

CANADIAN-AMERICAN PUBLIC POLICY

An occasional paper series sponsored by

The Canadian-American Center
The University of Maine
Orono, ME 04473-1591 U.S.A.
<http://www.umaine.edu/canam>



CANADIAN-AMERICAN PUBLIC POLICY is sponsored by the University of Maine's Canadian-American Center, which supports a nationally prominent program of Canadian Studies. Designated by the U.S. Department of Education as a national resource center for the study of Canada, the Center coordinates a comprehensive program of undergraduate and graduate education; promotes cross-border research in the humanities, social sciences, and natural sciences; and directs outreach programs to regional and national audiences. For further information: The Director, Canadian-American Center, University of Maine, 154 College Avenue, Orono, ME 04473-1591 U.S.A. (207) 581-4220.

CANADIAN-AMERICAN PUBLIC POLICY (ISSN 1047-1073) is published on an occasional schedule, with four issues appearing annually, by the Canadian-American Center. Subscriptions rates, U.S.: 1 year, \$21.00; 2 years, \$39.50; Canada and foreign subscriptions: 1 year, \$26.00; 2 years, \$47.00. Single copy cost: U.S., \$6.00; Canada and foreign, \$7.50. Bulk-order rates in US dollars (plus postage): 1-10 copies \$6 ea.; 11-25 copies \$5 ea.; 26-50 copies \$4 ea.; 51+ copies by arrangement. Payment should be made to the Canadian-American Center. Credit card orders, Canadian checks, and money orders in Canadian currency are welcome. Please call (207) 581-4220 for subscriber services. Advertising rates are available upon request.

Editorial correspondence should be directed to Dr. Robert H. Babcock, Canadian-American Center, University of Maine, 154 College Avenue, Orono, ME 04473-1591 U.S.A. e-mail: babcock@maine.edu FAX: 207-581-4223

The Canadian-American Center gratefully acknowledges the support of the Business Fund for Canadian Studies in the United States and External Affairs, Canada.

Printed on acid-free paper by Furbush-Roberts Printing Co., Bangor, ME 04401 U.S.A.

(c) 2000 by the Canadian-American Center. All rights reserved.

Number 41: February, 2000
ISSN: 1047-1073
ISBN: 1-882582-30-6

WHO DECIDES WHAT? CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES

DOUGLAS L. BLAND

Drawing useful conclusions from comparative studies in civil-military relations is confounded by the fact that there are few measures that can be reliably applied across state boundaries, political ideologies, and time. Most studies begin from the assumption that the civil control of the military is the desired end state in civil-military relations. They then assess "the problem" in civil-military relations in terms of the relative degrees of control over policy attributable to the principal actors—the civil authority and senior military leaders. In some cases where the differences between the states compared are wide, as between autocratic and democratic systems, some such studies yield practical insights. However, where the degree of control is narrow or subtle, as it tends to be in "like-minded" liberal democracies, state-to-state comparisons tend to be problematic. The analytical problem stems from weaknesses in civil-military relations theory and the concentration by many scholars on the *coup d'état*, and

No. 41:
February 2000

Civil-Military Relations / **Bland** 1

the intrusion of soldiers into a state's political process. But this is only one aspect of the several problems that affect how civil-military relations function in all states.

Some might suggest that this matter is inconsequential because civil-military relations in liberal democracies, for all their overt differences, produce the same outcome: civil control of the armed forces. This observation may be true or not, but it is increasingly unsatisfactory for one important reason — Western leaders are being asked to explain their system of civil-military relations to leaders in emerging democracies only to find that western intellectual and bureaucratic explanations of how liberal democracies control armed forces are inconsistent. Moreover, practices in even closely related NATO states vary considerably and for no reason that can be readily explained by extant Western theory and thought on civil-military relations.

On reflection and contrary to the expectations of academics and most citizens, the armed forces in Western democracies are not so much "controlled" by the civil authority as they are accommodated. Reaching for Samuel Huntington¹ provides cold comfort for politicians, officers, and officials who try to explain civil-military relations within the North Atlantic Alliance to leaders of states aspiring to join the community. It is evident that for all their "like-mindedness," control over the armed forces is exercised in different ways, and civil-

Douglas L. Bland retired from the Canadian Armed Forces as an officer after more than thirty years of service and holds a doctorate in public administration. Currently chair of defense management studies at Queen's University, Kingston, he is the author of The Administration of Defense Policy in Canada 1947-84 (1987), Chiefs of Defense: Government and the Unified Command of the Canadian Armed Forces (1995); "A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations," Armed Forces & Society 26/1 (Fall, 1999), and "Managing the 'Expert Problem' in Civil-Military Relations." European Security 8/3 (Autumn, 1999). In addition he has edited Canada's National Defence: Vol. 1: Statements on Defence Policy (1997); Canada's National Defence: vol. 2: Defence Organization (1998); and Issues in Defence Policy (1998); all published by the Queen's University school of policy studies. E-mail: db26@qsilver.queensu.ca

military relations difficulties and crises arise from different causes and produce different consequences.

The root cause of this state of affairs, and in comparative studies in civil-military relations generally, lies in the weaknesses in Western theories of civil-military relations and in narrow definitions of the civil-military relations problem that the civil authority is meant to control. Civil-military relations are not controlled by a dichotomous relationship between soldiers and duly elected politicians — the civil authority; nor, as some suggest, would such a relationship be particularly effective, even if it could be established.² Rather, as will be briefly explained in this paper, civil-military relations in mature liberal democracies function on the basis of responsibility between the civil authority and the military for national defense and the control of the armed forces. Sharing occurs in decision making about policy, defense management, the employment of forces, and in the control of armed forces, among other matters. The degree of sharing, or the dynamics of civil-military relations, depends on numerous and changing variables such as the quality of leaders, the nearness of threats and crisis, domestic politics, and the organization of armed forces and the defense establishment. All civil-military relations exist as a type of anarchy where neither the civil authority nor the military can dominate the other. Thus, by borrowing notions from theories of anarchy in international relations, the dynamics of civil-military relations in states can be observed and explained according "to a nationally evolved regime of principles, norms, rules and decision making procedures around which actor expectations converge in matters of civil-military relations."³

Civil-military relations regimes form around certain basic causal values, and these values and their consequences on the civil and military authority and relationships between such authorities ought to be the center of attention in civil-military relations theory and comparative studies. Regime differences between states account for the particular national character of civil-military relations much as "like-minded" regimes account for cross-cultural similarities in civil-military relations.

It is difficult to find two states more closely alike than Canada and the United States, but for all their similarity, significant differences have shaped civil-military relations in these nations. Furthermore, the national regimes for civil-military relations in Canada and the United States tend to produce, in predictable patterns, crises and

contrariness between the civil authorities and the military followed by characteristic patterns of decisions and outcomes. This paper explores some critical causal factors that mold national patterns in civil-military relations in Canada and the United States and suggests that distinct national regimes account for these patterns of behavior. This analysis, however, cannot proceed without an explanation of the theoretical base of comparison nor without acknowledging and explaining that "the problem" in civil-military relations is not one but four entwined difficulties that must be addressed simultaneously.

I. THE WEAK THEORETICAL BASE

Part of the difficulty in making comparisons of civil control over the military today can be attributed to the fact that until recently, as Huntington noted in 1957, "the study of civil-military relations has suffered from too little theorizing."⁴ This weakness exists partly because in Western states civil-military relations are inherently stable and provide little incentive to reexamine older theories or to construct new ones. But times and circumstances have disturbed this stability and excited those who find existing explanations of civil-military relations unsatisfactory and, perhaps, misleading.⁵

Most scholarly work in civil-military relations has been done in the United States and carries with it an ethnocentric bias that detracts (unintentionally) from its utility in other political and social situations, and in other states if not necessarily in the United States. Extant theories and studies in America and elsewhere concentrate on solving or preventing the *coup d'état*, something that is a dangerous but, arguably, an occasional problem of civil-military relations in most states. "No *coup*? No problem, and so no further discussion is required."⁶ The limitation in this approach is not that theories concentrate on the problem of military interventions in politics, but that they tend to overlook the other, perhaps more common, civil-military problems facing societies and their armed forces.

The emergence of nascent democracies in many parts of the world and a brief worry about "the crisis in civil-military relations" in America, among other things, have rekindled interest in civil-military relations theory. Scholars in this new debate have been especially critical of the central ideas advanced by America's two most prominent theorists on civil-military relations, Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz.⁷ Peter Feaver, for example, sees in American work on civil control of the military an essential disloca-

tion between politics and civil-military relations and a tendency for scholars to concentrate on coups, thus missing "much of what is interesting about American civil-military relations."⁸ In his view, "several core claims" in Huntington's major work, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, "have not been borne out by subsequent experience or empirical inquiry."⁹ He challenges as well Huntington's notion that "professionalism" will stimulate subordination to civil control, a hypothesis Feaver states that "has not held."¹⁰

Feaver is as critical of Morris Janowitz, and for many of the same reasons. Janowitz is unconvincing mainly because "he does not offer much in the way of an alternate theory [to Huntington] of how civilians assure control at the institutional level." His principal criticism is that Janowitz, like Huntington, relies ultimately "on the professionalism-equals-civilian-control theory" which Feaver views as an inadequate base for the treatment of the "civil-military problematic."¹¹

Rebecca Schiff is equally critical of what she calls "the current theory" of civil-military relations, meaning presumably the current theory advanced in the United States.¹² Her main criticism is that extant theory is "historically and culturally bound to the American case" and tends to separate "civil" and "military" institutions.¹³ Moreover, the "standard of professionalism" demanded by the theories is based on American models which may not be useful or even relevant in other states where "professionalism is quite different from the western [sic] norm."¹⁴ Second, Schiff believes the current theory "neglects issues of culture" and "fails to consider the importance of civilian society and culture."¹⁵ Her point is that "depending upon the culture, history and politics of a particular nation, civil-military relations may involve separate, integrated, or a variety of other forms [of institutions]."¹⁶ Culture may not only inform the civil view of civil-military relations, but it might also condition the military's view of the issues and their responses to them.

Schiff is right to raise this warning flag simply because a major tenet of current American theory, "professionalism," may not hold in other states. For example, the United Kingdom has enjoyed centuries of reasonable civil-military relations in a society where military officers, until at least the 1940s, seemed to prize their unprofessionalism.¹⁷ This limitation in much that has been written in America about civil-military relations is a critical issue today when

Western liberal democracies, led by the United States, are attempting to transfer Western values and norms to emerging democracies and other states.

Schiff's views have drawn criticism as well because her complaint about the ethnocentric bias in current theory "collapses if the project concerns . . . American problems."¹⁸ However, Schiff is certainly correct to note the American bias in much of the current literature for, if it is truly ethnocentric, then it has little value as a basis for comparative studies outside the United States.

Disquiet, if not dismay, with current theories of civil-military relations is being expressed or implied in the wide range of new work in the field. Huntington suggests that he is encouraged by the gradual improvement of civil-military relations in new democracies, attributing this modest success to "the movement toward objective civilian control" generally on the lines he recommended in 1957.¹⁹ Other scholars propose several different approaches that aim at getting the military onside. They include, for example, the mission model advanced on the supposition that a military facing external threats will be more compliant than one facing an internal threat.²⁰ A second suggestion, the institutional approach, encourages strong civilian-led institutions as the best path to assured civil control.²¹ Today, a civilian supremacy model reflects the ideas of those who believe that civil-military relations are politically driven and control demands the active intervention of political leaders at every level of the process.²² As Henry Eccles argued in 1965, "the only occasion when civilian control is in doubt is when civilian officials themselves fail to exercise it, or neglect to use the power legally vested in them."²³ Sir Michael Howard, on the other hand, leans on a humanitarian notion, for he believes "neither institutions nor men can fulfill their purposes . . . save in an atmosphere relatively free from mistrust and tension between soldiers and civilians."²⁴ His conclusion argues for a high degree of harmony among national defense elites.

Each of these ideas nicely captures aspects of a general theory of civil-military relations, but alone they do not provide a compelling answer to the main questions. How, exactly, is the military controlled by civil authorities, what policies and structures lead to civilian control, and what patterns of civil-military relations best serve the interests of democracies over the long term? Without some reasonable responses to these questions, it is plainly difficult to build a sound foundation on which to base conclusions about civil-military

relations in any nation and even more difficult to make state-to-state comparisons.

The difficulty in answering these questions stems in part from an apparently high degree of ambiguity between what Westerners describe as the principles underlying the relationship and the actual practice in their states. For example, while the first principle of civil-military relations in liberal democracies is that elected civilians control the armed forces, most everyone suspects that ultimately only the military's "voluntary and purposeful adherence to the principle of civilian control ensures civilian control."²⁵ Morris Janowitz, for instance, implicitly agrees with this notion when he states that officers are "subject to civilian control, not only because of the 'rule of law' and tradition, but also because of self-imposed professional standards."²⁶ Moreover, there are enough instances in the history of the West where officers have not volunteered to adhere to the principle, or have done so grudgingly, to raise the question of whether the principle is in fact merely a platitude. Critics ask also: if there is a democratic way of civil-military relations they should follow, where does it reside? Obviously, arrangements in each Western state are different. Which one is the most effective? If, as is commonly acknowledged, systemic differences arise from cultural, historical, and political variables, how can there be a truly "democratic system of civil-military relations" without taking these particular causal factors into account?

The regime theory of civil-military relations attempts to corral these differences and to account for changes within and between states' systems over time. The theory rests on two assumptions. First, the term "civil control" means that the sole legitimate source for the direction and actions of the military is derived from civilians outside the military/defense establishment. This definition says nothing about the moral or ethical base for the civilian direction — in democracies it is taken to mean civilians elected to legislatures. But in an autocracy it could mean legitimacy flowing from a dictator, and in a single party state it could mean control dictated by the party. The assumption implies that the military has no legitimate right to act on its own. Moreover, it implies that there are distinct bodies, civil and military, in the state, or no issue of civil-military relations arises. Clearly, when the civil authority is also the military commander, as in the case of Napoleon, then no civil-military questions occur.

