CANADA, A LAND OF DEEP AMBIVALENCE: UNDERSTANDING THE DIVERGENT RESPONSE TO US PRIMACY AFTER 9/11

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I. INTRODUCTION

This paper examines the Canadian response to the terrorist attacks on the US on September 11, 2001 (hereafter referred to as 9/11), and the US policy and institutional changes that ensued as well. These changes are potentially profound in terms of both domestic and regional governance and in terms of their potential impact on economic prosperity in Canada. Thus far, much of the literature on Canada after 9/11 has been reactive about what such changes may portend for the future of Canadian-US relations in long-term perspective (Netherton et al.2005). Our goal in this paper is to examine systematically which changes have occurred with respect to foreign policy, domestic security, economic and immigration policy, and the institutional adaptations that have flowed from these 9/11-induced policy shifts. There is a profound tension at the heart of contemporary Canadian governance. As continentally integrationist

forces in the economy remain very powerful, a broad trend toward diverging Canadian and US identities as expressed through foreign policy, domestic laws, immigration policy and social attitudes is now being reversed (see Farson 2006).

Because our analysis is aimed at a wide international audience, we present material on Canadian history and foreign policy in context. Some background discussions among Canadian intellectuals and non-governmental groups also are included, as these reflect the wider ongoing debate that concerns adjustments Canada can and should make in response to 9/11. Finally, we include a brief analysis of the Harper government's response to the changed security environment as well as discussion about how this divergence may be bridged. The paper is based on our own analysis of primary and secondary sources, as well as off-the-record interviews with over a dozen Canadian officials across a variety of Ministries, conducted over a two week period by Anil Hira in Ottawa in summer 2006. In order to elicit the utmost frankness, unless specifically requested, we have kept our sources anonymous.

With respect to foreign policy, we find a marked divergence in Canadian thinking and behavior from the global strategy developed by the Bush Administration. Canadians rejected the U.S.-driven invasion and occupation of Iraq and still strongly adhere to that view four years after the overthrow of Saddam's regime. A Canadian role in the stabilization of Afghanistan was accepted only because it has enjoyed unanimous support from NATO, and latterly significant support from the UN as well. But since Canadian casual-

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ties rose in 2006 and 2007, public support for the mission has fallen steadily. In a broader strategic context Ottawa has rejected US pressures to support its Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) defense vision, and rejected too the US approach to nuclear strategy which in the Bush era has entailed the attainment of complete nuclear primacy over all other nuclear rivals. Canada prefers to continue to support the core goal of eventual denuclearization that is at the heart of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime.

Regarding issues of domestic and border security, there has been much more congruence in the two national approaches post 9/11, but even here differences have been manifest. With respect to immigration and refugee policy, both countries have clearly tightened their frontiers over the past five years. But on this issue the US government continues to see Canada as a weak link in its own security perimeter (Koring 2006a), despite Canada's growing efforts to address the issue. Under both Liberal and Conservative governments, spending on the Canadian military and on internal security improvements has increased considerably post-9/11. But while the public service has understood the depth of American security fears and advocated still greater spending, at the political level successive Canadian governments simply have not been prepared to commit sufficient resources, financial and human, to strengthen the Canadian security perimeter to the degree sought by American leaders. Without additional major investments in the Coast Guard, the RCMP, port supervision and port personnel screening, the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS) and the Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA), one cannot say that border surveillance and enforcement will be able to apprehend or deter would-be terrorists aiming to harm Americans or Canadians. Accordingly the US side of the Canadian-American border is becoming harder to cross to the point where trade and commerce is being impaired. By August 2007, one commentator suggested that the Department of Homeland Security had completely hijacked Canadian-American relations by backing out of preclearance negotiations (Ibbitson 2007).

The politically constrained Canadian response has been due partly to the recognition that no amount of spending will guarantee perimeter and internal security or, more practically, be able to ensure a moderate American border response in the event of a trans-border attack coming from or through Canadian territory. Partly it may be

due to the conviction that American insecurity has been worsened by the intervention in Iraq, and the related notion that Canada's non-participation in that mission may make Canada much less of a target for radical Islamists. Finally, the perception that Washington policymakers may never be able to find sufficient unity and political will to control their southern border also may lead to Canadian skepticism about the security value of vastly greater spending on the Canadian perimeter. Paradoxically, despite the adverse economic effects, some Canadian politicians may privately welcome American perceptions of Canadian security deficiencies in the belief that it will cause American authorities to be more vigilant and foster tighter American screening all along the common frontier. Canadians will do what can reasonably be expected of good neighbors, but limits have to be considered.

Thus there are serious differences of opinion about long-term security planning and short-term organizational responses to the immediate threat of terrorism that have complicated bilateral relations. By contrast, on the economic front there remains a deep and broad consensus in the business communities on both sides of the border about the necessity and desirability of maintaining a border that is as open as possible for trade, investment and business travel. The considerable tension between the economic and security imperatives cannot be resolved any time soon. It may become a major issue in Canadian federal politics.

II. HISTORICAL DIFFERENCES ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY: IRAQ AND PRIOR CONFLICTS

Historically, Canadians have had mixed feelings about major directional shifts in US international security policy, particularly when this led to intensified US military intervention overseas. It is not at all surprising that Canadians are not yet full-fledged allies in the war on terrorism, or that they have preferred to take a more pragmatic and case-by-case approach to instances of state-supported terror. Neither are Canadians interested in supporting the US's determinedly unilateralist approach to the challenges of nuclear proliferation. Canadian governments have seen a vital if not critical role for major international institutions such as the UN, the IAEA and NATO. Some unilateralist supplementary actions from time to time may make it necessary for the U.S. or Europe to deal with specific threats, but in the long term most Canadian policymakers

prefer to rely on multilateral responses to major international security challenges. With respect to the special challenges pertaining to the diffusion of nuclear weapons technology, for example, an issue area of major policy divergence from the current US leadership, Canadian governments have consistently upheld the validity of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty's ultimate goals as stipulated in Article 6: negotiations in good faith by the nuclear weapon states towards complete nuclear disarmament, followed ultimately (and admittedly in the distant future) by the relinquishing of all weapons of war (for detailed Canadian views see Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs 2005; and Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs 1999). Current US preferences for the indefinite retention of nuclear weapons, and for their further refinement and improvement as fighting instruments sufficient perhaps to wage preventive nuclear first-strikes on Russia and China (Lieber and Press 2006) are seen by many Canadians as deeply destabilizing and therefore quite unwise. They also consider unilateral deployment of layered strategic ABM defenses especially problematic, although the Harper government has shown signs that it might try to alter this position if it were to attain a majority in the next federal election.

In this respect, Canadian leaders have supported a transformation of world politics to be achieved through an incrementally built up multilateral consensus and a patient elaboration of universally binding international treaties, conventions and norms. Simply trying to eliminate the bad guys in world politics, the declared policy of George W. Bush's Administration, is seen as bellicose and corrosive to the effort to build and extend the reach of a global regime of arms control and disarmament. Many Canadian leaders may harbor hopes of an eventual global victory for democratic transformation, but they do not think democracy can be forced on other nations. New democracies are more likely to endure if they spring from authentic domestic roots, rather than from imposition through foreign military occupation and external fiat.

The conflict in Iraq is not the first time that fundamental differences have arisen between Ottawa and Washington about the merits of overseas intervention. During the Cold War, Canadians viewed US military interventions in Asia skeptically or critically. Ottawa reluctantly sent a small, symbolic Canadian contribution to Korea from 1950 to 1953. Canadian governments chose to remain

on the sidelines in a truce supervisory role throughout the US intervention in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos from 1954 to 1975. In both of these limited wars Canadian governments aimed to restrain their superpower allies through persuasion and diplomacy, for the most part in vain at the tactical level (see Stairs 1974, and Ross 1984). Canadian leaders never found the domino theory credible, and they were totally opposed to hawkish elements in the U.S. who were inclined towards anti-communist rollback in Asia, in effect, war with (and advocacy of regime change in) communist China. Containment, multilateralism and international institution building were at the heart of the Canadian approach to waging the Cold War (Keating 2002).

All US direct and covert interventions in Central and South America and the Caribbean were viewed with considerable disfavor from the era of Louis St. Laurent through Jean Chrétien: the lengthy history of intervention in Guatemala (1954); Cuba (1961-62); the Dominican Republic (1965); Chile (1970s), El Salvador, Grenada, and Nicaragua in the early 1980s; and Panama (1991) were all criticized widely in the Canadian press and seen by the senior civil service and political levels of successive Canadian governments as a strategically illogical and at times quite immoral use of US special operations military or CIA personnel. The repeated interventions by the United States in effect kept Ottawa from joining the OAS until the Cold War was clearly drawing to an end in 1988-89, because of the certainty of a direct collision of views over Washington's Latin American policies prior to that time.

Canadian involvement in bilateral security measures was needed during the Cold War to set constraints on the intrusive and demanding presence of the United States (Mahant and Mount 1999). More than a little of the intensity of Canadian economic nationalism during the Cold War stemmed from fears of a silent surrender of sovereignty through the progressive expansion of US corporate control over key sectors of the Canadian economy. The integrating tendencies of geography, culture and the vision of an unimpeded continental division of labor, however, proved to be irresistible. When Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau's efforts to implement a National Energy Policy and to restrict and reduce levels of foreign (i.e., US) investment collapsed in the early 1980s under pressure from the Reagan Administration and regional anger over the projected redistributive costs that would be borne by oil-rich Western prov-

inces, nationalist economic fervor was spent. Only four years after Trudeau's retirement, Canadians narrowly approved the regional free trade concept in the 1988 national elections. This turnaround was based on the hope that both the bilateral Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (and later NAFTA) would end problems with selectively protectionist behavior by Congress on behalf of US special interests. Both agreements failed to achieve this goal, although they did stimulate a rapid growth in bilateral trade overall. Nevertheless, many Canadians came to resent US pressures on their country, which seem to have worsened since Mulroney and Chrétien backed free trade, first continentally and then throughout the hemisphere. On refugees and immigration, internal security, and public policies involving health care, pharmaceuticals, or different approaches to state regulation of private enterprise (as in the forest products industry, ranching or agriculture), US political and economic pressures to conform to its approaches have not been happily received.

Post-9/11, neither the Canadian government nor Canadian public opinion approved of the US invasion and occupation of Iraq. The decision by Prime Minister Chrétien to reject any contributory role in Iraq first evidenced in 2002 is still seen as both correct and presciently wise given the considerable problems that have arisen in the US attempt to create stable democratic governance in Iraq with a gravely inadequate occupation force. As in most other countries, the U.S. intervention in Iraq is seen in Canada as having increased the risk of international terrorist acts, not diminished it (69% think it has increased the risk, 22% think it has reduced it: Oziewicz 2006). In 2005 a classified CSIS report concurred with that judgment, as did the head of CSIS, Jim Judd, in a public statement in October of that year (Sallot 2005).

