NORTH AMERICA BEYOND NAFTA? SOVEREIGNTY, IDENTITY, AND SECURITY IN CANADA-U.S. RELATIONS[1]

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I. INTRODUCTION*

In basic geometry, we learn that the perimeter is the sum of the length of the sides enclosing a geometric space. It is about as linear a concept as one could imagine, a mere matter of locating a space, measuring the length of the straight lines that define its outline, and adding it all up. In the natural world things get a bit more complex, with land masses segmented and defined by rivers and mountain ranges that do not lend themselves to the linear calculus of geometry. Still more complex, of course, are political boundaries, which are the legally and militarily enforced lines in the sand that set off a centrally-governed, territorially-contiguous political community (what we political scientists call a 'state') from its neighbors.

Once we recognize the *invented* nature of these political boundaries, even in those states which claim transcendent historical attachment between people and territory, we see that

*A list of acronyms used in this article is provided on page 30 .

the perimeters, or the borders, of the state are designed not only to keep external enemies out, but to define who and what is worth defending within those barriers, and why that particular state has the legitimate right to do so. Rather than adding up the length of the sides of a geometric space to determine its value, the border-as-perimeter of a state is measured in less concrete terms that add up to state legitimation, such as sovereignty (autonomy from outside meddlers), security (from invasion) and identity (within the community and in contrast with outsiders). To paraphrase R.B.J. Walker's seminal work in this area, the state justifies its primary role in the international system and its monopoly over the use of force at home by mediating between the 'inside' and the 'outside'[2], and that mediation occurs – literally and symbolically – at the border.

This view of the international system of states as one of fortified units geared both internationally and domestically for continuous defense – individually and in strategic alliances – has been challenged in the immediate post-Cold War years by those proclaiming the rise of a community of 'liberal democratic states' that were no longer arming against one another, but rather opening their borders for economic (and, in the case of Europe, political) integration, often in regionally-defined spaces. In the vernacular of the constructivist literature with International Relations, which advocates for such a 'constructed' view of politics based upon the social transformation of identities, this is an expansion of the 'we,' a redefinition of the 'in-

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group' to, if not fully include, then to no longer absolutely exclude those who are beyond a nation's strict political perimeter.[3]

There are three main hypotheses advanced to explain this cooperative turn in international relations, two of which stress the consolidation of a shared sense of identity across national boundaries. The neoliberal-institutionalist model posits that intensifying economic interdependence provides an incentive structure that makes cooperation a positive-sum outcome for competitive states; in other words, the classical liberal idea of 'peace through trade' is consistent with, and is advanced by, the rational calculations of power-maximizing units.[4] The second hypothesis is equally inspired by classical liberalism and by Immanuel Kant, but instead advances what has been called the 'democratic peace thesis.'[5] This is the notion that states with liberal democratic regimes are less likely to go to war against one another because their institutions are transparent (and thus avoid problems of mutual misperception), their armies are drawn from and funded by the population (the latter through taxes with the purse-strings controlled by elected representatives in the legislature), and their leaders need popular support when they face re-election. Though not explicitly constructivist, the democratic peace thesis rests firmly on the assumption that democracies identify internationally with one another in a way that makes mutual interpretation of their foreign policy actions more likely to be sympathetic. They are like "us" and would not act this way without a good reason.

Finally, recent scholarship along constructivist lines has developed Karl Deutsch's postwar concept of the 'security community' to understand how and why states identify across boundaries in a way that perception of threat and ideas about what constitutes security are shared and yet not aimed against one another. Within 'pluralistic' security communities, write Adler and Barnett, there are "dependable expectations of peaceful change," and "peace is tied to the existence of a transnational community" based upon "shared identities, values and meanings, many-sided and direct relations, and some degree of reciprocity."[6]

The lessons of these three hypotheses – open borders and free-flowing commerce advance economic security, democracies make better neighbors, and shared threats can lead to shared identities – are surely not lost, nor are they readily accepted, by students of the world's longest undefended land border between Canada and the

United States. Indeed, we might describe that border as U.S. Undersecretary of State George Ball did cynically in the 1960s, as a symbolic manifestation of Canada's ongoing "rearguard action against the inevitable," meaning its absorption into the U.S. economic sphere and, by extension, its cultural and political domain. True, the extreme delineation between 'us' and 'them' symbolized by a "border as national perimeter" clashes with the reality of a "border as semi-permeable membrane" that we know allows (and encourages) bidirectional flows of goods, services, people, technology, and ideas on a scale perhaps unmatched except by its mirror image along the U.S.'s southern border. However, we may ask, what is more real than a symbol with the force of meaning attached, particularly when it changes the behavior of actors in line with those beliefs, as opposed to concrete realities that contradict them? While seers of globalization, and opponents of the 1988 Free Trade Agreement (recall the famous campaign ad), viewed the 'borderless world' as the future on the continent of North America, it is the border that has not only increased in significance, but also has retained its symbolic resonance within a region that refuses to be truly regionalized. And while we may more readily account for the persistence of the border-as-barrier image in relations between the United States and Mexico, given the vast differences in level of development, the history of U.S. interventionism, and the cyclical resurgence of anti-immigrant sentiments in the U.S., it is my contention here that the symbolic barriers that persist in U.S. and Canadian thinking form an even more striking and formidable obstacle to deeper regional integration than usually considered.[7] For even as industries, trade unions, NGOs and individual citizens have increasingly transcended the border in the past near-decade, 'North America' has just barely emerged in the U.S. and Canada as a publicly-debated idea beyond the narrow confines of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) or beyond the traditional venue of Canada-U.S. bilateral relations.[8] What stands between, literally and symbolically, is the border, and even as it becomes more trafficked, more sensitive for mutual security, and more jointly administered in line with self-interested forces of interdependence and the exigencies spurred by the September 11th attacks, it remains for the two national governments – in *identity* terms expressed in foreign policy – what divides 'us' and 'them' more than what joins together a 'North American' 'we.' Ironically but fittingly, in the age of globalization, and in the same borderless world that

spawned *Al Qaeda*, states continue to look to border-defending and border-defining foreign policy as the symbolic means of forging national unity and, by extension, replenishing state legitimation.

From this perspective I will analyze the identity-based borders that have been fortified and sanctified by Canada and the U.S. in their relations with one another, because I believe they explain a resistance on the part of government and foreign policy officials to 'construct' a 'North American' identity, even in the context of the golden opportunity offered by the post-September 11th moment. The paper begins with a brief constructivist analysis of the symbolic and interpretive link between sovereignty, security, and identity in the construction of the Canadian and U.S. national interests, as each state employed foreign policy to forge distinct domestic and, by extension, international identities for their respective and highly diverse national communities on the North American continent. The analysis reveals extreme ambivalence on the part of the U.S. as well as Canada regarding mutual identification in foreign policy and bilateral cooperation. This ambivalence is founded on a history of sensitivities over sovereignty on both sides – in part manufactured for domestic consumption – that have persisted despite (or, some would argue, because of) the formalization of economic integration. Instead of a smooth narrative of ever-deepening mutual regional identification driven either by shared geography, shared material self-interest or shared democratic or Western values, the story of 'North America' is punctuated by the intrusion of ideological and identity-inscribed borders erected by the two national governments and defended via foreign policy rhetoric, ostensibly to protect 'the nation' from the neighbor's designs on its sovereignty, security, and identity.

The remainder of the article takes this historical and constructivist analytical framework and applies it to the official re-inscription of borders with identity content as seen in post-September 11th security cooperation between the U.S. and Canada. With the coordinated attacks on the American 'homeland,' state-based, military-dominated, security/defense paradigms made a remarkable comeback on the U.S. side, meeting head-on with the post-Cold War shift towards viewing security as multidimensional and with Canadian government prioritization of "economic security" as the post-FTA *sine qua non* of 'national security'. The result, I will argue, is an asymmetrical and yet strangely parallel refocus on the border as sign and symbol of each state's fulfilling the "national interest" defined by a sover-

eignty-security-identity trinity. Specifically, I will examine the idea of a 'North American Security Perimeter' that was floated early on but later became transformed into the more pragmatically-framed Smart Border program. Here I will analyze speeches and government statements to assess the ideological and rhetorical evolution of 'borders' that include and exclude, based upon notions of shared norms and identity, and which provide 'security' for those imagined within them. Two issues touching on 'distinctness' and 'mutuality' as well as 'threat' and 'asymmetry' – economic security and sovereignty – will be highlighted. The final section asks the next logical question: if the Canadian and American states still require the border to define their nations and their own legitimacy, what are the prospects for a 'borderless' North America?

II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

A. The Setting: Security and Mutuality after 9/11/01

When the planes hit the World Trade Center towers and the Pentagon on September 11th, 2001, what crumbled along with these mighty symbols of American power was also the sense of geographic insulation enjoyed by both the United States and Canada for most of the past century. While the proximity of Canada to one of the two nuclear-armed superpowers during the Cold War did imply its concomitant vulnerability in case of a Russian misfire, as Joel Sokolsky has argued, the physical defense of North America took a back-seat for both the U.S. and Canada to that of the European theater, where it was believed any nuclear confrontation with the Soviets undeterred by overwhelming U.S. force would play out.[4] After the end of the Cold War and into the "age of globalization" dawning in the 1990s, both countries began to rethink the nature of "security" policy which was all the more detached from the traditional, territorial notion of self-defense. The concept of "human security" was championed by Lloyd Axworthy, then Canada's foreign minister. At the same time, Clinton administration military cuts were coupled with talk of expanding the definition of security to encompass non-military areas such as migration and disease. These changes in rhetoric and policy did not preclude a role for the protection of the "homeland," but they certainly did locate the main security threats in areas of the world far removed from the zone of prosperity formed by the two North American nations. The U.S. and Canada would cooperate multilaterally to meet these global challenges, but their

bilateral efforts to "secure" their common space would become a relic of the past.[10]

In a matter of hours on one fateful day, however, the primary security threat to the continent became state-directed, territorially-targeted, and quasi-military, provoked by an enemy that both organized and operated globally, and was entirely too close to home, as seen in the abuse of student visas and laxness in airport security. Moreover, the ideological content, or framing, of the conflict advanced in the aftermath by the Bush administration underscored the mutuality of the threat to both the U.S. and its neighbor, pointing beyond shared geography to imply a shared stake in defeating a force anathema to shared values, analogous to the West's fight against Communist aggression in the Cold War. As Canadians rallied to show their emotional support for their neighbors (and, more immediately, for stranded air passengers), cooperation on border security took center-stage out of mutual economic and security interest. Both countries began reviewing their immigration procedures and public health infrastructures, anti-terrorism legislation was enacted on both sides of the border in an atmosphere of urgency, and those fearing for the future of civil liberties were also activated in parallel. It was not naïve to ask, at this moment, whether what had been assumed missing in the purposefully underdeveloped project of building "North America" as a region – a deeper public-private sense of mutuality that transcended narrow economic interest as embodied in the NAFTA accord – had become possible through the most unanticipated of shared experiences.