The second assumption is that civil control is a dynamic process susceptible to changing values, conditions, issues, and personalities. The problems of civil control of the military are not puzzles amenable to engineering or rational management fixes. Rather, they are enduring difficulties of governance requiring the continuous attention of civil leaders and society. The sharing of responsibility between the civil authority and military leaders for national defense and the control of the activities of the armed forces is the dominant practice in Western civil-military relations. In reality, the civil authority is responsible and accountable for some aspects of national defense policy and control over the armed forces, while military leaders are responsible and accountable for others. Although some responsibilities may merge, they are not fused. How this sharing is effected over the long term is described in the state's evolved regime of principles, norms, rules, and procedures.

Explanations that try to describe civil-military relations in terms of absolute control of the leadership of the armed forces by politicians usually flounder when they attempt to describe how, in practice, this type of control is effected. Shared responsibility and consensus-building between the civil authority and the military within a dynamic national regime is the explanation advanced in this paper. Empirical evidence and history strongly suggest that sharing occurs, for instance, in the formulation of policies, in the administration of armed forces, in the execution of policies (including during operations), and in the regulation and disciplining of the military. In most states this relationship is acknowledged in law and custom and has developed over time such that most officers believe they have, in Richard Betts' term, "a rightful authority" over specific aspects of military administration and operations.²⁷

In states where a regime is well established – in time, custom, and, frequently, in law – relations between the civil authority and the military tend to be predictable, if not always harmonious. Disruptions may occur whenever either faction departs from the norm; that is to say, whenever there are alterations in rules and procedures, changes within a regime or alterations to principles and norms, and attempts to establish a new regime.²⁸ The former might be evolutionary change, while the latter would be revolutionary change. Challenges to the civil authority and to military prerogatives might arise also during serious and prolonged crises, as happened in the United Kingdom at the height of World War I, and when atypical and

dangerous situations prompt one or both parties to seek changes in regimes.

The boundary between norms and rules is imprecise and best expressed where norms are understood as customs and traditional ways and rules are authoritative, prescribed directions issued by a governing body. A great part of the military way is derived from custom of the service and tradition enforced by informal rewards and sanctions aimed at controlling and perpetuating a type of behavior — in other words, a culture.

Application of the ideas of shared responsibility and regime theory to civil-military relations provides a medium in which the actions of actors can transcend specific states, times and situations. They provide, as well, an identifiable foundation for civil-military relations based on principles and norms which, in turn, support rules (laws) and decision-making procedures. From this construct it is possible to locate, for example, the significance of ministries of defense as mechanisms for managing civil-military relations regimes; that is, as mechanisms for managing relations within a system known to officers and politicians.

Alterations of rules and decision-making procedures account for the dynamic nature of civil-military relations, while alterations of norms and principles may be responsible for conflicts in civil-military relations. Regime differences between states account for the particular national character of civil-military relations, much as "like-minded" regimes account for cross-cultural similarities in civil-military relations. Although national regimes may be stable for long periods, they can change as basic causal factors such as concepts, threats, values, issues, interests, and personalities change.

Once civil-military relations are seen as a shared relationship founded on a national regime, the relations in most states become obvious and dynamics can be explained empirically. The regime theory of civil-military relations, supported by the notion of shared responsibility, is particularly effective in explaining the basis for controlling armed forces by civil authorities, predicting outcomes, and comparing state systems. It also provides an instrument for organizing and managing civil-military relations in emerging democracies in the context of their history, culture and politics, while allowing the harmonization of these arrangements with those in other like-minded states.

No officer corps is perfectly apolitical and neutral. Military

"belief systems" always condition the advice senior officers give to political leaders, the reaction of officers to social and national security issues, and the administration and control of the armed forces at home and abroad by the officers. Comparisons between the behavior of military officers and politicians in Canada and the United States provide a rich field in which to explore patterns in civil-military relations. At first glance, circumstances, attitudes, histories, and the day-to-day functioning of relationships appear similar, if not identical. In other words, the controlling regimes seem in all important respects to be the same. Thus outcomes, or whose policies prevail—the true measure of the state of civil-military relations in any nation—appear to be determined by essentially the same dynamics and processes.

II. THE FOUR PROBLEMS OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

Many comparative studies in civil-military relations look mainly for evidence of the intrusive interference by the military in the government of the state. This is an important aspect and an ancient and persistent problem is in many parts of the world. But mature liberal democracies have passed the point where their first concern is "to curb the political power of the military establishment."²⁹ But even where the threat of a coup has been removed from the game it does not mean that the game is over. If Eccles is right and "civilian control is in doubt [only] when civilian officials themselves fail to exercise it," then leaders in old and new democracies need to recognize their responsibility to actively manage civil-military relations even after the power of the military has been curbed.

There are at least three other critical problems that excite debates and crises in civil-military relations in most states, and they are so closely related that one aspect of civil control cannot be managed without affecting the others.³⁰ Maintaining "good order and discipline" in the ranks is a critical social concern in some states. Liberal democracies fear armies not just because they might overthrow the government, but also because they are inherently dangerous and a burden to a peaceful society. Edmund Burke described the paradox by noting that "an armed disciplined body is, in its essence, dangerous to liberty; undisciplined, it is ruinous to society."³¹ But who should be responsible and accountable for keeping the armed forces in "good order and discipline," and how is it accomplished?

Keeping the armed forces in good order and efficient imposes costs and perhaps a burden on society. Citizens in the seventeenth century, forced to quarter soldiers in their homes, worried because these unwanted guests "were usually idle, often drunk and nearly always a nuisance in a small dwelling where there might be daughters."³² The armed forces may not interfere so directly with the lives of citizens today, but indiscipline can still be a problem. Certainly, even today, an inefficient army might be a danger, but trying to support an efficient and effective force as defined by military leaders may empty the treasury. The problem of maintaining "good order and discipline" without committing the government to extravagant costs is an old one that still requires attention. Who is to decide "how much is enough" in societies that most often wish to spend only just enough? The second problem of civil-military relations (after the *coup*), therefore, is ensuring that this "armed and disciplined body" behaves in ways that safeguard the state without causing harm—through indiscipline, misadventure, or the exaggerations of threats—to the people who employ it.

The third, and often neglected, dimension of civil-military relations concerns protecting the armed forces from political partisanship. It is what Michael Howard called the "double problem, [of civil-military relations] of the subordination of military force to the political government, and of the control of a government in possession of such force."³³ In many countries, and in some emerging democracies, the unrestrained use of armed forces by politicians and political parties for their own partisan purposes is an ever-present threat to democracy. Controlling the armed forces in democracies, therefore, means more than the simple, unquestioning obedience of the military to its political masters because the employment of the military by politicians to enhance their own power can be as great an abuse of civil control as a military *coup*. The third problem, managing the cleavage between political and military spheres and the power over the military entrusted to governments of the day, may be unique to democracies. However, it is increasingly a universal challenge as democratic forms of government arise around the world.³⁴

Finally, governments of every shape and style face what Huntington called the modern problem of civil-military relations, "the relationship of the expert to the minister."³⁵ The basic question is how are ministers to control the armed forces when they (usually) lack the necessary skills, knowledge, and experience to do this effectively?

Furthermore, what real control exists even over policy when a minister is dependent on the advice and council of those he or she would control? Implicit in these questions is the suspicion that officers (and increasingly, career defense civil servants) who offer advice and manage the armed forces are in a conflict of interest situation whenever they advise ministers.

Governments in peace and war have often felt themselves trapped by what British Prime Minister Lloyd George called "the trade union of the generals."³⁶ Ministers, of course, might reach outside the defense establishment to "whiz kids" or other counter-experts, but then the dilemma for ministers might be holding officers accountable for the consequences of decisions they had no hand in shaping. In an important sense, whenever a minister becomes his own chief of staff, a civil-military relations problem might not exist, but the safety of the nation would surely be in doubt. Furthermore, when ministers openly disregard their official experts, they tempt the military to react negatively. As an American officer remarked during the era of Robert McNamara, "it is not too difficult for a military man to accept an adverse decision based on non-military considerations. It becomes extremely difficult, however, for him to reconcile himself to an adverse decision by his civilian superior based on military considerations."³⁷

Governments do not have to take military advice, and this is a measure of their supremacy. However, governments that ignore such advice when it concerns matters that are seen by the military, the political opposition, and the public as normally within the province of soldiers may incur serious political damage if their policies fail. This potential outcome gives the military its own measure of supremacy and usually ensures their involvement when defense issues are discussed.

The four problems in civil-military relations cannot be finally and absolutely resolved. Each problem is related in some respect to the others and, ultimately, if they are to be managed to everyone's advantage, the military must be involved in the effort. Thus, paradoxically, the civilian control of the armed forces depends partly on the military, or at least on the senior leadership of the armed forces.

These brief remarks on the regime theory of civil-military relations and the four societal-military problems that citizens must address in order to provide for the comprehensive control of the armed forces by the civil authority set out the framework for a

comparison of civil-military relations in Canada and the United States. There is no attempt here to make a detailed historical comparison of the development of civil-military relations in these two states. Rather the aim is to illustrate mainly from current issues that the nature of civil-military conflicts and their consequences arise from casual differences located mainly in constitutional arrangements.

Civil-military relations in Canada and the United States are dominated not by contests between the civil authority and soldiers about sovereignty over civil-military relations. The game is rather a subtle contest between various political actors attempting to realign boundaries. The immediate cause of this contest involves budgets, missions, uses of force, and others. But the deep-seated causes surface from disputes about whose and what norms and rules will guide day-to-day civil-military relations in each country. In Canada, constitutional arrangements tend to restrict entry of the military into this debate, while in the United States constitutional arrangements encourage open competition and controversy among politicians that military leaders cannot avoid.

III. THIS BAND OF INTERNATIONAL BROTHERS (AND SISTERS)

Differences in civil-military relations between some states can be attributed to differences in military cultures and the consequences of these different cultures on military and political behavior. This model of analysis is used, for example, to compare civil-military relations between fascist and democratic states or between "Western" and Latin American nations. In other words, the military's culture is judged or assumed to be a significant, if not the most significant, "causal variable" in civil-military relations. But this model is not particularly revealing when it is applied to states where the culture of the armed forces is kindred but the outcomes of civil-military relations are different.

Military officers in the Canadian Forces and the United States armed services live within a near identical culture. They are recruited from a similar pool, educated in similar institutions, and hold to the same ideals, attitudes, and interests.³⁸ Even though the differences in size and scale of operations of the two forces are enormous, they hold to what Donna Winslow terms "an interoperable culture" or a common identifiable mode of behavior.³⁹ One should not be surprised, therefore, to find a common response on both sides of the

border to issues that bring the civil authority and military leaders to the table. Nevertheless, common culture, interests, and even shared missions do not produce identical or, in some cases, even similar outcomes in civil-military relations debates. Explanations for these different results lie elsewhere, beyond the brotherhood of arms.

A vast literature describes and explains the military histories of Canada and the United States and within it the early and modern stories of defense relations between these North American neighbors. Geography and, in the main, European politics conditioned this history of conflict and later of cooperation. Citizens in both countries shunned the armed forces as a profession and as an institution until war and the fear of war forced both into the center of foreign, and therefore, domestic, politics.⁴⁰

In both states, and in most others, it is the inevitable confluence of foreign policy, the armed forces, and domestic politics that is the essence of civil-military relations. As dangers and opportunities wax and wane, the costs of military establishments on domestic policies and their influence on politics change as well. These changes, in turn, tend to affect demands from society for someone to account for the costs, the decisions, and the activities of military leaders and the civil authority that directs them.

Civil-military relations in liberal democracies, therefore, are essentially an accountability mechanism meant to join the armed forces to the elected civil authority and politicians to the people. But the term also embraces the notions of effect and process: the dynamic interaction of the armed forces and their leaders with political authorities and even with society. Civil-military relations in Canada and the United States cannot be understood nor promptly appreciated except within the context of domestic politics and the principles, norms, rules, and decision-making processes that define domestic politics.

The armed forces and professional military officers in Canada and the United States share many common ideas, attitudes, and concerns; indeed, they are part of what might be called a world-wide military culture. Sir John Hackett caught the enduring sense of this subculture in his description of the officer corps throughout history as "a distinguishable corpus of specific technical knowledge and doctrine, a more or less exclusive group coherence, a complex of institutions peculiar to itself, an educational pattern adapted to its

own needs, a career structure of its own and a distinct place in the society which brought it forth."⁴¹

Officers in most states are by their duty unique, for as Richard Gabriel remarked, "no [other] profession has the awesome responsibility of legitimately spending lives of others in order to render its service."⁴² These attitudes and responsibilities and the sense of "unlimited liability" and duty to subordinates they evoke tend to separate the officer corps from other professions and to a degree from societies built on other standards. When officers have a particularly strong ethic founded on self-sacrifice and duty and when they perceive that politicians are self-serving, separation can turn to alienation and hostility. In some states officers broaden this ethic to include a near spiritual duty to the state itself which places the officer corps above all subordination. However, this notion is not now, and perhaps never has been, a "casual factor" in civil-military relations grounded in the Westminster political philosophy.

Canadian and American officers have not always been close to one another and until the early twentieth century many regarded the others as potential, if not actual, enemies. The gradual reconciliation between the United States and Great Britain, solidified by the common cause of World War I, helped to bridge past animosities. But it was the near defeat of the British Empire in 1939-40 and the decisive intervention of President Roosevelt that permanently allied the armed forces of Canada to those of the United States.

Throughout World War II, and especially once the U.S. joined the fight, the immediate and unified national objectives of the "united nations" brought military leaders into constant contact with each other. British and the American military leaders created the combined chiefs of staff system to manage and direct allied strategy and operations of their forces in the field. Canada contributed significantly to the allied warehouse, training facilities, and in "blood and treasure," by some measures only second to the major powers. This effort, however, did not win Canadian political leaders a place at the table with Churchill and Roosevelt, nor any significant positions for officers on the integrated military staffs. Nevertheless, "growing up allied" during the war created the first real professional military class in Canada and shaped the character of the Canadian armed forces for the remainder of the century.⁴³

The Canadian armed forces, numbering more than a million people in uniform at the end of World War II, had been rapidly and

severely demobilized by 1947. The government anticipated a more peaceful world under the developing aegis of the United Nations. While some contributions to international peace and security from Canada were to be expected, a modestly equipped armed force of some 30,000 individuals was considered sufficient and politically prudent. In fact, Canada in 1949 gave away "division sets" of surplus equipment to help rebuild new armies in Europe.

