CAPP's 10th Anniversary

In the spring of 1990 Peter Morici, a professor of economics at the University of Maine who had published widely on cross-border trade policy, launched *Canadian-American Public Policy* (CAPP) with the help of the Business Fund for Canadian Studies in the United States and the University of Maine's Canadian-American Center. "Within the U.S. and Canadian academic communities," Morici observed, "the expertise potentially available to sensitize public officials and opinion leaders and help resolve disputes fairly and in a mutually acceptable fashion has grown with the increasing number of university scholars studying bilateral relations in economics, political science, business and management, history, geography, the physical sciences, and the humanities." Morici chose a 'working papers' format so that each number of CAPP, devoted to a single but substantial essay analyzing a bilateral issue or comparing public policies in an issue area, could be edited, printed and disseminated quickly, enabling this growing body of academic work to reach an audience that included members of Congress and Parliament, cabinet and senior administration officials, journalists, academics, public policy research groups, and other opinion leaders. In short, CAPP would bring scholarly analysis directly to bear on the processes of policy formulation and dispute resolution. So that partisan advocacy would yield to academic integrity, balance and fairness, each essay was accepted for publication in the CAPP series only after it had received rigorous evaluation by recognized scholars.

Barely a year into the CAPP series, Peter agreed to assume new administrative burdens as director of the Canadian-American Center. When he asked me to assume the editorship of CAPP, it seemed at first to be a modest and relatively short-term chore. But it soon grew when Peter left Maine for the Washington, DC area, first as chief economist of the U.S. International Trade Commission and later as a professor in the University of Maryland's School of Business. Fortunately, Peter has graciously remained accessible. And since his departure Stephen Hornsby, his successor at the helm of U. Maine's Canadian-American Center, has been wonderfully supportive of CAPP in all the ways that an editor could hope. Without Peter and Stephen, CAPP would never have flourished so well for so long.

It remains now for our contributors during the past decade (along with the anonymous evaluators whose suggestions boosted the quality of their essays) to be acknowledged–in perhaps the most useful way for them as well as for our readers — by measuring their CAPP contributions on a grand scale of interpretive paradigms governing our understanding of the Canadian-American relationship. Few contemporary scholars match UBC Professor Allan Smith's sophisticated grasp of the many intricate steps in this vital two-centuries-old North American "dance." In this essay all of us who are necessarily caught up in the details of contemporary policy issues can step back to assess present-day concerns in the context of overarching interpretations which Allan delineates on the basis of his extraordinary command of the literature. He shows us again, in an age that worships the 'new', how a knowledge of the past can illuminate our own era. Finally, as an admiring evaluator of the manuscript noted, Allan's gold mine of references will offer invaluable nuggets to scholars of Canadian-American public policy for years to come.

Robert H. Babcock, Editor

DOING THE CONTINENTAL: CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF THE CANADIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP IN THE LONG TWENTIETH CENTURY

ALLAN SMITH

I. AMERICAN POWER AND CANADIAN NATION-BUILDING

In the course of its rich, lengthy, and complicated history, analysis and discussion of the Canadian-American relationship has moved through four main phases, each offering commentary on important aspects of that relationship, each reflecting changes in it, and each taking shape under the influence of a particular set of research methods, discursive practices, and conceptual tools.

The first to emerge, and the longest in the field, arose out of the compulsion – felt by Canadians and Americans alike – to grasp and understand the situation created by the vast and obvious disparities between Canadian and American power. Some observers thought the nature of that situation so stark and clear that assimilating its meaning hardly required analysis at all: American strength was so patently superior that one had simply to register the inevitability of its triumph over

all of the continent. Canadians, certainly, were not immune from this view: even before Goldwin Smith's celebrated dismissal of Canadian national pretensions in 1891, the New Brunswicker Alexander Monro had set out his strong conviction that, since "the United States and Canada belong as it were to each other," they "should unite."[1] In the main, however, insistence on the force and implacability of the American phenomenon was the property of observers at the heart of the United States' life itself. Taking their text from John Quincy Adams' 1819 declaration that "our proper dominion [is] the *continent* of North America," and very much influenced by the doctrines of Manifest Destiny, commentators announced the imminence of America's northern triumph with emphasis and regularity: indeed, insisted Samuel E. Moffett in 1907, that triumph was no longer for the future; it was at hand; Canadians "are already Americans without

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knowing it."[2] So obvious and sensible did the American victory seem that even after the passing of the great age of nineteenth-century expansionism it continued to be proclaimed with force and enthusiasm. Mild statements of it left no doubt as to what was being avowed: Franklin Roosevelt's 1936 declaration that Canadians were at one with their neighbors in the American orbit, anything but "foreigners," differed from the Moffett *pronunciamento* mainly in its greater solicitude for Canadian sensibilities. Less modulated remarks lost even that point of distinction: former Undersecretary of State George Ball's 1968 dismissal of Canadian attempts to resist American influence (they were, in his well-publicized phrase, "a rear-guard action") sent its message with a directness that went well beyond anything Moffett had mustered. And when journalist Joel Garreau re-mapped Canada outside Quebec as a series of American regions projected northward, his work gave a verdict on the place and importance of Canadian national structures the frankness of which transcended anything either Moffett or Ball had dared put forward. Economist Sidney Weinberg's 1994 claim that the great free trade agreements of the 1980s and 1990s were at last producing a victory over Canada's "east-west imperative" – this, as he saw it, was "an undeniable fact," the "long-term implications" of which "will surely affect the nature of Canadian society" – thus stood in a long line of clear and explicit comments concerning the impossibility of Canadian resistance to the powerful forces shaping continental life. Possessing no character or identity to set it apart, lacking the strength to assert what claims it did have, Canada could quite simply do no other than accept with resignation and fortitude the domination of its great neighbor.[3]

Plausible, compelling, and in harmony with the brute facts of the situation, the conviction that the United States was destined to triumph attracted no small measure of support. Yet for all the enthusiasm with which its adherents upheld it, it never managed to monopolize discussion. Alternative views of what the exercise of American power would bring in its train began, in fact, to appear by the middle of the nineteenth century. At their heart was the claim that United States' deployment of its strength need not be seen as involving an inevitable American victory over what lay north. Properly approached and assessed, American might could in fact be interpreted not as a threat to, but as a source of assistance for, Canada's growth and development.

For one group of commentators, transforming the American challenge into the means of its own modification and removal involved a heavy emphasis on the good that could come to Canada from virtually unlimited access to the republic's economy. Enjoying access to American markets, able to draw on its capital, and in a position to profit from its expertise, Canada would find itself benefitting from American strength in ways that would be altogether at the service of the great nation-building project which had become so central to its life and survival. Building on arguments first put forward in connection with Elgin's pursuit of a commercial treaty with the United States in the 1850s, partisans of this view made it their chief business to insist that advocacy of closer Canadian-American trade relations was perfectly compatible with – and would indeed serve – Canadian survival. "We have our history, our traditions, [and] our aspirations," the Liberal politician Sir Richard Cartwright told the New York Board of Trade in 1890, and each of these possessions would be helped and strengthened by implementation of the tariff reduction scheme he and his party had in view.[4]

With the proliferation of Canadian-American ties in the early twentieth century, stress on the positive nature of the relationship between nation-building and American power moved into a new phase. The kind of viewpoint embodied in O.D. Skelton's 1902 declaration – it was, as he put it, simply "impracticable" to think that Canada could "neglect the U.S. as a factor in [its] future, pile up tariff barriers, and deepen national prejudice"[5] – attracted growing support. Although attempts to act on that view in the general election of 1911 famously failed,[6] the conviction that nation-building had to involve working with, rather than against, the grain of American strength continued to grow in force and presence. Arguments that Canada's external orientation had to reflect the importance of the U.S. in its life played a critical part in the moves towards establishment of Canadian diplomatic representation in Washington which were completed in 1928.[7] Skelton's appointment as undersecretary of state in 1925 did much to entrench the 'American' view at the center of the policy-making process. And with the very extensive work done in the 1930s to amplify the idea that the relationship between Canadian nationality and the country's position next to the United States was positive, it became more fully imbedded than ever. The organizing principle of the Carnegie Endowment Series on Canadian-American relations (1936-1945), and the cardinal idea of

the policymakers promoting freer Canadian-American trade in the 1930s, it received classic expression in J.W. Dafoe's 1935 essay, *Canada: An American Nation*.[8]

None of this meant that anything perceived as an extreme statement of the claim that Canada was on intimate terms with the United States was any more acceptable than it had been in Goldwin Smith's day. Historian Frank Underhill's 1940 statement in favor of Canada's increasingly North American character and orientation was notoriously controversial, and even in the post-war period, policymakers – as those who favored comprehensive free trade between Canada and the United States found out – had to be very careful how far they pushed the idea.[9] Steady insistence on the point that Canada couldn't maintain itself – couldn't, indeed, really be a nation – without a close relationship to the United States nonetheless remained very much in evidence. As the diplomat-historian Hugh Keenleyside recalled it, the conviction was widespread that "industrial cooperation" would lead, not to dependency and subordination, but to "the exact opposite."[10]

As postwar growth in Canadian-American trade and investment became an established feature of the landscape, economist Harry Johnson insisted with characteristic vigor on the absolute compatibility of national survival and close Canadian-American association. Indeed, he argued, nothing could be clearer than that Canada's well-being depended on getting the prosperity that could only come from access to American markets and capital: "I believe that closer integration of the two economies into one continental economy would be beneficial to both countries and would involve no loss of any Canadian nationalist objectives worth pursuing."[11] With the revival of the idea that institutionalized economic integration was the goal to pursue, the argument that even formal association was compatible with – and, indeed, would serve – national integrity moved strongly to the fore. Defenders of the trade arrangements embodied in the Defense Production Sharing Agreement of 1959 and the Autopact of 1965 were careful to stress their nation-maintaining utility, and as the case for more general free trade strengthened, those making that case developed the view that more comprehensive measures – they would accelerate growth in national prosperity – could not help but serve national maintenance, too. Economists R.J. and P. Wonnacott were strong partisans of that view, and it was central to the powerfully argued free trade case of the 1980s. Indeed,

asserted the makers of that case, the free trade measure proposed would consolidate national survival in a number of ways: by enlarging government revenues, by enhancing regional prosperity, by creating the sorts of economies of scale and competitiveness that would allow penetration of foreign markets, and by disciplining American behavior it could, in fact, hardly be seen as anything other than a nation-building device of the first order.[12]

Ultimately successful – its victory in the great debate of the 1980s marked the moment of its triumph – this line of argument was never, it must of course be emphasized, in sole possession of the field. Its central proposition did, assuredly, go unchallenged: its opponents in fact made it very clear that they, no less than their adversaries, saw American strength and American vigor as resources to be utilized in the great cause of building the Canadian nation. The ancillary parts of the argument, however, became the targets of very heavy fire. Brought under especially vigorous siege was the idea that American markets and American capital could be put into service with a minimum of control, restriction, or management. This, the opponents insisted, would simply guarantee the dominance of those markets and that capital and so bring about the very American triumph the whole enterprise was designed to forestall. While, then, Canada had to engage American power, the terms of that engagement – this was the nub of the argument – had to be thought about, planned, and regulated: chance, openness, and anything even tending towards *laissez-faire* would simply not produce the results required.

One way, interventionists thought, of insuring that the American link would work in the Canadian interest was to offset and balance it with other ties and connections. In one of its most important dimensions Macdonald's Anglo-Canadian alliance was an element in his strategy for ensuring that the all-important relationship with the United States served Canadian interests. Laurier's concern with imperial preference had roots in the same objective, and Bennett's pursuit of the Ottawa Agreements derived in critical part from his belief that expanded trade with Britain and the Empire would make it possible to enjoy trade relations with the Americans without experiencing the kind of vulnerability to unilateral American actions that had been all too evident in the damage done a few years earlier by the Smoot-Hawley tariff revisions of 1930.[13] Strengthened by a new scholarly emphasis on Canada's transatlantic origins

and history,[14] and fed by the conviction that the need to manage American involvements had become greater than ever with the extensive growth in American power during and after World War II, the argument that Canada should position itself in frameworks that would qualify the dominating potential of its American link grew steadily more insistent. In one of the most important developments of the period, "obligations to a collectivity rather than a single ally" thus emerged as servants of Canada's "special relationship with the United States." In making that relationship less confining than it would otherwise be, those obligations would function to insure that it assisted and strengthened Canada rather than confining or even smothering it. Even the Third Option strategy of the 1970s took shape under the influence of these ideas. Designed to diversify Canada's trade ties and reduce the relative weight of the country's involvement with the United States, it pursued these objectives precisely so that the substantial American connections that would remain would operate, not as sources of undue exposure, but as the strengths they were intended to be.[15]

Prominent in the interventionists' strategy, the counterweight tactic was far from its main element. That role was played by the expedients and devices put in place in order to ensure that American power was confronted and dealt with at the point where its impact on Canadian development was most directly felt – in the area of cross-border markets, trade, and investment itself. Vital to Canadian development – its *sine qua non*, in fact – Canadian contact with these realities simply had to be managed and run in ways that would guarantee their contribution to that development. Emerging as the key element in the constellation of policies intended to gain that objective, the Canadian tariff almost immediately took its place at the center of the new strategy: the guarantor of jobs, factories, and economic diversification in Canada, its existence would make it possible to direct American power and dynamism in ways that would deliver "capital to the country, stimulate private enterprise, [and] provide our people with employment at home."[16]

By the early twentieth century, the strategy seemed very clearly to have worked: it was, as the Toronto Eighteen put it in 1911, thanks to its implementation that Canada had been able to uphold "Canadian autonomy and Canadian nationality" and to develop "her own resources in her own way and by her own people."[17] Even in the face of ever closer economic relations in the 1910s and 1920s, notwith-

standing the trade agreements of the 1930s, and in spite of wartime and postwar integration, the conviction that Canada owed much of its growth and development, not simply to the American tie, but to the strategies used to manage that tie, remained powerfully in play. Its strength – the point has already been made – kept King and St. Laurent from pursuing comprehensive free trade. It received powerful scholarly support, notably in Creighton's biography of Macdonald and in H.G.J. Aitken's identification of what he termed "defensive expansionism" as a principal element in Canada's nation-building strategy. And with the entry of the economic nationalist Walter Gordon into active national politics in the early 1960s it seemed set to hold – even expand – its place and position.[18]

In the event, Gordon's arrival marked the beginning of the end. His commitment to strategies of planning and regulation remained clear enough. But if he never gave up the view that American power could do its Canadian work only if it were under close scrutiny and control, he found it difficult to act on that view. In the opinion of a number of commentators, Canadian-American links had become so close and intimate that attempting to restrict and discipline them could be quite readily dismissed as quixotic and pointless. The general thrust away from controls – exemplified most obviously in the ongoing GATT process – had continued to gain in strength. Alternatives to involvement with the Americans – especially given the Diefenbaker government's failure to revive trade with Britain – seemed non-existent. Even with the support of militants in both the Liberal and New Democratic parties, Gordon and his strategy were constantly on the defensive. Only weakened versions of his proposals – the Canadian Development Corporation (1971), the Foreign Investment Review Agency (1974) – were implemented. The more substantial undertakings in the energy sector – Petro-Canada (1975), the National Energy Policy (1980) – came under incessant attack. With the successful assault of free trade's advocates in the 1980s, the Gordonite option found itself pushed almost completely off the field.[19]

The belief that American power could contribute only under specific conditions to the growth of a distinctive Canadian society and economy did not entirely disappear. A commitment to controls on the entry of American cultural products retained a particularly high profile. Wanting popular American publications, music, movies and television programming to cross the border in ways that

would lever Canadian benefits into place, the Canadian government insisted that the Canadian-American Free Trade Agreement recognize its right to require American cultural products to be distributed in Canada by Canadian firms. Not only distributors – publishers, broadcasters – were intended to be strengthened by handling American goods. Producers were expected to benefit, too, as American film and television production companies found that – if they wanted eligibility for grants and tax benefits in Canada – they would have to employ Canadian companies and personnel. Ultimately, it was thought, indigenous, 'Canadian' work would itself be assisted: the more prosperous publishers, book distributors, broadcasters, and film producers became in consequence of their American involvements, the more likely they would be to support and encourage Canadian creative work.[20]

The general shape of the situation was, nonetheless, clear: notwithstanding the fact that it lingered on in the cultural field, the idea that Canadian life and society would strengthen and consolidate its existence through a carefully controlled and managed relationship with American power had been fundamentally weakened. The argument over that power's implications for Canadian-American life thus moved onto the ground between those who thought its triumph assured and those who held to the view that it could be resisted, but only – and paradoxically – through the device of a very close relationship to it. With that development alternatives became much less sharply posed, distinctions between continentalists and the mainstream partisans of a strong Canada almost invisible, and the debate concerning the management of American power more constrained than it had ever been.

II. SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES

Where the first pattern of argument was generally shaped by a strong sense of the power asymmetries between Canada and the United States, the second had its roots in an impulse to compare the two societies in terms of factors other than strength, weight, and force. Turning their attention to such matters as social structure, value orientation, political culture, and national myth, commentators constructed a complicated set of arguments, the burden of which was that, though the two societies had to be viewed as resembling each other in obvious and important ways, adequate understanding of them demanded that they also be seen as entities possessing distinctive characteristics and attributes.