On the other hand, the far more authentically multilateral removal of the Taliban regime in late 2001, and the now NATO-led effort to stabilize Hamid Karzai's elected government in Kabul, enjoyed, until recently, substantial majority support from Canadians. Since late 2001, Ottawa made a major commitment of both special force commandos (elements of the JTF2 unit) and regular force troops first to Kabul (and parts of the eastern provinces), and after mid-2005 to Kandahar (polls indicated 66% support for a combat role in 2002, but only 54% in March 2006: Blanchfield 2006; Den Tandt and Clark 2006). One early survey indicated that 62% of Canadians opposed sending troops to Afghanistan, and only 27% ap-

proved such a deployment (Laghi 2006). To combat falling support for the mission, the Chief of the Defence Staff, Gen. Rick Hillier, waged an unusually active publicity campaign to promote the importance of Canada's Afghan role, so much so that Prime Minister Harper felt compelled to assert that the Canadian involvement would be determined by civilian leadership, not the senior officer corps (Blanchfield 2006). Gen. Hillier's initial success led to Harper's March 2006 visit to Kandahar, Kabul and Islamabad. Harper then gave what seemed to be unqualified and possibly indefinite support for the mission. But with a rapid increase in Canadian casualties from mid-2006 to mid-2007, the Prime Minister was forced to commit his government to ending the Canadian Afghan mission in January 2009 should any proposed extension at that time fail to secure a clear parliamentary consensus that included significant opposition party support (Galloway and Peritz 2007). As of August 2007, polls indicated that deployment of Canadian soldiers to Afghanistan was opposed by a solid majority of English-speaking voters and over two-thirds of Quebec voters (CanWest News Service 2007). By July 2007, the Liberal Party under new leader Stéphane Dion was firmly committed to termination of the mission in 2009 (Freeman 2007) , while Jack Layton's New Democrats have consistently called for immediate withdrawal.

With respect to international security issues, many analysts have complained that there has been no clear Canadian national security framework, vision, or long-term strategy (Macnamara and Fitz-gerald 2005). The first such policy statement was made in 2004. It is too early to say if there is any consensus on the goals set out in that short document. This absence is natural enough for a middle power lacking grand strategy ambitions. In terms of foreign policy, as outlined below, Canada has traditionally relied upon an involuntary US security guarantee to cope with potential threats from all third countries. From the US perspective this has often been a source of frustration because of perceived Canadian free-riding at the expense of the US taxpayer, a problem that has intensified since the last decade of the Cold War. Canadian governments, however, have simply accepted what they consider an involuntary commitment from Washington that the US cannot avoid extending. The chief problem for Canadian security planners then, from this free rider perspective, is one of defense against help in those situations where Ottawa wants to protect its sovereign control over national

territory and ocean approaches during peacetime (for the original statement of the defense against help thesis see Orvik 1984). Far too little time is spent actually scanning the international horizons for trends and events that may eventually threaten Canadians welfare.

Up to 1968 Canadian governments tried to contribute usefully and responsibly to Western international security debates. But with Pierre Trudeau, and with popular Canadian disillusionment with the US intervention in Vietnam, came a progressive decline in Canadian international security activism. This decline had actually begun in the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis when the US government, from the Canadian perspective, had failed to honor the NORAD agreement's obligation to consult meaningfully prior to imposing its air-naval blockade, and when it later assisted in the electoral demise of the Diefenbaker government via a well-timed press conference by a US general and a still more calculated State Department press release (Maynard Ghent 1979). The inability to influence US actions with respect to either nuclear arms control issues or crisis decision-making, coupled with steady escalation of violence in Vietnam during the 1960s, led to a retrenchment and disengagement from high policy security issues by Ottawa that was probably inevitable. It certainly fed impulses in the Canadian elite that can only be termed either free-riding or functionally isolationist (Ross 1999).

While Canadian differences with US international security policies grew deeper in the decades of the 1970s and 1980s (the latter decade often referred to as the second Cold War), security cooperation with Western Europeans also was becoming more difficult. As the peoples of Europe drew closer together, Canadians were incrementally excluded from an active or effective role in NATO. Trudeau's cuts to Canada's force deployments in NATO in the early 1970s had exacerbated the countrys waning influence with European leaders and had contributed to a fading of interest in a North Atlantic Community by Canadians. So too did Trudeau's failure to secure any meaningful boost in trade and investment relations with Europe under a contractual link negotiated with the EU in 1976. While still an active middle-ranking power on the international stage in the 1970s and 1980s, Canadian governments cultivated other venues for multilateral engagement such as the Commonwealth, *la francophonie*, and later the WTO. Canadian commitments to UN peacekeeping in the 1980s and early 1990s helped induce many

Canadians to forget that their military forces were at root created for lethal defense or coercive diplomatic intervention. Peacekeeping came to be seen as a better way to use military force by many Canadians, and a further way to differentiate Canadian policies from more aggressive American approaches to security threats.

During Lloyd Axworthy's tenure as Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Canadian government tried to brand itself not only through a greater rhetorical support for peacekeeping but also under a broader doctrine built on the notions of human security and soft power (a term developed by the US international affairs analyst Joseph Nye). Human security involved basic universal rights for safety and security of person and access to essential social services. As a policy it entailed an international responsibility to promote attainment of these goals wherever they were not being meteven to the point of engaging in humanitarian intervention as part of an international responsibility to protect (later referred to as R2P). As Foreign Minister, Axworthy led a soft power campaign to ban the use of land mines and secured a modest level of Canadian funding to help pay for their removal globally. The treaty was pronounced a success, although the US, Russia, China and India refused to endorse the treaty, citing overriding security needs for landmine use. Ten years after the conclusion of the treaty it is not clear that the total number of buried mines has in fact been reduced to any significant degree, although progress in de-mining in several countries has been considerable and there are now 157 signatories compared to the original 122.

In the wake of the Ottawa Land Mines Convention, Axworthy's Liberal successors went on to back international efforts to constrain the dissemination of small arms but with much less success. Under both Chrétien and Prime Minister Paul Martin, Liberal governments took pride in promoting good governance and sent jurists to China and RCMP officers to Haiti, Afghanistan and elsewhere to try to foster improved respect for the rule of law and a more sensitive administration of justice and law enforcement. One of the most notable virtues of such human security initiatives was their very low cost: training judges or police is decidedly less costly than training armed forces, or equipping them, or dispatching them on peace enforcement missions. During the Chrétien-Martin years, spending on both defense and foreign aid fell sharply as a percentage of GDP from some 2.5% to less than 1.5%. In fact, the

elimination of the federal government's year-to-year deficits during Paul Martin's tenure as Finance Minister was accomplished in large measure by sacrificing the country's international force projection and aid provision capacities (see Ross 2003, 539-40).

Canada's foreign policy responses after 9/11 had to be pursued both multilaterally and bilaterally with Washington. On some issues, mostly economic, one set of reactions was driven by the need to express solidarity with the US to reduce potentially punitive action from Congress. On other issues, mostly related to international security, another pattern of advocacy demanded greater distance from US policies that were perceived to be threatening international instability or simply were incompatible with Canadians international values. Some business groups, such as the Conference Board of Canada and the Canadian Council of Chief Executives claimed that Canada could not afford to alienate its largest trading partners by indulging in an independent approach to international security issues. Their dream of greatly expanded security cooperation by Canadians in return for the final full ending of all trade obstacles from the U.S. Congress (labeled deep integration) has thus far failed to gain traction in the face of American security concerns.

Scholars are predictably divided. They range from historian Jack Granatstein, who suggested the need for greater solidarity with US policies, including Iraq, to an array of critics such as Stephen Clarkson who criticized accommodation with the US (Clarkson 2003; Granatstein 2003). Michael Ignatieff, a Canadian political theorist turned Liberal politician (Deputy Leader of his party at time of writing), pointed out that Ottawa's unwillingness to adequately fund military, peacekeeping, and aid activity left the Canadian government with little recourse for independent action. This touched off considerable criticism inside the Liberal Party (Ignatieff 2004). Though Canada's performance does not match its self-image as a peacekeeper (the country ranked 34th in terms of numbers of troops committed to U.N. peacekeeping in 2004 and 50th by 2006), Canada did provide very modest financial support for multilateral initiatives to fight AIDS in Africa.

Though willing to support the multilateral stability operations in Afghanistan with US and European NATO forces, at least for a limited term, Prime Minister Chrétien pointedly refused to support the US war in Iraq because it lacked the legal authority of a UN Security Council resolution. Chrétien's preference for a commitment

to Afghanistan over Iraq was highly controversial and prompted one Canadian army general to resign in protest. Business groups feared, quite incorrectly as it turned out, that the US might retaliate against Canadian economic interests (Boag 2006). Activist, academic, and policymaking groups enthusiastically supported the Canadian "no" to participation in the invasion and occupation of Iraq. Liberal leaders were prepared to support the war on terror but only up to the limits allowed by the UN. They were not prepared to endorse George Bush's proposals for an open-ended and largely unilateral crusade against nuclear proliferation. Bush's effort to deny the world's most dangerous weapons to the world's most irresponsible governments was seen to fly in the face of Canadian efforts to build a stable structure of international law anchored by the U.N. and applied universally. The Canadian "no" with respect to Iraq was guided less by superior intelligence assessments about the absence of weapons of mass destruction in Saddam's Iraq, than by a political determination that Bush's counterproliferation unilateralism was likely to be deeply corrosive to international order (on the counterproliferation imperative in US policy, see McDonough 2005). Other Canadian officials think the intervention in Iraq is likely to create more terrorists than it will eliminate (Farson 2006). The decision also played well in domestic politics, underscoring Canada's ability to say no to participation in American interventionary missions.

III. THE ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE (ABM) DEBATE

In recent years one bilateral issue in particular has frustrated both Ottawa and Washington greatly: what to do about ABM defense cooperation? The evolving Canadian stance vis-à-vis participation in US plans for a layered missile defense strategy for North America reflected both considerable ambivalence and a long history of discussion of the issue inside the Canadian government and a broader defense policy community. The Chrétien decade, 1993-2003, saw Ottawa reject US calls for missile defense deployments and support the indefinite retention of the Soviet-US (later Russo-US) ABM Treaty that had banned extensive ABM deployments and highly constrained ABM technology development since 1972. The Clinton Administration's effort to neutralize Congressional Republicans' advocacy of ABM deployments was applauded quietly in Ottawa. Prime Minister Chrétien even made known his preference for Al Gore over Bush in the run-up to the presidential elections in 2000.

Paul Martin, by contrast, took up the reins of the Liberal Party with an open mind on the subject of missile defense, coupled with anxiety about the consequences of Chrétien's no on Iraq. Accordingly, with the support of three other members of his first Cabinet (John McCallum, Bill Graham and David Pratt), Martin was ready to endorse specific arrangements for limited involvement in the summer of 2004 just after the election that had reduced his government to minority status. In August of 2004, Martin's government approved the use of NORAD's infrastructure in Canada to facilitate the tracking and attack assessment of any missile re-entry vehicles headed for North America from across the polar region. But this agreement, while of considerable practical consequence to US authorities, was coupled with an explicit statement that such cooperation did not constitute endorsement of US plans to deploy a thick, multi-layered area defense of North America against ballistic missile attack (though Canada would be nonetheless partially covered by the system). Under pressure from the Québec wing of the Liberal Party, Martin retreated from endorsement despite a visit to Ottawa by President Bush to try to extract such an open-ended commitment (Quebeckers were the most ardently opposed to missile defense of all provincial electorates, just as they were the most ardently opposed to Canadian support for intervention in both Iraq and Afghanistan. See Ross 2003, 535, n. 5; Ross 2005, 42).

Canada has participated in the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) since 1957. But over the fifty years of cooperation in air and aerospace defense, Canadian authorities have never agreed to participate in any US plans for comprehensive strategic missile defense. In 1969 an ABM exclusion clause was written explicitly into the NORAD renewal agreement concluded that year. This clause was removed in 1981, when the Reagan Administration pressed for its excision. But even a Conservative government under Brian Mulroney did not endorse the grand scheme for thick missile defenses called for by President Reagan in his Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) speech of 23 March 1983 when the President proposed rendering the ballistic missile threat impotent and obsolete. Mulroney formally gave a polite no to a US invitation to participate in SDI in 1986 with no adverse consequences for Canadian-US relations, just as his Liberal predecessors had done seventeen years earlier. NORAD cooperation in air defense and aerospace early warning remained undiminished despite these re-

jections of an important US grand strategy preference.