Soviet hostility, failures in the United Nations, and the war in Korea changed this optimistic outlook and the nature of Canada's armed forces. Defense policy became a "front-burner issue" and pried open the doors of the treasury with surprisingly little resistance on the home front. The demand in 1951-52 for Canada to deploy forces in Europe in peace time in support of NATO marked a fundamental change in Canadian policies. Defense spending between 1950 and 1956 rose sharply, the armed forces grew to more than 120,000 persons, and modern equipment was brought into service. By 1955 more than 15,000 Canadians were on duty in Europe in a force that included an armored infantry brigade and 12 squadrons of modern jet fighters. Commitments to the United Nations and especially in the Middle East the next year added to this burden. A national force that had always been kept close to home — small, based on the mobilization of volunteer militia units, and non-professional — became a permanent force-in-being manned by career officers and servicemen deployed on overseas duty in peacetime.

Widening commitments broadened the officer corps in several ways. Opportunities arose to command larger forces deployed in critical situations. They attended foreign staff colleges and soon developed similar military institutions at home. Many officers routinely served in foreign posts, "attached" to foreign units, and in international assignments in NATO, the UN, and around the world. Foreign, Commonwealth, and allied officers (the distinction is important) came to Canada and joined Canadian units in all three services.

The combination of standing commitments, increasing technical competence, and service abroad tended to breed officers with a strong allegiance to allied causes. The "strategy of commitments"⁴⁴ was in some respects divorced from a more typical national defense strategy. Defense choices, whether in matters of equipment, doctrine, organization, or deployments, tended to follow from the needs of the Alliance. The Royal Canadian Navy, for example, developed almost

exclusively into an anti-submarine force intended to protect the sea-lanes between North America and Europe. It had little capability to operate in ice-bound waters on Canada's coasts or in the Arctic archipelago.

These commitments and extraterritorial loyalties affected officers' attitudes toward defense policies of governments and the advice they gave to ministers in some circumstances. During the Cuban missile crisis, Prime Minister John Diefenbaker's government hesitated and fumbled, trying to come to a decision about how to react to the emergency. Meanwhile officers, especially in the Royal Canadian Navy, reacted immediately to allied general defense plans and put their units on alert and in one case loaded war stores and put to sea without specific directions from the government. In the words of Admiral Jeffery Brock, commanding in Halifax at the time, allied decisions "automatically impinged on Canadian activities [even though] prudent dispositions caused confusion in government . . . Failure to honor such solemn obligations as those embodied in these [NATO] treaties would have been too degrading and traitorous to even contemplate."⁴⁵ Many other senior officers felt the same way, though few were as outspoken as Brock.⁴⁶

"Alliancemanship," to use their word, affected civil service advisors much as it did officers. In a 1964 report Robert Sutherland, a senior defense analyst, recommended to government that "the primary purpose of Canada's defense programs is to enable her to participate in a system of alliances . . . Canada is in a position neither to pursue an independent policy nor to avoid responsibilities." According to Sutherland, while it would be "advantageous to discover a strategic rationale which would impart to Canada's defense programs a wholly Canadian character [such a] rationale does not exist and one cannot be invented." Few politicians until the mid-1960s challenged what seemed to be the obvious sense of this point of view.⁴⁷

The establishment of NORAD was second only to NATO as a formative force in the Canadian armed forces. The agreement to join the forces responsible for the defense of North America created a new type of air force in Canada. Combined continental defense moved from rhetoric to fact. For the first time in history, the armed forces of Canada and the United States operated under a combined command centered solely on North American defense in a system that joined as well the political authorities of both countries. Where NATO rein-

forced the European connection in the army and the navy and in important elements of the air force, NORAD produced generations of Canadian airmen who associate themselves entirely with the continental United States Air Force and its attitudes, interests, and programs.⁴⁸

The alliance commitments accepted by governments in the 1950s shaped the Canadian armed forces for the next 40 years. Each service concentrated increasingly on the specific mission derived from the alliance's general defense plan, and as defense budgets fell this concentration intensified. The force-in-being became increasingly technical and professional. These attributes reinforced each other simply because professional officers sought to enhance their service's effectiveness by bringing the latest technical innovations into the line. This natural drive toward the leading edge of technology separated the armed forces from its amateur reserve force. But as expenses increased, the demand for up-to-date equipment competed with the costs of personnel, and eventually people lost the battle and the services became smaller. The demand for funds also aggravated interservice rivalries, pitting each service against the others in a defense force separated by three or four missions divorced from any nationally controlled strategy.⁴⁹

This unending cycle reinforced itself so that by 1964 the minister of defense could rightly complain that the armed forces were locked in a debilitating struggle with each other to prepare for three different types of war. There was no common strategy, no national war plan, and no central command or administrative structure to build either. Worse, by some accounts, senior officers were so distanced from "the national facts of life" that they had become incompetent advisers and mere advocates for service and alliance interests.⁵⁰

Canadian officers today are haunted by the unpreparedness of the armed services before both world wars and especially by the lack of government attention to the military in the interwar period. Mackenzie King's government is held up as an example of what can befall the nation when civilian leaders fail to heed military advice. If only, so the argument goes, the government had begun in the early 1930s to prepare the armed forces for war outside Canada, war might have been averted or the armed services might have been fully prepared to fight and win in 1939. The sin of unpreparedness in 1939 is the penalty of political neglect, and it is paraded before every government that ignores the opinions of their military advisers.

Today, the unpreparedness legend is closely entangled with what might be called the "world war" assumption. The two world wars of this century, horrific though they were, were anomalies. Warfare, even on the borders of major powers, has usually been limited in important ways. Yet the histories of the world wars are so influential that they obscure from many officers more likely types of international and internecine conflict even half a century later. The world wars were unusual also because for long periods they promoted the military aspects of national policy and this habit continued more or less throughout the Cold War era as well. Blinded by their view of history, officers seem unable to see any other possibilities and assume, moreover, that if a state is prepared for global warfare, then it is effectively prepared for any conflict. This is a dangerous assumption and has unnecessarily dislocated national defense planning in many states, as it did in the United States prior to the Vietnam War and in the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War era.

The allure of the Great War image prompts another myth that affects how some officers think about defense policies. "Proper soldiering," is a myth centered on the romantic notion that warfare can be conducted according to military ideals, uncluttered by political interference, rules and laws, and civil interests. In other words, the mythical Great War provokes the armed forces of two competing states into fighting to an unconditional surrender — one triumphant over the other. The issue will be decided by the force of arms and not by some untidy compromise. They ignore Lord Kitchener's famous observation that "we make wars as we must, not as we would like to,"⁵¹ for it offends doctrine and preferred ways of thinking.

The attitudes and policy choices of senior members of the Canadian Forces are shaped largely by their interpretation of Canadian history and by a "realist" view of international relations. The profession is characterized by a curious "little Canada" complex that is expressed in the willing subordination of Canadian national command to foreign officers. Add to this profile the typically conservative military mind, "nothing is ever secure," and the only question is not why do Canadian politicians and officers disagree, but why do they ever agree on any critical defense policy?

IV. THE ARMED FORCES IN THE UNITED STATES

The armed forces of the United States were shaped in the modern era by many of the same factors that forged the Canadian

armed services. Important differences, however, affect the norms and rules that guide military attitudes in the United States. First and perhaps most critical is the fact that the military defense of the United States is absolutely dependent on the national armed forces. Although allies may enhance national defense, there is no fall-back position, no Great Power to come to the rescue of a failed defense policy or military defeat. The objective of America's armed forces, "to fight and win the nation's wars," is not rhetorical but an unequivocal undertaking. The purpose of the officer corps is clear and gives it a powerful argument to place before the civil authority.

The armed forces of the United States have necessarily a global reach because America's interests are worldwide. No other force, including, arguably, those of the Soviet Union during the height of the Cold War, can claim the same responsibility. The United States must be prepared to project a degree of credible power in every theater of operations where vital interests may be threatened or vulnerable. One could certainly challenge definitions of interests, assessments of threats, and what degrees of power are sufficient to meet current and projected aggressions, but few would concede any quarter of the globe to another major or even local power. Officers, therefore, tend to think about national defense as the extraterritorial defense of the United States and to build forces and capabilities for this purpose.

How officers think about war and peace is an important causal variable in civil-military relations regimes, especially in a political system that provides room for their opinions during the formulation and management of public policy. Many Americans, scholars, politicians, and soldiers alike, have at times thought that war and peace sit at different tables. Politics and diplomacy are the business of politicians and their aides, while war, once it comes, must be placed in the hands of soldiers. Duty done, commanders will hand the business of peace back to the civil authority. Of course, this caricature is too simple. For example, as both Morris Janowitz and Huntington have explained, officers at various times have found the common ground between war and peace. But it is easy to march from the notion that civil-military relations are dichotomous to the idea that war and diplomacy are separate activities. Warfare, in this view, is in the military domain and best left in the hands of the officer corps. Such reasoning helps to explain, for instance, MacArthur's military

and political philosophy generally, and his challenge to the president during the Korean War in particular.

Yet those who claim that war and politics are inevitably fused confront ministers with the "expert dilemma" and invite soldiers to sit at the politician's table. This Clauswitzian notion of war and peace, and the vigor with which officers attempt to infuse the concept into the civil policy-making process and use it to demand places at the policy table, might explain much of what is called a crisis in American civil-military relations. But whether this concept is the immediate cause of crisis may be beside the point. What matters now is that it seems to be the foundation of the current American military view of war and peace, and it holds the key terrain in the defense establishment generally and in Washington in particular.

Two military defeats, at Pearl Harbor and in Vietnam, haunt both America's military establishment and the officer corps. The Japanese raid on Hawaii in 1941 exposed the continental United States to an invasion and seriously compromised the high command. The trauma of that event and the realization that it resulted from political, diplomatic, and military failures and a general lack of civil attention to national defense provides an overwhelming image that can be called forward whenever officers believe political attention to national defense is wavering or when officers perceive a "gap" between American capabilities and those of credible opponents.

The military-political defeat of the United States by a tiny, but resolute, nation in southeast Asia shocked and humiliated military leaders. The causes for the defeat were many, but for generations of officers, including current senior officers especially, Vietnam, in the collective psyche of the officer corps, is synonymous with the idea of an officers corps that had lost its way and with overt political interference in the military's rightful duties and responsibilities. American officers have and can make this connection to discipline themselves and to justify (to themselves at least) the inclusion of senior military leaders in the defense policy process, if not in the American political process more generally.

Arguably, in the last decade the American officer corps has used its constitutional advantages and the unique experiences of the Vietnam war to forge a place for itself in national policy process that challenges traditional norms of civil-military relations in the United States. In 1994 most Americans were surprised to find themselves in the midst of a "crisis in civil-military relations." The controversy

swirled around certain presidential policy initiatives aimed at broadening the social base of the armed forces and military resistance to them. Furthermore, American civil-military relations were stressed by a growing assertiveness among general officers about when and under what conditions military forces should be used. These types of discussions implied that military obedience to civilian directions might be conditional in some respects. Although some could argue that officers were only emphasizing agreements reached during the Reagan era, politicians and others considered the debate a challenge to civil control of the military in the United States.⁵²

The "weakening of civilian control" in the United States is expressed most poignantly by arguments carried to the public forum in "body bags." According to some analysts and popular commentary, political aversion to casualties in any conflict except those involving vital American interests is so deep-seated as to give officers a near veto on when force will be used in international relations and on how military operations will be conducted. Robert Kaplan observed that the American "military in all but a technical sense, is no longer ordered anywhere. It is a self-interested bureaucracy with the power of negotiation."⁵³ In Canada, by contrast, and perhaps because military casualties have been scattered in time and place since the end of the Second World War, politicians may be more likely to accept "body bags" earned in peacekeeping missions so long as they do not result from bungled operations.⁵⁴

Finally, and critically, the winning performance of American arms, especially in the last ten years or so, gained for the armed forces a measure of respect from the public which can be used to influence the political process in the armed forces' favor. As I shall record presently, public esteem for military leadership was brought to bear on individual politicians who broke the rules, and even President Clinton was not immune to this type of pressure.

There is little convincing evidence to support an argument that similarities and differences in civil-military relations in Canada and the United States can be attributed to differences in military values, interests, and policy preferences. Indeed, the evidence suggests just the opposite. Military officers in both states tend to view their civil-political roles and their contacts with politicians in much the same way. Given a choice, officers in Canada and the United States would likely set out a similar agenda for harmonious civil-military relations. It would include close attention by political leaders to national

defense needs as defined by senior officers, a greater voice for the military in defense policy decisions, increased spending to harmonize national ends with military means, raising the commitment threshold to avoid "over-tasking" of scarce resources, and protecting "the military way" from social and civil liberty reforms.

V. TWO DISTINCT POLITICAL SOCIETIES

Problems and patterns in civil-military relations in Canada and the United States cannot be explained from causal variables based in military cultures. Rather, similarities and differences in civil-military relations in these states arise from political cultures and constitutional arrangements.

It is obvious that no civil-military relations can exist unless two entities, the civil authority and the military, are present. The civil authority, however, provides more than a simple counter-point to the military: it provides the essential part of the framework of national regimes for civil-military relations. A nation's political history and culture shape its relationship with the national armed forces, which partly explains why Canadian and American civil-military relations are fundamentally different from those in Latin America, for instance.

Important as history is to the present functioning of states' relationships, extant legal and political frameworks (or the lack of any) condition the activities of civil authority and the military in any nation. Although civil-military relations in Canada and the United States was founded on the so-called Westminster tradition, a comparison of these relationships and the actual functioning of the two systems are profoundly influenced by their respective constitutions and political cultures.

