

THE COMPARATIVE
POLITICS OF
MILITARY BASE
CLOSURES

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I. INTRODUCTION

In democracies, domestic military base closures are seldom easy decisions for governments to make or implement. "There is a profound difference between extending benefits to large numbers of people and taking benefits away," political scientist Paul Pierson has explained. "The politics of retrenchment is typically treacherous, because it imposes tangible losses on concentrated groups of voters in return for diffuse and uncertain gains."¹ It has always been more politically saleable for representative governments to distribute goods rather than to "de-distribute" them.² Domestic military bases in the United States and in Canada are prime examples of both sides of this coin.

During the last quarter of the twentieth century, both the United States and Canada have faced a number of expected difficulties in their respective efforts to consolidate and modernize their domestic basing

*A list of acronyms used in this article is provided on page 52.

situations. Although the militaries in both countries want elected representatives to consent to the closure of surplus military bases, significant roadblocks have surfaced.

The number of bases in the United States dwarfs the relatively smaller number in Canada. While the U.S. had 312 major bases in 1988, Canada had just 35 in the same year, or roughly a 10:1 ratio. Still, the relatively large size of extraneous infrastructure costs represented a significant portion of military expenditures in both nations. Furthermore, any base closing will obviously affect the surrounding community, area or region. In political terms, then, the issue has been salient both above and below the forty-ninth parallel despite the obviously disparity in the size of the U.S. and Canadian military establishments.

The two political regimes both faced similar problems at approximately the same time, and both managed to reduce the domestic basing structure, but not without overcoming various hurdles. Some of these obstacles were indigenous to the particular form of representative democracy established within each country, and thus there are some differences in how the decisions were actually made and carried out. But there were also areas of similarity between the countries in the decision-making processes. This study investigates the problems that each country faced in deciding which domestic military bases would be closed, how the decisions were reached, and how they were implemented.

While the similarities between the two countries in terms of base-closing problems and ultimate solutions will be evident, most

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striking are the different processes adopted by the U.S. and Canada to close military bases since the end of the Cold War. The authors maintain that they are reflective of quite different institutional realities shaping a government's capacity to impose losses.

This study not only provides insight into the specific issue of military base closures, but it also addresses the institutional differences between the two countries and the ramifications for governments trying to impose geographically concentrated losses. Furthermore, although base closures have solicited some academic and legal attention in the United States, there has been little written about the politics of the decision-making process in this particular de-distributive category. Most of what has been written in the U.S. can be found in law review journals, the only arena where academic debate has appeared thus far. While Canadian policymakers have noticed developments south of the border, their capacity to chart a distinct course of action reveals the greater possibilities for loss imposition on this issue in Canada than in the U.S.

Both countries have intimated that more base closures are on the horizon. This politically contentious issue will again be the subject of discussion, and the options available to the two nations will again be shaped by institutional realities. Some of those are already predictable because of the most recent successes in this decision-making area. But since the timing and the political dispositions in both countries are somewhat different now than they were ten or fifteen years ago, new or unexpected items may exert an impact on the process as it evolves. This study will outline the context in which decisions were made and the political roadblocks that held up some of those decisions.

II. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

There are two theoretical areas to be addressed before going into the specific case studies of base closures in the United States and Canada before and after the end of the Cold War. The first is "de-distributive policymaking," what it is and why it is significant in this context and in regard to long-term concerns for representative governments. The second theoretical consideration is the "new institutionalism," an arena that follows from, in some part, the ramifications of de-distributive decision-making and policy-making.

Distributive and De-distributive Politics. "De-distributive" is the opposite of what most members of Congress and the House of

Commons like to do for their districts/ridings or states/provinces, which is to allocate and *distribute* federal dollars and jobs to constituents and regions.³ Instead of allocating or distributing federal dollars, closing or realigning domestic military bases removes federal funds and jobs from states/provinces and communities. Selecting domestic bases for closure and then implementing those closures are classic examples of de-distributive decision-making and implementation. Most members of Congress and Parliament see this as an unfortunate infliction of pain on their constituents and, as such, seek to avoid it if at all possible.

The essence of a de-distributive decision is that it will, in some form, impose a loss on a community, an area, a region, a particular constituency, or over an entire country. Elected officials have a tendency to shy away from decisions that impose loss since they fear the potential electoral repercussions. The simple task of closing a military base is de-distributive because it will lead to job loss and at least some economic hardship for the affected community. This is *not* the kind of policy that Congress or Parliament like to take when there are other factors at play, such as highly partisan atmospheres, unsteady or recessionary economies, highly critical media, and unrelenting interest group pressures. (Some of these factors are more present in one system than in the other and thus come to bear with either more or less strength when analyzed within each system.) Yet both the American and the Canadian governments learned that they had to arrive at some conclusions as regards domestic base closures, particularly in light of the changing international situation as a result of the end of the Cold War. Both governments finally came to some decisions, via different paths, as to how best to impose these geographically concentrated losses. We situate this particular study of U.S.-Canadian base closures under the umbrella of comparative loss imposition, since “de-distribution” is the character of the decisions that elected members must make and the imposition of loss is what results from such de-distributive decision-making.

Loss Imposition in a Comparative Context. Public policy scholars Kent Weaver and Leslie Pal have recently developed a framework for a neo-institutionalist, comparative assessment of “loss imposition” in the United States and Canada. Their framework for analysis is based upon two broad sets of factors that will affect a government’s capacity to impose losses: institutional structure (separation-of-powers and parliamentary systems), and the type of loss (for example,

symbolic versus material, or geographically-concentrated versus geographically-dispersed). Theory suggests that the greater concentration of power in parliamentary regimes like Canada facilitates loss imposition, especially when there is a majority rather than minority government, but this is partially offset by more concentrated accountability. The checks-and-balances system, by contrast, is subject to a greater fragmentation of power and multiple veto points, making it easier for U.S. interest groups to oppose losses, and is “prone to deadlock in times of crisis.”⁴

Weaver and Pal also reveal how other political and institutional factors can affect policy-making behavior. First, governments are less likely to “impose pain” the closer they are to the next election. Second, politicians seek to avoid blame for losses they impose through “insulation” or delegation of responsibility to others. Evasion can also take the form of “stealth style” policymaking such as technical budgetary measures. Third, policymakers must be able to successfully implement termination, best achieved through surprise, compensation, and the minimizing of delays. In situations where losses are imposed, politicians try both to manage the impact of the loss and to protect themselves from blame. Management can include either dispersion of the loss over time or over a wide segment of the population and/or country. Of course, the capacity of affected interests to organize opposition will also have a major impact on outcomes. In a parliamentary system, interests that might oppose a policy “can be denied early access ... [a]nd if the government in a parliamentary system is willing to bear the political costs of imposing losses, and is able to reach internal agreement, there is little to stop them from doing so — except in a situation of minority or coalition government.” Loss can thus be imposed quickly, given a majority government’s substantial control over the legislative agenda in a parliamentary system. If the opposition is fractured into several parties, the process of imposing losses is made even easier since there is no concerted effort to oppose the majority government’s will.⁵ In the U.S., there has been a need to create mechanisms that essentially move the decision-making process out of the hands of interested parties that might oppose such policy.

With the advent of sunshine laws, there has been a greater tendency over the years to use a “stealth” mechanism when the decisions being made are de-distributive in character. Because of sunshine legislation, members of Congress have had to make de-

distributive decisions in the “glaring light of day,” that is, with open sessions and hearings, recorded votes, and many “watchdog” groups to report on who voted which way on what issues. This situation abrogates the need for (or possibility of) secrecy which often had been present in congressional workings. Secrecy—or at least working behind closed doors—allows politicians to compromise when they may not wholly agree with the tactic, or when they think that their constituents may not agree with it, since the members can then avoid publicly taking an unacceptable stand.

The last twenty years have started to show some of the drawbacks with regard to the more open, and thus apparently more direct, democracy that sunshine legislation produced. When there is a confluence of de-distributive policy questions, open hearings and mark ups, along with high partisanship, it results in individuals not wanting to take responsibility for their decisions and votes. The individual politician has nowhere to hide, as it were. The statesmanship of taking responsibility for “hard decisions” that may have existed in the past seems to be lost in the “sunshine.” This situation has set up a process of or proclivity for “evasive delegation,” where elected representatives “farm off” an entire policy-making apparatus onto a more or less “unaccountable” structure, commission, committee, or even timeline.⁶ In so doing, members of Congress have removed any opportunity for recourse on their own individual parts and instead have engineered the final vote so that it is made on the entire package, thus guaranteeing passage. This contrasts with the Canadian parliamentary system where success tends to come when the majority government is willing to bear the responsibility for making de-distributive decisions.

New Institutionalism. As we have already implied, institutional frameworks have an impact on the way in which government works and how effectively it works. In their collected work, *Do Institutions Matter?*, Kent Weaver and Bert Rockman frame the issue of policymaking capabilities and governmental effectiveness with an outline of ten specific qualities that all governments require, including:

- the ability to set and maintain priorities;
- to target resources;
- to innovate when old policies have failed;
- to coordinate conflicting objectives;
- to represent diffuse interests;

- to ensure effective policy implementation once decisions are reached;
- to ensure policy stability;
- to be able to impose losses on powerful groups.

Differences in the distribution of power in parliamentary and presidential systems are rooted in basic institutional arrangements, but policymaking is also inherently situational. For example, government perspectives are not uniform across national boundaries and are thus imperfect points of comparison, nor are internal domestic situations static (for example, those involving a minority or divided government influence capacities for effecting change).⁷ Nevertheless, the study reveals that a comparative approach is useful in assessing governmental capabilities and in determining institutional realities that impinge on policymaking, particularly de-distributive policymaking.

Weaver and Rockman provide a series of broad theoretical assumptions for cross-national assessment of governmental institutions and policymaking and implementation. Strong party discipline in parliamentary systems leads to greater cohesion and control and leaves less room for members of the legislature to build a "personal vote" on issues affecting their riding or region. In parliamentary systems, legislative power is centralized in a cabinet protected by party discipline; although this concentration of power "can turn the legislature into a rubber stamp for executive actions," it also centralizes accountability in the government party or parties and their leaders. In the United States, there is a greater capacity for "buck-passing." Policy-making capabilities are also affected by:

- the degree to which a government (or coalition) has a common set of policy and political interests (i.e., "cohesion");
- the existence of effective veto points (the more veto points in a system, the more difficult it is to change policies, and parliamentary systems tend to have fewer);
- the government's or politician's short-term autonomy from group pressures and electoral considerations;⁸
- interest group access to and influence on decision makers.

"Third tier" influences on government capabilities and policies include broad frameworks such as judicial review and federalism, each diffusing power and adding veto points, the level and nature of political opposition, and past policy choices.⁹

In theory, politicians in both the United States and Canada

can attempt to avoid blame for loss imposition by delegating power over politically ticklish decisions to autonomous bodies such as regulatory commissions. In practice, however, notions of collective cabinet responsibility in Westminster style systems have made such arrangements less common, or made them subject to cabinet override rather than appeal to the courts, as is more common in the United States. Once again, concentrated accountability may put Canadian governments at a disadvantage *vis-à-vis* the United States in imposing losses. Thus whether parliamentary or check-and-balance systems have a greater ability to impose losses presumably resolves into an empirical question: does the “concentration of power” effect outweigh the “concentration of accountability” effect, or *vice versa*?¹⁰ With this question in mind, we now turn to a comparison of U.S. and Canadian base closures in order to determine which form of government was better able to resolve this thorny policy issue.

Previous Studies on Base Closures. The Base Realignment and Closing Commission (BRAC) came into being in 1988 in the United States. The government used this mechanism to make difficult decisions regarding which domestic military bases should be closed or realigned. The commission will be explored in greater detail in the latter part of our case study. But in order to set the stage, it is necessary to examine the literature that surrounds the base closure decision-making process in both the United States and Canada.

While the base closure topic comes up as an example of parochialism within elected institutions, not much has been written about either the history of the process or the political realities affecting such decisions. Particularly in the wake of the most recent period of military contractions in the waning years of the Cold War and in the post-Cold War period, domestic military base closures have remained contentious and difficult decisions for elected representatives. They are ones that officials would rather not take credit for, and for which they might well try to avoid being blamed.

In the United States there have been two avenues of discussion surrounding and following the advent and implementation of the BRAC. They are a bit different from one another, and also somewhat different from what we are presenting here. The first, a more greatly anticipated aspect of the discussion, is the actual decision-making process and the commission that was formed to make those decisions. These studies include David Sorenson’s *Shutting Down the Cold War: The Politics of Military Base Closures*, as well as a number of

articles written by scholars of the American Congress, including Kenneth R. Mayer's "Closing Military Bases (Finally): Solving Collective Dilemmas Through Delegation,"¹¹ Christopher J. Deering's "Congress, the President, and Automatic Government: The Case of Military Base Closures,"¹² and Charlotte Twight's "Department of Defense Attempts to Close Military Bases: The Political Economy of Congressional Resistance,"¹³ among others.¹⁴ These scholars address the issue of making tough closure decisions within the context of electoral politics. While some treat the actual decisions that the military must make in evaluating the bases (specifically in Sorenson's book), the general emphasis focuses on what a prickly problem closing domestic bases tends to be.¹⁵ Consequently, their analyses have not sparked much controversy.

More interesting debate and dialogue can be found in law review journals. Some authors raise questions about the constitutionality of the BRAC; mainly concerning whether it violated the non-delegation doctrine of Congress as written in the Constitution, or if it breached the *INS v. Chadha* decision. They also bring into the discussion the entire question of legislative delegation and the possible long-range implications of such a decision-making process. Natalie Hanlon's "Military Base Closings: A Study of Government by Commission"¹⁶ is one of a number of articles that address some of these more legalistic and constitutionally-based questions and concerns.¹⁷

There is, to date, no published scholarly study of Canadian base closures. Yet the broader issues of civil-military relations and of defense management decisions have been brought to light by Douglas Bland. He has demonstrated that a relatively uninterested Canadian federal government, from 1969 to the mid-1980s, either reformulated defense policies without the input of the military or, conversely, "the defense establishment [became] accustomed to the idea that policy ought to be formulated in the ranks and delegated upwards to ministers for final arbitration." Politicians neglected the details of defense administration and "allowed policy to drift for long periods" between 1964 and 1994.¹⁸ Our assessment of base closures in Canada not only bolsters Bland's argument but also links it to broader institutional considerations that help to explain defense management decisions north of the 49th parallel.

Base Closure Assumptions. Drawing upon the theoretical literature, several broad characteristics of military base closures can be

identified. First, the “pain” from base closings tends to be highly concentrated geographically. In contrast to other contentious issues like gun control and pension reform where the effects are concentrated in an identifiable group but one that is quite geographically dispersed, military bases can be viewed as huge funnels of material benefits that can be specified spatially. The concentric ring of benefits emanates from a dense core in the town or city closest to the base outward to the region, state or province. Consequently, for the most part loss imposition through closure of a base is highly visible and has a clear and delimited range of impacts.¹⁹ Benefits of such closures, however, are as widely dispersed as those that accrue from gun control or pension retrenchment.²⁰ As a member of the Joint Cross Service Group on Economic Impact for the U.S. Base Realignment and Closing Commission remarked,

[base closure pain allocation] isn’t an atypical problem, the problem is politics in general. There is a concentrated, very small minority who stands to suffer greatly versus a very diffused majority who stands to gain a little bit.²¹

Moreover, unlike some cases of geographically concentrated losses such as the establishment of a repository for high-level nuclear wastes, where imposition of costs on one community is likely to lead to all other areas being spared, it is hard to generalize about the precedent-setting effects of military base closures.

There are some generalizations, however, that can be made in regard to the urban versus rural area recovery from closures; more often, urban centers that lose bases tend to recover much more quickly and successfully than rural areas.²² Closing some bases may lead to other bases being spared or even expanded, but have the opposite effect: proponents of retrenchment, emboldened by success in one round, may demand even more closings.