B. Constructivism: Mutuality and Identity in Explaining International Cooperation

The idea of mutuality, or of mutual identification across national boundaries, is a central explanatory concept for those scholars operating in the *constructivist* mode in the field of international relations.[11] Specifically, while competing paradigms such as realism and neoliberalism view states as self-interested unitary actors making cost-benefit choices based upon power-related or material interests, constructivists claim that states will act upon their identities in ways not necessarily predicted by such "rational" calculations. State identity for constructivists consists of two equal and interrelated dimensions of the sense of self: a *subjective* self-schema, or the story one tells to oneself about what makes the self unique, and an *inter-*

subjective assessment of the meaning of the self and its role in a society of states based upon how one is viewed by others.[12] States, then, delineate and judge their options for international action based upon criteria that may advance symbolic or identity-inscribed values as opposed to material interests. Likewise, rather than engaging in a Hobbesian war of all against all in an anarchic international system without governance, states can and do forge and abide by mutually-respected rules because their identities are tied to advancing specific norms, and because they care about how other states view them and judge their commitments to those norms. These two observations advance theory in two ways: first by asserting that conflict between states is not "natural" or inevitable; and second by pointing beyond the surface of easily-measurable economic and strategic interests towards deciphering historic and symbolic meanings tied to the subjective and inter-subjective dimensions of state identity that better account for surprising instances of interstate conflict and cooperation.

Through these interpretive lenses, constructivist analyses can account for a variety of behaviors previously viewed as counter-intuitive, if not downright irrational. For example, Bruce Cronin's work on "transnational identity" looks at the phenomenon of smaller states voluntarily giving up independence and merging to form a larger state, as seen in the processes of unification in Germany and in Italy in the 19th century.[13] Other such "deviations" from traditional expectations of state behavior explored by constructivists are compliance with international agreements against or in the absence of decisive material incentives,[14] and the resilience of alliances to internal dissent.[15] Notably, all of these analyses cite some aspect of *mutuality of identity*, or in Bially Mattern's term, "we-ness," as the key motivating factor for state behavior not readily explained by material or power-based interests alone.

III. A TALE OF TWO NARRATIVES: MUTUALITY, DISTINCTIVENESS, AND CONSTRUCTION OF IDENTITY IN CANADA-U.S. RELATIONS

A. Against the Convergence or Mutuality Narrative

Taking a page from the constructivist handbook, we could easily craft a narrative of U.S.-Canadian relations that views the past two hundred years as a slow yet inevitable process of bringing Canada into conformity with a mutual but U.S.-defined 'North

American' identity within its regional system. In his recent overview of the bilateral relationship and its historiography, Allan Smith has documented distinct strains of such a convergence view that have drawn a relatively straight line from the "facts on the ground" – such as economic interdependence, bilateral institutions, treaties and other norm-based cooperation – to a shared or mutual identity that has stabilized the dyad overall.[16] Associated with this teleological view of U.S.-Canadian togetherness, often rehearsed by proponents of greater economic integration and decried by Canadian opponents of cultural Americanization, is the parallel narrative of Canadian foreign and security policy and its consistent mutual identification with the West and its liberal values. And with the events of September 11th, this process of convergence looked likely to deepen further, as the Canadian people and their government viewed the *Al Qaeda* threat as both personal (due to the myriad familial and friendship ties across the border) and transcendent (in terms of values such as human life and religious freedom) in ways that further consolidated a sense of "we-ness" with the United States.

And yet even as cooperation on border issues has borne some fruit (which will be analyzed in a later section), in the past year there has been more talk of conflict than comity in the bilateral relationship. This has been mostly due to the perennial issues of *asymmetry* and of *distinctiveness* that have had a history of upending the relationship just enough to prevent the kind of *mutuality* that could transform their identities into a true regional identity. A quite different constructivist reading of the Canada-U.S. narrative would focus on these serial rejections of mutuality that have punctuated the otherwise neat story of convergence and brotherhood, and have reinforced distinct identities in what J. Bartlet Brebner has classically described as a pair of national "Siamese twins."[17]

B. Constructing an Alternative Narrative: Three Theoretical Moves

To construct this narrative, I will first start with three main theoretical and methodological moves. First, I will adopt what has been called a *"domestic" constructivist framework*, which differs from the systemic constructivist paradigm in its attention to the internal dynamics of identity formation within the state and their expression through specific foreign policies.[18] In order to study these internal dynamics, I will follow domestic constructivists by adopting an

interpretive methodology that focuses on state-sanctioned public discourse as the materials of, or evidence for, state identity construction through the symbols and rhetorical strategies employed and the meanings they are meant to convey both to the national community and to the external audience.[19]

Second, I am taking a distinctly *path-dependent* view of the bilateral relationship, referring to the methodology currently at the center of debates in comparative politics and policy studies which suggests that decisions made and institutions constructed in the past send states down particular policy "paths" that open and foreclose options in accordance with the perpetuation of notions of "how we do things."[20] At the same time, I resist the structural determinism of some path dependency analysis and instead wish to highlight both the "policy windows" that open at critical junctures and the deliberate choices made by leaders (often supported by foreign policy establishments) in the U.S. and Canada which saw those windows close without a significant realignment of mutuality in the bilateral relationship.[21]

Finally, my narrative begins by positing that the construction and expression of distinct identities through foreign policy served a specific purpose– state legitimation– in both nations. Sovereignty, R.B.J. Walker reminds us, was a *norm* designed to institutionalize (quasi-legally and in practice) the legitimacy of centrally-governed, territorially-based political communities, a new universalism to replace church transcendentalism in the early modern period.[22] At the same time, sovereignty as a *practice* and a *discourse* has given the state and the elites who claim the right to rule in its name a tool to proclaim and institutionalize their particular right to rule a particular territory in a particular way.[23] Similarly, the *politics* of sovereignty discourse within the national territory involve the linking of an external narrative of defense of sovereignty with the formulation of the community's shared identity through what Rogers Smith has called the "constitutive story" that binds citizens to the state and establishes the content of state legitimation.[24] The discourse of sovereignty, so central to foreign policy ideology and action, not only defines what is special about us that is worth defending and from whom (i.e., security and identity), but also reasserts the right of those who have taken the mantle of the state to act on our behalf according to those definitions, values and self-schemas. It also establishes a temporal or historical connection between current leaders and a heroic past, the latter

treated as an icon or normative mold into which contemporary leaders can fit their policies and thus legitimate them.

Finally, to repeat the much-echoed observations of Benedict Anderson and Eric Hobsbawm on modern nationalism, even those national identities based upon so-called ethnic identity are constructed against an out-group (internal and/or external) and politically shaped by leaders for maximum legitimacy yield.[25] Modern states that are ethnically and geographically diverse are that much more likely to have their "constitutive story" (or "core narrative") revolve around actions, events or symbols that define the national community as separate and distinct from others or, more specifically an Other.[26] And, in keeping with the subjective and inter-subjective nature of identity, the external "out-group" may not be, objectively, all that different, or all that threatening, but nonetheless is treated as such within foreign policy doctrine for purposes of the politics of sovereignty and state legitimation.

C. Divergence and Distinctiveness: The Canadian Side

This interpretation should sound familiar to those who have studied Canadian foreign policy, since it resonates with the famous saying that Canada has had to choose between the State and the States.[27] While Sir John A. Macdonald's National Policy is often treated as the emblematic domestic policy in this quest to legitimate a Canadian state and institutionalize its role as national unifier,[28] it was also a *foreign* policy in that it raised the tariff as a defense policy and built East-West economic and transport links deliberately to show the Americans that Canada's national economy could be viable despite the deepening ties of North-South interdependence. Once Canada had an autonomous foreign policy, it, too, served to give content to the core narrative of Canadian national identity, first by asserting a "linchpin" role for Canada in the "North Atlantic Triangle" between the U.S. and Britain before and during World War II, and later as "middle-power multilateralist," both of which were designed to distinguish Canada from its southern neighbor (i.e., Canada as more British/European, then Canada as champion of world governance as an analogue for its experiment in governing an officially bilingual, multicultural society, and as a distinction from U.S. individualism and unilateralism).[29]

Another historic theme of Canadian foreign policy is diversification of relations, into which fell not only the North Atlantic Tri-

angle and multilateralism but also the bilateralism associated with Trudeau's Third Option in the 1970s.[30] More recently, despite the perception that Canada has moved decisively into the American orbit via the FTA, NAFTA and the future FTAA, Canadian foreign policy continued to carve out a distinct image and role for Canada abroad as a champion of rule-based governance, again contrasting American unilateralism and asserting Canada's substantive ties to issues such as development and peace (especially seen in the government's support for the campaign to ban land mines). In a world that has been widely viewed as undergoing homogenization toward American economic, political, and cultural standards, Canada sees nothing new *per se*, only an expansion in the scale and form of the American 'threat' to Canadian identity at home and abroad that the state is on guard to counter, whether through defense of a state role in healthcare insurance or through an increase in the foreign aid budget.

