I. INTRODUCTION

Although personal relationships between U.S. Presidents and Canadian prime ministers have often been cordial [e.g. Clinton-Chretien, Carter-Trudeau, G.H. Bush-Mulroney] and positively affected at least the atmosphere and tone if not always the substance of Canada-U.S. relations, at other times these personal relations at the top have been acrimonious [e.g. Nixon-Trudeau, Reagan-Trudeau].\(^1\) Especially since the U.S. decision to go to war with Iraq, such has been the case between President Bush and Prime Minister Chretien.\(^2\)

The relationship between them began badly when Raymond Chretien, the prime minister's nephew who in the presidential election year 2000 was Canada's ambassador in Washington, publicly suggested that Ottawa favored the candidacy of Al Gore. Relations between the two leaders were patched up to a degree due to President Bush's supportive performance at the Spring,
2001, Summit of the Americas which Canada hosted in Quebec City. But subsequently, things took a turn for the worse over a host of trade issues like grain, steel, and softwood lumber where the Bush Administration was seen to be playing petty parochial politics at the expense of Canadian jobs. The June, 2002, G-8 Summit in Alberta was also seen as undermining Chretien. When the prime minister proposed a comprehensive plan to aid Africa which was supposed to be an important part of Chretien’s legacy as world statesman, that image was undermined when Bush insisted on linkage between economic aid and democratic reform. The contrasts between the “little guy from Shawinigan” and George W. Bush’s relative lack of political and diplomatic experience, little if any knowledge of Canada, and hardly any travel beyond the borders of the United States prior to his controversial election as president could not have been starker. Having gotten along very well with small-town-Arkansas-boy-made-good moderate “liberal” Democrat Bill Clinton for the first seven years of his tenure as prime minister, it was perhaps inevitable that Chretien, whose humble origins echo Clinton’s, would not relate very well to the conservative Republican crowd around Bush.

This paper contends that the foundations of the Canada-U.S. relationship are resilient enough to survive the current stresses and strains between Ottawa and Washington over Iraq. Canada’s preference for multilateralism, soft power in defense of human security and human rights, global economic and environmental justice, along with the normal array of bilateral irritants ranging from wheat and cattle to acid rain will also survive. Policy differences between the two governments are currently taking place against a backdrop of mutual suspicion and disaffection at the summit between President Bush and Prime Minister Chretien. Among the interrelated factors which allow integrative tendencies in Canada-U.S. relations to continue to widen and intensify in spite of (as well as simultaneously with) current differences at the top are: globalization and “glocalization,” the de facto internationalization of functions and activities of subnational governments; and, most important of all, the enduring commonality or complementarity of a host of cross-border local and regional interests in a host of specific policy domains. Current post-9/11 Canadian and U.S. central and subnational governmental efforts to obtain a border which is both impervious to terrorist penetration and yet open to maintaining the largest bilateral
trade relationship in the world— a “smart” and “trade efficient” border, a secure yet open border— illustrate these themes.

The border between Canada and the United States is extremely porous and transparent. Not an entirely new development, the emergence of an increasingly permeable border was more the result of political will in response to economic, cultural, and ecological forces than of the brute facts of geography alone. This pattern unfolded in the period between the adoption by the “mother of all Parliaments” of the Quebec Act in 1774 and the Statute of Westminster in 1931, even as British North America was being transformed into two distinctive and presumably indivisible and univocal sovereign entities. Since that time, a bewildering variety of ties have continued to multiply among Canadian and U.S. inhabitants in all walks of life.

At the same time, cross-border transactions have come to implicate governments at the local and state/provincial as well as at the federal levels with much greater frequency than in the past, notwithstanding the considerable formal plenary powers to conduct international relations allocated by both of these federal constitutional regimes to Washington and Ottawa respectively. That is to say, the growth in inter-sovereign linkages between the two contiguous federal systems stems from the continued increase in private economic, cultural, environmental, social and transnational interactions. Despite possible objections on traditional federal distribution of powers grounds, effective management of the sheer volume and complexity of these interdependencies has noticeably enhanced opportunities for the participation of governments at all levels. Between and within each of these two neighboring North American Federal regimes, the central and subnational governmental units collaborate when complementary and common interests converge; however, those very same governmental units compete amongst themselves when conflicting interests diverge. External and internal streams perforate but do not eliminate intersovereign barriers between states. Consequently, it seems useful to qualify and refine the traditional notion of one state speaking to another with a single univocal legitimate voice.