Early efforts to deal in difference did not, to be sure, carry discussion quite to that point. In the grip of the notion – not always explicitly stated – that the two North American communities had to be assessed in terms of norms drawn largely from the liberal, dynamic, New World history and experience of the United States, nineteenth-century commentators tended to view failure to operate in terms of those norms as a sign, not simply of difference, but of gross and culpable deficiency. Quebec's exotic character thus emerged as an indication, not simply that it stood apart, but that it was a throwback to an earlier, more primitive age and civilization.[21] English Canada's slowness and conservatism earned it a place almost as far beyond the North American pale.[22] Even when difference was seen as a virtue, and, perforce, 'American' norms rejected, those norms kept their central place in discussion. Indeed, in the very act of celebrating Canadian society's difference from what lay south, turn-of-the-century Canadian nationalists made clear the measure in which their contrast-dependent signalizing of order, conservatism, and 'Britishness' took the individualist and chaotic society next door as its foil and pivot.[23]

Not only did the tendency to build argument around United States-derived standards and norms feature in many different types of commentary; it also endured through several decades of time. By the 1930s it had, in fact, taken on a new strength and vigor. Having evolved into an explanatory as well as a normative device (thanks largely to the work of historian Herbert Bolton), the frontier, individualist, 'American' model of development emerged as an instrument whose elements were to be seen, not simply as offering a standard in terms of which judgements could be rendered and behavior prescribed, but as factors actually driving, shaping, and conditioning the evolution of life and growth in, Bolton insisted, all the societies of the western hemisphere.

This extraordinary emphasis on common patterns and forces did not drive attention to difference out of the picture; it did, however, foreground concern with those patterns and forces to such an extent that attention to particularities was largely subordinated to the task of elucidating things held in common. Where, in consequence, difference owed its earlier marginalization to its status as an indicator of distance from the norm, its displacement in this period was a function of the belief that it could not be stressed too much lest focussing on it interfere with the business of getting an unobscured

view of the liberating, frontier, New World, essentially 'American' drama that was everywhere unfolding. Caught up in this understanding of matters, affected by its persuasiveness and appeal, and convinced that it offered fresh ways of grasping the situations with which they were concerned, not a few students of the Canadian-American relationship set about the task of showing that, though 'difference' plainly had a place in what they were investigating, the critical task was to reveal the ways in which the Canadian-American experience had been shaped by basic forces and imperatives linked to life in the New World. Even New France, it became clear at length, could be approached from that direction and in that spirit.[24]

With the new dominance of relativist modes of thinking after World War II, norm-based analysis and discussion receded in influence. Preoccupation with 'difference' acquired an enhanced status. Lingering tendencies to treat the Canadian-American scene in terms of strategies that minimized particularity[25] gave way to approaches that stressed the importance of considering precisely that attribute. The pitfalls of dealing with difference in too exaggerated a way had, of course, to be avoided. What could happen if they weren't was demonstrated with splendid irony in Carl Berger's treatment of the claims for Canadian specificity put forward by certain of the country's nationalists.[26] Generally, though, the problem did not arise. Discussion proceeded to a balanced examination of the matter. Sociologist S.D. Clark's treatment of the patterns exhibited by Canadian and American religious development was one manifestation of this; historian W.L. Morton's work on the 'metropolitan' nature of the Canadian west represented another.[27]

The appearance of the critically important comparative work of the 1950 and 1960s made the approach's potential clear. As S.M. Lipset and other analysts moved, in Gad Horowitz's formulation, from an effort "to explain Canadian phenomena ... by identifying them as variations on a North American theme" to attempting to grasp them "by contrasting them with American phenomena," new perspectives proliferated on a number of matters – the nature of the New World idea, individualism in Canada and the United States, class and mobility in the two societies, the fate of socialism on the North American side of the Atlantic. Lipset's use of conceptual tools derived from the work of Talcott Parsons allowed the familiar view that Americans privileged 'liberal', 'individualist' ideas to be elaborated in important new ways. Horowitz's application of Louis

Hartz's ideas concerning the foundation of new societies gave the argument for seeing Canada as relatively 'conservative', deferential, ideologically pluralist, and 'European' unprecedented depth.[28] Work examining the social and cultural patterns – and the national myths – created by immigration, ethnicity, and race continued the trend. The complex interaction among these phenomena received close attention, with the measure in which these processes left the two societies simultaneously moving together and staying apart being brought under especially intensive scrutiny.[29] Comparative study of national myths and symbols developed in very fruitful ways. The argument – developed by such critics as Henry Nash Smith and R.W.B. Lewis – that the United States had been 'imagined' as a garden of Eden, a place of new beginning, entered discussion on a number of fronts; the contrasting claim – largely the creation of Northrop Frye and Margaret Atwood – that Canadians had portrayed their land as a place of wilderness, challenge, and an intractable northern environment was powerfully present, too. The overall effect was to deepen the conviction that analysis carried out in term of contrast and comparison would – particularly as it involved a focus on difference – intensify the idea that Canadian and American society had to be understood as much in terms of what divided them as of what brought them together.[30] So fully entrenched did the belief that Canada and the United States were 'different' become that quite profoundly homogenizing phenomena could be treated as no more than partially successful in their attempts to subvert the qualities that set the two societies apart. In one of the most acutely sensitive treatments of the issue, the encounter between standardizing influences on the one side and forces geared to difference-maintaining on the other was seen to have yielded significant proof of the latter's stamina. American unionism's foray north, insisted Robert Babcock, was, for all its success in getting much of the Canadian labor movement under its control, unable to do more than 'delay' the appearance in Canada of the kind of 'British' approach to labor in politics that was anathema to American unionism and its leaders. Rooted deeply in value-difference, a unique view of the state, and a different relationship to the political culture of the Old World, that approach – the American presence notwithstanding – could not help but make its weight and influence felt.[31]

Sometimes seen as minor but significant – the title of David Card and Richard Freeman's *Small Differences That Matter* told that

tale – and sometimes viewed as of central importance – Lipset called his last look at the subject *Continental Divide: The Values and Institutions of the United States and Canada* – the qualities setting the two societies apart thus emerged as established features of the Canadian-American landscape. For all, then, that asymmetries of power between the two societies might be real, so also – as it was thought – were their identities as distinct and different societies. Exhibiting "differences that count," they could in no sense be seen as assimilating one to the other.[32]

III. A COMPLEX BINATIONAL SYSTEM

Taking the existence of two states as a given, but much struck by the way those two states had become enmeshed in an extraordinarily close and intimate relationship, the third group of observers made that relationship the focus and object of attention. Determined to understand it in all its manifestations, convinced that elucidation of its principles and structure had lessons to teach, and – in some instances – persuaded that it had come to possess a life of its own, they produced a pattern of argument the thrust of which was that a Canadian-American 'community' or 'system' was in existence, that that community had clear and discernible features, and that understanding these features would at once assist, and itself be assisted by, a grasp of key principles in international relations generally.

Not all observers saw connections across the border as the main cause of the special bond between the two societies. Laurier's view that Canada and the United States lived in a special North American community far from "the vortex of European militarism" was conditioned as much by his strong awareness of the two countries' distance – figuratively and literally – from the awful dynamic at the heart of Old World affairs as by anything he saw them building up together.[33] Action between the two was, nonetheless, the critical factor: nothing reinforced the view that a Canadian-American community was emerging quite so much as contemplation of the dense patterns of cross-border involvement that seemed so incontrovertibly a feature of the two societies' lives and existence. Particularly important on that front – especially in the formative stages of discussion – were the early twentieth-century agreements, structures, and agencies that took shape as the two nations moved to give important areas of their relationship a more rational, ordered, even administered character. By establishing jointly agreed upon mechanisms and procedures for

the settlement of disputes – Thompson and Randall speak of the International Boundary and International Joint Commissions as bringing "the age of Taylorism and scientific management to Canadian-American relations" – the act of creating those procedures and agencies in fact provided a very significant part of the ground for believing that a Canadian-American 'system' was assuming shape and form.[34] By the 1920s and 1930s observers could see in these institutions clear proof that such an entity existed. Pointing to Canadian-American success in managing disputes and in introducing principles of order to the handling of relations generally, commentators found every indication that a stable, mutually satisfactory, harmonious and smooth-functioning apparatus was at work.[35]

As attention turned to broader patterns of Canadian-American involvement, the view taken became less benign. Consciousness of Canadian-American asymmetries had a particularly important influence in shaping the new complexity, for with it came a tendency to deny that the Canadian-American system was always and everywhere the servant of the two countries equally. This was first evident in the realm of defense. The fact that the U.S. considered defense of Canada vital to its own security – "if there is one region more than another," wrote Dexter Perkins in 1942, "which the American people would defend against attack, it is Canada. This need not be a subject of speculation." – combined with the fact of American strength to ensure that 'joint' arrangements for Canadian-American security would be – and would be seen to be – largely American-run.[36]

What seemed clear in relation to defense systems was, thought a number of observers, equally obvious in the Canadian-American relationship as a whole. Influenced by André Gunder Frank, Immanuel Wallerstein, and adherents of the core-periphery and world systems models generally, the more radical of these observers insisted that the mechanisms for managing the Canada-United States relationship – and, indeed, the undergirding structures of the relationship itself – offered a prime example of hegemony at work. Put forward with uncompromising rigor by Kari Levitt, Wallace Clement, and Daniel Drache, the argument lost none of its appeal in the more nuanced form given it by Glen Williams and Philip Resnick.[37] Even analysts not working within the dependency tradition adopted ideas compatible with its general propositions. Commentators on the collapse of the Diefenbaker government found Canada to be implicated in an American-dominated system it was powerless to

control.[38] Charles Pentland defined Canada and the United States as a "hard region" shaped by "significant integrative or transnational organizations," almost all of which were American-dominated.[39] And, in an important refinement of the position, John H. Redekop identified the relationship as characterized by "asymmetric continental subsystems" of a powerfully subordinating sort: "no other country, let alone any other industrialized liberal democracy, experiences the degree of mutually reinforcing disparate bi-national subsystemic dominance involving only one other country as does Canada."[40]

For all the attention they attracted, arguments that Canada was heavily constrained by putatively joint systems did not dominate discussion. Canada, not a few commentators suggested, in fact had more than minimal influence over its relationship to the United States. Some thought the arranging and operation of protocols for the management of everything from Great Lakes pollution to fish resources to migratory birds made this clear.[41] Karl Deutsch's proto-functionalist claims concerning the communications-based emergence of a Canadian-American subsystem in a North Atlantic system gave credence to it.[42] Diplomats Arnold Heeney and Livingston Merchant, influenced both by these notions and by the more general argument that geography and interaction on a broad front had generated a community of interest between Canada and the United States, stressed the important role Canada played – and in its own interest should play – in the smooth functioning of that system.[43] And though, insisted John Sloan Dickey, Canada and the United States formed "an organic system" in which "transnational, public-private interaction was more important than traditional interstate relations," that didn't so much diminish Canada's ability to have an effect as to enlarge it: Canada, indeed, was particularly accomplished at exercising influence through informal channels.[44]

As the thrust towards theorization of the relationship deepened in the 1970s, the impulse to accord Canada influence over the bi-national system in which it was imbedded became more pronounced. Neo-functionalist principles of analysis joined with stress on the idea of complex interdependence to emphasize the role Canada – its small-power status notwithstanding – could have on that system's operation. Keohane and Nye themselves underscored the opportunities available to Canada.[45] Analyses framed under the influence of these ideas pointed – in some detail – to the precise ways in which the

relatively weak Canadian state could exercise control over its immediate environment.[46] One commentator advanced the view that the very logic of 'system' made hegemony impossible: "linguistic and cultural self-awareness and differentiation seem actually to be stimulated by increased economic interdependence."[47] The idea that Canada's diplomats were clever enough, and Canada itself strong enough, to manipulate the system in its favor took root,[48] and stress was placed on the country's capacity to adapt its old policy of multilateralism to a 'plurilateral' approach in order to undertake "multiple but highly selective initiatives" that would permit more effective management of its American involvements.[49] In time the Canadian-American Free Trade Agreement itself emerged as a device that could be used to complicate American hegemony. Stressing its rule-creating function, commentators insisted that in the very act of drawing the two countries closer together it would permit the smaller of them greater control over what would otherwise remain a situation shaped and contoured by the arbitrary exercise of American power. "True freedom, requires structure. Without a framework to define the rules there is anarchy in international relations, anarchy becomes a matter of might makes right ... In such a system there is no accountability and no responsibility."[50] Even Pentland suggested that, for all that an integrated system might be in process of emergence, the continuing existence of political instruments under national control gave some scope for qualification of that system's operation.[51]

Powerfully argued and skillfully put, the claim that 'system' need not be synonymous with 'hegemony' thus gained much ground against its opponents. Its victory could not, of course, be absolute: indeed, in the very act of urging it forward its architects made it clear that, whatever the influence available to Canada, it could by definition only be exercised within the framework of the system whose operations it was its object to channel and moderate. Emphasis on the role to be played by clever management, skillful bargaining, and effective exploitation of American inattention to what lay north nonetheless had its very important place: in strengthening assertions that system-imbeddedness – even in a situation of pronounced power asymmetry – did not necessarily mean categorical subordination for the smaller and weaker power, its role was, in fact, critical.

IV. GLOBALIZATION, BORDERLESSNESS, AND A 'UNIQUE CONTINENTAL AMALGAM'

In the last decades of the twentieth century two major conceptual changes – one in the understanding of global realities, the other in the understanding of understanding itself – prepared the way for fundamental shifts in thinking about the Canadian-American relationship. Emergence of the idea that 'globalization' and the 'borderless world' were critical features of the international system conditioned new, much less nation-focused ways of thinking.[52] Postmodernism's interrogation of the claim that phenomena – among them the nation-state – had stable, settled, identities capable of definition in some final way reinforced tendencies in the same direction.[53]

The impulse to treat Canadian-American relations as transactions engaged in by two 'stable', 'coherent', 'bordered' entities did not disappear altogether. The circumstance that intergovernmental relations retained an obvious importance in fact led to some quite innovative discussion of the relationship in terms of the place state-to-state dealings continued to have in it. Environmental analyst Alan M. Schwartz thus argued that though the new situation was undoubtedly more complicated, the complications operated mainly within each nation ("Activity, debate and change abound on all the major issues on the bilateral environment agenda. However, little of this activity is happening in a bilateral forum; virtually all activity, debate and controversy is within each party.") and didn't alter the fact that Canadian-American resolution of the issues concerned continued to be carried out on a nation-to-nation basis.[54] Even systems-oriented approaches might retain a strong focus on the realist idea that in the final analysis systems were the creation of – and the servant of – national interests. This, certainly, was a point that political scientist Christopher Kirkey made with special force: 'systems' for the management of continental defense and Arctic cooperation plainly existed, but they had to be seen as products of "inter-state bargaining" and a concern – particularly on Canada's part – "to enhance sovereign responsibility."[55]

The dominant tendency was, nonetheless, very much in the direction of treating 'border' and 'state' as of increasingly secondary importance. To the extent, in consequence, that state-centered approaches remained in evidence, they tended to be embodied in studies that concerned themselves with precise, technical aspects of the relationship with treatment even of these often spilling over into

demonstrations of the extent to which the dealings under discussion involved complicated, border-blurring transactions among actors operating in a frame that was increasingly transnational.[56] More dramatically still, the realist tendency to treat 'system' as the creature of state and nation was tempered by a stronger than ever emphasis on its character as a phenomenon which, whatever its origins, acquired a life of its own once it came into being. Some analysts found arrangements for continental defense especially open to discussion in terms of the way the structures shaped in years past by geography and the Cold War had acquired a kind of autonomy and so demanded care and maintenance even though the circumstances which had given them birth and kept them alive no longer existed. Defense production arrangements were seen by one observer as a particularly good candidate for analysis in these terms: having made not a few Canadian firms dependent on their existence, neither their demise, nor that of the system in which they were imbedded, could be contemplated with equanimity by the interests concerned.[57] Other analysts, concentrating on the defense system as a whole, suggested that the balance between that system's character as a servant of the national interest, and its nature as an entity oriented towards transnational goals and purposes, had become, at the least, difficult to establish.[58]

Evident enough in the domain of military and security relations, the tendency towards a more pronounced form of systems thinking could also be seen in analysis and discussion of the relationship at large. The assumption that the increasing complexity of the Canadian-American relationship had moved the two countries beyond 'complex interdependence' into a more systemically integrated framework – embodied in "the movement to codify North American integration" – governed the work of Robert O'Brien,[59] and even so vigorous a proponent of the realist approach as John Kirton could note the way "a much more open border" had created interactions, the need to eliminate "system friction" in relation to which had become central.[60] The emergence of a new orientation to comparative discussion revealed these border-blurring trends in a particularly obvious way. Dependent since the 1950s on the idea that each of the two societies could be understood as a particular entity capable in its difference and distinction of sustained comparison with the other, such discussion was, in fact, bound to move in new directions as the idea of 'boundedness' and definite frontiers was challenged by

the conviction that sensitivity to openness, permeability, and the porousness of dividing lines was vital to the understanding of one society in relation to another. Though, in consequence, Lipset had his defenders – "Lipset's thesis continues to be valid," argued a 1996 study[61] — commentators concentrated on the extent to which Canada and the United States were united by their involvement in a single pattern of belief and value, usually identified as 'post-materialist.'[62]