D. Divergence and Distinctiveness: The U.S. Side

What may not be so familiar to students of the bilateral relationship is the view that the diverting punctuations of the flow towards mutuality with the United States are not simply artificially manufactured by sovereignty-led, symbolically-saturated Canadian foreign policies designed to assert a separate and distinct Canadian identity, or by American hegemonic and so-called pragmatic attempts to get their Canadian counterparts to give up hollow pretensions to difference. Rather, a more fruitful way to understand this dynamic is to see both the parallels between the Canadian and American "core narratives" and the foreign policy ideologies they feed, *and* the asymmetries of power and attention that compound the striving for distinctness and the resistance to mutuality that the two neighbors' core narratives strangely share.

In his idea-based analysis on American foreign policy, Roger Whitcomb identifies a number of elements that make up an American "tradition" in foreign affairs that is said to reflect the values, traits, beliefs and ways of perceiving the world shared by the American people.[31] Central to this tradition is what has been called the belief in "American Exceptionalism," whether materially-based (i.e., geographic isolation, economic abundance or the transformation of the environment through technology) or morally-based (i.e., the Puritan work ethic, the experimental nature of American popular

democratic institutions, or the moral superiority of the U.S. as the *Promised Land and the pinnacle of political development). Whether,* in the terms of the historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., this sense of distinctness led one to see the U.S. as "experiment" and thus deserving of withdrawal from the messy conflicts of the world, or as "destiny" and thus morally obligated to act abroad in to spread its ideals, the underlying shared assumption of the isolationist/internationalist debate is still American Exceptionalism.[32] This identity as unique was positively self-oriented and open (at least theoretically) to immigrants and new generations, as what was believed to make the U.S. different and, by extension, better than other countries was its dynamic, individualist, freedom-based philosophy that contrasted with the tradition-bound Old World. It should also be recalled that *the overweening confidence that has been associated with Ameri-*cans and their foreign policy is not a creation of its great power status; rather, the distinctly adolescent and internally divided United States of the 1830s-60s gave rise to a Manifest Destiny ideology arguably demonstrating the close connection between identity and sovereignty-based foreign policy rhetoric and the insecurity of state legitimacy.[33] And, as the U.S. emerged as a great power at the turn of the *last century, its sense of uniqueness led to the internally-widespread* belief that somehow the rules of history and of power did not apply to it, and that American proselytizing and missionary zeal were surely not to be mistaken for crass imperialism à la Britain, or Rome.[34] Above all else, though, in symbols and in its conception of self, the United States strove to be different and believed itself to be thus in the most positive possible way.

Given this sense of identity based upon a subjective sense of uniqueness and an inter-subjective sense of being in the world as a model for other nations, American foreign policy has served state legitimation by offering the external projection of this sense of self in keeping with the core narrative. Another element of the core narra-*tive that was also incorporated in foreign policy ideology and action* was that of sovereignty – that is, *popular* sovereignty as conceived in the Lockean sense. Defense of sovereignty in the U.S. foreign policy lexicon has had two related meanings: first, it meant the right of the American people through their representatives – not foreign governments or even treaties – to make the law for the United States, and second, it meant the implicit right for laws not to apply to the U.S. in its capacity as model nation or leader. If the concept of sovereignty

has evolved to answer the question, "Who decides?" the answer in U.S. foreign policy has always been "us"; any sense of mutuality was such that the reserved right to detach and be accorded independent and unique status was a primary condition. Even within the NATO alliance during the Cold War at the height of what might be called Western mutuality, the U.S. always reserved the right to act alone and split with its European allies on issues such as *détente*, Cuba, and the Strategic Defense Initiative. After the Cold War, as incentives for multilateralism further waned and U.S. domestic demands for a "peace dividend" waxed, there was a deep concern among Western allies that the U.S. would shift towards isolationism and forsake its responsibilities as the sole remaining superpower – a clear reflection of the perception that the mutuality constructed during the Cold War to counter Soviet communism was not to be counted on now that the threat was gone.

E. Asymmetry and Disjuncture in the Convergence Narrative of Canada-U.S. Relations

Thus, both Canada and the United States have historically had state legitimation-oriented reasons to resist mutual identification and to preserve *distinctiveness*. At the same time, this dynamic must be viewed in the context of a second dimension: that of *asymmetry of power and attention*. Returning briefly to the realm of material measures, the fact that the United States has developed into a superpower – and, more recently, the only remaining global superpower – and has built up an economy and military that dwarf that of Canada, has exerted a two-fold impact on Canadian foreign policy beyond the distinctiveness imperative. First, Canadian policymakers have long sought to maximize the advantages of Canada's proximity to a superpower, most notably in their attempts to benefit from trade with, and investment flowing from, the prosperous and entrepreneurial south. Such benefits, however, came at the price of a certain degree of self-censorship and pre-emptive limitation on Canada's room for maneuver. On the political side, the practice of "quiet diplomacy" which prevailed during the first two decades of the postwar period reflected Canadian fears of going public with dissent from U.S. Cold War policies such as the Vietnam War. Meanwhile, on the economic side, Canadian diplomats assiduously avoided linking issues in negotiations with the United States, lest the survival of key integrated economic sectors become hostage to unrelated

areas of conflict in times of crisis. In both cases, Canadian foreign policy was responding to the exigencies of asymmetry and the real costs that a U.S. retaliation could have on its interdependent and vulnerable economy.[35]

However, it is not merely that the United States far outweighs Canada in terms of economic might, military reach, population, or technological advancement; it is that they share a geographic and symbolic space that makes asymmetry a defining feature of their relationship. While Canada's foreign policy apparatus is almost entirely geared either to deal with the U.S. or to symbolically distinguish Canada from the U.S., Canada barely registers on the U.S. foreign policy radar screen.[36] Indeed, because of this asymmetry of attention, a key exception to the pursuit of distinctiveness over mutuality in Canada's relations with the U.S. – the belief in the so-called "Special Relationship" – helps to make true mutuality unattainable. Canada's unrealistic expectations of special status and sustained identification as a primary partner have blinded its foreign policymakers to the realities of U.S. policy, which gives special status only to its own interests and is characterized by shifting internal priorities and a fragmented policy process that undermines the permanence of any symbolic set of relationships. Once blinded, Canada's policymakers are then more easily blind-sided when they are disabused of their belief in Washington's deep and abiding partnership, and then they are placed under political pressure the next time not to be perceived as too friendly to the U.S. In the end, Canadian policy is forced to prove its distinctiveness in traditional ways, and U.S. policy continues to insist upon its own form of distinctiveness, thus never entering into a dialogue about what mutuality would actually mean and what it might accomplish.

Here, the distinctiveness imperative and the asymmetry reality periodically meet to cause serial fall-outs in the bilateral relationship. The so-called "Nixon Shock" of 1971 offers a good example of this dilemma. Facing inflationary pressures from costs of social programs and a war in Southeast Asia, along with increased import competition from Europe and Japan, the U.S. economy experienced its first postwar taste of chronic trade deficits during the late 1960s and early 1970s. In August, 1971, U.S. President Richard Nixon announced two unilateral measures designed to communicate to domestic constituencies and to the world that the U.S. was no longer willing to bear what it considered to be an unfair burden in maintain-

ing the world economy. First, he pulled the dollar off of the gold standard, effectively ending its role as stabilizer in the postwar Bretton Woods system of international monetary cooperation through fixed exchange rates; then, he imposed an across-the-board import surcharge along with other measures designed to overcome the trade deficit. The latter announcement hit Canada particularly hard, not only in terms of the material costs it represented due to the concentration of Canadian exports headed to the U.S. markets, but also because of the political shock of not being consulted or exempted as had been expected under the "Special Relationship." This marked a turning-point in the relationship: the U.S. sounded a declaration of independence from the world's expectations of infinite munificence and in the process ran roughshod over Canada's somewhat naive expectations that its status as a steadfast ally would lead a world power to place mutual norms of political cooperation with a neighbor ahead of commercial and strategic self-interest. At that moment, patterns of deepening mutuality built up over the postwar period were abruptly undermined by American Exceptionalism and by U.S.-Canadian asymmetry of power *and* of attention. Thus, despite the fact that the actual surcharges were quickly negotiated away, the Nixon Shock became an emblematic moment for those in Canada who proclaimed the death of the "Special Relationship," and led Trudeau to adopt his "Third Option" foreign policy focused upon diversification of economic relations beyond the United States and distinctiveness in Canada's multilateral stances.[17]

Likewise, softwood lumber continues to be an issue that is held hostage to these same dynamics. The facts on the ground underscore the asymmetry of power in this conflict: the main market for Canadian lumber is the United States, and the rule-based system of dispute settlement laid out first in the FTA and later in NAFTA has not restrained U.S. unilateral retaliation, potentially threatening thousands of Canadian jobs. But other asymmetries, most notably those of divergent policy environments and values, exacerbate the tensions. The U.S. acts to defend its market-driven lumber interests from what is seen as unfair Canadian statist protectionism, while Canada claims that its state-led rather than market-driven system is necessary to maintain the industry and calls on its neighbor to adjudicate through dispute settlement rather than resorting to unilateral countervailing action. On the surface, this is a simple trade dispute, but underneath it is a toe-to-toe battle between conceptions

of the state and its role in the economy, as well as the value of following rules *vs.* acting alone. These are politically-charged issues linked to state legitimation in both countries, and because the distinctiveness dimension of identity is thereby repeatedly activated in these cycles of conflict, another opportunity to act in a mutually-identifying manner is serially undermined.