Since 2002, the Canadian Forces have developed a good working relationship with the new US Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and, under the auspices of a binational planning group, developed plans to add maritime security operations to NORAD's mandate in the 2006 renewal (Koring 2006). But the inherent indecisiveness of the Canadian government concerning US requests for a broad in principle endorsement of missile defense continues to the present day (for a review of such indecision see Richter 2004, 152-61; Fergusson 2005, 9-11, 28-30; and Ross 2005, 35-43). Since January 2006 Prime Minister Stephen Harper and his first Minister of National Defence, Gordon O'Connor, indicated several times that they were willing to consider any new but specific proposals from the Pentagon. This marked a return to the interest expressed by Paul Martin's government in late 2003 and early 2004. But the Conservatives' invitation was still well short of the support the Bush Administration was hoping to elicit. There is no indication to date that the Prime Minister is prepared to give unqualified support to global ABM development plans that Washington might wish to adopt (Den Tandt 2006a).

During the June 2007 G8 summit meetings, Harper expressed support for the American/NATO deployment of ABM sites in Poland and the Czech Republic, asserting that there is no reason to interpret those actions as a threat against Russia. But his official spokesperson also noted that the Canadian government opposed a global ABM shield, and that for any bilateral discussions to occur on further joint Canadian-American ABM activities the Americans would have to ask us. That has not happened, and it is not on our agenda (Saunders and Laghi 2007).

Since well before 2000 Foreign Affairs officials opposed the concept of comprehensive missile defenses, fearing that they would undermine strategic nuclear relationships between the U.S. and Russia and between the US and China, and thereby resuscitate rivalries in nuclear arms deployments. The case on behalf of unconditional missile defense cooperation with the US was made discreetly only by officials from DND during the 1990s. Such expressions of support remained low-key even after 9/11. But DND's political influence was weak with Liberal Cabinets in no way disposed toward supporting militarism or nuclear arms races, or undercutting their own electoral appeal among strongly anti-ABM voters in Quebec.

Canadian supporters of missile defense do exist in both major federal parties. They have argued that defenses built only against small-scale rogue states cannot be destabilizing vis-a-vis Russia and China now that both countries are deeply involved in global market economics. Second, Canadian opposition to US plans could lead to a severe marginalization or even termination of NORAD defense cooperation with very adverse and expensive implications for the Canadian government's ability to know what is happening in its own airspace in peacetime. Third, cooperation on the missile defense issue might help to soften Congressional attitudes on protectionist trade measures against Canadian softwood lumber and beef imports. It certainly would help protect existing levels of Canadian aerospace export trade under the Defense Production Sharing Agreements. Fourth, Canadians need to be in on the design phase of any comprehensive layered ABM systems because intercept engagement may someday take place over Canada. Fifth, a closer defense relationship with Washington would augment, not diminish, Canadian international standing because Ottawa's greater access to decision-making in Washington would give Canadian policy statements more credibility. Sixth, some level of layered ABM defenses could save millions of lives in the event of an accidental or unauthorized launch of ballistic missiles due to technical malfunction or events ensuing after civil war in some nuclear-armed country such as Russia or Pakistan. Seventh, modest ABM defenses *held multilaterally* would undercut the feasibility of crisis scenarios of limited counterforce attacks to show resolve, thus reducing the risk of great power nuclearized skirmishing. Lastly, the weaponization of space would not mark a qualitatively huge jump in the international military exploitation of space. Existing satellites are used for reconnaissance, surveillance and targeting of fixed and moving targets on earth with the attacks launched from weapon systems on the ground or from aircraft. Would it really matter if space-to-space and space-to-earth strike capabilities were added to the great power arsenals, when the US is already exploring the prospects for conventionally armed ICBM strikes and now that China has tested an anti-satellite weapon (ASAT) comparable to the most advanced American ASAT?

Critics in Canada, including three generations of Foreign Affairs/External Affairs officials, have consistently argued that a two-dimensional race in offensive and defensive strategic nuclear arms

will accelerate the arms race, block further reductions in nuclear stockpiles and deployed nuclear systems, and, worst of all, likely will worsen crisis instability by creating perceived incentives to strike first in any developing confrontation. For the foreseeable future any US rush into layered ABM defenses cannot be matched by any other nuclear weapon state. No other state has the requisite economic resources or technological capabilities. But such a world would not be stable. A world with an asymmetrical ABM defense advantage held by the US is only likely to stimulate further offsetting offensive deployments by Russia, China and any other countries who might feel threatened by an American capacity to engage in implicitly or explicitly nuclearized coercive diplomacy. This is all the more true when US strategic analysts begin to predict reasonably confidently that the U.S. now possesses strategic nuclear primacy, that is to say, an ability to carry out a disarming first-strike against the highly vulnerable nuclear arsenals in *both* China and Russia (Lieber and Press 2006).

As a result of the US abrogation of the ABM Treaty in 2002, some 1500 to 2000 more Russian warheads remain in service targeted at North America than would have been the case had abrogation not occurred and had START III been implemented. Russian defense planners have accelerated the development of long-range nuclear capable cruise missiles, and they have already tested the world's first Maneuvering Re-entry Vehicles (MaRVs) for new ICBMs that have remained in serial production. In late May 2007 they tested an advanced MIRVed (6 warheads per missile) replacement for SS-18 and SS-19 ICBMs that will be land-mobile in its deployment (Harding 2007). The Russian long-range bomber force has been refurbished rather than retired as seemed likely a decade ago. Long-range bomber patrols over the Arctic near Alaska were reinstituted several years ago. In 2007 President Putin, after failing to win over President Bush to an alternative ABM radar site in Azerbaijan both before and during the G8 Summit (Chivers 2007), signaled his considerable displeasure concerning American ABM deployments in Eastern Europe by confirming Moscow's abrogation of the CFE Treaty on European conventional force restraints (Blomfield 2007), and by authorizing additional regular bomber flights towards the UK, Canada and Alaska, and US bases in the Pacific (on UK flights, see Anonymous 2007; Guam and Arctic flights, see Kramer 2007). Additionally, Putin threatened that American

ABM deployments in Europe would necessitate retargeting European sites with both ballistic and cruise missiles with nuclear warheads (Blomfield 2007a). Finally, the Russian government has continued to refuse to discuss its immense inventory of tactical nuclear weapons and the Cooperative Threat Reduction security measures that are needed to reduce the risk of stolen loose nukes (see Allison 2004) largely because of fears of an emerging US nuclear first-strike capacity (on the progress towards first-strike nuclear dominance over Russia, see Lieber and Press 2006). It was thus not surprising when Putin and China's Hu Jintao attended a major joint military exercise by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in August 2007 that was labeled as anti-NATO and Warsaw Pact 2 in the Russian press. Iran's President Ahmedinejad also attended the event as a guest of honor (Blomfield 2007b).

US ABM defenses in space pose special problems that threaten crisis stability and arms race stability simultaneously. An American capacity to strike at other countries' satellites is likely to touch off a competition in ground-based anti-satellite systems and later space-based ones as well. The successful Chinese test of a direct-ascent Anti-Satellite weapon (ASAT) on 11 January 2007 certainly suggests this is a palpable risk (for test details, technical commentary and helpful explanatory graphics, see Hoffman 2007). For any country fearing an American disarming first strike, the temptation to strike first possibly with nuclear weapons to destroy US space-based assets and any vulnerable ground- or sea-based ABM facilities would be quite powerful. That risk in turn would increase the pressure on US leaders to make sure that US forces *preempted* any such efforts by destroying adversary ASAT or other ABM suppression systems before they could be used. The stage might then be set for a race across the threshold of nuclear use and an early end to the existing taboo on nuclear detonations.

In a less dramatic but still highly menacing scenario, Chinese leaders might be tempted to invade Taiwan after blinding what John Pike has called the low hanging fruit of US imaging reconnaissance satellites (Hoffman 2007). In the face of stepped up American global ABM deployments, the Chinese military could also threaten to ruin the usability of space by destroying many satellites at various altitudes to create a vast debris cloud that would destroy all satellites in low or medium orbits, without resort to nuclear warheads. That step could be taken prior to any such global ABM system going operational.

The ABM file will not be an easy one for Prime Minister Harper to handle. Russian and Chinese actions over the past five years have strengthened anti-ABM sentiment in Canada considerably. The various arguments for and against are technically complex and filled with political uncertainty, so they are not suited to public elaboration. Endorsing a globally ambitious US ABM deployment without any sort of *treaty-defined arrangement* on a cap for interceptor deployments of the type that were embodied in the ABM treaty would be politically hazardous. In addition to the strategic concerns already noted, such endorsement could lead to Ottawa being ensnared in sharing the cost of a massively expanded air defense system capable of handling new generations of stealth bombers and cruise missiles that sooner or later will be able to reach North Americaif American strategic relations with China and Russia continue to deteriorate. An ABM roof is quite pointless, after all, without capable air defense walls.

IV. CANADIAN DOMESTIC SECURITY RESPONSES AFTER 9/11: SECURITY/CULTURE DIVERGENCE?

Skepticism has restrained Canadian participation in US efforts at draining the swamps of international terrorism, but the response on the domestic and bilateral fronts has been far more cooperative and positive. Canadians have long enjoyed the benefits of largely unconstrained economic access across the world's longest undefended border. Cooperation with the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has been considerable and it continues to grow as the frontier evolves from mere geographic marker into a mature police border.

US policy changes after 9/11 led to the creation of the Department of Homeland Security and a host of other legal and intelligence shifts. The DHS embodies the newly heightened concern about the potentially unlimited reach of terrorism, not only mixing domestic with international concerns but also including functional areas that were traditionally considered at arm's length from security. DHS's purview includes emergency relief; cyber-terrorism and countermeasures; travel, transportation, and infrastructure security; and immigration and border security. DHS took over the former Immigration and Naturalization Service. DHS also sought to coordinate the work of various agencies across domestic/international and function lines, ranging from the Department of Energy to the

FBI and CIA. This was in response to the weaknesses revealed in intelligence sharing as a result of 9/11. *Securing Our Homeland*, the DHS strategic plan for 2004, included many objectives and concerns, along with a few of particular interest to this analysis (DHS 2004).

Securing Our Homeland's Objective 2.1 states that the DHS will create smart borders, which will monitor and prevent the importation of drugs, terrorists, and other illegal activity. Objective 6.4 states that the DHS will facilitate the efficient movement of legitimate cargo and people. Furthermore, the document notes that the border of the future must integrate actions to screen people and goods abroad prior to their arrival in sovereign US territory to ensure compliance with entry and import regulations. Agreements with our Canadian and Mexican neighbors are central to this effort. America's borders will be made more efficient, posing little or no obstacle to legitimate travel and trade. The report stresses the vital importance of international cooperation to prevent future terrorist threats. This aspect is the central focus of the Canadian response to 9/11, namely the creation of a smart border agreement that would not threaten trade with the US, as we discuss in the section below on migration issues. In pursuit of this goal of reassuring US trading partners, Canada revised its institutions and policies.

In fact, the Canadian security and intelligence apparatus has been under sustained scrutiny since the 1985 Air India bombing that killed 329 people on a flight from Toronto to London. The bombing was the worst single terrorist attack before 9/11 and has sparked a host of ongoing investigations. The bombing also led to stricter Canadian security in airports.