Analysts of political culture were at least as anxious to disavow claims that significant Canadian-American differences existed. Joining their American counterparts in making a fundamental revision of the terms in which North American political culture was discussed, they insisted that the principles of classical republicanism were as prominent north of the border as south of it.[63] So similar, indeed, were the two political cultures pronounced to be that they couldn't even be seen as yielding significant differences in the views they encouraged of state involvement in the economy. So far, insisted one observer, was Canada from any sort of 'statist' tradition that "Canadian-U.S. differences in these regards are quite minimal."[64] Tendencies towards convergence were held to be so significant that difference, where it was perceived to exist, was presented as anomalous and almost certain to disappear. Canadian attachment to union membership was losing its legitimacy,[65] and "in the absence of a global 'social charter' that sets employment standards for the international trading system, or a social consensus on maintaining worker-friendly wage-setting institutions, Canada seems headed towards American-style labor market rules."[66] Even the sense the two societies had of the way the rights of 'citizens' and those of 'persons' should be discriminated could be treated as merging and flowing together.[67]

Nowhere was the revolution being worked by disappearance of the idea that nations were 'bordered' and definable clearer than in the area of literary scholarship. From being one of the most difference-consciousness, nationally-oriented, identity-affirming of the disciplines, that scholarship moved to a problematizing of border and what it enclosed that raised fundamental questions both about the implications of thinking in terms of 'difference' and about the reality of the phenomena to which such thinking referred. The triumph of post-modern modes of analysis over what were now seen to be the exclusionary, reductionist, and totalizing conceptions of nation and country utilized by the thematic critics[68] did not, to be sure, eliminate every tendency to think in terms of 'border' and 'nation'. In what was

destined to become a very well-known phrase, Linda Hutcheon affirmed a 'Canadian' post-modern;[69] Donna Bennett explored the 'national' opportunities offered by the postcolonial variant of postmodernism;[70] and traces of the idea that 'North' was 'Canadian' remained evident.[71] The tendency to attenuate the border's significance was, nonetheless, pronounced. Critic and author Robert Kroetsch did it – his *Gone Indian* (1973) could be described by one commentator as "something of a continentalist manifesto" – and he himself, not as "Mr. Canadian Post-modern" but, "far more urgently, Mr. Great Plains Post-modern."[72] Frank Davey made English-Canadian fiction, which for Frye and Atwood had expressed an essential Canadianism, "announce ... the arrival of the post-national state – a state invisible to its own citizens, indistinguishable from its fellows, maintained by invisible political forces ..."[73] And tendencies to recuperate the 'American' character of Canadian poetry and writing became pronounced.[74] Even lamentations for the passing of the nation and urgings that it be maintained served only to underscore the extent to which its ability to be grasped and understood in terms of the sharp, patterned, highly articulated modes dealt in by Frye and the thematic critics had disappeared.[75] Nor did the clever defense of nation present in the studies of popular culture which began to appear in the 1990s alter the overall tendencies in evidence. Insisting – their authors drew extensively on reception and audience response theory to make the point – that a Canadian capacity to resist, reconfigure, and recode American cultural importations was fully operative, they argued that 'national' responses and a national frame of mind remained very much in existence. "It may be," wrote David H. Flaherty, "in popular culture that Canadian sovereignty finds its most meaningful and potent expression."[76] But though this argument left Canadians in control of their fate, it did so at the cost of conceding that fate to be something being played out in the context of interaction with the culture from the south. 'Borderlessness' was thus affirmed in the very act of attempting to deny it. The strength of the new way of seeing was left largely unimpaired.

That the new Canadian-American narrative thrusting forward in these analyses was seen by some commentators as needing more than the indirect and partial expression it was receiving in them is not, perhaps, surprising. Struck by the desirability of conceptualizing, pattern-making, and delineating in spite of their commitment to new, more open ways of thinking, they gravitated towards concep-

tions and models that would capture in some precise fashion the nature of what they saw before them. For some, what seemed most likely to do the job was development of the notion – it was certainly central to the new forms of understanding – that Canada and the United States were simply not to be seen as divided by any sort of unambiguous boundary. The border, rather than merely a line separating two distinct and different entities, became a site of interaction and exchange within a zone of linkages and associations.

Geographers, struck particularly forcibly by the arbitrary way in which political lines of demarcation might segment otherwise unified areas, played a key part in putting forward the idea that there was a need to develop "a new vision of North America" through examination of "borderlands in a North American spatial system moving towards greater integration."[77] The literary critics' interest in ambiguity and the indeterminate insured that they would continue to emphasize the "written" rather than the 'real' character of the border.[78] Historians, insisting on the deeply rooted character of transborder contacts – "there has always been a constant interaction" – argued the need to see the past as well as the present in "larger, more continental terms."[79] And political scientists and sociologists, oriented increasingly towards non-national behavior patterns, saw the issues they were concerned with in ways that raised real questions about the meaningfulness of frontiers and boundary lines.[80]

Not all those who took up the borderlands idea saw it as blurring – perhaps eliminating – distinctions between Canada and the United States. The literary critic W.H. New used the focus it provided to complicate rather than reduce border's meaning: "for all the openness and all the pull of a North-South geography in North America... [the] boundary has also configured – and continues to configure – separate areas of social possibility and expectation."[81] Geographer Randy Widdis insisted that north-south linkages across a porous, permeable, unstable frontier were not all that needed consideration in the course of getting a clear idea of what Canadian-American interplay involved. If, he argued, accuracy were to be served, it simply had to be seen that "Canada developed national economies and political-cultural institutions which transcended international regional boundaries and provided a counterbalance to the North-South integrative forces existing within transborder regions."[82] The dominance of the tendency to see matters in a border-eliding way was, nonetheless, clear. So strong, in fact, might that

tendency be that one commentator could be moved by the force it exerted to present borderland life as fully enough united effectively to 'erase' the forty-ninth parallel as a meaningful line of division between two societies. What some – the writer Wallace Stegner, for example – felt with great intensity was thus to be seen as a phenomenon bearing down upon all: rooted in the most obvious kind of shared history and geography, borderlands unity could, indeed, hardly help but impose itself in the most insistent, commanding, and irresistible of ways.[83]

If some observers saw the borderlands idea as a quite adequate expression of the sense that Canada and the United States constituted – the phrase is Konrad's – "a unique continental amalgam"[84], others took the view that so ample and comprehensive an assessment of matters could only be rendered in constructs of an equally broad and capacious sort.[85] Their putting into play devices intended to seize and depict the world around them in a more complete and accurate way turned out, however, to do much more than simply yield a closer fit between description offered and thing described. In a development of classically Kuhnian proportions the conceptualizations they created moved beyond the status of mere representations, took on the character of instruments influencing understanding of the data to which they referred, and entered actively into the process by which the phenomena of which they were ostensibly the reflection were interpreted, shaped, and given form.[86]

Much of what the Canadian-American complex offered to view seemed, of course, so obviously to justify thinking of it in Konrad's terms that many commentators' adoption of concepts consistent with that understanding of the situation remained the result of data-handling procedures that were essentially empirical in nature. The vast volumes involved in intra-firm trade, the virtual replacement of the national subsidiary by the multi-plant firm, and the marked increase in Canadian-American commerce certainly drove adoption of the idea that unity and integration – a "North American regional marketplace," as one group of commentators put it – were principal features of what was happening in the economic sphere.[87] The emergence of new and stronger links between the provinces and the U.S. market – by the 1990s most of them were trading more with the U.S. than with each other – entrenched that conviction even more deeply. Quebec's orientation to the south certainly reinforced notions that the "North American subsystem" one commentator had

seen emerging in the 1970s was a reality,[88] while Ontario's more pronounced role in the continental economy – it had become, insisted two investigators, nothing more nor less than a "North American region state" – impelled exactly the same conclusion.[89] Even phenomena closely associated with national maintenance and the serving of national purposes might present themselves as strong contributors to Canadian-American fusion and merger. In playing a highly visible role in the shaping of the cross-border institutions, conventions, and processes generated by "proliferating intermestic influences," the experience Canadians had gained with intra-system bargaining and negotiation in their own internal relations located itself squarely in the category of elements demanding to be seen as prominent in the building of Canadian-American links.[90] Policies formulated in explicitly 'national' terms might put themselves in that place in an even more obvious way. Indeed, the fact that initiatives intended to produce a 'national' outcome in the form of a Canadian film industry instead yielded a strong, clear and dominating focus on "production for the U.S. market" allowed activity in one important policy area to thrust itself forward as the most obvious kind of 'proof' that Canada and the U.S. had come to function in linked, complementary, and interlocking ways.[91] By the end of the 1990s some observers could take the ongoing, highly visible multiplication of cross-border ties, influence, interactions, and links as making it the merest truism that what was happening between (and 'above' and 'below') the two societies was to be understood in terms of association, the development of transnational institutions, and the weakening of the [Canadian] state. What flowed from the fact that the dispute settlement provisions of CAFTA and NAFTA had led to "greater bilateral... consultation and collaboration," insisted one commentator, was so obvious it didn't need to be stated.[92] Others considered it necessary to spell NAFTA's "quasi- constitutional status" out;[93] all agreed that what was happening created new realities in relation to which "policy must now be designed."[94]

For all, however, that many of the elements in the Canadian-American relationship virtually imposed a view of that relationship as a thing of coalescence and union, others did not; scope, in consequence, remained for an approach to the interpretation of data that would guide understanding of those data in ways that would make them consistent with just such a view. Getting crime rates to testify in support of the argument that nothing meaningful divided the two

countries certainly involved such an approach. Seen as recently as 1990 as indicators of significant difference between Canadian and American society,[95] their transformation into evidence for the claim that the two participated in essentially the same pattern of criminal and deviant behavior could hardly, in fact, have been accomplished without that approach. And not only did its use – in the form, in this instance, of an explicit invocation of an "analytical design" focusing attention on broad patterns of criminal activity in the two countries – impel the conclusion that "crime ... is not univocally more present in the U.S. than in Canada." Once that conclusion was in hand, the way was open for other elements in the situation – high U.S. homicide rates were the most obvious – previously interpreted as markers of 'real' Canadian-American divergence to be presented as functions of the simple fact that the U.S. had more racial difficulties and more urban ghettoes. "These results challenge the whole enterprise of explanation of a U.S.-Canadian gap... based on values and national character."[96]

Useful enough in cases of this kind, the identification and foregrounding of a Canadian-American *gestalt* helped contain major obstacles to the idea that the Canadian-American complex was best thought of in terms of unity and coherence. The revolution which adoption of that *gestalt* helped work in the status of national behaviors, national agencies, and, indeed, the national state itself was, in fact, nothing short of remarkable. Those phenomena, still considered at the start of the 1990s to be in an essentially adversarial relationship with continental forces,[97] found themselves transformed by the end of the decade into nothing more nor less than contributors to the functioning of (again the phrase is Konrad's) "a workable continent"[98] whose constituent elements were characterized, not by relations of conflict and opposition, but by the way they joined together in a balanced, coherent, smoothly functioning whole. Blank's focus on the idea that there was an emerging North American "architecture" whose elements played their roles in accordance with a Canadian-American variant of the European subsidarity principle certainly permitted him to relegate the state – particularly the Canadian state – to a place in the Canadian-American scheme of things which at once enfolded it in and made it an aid to the workings of something substantially larger and more comprehensive.[99] The assertion that national policymaking took place in a Canadian-American framework requiring "freedom" to be understood in terms of the "degree"

to which it could be exercised put activity in that sphere in much the same position.[100] Nowhere was this interpretation clearer than in the arguments of Thomas J. Courchene. Stressing the way "the sheer size of the U.S. market" was integrating the Canadian and American economies, emphasizing the fact that "cross-border relationships that, in effect, increase comity" were of major and growing importance, and pointing to the obvious way in which region was decoupling from nation and entering directly into the larger Canadian-American framework, he urged the claim that the Canadian state simply couldn't be understood as anything other than a force operating to maintain a set of precisely defined social services in the context of an ever larger and more integrated transnational association. While, then, as he put it, a "social policy railroad" might still be stiffening a national life, what bulked far larger in the shape of things was the framework in which that railroad was now being compelled to function. Given that Canada had become "a series of north-south, cross-border economies," the "arrangements/agreements concerning trade, institutional, and legal issues" emerging out of that fact were the governing realities of the country's existence and it was they that would increasingly define the situation.[101]

Even an entity not directly involved in the interaction between Canada and the United States might get viewed, depicted, and put to work in ways shaped by an emphasis on that interaction and the intensified forms of association it was producing. Of course some observers, untouched by the idea that the forms, structures, patterns and commonalities emerging 'above' and between Canada and the U.S. were uniquely the property of those societies, reacted to Mexico's arrival on the scene by expecting those forms and structures to be elaborated in ways that would embrace it as well. However, the formulations resulting from the belief that a common 'community', 'experience', or even 'culture' embracing all three North American societies existed never acquired real prominence and centrality.[102] In fact, those committed to the idea that what was 'above' Canada and the United States concerned them alone were able to turn Mexico's entry onto the stage into a development that, far from necessitating the qualification of that idea, heightened its profile and augmented its strength.

Critics of Canadian-American involvement with Mexico, at least of the kind proposed in the North American Free Trade Agreement, did a particularly effective job of using references to the

country to stress the broad band of affinities between Canada and the United States. Beginning with their already existing conviction that the Canadian-American complex was exceptional, they first confined Mexico in its own special place. It shared, they insisted, nothing with either of its northern neighbors that even approximated what they had with each other. They then used the opportunity for comparison and contrast which that action offered to emphasize the fact that the two northern nations were indeed 'apart', in their own system, and (for them, this was the real point) open to severe losses, mainly in the form of jobs and investment, if they were forced to move too close to their southern neighbor.[103]

Even those who favored closer links with Mexico argued their case in terms of essentially the same two-part argument and manoeuver. Their action in placing Mexico in a category of its own, sharply contrasting with the "large, highly developed economies" of Canada and the United States (it was, insisted economist Leonard Waverman, "an underdeveloped economy") was not, to be sure, followed by explicit use of its position there to heighten the contrasts between it and the complex they themselves inhabited. Indeed, in suggesting that its location in its own special category was temporary and to be vacated as it moved into the trade and economic system they were advocating – as, in Waverman's formulation, it "achieve[d] its potential" – they gave not a little ground for thinking that their concern was as much with future affinities as present differences. Their case's essential consistency with the position the critics had established was, nonetheless, clear, for in the very act of asserting that their neighbor would travel in their direction they made that neighbor an entity inspired by a desire to move towards the standards and patterns they exemplified and which – for the moment, at least – set them apart.[104]

Mexico's role as an indicator of Canadian-American community was demonstrated with special, if unintended, clarity in the work of those who professed to see a North American 'experience' or 'culture,' to the making of which all three societies were contributing. Some of that work did little more than make Mexico an 'absent signifier', the very lack of reference to which pointed to the fact that the processes of interaction and community-building in view were being seen mainly as matters of Canadian-American concern.[105] Even when Mexico received more than mere mention, the result was the same. One commentator's building of the country into his North

American whole – it was, he wrote, plainly a part of a "regional institutionalized system which includes a dispute settlement mechanism and common rules in many areas of economic activity" – was followed by an exclusion of it from the generally deeper and more integrated relationship between Canada and the United States. Only in respect of its involvement in the 'epistemic community' formed by neo-liberal economists and policymakers could Mexico be said to be part of anything of that tighter and closer kind.[106] Another group's putatively pan- North American view – "the basic pattern [of post-materialist values] in Mexico is similar to what we find in the United States and Canada" – made Mexico signal Canadian-American cohesion and solidarity in a way that was even clearer and more explicit. Indeed, in qualifying their general North American point with the observation that "in Mexico, the average loading on the materialist/post materialist dimension is weaker than in the other two countries," sociologists Nevitte, Basañez and Ingelhart could hardly have done more to position the country as a foil and contrast to what lay north.[107]

Nowhere was the way Mexico might be at once admitted to North American status and used to underscore Canadian-American particularity clearer than in the arguments of those who conceived of the new North America on the model of a hub with two spokes. References to Mexico's bilateral links with the U.S. allowed it to be thought of as 'in' North America. Depiction of those links as having none of the weight and density of the ones subsisting between Canada and the U.S. kept the focus on the fact that the latter were 'special'. The result was to very considerably enhance Mexico's status as an indicator of the Canadian-American complex's unique character. Whether, in consequence, commentators did their work with a certain indirection and subtlety – one treatment of the role Mexican-U.S. and Canadian-U.S. bilateral ties played in the shaping of the new North America simply assumed the obviousness of the differences between them[108] — or whether they carried it out with clarity and explicitness – Mexico, affirmed another, had sufficient distance from the US not to have to fear that its links with that country would threaten its future: Canada, by contrast, was so close to its neighbor as to be "entering a struggle for its very existence"[109] – the effect was to entrench Mexico firmly in place as a marker of Canadian-American 'specialness' and community.[110] Consistently talked of and bodied forth – even in European-North American compara-

tive study[111] – as contrasting Other, Mexico's occupancy of that peculiarly distinctive position constituted dramatic evidence of the power of the Canadian-American idea: a strengthener of that idea – but also a creature of it – the sense that Mexico was different and apart thus testified quite as clearly as the new discussion of crime or the altering picture of the Canadian state to the potency and force of which that idea disposed.