In contrast to symbolically driven issues such as gun control,²³ the losses imposed by closing military bases are primarily material in nature and include jobs, both civilian and military, the withdrawal of the economic stimulus to a city and region, and extra tax revenue generated for state and provincial economies. Naturally, “ways of life” are sometimes invoked to resist a closure,²⁴ but for the most part the arguments are nakedly material. Of course, the level of opposition to a base closure also tends to reflect or mimic the size of the facility and the impact that such a closure will have on the wider community. Again, in the United States, the closure of a large facility

like the Charleston (SC) naval shipyard, which was one of the first enterprises undertaken in that city after it had been colonized by Europeans, will have a much more intense and concentrated effect on the immediate and surrounding areas than a smaller facility. Over the years the Charleston shipyard has acquired a number of ancillary bases and installations that support the facility. Likewise, small maritime communities in Canada became highly dependent on bases for employment and income. Therefore, the closure of major or minor military installations in the region would have highly visible impacts on rural areas already suffering from weak economies and bleak economic prospects.²⁵

All of these considerations would lead us to expect that base closings are very difficult for governments to impose and relatively easy for potential losers, over time, to find the most effective means to resist. In institutional terms, there is an additional reason for this difficulty and this advantage. Since bases are located in a specific area, their loss can be clearly identified with a political representative. Because Congressional and Westminster-style parliamentary systems organize political representation among spatial lines, any type of loss imposition that has a clearly spatial delineation will be politically sensitive. Reinforcing this is the problem of regional rivalries. Virtually every country is divided along regional lines in some fashion, and politics everywhere involves treating different regions with some measure of fairness. This dynamic requires no elaboration in the U.S. and Canadian cases, because bases are distributed across both, and any closure always runs the risk of being framed as an attack on a particular region.

From this brief overview, it is clear that base closures in both countries have been dogged by the parochial and constituent concerns of elected representatives. Politicians would not be doing their jobs if they did not express concern about the potential impacts on their districts, ridings, states or territories of such closures. But the challenge of military base closures coupled with attempts to fulfill national security demands have generated some creative politics of loss imposition yielding greater success than might have been pre-supposed.

III. COLD WAR TRIALS AND TRIBULATIONS

Both countries had difficulty closing bases during 1970s and 1980s. Political sensitivity to the imposition of "pain" on voters

conflicted with a growing need to cut expensive surplus military infrastructure. Considerations of the social and economic impact of closures kept most representatives from taking any initiatives to assist the defense establishments with implementing them. In the United States, institutional characteristics and constraints impeded closures for expected reasons. In Canada, theoretical considerations associated with the Westminster-style political system also impeded progress. Although various sites were slated for closure, loud grassroots opposition negated the political will to undertake de-distributive policies in both countries.

A. The United States

The politics of military base closures should be particularly difficult in a political system like that of the United States, where, as former House Speaker Thomas P. (Tip) O'Neill put it, "all politics is local"; where congressional committees with jurisdiction over military bases tend to over-represent districts containing bases; and where gridlock and inaction are institutionally privileged. Given the potential dislocation that can result from a base closure, "the conventional wisdom holds that base closures end congressional careers, and few legislators are willing to sacrifice themselves."²⁶ Legislators could attempt to distance themselves from political blame by delegating authority for closures to the executive branch, and for quite some time in this century the executive branch made base closure decisions in some capacity.²⁷ But legislators share a not entirely unreasonable notion that Defense Department closure initiatives are likely to be either heavily biased in favor of the president's party²⁸ or targeted at those members who do not support the president's defense policies.²⁹ Since the end of World War II, domestic base closures have always tread a line between parochial and partisan politics on the one hand and national security needs on the other. That balancing act has changed a bit over time; mostly the shift involved the way the various political players behaved and how they wanted their actions to be perceived.

All these presuppositions suggest that when Congress actively involves itself in the base closure process, a decision in favor of shutting military bases is almost a political impossibility. If an observer were to examine the history of base closing from the late 1970s through the late 1980s, the record would be consistent with these presuppositions. The military base structure was notoriously

full of obsolete facilities, including a moat-encircled fort (later an army training center) in Virginia originally built to defend the U.S. against the British in the War of 1812, and another fort in Utah erected to protect pony express riders from hostile Indians.³⁰ But the political obstacles to closing bases remained so high that "the Department of Defense gave up even trying to close any major bases between 1979 and 1985."³¹ No major domestic bases were closed between 1977 and 1988, while thirteen new ones were opened, for a total of 312.³² This situation was arrived at through an incremental process of legislative initiatives; with each new one the entire base-closing process, from the point of view of the Defense Department, became more and more of a quagmire. Comparisons can be made between Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara's base closure during the early 1960s, facing little *concerted* opposition from Congress in regard to his selections, and Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci who, in the face of the process as it stood in the late 1980s, concluded that "the Pentagon was tied up in knots forever by endless procedures and litigation and political pressure to the point where the Defense Department finally throws up its hands and says, 'We just cannot do this. We cannot devote the time and resources to it.'"³³

Most secretaries of defense who followed Robert McNamara were not as lucky as he in closing down domestic military bases. The Kennedy and early Johnson administrations went about closing installations with little particular regard for political considerations or sensitivity to congressional reactions.³⁴ McNamara, at Kennedy's request, compiled extensive lists of closures and did not feel particularly threatened by objections from Capitol Hill. He made these decisions in the context of a strong policy consensus within the United States that communism needed to be contained, and that the military had to be prepared for that mission. This consensus helped to solidify the role of the Pentagon and the executive as *the locus* for making military policy decisions and choices.³⁵ It was, thus, much easier for a case to be made that the decisions of the secretary of defense and the sitting president should not be frivolously disputed by members of Congress because that might lead to the appearance of weakness and division easily exploited by the Soviet Union and its allies.

McNamara's objective was to streamline the military structure, and he started out by closing bases as he saw fit in order to accomplish that end. While there were some objections to McNamara's selec-

tions, especially by members whose districts and states were losing one or more facilities, they did not get very far, particularly during the Kennedy administration. Attempts at reforming the procedure by which the bases were selected for closure failed because there was no unified effort (or "logrolling") within Congress to accomplish this end. Because of the international atmosphere,

legislators who were not affected were unwilling to support reform efforts, because they feared that their constituents would interpret such efforts or votes as unpatriotic or as supporting government waste. The vast majority of legislators had no countervailing constituent pressure to support these reform efforts.³⁶

Occasionally individual legislators, particularly from areas that were selected for a major closure, contacted either the president or the secretary of defense, and in rare cases the decision was reversed. The objections raised by members during this period were parochial in character, based on concerns about job loss and other economic impacts rather than about national security, and such arguments were largely unacceptable in the context of a growing Soviet threat.

Changes promoting successful congressional involvement in the decision-making process started in the 1970s after the initial draw down following the United States departure from Southeast Asia. When 147 bases were proposed for closure or realignment in 1976, Congress fought back in a more concerted way, enacting various pieces of legislation. When these efforts were taken all together, they effectively tied up the entire base-closing process "in knots", as former Secretary of Defense Carlucci had noted. The first piece of legislation "required a one-year notice prior to closure of a base employing 500 or more civilians or 'reduction in the level of civilian personnel at any military installation by more than 50 percent.'" The secretary of defense was also required to tender to the Committee on Armed Services "detailed justification of the proposed closure or reduction together with the estimated fiscal, economic, environmental, and operational effects of the proposed closure or reduction."³⁷ At the same time as the White House and Congress fought over this legislation, a new law requiring the Defense Department to comply with National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) was enacted. Through this legislation Congress established a clear means of overseeing the selection of bases for closure from at least three different perspectives. By re-orienting the decision-making process in this

way, Congress was more or less “setting up shop” in an area that had long been the realm of the Department of Defense, with some minor influence from the White House (mostly via the National Security Council), and maybe a word or two from senior senators or members of Congress with special expertise in defense matters. Thus, by the late 1970s, Congress had engaged in a form of “covert politics” as regards base closure decision-making policy; legislators were not outwardly blocking policy decisions or thwarting a decision-making process through an overt or openly visible means.³⁸ Rather, the obstructive behavior was covert, typically extending over a long period of time and usually leading to so much frustration on the part of those trying to accomplish certain goals that they finally gave up, often in despair.

The inherent factiousness of the Congress played a distinct role in moving policymakers towards the need to create a new mechanism to deal with the problem. Institutional changes during the 1970s had led to the dispersal of power to more members. Sidney Milkis explains some of the results of this demand:

There was a strong anti-bureaucratic, anti-institutional ethos in the “new” Congress; in fact, those legislators who had revolted against the seniority system claimed to support “participatory democracy” within Congress.³⁹

While a participatory democracy tends to protect liberty, it also has a tendency, especially in an extended republic like the United States, to complicate and confound the decision-making process. The connection between the member and his individual district is strengthened. The allegiance of the member to the body of Congress as a whole or to a party is undermined because each member can rely upon their own area of power or expertise. This “fiefdom” becomes a tangible item for the elected official to present to the voters back home.

Thus the 1980s witnessed a resurgent Congress struggling with a popular and strong executive. In the post-reform era, quite a few individual members acquired a significant amount of power, but this did not enhance congressional leadership. Instead, Congress found itself in a bit of bind. There was a strong desire to rival the president, given the highly partisan environment. The fragmentation within Congress, combined with partisan differences, prompted a situation that is often termed “gridlock,” for the very reason that little legislation of any kind made its way through the legislative process. Eleven

years without a base being closed or realigned, after repeated pleas from the DoD, might well be considered an example of gridlock.

While Congress was unwilling to allow the president to confront the problem, it was reluctant to do so itself, mostly because of fears of voter "fallout." At least this is the general belief among members of Congress. According to Kent Weaver, "no one wants to make decisions that will inevitably incur blame from constituents."⁴⁰ This perspective had led to the culture of "blame avoidance" that is so prevalent among American elected officials.⁴¹ The long-standing constipation of the U.S. base closure process was a prime example of how this culture operates and how it tends to stymie the construction and implementation of coherent public policy.

Partisanship, because it was going on in the context of a divided government, played a very significant role in "gridlocking" base closures in the United States, at least for a time. The new system of base closure decision-making had to overcome partisan bickering and the perception of unfair treatment. If pain was going to be suffered, then it was necessary for everyone to endure it. Regardless of the ultimate compromise, the final process would have to possess three characteristics: (1) it must be a coordinated effort (enforced consensus), (2) it must require the targeting of bases for closure, (3) its closure decisions must be enforced. By contrast, the Canadian experience was different in a number of ways.

B. Canada

Military base closures did not arrive on the policy agenda until the mid-1960s in Canada. There were occasional reductions and rationalizations in the first decades after the Second World War, but apart from the divestiture of temporary facilities acquired for the duration of that war, the period was marked by the construction of military bases, training centers, and depots across the country. The first rumors of systematic closures arose in 1969.⁴² The new government led by Pierre Trudeau launched a review of foreign policy with inevitable consequences for rethinking the nature of defense posture and, consequently, defense facilities. The Trudeau administration also tried out the first of many systems to control its expenditures and set a target for the Department of National Defence that could only be met through rationalization of bases. Indeed, serious discussions of base closings in Canada have all been motivated by this dual dynamic: changes in defense policy driven by a shift in the global

strategic balance, and a fresh round of efforts to get the government's fiscal house in order.

In 1969 a special National Defence Task Force was established to study every base and station in Canada. By August of that year it had come up with two lists compiled on the basis of four criteria: military role, capital investment, involvement with the local community, and civilian jobs. As one senior defense official explained, the first list consisted of bases that would be "least painful to close... They are the ones where we think there is the best chance of finding alternative uses for the base and alternative employment for the civilian staffs involved."⁴³ It targeted four bases that were eventually closed: Canadian Forces Military Complex Ville La Salle in Quebec, and three facilities in Ontario.⁴⁴ These certainly fit the criterion of the "easy list": all of them, with the exception of the Clinton, Ontario, base, were depots with relatively few military or civilian personnel who might lose their jobs, and they lent themselves to easy disposal or sale to the private sector. Cobourg, Ontario, for example, had only 38 military personnel and 375 civilians, and there was another base in very close proximity. The local economies of Ville La Salle, Cobourg, and London, Ontario were all vibrant, and consequently the economic impact of the loss was negligible.

The potential impact of the second list—bases presumably with deeper community roots and wider economic spin-offs—made implementation more challenging. An interdepartmental committee, chaired by the deputy minister of a department other than National Defence and concerned with everything from regional and economic issues to manpower, explored the broad implications of potential closures beyond the purely defense requirements and even consulted with provincial authorities.⁴⁵ Rumors abounded and heightened tensions. As one commentator noted, "for the Cabinet, recent weeks have had the atmosphere when commutation of a death sentence is under study. It has been impossible to damp down the rumors and the ministers have been receiving alarmed calls for help from communities that think they are likely to be affected."⁴⁶ Assurances were sought from the prime minister even before the cabinet made its decision, and the issue was clearly linked to the question of regional economic stimulation.⁴⁷ The government, fully realizing some of the liabilities concomitant with such a loss-imposition scenario, floated several tactics to diminish the possibility of grassroots political retaliation. It offered compensation through either "adjust-

ment" grants or some countervailing regional investment, and it tried to spread the pain over time by staggering the base closings.⁴⁸

The federal cabinet itself had difficulty coming to a decision on the second list of proposed closures. At the time, discussions over closures were widely believed to be generating debate within the cabinet by ministers concerned with defending their regions against cuts.⁴⁹ A judgment was supposed to have been made by October, 1969, but federal decision-makers faced a fierce lobbying campaign from Prince Edward Island officials who feared the closure of the base at Summerside. By December of that year, the only official announcement on closures came not from the Defence Department but rather from Allan MacEachen, minister responsible for immigration but also the regional minister for Atlantic Canada. Summerside would stay open at least until 1973. In August, 1970, Defence Minister Leo Cadieux announced the closure of air training bases at Rivers (affecting 843 military and 204 civilians) and at Gimli (813 military and 206 civilians), both in Manitoba. Predictably, local opinion was aroused and delegations immediately traveled to Ottawa to try to reverse the decision.⁵⁰

In the early 1970s a budget-freeze, coupled with inflationary pressures, left the Department of National Defence in a dismal financial state. Defence Minister James Richardson looked for ways to increase the portion of the defense budget available for capital expenditures (it had plunged to an all-time low in 1973) through in-house economies and base consolidations, and he commissioned studies to identify the Canadian Forces' future infrastructure needs. One completed in 1975, concluding that the minimum infrastructure required to support the military was twelve bases, nevertheless recommended reducing the department's holdings from 32 to 23 bases.⁵¹ The next round of potential base closings thus coincided with the Liberal government's austerity program of 1975-76. The Ministry of Defence again faced major budgetary cuts, and the Chief of Defence Staff, General J.A. Dextraze, spoke publicly about the need to consolidate facilities in order to permit better personnel decisions in the face of new demands such as peacekeeping and security for the 1976 Olympics.⁵²

Rumors circulated about closures, most notably over the potential that Canadian Forces Base (CFB) Chatham in New Brunswick and some other bases in the Maritimes would be shut down. MPs from the region grilled the defense minister, extracting a promise that

no bases had been selected for closure “yet.”⁵³ By March, 1976, newspapers in the region were printing panic stories about the devastating impact of potential base closings.⁵⁴ As soon as the rumors surfaced, unions, businesses and local politicians organized “massive protest rallies” at several Maritime centers.⁵⁵ This tactic was a predictable response by those resisting loss impositions. By broadening the base of potential losers and implying that all bases in a region were potentially threatened, more people rallied to the cause. The regional dynamic also came into play because of a rumor that the air patrol functions performed by the now obsolete CF-101 planes located at bases in the Maritimes would be moved to Quebec along with a fleet of new fighter aircraft. A perceived emphasis on Quebec incensed Maritime spokespeople. Saint John, New Brunswick mayor Edis Flewelling asserted that CFB Gaagetown, which had once been the country’s “largest military establishment,” had now been “downgraded to almost training school status” at the very time an \$88-million language school was under construction at Saint-Jean, Quebec, and CFB Valcartier (also in Quebec) “had been raised in both personnel strength and physical construction to become the nation’s largest base.”⁵⁶ The protests proved effective: Chatham was not closed, although Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau tried again in 1982 only to back down in the face of loud protests.⁵⁷ The base finally closed in 1994.