Canada's preoccupation with accommodating the US without losing sight of its own independence led to the 2001 Anti-Terrorism Act (Bill C-23), passed on December 18, 2001. The Act was designed to facilitate domestic monitoring and actions against potential terrorists. It allows the labeling of groups and individuals as terrorist in nature, and it permits investigative hearings to prevent potential acts of terrorism and terrorist activities. It also broadens the possibility for domestic monitoring of activities, including financial transactions and other communications. The Act, like the Patriot Act in the US, has been highly controversial with domestic minority groups (especially Canadian Muslims) fearful that the legislation will erode civil liberties. Kent Roach has suggested that it may unduly target religious groups, and that its preventive arrest and in-

vestigative hearings provisions may impinge unduly on Canadian civil liberties. As in the US, these provisions curtail privacy protection (Roach 2003, 48-50, 90-92). The Act underwent a regular five-year review which saw the Opposition parties in Parliament defeat Prime Minister Harper's late February 2007 effort to extend the preventive detention and judicially compelled testimony provisions for a further three years. Bill C-23 was not significant in helping to bring charges against eighteen young men in Toronto in the summer of 2006 who allegedly conspired to attack Parliament, behead MPs and blow up landmarks with truck bombs. In fact the lapsed provisions were never used at all from 2002 to 2007 (Martin 2007).

Such fears were reinforced in 2002 with the case of Maher Arar. Arar, a Syrian Canadian, was deported by the US to Syria with Canadian complicity in response to US concerns about potential terrorist activity. In January 2007 Arar received a formal apology from Prime Minister Harper and compensation of some Cdn $10.5 million plus legal costs because of RCMP actions that led to his torture. Three other individuals are also alleged to have been abused in Syria or Egypt because of requests for information by Canadian security personnel who, it is alleged, sought to have the suspects interrogated under torture (Krauss 2005). As a result, the Act and RCMP behavior were placed under close scrutiny. The February 2006 release of information that some 74 CIA flights had landed in Canada since 9/11 aroused public misgivings that Ottawa has been implicated in a good many instances of extraordinary rendition, a process that is widely acknowledged to be quite inconsistent with civil liberties attitudes in Canada (AP 2006). There is also some question about data on Canadian consumers which was being processed by US companies, but was also vulnerable to US DHS seizure under the Patriot Act. At the same time, there are concerns among Canadian officials that the US was not giving full intelligence from Iraqi-based sources that were relevant to threats at home, because of Canada's non-participation in that war. Such issues point to the seemingly out-of-date institutional and legal infrastructure that predates 9/11.

Notwithstanding the abuses that may have occurred, internal security spending has continued to rise. Canadian governments have begun to invest heavily on improving immigration screening to try to identify potential terrorists, on improved airport and air travel security, and on inspections of cargoes at major ports.

Transportation security spending increases have been a high priority. Canada's transport industries handle over Cdn $1 trillion in goods annually. One in 15 jobs in Canada is in the transport business. Almost 80 million passenger trips are made on airlines, almost 40 million a year on ferry trips. Four million people a day use rapid transit or rail services. Of the Cdn $9 billion allocated for better transportation security since 9/11, one third billion went to transportation security improvements. A May 2007 report done for Transport Canada estimated that Canadian and American security tightening also cost the Canadian shipping industry some Cdn $2.6 billion since 9/11. The report found that some 86% of the new costs were generated by tougher American security requirements (Gordon 2007).

There has been considerable consolidation and change in Canada in regard to agencies related to security. The Privy Council Office (PCO) is the key advisory organization on security for the Prime Minister. Within the PCO is the office of the National Security Advisor. The Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness is responsible for the RCMP, CSIS, CBSA, and Correctional Services Canada. The Canadian Security and Intelligence Service covers both domestic and international intelligence, while the RCMP remains the police force, with some intelligence capabilities. The Department of Citizenship and Immigration covers migration issues, while the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) is involved with customs and security at border crossings. The Communications Security Establishment (CSE), which monitors electronic communications, reports to the Department of National Defence. Foreign Affairs Canada and International Trade Canada cover diplomatic relations and international economic affairs. The Department of National Defence, besides being home to Canada's military is also the administrative home to the Communications Security Establishment (CSE: provider of electronic intelligence and information protection). Transport Canada covers security threats in that area. Since 9/11, Canadian agencies have been meeting on a regular basis with their US counterparts. A Bi-National Planning Group has coordinated efforts to match Canadian DND with the US DOD. DND also set up Canada Com, which is a liaison and policy group that specifically responds to requests for DND help by PSEPC for domestic natural disasters or security threats.

In the months after 9/11, the then Canadian Foreign Affairs

Minister, John Manley, worked hard to complete a series of smart border improvements that would ensure sustained movement of goods and services across the border, even in crisis circumstances. The agreement, while marking a significant step forward, did not presage substantive improvements in the physical security of key border crossing points that have been identified as points of exceptional vulnerability. However, it did establish pre-clearance and notification procedures that helped to speed up commercial transits of the border. In this area, in particular, it is easy to see the nexus between economic and security interests in the new global war on terror. For instance, in a statement to the Canadian Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence in 2003, an aviation corporation owner stated:

> There is a huge amount of money for everyone if the public is placated and huge losses if people believe that anything bad might happen. Everyone makes money selling fuel and it is all predicated on an illusion. In one sense, we know it is not safe (Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence 2003A, 112).

The 2004 Senate report on airport security concluded that coordination remains a serious problem: The RCMP does not have overall responsibility for security at airports. Right now, no one is in charge. The report goes on to note that the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority (CATSA) is the delivery agency for pre-boarding screening of passengers, baggage, and personnel, but does not report to the RCMP. CATSA follows guidelines set by Transport Canada. Meanwhile, local airport authorities deliver the physical security services at airports (Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence 2004, 184-6). Three years later the same Senate investigative committee deplored the lack of governmental reform, reiterating their main finding that security at Canadian airports is largely an illusion (Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence 2007a, 67). The RCMP still has not been given central control, nor has any other agency. CATSA still does not receive security intelligence directly. Airport employee background checks are inadequate. Restricted areas do not have adequate control. Flight and ground crews are not checked effectively. Baggage screening is poor, while air cargo and air mail shipments are very vulnerable to terrorist exploitation. The dangers posed by armed marshals on flights could be dispensed with completely, if only

the government had required double doors into all aircraft cockpits. The known shipper system is inherently insecure. Aircraft from small airports or float planes get into larger airports on air-side without full screening of passengers and crew. Government officials, however, attempt to hide all these gaps behind official secrecy. The Chair of the Senate Committee told the Air India inquiry in June 2007 that every time an individual is going air-side to work around aircraft, they should be searched in the way a passenger is searched (Bolan 2007). Port security is another zone of gravely deficient security.

Since the early 1980s, Transport Canada has gone through a dramatic organizational retrenchment. With the privatization of many functions, market-driven imperatives asserted themselves across the country's transportation grid. The department work-force shrank from 25,000 to 5,000. Departmental staff no longer ran security operations at airports or ports. The federal government's port police force was dismantled and private port operators were tasked with providing security. The main focus of the scaled back department became one of regulating standards of security, licensing and certifying pilots, certifying airlines for safety, conducting inspections to ensure timely compliance and so forth. Port security deteriorated as a result.

Over four million cargo containers enter Canada each year. About 30% eventually are forwarded on to the US (Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence 2007b). Up to 2004, around 4% (national rate) were screened lightly (Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence 2004, 134) and of those, only a small fraction were actually destuffed and searched thoroughly. Few ports have an ability to X-ray significant numbers of containers while simultaneously checking for radiation emissions. There are only fifteen Vehicle and Cargo Inspection Systems (VACIS) for the entire country in CBSA hands, and they are used only intermittently (Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence 2007b, 29). This extremely low level of screening is unlikely to improve in the foreseeable future. Customs and Excise union employees told the Senators that ghost cans (containers without identifying origins that are not empty) regularly enter and leave major Canadian ports (Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence 2007b, 31). In the Senate Committee's view every single container entering the United States via Canadian ports

should be screened. Screening should include complete documentation every time, weight on arrival in Canada and departure, density checks for detection of contents at variance with bills of lading, radiation emission checks, and mandatory use of tamper-recording seals that use Radio Frequency Identification Devices (RFIDs). But there is little likelihood that these recommendations will be acted upon.

With respect to the control of Canadas territorial waters the situation is even worse than the gaps in coverage in port security. As noted above, the 2003 the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence found that Canada's coasts have been virtually undefended (Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence 2003, 81). The Canadian Coast Guard has been seriously under-funded for decades. It would take a major infusion of capital to rectify the inadequate number of ships and personnel with which they are expected to control Canadian coastal regions. The land-based law enforcement backup to the Coast Guard is even less capable. In 2003 only thirteen RCMP personnel were available for law enforcement along 7,400 km. of Nova Scotia coastline. In 2007 the situation was no better, as only fourteen officers were available. Ships less than 300 tons are not required to have identifying transponders. As a Senate Report stated, the Coast Guard does not have a constabulary function, it is not armed and it reports to the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, all of which contribute to a focus away from coastal security. Despite its name, the Coast Guard does not play a serious role in guarding Canada's coasts (Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence 2004, 41). Exacerbating this situation are questions about coordination between the Coast Guard, the RCMP, and local authorities (Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence 2004, 3).

The Harper Government has moved to address this criticism by establishing Marine Security Operations Centres, on each coast, where the different agencies will have a physical location in order to share information. However, it is not clear how information will be shared and how decisions will be made in crisis situations. There is also a new bilateral initiative to patrol the Great Lakes with US counterparts. Yet, here again, there seems to be no clear jurisdiction, protocols, or institutional chains of command across the different binational institutions.

As of 2007 little progress had been made on either coastal or inland waters security. According to the Senate Committee the

Coast Guard remains toothless, lacks any institutional mandate for security enforcement, and has received no significant retasking and budget in the five years since 9/11. Canadian coasts remain undefended despite the Harper government's pledge to frame its approach to security in terms of Canada First (Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence 2007, 1-2). Any security concerns are reported to the RCMP, but the number of police officers available is woefully inadequate. The Coast Guard is a generation away from capable enforcement, even if there were a will to buy and arm the new aircraft and new helicopter-equipped littoral cutters the Coast Guard would require (Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence 2007, 8-10), which there is not. Meanwhile organized crime elements remain present in Canada's three major ports (Vancouver, Montreal and Halifax). Employee screening remains unreliable; six of Canada's nineteen largest ports have no background checks on personnel at all (Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence 2007b, 11). To our knowledge, the Senators write, no Canadian ports have waterside fencing or 24/7 waterside police patrols (Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence 2007b, 15). They note that the port of Rotterdam has over 420 police; Canada has only twenty-four RCMP for all nineteen ports. All twenty-four have been stationed in Vancouver, Montreal and Halifax only. The contributions of local police forces to port security are minimal. Where they occur it is primarily to promote boater safety and search and rescue. No level of government is taking proper care to protect and regulate the security measures for large ferry boats and cruise ships. Overall, the picture remains bleak indeed.

With respect to the Arctic and the Harper government's expressed determination to protect Canadian sovereign claims over the North West passage, the situation is marginally better. In July 2007 Prime Minister Harper announced plans to spend Cdn $ 3 billion on six to eight new ice-strengthened ships to patrol Arctic waters. The ships, however, will not be heavy icebreakers. Their operations will exclude winter months in the thick ice regions of the Northwest Passage. The announcement was said to make good on the Conservative Party's Canada First Defence Strategy outlined in 2006 (Pugliese 2007). In August 2007 the Prime Minister went on to announce the creation of a Cdn $100 million deep-water port at Nanisivik (at the northern end of Baffin Island) as well as an Arctic

military training base at Resolute Bay, Nunavut. Initial operational capability for the port is projected for 2015. Meanwhile the Canadian Rangers will be modestly increased in numbers and their equipment and training markedly improved (for details and maps see the Canadian-American Strategic Review website: www.sfu.ca/casr).

