BOUNDARIES AND CORRIDORS: RETHINKING THE CANADA-UNITED STATES BORDER-LANDS IN THE POST-9/11

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AND
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I. INTRODUCTION

After September 11, 2001, the boundary between Canada and the United States became more apparent. The boundary line itself did not change, but crossing the border became more protracted, less civil and generally more complex. This development reflected the fact that September 11 both accelerated developing techno-based management strategies, and redirected existing border security programs. Cross-border movements, including trade, human migration and information flow, continued and grew, yet the focus shifted. On the border with Mexico, the shift was from stopping drugs, contraband and illegal immigrants to insuring national security. The U.S. was now at war with terrorism. On the United States border with Canada, the shift to national security implied a greater change for Canada than Mexico because the United States and Canada had evolved a relaxed border crossing relationship on the "world's longest unde-

fended border." Cross-border regionalism contributed to the evolution of the effective and benign exchange between boundary cooperation and identity helped to sustain cross-border movement after 9/11. The nature of the Canada-U.S. boundary, and the functions of the cross-border regions, appear to have been transformed during this crisis. This apparent transformation is explored in this paper.

Cross-border regionalism is shared perception and use of an area, often with similar landscape characteristics, which result in mutual benefit and cooperation across the geographical regions that emerge from a sustained process of cross-border regional interaction. In our view, economic, social and cultural components of cross-border regions prevail when cross-border regionalism is strong. However, we do acknowledge the indelible political borderline, its constant presence, and its propensity to re-emerge with tremendous speed and vigor, periodically, and in response to external threat and internal political pressure.

Cross-border regionalism is by its very nature both an ameliorative and a divisive process, for it brings together distinct nations and divides common interests. Add to these forces the impact of

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external events, and the erosive and depositional effects of time, and the cross-border region evident today may show only a resemblance to the borderlands apparent in previous decades. In this paper we explore how cross-border regions operate between Canada and the United States, and how their functions have changed in recent years.[1]

In the post 9/11 period two apparently opposing yet fundamentally integrated forces are emphasized. One is the entrenchment of the boundary. In a sense, the wall between the United States and Canada became higher and less permeable when homeland security became a major issue in the United States. Yet, as the border was reinforced, corridors of commodity flow and interaction were expedited. Technological improvements, gateway acceleration, crossing-point staff enhancement and other enabling measures developed rapidly within cross-border regional contexts. Specific cross-border regional approaches to interaction across the boundary were fundamental to re-articulating and expediting Canada-U.S. trade and migration.

Our road map to understanding cross-border regionalism in the post-9/11 era begins by situating the borderlands in the NAFTA-September 11 transition. NAFTA focused the vaguely defined borderland communities and regions between the United States and Canada. Under NAFTA, cross-border regions became distinct corridors and places of articulation between the national economies. Section II of the paper explores this notion along the extensive boundary, and evaluates the NAFTA effects of transportation, trade and regulation on border crossing and borderlands function. After 9/11, the United States' focus on homeland security has recast these cross-border regions as sub-national theatres of security implementation. Section III offers a snapshot of the state of the borderlands in the post-9/11 era. In section IV, we evaluate how boundaries and corridors have been re-visioned by Canadians and Americans, ostensibly under NAFTA, and then emphatically after the 9/11 events. The apparent juxtaposition of security and trade, heightened by 9/11, moved rapidly from a dialectic to a merged, broader understanding about secure trade. The juggernaut of NAFTA could not be halted long at the border. The 9/11 events sharpened, emphasized and accelerated a process previously caught up in the massive re-articulation of the Canada-U.S. borderland relationship. After 9/11 the discourses that situated borders within a popular and political framework emerged on both sides of the boundary. This underscored

9/11's significance as a critical signpost on the road map to a new borderlands relationship.

Also, as we discuss in Section V, the new discourse on nationalism and transnationalism externalized the threat, and the new Smart Border was designed to function as a trade conduit, and most visibly to enhance the "security perimeter" around "fortress America." This discourse found proponents among Canadians as well as Americans, and it triggered flights of neo-nationalism on both sides of the border. There are, however, geographical specificities attached to the debate about borders depending upon where it takes place. Section VI differentiates categories of borderlands. Some cross-border regions serve as "goods first" borderlands, where trade and security concerns impact aspects of function and landscape, and influence the role of the borderland community. From these primary corridors, cross-border regions grade to those borderlands aligned with moderate cross-border activity, and, finally, to marginalized and hinterland areas astride the border. Essentially, we see a continuum from taking care of business in the corridors of the Great Lakes and in the Pacific Northwest, to the sustained expression of tradition, culture and community in the less populated border regions.

In the final substantive section of the paper, we address the three levels of international engagement that define the border relationship and lead to sustainable cross-border regionalism. First is the level of the immediate physical relationship at the border. Building capacity in the community and infrastructure follows these initial binational policies and practices. The third level concerns the relationship with the broader international community, first as the new Canada-U.S. borderland interaction is now embedded within the wider transcontinental economy, and then as it is situated within the global economy. Are these alignments a necessary condition for sustainable cross-border regionalism? Further, will a reinvented border with its inherent sustainable cross-border regionalism enhance participation and success for Canada and the United States in the continental and global economies? These wider questions, and more specific issues related to the characterization of Canada-U.S. cross-border regions emerge from this research. We believe the work discussed in the following sections clarifies the evolution, indeed the reinvention, of our borderlands, evaluates how they operate, establishes that they are subtle yet effective transnational constructs, and defines their place in emerging globalism.

Understanding the cross-border region requires knowledge of its components, and how these components work together to define the region and sustain it over time. Corridors, boundary structures, linkage points to national networks, intra-regional complementarities, and shared visions of place are among the most important elements in realizing cross-border regional integrity and viability between Canada and the United States. This paper evaluates these and other components of several cross-border regions of international and intra-national forces.

II. SITUATING THE CANADA-US BORDERLANDS IN THE NAFTA-SEPTEMBER 11 TRANSITION

The impact of September 11, 2001 upon the Canada-U.S. border cannot be understood without reference to the dynamic cross-border relationship which had evolved under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), well before the tragedy. If much earlier in the century it was possible to cross the Canada-U.S. land border with little appreciable effort in some regions, by the end of the 20th century, the Canada-U.S. border had become more than a vaguely

Figure 1: Location of Canada-United States Border Crossings



defined series of borderland communities. It was increasingly functioning as a set of corridors and places of articulation for peoples and goods between the national economies (Figure 1). Trade between Canada and the U.S. had increased by approximately 152% since NAFTA was signed (Figure 2), accelerating as the continental economy deepened. The need for efficient cross-border interaction grew proportionately, with a 122.5% increase in traffic over a period of approximately a decade and a half. The 1990s saw borderlands function increasingly as places where Canada and U.S. joined–rather than divided–at very specific points, while the nature of the Canada-U.S. relationship was increasingly intermediated by more and more "focused" or perhaps even "economically specialized" borders.

The importance of land borders to the development of a continental economy was reflected not only in the overall size of the cross-border trade relationship, but also by the degree to which trade was carried in trucks through specific borderlands. There were, in the 1990s, approximately 130 border crossings between Canada and the United States, over which goods, vehicles and people traveled, although their overall importance in facilitating cross-border trade, as indicated by the volume of truck traffic, varied. Most cross-border commercial traffic was recorded in Ontario throughout the 1990s, a situation that prevails today.[2]

Figure 2: Daily Truck Traffic, Canada - US Border, 1986-2001

(Source: Transport Canada. http://people.hofstra.edu/geotrans/eng/ch2en/appl2en/tranbordrev.html)



Indeed, 52% of trade with the U.S. is trucked through four Ontario border points: Queenston, Fort Erie, Sarnia, and Windsor. Windsor crossings are responsible for over 25% of all cross-border

daily truck movements in Canada.[3] These "goods first" oriented crossings, which even in the 1990s were the subject of an expanding infrastructure and increasingly efficient vehicular monitoring processes, reflect to the greatest extent the impact of NAFTA upon the transnational experience.

On the other hand, there are borderlands seemingly little affected by the impact of NAFTA. At many small and rural crossings in the western, northern, central and eastern interior of the continent, a sense emerged that the growing trade had little impact upon expediting the crossing process, or in orienting the physical organization of borderlands and border crossing points. Indeed, this selective process's end result was that the growing volume of trade

Fig. 3 Major U.S. Transportation Corridors Leading to Canadian Border Crossings



in the late 20th century served to refocus cross-border trade and borderland operations and heap them upon ten major transportation corridors linking coastal and continental United States with corresponding crossings in Canada (Figure 3). These joined the U.S.-Canada economies at strategic points, and volumes of trade and truck traffic increasingly defined "strategic." Of the ten "high priority" corridors identified for special development by the U.S. Government in 1996, five link with Ontario border crossing–most via the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence borderland primarily via the

eastern and western borderlands of Lakes Ontario and Erie.[4] Most of the remaining major cross-border transportation corridors are in British Columbia–primarily those linking Western Canada and the U.S. at the Pacific Crossing between Blaine, WA and Douglas, BC. Indeed, the Pacific Highway crossing, linking Blaine with Douglas, handles about as much daily commercial truck traffic as Queenston, Ontario.[5]

If we visualize the pre-NAFTA borderlands between Canada and the United States as regional concentrations of cross-border interaction and activity along the boundary between the two countries, we can identify concentrations along the Pacific coast, in the western interior, in the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence lowlands, and

Figure 4: A Conceptual Model of Changing Canada-United States borderlands



finally on the Atlantic coast. (Figure 4) Although these concentrations varied in the intensity of economic exchange and the kinds of cross-border interactions before NAFTA, and the border crossings varied in traffic load, the border points exhibited similar features reflecting the nation state on either side of the border. In the 1980s, the United States Government even exhibited consistent graphics,

originated by popular artist Peter Max, at its border stations across the country.

In the post 9/11 and NAFTA era, the conceptual model has changed. The border crossings vary more considerably in size, complexity and relative importance. A hierarchy of border crossing places is evident. These places may be grouped according to magnitude of cross-border flow, integration of transportation modes, infrastructure development, and impact on the configuration of the surrounding borderlands. (Figure 5) A continuum appears in evidence from the three major corridor complexes dominating the flow at groupings of strategic locations in Southern Michigan/ Southwestern Ontario, the Niagara Frontier and the Pacific Highway, to

Figure 5: The Canada-United States Borderland Continuum



the growing number of marginalized crossings, some part-time, seasonal or non-staffed. Also more marginalized are the smaller road crossings in less populated cross-border regions along the Alaska-Yukon/BC, western interior, upper Great Lakes, and northeastern boundaries. Cross-border activities in these regions are more localized, with economic activities often limited to regional commerce and primary industry trade. A secondary set of corridors, is, however, growing as well at strategic regional crossing points, often linking U.S. interstate highways with major Canadian highways and rail links. These corridors are relatively evenly distributed across the continent. Combined with the three corridor complexes, these sec-

ondary corridors are emerging as the new era portals between the United States and Canada.

