

OGDENSBURG PLUS FIFTY AND STILL COUNTING:

CANADA-U.S. DEFENSE
RELATIONS IN THE
POST-COLD WAR ERA

JOEL J.
SOKOLSKY

The August, 1990, celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the Canada-U.S. Permanent Joint Board on Defense (PJBD)* was a decidedly subdued, almost invisible affair.¹ Although many past members of the board were in attendance, neither President George Bush nor Prime Minister Brian Mulroney or their respective secretaries and ministers of state and defense came to Ogdensburg, New York, to mark the event. They were too busy with security matters. Responding to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the United States rallied its allies, including Canada, in an unprecedented multinational political, economic and military front against Baghdad. At the same time, dramatic changes in Eastern Europe and in superpower relations were transforming the international strategic environment almost daily. Defense news was prominent in the first summer of the post-Cold War year, but very little of it had to do with the protection of North America.

In this one respect at least, the headlines seemed not that much different. Since the

* A list of the acronyms used in this article is provided on pages 34-35.

Cold War years North American defense, although always a significant item on the Canadian foreign and defense policy agenda, has been of less importance than the security of Europe and other areas of the world. As former Canadian Ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) John Halstead observed, Canada and the United States will be at risk if the U.S. nuclear deterrent fails, yet Europe has been the place where the East-West balance of power has been at stake.² Except for the early years of air defense collaboration up to and just after the establishment of the North American Air Defense (Aerospace since 1981) Command (NORAD),³ neither country devoted major resources specifically to the aerospace or maritime defense of the continent.

In the early 1980s, with the advent of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and the development of air- and sea- launched cruise missiles (ALCM and SLCM), it appeared that the strategic defense of North America was assuming a higher priority for the United States. The NORAD modernization agreement of 1985 was viewed by many in Canada as an indication of this new salience.⁴ The U.S. Navy's (USN) "maritime strategy" also raised concern about the Arctic.⁵ A major premise of the 1987 Canadian White Paper on defense was that North America was facing new and more complex threats that would increase the priority of continental defense for the United States.⁶ If Canada was to be a partner in meeting these threats, then it, too, would have to put more resources into air and particularly maritime forces, including the acquisition of nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs).⁷ The ambitious plans contained in the White Paper were annulled by the April, 1989, Federal budget, while in the United States the future of SDI and the maritime strategy became questionable because of financial concerns and the dramatic changes in the international environment. With the disintegration of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe and the unravelling of the USSR itself, the plans of only a few years ago to modernize continental air defense now seem like relics of a far-off era.

Joel J. Sokolsky is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the Royal Military College of Canada and Adjunct Associate Professor at Queen's University, where he is also a Senior Fellow at the Centre For International Relations. Professor Sokolsky is the author, co-author or co-editor of The U.S.-Canada Security Relationship (1989), Canadian Defence: Decisions And Determinants (1989), North American Perspectives on European Security (1990) and Seapower in the Nuclear Age: The United States Navy and NATO, 1949-1980 (1991). He has served as a consultant to the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence and the Federal Environmental Assessment Review Office.

But if improvements in North American defense efforts now seem unthinkable, it is equally implausible to argue that continental defense can be ignored and that bilateral defense cooperation will simply wither away. After all, the July, 1991, Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) allowed both sides to retain thousands of land and sea-based nuclear weapons. Uncertainty over the fate of these weapons in the new USSR seems to reinforce the need for NORAD. And what of changes in American defense policy? President Bush has declared that the new American strategic concept will be "guided by the need to maintain the forces required to exercise forward presence in key areas, to respond effectively in crises to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent, and to retain the national capacity to rebuild our forces should that be needed."⁸ How important will continental security be for the United States, and what level of effort will be required on Ottawa's part to sustain bilateral security cooperation?

This essay examines continental defense in the context of a changing strategic environment and recent trends in U.S. strategy. During the Cold War such external factors were crucial determinants of Canadian foreign defense policy, although the level of Canada's participation in the air and maritime defense of North America remained at Ottawa's discretion.⁹ Will this continue to be true in the coming years? And if so, what choices will be open to Ottawa and what decisions will it make as the post-Cold War era begins?

NORTH AMERICAN DEFENSE AND AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

A study by the Department of External Affairs in 1953 noted that "it may be very difficult indeed for the Canadian government to reject any major defense proposals which the United States Government presents with conviction as essential for the security of North America."¹⁰ At that time the two countries had been engaged for several years in the coordination of air defense, culminating in the establishment of NORAD and a host of less formal naval arrangements. But it was not merely because Canada was located between two nuclear armed superpowers that Ottawa was willing to participate in North American defense. Nor did Washington see Canada simply as a strategic foreground for the American homeland.

The United States has been fortunate to have on its northern border not only a compliant neighbour sensitive to American security concerns in North America, but also an active participant in Western collective defense. Canadian liberal internationalism meshed with the

broad internationalism that informed American foreign policy after World War II and into the Cold War years. To be sure, Canadian military contributions to this defense have not counted for much in the overall East-West balance of power, and trade and investment issues constitute the lion's share of U.S. interests in Canada. Nevertheless, Canada has been a good ally, lending its political and military support to the maintenance of Western unity.

Central to Ottawa's approach has been the view, explained in part by the Canadian preference for multilateralism, that North American and European security are inexorably linked. Atlanticism offered Canada a means to avoid a strictly bilateral defense arrangement, and it also corresponded to the strategic environment in which both Canada and the United States found themselves in the postwar era. The NATO alliance was cemented by the presence of large numbers of American conventional and nuclear forces in Europe. If the Soviet Union could successfully attack the United States without itself suffering unacceptable destruction, then the United States could not extend its deterrent guarantees to allies across the oceans regardless of how much force it forward-based abroad.

But the United States, especially the United States Air Force (USAF), did not approach North American defense with a great deal of conviction. It did not expect to erect a massive defensive system to meet the Soviet threat. Even during the era of the bomber threat, before the advent of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) and nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) with their submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), the key to the defense of North America and hence the Western alliance was the ability of the United States to deter attacks on its homeland by virtue of its offensive strategic nuclear forces. Despite the Soviet achievement of approximate parity in number and capabilities and the coming of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), security for North America rested upon the American retaliatory forces. "Unlike the Soviet Union, which regarded strategic defense as a more or less integrated complement to its ICBMs, SLBMs and bombers, the United States separated its defensive and offensive missions,"¹¹ placing almost exclusive emphasis on the offensive. Indeed, under MAD, defense against missiles came to be viewed as strategically destabilizing as well as technologically unfeasible.

Only when air defense could be tied to the credibility of the deterrent did the USAF give more attention to the Soviet bomber threat. Ultimately, it came down to a question of "what ought Canada do to make the United States apparatus of deterrence and defense as effective as possible?"¹² When the long-range bomber constituted both the major

threat to North America and the chief deterrent, Canadian airspace was important. For a time there were plans to disperse Strategic Air Command (SAC) bombers to Canadian airfields. More important, radar lines in Canada would allow sufficient warning time for bombers to get off the ground before being hit, while Canadian interceptor aircraft provided a measure of active defense.

Air defense cooperation was also matched at sea, where the USN and the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN)¹³ jointly monitored Soviet submarine movements in the western Atlantic and off the Pacific coast. Initially, this surveillance was primarily directed against attack submarines. By the early 1960s the two navies had extended their activities to include Soviet ballistic missile submarines whose ranges required them to come within less than five hundred miles of the coast. In 1965 the commander-in-chief of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet reported that Canadian and U.S. anti-submarine warfare (ASW) forces were testing "coordinated defensive operations against a submarine-launched missile threat to the east coast of North America."¹⁴ These naval exercises were conducted in conjunction with NORAD.¹⁵ In the early years of air defense, USN ships stood air defense picket duty off the coasts. But for the USN, as for the air force, North American defense was not a top priority but rather a very limited part of a global role, transoceanic in orientation.¹⁶

Close cooperation with the United States in the air and in maritime defense of North America required that Canada contribute some forces, especially interceptor aircraft. But because the United States assumed nearly 90 percent of the cost of NORAD, Canada was able to monitor its own airspace at far less cost than could have been possible if it had had to construct and maintain a national air defense system of its own. At sea, the RCN deployed the same ASW convoy protection forces earmarked for NATO's Atlantic Command (ACLANT). And, as with air defense activities, Canada's contributions to the maritime security of North America meshed with its efforts to assert national sovereignty.¹⁷

Even though the United States supplied the bulk of forces for North American defense and Canada's contributions were viewed as being consistent with its sovereignty and security, Cold War rearmament put a strain on the Canadian economy. Recognizing Canada's difficulty in keeping up with the demands of collective defense, Washington agreed beginning in 1959 to a series of Defense Development and Defense Production Sharing Arrangements (DD/DPSA) which set up a partial free-trade regime in defense products and allowed Canadian industry to bid on U.S. contracts. In return the Canadian armed forces had the benefit of lower prices (because of longer production runs) on larger items such as aircraft produced in the United States. Canada's

defense industry began to concentrate on specialized, internationally competitive products for export mainly to the United States, which became its largest market. The Canadian Forces purchased most of their equipment from U.S. manufacturers. Related agreements afforded some Canadian involvement in research and development and inclusion of Canadian firms in the American defense industrial base.¹⁸

The Cold War years were the halcyon days of bilateral defense cooperation. But the strategic value of Canadian airspace and maritime approaches declined as the bomber threat waned in the 1960s when the Soviet bomber force did not expand and ICBMs and intercontinental-range SLBMs emerged. The relative importance of the missile threat increased further when the Soviets, following closely upon the American lead, developed Multiple Independently-targeted Re-entry Vehicles (MIRV) warheads for their ICBMs and SLBMs, allowing a single launcher to carry as many as ten warheads. There was no defense against these missiles, nor could missile warning radars (such as the Ballistic Missile Early Warning facilities or PAVE PAWS, the SLBM radars located in Canada, provide adequate protection. By the 1970s, NORAD's prime role had become missile surveillance warning, attack assessment, and space surveillance with an increasingly marginal capability against bombers. The number of interceptors had dropped from three thousand in 1960 (of which two hundred had been Canadian) to roughly three hundred, of which thirty-six were Canadian. The Mid-Canada radar line of ninety-eight sites in 1954 had been completely eliminated by 1965, and the CADIN-PINETREE and Arctic Distant Early Warning (DEW) radars had been reduced by half by the mid-1970s. By 1972, all fifty-six Canadian BOMARC surface-to-air missiles had been dismantled.¹⁹

Although the focus of NORAD's activities shifted, the binational character of the command was preserved with a Canadian general as deputy commander-in-chief and Canadian personnel serving at the Cheyenne Mountain complex in Colorado Springs, Colorado. The importance of warning and attack assessment to the credibility and functioning of the U.S. offensive nuclear posture meant that NORAD placed Canada in a unique position relative to other American allies. No other foreign military personnel are as close as those of Canada to the central strategic nuclear forces upon which western collective defense rests. Nevertheless, Canada still had a limited role in overall U.S. defense policy. Participation in NORAD or in the less formal naval arrangements never gave the Canadian government any special influence in the conduct of American global security relations, especially the control of strategic nuclear forces. As Canada was to discover in many crises, Washington did not feel the need to consult Ottawa before taking steps