In April, 1976, the issue of base closures was turned over to a cabinet committee. After a month of deliberation on the DND recommendations, however, the defense minister admitted that the committee was stalled:

The proposal for shutting down several military bases has aroused a storm of protest from the areas affected. In several cases the defence base has become an integral part of the local economy and its closure would mean a substantial financial loss to each community. Members of parliament from areas expected to be involved have made their protests in the Commons and privately to the minister stressing the vital importance of keeping the local based [*sic*] in their respective communities operating.⁵⁸

By July the government simply had given up. Countrywide pressures, coupled with disagreement within caucus, led the Liberal government to “indefinitely postpone potentially contentious decisions on closing or partly closing military bases.”⁵⁹ A revised, re-

duced list of closures was drafted over the summer and submitted to the cabinet in October, 1976, but once again this generated a storm of protest across the country.⁶⁰ In the end, only one base was closed (in Toronto, Ontario) and another transferred (from Edmonton, Alberta to Petawawa, Ontario), affecting only 150 civilian jobs. No bases in eastern Canada were touched, not even Summerside, P.E.I., which had been on the chopping block for years and was avowedly maintained for regional development rather than defense purposes.⁶¹

The impetus for closures disappeared in the early 1980s for purely political reasons. Gilles Lamontague, the Liberal defense minister, operated with one objective according to Douglas Bland: "to keep defense issues out of cabinet and the newspapers, and he found willing allies in NDHQ." Concurrently, "[t]here was little flexibility in the defence portfolio because too many items were protected by domestic political interests. The defense infrastructure, for example, consumed billions of defense dollars for little operational return, but that cash was off-limits" to the DND. The absence of a cohesive strategic direction within the department⁶² offset any impetus within the Trudeau government to subject the citizenry to painful closures at a time when it was increasingly challenged by opposition critics and public commentators for every defense-related decision.

Although the DND had determined a "blueprint" for military infrastructure by 1976, political will hindered any significant action to close surplus bases during the 1970s and 1980s. As the office of the auditor general of Canada surmised, "government concern about the impact of base closures on local economies and the potential political fallout led to indecision." There was no established governmental framework to deal with local economic impacts although there was overlapping jurisdictional interest between several federal departments and agencies. As a result, "National Defence ... continued to bear the cost of keeping bases open even as budgetary pressures increased."⁶³ In the battle between local economic interests (political support) and defense economies and effectiveness, the latter was consistently losing out.

The next round of Canadian closures did not begin until the late 1980s, again under the pressure of a defense policy review and fiscal constraints. The Tory government's 1985 foreign policy paper (*Competitiveness and Security*) was a vintage Cold War document, arguing, for example, that "the most direct threat to Canadian security derives

from the Soviet Union's military capabilities and antipathy to our values."⁶⁴ It set the background for the 1987 White Paper on Defence, yet neither document had made much sense by 1989 with the rapid obsolescence of the Cold War. The Tories had also promised, without much success, to do something serious about the deficit. Clearly, Canada's broad strategic outlook and domestic expenditures needed re-evaluation in light of an emerging post-Cold War era. There was a similar sentiment growing south of the forty-ninth parallel.

IV. POST-COLD WAR ADJUSTMENTS

The end of the Cold War, and the concomitant decline in public attentiveness to military matters in the new strategic environment, justified the need for widespread military base closures in both countries. Institutional and political realities, however, led the United States and Canada to adopt different processes of selecting bases for closure and realignment.

A. United States

1. Creation of BRAC

By the late 1980s, it was clear that the process for closing military bases in the United States was riddled with more problems than ever before. They included excessive delays, vigorous congressional objections, expensive litigation, and repetitious environmental impact statements. As one scholarly observer put it: "The new institutional mechanisms [put in place by Congress in the late 1970s] so lowered the marginal cost of resisting major base closures and realignments that it became politically untenable for an individual member of Congress not to block closures and realignments. The rules invited such resistance; constituents demanded it."⁶⁵ All that changed, however, with the creation of a new process for closing military bases in 1988. Although altered in some significant ways in 1990, it works like this: the military services indicate to the secretary of defense those bases that they would like to close; the secretary makes additions or deletions from this list and sends it to a temporary, independent commission which then prepares its own list after a review that includes analysis of available data and public hearings. The commission makes up a final list and sends it to the president, who can either accept it and submit it to Congress or reject it, but he cannot make additions or deletions. Once it is approved by the president, base closings can proceed unless both houses of Congress

pass a joint declaration disapproving the list within 45 working days. Once again, Congress cannot make changes in the list by adding, subtracting or substituting individual bases or groups of bases.⁶⁶ Even if both chambers passed such a declaration, it is subject to a presidential veto, meaning that a two-thirds majority in each chamber would be required to enact it.

In theory at least, this mechanism offers several advantages in imposing regionally concentrated losses. It places detailed decision-making in the hands of a body that is not concerned about reelection—indeed, that goes out of business after recommendations. It places pressure on the president and the Congress to approve the work of a body that they themselves have created.⁶⁷ And instead of multiple congressional hoops to jump through to approve base closures, opponents must quickly build support in both chambers of Congress. Legislators do not have to put their fingerprints on a base closure by voting for it directly. So long as the number of affected congressional districts or states is kept below a majority (or even two-thirds) in at least one chamber, members have short-term incentives to vote *not* to overturn the commission's recommendations.⁶⁸ The calculus of legislators may be different if they think that acceptance of a round of base closings sets a precedent making it more likely that there will be later rounds affecting their own constituents. If one chamber fails to overturn the commission's recommendations, members of the other chamber are off the hook entirely from even having to vote: there is little incentive for legislators to force an embarrassing roll-call vote on their colleagues since a single chamber's opposition would not overturn the commission's recommendations anyway. Moreover, the second through fourth rounds of base closures were authorized by a single piece of legislation in 1990, further lowering the probability that legislators might be punished by their constituents for voting to put the process in place.⁶⁹

Why would legislators in the United States adopt such a procedure? Public choice theory suggests that they are unlikely to adopt new procedures that produce outcomes harmful to a majority of those approving the procedures unless they are unable to predict accurately the outcomes of those new procedures. While it is certainly true that they could not predict precisely which bases would be recommended for closure, the general outlines of the scope of closure and the types of bases likely to be closed were known with reasonable accuracy before the initial base closure procedure was put

into effect. A more plausible interpretation of legislators' behavior is that they were amenable to a procedure that (1) allows them to pursue personal preferences for governmental economy and efficiency,⁷⁰ (2) enables them to cast a politically popular vote in favor of those preferences for which they can claim credit from constituents, (3) simultaneously protects them from the wrath of an intense minority of their constituents when those decisions are made, and (4) facilitates their loud protests against individual base closures affecting their constituents, while ensuring that their complaints will not be effective.⁷¹ (There was also an issue of the rather appropriate timing of the passage of the initial BRAC legislation—that it made it through with the intended implementation at a point where both the White House and Congress were in a major transition and those elected in 1988 were going to be largely newcomers.) In short, it is less important that the base closing procedure provides a Rawlsian "veil of ignorance" about which bases are likely to be closed for *legislators* (who may actually agree that bases should be closed, but fear the political consequences) than for *constituents*, because by shielding constituents from this knowledge their legislators are protected from blame.

It is also helpful to recognize that not all legislators can be expected to have the same preferences for preserving congressional discretion over military base closings. That motivation is likely to be especially strong among the congressional committees with jurisdiction over military issues whose delegation of authority cuts into their jurisdiction and removes a potential legislative currency. This particular jurisdiction only became acutely congressional in the post-Vietnam and post-Watergate period with the waves of institutional reforms. As such, this province of congressional decision-making, as it has existed for the past twenty years, has been exceedingly parochial and, as a realm of congressional power, it has therefore been one that members are rather disinclined to give up easily.

It should be no surprise, then, that the idea for a military base-closing commission came not from committee leaders but from a member of the then-minority party, Representative Dick Armey of Texas (now House majority leader), who wanted to prevent Congress from overturning an independent commission's recommendations.⁷² Acting as might be expected in the face of policy that has the potential ability to impose significant loss on communities as well as to deny certain members autonomy over a decision-making process,

four separate committees all claimed jurisdiction to evaluate and mark up the BRAC legislation.⁷³ Committee leaders then proposed weaker alternatives to Arme y's bill, and the legislation was burdened with so many amendments that the Pentagon claimed the proposed new procedures would actually make it harder to close obsolete bases.⁷⁴ Congress eventually enacted a stronger version incorporating the fast-track joint resolution as a congressional check on the commission's actions. By outlining such circumscribed provisions to disapprove of the base-closing and realignment list, the law goes far to insure that individual members' political interests are protected, since each member can lobby, protest, and make a case while the commission is deliberating but would find it nearly impossible to prevent the process from proceeding once the decisions are made. While Rep. Arme y's motive was to assist the Pentagon in actually getting some bases closed and thereby eliminate excess federal spending, he—like those who supported his efforts—also knew that fellow legislators, especially those with bases in their districts or states, had to be given some sort of political coverage in order to get them to support base closings. By creating an independent commission to choose which bases to close or realign, the "political football" that otherwise would have plagued members of Congress was more or less removed.

The way in which this legislation was written allowed Congress to overcome some of its own institutional difficulties by forcing it to consent to base closings. Since the only real option for Congress is to accept or reject the entire package, elected officials are forced into a consensus of a kind. Most members would rather work together in this instance, particularly because they have been given an option in terms of "shifting the blame." As there is no option to vote *for* the list, members of Congress and the president are able to deflect a certain amount of responsibility for decisions that may put voters out of work.

The "all or nothing" restriction in regard to congressional disapproval of the BRAC recommendations is another means Congress instituted to overcome its earlier institutional difficulties in making large-scale decisions and policies. Some of those problems stemmed from anticipated electoral reactions and some from other factors such as "the decline in intercommittee reciprocity and the rise of floor amending activity, split control, and the huge deficits."⁷⁵ The BRAC legislation is designed to circumvent these particular prob-

lems; the resolution of disapproval is referred only to one committee in each House, the Committee on Armed Services, and the respective committees must discharge the resolution within a 20-day period or "at the end of such period, [such committee shall be] discharged from further consideration of such resolution, and such resolution shall be placed on the appropriate calendar of the House involved."⁷⁶ The statute also prohibits committee or floor amendments to BRAC recommendations. Congress may not tinker with the package that is presented to it; either it is rejected or it goes into effect and the secretary of defense then commences closure of the recommended bases.

By moving the actual decision-making structure out of Congress and by placing it in the hands of this commission, the legislation also eliminates the main avenue for public intervention and interference in the process. In the past, the public, when it wanted to stop the base closure process, would most often lobby its representatives and senators to take a stand against closure. When a recommendation for closure reached the floor, the elected official would persuade his or her colleagues to vote against the closure and the base would usually remain open. While members of Congress and the president are still lobbied by those who may be affected by the impending closures, there is nothing those officials can do except make the case to the Base Realignment and Closing Commission [BRAC] on behalf of their constituents. This is the general pattern in congressional de-distributive policymaking:

Rather than alienating the clients or beneficiaries of programs facing cutbacks, freezes, or stretch-outs, lawmakers find it prudent to vote for omnibus measures that embody across-the-board formulas or complex compromises. As long as everyone else is taking their lumps, it is argued, it is easier to accept damage to one's own favored programs.⁷⁷

The decision as to which bases will be recommended for closure sits with the commission, not with the Congress or even the president, and thus the elected representatives are more or less protected from "alienating" their constituents.

In moving the decision-making venue from Congress to the commission, and then constructing this "all-or-nothing" mechanism through which the recommendations go into effect, the BRAC legislation went far towards eliminating much of the previous parochial

interference in the decision-making process. The initial Commission's⁷⁸ recommendations for closure or partial closure of 91 bases and "realignment" of 54 others were made public at the end of December, 1988, at one of the biggest defense-related press conferences since Franklin D. Roosevelt had announced that the United States was entering World War II. In April, 1989, the House rejected a joint resolution of disapproval by an overwhelming 381-43 vote.⁷⁹ While powerful legislators tried to win exemptions for bases in their states, alleging factual errors in the Commission's decision-making process, the Bush administration refused to go along. Defense Secretary Richard Cheney argued that "It was a package, and if we get into the business of pulling out individual bases, I'm fearful the entire package will come apart and I'll end up without any bases closed."⁸⁰

While there was some speculation among those in the press that the first round had led to more closures than had been anticipated in Congress,⁸¹ members and staff who worked with the 1988 Commission suggested that the list could have been much longer but, instead, the commissioners had tried to strike a balance of some kind between too much and too little. One of the senior staff members on the 1988 Commission acknowledged that while there were "other bases that [the Commission] was looking at, and would [have] considered for closure, and perhaps would have liked to have closed, but there was a kind of a sense, not that we could quantify it, that maybe this would go too far and we didn't want to over-tax the system."⁸²

Nothing succeeds like de-politicized decision-making when the issue is loss imposition, or so it seemed. In 1990, when Defense Secretary Richard Cheney, as part of President George Bush's annual budget request, put forward a package that included 35 new base closures, there was quite a rumble through Congress, especially from Democratic members who said that their districts had been specifically targeted.⁸³ When Congress blocked Cheney's plan, Armed Services Committee chair Les Aspin immediately offered legislation establishing another base closure commission with much of the same design as the 1988 Commission. This new Commission presented three separate rounds of closure decisions in 1991, 1993, and 1995. By moving to establish a new BRAC, the Democratic members avoided the charges that they were spendthrift while weakening the power of the administration over outcomes. They looked less like they were "speaking out of both sides of their mouths," since they had been calling for defense budget cuts at the end of the Cold War while at the

same time complaining about the cuts that fell in their districts or states.

2. Fine-Tuning Policymaking

The second BRAC looked and acted a little bit different from the 1988 model. Alterations were mostly due to some of the complaints that had been filed against the first commission. Because of questions about the independence of the initial BRAC, the new one required that the General Accounting Office, Congress's autonomous investigation and auditing arm, provide its own analysis of the money-saving potential of DoD recommendations.⁸⁴ After holding public hearings mandated by the second BRAC law, a new commission deliberated in public (televised live on C-SPAN) on a final list of bases instead of holding all its debates behind closed doors.⁸⁵ The latter tactic had been used by the social security reform group's "Gang of 17" which had concluded that the only way to come to decisions and consensus among the various partisan members was to keep the doors closed. The 1991 BRAC commission largely followed Cheney's lead, recommending the closure of 25 bases with the loss of 100,000 civilian and military jobs. By a vote of 354 to 60, the house rejected a joint resolution to overturn the BRAC recommendation.⁸⁶ Two years later, another round of base closure proposals, although highly controversial because its effects were concentrated in California, ended up producing the most ambitious record to date with 35 major and 95 minor base closings.⁸⁷ Legislators and local officials had attempted by a variety of maneuvers to prevent bases from being closed, but the revised BRAC process remained largely insulated from their efforts.

Citizens' groups, local officials, and elected representatives still tried to influence the BRAC process. For instance, immediately after the initial list of bases compiled by Cheney had been transmitted to BRAC, Arlen Specter, Republican senator from Pennsylvania, complained publicly because closure of the Philadelphia navy station and shipyard would hurt his constituents. His cry was joined by others who wanted to "stop the madness" because their districts had also been targeted. Specter talked to Cheney and with John Sununu, the president's chief of staff, but not with members of the BRAC. By contrast, Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN), whose state was slated to lose an air base with 3,200 jobs, left Washington to visit the facility. Afterward he asked BRAC "to check for possible errors in the

evaluation [made by the Pentagon in recommending the base for closure].⁸⁸ Unlike Specter, Lugar recognized that under the revised legislation it was BRAC, rather than Cheney or Bush, who would make the final decision. (Though presidents can reject an entire BRAC list of targets, thus far none has done so.) As a result of changes in the law, most legislators now complained before BRAC had begun its evaluations rather than saving their ammunition until the commission had put forward its recommendations.

This shift in responses is a direct result of the change in the BRAC legislation and the way the decision-making procedures were to operate, since the Defense Department now had to draw up a list of bases for closure and realignment and then present that to the BRAC for analysis. This returned the procedure, in many respects, to the way base closures had been done in the past when the secretary of defense would begin by submitting a list of bases to Congress. But the difference here—both from the 1988 BRAC and from the way it had been done previously—was that the base closure and realignment decision-making process was protected and insulated from partisan or parochial politics to a large extent. *The 1991 BRAC Report to the President* mentioned this particular characteristic of the commission, and how it had helped this Commission do a better job:

The 1991 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission's recommendations emerged from a uniquely open process, in which testimony and viewpoints were heard from community and congressional leaders. *This process insulated the Commission from partisan politics.*⁸⁹

The end result—that some bases would be closed—had been determined by the passage of the legislation to reconstitute the BRAC. This protected and more or less guaranteed base closures. The structure of the BRAC and the way it operates were crafted so as to protect the Commission itself from accusations of partisanship or other kinds of bias in its decisions.