Active enough in the process by which these phenomena took on new meaning and significance, the Canadian-American idea was no less heavily involved in the proceedings transforming understanding of others. Its role in the dynamic by which interaction occurring 'above', 'below' and 'between' the two societies came to be seen as consolidative and integrating was particularly notable. There, to be sure, it did its work in a different, simpler, way: the fact that the phenomena in prospect presented themselves, not as transactions and occurrences at odds with the notion that Canada and the United States were united by bonds and commonalities of a special, intricate sort, but as ties and linkages already possessing a certain consistency with that notion, meant, indeed, that its task was by several degrees of magnitude both easier and less complicated than that it was involved in elsewhere. The basic nature of what that Canadian-American idea did remained, nonetheless, the same: realities observed – for all that they signified filiations and links between the two societies – still had to be made to denote the closer kind of conjunction and compendency associated with 'borderlessness' and 'integration', and in that need lay all that was necessary to insure the idea's intervention in this area would virtually replicate what it did elsewhere.

Its participation in the process by which understanding of formal trade relations between the two societies shifted and changed certainly kept it on familiar ground. Erosion of the view that such relations represented a danger to sovereignty and independence in favor of the notion that, in a 'borderless', 'continentalizing' age, they were perfectly acceptable expressions of national deliquescence was, indeed, so plainly related to its ascendancy that the point hardly needs to be made. Its place in the changes experienced by interpretation of Canadian lobbying in Washington and Canadian exemption-seeking from American law was no less obvious. Merely to note the shift in emphasis as the conviction that these practices were dangerous because they drew Canada too much onto American

ground was displaced by the view that they were a necessary part of a close and intimate relationship was, indeed, to see it at work.[112] The manner in which it facilitated a new emphasis in treatment of talks and negotiations between the two societies stood out at least as clearly. Weakening of the notion that such dealings, at least in principle, were transactions between two sovereign states in favor of the idea that they took place among and between actors 'within' a single 'system' constituted one of the strongest indications visible of its influence and force. Particularly obvious in the way understanding of pollution negotiations altered and changed,[113] its presence was almost equally plain in the transformations occurring in interpretation of fisheries talks.[114] Nowhere did it manifest itself more obviously than in the changes occurring in understanding of the process involved as ideas passed from one society to the other. Indeed, the reconfiguration of that process as something to be seen, not as a matter of 'influences' formed in one country moving from it to the second, but as a question of phenomena functioning in terms of 'demonstration effects', 'spillover', 'modeling', 'lesson-drawing', 'idea diffusion', and 'convergence' within an increasingly borderless whole revealed its shaping power in a very graphic way. Evident in the work of historians,[115] the new perspective could also be seen in the research political scientists produced.[116] Its effect on understanding of the relationship between Canadian and American culture was particularly noticeable. Animating the great shift which saw American culture in Canada, whether popular,[117] sociological,[118] or a combination of the two,[119] lose its 'alien' status and win recognition as an integral part of the domestic scene ("'things American'," noted one observer, "are so extensively woven into Canadian that the national boundary all but evaporates")[120] it announced its presence with a clarity that was quite unmistakable.

V. CAPP AND THE CANADIAN-AMERICAN IDEA

Evident enough in the trajectories described by discussion in these several areas, the fact that Canadian-American interaction was increasingly understood in terms of "workable continent" models and designs presented itself with particular cogency and distinction in the pages of *Canadian-American Public Policy (CAPP)*, a new publication dedicated from the moment of its 1990 appearance to exploration of that interaction in terms of precisely those models and designs. Conceived at the point when the Canadian-American Free

Trade Agreement was giving formal expression to Canadian-American 'borderlessness' and 'unity', resting on the assumption that there was a Canadian-American entity in relation to which an identifiable body of public policy was taking shape, and organized to stimulate investigation of that policy in all its forms and manifestations,[121] that publication in fact functioned as the single most important vehicle for the encouragement and dissemination of scholarship framed in terms of the new perspective.

Not all *CAPP* contributors, it must immediately be said, worked in terms of the fresh dispensation. Some, indeed, continued to affirm the 'bordered', 'definable' character of national life, even the idea that lines and boundaries were in an important sense impermeable and resistant. Joan Price Boase's insistence on the way institutional and value differences insured that health care "policy choice and policy result are constrained by state-specific historical experience" was particularly strong[122], while Gerald Boychuk's stress on "distinct socio- economic contexts", "institutionalized policy traditions", and "race" led him to the equally firm conclusion that "economic and cultural integration do not appear to be leading to [social policy] convergence between the two countries, nor are they likely to do so in the foreseeable future."[123] Others took the view that while Canadian-American differences were not necessarily fundamental – socio-economic indicators pointed to significant similarity – such differences existed and were important enough to manifest themselves in major policy areas. While, in consequence, Raymond Tatalovich might find that "the Canadian portrait [in respect of abortion-related issues] is a microcosm – with some differences – of the American pattern," he could also conclude that the two policy frameworks concerning those issues were "of fundamentally unlike character."[124]

Even when the idea that Canada and the U.S. formed a special kind of unit did enter discussion, it did not always do so in a paradigmatic, data-organizing way. Struck, like many observers, by the manner in which new empirical realities bore on the situation, not a few *CAPP* contributors made very clear their sense that their attachment to that idea was a function of hard, close, and careful examination of concrete and tangible change. Some found that change in the increasingly prominent role being played in the two societies' lives by joint agencies, procedures, protocols, and contacts: Joseph T. Jockel, certainly, had no trouble isolating "the new, or at least substantially modified, Canada-U.S. 'management culture'"

which had emerged in the 1980s.[125] Others located it in the very specific dispute settlement procedures that seemed more and more prominent in the two countries' lives, as Annette Baker Fox's registering of the way "highly interdependent neighboring states of unequal power but similar culture [have agreed] on rules for settling disputes" made clear.[126] And still others saw it in the accords and agreements made in relation to specific sectors of the economy – which, whether these were between the two federal governments (the case with air transport)[127] or between states and provinces with the involvement of non-governmental organizations (as in the growing number of hydroelectricity accords),[128] contributed particularly powerfully to the shaping of the notion that Canada and the U.S. were bound together in tight and specific ways. Evidence for ties and connections at the sub-national level seemed prominent as well. Focusing on border cities, Peter Karl Kresl found clear indications of their presence in that domain: "each city", indeed, "is incapable of functioning without taking into account the actions and presence of the other."[129] New links between business organizations were similarly seen to point to new forms of association.[130]

For all the persisting emphasis on two distinct entities, and notwithstanding the extent to which those who did see increased integration were led to do so by their contemplation of new realities, the overall tendency was in a different direction. Commentators generally stressed border-attenuating influences and – the critical point – they did so, not through any particular orientation to new realities, but through their use of conceptual devices the essential function of which was to authorize a fresh look at old ones. Even those who considered new factors to be vital adopted a more complicated, 'transnational' view of what they saw mainly because of conceptual developments. Though, in consequence, the shift made by Gordon Munro and his colleagues – they moved from seeing the west coast salmon dispute as "an unadorned two-player game" to viewing it as a complex interaction among many actors in a transnational whole ("a complex multiplayer game") – was partly driven by the arrival of new participants (Native Americans who became actively involved in the 1970s), it owed most of its momentum to the way game theory directed attention to dimensions of the situation, involving states and the province of British Columbia in particular, the centrality of whose place had not previously been seen.[131]

Invocation of ideas that shifted the focus to 'borderlessness' and the 'transnational' did not, of course, always involve versions of those ideas that were novel and not before used. Mildred Schwartz's implicit identification of a 'liberal', 'pragmatic' Canadian-American political culture the Ontario NDP's failure to operate in harmony with which was at the root of its very considerable difficulties rehearsed ways of thinking that had been in use for some time.[132] More clearly still, Sokolsky's idea that Canadian-American defense remained a matter of maintaining bilateral structures was imbedded in the formidably well-established conviction that geography, having placed Canada "within the U.S. defense system," mandated an approach to the issue that – if Canada was to have any influence at all – could only be jointly conceived and managed."[133] Usually, though, the principles put in play tended to be both 'new' and revelatory of elements in the situation not before seen. Waggener's use of spatial equilibrium theory to diminish "a narrow bilateral focus" in favor of "an emerging view of a North American forest and forest products sector in lieu of national or subnational industries" confirmed this truth,[134] while Alm's preoccupation with efficient use of resources in the environmental domain – there was a clear need to "foster successful cross-border environmental cooperation...within a transboundary, environmental and political context" – spoke equally in its favor.[135]

'New' conceptions and awarenesses played a particularly important part in articulation of the idea that Canadians and Americans were converging towards common patterns of behavior and activity. Notions of spillover allowed Rosenau and her colleagues to highlight the "formal and informal homogenization" emerging as – in their view – delivery of medical services took place more and more on the American, corporate, model.[136] Others, insisting that "lesson- drawing was a two-way street,"[137] argued that the commonalities they saw emerging were the product of a quite balanced Canadian-American interaction. In some instances, indeed – tobacco regulation was one – Canadians might play the lead role,[138] but even when they didn't, their influence was far from minimal. Patterns of care for the aged were transcending "the prevailing acute care model" in ways that combined "collectivist and individualist values"[139] and the delivery of health care in general showed "recognition of the limits of market-driven reform and the proven, even necessary role of the state to ensure the distribution of health benefits at reasonable cost."[140]

The new sensitivity to supranational patterns and structures even affected the activity of analysts concerned to do their work in terms of nation-maintaining assumptions. This was evident in the thinking of those concerned with the cultural dimension of Canadian-American life. Framed under the influence of that sensitivity, such thinking pointed to the existence of Canadian-American interaction not simply in culture but in the making of the policy that related to it. Allan Smith's reading of a lesson to American policymakers concerning the way they should conduct themselves in relation to Canadian cultural issues was predicated on the assumption that those policymakers would have a role in decisions concerning such issues[141]; Ted Magder's stress on Canadian complicity with the forces making for American domination of the Canadian cultural market was as obvious in his analysis of the split-run magazine issue as it had been in his consideration of feature film policy[142]; and Joel Smith's concern with using public cultural agencies like the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation to maintain the conditions for a civic culture in Canada derived from a strong sense that the triumph of American popular culture in Canada had made this the only option if "media consumption" were to be anything other than "emotional or ideological."[143]

Few areas saw the organizing force of the new ideas enter more obviously into play than that of regime articulation.[144] This did not mean that attention to the way in which Canadian- American interaction was generating definable sets of nation-attenuating forms and conventions was always and everywhere a consequence of the impulse to view 'old' phenomena in new ways: sometimes, indeed, the process was almost entirely driven by the appearance of fresh facts on the ground. One commentator's contention that the outlines of a common complex of law and policy based on "privatization and deregulation" could be seen emerging in the agricultural sector derived from the way Canadian reforms in supply management and regulated marketing enforced the idea that the two countries were moving towards an increasingly "similar" and "interdependent" environment.[145] When another claimed that dealings over softwood, however conflicted they might appear, existed within the limits of a quite clear set of policy-shaping requirements and constraints, his action was a direct response to the way in which "an increasingly liberal trade policy between Canada and the U.S." had joined with "increased administered protection" in the United States to produce

sharply defined patterns of interaction.[146] As a third moved to press her belief that "harmonized standards" ruled in relation to intellectual property law, her argument was impelled forward by concrete change in both statutes and regulation.[147] In most instances, though, the critical shaping force was conceptual. In some cases, its work was done by indirection: operating first to transform understanding of basic relations, it precipitated a tendency to think in terms of regimes only in consequence of that preliminary step. Suggestions that "the regulatory, industrial, and economic development policies" of the Atlantic fishery "should be linked," that "both countries can benefit from a greater integration of the Northeast Atlantic/regional fishing economy," and that "integration in harvesting should be coupled with harmonized management practices" thus followed upon the reinterpretation of an ancient and venerable interface as a zone of fusion and merger where the only rational way of handling activity was by means of unified institutions and approaches[148]; calls for "a U.S.-Canada subsidies committee, supported by a secretariat domiciled outside the two federal bureaucracies...to monitor and review new and existing programs" attended a like metamorphosis of an economic relationship always seen as close into one to be understood in terms of integration and joint control[149]; and advocacy of "one umbrella" in matters of pollution control was a product of the way the new lens ("we [Canadians and Americans] are all one") made environmental phenomena long seen as linked and interdependent assume the guise of things united and conjoined.[150]

More commonly, the new way of seeing acted directly to transform understanding of already existing interactions and proceedings. The mutation of Jockel's "continentalist approach" to economic relations into something programmatic and mandatory – "the blunt truth is, that harmonious relations ultimately rest on [the behaviors that approach prescribes]" – was one indication of this[151]; Stewart's incorporation of Canada's "culture of compromise" into the negotiating regimen subsisting between Canada and the United States constituted another[152]; Fox's association of familiar links and connections ("transnational ties...among middle-level officials"; the fact that "personal relationships among officials across the border strongly influence comity and mutual understanding") with the rules-based interactions she saw emerging in the trade and environment areas was a third[153]; and Diebold's conversion of types of relation- conducting associated with "parallel action" and "devolu-

tion and interpenetration" into a species of bilateral interaction and governance founded on "diffusion of power" formed a carefully articulated fourth.[154]

Nowhere in the pages of *Canadian-American Public Policy* did the influence of the new idea manifest itself more clearly than in the treatment accorded the two countries' involvement with other nations. Discussion of their ties and links with Mexico certainly showed its presence. Framed in terms of the conviction that those ties and links amounted to very little compared to the bonds uniting Canada and the United States, that discussion in fact unfolded in ways that left little room for doubt. Though, in consequence, one observer hazarded the thought that "NAFTA is changing the 'architecture' of North American relationships" in ways that were bringing Mexico into a fuller association with the other two nations,[155] the tendency to see both that country and its ties with its North American partners as standing distinctly apart emerged with real clarity. Stephen Herzenberg's sense that Mexico's "corporate culture and institutions" and its "difference with the United States and Canada" were what counted was very plain[156], and even when its ties to the others were acknowledged, this was done in ways that emphasized the difference between those ties and the bonds existing between the two northern nations. North America, as Stephen Clarkson put it, "is really two overlapping, asymmetrical subcontinental systems, the Canadian-American and the Mexican-American"[157], and – the critical point – the elements forming the first were much more extensive than those comprising the second.

Comment on Cuba showed the shaping influence of the Canadian-American idea even more clearly. Indeed, in arguing for fundamental congruence between Canadian and American policy on that difficult issue – properly understood, insisted Stephen Randall, Canadian policy towards Castro's island was rather "serving the interests of the United States" than undermining them[158] – that comment made its foundations in the belief that there was an essential community of concerns and interests between the two countries obvious beyond doubt.

At no point was the influence of the idea more clearly manifest than in discussion of the way Canadian and American ties beyond North America might bear on the two nations' connection with each other. Notions of Canadian-American closeness and intimacy certainly grounded Graham Carr's sense that Canada's involvement in

those ties needed to be worked out in ways that would reduce the strength of that connection: their role in shaping his concern with a counterbalancing "framework out of which an adequate [Canadian] response to American initiatives might arise" was, in fact, palpable.[159] They could be seen, too, at the base of the markedly different claim that such ties, no matter what their nature, were not in fact likely to accomplish so 'national' and state-centered an objective: Elizabeth Smythe's contention that Canadian involvement in multilateral organizations was at least as likely to strengthen as weaken bilateral bonds was, indeed, founded on a quite explicit conviction that the density and closeness of those bonds would very much complicate attempts, even ones made in "multilateral fora," to qualify them.[160] And, dramatically, they were apparent in arguments that, though Canada and the United States might be transforming their relationship through interaction in contexts that were increasingly 'plurilateral,' it was "the United States-Canada partnership" that remained central, and the fact that Canada and the United States would be "equal members and ranking powers in the inner core of all the institutional clubs" that weighed.[161]

A major vehicle for discussion framed in terms of borderlessness, the transnational, and the deep general sense that Canadian-American relations were mainly intelligible as artifacts of closeness and intimacy, *Canadian-American Public Policy* took its place at the center of the new conversation with ease and naturalness. The site of argument possessing both substance and breadth, it in fact became a principal influence on, as well as a critical addition to, the developing themes and modalities in terms of which that conversation was being articulated. Considerable in weight, authoritative in voice, extensive in reach, its attainment of a featured role in the exchange under way was a remarkable achievement altogether unmatched by any other publication in the field.

