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Special Congratulations
to the winner of the first annual
History Essay Contest

Michael Siemens

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Sword of Damocles

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“The unleashed power of the atom has changed everything save our modes of thinking and we thus drift toward unparalleled catastrophe.” –Albert Einstein

The term “Front Lines” has traditionally been used to indicate where fighting is occurring in a war. However, while its connotation has always been one of danger, it also denotes a modicum of safety, as those who are away from the “Front” cannot be touched. This was true back in the days of bullets and bayonets, but bombs have turned this axiom to an illusion. It is foolish to believe that anyone can be safe when one considers the nuclear afterglow of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, where the true destructive capabilities of the atom were revealed. For the first time in humanity’s history, people carry the ability to create an Extinction Level Event. As ability outpaces empathy, man finds himself with enormous power but could be without the wisdom to use it responsibly. Apocalyptic technology, ideological differences, and simple stubbornness all collided in the Cuban Missile Crisis in October of 1962, making it *the* decisive moment of the 20th century.

In 1962, Fidel Castro had only been in control of his newly-minted Communist party for about three years. During this time, he was suspected of creating bonds with Nikita Khrushchev and the Soviet Union, which alarmed the United States immensely. In response to this proximal threat, the US supported the “Bay of Pigs” invasion and launched Operation Mongoose (a secret program of propaganda, psychological warfare, and sabotage in Cuba), both of which failed miserably. Castro, fearing usurpation, turned to the Soviets, who allied with the Cubans in exchange for the placement of nuclear weapons on their island. This maneuver was a response to US deployment of Thor IRBMs (Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile) in the UK and Jupiter IRBMs in Italy and Turkey, which put Russia firmly within America’s strike zone. It was also seen as a possible solution to America’s massive lead in missile quantity. In August of 1962, covert bases underwent construction in Cuba, weapons were shipped in under various guises, and the Soviets maintained an impenetrable poker face even as the US grew suspicious of their ruse. The stage had been set for the ensuing crisis.

On October 14 of 1962, an American U-2 spy plane captured photographic proof of Soviet missile bases in Cuba. Political posturing and planning inevitably followed as Kennedy and various staff members (formally called the “Executive Committee of the National Security Council”) contemplated how to proceed. The Committee discussed several different plans, but the one with the most backing was a full invasion of the country and an overthrow of the government. The Joint Chiefs of Staff unanimously agreed to this scenario, but Kennedy was concerned that it would paint the US as “trigger-happy cowboys” and that it would give the

Soviets an excuse to conquer West Berlin. After much deliberation, a “quarantine” was put in place around Cuba to block incoming ships that could be carrying weaponry. The situation reached a stalemate on October 26, as neither country showed signs of backing down and the spectre of Mutually Assured Destruction cast long shadows over both aggressors.

Soviet spy Aleksandr Fomin arranged a meeting with ABC News’ John A. Scali. At the time, it was believed that he was under orders from Moscow, but it has since been determined that he was almost certainly acting of his own accord. He outlined a possible way to defuse the situation, which would involve the removal of the Soviet missiles under UN supervision in return for the US announcing that they would promise never to invade Cuba. JFK and company made some changes to the plan and sent them to the Soviets for approval. There were a few setbacks and some moments of uncertainty, but both sides eventually agreed to the stipulations of the shaky understanding. The Russian missiles were removed and the US announced their promise to never invade Cuba. They also secretly removed their own missiles from Turkey and Italy a year later, claiming that it was because they were obsolete. This allowed them to appease the Russians while saving face in the public forum. In the face of global annihilation, cooler heads prevailed.

The Cuban Missile Crisis perfectly encapsulated the greatest and most horrible aspects of the 20th century. The Soviet Union was a paragon of communist ideals, which had been realized in the Russian revolution of the century’s second decade. On the other end of the spectrum was the heavily-capitalist United States, whose fear of the spread of communism (as outlined in Eisenhower’s “Domino Theory”) reached its apex during the crisis. What had once been a Soviet-USA World War II era friendship had now soured to rivalry, a rivalry which defined the latter half of the 1900’s. The bitter echoes of this fallen camaraderie rang loud in 1962, as did the ticking of the atomic clock counting down to midnight. Most of all, the Cuban Missile Crisis represented the mounting fear that all nations felt when considering the horrific mixture that animosity and limitless power create. Both sides could destroy the world several times over, and each of them knew it. However, this fear birthed something beautiful: the realization that nuclear arms could actually stay the hands of war-hungry leaders. Self-preservation and a sense of global responsibility overcame ideological indignation, and both sides decided to let the world exist for a little while longer.

Famous astronomer Carl Sagan once suggested that the reason humans hadn’t received any communication from alien life was simply that intelligent species are doomed to destroy themselves. Technological beings, according to this theory, will always overstep their moral strictures and common sense and subsequently end up dead by their own hands. The Cuban Missile Crisis proves that humanity once abstained from this choice and that it could potentially do so in the future. However, it also serves as a terrifying lesson on man’s self-destructive capabilities. When it comes to nuclear weapons, all people can do is try to exercise restraint, close their eyes, and pray for silence.

Was the War a Watershed? An Examination of First World War's impact on a Small Town in B.C.

Bryan Smith

Throughout Sidney, a small town in British Columbia, memory of the First World War is everywhere. Walking down Beacon Avenue, the town's main street, pedestrians pass by several reminders of the town's military heritage: a cenotaph outside City Hall, a Veteran's Memorial Garden, a large mural commemorating the armed forces, an Army Navy & Airforce Veterans Unit, a memorial to Canada's peace keeping forces, a decommissioned tank, a decommissioned F-86 Sabre jet, and a military bookshop are all within a block. Given that Sidney contributed nearly a third of its population to fight at the front during the First World War, this recognition is hardly surprising.¹ Accordingly, Sidney seems an ideal case example through which to investigate the effect of the First World War on a small town in British Columbia; if the war affected any small town in B.C., seemingly that town was Sidney. Historians are often split into two camps when considering the effects of the war on Canadian towns. Some argue that the war brought significant change, and thus had a transformative effect on Canadian society and economy.² Others suggest that Canada's transformation had already begun, and that the war served as a "devastating" disruption to the nation's growth.³ However, by examining Sidney between 1914 and 1919, this paper will demonstrate that the town was neither transformed nor devastated by the war. Instead, it will be suggested that the war had a formative effect, serving to strengthen and reinforce existing trends while creating new opportunities which were neither radical nor transformative. After a brief overview of the historiography both of Canada during the Great War and of Sidney, this paper will examine demographic and economic activity, as well as political and social trends, to posit that the First World War contributed to the character of Sidney, but neither transformed nor upset the small town. Ultimately, this paper will conclude by placing Sidney in a larger picture in order to suggest that the role of the First World War as a turning point in B.C.'s history may need to be reevaluated.