Along with the reworking of the BRAC structure, there was a newly opened avenue to try to influence the Commission's decisions and evaluations. This is what prompted the outspoken and immediate responses from elected officials. They were hoping to focus the Commission's attention during its four-month period of scrutinizing and analyzing the secretary's recommendations. The task for members of Congress, and/or agitated members of a community, was to focus the Commission's attention on a particular installation and

suggest that the Department of Defense had somehow been remiss in its analysis of that particular installation and inappropriately had included it on the list for closure or realignment. The BRAC was fully within its authority to "add, delete, or modify the Secretary's list."⁹⁰ The job of the Commission was specifically to "ensure that the proposals submitted by [DoD] did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and the eight [congressionally approved] selection criteria."⁹¹ The newly open procedure, along with this mandate to make sure that the Defense Department had been true to the evaluation criteria for selecting bases, meant that elected officials changed their behavior with regard to the base closure decision-making process. This reorientation brought about a shift in initial responses to the secretary's list of bases as well as towards the Commission itself.

The new open process prompted politicians to take some kind of action. Elected officials worried that if they did not publicly take action their constituents would blame them if bases were closed in their districts and states. Faced with public hearings, public announcements of the bases to be closed, and an established procedure, politicians could not reasonably be expected to refrain from trying to influence the base closure process. And try they did.

During the 1970s and 1980s, those who had lobbied members to keep their bases open had been grass roots organizations, generally without much sophistication. What had to be done in those days consisted mostly of bringing the issue to the attention of the appropriate congressional delegation. After that, the affected members would do the rest of the lobbying, urging their colleagues to vote with them, and so on. This was not to be the case with the newly implemented BRAC process. Those who hoped to keep their base open would have to find some means of convincing the Commission that the Defense Department had made a miscalculation by putting the base on its list in the first place. This would take more sophistication and creativity, and possibly more professional lobbying methods. Thus, the three BRAC rounds that came out of the 1990 legislation opened up opportunities for professional consultants to make public presentations, offer new arguments for keeping bases open, manipulate the system and otherwise influence outcomes. A few brief examples should satisfy curiosity and provide an overview of the kind of lobbying that was done and the avenues pursued to influence the process.⁹² The city of Charleston, S.C. spent about \$1

million to make its case to the BRAC, hiring consultants, putting together facts, figures and reports, and presenting extensive information to the BRAC when it came to town. In the end, Charleston lost. Although the BRAC commissioners acknowledged that the presentation had made them re-consider the case, they stuck to their original conclusion. Members of Congress and various communities hired former staff members from the BRAC to advise them during the subsequent rounds. One member from New York went so far as to hire his predecessor for his staff, since this person had been intimately involved not only with campaigning to protect the local base, but also on the legislation that had created BRAC in the first place. These were just a few of the more “extra-ordinary” ways in which attempts were made to influence the BRAC process.

Members of Congress also pursued the usual routes to “get what they wanted” by holding up appointments to the Commission and trying to frustrate the appropriations process. The White House joined in, selecting more overtly political and partisan appointees for the Commission and offering up less controversial lists of bases to be closed. In addition, fewer bases were selected for closure in the run up to the 1995 election year, and there was an attempt to avoid base closures in states exerting political weight during the presidential election season.

Every effort was made to slow or reverse the process, lessen the pain, and particularly to influence those making the decisions. With each round of closures, the commission felt the pressures from various actors. Bases were still chosen for closure, but the final round had selected fewer of them, and the openings for those who had hoped to change outcomes had become more discernable. There was also an attempt to pit the institutions of government against one another in order to hold up the decision-making process.

3. Institutional Checks and Balances

Opponents of closure of the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard (ordered in the 1991 round) mounted both a court challenge to the commission process and a legislative effort to subject it to judicial review, but neither succeeded.⁹³ The Supreme Court’s decision is particularly interesting in context of the political motivations behind the creation of the BRAC itself (and any subsequent, similarly designed entities), highlighting institutional perspectives on the difficulty of loss imposition in instances where there is a geographically-

concentrated area effected by the decisions. A great outcry arose when the Philadelphia Yard was originally selected for closure, because it employed a significant number of people, both directly and indirectly, and its closure would certainly be keenly felt in the immediate area, particularly during a recessionary period in the early 1990s.

When Senator Arlen Specter (R-PA) stood before the Supreme Court in March, 1994, it was the "first time in more than 20 years that a member of Congress had argued a case "before this body the Court."⁹⁴ Not only was it out of the ordinary, but Specter also asked the Court to "declare that the Government's selection of military bases for closing or downgrading is subject to challenge in Federal court."⁹⁵ In the end, the Supreme Court unanimously rejected Specter's claim, explaining that it was not in the Court's purview to decide such questions.

Where a statute, such as the 1990 [BRAC] Act, commits decision making to the discretion of the President, judicial review of the President's decision is not available...our conclusion that judicial review is not available for respondents' claim follows from our interpretation of an Act of Congress, by which we and all federal courts are bound. The judicial power of the United States conferred by Article III of the Constitution is upheld just as surely by withholding judicial relief where Congress has permissibly foreclosed it, as it is by granting such relief where authorized by the Constitution or by statute.⁹⁶

Although the Court unanimously rejected Specter's argument, some justices dissented with regard to all of the elements in the case. The foremost assertion, both in the majority opinion and in a concurring one, is that judicial review, one of the instruments which Specter claimed is necessary and proper in this instance and for the 'health' of the decisions that come out of the BRAC, has, in fact, no place in this process. As Justice Souter explained:

The point that judicial review was probably not intended emerges again upon considering the linchpin of this unusual statutory scheme, which is its all-or-nothing feature. The President and Congress must accept or reject the biennial base-closing recommendations as a single package. Neither the President nor Congress may add a base to the list or "cherry pick" one from it. This mandate for

prompt acceptance or rejection of the entire package of base closings can only represent a considered allocation of authority between the Executive and Legislative Branches to enable each to reach important, but politically difficult, objectives. Indeed, the wisdom and ultimate political acceptability of a decision to close any one base depends on the other closure decisions joined with it in a given package, and the decisions made in the second and third rounds just as surely depend (or will depend) on the particular content of the package or packages of closing that will have preceded them. If judicial review could eliminate one base from a package, the political resolution embodied in that package would be destroyed; ...the very reasons that led Congress by this enactment to bind its hands from untying a package, once assembled, go far to persuade me that Congress did not mean the courts to have any such power through judicial review.⁹⁷

The decision-making process, through the BRAC legislation, had been cleaned up and streamlined as much as possible, and according to Souter's argument, judicial review and the courts are not to be used to stymie base closure policy. Senator Specter and his co-plaintiffs expressed concern about their districts and states and the potential job loss that closure would bring.⁹⁸ The BRAC was designed to make sure that while these concerns existed and admittedly were troublesome for elected officials, there was a greater need for antiquated and excess bases to be closed. The justices were not convinced that the Base Realignment and Closing Commission, nor its procedures or results, could be seen as a violation of any of the guarantees of the U.S. Constitution in any way. In fact, to suggest that the Court could declare the viability of the BRAC decisions would violate the separation of powers doctrine. Not only this, but to integrate the Court into the process in the way requested by the suit would also be a violation of its position and vantage point outside of parochial politics.

It is certainly not the case that the court should always avoid entering into partisan or parochial battles. But as the Solicitor-General Drew S. Day III explained to the Court, the BRAC, as a solution to the difficulty of closing bases, is a coordinated and consensual effort between the executive and the legislative branches to make tough, de-distributive decisions. The court concurred,

suggesting that if it were to get involved, it would disturb the delicately constructed BRAC process.

In sum, the text, structure, and purpose of the Act clearly manifest congressional intent to confine the base-closing selection process within a narrow time frame before inevitable political opposition to an individual base closing could become overwhelming, to ensure that the decisions be implemented promptly, and to limit acceptance or rejection to a package of base closings as a whole, for the sake of political feasibility. While no one aspect of the Act, standing alone, would suffice to overturn the strong presumption in favor of judicial review, this structure (combined with the Act's provision for Executive and congressional review, and its requirement of time-constrained judicial review of implementation under NEPA) can be understood no other way than as precluding judicial review of a base-closing decision under the scheme that Congress, out of its doleful experience, chose to enact...accordingly...the Act forecloses such judicial review.⁹⁹

Senator Specter's argument for judicial review rests on the thesis that "the absence of recourse to the courts would make the base closing law unconstitutional, because Congress could not delegate such unreviewable authority to an independent, nonelected commission."¹⁰⁰ The arguments that refuted this make the point that because the BRAC and its processes are not completely independent and disassociated from Congress, it is the proper place of Congress and the president, rather than the courts, to evaluate the decisions made by the BRAC. Not only is it properly the place of the president and Congress to evaluate and review the decisions, but they are also given specifically determined time and guidelines to conduct such a review.

The BRAC essentially remains a "creature" of the Congress, unlike other independent regulatory agencies or commissions, because it does not operate wholly independently.¹⁰¹ While the congressional approval process of its actions is streamlined, the BRAC decisions, unlike those of *independent* regulatory commissions and agencies, cannot go into effect without the approval of Congress.

Another court challenge to the BRAC failed, as well as an attempt to force the court to define the BRAC-process as somehow

outside of the constitutional order. *National Federation of Federal Employees [NFFE] v. Cheney* made it only as far as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. In this particular case, which claimed that the BRAC legislation and process constituted excessive delegation of powers and violated the separation of powers of the constitutional system, the court found that the BRAC process did not constitute excessive delegation since the legislation had provided clear guidelines for the commission to follow in making its decisions. The court also noted that the process was not a violation of the separation of powers because "Congress was [not] interfering excessively with the Secretary of Defense's performance of his duty."¹⁰² The role of Congress in the BRAC process does not "enhance Congressional power *vis-à-vis* the Executive Branch because, like all other statutes, it is subject to the president's veto."¹⁰³ *NFFE v. Cheney* also evaluated the claim that the BRAC process was a violation of the Court's decision in *Immigration & Naturalization Service [INS] v. Chadha*. Again, the BRAC process was found to be constitutionally sound and not a violation of the *Chadha* decision. The BRAC neither violated the presentment clause of the constitution, since the commission's recommendations must be approved by the president and by Congress before going into effect; nor did the process pose the bicameralism problems of *INS v. Chadha* since the "commission's recommendations can only be rejected by a joint resolution from both houses signed by the President."¹⁰⁴

The decisions by the courts in *Dalton v. Specter*, No. 93-289, and in *NFFE v. Cheney*, No. 90-5004, also closed down these particular avenues as means to try to influence the new base closure decision-making process. But like all avenues that were tested, some more usefully than others, these particular ones certainly had to be attempted; and with this venture, the district court's and the Supreme Court's opinions of the BRAC as an entity were fleshed out in constitutional, institutional and legal contexts. The court agreed with Congress and the original intention in the construction of the BRAC, which was that it was not, in fact, fully independent of Congress or the executive. It was, as the Court addressed it, a "kind of *modus vivendi* between the two political branches."¹⁰⁵ It also did not violate the constitution.

4. Reflections on the U.S. Base Closing Process

Between 1988 and 1995, the various incarnations of the Base

Realignment and Closing Commission selected about 534 domestic military bases for closure and/or realignment.¹⁰⁶ While the bulk of this figure is made up of smaller closures and realignments, each round of selections and recommendations did strike at nearly 100 major bases slated for closure or significant downsizing through this process.

Each round of closures also saw a greater reduction in the domestic base structure itself, with a total reduction over seven years of nearly 20 percent of the entire domestic base structure. The estimate of actual dollars saved by the closures can only be calculated over a period of time, since each round of closures also demands an initial one-time expenditure to pay costs actually associated with the shut down.¹⁰⁷ But according to estimates, by 1998 the "cumulative savings of the four [BRAC] rounds completely offset the cumulative costs to date."¹⁰⁸ Through the year 2001, base closure savings are projected to reach \$14 billion with annual savings of \$5.6 billion in the year 2002 and each year thereafter.¹⁰⁹

Given such significant cuts in the domestic base structure, the BRAC was seen by most elected representatives as having successfully executed a tough, de-distributive decision-making task. It did so in a manner that spared most members of Congress as well from being blamed for the hardships visited upon constituents.

Essentially, the BRAC did what it was intended to do, making decisions that imposed a loss while protecting elected representatives from being blamed. Congress had long faced a number of difficulties in terms of making these decisions, and it had sought a solution that would provide some political protection for members while not ceding the job to the president. Congress determined that in order to change its behavior and actually make some decisions on base closures and realignments, an effective decision-making process would have to incorporate some broad political solutions to certain ongoing problems:

Political Problem

blame avoidance

deficit politics

divided government

institutional or turf protection

lack of consensus

partisanship

Broad Solution

insulate members

all or nothing restrictions

no amendments

automatic pilot

force consensus

omnibus legislation¹¹⁰

There were some differences in terms of the particular solutions that characterized the various BRACs, as Congress went about constructing and then reconstituting the commission for subsequent rounds. Some key aspects of the first BRAC were not retained in the subsequent legislation because of the criticisms they had engendered. Once members of Congress and the president saw the successful execution of the BRAC process in 1988, there was almost no turning back. They were essentially locked into the process they had invented.

Perhaps the greatest shift in this procedural change involved trading in blame avoidance in the context of de-distributive decision-making for partial delegation of decision making to creatively constructed entities. There has been a growing tendency in this area, as many scholars of the U.S. Congress and policymaking in general have started to note. Many of these analyses reveal a brewing crisis requiring some decisions to be made and implemented with expediency, thus pressing all the elected officials involved to figure out a method of making certain de-distributive decisions.¹¹¹ Granted, the excess base capacity of the military was not the same level of crisis as the potential financial collapse of the social security system. But in the long term, excess base capacity meant that defense dollars were not being spent wisely or efficiently. Policymakers believed that eventually it would lead to the weakening of U.S. defense capabilities and could undermine the national security and safety of the United States and its allies. By the late 1980s a confluence emerged between the need for Congress to do something about the excess domestic base capacity and members' need to avoid being blamed for hardships resulting from such decisions.

BRAC became the product of this confluence. Once it had been established, members were able further to refine its character and components, tweaking it so that the entire decision-making process was streamlined at the same time that it was made more and more legitimate. The process still had to attend to the original difficulties that Congress faced when making de-distributive decisions while trying to avoid being blamed for them. The broad solutions to these problems remained constant but the specific measures were altered to take evolving considerations into account. The following chart specifies these variations between the solutions produced by the original BRAC and those of the later BRACs:

<u>Broad Solution</u>	<u>'88 Solution</u>	<u>'91-'95 Solution</u>
<i>Insulate Members*</i>	<i>Closed Doors</i>	<i>Open Doors</i>
<i>All or Nothing Restrictions</i>	<i>One Shot Deal*</i>	<i>Multiple Rounds</i>
<i>No Amendments</i>	<i>Political Vacuum</i>	<i>Professionalized Process*</i>
<i>Automatic Pilot</i>	<i>Respect for Commission</i>	<i>Experts/Valid Arguments</i>
<i>Force Consensus*</i>	<i>Enforced Consensus*</i>	<i>Enforced Consensus*</i>
<i>Omnibus legislation</i>	<i>Non-Partisan Commission</i>	<i>Insulate Commission Itself¹²</i>

*bold items indicate key elements

Some of the specific solutions, especially the enforcement of consensus, proved to be more important to the Commission's effectiveness than others.

While other components of the new process were also important to its success, the institutionalization of the consensus view — that something was going to be done to make these decisions— prompted the establishment of the commission mechanism itself. It was also vital for the later acceptance of the recommendations made by this mechanism. This may be considered an inverted conclusion; since base closures affect geographically concentrated areas, there should be less of a need for a general consensus. But one of the primary operating components of the success of the BRAC is that “everyone takes their hits together”; members believe that there is safety in numbers. While the pain was highly localized in the communities where bases were closed or downsized, there were enough places to make the entire process more acceptable to elected representatives. Safety in numbers extended over subsequent rounds of base closures as well.

In this regard, the 1988 BRAC set a kind of precedent. With some complaining, but generally with a sigh of relief that something was finally being accomplished in this difficult area, members of Congress had forced themselves through an intermediary to close selected domestic military bases. An agreement on the need for an enforced consensus carried over to the subsequent rounds and motivated the fine-tuning of the BRAC process, which later operated in a more positive and optimistic atmosphere, contributing to the overall enthusiasm for the BRAC and impelling elected officials to accept the decisions made by the commissions.