The patterns of corridor enhancement and increasing specialization in cross-border trade are not accidental, but are related in large measure to change in the structure and location of the automobile industry. An integrated manufacturing economy based largely on the automotive industry has appeared. Indeed, "for the private sector, the border is essentially in the middle of the production line, representing a significant transactional factor for just-in-time delivery systems."[6] Pressure from a transnational economy gave borders a new currency, as points of articulation in an economic system, rather than the divisive edges of one sovereign state and another. For example, even before the Twin Towers fell, in both 2000 and 2001, both Canadian and U.S. governments set aside $665 million in funding for border infrastructure under the Border Infrastructure Fund (BIF) and the Strategic Highway Infrastructure Program (SHIP).[7] This new attention to infrastructure was accompanied by significant changes to border management to facilitate cross-border traffic, mainly in the form of technological innovations to ensure speedy movement of the increased truck and vehicular traffic. The bulk of these expediting efforts remained focused on the busiest border crossings in Ontario and in the burgeoning Pacific coast area. NEXUS, FAST and a host of other experimental programs were initiated to test pre-authorized, high frequency border crossings, while attention to new infrastructure and dedicated lanes was part of a plan encouraged by federal authorities who observed, approvingly, that "State, provincial and municipal authorities are forming North-South corridor regions to improve trade, market tourism, and promote foreign investment and exchange best practices."[8]

Thus, two very important features of the new function and definition of North American borders had taken their cue from the West Coast and Central Canada experience in terms of not only the need for better management approaches to facilitate an increasingly "goods first" approach to cross-border flows, but also in the desire for policy to address the issue of infrastructure and increased traffic in a comprehensive way. They set the stage effectively for cross-border regionalism, and these forces continue to shape it after 9/11.

Since September 11, of course, borders have seen a dramatic reorientation of methods and means of scrutiny. Yet the critical groundwork was laid in the late 20th century, particularly in the

1990s, with efforts to build a cross-border dialogue with the United States, and to effectively reinvent the Canada-U.S. borderlands as trade corridors. One of the most significant instruments to develop with respect to the latter was the Joint Border Agreement: The Canada-U.S. Accord on Our Shared Border.[9] The Shared-Border process, initiated in 1995, ostensibly because of the increasing importance of cross-border trade and traffic, was announced with much fanfare. Ottawa declared that Canada and the U.S. had developed a program whose mandate was "to develop a vision for the border that develops and preserves its open character, while protecting our communities." But the selection of "community" was an interesting choice, since involved in this initiative were numerous, different agencies: the U.S. INS, Canada Immigration and Customs, the U.S. Customs Service, Canada's Customs and Revenue Agency, the U.S. State Department and Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. Each of these state agencies was to identify areas in which enhanced cooperation and efficacy would expedite cross-border flows, mindful of the need for security. In fact, there was little evidence of community at all in the processes. Rather, these processes suggested that the role of the binational borderlands communities, cross-border settlements and neighborhoods that had shaped the nature of the cross-border relationship prior to September 11, was to give way to a new era in border control. Perhaps this was a portent of things to come.

A new and dialectical border discourse emerged at this juncture. It was based upon the idea that two goals that appeared to be diametrically opposed–trade and security–could be combined into one. This new border dialectic was an important justification for the Shared Border Agreement. It set the stage for a new way of thinking about the structure and mechanics of bilateralism. The Shared Border discourse was rapidly fortified by the Canada-U.S. Partnership (CUSP), was set in place in 1999, and then was enhanced by the U.S. INS-CIC Border Vision and Cross-Border Crime Forum, shortly before September 11.[10] This was an agenda for the 21st century, outlining a vision which streamlined and harmonized border policies and management.

The CUSP and INS-CIC program was, in many respects, a continuation of the Shared Border Accord, in that its intention was to maintain a process of cross-border consultation and to facilitate an expanding cross border trade. It was also, in many respects, a model

for the Smart Border Accord to follow, in December 2001.[11] Central to the CUSP was the prospect of establishing a binational consultation process, with governments, agencies and private sector groups (stakeholders in the cross-border businesses), to establish "best practices in border management." Some best practices included the Pre-arrival Processing System and Customs Self-Assessment Program for cargo, NEXUS identification cards for passengers, the Remote Video Inspection System-Remote Ports Program for non-staffed ports, and the Integrated Border Enforcement Team.[12] Significantly, these initiatives were not rooted in the context of community, but government agency, often integrating various departments and levels of government institutions. In areas such as Cascadia in the Pacific Northwest, where binational cooperation has traditionally been cultivated at the level of cross-border regional and municipal governments and NGOs, this represented a dramatic change.

Another dramatic change was apparent in the fact that the CUSP agreement specifically identified the requirement for "risk management" approaches to facilitate trade while maintaining security.[13] It advocated using high tech border processes, policies and procedures to facilitate the flow of goods and peoples. Risk management strategies refocused borders upon their function as conduits of economic exchange. They promoted efficient "goods first" security strategies, rather than alternatives such as furthering binational capacity for cross-border community, cultural exchanges or environmental cooperation. The Commercial Vehicle Processing Center (CVPC) initiative, for example, was a part of this new "risk management" regime. It was first developed in 1999, encouraging cooperation in "Contraband Detection Terminology" as an integral part of this process–including the use of chemical and x-ray system projects. Vapor detection systems for cocaine, potassium 40 prototype systems for bulk marijuana, pallet X-ray systems, canine detection and other narcotics controls were also planned under the umbrella of the CVPC initiative.

Other new or continuing risk management initiatives included enhanced passenger processing systems like CANPASS, PORTPASS and NEXUS, all working on the idea of border-crossing pilot project which required license plate readers and identity cards. In some areas, such as the Pacific Coast, these or similar programs had been in place as early as 1997. Also important under the CUSP and Shared Border initiatives were efforts to improve in-transit highway checks

or to create simplification of the border-crossing process–in some cases moving the inspection process away from the border itself–while stepping up attempts to streamline commercial traffic checkpoints.

If the impetus and justification for these initiatives appeared to be "strategic", promoting economic co-operation and reducing risk to national economic security, NAFTA became the flash point for consensus, motivating cooperation for economic integration at the continental level. The latter was not only critical, but increasingly recognized as such given that the Canada-U.S. trade relationship had become the largest in the world by the late 1990s. In terms of the bigger picture, then, the CUSP and Shared Border agreements were significant because they acknowledged and formalized two new organizational relationships at the Canada-U.S. border. One, as we have seen, was the importance of risk management and risk management technologies, many of which provided the basis for practices and policies currently in use at specific border posts. The other important outcome recognized the burgeoning globalization in which the two-way Canada-U.S. trade relationship was embedded. Even the CUSP report openly acknowledged as much: on one hand it argued that "risk management" would be an "effective way to expedite low-risk travelers and goods while focusing limited resources on those more apt to pose problems." For example, programs utilizing smart-card technologies or alternative accounting methods could have significant positive impact. "Intelligent Transportation Systems" offer potential for more efficient use of cross-border transportation networks.[14]

On the other hand, the CUSP report noted that "we must be vigilant and cooperate closely to prevent these groups from taking advantage of this openness and playing on the differences between our policies and procedures to move arms, drugs and people to and through our two countries. Improvements in strategic controls away from the border, and cooperation in alleviating the sources of global threats including off our shores, could remove much of this advantage and decrease pressures on our internal border."[15]

In summary, cross-border technologies deployed under the NAFTA to the eve of September 11 were designed to facilitate greater economic interaction, while maintaining security and protecting against all aspects of cross-border crime. This fact indicated not a decreasing concern with tracking and facilitating cross-border flows,

as the volume of trade grew under the framework of NAFTA integration, but rather an *increasing* concern, making the very idea of "open borders" an oxymoron. Developments in the structure and function of borderlands, as well as in bordering policies and programs, reflected the need to deploy "high tech" and address the danger of international transportation "gridlock", while controlling for security threats. As such, a new dialectical function for the border emerged: it had to be both open and closed simultaneously. Indeed, somewhat prophetically, given the events of the following year, the CUSP Forum announced in December 2000: "Global integration and competition are pushing us toward a seamless border. Yet at the same time, open borders and modern transportation systems provide transnational organized crime organizations reliable and affordable means for conducting illicit activities worldwide." The latter was to become the overwhelming challenge for North American borders in the post-September 11 period.

So accompanying a general effect in transportation infrastructure and trade orientation has been the shifting of regulatory functions, practices and programs to specific borderlands, and the increasing structural and functional specialization of specific crossing points. Indeed, Jason Ackleson suggested, well before the 9/11 tragedy, that "policy changes vary in degree on both northern and southern borders, but range from using high-tech surveillance systems borrowed from the military, to posting more guards, to actually constructing physical barriers. This 'rebordering' or 'reterritorialization' contrasts markedly with concurrent moves to increase economic growth and interdependence by freeing capital and trade under the North American Free Trade Agreement, and with long patterns of transnational socio-cultural interaction and interdependence that have characterized the borderlands, the wide swath of land which transcends the political boundary and bears unique characteristics."[16] In recent years this has meant that the most active border regions, in terms of cross-border traffic and trade, have become increasingly important to the process of regulation of trade and immigration, and to the monitoring of cross-border security. This development is significant to the post-September 11 period, because it set the stage for the way in which both Canada and the U.S. responded to the tragedy at the border. It conditioned their choice of rhetoric, border check protocols, binational agreement and policing, and monitoring technologies. What was to differ, as we shall see in

the following section, was not the fact that borders were "open" and then "closed", but rather the way in which certain, if not all, cross-border regions have become sub-national theatres of homeland security implementation as well as conduits for deepening the transnational economy. The former concern, only a sidebar in the pre-September 11 era, is now the main event to which trade concerns must adapt effectively.

III. THE STATE OF THE BORDERLANDS IN THE POST-9/11 ERA

Cross-border regions between the United States and Canada remain geographically distinct, defined by their traditional alignments north and south astride the boundary running from east to west. Since 9/11 and the U.S. focus on homeland security, these cross-border regions have become sub-national theatres of homeland security implementation, where national agendas have been articulated according to regional traditions of cross-border interaction.

In the Atlantic Provinces and New England cross-border region, the "lock down" after 9/11 was swift as border agencies reacted to the possibility that terrorists had entered the U.S. through relatively quiet crossings between Maine and New Brunswick. This cross-border region, however, retains strong traditions of north-south mobility, extended family linkages across the boundary, cooperative arrangements, and a shared identity. Adjustments to the new security arrangements at the crossing developed rapidly on both sides of the border. Because air traffic across the border in this region remains limited, the new air security measures did not have as great an effect here as in the heartland regions of the St. Lawrence and Great Lakes immediately to the west. In the heartland the full impact of lock down and subsequent heightened security measures was seen in trade disruption, air passenger declines, unprecedented border-crossing line-ups, and redistribution of freight traffic. These impacts remain evident here and in the regions to the west where trade and passenger traffic is also funneled through corridors comprised of parallel surface and air routes across the border. Post 9/11 changes were less apparent only along the Alaska-Canada boundary, where crossing points are small, limited in trade and traffic capacity, and far removed from major cross-border flows.