(such as going to higher stages of nuclear alert) that directly affected continental security. Indeed, provisions were made for the NORAD headquarters to operate without Canadian personnel if, as in the 1973 cease-fire alert, Ottawa did not go along with U.S. actions.²⁰ A crucial element in the bilateral defense partnership has been Washington's view that Canada's contributions to collective defense in Europe are more important than its efforts to secure the American nuclear deterrent. This is not because the United States has ignored Canada's unique position within the alliance. As Henry Kissinger observed,

Canada's relations with NATO have always had a special character. Unlike the European countries, it was not directly threatened; unlike the United States, it could not be decisive in the common defense; the Canadian defense contribution would be marginal compared with that of the major European powers or the United States. Canada's ties, therefore, had above all a strong symbolic character.²¹

The symbolic importance which Canada attached to participation in NATO, and especially to the maintenance of forces in Germany, dovetailed very well with the American view. From Washington's perspective Canada, like any other ally, had to make a contribution in Europe to help maintain allied unity. In particular, Washington has been concerned that reductions in Canada's commitments in Europe might set a bad precedent for the smaller allies. Thus, although the United States welcomes a Canadian commitment to North American air and maritime defense, and although there are operational links between NORAD and NATO, the Americans have never regarded NORAD as a NATO command, nor are they prepared to give much weight to Canada's contributions to North American security.²²

The United States has attached such importance to having Canadian forces in Europe that during the 1950s, when Ottawa was sending ground and air forces there, the United States eased Canada's defense budget by building and staffing the radar stations in Northern Canada. In the 1970s, when Canada was replacing some of its military equipment, Washington urged Ottawa to give priority to weapons designed for NATO roles. U.S. Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger told Ottawa in 1975: "The basic premise, I believe, is that unless we are prepared to defend parts of the world other than the North American continent, we will soon have nothing more than the North American continent to defend."²³ The United States has long looked to Canada to supply surface escorts for ACLANT. This was one of the reasons Washington seriously questioned the threat contained in the 1987 Canadian

White Paper on defense to cancel additional surface escorts in favor of the SSNs.²⁴

American and European support for a continued Canadian land and air role in Germany, as well as the commitment of maritime forces to ACLANT, persisted even though it was evident by 1970 that the sum Canada spent on defense was insufficient to meet its military obligations in Europe and North America. Canadian expenditures for NATO commitments increased by 52 percent between 1971 and 1988,²⁵ but this was only about 2 percent of Canada's gross domestic product (GDP). Among NATO countries this expenditure surpassed only the proportion contributed by Luxembourg and Iceland. According to the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) reports to Congress, Canada was spending only about half of what it should have spent on defense given its relative prosperity compared with other NATO allies.²⁶

In the early 1970s, Canadian forces in Europe were severely affected by budget cuts imposed by the Trudeau government. By the late 1980s, Canada's total air and ground forces in Europe numbered 7,500, and only one Canadian-based battalion was committed to the Allied Mobile Forces (Land) (AMF[L]). In terms of principal equipment, there were only 114 main battle tanks (77 of which were in Germany) and 135 fighters (44 of which were in Germany and the rest were dedicated to NORAD or used for training). At sea, only 4 of 20 destroyers/frigates were less than twenty-five years old, and this relatively small force was responsible for the defense of three ocean frontiers. Six new frigates were under construction (although their completion was delayed) and six more were planned. The situation for naval aviation was somewhat better because 18 Aurora Long-range ASW patrol aircraft (a version of the USN's P-3) had been acquired in the mid-1970s.²⁷ Canada also contributed funds and personnel to NATO's Airborne Early Warning and Control Force and supplied training facilities in Canada for various allied countries, for which they paid. Recently NATO decided not to proceed with plans to build a major air training center at Goose Bay, Labrador.

The ambitious plans described in the Canadian White Paper of 1987, which the Mulroney government said would solve the "commitment-capability gap," never materialized. Not only was the SSN program cancelled in the April, 1989, budget cuts, but plans to provide equipment for a full division in Germany (with half the force based there) were placed in doubt. Ottawa also ended its obligation to reinforce Norway, although it retained the AMF(L) commitment. Not surprisingly, therefore, U.S. Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, in his April, 1990, report to Congress on allied defense spending, noted Canada's "below-par" efforts.²⁸

The United States has long accepted "below-par" efforts by Canada because it has little leverage over Canadian defense spending and cannot threaten to reduce its own commitment to Canada's defense. More importantly, Canada's defense budget has not been as serious a problem as those with Germany over nuclear forces, with Greece and Turkey's outright hostility towards each other, or with the defense spending of other small allies in Europe. As long as Canada maintained some forces in Germany and continued to give full diplomatic support to allied cohesion, the United States remained satisfied with its commitment to NATO.

But the recent dramatic transformations in Europe, and the successful conclusion of the first round of conventional arms control negotiations in Europe, combined with budgetary pressures, have already affected even the small Canadian contingent in Germany. In September, 1990, it was announced that Canada would withdraw 1,400 troops from Germany.²⁹ In early 1991, Canada reduced its air squadrons in Germany from 3 to 2.³⁰ Cabinet consideration was also given to closing all bases and totally withdrawing Canadian land and air elements.³¹ Although the military favored a full withdrawal because the funds thereby saved could be used to buy modern equipment, External Affairs lobbied "to keep the troops in Europe to ensure that Canada has a voice in negotiations on disarmament and the military future of that region."³² At the same time Allied officials, including German foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, urged Canada to maintain a military presence in Europe.³³

By the spring of 1991, allied lobbying combined with broad political considerations appeared to have won out over the arguments of the military. During his June, 1991, visit to Germany, Prime Minister Mulroney announced that Canada would reduce but would not completely withdraw its forces from Germany. "Canadian forces," he told a Berlin gathering, "will remain as long as there is a residual threat to European and Canadian security here and as long as Canadians are welcome."³⁴

Yet shortly after this pledge to keep forces in Germany, a large part of the Canadian army was required to deal with a potentially explosive and prolonged situation at two Indian reservations in Quebec. A tense stand-off lasted until September.³⁵ The whole experience prompted renewed attention to the role of the military in Canada for domestic security, often called "aid to the civil power."³⁶

On September 17, 1991, Marcel Masse, the Canadian Minister of National Defence, delivered a long-awaited policy review. The statement was clearly an effort to accommodate the need to alter the posture

of the armed forces in light of international and budgetary realities, and to respond to the preferences of the military while serving notice of Ottawa's desire to remain active in European and North American security affairs.

"This review," Masse noted, "scrupulously adheres to the priorities that have long been imposed upon our armed forces by our geography and history." Canada will continue to seek its security through collective defense arrangements and will support international peacekeeping, arms control and humanitarian assistance abroad. Special emphasis was placed upon the defense of sovereignty and civil responsibilities at home. Mr. Masse stressed that the great changes in the international environment, "budgetary constraints," and the need for "assistance and support at home," provided the "context in which our new defence policy is situated." As a result the armed forces are scheduled to be reduced from 84,000 to 76,000 by 1995. Most important, Canada will close its two military bases in Germany and withdraw its two air squadrons and one armored brigade from Europe. As for North American defense, the statement suggests little change. Canada must be able to contribute to the defense of North America, the surveillance of its own airspace, "and strategic deterrence...in concert with the United States...This commitment continues to be of paramount importance to [Canada's] security. It is therefore crucial that we maintain our role as a full-fledged partner."³⁷

By 1993 the personnel for the land and air forces in Germany will be cut by more than half. Major combat units, the armored brigade and two air squadrons will be withdrawn by 1994 and the base at Baden-Soellingen will be closed with the Lahr base decommissioned the following year. A "task force" of some 1,100 military will remain in Europe at a location to be determined in consultation with allies and NATO authorities.

Canada will maintain sufficient forces to provide a brigade group and two squadrons "for contingency operations which could be made available to NATO in the event of crisis or war in Europe." In addition Ottawa will continue its commitment of a battalion group to the NATO Composite Force and the AMF(L) for use in northern Norway, where it will retain "much of the required equipment for a battalion group." The navy will supply ASW forces to NATO's Atlantic Command, including the Standing Naval Force Atlantic. Canada will also participate in the NATO Airborne Early Warning Force and contribute to the alliance's common-funded programs.³⁸

The September, 1991, statement goes to great lengths to reaffirm Canada's commitment to European security and to a Canadian role

there. Echoing a familiar refrain in Canadian foreign and defense policy, Mr. Masse declared:

We seek partnership with countries whose values and aspirations are compatible with our own. Consequently there is no question of our contemplating a less than total commitment to NATO. Accordingly the government is not considering changing the nature of links with Europe. It is our profound hope that Canada will continue to participate in the collective defence arrangements emerging across the Atlantic.³⁹

The reduction of Canada's military presence in Germany is in line with what other allies are doing and could mesh well with changes in NATO strategy and posture. In July, 1990, NATO's leaders declared that the alliance would move toward a "new defensive approach using small multinational light forces stationed far from the former front."⁴⁰ In April of 1991, NATO's military committee, with Canada concurring, agreed to establish a "rapid reaction" corps of between 70,000 to 100,000 personnel.⁴¹ It is evident that Ottawa intends to find a role for the 1,100 person task force within the context of the evolving NATO strategy. This would be consistent with Ottawa's traditional penchant for reducing costs and enhancing multilateralism.

Despite the present pledge to maintain forces in Europe, a total withdrawal of Canadian forces is ultimately possible. But even this would not entail abandoning all military contributions to European security. From a purely military standpoint, Canadian retention of the AMF(L) role, pre-positioned equipment in Norway, a commitment to send land and air forces into central Europe, and a continued naval role in the North Atlantic, would be in line with the American posture *vis-à-vis* NATO which will take advantage of the expected longer mobilization time in the event of war and thus highlight the importance of reinforcement and sealift.⁴²

Whether or not Canada retains a small force in Europe, the planned reduction of the existing units is significant. Indeed, it is historic. A physical presence in Germany has long been a *sine qua non* of Canadian foreign policy. Yet the new task force will represent the smallest number of Canadian forces in Europe since they were first deployed in the early 1950s.

A reaffirmation of Canada's commitment to collective defense notwithstanding, the emphasis of the new defense policy is on the need to maintain forces in Canada for national tasks such as to protect sovereignty and to aid the civil power. While retaining a pledge to

reinforce Europe, Masse's statement declares that Canada's "principal NATO commitments will, like most Alliance members, be those related to the defence of our own territory and our air and maritime approaches."⁴³ Consistent with this approach, the statement notes that while all of Canada's current naval commitments will be honored, "the navy will in future focus its activities primarily on our areas of responsibility off our East and West coasts. Specifically, the navy will ensure that we maintain the capability to exercise control of these Canadian waters."⁴⁴ The projected naval building program, which calls for smaller vessels after completion of the frigate program, reflects this focus. Likewise, once out of Europe, the army will shed its heavy armor while the national and North American defense roles of the air force will become relatively more important.

To be sure, the new plans call for Canada-based forces to be available to support foreign policy through peacekeeping, and possibly in a future Gulf War-type situation or in Europe. But the central thrust of the September, 1991, statement is to dramatically reduce the impact of European security commitments in determining the equipment and posture of the Canadian Armed Forces. Whereas there are major cuts in the European commitment, North American defense is to remain largely unchanged. Ottawa will still want to remain active diplomatically in discussions regarding security in Europe. Canada may find that it can have its valued seat at the table for a fraction of what it has been paying since the Cold War. Although with the Europeans now seeking to manage more of their own security affairs, the influence Canada obtains by virtue of this seat, never great even during the Cold War, will likely diminish further. Overall, the trends within Europe and Canada's own response suggest that the relative weight of NATO in Canadian foreign policy will be progressively reduced.