Professionalism and oversight of various kinds, combined with the mandate for open hearings and visits to communities, established a process that was generally accepted as legitimate and respectable. These alterations in the way that the Commission went about its business also changed a secretive and stealthy organization

into a more open and accessible one, allowing for public involvement and for the professional evaluation of decisions. All this helped BRAC to do its job more effectively and efficiently. At the same time, because BRAC operations were becoming more and more accepted and even praised by those who had any involvement in the process, the newly implemented tools helped to close down many avenues that might have been used to undermine the work of the BRAC.

BRAC has ended up having a long-term effect on the entire base closure decision-making process by changing the way these decisions are made. It is doubtful that domestic military bases will ever again be closed without a commission to guide the process, make the decisions, and cushion the political shocks.

B. Canada

1. Mulroney Government

Similar to the military planners in the United States, Canadian officials had long supported reductions in facilities since this would free up money for badly needed new equipment. By the late 1980s, the Canadian military establishment simply awaited the political decision by the Mulroney government (then early in its second mandate) to facilitate the reallocation of resources. The perceived success of base conversions in the United States and Canada, coupled with the need to reduce infrastructure as "an inevitable consequence of changing military requirements," justified immediate rationalization according to a Department of National Defence release:

In the past, the option of closing bases has been resisted because of the financial impact on surrounding communities. But the situation has come to a head: in two decades the size of the Canadian Forces has dropped by one third, without a corresponding reduction in support infrastructure. The choice today is between cutting operational effectiveness — thus national security — or cutting an inefficient infrastructure.¹¹³

The 1989 federal budget announced a total of fourteen base and station closures and reductions, most prominently in P.E.I., Ontario, Manitoba, and New Brunswick, all of which had received reprieves over the years. A 1988 study (based on the 1975 recommendations) had exerted some impact on this budget announcement, "but its recommendations were altered substantially by a departmental review and also at the ministerial level."¹¹⁴ At the time, Manitoba and

New Brunswick were withholding support from the Meech Lake Accord. Coupled with the consideration that Quebec was least effected by the cuts (the loss of the Mont Apica radar site was offset by establishment of a mobile radar establishment at Bagotville), this suggested that decisions might have been designed to punish recalcitrant provinces while placating Quebec for political reasons.¹¹⁵

Protests were predictably loud. Interestingly, the scale of the loss imposition generated precisely the type of coalition building one might expect, and the affected communities banded together to resist the cuts. The mayor of London noted:

We've been in contact with some of the other jurisdictions, but eventually we will have to go it alone - I think we should go together to the point where we could say to Mr. McKnight [the Minister of National Defence] and the Government of Canada that we want an opportunity to come in and make our cases.¹¹⁶

Rallies were held in virtually every affected community, delegations were sent to Ottawa, and premiers visited the national capital to lobby on behalf of their provinces. P.E.I. residents even tried to enlist God on their side: prayers were said in virtually every church on the island.¹¹⁷ This was entirely understandable since CFB Summerside was P.E.I.'s largest industry after agriculture. The island's lobbying campaign, honed through years of practice, included Premier Joe Ghiz, all the members of the provincial legislative assembly (regardless of party stripe), chambers of commerce and unions, the Public Service Alliance of Canada, the largest demonstration in provincial history (about 6000 participants), and protests on Parliament Hill in Ottawa. Remarkably, given the history of Canadian base closures, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney held firm, although he promised some form of federal compensation.¹¹⁸ In the end the base was closed, but Summerside received the Goods and Services Tax Processing Centre to mitigate the impact. In the words of Peter C. Newman, this conversion led the government to "spend more money than it had saved."¹¹⁹

Five years later, the auditor general of Canada assessed the impacts of the two major base closures Summerside and Portage La Prairie, Manitoba carried out as a result of the 1989 budget announcement. In response to the broad question "are the two communities significantly worse off since the closure announcement, and has the government really saved money?", the study drew several conclu-

sions. First, the data on economic impacts of the bases used by the department to support the closure decisions was founded on provincial and national demographic and economic indicators that proved inappropriate, since local conditions varied substantially. Second, the estimates of savings "were not rigorously derived and...contained many flaws"; they did not include provisions for financial assistance to communities and significantly underestimated closure costs. "The absence of a coherent government framework for carrying out the closures and of a clear strategy for mitigating negative economic impacts contributed to enormous resistance in the communities," and as a result emergency financial assistance, "negotiated in reaction to the backlash, turned out to be extensive." Third, although this financial assistance was unplanned, it appeared to mitigate the negative impacts of the closures on the local economies, and despite the extent of federal contributions to offset ill effects, the government "began achieving net savings fairly soon after the closures."¹²⁰ In this respect, base closures appeared to save money over the long run. In the short term, however, the DND was still saddled with costly, superfluous infrastructure as the new decade began.

In September 1991, the Minister of Defence, Marcel Masse, issued a statement on defense policy that pointed clearly to further base closings and reductions. He announced that Canada's two overseas bases in Germany would be closed. "Redundant infrastructure" in Canada would be the subject of another committee study, the *September Review* indicated: "...if we wish to ensure that a satisfactory level of funding is available for the procurement of equipment, redundant or unnecessary infrastructure should be eliminated *immediately* in order to recover the savings thus realized."¹²¹ The acrimony and maneuvering generated by the 1989 closures doubtlessly encouraged the minister to copy the American strategy for de-politicizing the proposed closure of bases in the U.S.¹²² Masse appointed an Advisory Group on Defence Infrastructure to develop a decision-making framework (in part based on "the experience of foreign governments in dealing with identical problems of rationalization") and to report within six months. Part of the Group's mandate was to consider the socio-economic impact of "adjustments," taking into account government programs as well as regional equity and Canada's French-English duality.¹²³

The Advisory Group reported in June 1992, urging the establishment of an independent review panel on defense infrastructure to

ensure that the decisions to close bases were based on clear security criteria rather than regional development concerns. After making inquiries and holding open hearings, the review panel would be free to modify the proposals it received from the minister of national defence before sending them to the minister and the government. If these recommendations were accepted without amendment, the report would be forwarded to a parliamentary committee (including opposition party members) that would be able, after up to thirty days of hearings, to vote for or against the report as a package before the final decision was made. An interdepartmental committee would then handle government financial assistance. In a departure from past processes, Dr. Katy Bindon argued, the proposed process imposed a greater degree of accountability and transparency, as well as a "timeframe ... in which there is a multifaceted assessment of the basis of [each] recommendation and the arguments in support of it." The process could not be "entirely painless," she argued, but could certainly be more "felicitous than it has been."¹²⁴ The House of Commons standing committee on national defence and veterans affairs endorsed the report, but the minister of national defence deferred action.

The appeal of the proposed procedure, designed to be as non-partisan as possible while placing significant constraints on government decision-making power, was grounded in the notion that the government itself would not be held accountable for the 'pain' inflicted on communities. Coming late in the Conservative mandate, however, some observers accused the government of simply using this advisory and committee process as a politically motivated delaying tactic to avoid announcing any base closures before the next election. They pointed to the American BRAC process as an indication that the decision-making process could be expedited if the government desired.¹²⁵ As events unfolded, all of these proposed procedural changes were rendered moot when an election was called and the Liberals were swept into power with a majority government.

2. The Liberals and their Critics

The Liberal Red Book committed to \$1.3 billion in federal cuts in 1994-95, of which nearly half would come from the cancellation of the EH-101 helicopter program and other unspecified defense programs.¹²⁶ As promised, the new government initiated a review of defense priorities but undertook serious reforms before the final

report was issued. In late 1993 an infrastructure review board comprised of senior officers was established to determine defense rationalization proposals and to reduce infrastructure to minimum requirements. The board's recommendations were subsequently circulated to departmental officials, the minister, cabinet, and government members of Parliament. Behind closed doors "the government significantly altered the package of recommendations and identified additional reductions in Defence infrastructure."¹²⁷

The February, 1994, budget announced the single largest program of base reductions and closures in Canadian history: four large bases and two military colleges would be closed in the next three years, and sixteen other installations would be shut down, consolidated, or have their operations scaled back. Perhaps even more surprisingly, the minister of national defense warned that the government's fiscal position would permit only modest compensation in special cases for these closures. There would be "no more Summersides" because the government "just [did not] have the millions of dollars to replace the economic activity." The government estimated that these actions would save \$850 million over five years and by 1997-98 would produce annual savings of \$350 million.¹²⁸ The 1995 federal budget announced the closure of nine more facilities.

The Department of National Defence's rationale for the reductions and closures was remarkably blunt and dismissive of the consultation procedures recommended by the advisory group:

Under the previous government, the Minister's Advisory Group on Defence Infrastructure, in its report to the Minister of National Defence, called for public consultations to be held prior to base closures. The recommended process involved extensive consultations, which would occur over an extended period of time. The Red Book, "Creating Opportunity," identified defence expenditure reductions which were both immediate and drastic. The timing of the savings required in this budget could not await the completion of the recommended public consultation process.... The base closures and facility reductions are occurring in order to save money. It will not, therefore, be possible financially to offset the impact of these decisions on local communities. The Federal Government is, however, pre-

pared to work with community leaders and other levels of government to assist in the development and implementation of community adjustment plans.¹²⁹

The constraints of public discussion and committee oversight were put aside in the name of expediency and efficiency. While the lack of input solicited criticism from opposition MPs and the media in affected areas, the Liberals achieved results. Defence Minister David Collenette, defending his government's actions, merely shifted blame to the previous Conservative administration: "For 10 years the Conservatives sat here in the biggest post-war economic boom and did not deal with the tough questions of surplus military infrastructures. They just sat on them and saddled Parliament with the consequences of their action, which is a deficit last year of \$45 billion. They should be ashamed of themselves.... The Conservatives should have taken these tough decisions and not left them to us."¹³⁰ The collapse of the Conservatives in the 1993 election meant that there was no force to counter this evasion of responsibility.

It took more than twenty-five years after the intention had been first announced in 1970 to close CFB Chatham. Defense officials publicly admitted in their budget documents that the department had been planning facility closures for years. Why, after decades of paralysis, was the Liberal government able to move so quickly and so drastically to impose these politically difficult losses on communities across the country? There were several key factors. First, by 1994 the Government was able to claim convincingly that the federal budget deficit was at a point of crisis. With virtual unanimity in the country that "something had to be done," it claimed a rare opportunity to impose losses not just in the defense budget but across the board. As a result, the Liberals were prepared to act promptly and confidently early in their mandate. Second, the 1994 reductions were spread out across the country,¹³¹ and the defense budget was careful to document precisely how even-handedly the cuts had been distributed. Third, while the budget had sternly warned that compensation would be minimal, it was still offered in some cases. Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu, the site of a military college, received \$25 million as well as a refitting of the facilities for new academic uses. Cornwallis, Nova Scotia, received \$7.5 million and would become home to a Canadian International Peacekeeping Centre. Chatham received \$17 million, including an armored vehicle renewal contract for which the region had no existing infrastructure.¹³² Fourth, the Liberals faced a unique

configuration of opposition parties, all of whom supported deficit reduction. Although opposition members attacked the government over specific closure decisions, they did not challenge the notion that a widespread reduction in infrastructure was badly needed. Furthermore, both the Bloc Quebecois and Reform parties had their power bases in specific regions of the country; as such, their opposition to Liberal decisions focused on areas they represented, allowing the government to dismiss their criticisms as narrow and self-centered.

Protests over the 1994/95 closures were different from those voiced in 1989. The debate in the House of Commons was, of course, thoroughly partisan. The Bloc Quebecois focused its energies on protesting the closure of the College Militaire Royal (CMR) in Saint-Jean, Quebec, the only French-language military school in Canada. With another referendum on Quebec sovereignty pending, the highly publicized, vociferous debate largely dissipated in 1995 when Saint-Jean was slated to become a "megaplex" training facility.¹³³ Reform Party members attacked the absence of a parliamentary review process on the closure decisions. While supportive of the government's promise to undertake a military defense review, members felt that the accelerated process prevented parliamentary input and, in the words of MP Dale Johnston, the government "completely prejudiced the outcome of the [review] study by going ahead and closing bases and reducing others."¹³⁴ Moose Jaw MP Allan Kerpan advocated that an *ad hoc* committee of MPs with bases in their ridings be established so that communities and parliamentarians could contribute information to the decision-making process. These accusations and suggestions did not influence the process at all; the Liberal response was that the Reform Party's own deficit-reduction agenda confirmed the need for the expedited process,¹³⁵ and de-distributive decision-making power remained centralized in the cabinet.

The Liberal government justified the 1994 cuts on the basis that a regional balance had been struck and that the majority of closures had come in Liberal constituencies.¹³⁶ The need to maintain a regional balance to the cuts was no longer a key criterion in 1995.¹³⁷ While the Liberals could plead a wide dispersion of loss in 1994, Reform-voting constituencies in Alberta and British Columbia clearly took the brunt of the following year's cuts. As a result, the most enduring criticisms came from the western provinces.

Calgary, Alberta, known for decades as the "Home of the Army of the West," went from proud "Garrison Town" to military ghost

town as a result of the federal budgets. Senior defense officials, fed up with years of uncertainty and tenuous negotiations over a training area on aboriginal lands, supported the closure of Harvey Barracks and the return of the Sarcee Training Area to the Tsuu T'ina First Nation in 1994. This sealed the fate of the rest of CFB Calgary. Although the cabinet had decided to close the entire base in 1994, it did not publicly announce the decision until the following year's budget. This stealthy approach caught many Calgarians by surprise, but the method of closing the base in stages helped preserve balanced national statistics for the 1994 cuts. The large and prosperous city could certainly absorb the economic shock of the loss, although local spokespeople questioned the motives and dubious financial justification for the closure. Edmonton, which had elected two Liberal members to Ottawa, stood to benefit from the transfer of soldiers and concomitant spending, including a large appropriation for new construction originally planned for Calgary. Rumors linked the closure of CFB Calgary with the need to console Edmontonians who had lost a squadron of Hercules aircraft that had been moved to Winnipeg, the riding of the minister of foreign affairs and international trade. In the latter case critics noted that the Winnipeg airport would have been no longer viable without this transfer, and that the minister's riding needed to be compensated for the loss of a regular force regiment moved to CFB Shilo.¹³⁸ For Calgary MP Jan Brown, the situation demonstrated "a lack of strategic planning from the government regarding its management and administration of the Canadian forces.... Strategic necessity dictates that government cease using the Canadian forces as the political football."¹³⁹ In the end, even a petition signed by more than ten thousand Calgarians protesting the closure posed little concern to the government in Ottawa.¹⁴⁰ The city was the heart of Reform country and would remain so whether the base was closed or maintained.

The closure of CFB Chilliwack was similarly controversial, although for different reasons. Also located in a riding held by a Reform MP, the army itself in this case, had vigorously opposed the closure. In internal national defense memoranda, Land Forces Command opposed the proposed closure on the basis that it needed an army base to support domestic operations in British Columbia, and that the excellent condition of the infrastructure (including several brand new buildings), low maintenance costs, and the high capital costs of moving elsewhere offset proposed benefits.¹⁴¹ More

closure proposals in the past. Its strong base of support in Ontario, where demographic and economic concentration (coupled with creative local reuse plans) muted the material losses of closures on communities, and diminished the need for costly, nationwide compensation. For political reasons the Maritimes, Quebec and Manitoba received moderate compensation for their losses, but the West, in turn, received little. Whatever the sentiments of citizens in constituencies (especially those represented by opposition MPs) that were impacted by the closures, there was no means of upsetting the process except by way of efforts to embarrass the government in the media or through their local representative in the House of Commons. Although the Liberals were ultimately accountable for the decisions, blame was averted by casting the closures and realignments in terms of deficit reduction, the military's self-professed need to divest surplus infrastructure and consolidate, and the opposition parties' concentrated interest in specific ridings. There was no broad threat to the notion that base closures were needed on a sweeping scale. In short, the Liberals accomplished their political objectives through enforced consensus without delegating authority to an autonomous, consultative body or dispensing large amounts of compensation to affected communities.