Canadian politicians hold consistently to a few critical ideas (some tested by history and others simple national myths) concerning threats, international relationships and responsibilities, and the role of military professionals in the national policy process. Few prime ministers (and they are the politicians who matter in this discussion) in this century have worried much about military threats to Canada. The greatest threat to national defense came from involvement in other people's quarrels, meaning, generally, those engaging the British Empire and later those generated by the super powers. Until about 1954 and the advent of nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them over long ranges, Canadians could only become

involved in wars by leaving Canada in search for them. The object of a national defense policy, according to some, is always "to speak quietly and give no one cause for alarm."

As the Cold War intensified most politicians concluded that no amount of defense could change the outcome if nuclear warfare erupted worldwide. Moreover, politicians, and many senior officers as well, came to understand that national defense meant the avoidance of war and spent national resources to this end. In effect, Canada has no obvious "war aims" other than to avoid international commitments that might unduly impinge on the federal budget.

Partner to this idea is the important notion that even if Canada were threatened and attacked, someone else would save the nation. National defense was initially in the hands of the British Empire and then was the responsibility of the United States. Sir Wilfred Laurier laid down a benchmark of Canadian defense policy before World War I. "You must not take the militia seriously," he wrote, "for though it is useful for suppressing internal disturbances, it will not be required for the defense of the country, as the Monroe Doctrine protects us from enemy aggression."⁵⁵ No prime minister has been as forthright, at least in public, but they usually welcome Uncle Sam's defense. Certainly, Mackenzie King made no complaint when, in 1938 at Queen's University, President Roosevelt declared "that the people of the United States will not stand idly by if domination of Canadian soil is threatened by any other empire." Indeed, King supported the idea two days later with his "good friendly neighbor" policy promising that "enemy forces should not be able [to attack] the United States across Canadian territory."⁵⁶

The foreign defense of Canada is a fact of national life, if not always a welcome policy. Nevertheless, this natural policy worries some Canadians who see a threat from "our neighbors to the south who . . . may offer us 'help' which we may not want but cannot reject." Canada, so the argument goes, requires a policy of "defense against help."⁵⁷

Many politicians, like most Canadians nowadays, assume that Canada has no national interests that can be achieved through the use of Canadian military power, at least outside Canada. They come to this conclusion partly from a recently developed national myth that Canadians are an "unmilitary people," despite a history of Canadian military involvement in South Africa, Germany, Italy, and Korea, among other places, and a long record of conflicts with Europeans,

Americans, Japanese, Chinese, Russians, British, French, each other, as well as with native peoples. Politicians repeatedly declare that they are guided by Canada's nonaggressive, anti-colonial past.

Canada's armed forces played a central role in NATO's military plans until about 1968. Thereafter, the Canadian Forces entered the anti-NATO Trudeau era, or what Jack Granatstein termed "a long, dark night of the spirit."⁵⁸ At about the same time the public came to believe that Canada had a comparative advantage as a peacekeeper, despite the reality that most of the now much reduced defense budget was still spent on military capabilities for war fighting.

Today, the popular conclusion from this skewed history is that Canada never has and never will have much need for an armed forces except, perhaps, to shape the world in Canada's image. Even where armed forces are useful, the guiding assumption is that they will be used peacefully and, therefore, need not be extensively equipped for warlike operations.⁵⁹ The government's strategy is that "human security" can be achieved through "soft power" with only minimal aid of modern arms. Defense planners, on the other hand, continue to remind governments that Canada must have "modern, task-tailored, and globally deployable combat-capable forces" for standing NATO commitments and so-called "operations other than war" and peacekeeping.⁶⁰ Ironically, today the public's romance with peacekeeping is reflected in political enthusiasm for involvement in distant conflicts which have become dangerous and require more, not less, war-like capabilities. Thus the realities of current operations are driving the government into a corner—spend a great deal more for war fighting equipment or abandon its human security, soft power strategy.⁶¹

An important contradiction runs through this political framework. Canada needs armed forces and employs them in combat from time to time within "a realist paradigm" to advance national interests and influence. Prime ministers are granted audiences with American presidents and diplomats are seated on NATO committees and at United Nations Security Council tables partly because Canada makes a contribution to the national and collective interests of other states. The dilemma for Canadian politicians and diplomats, as always, is to find ways to gain position and influence without acquiring military liabilities as a consequence.

The preferred policy, therefore, is defense on credit, something allies tend to reject.⁶² Canada maintains its good standing with its

allies by maintaining a professional, but small, armed force to deploy to Europe and in the Atlantic and in North America or with the United Nations to serve this purpose. Few politicians in power, however, contemplated ever having to fulfill Canada's "commitments" as they are defined by their military advisers.

It was for this reason that Brooke Claxton (Minister of National Defense, 1946-54) emphatically warned the chiefs of staff that "I am all for silent soldiers as well as sailors," and he threatened to remove any officer who "was not content to express his opinions in private."⁶³ He worried also about over-zealous junior staff officers and cautioned the Chiefs of Staff Committee against military planning that sought "ideal solutions" without due regard for "the facts of national life."⁶⁴ Every prime minister and most defense ministers, before and since, have expressed similar sentiments at one time or another.

These political attitudes run counter to the way "the military mind" thinks about national defense and the interests of the military community, but there is little senior officers can do to overcome them for they are captives of the policies of the government of the day. Control of civil-military relations in Canada is a consequence of the country's constitutional arrangements, or what some call the Westminster model of government.

The political system of the United States is characterized by checks and balance an arrangement of diffused political power presenting many openings in the policy formulation process. On the other hand, the Westminster system or parliamentary system is distinguished by the unity of political power in the hands of the government of the day. Unity is expressed (and enforced) in several ways. Above all else, it is synonymous with party loyalty and discipline. Party membership brooks no deviation from the party's policy platform, attitudes, and interests. Members, whether the party is in government or not, vote the party line or risk censure, loss of support, or expulsion. Canadian political parties, of course, are divided at times over policy, leadership, and tactics (especially when the prime minister is weak), but party differences are usually held in check by party discipline. Disagreements are saved for caucus meetings behind closed doors.

Unity is most evident in the House of Commons and especially in the governing party. The government maintains its position and advances its policies by controlling the House of Commons. Govern-

ments set the political agenda, schedule votes, and define or limit debates. The most powerful instrument, however, is the government's control over its own members of Parliament who vote with the party or risk their political future. Party loyalty coupled with party discipline ensures that the government (and even minority governments for long periods) can force, if necessary, most any legislation through the House of Commons. The Opposition may criticize, delay, and at times embarrass the government and some of its members, but it rarely changes anything of substance once the government has set its collective mind on a particular course or policy.

Unity in the party and in the House of Commons is directed and maintained in the cabinet. This committee of equals is the real seat of power in the parliamentary system. The cabinet shapes general party policy into legislation, decides priorities and sets out policy plans, enacts legislation through various constitutional procedures, and allocates resources to policies, government ministries, national regions, and occasionally, the party faithful. The cabinet bestows favors, positions, and benefits on its members, benefactors, and government officials among others. Power and political control are ensured by the principle of cabinet solidarity. Though disagreements over policy and personal pettiness may characterize the actual make-up of many cabinets, outside the chamber all members of cabinet hold to the decision of the day, accepting the rewards and penalties of "collegial responsibility."

Above all other things, however, unity is personified by the prime minister—first among equals—and arguably holding a more powerful political office than that of the president of the United States. The prime minister is the individual who dictates how the government will manage its affairs and which policies will receive support in the party and in the House. Prime ministers exercise control in several ways. Their popularity, or lack of it, is critically important to the political fortunes of the party and ordinary members understand that their futures and the future of the party hinge mainly on the prime minister. He (and thus far on one occasion, she) can, therefore, use this political reality to sway the party and individual members to his or her point of view and support.

Prime ministers alone appoint cabinet members and ministers. Any member of Parliament who hopes to advance from the back benches to the cabinet table understands that his or her first loyalty is to the prime minister. Occasionally an individual might challenge

the prime minister in public, but principled as that attack might be, it is a sure path to political oblivion.

Prime ministers also have considerable discretionary power over the national purse. They can send money, in the form of programs, to almost any riding and thus boost the prestige and fortunes of ordinary members. In this way, and through the power of appointment, prime ministers can maintain the support of influential citizens, community leaders, and opinion-makers for himself, his party, and his policies.

The machinery of government in Canada, as in most parliamentary-based systems, is founded on functional departments or ministries directed by elected citizens who are members of the governing party. These ministers are supported by deputy ministers, heads of departments, who come from the permanent, professional public service. Typically, a deputy minister has many years experience in government and public administration, has advanced in responsibility on merit, and has no political affiliation.

Deputy ministers are appointed by "order-in-council" which means effectively by the prime minister and they "serve at pleasure." Although deputy ministers are usually expert in their field and the chief executive officer of their departments, they are not politically responsible for the actions or decisions of officials or for the efficacy of government programs. These responsibilities fall completely on the minister who is required to answer for his or her department before Parliament. Ministers, not their deputies, set policy and public servants merely administer them. Some might argue that this policy/administration dichotomy is a fiction, because in practice deputy ministers exercise considerable influence on policy in their duty as advisor and in their freedom of discretion in the administration of policy. But it is a cruel fact for politicians that should something go seriously wrong in their ministry, it is customary that they make the necessary public explanations while protecting the anonymity of their officials. Their reward for this obligatory duty is (usually) obedience, trustworthy administration, and silent public servants.

The power of appointment over the public service and the concept of ministerial responsibility give the prime minister substantial control over the leaders of the federal public service. The prime minister not only can set the policy of the day, but he can also closely supervise the implementation of that policy through the selection of

ministers and his absolute control over the professional lives of senior public servants.

In a similar way, the prime minister exercises considerable control over the Canadian Forces. He alone appoints an officer to be chief of the defense staff who, like deputy ministers, serves at pleasure. Prime ministers, of course, exercise control in other customary ways by, for instance, opening and closing the doors to the treasury, supporting favored projects, and championing the armed forces in public. In return, he expects and gets compliance, good order and discipline in the ranks, and public support for his policy from the chief of defense.

The power of appointment allowed partisan politics into the armed forces, especially before and during World War I when every rank was open to ministerial approval. Since then, the National Defense Act has been amended to place barriers between ministers and officers. Today, a dual-key approach is used to provide for the civil control of the general and flag officers list while guarding against obvious political manipulation of the officer corps.

The chief of the defense staff alone is responsible for the selection and promotion of officers up to the rank of colonel. He alone appoints commanders and organizes units and elements of the Canadian Forces. The minister of national defense is responsible in law for the promotion of officers to general or flag rank, but only on the advice of the chief of the defense staff. No minister can appoint or promote any officer without the recommendation of the chief of the defense staff. This device places a bar between professional and political appointments in the armed forces much as does the congressional oversight of officers' promotions in the United States. Nevertheless, it has always been clear to every chief of defense and to aspirants that they are servants of the government of the day; while they may disagree with the government's policies, they do so in private or forfeit their careers.

Finally, in the Canadian political system there are few effective means to counter a government's programs or policies. The "loyal Opposition" can oppose, but it usually lacks the resources, information, and votes in the House of Commons to do more than harry a minister. The Senate of Canada, an appointed body, can delay legislation, but any party that has been in power for any time soon fills the seats in the Senate with its supporters, thus turning the upper house into no more than a partisan rubber-stamp.

Parliament routinely establishes a House of Commons committee on national defense but it is not really an independent body. The chair of the defense committee of the House is always a member of the governing party. Although the committee is usually composed of members of Parliament from all parties, proportional representation ensures that the government controls the committee's deliberations and recommendations. Moreover, committees of the House are creatures of the government of the day. Committees are formed only on the authority of the government, and the committee's agenda and investigations, if any, are initiated by the appropriate minister. The defense committee of the House does allow for the examination in public of certain issues, and some have produced important reports. But the defense committee, like others of its kind has no authority and rarely acts outside the interests of the government.

VI. THE AMERICAN POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

Relations between Americans and their armed forces are shaped by three fundamental principles. They abhor, like their British forefathers, standing and professional armies because they are a threat to civil liberties and a burden on society. Such armed forces which may from time to time be necessary must be segregated from the political process so as not to tempt politicians to use them for partisan purposes. Thus, the control and administration of the armed forces are divided between Congress and the executive. Similarly, Americans have tried to maintain a distance between themselves and "entangling alliances" by dividing treaty and war-making powers in various ways. The guiding notion in American civil-military relations has always been "to keep the army out of politics and politics out of the army."

For a remarkably long time these three principles have freed the United States from the turmoil and dangers that national armed forces have brought to many other societies that are built on revolution and warfare. Despite, or perhaps because of its early isolation, the United States was often a warring state, fighting Europeans, Canadians, Mexicans, various Latin Americans, native peoples (sometimes to extinction) and, of course, each other. Concern about civil-military relations figured prominently in the era of the War of Independence, during the Civil War, and in constitutional arrangements with the states resulting in, among other things, those curious

creatures (in Canadian eyes, at least) — states' militia and national guards. American officers often, and with seeming ease, moved from the garrison to the capital, a phenomenon that has no companion in British or Commonwealth histories except perhaps for Wellington's great influence in the mid-1800s.

What is as remarkable is that this long and close association between the armed forces and government has not in any instance led to a prolonged or serious crisis in American civil-military relations. Occasionally, crises occur causing some, like President Lincoln during the Civil War, to worry about an apprehended *coup*, but generally American officers and politicians have kept their places and maintained an appropriate distance between the armed forces and the government. Why is this so? Is military obedience to civil authority merely "an unreflecting belief" as Samuel Finer suggests? Perhaps, like Finer, "instead of asking why the [American] military engages in politics, we ought surely to ask why they ever do otherwise."⁶⁵

The answer seems to follow from two cardinal norms that shape the American regime for civil-military relations. First, what some writers, such as Colonel Harry Summers, refer to as the "remarkable trinity" of the people, the government, and the army⁶⁶ may be so well enconced in society that no one would contemplate the overthrow of one side by the other. Some suggest that the armed forces are in all respects subordinate to the civil authority because the principle is ingrained in the minds of officers (who are essentially civilians) before they reach high rank, thus simply eliminating the idea of a *coup d'état* from their consciousness. But serendipity is not a very satisfying explanation for this critical and voluntary attitude. Willing obedience may have more pragmatic roots. That is to say, the officer corps may have learned from experience that the "trinity" is irrevocable and useful to the armed forces.