II. POLICY CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE IN THE CONTEXT OF CANADA – U.S. INTERDEPENDENCIES

The bilateral relationship between Canada and the United States is an asymmetric one. As a result, whenever North American
cross-border policy agenda spillovers occur, they are usually from the more powerful United States to Canada rather than the reverse. The widespread awareness in Canada of unequal power relationships between the two countries not infrequently contributes to reactive policy responses in Canada to common environmental shocks (crises) at variance with those in the United States. Canada’s political elite intermittently justifies such policy divergence on the grounds of forging and maintaining a distinctive national identity vis-a-vis its more powerful neighbor to the south.

Because it is sometimes politically profitable and convenient to do so, Canadian politicians will adopt policies in specific issue-areas which run counter to those in the United States in order to compensate for perceived loss of Canadian autonomy in any number of other policy domains. Nevertheless, as asymmetric Canada–U.S. economic integration cum policy convergence proceeds post-NAFTA, Canadian reactive policy responses leading to policy divergence will continue unabated and perhaps intensify even while Canada feels compelled to embrace continentalist imperatives in many fields. Canada is small but not powerless vis-a-vis even the United States. Trajectories of policy convergence in some spheres occur simultaneously with paths of Canada–U.S. policy divergence in other domains.13

Yet, the on-going, incomplete process of Canada–U.S. integration14 suggests the existence of a common northern North American policymaking environment within which public policies in the two neighboring sovereign polities are formulated, evaluated, and implemented. Here are two contiguous states, advanced industrial democracies, engaged in adapting to similar environmental disturbances in the international system, albeit often at different rates, times, and substances. Thus, Canadian policy sometimes imitates and at other times reacts against U.S. policy. Depending upon the specific issue, common problems perceived in the same way, irrespective of such important differences as relative power, institutional frameworks and political culture, should not infrequently give rise to similar public policy responses to common environmental shocks.

Canada is both a victim and beneficiary of its multitude of economic, cultural, and social interdependencies with the United States. Cross-border diffusion of ideas, technologies, capital, business structure, cultural commodities and the like reinforces the notion that the two societies are more similar than dissimilar from
one another. The 5,000+ miles international boundary not only separates and divides but also links and unites these two neighboring sovereign federal states. Over the border flow people, pollution, and ideas as well as products; the border is permeable and acts more like a sieve than an impenetrable shield.

What, then, is the relationship between the external forces of international economic integration on the one hand, and domestic policy choices open to government decision-makers in Canada on the other? Prematurely pessimistic nationalists as well as continentalists, enthusiastically preaching the necessity of Canada inevitably bowing before the irreversible logic of more integration, exaggerate the consequences of closer Canada–U.S. economic links. As George Hoberg puts it, Canada has had and, in fact, continues to retain "the capacity to choose." The consequences of continental integration have not been as grave and far-reaching as many people on both sides of the nationalist/continentalist divide in Canada believe them to be. While Canada, in order to acquire and defend access to larger markets, has had to abandon certain domestic protectionist policy instruments (and, yes, policy harmonization has indeed increased) nevertheless Ottawa still maintains a significant margin of maneuver, even in policy spheres directly impacted by North American economic integration.

On September 11, 2001, terrorists hijacked airplanes and then used them as bombs to destroy the World Trade Center in New York City and part of the Pentagon in Washington D.C. Some three thousand human beings, including 25 Canadians, died in the attack. Immediately after September 11th, delays at some of the most heavily used Canada–U.S. border crossings were reported to have been as long as 18 hours. This could have had a substantial negative impact upon Canadian and American businesses, such as the auto industry, that depend upon the quick transportation of goods across the border.

Since 9/11 the United States has reitered more strongly than ever that security at the border needs to be strengthened. In order to ensure the American people of their safety, the development of new security measures along the Canada–U.S. border is among the main homeland security policy priorities of the U.S. government. Washington looks to Ottawa to take on this venture together. Pressures on Canada from the United States to implement greater border security could have serious effects on the Canadian economy. This places
Canada in a precarious position. It should be noted that a not insubstantial 25 percent of U.S. exports go to Canada compared to 86 percent of Canadian exports shipped to the United States. Whereas the exports from Canada to the United States make up 37 percent of Canada's GDP, exports from the United States to Canada constitute a meager 2.4 percent of U.S. GDP. Comparatively speaking, then, unilateral U.S.-imposed regulatory hurdles that slowed down and therefore reduced the cross-border flow of persons and products as a corollary of the global war on terrorism would detrimentally affect vital Canadian far more than American interests. Nevertheless, the development of new homeland security measures along the Canada-U.S. border would also have a negative effect on any number of important economic spheres such as investment and tourism in many U.S. localities as well. Dire consequences stemming from such measures for various subnational state, provincial, and local economies throughout the United States as well as Canada can be readily foreseen.