In the history of Canada's Great War, there is considerable polarization. As mentioned, historians tend to be divided into two camps. On one side, some suggest that the First World War transformed and defined Canada as a nation. In this narrative, the war instilled a sense of national pride and identity, increased the nation's industrial production, created distance from Britain, and

¹ Darryl Muralt, *V. & S.: The Victoria and Sidney Railway 1892-1919* (Victoria: The B.C. Railway Historical Association, 1992), 183.

² Nick Brune, "Canada and the First World War," *National Post* (October 10, 2008): P2; David MacKenzie, "Myth, Memory, and the Transformation of Canadian Society," in *Canada and the First World War*, ed. David MacKenzie, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005), 4-5.

³ Muralt, 183; Douglas McCalla, "Economic Impact of the Great War," in *Canada and the First World War*, ed. David MacKenzie (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005), 159.

strengthened the movement for women's rights.⁴ In short, this narrative suggests that the First World War was "Canada's coming-of-age," and that it marks the beginning of a new era.⁵ On the other hand, many historians have challenged this view, claiming instead that the narrative of identity and transformation is an "imaginative version" of the war years.⁶ Historian Vance suggests that the discourse of national identity has "enabled [Canadians] to cope with grief."⁷ Ultimately, this approach suggests the Great War was divisive and burdensome, concluding that "the dominant image must be disruption, not transformation."⁸ A central problem in both arguments has been the attempt to define a monolithic and universal pattern for the effect of the war on Canada. Given the vastness of the country and its many variables, it is not surprising that opposing views have developed. Additionally, each narrative seeks to define the Great War as a watershed moment in B.C.'s history. As will be seen, this does not prove universally true.

Sequestered in the rural area of North Saanich, about twenty kilometres north of Victoria, Sidney was a relatively new town upon the eve of the First World War. Established in 1891, Sidney grew rapidly during its first two decades of township.⁹ Immigrants from Britain, France, Eastern Europe, and throughout Canada had begun to settle in the North Saanich district as early as 1857, many having worked in British Columbia's interior during the Gold Rush years.¹⁰ While agricultural work was the dominant trade during the 19th Century, between 1895 and 1910 significant industries sprang up throughout Sidney and North Saanich. The opening of the Victoria and Sidney (V&S) Railway in 1894 aided industrial growth, and Sidney soon boasted a sawmill, a brickworks, a canning factory, a cigar factory, and more.¹¹ By 1913, Sidney was flourishing, and a new railway, the B.C. Electric Line, was opened between Victoria and Deep Cove to cater to the expanding population in the North Saanich area.¹² By and large, the First World War has been seen as a disruption to this growth. Daryl Muralt, a historian of the area, has suggested that the war had a "devastating" effect on the local community.¹³ Noting that of Sidney's 1914 population of 600, 200 men left to serve on the front, Muralt posits that this decline in the population resulted in the closure of the V&S railway; several other industries, he argues, followed in succession.¹⁴ Yet, as will be discussed, Muralt's view of Sidney's war years is perhaps too dramatic. In fact, for various reasons, a more moderate approach might be taken in order to understand Sidney between 1914 and 1919.

⁴ Brune, 2; McCalla, 138-139.

⁵ Brune suggests that "World War One was a defining moment for both Canada and the world." Brune, 2.

⁶ Terry Copp, "The Military Effort, 1914-1918," in *Canada and the First World War*, ed. David MacKenzie (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005), 35.

⁷ Vance, quoted in MacKenzie, 11.

⁸ McCalla, 150.

⁹ Peter Grant, *The Story of Sidney* (Victoria: Porthole Press, 1998), 24.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 15.

¹¹ *Ibidem.*

¹² Nell Horth, *North Saanich Memories and Pioneers* (Sidney: Porthole Press, 1988), 18.

¹³ Muralt, 183.

¹⁴ *Ibidem.*

Demographic and Economic Activity

Foremost, Muralt's suggestion that Sidney was devastated by the departure of 200 of its men to the front needs revision. Instead, several factors limited the impact of this exodus. First, not all 200 soldiers left Sidney at the beginning of the war. Individuals and small groups enlisted sporadically throughout the war, and the total gradually reached 200 over the five-year period.¹⁵ By late 1915, only 60 men from the North Saanich area had left for France.¹⁶ Moreover, while some were leaving, by 1916 other men were returning from the front, either on leave or having completed their tour of duty.¹⁷ Consequently, it seems fair to estimate that a maximum of 100 men were gone at any given time. While this was still a substantial part of the population, their absence does not seem to have radically affected the town economically. Not following the pal system – which devastated many towns – Sidney's volunteers were from a wide variety of occupations.¹⁸ Those in the industrial and agricultural sectors quickly had their positions filled by Chinese labourers who had been pushed out of work during the economic slump of 1913-1914.¹⁹ Shops which were privately owned were often closed during the absence of their proprietor; upon his return, they were easily reopened and restocked.²⁰ Thus, at least directly, the absence of the soldiers did not radically interrupt nor transform Sidney's development. Tragically, twenty of Sidney's men were killed during the war.²¹ While their loss was felt throughout the community, economically the burden could be absorbed.