This situation poses no real difficulties for Washington. From a political perspective the symbolic significance of Canada's military commitment, which has always been of prime concern to the United States, will also progressively decline as all allies, including and especially the United States, reduce their conventional forces in Europe. As the importance of Canada's role in NATO diminishes for both North American allies, security relations between the two countries will become even more limited and restricted to North America. It remains to be seen whether they will also become more strategically significant for Washington and more politically problematic for Ottawa.

THE 1980s: SDI, NORAD, THE MARITIME STRATEGY, AND OFFSETS

In the late 1970s, a joint Canada-U.S. study pointed to significant gaps in NORAD's bomber-warning systems. One challenge was the potential Soviet cruise missile threat to North America. As a Congressional study observed, over the years Pentagon planners had paid little attention to (and Congress had provided little money for) "defenses that could ward off ALCM, SLCM and bomber attacks against the United States."⁴⁵ At the instigation of Congress, the Department of Defense drew up an Air Defense Master Plan (ADMP) which was incorporated in the Reagan administration's strategic modernization program. The so-called air-breathing threat (Soviet bombers and cruise missiles) did not fundamentally alter the balance of power or seriously call into question the credibility of the U.S. deterrent. The concern was with the possibility of an undetected surprise "precursor" strike by Soviet ALCM-carrying bombers and SLCM-carrying attack submarines against a small number of sensitive, soft targets. If successful, such a strike could partially blind the United States and prevent warning of a follow-on ICBM and SLBM attack as well as delay or degrade any retaliation. This threat was considered unlikely in view of the other options open to the Soviets. Nevertheless, "the precursor strike...was used for planning purposes because it was large enough, given the assumption of surprise, to be a significant threat. Equally, such a strike was considered small enough so that a reasonable defensive system might be considered 'affordable'."⁴⁶

The dismantling of southern radar lines and the deteriorating condition of the DEW line diminished Canada's ability to monitor its own airspace and enforce national air sovereignty. Thus both countries had an interest in improving North American air defense capabilities and in 1985 they signed a modernization agreement. The total cost of the program was \$7 billion, of which Canada would cover approximately 12 percent. Most of the improvements to NORAD were to be located in and paid for by the United States. These were to include the installation of over-the-horizon backscatter radars (OTH-Bs) in the continental United States. In Alaska and Canada, the old DEW line was to be replaced with the new North Warning System (NWS) and some improved coastal radars. Ottawa assumed 40 percent of the cost of the NWS and, unlike the DEW line, the new system is to be entirely owned and operated by Canada. Backing up the NWS are improved northern airfields for interceptors and USAF Airborne Warning and Control (AWAC) aircraft.

The modernization agreement of 1985 and the renewal of NORAD for another five-year term a year later generated considerable controversy in Canada because of possible links with SDI. Again, Canada found itself in a unique position relative to other U.S. allies. If MAD meant annihilation without representation, the prospect of ballistic missile defense (BMD) could mean protection without representation. NORAD would seem to be the logical organization to control the BMD systems because it is already in the strategic defense business, including missile warning and space surveillance. Critics of SDI noted, in the roof-and-wall analogy, that if the United States moved ahead with BMD, whether ground or space-based, the Soviets might build up their bomber, ALCM, and SLCM forces in retaliation. This in turn would necessitate further improvements in North American air defenses. And since Canada falls within the U.S. defense perimeter, American interest in Canadian air and maritime space would increase. It would make sense to leave air defense with the command that handled BMD, especially if SDI technologies could be applied to surveillance of bombers and cruise missiles. As the 1985 Office of Technology Assessment report on SDI noted, "a BMD system does not have to be able to attack aircraft. However, should one be developed, the advantages of also providing it with anti-aircraft capability may be compelling."⁴⁷

The link between BMD and air defense was established in the Strategic Defense Architecture 2000 (SDA 2000) studies that began in the fall of 1982. Phase I of SDA 2000, in which Canada participated, looked specifically at air defense, and its results became a planning annex to the ADMP. From this emerged the Air Defense Initiative (ADI), a companion and complementary research effort to SDI which is investigating new technologies for bomber and cruise missile surveillance and interception, again with Canadian participation.

The possible involvement of NORAD in SDI was also suggested by changes in the U.S. command structure relating to aerospace activities. In September, 1985, the Pentagon established the United States Space Command (USSPACECOM), a unified command drawing on many of the space assets of the three services, primarily the missile-warning and space-surveillance systems of the United States Air Force Space Command (USAFSPACECOM) that support NORAD. The commander-in-chief of USSPACECOM was also commander-in-chief of NORAD. As the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence (SCEAND) observed in its 1986 report on NORAD renewals, the "comfortable certainties and familiar assumptions" of North American aerospace defense were being challenged.⁴⁸

The prospect of some type of BMD system linked to NORAD also created a political problem for Brian Mulroney's Conservative government. Since the late 1960s Canada has opposed ballistic missile defenses. When the NORAD agreement was renewed in 1968, a clause was inserted precluding any Canadian involvement in BMD. Not surprisingly, Canada was a staunch supporter of the 1972 Anti-ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. The treaty, combined with the total absence of any American BMD system, persuaded Canada to drop the BMD-clause in 1981. The Reagan administration's revival of BMD met much public opposition in Canada on the grounds that SDI, along with revisions in U.S. nuclear doctrine, would drag the country, via NORAD, into dangerous and destabilizing nuclear war-fighting plans.⁴⁹ Thus in 1985, when Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger extended an invitation to all allies to participate in SDI research, the Mulroney government turned down the invitation, although private firms and individuals were allowed to bid on SDI contracts.

But if some in Canada were concerned that SDI would entangle the country in a more elaborate continental defense arrangement, with increased emphasis on air defense, there was also apprehension at the Department of National Defence (DND) that Canada might find itself increasingly left out. In particular, the possible development of space-based radar (SBR) for air surveillance ADI, combined with command changes in the United States, would reduce the importance of Canadian territory and forces for continental air defense and make it difficult for Canada to participate in "ventures that should be of interest to it."⁵⁰ By the late 1980s, Canada's sole contribution to NORAD's space surveillance assets was a single, aging, Baker-Nunn camera. As SCEAND also noted its 1986 report, the United States might be able to "dispense not only with Canada's geography but with Canada's good will and counsel as well."⁵¹

Not surprisingly, then, Ottawa became involved in ADI despite its misgivings about SDI. Canadians became members of an ADI Coordinating Committee which allows them to receive updates on the latest research developments. In addition, a Canadian officer was assigned to the ADI program office at Hanscom Air Force Base near Boston. And in 1986, an Aerospace Defense Advanced Technology (ADAT) Working Group "composed of military and political representatives from both countries was formed to keep track of research and development activities and to deal with any difficulties encountered with bilateral cooperation in the program."⁵²

Canadian apprehension over the direction of U.S. aerospace policy was matched by an unease over changes in American naval policy

with the advent of the USN's so-called "maritime strategy." Drawing on classical naval strategy, especially the writings of Alfred Thayer Mahan, as well as upon the role of the USN in the nuclear age, the maritime strategy was a broad concept for the conduct of global war in which it was assumed that Europe would be the prime Soviet objective. The goal of the strategy was to "use maritime forces in combination with the efforts of our sister services and the forces of our allies to bring about war termination on favourable terms." The USSR was to be denied the luxury of concentrating all its forces against Western Europe by the horizontal escalation of any regional conflict into a global engagement of Soviet bloc forces. In addition, the USN would mount a strategic-ASW (in contrast to tactical-ASW against attack submarines) campaign to threaten and perhaps destroy Soviet SSBNs in their Arctic bastions as a means of applying nuclear leverage over Moscow during a conventional conflict. By degrading the USSR's strategic reserve, according to the maritime strategy, the Soviets, who place great weight upon the nuclear correlation of forces, would be less disposed to escalate a conflict to the nuclear level and more disposed to terminate hostilities on conditions favorable to the West.⁵³ This was consistent with trends in U.S. nuclear strategy which sought to increase the vulnerability of Soviet nuclear forces.⁵⁴

It was unclear to what extent the maritime strategy was national policy or "preeminently a strategy favored by the carrier air and submarine communities, facilitated by an environment of relative budgetary plenty for the Navy."⁵⁵ The Reagan administration seemed committed to the six-hundred ship navy upon which the strategy was predicated, but there was also considerable controversy and criticism, especially over counter-SSBN operations in the Arctic which were viewed as unfeasible at best and highly destabilizing at worst.⁵⁶ A stable balance of power, it was argued, required that the SSBNs remain invulnerable. Critics charged that the USN was contributing to the militarization of the Arctic, much as SDI was promoting the militarization of space.

The Canadian navy had long been involved in strategic ASW because North American maritime surveillance included the monitoring and tracking of Soviet SSBNs as they approached the continent.⁵⁷ However, this policy did not equate with support for counter-SSBN operations in Soviet waters. As was the case with SDI, the maritime strategy raised questions about the extent to which new directions in U.S. strategy would require more operations in Canada, in this case the Arctic waters, to carry out its mission. The surfacing of several American SSNs at the North Pole in 1985 and the development of the Seawolf class of SSNs, designed for under-ice operations, seemed to confirm these fears. One of the criticisms of the 1987 White Paper's proposal for SSNs was that Canada itself might be drawn into the maritime strategy.⁵⁸

The Mulroney government contended that its SSN program was primarily directed towards security in the Atlantic and the Pacific and was not intended to mesh with the U.S. Navy's maritime strategy. The Canadian project was in fact vigorously opposed by the USN.⁵⁹ Nevertheless, similar to developments in aerospace defense, DND believed that Canada could not ignore maritime developments in the Arctic for fear of being left out. As the minister argued, the Arctic was a region of strategic importance, particularly for the operation of "foreign submarines" which raised security and sovereignty concerns for Canada. "Technology...is making the Arctic more accessible. Canadians cannot ignore that what was once a buffer...could become a battleground."⁶⁰ The SSN question also became entangled in the revival of the controversy over the international legal status of the Northwest Passage. Even though the United States agreed to obtain Canadian consent before sending its Coast Guard icebreakers through the passage, the two countries continued to disagree on whether it is an international strait or internal Canadian waters.

The 1980s also saw disagreement in the economic sphere of defense. When the Trudeau government began replacing major equipment in the mid-1970s it adopted a policy of defense offsets. To secure Canadian sales foreign, mainly American, firms were required to offset the purchase price of their goods through increased investment and/or purchases in Canada. For example, when DND selected the F-18 as its new fighter, the American aircraft manufacturer, McDonnell Douglas, agreed to invest or place orders in Canada for an amount exceeding 126.3 per cent of the original purchase price.⁶¹

From the American perspective, such offset requirements imposed by foreign governments constituted an unfair trading practice and the export of defense jobs. In 1984 the U.S. Comptroller General issued a report, *Trade Offsets in Foreign Military Sales*, "which singled out Canada as having the largest share both in numbers and dollar value, of U.S. defense offset contracts and which noted serious deficiencies in U.S. offsets policy." As Danford Middlemiss told a parliamentary committee in 1985, the complaint against Canada was even sharper because the United States already regarded the DD/DPSA as a form of offset and thus considered Canada guilty of "unfair double-dipping or taking a second bite at the apple."⁶²

Despite Canadian concerns about the direction of U.S. strategies, the late 1980s actually were years of relative harmony in defense relations between the two governments. The Mulroney government placed a high priority on improving overall ties with the United States, and the Prime Minister gave Washington enthusiastic political support

for its renewed containment of the Soviet Union as well as the benefit of the doubt regarding events from Libya to Grenada.