All of the cross-border regions experienced the impact of the heightened security measures, albeit in varying degrees, often directly proportional to the amount of traffic crossing the border. The greater the cross-border flow, the greater was the strain experienced by travelers and business concerns. Wait times, line-ups, personal inconvenience, and enhanced official scrutiny all added up to financial cost and anxiety about crossing the border. Everyone has a 9/11 story, and many Canadians have 9/11 border crossing stories. Mine found me (Victor Konrad) in Washington, DC on the morning of September 11. The capital was in a state of emergency, everyone evacuating, planes grounded. Fortunately, I had rented a car at National Airport when I arrived early that morning. After the traffic subsided, I was able to drive back to Ottawa. Almost two hours of the ten hours en route were spent in line at the Ivy Lea crossing.

There, I witnessed first hand the impact of the border lock down as I attempted to leave the United States and re-enter Canada. I was fortunate. Crossings at major ports of entry like the Ambassador Bridge between Detroit and Windsor required considerably more time on 9/11 and shortly thereafter. Today, the delays continue. Even three years after 9/11, the lines and the scrutiny were still apparent. A recent crossing at Ivy Lea found us waiting almost two hours for processing a routine customs declaration as we entered the United States. This gave me time to survey the new security landscape of the border crossing. In addition to the enhanced screening procedures by customs and immigration personnel, the crossing bristled with security equipment and weaponry. Around the perimeter, pre-fabricated brokerage buildings attested to the heightened complexity of moving goods across the border.

The strain of border crossing has been reinforced by additional threats. Several epidemics impacting humans directly and indirectly have heightened health security measures between the United States and Canada. The SARS outbreak in Asia quickly spread to North America, and particularly to Toronto and Vancouver. Mad Cow disease traced to Alberta devastated the beef cattle industry throughout Canada, and immediately halted exports to the United States. A recent occurrence of Avian Influenza identified in British Columbia has had similar impact on the cross border trade in poultry. Germs as well as terrorism have heightened border security.

The state of the borderlands in the post-9/11 era is not chaotic or tense in spite of the constant challenges to security during the past

three years. Americans living in the cross-border regions, and particularly Canadians, most of whom reside in these areas, have adjusted to the new security arrangements. Allowances have been made for border-crossing procedures. Once viewed as formalities, border-crossing requirements are increasingly viewed a necessary steps of vigilance and the costs of doing business. The cross-border regions of Canada and the United States have become operational border regions.

IV. RE-VISIONING BOUNDARIES AND CORRIDORS

We have seen that although the events of September 11, 2001, have led very rapidly to a new perspective on the boundary between the United States and Canada, there is a degree of continuity in the process, not only in the sense of how Canadian and Americans perceive the border, but in terms of border practices and policies already instigated prior to 9/11. In the late 1990s, Ackleson suggested that a close examination of the US-Canadian borderlands "uncovers anything but completely differentiated spatial identities. Instead, a rich and vibrant historical mosaic of cultural, social, and economic interaction transcends this arbitrary political boundary. Moreover, growing transnational flows and contacts (among migrants and others) under NAFTA are prompting such increased integration. They potentially contest the collective identities within the greater North American political 'space'."[17] This was to change after September 11 in many ways.

Canadians and American have differed in their views of their common border. Canadians have perceived the border as a permeable extension of the special and reciprocal relationship between the countries. After 9/11 the American perspective changed. The U.S. Government chose to place spikes on the good fence between neighbors. These national differences led to the polarization of thinking about borders and the development of specific national constituencies: security concerns came from the United States, trade concerns came from Canada. Canadians initially saw the heightened security measures as an affront, but indignation soon turned to practical measures to help expedite security, enhance the flow of people and goods, and re-establish the positive cross-border relationship.

Indeed, the immediate challenge for policy-makers in the post 9/11 period was to merge the two viewpoints into a broader understanding about secure trade. From a Canadian perspective this was

necessary because, between 2001 and 2002, Canadian-based "for hire" trucking firms carried nearly 8 million shipments across the border, for a total of C$7.3 billion in revenue. This was an increase of approximately 7% from the previous year.[18] Growth continued in 2002, but at a slower rate. It fell slightly in the following year.[19] Obviously the shutdown shock of September 11 was to be replaced by a bigger problem–the problem of more vehicular traffic undergoing increasingly onerous border checks. These became more time consuming and complex, and increasingly, targeted towards high-volume land border posts, where 66% of the two-way trade between Canada and the U.S. was carried by trucks.[20] Nonetheless, it was clear given the significance of September 11 upon American security consciousness that these problems were to remain in place for the long run.

So even after September 11, even after borders had reopened for business, delays in commercial crossings were increasingly common. In 2003, for example, over 60% of cross-border commercial traffic experienced delays from one to eight hours. Most delays were one to two hours.[21] Clearly the increase in border crossings as a result of a growing continental trade was one reason for the delays, but attempts to monitor traffic more closely also took their toll. Under the burden of increasing scrutiny for security purposes, the problem of increasing traffic and border delays, already apparent in the 1990s, intensified. The result has been staggering: in 2004 alone, the Ontario Government estimated the cost of these delays as approximately C$13.6 billion binationally, from all border crossings–or C$8.34 billion to Canadians alone.[22] If they had not noticed before, the sheer costs involved in increasing border scrutiny have forced Canadian and American authorities to pay attention. The result has been new measures to expedite, control and manage the flow of people and goods, some promoting greater divisions, other facilitating closer interaction between the two nations. To some this represents greater coordination and harmonization, while for others it suggests "tokenism" in the sense that Canada-U.S. trade flows continue to develop without substantial challenge to the concept that economic borders should be porous. Thus the concept of "harmonization" is itself left open to interpretation.

For example, in the U.S. in response to the problem of delays, intensification of border security has been met with a tripling of border guards along the Canada-U.S. border (where only a few

hundred served before, over 1,000 border guards are now deployed)[23], in conjunction with the development of new enabling technologies and dedicated infrastructure to facilitate pre-cleared traffic. The result in the United States has been the development of what might be termed a more militaristic border. Certainly, the Border Guard has adopted a more militant stance. In promoting border security, Customs and Border Protection have identified themselves more closely with militaristic imagery. One need only peruse "news events" or "photographs" under the Customs and Border Control website to appreciate this point, or to contrast archival photographs, such as those at the Wellesley Island crossing post in New York State, with contemporary border post images online. The iconography and infrastructure of state are much more highly visible in the latter period, both in defining individual posts and in defining the Customs and Border control agency more generally, or to new "noteworthy practices" discussed below. These include "electronic signage" initiatives or camcorder broadcasts of cross-border choke points on both sides of the border.

In Canada, similar adjustments have been made, both on land and in ports and airports. Borders are well demarcated, the symbols of state prominently displayed, and with conspicuous surveillance and policing personnel and devices. Yet, increasingly, it is clear that while the regulatory procedures at the border demand more onerous accountability for cargo and immigration, they are not necessarily matched by expediting technologies, despite the best intentions of binational agreements. The problem of sheer increase in volume of flows compounds the issue. Prior to September 11, concerns rested more with expedition of ever-larger traffic flows than with increasing the monitoring of the flows. Post 9/11, even with potentially fast-tracking technologies, the problem is not just moving traffic but moving it under heightened regulatory control. And, as always, each year the volume under control is growing at an unprecedented rate.

This means that although trade has ostensibly held steady or grown, the conditions under which cross-border trade occurs have become increasingly burdensome. As under the NAFTA, the result of this conundrum in the post-September 11 era–more, but slower–has touched off a series of new initiatives designed to heighten security in a conventional sense, yet promote expedited trade. Again, the process is not unlike that at the end of the 20th century, when the Shared Border, CUSP and cross-border crime initiatives turned to

enhanced technologies. New technologies, or what the Border Guard has called "noteworthy practices" (see Table 1), include the Pre-Arrival Processing System (PAPS), the International Mobility, Trade Corridor Project (IMTC), FAST and NEXUS–the latter involving single time pre-clearance or security authorizations for multiple border crossings. Most of these systems or practices require the use of barcode, biometric and other types of "high tech" application. Indeed, there are close to 30 new high tech and pre-authorization initiatives in effect at the US and Canada border in recent years (see Table 1).

Enhanced policing and border patrol initiatives have also gained greater attention in the post-September 11 era. "Security" may be considered as a "lock" mechanism in terms of its function on border permeability. But the building of Canada-U.S. border policing mechanisms falls under the second level of transborder adjustments to 9/11–the cultivation of binational context for cooperation–with its capacity building in terms of community as well as the creation of infrastructure. Governments in Canada and the United States have allocated funds for specific projects designed to build the effectiveness of internal border policing. In 2003, for example, the U.S. allocated a 29% increase in the INS budget, along with a 36% increase to the Customs Service and a significant increase to the Coast Guard.[24] Similarly, Canada has recently committed funding to a host of new national programs designed to heighten security. These include $137 million for enhancing security capabilities, just over $99 million for fully implementing the RCMP Real Time Identification Project and improving the national fingerprint system, and approximately $10 million for the Passport Security Strategy, including facial recognition biometric technology on the Canadian passport, in line with international standards.[25]

In addition, Canada has taken initiatives to build internal capacity. These include projects such as the creation of the Integrated Threat Assessment Centre and government Operations Centre, which are designed to make the sharing and dissemination of threat information more efficient and coordinated; the creation of Health Emergency Response Teams made up of health professionals, to strengthen national ability to respond to health emergencies; and the convening of a high-level national Cyber-security Task Force to develop a National Cyber-Security Strategy.[26] One of the newest rounds of capacity building includes a May 2004 agreement between the Cana-

dian and U.S. Governments and partner agencies to spend C$323 million to build more infrastructure along the border at specific Ontario border crossings. Ottawa announced that "the governments of Canada and Ontario, together with the Niagara Falls Bridge Commission confirmed a joint funding agreement of $281 million for improvements to highways and border-crossing infrastructure in the Sarnia, Niagara and London areas. This joint funding will support capacity upgrades to the Queen Elizabeth Way and Highways 401, 402 and 405 in Southern Ontario, as well as to the Queenston-Lewiston Bridge."[27]

On another level, however, are the post-September 11 bilateral agreements designed to reorganize the relationship between Canada and the U.S. at the border. For example, in December 2001, following discussions with American decision-makers over border security and responding to the newly identified "risk" posed by Canada-U.S. borders, Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, John Manley, told Canadians that they were entering an era of "smart borders" with Americans: "Since signing the Smart Border Declaration, Canada and the United States have proven that tremendous progress can be made through close cooperation and a commitment to an effective philosophy of risk management." The Smart Border laid out specific types of technological interventions that were to guide the cross-border relationship in the future. It outlined a thirty-point "Action Plan", based on four pillars, which provided for on-going collaboration in identifying and addressing "security risks" while "efficiently expediting" the "legitimate flow of people and goods" across the Canada-U.S. border. Canada and the U.S. signed the border agreement amidst fanfare that a new era in security had begun.[28]

But had it? As we have seen, the new security agenda in the post 9/11 era was already constrained by patterns and expectations in levels of cross-border activity determined under the NAFTA. North America, at least at the Canadian and American interface, was not a "borderless North America" regardless of popular media misconceptions. To a large extent Smart Borders had already been implemented. The discourse of security had changed since September 11, assuming a more aggressive presence in the public arena. But in actual fact the basic proposition, if not many of the locking mechanisms of bordering under conditions of a new economic and security climate, was already in place, and had been for at least half a decade.