Though a large percentage of the work force was absent, Sidney saw industrial growth over the war years. This was in part a direct result of the war, as the opening of the Canadian Explosives Plant on James Island – just off the coast of Sidney – was an enormous asset to the community.²² Not only did the plant bring in and employ roughly 700 workers, it also employed local residents as carpenters, bricklayers, ferry drivers, and railway employees.²³ Much of the industrial growth which occurred between 1914 and 1919, however, was simply a continuation of projects from before the war began. After receiving electric power and telephone lines in 1912-1913, projects

¹⁵ "Large Number of Local Boys leave with the 48th," *Sidney and Islands Review [SIR]*, July 1, 1915, 3; "More Recruits from North Saanich District: Sidney Men are Willing to Fight for their King and Country," *SIR*, Aug. 26, 1915, 1.

¹⁶ "Enlistment," *SIR*, Sept. 2, 1915, 2.

¹⁷ "Lieutenant Harvey Back," *SIR*, Nov. 4, 1915, 1; "Former Sidney Resident Returns from the Front," *SIR*, March 30, 1916, 3; "Returned Soldiers to be Welcomed" *SIR*, Jan. 11, 1917, 8; Early discharge typically meant an injury. Douglas Horth, for example, returned to Sidney after losing his leg on the front. "News in Brief," *SIR*, April 26, 1917, 4.

¹⁸ Some were agriculturalists, others were shopkeepers or clerks, and others still had been unemployed before the war. Sidney Museum Archives, Binder Stacks, World War One General, Enlistment Records, P10-80, 1914-1919.

¹⁹ "Sidney's Chinatown." Sidney Historical Museum, Sidney, British Columbia; "Large force of Men at Work on Construction of the Plant," *SIR*, Aug. 19, 1915, 1; "Local Firm will Employ White Labour in the Future," *SIR*, Feb. 6, 1914, 1.

²⁰ "Former Sidney Resident Returns from the Front," *SIR*, March 30, 1916, 3.

²¹ Sidney Museum Archives, Binder Stacks, World War One General, P08, 1915-1919.

²² "Opened James Island Plant," *SIR*, Aug. 19, 1915, 1

²³ Muralt, 185.

to introduce street lights and telephone lines were logical second steps.²⁴ Likewise, the introduction of the automobile necessitated infrastructure projects such as paving local thoroughfares.²⁵ Meanwhile, both the Sidney Rubber Roofing Company and the Sidney Kelp Manufacturing Plant opened in 1915, independent of the war.²⁶ Thus, though the Explosives Plant did contribute to production in Sidney, it only reinforced the existing growth of industry within the town – it did not initiate the trend.

The closure of several major industries during the war years should not be seen as a result of the war. The V&S Railway, an oft-cited example of the war's destructive effect on Sidney, had been in financial trouble since well before the war. By early 1914, the V&S had already racked up a deficit of \$25,399 and ridership was down over 40% from the previous year.²⁷ Before the war, frequent diatribes were made by riders upset by the railway's infrequent, unreliable, and often unpleasant service, resulting in a formal petition by riders in 1916.²⁸ Combined with the competition of two new railways on the Peninsula – the B.C. Electric and the CNR– the V&S was bound for receivership with or without the war.²⁹ The closure of the local Cigar Factory and its subsequent move to Nanaimo was the result of this inadequacy of service from the V&S.³⁰ The Sidney Lumber Mill, on the other hand, shut down in 1913, sending many into unemployment before the war.³¹ In fact, the Mill *reopened* in 1917 and began production at record setting levels, apparently undisturbed by the war.³² The Sidney Brickworks also closed during the war years, but as a result of a mishap in production rather than labour shortage or lack of customers.³³ In studying the economic lapse between 1913 and 1915, Sidney businessmen concluded that real estate speculation was largely to blame, and suggested that the towns along British Columbia's coast "are now recovering."³⁴ Sidney felt this slump, and the closure of several industries did not help. However, by 1915 the town seems to have been on an economic upswing in spite of, rather than because of, the war.

²⁴ Grant, 83-84; Sidney Museum Archives, P1010220, "Light and Power," 1913.

²⁵ "Open Session of the Board of Trade," *SIR*, July 15, 1915, 1.

²⁶ "Big Plant Starts Operations," *SIR*, Sept. 23, 1915, 2; "Sidney Kelp Industry now in Full Operation," *SIR*, Sept. 23, 1915, 1.

²⁷ Muralt, 185.

²⁸ Muralt, 182; "Resolution of the Institute was Endorsed: Board of Trade will also Petition Railway Company for a Reduction in Fares to Victoria," *SIR*, April 6, 1916, 1.

²⁹ Horth, 26.

³⁰ Sidney Museum Archives, P1010238, "Cigar Factory," 1916.

³¹ Muralt, 183.

³² "Big Plant of Canadian Southern Lumber Company Will be Put in Operation in about One Month," *SIR*, Feb. 22, 1917, 1; "19,000,000 Feet For Year 1919: Output of Sidney Mills, Ltd. Increased by Four Million Feet Over Last Year; Mill Practically Rebuilt Since May, 1917," *SIR*, Feb. 5, 1920, 1.

³³ Unfortunately, the Brickworks used an American-size mould for bricks, yielding the production of hundreds of thousands of bricks which were not up to standard in Canada, and therefore not sellable. Realizing this mistake too late, the Brickworks was unable to recuperate the loss, and closed. "The Sidney Brickworks." Sidney Historical Museum, Sidney, British Columbia.

³⁴ "Trade Conditions," *SIR*, July 22, 1915.