In return, the Reagan administration, including apparently the President as well, was anxious to promote a bilateral partnership.⁶³ For example, Britain could not sell its Trafalgar class SSN to Canada without American approval because the British had originally obtained the technology from the United States. Over the strong objections of some of his advisers and the USN, Reagan was prepared to ask Congress to approve the sale of British submarines to Canada had Ottawa selected the Trafalgar instead of a French SSN.⁶⁴ Another indication of this spirit of cooperation was the renewed emphasis on bilateral defense economic cooperation at the March, 1985, Quebec summit. In March, 1987, the two governments established the North American Defense Industrial Base Organization (NADIBO) "to promote the development and administration of U.S. DOD and Canadian DND industrial readiness programs."⁶⁵

In the 1980s, as during most of the Cold War years, defense relations were not the primary concern of either country. For Canada, concerns about SDI, NORAD and the maritime strategy, as well as the efforts a reviving defense economic cooperation, paled in significance against issues such as acid rain and the Free Trade Agreement. Washington, for its part, was far more interested in alleged Canadian subsidies to lumber producers and lobster fishermen than on the affect SDI would have on Canada, or how NORAD would relate to USSPACECOM, or how to approach bilateral strategic cooperation in the Arctic. U.S. defense trade with Canada cost over a trillion dollars in its first five years, which, in terms of defense spending, was not a great deal.

The atmosphere of goodwill has continued into the Bush administration. As Canada and the United States marked the fiftieth anniversary of the PJBD in August, 1990, defense cooperation seemed to harken back to those heady days of World War II and the early Cold War. Ottawa strongly supported American diplomacy at the United Nations after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and dispatched naval and air contingents to join the coalition forces in the Persian Gulf.

THE FUTURE OF NORTH AMERICAN STRATEGIC DEFENSE AND CANADA

As the renewal of NORAD approached in 1991, much of the anxiety which had surfaced in the 1980's dissipated with the sweeping changes in the international environment. The deep cuts in offensive strategic nuclear weapons being negotiated under the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) seemed to hold the promise of reducing the

threat to North America. There were also announcements of large reductions in U.S. defense spending, including on SDI and maritime forces.

These changes prompted some in Canada to question the continued necessity of NORAD. When in March, 1990, the Minister of Defence argued that Soviet nuclear forces still constituted the most serious threat to North America, it elicited near universal derision in the Canadian press and academic communities as "Cold War Thinking."⁶⁶ A September, 1990, interdepartmental report, *Canadian Security in a World in Transition*, suggested that Canada renew NORAD and "participate in further defense aerospace activities with the U.S. only if such moves respect international disarmament treaties and do not affect the spread of nuclear weapons." The document also cautioned that further defense accords "might harm Canadian sovereignty" and that "any additional close Canada-U.S. military co-operation might arouse Canadian public opinion."⁶⁷ During the brief parliamentary review of NORAD some analysts suggested that global conditions and national opinion mandated a two- or three-year renewal.⁶⁸

These concerns had little impact. In sharp contrast to 1986, the renewal of NORAD in April, 1991, for another five years went almost unnoticed, even in Canada. In a sense the improved global environment made it politically easier for the Mulroney government to continue Canada's role in the joint command because of a lack of public and media interest. A parliamentary review concluded that NORAD's missile warning/attack assessment, space surveillance and air sovereignty functions were still needed. It noted that even under the deep cuts of the START agreement, thousands of nuclear warheads were still pointed at North America. Indeed, in its report the committee observed that "there is a disconnection between general political developments" and the level of strategic nuclear forces."⁶⁹

In reality, though, there has already been a definite link between "general political developments" and the level of strategic nuclear forces deployed against North America. This has influenced U.S. assessments of NORAD's requirements. The air and maritime security of North America, which the 1987 White Paper predicted would become more important, appeared to have been affected by the Gorbachev era's new thinking. According to (unclassified) NORAD reports, the frequency of Soviet Bear bomber flights near North America was "significantly reduced during 1989" to just twenty one. In the 1986-1988 period, there had been as many as sixty-six flights per year.⁷⁰ A U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee report released in July, 1990, noted that "the Soviets have ceased submarine patrols off the U.S. coast, and flights by Bear bombers

to Canada's northern border." Also in July, the SAC ended its nearly thirty-year practice of maintaining one "Looking Glass" plane in the air at all times so as to be able to exercise command and control over U.S. nuclear forces in the event ground forces were destroyed. The decision "to move to 'ground alert status' reflects both budgetary pressures and greater confidence that a Soviet nuclear alert could be detected in time to take precautionary measures."⁷¹

In February, 1991, the USAF announced that because of budgetary pressures it was mothballing the only operational OTH-B site in Maine as well as the soon-to-be operational site in Oregon. The proposed OTH-B sites in Alaska and the southern U.S. would not be built at all. In March it was announced that as "a result of Pentagon budget cuts," the entire OTH-Bs program was being cancelled. After intervention by Defense Department officials and members of Congress in the affected states, the decision was partially reversed a month later. The existing Maine radar will see its operation reduced to 40 hours a week, while the one in Oregon will remain capable of being brought back on line in an emergency.⁷² Thus it would appear that as far as air defense is concerned, NORAD may be moving to more reliance on mobilization capabilities on the grounds that an 'out-of-the-blue' Soviet attack is now exceedingly unlikely. This would be in line with overall trends in U.S. strategy as well as major progress in arms control.

As a result of the July, 1991, START agreement, superpower strategic nuclear arsenals are to be reduced by approximately 30 percent. The numbers may be reduced even further as result of President Bush's September 27, 1991, initiative in which he declared that "the time is right to use START as a springboard to achieve additional stabilizing changes."⁷³ Under the START agreement there will be a ceiling of 6,000 nuclear warheads carried on 1,600 nuclear delivery vehicles (deployed ICBM, SLBMs, and bombers). Of these 6,000 warheads, no more than 4,900 could be deployed on ICBMs and SLBMs with further limits of 1,540 warheads on heavy ICBMs. This latter provision will require the Soviets to cut in half their force of heavy MIRVed SS-18 ICBMs. There will also be a 1,100 limit on mobile ICBMs. In addition, a "politically-binding" declaration that accompanied the Treaty allowed both sides up to 880 long-range nuclear SLCMs. These limits would bring nuclear forces back only to the numerical levels of the late 1970s. Each side would have eight to ten thousand nuclear warheads capable of striking the other's territory. On balance, it would appear that the Treaty favors the United States in so far as it cuts Soviet heavy ICBMs while leaving the U.S. free to modernize its strategic forces in three areas where it has a comparative advantage: bombers with ALCMs, SLBMs and SLCMs.

In his September, 1991, statement the President announced that he was ordering American bombers and some ICBMs to step down from their high alert status. He also stated that the United States would not proceed with development of the mobile version of the MIRVed MX missile and the mobile version of the single-warhead ICBM currently under development. He called upon the USSR to terminate any new MIRVed ICBMs and also to limit modernization to single-warhead launchers. In addition the President wants to go beyond the START agreement and eliminate all MIRVed ICBMs. The U.S. has long argued that MIRVed ICBMs in silos are particularly destabilizing because of their accuracy and vulnerability. But Bush would not negotiate reductions on MIRVed SLBMs. Because most Soviet warheads are MIRVed ICBMs and most American warheads are MIRVed SLBMs, acceptance of this proposal would be more to the American advantage. This would especially be the case since the U.S. has greatly increased the accuracy of its SLBMs.⁷⁴ In addition, while calling for the elimination of some systems, President Bush will ask Congress for full funding of the B-2 bomber.

Under the July, 1991, START agreement the counting rules for ALCM-capable bombers would allow for an augmentation of Soviet and American bomber forces.⁷⁵ The agreement on SLCM might also permit an increase in Soviet capabilities in this area. Taken together, this could mean that as the number of ICBMs and SLBMs declines, the relative importance of Soviet cruise missiles in their overall strategic nuclear arsenal may increase. This could be a significant problem because though ballistic missiles can be detected, surveillance and warning of a cruise missile attack is problematic and the percentage of weapons that could not be detected by NORAD radar would increase.⁷⁶

The situation would become more dangerous if the Soviets follow the American lead and develop advanced air and sea-launched cruise missiles. Even in limited numbers, these weapons would "pose a severe threat to U.S. capacity to provide warning to U.S. National Command Authority in case of attack."⁷⁷ Although NORAD's NWS, OTH-Bs, and interceptors have improved warning of low-flying systems, it is uncertain whether they will be sufficient in the future, especially against a long-range advanced cruise missile attack on soft targets near the American East and West coasts.⁷⁸ It is also uncertain whether the Soviets will develop advanced cruise missiles or other air-breathing systems such as bombers, although a START agreement would not preclude their doing so. This is especially the case in light of President Bush's September, 1991, initiative in which he announced that the United States would withdraw and store all of its nuclear SLCMs as

part of an overall draw-down and elimination of land, air and sea-based tactical nuclear weapons.⁷⁹

Given the limited nature of the air-breathing threat and prospects for further reductions, there seems to be less urgency than before to improve NORAD's warning and interception capabilities against cruise missiles. The Pentagon, including the USAF, was reluctant to spend money on air defense when budgets were plentiful. It is unlikely that such expenditures will receive high priority during a period of severe fiscal constraint. In addition, air defense is still linked to developments in BMD. As Stephen Cimbala notes, "deployed alone without other active defenses, air defense would seemingly add little to deterrence and stability." Deployment of air defenses "presupposes BMD deployments with all their attendant consequences."⁸⁰

Under the September, 1991, Bush initiative SDI research was continued. The controversy over SDI has been heightened as a result of improvements in the international environment and budget restraints. Secretary of Defense Cheney commissioned an outside assessment of the program which argued that cuts under a START agreement will not be significant enough to warrant scaling back the research and development of BMD systems. At the same time, some DOD officials contended that the United States should pursue a more limited and cheaper SDI which focused on the potential threat from Third World countries armed with ballistic missiles, in an effort to evaluate whether SDI technologies could be used in areas other than BMD. A Joint SDI Defense Technology Applications Initiative (JDAI) panel was established in December, 1987, to "identify where SDI-developed technologies can be shared to help meet the operational requirements of on-going DOD research and development work."⁸¹

In the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization's (SDIO) May, 1990, report to Congress, Secretary Cheney pointed to real progress with promising technologies such as brilliant pebbles and Beam Experiment Aboard a Rocket (BEAR). He wrote that "our accomplishments are reshaping the debate over defenses from one based on broad statements that defense won't work, to consideration of the many useful military missions defenses can perform."⁸² For fiscal year (FY) 1991, the Bush administration requested \$4.7 billion, an increase of \$870 million over the FY 1990 appropriation but a \$1 billion reduction from the FY 1991 budget included in the 1990-1991 request.⁸³ In August, 1990, the Senate accepted the recommendation of its Armed Services Committee that the program be cut by \$1 billion.⁸⁴

In the wake of the Persian Gulf War with the success of the Patriot missile and the prospect of more countries acquiring ballistic

missiles, the refocusing of SDI has continued. President Bush has asked the Soviets to join with the United States in allowing "limited deployment of non-nuclear defenses to protect against limited ballistic missile strikes—whatever their source—without undermining the credibility of existing deterrence forces." The SDIO is now pressing the idea of Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS), a system that would be less than half the size of the earlier SDI Phase I concept and "would provide an affordable defensive capability." Rather than protecting the U.S. against an all-out Soviet missile attack, GPALS would be designed to "to protect U.S. forces deployed overseas, U.S. power projection forces, and U.S. allies and friends—as well as the United States itself—against accidental unauthorized, and/or limited ballistic missile strikes." When deployed, the GPALS systems will involve a combination of space- and surface-based sensors for warning and tracking. Interceptors will be based on the ground, at sea and in space.