While the steps to improve the Canadian security presence in the Arctic may be well worthwhile from a sovereignty enhancement perspective, they do nothing at all to cope with the very serious security threats facing the vast majority of Canadians, who live south of the 55th parallel. Developing new spending plans for Arctic ships when Canadian seaports, airports and coastal approaches remain highly vulnerable seems strategically illogical and irresponsibly negligent. Perimeter defense is simply not under consideration in Harper's Ottawa, any more than it was under previous Liberal governments.

V. ORGANIZATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

The events of 9/11 required a rethinking of both domestic and international institutions in terms of the nexus between security and economics. Concerns for domestic civil society protection, sovereignty, and an independent foreign policy must be balanced with concerns regarding terrorism, smooth economic commerce, and security cooperation. Thus far, institutional changes have included ad hoc efforts with no particular level of organizational coordination between Canada and the US, mirroring the lack of coordination on the regional (there is no security counterpart to NAFTA) and international level (NATO separate from WTO) despite the new reality of security-economic linkage. These efforts are occurring on the federal level through inter-agency coordination, joint teams and task forces, and attempts to make security measures compatible. They are also occurring on the provincial, regional, and municipal levels, and between public, private, and non-profit organizations and with individuals. It is interesting to note that there is ongoing activity at the subnational level. For example, annual summits have been held between Quebec and New York since 1983 (Lubin 2003). One of the primary challenges is the problem of information sharing and coordination of various efforts.

Despite the strong efforts to centralize management under the PSEPC, mirroring the development of DHS in the US, the same problems that DHS faces lurk for Canadian officials. PSEPC is a

coordinating agency covering a wide gamut of different partners, from the RCMP to emergency management to health threats to CSIS in terms of intelligence. In theory, centralization should ease information flow and make coordination easier. In practice, however, PSEPC is dealing with long-standing agencies with a naturally strong sense of bureaucratic turf protection. Our interviews with public officials revealed a great deal of trepidation and uncertainty in regard to what information could be shared without violating privacy protection in Canada. As a result, the individual pieces of information from diverse sources may never be fused, just as important information from the FBI, the CIA and the Pentagon prior to 9/11 was never synthesized in the US. Moreover, PSEPC as a purely policy advisory and coordinating agency covers too many different areas for a clear sense of mission, objectives, and prioritization, or an ability to measure progress.

As in the case of DHS, PSEPC has neither carrots nor sticks to get agencies to work together. Most interviewees in Ottawa noted that PSEPC was overwhelmed, under-staffed (and suffering from turnover), and under-resourced for such a monumental task. This is compounded by the muddling of the security with economic agencies as well as domestic and international ones. In a crisis situation, there is no clear set of protocols or guidelines about a clear chain of command. In a situation such as an unusual ship on the high seas, the Coast Guard which scans domestic waters would have to report back to the RCMP, the RCMP would then need a warrant, and then the RCMP would have to use the Coast Guard to intercept the vessel. If the ship by then moved back to international waters, DND would have to be brought in and summon naval vessels. This is a recipe for disaster in the minute-by-minute world of terrorist threats, illustrated by US military's inability to launch jets to protect either New York or the White House and Pentagon during 9/11.

Similar scenarios, such as Canadian citizens linked to terrorist activities abroad, or foreign citizens attacking a domestic military base, bring into further relief the inadequacy of the new institutional relationships. The problem is compounded when one considers the need to coordinate across provincial lines and down to the provincial and municipal levels, where, as one interviewee put it, there is not much political capital in spending on security rather than on road and other local priority projects. Two interviewees in the Canadian public service suggested that within particular issue ar-

eas, communication across geographical levels is competent. However, across issues and within the Federal government across agencies, it is still problematic. In sum, while the new working groups bring together different individuals from across agencies, and while the idea of a coordinating agency in PSEPC may seem logical, these are only interim steps without any proven or even probable competence for dealing with major crises. In some future terrorist crisis it will be very difficult for PSEPC and DND to establish a clear center of authority if that has not been done in peacetime. It is unlikely that the Privy Council Office will be able to provide central coordination that is timely and effective without considerable advance planning and rehearsal.

These organizational communication and coordination problems are compounded by the lack of clear long-term thinking about the role of the military in the new age of terrorism. The Canadian Forces (CF) leadership has been promoting transformation for a decade without much to show for it. It has only just begun to acquire new long-range, heavy-lift transport aircraft after coping with obsolete worn-out tactical aircraft for at least a generation. The military planners still think in terms of conventional warfare. They hope to acquire new fighter aircraft and new ships that will permit the CF to project force to distant regions. The military officer class is not interested in training for aid to the civil power in the event of a major terrorist incident in Canada or the northern US that might involve nuclear, radiological, biological or chemical weapons. Neither do they think much about how they could quickly impose quarantines on major Canadian cities or the Canadian-American border. The CF officer elite seems convinced that NATO should attempt to stabilize the Karzai government, even if casualties continue indefinitely, and even if Afghan operations begin to consume a major share of DND's operating budget. In this respect they are out of touch with Canadian public opinion and Canadian security interests. Nation building on the cheap is not possible by NATO and the US in Afghanistan, or by the US and its coalition of the willing in Iraq.

In Afghanistan, Canada and its NATO allies face a protracted insurgency that is likely to remain ideologically committed, adaptable, and well supplied from secure rear areas. Pakistan under President Musharraf is unlikely to be able to crush Afghan insurgent training sites near the Afghan border. Musharraf's autocratic rule is not stable, and the most likely successor to him were he toppled

is radical Islamist rule of some type. With that risk in prospect, and with Pakistan's military in possession of some sixty atomic weapons (Federation of American Scientists estimate), does it make sense to attack insurgent forces on the Pakistani side of the border if such attacks threaten to topple the current regime?

A majority of the Afghan people depend on the cultivation of poppies and the sale of heroin. NATO governments have not devised an alternative crop for Afghan farmers, or an alternative economy for the Afghan regional warlords. The lessons of Vietnam to win hearts and minds and the political nature of such struggles seem to have been ignored in both Iraq and Afghanistan. There is no clear mission and no way to gauge progress without thinking more clearly about these key contextual factors. NATO soldiers with no local language capability, no history or background in the region, and no understanding of the local politics have very little chance of success. When asked about this gap in training and peacemaking capability, one official said that since many Canadian soldiers are from small towns, they could relate to the issues faced by provincial leaders in Afghanistan. The clear lesson of the lack of timely and accurate humint (human intelligence) from 9/11 seems to have been lost so far in terms of our forces priorities and strategic planning. Building a new Afghan National Army under Karzai's control will not solve the problem if there is no viable police force to protect villagers from Taliban intimidation and blackmail, and no viable solution to the problem of a heroin-based economy. Burning villagers' only cash crop is not going to build support for President Karzai. DND's current force projection mandate needs fundamental rethinking.

Clearly, whether Liberals or Conservatives govern in Ottawa, the defense budget and the national security budget are both going to be very limited relative to the nature of the trans-national terrorist threat. Should it be the priority of the CF to participate in nation-building on the other side of the planet or ensure security for the 2010 Vancouver Winter Olympics, or security for large ferries and giant cruise ships? Is the Canadian navy best used to protect the coasts if no federal party is willing to finance the upgrading and arming of the Coast Guard? Should scarce resources be spent on sovereignty over the Northwest Passage, when the country's airports and major sea and inland ports are woefully insecure? In an ideal world, the Canadian government would be able to fund all of

these worthy missions, but in the real world of constrained budgets and minority governments that is not possible.

VI. ECONOMIC & TRADE EFFECTS OF 9/11 ON THE CANADIAN ECONOMY

Differences in resource endowments and the geographic isolation of some areas have weakened Canadian unity. Claims of Western alienation among the people of the Prairie Provinces and British Columbia have been reinforced by Alberta's burgeoning oil- and gas-derived wealth and a sense of political disengagement by the people of these provinces from federal Liberal governments that have struggled to win seats for MPs in the West.

If any such inferiority is widespread, it would likely be the product of a sense of constrained economic opportunities. One must consider the integrative impact of US direct investment in Canada since the 1930s, which has accelerated the importation of additional economic, scientific and technological processes originally developed south of the border. Primarily because of the highest levels of foreign ownership of any developed country, the Canadian economy has been (and remains) the weakest among the G7 countries in private sector spending on research and development. Few if any US or other foreign corporate subsidiaries have product development or global marketing mandates. Such work is reserved for headquarters, usually in the US. Given this persistent structural aspect of Canada's branch plant economy during the Cold War, and the inability of CUSFTA and NAFTA to reduce in any significant way the levels of US ownership of the leading sectors of the economy, many talented and highly educated Canadians continue to feel they must leave for the US to realize their full economic potential. Many Canadians emigrate to the United States seeking greater economic opportunity, but not on a scale that provoked fears of a brain drain in the 1960s. Nevertheless, the trend throughout the 1990s was for some 22,000 to 35,000 young, highly educated Canadians to leave for employment in the U.S. each year, about 0.1% of the adult population (Statistics Canada 2000).

Canada's population is heavily urbanized. But apart from Edmonton and St. John's, the larger urban centers are all located close to the US border, a geographic reality that has contributed enormously to a pattern of north-south integration with the US economy. The fact that four-fifths of Canadian trade and investment with the

US is facilitated by a common language and legal-business culture reinforces what geographic proximity had initiated. One analyst has speculated that some additional impetus favoring continental economic integration flowed from Canadians' chronic inferiority complex vis-à-vis US society, a society that has been seen as consistently more prosperous and productive, and that has enjoyed a higher standard of living (Molot and Hillmer 2002).

The Canadian economy continues to have an interesting dualistic nature. While much of the economy, including parts of urban Ontario, Quebec, and British Columbia have well-diversified industrial and service sectors, other regions in Canada, including Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, British Columbia, and the Maritime provinces are dominated by traditional natural resource exports, ranging from fisheries to wheat and cattle to minerals, forest products and fuels. The Canadian economy originally revolved solely around these staples, with all the incumbent problems of commodity price and earnings fluctuations. Canada is also highly trade dependent. By geography and infrastructure, the sparse population is oriented more along North-South rather than East-West corridors. The desire to lock in the dominant customer market, namely the US, in order to avoid disturbances in economic growth was consummated, amidst great controversy, with the NAFTA agreement in 1993 under the Conservative Mulroney government. Under NAFTA, Canadian dependence upon US trade and investment has only increased. In several sectors, such as mining, energy and automobiles, there are industrial clusters that overlap the border, with heavy US investment in key companies.

The Canadian business sector's reaction to 9/11 was swift and certain. More than forty business associations and individuals founded the Coalition for Secure and Trade-Efficient Borders to push Canadian policymakers towards reassuring the US on border security. This was backed up by several reports by the Conference Board and the Canadian Council of Chief Executives.

The Canadian relationship with the US is easily clarified with some basic statistics. Table 3-1 below shows that the overwhelming Canadian dependence upon the US as the major trading partner is virtually unchanged since Sept. 11.

Table 3-1: Canadas Trade Dependency on the US is Unchanged

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
US	81%	82%	85%	87%	87%	87%	87%	86%	85%	84%
OTHERS	19%	18%	15%	13%	13%	13%	13%	14%	15%	16%

Source: Author calculations from Statistics Canada

Table 3-2 shows that this holds regardless of whether we look at exports or imports. It is interesting to note that dependency for exports is significantly greater than dependency for imports.