Canada and her subnational governments always must look at the border through a trade lens. In 2000 about 86 percent of Canada's total exports were sold to the United States, which constitutes 65 percent of Canada's manufacturing production. More than $400 billion annually, or approximately $1.3 billion daily worth of goods, cross the border. Canada's largest foreign investor is the United States. At the same time that Canada is the largest export market for 38 states, 94 percent of natural gas imports into the United States come from Canada. In 1999 the three provinces of Ontario, Quebec, and British Columbia alone were responsible for 88 percent of Canada's exports to and 90 percent of imports from the United States.

While it might seem normal for Washington to want tighter security measures in response to a very credible terrorist threat, the economic burden of such measures would fall disproportionately on Canada's shoulders. This largely explains why the Chretien Liberal government after 9/11 opposed unilateral U.S. border security measures and agreed instead to on-going consultations that resulted in joint Canada-U.S. cross-border administrative arrangements that reduced "the chance of the United States taking unilateral action on the Canada-U.S. border." In the eyes of the Bush Administration, Ottawa is not concerned enough with security. For Ottawa, trade and sovereignty are the key factors motivating officials to conclude
border security understandings with Washington consistent with the Canadian national interest as the Chretien government defines it.

III. TRANS-BORDER REGIONALISM IN NORTH AMERICA

North American subnational governments (i.e., states and provinces) are, in a sense, partially autonomous managers of the economic, social, and in some instances even the cultural well-being of their inhabitants. Since the early 1970s they have been induced more and more to look for, or respond to, any number of very diverse contacts with foreign centers of economic, cultural, and political influence. These external sources of influence upon subnational jurisdictions, foreign governments as well as multinational corporations (MNCs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) include not only immediate trans-border neighbors but also relatively distant centers of investment or industrial power, including even central governments that oversee national economies.

Neither constitutions nor the traditional procedures derived from them provide for adequate management of the various challenges or opportunities which call for the presence of subnational alongside central governments on the international scene. Whatever the constitutional, conceptual, or practical objections that central governments may express, federal democratic polities in North America have come to speak abroad with regionally nuanced voices. Consequently, as practitioners of democracy and federalism, Canada and the United States must somehow constructively coordinate the various activities and signals emanating from central as well as subnational sources.

Neither the idea nor the facts of global, continental, and regional interdependence are new, but the subnational awareness of its pressures and opportunities and the need to reach out to them is recent. The awareness of subnational vulnerability to extra-national and distant developments has trickled from beyond borders down to subnational elected leaders and their staffs. At the very least, these people are responsible for their own political survival which is increasingly linked to the economic progress and social well-being of their respective subnational territorial political communities. Not only Ottawa and Washington but also states and provinces must engage in activities beyond international frontiers in order to remain custodians of the living standards and welfare of their people.
In federal systems, Duchacek notes, subnational governments have long preceded the central government in the social service roles of modern states. Long before Ottawa and Washington began to establish bureaucracies to promote individual and group well-being, education, social services, and general welfare had constituted the agendas of subnational government authorities in North America. These historic roles have prompted many subnational governments nowadays to assert some degree of international competence in issue-areas which they view as not clearly under the exclusive jurisdiction of a univocal central government. Therefore, when subnational semi-sovereign territorial communities (states and provinces) project their needs and interests abroad, they do so in such matters as locating job-creating branch plants of MNCs as well as in various trade, energy, tourism, ecology, and investment issues.

Similarity of social, economic, and environmental problems stemming from geographical proximity has always been a reason for contiguous subnational governments to look more often towards their immediate neighbors beyond the intersovereign divide than towards Ottawa and Washington. Practical and pressing needs rather than any theory underpin the useful and inevitable perforations of all boundaries. Transborder linkages involve neighbors that regionally are substantially less asymmetric and therefore less afraid of each other than are states like Canada and the United States facing each other in a continental context.

It is not accidental that French Quebec constituted a major bastion of electoral support for the Canada–U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CUFTA) during the historic Canadian general election campaign in November, 1988. Much more divided sentiments on the free trade issue prevailed in many other parts of English Canada. Because it was not perceived as a threat to Quebec’s unique North American francophone culture, free trade during the 1980s was widely embraced there. The Quebecois resist political domination by the “Canadian Nation” because they perceive it as trying to squelch their specific national identity more than they fear U.S. cultural influence.