VI. CONCLUSION: THE RETURN OF THE 'NATIONAL'?

Heavily entrenched both in scholarship generally and in the benchmark studies of *Canadian-American Public Policy*, the new, 'borderless' sense of the Canadian-American relationship gave every indication that it would continue to play a major discussion-structuring role into the future. Nor was its presence on the scene likely to be in any sense diminished by the proliferation of phenomena which all but demanded treatment in terms of the principles in which it so

actively dealt. Developments related to familiar forms of Canadian-American interaction – expansion of cross-border pipeline links, ongoing integration of power grids, growth in intermodal shipping, increases in cross-border trucking, new north-south air services, closer ties between Canadian and American railways – certainly compelled consideration in terms of precisely those principles. What was taking place in a number of new fields of endeavor did as well. Investigation of the Internet's role in Canadian-American interaction could, indeed, hardly be carried out through the agency of anything but integrationist ideas[162], while analysis of a wide range of other realities – the pressure building for Canadian adoption of the U.S. dollar[163], Canadian concern to harmonize law and policy in the vital areas of taxation and competition policy[164], and a growing Canadian tendency to assess levels of productivity and output in relation to American standards[165] – similarly demanded treatment in terms of border-eliding concepts and approaches.

All, however, was not unalloyed sweetness and light for the new framework's future. Notwithstanding its enviable success at establishing itself at the center of discussion, its failure totally to efface tendencies to foreground and emphasize 'national' phenomena left a real potential for alternative views of the situation to emerge and assert themselves. Manifestations of United States' nationalism and self-concern – protectionist sentiment, selective internationalism, and a rising anxiety over border security were among the most prominent – were certainly highlighted in ways that left 'borderless' thinking in relation to that country looking, at the least, like something that could only be understood in realist, nation-centered terms.[166] Signs of 'national' phenomena on the Canadian side attracted a no less complicating sort of attention: stress placed on the viability of the Canadian political community,[167] the nation-maintaining relevance of the new communications technologies,[168] and the nationalizing function of federal initiatives in post-secondary education and research[169] had particularly obvious implications for arguments that the movement towards borderlessness and integration was dominant – which implications began almost immediately to be drawn out. Thompson and Randall's 1994 insistence that "any apparent tendency towards [Canadian-American] convergence ... must be viewed through the lens of divergence and ambiguity" was an early indication of the explicitness with which this exercise in 're-bordering' might be carried out.[170] John Helliwell's claim that economic

integration between Canada and the United States was far from reducing trade links among provinces to a nullity – "borders", in his trenchant formulation, still "mattered" – constituted a later, even more forceful statement of the point.[171] And Bruce Doern and Mark MacDonald's argument that Canada functioned in a complex multi-level framework to the operating of which national orientations remained central saw it given a third highly articulated presentation.[172]

Analysts were, to be sure, still far from reviving the idea that absorptive systems were impossible: if, however, the closest they have yet got to that step was William Watson's claim that "deepening economic integration ... does not bind national governments nearly so tightly as much popular commentary suggests,"[173] the logic of the situation suggested that such an intervention was not far off. Influenced by shifting and changing world views, responding to fresh new developments in the domain of events and occurrences, focusing on quite different aspects of the relationship than those emphasized by their 'continentalist' counterparts, thinkers seemed, in fact, highly likely to proceed to a new kind of 'national' argument, one which in its challenging of the continentalist assumptions that had come to loom so large would do nothing quite so much as produce a revivified version of the old contest between 'national' and 'continental' ways of understanding Canadian-American interplay. The grand unfolding of conceptual frameworks and patterns seemed, then, certain to continue: given, indeed, the fact that no notion – no matter how complex and nuanced – could be (to take a phrase from John Sloan Dickey) "conceptually adequate to ... the myriad of realities" it was configured to represent,[174] the new, more complex 'nationalism' in process of emergence seemed itself likely to be displaced with the passage of time. Though, in consequence, an understanding of matters that would marry the national and the continental appeared likely to move increasingly into view, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that in time it, too, will be confronted by some new and innovating perspective: part of a dynamic, ongoing, open-ended process, its entry onto the scene in fact doing no more than marking another stage in the continuing struggle to combine endlessly altering realities and constantly changing conceptual frameworks into a coherent, persuasive, and usable pattern of explanation and understanding.

NOTES

[1]Alexander Monro, *The United States and the Dominion of Canada: Their Future* (Saint John: Barnes and Co., 1879), vi; Goldwin Smith, *Canada and the Canadian Question* (Toronto: Hunter Rose, 1891).

[2]C.F. Adams, ed., *Memoirs of John Quincy Adams* (Philadelphia: 1874-1877, 12 vols.), IV, 438. Cited in Dexter Perkins, *A History of the Monroe Doctrine* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1941), 29; Richard W. Van Alstyne, *The Rising American Empire* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960); Samuel E. Moffett, *The Americanization of Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972 [reprint of the 1907 edition]), 114. For general discussion of Canadian-American union in the nineteenth century, consult Donald F. Warner, *The Idea of Continental Union: Agitation for the Annexation of Canada to the United States, 1849-1893* (Louisville: University of Kentucky Press, 1960).

[3]For Roosevelt's remarks, see the *New York Times*, August 1, 1936, 1, 5. Ball's comments are in *The Discipline of Power: Essentials of a Modern World Structure* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1968), 113-114. Garreau's *The Nine Nations of North America* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1981) states his case. The Weintraub view is in his "Current State of U.S.-Canada Economic Relations," *American Review of Canadian Studies*, 24 (21), Winter 1994, 473-488, 473. For a summary of the position of the American officials whose job it was to think about Canada, see Gordon Stewart, *The American Response to Canada Since 1776* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1992).

[4]Richard Cartwright, "The United States and Canada: Speech to the ... Board of Trade ... of New York." February 21, 1890. Cited in John Herd Thompson and Stephen J. Randall, *Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1994), 59.

[5]O.D. Skelton to Adam Shortt, March 1, 1902. Shortt Papers. Public Archives of Canada. Cited in Carl Berger, *The Writing of Canadian History: Aspects of English-Canadian Historical Writing 1900 to 1970* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1976), 49.

[6]Notwithstanding quite plausible claims that the essential aim – to use American strength in the building up of the Canadian nation –

had been a fixture of Canadian thinking for decades. See, for example, Finance Minister Fielding's reminder that entering the American market had been "the historic policy of the Dominion from the first day of Confederation down to the present time." Canada. House of Commons. *Debates*, January 26, 1911, 2441.

[7]Canada's "only real foreign policy" said Clifford Sifton, "must be with [the United States] and the main business of Canada in foreign relations is to remain friendly with the United States while preserving its own self-respect." Clifford Sifton to J.W. Dafoe, October 29, 1921. Cited in Ramsay Cook, ed. *The Dafoe-Sifton Correspondence, 1919-1927* (Altona: D.W. Friesen, 1966) II, 84.

[8]On the Carnegie Series, see Berger, *Writing of Canadian History*, 137-159; on the ideology of free trade in the 1930s, Richard N. Kottman, *Reciprocity and the North Atlantic Triangle 1932-1938* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1968); and on Dafoe's view of matters Ramsay Cook, *J.W. Dafoe and the Politics of Free Press* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963), 212.

[9]The Underhill *contretemps* is discussed in Douglas Francis, *Frank H. Underhill: Intellectual Provocateur* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986), 114-127. For the fate of the 1948 and 1953 suggestions that Canada pursue free trade with the United States, see R.D. Cuff and J.L. Granatstein, "The Abortive Customs Union, Winter 1947-48," in their *American Dollars, Canadian Prosperity* (Toronto: Samuel-Stevens, 1978), 64-82, Donald Barry, "Eisenhower, St. Laurent, and Free Trade, 1953," *International Perspectives*, March-April 1987, 8-10, and Michael Hart, "Almost But Not Quite: The 1947-1948 Bilateral Canada-U.S. Negotiations," *American Review of Canadian Studies*, 19(1), Spring 1989, 25-58.

[10]Hugh L. Keenleyside, *Memoirs of Hugh L. Keenleyside, Volume 2: On the Bridge of Time* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1982), 91-92.

[11]Quoted in Stephen Clarkson, "Continentalism," *The Canadian Encyclopedia* (Edmonton: Hurtig, 2nd ed., 1988), 511. See also Harry G. Johnson, *The Canadian Quandary* (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1963).

[12]For the Wonnacotts' argument, see their *Free Trade Between the United States and Canada* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967). See also H.E. English, ed., *Industrial Structure in Canada's*

International Competitive Position (Montreal: Private Planning Association of Canada, 1964). The claim that free trade would use American strength to gain Canadian objectives was stated most cogently in the *Report* of the Royal commission advocating that step. See Canada. *Report of the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada* (Ottawa: Department of Supply and Services, 1985), especially "Freer Trade with the United States," I, 297-385. See also the essays in John Crispo, ed., *Free Trade: The Real Story* (Toronto: Gage, 1988).

[13]Macdonald's conviction that the British tie was to be sustained, not just for its own sake, but because of its role in ensuring that Canada could enter into relations with the United States in the confidence that those relations wouldn't overwhelm it was a principal reason why he "had always been deeply interested in the present and future form of the Anglo-Canadian alliance." Donald Creighton, *John A. Macdonald: The Old Chieftain* (Toronto: Macmillan, 1955), II, 475. See also II, 206-207. For the relationship between Laurier's consolidation of the imperial trade tie and Canada's involvement with the American economy, see R.C. Brown, *Canada's National Policy 1883-1900: A Study in Canadian-American Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), 348-349. The context for Bennett's pursuit of the Ottawa Agreements of 1932 is given in C.P. Stacey, *Canada and the Age of Conflict: Volume 2, 1921-1948* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989), 137-145.

[14]H.A. Innis, *The Fur Trade in Canada: An Introduction to Canadian Economic History* [1930] (Toronto: rev. ed., University of Toronto Press, 1956); Donald Creighton, *The Commercial Empire of the St. Lawrence* (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1937).

[15]John W. Holmes, "The Relationship in Alliance and World Affairs," in his *The Better Part of Valor: Essays on Canadian Diplomacy* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1970), 144. The Third Option is discussed in Peyton V. Lyon, "The Quest for Counterweight: Canada and the Expanding European Community," in P. Stingelen, ed., *The European Community and the Outsiders* (Don Mills: Longman Canada, 1973), 49-61; Michael B. Dolan, "Western Europe as a Counterweight: An Analysis of Canadian-European Foreign Policy Behaviour in the Post-War Era," in Brian Tomlin, ed., *Canada's Foreign Policy: Analysis and Trends* (Toronto: Methuen, 1978), 26-50; Harold von Riekhoff,

"The Third Option in Canadian Foreign Policy," in ibid., 89-110; and G. Mace and G. Hervouet, "Canada's Third Option: A Complete Failure?" *Canadian Public Policy*, XV(4), December 1989, 387-404. For a strong examination of attempts to forestall the situation The Third Option was intended to deal with, see B.W. Muirhead, *The Development of Post-War Canadian Trade Policy: The Failure of the Anglo-European Option* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1992).

[16]The quotation is taken from Sir Joseph Pope's summary of Macdonald's thinking on tariff policy as it had developed by the autumn of 1878. Sir Joseph Pope, *Memoirs of the Right Honourable Sir John A. Macdonald*, G.C.B. (Toronto: The Musson Book Company, [1894]) 567. For Finance Minister Tilley's defense of the tariff in his budget speech of 1879, see Canada. House of Commons. *Debates*, March 14, 1879, 14. The classic statement of the role played by the ideology of managed continentalism in the shaping of the National Policy is in Michael Bliss, "Canadianizing American Business: The Roots of the Branch Plant," in Ian Lumsden, ed., *Close the 49th Parallel: The Americanization of Canada* (Toronto: The University of Toronto Press, 1970), 27-42.

[17] "Toronto Eighteen Manifesto," *Canadian Annual Review*, 1911, 48-49. Cited in Thompson and Randall, *Canada and the United States*, 89. [18]Creighton, *Sir John A. Macdonald*; H.G.J. Aitken, "Defensive Expansionism: The State and Economic Growth in Canada," in H.G.J. Aitken, ed., *The State and Economic Growth* (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1959), 79-114. Gordon's work as chairman of the Royal Commission on Canada's Economic Prospects (1955-1957), and his publications after, had shown him to be a strong advocate of the view that Canada's utilization of American economic strength had to be managed with great care. He "favoured a greater degree of national economic planning than had been the Liberal habit since 1945; and [he supported] policies intended to define and assert, in moderate terms, a national policy favouring domestic investment and management of the economy [along with] a stable tariff policy." Denis Smith, *Gentle Patriot: A Political Biography of Walter Gordon* (Edmonton: Hurtig, 1973), 39-40. See also Royal Commission on Canada's Economic Prospects, *Final Report* ([Ottawa: Queen's Printer], 1957); Walter L. Gordon, *Troubled Canada: the Need for New Domestic Policies* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1961); Walter L. Gordon,

A Choice for Canada: Independence or Colonial Status (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1966); and Stephen Azzi, *Walter Gordon and the Rise of Canadian Nationalism* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1999).

[19]The views of Gordon's supporters on the left are summarized in Melville Watkins, "A New National Policy," in T. Lloyd and J. McLeod, eds., *Agenda 1970* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970), 159-176. The 1970s as the culminating point of Canadian state activity in economic and social life are considered in Leo Panitch, ed., *The Canadian State* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978). FIRA's creation comes under review in Michael Bliss, "Founding FIRA: the Historical Background," in James M. Spence and William P. Rosenfeld, eds., *Foreign Investment Review Law in Canada* (Toronto: Butterworths, 1984), 1-11. For Petro-Canada, see Larry Pratt, "Petro-Canada," in Alan Tupper and G. Bruce Doern, eds., *Public Corporations and Public Policy in Canada* (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1981), 95-148. The NEP receives treatment in G. Bruce Doern and Glen Toner, *The Politics of Energy: The Development and Implementation of the NEP* (Toronto: Methuen, 1985).

[20]For a summary statement of the relationship among American power, Canadian culture, and cultural policy in Canada, see Allan Smith, "Canadian Culture, the Canadian State, and the Management of the New Continentalism," in his *Canada – An American Nation? Essays on Continentalism, Identity, and the Canadian Frame of Mind* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1994), 88-123. The dependency of the Canadian cultural industries on the handling of American cultural products is a major theme in Paul Audley, *Canada's Cultural Industries: Broadcasting, Publishing, Records and Film* (Toronto: James Lorimer, 1983) and Michael Dorland, ed., *The Cultural Industries in Canada: Problems, Policies, and Prospects* (Toronto: James Lorimer, 1996). Ted Magder, *Canada's Hollywood: The Canadian State and Feature Films* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993) is indispensable to an understanding of these issues.

[21]For Tocqueville there was no doubt that French society in North America preserved the *ancien régime* in ways that were quite at odds with what lay around it; Thoreau found the community on the St. Lawrence "a nation of peasants"; to Parkman its virtues – nobility, character, an aristocratic presence — stood alike with its vices – an

authoritarian church, strong attachment to deferential values – as anomalous and out of place even when they held sway over much of the continent. George W. Pierson, ed., *Tocqueville in America* (Garden City: Doubleday Anchor, 1959), 210; Henry David Thoreau, "A Yankee in Canada," in his *Excursions,* Volume IX of *The Writings of Henry David Thoreau* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1893), 102; Francis Parkman, *Pioneers of France in the New World* (Toronto: George N. Morang and Co., 1899), "Introduction," I, xcv-ci.

[22]Lord Durham pronounced the U.S. side of the border to evince "every sign of productive industry, increasing wealth, and progressive civilization," while on the British "all seems waste and desolate." Fifty years later Engels could note the same debilitating contrast – in crossing from the U.S. into Canada "one thinks one is in a positively retrogressing and decaying country" – and insist that conformity to the American pattern would not only come, but come in the form of annexation: "an infusion of Yankee blood will have its way and abolish this ridiculous boundary line ..." G.M. Craig, ed., *Lord Durham's Report* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1963), 114; Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Letters to Americans*, trans. Leonard E. Mins (New York: International Publishers, 1953), 204.

[23]Carl Berger, "Critique of the Republic," in his *The Sense of Power: Studies in the Ideas of Canadian Imperialism 1870-1914* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970), 153-176.

[24] J.B. Brebner would later qualify his view, insisting that Canada and the United States could only be understood as part of a grand, British-including 'North Atlantic triangle'. In 1931 his sympathies were very much with Bolton, to whose work he referred, and he made explicit his belief that "the method of applying North American, that is, continental contours to the histories of Canada and the United States is very useful." J.B. Brebner, "Canadian and North American History," Canadian Historical Association *Annual Report*, 1931, 37-48, 38, 37. See also Frank Underhill, "Canadian and American History – and Historians," *Canadian Forum*, June 1928, 686; W.B. Munro, *American Influences on Canadian Government* (Toronto: Macmillan, 1929); Hugh Keenleyside, *Canada and The United States* (New York: A.A. Knopf, 1929); and, on New France, A.L. Burt, "The Frontier in the History of New France," Canadian Historical Association *Annual Report*, 1940, 93-99. For Bolton's views, see his "Epic of Greater America," *Ameri-*

can Historical Review, XXXVII(2), April 1933, 448-474. Consult also his *History of the Americas* (Boston: Ginn and Company, 1928) and his *Wider Horizons of American History* (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1939).