This is apparently the "lesson" Summers and other officers have carried home from Vietnam. The armed forces cannot prosper or even survive if they were to challenge overtly the principle of civil control over the military. No matter the circumstances, there is no explanation or rationale that would win public support for any intervention by the military in domestic politics or internal affairs in the United States. This fact of national life was reinforced during MacArthur's confrontation with President Truman, again at the time of President Nixon's resignation, and, more recently, when General Colin Powell seemed to challenge President Clinton's defense policies.

Generally, Americans are proud of and willing to support their armed forces, especially when they are engaged in operations that the people think are worthwhile and righteous. Citizens will often rally around the guidon whenever they believe that members of the armed forces are being treated unfairly by politicians, or when cherished institutions are threatened. Officers and politicians understand this dynamic and use it, albeit for various purposes, as the need arises. If the trinity precludes direct intervention in the policy process, it allows officers to garner support for their efforts and their institutions. Obedience to the principle of civil control and oneness with the people are mutually reinforcing ideas that provide varying degrees of legitimacy to military demands and public support for the "rightful authority" of the military over politicians in some incidences and in some policy areas. Consequently, obedience and connection give senior military officers a circumstantial political power and an implied right to be consulted in matters that affect the funding, structure, and operations of the United States armed forces.

"Rightful authority" and recognition of the military's place in the policy process is the second important operating norm in American civil-military relations. It is also the source of confusion and conflict in the arrangements of civil-military relations. According to Paul Schratz, the Constitution is not simply or ever intended to subordinate the military to the government of the day, but rather to balance "civil and military authority with a fulcrum held by the chief of states." Moreover, in his view, "the Commander-in-Chief clause, insofar as *operational* authority over the military is concerned, seemed no more designed to *provide* than to *prevent* civilian control over the military."⁶⁷

Although this interpretation may seem overly strident to some scholars, and even dangerous to others, it coincides with aspects of the reality of civil-military relations in the U.S. Richard Kohn, concludes, for instance, that "the military cannot perform its duty, nor can civilians exercise their authority, unless the machinery of government allows military and civilian perspectives to mix in the formulation of policy, enabling the two sides to understand each other and work together."⁶⁸ At another level, the fact that officers swear to defend and protect the Constitution might situate their allegiance above the president in both his capacities as the civil authority and the commander-in-chief.

American constitutional arrangements create an unsolvable dilemma for civil-military relations in the United States. The "expert problem" of civil-military relations is aggravated whenever leaders of the armed forces are granted their rightful place in the policy process, whether through the business of Congress or the policy machinery of the administration. Once the experts are at the table, they can define "the problem" of the day in their own terms; and defining problems is the crucial step in agenda setting and controlling outcomes. If, on the other hand, experts are excluded from the table, something not completely possible in the intermingled American policy process, policy may be doomed (like Clinton's early policy on homosexuals in the armed forces) because it is devoid of detail. No matter whether the military is in or out of the policy process, someone is sure to apprehend "a crisis in civil-military relations" either because the military has, respectively, too much or not enough say in the politics and policies for national defense.

VII. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS PROBLEMS IN CANADA

Canada's officer corps, under the direction of civilians elected to Parliament, is responsible and accountable for the control and administration of the Canadian Armed Forces in peace and war. Officers are given in law considerable discretion over significant resources, the use of lethal force, the lives of citizens, and the safety of the state. The chief of the defense staff is armed with vested rights that in some circumstances allow him, even compel him, to act according to his appreciation of events. However, political leaders are responsible for all aspects of national defense. Although some might wish to segregate the officer corps from politics, it is an instrument of politics and has been formed within this context.

Two apparently permanent contradictions flow through Canadian civil-military relations. First, most political leaders, no matter their ideological differences, would agree with Prime Minister Mackenzie King, who declared in 1937 that "no person dislikes everything that has to do with expenditures for defense purposes more than I, [and] the members of my party in Canada all felt alike in this particular."⁶⁹ National defense is a burden best avoided. Unfortunately, no government during the Cold War could entirely avoid making commitments to the West's collective defense effort. However, few politicians, once in power, ever contemplated having to

fulfil Canada's "commitment," as they were defined by their military advisers. Generally, politicians assume that Canada's commitments are whatever Parliament decides they are at any given moment. National defense policy is, therefore, about budgets, not strategies. Consequently, the military's operational planning and programs do not require much oversight.

Officers, on the other hand, think of commitments as firm undertakings and prepare plans and budget estimates on the assumption that commitments will be met according to standards set by military doctrine. Military planners, left unattended by the cabinet because defense policy and administration are not important matters, tend to make demands that invariably cause political difficulties for a prime minister within the party and also with the public (if and when they come to light).

Thus the political assumption that there are no threats, and that Canadians could do nothing about them if they existed, coupled with the attitude that defense is a burden to be avoided, puts defense policy and the activities of the Canadian Forces on the back burner. Politicians tend to leave the determination of defense choices and outcomes to the experts. Inattention, however, creates the very civil-military relations problems that politicians hope to avoid—exaggerated demands from the military, disharmony between policy declarations and capabilities, and embarrassing surprises concerning military plans and the activities of the armed forces. The unlearned lesson for Canadian politicians is this: if you really dislike anything to do "with expenditures for defense purposes," then you had best spend a great deal of time being involved in everything to do with defense expenditures.

The disharmony of political and military attitudes, interests, and values—a clash of belief systems—leads invariably to disconcerted defense policies, decisions, and outcomes. This assertion is overwhelmingly evident in the operational histories of the NORAD agreements of 1956, in the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, nuclear weapons policies over the years, in the defense policies of the Trudeau era, in the recent deployments to the former Yugoslavia and Somalia, and in the current disparate defense and foreign policies. Disharmony is evident in the history of defense administration, as in the case of naval force development in the early 1960s, nuclear submarine and EH101 helicopter decisions, more recently in disagreements over the need for main battle tanks, in the debates around

the purposes and size of the militia, and in questions over which military bases would survive and which would close.

Discord characterizes policies concerning force sizes, budgets, and deployments; indeed, in just about every critical area. The much discussed "commitment-capabilities gap" of the late 1980s was, arguably, not a gap in capabilities as much as a gap in how politicians and officers viewed commitments.⁷⁰ Present Canadian policies based on the white paper, *Defense 1994*, seem as disharmonious as ever, with little agreement except on the need for an undefined, and undefinable, "multi-purpose combat capability."

The second permanent contradiction in Canadian civil-military relations arises from the first one. That is to say, officers rightly complain that they are abandoned by their political leaders. Moreover, most officers believe that politicians know nothing and care less about defense policies and the Canadian Forces.⁷¹ While few serving officers would dare say such things in public, once released from the confines of the uniform, many complain loud and long and in public about the "neglect" of the armed forces by politicians. As the late General Gerald Theriault observed, "the military requires [from politicians] a great deal more than the kind of weak, inconsistent, reactive, and insufficiently informed leadership that nearly inevitably results from the structural shortcomings of the political control machinery we have in Canada."⁷²

Theriault is surely right, and he suffered as chief of the defense staff under a particularly bizarre defense minister and his political aides. Notwithstanding his criticisms of ministers, Theriault also understood that Canadian officers have themselves to blame for many of their problems with the civil authority. According to him, the officer corps at times "has great difficulty differentiating between its own institutional interests and aspirations and the real interests of the state, viewing both as coincident when, in fact, they are often very different."⁷³

The contradiction between the military's demand for attention and its reaction to firm directions from ministers is remarkable. When ministers arrive at the ministry with strong views on almost any extant policy, plan, or issue that differs from the military's own interests or assessments, military leaders usually howl with pain and indignation. Occasionally, they have tried to thwart the minister's direction, sometimes overtly. As Brooke Claxton observed in frustra-

tion, bringing order to the defense portfolio exposed him to "bitter and biased opposition to anything he tried."⁷⁴

The most notorious conflict between the armed forces and a minister involved the decision by Paul Hellyer (Minister of National Defense 1963-67) to unify the Canadian military services into a single service Canadian Forces. Hellyer also proposed a fundamental restructuring of defense headquarters, policy and program procedures, and missions of the services. These changes where necessary, in Hellyer's view, to bring the armed forces under control following the Cuban missile debacle and to unify Canada's defense ends and means.

The military reacted by staging, as some termed it, an "admirals' revolt." Naval officers were the most aggressive and overt in the military's attack on the civil authority, but other senior officers were just as adamant that the minister had to go, although less open in their criticisms. Eventually, the prime minister and the public sided with Hellyer and a type of unification became law. Nevertheless, even 30 years later, many armed forces' leaders continue to struggle against Hellyer's ghost and his legacy.

Hellyer was not the only minister to discover that the military usually begs for political attention and appreciates it only as long as it blesses their preferences and ideas. In 1970, Defense Minister Donald Macdonald, with the concurrence of Prime Minister Trudeau, began his first term in office by focusing specifically on Canada's defense and foreign policies and then significantly altering Canada's long-standing "commitments," the resources allocated to national defense, and the organization of the defense establishment. He was met by obstruction and outright hostility from officers and their supporters outside government. Macdonald believed, because of the opposition of the armed forces to the government's policies, that he could only trust advice from civilians recruited from outside defense headquarters and the armed forces. The policies and the organizational decisions that followed from this experience are still controversial.

Other ministers have experienced the same problems in their relations with military leaders. However, the most serious occurred during and following the deployment of Canadian units to Somalia in early 1993. The deployment was rushed and ill-prepared troops, mainly from the Canadian Airborne Regiment, were sent to join an international force in the region. Subsequently, several members of

the unit committed unlawful acts, including at least one murder. The reaction of senior military leaders and officials in Ottawa was to hide and confound information and to otherwise cover up the incident. Allegedly, these same officers hid information about the mission and lied to the minister of defense in an effort to deflect criticism of their actions and decisions and to protect the reputation of the Canadian Forces. Eventually, the tangled web of lies and deceptions prompted the government to convene an *Inquiry Into the Deployment of the Canadian Forces to Somalia* that confirmed much of what had been suspected.⁷⁵

What was remarkable, and perhaps characteristic of civil-military relations in Canada at the time, was the attitude of officers call before the *Inquiry*. One after the other seemed outraged that they should be asked to account for their actions and decisions. The most spectacular instance involved the so-called acting chief of defense, Vice Admiral Murray, who so provoked the commissioners by his refusal to answer their questions and to follow their instructions that they threaten to hold him in contempt of the inquiry. Officers, according to one observer, had become so accustomed to acting without critical supervision that many apparently thought that they were not accountable at all.

Even as the *Inquiry* was in progress, the intrigues continued, leading to the forced resignation of one minister, the disbandment of the Airborne Regiment, and the dismissal of the chief of defense staff. Afterwards, a strong politician, Doug Young, stormed into the ministry and ordered a fundamental restructuring of policy, officer education, headquarters organization, and military laws and procedures, an agenda of some 300 reforms in all. Before these could come into effect another chief of defense resigned early and other senior officers and officials retired or were moved to minor positions. The reverberations from the lack of political attention to the deployment in 1993 and the actions of military and public service leaders to maintain their independence from ministers are ongoing and still may affect the Canadian Forces after many years.

Canada's parliamentary system and its legal framework for national defense strengthens the civil control of the armed forces but in some ways detracts from it. The prime minister especially and the cabinet generally have absolute control over defense budgets, defense organization, the selection and appointment of general officers, and the use of force. The system provides no opportunity for officers

or officials to challenge the government publicly or even to present views which might undermine the government's program or partisan interests to parliamentary committees.

On the other hand, military leaders are not powerless in the bureaucratic politics that transform declared policies into actual outcomes. Although the prime minister is the dominant individual, military leaders in parliamentary systems have "considerable negative power . . . to delay or prevent policies, particularly those having to do with the organization and traditions of the services. . . . This negative power assures that governments have to consult the senior military leadership, even if they do not take their advice in the end."⁷⁶ Officers can also, to a degree, apply subtle pressures on ministers by attributing failures or falling capabilities to the government's policy. No chief of defense would do this openly, but they can arrange for members of the Opposition who sit on the defense committee or individuals from the media to ask "the right question" to which the government must give an honest answer.

The system reduces civil control when the term is taken to mean control of the armed forces in national, and not political, interests. The lack of checks and balances and the government's control of individuals (and more importantly of information) provides opportunities for politicians to use the armed forces for their own partisan interests. This largely neglected aspect of civil-military relations in liberal democracies is very difficult to identify and control in a parliamentary system where power and information are concentrated in government and in a political bureaucracy that is required to support the government of the day. It is especially difficult in Canada where national defense is not a major public issue and where there are few members of the media who spend the time to become familiar with the complex intermingling of partisan politics, military interests, and defense policy outcomes—the stuff of civil-military relations.

Political inattention, a significant degree of independence and discretion on the part of senior officers and officials, and disharmony followed by surprise are the chief characteristics of civil-military relations in Canada. The fault (if it is a fault in the usual sense) comes from both camps. Political leaders fail to set out achievable defense objectives and to provide adequate funding for those they declare. Too often, rhetoric passes as policy with the hope, perhaps, that our allies can't count. Politicians also fail as overseers. They simply do not

pay sufficient attention to their duty to guide and audit military leaders and programs, nor do they spend time acquainting themselves with the details and the history of defense policy.⁷⁷ On the other hand, military leaders act as though they were free of "the facts of national life." Military concepts, interests, and doctrine cannot easily change political ideas and attitudes about national defense. The challenge facing the senior officer corps, therefore, is to establish within the Canadian Forces a set of ideas that will bring the officer corps into line with the way most Canadians think about national defense. This means that officers will have to rethink their assumptions about threats, defense objectives, capabilities, organizations, relations with allied military leaders, and operational methods. It is not certain, however, whether the contradictions built into Canadian civil-military relations by history, culture, and the nation's legal framework will encourage this reformation any time soon.