Table 3-2: Percentage of Exports and Imports by Partner

Exports	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
US	83.6%	83.7%	83.8%	82.6%	81.7%	81.4%
Japan	2.6%	2.4%	2.5%	2.4%	2.3%	2.3%
UK	1.7%	1.6%	1.5%	1.9%	2.2%	2.1%
Other EEC	3.9%	4.0%	3.9%	4.1%	4.1%	4.2%
Other OECD[2]	2.8%	2.9%	3.0%	3.2%	3.4%	3.4%
Other countries	5.3%	5.4%	5.3%	5.8%	6.3%	6.5%
Imports						
US	73.6%	72.7%	71.5%	70.1%	68.9%	66.8%
Japan	3 2%	3.0%	3.3%	3.1%	2.8%	2.9%
UK	3.4%	3.4%	2.9%	2.7%	2.6%	2.4%
Other EEC	5.8%	6.6%	7.2%	7.6%	7.4%	7.6%
Other OECD[2]	5.3%	5.3%	5.5%	5.7%	6.1%	6.2%
Other countries[3]	8.7%	9.0%	9.5%	10.7%	12.2%	14.2%

Source: Author Calculations from Statistics Canada

Table 3-3 demonstrates a small dip in total value of both exports and imports from 2001-3, but the absolute amount of trade volume has resumed its positive trajectory from 2003-4 onwards.

Table 3-3:
Total Amounts of Canadian Exports and Imports by Partner

Exports	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Total	429,372.20	420,730.40	414,056.00	400,175.40	429,134.20	453,600.20
US	359,021.20	352,165.00	347,072.10	330,468.30	350,769.30	369,284.10
Japan	11,297.40	10,120.80	10,146.90	9,770.30	9,958.00	10,488.10
UK	7,273.30	6,910.30	6,182.20	7,699.70	9,439.70	9,692.00
Other EEC	16,846.30	16,688.90	16,353.00	16,423.60	17,461.70	19,211.90
Other OECD[2]	12,059.00	12,172.50	12,460.50	12,679.60	14,394.40	15,238.40
Other countries	22,875.10	22,672.90	21,841.30	23,134.00	27,111.00	29,685.70
Imports	362,336.70	350,071.20	356,758.60	342,608.00	363,075.80	386,906.90
US	266,511.10	254,330.70	255,259.70	240,291.90	250,064.40	258,430.00
Japan	11,729.80	10,571.90	11,732.60	10,644.90	10,018.90	11,182.60
UK	12,289.30	11,954.10	10,180.90	9,166.10	9,461.20	9,111.60
Other EEC	21,136.50	23,197.10	25,862.10	25,999.70	27,014.60	29,247.70
Other OECD[2]	19,067.60	18,649.80	19,685.60	19,692.00	22,217.10	24,115.20
Other countries[3]	31,602.50	31,367.60	34,037.60	36,813.40	44,299.60	54,819.80

Source: Statistics Canada, C$ millions

Table 3-4 below demonstrates that the general product mix of Canadian exports to the US remains the same. The most significant difference is the increasing value of oil exports, and to a lesser extent plastics derived from petroleum, presumably due primarily to increases in the international price of petroleum.

Table 3-4: Top Canadian Exports to US, Pre- vs. Post- 9/11

Table 3-4: Top Canadian Exports to US, Pre- vs. Post- 9/11

	Ave1996-00		Ave 2001-05
87 - Motor Vehicles, Trailers, Bicycles, Motorcycles and Other Similar Vehicles	70,807	87 - Motor Vehicles, Trailers, Bicycles, Motorcycles and Other Similar Vehicles	78,302
27 - Mineral Fuels, Mineral Oils, Bituminous Substances and Mineral Waxes	31,695	27 - Mineral Fuels, Mineral Oils, Bituminous Substances and Mineral Waxes	62,796
84 - Nuclear Reactors, Boilers, Machinery and Mechanical Appliances	25,690	84 - Nuclear Reactors, Boilers, Machinery and Mechanical Appliances	26,822
85 - Electrical or Electronic Machinery and Equipment	17,733	44 - Wood and Articles of Wood (Incl. Wood Charcoal)	16,952
44 - Wood and Articles of Wood (Incl. Wood Charcoal)	15,057	85 - Electrical or Electronic Machinery and Equipment	15,491
48 - Paper, Paperboard and Articles Made From These Materials	13,275	48 - Paper, Paperboard and Articles Made From These Materials	14,151
39 - Plastics and Articles Thereof	7,816	39 - Plastics and Articles Thereof	11,853
94 - Furniture, and Stuffed Furnishings; Lamps and Illuminated Signs; Prefabricated Buildings	6,354	88 - Aircrafts and Spacecrafts	8,266
76 - Aluminum and Articles Thereof	5,943	94 - Furniture, and Stuffed Furnishings; Lamps and Illuminated Signs; Prefabricated Buildings	7,764
88 - Aircrafts and Spacecrafts	5,201	76 - Aluminum and Articles Thereof	7,534

Source: Author Calculations from Industry Canada, current C$ millions

Source: Author Calculations from Industry Canada, C$ millions

Table 3-5 below of Canadian imports from the US demonstrates again remarkable stability in import product mix from before and after 9/11. Tables 3-4 and 3-5 together indicate that much of Canadian-US trade is of Lindert (like products) intra-industry nature. This suggests a deep vertical integration (suppliers to buyers in the production process) of the two economies.

Table 3-5: Top Canadian Imports from the US, Pre- and Post 9/11

	Ave 96-00			Ave 01-05
87 - Motor Vehicles, Trailers, Bicycles, Motorcycles and Other Similar Vehicles	44,106		87 - Motor Vehicles, Trailers, Bicycles, Motorcycles and Other Similar Vehicles	48,962
84 - Nuclear Reactors, Boilers, Machinery and Mechanical Appliances	39,129		84 - Nuclear Reactors, Boilers, Machinery and Mechanical Appliances	38,157
85 - Electrical or Electronic Machinery and Equipment	22,360		85 - Electrical or Electronic Machinery and Equipment	17,922
39 - Plastics and Articles Thereof	8,310		39 - Plastics and Articles Thereof	10,421
90 - Optical, Medical , Photographic, Scientific and Technical Instrumentation	6,942		90 - Optical, Medical , Photographic, Scientific and Technical Instrumentation	7,022
73 - Articles of Iron or Steel	4,405		27 - Mineral Fuels, Mineral Oils, Bituminous Substances and Mineral Waxes	6,530
48 - Paper, Paperboard and Articles Made From These Materials	4,392		48 - Paper, Paperboard and Articles Made From These Materials	5,247
40 - Rubber and Articles Thereof	3,358		73 - Articles of Iron or Steel	4,883
27 - Mineral Fuels, Mineral Oils, Bituminous Substances and Mineral Waxes	3,278		40 - Rubber and Articles Thereof	3,688

94 - Furniture, and Stuffed Furnishings; Lamps and Illuminated Signs; Prefabricated Buildings	3,051		72 - Iron and Steel	3,581
29 - Organic Chemicals (Including Vitamins, Alkaloids and Antibiotics)	2,880		29 - Organic Chemicals (Including Vitamins, Alkaloids and Antibiotics)	3,536
88 - Aircrafts and Spacecrafts	2,716		30 - Pharmaceutical Products	3,501
76 - Aluminum and Articles Thereof	2,704		76 - Aluminum and Articles Thereof	3,067
49 - Printed Books, Newspapers, Pictures, Manuscripts and The Like	2,697		94 - Furniture, and Stuffed Furnishings; Lamps and Illuminated Signs; Prefabricated Buildings	3,066
72 - Iron and Steel	2,614		88 - Aircrafts and Spacecrafts	2,922

The tables above reflect the deep economic dependency of Canada on the US. Indeed, Canadian trade with non-US partners, including Mexico, is insignificant. Nonetheless, Canada also has attempted at various times to follow a more multilateral route to reduce its dependence on possible political changes in US economic policy. Canada was a leader in the creation of the WTO and participates in a variety of other multilateral groups, such as the Cairns group of agricultural-producing nations. Canada has also promoted the floundering Free Trade Agreement of the Americas, and has signed a variety of bilateral free trade agreements outside of NAFTA, including one with Chile. Canada has more recently sent and received diplomatic missions to and from China, seeking to become a Pacific gateway of resources and investment capital for that fast growing economy. Canada's attempts to diversify its trading partners have not reduced its vulnerability to US pressure. In a sense, economic vulnerability gives the US government enormous indirect leverage if it wishes to press Ottawa for compliance with its security policy wishes.

The data on physical crossings are quite limited. Table 3-6 below shows that there was a roughly stable rate of truck crossings at the major Canada-US border crossings, though some variation

by crossing occurred. It is interesting to note, in contrast, that the number of cars and other vehicles crossing has decreased steadily over the same period.

Table 3-6: Truck Crossings by Border Station, 2000-4

		Millions						Per cent				
Crossing	*Province*	*2000*	*2001*	*2002*	*2003*	*2004*		*2000*	*2001*	*2002*	*2003*	*2004*
Windsor - Ambassador Bridge	Ontario	3.54	3.38	3.48	3.41	3.49		26	25.6	25.9	25.8	26
Sarnia - Blue Water Bridge	Ontario	1.48	1.47	1.56	1.61	1.71		10.9	11.1	11.6	12.2	12.7
Fort Erie - Peace Bridge	Ontario	1.45	1.35	1.31	1.27	1.27		10.6	10.3	9.7	9.6	9.4
Niagara Falls - Queenston Br.	Ontario	1.04	1	1.05	1.01	1.01		7.7	7.6	7.8	7.7	7.5
Lacolle	Quebec	0.79	0.79	0.78	0.77	0.78		5.8	6	5.8	5.8	5.8
Pacific Highway/ Douglas	British Columbia	0.87	0.79	0.78	0.75	0.75		6.4	6	5.8	5.7	5.6
Lansdowne	Ontario	0.53	0.5	0.53	0.49	0.49		3.9	3.8	3.9	3.7	3.6
Top 20 (trucks)		12.1	11.7	12	11.8	12		88.9	88.9	89	89.2	89.3
Other crossings (trucks)		1.51	1.47	1.48	1.43	1.44						
Total All border crossings (trucks)		13.6	13.2	13.5	13.2	13.5						

Source: Transport Canada

However, a consultants report to Transport Canada, released in 2005, revealed that Canadian truckers found substantially increased costs as a result of US post 9/11 security measures at crossings. Trucks haul 70 % of trade with the US, 57% of exports and 80% of imports. These measures include the need to gather information for the new Pre-Arrival Processing System (PAPS) as well as Food and Drug Administration information for agricultural shipments

prior to arrival, and security compliance with the Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism (C-TPAT), which is required for approval for FAST border clearance. Additional costs were required for FAST cards, driver training, upgrading information systems, and new security equipment. In addition, there are costly delays while awaiting FAST approval of shippers and drivers. The study also suggests that there has been an increase in waiting times at the border. The study estimates total costs at a minimum of C $178.9 million per year (DAMF Consultants Inc. 2005).

Canadian economic vulnerability has come to the forefront in recent years with the softwood lumber dispute, finally settled in 2006, with Canada surrendering a large proportion of US duty charges, part of which went directly to the White House for meritorious objectives. In addition, a major blow was suffered by cattle producers in the West when the US banned imports because of concerns regarding BSE infestation. These disputes revealed as much about domestic US politics as about foreign policy, as competing US producers of lumber and cattle were better organized than importers. On the other hand, Canada has some cards in its hands in terms of negotiations. Fears of potential privatization of health care and water have led to Canadian leaders reassuring the public on those fronts. Similarly the unquenchable US appetite for energy resources has it looking northward amidst its policy fiasco in the Middle East. Canada is now the largest supplier of petroleum to the US. Unfortunately, the federal-provincial structure has prevented Canadian policymakers from capitalizing on such possibilities. Alberta's strong policy independence and its refusal to use the oil card to extract concessions for other areas in Canada's national interests, such as softwood lumber, in combination with the inherent split with Francophone Quebec, prevented the development of a consistent national trade and investment strategy.