Smart Borders was a product of the NAFTA as much as it was September 11. To facilitate cross-border trade and environmental cooperation, the two countries had foreseen the need to deploy "high tech" on the border, to address a growing international regulatory and transportation "gridlock" with important consequences for trade and commerce while controlling for security threats. The "leaky" Canadian border, which served as a convenient metaphor to whip up a heightened sense of urgency, when "globalization" and "security" became polar opposites, was not really so leaky after all. It was, and had been for some time, more strategically porous than devastatingly vulnerable. Indeed, the metaphor of vulnerability, and the urgency of efforts to "circle the wagons" or "prevent the dam from bursting at the seams", were based more on fiction than fact. Prior to September 11, 2001, Ackleson observed just this trend, and linked it to a more comprehensive trend situated within the process of globalization itself. He noted:

> American border policy in the 1990s and at the beginning of the twenty-first century increasingly favors tightened or 'hardened' 'control' of state boundaries, seeking to seal them from unofficial incursions by undocumented workers or drug flows, presenting the 'image' that these flows are being reduced and 'chaos' is leading to 'order.' Policy changes vary...but range from using high-tech surveillance systems borrowed from the military, to posting more guards, to actually constructing physical barriers. This 'rebordering' or 'reterritorialization' contrasts markedly with concurrent moves to increase economic growth and interdependence by freeing capital and trade under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and with long patterns of transnational socio-cultural interaction and interdependence that have characterized the borderlands, the wide swath of land which transcends the political boundary and bears unique characteristics. Thus, in a moment of globalizing late modernity, the traditional state apparatus (and our accompanying theoretical understandings and reproductions of it) reimposed itself.[29]

This leads us to consider, after September 11, how the discourses that situated borders within a popular and political framework emerged on both sides of the borderlands, and how this discourse united and divided borderlands in ways that were new and not so new.

V. EXTERNALIZATION OF THE THREAT: BUILDING A NEW DISCOURSE ON NATIONALISM AND TRANSNATIONALISM

Before September 11, much of the redefinition of borderlands was involved in describing their new role as points of articulation between national economies. After September 11, the function of the Smart Border clearly was to "externalize the threat" of terrorism to North American borderlands by bolstering the border function more clearly in the area of security as well as trade, and by joining Canada and the U.S. in an "Action Plan" that effectively attempted to harmonize security and immigration issues. Although not the equivalent of a Schengen Treaty, such as the European Union had already negotiated and implemented in the 1980s and 1990s, the Smart Border was not unlike the latter in its desire to build "fortress America." The North American term for the process was "security perimeter." The idea was predicated in the belief, at least in the U.S., that American security and safety were only as good as the weakest link, and that the weakest link was perhaps to be found in the borderlands shared with the U.S.'s "neighbors." Particularly relevant to this assumption was the growing idea among Americans that there was a vast and "unsecure" Canadian "frontier."

Since September 11 a rhetorical sense of risk has been constructed in the U.S., principally by the media, but also in political dialogue and texts. This risk discourse externalizes the inherent security threat to the U.S., and shifts scrutiny towards the outside borders of "America." There is a sense of the northern borderline being a dangerous frontier, a frontier where a slightly suspect less competent neighbor state has been charged with the task of ensuring the safety of North Americans. Recent years have seen the development of a popularized geopolitical narrative, supported by a series of images that draw inspiration from unlikely places like Fort McMurray in northern Alberta, or Indian reservations in Ontario and upstate New York. These are places where "foreigners" (Arabs and South Asians) are believed to conceal themselves and cross unimpeded into a vulnerable, and ultimately more diligent U.S. For example, in the early hours after 9/11, there was growing speculation in the U.S. that Canada and Canadian borders had somehow been to blame–that Canadian policies and border practices were not adequate to maintain continental security. Canadian immigration policy was criticized as being too lax, Canada's refugee program too soft, and the

miles of undefended border a "problem" rather than an asset.

> Top officials from states along the U.S.-Canadian border told Congress that they needed more help to tighten the porous 4,000-mile boundary line in the fight against terrorism. The officials said terrorists can still pass easily over hundreds of rural, unstaffed crossings, and they charged that delays at many checkpoints were hurting the economy.[30]

Indeed, although no September 11 terrorist came from Canada, the Center for Immigration Studies (CIS) in Washington based its policy recommendations on the fact that "leaving the borders largely undefended is an invitation for terrorists to do as attempted Brooklyn subway bomber Gazi Ibrahim Abu Mezer did; having been denied a visa, he simply went to Canada and snuck across the border." This focus on immigration is consistent with the identification passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Section 110 of which has not entered into force, but which is specifically designed to rebuild the Canada-U.S. border relationship.[31] The border has recently become the focal point for a new American security narrative that focuses upon the perils of the outside world and its peoples, and the problem that sharing a continent entails.[32] Consider the incident at the Niagara border, where a woman's similar visible ethnicity and physical proximity to a drug smuggler in the process of being arrested by American border guards, resulted in her suffering physical abuse, despite the fact that she had no connection whatsoever with the individual and was nearby quite by chance. Such short tempers and ethnic targeting represent the unfortunate underside of a heightened process of due diligence, where "security threat" is geographically externalized and borderlands assume important new proportions as a last defense against tragedy.

Americans regard the Mexican border as a greater threat than the Canadian border, although both are seen as a threat. Still, there is a general sense, at least within the popular media and popularized security discourse, that Canada is "failing" in border security, and greater Canadian governmental intervention is required. This is essentially a U.S. perception, however, in that protecting American borders is the role of the U.S. government and its state apparatus, while protecting Canadian borders is Canada's job. Thus, the concern is not that U.S. efforts to enhance border security have been less

significant on the northern borderline. Rather, some see Canadian and U.S. efforts in this area as "tokenism." Canadians are most concerned with structuring border security to retain and enhance access under conditions of heightened security, reflecting the crucial role of the continental economy in Canadian economic well-being. The U.S., on the other hand, is consumed with the need for border security for protection. Christopher Sands suggests that to Canadians the special nature of Canada's bilateral relationship with the U.S., and its relationship with the U.S. border and business community, triggered the CUSP response to pre-September 11 security concerns in the U.S.[33] It thus remains difficult for Canadians to compete within the post 9/11 global economy without a strong commitment by both nations to cooperation across borders: "Canada and the United States face the challenge of governance coexisting and competing with other actors over a network of regional markets and market actors engaged in transborder flows."[34]

Given these realities and political complexities, a growing unease among Canadians has accompanied the rising tide of American national angst that is reflected in new attitudes and in the development of a more militant border imagery and rhetoric. To some Canadians, the U.S. has at times assumed a lurking and dangerous presence halted at the border only by the diligent and persistent evocation of a national claim to sovereign rights. Canadian newspaper articles and public debates have consistently identified an American threat to Canadian identity and sovereignty posed by U.S. security responses to September 11th. In this scenario, borders represent cultural lines that, if crossed, threaten the existence of territory, sovereignty and distinct national culture. In a world of "us against them", a clearly defined sense of being Canadian is pitted against a clear sense of American values and global leadership ambitions. But many Canadians actually shared the U.S. concern about borders being too open (principally with respect to a growing and somewhat xenophobic reaction to refugees and immigrants from non-traditional countries), resulting in a propensity for national sentiments after September 11 to harden around the image of the border, whether fence or frontier, on both sides of the borderline.

On the other hand, it was not just Americans who promoted the sense of alarm about the U.S.-Canadian border. Canadians did so as well. Some right-wing Canadian Members of Parliament also whipped up fears. In the days that followed September 11, in the House of

Commons, during question period, such talk was typical:

> Mr. Stockwell Day (former Leader of the Opposition, Canadian Alliance): Mr. Speaker, we hear reports continually about suspected terrorists hiding in Toronto, or in Fort McMurray or simply roaming the countryside. Will the Prime Minister please commit here in the House today that any discussions with our North American partners on securing the perimeter will definitely include changing the laws and the policies in Canada, so that we can detain and deport, if necessary, those who are deemed dangerous?[35]

Or

> Mr. Kevin Sorenson (Crowfoot, Canadian Alliance): Mr. Speaker, we learned from immigration documents and the media that three men in Fort McMurray may have been connected with the September 11 attack on the United States. Canadians had to learn from the Sun newspapers that Nabil Al-Marabh, who was freed by the government's Immigration and Refugee Board, may be the chief al-Qaeda operative in North America and living in Canada. We also learned from the media that Mohammed Atta may have been working in Toronto.[36]

Clearly, elements of the Canadian political community thus supported, and exaggerated a "weak Canada" narrative. The "security initiative", as the "culture wars" supposedly between Canadian and American values were reflected in the structure of parliamentary discourse. Indeed, in the early days after September 11, Canada responded to the U.S. crisis as if it were its own. New initiatives were put in place to enhance security at the U.S. border, as well as at airports. While some were vaguely alarmed at the rhetoric of a "perimeter defense system", which they saw as compromising Canadian security, Canadians in general were more than willing to take security-related initiatives. A compelling argument and a compelling fear opened pocketbooks and mobilized action. On October 1, 2001, for example the Government of Canada adopted Canada's anti-terrorist plan. It allocated more than $79,000,000 for equipment and support activities at the airports, and $12,000,000 to meeting staffing and public security requirements of Canada Customs and Revenue and Transport Canada.[37] Presumably, many of the new resources were to be deployed within the traditional borderlands and land crossings.

Yet for Canadians, the Canada-U.S. borderlands were not necessarily the source of concern, because ultimately the threat was perceived to be southern-bound. This was inherently clear in the "anti-terrorist legislation" in terms of the language it contained. While its aim was ultimately to stop terrorists from entering Canada and to protect Canada from terrorist acts, its purpose was to develop "tools to identify, prosecute, convict and punish terrorists"; to "work with the international community to bring terrorists to justice and to address the root causes of such hatred" while preventing the Canada-U.S. border "from being held hostage by terrorists and impacting on the Canadian economy."[38] Closed borders were not seen as the result of a functional failure on the part of the state. Rather, they were perceived a greater more globalized threat, one between North American allies and terrorist "others."