The armed forces of Canada and the United States grew out of the same necessities after 1945, but since their 1989 victory over the Soviet Union officers have come to appreciate Churchill's observation that "the problems of victory are more agreeable than the problems of defeat, but they are no less difficult."⁷⁸ However, despite "down-sizing" budget cuts, loss of preferred missions, over-tasking, and other seeming outrages, these professional armed forces maintain a cohesion borne from their special calling. Officers insist on holding fast to their right to direct the profession in traditional ways. They resist changes in rules that they believe have served the military, and therefore society, well. Officers especially resent the imposition of norms and rules drawn from societies that appear unsympathetic to military needs as officers see them.

Today, the modern problem of civil-military relations might not be merely political but rather a more fundamental discord between the military culture, as created and sustained by officers, and its parent society. The conflict in Western civil-military relations generally may be rooted in the growing difference between so-called narcissistic democracies and a conservative military, "a distinguishable corpus," loyal to its own history and hierarchy and whose regime of principles, norms, and rules will prevail in the future.

In Canada civil-military relations since the end of the Cold War have been dominated by the "re-engineering" of the Canadian Forces occasioned mainly in response to a changing political agenda emphasizing fiscal restraint and social welfare priorities, increased overseas

commitments in dangerous places, and a continuing public distrust of military leaders who have been plagued by a series of scandals, individual failures, and policy missteps. Many military officers would describe themselves as isolated from the government and misrepresented by a hostile, ill-informed media. They might declare, in private, that the essential link between the people, the armed forces and the government has been broken, perhaps for years to come. This situation, when combined with the constitutional isolation of the Canadian Forces, leaves military leaders with few venues to make their case for a strong armed forces and exposes the defense budget to continued cuts.

The collapse of trust began far from home in Somalia and from an apparent innocuous report filed by a reporter from a tiny community newspaper. Ironically, as it would turn out, the reporter was visiting the force at the invitation of the Defense Department to build community relations with a nearby military base. As the story unfolded, first sporadically and then quickly, Canadians were shocked to find that soldiers had committed murders, acted brutally toward local inhabitants and openly displayed grossly racist attitudes. Official explanations for this situation and edited reports of internal investigations soon created the impression in the public mind that officers and officials were scrambling to explain away their own actions, covering up facts and evidence, and placing blame on soldiers, "a few bad apples," for decisions and activities that could only be attributed to senior officers. Sensing the public interest, the media hounded the defense establishment looking for other scandals and easily found several. Public denials of wrongdoing and indiscretion were often quickly overtaken by clumsy "restatements" which the media took to be attempts to dodge the truth. During the subsequent government *Inquiry into the Deployment of the Canadian Forces to Somalia*, senior officers and officials stumbled badly when asked to explain the inconsistency of their words and deeds, and public mistrust turned to ridicule. Appointments were followed by firings and resignations, statements by ministers and officers seemed to be at odds, with the result that the entire defense establishment, seemingly besieged on all sides, fell in upon itself.

Strangely, a situation that one might think would break any relationship between the government and the armed forces gradually forced them together in a sort of back-to-back defense. The Somalia crisis occurred in the midst of a general election and a change

of government. The new Liberal government of Jean Chrétien first scoffed at and then attacked the Progressive Conservative handling of the affair, but soon found itself enmeshed. At first, Chrétien could point to officers and officials appointed by Prime Minister Mulroney and supported by his successor, Kim Campbell. However, in the months that followed the election and before the full extent of the scandal was known, Chrétien had appointed his own chief of defense and deputy minister. Others who had commanded the Canadian Forces and managed defense policy during and before the deployment to Somalia were rewarded with ambassadorial and other high appointments. Many of these individuals would subsequently come under suspicion and the close scrutiny of the inquiry and the media. When officers and officials stuttered and stumbled in the witness chair, members of the Prime Minister's Office became restive. They began to panic when the prime minister was forced by public pressure "to accept" the resignation of his chief of defense, General Jean Boyle, only months after his initial appointment. To their chagrin, the government, and especially the defense minister and the prime minister, found that the liability carried by the Mulroney/Campbell governments had been unwittingly transferred to them.

Criticisms mounted daily with each revelation by the media of other wrong doings. The Somalia inquiry meanwhile relentlessly pursued its mandate to investigate the "actions and decisions of officers and officials" in full public view. After many months and a mountain of testimony, it became increasingly clear to the commissioners of the inquiry and to officials and politicians that the inquiry's findings would seriously embarrass the government and possibly force the prime minister to censure or even dismiss other senior officers and officials he had appointed. Rather than face that possibility and to guard against any chance that the inquiry would become a political issue during the federal election planned for the autumn of 1997, the government abruptly terminated the inquiry. The prime minister judged, correctly as it turned out, that once out of sight, the public and the media would lose interest in the Somalia scandal and the fate of the Canadian Forces.

Unfortunately for the leaders of the Canadian Forces, the termination of the inquiry left a pall hanging over the armed forces and senior officers. Whenever new incidents were unveiled, no matter that they had nothing to do with the actions and decisions of newly appointed commanders, the public suspected the worst and quickly

condemned senior leaders as heartless careerists. A civil-military relations problem centered on the connection between the armed forces and society haunts the Canadian Forces to this day, but it is not necessarily a political civil-military relations problem.

There is no problem of "control" nor does public distrust of senior officers affect the government's popularity. Since the election of 1997, the government has dampened public concerns (and interest) by establishing several quasi-independent studies and by initiating a number of "reforms" to thwart criticisms that it is trapped by old policies. Second, the government has distanced itself from the officer corps and in a way joined the public in criticizing senior officers. For example, after the prime minister was forced by circumstances to remove David Collenette from the Defense portfolio, he appointed Doug Young as defense minister with press releases proclaiming Young as a "no-nonsense minister." Young stormed into NDHQ to take charge and ordered a review of policies, regulations, and procedures aimed at giving the impression that he would bring the defense establishment to heel. His aggressive behavior also curbed criticisms arising from the cancellation of the Somalia inquiry, while protecting appointees from further public embarrassment. Finally, after the election, the minister, Art Eggleton, (who replaced Young, defeated in the election for reasons unrelated to defense policy) tried to discredit the inquiry's report and, having found himself on the wrong side of the issue, he replaced the "acting chief of defense," Admiral Murray, who had been tainted by the scandal, with a putatively clean officer from outside the Ottawa environment.

This, at times, bizarre story could not be duplicated in the United States. The media, much more alert and informed on defense issues than any in Canada, would have chased the story to its conclusion. No president, having once ordered an inquiry, could have terminated it for such brazenly partisan reasons. Congress, for any number of reasons, would surely have launched investigations, called for sanctions against officers and officials, and blocked any promotions of individuals even faintly connected to the scandal. Whereas in Canada the resolution of this civil-military relations problem was entirely in the hands of the government of the day, in the United States the resolution of such a problem would have engaged all the various entities in the government that shared responsibility for the control of the armed forces. National principles,

norms, and rules always dictate how the armed forces will be controlled.

The Canadian Forces and the professional officer corps face other difficulties that are familiar to officers in the American armed forces. "Down-sizing" and "re-engineering" – concepts taken from the corporate world and ostensibly aimed at finding economies in defense – are affecting the military way of doing things and challenging doctrine that was once solely the preserve of military professionals. As unhealthy side effects of these remedies for falling budgets become increasingly obvious, for example, as "alternate service deliverable" programs, contracting out, degrading overseas deployable support services, officers' complaints about government funding and policies grow louder.

"Over-tasking" on peacekeeping and other missions while military personnel strengths and modern capabilities dwindle fractures the leaders' confidence in governments and weakens soldiers' trust in their superiors' ability to represent national interests. Morale declines even further when military concerns are dismissed offhandedly by the prime minister and by his references to members of the Canadian Forces as "boy scouts" doing good deeds around the world.

The imposition of new social mores on the Canadian Forces creates other problems. Many officers consider the recruitment of women and their employment as nothing more than "political correctness" and harmful to the true purpose of the armed forces. Similar enforced changes regarding recruiting and employment standards, applications of military law, individual rights, and homosexuality in the barracks distant the officer corps from society and especially from governments who seem to make no effort to protect the military way from noisy special interests. However, no matter the seriousness of military objections to government policies, few significant civil-military relations problems appear.

The armed forces in Canada have no constitutional avenue or mechanism that would allow officers, including the chief of the defense staff, to openly question government policy. Indeed, no officer can publicly disagree with policy, even before a House of Commons committee. Any open challenge would result in the dismissal of the offending officer, for to do otherwise would spark a civil-military relations crisis. Although the chief of the defense staff might suggest in public that the government's policy causes certain

difficulties for the Canadian Forces, he could never call the policy incorrect, inappropriate, or dangerous to the national defense and remain in office. Chiefs of defense obey Claxton's decree and remain "silent soldiers as well as sailors too." This traditional approach nicely describes the concept of place for Canadian officers in civil-military relations and in the mechanism for the higher direction of national defense.

VIII. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS PROBLEMS IN AMERICA

The regime that has guided American civil-military relations since the Declaration of Independence is strong and secure, but the Cold War, related events, and now the post-Cold War world have strained the system, sometimes severely. The United States has largely cast aside its citizens' army, building instead a professional standing armed force. Stresses in American society and the apparently fractious nature of domestic politics are infecting the armed forces on the one hand and prompting officers to seek protection from these tendencies by isolating their units in garrisons removed from the temptations and vices of contemporary society.

Checks and balances meant, among other things, to curtail the involvement of military officers in national politics may actually be working against this objective. The Constitution provides several avenues that invite officers to challenge the authority of the president as commander-in-chief. Some, extremists to be sure, suggest that their first loyalty is to the Constitution and in any situation that requires a choice between the Constitution and the orders of the president, loyalty to the Constitution prevails. The civil-military relations problem arises in this case when the choice of whether or not to obey the civil authority is left in the hands of the "agent."

A more common problem occurs when officers are allowed or required by law to serve two or more masters. For example, American officers have a duty to their commander-in-chief and to Congress, and their response to either or both is problematic. In some circumstances, a chief of a military service testifying before Congress who does not exactly and specifically support the administration may be accused by the White House of undermining the president's policies. On other occasions this same officer who does explicitly recommend the president's policies may be accused by Congress of

offering "politicized" answers to questions that challenge the president's preferences.⁷⁹

The concept of checks and balances, ironically, provides opportunities for the military to play one civil authority against the other and to legitimately intervene in the political process in their own interests. The fact that this is not often done (openly, at least) is mostly due to choices made by the agents, the senior officers. Thus, the American Constitution and the reality of politics in Washington subvert the definition of civil control used by many American students of civil-military relations; namely, the regime invites officers to enter the policy process and to use their implied powers to influence policy choices, and they do so.

Although this contradiction is most dramatic and most obvious when service chiefs testify before Congress, and usually before the media at the same time, it is replicated time and again in less public forums. Individual members of Congress, unlike their parliamentary cousins, may be powerful actors in the national policy process. They can introduce policy, shape policy debates, and lobby for or against choices that affect their interests. Senior officers must pay almost as much attention to influential representatives and senators as they do to the commander-in-chief and the secretary of defense. Here too, the system provides opportunities for military officers to enter the political process for their own ends, to prompt a critical defense program, for instance.⁸⁰

Since the end of the Cold War when defense choices were largely settled, American elites have begun an unprecedented self-examination of civil-military relations in the United States. Civil-military relations, according to recent research, are variously described as "in crisis" or essentially stable and unimportant. But no matter their conclusions, most analysts agree that such problems that do exist can be attributed to one or a combination of causes: excessive interventions by the military in the policy process; a widening fracture between the armed forces and society; increasing quarrels about the military's missions and the decline in effectiveness; and the politicization of the high command.

There is no space in this brief paper nor much need to rehearse the wide-ranging and erudite arguments that fill many volumes of current literature on American civil-military relations. At the moment, the U.S. appears to be in the midst of an evolutionary change in the norms, functional rules, and decision-making procedures of

civil-military relations. According to the regime theory of civil-military relations, although a regime may be stable for long periods, it may change as basic causal factors such as values, issues, interests, and personalities change. Attempts to replace principles or norms account for conflict in civil-military relations, while alterations of rules and decision-making procedures account for the continuous dynamic nature of civil-military relations. By these definitions there is no crisis in civil-military relations in the United States.

The principles underlying American civil-military relations are sound and essentially unchallenged, and these conclusions are certainly true so far as civil control over the military is concerned. Those who worry about the involvement of senior officers in decisions about how and where the armed forces will be used see, perhaps more plainly than before, the usual civil-military decision-making process in action. American officers have always had some part in decisions by the civil authority about how the armed forces would be structured, commanded, and employed, just as the civil authority has had a voice in detailed military operations. For instance, on the critical matter of the use of force in international relations, Richard Betts concludes that it is "impossible to detect objectively whose influence is greatest" in such decisions, but evidently the responsibility was shared more or less depending on the issue and especially on the style of the president.⁸¹ The overt articulation of this sharing of responsibility, though not of accountability, in the so-called Weinberger doctrine (1984) and the free use of it by General Colin Powell in 1990 merely formalized common experiences. The open involvement of officers in the policy process is not a change or challenge to principle, but rather a subtle change in decision-making procedures.⁸²

The advent of the new and permanent professional armed force in the United States is another cause for worry, for it seems to impinge on the fundamental prohibition against a standing army. In some respects the worry is justified; large professional forces are closed cultures, prone to promote their own interests, and can be a burden on society, especially as professionalism begets costly high technology which demands more professionalism. But these factors can be controlled by close civil supervision and political control of the budget. Anxiety about the threat that standing armies pose to civil liberty and democracy has been allayed by time and the evolution of civil-military regimes compatible with civil and military interests.