Like the immigration issue between the U.S. and Mexico, the lumber issue – and, to some extent, the wheat and fisheries issues as well – masquerade as irritants on the Canada-U.S. bilateral agenda when they are, in fact, the essence of the bilateral agenda. They are small issues that add up to a deep and penetrating economic interdependence that is countered by state-sanctioned beliefs in distinctiveness and against mutuality, making it inevitable that relations maintain a choppy, unequal and unstable potential despite all of the institutions and institutionalized mechanisms in place to keep the relationship running smoothly. The U.S. is absorbed by its belief in its own beneficence and does not understand that Canada could see America's unilateral economic, political and military power as a threat. (Indeed, U.S. officials would be shocked to see the results of a recent nationwide poll in Canada which reveals that nearly 40 percent off respondents viewed President Bush to be the leader who poses the greatest threat to world peace and stability.)[38] Meanwhile, Canada cycles between optimism that the "special relationship" will redeem its faith in rules in the face of U.S. unilateralism, and deep disillusionment leading to the manufacturing of symbolic policies of distinctiveness.

IV. THE SMART BORDER INITIATIVE: LOOKS LIKE MUTUALITY, SOUNDS LIKE DISTINCTIVENESS

On the surface, it would appear that cooperation between the United States and Canada on border issues has reached a new level of institutionalization and shared purpose which in turn should translate into a seed for the kind of mutuality I have argued to be essential to constructing a "North American" identity beyond NAFTA. This latest and deepest round of shaping joint institutions, norms, and security procedures for the border[39] started immediately after the September 11th attacks and was apparently given the highest priority by the two national leaders. Once President Bush had appointed his personal friend and former Pennsylvania governor, Tom Ridge, to head the newly-created Office of Homeland Security

within the White House,[40] Ridge began working on border management issues with John Manley, Prime Minister Chrétien's foreign minister and close political ally, who had also been named chairman of a newly-established *ad hoc* cabinet committee on public security and anti-terrorism and would later become Chrétien's deputy prime minister.[41] Their "Smart Border Declaration" of December 12, 2001, which was accompanied by a 30-point action plan, set out ambitious goals which crossed ministerial/departmental turf lines and clearly established joint responsibility and a need to harmonize standards, two important elements of "mutuality."[42]

This initiative quickly borne fruit when two key programs came on line as of September, 2002, and their implementation has advanced as of the first annual update report issued in December, 2002.[43] The first of these programs, known as FAST (Free and Secure Trade), engages the private sector to pre-certify its commercial shipments and drivers as low-risk, thus expediting the border-crossing process and freeing customs agents to focus on high-risk goods.[44] Ridge and Manley pledged to have the system fully operable in six key major crossings by the end of 2002, but as early as the fall of that year joint registration processes had already become available for carriers and importers. By 2005 the two countries plan to harmonize all other customs processes for commercial shipments. Similarly promising is the NEXUS program offering express clearance for "low-risk, pre-approved travelers" which will expand to include the Windsor/Detroit and Fort Erie/Buffalo by the start of 2003 and is slated to come on line in most high-volume crossings and perhaps even airports by the end of that year.[45]

In a number of ways the Smart Border initiative can be read as a significant shift in scale and urgency for both the U.S. and Canada in the way the border is conceived, managed, and shared. Just the FAST and NEXUS programs alone require the two nations to harmonize their standards regarding what constitutes a "safe" company or a "low-risk" individual based upon what the two leaders called a "joint mission" for the U.S. and Canada "to protect the security and enhance the prosperity of our citizens"at the international border.[46] Its many other proposed areas of cooperation raise the bar for information and intelligence sharing, joint policing and law enforcement, cooperation in matters of immigration and refugee applications, and other issues that traditionally form the conceptual borders of the "national" and previously have been the sacred trust of the

state. But there is a danger here of interpreting these actions as proof of a true convergence of identification and identity that we should expect from a project building "mutuality," even if we keep our focus only on the issue of the border. Rather, behind two key elements of mutuality embodied in the project and expressed in official rhetoric, I will argue that there are signals of distinctiveness and asymmetry-led disjuncture, and they can be found by studying how mutuality is being framed. As evidence, I will use speeches made to domestic audiences by two relatively comparable government officials: Tom Ridge on the American side, and John Manley on the Canadian side.

A. Economic Security

The link between security and prosperity underscored by the Bush/Chrétien joint statement seems primarily driven by material incentives: both leaders were pressured by the huge negative economic impact of closing the border after September 11th on just-in-time delivery systems and on businesses whose employees routinely cross the border, especially during a period of lagging U.S. economic growth. Clearly, both sides have long recognized that it is in the interest of neighbors with highly interdependent economies to facilitate legal trade, but now there is an added reason to cooperate to keep out illegal cross-border flows. However, there was also a conscious choice by the two leaders to step back from a more grandiose, and potentially destabilizing, project of building a 'North American Security Perimeter.' Deepening security and military cooperation could and would progress under the rubric of NORAD, more recently seen in the announcement of the formation of a binational joint planning group headed by a Canadian based at NORAD headquarters to advance coordination of anti-terrorism preparedness.[47] At the same time, it was determined that less public attention to this aspect of cooperation was preferable to igniting a divisive debate over what defense of such a shared perimeter would entail, who would do the defending, and according to which rules. Rather, a laser-like focus on the bilateral nuts-and-bolts of *everyday border management* and the shared goal of "economic security" would give a distinctly *pragmatic* cast to cooperation that could lower the volume on the kinds of symbolic conflicts that had historically upended the bilateral relation. Theorists of regional integration could look at this materially-driven cooperation and see in it the start of "spill-over" effects which broaden the scope of cooperation to other areas that, in turn, strengthen

a sense of mutuality similar to how the European Community had its origins in Franco-German cooperation in coal and steel during the early 1950s.[48] Constructivists, on the other hand, may see the "spill-over" as evidence of the lowering of identity-inscribed barriers regarding what constitutes "security" or a "security threat," specifically allowing the two neighbors to reinterpret their relationship and view their economic fates as mutually helped or hurt according to their political will to cooperate.[49]

What do we see, though, when we take a closer look at the way each side conceives of its "economic security"? Tom Ridge, in keeping with the paradigms of identity described above, focuses on the private sector as part of what makes America unique, uniquely free, and uniquely equipped to meet the terrorist threat. In a speech to the Electronics Industries Alliance in spring, 2002, Ridge praised this industry for its typically-American "entrepreneurial approach," rising to the challenge of developing new technologies for surveillance and other homeland security-related needs and proving "that the market doesn't need government's permission to meet the needs of America."[50] He went on to delineate a theme seen in other speeches— how homeland security will make the U.S. not only safer, but stronger, both absolutely and relative to other countries.

> Homeland security gives you the opportunity to be aggressive, to protect Americans and develop new markets and products in the process. It gives you the opportunity to do well by doing good. This entrepreneurial spirit is a potent weapon against terrorism. And it is, in my judgment, what gives America one of our greatest competitive advantages. I've often said that homeland security can give us not just a safer and more secure America, but a better America, as well — one that's ready to compete with any nation in the world...Our homeland security effort must tap into this energy. Government needs to partner with the private sector to share resources and expertise. Our goals are the same: increase security, improve preparedness. Now, let's discuss and share the means to get there. It's more important today than ever before that we find ways to work together.[51]

Thus, homeland security will make America more economically secure because its unique and superior private sector will lead the way technologically, through what he praised to a conference of

defense and aerospace experts as "American know-how, ingenuity, and technology" which has led the world in innovation.[52] Even while repeating the official rhetoric of partnership regarding border cooperation, Ridge made it clear to the mayor of Detroit that this cooperation was, at one level, about making sure local costs for personnel and law enforcement would be shared with Canada[53] – that is, while costs would be shared, the benefits to the companies developing the new technology would remain at home.

On the Canadian side, in keeping with the distinctiveness aspects of Canadian identity, "economic security" as reflected in John Manley's speeches has a different meaning and resonance. Speaking to the peak organization of business leaders, the Canadian Council of Chief Executives, formerly known as the Business Council on National Issues (BCNI), Manley does not focus on the private sector as a national weapon and symbol, but rather takes the opportunity to link security and identity through an explication of what precisely it is about Canada that is worth defending. He comes up with this formulation:

> Surely the highest priority for any democratic government, anywhere in the world, is the protection of its citizens and interests. But how we interpret security is *entirely a function of who we are and of [our] values and aspirations*.... Canada's approach is broad, and quite unique, I believe. Going well beyond the physical defence of our nation and of our communities, we also seek economic security for our people, and a standard of social inclusiveness and protection that aims to ensure that no person and no group is unduly disadvantaged as this country moves forward. And, finally, we see our security in the context of a world that must be made to work better than it currently does.[54]

Here, economic security is coupled with social inclusiveness and protection which communicates the government's commitment to traditional measures of state legitimation through social programs that offer a kinder, gentler identity for Canadians. Similarly, at the end he reconnects to Canada's foreign policy tradition of engaged and pro-active membership in the international community, working for peace, justice, and stability through joint efforts. "Economic security" is a far more complex notion for Canada, Manley implies, as promoting "prosperity" is not simply a matter of unleashing the

private sector loose but rather of promoting a democratic state-society dialogue aimed at setting national goals and priorities regarding how wealth is to be generated and distributed according to national values such as equality and social justice. The speech is laden with messages asserting Canada's distinct character as a society that thinks deeply about what is right and uses the state to act upon those decisions. While he does claim that this "balanced view" is "what makes our country and our quality of life the envy of so many," it does not translate into Canada having the right to export its model but rather burdens it with the responsibility to remain engaged in the world in less heroic and self-centered ways – again, in keeping with the state's claim to act on behalf of shared national values that justifies its existence in general and in relation to the United States.[55]

Asymmetry as well as distinctiveness is evident in the approach to the border expressed by Manley in this and other speeches. Here, he outlines the progress made in his dealings with Tom Ridge but warns that, while the U.S. side clearly recognizes Canada as a necessary and reliable partner for border cooperation, there are many others across the 49th parallel (he identifies "Congress, Hollywood and the *New York Times*") who "need convincing."[56] In a speech before the Toronto Board of Trade, he reiterates a much-used formulation regarding "the intrinsic linkage between our public and our economic security, and the critical underpinning to both which is represented by a secure and trade-efficient border." At the same time, the focus of his speech (granted, in keeping with one of the cabinet portfolios he had at the time) is the need to invest in border and infrastructure and joint security measures, ostensibly to allow Canada to be even more of a conduit for goods heading to the American market.[57] Though he advocates a new Canadian identity as a "northern tiger – or grizzly," meaning a world-wide destination of high-tech business and human capital,[58] the dependence of Canada on its southern border is hard to escape, and thus "economic security" is more border-engaged than it is in the United States.