Indeed, Michael Hart and Bill Dymond, in their comprehensive post-September 11 study, observed that, despite Canada's traditional concern with the unilateral nature of American policy, surveys and contemporary polls showed Canadians to be exceptionally united in their support for structured border controls.[39] But there was little enthusiasm, on the other hand, for a continent-wide system of securing the perimeter. The Canadian Government's response, *Managing Relations in Light of the New Security Environment*, reported that during discussions of the re-structuring of Canada-U.S. border relations, there was considerable unease and uncertainty remaining, extending to certain concepts being promoted, such as a "common security perimeter." For example, [some]...saw risks that this might reinforce "fortress" North America tendencies in which the margin for a creative multilateralist Canadian foreign policy would be constrained. Hence, if there is to be a "rebranding" of the bilateral relationship, they argued it would be much better to "move beyond perimeter notions. ... The emphasis should be something like smart borders because, not only does this allow for security and an economic dimension, at the same time it focuses on technical issues, in some of which Canada is ahead of the United States."[40]

Before 9/11, Canadians considered the idea that Canada-U.S. borders require consideration under the rubric of "foreign policy" as an oxymoron of sorts, rendered obsolete by NAFTA. Canadian domestic interest required and had successfully constructed a friendly and stress-free border relationship with its southern neighbor. In this sense, borders were a reflection of national rather than international

processes. The Canadian Government actually said as much: the Canadian Government's report, *Managing Relations in Light of the New Security Environment,* observed that a border review was long overdue, and that "apart from occasional consideration within general foreign policy reviews, there has been no wide-ranging parliamentary examination of Canadian-American relations in recent times. Moreover, in the decade since Canada joined Mexico and the United States in the NAFTA negotiations, there has yet to be a thorough parliamentary inquiry into developments at the rapidly evolving North American level that could have a large foreign policy impact."[41]

September 11 and its impact triggered a round of nationalism and neo-nationalism on both sides of the Canada-U.S. border. We have seen that for Americans the Canadian border was really a frontier–a foreign place. But for Canadians the relationship between border and national identity was also affected, in the first place by the degree to which a new post-9/11 polemic discourse of economic versus security concerns has been constructed which juxtaposes Canadian sovereignty against American expansionism, and the second a discourse in which Canadian society has become polarized–traditional national sentiments pitted against cold hard cash and the politics of continental economic interest. Note the *Globe and Mail's* headline "Are we being integrated into the U.S. without having real public debate?"[42]

The problem, as we shall see when we explore the changing nature of specific borderlands, below, is that there are geographical specificities attached to the issue of how the debate about borders is structured depending upon where it takes place. Indeed, rather than representing some kind of essential clash over culture, that of Canada and the U.S., the security perimeter approach, and ultimately, Canada's position towards its bordering activities, is a response to fundamentally different visions which are shared among Canadians, as well as between Canadians and Americans. These visions are both interterritorial and intersectional. Rather than "us verus them", they exemplify a growing fracture line between discourses or constructed prescriptions in public policy–both of which are perceived as mutually exclusive, polar opposites. This is the tension between the potential impacts of open and closed borders: those that facilitate "free commerce" and those that facilitate "security." The only apparent definitive resolution lies in a borderless North America, or

more likely still, a North America without Canada. As Emile Martel observed, "the fatality of geography has imposed on us the necessity of establishing a relationship which will always be...odd, and uneven."[43]

VI. REGIONAL COMPARISONS: HOW THE CROSS-BORDER REGIONS OPERATE

Figure 2, based upon the importance of specific border crossings in terms of cross-border trade, suggests that there are several categories of borderlands. Those which carry the largest volumes of commercial traffic may be considered as "goods first" borderlands, where trade and security concerns have had significant impact on the physical landscape and functions of borderlands, and on the role of borderland community. These include the borderlands of the Great Lakes Region and central Canada, as well as the Pacific Northwest. In these cases, we note from Figure 3, borderlands are connected by highly visible and prioritized transportation corridors to U.S. markets.

Regional specialization and differentiation among regional borderlands in Canada are nothing new. The degree of connection and disconnection along borderlines has always been highly regionalized. Roger Gibbins suggests, for example, that in the east, where cultural enclaves were divided by subsequent boundaries, the juxtaposition of community across the border with statist allegiance, designated by the boundary, produces complex borderland landscapes of interwoven continuity and differentiation.[44] Ackleson proposes, too, that there is a degree of interwoven community life that transcends the Canada-U.S. border in the northeast, where "the northern border straddles mutually interdependent communities; numerous examples of the international line bisecting community churches, restaurants, and even homes exist." Ackleson observes that residents in these bi-national communities cross the border frequently, if not regularly, and have done so for centuries. In many places, "the boundary is unmarked or demarcated only by a post or sign; multiple free crossing points exist. Derby Line, Vermont, for instance, is literally spliced in two in places where Vermont collides with Quebec, sharing municipal services, neighborhoods, and even a library where the international line crosses."[45] But recently, the nature of regionalism with respect to cross-border interaction has assumed new dimensions, in the sense that "for local communities

along the border, the economic benefits of cross-border trade are obvious...Border congestion has meant that these communities assume a much larger share of the infrastructure, social and environmental costs associated with trans-boundary traffic."[46] The role of the border, increasingly formalized, increasingly focused, increasingly binational and based on accords and "noteworthy practices" rather than general treaties, has turned border communities inside out–refocusing them on physical landscapes which are highly formalized and dense with the infrastructure of transnational institutions and information for successful crossings. The Electronic Signage initiative, used to direct trucks through particular primary lanes at the Port Huron border crossing in Michigan, is one example. Others are many of the electronic border information initiatives which broadcast border wait times and display by camera the state of cross-border traffic at busy crossings.

In this sense, it is the land border landscapes which increasingly "must do the work" not only of policing borders, but also of symbolically representing them to the cross-border community, whose constituency is increasingly economic and institutional in nature. Indeed, prior to the formation of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, inspection services on the border from both countries were mandated to act on behalf of over fifty government agencies![47] Moreover, the border, rather than a broad and vague frontier that facilitates exchange of goods, services and people, has become more geographically specific in terms of state practice. The Government of Canada observed in 2000 that the border was effectively a place where "the majority of vehicle crossings take place in choke points along the Ontario-Michigan, the Ontario-New York, and the British Columbia-Washington borders. These crossings are located on narrow slips of land surrounded by the Great Lakes or between the Pacific Ocean and the Cascade Mountains."[48] Such formal, government source definitions of border are indeed revealing.

1. Great Lakes Corridors and the North West Coast: Taking Care of Business or Finding a Balance?

An astounding 52% of trade with the U.S. is trucked through four Ontario border points–Queenston, Fort Erie, Sarnia, and Windsor–the latter responsible for over 25% of all cross-border daily truck movements in Canada.[49] The major border crossings are the Ambassador Bridge between Windsor, Ontario and Detroit, Michigan, and the Detroit-Canada Tunnel connecting the same cities.

TABLE 1: NOTEWORTHY POLICIES AND PRACTICES AT THE BORDER

Title	Title	Location	
NP-1	Border Release Advanced Screening & Selectivity	Detroit, MI (Wayne County)	U.S. Customs & Border Protection
NP-2	Electronic Mailing Lists	Port Huron, MI	U.S. Customs & Border Protection
NP-3	Electronic Signage	Port Huron, MI	U.S. Customs & Border Protection
NP-4	Pre-Arrival Processing System (PAPS)	Detroit, MI (Wayne County)	U.S. Customs & Border Protection
NP-5	Pre-Arrival Processing	Port Huron, MI	U.S. Customs & Border Protection
NP-6	Pembina/Emmerson Alliance	Pembina, ND/Emerson, Manitoba Ports of Entry	U.S. Customs & Border Protection
NP-7	Commercial Vehicle Processing Center and the U.S. Customs Service's Pre-Arrival Processing System (PAPS)	Peace Bridge, Fort Erie, Ontario Canada for U.S. Bound Commercial Traffic	Buffalo and Fort Erie Public Bridge Authority (The Peace Bridge)
NP-8	Pre Arrival Processing System (PAPS)	Port of Buffalo/Niagara Falls NY - Note, this may also be employed in Detroit & Port Huron, MI, Champlain & Alexandria Bay, NY, and Blaine, WA.	U.S. Customs & Border Protection
NP-9	NEXUS	Blaine, WA; Pt. Huron, MI; Scheduled Peace Bridge - Buffalo, NY; Ft. Erie, Canada Jan. 2003	U.S. Immigration, U.S. Customs & Border Protection, Canada Immigration, Canada Customs
NP-10	Truck Driver Training School	Alexandria Bay, NY Jefferson County	U.S. Customs & Border Protection
NP-11	Driver Manual - Border Crossing Procedures	Port Huron and other Northeastern Ports	Bowen Enterprises, Inc.
NP-12	Automated Equipment Identifier (AEI)	Washington State, Counties of Pierce, King and Whatcom, Cities of Seattle, Tacoma and Blaine	U.S. Customs & Border Protection
NP-13	Binational Rideshare Program	Northwest Washington State (Whatcom County) and Lower Mainland British Columbia	Whatcom Council of Governments
NP-14	International Mobility, Trade Corridor Project (IMTC)	Washington State, Whatcom County, Bellingham, Blaine and British Columbia, Municipalities of Surrey, Vancouver, etc.	U.S. Customs & Border Protection
NP-15	The International Mobility and Trade Corridor Project (IMTC)	Border region joining western Washington State and lower-mainland British Columbia	Whatcom Council of Governments (MPO)
NP-16	Coordinated Commercial Vehicle Operations (CVO) ITS Projects	Border region joining western Washington State and lower-mainland British Columbia	Washington State Department of Transportation - Advanced Technology Branch
NP-17	Cascade Gateway 2000 Trade and Travel Study	Border region joining western Washington State and lower-mainland British Columbia	Whatcom Council of Governments (MPO)
NP-18	Cross-Border Advanced Traveler Information Systems (ATIS)	The Peace Arch and Pacific Highway ports-of-entry joining U.S. Interstate 5 and British Columbia Highway 99	Whatcom Council of Governments
NP-19	Cross-Border Regional Traffic Model	Northwest Washington State and Lower Mainland British Columbia	Whatcom Council of Governments
NP-20	Southeast Michigan/Southwest Ontario Binational Transportation Planning	Seven counties in Southeast Michigan (Wayne, Oakland, Macomb, Monroe, St. Clair, Washtenaw and Livingston) and five counties in Southwest Ontario (Essex, Kent, Lambton, Elgin and Middlesex).	SEMCOG
NP-21	Pre-Approved Travel Program Marketing & Outreach	Marketing and extends to the Cascade Gateway border region, including Whatcom County, Washington State, and the Lower Mainland of British Columbia	Whatcom Council of Governments
NP-22	FAST (Free and Secure Trade)	US & Canadian POEs at Blaine, WA-Douglas, BC; Port Huron, MI-Sarnia, ON; Detroit, MI-Windsor, ON; Buffalo, NY-Ft. Erie, ON; Lewiston, NY-Queenston, ON; Champlain, NY-Lacolle, PQ.	U.S. Customs & Border Protection
NP-23	Niagara International Transportation Technology Coalition (NITTEC)	Buffalo, New York - Fort Erie, Ontario - Niagara Falls, New York - Niagara Falls, Ontario - Lewiston, New York - Queenston, Ontario	NITTEC
NP-24	Queue Detection Trailers	I87 Border Crossing at Champlain, New York, to Province of QuebecI81 Border Crossing at Wellesley Island, New York, to Province of Ontario	New York State
NP-25	International and Intergovernmental Coordination and Cooperation, Calais - St. Stephen Area New International Border Crossing Preliminary Design and NEPA Compliance	Calais, Maine and St. Stephen, New Brunswick, Canada	Maine DOT, New Brunswick FHWA, GSA, and Border Services