Reflecting on the 1994 closures, Peter C. Newman noted that for more than a decade "the chief of defense staff's office has kept a confidential list of twenty bases that could be closed without any serious military consequences."¹⁴⁶ Of the fifty-two bases, stations and detachments maintained by the military in 1994, this number had dropped to twenty-four by the end of 1999.¹⁴⁷ The recent closure process was perceived to be so successful that in the summer of 1999 the DND announced that a further ten percent of military infrastructure would be divested in order to pay for the acquisition of new equipment. With the scars of the 1970s and 1980s now removed from the federal political psyche, the upcoming round(s) of military base and infrastructure reduction in Canada will likely resemble those of the mid-nineties.

V. CONCLUSION

The U.S. and Canadian experiences with military base closures show strong similarities. Initially the two countries went through prolonged periods with minimal base closures until the late 1980s, but then both moved much more strongly to impose new closures,

impelled in large part by a combination of high budget deficits, high expectations for a "peace dividend" at the end of the Cold War, and a realization that continuing defense obligations, made more real by the Gulf War for the United States and new peacekeeping commitments for Canada, could only be sustained in the new fiscal environment by streamlining defense infrastructure.

The procedures adopted by the two countries to close military bases differed both in methods and in magnitude. The United States implemented a new procedure involving independent commissions that combined a highly visible analytic process, a veneer of public consultation, and a heavy dose of insulation from political blame for politicians. The Canadian Advisory Group was modeled on this experiment, but the Liberals scrapped it and reverted to an *ad hoc* budget-driven process imposing closures in 1994 and 1995. The government "essentially rejected the main components of the U.S. approach, namely a legislative requirement that the amount of infrastructure match the size of the force structure, retention of infrastructure according to well-defined military priorities and requirements, open public debate on closure proposals and a well-defined process for providing government financial assistance."¹⁴⁸

Two intertwined differences, one in the political environment and the other in political institutions, seem central in explaining the different paths taken by the two governments. The first difference is the greater salience of regional cleavages in Canada than in the United States. While regional divisions are by no means absent in the latter, the sense that any defense cutbacks in a region represent an affront to an already aggrieved and mistreated area, a self-perception shared by almost all regions in Canada, has weak parallels in the United States. Legislators from several regions lambasted the insensitivity of Washington-based bureaucrats in drawing up lists considered for closures, and charged that their regions were being singled out unfairly.¹⁴⁹ In 1994 California officials, for example, charged that their state had suffered 70 percent of the job losses in the first three rounds of base closures despite the fact that only 15 percent of military personnel had been based there.¹⁵⁰ In many cases, state and regional congressional delegations often worked together to block specific base closures. But on the whole, the sense of grievance was much more localized, and thus less politically explosive, in the United States.

Paralleling and reinforcing this difference was the role of the cabinet in Canadian base closures – a factor that has no parallel on the U.S. side. Canadian cabinets are composed of elected politicians and are constructed to be regionally representative and sensitive.¹⁵¹ While cabinets often delegate decision-making authority to specialized bodies like regulatory commissions, they almost always retain ultimate authority to overturn politically sensitive decisions made by those bodies. Peter Dobell, Research Director at the Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, explains:

The main ... distinction between the United States and Canada is that in the United States, the budget of the government or the budget of the executive has to be approved by Congress and is significantly modified. In Canada, the estimates are submitted to Parliament, but it is a matter of confidence. If the government fails to pass the estimates, the government falls and an election is called. So the major difference is, you might say, political more than constitutional. In the United States the President is incapable of closing a base without having the approval of Congress, whereas in Canada, I assume you would agree the past actions of the [federal] government in closing bases has been legal; they were within the government's power.¹⁵²

In the Canadian context, with decision-making power vested in the governing party, there was no *need* to establish 'non-partisan' commissions to determine what bases should be closed or realigned. While this de-distributive power alarmed the Conservative Party during its tenure in government, the Liberals have used the direct, cabinet-centered, decision-making powers at their disposal to great effect over the last decade. Furthermore, for the Canadian cabinet to bind itself in a meaningful way to an independent commission would be a much bigger leap than for American legislators, where such delegations are common, and where the courts (notably in the *Chadha* decision on the legislative veto) have limited legislative efforts to delegate authority.

Although an approach modeled on the American framework, such as that proposed by the MAGDI in 1992 and advocated by the auditor general, is viable for Canada, the BRAC process is not without shortcomings. Perhaps chief among them is the fact that decisions are made by unelected commissioners who will essentially

vanish after they have done their job. In a system based on elected representation and the opportunity to hold one's representatives accountable for their decisions, who is to be held responsible in this situation? Among the requisite features of representative democracy is the ability of the citizenry to make the laws and policies under which they live. The only way to do this successfully in countries as diverse and vast as the United States and Canada is through partial delegation of power from all of the citizens to those they regularly elect. Representative democracy is predicated on the idea that the individual citizen gives over his or her decision-making powers to an elected representative, who in turn is essentially responsible to the people. The government holds itself responsible for its own actions, and this is overseen by the people themselves. Has the BRAC experiment violated this connection between the government and people? Has Congress abdicated its institutional role as policymaker? And what of the individual representative who cannot really be held accountable for much more than voting to create the BRAC in the first place? Have elected officials circumvented their role in terms of taking responsibility for the policies that they are supposed to be formulating? Do decision-making mechanisms such as the BRAC undermine that accountability? Although elected officials are not eager to take responsibility for difficult and unpopular decisions, maneuvering to avoid accountability and responsibility also has potentially heavy costs, especially in terms of exacerbating the public's growing cynicism toward government.

The dilemma here is obvious. The BRAC approach seems to be an effective decision-making mechanism to deal with a tough political problem in the American system. But the dilemma emerges when there are calls for other BRAC-like commissions to attend to other redistributive issues. If this is the path that Congress and the president start to follow with some regularity, there may well be something to fear in terms of declining accountability in the political system. This is not a new dilemma, of course. There has always been a trade off between democratic institutions (characterized by openness, accessibility, and accountability) and policy efficiency. But is it worth a decline in political accountability and in the democratic character of institutions to make it easier to close excess domestic military bases? Is it worth that to get other difficult decisions implemented?

ACRONYMS

ACOA	Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency
AGC	Auditor General of Canada
BRAC	Base Realignment and Closure Commission (United States)
CFB	Canadian Forces Base
DND	Department of National Defence (Canada)
DoD	Department of Defense (United States)
GAO	General Accounting Office (United States)
INS	Immigration and Naturalization Service (United States)
MAGDI	Minister's Advisory Group on Defence Infra- structure (Canada)
MP	Member of Parliament (Canada)
NEPA	National Environmental Policy Act (United States)
SCEAND	House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence (Canada)

NOTES

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¹Paul Pierson, "The New Politics of the Welfare State," *World Politics* 48 (January 1996), pp. 144, 145. Also see R. Kent Weaver, "The Politics of Blame Avoidance," *Journal of Public Policy*, 6 (October-December 1986).

²For one of the many works on the topic of the distribution of goods by elected representatives and legislatures, see Theodore J. Lowi, "American Business, Public Policy, Case-Studies, and Political Theory," *World Politics*, 16 (July 1964). More references to and explanations of this theory will follow in the body of this work. As a point of clarification, Lowi discusses three kinds of policy areas in his article: distributive, regulatory, and re-distributive. De-distributive policy, which is the implementation of policy decisions that take some "good" away from a community, region, or state, should not be confused with Lowi's classification of "re-distributive" policy, which is the broad allocation of goods or wealth to the citizens.

³For much more information and a broader picture of the distributive tendencies of elected members and bodies, see Lowi, "American Business, Public Policy, Case-Studies, and Political Theory," *World Politics*, 16 (July 1964); David R. Mayhew, *Congress: The Electoral Connection* (New Haven, 1974); Richard F. Fenno, *Homestyle: House Members in Their Districts* (Boston, 1978); Paul Light, *Artful Work* (1985); Roger Davidson, *The Postreform Congress* (New York, 1992); R. Kent Weaver, "The Politics of Blame: Public Policy and Avoidance Behavior," *Current* (October 1987).

⁴Leslie A. Pal and R. Kent Weaver, "The Politics of Pain: Political Institutions and Loss Imposition in Canada and the United States." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political

Science Association, June 6-8, 1999, Sherbrooke, Quebec. Cited with permission of the authors.

⁵ Pal and Weaver, "The Politics of Pain."

⁶For a more extensive and somewhat more extreme analysis of this tendency, see David Schoenbrod, *Power without Responsibility: How Congress Abuses the People Through Delegation* (New Haven, 1993).

⁷R. Kent Weaver and Burt Rockman, *Do Institutions Matter?: Government Capabilities in the United States and Abroad* (Washington, D.C., 1993), p. 6.

⁸In the case of a minority parliamentary government, the administration must craft its positions to maintain support in the short term to ensure support for their proposals and their government. Furthermore, when an election is imminent, political elites will be less likely to support contentious legislation in fear of voter backlash.

⁹Weaver and Rockman, *Do Institutions Matter?*, pp. 12-37.

¹⁰R. Kent Weaver, "Are Parliamentary Systems Better?" *The Brookings Review*, 3 (Summer 1985), pp. 16-25.

¹¹*Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 20 (August 1995).

¹²*Rivals for Power: Presidential-Congressional Relations*, Edited by James A. Thurber (Washington, D.C., 1996).

¹³*Arms, Politics, and the Economy: Historic and Contemporary Perspectives*, edited by Robert Higgs (New York, 1990).

¹⁴Also see Fred Thompson, "Why America's Military Base Structure Cannot be Reduced," 48 *Public Administration Review* 557 (1988); Andrew Meyer, "Base Closures: Law and Politics" *Armed Forces and Society*, 8 (1982); Marcia Lynn Whicker and Nicholas A. Giannatsio, "The Politics of Military Base Closing: A New Theory of Influence," *Public Administration Quarterly*, 21:2 (Summer 1997).

¹⁵It should also be noted, for those looking for more information on this topic, that many of the military academies have had graduate students, mostly at the master's level, who have written theses on some particular aspect of the BRAC and the base closure process. The

emphasis within the theses tends to be much more an evaluation of the process that the various service branches go through to determine which bases they are suggesting for closure. These theses are difficult to attain because the academies only make limited copies available to the public, and from what the authors can determine, none of them have been published in any commercial forum.

Also, those looking for more information might want to search dissertation databases, since there have been a number of doctoral dissertations written on the BRAC.

¹⁶*University of Colorado Law Review*, Volume 62 (1991).

¹⁷See *Dalton v. Specter*, 511 U.S. 462 (114 S. Ct. 1719, 1994) and *National Federation of Federal Employees vs. U.S.*, 284 U.S. App. D.C. 295 (905 F. 2d 400; 1990 U.S. App.) for the actual court decisions on these constitutional issues. Also see, among others, Michael A. Fitts, "Can ignorance be bliss? Imperfect Information as a Positive Influence in Political Institutions," *Michigan Law Review* (April 1990); Louise Weinberg, Ira Rothgerber, Jr. "Conference on Constitutional Law: Guaranteeing a Republican Form of Government: Political Questions and the Guarantee Clause," *Colorado Law Review* (Fall 1994); Larry Alexander & Evan Tsen Lee, "Is there such a thing as extraconstitutionality?: The Puzzling Case of *Dalton v. Specter*," *Arizona State Law Journal* (Fall 1995); Jay S. Bybee, "Advising the President: Separation of Powers and the Federal Advisory Committee Act," *Yale Law Journal* (October 1994).

¹⁸ Bland, *Chiefs of Defence: Government and the Unified Command of the Canadian Armed Forces* (Toronto, 1995), pp. xv, 35. See also Bland's *The Administration of Defence Policy in Canada 1947-84* (Kingston, 1987).

¹⁹There are a few exceptions to this generalization, particularly in the United States. Most of the exceptions have to do with military spending trends (which may or may not be attributable to political motives in the first place), but while specific closings are concentrated geographically, the closings also tend to reflect the age of bases. There are many more older, outdated, and theoretically less efficient bases in the northeast and midwestern regions of the United States, therefore base closure decisions will consciously or unconsciously target the northeast and midwest. (And the weather in the northeast and midwest also has a more acute effect on structures in

general, to say nothing of beneficial flying weather in the southwest and other such considerations.) And there is, of course, the case of California. California received approximately one-fourth of defense expenditures during the most recent military build up in the 1980s. Therefore, when there is a general trend towards military de-distribution across the board (not just as regards military bases), California was and did take much more of a hit than any other state or region. And there was a great outcry by the state and its elected representatives to take this into consideration when many of the base closure decisions were being made.

²⁰Of course, if the closure involves some consolidation so that operations are moved to another locale, then the beneficiaries are equally visible and concentrated. However, they will be small in number, and can hardly afford to crow about their good fortune (at least not too loudly.) The present situation would suggest that there are *very few* bases that can consider themselves "safe" from closure, regardless of expansions or changes in missions.

²¹Interview with Mike Berger, Arlington, Virginia, May 5, 1998.

²²Urban areas have, for the most part, been much more able and suited to successfully recover from a major base closure. In many cases, the military's exodus from a facility has proven to be a significant bonus for the economy of an urban area. Rural areas have had a tougher time because there are not, usually, as many options for vacated facilities.

²³Though there are cases where there is an argument to be made for the symbolic quality or character of a base that often keeps it from making it on to a list of closures. In the United States these bases are referred to as "crown jewels" by those in the services who want to keep them open. Most of the time the reason these bases are symbolic is because extensive cadres of personnel have trained and worked there, over a long period of time and the military then attributes a sense of history and tradition to such a place and will do much to keep it open. The symbolic quality is one that the military tends to associate with these "crown jewels" of bases, not necessarily an association mirrored by the general public.

Fort Monroe in Virginia is an example of a "crown jewel" since it has "a training command which runs all the training bases

and all the officer training” and quite a few people have come through Ft. Monroe over the years since it was first built to protect the U.S. in the War of 1812. According to Doug Hanson, who was involved, in one form or another—though mostly from the military’s perspective—with each of the BRAC rounds, “we are a prisoner of history, that is why we still have Ft. Monroe, because that is where the military operated out of for a long time and we still have use for it.” Interview with Doug Hanson, Arlington, Virginia, May 7, 1998.

²⁴For example, the idea of some historical or organizational link between a base and its surrounding region or area can be invoked to oppose a closure. The case of the Charleston Naval Shipyard is a classic example of this, since it had been present for as long as Charleston, South Carolina had existed.

²⁵See, for example, “Shutdown of forces base will knock N.B. town flat,” *Calgary Herald*, November 10, 1981, and the Canadian Department of National Defence (DND) budget impact statements for 1994 and 1995 which detail anticipated socio-economic impacts on communities.

²⁶ Kenneth R. Mayer, “Closing Military Bases (Finally): Solving collective Dilemmas Through Delegation,” *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 20:3 (August 1995) p. 396. See also Bob Benenson, “Members Hustle to Protect Defense Jobs Back Home,” *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 48:2 (January 13, 1990), pp. 90.

²⁷Following the respective ends of World War I and II, there were a variety of executive agencies that dealt with base closures and disposal of property. In 1918, the General Supply Committee in the Treasury Department was established; it went through a variety of incarnations during the inter-war years, finally evolving into the War Assets Administration which was established in the midst of WWII to make sure that there was a plan in place after the war to draw down the military in the United States.

²⁸Mayer, “Closing Military Bases,” pp. 398-99.

²⁹As Bob Bayer (who has worked on Capital Hill, in the Defense Department, and with the BRAC, over the course of his career) remarked:

There is this whole history, a bipartisan history, of the executive branch using the base closure process to essentially reap retribution on their political foes. It's done by both Republicans and Democrats or at least the assertions were made that it was done and it was conventional wisdom that it had been done and therefore whether you could [actually] justify those assertions, the belief that they were true became a reality in it's own right.

Interview with Robert Bayer, Arlington, Virginia, May 1998

Representative Dick Armey (R-TX), in his article on the need for a Base Closure Commission, goes into great detail on this topic as well, explaining some of the instances where this fear of political retribution via base closures has come into play. He cites two stories in particular, representing this "sin" by both Democrats and Republicans.

Texans tell the story of Lyndon Johnson's personal war against the Amarillo Air Force Base. When he was up for reelection, Johnson supposedly told the elders of Amarillo, Texas, that if he did not carry their town, he might decide that their air base should be shut down. Amarillo went for his opponent anyway, and in due course, the air base was deemed "uneconomical" and eliminated. More recently, many thought it suspicious that the Nixon administration chose to close two bases in Massachusetts shortly after Massachusetts became the only state to support George McGovern.