Both the pro-Meech Lake renewed federalism Quebec Liberal Party and the pro-sovereignty-association Parti Quebecois were strongly supportive of CUFTA. That agreement opened up the tantalizing possibility of at least loosening but not irrevocably dissolving some of the traditional East-West economic and political ties between Quebec and the rest of Canada in favor of a more intense
north-south economic linkages with the United States. Unlike their English Canadian fellow countrymen, those among Quebec provincial elites endorsing sovereignty-partnership and renewed federalism have adopted by and large the view that language and cultural distinctiveness had always been in the past and would in the future as well prove to be effective barriers slowing down the process of Americanization in Quebec society and culture to manageable proportions.

IV. THE OPEN AND/OR SECURE BORDER IN THE QUEBEC-NEW YORK-NEW ENGLAND NEIGHBORHOOD

Either through silence, inaction, or positive acquiescence, cooperation, and logistic support, Ottawa and Washington have at least tacitly acknowledged the transborder regional activities of states and provinces, all of whom lack treaty powers. The volume, complexity, and enduring nature of many a transborder energy, environment, and (currently) trade or security issue, each of which impacts upon vast and bewildering arrays of local interests in many important ways, means that central governments often need and welcome (or at least do not object to) the involvement of subnational governments in international outreach activities.

One form of a bilateral state-province contact is regular meetings between the heads of government of Quebec and New York. Since 1983, there have been annual Quebec-New York “summits” to review joint programs which have already been put into effect; and they discuss the possibility of increasing those links. At the center of discussions between New York’s Governor Pataki and Quebec’s Premier Landry on November 29, 2001, in New York City were homeland security and the improvement of the infrastructure of the trade corridor connecting New York and Quebec. They also announced agreement to make government procurement mutually accessible to businesses from both jurisdictions, and to hold a Quebec-New York “summit” in May, 2002 at Plattsburgh, New York, and St. Jean-sur-Richelieu, Quebec. Those “summit” meetings were organized jointly by the two governments in cooperation with the Chambre de Commerce du Quebec and the Plattsburgh–North Country Chambers of Commerce. The governor and premier agreed on the need to ensure optimum security throughout North America while maintaining the smooth flow of goods and people. Consequently, they both supported establishment of a North American
security perimeter. They also agreed on the need to foster closer links between the Quebec Department of Public Security and the New York State Office of Public Security.\textsuperscript{31}

In order to enhance the flow and safety of transportation in the main trade corridor between Quebec and New York State, the two governments expect to undertake an infrastructure improvement project with the financial participation of Ottawa and Quebec City. In light of the 9/11 attacks and presumably the broader security measures made necessary by the fight against terrorism, the governor and premier agreed to broaden collaboration between the New York State and Quebec provincial Departments of Transportation in five specific areas: improved access to the Lacolle (Quebec)-Champlain (New York) border crossing; harmonization of road signs on both sides of the border; the implementation of coordinated projects for the development of intelligent transportation systems with respect to the verification and management of traffic; the promotion of the transportation and trade corridor along the Autoroute 15 (Quebec)-Interstate 87 (New York) highways; and the development of close cooperation with federal agencies responsible for borders in Canada and the United States. Shortly after the Pataki-Landry meeting in New York, the Quebec government on December 3, 2001, announced the investment of U.S.$48 million to upgrade the Quebec side of the Lacolle-Champlain border crossing through a four-year plan to improve roads, new signs, and more police patrols between the border and Montreal.\textsuperscript{32} It is worth noting that New York State is Quebec’s leading international trading partner. In 2000, trade between Quebec and New York State reached $9 billion U.S., an increase of over 300 percent since 1990. Roughly 45 percent of truck traffic between Quebec and the United States uses the Lacolle border crossing.\textsuperscript{33}

The May, 2002, New York–Quebec “summit” in Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu and Plattsburgh brought together more than 450 business, academic, and government leaders. Organized once again by the Quebec and New York state governments in cooperation with the Chambre de Commerce du Quebec and the Plattsburgh-North Country Chamber of Commerce, this two-day forum also focused on how to increase the unhindered movement of goods, services, and people while ensuring border security. Governor Pataki offered U.S.$35 million to complement the U.S.$48 million that Quebec had commit-
ted earlier (see above) to the trade corridor which traverses the Lacolle-Champlain border crossing.  