Source: United States Department of Transportation - Federal Highway Administration

Indeed, the International Boundary Commission observes that "heavy commercial and private traffic rumbles through a tunnel and across a bridge (Ambassador) between Windsor and Detroit"[50] a total of some 7,000 per day or one truck every minute in each direction.[51] It is here that the greatest change in the borderlands over the last two decades of the 20th century has occurred. The change is most apparent in the expanding function as a transportation and trade corridor, to facilitate increasing internationalization of the North American economies.

Other important commercial crossings include the international boundary between Buffalo, New York-Fort Erie, Ontario (Peace Bridge); Sarnia, Ontario-Port Huron, Michigan (Blue Water Bridge); Watertown, New York-Lansdowne, Ontario (Thousand Islands Bridge); Cornwall, Ontario-Rooseveltown, New York (Seaway International Bridge); Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario-Sault Ste. Marie, Michigan; and Ogdensburg, New York-Prescott, Ontario.[52] Combined, these crossings account for over 50% of cross-border truck movements, and equivalent cross-border flows in goods and peoples. This clearly places Ontario, and specifically Southern Ontario, as the focal point in a series of transportation networks and corridors linked to transcontinental trade.

Due to the sheer volume of trade and the structure of the transactional economy, certain regions, such as Central Canada, have become the nexus for cross-border trade networks in a "goods first" universe. Most border crossings are affected by "noteworthy practices" connecting U.S. monitoring of shipping and vehicular traffic flows with Canadian border posts. Special programs facilitate advanced screening of commercial traffic (see Table 1: BRASS, PACS, Pre-Arrival Processing, VPC, Truck Driving School, Driver Manuals, NEXUS, SE Michigan/SW Ontario Binational Transportation Planning, NATICK, Queue Detection Trailers). Most of these programs function in the area of developing policies and procedures for binational cross-border interaction, of developing technologies for detection and information management, and for congestion and traffic management.[53]

The economic imperative of the relationship is reflected in the agreements to govern transnational interactions in the Great Lakes region. In central Canada, formal treaty agreements have prevailed in organizing the nature of the binational relationship, including government-to-government agreements regulating the use of the St.

Lawrence Seaway and the Great Lakes. Most crossings take place over water, via bridges traversing a number of rivers. In this region, the development of binational agreements under NAFTA has remained relatively new, and institutionally limited to economic and trade imperatives. Yet most of these policies are not jointly administered between Canada and the U.S. Of all noteworthy practices listed in Table 1 only two are managed jointly with Canada. This means that the border crossings themselves are points of reference for "noteworthy practices and policies" which are irregular in their application. The NE Michigan and SW Ontario Binational Transportation Planning Project is one exception, where seven counties in southeast Michigan (Wayne, Oakland, Macomb, Monroe, St. Clair, Washtenaw and Livingston) and five Southwest Ontario counties (Essex, Kent, Lambton, Elgin and Middlesex) have opted to work together. Another cross-border planning and development initiative links the Niagara Peninsula and upstate New York in comprehensive efforts to build and manage tourism, grow the wine industry and cooperate in education and cultural activities. Indeed, the formality of the Central Canada border region has much to gain from a more localized consultative effort–as a pre-September 11 dialogue among Canadian and American governments was to emphasize: they noted in 2000 that "Ontario-Michigan-New York bridge authorities are contemplating over $1 billion in infrastructure outlays, but do not have a good sense of what the inspection agencies are planning in coming years. Federal agencies also have much to learn from border-area NGO groups, some of which are very forward-looking in the area of intelligent transportation systems and environmental protection."[54]

In Central Canada it is clear that a "goods first" orientation defines the borderlands–at least at the institutional and formal level. But economic imperatives are also important to a burgeoning transnational regionalism in Western North America. The volume of traffic at the Blaine crossings is equal to some cross-border points in Southern Ontario. Border waits are lengthy for many. Nonetheless, it is clear that the role of borderlands in building transnational linkages has remained somewhat less specialized in the area of economic linkages, and more developed in terms of strengthening binational cultural, environmental and intergovernmental cooperation, because regionalism in Western Canada and the U.S. has historically been more environmental and comprehensive in its focus, and

the institutional capacity for cooperation more broad-based and localized.[55] Here, "under the Pacific Northwest Economic Region (PNWER), provincial and state governments have been cooperating on the creation of a binational transportation network and have made a number of policy proposals to federal governments."[56] The result is that binational transportation projects are well developed in this region, and better integrated at local levels of governance, integrating Washington State and the Lower Mainland.[57]

The only major exceptions are FAST and NEXUS, however, both of which are programs developed through cross-border agreements and implemented jointly. FAST and NEXUS have been adopted at both the Central Canada and Cascadian borders and their US counterparts (at Blaine, WA-Douglas, BC; Port Huron, MI-Sarnia, ON; Detroit, MI-Windsor, ON; Buffalo, NY-Ft. Erie, ON; Lewiston, NY-Queenston, ON) as well as one point of entry in Quebec (Champlain, NY-Lacolle, PQ).[58]

At the same time, however, the PNWER borderland has a history of broad-based regionalism that is unparalleled in other cross-border regions. Alan Artibise, Ted Cohen, and Donald Alper suggest that there are unprecedented ecological, cultural, institutional and strategic alliances that have shaped the cross-border community. This means that while the PNWER region thus supports an efficient cross-border relationship for goods and services, it does not take the character of transnational regionalism exclusively from a goods first perspective. Municipal and regional governments are connected in efforts to promote sustainable cross-border development, environmental protection, and indigenous cultures. Indeed, Artibise submits that the notion of closer cooperation along the Pacific Northwest Coast is rooted in a common historical and environmental geography–based upon the old Oregon Territory "severed by the fixing of the 49th parallel" and the persistence of bioregional visions and bioregional initiatives.[59]

However, Alper adds that while there are multiple linkages, including the Georgia Basin Ecosystem Initiative, the Puget Sound Action Team and the Fraser Basin Council, transboundary NGOs, the BC-Washington State Environmental Cooperation Council, frameworks for State and Province coordination including the BC-Washington Corridor Task Force and the Pacific Corridor Enterprise Council, there is a lack of development of a more general operational model for the organization and management of transboundary coop-

eration. He suggests that this relates partly to the relatively late onset of cross-border activities within the region, and partly to the fact that British Columbia has rejected formalized ties with its American neighbors.[60] Alper observes that the effective cooperation in transportation and environment prior to September 11 had progressed without the aid of Washington or Ottawa–a fact of significance in the post September 11 era where new security measures implemented, such as FAST and NEXUS, have become integral and connected to a broader continental security vision. Still, because the focus of regionalism in the PNWER has been significantly influenced by environmental awareness of the distinctive Cascadian bioregion, business-oriented regionalism has been supplemented by environmental cooperation. For Artibise, "a central characteristic of evolving transborder regions around the world is the differing vision groups within the region hold regarding the purpose and future of cooperation. In Cascadia, the debate takes place between those who promote Cascadia as a fundamental imperative in the new global and continental economy, and those who envision Cascadia as a bioregion."[61]

Given the massive amount of discourse and media coverage that accompanies the Cascadia movement, it is possible to exaggerate the importance of this cross-border region's impact, and of Cascadia-type cooperation in general. Some skeptics may say that little has been accomplished in practice, due in large part to both federal governments' discouragement of state–provincial linkages. Experts in subnational relationships between the United States and Canada point to a varying yet consistent state/provincial and cross-border regional alignment. This is an ongoing debate in Canada-U.S. relations. Our position is that cross-border regions like Cascadia, real or imagined, are now embedded in the functional if not formal relationship between Canada and the United States.

Some researchers question the potential for such informal and broadly defined borderlands in the post September 11 years. Based upon analysis of the texts and discourse brought to the table by American policy makers in the late 20th century, Ackleson suggests that "by understanding the border in a modern territorial, sovereign frame", that is to say by reducing transnational flows to the problem of controlling "chaos" at specific points and lines, problems can be solved "by the proper application of technology," and indeed 'control' becomes the objective."[62] It is perhaps significant, with this in mind, that in the Great Lakes and Central Canada borderlands and

within the PNWER new border technology features instruments which effectively expedite the movement of pre-authorized vehicles across the borderlands, to carry more members and goods to and from transnational communities. The borders are more formal and more open to scrutiny, at the same time that they continue to express increasingly strengthened cross-border community. Controlling chaos has become the primary goal, and the definition of borderlands functionally narrowed to efforts that address these border crossings in such specific terms.

2. Far from the Corridors: Tradition, Culture and Community in the Less Populated Border Regions

Nonetheless, borderlands are more than funnels for economic change. The post-NAFTA agreements, and the focus on the trade and security dialectic have not obliterated the importance of cross-border community and cultural ties. They have merely concentrated the thrust of the security dialogue in certain areas. But there are specific borderlands where the ties remain strong, and differentiation is less prominent. Atlantic Canada and New England continue to sustain traditional ties and expand connections along time-honored routes between places where community thrives on the border and borderlands culture extends across the boundary. In the summer of 2004, Canadians and American celebrated 400 years of Acadian history in the cross-border region. The Canadian-American Center at the University of Maine recently published a commemorative map to document and explain the cultural linkages that persist.[63] The New England States, the Atlantic Provinces, and Quebec continue to build on the history and tradition of cooperation among the intertwined cultures of Aboriginal, French, English and other charter cultures in the cross-border region through annual summit meetings, cross-border accords for trade and environmental cooperation, and an array of cultural linkage initiatives. Cross-border community continues to thrive and work where cooperation is necessary both to sustain livelihood and community. The twin cities of Sault Ste. Marie are a case in point. Only through cross-border commerce and cooperation in municipal services such as fire and emergency response can the cross-border communities sustain resource industries. These symbiotic, cross-border adjustments to retain and build community are found along the U.S.-Canada border from the Atlantic coast to the western intermontane crossings, and north to the Canadian boundary with Alaska. After 9/11, these crossings were indeed placed on

alert, and measures were taken to enhance security. However, trade and commerce were characteristically more localized. Consequently, the trade and security dialectic that emerged so strongly at the major corridors did not materialize at the northern periphery to the same extent. What did emerge was a stronger differentiation between these smaller crossings and their respective borderlands regions and the massive conduits of cross-border traffic in central Canada and on the Pacific coast.