VII. CANADIAN RESPONSES IN TERMS OF IMMIGRATION, REFUGEES AND BORDER SECURITY

As in Mexico, Canadian society has been strongly affected by US economic influences. But far more than in Mexico, Canadian popular and high culture have been greatly shaped by US cultural trends. This cultural impact has been somewhat mitigated by strong regional identities and by provincial control over education. Canada's national (federal-level) commitment to bilingualism and

biculturalism is supplemented by a de facto multiculturalism that is the product of continuing extraordinarily high levels of immigration (some 250,000 to 300,000 per year on a population base of some 33 million), with many of these people from Asia and only a small fraction coming from French-speaking countries of origin. Almost all such immigrants have preferred to integrate into an English-speaking society. Not surprisingly this has added to internal tensions between francophone Quebecers and the rest of the country and has fed separatist sentiment in their province. Aboriginal communities in the western provinces and the north also have expressed concern about the impact of such immigration on their position within the national community, despite a fairly flexible federal structure which has permitted a high degree of provincial autonomy and has even accommodated aboriginal self-government to an unusual degree by international standards.

The heavily Asian component of Canadian immigration and the equally heavy component of Latino immigration to the United States have already produced significant cultural divergence between the two countries. They also led to demands that the Canadian border with the US be tightened because of populist anti-Latino sentiments in southwestern US states which made illicit Latino immigration into a major issue in the 2006 Congressional elections. In an effort to avoid charges of ethnic bias, US immigration exclusionists have demanded a new wall along the Canadian border to keep out illegals, even though estimates of the numbers of illicit entrants from Canada are fewer than 5 per cent of the 400-500,000 illegal migrants per year who cross the southern border of the US (Swarns 2005).

For Canadian observers the most important aspect of the US immigration debate is its almost certain massively negative impact on US tourism and convention business in Canada. The imminent requirement for all returning Americans to have passports is certain to damage Canadian tourist-related industries as it takes effect over the next two years. The hardening of the border in this respect has been treated as something of a national insult by some Canadians, as a reflection of an unjustified US perception that Canada is a weak link in US security. The hardening border may also be feeding the sense of inferiority in some quarters as well.

While some Canadians may feel inferior to their US neighbors, others have celebrated their commonalities, but often by differenti-

ating themselves from US methods and approaches to public institutions, values and foreign policy. Canadians strongly support their national health care system, even as they demand better service; they also have value their more generous welfare, social security, and educational benefits. Most Canadians endorse the abolition of capital punishment and see its continuance in the US as morally retrograde and racially discriminatory (see comments by Senator Celine Hervieux-Payette: CBC News 2006). Because Canadians have experienced lower rates of crime and violence, and fewer problems with guns and narcotics, most Canadians feel they enjoy a more peaceful and equitable existence than do most Americans. For Canadians who share such sentiments, there is often a subtext of anti-Americanism in political discussions, so much so that one senior political commentator noted during the run-up to the January 2006 national elections with respect to outgoing Prime Minister Paul Martin's campaign that dwelling on the failures of Americans is our favorite way of feeling accomplished and virtuous (Fulford 2005).

Such attitudes have led many Canadians to oppose any strong dependence upon the US. Many nationalists in the center and left of the political spectrum fear the Americanization of societal values and thus resist any further acquisitions in Canada by US corporations (Hurtig 2002). Stephane Roussel summarized the situation as a Triangular Contradiction, where Canadians feel they are pulled by three competing goals: security, sovereignty and prosperity (Roussel 2002).

Regardless of these philosophical and cultural differences, with Canada's dependence on the US economy, Ottawa naturally feels compelled to ensure the ease of cross-border traffic flow all along the border. More than 200 million people and fourteen million vehicles cross the border every year. The Ambassador Bridge in the busiest corridor, Windsor-Detroit, home to the auto industry, witnessed more than 12 million vehicle crossings in 2000 alone (House of Commons 2001). In the months after 9/11, Canada's Foreign Minister John Manley therefore worked hard to complete a series of smart border improvements that would ensure sustained movement of goods and services across the border, even in crisis circumstances. The agreement, while marking a significant step forward, did not presage substantive improvements in the physical security of key border crossing points that have been identified as points of exceptional vulnerability.

The main feature of Canadian and US responses to 9/11 is to work towards compatibility and cooperation in terms of information sharing, screening, and enforcement measures along the border. Canada feels it suffers a credibility gap in terms of US policymakers, dating from the 1998 Ressam arrest at the Port Angeles, Washington border crossing, and false beliefs that many of the 9/11 hijackers came through Canada (Sands 2001).

The perceived need for reassurance explains Canada's attempt to develop stricter border control measures. The Ridge-Manley accord of December 2001 called for a smart border, meaning one in which stricter security would not prevent the convenient flow of goods, services, and people. The implication is that with some greater investment in technology and border infrastructure, there would be no such tradeoff. The idea is to tighten inspection of goods and people before they arrive in North America (the perimeter concept), and to facilitate traffic of both within North America through pre-clearances. In the same month, a Joint Statement on Cooperation on Border Security and Regional Migration Issues followed. The Joint Statement placed Canadians on the US Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force, and agreed to review visitor visas, develop common biometric identifiers for travel documents, send more immigration officers overseas, and enhance Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBETs). In 2002, Canada and the US established the Bi-National Planning Group for enhancing cooperation among military, intelligence, emergency response, and maritime surveillance. The group has fifty staff members, including twenty Canadian military personnel and one member of PSEPC. It is located at NORAD headquarters in Colorado Springs. The mandate of this temporary group was extended until 2006, though there has been some discussion of making it permanent (Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence 2004, 97-8). In addition, the GOC and the GOUS have agreed to pre-screen ships entering the St. Lawrence Seaway in the port of Montreal, and to coordinate marine security regimes. There are joint operations at major ports to screen shipments (Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence 2004, 117-8). One major feature of smart borders is the NEXUS pass system, which allows for more rapid clearance by frequent border crossers. There is also the FAST (Free and Secure Trade) program, a pre-clearance program for companies that frequently ship cargo across the border. Despite a few incidents and

expressions of concern by US officials over lax security, there has been no major change in the basic nature of the border relationship thus far. This has led to criticism of under-funding and under-training of Canadian border agents as well as discussions around whether they should be armed. Moreover, a number of border posts continue to be manned by a single officer, and others do not have adequate access to security databanks (Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence 2005, 19, 37).

In more concrete terms, the US has increased its security presence on the Canadian border. It has tripled agents on the border, and the Coast Guard now stops all boats and escorts oil and gas tankers in the Great Lakes. So far, efforts have been concentrated at the major commercial crossing points, such as Windsor-Detroit, and Vancouver-Blaine (Andreas 2003, 9). The Windsor-Detroit crossing is by far the most important conduit, as 23% of bilateral trade passes there. For 2004, the total value of trade through that border crossing was $141.67 billion Canadian. The vital importance of this physical link has raised alarm about its possibility of becoming a target (Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence 2005, 47). In turn, Canada has increased the border security budget by C$280 million, including beefed-up border presence, additional security and intelligence personnel (including 2000 re-assigned RCMP officers) and airport security measures. In addition, Canada further tightened its visa regime, requiring visas from Saudis and Malaysians. Canada also increased refugee screening and detention and deportation capacity, and introduced a new tamper-resistant permanent resident card for new immigrants (Andreas 2003; Hristoulas 2003). A variety of more under the radar changes have also ensued in terms of increasing cooperation with the US security apparatus. Besides greater information sharing, the number of US agents, including customs, FBI, and immigration officials operating in Canada has tripled (Hristoulas 2003).

The possibility of more stringent US enforcement of borders has disquieted some Canadians. The US introduced the provisional idea that Canadians would need to carry passports to cross the border. Discussions have also centered on various digital voice, fingerprint, and iris recognition equipment for screening visitors. Former Canadian Ambassador to the US Allan Gotlieb, echoing the sentiments of several in the business community, has suggested in response the idea of forming a common perimeter and customs

union, in other words a fully integrated border (Cody 2003). Again, nationalists such as Stephen Clarkson would see this as an end to the differentiating factors of Canada, including public rights to access to health care, lower crime and inequality, and greater public-private partnerships in production, a process which they fear has already begun under neoliberalism (Clarkson 2003).

On the domestic side, there are concerns that Canada is not living up to its self-image as a place for refugees, and that conditions for them may worsen with 9/11 fears. The 1976 *Immigration Act* was the principal guiding framework for immigration law before 9/11. The 1976 Act removed all explicit traces of discrimination against the physically and mentally-handicapped and along the lines of sexual preference. But it maintains denial clauses for health, criminality, safety and national security reasons. The Act was touted as an excellent example of Canadian liberalism. Since 9/11, several important policy changes have taken place. The Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) was created in December 2003 as part of the new Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada (PSEPC) portfolio. PSEPC was created as a new department in April 2005. The CBSA is designed to coordinate border security agencies, including customs; the Intelligence, Interdiction, and Enforcement program of Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC); and the Import Inspection at Ports of Entry program of the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA). Further coordination occurs with the DND, the RCMP, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, and local public and infrastructure officials. These programs now fall under the jurisdiction of the solicitor general (Pratt 2005).

One way to understand the central challenge of the 9/11 failures is the failure of coordination, when intelligence clues were passed over, not passed along, or action upon them was simply delayed until it was too late. *In the post 9/11 world, there is an action to coordinate across economic and security lines, and across geographic lines, from local to regional to national to international in unprecedented ways.* In the US, the DHS experiment has received major critiques in terms of the capability of the agency to coordinate action, as well as the highly politicized nature of its budget expenditures. In Canada, the attempt to consolidate security under the Privy Council and the PSEPC has also received criticism. For instance, during Senate testimony regarding responsibility for security training for aircraft

crew, there was a split between two branches of Transport Canada, security and civil aviation, over jurisdiction (Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence 2003, 120). There is a high probability that the rather ad hoc bilateral coordination with the US on security matters will become more institutionalized over time. It is unlikely that a unified North US Security Perimeter that does away with borders between Canada and the US will appear, for the various reasons stated in this analysis. However, the idea of a North US layer of coordinated security seems likely and would follow traditional Canadian strategic reliance on the US for its national security (Senate Standing Committee on National Security and Defence 2005, 7). As one interviewee stated, it is not enough merely to create PSEPC. A major change in the culture of each organization in the public sector is also needed.

VIII. CANADA'S STANCE TOWARDS MEXICO POST 9/11

Despite the existence of NAFTA, Canada's relationship with Mexico remains under-developed. Though there are obvious parallels in terms of reducing strategic dependence on the US, these have yet to be developed. Canadian trade with Mexico remains a small fraction of total trade. Canada receives some Mexican migrants, but for a variety of reasons the nature of immigration is quite different in Canada than in the US. First, Canada has no long-standing history of Mexican settlement, unlike the Southwestern US, seized from Mexico in the 19th century. Second, with no border contiguity, distance makes reaching the northern border more difficult and expensive. Third, Canadian immigration laws are enforced at the workplace, and the national health care system requires proof of legal residence for access. For all of these reasons, the family and institutional networks the facilitate Latin US immigration in the US are just beginning to spring up in Canada.