Since 1973 the heads of government of the four Atlantic Canada provinces and Quebec ("Eastern Canada") have met annually to discuss with their counterparts, the governors of the six New England States, common problems ranging from economic cooperation and fisheries to (nowadays) border security and transportation. Hosted by Premier Bernard Landry, the 27th Annual Conference of New England Governors and Eastern Canadian Premiers (AC) was held August 26–28, 2002, in Quebec City. The governors and premiers as well as guest speakers focused on new approaches to improving regional economies, trade links, and the quality of the environment. In the wake of 9/11, they also discussed the impact of terrorism on border security and trade between the states and provinces. One resolution the AC adopted expressed support for enhanced collaboration and information-sharing to address all of the aspects of the border, including security, immigration, trade, movement of people, and infrastructure. Maine Governor Angus King suggested that both federal governments act on the idea of "security at the border of the continent... [and] elimination of border restrictions between our respective jurisdictions." Quebec Premier Landry added that "we must serve the population through fluidity of goods, services, capital and persons...like in Europe.... It's a concept that I would like us to explore together and convince our federal governments to explore together." Former Governor of Massachusetts and AC alumnus Paul Cellucci, currently U.S. Ambassador to Canada, addressed the governors and premiers on bilateral Canada-U.S. relations, as did the deputy chief of mission of the Canadian Embassy in Washington. Cellucci pointed out that most trade disputes between the two countries involve items explicitly excluded from the Free Trade Agreements—namely softwood lumber, agriculture, and cultural industries.  

V. CONCLUSION  

Canada is an artifact of political will and statecraft whose continued existence on the basis of East-West interregional and interprovincial patterns of intercourse defies the North-South logic of economic geography in this vast northern portion of North America. At the symbolic level, in order for Canada to differentiate itself from too close an identification with its more powerful neighbor to the
south, Canadian political elites have since the mid-1960s stressed bilingualism and biculturalism. Yet at the same time, they often discredit Quebec’s longstanding demands for more provincial autonomy; they reject the notion that “special status”, “two nations”, “distinct society” or “sovereignty-association/partnership” is an absolutely essential prerequisite for the perpetuation of the French “fakt” in Quebec and therefore in Canada and North America. For, without a viable francophone national community in Quebec, French Canada is dead. Should Quebec ever break the current federal ties that bind it to the rest of Canada and walk the path of some version of political sovereignty rather than some version of renewed federalism, the idea of a “rest of Canada without Quebec” that remains meaningfully distinct from the United States will also vanish.

Support in Quebec for the principle of opening up continental and world markets to exports from Quebec should not be understood as endorsement of more centralization of powers in Canada — i.e., greater uniformity of economic policies and regulation through an even more predominant Ottawa role despite the current constitutional division of powers. From a liberal federalist Quebec provincial government perspective, the neoclassical economic theory of comparative advantages with its long-term promise of greater economic prosperity underpins Quebec’s support of continental, hemispheric, and global economic integration. The more the opening up of new markets discourages state interventionism by the federal as well as provincial governments, the more likely will continental, hemispheric, and global economic integration succeed in making this liberal perspective popular. From a PQ sovereignist provincial government perspective, support for the integration process must be understood as a strategy leading to the gradual erosion of the Canadian domestic market for Quebec goods and services. Increasing dependence upon North American and world markets ultimately becomes a structural argument in favor of Quebec sovereignty. The Quebec Liberal party primarily focuses on building up Quebec’s trade with the United States, as well as its overall economic power, in order to ensure the province’s cultural and linguistic survival and political clout within a revised Canadian federation.

What are the consequences of North American continental economic integration on the capacity of provincial/state subnational and federal governments to control their own social and economic development? What levels of government, central or subnational,
are benefiting most from this process of economic integration in the new North America? Integration of continental and world markets depends upon the continued active participation of the central governments. We are still far away from inhabiting a borderless world in North America. Borders mean something; Ottawa and Washington still have crucial roles to play in helping citizens prepare to respond effectively to both the challenges and opportunities of an increasingly pan-North American common economic space. Federal states like Canada and the United States must be responsive and accountable at one and the same time to their citizens, yet speak with one voice for certain purposes in an international arena of sovereign polities. The Canada–U.S. border represents the juncture of a dual role by central governments to balance developments in the international environment with domestic pressures. In part, each central government tries to protect domestic society from external threats and, as best it can, to nudge the international system in directions consistent with diverse domestic interests and concerns. Furthermore, Ottawa and Washington register pressures stemming from the wider international context to domestic society, adapting internal policies to international conditions which they cannot change, and helping domestic interests to adjust to the world beyond their borders.