Partly because of this industrial growth, Sidney's population during the war years actually expanded. A major contributor to this growth was of course the James Island Explosives Plant.³⁵ Another key factor in the population influx was the military. As early as 1915, Sidney's surrounding areas were used as a training camp for many regiments from the coast before they shipped east.³⁶ While many battalions were present in Sidney only for a short period, others, like the 564 strong 231st Battalion, stayed in residence in Sidney for over a year.³⁷ This population increase helped sustain local businesses. Pool halls, the Reading Room, cafes, the Berquist Event Hall, and other stores were frequented by these soldiers.³⁸ That Sidney could support two brothels during the war years speaks to the economic stability of the town.³⁹ On a permanent basis, after the war's end many new families moved into the North Saanich area as a result of the Federal Soldier Settlement scheme, taking advantage of the inexpensive agricultural property and boosting the town's numbers greatly.⁴⁰ By 1921, Sidney had roughly 1200 residents, having doubled its population over the past decade.⁴¹ This population growth should not be seen as unusual, however, as Sidney had been growing at a similar rate for two decades already. Moreover, its growth rate was on par with Port Alberni and Duncan, similar towns which had also doubled their population over the decade.⁴²

As well as industrial growth, Sidney also saw domestic commercial stability and expansion. Local businesses maintained stable hours and continued to import goods, including goods from Britain.⁴³ This stability cannot be credited entirely to the temporary residents, as new and popular goods included mops, electric irons, and fashionable women's clothes, all unlikely purchases for the soldiers in training.⁴⁴ Local businesses maintained stable advertisement slots in the newspaper, and were able to bring in delicacies and luxuries throughout the year.⁴⁵ Moreover, some businesses were able to expand. The Sidney Restaurant, for example, renovated to double its size, while the local shoe store opened a second branch on James Island.⁴⁶ Other commercial ventures developed extraneous to the war, including the opening of a B.C. Electrical shop in 1916 and the creation of several auto-taxi and freight lines.⁴⁷ This commercial growth was

³⁵ Grant, 36-37.

³⁶ Muralt, 188; "67th will have its Winter Training Quarters in Sidney," *SIR*, Aug. 26, 1915, 1.

³⁷ "Western Scots will spend Two Days in Camp in Sidney," *SIR*, Dec. 16, 1915, 1; "231st Battalion Issues Handsome Souvenir [sic] on Eve of Departure," *SIR*, March 8, 1917, 1; Months of training were spent at the militia camp by the 123rd, the B.C. Bantams, the 321st, the Seaforth Highlanders, the 67th, and the 143rd to name a few. Muralt, 190.

³⁸ "Visit of the 67th Western Scots was Pleasing Event of Week," *SIR*, Dec. 23, 1915, 1.

³⁹ *B. Co. Pay Parade [sic] Camp Sidney, Sidney BC*, 1916, Sidney Museum Archives, P991.33.1.

⁴⁰ Horth, 11.

⁴¹ John D. Belshaw, *Becoming British Columbia: A Population History* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2009), 197.

⁴² *Ibidem*.

⁴³ *Critchley's General Store*, c. 1915, Sidney Museum Archives, P982.8.1.

⁴⁴ "B.C. Electric Railway Co., Ltd: Appropriate Gifts," *SIR*, Dec. 16, 1915, 3.

⁴⁵ "Local Butchers: Turkeys, Geese, Chicken, Beef, Mutton, Veal, Oysters, and Mince Meats for Christmas," *SIR*, Dec. 16, 1915, 2.

⁴⁶ "A Rest Room," *SIR*, Oct. 28, 1915, 3; "Sloan's Shoe Store Opens Branch on James Island," *SIR*, Sept. 2, 1915, 1.

⁴⁷ "A New Deep Cove Firm," *SIR*, March 16, 1916, 1; "B.C. Electric Open New Office on Beacon Avenue," *SIR*, April 27, 1916, 1.

complemented by agricultural expansion and increased yields as a result of new farming technologies.⁴⁸ Overall, Sidney experienced slow economic growth between 1914 and 1919, bringing the town out of its pre-war economic downturn. This growth was aided by the influx of soldiers to the town, but it was not defined by it. Residents continued to purchase new technologies, buy new products, and support local businesses just as they had before the war, and just as they would after it.

Political and Social Ramifications

Alongside population and economic growth, Sidney also grew as a community. Far from being divisive, the war years saw an expansion in Sidney's sense of identity. A large part of this community identity was a direct consequence of the war effort. New societies, like the Red Cross or the Patriotic Fund, fostered an unprecedented amount of community interaction; weekly meetings, knitting parties, constant correspondence, and nearly weekly fundraisers brought members of the community noticeably closer together over the course of the war.⁴⁹ While fundraisers like local dances or the Red Cross "Sock Days" brought in hundreds of dollars, they also created opportunities for the town to congregate.⁵⁰ The war provided an impetus for high attendance and participation at these community events, otherwise locals could be branded "unpatriotic."⁵¹ As the troops returned from the front they brought new friendships back with them, contributing to this community spirit.⁵² As a result, new interest was taken in preservation, beautification, participation, and community action.⁵³ Yet, this community growth was only reinforced by the war. Before the war, community organizations, events, and a corresponding local spirit were already developing. Social clubs, unions, work groups, and ladies organizations were all formed before the beginning of the war, and in many instances existing groups merged with or into war effort societies.⁵⁴ While the war reinforced and perhaps sped this development, it did not transform nor destroy it.

In part, community development in Sidney was fostered by the emergence of local leaders who rose through the war effort. Given a new degree of prestige or sway, home-front organizers and returned soldiers gained positions of leadership in the community. This was true of a number of major figures. Cy Peck and George Pearkes, for example, became leading public figures, and

⁴⁸ Horth, 14; "An Up-to-Date Machine," *SIR*, Sept. 9, 1915, 2.

⁴⁹ "Local Branch of [sic] Red Cross Formed," *SIR*, July 1, 1915, 1; "Generous Support Given Red Cross Society Linen Shower," *SIR*, June 17, 1915, 1; "Sock Day on September 8," *SIR*, Aug. 19, 1915, 1; "The Allies Chapter," *SIR*, July 8, 1915, 1.

⁵⁰ "Picnic Social at Beaver Point," *SIR*, Aug. 19, 1915, 3.

⁵¹ Advertisements for the Anniversary celebration, for example, read: "It is intended that everyone residing in the district will be there to uphold the dignity of the Empire." Similarly, church service advertisements read: "It is hoped all members of the congregation will be patriotic enough to be present." "Anniversary of Declaration of War Celebration," *SIR*, July 15, 1915, 1; "Patriotic Services Sunday," *SIR*, July 1, 1915, 4.