[25]Paul F. Sharp, "When Our West Moved North," *American Historical Review*, LV(2), January 1950, 286-300; *Whoop-Up Country: The Canadian-American West 1865-1885* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1955).

[26]Carl Berger, "The True North Strong and Free," in Peter H. Russell, ed., *Nationalism in Canada* (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1966), 3-26.

[27]S.D. Clark, *Church and Sect in Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1948); see particularly "The Break with American Sectarianism," 173-235. W.L. Morton, *The Progressive Party in Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1959).

[28]The comparative themes adumbrated in Lipset's *Agrarian Socialism: The Cooperative Commonwealth Federation in Saskatchewan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1950) were spelled out very explicitly by the 1960s, particularly in his "Canada and the United States: A Comparative View," *Canadian Review of Anthropology and Sociology* 1(6), 1964, 173-189, and his "Value Differences, Absolute or Relative: The English-Speaking Dominions," in his *The First New Nation: The United States in Historical and Comparative Perspective* (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1967), 284-312. Horowitz's seminal contribution to the debate is in his "Conservatism, Socialism, and Liberalism in Canada: An Interpretation," *Canadian Journal of Economic and Political Science*, 32(2), May 1966, 143-171. The remark cited is on p. 143.

[29]Allan Smith, "Metaphor and Nationality in North America," *Canadian Historical Review*, 51(3), September 1970, 247-275; Allan Smith, "National Images and National Maintenance: The Ascendancy of the Ethnic Idea in North America," *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 14(2) June 1981, 227-257; Allan Smith, "First Nations, Race, and the Pluralist Idea: Canada and the United States in the Post-Modern Age," in his *Canada: An American Nation? Essays on Nationalism, Identity and the Canadian Frame of Mind* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1994), 195-249.

[30]Marcia B. Kline, *Beyond the Land Itself: Views of Nature in Canada and the United States* (Cambridge: Harvard University press, 1970); Ramsay Cook, "Imagining a North American Garden: Some Parallels and Differences in Canadian and American Culture," *Canadian Literature*, 103(4), Winter 1984, 10-23; Northrop Frye, *The Bush Garden* (Toronto: Anansi, 1971); Margaret Atwood, *Survival: A Thematic Guide to Canadian Literature* (Toronto: Anansi, 1971); Gaile McGregor, *The Wacousta Syndrome: Explorations in the Canadian Langscape* [sic] (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985).

[31]Robert H. Babcock, *Gompers in Canada: A Study in American Continentalism Before the First World War* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974).

[32]David Card and Richard Freeman, *Small Differences that Matter: Labour Markets and Income Maintenance in Canada and the United States* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993); Seymour Martin Lipset, *Continental Divide: The Values and Institutions of the United States and Canada* (New York: Routledge, 1990); David Thomas, ed., *Canada and the United States: Differences That Count* (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 1993).

[33]O.D. Skelton, *Life and Letters of Sir Wilfrid Laurier*, ed. D.M.L. Farr (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1965), vol. 2, 111.

[34]*Canada and the United States*, 74.

[35]C. Joseph Chacko, *The International Joint Commission* (New York: Columbia University press, 1932); P.E. Corbett, *The Settlement of Canadian-American Disputes* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1937).

[36]Dexter Perkins, "Bringing the Monroe Doctrine Up to Date," *Foreign Affairs*, 20(2), January 1942, 253-265, 256. For more on "the involuntary American guarantee" and its implications, see R.J. Sutherland, "Canada's Long Term Strategic Situation," *International Journal*, 17(3), Summer 1962, 199-223, 202; Joseph T. Jockel, *No Boundaries Upstairs: Canada, the United States, and the Origins of North American Air Defence* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1987); John Harme, "Continental Air Defence, United States Security Policy, and Canada-United States Defence Relations," in R.B. Byers, John Harme, and George R. Londsay, eds., *Aerospace Defence: Canada's Future Role?*

(Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1985); and John Anderson, "Canada and the Modernization of North American Air Defence," in David G. Haglund and Joel J. Sokolsky, eds., *The U.S.-Canada Security Relationship: The Politics, Strategy, and Technology of Defence* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989).

[37]Kari Levitt, *Silent Surrender: The Multinational Corporation in Canada* (Toronto: Macmillan, 1970); Wallace Clement, *Continental Corporate Power* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977); Wallace Clement, *Class, Power, and Property: Essays on Canadian Society* (Toronto: Methuen, 1983); Daniel Drache, *"The Crisis of Canadian Political Economy: Dependency Theory vs. the New Orthodoxy," Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory*, 7(3), Fall 1983, 25-49; Glen Williams, "On Determining Canada's Location within the International Political Economy," *Studies in Political Economy*, 25, Spring 1988, 107-140; Philip Resnick, "From Semiperiphery to Perimeter of the Core: Canada's Place in the Capitalist World Economy," *Review*, 12(2), Spring 1989, 263-297; Glen Williams, "Canada in the International Political Economy," in Wallace Clement and Glen Williams, eds., *The New Canadian Political Economy* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1989), 116-137.

[38]George Grant, *Lament for a Nation: The Defeat of Canadian Nationalism* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1965); Jocelyn Maynard Ghent, "Did He Fall or Was He Pushed? The Kennedy Administration and the Collapse of the Diefenbaker Government," *International History Review*, 1(2), April 1979,246-270.

[39]Charles Pentland, "The Regionalization of World Politics: Concepts and Evidence," *International Journal*, 30(4), Autumn 1975, 629.

[40]John H. Redekop, "A Re-interpretation of Canadian-American Relations," *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 9(2), June 1976, 227-243, 242.

[41]John Carroll, *Environmental Diplomacy: An Examination and a Prospective of Canada- U.S. Transboundary Environmental Relations* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1983); Lynton K. Caldwell, "Binational Responsibilities For a Shared Environment," in Charles F. Doran and John Sigler, eds., *Canada and the United States: Enduring Friendship, Persistent Stress (Englewood Cliffs*: Prentice-Hall, 1985),

203-230; John Carroll, ed., *International Environmental Diplomacy: The Management and Resolution of Transfrontier Environmental Problems* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

[42]K. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1952); K. Deutsch, *et al.*, *Political Community in the North Atlantic Area* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957).

[43]A.D.P. Heeney and Livingston Merchant, *Canada and the United States: Principles for Partnership* (Ottawa: R. Duhamel, Queen's Printer, 1965).

[44]John Sloan Dickey, *Canada and the American Presence: The United States Interest in an Independent Canada* (New York: New York University Press, 1975), x.

[45]Andrew Axline, *et al.*, eds., *Continental Community? Independence and Integration in North America* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1974); William Willoughby, *The Joint Organizations of Canada and the United States* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979); Robert Spencer, John Kirton, and Kim Richard Nossal, eds., *The International Joint Commission Seventy Years On* (Toronto: University of Toronto Centre for International Studies, 1981); Roger Frank Swanson, *Intergovernmental Perspectives on the Canada-U.S. Relationship* (New York: New York University Press, 1978); Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Introduction: The Complex Politics of Canadian-American Interdependence," in Annette Baker Fox, Alfred O. Hero, Jr., and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., eds., *Canada and the United States: Transnational and Transgovernmental Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), 3-15. For a fine summary of the state of theoretical play by 1980, see Elizabeth Smythe, "International Relations Theory and the Study of Canadian-American Relations," *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, XIII(1), March 1980, 121-147.

[46]"Canada is smaller," succinctly noted Nye, "but not powerless." Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Transnational Relations and Interstate Conflicts: An Empirical Analysis," in Fox, Hero, and Nye, *Canada and the United States*, 367-402, 400.

[47]Naomi Black, "Absorptive Systems are Impossible: The Canadian-American Relationship as a Disparate Dyad," in Axline, *et al.*, eds., *Continental Community*, 92-108.

[48]Charles F. Doran and Joel J. Sokolsky, eds., *Canada and Congress: Lobbying in Washington* (Halifax: Dalhousie University, 1985); David Dewitt and John Kirton, *Canada as a Principal Power* (Toronto: John Wiley and Sons, 1983), esp. 36-46.

[49]The Rt. Hon. Joe Clark, "Canada's New Internationalism," in John Holmes and John Kirton, eds., *Canada and the New Internationalism* (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1988), 4.

[50]Michael Hart with Bill Dymond and Colin Robertson, *Decision at Midnight: Inside the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Negotiations* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1994), 369.

[51]Charles Pentland, "North American Integration and the Canadian Political System," in Denis Stairs and Gilbert Winham, eds., *The Politics of Canada's Economic Relationship with the United States.* Vol 29, Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985), 95-125.

[52]Kenichi Ohmae, *The Borderless World: Power and Strategy in the Interlinked Economy* (New York: Harper Collins, 1990); Richard Stubbs and Geoffrey R.D. Underhill, eds., *Political Economy and the Changing Global Order* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1994); Peter Marden, "Geographies of Dissent: Globalization, Identity, and the Nation," *Political Geography*, 16(1), January 1997, 37-64; Janeen M. Klinger, "International Relations Theory and the Transformation of the International System," *International Politics*, 34(4), December 1997, 371- 394; Peter F. Drucker, "The Global Economy and the Nation State," *Foreign Affairs*, 76(5), September-October 1997, 159-171; Peter Evans, "The Eclipse of the State? Reflections on Stateness in an Era of Globalization," *World Politics*, 50(1), October 1997, 62-87; Daniel Yergin and Joseph Stanislaw, *The Commanding Heights: The Battle Between Government and the Marketplace That is Remaking the Modern World* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1998). For arguments that the national hadn't become an absolute nullity, see Linda Weiss, *The Myth of the Powerless State* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998).

[53]For postmodernism in its own right, see Jean-Francois Lyotard, *The Post Modern Condition* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984); for postmodernism in the social sciences, see Pauline M. Rosenau, *Post-Modernism and the Social Sciences* (Princeton: Princeton

University Press, 1992); for postmodernism in international relations, see Yosef Lapid, "The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-Positivist Era," *International Studies Quarterly*, 1989, 33, 235-254; V. Spike Peterson, "Transgressing Boundaries: Theories of Knowledge, Gender, and International Relations," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 1992, 19, 83-110; Steve Smith, "Positivism and Beyond," in Steve Smith, Ken Booth, and Marysia Zalewski, eds., *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 43-67; John A. Vasquez, "The Post-positivist Debate: Reconstructing Scientific Enquiry and International Relations Theory After Enlightenment's Fall," in Ken Booth and Steve Smith, eds., *International Relations Theory Today* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 21-46; Chris Brown, "'Turtles All The Way Down': Anti-foundationalism, Critical Theory, and International Relations," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 1994, 23, 213-236; and Mark A. Neufeld, *The Restructuring of International Relations Theory* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

[54]Alan M. Schwartz, "Canada-U.S. Environmental Relations: A Look at the 1990s," *American Review of Canadian Studies*, 24(4), Winter 1994, 489-508, 505.

[55]Christopher Kirkey, *The Canadian-American Relationship in the North: Explaining Interstate Bargaining Outcomes* (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1994); Christopher Kirkey, "Smoothing Troubled Waters: the 1988 Canada-United States Arctic Co-operation Agreement," *International Journal*, 50(2), Spring 1995, 401-426; Christopher Kirkey, "The Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Initiative: Canada's Response to an American Challenge," *International Journal of Canadian Studies*, 13, Spring 1996, 41-59; Christopher Kirkey, "Negotiating the 1985 North American Air Defence Modernization Agreements," *International Journal of Canadian Studies*, 18, Fall 1998, 153-182. The reference to "sovereign responsibility" is on p. 158 of the last article.

[56]Schwartz himself conceded the role being played by non-governmental organizations in the emergence of a policy nexus operating 'above' the two nations. See his remarks on the place of "environmental groups and other non-governmental organizations" in the management of Great Lakes pollution issues. Schwartz, "Canada-U.S. Environmental Relations," 502.

[57]Ann Denholm Crosby, "The Relations of Economic Integration to the Making of Canadian Defence Policy," *Studies in Political Economy*, 52(1), Spring 1997, 39-72.

[58]Joel J. Sokolsky and David Detomasi, "Canadian Defence Policy and the Future of Canada-United States Security Relations," *American Review of Canadian Studies*, 24(4), Winter 1994, 537-559.

[59]Robert O'Brien, "North American Integration and International Relations Theory," *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 28(4), December 1994, 693-724, 693.

[60]John Kirton, "Promoting Plurilateral Partnership: Managing United States-Canadian Relations in the Post-Cold War Period," *American Review of Canadian Studies*, 24(4), Winter 1994, 453-472, 454.

[61]Jon P. Alston, Theresa M. Morris, and Arnold Vedlitz, "Comparing Canadian and American Values: New Evidence from National Surveys," Special Joint Issue. *American Review of Canadian Studies / Canadian Review of American Studies*, 26(3), Autumn 1996, 301-314, 311.

[62]N. Nevitte, "Bringing Values 'Back In': Value Change and North American Integration," in D. Barry, ed., *Toward a North American Community? Canada, the United States, and Mexico* (Boulder, Westview Press, 1994), 94-125; N. Nevitte, *The Decline of Deference* (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 1996). See also D. Baer, E. Grabble, and W. Johnson, "National Character, Regional Culture, and the Values of Canadians and Americans," *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology*, 30(1), February 1993, 13-36.

[63]For the evolving debate, see Peter J. Smith and Janet Ajzenstat, eds., *Canada's Origins: Liberal, Tory, or Republican?* (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1995) and their "Canada's Origins: The New Debate," *National History*, 1(2), Spring 1997, 113-126.

[64]Harold D. Clarke and Marianne C. Stewart, "Public Beliefs About State and Economy: Canada and the United States in Comparative Perspective," *International Journal of Canadian Studies*, 13, Spring 1996, 11-39, 36.

[65]Gary Bowden, "Labor Unions in the Public Mind: the Canadian

Case," *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology*, 26(5), November 1989, 732-742.

[66]Marc V. Levine, "Public Policies, Social Institutions, and Earnings Inequality: Canada and the United States, 1970-1995." Special Joint Issue. *American Review of Canadian Studies / Canadian Review of American Studies*, 26(3), Autumn 1996, 315-339.

[67]Mark E. Rush, "Citizenship and Rights in Canada and the United States: Managing the Tension that Haunts International Law," *International Journal of Canadian Studies*, 15, Spring 1997, 187-208.

[68]For early, and very influential, salvoes in the war against thematic criticism, see Robert Kroetsch, "Unhiding the Hidden: Recent Canadian Fiction [1974]," in *Robert Kroetsch: Essays*. Special Issue of *Open Letter*, 5th Ser. 4 (1983), 17-21 and Frank Davey, "Surviving the Paraphrase [1974]," in his *Surviving the Paraphrase: Eleven Essays on Canadian Literature* (Winnipeg: Turnstone Press, 1983), 4-27.

[69] Linda Hutcheon, *The Canadian Postmodern: A Study of Contemporary English-Canadian* Fiction (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1988).

[70] "The postcolonial model invites us to see – and gives us a new way of seeing – the play of tensions within Canadian culture as well as the tensions between Canada's culture and that of any external centre." Donna Bennett, "English Canada's Postcolonial Complexities," *Essays on Canadian Writing*, 51-52, Winter 1993 – Spring 1994, 164-210, 197.

[71]"Representing North," a Special Issue of *Essays on Canadian Writing*, 59, Fall 1996.

[72]Gunilla Florby, "An American in Alberta: Robert Kroetsch's Gone Indian," in Peter Easingwood, Konrad Gross and Hartmut Lutz, eds., *Informal Empire? Cultural Relations Between Canada, the United States, and Europe* (Kiel: I. and F. Verlag, 1998), 205-218, 205; Francis Kay and Robert Thacker, "'Gone Back to Alberta': Robert Kroetsch Rewriting the Great Plains," *Great Plains Quarterly*, 14(3), 1994, 167-183, 181.

[73]Frank Davey, *Post-National Arguments: The Politics of the Anglophone-Canadian Novel Since 1967* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), 266. See also Herb Wylie, "Regionalism, Postcolonialism, and

(Canadian) Writing: A Comparative Approach for Postcolonial Times," *Essays on Canadian Writing*, 63, Spring 1998, 139-161.

[74] Roy Miki, "The Future's Tense: Some Notes on Editing, Canadian Style," *Open Letter*, 8th Ser., 5-6, 1993, 182-196; Russell Brown, "Callaghan, Glassco, and the Canadian Lost Generation," *Essays on Canadian Writing*, 51-52, Winter 1993 – Spring 1994, 83-112.

[75]For one critic "the [Canadian] nation state" could be defended, but only as "a problematic but serviceable entity which counters the tendency to see society as simply a random concatenation of social atoms or possessive individuals abandoned to the tender mercies of the multi-national corporations." L.M. Findlay, "Writing the Canadian Flag," *Alphabet City*, 2, 1992, 46-47, 47.