Yet, one must acknowledge that in an era of more and more diverse and complex cross-border transactions, globalization, and “glocalization”, international boundaries have become less rigid and more permeable. Old traditions in the conduct of Canada–U.S. relations are yielding to new practices and new stakeholders such as states and provinces because ideas, people, goods, money, pollution and crime are passing through and over borders with greater frequency than ever before. A new type of international relations between Canada and the United States is emerging that involves interactions between “perforated sovereignties” where territorial boundaries between the two central and 60 major subnational state and provincial political jurisdictions of North America are both respected and ignored. Even while presidents and prime ministers occasionally fail to get along and central governments publicly disagree from time to time over substantive policy matters, such a pattern permits Canada-U.S. integration to continue to widen and deepen on the basis of enduring reciprocal and complementary
interests. These in turn fuel more and more cooperative cross-border outreach activities at the local base between states and provinces.

Generally speaking, for many years Americans and Canadians have lived together in North America as friends, allies, and partners in trade. The 5,000-mile border accommodates a diverse flow of people, commodities, and ideas, but the sense of mutual security and amity afforded by long experience with an "undefended" border masks its current importance and growing complexity.41 Until 9/11, the notion of a relatively "open" Canada-U.S. border was routinely taken for granted. Since then, public policy discussions between the two countries have revolved increasingly around ways to secure the border during a protracted "War on Terrorism"42 against the backdrop of a longstanding and continuing process of North American integration that is not likely to be fundamentally reversed in the very near future despite intermittent strains at the top.
NOTES

1 A broad thumbnail general overview in Lawrence Martin, The Presidents and the Prime Ministers, Washington and Ottawa, Face to Face: The Myth of Bilateral Bliss, 1867-1982 (Markham: Paper Jacks Ltd., 1982). Because the focus there is frequently more on the personalities than on the issues, the book should not be viewed as a comprehensive study of bilateral relations. Since 115 years of history are covered in a relatively short space, the treatment in some areas is necessarily general and sweeping.


4 The central feature of the idea of globalization is that many contemporary issues cannot be adequately studied in terms of each country standing alone (state centrism) and its international relations with other self-contained states, but needs to be seen in terms of transnational processes. Based on globalizing forces and institutions, the transnational approach defines globalization as a way of organizing political, social, and economic life across existing state borders. We cannot completely ignore the nation-state; but existing territorial borders are declining in significance while transnational practices are growing. It is not the state as such which drives globalization, although its politicians and bureaucrats play prominent roles. In federations like Canada and the United States, these include subnational provincial and state as well as central government officials. See Leslie Sklar, Globalization Capitalism and its Alternatives (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), Introduction and Chapter 3. 9/11 makes it all the more necessary to think of our world in globalizing rather than only in state-centrism terms. But, democratic
states constitutionally governed by the rule of law have a continuing and important role to play. See, for example, David Cameron and Janice Stein, “Globalization, Culture and Society: The State as Place Amidst Shifting Spaces.” Canadian Public Policy XXVI, (Aug. 2000), 15 – 34.

5 A term derived from the global culture approach, which argues that globalization is driven by a homogenizing mass media-based culture and that this threatens national and/or local identities. Characterized as “globo-localism,” it emphasizes the territorial dimension—what happens to territorial identities within, between and across states in a world of growing interconnections. Ibid., Sklar, 43-43. See also Thomas J. Courchene, “Globalization: The Regional/International Interface,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 18 no. 1 (Spring 1995), 1-20. A signal contribution to the study of tensions between complex interdependence and the territorial fragmentation of humanity which, while not explicitly using the term “glocalization,” creatively combines insights from the political science subfields of international relations, comparative politics, and state/provincial politics appears in Ivo D. Duchacek, The Territorial Dimension of Politics Within, Among, and Across Nations (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986).

6 In this paper, the term used consistently throughout to mean U.S. states and Canadian provinces rather than the alternatives “non-central” or sub-central” to reflect the primary of the national (central) levels of government in conduct of international relations in both of these neighboring federations.

7 Although a few provinces in Canada (most frequently, Quebec) have taken the position that they have an undeniable right to act internationally in areas of their constitutional jurisdiction, e.g., the implementation of particular provisions of treaties like CUFTA and NAFTA negotiated and ratified by central governments which touch upon provincial spheres of jurisdiction. See Gouvernement du Quebec, Ministre des Affaires Internationales, Quebec and the North American Free Trade Agreement (Quebec: 1993), 13-17. Section 1.42 of this document, entitled “Quebec’s Conditions,” alludes to the following: 1) the implementation in Canada of an impending agreement must take into account the current division of legislative powers between different orders of government; 2) full respect for legisla-
tion, programs and policies which in the fields of social policy, communications, language and culture contribute to the uniqueness of Quebec society; 7) Quebec’s right to approve or reject the Agreement depending on its final assessment in light of the province’s basic interests. A Quebec Liberal government, not a Parti Quebecois one, held power in Quebec City, and the document was published in the name of John Caccia, then Minister of International Affairs.