Richard Armey, "Base Maneuvers: The Games Congress Plays with the Military Pork Barrel," *Policy Review* (Winter 1988), p. 73.

³⁰Mike Mills, "Members Go on the Offensive to Defend Bases," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, July 2, 1988, pp. 1815-1817.

³¹Mayer, "Closing Military Bases," p. 394. See also Charlotte Twight, "Department of Defense Attempts to Close Military Bases: The Political Economy of Congressional Resistance," in Higgs, ed., *Arms, Politics, and the Economy*. The key provision impeding military base closures was a requirement that detailed environmental impact studies be conducted of any base closure proposal. See Mike Mills, "1976 Law Poses Key Hurdle to Closing Bases," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, vol. 48 (July 2, 1990), p. 1817.

³²Phil Kuntz, "House Panels Differ Over Base-Closing Bill," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, June 11, 1988, p. 619.

³³H.R. 1583 to Establish the Bipartisan Commission on the Consolidation of Military Bases, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Military Installations and Facilities, 100 Cong. 1st sess., March 17, May 18, 19, and June 8, 1988, p. 120.

³⁴"Politics" did not play all that extensive a role in the base closing process as World War II came to a close. Much larger policy requirements held sway over the more parochial considerations during this period. These larger requirements included the need and desire to avoid another depression; the resulting promise of a full employment economy; and the general tendency to allow the executive and the secretary of defense and the newly established National Security Council to make such decisions based on their advanced expertise in the area and also their understanding of the international atmosphere. After WWII, many of the old bases were converted into satellite campuses for state colleges and universities, housing for returning servicepeople and their families, and other federally supported missions. This kept federal dollars flowing into the geographic areas that had had federal military dollars support during the war. Subsequent base closure periods did not have the same kind of extensive federal support, but the DOD has long had an Office of Economic Assistance to aid communities facing base closures and to help those in the community who may need to relocate or find new employment as a result of such closures. With the advent of the BRAC, particularly through the later legislation that created the multiple-round Commission, the DOD Office of Economic Assistance has received more budgetary allocations and has expanded its staff and the extent of its aid and assistance. Because of the extensiveness of base closures in the United States, particularly during the last decade of closures, there is no realistic way that the federal government could come in and allocate and administer the same kind of assistance that it provided after WWII. This also provides a point of contrast with the kind of assistance that the government of Canada was able to provide to the communities facing a major base closure or downsizing. See the latter part of this work for more information on some of those differences.

³⁵According to Warner R. Schilling, in his section of *Strategy, Politics and Defense Budgets*, the congressional committees and members in 1950 really had no idea even what questions to ask of the either the DOD or the president when it came to military policy, let alone trying to make some kind of coherent policy themselves. Casimir Hadwiger, in his dissertation, makes a similar point with regard to the period of the late 1950s and early 1960s. C.D. Hadwiger, *Military Base Closures: How Congress Balances Geographic and General Interests* (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California at Berkeley, 1993) p. 54.

³⁶*Ibid*, p. 57.

³⁷*Ibid*, p. 77.

³⁸Such as resorting to a filibuster, amending a bill to death, or tying up the legislation in committee.

³⁹Sidney M. Milkis, *The President and the Parties: The Transformation of the American Party System Since the New Deal* (Oxford, 1993), p. 244.

⁴⁰R. Kent Weaver, "Is the Congress Abdicating Power to Commissions," *Roll Call*, February 12, 1989, p. 5.

⁴¹R. Kent Weaver, "The Politics of Blame," *The Brookings Review* (1987), pp. 43-47.

⁴²Following the unification of the Canadian Armed Forces, there were several closures and reductions in 1966, related to an attempt to rationalize the over 100 training centers the military maintained across the country. See "Ottawa May Close Centralia Air Base," *Globe and Mail* (Toronto, Canada), May 9, 1966; "Churchill to Lose Navy," *Winnipeg Free Press*, September 14, 1966. The reduction in the number of supply depots from fifteen to four, in basic training camps from eleven to two, in specialized training schools from ninety-one to thirty, and the concentration of all basic officer training at one camp were key successes of unification that lowered Canadian defense costs in the late 1960s and early 1970s, according to J.L. Granatstein and Robert Bothwell. See *Pirouette: Pierre Trudeau and Canadian Foreign Policy* (Toronto, 1990), p. 249.

⁴³Clive Baxter, "Bad News on Base Closings Comes Soon," *Financial Post*, August 9, 1969.

⁴⁴Canadian Forces Supply Depot in Cobourg, Canadian Forces Supply and Maintenance Depot in London, and a radar base in Clinton. Clive Baxter, "Want to Buy a Base? Ottawa Selling Some," *Financial Post*, November 29, 1969.

⁴⁵Dr. J.C. Arneil, Assistant Deputy Minister (Finance), Department of National Defence [hereafter DND], SCEAND, March 26, 1971, pp. 20:15-16; Mr. D.H.W. Kirkwood, ADM (Policy), DND, SCEAND, March 28, 1974, pp. 7:16-17.

⁴⁶Clive Baxter, "Bad News on Base Closings Comes Soon," *Financial Post*, August 9, 1969.

⁴⁷Scott Young, "No Firm Commitment, But PM Sympathetic on Base-Closing Issue," *Globe and Mail*, July 25, 1969.

⁴⁸"Defence Closedowns to Take Some Years," *Montreal Star*, July 29, 1969.

⁴⁹"Defence Base Closings, Cuts, to Be Staggered," *Ottawa Journal*, July 29, 1969.

⁵⁰"To Fight Air Base Closure," *Winnipeg Free Press*, August 28, 1970; Paul Pihichyn, "Government May Delay Closures," *Winnipeg Free Press*, November 19, 1970. Cadieux's successor, Donald MacDonald, explained that the closures of Gimli and Rivers were "an essential element in the overall base consolidation program stemming from a general reduction in the size of the forces, a change in force priorities and a fixed defence budget." He also justified the retention of Camp Vernon for cadet training (an early decision had slated the facility for "caretaker status"), although he stressed that "the policy of consolidation of such camps and installations at the larger and more permanent bases, with the overall advantages that are to be gained by such consolidation, does remain an ultimate goal." SCEAND, February 18, 1971, pp. 12:12-13. For a list of closures from 1965-1972, including the number of displaced personnel by site, see Lieutenant-Colonel J. Gardam, Directorate of Base Planning, DND, SCEAND, March 16, 1972, p. 5:18.

⁵¹Gerald Porter, *In Retreat: The Canadian Forces in the Trudeau Years* (Ottawa: Deneau and Greenberg, 1978), pp. 8-11; Report of the Auditor General of Canada 1994, chapter 26: Infrastructure Reduc-

tions (hereafter 1994 AGC Report), <http://www.oag-bvg.ca/domino/reports.nsf/html/9426ce.html>.

⁵² "Forces Thin, Gov't Studies Cutting Bases," *Ottawa Journal*, November 26, 1975. On the need for closures, see also Hon. James Richardson, Minister of National Defence, Statement on Defence Expenditures for 1976-77, Appendix Q, SCEAND, April 13, 1976, p. 35:29.

⁵³ "No Decision Made on Base Closures," *Ottawa Citizen*, January 27, 1976; SCEAND, May 6, 1976, pp. 39:19-20, 23; May 13, 1976, p. 35:19.

⁵⁴ Greg Coolen, "Economic Nightmare," *Chronicle-Herald* (Halifax), March 23, 1976.

⁵⁵ John Porteous, "Maritime Bases 'On Alert' Over Rumours of Closings," *Financial Post*, April 3, 1976.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ "Shutdown of forces base will knock N.B. town flat," *Calgary Herald*, November 10, 1981; "N.B. Businessmen fear CFB Chatham to close," *Globe and Mail*, 5 February 1984; DND, News Release, May 22, 1984.

⁵⁸ Victor Mackie, "Plan to Close Bases Stalled in Committee," *Ottawa Journal*, May 27, 1976.

⁵⁹ "Ottawa Postpones Plans to Trim Military Bases," *Globe and Mail*, July 26, 1976.

⁶⁰ National Defence Headquarters Study Directive S 61, "Infrastructure Rationalization," November 30, 1976, Directorate of History and Heritage 78/154; Victor Mackie, "Military Base Cuts Reduced," *Ottawa Journal*, October 6, 1976; "Pressures Force Ottawa to Reduce Base Closures," *Albertan*, October 6, 1976.

⁶¹ John McHugh, "CFB London to Remain Open," *London Free Press*, November 30, 1976; Hon. B.J. Danson, Minister of National Defence, SCEAND, November 29, 1976, pp. 2:14-15; December 1, 1976, pp. 3:24-5; March 8, 1977, pp. 6:37-40; General Dextraze, SCEAND, March 10, 1977, pp. 7:14-32. On the rationale for maintaining CFB Summerside, see Third Report to the House, SCEAND, June 29, 1972,

p. 19:9; SCEAND, May 6, 1975, p. 20:36.

⁶²Bland, *Chiefs of Defence*, 109, 151, 241.

⁶³Only two facilities were closed in the late 1970s and early 1980s: Canadian Forces Ammunition Depot Renous in New Brunswick and Canadian Forces Station Churchill in Manitoba in 1978 and 1980 respectively. 1994 AGC Report.

⁶⁴*Competitiveness and Security* (Ottawa, 1985), p. 37.

⁶⁵Twight, "Department of Defense Attempts to Close Military Bases," p. 262.

⁶⁶Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1988, section 208 [Public Law 100-526], Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, section 2903 (e), section 2904 (a) [Public Law 101-510]. Also see Christopher Deering, "Congress, The President, and Automatic Government: The Case of Military Base Closures," in James A. Thurber, ed., *Rivals for Power: Presidential-Congressional Relations* (Washington, D.C.), pp. 153-169.

⁶⁷The BRAC is to be composed of members who are appointed by the president and are approved by the senate. The appointments are to be made in consultation with the majority and minority parties in both houses so as to make sure that the Commission has a partisan balance. The members are not elected representatives, though quite a few of them have formerly been elected representatives and senators, as well as retired military personnel and civilian businesspeople.

⁶⁸As Ken Mayer notes, the first round of base closings under the independent commission process contained one potential roadblock that could (and almost did) kill the process: a requirement that normal procedures be used to appropriate funds needed to implement base closures. In the subsequent legislation that set up the later rounds of base closures, funds were both authorized and appropriated in advance. See Mayer, "Closing Military Bases," p. 401.

⁶⁹Mayer, "Closing Military Bases," p. 406.

⁷⁰Rep. Armev, as the author of the base closure commission legislation, has long defended it and other issues that he supports as efforts to get rid of unnecessary waste in the government.

⁷¹ Robert Meyer, who was intimately familiar with most of the BRAC rounds, having worked with them in one capacity or another (running the congressional oversight component—GAO—in '91 and '93, and in '95 he ran the DOD side of the BRAC process), explained the members, behavior in this way:

...by and large the members have to defend against closure and politically they have to defend against closure, the fact is, frankly, it's a political show that they have to go through because they are convinced, in the long run, there will be more jobs there. [But] they have to rant and rave against [the closure decisions] and try and defend it, which they'll do, so they need the political [cover] of the commission, they need the political [cover] of the thing to allow the process to work.

Interview with Robert Meyer, Crystal City, Virginia, 6 May 1998.

There is also, of course, Senator Phil Gramm's (R-TX) famous statement as to the merits of the way that the BRAC works:

The beauty of this proposal is that: If you have a military base in your district—G-d forbid one should be closed in Texas, but it could happen—under this proposal, I have 60 days. So, I come up here and I say, "G-d have mercy. Don't close this base in Texas. We can get attacked from the south. The Russians are going to go after our leadership and you know they are going to attack Texas. We need this base.

Then I can go and lie down in the street and the bulldozers are coming and I have a trusty aide there just sitting here to drag me out of the way. All the people in Muleshoe, or wherever this base is, will say, "You know, Phil Gramm got whipped, but it was like the Alamo. He was with us until the last second.

Quoted in Dick Arme's "Base Maneuvers" in *Policy Review* (Winter 1988), p.74.

⁷²As author of the BRAC legislation, Rep. Arme was unabashedly clear that he was modeling the BRAC on the more useful or successful characteristics of what was finally known as the "Gang of 17", or the group that crafted and then streamlined the process for putting through bipartisan Social Security Reform in 1982-1983. See Paul

Light's *Artful Work: The Politics of Social Security Reform* for more details on that particular commission.

⁷³The four committees were Armed Services, Merchant Marines and Fisheries, Government Operations and the Rules Committee.

⁷⁴See Phil Kuntz, "House Panels Differ Over Base-Closing Bill," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, June 11, 1988, pp. 1619—1620, and Mike Mills, "Members Go on the Offensive to Defend Bases," p. 1815.

⁷⁵Barbara Sinclair, "House Majority Party Leadership in an Era of Legislative Constraint," in Roger Davidson, ed., *The Postreform Congress* (New York, 1992), p. 92.

⁷⁶Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, sec. 2908(c), 104 Stat. 1817 (1990), 10 USC 2687 note. [PL 101-510].

⁷⁷Roger Davidson, *The Postreform Congress*, p. 17.

⁷⁸Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci already appointed a commission before the 1988 legislation was passed, but the legislation defined the procedures by which its recommendations could be rejected by Congress.

⁷⁹"House Clear the Way for Base Closings," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 47 (April 22, 1989), p. 918.

⁸⁰Cheney is quoted in Pat Towell, "On Base Closings, No Hill Reprieve," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 49 (September 30, 1989), p. 2576. See also Mike Mills, "Challenge to Base Closings Fizzles On House Floor," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 47 (August 5, 1989), pp. 2062-2064. Secretary of Defense Cheney's comments are the same argument that the Supreme Court later made when it was confronted with a complaint about the BRAC process and the desire by some elected representatives to have certain bases taken off the list after the fact.

⁸¹Press speculation at the time suggested that about two dozen bases were likely to be closed. See Associated Press, "Panel Expected to Favor Closing Two Dozen Military Bases," *Washington Post*, Decem-

ber 14, 1988, p. A4; "Bye-Bye Bases," *National Journal*, October 15, 1988, p. 2624.

⁸²Interview with Jay Winik, Washington, D.C., May 5, 1998.

⁸³Twenty-nine of the thirty-five major domestic base closures proposed by the defense secretary for consideration were in Democratic districts. See Mike Mills, "Cheney's Plan for Shutdowns A New Salvo in Long Fight," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 48:5 (February 3, 1990), pp. 340-342.

⁸⁴See Elizabeth A. Palmer and Pat Towell, "Cheney Reveals new Hit List; Members Feel the Pain," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, April 13, 1991, pp. 931-932.

⁸⁵Barton Gellman, "Base-Closing List Likely to Stick Despite Flack," *Washington Post*, July 2, 1991, p. A4.

⁸⁶Elizabeth A. Palmer, "Commission Spares Just a Few from Cheney's Hit List," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, July 6, 1991, pp. 1845-1848; Elizabeth A. Palmer, "Bush Approves Panel's List, Dashing Members' Hopes," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, July 13, 1991, p. 1915; Elizabeth A. Palmer, "Opponents Lose Final Bid to Save Installations," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, August 3, 1991, p. 2190.

⁸⁷See Elizabeth A. Palmer, "Megaports to Keep navy Afloat As Other Facilities Close," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, July 3, 1993, pp. 1755-1758.

⁸⁸"Base Closings Pit Some Republicans Against Bush," *New York Times*, 15 April 1991, section A, p. 10.

⁸⁹Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, *1991 Report to the President*, Executive Summary, (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1991), p. vi. (Emphases are the authors'.)

⁹⁰Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, *1995 Report to the President*, Previous Base Closure Rounds, p. 5, subsection Chapter 4.

⁹¹ Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, *1991 Report to the President*, Executive Summary, p. v.

⁹²For more extensive details and information on this topic, see "Chapter 6: The Return of Politics to the Process: Rounds Two, Three and Four" in Lilly J. Goren's doctoral dissertation, *BRAC to the Future: Evasive Delegation and Blame Avoidance in Base Closings* (Ph.D. dissertation, Boston College, 1998).

⁹³*Dalton v. Specter*, 511 U.S. 462 (114 S. Ct. 1719, 1994).

⁹⁴"High Court Hears a Senator Argue for Right to Sue on a Base Closing," *New York Times*, 3 March 1994, section A, p. 16.