In contrast to the initial SDI research, GPALS places greater relative emphasis on the land-based systems but will involve approximately half those envisioned under the original plans. The plan is to move ahead with the theater missile defenses first, to be followed later in the 1990s with strategic defenses for the United States itself. The Bush administration is seeking to restore Congressional funding levels for SDI to the roughly \$4.7 billion requested in the last fiscal year. They estimate that by the mid-1990s, the program will require \$6 billion annually.⁸⁵ It remains to be seen whether Congress will agree to fund even this scaled-back version of SDI in an era of budget constraint.

During the early days of SDI, space-based air surveillance technologies such as those being researched under ADI were linked to BMD development, and the JDAI has identified ADI programs that could benefit from SDI research.⁸⁶ There is, though, no reference to air defense in the GPALS proposals. But in light of the scaling-back of SDI and given the prospects for limits on cruise missiles, it seems likely that research into space-based air surveillance, while continuing, will not proceed with any urgency. New air defense systems, if they emerge at all, are not expected to be available before the end of the decade.⁸⁷

For the present it appears that the U.S. will maintain NORAD's existing air defense capabilities and that the Command will fare relatively well in an era of defense budget cuts. For example, although USAF has significantly cut-back on the OTH-Bs system, the Air National Guard, which provides eleven of NORAD's sixteen American squadrons, "will continue to be strengthened by an infusion of more modern equipment," especially the conversion from A-7s to F-16s.⁸⁸ It is possible that the withdrawal of tactical fighter forces from overseas bases would

also make more aircraft available in the United States for air defense. And NORAD stands to benefit from its "stepped-up participation" in the surveillance and interception of drug smugglers. In 1989 the command helped in twenty-five arrests. The Pentagon has proposed a new \$500 million southward-looking radar to detect low-flying aircraft coming out of Colombia.⁸⁹

If the rapidly changing strategic environment will have little impact on the nature of continental aerospace defense, so it seems also to be the case with regard to North American maritime defense. The USN itself has declared the vaunted "maritime strategy" of the 1980s, with its emphasis upon forward operations to contain Soviet naval power, dead in the water. A year before Desert Storm, the USN was telling Congress that "the need for a strong, well funded Navy will grow in the next decade as Soviet military power wanes and the Third World assumes greater prominence in U.S. strategy."⁹⁰ The Gulf War has only reinforced this view. In the USN's report to Congress for FY 1992-93, Secretary of the Navy Lawrence Garrett declared that whereas the strategy for the Cold War had been one of containment, "our new strategy should be one of stability focusing on peacetime presence and regional conflict." While in the 1980s "our forces were built to counter the Soviet threat," in the 1990s "the forces we will retain and build must address peacetime presence, deal with regional contingencies, and continue to pace the Soviet threat." All this requires continued American maritime superiority, but "fiscal realities have also made affordability an important factor [to] be considered in sustaining" that superiority.⁹¹

Fiscal realities mean that the 600-ship navy of the 1980s, which by 1991 had already been reduced to 545, will be drawn down to 451 ships by 1995 with personnel being reduced from 551,000 to 510,000.⁹² Over the next two years over 100 ships, including 34 frigates, 10 destroyers and 2 battleships will be retired or transferred to the reserve fleet. By 1995, the number of active carriers will be reduced from 13 to 12 with active carrier air wings cut from 13 to 11.⁹³ In January, 1991, Cheney cancelled development of the Navy's carrier-based A-12 stealth attack plane. The present fleet of 91 attack submarines of all types is expected to fall to 68 by the end of the decade and the Navy's plans to acquire 30 Seawolf SSNs has been drastically scaled back to just five, "the minimum force that can be economically maintained and supported logistically."⁹⁴ At the end of the decade, the SSBN fleet comprised just 18 Ohio-class boats, down from the present number of 34 Ohios and Poseidons.⁹⁵

Despite these reductions, the USN will continue to modernize and maintain its maritime superiority. Over the next several years more Los Angeles-class SSNs, Ohio-class SSBNs, cruisers, destroyers and an

aircraft carrier will be added to the fleet. The Navy will also acquire more fast supply ships, oilers, surveillance and amphibious assault ships.⁹⁶

More important, the USN is likely to benefit most of all the services from the new American strategic concept which emphasizes the need to project power abroad while maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent. The USN has been essential for protection of American interests abroad and for the projection of power ashore, as was demonstrated vividly during the Gulf War. To this extent its traditional 'transoceanic' orientation will in fact be strengthened. Indeed, the chief of naval operations has argued that the SSN, formerly the key weapon in the counter-SSBN plans of the 1980s maritime strategy, would be freed of "its nearly full-time requirement to train for ASW in forward areas" and "be available for more regional and power projection and support missions."⁹⁷

The USN has also played an important role in NATO.⁹⁸ If some kind of military pact survives, NATO will continue to look to the USN to supply the bulk of the Alliance's maritime forces which could become a significant part of any new transatlantic bargain. With U.S. and allied thinking now being based upon expectations of an extended period of warning in the event of a Soviet attack in Europe, sealift would become relatively more salient in European security.

The USN's plans will also mesh well with the need to maintain a smaller, yet increasingly invulnerable nuclear deterrent force. Although the SSBN force will be cut to 18, these Ohio-class boats will each have 24 MIRVed SLBMs with eight to twelve warheads. Indeed, combined with arms control, the relative importance of the sea-based deterrent, which already contains the majority of American warheads, will increase as older ICBMs are phased out and the bomber force is reduced.⁹⁹ If President Bush's September, 1991, proposals are accepted by the Soviets, the only MIRVed missiles will be those on SSBNs. In addition, since Bush proposes only to remove nuclear SLCMs from U.S. ships and store them, the USN will retain a potential nuclear cruise missile capability.

Closer to home, the USN has not played a major role in continental defense since the 1950s when its ships did picket-duty for air defense. In the late 1980s, when the Soviet SLCM threat appeared to be on the rise, the USN was more concerned with the sea-based air threat and became involved in ADI. Surveillance of the ocean approaches will continue to be a role for the USN, and the withdrawal of ships and naval aviation from forward bases will make available more assets for North American security. However, this will not be a major task, particularly if agreement with the USSR is reached removing SLCMs from the superpower navies.

If anything, the USN's involvement in the drug war will draw more ships and aircraft into active patrolling of the American coast and in South American waters.

What does all this mean for Canada's role in continental defense? As long as thousands of highly accurate nuclear weapons are targeted on North America, NORAD's missile warning and attack assessment role will continue. But apart from having personnel at the NORAD headquarters, Canada is not directly involved in missile warning and surveillance. Thus the reductions in ICBMs and SLBMs in the START agreement will not affect Canada's role in missile warning and attack assessment. Canada will remain primarily concerned with air defense. Canada's forces, interceptor aircraft, and maritime surveillance assets will still be required to cover Canadian air space and maritime approaches. This should not be a major problem because of the capability of the CF-18s and the construction of forward operating locations. The number of CF-18s available to NORAD will increase with the withdrawal of the Canadian squadrons from Europe. Canadian forces, as well the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, are involved in NORAD's anti-drug efforts, but more and different types of aircraft and better radar coverage will be needed to maintain adequate coverage.¹⁰⁰

Although it is possible that some of the ground-based interceptors envisioned under GPALS would intercept missiles over Canada, none of the systems currently under review for SDI would require use of Canadian territory.¹⁰¹ Nor has the United States government given any indication that it is seeking to integrate BMD into the binational NORAD command structure. As it has with strategic offensive forces, the United States will want to retain exclusive control over strategic defenses. The U.S. has created a new Strategic Command which places the bomber, ICBM and SLBM legs of the American nuclear triad under a single commander. NORAD does not come within this command but remains with USSPACECOM. In the past five years the relationship between NORAD, USAFSPACECOM, and the unified USSPACECOM have been sorted out and clarified. Although certain activities are exclusively American, a large number of Canadian personnel are now filling posts in the USAFSPACECOM.

Canada's role in NORAD will be affected less by BMD developments or command changes in the United States and more by developments in air defense, especially in space-based radar. Some Canadian analysts argue that because the July, 1991, START agreement left open the possibility that the Soviets would expand their ALCMs and SLCMs, the importance of Canadian airspace and waters would increase. This, in turn, heightened the need for "an expensive space-based radar system,"

and Canada will come "under pressure" from the U.S. to modernize NORAD with such a system.¹⁰² Canada would have to become more involved with ADI. However, as noted above, further arms control steps may curtail any expansion of cruise missile arsenals and the GPALS focus of SDI appears to have little linkage to ADI.

Canada has been active in research into military and civilian SBR, both on its own and in conjunction with the United States. In 1987 the government approved a \$47 million all-Canadian research project in this area. There is a civilian initiative, RADARSAT, which is receiving some assistance from the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration. It is Ottawa's intention to promote research in Canada so that Canadian industry can be in a better position to participate in American SBR developments. There is continued Canadian involvement in the U.S. ADI program and in the Space-based Area Surveillance System project. There is also some American SBR research in which Canada is not participating. Ottawa and Washington have signed a bilateral Master Data Exchange Agreement which provides for consultation and exchange of information on SBR.¹⁰³ However, as Andrew Richter has observed, Canada is by no means an equal partner in American SBR research. It plays a small role in ADI, and Canadian industry has had difficulty obtaining access to classified material on ADI programs.¹⁰⁴

While it would be in the United States' interest to continue to involve Canada in ADI and SBR research to enhance continued air defense cooperation, it is not a necessity. If the United States does develop the technology to improve continental air defense dramatically, especially against cruise missiles, it is likely that such systems will be deployed predominantly in the continental United States or will rely on space surveillance. The onus will be on Canada, therefore, to remain involved in air defense research. In order to contribute to North American air defense and for its own air sovereignty, Canada will maintain an interest in space-based air surveillance and participate in some U.S. research and development.

As for bilateral maritime cooperation, the September, 1991, defense statement indicates that Canada will have 16 ocean-going surface ships at sea by the end of decade. Because 12 of these will be new, the Canadian maritime contribution to continental defense will actually be better than it is at present. Some ships have been transferred to the west coast and the government plans to improve the balance. Replacement of the Sea King ship-borne helicopters will also improve the ASW effectiveness of the fleet. For maritime air, the eighteen Auroras will maintain long-range ASW patrols. The purchase of 3 more aircraft without sophisticated ASW equipment for training and Arctic patrols

will free more Auroras for NATO and continental defense duties. The government has also said it will acquire new shorter-range patrol aircraft to be used primarily for non-military surveillance. Plans for replacing the submarine fleet remain vague, with the defense statement indicating only that from 3 to 6 conventional submarines will be purchased. Since the USN has not counted on a Canadian submarine capability, the delay will not be a problem from the American perspective.