⁵² Horth, 22.

⁵³ Muralt, 188.

⁵⁴ Victor E. Virgin, *History of North and South Saanich Pioneers and District* (Victoria: Saanich Pioneers Society, 1985), 70.

were both instrumental in major projects throughout the community for the next half-century.⁵⁵ Besides these well-known names, a number of lesser-known figures also rose to prominence during the war period. Patriotic Fund organizer Mr. P.N. Tester, for example, became a key figure throughout the war years, while local Red Cross organizers like A.O. Wheeler and A.J. Campbell, and proprietors of key businesses rose to community leadership roles.⁵⁶ These figures had sway with the Sidney Board of Trade, could organize and lead community gatherings easily, and had well-established networks of support.⁵⁷ Many pioneered or led new organizations and societies during and after the war, including the Saanich Fruitgrowers Association, the Mount Newton Lodge, the Saanich Branch Legion, and the Sidney Literary Club.⁵⁸ It should be noted that, at least to a degree, women were also included in these local leadership positions.⁵⁹ To what extent this development of local leaders can be accredited to the war, however, is questionable. With a growing population, especially within the town center, and with the establishment of several local political and social groups prior to the war – including women’s political groups – community leaders seem to have been slowly on the rise anyway.⁶⁰ An influx of professionals into the town before and during the war – such as a new doctor, a dentist, teachers, and agricultural experts from the nearby Dominion Experimental Farm – appears to have already been contributing to the group of community leaders regardless of the war.⁶¹ While the war may have reinforced this development, it certainly did not radically alter the social dynamic of the town.

In the midst of these social changes, between 1914-1919, Sidney began to define itself as a community separate from Victoria. While prior to the war, local headlines included Victoria events and concerns, during the war the focus of the community turned inwards.⁶² This appears partly to have been for economic reasons. Relying on local patronage to weather economic downturn, Sidney businesses made pleas for residents to shop locally.⁶³ Additionally, the separation from Victoria seems to have been the result of the new local leaders discussed above. With strong leadership and a Board of Trade autonomous from Victoria, Sidney residents made efforts to develop infrastructure, improve education, and prevent unemployment.⁶⁴ Population growth also yielded a degree of self-sufficiency, as new professionals entered the community,

⁵⁵ “Cy Peck,” Sidney Historical Museum, Sidney, British Columbia; “George Pearkes: English Heroes,” *This England* (1987): 33.

⁵⁶ “I.O.D.E. Elect their Officers,” *SIR*, March 9, 1916, 1; “Generous Support Given Red Cross Society Linen Shower,” *SIR*, June 17, 1915, 1; “Subscriptions to Patriotic Aid Fund now being Solicited,” *SIR*, Dec. 9, 1915, 1.

⁵⁷ Horth, 22.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 14; Virgin, 79-80.

⁵⁹ “I.O.D.E. Elect their Officers,” *SIR*, March 9, 1916, 1; “Generous Support Given Red Cross Society Linen Shower,” *SIR*, June 17, 1915, 1.

⁶⁰ Virgin, 79-80.

⁶¹ “The New Doctor,” *SIR*, Nov. 4, 1915, 1; Horth, 23.

⁶² For example, “Are you going to the Hockey Match in Victoria,” *SIR*, Feb. 20, 1914, 8.

⁶³ “At your Service,” *SIR*, Sept. 23, 1915, 4.

⁶⁴ “Open Session of the Board of Trade,” *SIR*, July 15, 1915, 1; “Our School Life and Our Schools: Greater Attention must be Paid to Making Schools More Attractive,” *SIR*, March 29, 1917, 3; “Returned Soldiers to be Welcomed,” *SIR*, Jan. 11, 1917, 2; “Light and Power Accounts can now be Paid in Sidney,” *SIR*, Sept. 2, 1915, 1; “Sends Delegation on Good Roads,” *SIR*, Feb. 22, 1917, 1.

alleviating the need to travel to Victoria. Connections to Victoria appear to have been displaced by a deep connection to Britain. Before the war, a majority of Sidney residents were either first- or second-generation immigrants from Britain; after the war this number increased via the Soldier Settlement scheme.⁶⁵ While they placed less importance on ties with the Province or the Nation, Sidney residents found a strong connection with the “United Empire of Tomorrow.”⁶⁶ Thus, Sidney appears to define itself not in terms of a new-found nationalism, but instead through independent loyalty to Britain.

Sidney in the Bigger Picture

By placing so specific a focus on one town, it may be argued, this study does little to suggest that the overwhelming majority of towns throughout Canada did not experience opposite results. Indeed, in many ways, Sidney had a number of advantages. Its proximity to Victoria, variety of resources, and position as a transportation hub doubtless helped sustain the town. Despite its individual situation, however, Sidney should not be seen as the exception which proves the rule. While it is clear that Sidney cannot represent every small towns’ experience, it does share some fundamental similarities with many of the towns surrounding it. With a similar population distribution at the beginning of the war to several towns throughout B.C., Sidney also grew at a similar rate over the decade between 1911-1921 to towns like Duncan, Port Alberni, Mission City, Ladysmith, and Merritt.⁶⁷ Settled at a similar time and organized upon a comparable basis to many British Columbian towns, it is therefore not surprising that the rise of local leaders and prominent community members was also not unique to Sidney, but occurred throughout B.C.⁶⁸ And, with the spread of technology throughout the province, it is also not surprising that the introduction of the telephone, the automobile, and the expansion of rail lines did not only affect Sidney, but were omnipresent throughout the province. Sidney’s war experience should therefore not be considered atypical, but as relatable.