9 For example, Quebec hydroelectricity feeds demand in New York and New England.

10 For example, cooperation between states and provinces such as New York and New England, Quebec and the Maritimes whose forests are downwind from U.S. Midwestern power plants in Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois as well as Ontario, sources of emissions leading to acid rain damage.

11 For example, conflicts over the location of automobile plant closures or new production facilities in Michigan, Ontario, or any other particular subnational jurisdiction north or south of the 49th parallel.

12 According to the Hobbesian state-centric paradigm, a nation-state traditionally appears to be univocal, and foreign governments hear it as a single authoritative voice. This perspective distorts the reality of multiple perforations of inter-sovereign boundaries. In reality, the federal nation-state is increasingly audible as a multi-vocal actor in the international system. Either the diverse voices of the multi-vocal actor may be sharply dissonant—i.e., between the central and the various subnational components of the federation; or, these central and subnational voices may be mutually complementary. See Ivo D. Duchacek, et al., Perforated Sovereignties and International Relations: Trans-Sovereign Contacts of Subnational Governments (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988), 4-5. Also Duchacek, The Territorial Dimension of Politics Within, Among, and Across Nations (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), 219-223.
Stephanie R. Golob, “North America Beyond NAFTA? Sovereignty, Identity, and Security in Canada-U.S. Relations,” Canadian-American Public Policy no. 52 (December 2002) 14 – 19. Asserts that both Canada and the United States have state legitimation reasons to resist mutual identification and to preserve distinctiveness, but viewed in the context of asymmetry of power and attention – i.e. a distinctiveness imperative and an asymmetric reality (sharing of a common geographic and symbolic space). That imperative and that reality periodically meet, e.g. the 1971 “Nixon Shock”, softwood lumber. For Golob, the post-09/11/01 Smart Border initiative, therefore, looks like mutuality, but sounds like distinctiveness.

George Hoberg, Le Capacite de Choisir: Le Canada Dans Une Nouvelle Amerique Du Nord (Montreal: Les Presses de l’Universite de Montreal, 2002). Introduction, 14. Table 1.1 outlines a Canada-U.S. “integration continuum.” For example, in the economic sphere, the polar opposites range from no international exchanges whatsoever to a common currency and customs union – i.e. characteristics of complete economic integration; in the political sphere, from autonomous nation-states (no integration whatsoever) to every pertinent decision entails a transfer of power to a supra-national authority (complete integration).

“Le Canada et la politique d’autonomie dans le contexte de la mondialisation” in Ibid, Chapter 9, 279. They distinguish between three types of convergence; one which stems from parallel domestic pressures in Canada and the United States, another which is the result of imitation mostly by Canada of the United States (asymmetry), and the third which is the result of international constraints, e.g. treaties; international mobility of capital. Also, Hoberg, ibid, conclusion, 339.


Ibid. For example, “just in time” shipments of intermediate products such as automotive parts to manufacturing plants in both Ontario and Michigan or elsewhere in North America where they are
made into final products. Delays at the border cause these shipments to be late, interrupting the production process of plants in both Canada and the United States. According to Ford Motors Canada spokesman, Michael Sheridan: “Four hours after an engine leaves Windsor, it’s in a Michigan truck. So the border is important for us because we again ship about one million engines from Windsor into the United States to eight of our fifteen assembly plants... on 09/11/01, facilities were closed on both sides of the border as a result not being able to get those engines to the marketplace.” The automotive industry in Canada has claimed that border delays have caused a $1 - $1.5 million loss per hour of delay.


21 Ibid.


23 Nevertheless the burden of such measures upon the U.S. economy – especially in certain states such as Michigan would be considerable. For example, I have already pointed out above that Canada is the largest export market for 38 states; two-way trade between Ontario and Michigan alone, for instance, was $97 billion in 2000, roughly 25 percent of all U.S. exports are to Canada, some $37 billion from Michigan to Ontario – data tantalizingly suggestive of Ontario as a “North American region state?” See Thomas J., Courchene & Colin R. Telmer, From Heartland to North American Region-State: The Social,
Fiscal, and Federal Evolution of Ontario (Toronto: Faculty of Management, University of Toronto, 1999).

