstances.

Humanity has been scaling up its niche, changing the climate and the species mix around the world since the end of the last ice age and in the process generating a new geological epoch known as the Anthropocene.

Human activities occurring on a global scale are now impacting and altering boundaries that constitute the conditions under which humanity has been able to flourish over the last ten thousand years. Rapid changes in the earth system mean that old assumptions of stable borders as the basis of sovereignty have to be reconsidered. Securing the fossil fuel economy remains a policy priority, as does trying to cope with disasters on a global scale—all of which makes sustainability more difficult as geopolitical rivalries shape contemporary global policy.

The Anthropocene is thus the new context for sustainability policy in the latest phase of globalization, and both academic analysis and practical initiatives will have to incorporate its insights if they are to be effective.

Simon Dalby is a professor of geography and environmental studies at Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Ontario, where he teaches in the Balsillie School of International Affairs, and a Senior Fellow at the Centre for International Governance Innovation.

www.press.uOttawa.ca/anthropocene-geopolitics

World Rights | Anthropocene; Geopolitics; Globalization; Sustainability; Security

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The Centre for Global Studies (CFGS), founded in 1998, fosters research, reflection, and action on complex issues of local, national, and global importance. Located at the University of Victoria, CFGS is a collaborative community of scholars and leaders that is uniquely positioned to bridge academic research and student mentoring with innovative knowledge mobilization and effective community engagement.

As a truly interdisciplinary research centre exploring global and Indigenous perspectives, CFGS fosters exploration, discussion, and collaboration in new and unexpected ways. CFGS is an international community, purposefully designed to foster exchanges that lead to collaboration and innovation.

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CFGS research considers the nexus of the local and global – how local concerns have global effects and how global issues manifest at the local level. Fellows and researchers are exploring issues vital to people, places, policy, and the planet, and are making an impact around the world. Research foci include:

- Borders and migration in the 21st century
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Projects & Programs
We collaborate on projects across faculties and departments at UVic, as well as with communities, practitioners, partners, and universities around the globe. These projects bring together diverse groups of people to communicate our research through events, publications, and collaborative networks. We make our boundary-pushing research accessible to policy makers, researchers, and the wider community.

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One of the central objectives at CFGS is to create a community of scholars and scholarship. The CFGS hosts conferences, workshops, and speakers that promote critical citizenship in a complex and rapidly changing global environment and respond to defining events as they unfold. These events bridge the divide between academia and the community, as well as inform policy, decision makers, and citizens on important issues.

RESEARCH FOR A SUSTAINABLE AND EQUITABLE WORLD

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The Centre awards fellowships to graduate students, international scholars and faculty researchers with an overarching aim to build a sophisticated and transdisciplinary network. These fellowships provide office space, a stipend for students & visiting scholars, and a course administrative release for faculty ranging from several weeks to a year.

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ANITA GIRVAN, FORMER GRADUATE STUDENT FELLOW

CFGS offers fellowship opportunities for UVIC graduate students, UVic faculty, visiting researchers, and visiting graduate students. More info at www.globalcentres.org.
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Kathleen Staudt

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Sitwat Azhar Hashmi

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Tatiana Shaban

Aztlán: From Mythos to Logos in the American Southwest
Toni Muñoz-Hunt

Borders and the Feasibility of Rebel Conflict
Lance Hadley

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Edwin Hodge

ARTWORK AND POETRY

By Karen Yen, Amanda Merritt, Natasha Sardzoska, Roxanne Lynne Doty

ESSAYS

Some Consideration on the Aesthetics of the Geopolitical Wall
Elisa Ganivet

Understanding Aterritoriality through a BIG Reading of Agnew’s Globalization & Sovereignty
Michael J. Carpenter

La « frontière » selon Paul de La Pradelle
Benjamin Perrier

BOOK AND FILM REVIEWS

By Daniela Johannes, Martin Klatt, Saleh Shahriar, Emmanuel Brunet-Jailly

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