[76]David H. Flaherty, "Preface," in David H. Flaherty and Frank E. Manning, eds., *The Beaver Bites Back: American Popular Culture in Canada* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993), xiii.

[77]Victor Konrad, "The Borderlands of the United States and Canada in the Context of North American Development," *International Journal of Canadian Studies*, 4, Fall 1991, 77-95, 83, 84.

[78]Russell Brown, "The Written Line," in Robert Lecker, ed., *Borderlands: Essays in Canadian-American Relations* (Toronto: ECW Press, 1991), 1-27; Frances W. Kaye, "Canadian- American Prairie-Plains: Literature in English," *ibid.*, 222-242; Laurie Ricou, "Crossing Borders in the Literature of the Pacific Northwest," *ibid.*, 286-308; M. Vinz and D. Williamson, eds., *Beyond Borders: An Anthology of New Writing from Manitoba, Minnesota, Saskatchewan and the Dakotas* (Winnipeg: New River Press, 1992); Camille R. La Bossière, ed., *Context North America: Canadian/U.S. Literary Relations* (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1994). For an early exploration of some of these themes, see Dick Harrison, *Crossing Frontiers: Papers in American and Canadian Western Literature* (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1978).

[79]David Murray, "Criminal Boundaries: The Frontier and the Contours of Upper Canadian Justice, 1792-1840," Special Joint Issue. *American Review of Canadian Studies / Canadian Review of American Studies*, 26(3), Autumn 1996, 341-366, 341, 344.

[80]Mildred A. Schwartz, "Political Protest in the Western Borderlands: Can Farmers Be Socialists?" in Lecker, *Borderlands*, 28-53; Susan E.

Squires, "Newfoundland to the Boston States: Seasonal Cross-Border Migration," *ibid.*, 127-145.

[81]W.H. New, *Borderlands: How We Talk About Canada* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1998), 39-40.

[82]Randy William Widdis, "Borders, Borderlands, and Canadian Identity: A Canadian Perspective," *International Journal of Canadian Studies*, 15, Spring 1997, 49-66, 49.

[83]Robert Thacker, "Erasing the Forty-Ninth Parallel: Nationalism, Prairie Criticism, and the Case of Wallace Stegner," *Essays on Canadian Writing*, 61, Spring 1997, 179-202.

[84]Konrad, "Borderlands of the United States and Canada," 81.

[85]One observer saw the need for such constructs implied in the fact that "the most important impact [on Canada] comes not from the proximity of the international boundary itself, but from the more general proximity of the United States"; others located it in the way "transnational contacts and interactions have called into question the traditional national sovereignty function of borders [and focused attention on] new relationships and forms of association that transcend national functions." Roger Gibbins, "Meaning and Significance of the Canadian-American Border," in Paul Ganster, Alan Sweedler, James Scott, and Wolf Dieter-Eberwein, eds., *Borders and Border Regions in Europe and North America* (San Diego: San Diego University Press, 1997), 315-331, 32; Donald K. Alper and James Loucky, "North American Integration: Paradoxes and Prospects," *American Review of Canadian Studies*, 26(2), Summer 1996, 177- 182, 177-178.

[86]The complicated way in which observers make sense of what they see was, of course, noted long before Kuhn drew attention to it. "The neo-Kantian Ernst Cassirer ... rejected empiricism; he believed that all systems of representation, scientific as well as mythical, are penetrated by symbols that actively organize rather than merely copy the field of sensory perception." The point, too, continues to be made: "The conceptual framework chosen," notes historian Ludmilla Jordanova, "exercises a large measure of influence over the sources used ..." Kuhn's statement of the central issue – "what a man sees depends both upon what he looks at and also upon what his previous

visual-conceptual experience has taught him to see" – remains, nonetheless, very influential, mainly because of the persuasive way it developed Cassirer's claim concerning the essential similarity between scientific and other modes of thinking. Daniel Gordon, "Capital Punishment for Murderous Theorists?" *History and Theory*, 38(3), 1999, 378-388, 378; Ludmilla Jordanova, *History in Practice* (London: Arnold/Oxford University Press, 2000), 103; Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 2nd. ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), 113. See also Mary Poovey, *A History of the Modern Fact: Problems of Knowledge in the Sciences of Wealth and Society* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).

[87]On the importance of intra-firm trade, see Graham D. Taylor and Peter Baskerville, *A Concise History of Business in Canada* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1994), 463; Greg Ip, "Is the U.S. Really Committed to Free Trade?" *Financial Post*, December 3, 1994; and Bruce Little, "How More Exports Mean More Imports," *Globe and Mail*, December 12, 1994. For the multi-plant firm, and the decision to give subsidiaries "specific product mandates" for the Canadian-U.S. markets as a whole rather than assigning them responsibility for a comprehensive range of products for the 'national' market, see Isaiah Litvak, "U.S. Multinationals: Repositioning the Canadian Subsidiary," *Business in the Contemporary World*, Autumn 1990, 115. Sidney Weintraub, "Current State of U.S.-Canada Economic Relations," *American Review of Canadian Studies*, 24(21), Winter 1994, 473-488 considers overall trade patterns. The reference to the "North American regional marketplace" is in Alan M. Rugman, John Kirton, and Julie A. Soloway, "Canadian Corporate Strategy in a North American Region," *American* Review of Canadian Studies, Summer 1997, 27(2), 199-219, 199.

[88]Daniel Latouche, "Quebec and the North American Subsystem: One Possible Scenario," *International Organization*, 28(4), Autumn 1974, 931-960; Rita Dionne-Marsolais, "The FTA: A Building Block for Quebec," *American Review of Canadian Studies*, 21(2-3), Summer-Autumn 1991, 245-252; Dorval Brunelle and Christian De Block, "Free Trade and Trade-Related Issues in Quebec: The Challenges of Continental Integration," *American Review of Canadian Studies*, 27(1), Spring 1997, 63-85. "Overall," conclude Brunell and DeBlock, "Quebec is more dependent on US Markets than the Canadian economy as such." 65.

[89]Thomas J. Courchene with Colin R. Telmer, *From Heartland to North American Region State: The Social, Fiscal, and Federal Evolution of Ontario* (Toronto: Centre for Public Management, University of Toronto, 1998).

[90]For the phrase "proliferating intermestic influences," see Earl H. Fry, "Economic Development Strategies in Canada and the United States: Linkages Between the Subnational, National, and Global Settings," *International Journal of Canadian Studies*, 16, Fall 1997, 69-91, 69; for the origins of the concept, see Bayless Manning, "The Congress, the Executive, and Intermestic Affairs: Three Proposals," *Foreign Affairs*, 55(2), January 1997, 306-324; for general commentary, see Douglas M. Brown and Earl H. Fry, eds., *States and Provinces in the International Economy* (Berkeley: Institute of Governmental Studies Press, University of California; and Kingston: Institute of Government Relations, Queen's University, 1993); for discussion of a region in which the phenomenon can be seen particularly clearly, consult Theodore H. Cohn and Patrick J. Smith, "Subnational Governments as International Actors: Constituent Diplomacy in British Columbia and the Pacific Northwest," *BC Studies*, No. 110, Summer 1996, 25-59; J.C. Day, *et al.*, "Emerging Institutions for Bilateral Management of the Columbia River Basin," *American Review of Canadian Studies*, 26(2), Summer 1996, 217-232; and Pacific Northwest Economic Region, *Vision 2001: A Look Ahead for the Pacific Northwest Economic Region* (Seattle: PNWER, 1996).

[91]Ted Magder, *Canada's Hollywood: The Canadian State and Feature Films* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), xii.

[92]Peter Watson, "Dispute Settlement Under FTA-NAFTA," *Policy Options*, 20(5), June 1999, 33-36, 33.

[93]G. Bruce Doern and Mark R. MacDonald, *Free Trade Federalism: Negotiating the Canadian Agreement on Internal Trade* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), 151.

[94]*Ibid.*, 152.

[95]Seymour Martin Lipset, "Law and Deviance," in his *Continental Divide*, 90-116.

[96]Marc Ouimet, "Crime in Canada and the United States: A Com-

parative Analysis," *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology*, 36(3), August 1999, 389-408, 390, 405.

[97]Some commentators saw the contest between the two as yielding a victory for the continental: "content-wide systems of interaction," argued John N. McDougall, "[are] displacing Canada's nation-wide systems of interaction." Others took the view that the nation, in the form of a state apparatus capable of focusing national loyalties even in the face of substantial Canadian-American integration in the fields of economy and culture, was holding its own. "Canada holds together as a political institution, as a state, very well." There was, however, no disagreement concerning the central issue: what was taking place could only be understood in terms of rivalry and competition of the most fundamental kind. For McDougall's comment, see John N. McDougall, "North American Integration and Canadian Disunity," *Canadian Public Policy*, 17(4), December 1991, 395-408, 395. For earlier statements making much the same point, see Robert Gilpin, "Integration and Disintegration on the North American Continent," *International Organization*, 28(4), December 1974, 851-874; Garth Stevenson, "Continental Integration and Canadian Unity," in Axline, *et al.*, eds., *Continental Community*, 194-217; and Lynn K. Mytelka, "Global Interaction and National Segmentation," in Jon H. Pammett and Brian W. Tomlin, eds., *The Integration Question: Political Economy and Public Policy in Canada and North America* (Don Mills: Addison-Wesley Publishers Ltd., 1984), 38-49. For argument that the state, given the triumph of continentalism in the areas of economics and culture, was the principal site of national resistance to integrating influences, see Richard Collins, *Culture, Communication, and National Identity: The Case of Canadian Television* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 20-21.

[98]Konrad, "Borderlands of the United States and Canada," 83.

[99]Stephen Blank, "The Emerging Architecture of North America," in A.R. Riggs and Tom Velk, eds., *Beyond NAFTA: An Economic, Political, and Sociological Perspective* (Vancouver: The Fraser Institute, 1993), 22-35.

[100] Keith Banting, George Hoberg, and Richard Simeon, eds., *Degrees of Freedom: Canada and the United States in a Changing World* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1997).

[101]Adumbrated in his 1991 essay *In Praise of Renewed Federalism* – the notion that some of the nation's powers were passing 'upward', others 'downward', that in an age of Canadian-American integration economic policy would be continental, and that Canada's 'national policy' was now the 'social policy railroad' were all brought forward there – Courchene's leading ideas received ever more precise and refined articulation as the 1990s advanced. See Thomas Courchene, *In Praise of Renewed Federalism* (Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute, 1991), 80-81, 85; Thomas Courchene, *Social Canada in the Millennium: Reform Imperatives and Restructuring Principles* (Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute, 1994); and Thomas Courchene, "Globalization: The Regional/International Interface," *Canadian Journal of Regional Science*, 18(1), Spring 1995, 1- 20. The quotations cited are from Courchene and Telmer, *From Heartland to North American Region State*, 280, 289, 291.

[102]"[I]n my view," wrote John D. Wirth, "some sort of [North American] community already exists." "Advancing the North American Community," *American Review of Canadian Studies*, 26(2), Summer 1996, 261-273, 261. See also Michael S. Cross, "Towards a Definition of North American Culture," in S.J. Randall, Herman Konrad, and Sheldon Silverman, eds., *North America Without Borders? Integrating Canada, the United States, and Mexico* (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 1993), 303-306, and Jean-François Côté, "The North American Novel in the United States: Ishmael Reed's Canada," Special Joint Issue. *American Review of Canadian Studies / Canadian Review of American Studies*, 26(3), Autumn 1996, 469-480.

[103]Richard Martin, "Canadian Labour and North American Integration," in Randall, Herman, and Konrad, eds., *North America Without Borders*? 181-187. In contrast to Mexico, noted Ross Perot, "Canada and the United States have almost equal income levels, possess similar institutions, and share a common heritage." Ross Perot with Pat Choate, *Save Your Job, Save Our Country: Why NAFTA Must Be Stopped – Now* (New York: Hyperion, 1993), 16.

[104]Leonard Waverman, "A Canadian Vision of North American Economic Integration," in Steven Globerman, ed., *Continental Accord: North American Economic Integration* (Vancouver: The Fraser Institute, 1991), 31-64, 45.

[105]This was the case with the Cross and Côté interventions in the

discussion. See Cross, "Towards a Definition of North American Culture," and Côté, "The North American Novel in the United States."

[106]Robert O'Brien, "North American Integration and International Relations Theory," *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 28(4), December 1995, 693-724, 693, 719.

[107]Neil Nevitte, Miguel Basañez, and Ronald Inglehart, "Directions of Value Change in North America," in Randall, Konrad, and Silverman, *North America Without Borders*?, 245-259, 248.

[108]See, in particular, Randall's reference to the way "historical pattern[s] of bilateralism" were limiting trilateral integration. Stephen J. Randall, "Managing Trilateralism: The United States, Mexico, and Canada in the Post-NAFTA Era," in Stephen J. Randall and Roger Gibbins, eds., *NAFTA in Transition* (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 1994), 37-46, 38.

[109]Charles F. Doran, "Introduction," in Charles F. Doran and Alvin Paul Drischler, eds., *A New North America: Cooperation and Enhanced Interdependence* (Westport: Praeger, 1996), xiv.

[110]Occasionally, reference to the Mexico-U.S. relationship pointed up the closeness of Canadian-U.S. links through comment on particular issues: "NAFTA's immigration provisions," thus noted one observer, "allow for discriminatory treatment of Mexican nationals as compared to Canadian nationals." Gerald A. Wunsch, "Why NAFTA's Immigration Provisions Discriminate Against Mexican Nationals," *Indiana International and Comparative Law Review*, 5, 1994, 127-142, 127. Mexico, noted another, didn't share a "common legal ancestry" with the U.S. and so didn't operate in terms of the "United States-Canadian standard" in matters of trade regulation. Jeffrey J. Schott, "A North American Free Trade Area: Only an ideal or a Viable Policy Option?" in Glen E. Lich and Joseph A. McKinney, *Region North America: Canada, United States, Mexico* (Dallas: Baylor University Regional Studies, 1990), 114-134, 133, 123. Usually, observations were general: "the Mexican and Canadian situations [in respect of the U.S.] differ" simply noted Joseph A. McKinney, "Problems and Prospects: A Preliminary Reconnaissance," in *ibid.*, xvii-xxiii, xx. "The Canadian-American and Mexican-American borderlands have

little in common" stated Gibbins, "Meaning and Significance of the Canadian-American Border," in Ganster, et al., *Borders and Border Regions*, 323.

[111]That study almost always invited the observation that only the Canadian-American part of the North American whole conformed in any real way to the patterns of integration developing across the Atlantic. The fact that Canadian-American integration had, in the view of some commentators, been pushed by American dominance *beyond* anything in Europe of course confirmed the measure in which that integration was being seen as having put the two countries in a place still largely closed to their southern neighbor. Leslie A. Pal and Rainer-Olaf Schultze, eds., *The Nation-State versus Continental Integration: Canada in North America – Germany in Europe* (Bochum: Universitätsverlag Dr. N. Brockmeyer, 1991); Bruce W. Wilkinson, "Regional Trading Blocs: Fortress Europe versus Fortress America," in Daniel Drache and Meric Gertler, eds., *The New Era of Global Competition: State and Policy and Market Power* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1991), 51-82; Brigitte Lévy, "The EU and NAFTA: Two Regional Economic Blocs in a Complex and Interdependent International Economy," *Revue d'Intégration européene*, 17(2-3), 1994, 211-233; Edelgaard Mahant, "The European Community and North American Free Trade: Contrasts and Comparisons," in Gretchen Macmillan, ed., *The European Community*, Canada, and 1992 (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 1994), 131-150; Peter Karl Kresl, "Sub-national Governments and Regional Trade Liberalization in Europe and North America," *Revue d'Intégration européene*, 17 (2-3), 1994, 309-335; Dorval Brunelle and Christian Deblock, "L'Union européene et l'Amérique du nord: analyse comparée des dépenses sociales," *Revue d'Intégration européene*, 17(2-3), 1994, 267-308; Xavier de Vanssay and Edelgard Mahant, "Three's Company and Fifteen's a Union: The Comparative Political Economy of NAFTA and The European Union – Integration or Liberalisation," in Till Geiger and Dennis Kennedy, eds., *Regional Trade Blocs, Multilateralism and the GATT: Complementary Paths to Free Trade?* (London: Pinter, 1996), 131-155; Robert Anderson, Theodore Cohn, Chad Day, Michael Howlett, and Catherine Murray, eds., *Innovation Systems in a Global Context: The North American Experience* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1999).

[112]For the criticism of lobbying and exemptionalism, see R.D. Cuff and J.L. Granatstein, "Canada and the Perils of Exemptionalism," *Queen's Quarterly*, 79, 1972, 473-481 and Kim Richard Nossal, "The Imperial Congress: The Separation of Powers and Canadian-American Relations," *International Journal*, 44(3), Autumn 1989, 863-883, 881. The argument in their favor is in Allan Gotlieb, *"'ll Be With You in a Minute, Mr. Ambassador": The Education of a Canadian Diplomat in Washington* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991).