For example, on December 12, 2001, Canada’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, John Manley, and the Director of the U.S. Office of Homeland Security signed the Smart Border Declaration. Manley declared it to be “...an agreement between 2 independent sovereign nations...to solve problems of mutual interest that affect the security and safety, as well as the economic well-being of citizens in each country.” This Joint U.S. – Canada Smart Border Plan has 4 main goals: the secure flow of people, the secure flow of goods, a secure infrastructure, and coordination in the enforcement of these objectives. See Campbell Clark, “Door opened to armed border inspectors: Manley willing to discuss having U.S. Customs agents with guns on Canadian soil.” Globe and Mail, December 13, 2001, 1; and Ibid., “Ottawa signs deal with U.S. on border policies.” December 12, 2001, 1. In addition, to alleviate border traffic congestion, part of the joint Canada – U.S. Smart Border plan of action, the two governments agreed to adopt a unified single system. NEXUS is designed to simplify border crossings for pre-approved low-risk travelers such as some categories of cargo carriers and people who cross the border to work. NEXUS would incorporate common Canada – U.S. eligibility requirements, a common security I.D. card, a common sanctions regime, et al.. Prelude to a possible impending common Canada – U.S. (probably not Mexico?) security perimeter? NEXUS is already operational at two ports of entry from Canada into Michigan as well as Buffalo and Washington State and will begin to function at the Champlain, New York/Lacolle, Quebec crossing in late August, 2003. See Daniel P. Bader, “Trans-border NEXUS System in by August,” Press-Republican, June 19, 2003, A3.


These include “transregional microdiplomacy” which describes connections between subnational governments that are not contiguous, e.g., Quebec delegation in Los Angeles; and “transborder regional microdiplomacy” which refers to transborder formal and above all informal contacts between subnational governments condi-
tioned by geographic contiguity and common problems. On the other hand, “Global Paradiplomacy” consists of political-functional contacts with foreign countries that bring subnational governments into contact with agencies of foreign central governments as well as trade, industrial, or cultural centers there. See Soldatos loc. cit. Chapter 2 who refines the definitions of these terms in Ivo D. Duchacek, *The Territorial Dimension of Politics*, loc. sit., 240-248.


28 Paul Painchaud, “Quebec’s International Relations” in Ivo D. Duchacek et al, *Perforated Sovereignties and International Relations. Trans-Sovereign Contacts of Subnational Governments* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1988.), 92. The international activity of the majority of federated states is said to fall under the category of “low politics” – i.e. purely functional matters outside the realm of national security. On the other hand, Quebec has developed its international outreach activities in relation to the double paradigm of “high” and “low” politics. Part of its activity is an extension of certain domestic interests abroad, e.g., commercial exchanges; but other aspects, i.e. relations with France, have resembled “high politics.” It is far too early to ascertain how the April 14, 2003, Quebec provincial election which saw the replacement of a sovereignty-oriented PQ government by a federalist liberal provincial government will affect this high/low politics double paradigm.


32 Ibid.

33 Ibid.
34 Quebec Update, vol. 25, no. 8, Fall 2002, 2.


38 The state plays and will continue to play a significant role in governance. In a world marked by the rapid proliferation of power centers, the need for interest coordination will grow. See Daniel Wolfish and Gordon Smith, “Governance and Policy in a Multicentric World,” Canadian Public Policy XXVI, August 2000, 551-572.

39 Relevant to understanding the notion of “glocalization” is Guillaume R. Frechette et al., “Unraveling the Central State, but How?” Types of Multi-level Governance,” American Political Science Review, vol. 97, no. 2, May 2003, 233-243, addresses the reallocation of authority upward, downward, and sideways from central states and distinguishes between two types of multi-level governance. One conceives of dispersion of authority to general-purpose, nonintersecting and durable jurisdictions, i.e., watertight compartments and impermeable; the second conceives of task-specific, intersecting, and flexible jurisdictions – i.e., permeable, perforated, and overlapping.


41 Seymout M. Lipset, North American Cultures: Values and Institutions in Canada and the United States (Orono: Borderlands Project, 1990), iii.

42 Useful information on this topic is provided in Michel Fortmann et al., Vers des perimètres de Securite? La gestion des espaces continentaux en Amerique du Nord et en Europe. (Montreal: Centre d’etude des politiques etrangeres et de securite, 2002). The four major themes of this work are the maintenance of order and law enforcement cooperation, border control, armed forces and antiterrorist activity, and transatlantic linkages. The book concludes with some observations about