B. Sovereignty

According to a fact sheet published by the White House, President Bush's border policy after September 11th was envisioned as "grounded on two key principles":

1) America's air, land, and sea borders must provide a strong defense for the American people against all external threats, most importantly international terrorists but also drugs, foreign disease, and other dangerous items.

2) America's border must be highly efficient, posing little or no obstacle to legitimate trade and travel.[59]

The central, isolationist element in this vision of the border is the sovereign will of the American people. The border is there to protect the U.S. from an outside threat. While clearly recognizing the post-September 11th reassessment of the nation's geographic vulnerability to threat, this view of the border reinforces the traditional belief that the U.S. is a unique beacon of democracy to the world that deserves protection for its special status. As for the impossibility of preventing all future threats, Tom Ridge admits this in his speeches but is not deterred from invoking other "impossible" tasks accomplished by the United States, such as "building the Trans-Continental Railroad, fighting World War II, or putting a man on the moon."[60] Repeatedly citing invincibility, resolve, and an historic capability of the sovereign American people (World War II is mentioned as if the U.S. won the war by itself) speaks not to mutuality but to a go-it-alone sense of national purpose and identity.

The second element in the Bush border vision also speaks to sovereignty of the people, this time to the idea of "negative liberty" so ingrained in the individualistic "liberal" society celebrated by Ridge in his speeches. As formulated by Sir Isaiah Berlin, "negative liberty" refers to "freedom from...", meaning freedom of the individual to pursue his or her goals free of impediments and prejudices that might block the way. It also implies a sacred space for individual identity, belief, and activity where the state dare not tread.[61] In the U.S. consumer market-oriented society, this also has meant the freedom of economic activity, which has been placed nearly on a par with civil and political liberties and is elevated here to become an inalienable right of Americans, and American businesses shipping American products, to move across the border as they wish without the state unduly interfering with their liberty. It is also in keeping with the self-image of America as a "welcoming" and "generous" country,[62] but always with the needs of its sovereign people coming first.

This fragmentation of power in America has been called its strength by those like de Tocqueville who saw civil society as the

great restraining power over a potentially despotic state. Similarly, and in keeping with this self-image of a country whose greatness lies in the decentralization of power that keeps it close to the people, Ridge speaks often of the homeland security strategy as being "national" rather than "federal."[63] In contrast to the more centralized policymaking process in Canada, there is much more decision-making power vested at the local level in the U.S., and in the legislative branch as opposed to the executive. Ridge sees this as a challenge, but also as a strength, when he says that civil society, the private sector, and the local authorities ("our hometowns") are the true constituents of homeland security policy. By using "national" rather than "federal," he purposefully articulates the U.S. anti-statist philosophy as well as his party's particular ideological antipathy for less "big government." He also distinguishes the United States as a uniquely free society that will demand a homeland security policy designed to suit its own needs.

In contrast, Canadian notions of sovereignty continue to dominate perceptions of real and imagined borders with the United States, but have partially evolved a more open and outward-looking dimension in keeping with the strategy adopted during the mid-1980s when Brian Mulroney and his Progressive-Conservative government decided to negotiate the FTA with the United States. At that time, as I have argued elsewhere, a distinct "strength through integration" paradigm was developed to reconcile the shift from an equation of economic and political sovereignty in the conceptualization of national interest to one which saw an opening to the world economy as a sign of national valor.[64] The Liberals, despite protestations to the contrary, were quick to pick up this piece of ideological rhetoric and apply it to lead the charge towards Canadian participation in the Free Trade Area of the Americas. Likewise, one can hear its echoes in the words of John Manley, who devotes a sizeable portion of his speeches on U.S.-Canada security issues to a discussion of what sovereignty means to Canada today, and why it must be a "dynamic" concept.[65]

The first main element is that of choice: he argues that Canada is a country which its citizens have chosen for a reason – for its way of life, its balanced notion of rights and responsibilities, its social cohesion – and that, because of this, it is the Canadian state's obligation to make choices in its domestic and foreign policies that reflect the reasons and values that underlay citizens' choices. Thus, as he

tells the Canadian Club, "Sovereignty is fundamentally about making choices, and about acting responsibly in the national interest so that we are able to preserve that field of choice for ourselves."[66] The second element is in the second part of that phrase: "preserving the field of choice" means that Canada must define the substance of what its choices are based upon, and make choices bravely when faced with difficult decisions. For example, rejecting the U.S. offer on softwood lumber is depicted as an example of how Canada exercises its sovereignty based upon substance rather than merely placing the forms of cooperation as a value ahead of the good of the country or of its sense of fairness or justice.[67]

But finally, there is the rejection of what Manley calls the "zero-sum" concept of sovereignty,[68] in which Canada needs to be on guard to losing sovereignty to the United States. In one evocative speech he invoked the "Canada First" movement – a late-nineteenth century drive to assert Canada's British ties and reject creeping Americanization – to say that, in its own way, the Canadian state was putting Canada first by being open to the dynamics of globalization and economic integration which would provide the resources for the Canadian state to advance Canadian priorities.

> Getting our border and our entry points right gives our country a launch pad to advance so many of our other political, social and economic goals. The strong economy that depends on a smart border allows us to continue making the right investments into Canada's future - in health care, education, skills development, research, innovation and so on. It also allows us to further reinforce our national infrastructure - the organs and arteries that make this country work.[69]

Again, the outlook is non-traditional, but its message returns to the traditional view of the state as the depository of the national interest and of all that makes Canada distinct from the United States. The message is that negotiating borders with the U.S. does not imply harmonizing other policies that are seen as remaining at the heart of what it means to be Canadian, and what it means for the Canadian state to have a reason to exist.

V. CONCLUSION

In this essay, I have argued that, despite obvious and empirically-robust evidence that Canada and the U.S. have arrived at a new

level of mutuality in their relationship, certain ideological "borders" having to do with national identity and how that identity is appropriated and articulated back to the public for state legitimation purposes have remained entrenched. I have employed a constructivist framework to set forth a historical analysis demonstrating how distinctiveness and asymmetry of power and attention have worked to derail mutuality in the bilateral relationship over time, despite overwhelming material and institutional resources to the contrary. What we see is that, despite all of the institutionalization around, there is little spill-over to speak of, as it is contained by these ideological borders. Despite the optimism placed in institutions by Robert Pastor in his recent and influential study of North American integration,[70] my analysis suggests that the habits of cooperation and even the legal mechanisms designed to build trust are not enough to overcome these embedded drives towards singularity in the national self-conception and, by extension, the state's foreign policy.

With this in mind, I have looked at the much-touted recent cooperation between Canada and the U.S. under the rubric of the Smart Borders Initiative, and I have challenged the optimistic predictions that such cooperation on technical and material matters represented a key advance towards forging *mutuality* in line with the future deepening of regional integration. To do this, I have employed constructivist methodologies of rhetorical interpretation to show that the way the two countries' representatives talked to one another is not the same as they spoke with domestic audiences, the latter discourse being rife with symbols and conceptualizations emphasizing distinctness over mutuality. It is important to look "inside" and see how the codes of state legitimation are still strongly limiting how a mutual identity can be constructed. Embedded in discourse on both economic security and sovereignty, not only did we see continued imperatives for public officials to stress national distinctiveness, but we also saw persistent asymmetries in attention that hardly augur well for any "spill-over" beyond the resolution of concrete border problems and towards the perception of the "Other" as a partner in a joint region-constructing project. The rhetorical and operational pragmatism of the Smart Borders Initiative is emblematic in that the more visionary alternative – the construction of, and open discussion about, a North American Security Perimeter – outstripped the level of mutuality officials on either side felt could be advanced without running afoul of ideological borders inscribed to

defend state legitimacy. As it stands, it appears that, once citizens' demands for greater physical and economic security at the border are met, there is little to go on in terms of public demand and governmental supply of *ideas* to drive integration significantly deeper.