[113]For the measure of that change compare D.H. Dinwoodie on The Trial Smelter case and Robert Spencer on the International Joint Commission's involvement with Great Lakes pollution with John E. Carroll's examination of pollution negotiations generally and Fredric C. Menz's treatment of talks concerning acid rain. Where Dinwoodie wrote of "the role of the federal governments," the obligations of "both nations," and "the diplomatic process between them," and Spencer referred to relations between "two sovereignties sharing a continent," Carroll's concern was with "a new order" in which government representatives – federal, state, and provincial – interacted with non-government organizations in a complex whole while Menz examined "an *effective* [sic] North American [i.e. Canada-U.S.] program to control acid rain" in which movement towards more coherent management was breaking "new ground." D.H. Dinwoodie, "The Politics of International Pollution Control: The Trail Smelter Case," *International Journal*, 27(1), Spring 1972, 219-235, 235; Robert Spencer, "Preface," in Robert Spencer, John Kirton, and Kim Richard Nossal, eds., *The International Joint Commission Seventy Years On* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981), vii; John E. Carroll, *Environmental Diplomacy: An Examination and Prospective of Canadian-United States Transboundary Environmental Relations* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1983), 279; Fredric C. Menz, "Transboundary Acid Rain: A Canadian-U.S. Problem Requires a Joint Solution," in Jonathan Lemco, ed., *Tensions at the Border: Energy and Environmental Concerns in Canada and the United States* (New York: Praeger, 1992), 45-60, 54.

[114]For the starkness of the contrast between the 'old' and the 'new' compare Barbara Johnson's stress on "the two countries' interests" and the necessity for "bilateral co-operation" with Robert J. Schmidt Jr.'s emphasis on the measure in which negotiations were to be

understood as occurring among national and subnational players in a single two-level system which "allows the Canadian strategy of leveraging one U.S. interest against the other." Barbara Johnson, "Canadian Foreign Policy and Fisheries," in Barbara Johnson and Mark Zacher, eds., *Canadian Foreign Policy and the Law of the Sea* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1977), 52-99, 90-91; Robert J. Schmidt, Jr., "International Negotiations Paralyzed by Domestic Politics: Two-Level Game Theory and the Problem of the Pacific Salmon Commission," *Environmental Law*, 26(1), Spring 1996, 95-139, 139.

[115]Note, for example, changes in the treatment of the relationship between Upper Canadian and American political ideas. Where G.M. Craig and J.E. Rea understood that relationship in terms of principles from one society impacting on those of another, Jane Errington concentrated attention on the extent to which it represented a commingling of those principles in an ideologically undifferentiated whole. G.M. Craig, "The American Impact on the Upper Canadian Reform Movement Before 1837," *Canadian Historical Review*, 29(4), December 1948, 333-352; J.E. Rea, "William Lyon Mackenzie – Jacksonian?" *Mid-America*, 50(3), July 1968, 223-235; Jane Errington, *The Lion, the Eagle, and Upper Canada: A Developing Colonial Ideology* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1987).

[116]Even those who continued to stress the existence of national policy-making apparatuses might see these as agencies working under the influence of, and in ways that perpetuated the existence of, a single complex of transnational ideas and principles. Hoberg, for example, viewed Canadian policy formation as (in at least some instances) intelligible in these terms and therefore as open to interpretation as coterminous with, rather than simply structured under the influence of, American. George Hoberg, "Sleeping with an Elephant: The American Influence on Canadian Environmental Regulation," *Journal of Public Policy*, 11(2), March 1991, 107-132.

[117]"The crucial point," asserted Paul Rutherford, "is that the forty-ninth parallel has only slight cultural significance nowadays." Paul Rutherford, "Made in America: The Problem of Mass Culture in Canada," in Flaherty and Manning, *The Beaver Bites Back*, 260-280, 277.

[118]Gibbins, "Meaning and Significance of the Canadian-American Border."

[119]Such a combination had acted, thought Yvan Lamonde, to make Quebec itself "*Presqu' Amérique.*" Yvan Lamonde, "L'ambivalence historique de Québec à l'égard de sa continentalité: circonstances, raisons, et signification," in Gérard Bouchard et Yvan Lamonde, sous la direction de, *Québécois et Américains: La culture québécoise aux XIX^e^ et XX^e^ siècles* (Montréal: Fides 1995), especially 76-78.

[120]Gibbins, "Meaning and Significance of the Canadian-American Border," 317.

[121]For the publication's 'mission statement', see Victor Konrad, "A Note from the Director," *Canadian-American Public Policy* [Hereafter *CAPP*], No. 1, April 1990, n.p.

[122]Joan Price Boase, "Health Care Reform or Health Care Rationing: A Comparative Study" *CAPP*, No. 26, May 1996, 2.

[123]Gerald Boychuk, "Are Canadian and U.S. Social Assistance Policies Converging? *CAPP*, No. 30, July 1997, 3.

[124]Raymond Tatalovich, "The Abortion Controversy in Canada and the United States," *CAPP*, No. 25, February 1996, 10, 1.

[125]Joseph T. Jockel, "Canadian-U.S. Relations in the Bush Era," *CAPP*, No. 1, April 1990, 3.

[126] Annette Baker Fox, "Settling U.S.-Canada Disputes: Lessons for NAFTA," *CAPP*, No. 11, September 1992, 46-47.

[127]Martin Dresner, "The Regulation of U.S.-Canada Air Transportation: Past, Present and Future," *CAPP*, No. 9, March 1982; Michael W. Pustay, "The Long Journey To Free Trade in U.S.-Canada Airline Services," *CAPP*, No. 29, April 1997.

[128]William Averyt, "Canada-U.S. Electricity Trade and Environmental Politics," *CAPP*, No. 12, December 1992.

[129]Peter Karl Kresl, "The Impact of Free Trade on Canadian-American Border Cities", *CAPP*, No. 16, December 1993, 19.

[130]Joint action by the Business Council on National Issues and the U.S.-based Business Roundtable in support of the Canadian-American Free Trade Agreement was, thought Henry Jacek, a prime example of this emerging reality. Henry J. Jacek, "Public Policy and NAFTA: The Role of Organized Business Interests and the Labor Movement," *CAPP*, No. 19, October 1994, 5.

[131]Gordon Munro, Ted McDorman, and Robert McElvey, "Transboundary Fishery Resources and the Canada-United States Pacific Salmon Treaty, *CAPP*, No. 33, February 1998, 17, 18.

[132]Mildred A. Schwartz, "North American Social Democracy in the 1990s: The NDP in Ontario," *CAPP*, No. 17, April 1994.

[133]The same sort of thinking enforced Jockel's conviction that Quebec – no matter what its political status – would continue to operate in terms of defence policies framed in 'Canadian-American' terms. Joel J. Sokolsky, "Ogdensburg Plus Fifty and Still Counting: Canada-U.S. Defense Relations in the Post-Cold War Era", *CAPP*, No. 8, December 1991, 14; Joseph T. Jockel, "If Canada Breaks Up: Implications for U.S. Policy", *CAPP*, No. 7, September 1991, 6.

[134]Thomas R. Waggener, "Forests, Timber, and Trade: Emerging Canadian and U.S. Relations under the Free Trade Agreement," *CAPP*, No. 4, December 1990, 2, 36.

[135]Leslie R. Alm, "Scientists and Environmental Policy: A Canadian-U.S. Perspective," *CAPP*, No. 37, February 1999, 3.

[136]Pauline V. Rosenau, Russell D. Jones, Julie Reagan Watson, and Carl Hacker, "Anticipating the Impact of NAFTA on Health and Health Policy," *CAPP*, No. 21, January 1995, 31.

[137]Donley T. Studler, "The Mouse That Roared? Lesson Drawing on Tobacco Regulation Across the Canada-United States Border," *CAPP*, No. 38, November 1999, 40.

[138]*Ibid.*

[139]Philip G. Clark, "The Moral Economy of Health and Aging in Canada and the United States", *CAPP*, No. 23, November 1995, 34.

[140]Antonia Maioni, "Divergent Pasts, Converging Futures? The

Politics of Health Care Reform in Canada and the United States," *CAPP*, No. 18, August 1994.

[141]Allan Smith, "Canadian Culture, the Canadian State, and the New Continentalism," *CAPP*, No. 3, October 1990.

[142]Ted Magder, "Franchising the Candy Store: Split-Run Magazines and a New International Regime for Trade in Culture," *CAPP*, No. 34, April 1998.

[143]Joel Smith, "Unwarranted Hopes and Unfulfilled Expectations: Canadian Media Policy and the CBC," *CAPP*, No. 39, July 1999, 31.

[144]I am here following Pierson's understanding of a regime as "a set of rules and institutions through which relations between states and their representatives are [stabilized] ... they bring a certain amount of order, predictability and rule-guidedness to international affairs." But it should be noted that regime theory sometimes gives these phenomena a quite "subjectless" character even more in harmony with the 'disappearance' of the state: Kratochwil and Ruggie stress "the structure of international relations...rather than...the role of formal manifest agencies and organizations staffed by visible individuals." Christopher Pierson, *The Modern State* (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), 173; Friedrich Kratochwil and John Gerard Ruggie, "International Organization: A State of the Art or an Art of the State," *International Organization*, 40(21) Autumn 1986, 753-775, 766. See also Oran Young, "International Regimes: Towards a New Theory of Institutions," *World Politics*, 39(1) October 1986, 104-122. The quotation characterizing Kratochwil and Ruggie's work is taken from Pauline Marie Rosenau, *Post-Modernism and the Social Sciences* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 51, n. 7.

[145]Theodore H. Cohn, "The Intersection of Domestic and Foreign Policy in the NAFTA Agricultural Negotiations", *CAPP*, No. 14, September 1993, 46; Theodore H. Cohn, "Emerging Issues in Canada-U.S. Agricultural Trade Under the GATT and FTA," *CAPP*, No. 10, June 1992, 41.

[146]Benjamin Cashore, "Flights of the Phoenix: Explaining the Durability of the Canada-U.S. Softwood Lumber Dispute", *CAPP*, No. 32, December 1997, 4.

[147]Myra J. Tawfik, "The Secret of Transforming Art into Gold: Intellectual Property Issues in Canada-U.S. Relations," *CAPP*, No. 20, December 1994, 26.

[148]Peter B. Doeringer, David G. Terkla, and Audrey Watson, "Regulation, Industry Structure, and the Future of the North Atlantic Fishing Industry," *CAPP*, No. 22, June 1995, 3, 43, 44.

[149]Peter Morici, "Resolving the North American Subsidies War," *CAPP*, No. 27, September 1996, 23.

[150]John E. Carroll, "Transboundary Air Quality Relations", *CAPP*, No. 2, July 1990, 21.

[151]Jockel, "Canada-U.S. Relations in the Bush Era," 12.

[152]Gordon T. Stewart, "Canadian Politics in a Global Economy," *CAPP*, No. 13, June 1993, 17.

[153]Annette Baker Fox, "Observing the Rules: Canada-U.S. Trade and Environmental Relations," P, N *CAPP* No. 31, November 1997, 12, 29.

[154]William Diebold, "Change and Continuity in Canada-U.S. Economic Relations," *CAPP*, No. 5, March 1991, 52.

[155]Theodore H. Cohn, "Cross-Border Travel in North America: The Challenge of U.S. Section 110 Legislation", *CAPP*, No. 40, October 1999, 4.

[156] Stephen Herzenberg, "Calling Maggie's Bluff: The NAFTA Labor Agreement and the Development of an Alternative to Neo-liberalism", *CAPP*, No. 28, December 1996, 7.

[157]Stephen Clarkson, "Fearful Asymmetries: The Challenge of Analyzing Continental Systems in a Globalizing World," *CAPP*, NO. 35, September 1998, 55.

[158] Stephen J. Randall, "A Not So Magnificent Obsession: The United States, Cuba, and Canada from the Revolution to the Helms-Burton Law", *CAPP*, No. 36, November 1998, 23.

[159]Graham Carr, "Trade Liberalization and the Political Economy of Culture: An International Perspective on FTA," *CAPP*, No. 6, June 1991, 5.

[160]Elizabeth Smythe, "Multilateralism or Bilateralism in the Negotiation of Trade-Related Investment Measures?" *CAPP*, No. 24, December 1995, 25.

[161]John Kirton, "A New Global Partnership: Canada-U.S. Relations in the Clinton Era" *CAPP*, No. 15, November 1993, 37.

[162] For an example of the direction in which such investigation might go, see "Les chaînes météo nord-américaines veulent profiter de l'embellie Internet," *Le Monde*, 24 avril 1999.

[163]A summary of the case for this can be found in Herbert Grubel, "The U.S. Dollar Makes Sense for Us", *Globe and Mail*, January 28, 2000.

[164]Pierre Fortin, *The Canadian Standard of Living: Is There a Way Up? C.P. Howe Institute Benefactors Lecture, 1999* (Montreal: C.D. Howe Institute, 1999).

[165]Shawn McCarthy, "Productivity Grows But Lags U.S.", *Globe and Mail*, May 2, 2000.

[166]Some commentators viewed insistence on the 'national' dimension in American relations with the world as entirely defensible and to be encouraged: see, for example, Condoleeza Rice, "Promoting the National Interest," *Foreign Affairs*, 79(1), January – February 2000, 45-62. Others wanted to expose what they saw as a serious disjunction between 'global' posturing and 'national' practice: "Clinton," as Stephen M. Walt put it, "may cloak U.S. policy in the rhetoric of 'world' order and general global interests, but its defining essence remains the unilateral exercise of sovereign power." "Two Cheers for Clinton's Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, 79(2), March – April, 2000, 63-79, 78, and on the same general point, Edward C. Luck, *Mixed Messages: American Politics and International Organization, 1919 – 1992* (New York: The Century Foundation, 1999); Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno, eds., *Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies After the Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999); and Robert Gilpin, *The Challenge of Global Capitalism: The World Economy in the 21st Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000). For a look at the Canadian-American relationship as seen through this lens, consult Kim Richard Nossal, "Without Regard to the Interests of Others': Canada and American Unilateralism in the

Post-Cold War Era," *American Review of Canadian Studies,* 27(2), Summer 1997, 179-197, and Robert A. Pastor and Rafael Fernandez de Castro, eds., *The Controversial Pivot: The U.S. Congress and North America* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1998). Pastor and Castro set out to show that the U.S. Congress has been instrumental in moving the three North American nations "from a relationship of paternalism to one of partnership."(2) Their volume in fact depicts that institution as an impediment to closer and more positive relations, unless those relations could be shown to be in the U.S. national interest. Given the priority of that interest, "Congress", as they themselves say, "is not ready to manage a complex North American integration process." (22).

[167]Samuel V. LaSelva, *The Moral Foundations of Canadian Federalism* (Montreal: McGill- Queen's University Press, 1996); Gerald Friesen, *Citizens and Nation: An Essay on History, Communication, and Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000); Gordon Laxer, "Surviving the Americanizing New Right," *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology,* 37(1), February 2000, 55-75.

[168]Robert E. Babe, "Convergence and the New Technologies", in Michael Dorland, ed., *The Cultural Industries in Canada* (Toronto: James Lorimer and Company, 1996), 283-307; Leslie Regan Shade, "Roughing it in the Electronic Bush: Community Networking in Canada," *Canadian Journal of Communications,* 24(2), Spring 1999, 179-198; Brian Lewis, Richard Smith, and Christine Massey, "Mirroring the Networked Society: Government Policy, Higher Education, and Telelearning Technology in Canada," *ibid,* 24(3), Summer 1999, 319-345.

[169]Scott Carson, "Emberley on Hot Button Politics in Canadian Universities: A Review Essay," *Canadian Journal of Higher Education,* 29(2-3), 1999, 175-1999; Virginia Galt, "Canadians Pursuing Higher Education in Record Numbers," *Globe and Mail,* February 22, 2000; Hilary Thompson, "Federal Budget Bolsters Funding for Universities," *UBC Reports,* March 9, 2000.

[170]*Canada and the United States,* 305.

[171]John F. Helliwell, *How Much Do National Borders Matter?* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1998). See also John McCallum, "National

Borders Matter: Canada-U.S. Regional Trade Patterns," *American Economic Review*, 85(2), June 1995, 615-623; John F. Helliwell and John McCallum, "National Borders Still Matter for Trade Policy," *Policy Options/Options Politiques*, 16, July-August 1995, 44-48; John F. Helliwell, "Do National Borders Matter for Quebec's Trade?" *Canadian Journal of Economics*, 29(3), August 1996, 507-522; and Charles Engel and J.H. Rogers, "How Wide is the Border?" *American Economic Review*, 86(4), December 1996, 1112-1125.

[172]G. Bruce Doern and Mark R. MacDonald, *Free Trade Federalism: Negotiating the Canadian Agreement on Internal Trade* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999).

[173]William Watson, *Globalization and the Meaning of Canadian Life* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998), x.

[174]John Sloan Dickey, "The Relationship in Rhetoric and Reality: Merchant-Heeney Revisited," *International Journal*, 27(2), Spring 1972, 172-184, 183. For a comprehensive examination of the epistemological situation created by the lack of 'final', 'absolute' congruence between ideas and the realities they purport to represent, see Paul Feyerabend, *Conquest of Abundance: A Tale of Abstraction versus the Richness of Being* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000).

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