Examining Sidney’s history outside the war years, it is clear that the town experienced several transformative changes; the introduction of the Patricia Bay Airport, the opening of the Swartz Bay Ferry terminal, or the closure of the peninsula’s rail lines, for example.⁶⁹ At each of these pivotal points, the community underwent change much more drastic and transformative than any of the changes between 1914 and 1919.⁷⁰ Yet, the narrative of Sidney’s history still places key importance on the war as a chapter, or dividing line, in the town’s history. As historian McCalla notes of Canadian history, the war is upheld as a “turning point around which our entire narrative

⁶⁵ Horth, 11.

⁶⁶ “The United Kingdom of Yesterday, the United Empire of Tomorrow,” *SIR*, June 17, 1915, 2.

⁶⁷ Belshaw, 197.

⁶⁸ Charles Lillard, *Seven Shillings a Year: The History of Vancouver Island* (Ganges, BC: Horsdal & Schubart, 1986), 178-182.

⁶⁹ Grant, 13, 24.

⁷⁰ Grant, 13, 24.

is organized.”⁷¹ Historian Winter further suggests that this role for the war within our narrative may be a way of commemorating and memorializing the period.⁷² Yet, by viewing the war as pivotal in Sidney’s narrative, historians and residents tend to polarize on exactly what effect the war did have. Perhaps then, a new narrative of Sidney’s history may be constructed, redefining the town’s history according to local-specific transformations and watersheds. Following the above conclusion that Sidney’s war experience was not unique, perhaps local histories throughout British Columbia, or throughout Canada, need to reevaluate their narratives according to locally-specific periods.

Though a long way from France, Sidney made a great contribution to the First World War. As well as sending soldiers to the front, Sidney residents at home worked tirelessly to bring the war to an end. However, despite claims that the war devastated or, oppositely, transformed the small town, Sidney remained stable throughout the war years. Maintaining steady population growth, Sidney’s economy grew slowly throughout the war, and commercial activity increased. At the same time, the community grew together, and with the assistance of new leaders, began working as a self-sufficient town. These changes, however, appear to have been only reinforced, not initiated, by the war. Given Sidney’s relatively stable war years, it may be suggested that the town’s unique location yielded unique results. However, as Sidney shared a number of commonalities with several B.C. towns, its experience should be considered at least somewhat familiar. While the Great War undoubtedly had great consequences for Sidney, by considering it a watershed moment perhaps we undervalue other events in Sidney’s history. Given Sidney’s example, perhaps by redefining the narrative of British Columbian history according to locally-specific dividing lines, we may discover much more about our past.

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United States-Cambodia Relations During the Cold War: the Dire Consequences of a Mised Policy

Graeme Pugh

Successive forms of Cambodian nationalism and governance during the Cold War were primarily shaped by United States geopolitical and security interests. Despite the United States disapproval of French colonialism, it tacitly supported France in the First Indo-China War. However, by 1954 France could no longer sustain its commitment to a protracted colonial war. As the U.S. began to militarily replace France in Vietnam, the composition of Cambodia's government became increasingly dictated by the globalist, geopolitical, and militarily strategic preferences of the U.S. During the course of the war the Cambodian monarchy, military, and dissident groups all separately ascended to power primarily through the political, military, and economic circumstances created by U.S. policy in the region. The coming to power of these groups was not based on the application of U.S. democratic statehood inherent in its rhetoric. Rather, political ascendancy was a by-product of U.S. Cold War globalist and military strategy. The violence that defined South East Asia for the duration of the Vietnam War ironically came to a crescendo in its wake. The tragic genocide in Cambodia was a culmination of decades of misled policies of the U.S. and Cambodian governments, along with the potent nationalism, militarization, and radical ideology that it bred.

In the immediate wake of World War Two, the United States began to pressure European states to decolonise their empires. Despite previous pledges, these states were often reluctant to fully abandon colonies which were so integral to their political and economic systems. The form of government and ideology of these nations became inextricably linked with the geopolitical, ideological, and strategic interests of competing world powers in the Cold War context. The National Security Council stipulated as early as 1949 that containing communism was central to United States policy in the region. In doing so it pursued, "Development of sufficient military power in selected non-communist nations of Asia to maintain internal security and to prevent further encroachment by communism."¹ The threat of communism in Vietnam and throughout South East Asia was seen as part of a monolithic movement which had to be contained at all costs.

Cambodian nationalism was largely repressed during the course of the First Indo-China War. Although France granted King Sihanouk nominal independence over Cambodia in the mid 1940s, ultimate power continued to reside with France. France was indeed intent on holding its colonial possessions, while the United States was more preoccupied with curbing communist expansion than colonization. It is also important to note that the independence granted to

¹ Melvyn Leffler, *The Spectre of Communism: The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1917-1953*, (New York, 1994), 240.

Cambodia's monarchy was disconnected from the population. As Kenton Clymer observes, "The new agreement, together with Sihanouk's peremptory dissolution of the Assembly in September 1949, only increased internal Cambodian dissent."² Even in the early stages of the Indo-China war, the limited role given to government was concentrated in the hands of the political elite and excluded the majority of Cambodians from the political process. This exclusion of various groups within Cambodia was also evident in the 1954 Geneva Convention. Although the Viet Minh were recognised alongside Vietnam's government, dissident groups within Cambodia and Laos were ignored.³ Thus, the early recognition of Cambodia's political regime gravitated towards those who could best represent the United States anti-communist policies, rather than those who embodied the legitimate dynamics of Cambodia's varied political spectrum.

U.S. policy towards Cambodia was based on a globalist perspective throughout the Cold War. Rather than taking into account the intricacies of the multiple forms of South East Asian nationalism, successive American administrations perceived these emergent states through an overwhelmingly limited security paradigm. In explaining the geopolitical importance of Indo-China President Eisenhower explained to a journalist, "You have a row of dominos set up, you knock over the first one, and what will happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go over very quickly. So you would have the beginning of a disintegration that would have the most profound influences."⁴ This was certainly a contrast to the nationalist rhetoric previously espoused by the U.S. The perception of the looming threat of communism would indeed compel the U.S. to pursue loyalty among emergent states at any cost. The bolstering of authoritarian regimes superseded legitimate democratization. In sponsoring the absolutist regime of King Sihanouk, "the United States hoped that with a potentially obstructive government out of the way, Sihanouk could turn his attention to defeating subversive forces."⁵ The United States hoped that sustaining Sihanouk's regime with political legitimacy and military and economic aid would effectively curb both internal and external Communist incursion. The relationship between the two states, however, was not quite that simple.