No problem of civil-military relations is ever solved in the sense that it is eliminated, but mature liberal democracies need not fear professional armed forces nor are they the portent of a crisis in civil-military relations.

The third "indicator of crisis" in American civil-military relations is related to the professionalization of the armed forces and "the degree to which the military is representative of society."⁸³ It is suggested that the all-volunteer force is developing into a military caste without the leveling influence of short-service citizen soldiers. The "crisis," according to this argument, arises from the assumption that the professional officer class (in the main) will grow increasingly restive under controls imposed by a society it neither understands nor appreciates. Yet, as Navy Secretary Richard Danzig argues, the Navy is "part of a wider society and it is . . . crucial for the military to be connected to that wider society." His point is that when society's norms change and the military does not follow the trend, then the armed forces "wind up putting themselves at risk of losing the support of the larger society."⁸⁴

Professional officers, on the other hand, see the situation differently. It is not that they despise traditional civil control, but that they feel the military way, their "distinguishable corpus" and "more or less exclusive group coherence," is threatened by the demands of modern society. While the military strives to recreate and sustain the "warrior ethic" in the armed forces, society demands that the armed forces find room within that ethic for women, homosexuals, and egalitarian attitudes.

American principles and norms allow, in a manner foreign to parliamentary systems, ways to try to influence, challenge, and change government policy. While officers profess loyalty to their commander-in-chief, they can proclaim, as need demands, a higher loyalty to the Constitution and this notion provides a narrow plank in any argument between duty to the civil authority in the person of the president and a duty to the people. Officers are answerable to Congress, and this duty also provides opportunities and hazards for officers who might wish to present their opinions in public.

A system that invites the military into what is essentially a political forum and debate also encourages military officers to press their special interests and to exploit political divisions in Congress. According to Richard Kohn, "it is critically important to civilian control that the parliament exercise these powers [to examine mili-

tary opinion] independently of the executive . . . [so that] the legislature can get the military expertise it needs in order to exercise intelligent oversight."⁸⁵ While most ministers in Ottawa would recoil from Kohn's suggestion (except, of course, when they are out of power) most representatives and senators in Washington would think his observation unremarkable.

Some could argue that divide and rule is (somewhat) the essence of the "Powell Doctrine." Moreover, they might point out that this was the approach taken by military officers in formulating the Gulf War campaign and when they challenged Clinton's early defense policies. Gibson and Snider even contend that "over the past three decades the decline in civilian expertise has coincided with a marked increase in expertise and experience of the uniformed officers," which may have resulted in a "shift in balance" in civil-military relations that favors military officers over the civil authority in political-military affairs.⁸⁶

Officers engaged in policy debates, whether in government forums or before public audiences, face certain risks. They may alienate important segments of the population, as General MacArthur did in his challenge to President Truman, and as General Powell may have done when expressing his personal policy views in public. Even appearances before Congress can trap officers between their duties to the executive and the legislature. Military witnesses testifying on military issues at the demand of congressional committees, for instance, may offend members of the committee, members of the administration, or both, and the offense may provoke sanctions against the institutions and individuals.

Although the contest between the demands of the armed forces to shape their own culture and the requirements of society that the armed forces be "representative" are serious, it is not a crisis in civil-military relations. Rather, the armed forces and society are negotiating and finding a new set of norms and rules to support them. Generally, the military culture is joined to society because the majority of its members hold to society's attitudes, not military attitudes, because they are recruited via the compulsory draft, for instance. Or society regulates the military culture by stipulating how it will behave in certain circumstances and situations. Typically, civil-military relations are peaceful when norms and rules are compatible or at least stable and predictable, but tumultuous when they are not.

The American armed forces, like the Canadian Forces, are in a period of normative and regulatory change. The present administration, and possibly the majority of Americans, think that the armed forces should adjust itself to society's views on gender equality, the fact of homosexuality, and the privacy of persons, among other things. When these changes can be accommodated through the evolution of military norms, as may be happening (too slowly perhaps) in the case of women in combat, the regulators may place a light hand on the reins. When, however, this approach fails, as in President Clinton's early attempts to bring civil rules governing homosexuals into the armed forces, then the civil authority may need to be specific. The intensity of the civil-military conflict that will result from either of these approaches is usually centered on normative values and not on the precise wording of instrumental rules, laws, and regulations. The conflict over homosexuals, for example, was settled (for the moment) by a compromise that recognized the fact of homosexuality in the armed forces without the imposition of an explicit civil law to protect their rights. The new norm (and rule) is "don't ask, don't tell."

Civil-military relations in the United States are in the midst of a periodic regime change brought on by the end of the Cold War, "a new world order," fluctuating domestic values and priorities, and the realignment of political forces in the nation. In some respects what is happening today resembles the situation in 1940-41 as the United States prepared for war and in 1947-50 as the United States and the world entered the Cold War. In both those periods the United States changed its relationship with its armed forces. In some respects the present "crisis" is occasioned by the re-establishment of a pre-World War II regime on the current civil-military relation— an incremental return to a less involved and knowledgeable political elite and a smaller professional armed force, withdrawn from society, underfunded, and over-tasked.

IX. CONCLUSION: WHERE CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS MATTER

Civil-military relations in Canada and the United States are founded on the right of the people to decide how much defense is enough; and to hold politicians, officers, and officials to account for their actions and decisions. Civil-military relations in Canada are truly about relationships between the civil authority, the govern-

ment of the day, and the leaders of the armed forces. There are no other players and no other game. It is a system derived from Canada's British past, parliamentary norms, and a general sense within society that national defense is not now, if it ever was, a central concern of government for Canadians.

The central problem of civil-military relations in Canada comes from the political indifference to the detailed implementation of policy and the soldier's habit of constructing procedures and plans as though that indifference was license to shape defense outcomes and the Canadian Forces to the self-defined needs and interests of officers. Crises occur whenever governments suddenly take an interest and find themselves committed to plans or policies that they have never properly considered. Officers, however, see a continuing crisis resulting from political neglect of a vital national policy and a necessary institution. It is not trite to say that the chief characteristic of civil-military relations in Canada is silence, interrupted by periodic surprise and discord.

In the United States, by contrast, civil-military relations are built on nicely interlaced relationships at political, military, and social levels. There are many players involved in many games. This system provides opportunities for (and may require) officers to enter the politics of defense policy, and offers possibilities for politicians to use military leaders to bolster their own interests. Civil-military relations in the United States is a central national affair because national defense policy and the quality and activities of the armed forces cannot be separated from the central purpose and business of government. It is not surprising, therefore, that this vital activity should be characterized by intense debate and, occasionally, by loud complaint and periodic breakdown. The noise of the machinery should not be confused with any failure of design, but rather, considered evidence that the machinery of American civil-military relations is operating according to the wishes of its founders and extant guardians.

Civil-military relations in Canada and the United States share many common attributes because they are grounded in the same fundamental principles of government. Both regimes were developed from and are sustained by the notion that the citizen will decide what is to be done in respect of national defense and every other national policy. Civil-military relations in these states describe and represent how military leaders are accountable to the civil authority

for their actions and decisions, and how the civil authority is accountable to citizens for its control of military leaders and the effectiveness of national defense.

The two national regimes are different mainly in the degree of control that is available to the civil authority, the government of the day. In Canada the government, and especially the prime minister, has in custom and law near perfect and total control over all aspects of the armed forces and defense policy. In the United States, the administration and the president enjoy a much less perfect system, but political control as exercised by the president and Congress is no less effective.

Laws built on an agreed regime of principles, norms, and rules provide the main instruments for controlling civil-military relations in liberal democracies. Together with other national laws, such regimes have largely solved three of the cardinal civil-military problems facing societies and the military; that is, how to prevent military interference in government, how to maintain good order and discipline in armed units, and how to keep partisan politics out of the armed forces. The idea and practice that gave effect to these laws and the regime as a whole is shared responsibility, a concept that demands military officers provide an essential element in the maintenance of civil control of the armed forces in democratic states. In other words, military officers are not only the "managers of violence," but they are also a partner with the civil authority. Together they manage important aspects of civil-military relations.

Ministers, therefore, are inescapably bound to their experts as advisers, commanders, and partners in the civil control of the armed forces. While laws and regulations may provide the base for the control of the first three problems of civil-military relations, the law alone cannot ensure the citizen's "right to know that the authorities, responsibilities, and duties . . . especially of leaders, are performed effectively and efficiently, and within the law."⁸⁷ Finely honed regimes are not enough because they are not self-enforcing.

In the end, civil control of the military in democracies demands that politicians actively direct and guide the defense policy process and the armed forces toward socially acceptable ends. This political activity must be linked to an open, trusted, public mechanism meant to hold both officers and politicians to account for their actions and decisions. How is the military controlled in democracies? Control comes from responsible politicians and officers working within a

regime "in which actors' expectations converge," aimed at keeping both officers and politicians at arm's length from unimpeded control of the sword.

Finally, it is no insult to say that while the Canadian regime of civil-military relations may be most direct, its efficiency hardly matters beyond domestic politics. In contrast, the American regime for controlling civil-military relations may be indirect, but its effectiveness and efficiency matters a great deal to the United States, to Canada, and to the entire international community.

NOTES

¹ Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (New York: Vintage Books, 1957).

² Paul Schartz, "On Military Advice and Dissent," *Strategic Review*, (Winter 1981): 45.

³ Douglas L. Bland, "A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations," *Armed Forces and Society*, 26, 1 (Fall 1999) 7-26.

⁴ Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, p. vii

⁵ See, for example, Russell Weigley, "The American Military and the Principle of Civilian Control from McClellan to Powell," *The Journal of Military History*, 57, 5 (October 1993): 27- 58; Donald Snider and Miranda Carlton-Carew (eds.), *U.S. Civil-Military Relations: In Crisis or Transition?* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies 1995); Rebecca Schiff, "Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance," *Armed Forces and Society*, 22, 1 (Fall 1995); Peter Feaver, "The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control," *Armed Forces and Society*, 23, 2 (Winter 1996) Andrew J. Bacevich, "Tradition Abandoned: America's Military in a New Era," *National Interest*, 48 (Summer 1997): 16-25.

⁶ Bacevich, "Tradition Abandoned," p. 17.

⁷ These more recent criticisms echo those made in 1962 by S.E. Finer. See Samuel E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1962) pp. 23- 60.

⁸ Feaver, "The Civil-Military Problematique", p.157.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 158.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 163.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 165-166.

¹² Schiff, "Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered", pp. 7-24

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ Sir John Hackett, *The Profession of Arms* (London: Times Publishing Co., 1962), pp. 36-37, 52; Jay Luvaas, *The Education of an Army: British Military Thought 1815-1940* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964); Correlli Barnett, *Britain and Her Army 1509-1970: A Military, Political, and Social Survey*, (London: Penguin Press, 1970); and Ian Beckett, *The Amateur Military Tradition 1558-1945* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991).

¹⁸ Feaver, "The Civil-Military Problematic," 168.

¹⁹ Samuel Huntington, "Reforming Civil-Military Relations," in Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner (eds.), *Civil-Military Relations and Democracy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), p. 7.

²⁰ Michael Desch, "Threat Environment and Military Missions," in Diamond and Plattner, *Civil-Military Relations and Democracy*, pp. 12-29.

²¹ Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner, "Introduction," in Diamond and Plattner, *Civil-Military Relations And Democracy*, p. xxix; Jeffrey Simon, *NATO Enlargement and Central Europe: A Study in Civil-Military Relations* (National Defense University press, 1996).

²² Diamond and Plattner, "Introduction," in Diamond and Plattner, *Civil-Military Relations And Democracy*, p. xxviii; Jakkie Cilliers, "Security and Transition in South Africa," in Diamond and Plattner, *Civil-Military Relations and Democracy*, pp. 81-95; Simon, *NATO Enlargement and Central Europe*.

²³ Henry Eccles, *Military Concepts and Philosophy* (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1965), p. 175.

²⁴ Sir Michael Howard, *Soldiers and Governments: Nine Studies In Civil-Military Relations* (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1957), p. 22.

²⁵ Peter Feaver, *Guarding the Guardians: Civilian Control of Nuclear Weapons in the United States* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), p. 253.

²⁶ Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (New York: The Free Press, 1960), p. 420.

²⁷ Richard Betts, *Soldiers, Statesmen and Cold War Crises* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), pp. 7-8.

²⁸ The theoretical framework for this discussion is taken mainly from Stephen Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables," in Stephen Krasner (ed.), *International Regimes*. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983).

²⁹ Samuel Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), p. 231.

³⁰ For a comprehensive survey of the many problems of civil-military relations, see *Soldiers and Governments*, pp. 11-24.

³¹ Edmund Burke, *Collected Works 1823*, Volume V, p. 16 as quoted in Howard, *Soldiers and Governments*, pp. 11-12.

³² Hackett, *The Profession of Arms*, p. 21.

³³ Howard, *Soldiers and Governments*, p. 12.

³⁴ Douglas Bland, "Protecting the Military from Civilian Control: A Neglected Dimension of Civil-Military Relations," in Ernest Gilman and Detlef Herold (eds.), *Democratic and Civil Control Over Military Forces: Case Studies and Perspectives*, (Rome: NATO Defense College, 1995), pp. 107-125.

³⁵ Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, p. 20.

³⁶ John Terraine, *The Western Front, 1914-1918* (London: Hutchinson, 1964), p. 74.

³⁷ R.N. Ginsburg, "The Challenge of Military Professionalism," *Foreign Affairs*, 42 (January 1964): 255.

³⁸ See, for example, Ole Holsti, *A Widening Gap Between The Military*

And Civilian Society? Some Evidence, Working Paper 13, (Harvard: Olin Institute, Project On U.S. Post-Cold War civil-Military Relations) and Triangle Institute

³⁹ Donna Winslow, University of Ottawa, unpublished address to the National Defense Security and Defense Forum, Ottawa, April 1999.