By applying this interpretive framework emphasizing the persistence of distinctiveness and asymmetry in Canada-U.S. relations, we also get a more nuanced and, I believe, realistic perspective on the recent spate of media, academic, public, and governmental attention on the Canadian side towards issues of bilateral and regional integration in 'North America.' The past year has seen the publication of numerous polls in major Canadian newspapers which purport to establish a decrease in anti-free trade feelings and a surge of enthusiasm of Canadian citizens for closer relations with the United States. For example, underscoring similar results released by Ekos[71] and Environics/Pew[72], in late October Pollara released data showing that two-thirds of respondents wanted the government to pursue greater economic integration with the United States, 29 percent were somewhat opposed, and only 5 percent were categorically opposed.[73] Around the same time several top public officials, including John Manley, International Trade Minister Pierre Pettigrew, and David Dodge, Governor of the Bank of Canada, publicly endorsed the idea of "NAFTA-Plus" negotiations to expand and more deeply institutionalize trade integration and related areas of "unfinished business."[74] For its part, the Department of Foreign Affairs was reported to have circulated a draft outline favoring such negotiations with the Bush Administration.[75] Meanwhile, this past year the Policy Research Initiative within the Privy Council Office launched a project investigating prospects for North American integration and Canada's options within the region,[76] and the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade held cross-country consultations that resulted in a report highly enthusiastic about Canada's taking the lead in pursuing a creative if not overly ambitious North American integration strategy.[77] Finally, Canadian academics and policy analysts have seen the free-trade debate recast as an examination of Canada's future within North America in influential books by three prominent voices from the earlier confrontation.[78]

This sudden upsurge of interest and affinity for "thinking North America" in Canada may be just what it seems – a reflection of a deepened sense of mutuality spurred by the September 11th attacks

and the sense that Canada's economic and physical security may require (or come at the price of) greater formalized cooperation with the United States. It may also be read in quite a different manner as a reflection of growing anxiety regarding the Bush administration's bent towards a distinctiveness-led foreign policy and its correlative deepening of the unilateralist impulse in U.S. policy that has undermined the effectiveness of those continental and bilateral institutions that already exist. The Hurtig and Clarkson arguments are, in their distinct ways, responses to this anxiety about distinctiveness and asymmetry, centering around the future survival prospects of Canada and, more specifically, the Canadian state as the repository of Canadian distinctiveness, in the context of U.S. insistence on the right to make or shape continental rules according to its own economic and security interests. Even the Parliamentary Report, which is perhaps the most visionary statement of North American policy to emerge from that branch of government to date, insists that such policy would have to be "coherent, strategic and *Canadian*,"[79] meaning that it would be Canadian distinctiveness, not mutuality, that would drive Canada to take the lead in "shaping the kind of North America Canadians want."[80]

There is also, in the government initiatives towards "NAFTA-Plus," a danger of falling into the trap of asymmetry of attention that has led to the cycles of backlash as Canadians expect too much from their American counterparts. Indeed, what is most striking about the new debate on North America in Canada is the eerie silence it is meeting on the U.S. side of the border, both in and out of government. Americans are obsessed with the failing economy and do not see greater integration with Canada, or Mexico, as part of the recipe for recovery. Likewise, despite statements to the contrary by Bush's pro-active ambassador in Ottawa, interest in negotiating with the Canadians is a low-priority issue in a Washington gearing up for an invasion of Iraq. Canadians would be wise to recall their historic aversion to issue linkage in order to keep NAFTA-Plus negotiations from becoming tied to specific forms of Canadian support for such a war, and in order to prevent U.S.-desired increases in the Canadian defense budget from siphoning off funds that the public wants invested in an expansion of its venerated health-care system, a cornerstone of state-centered national identity.

Thus, at this juncture, despite major recent advances in technical and material border cooperation between Canada and the U.S., the historic and symbolic forces of asymmetry of both power and attention continue to stand in the way of deepening mutuality and to conjure renewed assertions of conflict-provoking distinctiveness. The internal Canadian debate on North America can, by itself, be read as a healthy sign of the potential emergence of the kind of civil society-led popular democracy championed by Clarkson, encouraging citizens to articulate what they expect from their state in a new, and more constrained, international context. However, when contrasted with the lack of such a debate in the United States, it seems a sign of Canadian vulnerability as it prepares for partnership with a society that expects its limited state to focus exclusively on its own internal problems and sees the international context as something to act upon, rather than to act within. The disjuncture between Canadian outward-orientation and American inward-orientation may be hidden behind the rhetoric of partnership and joint operations in statements regarding the Smart Border, but underneath it all these two distinct formulae for state legitimation remain in conflict. This is a recipe for integration under asymmetry without mutuality, and it is one which puts the future of the North American project at considerable risk.

ACRONYMS

BCNI	(Cdn) Business Council on National Issues
DFAIT	(Cdn) Dept. of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
FAST	Free and Secure Trade Program
FTA	Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement
FTAA	(Proposed) Free Trade Agreement of the Americas
NAFTA	North American Free trade Agreement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEXUS	Express clearance for pre-approved travelers crossing the U.S.-Canada border
NGOs	non-governmental organizations
NORAD	North American Aerospace Defense Agreement
WTO	World Trade Organization

NOTES

[1] An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Closing Plenary of the 2002 ACSUS-in-Canada Colloquium, "Integration and Fragmentation in Canada and the United States," sponsored by the Association of Canadian Studies in the U.S. and held at the University of Ottawa, September 20-21, 2002. The author would like to gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the Eugene Lang Junior Faculty Research Fellowship at Baruch College and The City University of New York PSC-CUNY Research Award Program.

[2] R.B.J. Walker, *Inside/Outside: International Relations as a Political Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

[3] On "we-ness," see Janice Bially Mattern, "The Power Politics of Identity," *European Journal of International Relations,* vol. 7, no. 3 (Autumn 2001), p. 353

[4] See Kenneth A. Oye, 'Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies,' in Kenneth A. Oye (ed.) *Cooperation Under Anarchy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 1-24, esp. pp. 12-18.

[5] See various essays in Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller (eds.), 1996. *Debating the Democratic Peace* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996).

[6] Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, "A Framework for Studying Security Communities," in Adler and Barnett (eds.), *Security Communities* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 30-31.

[7] While recognizing that the construction of "North America" as a region involves Mexico as well as the U.S. and Canada, this article will focus on the dynamics between the latter pair. [Aside from the fact that the term "North America" has traditionally referred to its two northernmost members, separate treatment of the U.S.-Canadian dyad at this juncture makes sense empirically, given the broader and deeper pre-existing levels of security interdependence (including military cooperation via NATO and NORAD) and border permeability, as well as the more advanced state of post-9.11 border cooperation. It also makes sense in policy terms, as one of the

remaining obstacles to the construction of a regional identity is the persistent bilateralization of relations of the U.S. with its neighbors. Finally, it has a theoretical foundation in the "spill-over" hypothesis advanced by neo-functionalist theories of regional integration discussed below. That is, the expectation is that regional integration advances from a "core" of key states whose progressively deepening ties can generate a pull of identity and interests that will bring in other members.] I have treated Mexico's recent attempt to construct its own "North American" identity – conceived and rhetorically advanced by President Vicente Fox and his foreign minister, Jorge G. Castañeda and driven by the dynamics of Mexico's democratic transition – in a separate study. See Stephanie R. Golob, "Bordering on Democracy: Regionalism, Transnationalism, and Civil Society in Mexico," paper presented at the 98th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (APSA), Boston, August 29- September 1, 2002, available at <http://apsaproceedings.cup.org/Site/abstracts/045/045002GolobSteph.htm

[8]A recent indication of its emergence on the Canadian side is the release in mid-December 2002 of a Parliamentary report on Canada's strategic interest in developing its role in "North America" as a region. I will treat this report, and other indications of growing interest within the Canadian government and public in 'North America beyond NAFTA,' in greater detail in the Concluding section. See House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, "Partners in North America: Advancing Canada's Relations with the United States and Mexico," tabled December 12, 2002, summary of findings available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/InfoCom/CommitteeReport.asp?Language=E&Parliament=9&Joint=0&CommitteeID=257, accessed December 26, 2002.

[9] Joel J. Sokolsky, "The Bilateral Defence Relationship with the United States," in David B. Dewitt and David Leyton-Brown (eds.), *Canada's International Security Policy* (Scarborough, ON: Prentice Hall Canada, 1995), 172-177, esp. 173 and 175-6.

[10] One indication of this sense of paradigm shift is articulated by Jockel and Sokolsky, who start their late-1990s essay as follows: "The Canada-United States defense relationship, just like the Cold War that necessitated and sustained it, is over." See Joseph T. Jockel and

Joel J. Sokolsky, "The End of the Canada-U.S. Defense Relationship," in Victor Howard (ed.), *Creating the Peaceable Kingdom and Other Essays on Canada* (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 1998), p. 197.

[11] For surveys of the literature, see Jeffrey T. Checkel, "The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory," *World Politics* 50 (2) (1998): 324-48; Dale C. Copeland, "The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism: A Review Essay," *International Security* 25 (2) (2000): 187-212; and Ted Hopf, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory," *International Security* 23 (1) (1998): 171-200. For a more critical view, see Michael C. Desch, "Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies," *International Security* 23 (1) (1998): 141-70.

[12] This definition is based upon the analysis of Glenn Chafetz, Michael Spirtas, and Benjamin Frankel, "Introduction: Tracing the Influence of Identity," in Chafetz, Spirtas, and Frankel, eds. *The Origins of National Interest* (London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1999), pp. viii-xv

[13] Bruce Cronin, *Community Under Anarchy: Transnational Identity and the Evolution of Cooperation* (New York: columbia University Press, 1999).

[14] Martha Finnemore, *National Interests in International Society* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1996).

[15] Bially Mattern, "Power Politics of Identity."

[16] Allan Smith, "Doing the Continental: Conceptualizations of the Canadian-American Relationship in the Long Twentieth Century," *Canadian-American Public Policy*, no. 44 (December 2000).

[17] John Bartlet Brebner, *North Atlantic Triangle: The Interplay of Canada, the United States, and Great Britain*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Series on The Relations of Canada and the United States (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1945), p. xi.

[18] For the designation of "domestic constructivists," see Copeland, "The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism," p. 203. For more on foreign policy as the window onto the subjective and

intersubjective dynamics of identity formation in international relations, see Steve Smith, "Foreign Policy is What States Make of It: Social Construction and International Relations Theory," In Vendulka Kubalkova (ed.), *Foreign Policy in a Constructed World*, (Armonk, NY and London: M.E. Sharpe, 2001, p. 52; and Marc Lynch, "Abandoning Iraq: Jordan's Alliances and the Politics of State Identity," in Chafetz, Spirtas, and Frankel (eds.) *The Origins of National Interest*, pp. 349-54.