In understanding this relationship, that is, the difference between what contemporary American and Canadian decision-makers and transportation planners have identified as the "chokepoints" and corridors on one hand, and the borderlands which remain secondary to that process on the other, we need to see how the renegotiation of borderlands functions as part of a process where cultural plurality plays an important role as a basis of nationalism. For example, the Eastern Townships of Quebec, and the northern portion of Vermont were less distinguishable in the mid-20th century than they are today. The borderline has become more evident as the French language has become institutionalized in the Eastern Townships or *L'Estrie*. In this context the border is much more a cultural and linguistic line than it was fifty years ago. This example shows us that at the border "identities are being rendered and reproduced through difference, which is manifest through many kinds of 'borders' and narrative practices, including those of securitization."[64] The work done by some of the cultural borders outside of the "goods first" corridors, indicates that in North America cultural plurality plays a more important role because borderlands may also accentuate the differences among group identities, cultural experiences, and practices by multiple groups within the Canadian state itself. The divisive lines are not simply questions of English versus French constitutional rights, but of the multiple, gendered, ethnic, income, and identity-laden concept of cultural identity and Canadian culture itself that is regionally distinctive and remains expressed in territorial terms. Here, the role played by regional context in defining the function of borders cannot be ignored, and is perhaps best measured in terms of the lack of cross-border traffic, rather than the degree to which cross-border traffic is facilitated. So while September 11, and its long term impact on the security discourse of North America seems clear cut–Canada versus the U.S., locked in asymmetrical political, cultural and sovereign negotiations, joined only by increas-

ingly scrutinized and formal border practices–tremendous room for variation remains.

The example of the Point Roberts border also highlights this process of variation. Point Roberts is a small point of land along the Pacific U.S. coastline, which shares its own border with Canada. School children, shoppers, those traveling to and from work, and virtually any and all forms of goods and services routinely cross the border, as American citizens pass through Canada to the U.S., or vice versa. Point Roberts is an exclave of the U.S. As such it remains a strongly regionalized border. There is little border security. Only a gate opened during the day and closed at sun down controls some crossings. Or an infrared beam records the crossing of people, vehicles and the occasional large mammal. To some residents of the region, this represents a potential security threat. But in terms of the reality of a regionalized border such as this, the threat is minimal. The examples of regionalized, yet marginal, borders between Canada and the U.S. are rare. They stand at one end of the continuum of border types.

The situation is different again in the Alaska/Yukon/British Columbia border region. While this region lies far from population ecumenes, many fret about the potential for terrorists to transport weapons of mass destruction from such remote areas. In truth, however, these borders are also highly regionalized. Transportation corridors are limited, in some cases seasonal. The U.S. territory lying beyond the international interface represents another kind of "dead end" in North America–inaccessible directly to the rest of the American land mass. Indeed, most of the cross-border traffic consists of herds of migratory caribou and other large and small mammals. The real concern is the transnational nature of economic and environmental impacts upon indigenous peoples. While not impossible, the scenario of border insecurity within the region makes little sense. Such remote locations, far away from the action to the south, difficult to traverse, and relatively unpopulated, are poor strategic locations for illicit cross-border activity. Rather, these represent the frontiers of North America that have always featured large native populations whose indigenous institutions exercise much scrutiny and control. The U.S.-Canada border in this region is perhaps one of the few in which cross-border cooperation has been promoted on the basis of foreign policy and environmental issues, while rigorous cross-border management policies remain poorly developed.

After all, the circumpolar north has been targeted as a region for cooperation among the international community. Much effort is expended to establish cross-border co-operation in the area of Arctic environmental monitoring. Moreover, as the end of the Cold War removed American troops from Canadian territory along the D.E.W. line, the real focus with respect to border issues in the Arctic has turned to maritime considerations. Will there be a contested border in the Beaufort Sea? How will Canada and the U.S. manage the cross-border movement of oil, resources and even defense infrastructure, ships and satellite imagery? Clearly a new type of regionalism is emerging within the circumpolar north, which the Canada-U.S. border will increasingly have to accommodate, and which will be increasingly focused on indigenous human security and resource utilization.

VII. SUSTAINABLE CROSS-BORDER REGIONALISM: WHERE TO FROM HERE?

There are three levels of international engagement that increasingly define the border relationship between Canada and the U.S. One level, defined in Table 1, concerns the immediate physical relationship at the border — those binational policies and practices exercising influence over policing, national security, risk management technologies and programs like NEXUS, FAST and other pre-clearance and pre-authorization practices and technologies. The second concerns the cultivation of a binational context for cooperation-capacity building in terms of community as well as the creation of infrastructure. This includes the building of joint border posts, policing initiatives, cross-border transportation corridors and infrastructure, and other initiatives, including policy orientation and capacity-building documents such as the Smart Border Agreement. The third level of international engagement concerns the relationship that Canada adopts with the broader international community. These policies are nested in an increasingly globalized context, and involve the coordination of immigration and security policies respecting third party countries. The first and second directly concern the definition of Canada-U.S. borderlands, as goods and peoples attempt to cross at the interface between the two countries. The third also governs this interaction, but indirectly. It also establishes the "bar" from which broader international security measures take their

cue, and the degree to which new borders designed to secure trade and security will be sustainable.

The Smart Border Agreement, for example, has proven to be the first of a series of agreements whose aim is to harmonize Canada-U.S. policies in other critical areas, such as immigration. Recently, Canada and the United States signed the "Safe Third Country Agreement" to allow both countries to manage the flow of refugee claimants more effectively.[65] The Permanent Resident Card, effective in December 2003, was required by permanent residents seeking to re-enter Canada on any commercial carrier.[66] Such broad field agreements increasingly will be part of the bordering process, and Canada's border crossings will undoubtedly change to reflect the more global context.

Binational cooperation, then, has been embedded in a series of more globalized initiatives which attempt to limit and control the impact of potential third parties–sometimes Mexico, as in the case of the new Hazardous Materials Rules, and some more globally targeted initiatives such as the Bio-Terrorism Act. Effective in August 2004, the new Hazardous Material Rules demand a national safety permit from all motor carriers of hazardous goods. The permit issued by the U.S. Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration requires that "a carrier must have a 'satisfactory' security program in place using telephone or radio or electronic tracking devices, by which the vehicle operator can contact the motor carrier during a trip; and a means of giving employees security training. The carrier must be registered with the Research and Special Programs Administration, the agency within the Department of Transport concerned with 'Hazmat' issues. Carriers of radioactive materials also must provide a written route plan for trips, and undergo a pre-trip inspection by a federal, state or local government inspector or a government-approved contractor."[67]

Similarly, the Bio-Terrorism Act that took effect December 2004, requires pre-notification for cross-border shipments of foods. This includes information with the identification of the articles of food, complete FDA product code, the common or usual or market name, the trade or brand name, quantity (smallest package size to the largest container), and the lot or code numbers along with a host of other identifiers including that of the manufacturer, identification of the grower, the originating country, identification of the shipper, the country from which the food was shipped, and its anticipated arrival information like the location, date and the time and identification of

the carrier.[68] In their response to this initiative, some Canadian seafood exporters have lamented that "still swimming" is not a category contained in the paperwork options. They are drawing attention to the fact that the Bio-Terrorism Act is, much like the initial Shared Border Accord, now targeting a highly internationalized and flexible time food and drug industry. This raises again the point that the Canada-U.S. border is a product not only of a policy paradigm designed to expedite increasing trade. The trade is itself embedded in the fact of a global economy, and a reorganization of world-wide trade patterns.

In other words, the current state of Canada-U.S. borderland interaction is embedded within a broader transcontinental economy. Even more, it is situated within a globalized economy. In many respects, these represent two sides of the same coin–the intensification of greater border scrutiny accompanied by the increasing attention given to building a common and globalized foundation for international interaction. The challenge for building sustainable borders includes understanding the nature of the changing function of the borderlands concerning the Canada-U.S. relationship's role and context, and recognizing that a more global context is fundamental to the construction of sustainable borders. Until recently, Canadians have been more concerned with economic and sovereign aspects of the bordering process. In general, they have failed to appreciate the importance of developing regionalized or spatialized approached to cross-border cooperation, leaving it to those narrower constituencies such as the business sector and its negotiations and the vision of cooperation, enhancing asymmetries and highlighting differences. In the end, it makes the impetus for reorganizing the border process and the nature of security versus globalization a question of internal politics as much as external politics, even a cultural war revolving around Canadian resistance to U.S. hegemony. There is a danger in having specific sets of sectoral interests prevail, without articulating a more general vision of how borderlands serve as both as fences and corridors, filters and hinges, which mediate between a broad variety of communities and broad fields of interest.

Moreover, there is also a danger in negotiating a series of arrangements which fail to consider the broad context in which Canada and the U.S. meet at the border, the varied nature of persistent borderland communities, or the increasingly trinational context of border functions. In engaging in transnational projects and

agreements, the Canada-U.S. borderline finds itself increasingly contextualized at the continental scale, where rules applying to cross-border trade with Mexico are now increasingly relevant for Canada, while operating with reference to more globalized security issues.[69] Recognition of this fact requires broad field thinking concerning how Canada's visions for international relevancy can be incorporated into its spatial practices. This can be effected through regulatory border functions as well as by thinking about how continental border practices reflect foreign policy priorities and impact more generally upon a Canadian consensus concerning internationalization.

VIII. CONCLUSIONS

The events of September 11, 2001 define a sudden and distinct turning point in the emergence and development of the cross-border regions between the United States and Canada. To a great extent this change or watershed was really an acceleration of a process toward smart borders and rapid corridors that was already well in hand with the NAFTA developments of trilateralization of trade and economic integration during the 1990s. Clearly the consideration and indeed implementation in some areas of development of cross-border risk management respecting crime, bioterrorism and drugs had begun in the pre-September 11 era, under the Shared Border agreement. In the months that followed, however, national leaders and policy makers in both countries were obliged to stop and ponder the implications of 9/11. They found it necessary to consider the impact of the events on the border relationship between the two countries, and to address how the call for heightened security would affect the constantly increasing trade and human traffic across the border. Their response was to reinvent the border, but to reinvent it in ways that built upon the foundations already established prior to this major terrorist event. These existing concepts of risk management and heightened technological survey techniques thus continued to serve as a toolbox for new border management structures, helping to set the stage for the nature of interventions which followed.