Although Sihanouk was expected to express strict support for his American benefactors, he was certainly still inclined to enhance the independence of Cambodia. Herein lays the intricacies of Cambodia's precarious position during the Cold War. On the one hand, Sihanouk attempted to remain neutral through the non-aligned movement, utilizing both communist and American aid to develop Cambodia's institutions and counter ancient regional dynamics with neighbouring Thailand, Vietnam, and Laos. On the other hand, the burgeoning military commitment of the U.S. in neighbouring South Vietnam, which eventually led to the introduction of American soldiers in 1965, forced Cambodia to react. The presence of combatants on its eastern border

² Kenton Clymer, *The United States and Cambodia, 1870-1967: From Curiosity to Confrontation*, (London, 2004), 23.

³ Ibid, 35.

⁴ Public Papers of the Presidents: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1954 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, pp. 381-90. Quoted in, Robert McMahon, *Major Problems in the History of the Vietnam War*, (Boston, 2008), 85.

⁵ Kenton Clymer, *The United States and Cambodia*, 29.

inextricably drew Cambodia into the conflict in ways that the United States, communist forces, and dissident groups would all try to exploit and influence. In formulating Cambodia's neutral stance, Ben Kiernan observes that Sihanouk's strategy was "A domestic accommodation, an implicit acknowledgement of the local communists' important role in the war for Cambodia's independence and their potential and incentive to disrupt a more pro-western regime. Neutrality was also a...strategy to keep Cambodia out of escalating conflict in Vietnam."⁶ A consistent pitfall of U.S. policy toward Cambodia was its inability to understand the regional and internal dynamics of the country and its neighbours.

The Cambodian people, the *Khmer*, have existed in South East Asia for much longer than the United States. In this time Cambodia has of course established relationships with its bordering countries. The globalist perspective of the United States failed to take these ancient relationships into account. Cambodia was certainly fearful of South Vietnam's violation of its territorial sovereignty. In response to frustration over United States coalescence to South Vietnam's repeated border incursions, Cambodia diplomatically expressed its frustration by officially recognising communist China.⁷ Washington was incensed, yet Sihanouk perceived the issue differently. As Clymer observes,

Never were the conflicting perspectives of Cambodia and the United States more clearly evident. The United States viewed Cambodia only as a part of the larger worldwide struggle against the communist menace. Sihanouk, on the other hand, saw events much more in their regional context.... Traditional anti-Vietnamese sentiment was clearly in the ascendant and much more important than an abstract anticommunism.⁸

In other words, although the U.S. perceived China and communism to be the biggest threat to the future of Indo-China, Cambodia was much more worried about its traditional rivalry with Vietnam. At the time, the traditional jockeying between these powers seemed much more pressing to Cambodia than abstract communist ideology.

The centrality of Cambodia's borders to the progression of the Vietnam War and its internal politics also warrants examination. As South Vietnam and American soldiers waged the counterinsurgency ever closer to the Cambodian border, cross border incursions became commonplace. As the border was largely unprotected, anti-government forces would use Cambodia's eastern frontier as a defensive tactic and for logistical support throughout the war. The U.S. had recognized this at a very early stage. They had long applied pressure on Sihanouk to fight these communist elements. However, despite millions of dollars in military aid the Cambodian regime was largely unable to impede the flow of combatants through what became known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Perhaps Sihanouk even hedged his bets. It is possible that he

⁶ Ben Kiernan, "Introduction: Conflict in Cambodia: 1945-2002," *Critical Asian Studies*, 34, No. 4 (2002), 484.

⁷ Kenton Clymer, *The United States and Cambodia*, 65.

⁸ *Ibid*, 65.

realized the best way to elicit American aid was to pledge to fight the insurgency, while also realizing that overly aggressive enforcement threatened his supremacy. This had indeed determined the way the U.S. viewed Cambodia throughout the war. In fact, most Cambodians realized that their economic and institutional needs were secondary to U.S. primary interest, Vietnam.⁹

As American public support over the direction of the war continued to decline, the U.S increasingly pursued a more aggressive policy towards Cambodia. Of course, this did not represent a drastic change in its policy towards Cambodia. In fact, a military solution to Cambodia's instability was central since the beginning of the war in 1965. By the time President Nixon had been in office for nearly a year, the total number of bombs unleashed by the U.S. climbed to nearly half a million tons.¹⁰ In response to Nixon's inability to use troops in Cambodia he increasingly relied upon bombing communist strongholds. Bombing became a near obsession of Nixon's. In a phone conversation with Henry Kissinger, Nixon orders Kissinger to develop a "Plan where every goddamn thing that can fly goes into Cambodia and hits every target that is open."¹¹ Any respect for the territorial or national integrity of Cambodia had, in essence, been completely dwarfed by the security interests of the U.S.

President Nixon continued to escalate the extent of military involvement in Cambodia to unprecedented levels. In the late spring of 1970 President Nixon announced the invasion of Cambodia by United States and South Vietnam forces. In addressing the nation President Nixon argued that the invasion was essential to protect the remaining American forces in Vietnam, as it would dismantle what he claimed to be the "headquarters for the entire Communist military operations in South Viet-Nam."¹² Of course, United States forces were unable to uncover a central command and the mission was met with domestic public outrage. As a result, the U.S. soon withdrew from Cambodia. Yet the use of military force to solve what had increasingly becoming a civil war in Cambodia would remain the dominant strategy of successive United States administrations.

The bombing and invasion of Cambodia certainly had a profound impact on the stability of its internal political environment. Sihanouk had been ousted by the military commander, Lon Nol. Yet even Lon Nol was unable to quell the unrest that had been growing since the latter half of the 1960s. A civil war had been ongoing in the countryside since 1967 with the communist Khmer Rouge gaining considerable ground.¹³ After the U.S. expanded into Cambodia, the situation worsened exponentially. The communist Vietnamese and Khmer Forces were driven deeper into

⁹ Ibid, 118.