[19] On the connection between identity and discourse, see Maja Zehfuss, "Constructivism and Identity: A Dangerous Liaison," *European Journal of International Relations* 7 (3) (2001): 326-36; see also Bially Mattern, "Power Politics of Identity," p. 364; and Lynch, "Abandoning Iraq," pp. 349-50. On identity formation through public rhetoric at the domestic level, see Consuelo Cruz, "Identity and Persuasion: How Nations Remember Their Pasts and Make Their Futures," *World Politics* 52 (3) (2000): 275-312. On rhetorical analysis as a methodological approach, see Frank Schimmelfennig, "The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union," *International Organization* 55 (1) (2001): 65-66. On the importance of meaning for constructivists, see Hopf, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory," p. 174.

[20] An excellent review of the literature on path dependency is Kathleen Thelen, "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics," *Annual Review of Political Science* 2 (1999): 369-404.

[21] The most well-developed model of "policy windows" and the role of new ideas in the policy process is found in John Kingdon's work on American politics. See John Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policy* 2nd ed. (New York: HarperCollins College Publishers, 1995), pp. 179-83. For an application of the concept to the comparative politics subfield, see John T.S. Keeler, "Opening the Window for Reform: Mandates, Crises and Extraordinary Policy-Making," *Comparative Political Studies* 25 (January 1993): 433-486, esp. pp. 439-442.

[22] Walker, *Inside/Outside*, pp. 151.

[23] I would like to thank Joseph Nye for his observation that sovereignty is a practice. On sovereignty as a discourse and how to read

sovereignty claims as speech acts, see Wouter G. Werner and Jaap H. De Wilde, "The Endurance of Sovereignty," *European Journal of International Relations* vol. 7, no. 3 (Autumn 2001): 286-90.

[24] Rogers M. Smith, "Citizenship and the Politics of People-Building." *Citizenship Studies* vol. 5, no. 1 (January 2000): 75.

[25] See Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*, Revised Edition (London: Verso, 1991); and E.J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, and Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), esp. pp. 118, 155, 167.

[26] In this paper, I am focusing exclusively on the development through foreign policy of what analysts have called "pan-Canadian nationalism," or a state ideology of national identification aimed at all Canadians but primarily resonating with English-speaking citizens. Historically, anti-Americanism – and specifically anti-integration sentiments – made up a central part of that nationalist vision, pitting a Canadian "in-group" against an American "out-group." This argument is developed extensively in Sylvia B. Bashevkin, *True Patriot Love: The Politics of Canadian Nationalism* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1991), esp. pp. viii-ix; 3-6. Though it is beyond the scope of this paper to explore fully Quebec nationalism, it should be noted that it lacks the strong element of insecurity *vis-a-vis* the United States, most likely since French Canadian culture is perceived to be threatened less by U.S. cultural influence or economic expansionism than by systematic marginalization by the institutions of Federalist (Anglo) Canada.

[27] This phrase is attributed to Graham Spry, who used it to describe the choice facing cultural nationalists in the 1930s. Cited by Bashevkin, *True Patriot Love*, p. 9. In a recent refutation of this all-but-accepted truism, economist William Watson lays out the premises of a state-centered view of Canadian national identity which he sets out to critique: "We *are* different from the Americans; It is important, both for ourselves and for the world, that we continue to be different from the Americans; In large part, our difference is either caused by or sustained by our greater use of government; We have always used government more than they have; [The] forced reduction in our use of government [through the FTA, NAFTA and WTO] risks taking us

below the critical threshold where we effectively become identical to the Americans." See William Watson, *Globalization and the Meaning of Canadian Life* (Toronto, Buffalo and London: University of Toronto Press, 1998), pp. 9-10.

[28] Craig Brown made this point as follows: "The idea of protection embodied in the tariff became equated with the Canadian nation itself. The National Policy, by stressing that Canadians should no longer be the 'hewers of wood and drawers of water' for the United States...recalled and reinforced that basic impulse of survival as a separate entity on this continent." See Brown, "The Nationalism of the National Policy," in Peter Russell (ed.), *Nationalism in Canada* (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1966): 157.

[29] On the link between Canadian national feeling and ties to the British Empire, see Carl Berger, *The Sense of Power: Studies in the Ideas of Canadian Imperialism, 1867-1914* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970). On the North Atlantic Triangle as a foreign policy strategy, see Brebner, "A Changing North Atlantic Triangle," *International Journal* 3 (1948): 309-319. On middle-power status and Canada's identity as multilateralist, see J.L. Granatstein, (ed.), *Canadian Foreign Policy Since 1945: Middle Power or Satellite?* (Toronto: Copp Clark Publishing Company, 1973); and, more recently, Andrew F. Cooper, "Multilateral Leadership: The Changing Dynamics of Canadian Foreign Policy," in John English and Norman Hillmer (eds.) *Making a Difference? Canada's Foreign Policy in a Changing World Order*, (Toronto: Lester Publishing Limited, 1992), pp. 200-221.

[30] See Harald Von Riekhoff, "The Third Option in Canadian Foreign Policy," in Brian W. Tomlin (ed.) *Canada's Foreign Policy: Analysis and Trends*. (Toronto: Methuen, 1978) pp. 87-109. See also Mitchell Sharp, "Canada-U.S. Relations: Options for the Future," *International Perspectives* (Special Issue, Autumn 1972).

[31] Roger S. Whitcomb, *The American Approach to Foreign Affairs: An Uncertain Tradition* (Westport, CT and London: Praeger, 1998), p. 1 for definition of foreign policy "tradition"; pp. 7-32 on the content of the American "tradition."

[32] Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "The Theory of America: Experiment or Destiny?" in Schlesinger, Jr., *Cycles of American History* (New York and London: Penguin Press, 1986), pp. 3-22.

[33] On Manifest Destiny ideology, see Albert K. Weinberg, *Manifest Destiny: A Study of Nationalist Expansionism in American History* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1935); and Michael Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987). It is also interesting to note that, under the sway of Manifest Destiny ideology, Canada became a target equally for those with vast territorial ambitions and those, like Congressman Hiram Bell, who saw Canada's "acquisition" by "assimilation" as more natural and advantageous than taking in all of the hemisphere willy nilly. See Hiram Bell, Speech before the U.S. House of Representatives, January 10, 1853, *Congressional Globe* (32nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1853), Appendix, pp. 58-60, exerpted in Norman Graebner (ed.) *Manifest Destiny* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1968), pp. 265-274.

[34] See Emily S. Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890-1945* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982), Chapter 3, pp. 38-62.

[35] I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer and the CAPP editor for raising this point.

[36] This is relentlessly exemplified throughout a recent, well-titled volume on U.S. policy towards Canada. See Edelgard Mahant and Graeme S. Mount, *Invisible and Inaudible in Washington: American Policies Toward Canada* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1999).

[37] For a lively account of the deterioration of relations between Canada and the U.S. in the wake of the "Nixon Shock" of 1971, see Stephen Clarkson, *Canada and the Reagan Challenge: Crisis and Adjustment, 1981-85*, Updated Edition (Toronto: James Lorimer & Company, 1985), pp. 1-22.

[38] EKOS/CBC/Toronto Star/La Presse poll, "Canada-US Relations [Summary of Findings]," December 6, 2002, p. 8, posted on http://www.ekos.com/admin/articles/6dec2002CanUS.pdf, accessed December 27,2002.

[39] Notable in the past decade have been the Shared Border Accord (1995), the Cross Border Crime Forum (1997) and the Border Vision Initiative (1997), as well as the Joint Declaration on Counter-Terrorism (1988). See "Fact Sheet: Canada and the United States: Partners Against Terrorism," September 25, 2001, posted on Prime Minister of Canada, Official Website, <http://www.pm.gc.ca/default.asp?Language=E&Page=newsroom&Sub=FactSheets&Doc=terrorism1_20010925_e.htm> Accessed September 18, 2002. On the Canada-U.S. Partnership (CUSP) established in 1999 to facilitate border cooperation via top-level coordination between the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) and the U.S. State Department, see "Creating Tomorrow's Border Together," < http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/can-am/menu-en.asp?act=v&mid=1&cat=10&did=285 > Accessed September 18, 2002.

[40] The Office of Homeland Security was created on October 8, 2001, when Tom Ridge was named its Director. For a timeline of Bush Administration actions regarding Homeland Security, see the White House website, "Homeland Security Archive," <http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/archive.html> Accessed September 17, 2002. With Congressional approval of a new Department of Homeland Security, Ridge is slated take a cabinet-level position in the administration. See David Firestone, "Senate Votes, 90-9, to Set Up Homeland Security Department Geared to Fight Terrorism, *The New York Times* (November 20, 2002), posted on http://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/20/politics/20HOME.html?ex=1038831704&ei=1&en=d216e5c99b019819 accessed November 20, 2002.

[41] Manley has since left his post as Foreign Minister to assume several Cabinet portfolios, most recently as Minister of Finance as of June 2, 2002. For Manley's biography, see his personal website, "About John Manley," <http://www.johnmanley.com/en/about/index_e.html > Accessed September 10, 2002.

[42] For the full text of the Smart Border Declaration, see the posting on the Canada-U.S. Relations site of DFAIT-Canada < http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/can-am/menu en.asp?act=v&mid=1&cat=10&did=1248> Accessed September 18, 2002.

[43] The importance given to these results by the two governments is reflected in the fact that they were announced in a joint statement by Bush and Chrétien following an official meeting of the two at Detroit. For the text of the joint statement, see "Joint Statement by Prime Minister Jean Chrétien and President George W. Bush on Implementation of the 'Smart Border' Declaration and Action Plan," Detroit, Michigan, September 9, 2002, posted on the Prime Minister's Official Website:
http://www.pm.gc.ca/default.asp?Language=E&Page=newsroom&Sub=NewsReleases&Doc=canu.s.border 20020909_e.htm Accessed September 10, 2002. For the official press release and first-anniversary Status Report, see the posting on the DFAIT site, "Governor Ridge and Deputy Prime Minister Manley Issue One-Year Report on the Smart Border Action Plan: December 6, 2002," http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/can-am/menu-en.asp?act=v&mid=1&cat=1&did=1671, accessed December 26, 2002.