⁴⁰ A survey of Canadian military history should include, among others, James Boutelier, (ed.), *The RCN in Retrospect* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1982); Andrew Brewin, *Stand on Guard: The Search for a Defense Policy* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1965); W.A.B. Douglas, *The Creation of a National Air Force: The Official History of the RCAF* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986); James Eayrs, *In Defense of Canada*, 4 vols. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972); John English, *The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign: A Study of Failure in High Command* (New York: Praeger, 1991); J.L. Granatstein, *Canada 1957-1967: The Years of Uncertainty and Innovation* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1986) and "The American Influence on the Canadian Military, 1939-1963," in *Dictionary of Canadian Military History* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1992); J.L. Granatstein and D. Morton, *A Nation Forged in Fire: Canadians and the Second World War, 1939-1945* (Toronto: Lester & Orpen Dennys, 1989); and Desmond Morton, *Canada and War: A Military and Political History* (Toronto: Butterworth and Co., 1981).

⁴¹ Hackett, *The Profession of Arms*, p. 3.

⁴² Richard Gabriel, *To Serve With Honor: A Treatise on Military Ethics and the Way of the Soldier* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982), p. 86.

⁴³ James Eayrs, *In Defense of Canada: Growing Up Allied* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972).

⁴⁴ See Douglas L. Bland, *Chiefs of Defense: Government and the Unified Command of the Canadian Armed Forces* (Toronto: CISS, 1995), pp. 214-23; and Douglas L. Bland and John Young, "Trends in Canadian Security Policy and Commitments," *Armed Forces and Society* 15,1 (Fall 1988), pp. 24-30.

⁴⁵ J.V. Brock, *Memoirs of a Sailor: The Thunder and the Sunshine*, Vol. II (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1983), pp. 107-08.

⁴⁶ On the RCN and the Cuban missile crisis, see Peter Haydon, *The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis: Canadian Involvement Reconsidered* (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1993).

⁴⁷ Robert Sutherland, "The Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Defense Policy," Ottawa, September 1963, as quoted in Bland, *Chiefs of Defense*, p. 226.

⁴⁸ Joseph Jockel, *No Boundaries Upstairs: Canada, the United States and the Origins of North American Air Defense, 1945-1958* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1987).

⁴⁹ See Bland, *Chiefs of Defense*, pp. 175-260.

⁵⁰ Paul Hellyer, *Damn the Torpedoes: My Fight to Unify Canada's Armed Forces* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1990), pp. 32-39.

⁵¹ As quoted in Trevor Royle, *The Kitchener Enigma* (London: Michael Joseph Ltd., 1985), p. 327.

⁵² See, for example, Richard Kohn, "Out of Control: The Crisis In Civil-Military Relations," *National Interest*, 35 (Spring 1994): 3-17. John Lehman, "An Exchange On Civil-Military Relations," *National Interest*, 36, (Summer 1994): 23-25; Colin Powell, et al, "Exchange On Civil-Military Relations," *National Interest* 36, (Summer 1994): 23-31; and Michael Desch, Soldiers, States, And Structures: The End of The Cold War And Weakening U.S. Civilian Control", *Armed Forces & Society* 24 (Spring 1998).

⁵³ As quoted in Desch, "Soldiers, States, And Structures", 398.

⁵⁴ Bland, "Parliament, Defense Policy, and The Canadian Armed Forces", Survey data, Question 19.

⁵⁵ As quoted in George Stanley, *Canada's Soldiers: The Military History of an Unmilitary People* (Toronto: Macmillan Company, 1960), p. 294.

⁵⁶ James Eayrs, *In Defense of Canada: Appeasement and Rearmament* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1967), p. 183.

⁵⁷ Nils Ørvik, "Canadian Security and 'Defense Against Help,'"

International Perspectives, (May/June 1983), p. 3. Professor Ørvik, of course, was arguing for an appropriate defense budget to forestall any American response to defend themselves in Canada because Canadians could not or would not do the job. Others have treated the United States as though it were a threat much like the Soviet Union.

⁵⁸ J.L. Granatstein and Robert Bothwell, *Pirouette: Pierre Trudeau and Canadian Foreign Policy*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990) p.234

⁵⁹ See, for example, Lloyd Axworthy, "Canada and Human Security: The Need For Leadership," *International Journal*, 52 (Spring 1997).

⁶⁰ Canada, Department of National Defense, *Shaping The Future of Canadian Defense: A Strategy for 2020*, (Ottawa: June 1999) p. 6.

⁶¹ The author is grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this observation.

⁶² Eayrs, *In Defense of Canada: Growing Up Allied*, pp. 128-53.

⁶³ Canada, National Archives, Brooke Claxton, *Memoirs*, Vol. 221 (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada), p. 21.

⁶⁴ Eayrs, *In Defense of Canada: Growing Up Allied*, p. 132.

⁶⁵ See Finer, *The Man on Horseback*, p. 5.

⁶⁶ As quoted in Kenneth Campbell, "Once Burned Twice Cautious: Explaining The Weinberger-Powell Doctrine," *Armed Forces & Society*, 24,3 (Spring 1998): 364.

⁶⁷ Schratz, "On Military Advice and Dissent," p. 45, emphasis in the original.

⁶⁸ Richard Kohn, "How Democracies Control the Military," *Journal of Democracy*, 8, 4, (1997): 147.

⁶⁹ Eayrs, *In Defense of Canada: Appeasement And Rearmament*, p. 227.

⁷⁰ Bland, *Chiefs of Defense*, pp. 211-231 and 252-261.

⁷¹ For a recent review of this attitude see, Douglas Bland, "Parliament, Defense Policy, And The Canadian Armed Forces", *The Claxton*

Papers 1, School of Policy Studies, Queen's University at Kingston, Canada, 1999.

⁷² General Gerry Theriault, "Democratic Civil-Military Relations: A Canadian View," in *The Military In Modern Democratic Society*, (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, November, 1996), p.10.

⁷³ *Ibid.*

⁷⁴ Canada, National Archives, *Claxton Memoirs*, Vol 221, p.31.

⁷⁵ Canada, *Dishonoured Legacy: The Lessons of the Somalia Affair*, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of the Canadian Forces to Somalia, Volume 2 (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works, 1997)

⁷⁶ Hitchens and Jacobs, "United Kingdom," p. 408.

⁷⁷ See, Bland, "Parliament, Defense Policy, And the Canadian Armed Forces."

⁷⁸ Sir Winston Churchill, Speech, 11 November 1942, House of Commons.

⁷⁹ For recent examples of this inter-play see, "Military: Demands Hurt Readiness," *Associated Press*, 24 February 1998; "Defense Budget Boost Comes With Uncertain Consequences," *Washington Post*, 14 January 1999, p. A12; and "Military: Budget Will Meet Top Needs," *Washington Post*, 6 January 1999, p. A23.

⁸⁰ See, for example, Richard Kohn, "Out of Control" pp. 3-17; and Colin Powell *et al.*, "Exchange on Civil-Military Relations," *The National Interest*, 36 (Summer 1994): 23-31.

⁸¹ Betts, *Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises*, p. 5.

⁸² See Campbell, "Once Burned, Twice Cautious" 367.

⁸³ Deborah Avant, "Conflicting Indicators of 'Crisis' In American Civil-Military Relations," *Armed Forces and Society*, 24, 3 (Spring 1998): 375-88.

⁸⁴ Tom Philpott, "Full Speed Ahead," *Washingtonian*, July 1999, p. 96.

⁸⁵ Kohn, "How Democracies Control the Military," p. 150.

⁸⁶ Christopher Gibson and Don Snider, "Civil-Military Relations And The Potential To Influence: A Look At The National Security Decision-Making Process," *Armed Forces & Society*, 25,2 (Winter 1999), p.211.

⁸⁷ Canada, *Dishonoured Legacy: The Lessons of the Somalia Affair*, Volume 2, p. 389.

CANADIAN-AMERICAN PUBLIC POLICY

Occasional papers on a wide range of issues in U.S.-Canadian relations

CAPP 1: April 1990 — **Canada-U.S. Relations in the Bush Era**
Joseph T. Jockel

CAPP 2: July 1990 — **Transboundary Air-Quality Relations: The Canada-United States Experience**
John E. Carroll

CAPP 3: October 1990 — **Canadian Culture, the Canadian State, and the New Continentalism**
Allan Smith

CAPP 4: December 1990 — **Forests, Timber, and Trade: Emerging Canadian and U.S. Relations under the Free Trade Agreement**
Thomas R. Waggener

CAPP 5: March 1991 — **Change and Continuity in Canada-U.S. Economic Relations**
William Diebold

* CAPP 6: June 1991 — **Trade Liberalization and the Political Economy of Culture: An International Perspective on FTA**
Graham Carr

CAPP 7: September 1991 — **If Canada Breaks Up: Implications for U.S. Policy**
Joseph T. Jockel

* CAPP 8: December 1991 — **Ogdensburg Plus Fifty and Still Counting: Canada-U.S. Defense Relations in the Post-Cold War Era**
Joel J. Sokolsky

* CAPP 9: March 1992 — **The Regulation of U.S.-Canada Air Transportation: Past, Present and Future**
Martin Dresner

* CAPP 10: June 1992 — **Emerging Issues in the U.S.-Canada Agricultural Trade Under the GATT and FTA**
Theodore H. Cohn

- CAPP 11: September 1992 — **Settling U.S. - Canada Disputes: Lessons For NAFTA**
Annette Baker Fox
- CAPP 12: December 1992 — **Canada-U.S. Electricity Trade and Environmental Politics**
William Averyt
- CAPP 13: June 1993 — **Canadian Politics in a Global Economy**
Gordon T. Stewart
- CAPP 14: September 1993—**The Intersection of Domestic and Foreign Policy in the NAFTA Agricultural Negotiations**
Theodore H. Cohn
- CAPP 15: November 1993—**A New Global Partnership: Canada-U.S. Relations in the Clinton Era**
John Kirton
- CAPP 16: December 1993 — **The Impact of Free Trade on Canadian- American Border Cities**
Peter Karl Kresl
- CAPP 17: April 1994 — **North American Social Democracy in the 1990s: The NDP in Ontario**
Mildred A. Schwartz
- CAPP 18: August 1994 — **The Politics of Health Care Reform in Canada and the United States**
Antonia Maioni
- CAPP 19: October 1994 — **Public Policy and NAFTA: The Role of Organized Business Interests and the Labor Movement**
Henry J. Jacek
- CAPP 20: December 1994-- **The Secret of Transforming Art Into Gold: Intellectual Property Issues In Canada-U.S. Relations**
Myra J. Tawfik
- CAPP 21: January 1995--**Anticipating The Impact of NAFTA on Health And Health Policy**
Pauline V. Rosenau, Russell D. Jones, Julie Reagan Watson and Carl Hacker

- CAPP 22: June 1995--**Regulation, Industry Structure, and the North Atlantic Fishing Industry**
Peter B. Doeringer, David G. Terkla and Audrey Watson
- * CAPP 23: November 1995--**The Moral Economy of Health and Aging in Canada and the United States**
Phillip G. Clark
- CAPP 24: December 1995--**Multilateralism or Bilateralism in the Negotiation of Trade-Related Investment Measures?**
Elizabeth Smythe
- CAPP 25: February 1996--**The Abortion Controversy in Canada and the United States**
Raymond Tatalovich
- CAPP 26: May 1996—**Health Care Reform or Health Care Rationing? A Comparative Study**
Joan Price Boase
- CAPP 27: September 1996—**Resolving The North American Subsidies War**
Peter Morici
- * CAPP 28: December 1996—**Calling Maggie's Bluff: The NAFTA Labor Agreement and the Development of an Alternative to Neoliberalism**
Stephen Herzenberg
- * CAPP 29: April 1997—**The Long Journey to Free Trade in U.S.-Canada Airline Services**
Michael W. Pustay
- CAPP 30: July 1997—**Are Canadian and U.S. Social Assistance Policies Converging?**
Gerard Boychuk
- CAPP 31: November 1997—**Observing the Rules: Canada-U.S. Trade and Environmental Relations**
Annette Baker Fox
- CAPP 32: December 1997—**Flights of the Phoenix: Explaining The Durability of the Canada-U.S. Softwood Lumber Dispute**
Benjamin Cashore

* Out of print

- CAPP 33: February 1998—**Transboundary Fishery Resources and the Canada-United States Pacific Salmon Treaty**
Gordon Munro, Ted McDorman and Robert McKelvey
- CAPP 34: April 1998—**Franchising the Candy Store: Split-Run Magazines and a New International Regime for Trade in Culture**
Ted Magder
- CAPP 35: September 1998—**Fearful Asymmetries: The Challenge of Analyzing Continental Systems in a Globalizing World**
Stephen Clarkson
- CAPP 36: November 1998—**A Not So Magnificent Obsession: The United States, Cuba, and Canada from Revolution to the Helms-Burton Law**
Stephen J. Randall
- CAPP 37: February 1999—**Scientists and Environmental Policy: A Canadian-U.S. Perspective**
Leslie R. Alm
- CAPP 38: March 1999—**The Mouse That Roared? Lesson Drawing on Tobacco Regulation Across the Canada-United States Border**
Donley T. Studlar
- CAPP 39: July 1999—**Unwarranted Hopes and Unfulfilled Expectations: Canadian Media Policy and the CBC**
Joel Smith
- CAPP 40: October 1999—**Cross-Border Travel in North America: The Challenge of U.S. Section 110 Legislation**
Theodore H. Cohn
- CAPP 41: February 2000—**Who Decides What? Civil-Military Relations in Canada and the United States**
Douglas L. Bland

CONTENTS

I.	THE WEAK THEORETICAL BASE	4
II.	THE FOUR PROBLEMS OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS	10
III.	THIS BAND OF INTERNATIONAL BROTHERS (AND SISTERS)	13
IV.	THE ARMED FORCES IN THE UNITED STATES ..	19
V.	TWO DISTINCT POLITICAL SOCIETIES	23
VI.	THE AMERICAN POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK	30
VII.	CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS PROBLEMS IN CANADA	33
VIII.	CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS PROBLEMS IN AMERICA	44
IX.	CONCLUSION: WHERE CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS MATTER	49
	NOTES	53