⁹⁵"High Court Hears a Senator," *New York Times*, 3 March 1994, section A, p. 16.

⁹⁶*Dalton v. Specter*, 511 U.S. 462 (114 S. Ct. 1719, 1994).

⁹⁷*Ibid.*

⁹⁸The co-plaintiffs included Senators Harris Wafford (Democrat-PA), Bill Bradley (Democrat-N.J.), Frank R. Lautenberg (Democrat-N.J.) and Robert P. Casey (Governor, PA) as well as some twenty other officials.

⁹⁹*Dalton v. Specter*, 511 U.S. 462 (114 S. Ct. 1719, 1994).

¹⁰⁰ "High Court Hears a Senator," *New York Times*, 3 March 1994, section A, p. 16.

¹⁰¹Independent regulatory commissions were constructed with "sub-legislative" powers, "quasi-judicial" powers, and the executive powers that are more or less *de facto* in any administrative context. The fusion of these three kinds of powers in one place might seem to violate the constitution on the basis of separation of powers. But, consistent with the logic applied to the grants of legislative and judicial powers to the commissions, the commissions themselves are not composed of precisely the powers that may not be combined according to the principle of the constitution. In the constitutional legitimacy of these entities independent regulatory commissions and agencies are not merely extensions of executive power; rather, they are consolidations or confederations of the powers separated by the

tripartite system established by the constitution. And while this is the unique and potentially tyrannical quality of an independent regulatory commission or agency, the protection against tyranny comes from the confining boundaries of a commission's mandate. The integration of a judicial oversight function within the context of those mandates and thus within the structure of the commissions and agencies themselves also provides a protection.

The BRAC is not constituted in the same fashion as are independent regulatory commissions or agencies. It is not like the "old" models of these commissions. Although, this is, in many ways, the theoretical model that the BRAC most closely resembles, it is missing a number of the independent regulatory commissions' and agencies' basic characteristics. To begin with, the BRAC is not a permanent commission. It has been brought to life by two separate pieces of legislation, allowing for a total of four "rounds" of decision-making. But unlike the Interstate Commerce Commission or the Federal Trade Commission or even the National Labor Relations Board, the BRAC was not intended to be a permanent institutionalized structure. From the outset, its somewhat stealthlike character was one of the BRAC's most attractive attributes. It comes into being, quickly executes its task, since it has a very condensed timetable, supplies the crucial list of proposed bases for closure or realignment, and simply disappears.

For a much more extensive analysis of this topic, particularly supplying the constitutional case law history and the evolution of independent regulatory commissions and agencies within the context of the U.S. Constitution and in relation to the place of the BRAC in that context, see "Chapter 2: The Evolution of Congressional Delegation: Constitutional Context, History, and Recent Variations" in Goren's *BRAC to the Future*.

¹⁰²Natalie Hanlon, "Military Base Closings: A Study of Government by Commission," *University of Colorado Law Review*, 62 (1991), pp. 347-348.

¹⁰³National Federation of Federal Employees v. United States of America, 905 F.2d 404, (D.C. Cir. 1990).

¹⁰⁴Hanlon, "Military Base Closings," p. 349.

¹⁰⁵ "High Court Hears a Senator," *New York Times*, March 3, 1994, section A, p. 16.

¹⁰⁶The 1988 BRAC selected 86 bases for closure, 16 of them major installations, and 59 bases for realignment, 11 of them major installations. The 1991 BRAC selected 34 bases for closure, 26 of them major installations, and 48 bases for realignment, 19 of them major installations. The 1993 BRAC selected 130 bases for closure, 28 of them major installations, and 45 bases for realignment, 13 of them major installations. Finally, the 1995 BRAC selected 132 bases total for either closure or realignment. Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, *1995 Report to the President*, Previous Base Closure Rounds, Subsection Chapter 4.

¹⁰⁷The BRAC had been instructed to take this calculation into effect when making its decisions, since the bases that are selected are to reach a point of savings instead of expenditures within a five or six year period.

¹⁰⁸ Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, *1995 Report to the President*, Executive Summary, p. v.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁰While the authors understand that these terms and titles are rather brief, for a lengthier explanation of much of this information, see Goren's doctoral dissertation, *BRAC to the Future: Evasive Delegation and Blame Avoidance in Base Closings*, where these themes provide much of the framework for understanding and analyzing the Base Realignment and Closing Commission as somewhat new form of congressional and presidential de-distributive or loss-imposing decision making.

¹¹¹Scholarly examples such as Paul Light's *Artful Work*, R. Kent Weaver and Burt Rockman's *Do Institutions Matter*, and Francis E. Rourke & Paul R. Schulman's article "Adhocracies in Policy Development," (in *The Social Science Journal*, Volume 26, Number 2, pages 131-142) point to some of these conclusions. Congressional activity also leads in this direction; automatic legislation like the Gramm-Rudman-Hollins budget bill and creations such as the BRAC can only suggest that elected officials will respond when there is a crisis brewing, but they may not want to incur any blame for the solutions.

¹¹²The lines in bold indicate what appeared to be the key characteristics for the success of the particular commission, or the key element that needed to be integrated into the decision-making process so that it would be accepted and acceptable.

¹¹³DND, Backgrounder, *Base Reconstruction*, May 1989. The high cost of maintaining small, remote, and obsolete facilities did lead to some closures between 1986 and 1990. Twenty-one Pinetree Line radar stations were shut down, but because of their size and location they generated little public controversy. 1994 AGC Report.

¹¹⁴ Canada, Department of Finance, *The Budget Speech*, April 27, 1989, p. 6; 1994 AGC Report.

¹¹⁵ Michel Rossignol, *Military Base Closures* (Ottawa: Library of Parliament, 1993); *Canada's Defence News Bulletin*, 3/18, May 3, 1989. The resounding Conservative majority in the House of Commons (168 seats, compared to 83 for the Liberals and 43 for the NDP, as of January 1989) did not translate into a majority of closings and reductions in Conservative-voting ridings. In fact, most of the cuts hit ridings with Liberal representatives.

¹¹⁶Carey French, "Communities Join Forces Against Base Closings," *Globe and Mail*, May 2, 1989. See also SCEAND, June 26, 1989, pp. 4:14-17.

¹¹⁷John Lyons, "Prairie Effort Trails Island Lobby," *Winnipeg Free Press*, June 30, 1989.

¹¹⁸Roy Wood, "PM Stands Firm on Base Closing Despite Ghiz's Plea," *Montreal Gazette*, July 11, 1989; Julian Beltrame, "6,000 Islanders protest base closing," *Calgary Herald*, May 15, 1989. The closure of CFB Summerside was the subject of much debate in the House of Commons during the 2nd session, 34th Parliament. On efforts to mitigate the impact of closures on local communities, see SCEAND, June 21, 1989, pp. 3:8-32.

¹¹⁹Peter C. Newman, "Time to Gut Our Biggest Landlord," *Maclean's*, 7 March 1994, p.44. Prime Minister Brian Mulroney created a special joint federal-provincial committee on the adjustment process for Summerside and surrounding communities. In March 1990, less than a year after the closure was announced, a locally-controlled

corporation was established to take over the assets of the base, when the military ceased its operations in 1992, and then to aid in redeveloping the property. Slemon Park Corporation was capitalized with \$10 million from the federal Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency and \$5 million from the provincial government, and with the continued backing of the federal government the community's economy diversified successfully (especially in the aerospace industry). Mike Carson, "Citizens recall black day: Summerside remembers base closures in 1989," *Charlottetown Guardian*, April 24, 1999. In two cases, the decision to reduce and close bases were either reversed or never carried out (CFB Moncton and CFB Winnipeg). 1994 AGC Report.

¹²⁰All quotes are from the 1994 AGC Report.

¹²¹Quoted in "Comments: A Non-Interview with Marcel Masse," *Esprit de Corps* (April 1992), p. 13.

¹²²"How to Streamline our Defence System," *Maclean's*, August 19, 1991. On another proposed course of action for infrastructure reductions through an all-party panel and the establishment of a Royal Commission on Defence Infrastructure (to facilitate the input of local officials and the public), see Lieutenant-Colonel Douglas Bland, "A White Paper for Canada," *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, 20/3 (December 1990), p. 31.

¹²³The advisory group was composed of Dr. Kathryn Bindon (the principal of Sir Wilfred Grenfell College and a history professor in Newfoundland), Guy Fournier (an engineer and president of a major Montreal consulting firm), and chaired by Harry Graschuk (a chartered accountant from Edmonton, Alberta). It was not mandated to identify specific facilities for closure. *Statement by the Honourable Marcel Masse*, September 17, 1991. Masse, an ardent Quebecois nationalist, was sharply criticized for his alleged "pork-barreling" and allocation of resources to Quebec at the expense of the rest of Canada, especially the Maritimes and the West. See "Anti-Quebec backlash unfounded, Masse says," *Globe and Mail*, September 5, 1992; Courtney Tower, "The Quebec military build-up: Ottawa centralizes defence infrastructure in a province threatening separation," *Alberta Report* (August 17, 1992), p. 10.

¹²⁴SCEAND, June 16, 1992, p. 26:14.

¹²⁵ See, for example, SCEAND, October 21, 1991, p. 7:15.

¹²⁶ Liberal Party of Canada, *Creating Opportunity: The Liberal Plan for Canada* (Ottawa, 1993), p. 111. Once in power they saw even greater advantage in slashing planned defense expenditures on new weaponry.

¹²⁷ In the autumn of 1993, the Chief of the Defence Staff issued instructions to achieve the "minimum required infrastructure" according to "a dollar-defined objective." AGC Report 1994.

¹²⁸ Hugh Winsor, "Collonette warns of base closings," *Globe and Mail*, February 18, 1994; Jeff Sallot, "Four military bases wiped off map," *Globe and Mail*, February 23, 1994.

¹²⁹DND, *1994 Budget*, 19.

¹³⁰Canada, House of Commons, *Debates* [hereafter *Hansard*], February 23, 1994, p. 1744.

¹³¹The high per capita military cuts in Atlantic Canada, the Minister argued, reflected the disproportionate number of bases built in the region as staging points during the Second World War that had never been closed. See Jeff Sallot, "Four military bases wiped off map," *Globe and Mail*, February 23, 1994.

¹³²"\$1 Million is Enough, Ottawa Says," *Montreal Gazette*, June 13, 1996; Jean-Marc Jacob (Charlesbourg, BQ), *Hansard*, November 21, 1995, p. 16584; DND, Backgrounder, "Cornwallis: A Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre," February 1994. There were also criticisms of so-called 'closures' of some bases that were not closed completely but reduced to "detachment status." See, for example, Robert Sheppard, "The way to 'close' a military base," *Globe and Mail*, November 22, 1994.

¹³³David Johnston, "Defence Fallout," *Montreal Gazette*, February 26, 1994; "Anne McIlroy, "Quebec signs deal for military college," *Calgary Herald*, July 20, 1994; Rheal Seguin and Susan Delacourt, "PQ wants military college left open," *Globe and Mail*, October 19, 1994.

¹³⁴*Hansard*, February 24, 1994, p. 1819.

¹³⁵*Hansard*, February 17, 1994, p. 1517; see also February 3, 1994, p. 885.

¹³⁶See Hon. David Michael Collenette, *Hansard*, February 23, 1994, p. 1744. The 1993 election saw the Liberals win a majority government with a power base in the Maritimes, Ontario and Manitoba. The BQ won 54 of 75 seats in Quebec, and the Reform Party won 50 of 72 seats in Saskatchewan, Alberta and British Columbia.

¹³⁷Confidential Comd 8009, re: Federal Budget 27 Feb 95, dated February 28, 1995, p. 4 (acquired through Access to Information).

¹³⁸See Letter, General A.J.G.D. de Chastelain, Chief of the Defence Staff, August 5, 1994; CFB Calgary Closure - Master Implementation Plan; Annex D to (A) 94/0156 (VCDS), July 1994 (acquired under Access to Information); Stephen Harper (Calgary West, Ref.), *Hansard*, March 23, 1995, p. 10885; *Hansard* (online version), September 19, 1994, http://www.parl.gc.ca/english/hansard/previous/092_94-09-19/092SM1E.html. On Aboriginal- military relations in the context of real property, see P. Whitney Lackenbauer, "Aboriginal Claims and the Canadian Military: The Impact on Domestic Strategy and Operations," Conference of Defence Associations Institute, <http://www.cda-cdai.ca/symposia/1998/98lackenbauer.htm>.

¹³⁹*Hansard*, March 23, 1995, p. 10885. In addition, the dubious nature of the financial figures cited by the military when justifying the relocation to Edmonton became a source of significant controversy as expected costs for the move rose from \$23 million to \$143 million (according to a cost estimate external to the department). Some media reports placed the expected closure and related costs at more than \$300 million. See, for example, Bob Bergen, "Troop moves could cost extra \$21 M," *Edmonton Journal*, August 11, 1994; Bergen, "Ottawa ignored high cost of base closing," *Calgary Herald*, October 20, 1995. DND's propensity to overestimate the projected savings from base closings had been criticized in the past, and seems to indicate the department's strong desire to sell governments on infrastructure reduction plans. See, for example, Hugh Winsor, "Defence audit reveals flaws in department," *Globe and Mail*, November 23, 1994.

¹⁴⁰Stephen Harper, *Hansard*, October 5, 1995, p. 15253; June 3, 1996, p. 3325.

¹⁴¹The LFC also opposed the closures of Detachments Moncton and Toronto, and stated that the potential savings at Montreal, Toronto and London were likely inflated. Secret Memorandum, Col. J.R.P. Daigle, G3, "Executive Summary of Program Review," October 14, 1994, pp. 1-2, Annex D (acquired under Access to Information).

¹⁴²Jack Frazer (Saanich-Gulf Islands, Ref.), *Hansard*, September 30, 1996, p. 4839; Chuck Strahl (Fraser Valley East, Ref.), *Hansard*, March 2, 1995, p. 10287; DND, *1995 Budget Impact Statement*, p. 11; CFB *Chilliwack Closure Newsletter Taps*, June 20, 1996, p. 6; *Land Force Command Comments, Program Review, Appendix 2, Annex A, CFB Chilliwack-Closure*, March 2, 1995 (acquired under Access to Information).

¹⁴³Strahl, *Hansard*, March 23, 1995, p. 10910.

¹⁴⁴AGC Report 1994. Office of the Auditor General of Canada, Report of the Standing Committee on Public Accounts to the House of Commons, 12 June 1995, <http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/domino/reports.nsf/a1b15d892a1f761a852565c40068a492/7547b89b15eafa23852565d90070237e?OpenDocument>.

¹⁴⁵AGC Report 1994.

¹⁴⁶Newman, "Time to Gut Our Biggest Landlord," *Maclean's*, March 7, 1994, p.44.

¹⁴⁷Minister – Compendium of Changes in the Canadian Forces and the Department of National Defence - <http://www.dnd.ca/eng/min/reports/Compendium/Change2.htm> (last accessed October 1, 1999).

¹⁴⁸1994 AGC Report.

¹⁴⁹ In 1991, for example, 31 members of the Northeast-Midwest Coalition in Congress wrote a letter to Defense Secretary Cheney urging that "geographic equity" considerations be included in choosing which bases to close. The Coalition's letter argued that although their region received lower per capita defense expenditures than the south and west, they were bearing a higher burden of base closures. See Elizabeth A. Palmer, "Commission May Help Ease Members' Unsavory Task," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, March 2,

1991, p. 555.

¹⁵⁰ William Claiborne, "California Seeks to Fend Off Further closings of Military Bases," *Washington Post*, December 10, 1994, p. A3.

¹⁵¹ See Herman Bakvis, *Regional Ministers: Power and Influence in the Canadian Cabinet* (Toronto, 1991).

¹⁵² SCEAND, June 16, 1992, 26:12.

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CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION	1
II.	THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS	3
III.	COLD WAR TRIALS AND TRIBULATIONS	11
	A. The United States	12
	B. Canada	16
IV.	POST-COLD WAR ADJUSTMENTS	21
	A. United States	21
	1. Creation of BRAC	21
	2. Fine-tuning Policymaking	27
	3. Institutional Checks and Balances	30
	4. Reflections on the U.S. Base-Closing Process	34
	B. Canada	38
	1. Mulroney Government Policies	50
	2. The Liberals and their Critics	55
	3. Reflections on the Canadian Base-Closing Process	47
V.	CONCLUSION	48
	ACRONYMS	52
	NOTES	53

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