[44] For a summary of the program and its goals, see "Free and Secure Trade Program (FAST)," Canada Customs and Revenue Agency, < http://www.ccra-adrc.gc.ca/newsroom/factsheets/2002/sep/fast-e.html > Accessed September 9, 2002.

[45] For a similar summary, see "NEXUS - The Simplest Way for Frequent Travellers to Cross the Border," Canada Customs and Revenue Agency, <http://www.ccra-adrc.gc.ca/customs/individuals/nexus/menu-e.html >Accessed September 9, 2002.

[46] "Joint Statement by Prime Minister Jean Chrétien and President George W. Bush on Implementation of the 'Smart Border' Declaration and Action Plan," Detroit, Michigan, September 9, 2002, *op. cit.*

[47] According to the summary posted on the DFAIT Canada-U.S. site, the Planning Group would "develop coordinated Canada-US contingency planning to respond to possible crisis scenarios…coordinate maritime surveillance and intelligence sharing, shared threat assessments, planning and exercises that will help to deter or respond to threats and crises." The site also has links to the official press release, a backgrounder, and the text of the agreement signed December 9, 2002. See DFAIT "Canada and the U.S. Enhance Security Cooperation," available at <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/can-am/menu-en.asp?act=v&mid=1&cat=1&did=1731>, accessed December 26,

2002. Further information is available on the Department of National Defence website, <http://www.dnd.ca/eng/archive/2002/dec02/09Security_n_e.htm>, accessed December 26, 2002.

[48] The classic statement of this view, known as neofunctionalism, is found in the work of Ernst Haas. See, for example, Ernst B. Haas, *The Uniting of Europe: Political, Economic and Social Forces 1950-1957* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958).

[49] For a constructivist defense of spill-over, see Bill McSweeney, *Security, Identity, and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 168, 195-96.

[50] Remarks of Tom Ridge, Director of the Office of Homeland Security, to the Electronics Industries Alliance, April 23, 2002 posted on the White House Homeland Security Archives site, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/04/20020423-15.html> Accessed September 17, 2002.

[51] *Ibid.*

[52] Remarks of Tom Ridge, Director of Homeland Security, to the Homeland Security and Defense Conference, November 27, 2001, posted on the White House Homeland Security Archives at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011128-6.html> Accessed September 17, 2002.

[53] Remarks of Tom Ridge, Director of Homeland Security, to the U.S. Conference of Mayors, Washington, D.C., January 23, 2002, posted on the White House Homeland Security Archives at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020123-23.html>Accessed September 17, 2002.

[54] Notes for an Address by the Honourable John Manley, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the Canadian Council of Chief Executives, Toronto, Ontario, January 15, 2002, posted on the John Manley website, <_http://www.johnmanley.com/en/newsroom/s_executives_e.html> Accessed September 10, 2002.

[55] *Ibid.*

[56] *Ibid.*

[57] Notes for an Address by the Honourable John Manley, Deputy Prime Minister of Canada and Minister of Infrastructure and Crown Corporations to the Toronto Board of Trade, Toronto, Ontario, April 25, 2002, posted on the John Manley website, <http://www.johnmanley.com/en/newsroom/s_toronto_e.html> Accessed September 10, 2002.

[58] Manley to Canadian Council of Chief Executives, *op. cit.*

[59] White House, Office of the Press Secretary, "Securing America's Borders Fact Sheet: Border Security Action Plan for Creating a Secure and Smart Border," January 25, 2002, posted on the White House Homeland Security Archive, at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020125.html> Accessed September 17, 2002.

[60] He also cites a motto heard from friends in the Army Corps of Engineers: "The difficult, we do immediately. The impossible takes a little longer." See Ridge's remarks following his swearing-in ceremony, posted as Office of the Press Secretary, "Gov. Ridge Sworn-In to Lead Homeland Security," East Room [The White House], Washington, D.C., October_8,_2001 <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011008-3.html > Accessed September 17, 2002.

[61] Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty [1958]" in *Liberty* ed. by Henry Hardy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 169-178 on "negative liberty."

[62] In his speech to U.S. governors, for example, he calls the U.S. an "open, welcoming, trusting country." See Remarks by Homeland Security Director Tom Ridge at the National Governors' Association Committee on Human Resources, Washington, D.C., February 26, 2002, posted on White House Homeland Security Archive site, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020224-2.html Accessed September 17, 2002.

[63] This is mentioned in nearly every speech posted on the Homeland Security Archives site. See Remarks to Mayors, Governors, Homeland Security and Defense Conference, *op. cit.*

[64] Stephanie R. Golob, "Beyond the Policy Frontier: Sovereignty, Security, and Identity in the Origins of NAFTA," paper presented at the 97th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (APSA), San Francisco, August 30-September 2, 2001, available at<http://pro.harvard.edu/abstracts/016/016011GolobSteph.htm>

[65] See, for example, Manley, "Notes..Business Council of British Columbia," *op. cit.*

[66] Notes for an Address by the Honourable John Manley, Deputy Prime Minister of Canada and Minister of Infrastructure and Crown Corporations, to the Canadian Club, Toronto, Ontario, February 11, 2002, posted on the John Manley website, http://www.johnmanley.com/en/newsroom/s_canadian_e.html
Accessed September 10, 2002.

[67] Manley, "Notes..Business Council of British Columbia, *op. cit.*

[68] See Notes for an Address by the Honourable John Manley, Deputy Prime Minister of Canada, to the Economic Leadership Speaker Series, Halifax, Nova Scotia, May 15, 2002, posted on the John Manley Website, http://www.johnmanley.com/en/newsroom/s_dtpMay15_e.htm
Accessed September 10, 2002.

[69] Notes for an Address by the Honourable John Manley, Deputy Prime Minister of Canada, to the Commercial Finance Association of Canada, Toronto, Ontario, May 13, 2002, posted on the John Manley website,< http://www.johnmanley.com/en/newsroom/s_cfaMay13_e.htm> Accessed September 10, 2002.

[70] Robert A. Pastor, *Toward a North American Community: Lessons from the Old World for the New* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 2001, esp. Chapter 5, pp. 95-117.

[71] In the immediate aftermath of the September 11th attacks, a Toronto Star/La Presse/CBC-SRC/EKOS poll found that 65% of Canadians polled felt "a closer sense of shared values and interests with Americans." See ""Security, Sovereignty, and Continentalism: Canadian Perspectives on September 11th," (September 27, 2001), p. 18; posted as a PDF document on the EKOS website, http://www.ekos.com/admin/articles/27-sept-2001E.pdf accessed January 3, 2003.

[72] In the Canadian portion of a global poll sponsored by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press and executed by Environics, 72 per cent of Canadians polled were favorable towards the U.S. while 27 per cent were not. See Michael Adams, "Good News for Canada," *The Globe and Mail* (December 30, 2002), p. A13. Michael Adams is president of Environics. See also the Environics Research Group website, http://erg.environics.net/news/default.asp?aID=506, accessed December 27, 2002.

[73] For the Pollara figures, see Robert Fife, "66% Favour Stronger Ties to U.S.," *National Post* (October 21, 2002), available at http://www.nationalpost.com/home/story.html?id=3777B53D-84AD-41E2-BB28-43114892CA0A,accessed October 21, 2002. See also the Pollara website, http://www.pollara.ca/new/POLLARA_NET.html, accessed December 27, 2002.

[74] See Ian Jack, "Ottawa Sees Closer NAFTA Ties," *National Post* (October 25, 2002), available at http://www.nationalpost.com/search/site/story.asp?id=6EA7241D-A9C1-4167-ABC5-DC36A28FD17A
accessed October 25, 2002. See also Anne Dawson, "Pettrigrew Confirms Push to Add Labour to NAFTA," *National Post* (October 26, 2002), available at: http://www.nationalpost.ca/home/story.html?id=341350C3-401A-4C88-9C45-993A00302EA4, accessed October 28, 2002.

[75] This report notes that the Prime Minister was critical of the outline, but that it was privately favored by some Cabinet ministers. See Drew Fagan, "What Canada Must Do to Crack the U.S. Market," *The Globe and Mail* (November 5, 2002), available at www.globeandmail.com, accessed November 5, 2002.

[76] For a summary of findings from a recent PRI-sponsored conference, see "Strengthening the North American Partnership: Scenarios for the Future," (Ottawa, May 12-13, 2002), available at the PRI website, http://policyresearch.gc.ca/page.asp?pagenm=hp-ph_nal-lna_cr, accessed January 3, 2003.

[77] For example, the report does not endorse expanding towards a true customs union and rejects monetary integration. See "Notes for a Statement by Chair Dr. Bernard Patry M.P., Press Conference on the

Release of the Committee's Report *Partners in North America...*", Ottawa, December 12, 2002, p. 7. See note 10 for full reference and website address.

[78] These three are Mel Hurtig, an outspoken and long-time proponent of anti-American Canadian nationalism who sounds the alarm of national self-defense in the face of stealth absorption via integration with the U.S.; Stephen Clarkson, a professor at University of Toronto who calls for a return of more state pro-activity to reinforce Canadian distinctiveness, and Michael Hart, a key bureaucratic player in the advancement of free trade ideas in the years leading up to and including the negotiation of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, who favors greater rule-based integration with the U.S.. See Mel Hurtig, *The Vanishing Country: Is It Too Late to Save Canada?* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2002); Stephen Clarkson, *Uncle Sam and Us: Globalization, Neoconservatism, and the Canadian State* (Toronto and Washington, D.C.: University of Toronto Press and the Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2002); and Michael Hart, *A Trading Nation: Canadian Trade Policy from Colonialism to Globalization* (Vancouver and Toronto: UBC Press, 2002).

[79] "Notes for a Statement by Chair Dr. Bernard Patry, M.P.," p. 5. Emphasis is mine.

[80] "Partners in North America..." [Summary of Findings], p. 33.