The cancellation of the SSN program will deny Canada an under-ice capability. The government has said it will move ahead with development of a fixed under-ice surveillance system. Since the United States never expected Canada to have such a capability, this will not affect (and indeed removes a potential problem in) bilateral maritime relations. There has also been less controversy over the continued conflicting claims about the status of the Northwest Passage since the 1988 agreement. A residual Soviet SLCM threat from the Arctic remains a possibility but it is greatest on the Atlantic and Pacific seabords of the United States.¹⁰⁵ For Ottawa, sovereignty and not security is the main issue in the decision to acquire full under-ice capability. Sovereignty demands that Canada be able to patrol all areas it claims as its own.

Under current plans the USN will retain an impressive under-ice capability and the potential to threaten Soviet SSBNs, although the priority attached by the maritime strategy of the 1980s to forward operations near the USSR will diminish. American (and British) submarines will continue to transit and occasionally surface in the Canadian Arctic as they did in May, 1991.¹⁰⁶

However, it is apparent that the Mulroney government views full Arctic capability as important. In 1990 the former minister of defense observed that "We have been a country for 127 years (*sic*) and haven't been able to go under the ice yet."¹⁰⁷ In a budget reducing measure the Mulroney government cancelled plans to build a more capable ice-breaker. The September, 1991, defense statement emphasized sovereignty protection in the Atlantic and Pacific. It did note that Canada would increase its surveillance capability in the Arctic, but Mr. Masse seemed to dismiss concerns both about the Soviets and about American threats to Canadian sovereignty: "The North is between Russia and us. It is not between other countries where you have military problems...The 19th century is over. In North America we have an alliance between the U.S. and Canada, which has served the interests of this country."¹⁰⁸ Overall then, current Canadian naval plans, as uncertain as they remain, would seem to mesh well with the evolving new strategy of the USN.

With regard to defense economic cooperation, shrinking American defense budgets and the resulting pressure to favor domestic over

foreign producers is likely to contract the U.S. market for Canada's already small defense industry. At the same time, as long as neither country intends to dismantle its military establishments totally and bilateral security collaboration is sustained, cooperation in defense economics will continue. There may even be grounds for enhancing DD/DPSA and NADIBO as a result of the European Community's move toward a single market in 1992, including a unified European defense market. An "Action Plan" issued by the community's Independent European Program Group in December, 1988, suggested a NADIBO-type arrangement. As Middlemiss argued recently, "A two pillar defence economic system may emerge within NATO" which could lead Canada and the United States to move unilaterally to break into the European defense market. Or the two governments could "respond to this challenge by strengthening their defence economic links...."¹⁰⁹

Perhaps the greatest uncertainty regarding the future of North American defense relations will originate from within Canada rather than from the external environment. With the failure of the Meech Lake Accord in 1990, and with Quebec now defining its own future, the possibility of sovereignty for that province seems closer than ever before. It is by no means assured that the Mulroney government's new constitutional proposals announced in September, 1991, will provide the basis for a renewed Confederation.

In the past, American fears about North American security have always hovered in the background of Washington's assessment of the impact of Canada's national unity problems. Would an independent Quebec cooperate in NORAD? Would it join NATO? Or would a left-leaning, nationalistic government in Quebec seek to identify with the Soviet bloc and anti-American governments in the Third World, presenting the United States with a 'Cuba to the North'? Today, sovereigntist sentiment in Quebec can be found among the province's business elite who are confident that an independent Quebec would be able to take its place alongside the United States and other major industrial countries, and that Quebec would contribute to western collective defense.

Still, the uncertainty of where Canada is heading and what it will mean for security relations should be a cause for concern in Washington. A number of scenarios are possible. If the Mulroney government is successful in implementing its constitutional proposals, Canada will remain united, defense will remain exclusively in Ottawa's hands, and the status quo will prevail. It is possible, though, that a more decentralized version of the current proposals, one that shifts greater taxing power to the provinces, might reduce the funds available to the federal government, which might in turn force Ottawa to seek to reduce defense

spending even further. This could curtail Canada's ability to contribute to North American defense but will not seriously affect bilateral arrangements.

If the current constitutional efforts fail, then Quebecers will likely vote to negotiate some form of sovereignty-association. Assuming the rest of Canada is willing to negotiate the terms of the new arrangement, it is possible that defense policy could still be left in Ottawa's hands. This would involve no major change in bilateral security relations but would assume that Quebec would allow Canadian forces, especially air forces, to operate on and over its territory.

It is more likely, however, that an independent Quebec will want to maintain armed forces (including air forces) of its own as a concrete manifestation of its sovereignty. As part of the separation negotiations with Ottawa the defense labor (and the armed forces themselves) would probably be divided up. Washington would then have to make new arrangements with both Quebec and the rump Canada, both of which are likely to have fewer resources available for, and perhaps less interest in, defense. U.S. forces would then have to assume more of the continental air and maritime surveillance. While undesirable, adjusting to this situation would be by no means impossible. Indeed, given the slackening of the Cold War, the declining threat to North America, and the relatively low priority North American security will continue to be for the United States, a negotiated separation of Quebec from Canada presents fewer problems for Washington than it might have offered a decade ago.

The most troublesome scenario for the United States would be a pell-mell break-up of Canada. If the constitutional talks fail and Ottawa either refuses or is unable to negotiate sovereignty-association, Quebec might issue a unilateral declaration of independence which could be followed by bitter wrangling, including perhaps civil strife. Washington would have a Yugoslavia to the north. Not only would Canada be unable to contribute to North American security, but internal order might break down with the armed forces themselves coming apart. Under these circumstances, it may not be possible for the United States to stand by idly. What steps it could or would take to cope with this chilling but no longer impossible scenario are difficult to imagine.¹¹⁰

CONCLUSION

Great changes are taking place in the international environment. In response, the American strategic concept will now be "guided by the need to maintain the forces required to exercise forward presence in key

areas, to respond effectively in crises, to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent, and to retain the national capacity to rebuild our forces should that be needed."¹¹¹ But these transformations will not dramatically alter the place of North American security in U.S. defense policy. The continent is not to be a nuclear-girded fortress behind whose walls the United States will retreat from world leadership and entangling alliances. Rather it will be a base secured by a reduced, yet powerful and invulnerable nuclear deterrent, from out of which the United States will sally forth in defense of its wider global interests when necessary. If, therefore, North America was a geo-strategic backwater during the Cold War, it is likely to become even more so in the post-Cold War era. Military issues will move even further down on the Canada-U.S. bilateral agenda.

There will be a residual and potential threat to the continent arising simply from the continued existence of strategic nuclear weapons and the uncertain future of the Soviet Union. Washington will expect that Ottawa will want to maintain its contribution to the aerospace and maritime defense of North America. The September, 1991, Canadian statement on defense seems to indicate that the Canadian government also wishes to continue this contribution. The statement heralded a shift of emphasis away from NATO Europe and thus would seem to mesh well with the new American strategic concept which focuses on being able to project and mobilize forces from a secure North American base, but which places no particularly new emphasis upon protecting that base.

Thus Canada is free to concentrate its forces closer to home while retaining a limited ability to deploy them abroad in furtherance of Canadian foreign policy objectives, as for example in international peacekeeping. The continuation of roughly the existing level of the Canadian contribution to North American defense should mesh with Ottawa's sovereignty concerns elsewhere by reducing the need for U.S. forces to assume a greater burden of continental security and by providing some of the wherewithal to assert sovereignty against non-military threats such as fishing violations.

The strategic and material basis exists, therefore, for a continuation of the Canada-U.S. defense partnership. To be sure, the United States has never especially sought out Canada's counsel in security matters within this partnership, nor will it in the present changing global environment. Equally, however, Washington will want to retain both Canada's goodwill and its participation in North American defense on roughly the same basis as in the 1980s. From the American perspective, these contributions will be important not so much for their military value, which will remain marginal, but in a larger political context. The

Canada-U.S. security relationship has never been based solely on strategic imperatives; it rests instead on common adherence to Western collective defense and unity.

But with the military threat declining to North America, it may be increasingly difficult for any Canadian government to offer compelling reasons to taxpayers for continuing strategic cooperation with the United States. There is also the concern that with the withdrawal of Canadian forces from Europe, Canadian defense policy might become increasingly continentalized and less multilateral.¹¹² Combined with the Free Trade Agreement, this could lead to a further erosion of Canadian sovereignty and independence. All the more reason, it will be argued, to withdraw from what has always been, even in its halcyon days, a limited and unequal partnership.

If a future Canadian government moves in this direction, there may be little the United States can do. Washington has little influence over Canadian defense spending and will not hound or chase after Canada if Ottawa refuses or is politically unable to sustain a modest level of continental defense effort. In the coming years, the United States will confront other security issues of greater complexity and higher priority. Only the prospect of the uncontrolled break-up of the Canadian confederation would move Canada-U.S. defense relations to the top of the American national security agenda. Then it would not so much be a question of increasing continentalism, but of unavoidable unilateralism on the part of the United States.

But this outcome is not a foregone conclusion. Canada may solve, or once again outlive, its domestic difficulties. Ottawa's decision to support the U.S.-led United Nations action in the Persian Gulf indicates that Canada is still a dependable ally, anxious to participate in global security affairs. To be sure, Canadians, as with Americans, expect lower defense budgets. Yet, as argued above, the United States will not be seeking closer integration with Canada in North American security or demanding increased Canadian defense resources. And Canada has indicated that it wants to remain active within European security affairs by not withdrawing entirely from Europe and by retaining a commitment of forces to NATO. Indeed, if a declining Soviet threat in Europe leads to the evolution of the alliance into a more political organization, its attractiveness to Canada and Canadians may increase even as Ottawa's real influence inevitably declines. Provided the Canadian government can demonstrate that continued security cooperation with the United States shall remain a limited undertaking, both in North America and Europe, declining perceptions of an external threat need not necessarily undermine the bilateral partnership.

The deployment to the Persian Gulf showed that Canadian governments find it easier to justify military undertakings when they take place in a multilateral framework. Although Canadian defense activities may become more restricted to North America, Washington should continue to encourage Ottawa's involvement in European security affairs through NATO or any future transatlantic arrangements. This will make it easier for Canadian governments to maintain a reasonable level of defense expenditure. Sustaining the spirit of common interests that has always characterized Canada-U.S. defense relations may depend on the maintenance of a broader framework of Western collective defense.

Whatever measures the United States takes to accommodate Canada, the future level of strategic cooperation will depend as much on the decisions and choices made by Ottawa as on trends in the larger strategic environment. As far as both governments are presently concerned, it is Ogdensburg plus fifty and still counting.