In terms of strategic cooperation, trade and investment diversification, and Canada's interests in multilateral rules of law regarding NAFTA, Canadian policymakers have recognized the desirability of greater cooperation with Mexico. Before 9/11, in parallel with discussions around the FTAA, there was discussion of the creation of a NAFTA plus arrangement which would move towards a common market, allowing for the free movement of goods, services, investments and freedoms. Mexican President Fox even briefly suggested a common currency, though this idea does not have strong support

in Canada. By 2002, the Canadian government instead supported a bilateral customs union with the US as a step forward. The idea did not gain much traction within the Bush Administration (Campbell 2003). In other words, Canadian policymakers seem to recognize the strategic value of extending and strengthening trilateral relations and NAFTA regimes (which one group of executives called the North US Security and Prosperity Initiative), but they do not see this as feasible in the short-term given Washington's security concerns (Canadian Council of Chief Executives 2004).

Most experts note that the relationship with Mexico remains very much on the back burner. Canadian policymakers remain focused on the bilateral relationship with the US, following the lead their economic interests dictate, despite Mexican efforts to forge a more trilateral relationship (Hristoulas 2003). Since much of the Canadian left has a sense of nationalism (even if unrequited), there is a strong reluctance to consider the idea of entering into a North US citizenship, which they fear would lead to US dominance (Welsh 2004).

IX. HARPER'S NEW CONSERVATIVE GOVERNMENT

While the new Harper government was lauded in the US as pro-US, there are not yet any signs of major changes in Canadian security policy, certainly not with respect to Iraq. Prime Minister Harper's March 2006 visit to Afghanistan and Pakistan has clearly cemented his governments support for the NATO ISAF mission for at least one year and possibly much longer. According to Margaret Purdy, Special Advisor to the Deputy Minister for Transport Canada (public talk at Simon Fraser University, February 23, 2006), the new government has made a number of promises in regard to security. Its main focus is on quelling Canadian fears about crime, including issues of drugs, organized crime, and gun violence. In terms of national security, the new Government will appoint a new National Security Commissioner to coordinate the activities of all relevant agencies through a National Security Review Committee, establish a Canadian agency for foreign intelligence, re-establish port police, and create a new enquiry into the Air India bombing. Purdy notes that the Canadian government continues to struggle to convince the US that we are not a weak link. During the January 2006 election campaign, the Conservatives also pledged to issue firearms to Canadian border inspectors at all land crossings and end the prac-

tice of having single officers on duty at remote locations for long periods of time. Coast Guard ships would be replaced in a more timely fashion. The Harper government announced that before 2016 all border guards will be equipped with weapons to track possible criminals, after controversy regarding whether they should be armed. Also, Harper promised to spend over $100 million to add extra staff to patrol borders, including 400 or more new officers. Not surprisingly, the WHTI requiring passports for everyone (re-) entering the US created a great deal of controversy both in Canada and in US border regions amidst fears of severe negative economic repercussions, reflected in current efforts to delay the process in the US Congress. This led several business-local government coalitions to propose easier alternatives to passports, such as Washington State proposing a modified drivers license. With the requirement on air travelers set to go into effect, and massive delays in both US and Canadian passport issuances, the US Government postponed implementation of the rule in June 2007.

In response to the need for better coordination among security branches, the Harper government set up a new around-the-clock Government Operations Centre, as well as the Integrated Threat Assessment Centre. There is also an annual meeting and a permanent high-level forum among the ministers to coordinate action on emergencies, and the intention to create a national emergency response system. The government also created a new Public Health Agency of Canada, in part to manage the possibilities for the spread of disease. Partly in response to worries about the new intrusiveness into privacy, the Government set up the Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security to encourage citizen input. (Privy Council Office 2005, preface).

With respect to international security policy, the Harper Government embraced the Afghanistan mission, despite wavering public support and questions about the endgame similar to those in the US about Iraq. In February 2007, the Government announced its commitment of an additional $100 million (on top of the existing $100 million) to Afghan reconstruction, to be spent over the following ten years. On April 24, 2007, a Liberal motion to withdraw troops by 2009 was defeated 150-134, by the Conservatives and the NDP. The NDP wanted an immediate withdrawal of the troops. Defence Minister Gordon O'Connor stated that troops may be needed until 2010. The Harper government indicated that it will try to in-

crease the strength of the regular forces from 60,000 to 75,000; that it will look seriously and with sympathy on any specific new proposals for cooperation on ABM defenses; that it will renew NORAD with an expanded mandate to include the surveillance and control of all maritime approaches to North America (Koring 2006); and that it will provide the necessary early upgrades to sustain the existing force projection capacity of the Canadian navy and air force. Despite apparent loss of domestic support amidst mounting body bags and no real signs of endgame, it was still a surprise in June 2007, when Harper's government stated that it would push to renew beyond the set time frame of February 2009 only with consensus support from the Parliament.

The Harper cabinet will be facing a major budgetary challenge to make good on its declared commitment to refurbish the capital equipment of the Canadian Forces. But given the budgetary surplus position that his government has inherited, it is in a far better position to contemplate major increases in defense spending than any other G7 country. Indeed, the Harper government announced a $1.1 billion increase in spending by the armed forces in 2006 over two years as well as increases in international aid. On top of that, in the wake of Russian declarations that parts of the Arctic belonged to them in July 2007, Harper announced the intention to build up Canadian forces in the region, including a new military port and new vessels. An international scramble for the Arctic now seems likely given its importance to shipping and, more importantly, a potential resource gold mine, including petroleum reserves opening up ironically due to global warming.

A renewed effort to shore up the security issues around NAFTA trade led to the Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America (SPP), announced on March 23, 2005. The agreement covers cooperation in security, transportation, the environment, and public health. In 2006 the Harper Government pledged C$1.4 billion towards security over the next two years, including $73 million towards securing the financial system; $202 million towards the border security components of SPP, and $101 million towards arming border officers and eliminating sole officer posts. The SPP also contains coordinating commissions in the North US Competitiveness Council (NACC), geared towards coordinating regulatory policies, North US Emergency Management, Avian and Human Pandemic Influenza, North US Energy Security, and North US Smart and Se-

cure borders. The Harper government has continued the Counter-Terrorism Capacity Building Program, begun in 2004, to share expertise on security measures with the UN and other multilateral fora, and it has participated in several international terrorism joint exercises, notably tripleplay with the US and UK in 2005. In short, while the Harper government represents a clear *rapprochement* with the US, certainly in comparison with Liberal governments, there is no sign of a major shift in Canadian foreign policy in terms of support of multilateralism or support for the Iraq War. Rather, Harper seems to be using the wiggle room of terrorism to re-leverage new resources into Canadian foreign policy towards greater activism through renewal of the military, with a principal focus in Afghanistan, but also with greater activism on other fronts. This includes efforts to negotiate (free) trade agreements (eg with Colombia and the Asia Pacific Gateway initiative) outside the NAFTA guise and to remain active in peacekeeping, such as providing financial support for Darfur and substantial support in Haiti. However, these new initiatives do not seem to share a coherent vision for Canada's role in the world. We return to this problem in our conclusion.

X. CONCLUSION

Canada's main concern following 9/11 remains to ensure steady economic flows with the United States (Senate Standing Committee on National Security and Defence 2005). This is a reflection of the Canadian reality of economic dependence upon the US for trade and investment flows. Canadians continue to balance the desire to maintain their social and governance differences from the US while reassuring its dominant partner. That ambivalence is illustrated by Canadian and United States defense headquarters security arrangements. For example, Canada's DND headquarters, unlike the Pentagon, occupies a large office building in the middle of Ottawa, with a mass transit bus loop in front of the building and a shopping mall, the Rideau Centre, across the street. There are no metal detectors, although there are some security gates for guests. There is an underground garage and the parking lot is easily accessible without identification. The state of affairs for these domestic policy buildings is in sharp contrast to the beefed-up security at Canadian airports, key conduits to trade with the US.

This paper brings several issues forward that warrant further investigation, issues that apply not only to Canada but to all coun-

tries in the new security environment. September 11 has begun to change the nexus between security and economic linkages in Canada and the US (and in Mexico). In key sectors such as energy, migration, and transportation, 9/11 is forcing cooperation between security and economic institutions and coordination of policies within key sectors where these were previously separate. At this point it does not seem to threaten commerce in Canada, yet fears of potential US reactions following another attack are widespread. A relatively small incident (as compared to the damage of a natural disaster or highway fatalities) could have profound economic reverberations as the news spreads and stokes fear throughout the population. The hugely magnified effect, which we saw with 9/11, precipitated not only a new era of institutional governance, but two wars and a massive expenditure for non-economically productive security (except for those receiving such contracts). It also reverses the normal rules of power in international relations, namely that power is cumulative, based on military force and economic production fungible into military force. Thus, a handful of people can create havoc at the largest levels at relatively low expense, especially in North America which is unaccustomed to such incidents. The effect is akin to the herding effects of stock market crashes such as that in East Asia in 1999, where there is an emotional reaction to the loss of confidence by one significant holder that magnifies into a massive flight of capital. This scenario should push us to think more carefully about what we mean by terrorism and by security. In the new security scenario, where any target is vulnerable, though higher profile targets are preferred, what is the appropriate calculus for achieving adequate security at a reasonable cost? As one Canadian official put it, there is a danger that the threat of terrorism may overwhelm the ability to sort out and maintain other functions as well as our financial capabilities. To our knowledge, there is no real discussion of this issue thus far. Still, it is not a purely existential question but one which must be engaged in order to set priorities and move from a reactive, fear-based milieu to one in which we can become pro-active. Our discussions with Canadian officials so far support a scenario in which Canada can balance the need to do enough to reassure the US not to close borders or fear a weak link to the North without endangering its hard-won budget surplus and reduction of long-term debt.

Notwithstanding the positive steps by the Harper government, we have also seen that there remains massive confusion about how to coordinate a public sector response to terrorism at the multilateral, bilateral, national, and provincial levels, and across functional lines. A more serious long-term plan based on protocols for action and a clear chain of command needs to be developed. This type of thinking is hard to come by in Ottawa and Washington, where timelines are short-term in response to the political climate. However, it is particularly important for Canada to further develop its institutional and policy priorities in order to coordinate with the US from a strong base of self-confident action and clarity of thought and strategy. Such a foundation would provide for a more mutually beneficial relationship in the long run. Canadian leaders need to avoid reactive, crisis-driven responses to American demands by anticipatory planning, coordination and spending on tangible, crisis-accessible instruments, whether in the military, the police, the intelligence community or public health management. As one interviewee noted, we cannot view every single event through the prism of terrorism. But it is also true that authorities on both sides of the border need to think more clearly about the most plausible and remediable vulnerabilities that now exist. To date, Canadian governments lack clear, integrated planning for coping with future acts of terrorism. Emotionally and politically-charged thinking explains our mixed, incoherent and at times illogical reactions thus far. Transcending partisan perspectives in Ottawa to foster a proactive, creative approach to the common security challenges faced by Canadians and Americans will be difficult, but it must be done soon.

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CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION 1

II. HISTORICAL DIFFERENCES ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY: IRAQ AND PRIOR CONFLICTS 4

III. THE ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE (ABM) DEBATE 12

IV. CANADIAN DOMESTIC SECURITY RESPONSES AFTER 9/11: SECURITY/CULTURE DIVERGENCE? 18

V. ORGANIZATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 26

VI. ECONOMIC & TRADE EFFECTS OF 9/11 ON THE CANADIAN ECONOMY 30

VII. CANADIAN RESPONSES IN TERMS OF IMMIGRATION, REFUGEES AND BORDER SECURITY 38

VIII. CANADA'S STANCE TOWARDS MEXICO POST 9/11 44

IX. HARPERS NEW CONSERVATIVE GOVERNMENT 45

X. CONCLUSION 48

REFERENCES 51

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