In this way, the reinvention of the border between Canada and the United States has accelerated the development and operationalization of a set of rapid corridor complexes and a larger group of secondary rapid corridors to enhance trade. The rapid corridors are primarily a response to traffic pressure in trade, rather than other concerns such as balanced regional accessibility. The new

border is replete with technological advances and enhanced security measures that only a tragedy like 9/11 could impose. Yet, the reinvented border is more than a technological advance and an enhanced conduit of trade. In the wake of these rapid responses to sustain the economic powerhouse of the United States and Canada, borderland communities have emerged with clearer cross-border visions, and embarked on stronger cooperative enterprises. Heritage tourism in the Niagara region continues to grow and thrive in the wake of 9/11 as community leaders on both sides of the Niagara River expand their horizons and take advantage of expedited border crossings at Queenston, Niagara Falls and Fort Erie. Similarly, the Detroit/Windsor cross-border economic zone has turned a potential trade bottleneck into a state -of-the-art core for one of the world's largest border crossings and international economic zones. In the Pacific Northwest, the vision of a coastal transportation corridor by land and sea, mindful of a delicate environment, representative of cultural plurality and reflective of human scale, continues to emerge. These regional developments, and others across the continent, have brought new vitality to the borderlands between the United States and Canada. The reinvented border is much more than a stronger boundary between Canada and its powerful and often isolationist neighbor. The reinvented border lies at the core of a new definition of cross-border regions, regions that are both expedient transfer places between countries and expressions of trans-national community. In this sense the cross-border regions between Canada and the United States are a part of a global phenomenon and one of the world's most important proving grounds for trans-national development.

Several questions remain to be explored more thoroughly. What are the characteristics of the emerging hierarchy of border crossing places? The border crossings appear to be more and more differentiated, and it is important to understand the increasing complexity of this system of places. Where is the Washington-to-Ottawa dialogue more important and less important? During the 1990s, sub-nationalization at the border was growing, and sub-national governments were becoming more involved in cross-border dialogue and in decision-making. Is this still the case at the major corridors or in the marginalized borderlands? One of our most important conclusions is that the difference between major corridors and smaller crossings is growing. This difference needs to be

explored carefully in all of its facets. Then we need to expand our exploration to the global context. How does concurrent globalization and localization develop in cross-border regions? This paper has raised some issues in this regard, and it has contributed some insight on this important process. The Canada-U.S. situation may reveal more important information to expand our understanding of concurrent globalization and localization. Also, we must address the continuing situation of asymmetries between the United States and Canada and how this imbalance impacts every aspect of the relationship between our countries. The asymmetries are perhaps most evident at the border, but they also make themselves felt in the borderlands. As we have seen in this study, the boundary relationship is, however, varied and dynamic in space and time. This fluidity may be both consistent with and contrary to the asymmetric United States-Canada relationship. Where are the asymmetries between the United States and Canada eroding, remaining intact, or expanding?

These are all large questions. Our aim is to reveal the continuing importance of these issues as we explore and document the state of the border regions in the post 9/11 era. The borderlands, and the charged boundary that energizes them, have changed somewhat in response to a complex of increasingly linked local, regional, national and global forces. But their continuing significance as a mediation space between Canada and the United States endures.

NOTES

[1] The literature of cross-border regionalism and borderlands applied to the Canada-United States border continues to expand rapidly. No comprehensive review is currently available. A useful cross-section is available in the following publications: Lauren McKinsey and Victor Konrad, *Borderlands Reflections: The United States and Canada,* Borderlands Monograph 1, University of Maine, 1989; Victor Konrad, "Borderlines and Borderlands in the Geography of Canada-U.S. Relations", in *NAFTA in Transition.* Stephen Randall and Herman Konrad, eds., Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 1996; Roger Gibbins, "Meaning and Significance of the Canadian-American Border", in *Borders and Border Regions in Europe and North America.* Paul Ganster, Alan Sweedler, James Scott and Wold Dieder-Eberwein, eds., IRSC San Diego State University: San Diego State University Press, 1997; Heather Nicol and Ian Townsend-Gault, eds, *Holding the Line: Borders in a Global World,* Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005. The last two volumes also contain an extensive and significant border literature on North American and European case studies, particularly on regionalism in the European Union.

[2] Government of Canada, *Building a Border for the 21st Century,* CUSP Forum Report, December 2000. http://www.canadianembassy.org/border/cuspreport-en.asp

[3] Government of Canada. Transport Canada, "Transportation and North American Trade", 1998. http:www.tc.gc.ca/trucking/corridors. See also Daniel E. Turbeville III and Susan Bradbury, "NAFTA and Transportation Corridor Improvement in Western North America: Restructuring for the Twenty-first Century" in *Holding the Line: Borders in A Global World,* Heather Nicol and Ian Townsend-Gault, eds. Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005, p. 277. See also U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, *NHS High Priority Corridors Description.* http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/hep10/nhs/hipricorridors/hpcor.htm

[4] U.S. government. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration. http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/hep10/nhs/hiprocorridors/hpcor.html

[5] Daniel E. Turbeville III and Susan Bradbury, "NAFTA and Transportation Corridor Improvement in Western North America: Restructuring for the Twenty-first Century", op. cit., p. 277.

[6] Government of Canada. *Building a Border for the 21st Century*, CUSP Forum Report, December 2000. http://www.canadianembassy.org/border/cuspreport-en.asp

[7] Government of Canada, Transport Canada, Canada/U.S. border Transportation Planning. http://www.tc.gc.ca/pol/en/tbwg/310.htm

[8] Ibid.

[9] See Government of Canada. *Canada-US Smart Border Declaration: Action Plan for Creating a Secure and Smart Border*. www.dfait-maeci.ca/anti-terrorism/actionplan.asp

[10] See Government of Canada, *Building a Border for the 21st Century*, op. cit.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid

[15] Ibid.

[16] See Jason Ackleson, *Navigating the Northern Line: Discourses of the U.S.-Canadian Borderlands*, International Studies Association 41st Annual Convention, Los Angeles, CA, March 14-18, 2000. http://www.ciaonet.org/isa/acj01/CIAO 7/00

[17] Ibid.

[18] See Government of Canada. Canadian Embassy, Washington, D.C. Canada-U.S. Customs Cooperation. http://www.canadianembassy.org/border/customs-en.asp. Canada exported C$317 billion in goods to the United States in 2002, while the US exported C$218.3 billion in goods to Canada–or approximately C$535 billion in cross-border trade. Significantly, the lion's share

(from 55% on the Canada side to 80% on the US side) crossed the border in trucks.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Ibid. This source indicates that 17% was by rail, 10% was by pipeline, 6% was by air and 3% was by marine vessels.

[21] "Clogged Border? The Border–How Bad is It?" *The Bar-Code Border*, 2 (34) June 15, 2003.

[22] Government of Ontario. Ontario Chamber of Commerce, 2004. *Cost of Border Delays to the Ontario Economy Study*. http://www.occ.on.ca/

[23] Yet the rationale for this increased deployment appears to have little to do with expedited shipping. U.S. Border Patrol Chief Gus de La Vina explained that "the additional agents will enable the force to maintain a more comprehensive enforcement posture in our efforts to sustain border security and combat terrorism." See "US Border Agents Raised Past 1000." *The Bar-Code Border*, 2(24), January 1, 2004.

[24] Peter Andreas, "A Tale of Two Borders: The US Canada and US Mexico Lines after 9-11", in *The Rebordering of North America*, Peter Andreas and Thomas J. Biersteker, eds., New York, Routeledge, 2003, p. 7.

[25] Government of Canada. Office of the Prime Minister, "Government of Canada Releases Comprehensive National Security Policy." NEWS RELEASE, April 27, 2004. http://pm.gc.ca/eng/news.asp?id=186.

[26] Ibid.

[27] Canada, Infrastructure Canada. "Joint Investments to Tackle Congestion at Canada-US Border." http://www.infrastructure.gc.ca/bif/publication/newsreleases/2004/2004-5-6forterie_e.shtml.

[28] But consistent with the idea that the Canada-U.S. borderlands have as their foundations economic imperatives organized by the NAFTA, the plan looked vaguely familiar, including its provisions for infrastructure and technology development. Nine of the thirty points it

embraced had already been set out in the *Shared Border* accord of 1995 and the 2000 CUSP Forum.

[29] Jason Ackleson, *Navigating the Northern Line: Discourses of the U.S.-Canadian Borderlands,* op. cit.

[30] David Eggert, *Seattle Post – Intelligencer* Washington Bureau, Dec. 6, 2001.

[31] Jason Ackleson, *Navigating the Northern Line: Discourses of the U.S.-Canadian Borderlands,* op. cit.

[32] See "How Have Terrorists Entered the U.S.? Study: Since 1993, Almost Every Means of Immigration Exploited," Center for Immigrations Studies. www.cis.org.

[33] See Christopher Sands, *Institutions or Networks? The Future of Conflict Management Between Canada and the United States.* Paper presented at the Association of Canadian Studies in the United States, 17th Biennial Conference, Portland, Oregon, November 2003.

[34] Ibid.

[35] Government of Canada. Hansard, selected discussion concerning the Canada-US border, from 1410Eham099.htm

[36] Ibid. Selected discussion concerning the Canada-US border, from 1410-Ehan099.htm

[37] Government of Canada. Transport Canada, "New Initiatives to Enhance Airport Security", October 11, 2001. www.tc.gc.ca/mediaroom/releases/nat/2001

[38] Government of Canada. Foreign Affairs Canada. Canada-US Smart Border Declaration: Action Plan for Creating a Secure and Smart Border. December 2001. www.dfait-maeci.ca/anti-terrorism/actionplan.asp

[39] Michael Hart and Bill Dymond, *Common Border and Shared Destinies: Canada, the United States and Deepening Integration.* 2001. http://www.carleton.ca/ctpl/

[40] Government of Canada. *Managing Relations in Light of the New Security Environment,* December 2001. www.prt.gc.ca/common/Chamber.asp?Language=E&Parl+37&Ses=1

[41] Ibid.

[42] *The Globe and Mail,* April 20, 2002, p. A8.

[43] Ibid.

[44] Roger Gibbins, "Meaning and Significance of the Canadian-American Border", in *Borders and Border Regions in Europe and North America,* eds. Paul Ganster, Alan Sweedler, James Scott and Wold Dieder-Eberwein, IRSC San Diego State University: San Diego State University Press, 1997, pp. 237-266.

[45] Jason Ackleson, *Navigating the Northern Line: Discourses of the U.S.-Canadian Borderlands* International Studies Association 41st Annual Convention Los Angeles, CA March 14-18, 2000. http://www.ciaonet.org/isa/acj10/CIAO 7/00

[46] Government of Canada. *Building a Border for the 21st Century,* op. cit.

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