INDEX

- ABM = Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
ACLANT = Atlantic Command
ADAT = aerospace defense advanced technology
ADI = air defense initiative
ADMP = Air Defense Master Plan
ALCM, SLCM = air- and sea-launched cruise missiles
AMF(L) = allied mobile forces (land)
ASW = anti-submarine warfare
AWAC = airborne warning and control
BEAR = beam experiment aboard a rocket
BMD = ballistic missile defense
BOMARC = surface to air anti-aircraft missile
CADIN-PINETREE = Continental Air Defense Integrated North,
Pine Tree Line
DD/DPSA = defense development and production sharing
arrangements
DEW = distant early warning
DND = Department of National Defence
DOD = Department of Defense
FY = fiscal year
GDP = gross domestic product
GPALS = global protection against limited strikes
ICBM = intercontinental ballistic missile
IEPG = Independent European Program Group
JDAI = joint SDI defense technology applications initiative
MAD = mutual assured destruction
MIRV = multiple independently-targeted re-entry vehicles
NADIBO = North American Defense Industrial Base Organization
NATO = North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NORAD = North American Air Defense Command
NWS = north warning system
OTH-B = over-the-horizon backscatter radar
PAVE PAWS = detection radar for submarine launched ballistic
missiles
PJBD = Permanent Joint Board on Defense

RCN = Royal Canadian Navy
RADARSAT = remote-sensing earth observation radar satellite
SAC = Strategic Air Command
SBR = space based radar
SCEAND = Committee on External Affairs and National Defense
SDA 2000 = Strategic Defense Architecture 2000
SDI = strategic defense initiative
SDIO = Strategic Defense Initiative Organization
SLBM = submarine-launched ballistic missile
SSBN = nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine
SSN = nuclear-powered attack submarine
START = strategic arms reduction talks
USAF = United States Air Force
USN = United States Navy
USSAFSPACECOM = United States Air Force Space Command
USSPACECOM = United States Space Command

NOTES

¹ In the summer of 1940, with the fall of Western Europe and what many feared to be the impending defeat of Britain, President Franklin Roosevelt began to take steps towards greater co-operation in North American defense. The PJBD was created that August by an exchange of notes following a meeting at Ogdensburg, New York between Roosevelt and Canadian Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King. Co-chaired by a Canadian and an American and composed of senior military and civilian officials from the two governments, the PJBD was active during the war and immediate postwar era in overseeing bilateral defense relations. Although it continued to serve this function, its impact declined greatly from the mid 1950s onward. See Christopher Conliffe, "The Permanent Joint Board on Defence, 1940-1988," David G. Haglund and Joel J. Sokolsky, eds., *The U.S.-Canada Security Relationship: The Politics, Strategy and Technology of Defense* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1989), 145-165.

² See Ambassador Halstead's foreword to Joseph T. Jockel and Joel J. Sokolsky in *Canada and Collective Security: Odd Man Out*, Washington Papers, No. 121 (New York: Praeger, 1986), viii.

³ The acronym NORAD now stands for North American Aerospace Defense Command. The command was renamed in 1981 to reflect its new role in the surveillance, warning, and assessment of missile attacks as well as the monitoring of space activities. For a history of the origins of NORAD see Joseph T. Jockel, *No Boundaries Upstairs: Canada, the United States and the Origins of North American Air Defence, 1945-1958* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1987).

⁴ See: Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence (SCEAND), *Canada-U.S. Defence Cooperation and the 1986 Renewal of the NORAD Agreement* (1986); David Cox, *Canada and NORAD, 1858-1978: A Cautionary Retrospective*, Aurora Papers, No. 1 (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, 1985); Cox, *Trends in Continental Defence: A Canadian Perspective* (Ottawa: Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security (1986); Joel J. Sokolsky, "Changing Strategies, Technologies and Organization: The Continuing Debate on NORAD and the Strategic Defense Initiative," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 19 (December 1986): 757-774.

⁵ Joseph T. Jockel, "The U.S. Navy, Maritime Command, and the Arctic," *Canadian Defence Quarterly* 19 (Winter 1989): 23-34.

⁶ Canada, Department of National Defence, *Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada* (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1987).

⁷ See Joel J. Sokolsky, "Trends in U.S. Strategy and the 1987 white paper on defence," *International Journal* 52 (Autumn 1987): 675-706. On the 1987 White Paper see Fen Osler Hampson, "Call To Arms: Canadian National Security Policy," Maureen Appel Molot and Brian W. Tomlin, eds., *Canada Among Nations: A World of Conflict/1987* (Toronto: Lorimer, 1988), 68-91.

⁸ "Remarks by President Bush on Reducing U.S. and Soviet Nuclear Weapons," *New York Times*, September 28, 1991, 4.

⁹ For an overview of Canadian defense policy, see D. W. Middlemiss and J. J. Sokolsky, *Canadian Defence: Decisions and Determinants* (Toronto: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Canada, 1989).

¹⁰ Department of External Affairs Study, "Continental Radar Defence," October 3, 1953, in Brooke Claxton Papers, Vol. 102, Public Archives of Canada, Ottawa.

¹¹ Kenneth Schaffel, "The U.S. Air Force's Philosophy of Strategic Defense: A Historical Overview," in Stephen J. Cimbala, ed., *Strategic Air Defense* (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources Books, 1989), 17.

¹² James Eayrs, "Military Policy and the Middle Power: The Canadian Experience," in J. King Gordon, ed., *Canada's Role as a Middle Power* (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1965), 73.

¹³ In 1968, the RCN, the Royal Canadian Air Force, and the Canadian Army were unified into a single service entity—the Canadian Forces—with an integrated National Defence Headquarters under a single Chief of the Defence Staff. After further organizational changes Maritime Command, Air Command and Mobile Command emerged roughly to take the place of the older services. See Douglas Bland, *The Administration of Defence Policy in Canada, 1947 to 1985* (Kingston: Ronald P. Frye, 1987).

¹⁴ *Annual Report of the Commander-in-Chief Atlantic Fleet*, April 1965, 39, Command File-Post 1946 United States Navy, Operational Archives, Washington Navy Yard, Washington, D.C.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, June, 1961, 24.

¹⁶ Samuel P. Huntington, "National Policy and the Transoceanic Navy," *United States Naval Institute Proceedings* 80 (May 1954): 483-93.

¹⁷ See Joel J. Sokolsky, "Canada and the Cold War at Sea," in W. A. B. Douglas, ed., *RCN in Transition, 1910-1985* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1988), 209-232.

¹⁸ Middlemiss and Sokolsky, *Canadian Defence*, 23. See also Danford W. Middlemiss, "Economic Defence Co-operation with the United States, 1940-1963," in Kim Richard Nossal, ed., *An Acceptance of Paradox: Essays in Honour of John W. Holmes* (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1982), 86-114.

¹⁹ Canada, Senate, Special Committee on National Defence, *Canada's Territorial Air Defence* (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, January 1985), 9.

²⁰ On the workings of NORAD see David J. Angell, "NORAD and Binational Nuclear Alert: Consultation and Decision making in the Integrated Command," *Defense Analysis* 4 (June 1988): 129-146.

²¹ Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston: Little Brown, 1979), 383.

²² For a detailed discussion of the relationship between NATO and NORAD see C.A. Cannizzo, "NATO-NORAD Linkages," *Canadian Defence Quarterly* 19 (Spring 1990): 21-27.

²³ Quoted in Middlemiss and Sokolsky, *Canadian Defence*, 38-39.

²⁴ Jockel, "The U.S. Navy, Maritime Command and the Arctic," 31.

²⁵ "Canada criticized over NATO spending," *The Ottawa Citizen*, April 17, 1990, A4.

²⁶ United States Department of Defense (DOD), *Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense* (Washington, D.C.: March 1986), 18-20, 23.

²⁷ *Challenge and Commitment*, 30, 33, 37.

²⁸ "Canada criticized over NATO spending," A4.

²⁹ *Kingston Whig Standard*, September 21, 1990, 1. These reductions brought the total forces in Europe near to 1985 levels. That year, the Mulroney government dispatched an additional twelve hundred ground troops to Europe. At the same time the dispatch of one squadron of CF-18s from Germany to the Persian Gulf in September, 1990, reduced by one-third the number of Canadian fighter forces in Germany.

³⁰ *Defence Newsletter* (Halifax, Nova Scotia), Vol. 10, February 1991, 10.

³¹ Ian Hunter, "Plans would shut four bases in Canada, two in Germany," *The Ottawa Citizen*, May 18, 1991, B3

³² Geoffrey York, "Canada urged to keep troops in Europe," *The Globe and Mail*, May 20, 1991, A3.

³³ *Ibid.*, and "Un appel de l'Allemagne," *La Presse Montréal*, 22 mai 1991, C8.

³⁴ Stephen Ward, "Canadian Troops to stay in Germany," *Kingston Whig Standard*, June 15, 1991, 1.

³⁵ Brigadier-general J.A. Roy, "Operation Salon," *Canadian Defence Quarterly* 20 (April 1991): 20-24.

³⁶ Desmond Morton, "Bayonets in the Streets: The Canadian Experience of Aid of the Civil Power, 1967-1990," *Canadian Defence Quarterly* 20 (April 1991): 30-36.

³⁷ Canada, Department of National Defence, *Address*, "Statement by the Honourable Marcel Masse, Member of Parliament for Frontenac and Minister of National Defence, at the National Press Theatre," September 17, 1991, 3-4.

³⁸ Canada, Department of National Defence, *Backgrounder*, "Canadian Forces Europe (CFE)," September 1991, 1-2.

³⁹ Canada, Department of National Defence, *Address*, "Statement by the Honourable Marcel Masse," 3-4.

⁴⁰ Craig R. Whitney, "New Defense Stand," *New York Times*, July 7, 1990, 1.

⁴¹ "Canada ponders joining NATO's new military unit," *The Toronto Star*, April 13, 1991, A13.

⁴² James Kitfield, "Rethinking Defense," *Government Executive* 22 (February 8, 1990): 23.

⁴³ Canada, Department of National Defence, *Backgrounder*, "Canadian Forces Europe," 2.

⁴⁴ Canada, Department of National Defence, *Address*, "Statement by the Honourable Marcel Masse," 8.

⁴⁵ John M. Collins, *U.S.-Soviet Military Balance, 1980-1985* (New York: Pergamon-Brassey, 1985), 154.

⁴⁶ John Hamre, "Continental Air Defence, the United States Security Policy and Canada-United States Defence Relations," in G.R. Lindsey *et al.*, eds., *Aerospace Defence: Canada's Future Role?*, Wellesley Papers, No.9 (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1985), 22.

⁴⁷ U. S., Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, *Strategic Defenses: Ballistic Missile Technologies* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 191-192.

⁴⁸ SCEAND, *Canada-U.S. Defence Cooperation*, xi.

⁴⁹ See Cox, *Trends in Continental Defence*, and Sokolsky, "Changing Strategies."

⁵⁰ SCEAND, *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence* 52 (6 December 1985): 11.

⁵¹ SCEAND, *Canada-U.S. Defence Cooperation*, xi.

⁵² Andrew Richter, *North American Aerospace Defence Cooperation in the 1990s: Issues and Prospects*, Extra-Mural Paper No. 57 (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, Operational Research and Analysis Establishment, July 1991), 32.

⁵³ Admiral James D. Watkins, USN, Chief of Naval Operations, "The Maritime Strategy," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, Supplement on the Maritime Strategy, 4 (January 1986): 14. See also David B. Rivkin, Jr., "No Bastion for the Bear," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* 110 (April 1984): 36-43.

⁵⁴ Tom Stefanick, *Strategic Antisubmarine Warfare and Naval Strategy* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1987), 4.

⁵⁵ John J. Weltman, "The Short, Unhappy Life of the Maritime Strategy," *The National Interest* 15 (Spring 1989): 86.

⁵⁶ For this controversy see John J. Mearsheimer, "A Strategic Misstep: The Maritime Strategy and Deterrence in Europe," and Linton F. Brooks, "The Case for the Maritime Strategy," *International Security*, 11 (Fall 1986): 3-88; Norman Friedman, *The U.S. Maritime Strategy* (London: Janes, 1988); Mark Sakitt, *Submarine Warfare in the Arctic: Option or Illusion*, Occasional Paper of the Center for International Security and Arms Control, Stanford University (Stanford, California: Stanford University, 1988).

⁵⁷ The Canada-U.S. SLAMEX series of exercises begun in the early 1960s were directed against Soviet ballistic missile submarines. Another series, DESKTOP, was coordinated with NORAD. See *Annual Report of the Commander-in-Chief Atlantic Fleet*, April 1965, 24

⁵⁸ Richard Halloran, "A Silent Battle Surfaces," *New York Times Magazine*, December 7, 1986, 96; John N. Crushman, "Navy Warns of Crisis in Anti-Submarine Warfare," *New York Times*, March 19, 1987, 17. These concerns came out during the parliamentary hearings on the SSN project. See Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on National Defence, *The Canadian Submarine Acquisition Project* (Ottawa: August 1988).

⁵⁹ See Jockel, "The U.S. Navy, Maritime Command and the Arctic;" Joel J. Sokolsky, *Defending Canada: U.S.-Canada Defense Policies*, A Twentieth Century Fund Paper (New York: Priority Press, 1989), 45-47; U. S. Congress, Congressional Research Services, *Canadian Nuclear-Power at-tack Submarine Program: Issues for Congress* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, March 22, 1989).

⁶⁰ Canada, Department of National Defence, *Address*, by the Honourable Perrin Beatty, P.C., M.P., Minister of National Defence, Tabling of the

Defence White Paper in the House of Commons, June 5, 1987, 4. See also Department of National Defence, *Challenge and Commitment*, 6.

⁶¹ R. B. Byers, "Canadian Defence and Defence Procurement: Implications for Economic Policy," in Denis Stairs and Gilbert R. Winham, eds., *Selected Problems In Formulating Foreign Economic Policy* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985), 184.

⁶² SCEAND, *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence* 50 (November 28, 1985): 9.

⁶³ See David Leyton-Brown, "A Refurbished Relationship with the United States," in Brian W. Tomlin and Maureen Appel Molot, eds., *Canada Among Nations: The Tory Record/1988* (Toronto: Lorimer, 1989), 171-188; Joseph T. Jockel, "Canada-U.S. Relations in the Bush Era," *Canadian American Public Policy* 1 (April 1990).

⁶⁴ See Jockel, "The U.S. Navy, Maritime Command and the Arctic."

⁶⁵ Danford Middlemiss, "The Road from Hyde Park: Canada-U.S. Defence Economic Cooperation," paper presented at the conference on "The Road From Ogdensburg: Fifty Years of Canada-U.S. Defense Cooperation," St. Lawrence University, Canton, New York, August 16-17, 1990, 34.

⁶⁶ *Defence Newsletter* 9 (March 1990): 9-10.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, (September 1990): 4.

⁶⁸ Paul Mooney, "Canada, U.S. renewed NORAD agreement," *The Ottawa Citizen*, April 20, 1991, 4.

⁶⁹ Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade, *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*, Issue No. 77A, "The NORAD Renewal Issue: Report of the Special Panel," (Ottawa: December 19, 1990): 54.

⁷⁰ Briefing by Major General J. D. O'Brien, Commander, Fighter Group Canadian NORAD Region, Ottawa, May 31, 1990.

⁷¹ David Cox, "Defence Notes," *Peace and Security* (1990): 17.

⁷² Andrew Richter, *North American Aerospace Defence Cooperation in the 1990s*, 36.

⁷³ "Remarks by President Bush," 4.

⁷⁴ Strobe Talbot, "Toward a Safer World," *Time Magazine*, October 7, 1991, 10-12.

⁷⁵ Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough, "Baker 'Sellout' in Arms Talks Feared," *Washington Times*, May 22, 1990, 1.

⁷⁶ Briefing by Major General J. D. O'Blenis.

⁷⁷ David S. Sorenson, "Defending against the Advance Cruise Missile: The Ultimate Air Defense Nightmare?" in Cimbala, ed., *Strategic Air Defense*, 147.

⁷⁸ Theodore A. Postol, "Banning Nuclear SLCMs: It Would Be Nice If We Could," *International Security* (Winter 1988/1989): 99-201.

⁷⁹ "Remarks by President Bush," 4.

⁸⁰ Stephen J. Cimbala, "Issues and Problems: An Overview," in Cimbala, ed., *Strategic Air Defense*, 265.

⁸¹ U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, *1990 Report to Congress on the Strategic Defense Initiative* (Washington, D.C.: 1990), D-1.

⁸² *Ibid.*, 2,3.

⁸³ Statement on the Strategic Defense Initiative by Lieutenant General George L. Monahan, Jr., director of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, before the Subcommittee on Research and Development, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, April 4, 1990, 11.

⁸⁴ *Colorado Springs Gazette Telegraph*, August 5, 1990, 1.

⁸⁵ United States, Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), "New Strategic Defense Initiative Program Focus: Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS)," *News Release*, January 30, 1991. United States, Department of Defense, Strategic

Defense Initiative Organization, *Briefing On The Refocused Strategic Defense Initiative* (Edited Transcript), February 12, 1991.

⁸⁶ U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, *1990 Report to Congress*, D-1.

⁸⁷ For a discussion on future U.S. air defense requirements see William P. Delaney, "Air Defense of the United States: Missions and Modern Technology," *International Security* (Summer 1990): 181-211; Arthur Charo, *Continental Air Defense: A Neglected Dimension of Strategic Defense*, Occasional Paper, No. 7 (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for Science and International Affairs, 1990).

⁸⁸ Tony Robinson, "What Budget Cuts Mean to U.S. Air Force Resources," *Jane's Defense Weekly* 13 (February 10, 1990): 241.

⁸⁹ *The Ottawa Citizen*, April 26, 1990, 15.

⁹⁰ Robert Holzer, "Navy Document Stresses Strength for '90s Threats," *Defense News*, May 28, 1990, 26.

⁹¹ United States, Department of the Navy, *Fiscal Years 1992-1993 Report to the Congress*, February 21, 1991, 7.

⁹² Robert Holzer, "Navy Funds AX Aircraft, Cut Ships," *Defense News*, February 4, 1991, 1.

⁹³ "Smaller, more modern fleet," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 15 (February 16, 1991): 221. Robert Holzer, "U.S. Surface Fleet Will Continue Decline Despite Gulf Conflict," *Defense News*, January 28, 1991, 4, 37.

⁹⁴ Robert Holzer, "Navy Seawolf Buy Will Plummet to 5," *Defense News*, January 14, 1991, 1, 21.

⁹⁵ Holzer, "Navy Funds AX Aircraft, Cut Ships," 1.

⁹⁶ "Smaller more modern fleet," 212.

⁹⁷ Barbara Starr, "'Storm' shows the way for U.S. underwater forces," *Jane's Defence Weekly* 15 (May 11, 1991): 779.

⁹⁸ Joel J. Sokolsky, *Seapower in the Nuclear Age: The United States Navy and NATO, 1949-1980* (London: Routledge, 1991).

⁹⁹ Barbara Starr, "JSC gives glimpse of new U.S. role," *Jane's Defence Weekly* 15 (March 15, 1991): 424.

¹⁰⁰ *Defence Newsletter* (December 1989): 6,7.

¹⁰¹ David Cox, "Defence Notes," *Peace and Security*, 6 (Autumn 1991): 17.

¹⁰² Paul Mooney, "Nuclear treaty is bad news for Canada, experts say," *Montreal Gazette*, August 6, 1991, B4.

¹⁰³ Richter, *North American Aerospace Defence Cooperation in the 1990s*, 43-45.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 32.

¹⁰⁵ Peter T. Haydon, *The Strategic Importance of the Arctic: Understanding the Military Issues*, Strategic Issues Paper, No. 1/87 (Ottawa: Department of National Defense, March 1987), 12,13.

¹⁰⁶ "British, U.S. submarines cruise Pole," *The Globe and Mail* August 1, 1991, A5.

¹⁰⁷ Ron Chepesiuk, "Interview: The Honourable Bill McKnight, Canada's Minister of National Defence," *Defense and Diplomacy* 8 (April 1990): 23.

¹⁰⁸ Quoted in Carol Goar, "The two sides of Masse," *The Toronto Star*, September 21, 1991, D5.

¹⁰⁹ Middlemiss, "The Road From Hyde Park," 42.

¹¹⁰ For a detailed analysis of the security implications of Canada's crisis of national unity see Joseph T. Jockel, *Security To the North: Canada-U.S. Defense Relations in the 1990s* (East Lansing, Michigan: Michigan State University Press, 1991), chapters 9, 10.

¹¹¹ "Remarks by President Bush," 4.

¹¹² Jocelyn Coulon, "La defence canadienne fait desormais face a une inevitable continentalisation," *Le Devoir*, 23 septembre 1991, A1.

CONTENTS

North American Defense and American National Security Policy	3
The 1980s: SDI, NORAD, the Maritime Strategy, and Offsets	13
The Future of North American Strategic Defense and Canada	18
Conclusion	30
Index	33
Notes	34

CANADIAN-AMERICAN PUBLIC POLICY

Occasional papers on a wide range of issues in U.S.-Canadian relations

CAPP 1: April 1990— Canada-U.S. Relations in the Bush Era

Joseph T. Jockel

**CAPP 2: July 1990— Transboundary Air-Quality Relations: The
Canada-United States Experience**

John E. Carroll

**CAPP 3: October 1990— Canadian Culture, the Canadian State, and
the New Continentalism**

Allan Smith

**CAPP 4: December 1990— Forests, Timber, and Trade: Emerging
Canadian and U.S. Relations under the Free Trade Agreement**

Thomas R. Waggener

**CAPP 5: March 1991— Change and Continuity in Canada-U.S.
Economic Relations**

William Diebold

**CAPP 6: June 1991— Trade Liberalization and the Political Economy
of Culture: An International Perspective on FTA**

Graham Carr

**CAPP 7: September 1991— If Canada Breaks Up:
Implications for U.S. Policy**

Joseph T. Jockel

**CAPP 8: December 1991— Ogdensburg Plus Fifty and Still Counting:
Canada-U.S. Defense Relations in the Post-Cold War Era**

Joel J. Sokolsky

* * *

Future issues will deal with U.S.-Canada agricultural trade, cross-border air routes, the future of international trade unionism, exports of hydroelectricity, and other vital topics

Write for bulk-order classroom rates on single issues

CANADIAN-AMERICAN PUBLIC POLICY

Occasional papers on a wide range of issues in U.S.-Canadian relations

Rapidly growing commercial ties between Canadian and the U.S. are raising complex new policy issues in both countries concerning trade, investment, energy, the environment, resources management, cultural politics, and foreign affairs. Published four times a year on an occasional schedule, **Canadian-American Public Policy** will keep you abreast of these issues with informed, timely, and objective analysis by leading experts in both countries. Subscribe now to be certain not to miss any important issues.

Please enter my subscription to **Canadian-American Public Policy**. (Individuals must include payment or credit card authorization with order. Canadian checks and money orders in Canadian currency are welcome.) One year: \$20.00 U.S., \$25.00 Canada and foreign. Two years: \$37.50 U.S., \$45.00 Canada and foreign.

Payment enclosed: \$ _____.

Please charge to _____ VISA _____ MasterCard.

Cardnumber: _____

Expiration date: _____

Signature: _____

Name (please print or type): _____

Address: _____

City/State or Province: _____

Postal code or Zip: _____

Please return to:

Canadian-American Center, University of Maine
154 College Avenue, Orono, ME U.S.A. 04469
(207) 581-4220

ISSN 1047-1073