¹⁰ http://www.yale.edu/cgp/Walrus_CambodiaBombing_OCT06.pdf, Accessed April 4, 2011.

¹¹ Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, quoted in <http://www.yale.edu/cgp/us.html#bombing>, accessed April 4, 2011.

¹² Nixon speech, April 30, 1970, U.S. Department of State Bulletin, 62 (May 18, 1970), 617-21. Quoted in, *Major Problems in the History of the Vietnam War*, 375.

¹³ Ben Kiernan, "Introduction: Conflict in Cambodia," 484.

the country, coming into contact with increasingly populated areas. The bombing campaign drove many into the open arms of the Khmer forces. At this point the U.S. was less concerned with the internal dynamics of Cambodia than they were with the struggle in Vietnam. Once again, the U.S. proved how Cambodian nationalism and statehood was subjugated to its ultimate security strategy in the region.

In the wake of the Vietnam War, the Khmer Rouge toppled the government of Lon Nol and formed a communist government. Over the course of the war, the U.S. role in the ascendancy of the Khmer Rouge was certainly central. It had fuelled civil strife along Cambodia's border regions through sustained bombing and sponsorship of political repression. Furthermore, its departure left a power vacuum, with the government of Lon Nol unable to defend itself. In May 1975 the *Mayaguez* – an American ship – was captured by the newly formed Khmer government. It was the U.S. first encounter in South East Asia since the end of the war. The U.S. responded with brute force in an attempt to rescue the hostages, despite Khmer claims that they would release them.¹⁴ It was a show of force and a blatant attempt to redress the failures of Vietnam and underline American credibility in the region. Tragically, 41 Marines lost their lives in a covert mission to save the 39 hostages.¹⁵ Adding to the failure of this mission, it was soon uncovered that these hostages had already been released by the Khmer. The *Mayaguez* incident is another example of the flawed globalist perspective of the United States during the Cold War. “Washington understood the capture of the ship and its crew as a deliberate communist conspiracy rather than as a by-product of local nationalist ideology.”¹⁶ Despite the failure of this globalist policy it certainly did not come to an end.

The United States would continue to choose sides in an attempt to counter Communist Vietnam. In referring to the Khmer Rouge during a conversation with the Thai Prime Minister in the fall of 1975, Kissinger would state, “You should also tell the Cambodians we will be friends with them. They are murderous thugs, but we won't let that stand in our way. We are prepared to improve relations with them.”¹⁷ Even after the war the primary focus of the United States pertained to security and geo-political strategy, regardless of the overwhelmingly negative implications this had for the prospect of peace and legitimate democratization in the region.

The U.S. failed to effectively harness Cambodian nationalism throughout the course of the entire Cold War. Rather, its policy towards Cambodia was based upon geopolitical and security interests. The United States interpreted events in Indo-China through a globalist perspective, ignoring the subtle nuances and intricacy of nationalism in the region. As it became bogged down in the Vietnam War, disregard for Cambodian self determination further dwindled.

¹⁴ Cecile Menetrey-Monchau, “The *Mayaguez* Incident as an Epilogue to the Vietnam War and its Reflection of the Post-Vietnam Political Equilibrium in South East Asia,” *Cold War History*, 5. No. 3. (2005), 345.

¹⁵ *Ibid*, 346

¹⁶ *Ibid*, 343.

¹⁷ Secretary of State Henry Kissinger Discusses the Khmer Rouge Regime with Thailand's Foreign Minister Chatichai, November 26, 1975, Quoted in <http://www.yale.edu/cgp/us.html#bombing>, 8.

Concerns over military security dominated policy discourse. The intensification of bombing delegitimized the government and increase support for the Khmer Rouge. The unspeakably tragic genocide which followed was also met with intransigence. The U.S. continued to support groups to balance the regional power of Vietnam. The harsh contradictions of the U.S. globalist perspective continued well into the end of the twentieth century. On the one hand, the Cold War was rooted in the preservation of democracy. On the other hand, the policies of the United States stifled those very same values it claimed to be fighting for.

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Cosimo de' Medici: Dynastic Solidarity, Piety and Political Promotion

Isabella Casciola

Founding father of one of the Renaissance's most storied dynasties, Cosimo de' Medici was an astute statesman who established the framework for continued Medici success. He was also a prolific patron of the arts and scholarly learning, contributing to the renovation of several churches and convents, as well as establishing the basis of Florence's first public library. Indeed, he was Florence's preeminent private patron of the arts in the first half of the fifteenth century.¹ He paved the way for future patrons of art by extending his patronage to a variety of art media. Cosimo did not restrict patronage to a local scale by sponsoring renovations upon solely his neighborhood church, as was the custom for wealthy patrons. Instead, he sponsored works throughout Florence and the Mugello (the contada north of Florence and ancestral home of the Medici.)² Nor was he restricted by denomination, generously patronizing both Dominicans and Franciscans in various endeavors.

Works that Cosimo sponsored, such as the Dominican monastery of San Marco and the Basilica of San Lorenzo, stand today as testament to his munificence. But they also provide the modern observer with a framework for understanding the patron himself. Through close analysis of several works from his oeuvre, Cosimo's major preoccupations become evident. The observer can identify three important themes: dynastic solidarity, intercession and piety, and political self-aggrandizement. Concomitantly the extent of Cosimo's patronage can be understood.

Dynastic solidarity is a pervasive theme throughout Cosimo's sponsored works. It is useful to note that before the Medicis, the preceding "two centuries of late medieval Florentine politics could be characterized by a cyclic alternation between guild corporatism and warring urban feudal factions." After the rise of the Medici, the periodic collapse of the system "under the pressure of new men families" ceased and did not return.³ Given this cycle between *popolo* and a divided, conflicted elite, it is explicable that Cosimo would be preoccupied with ensuring the continuation of his line. After all, this was a society that valued familial allegiance to a great extent; so much so that major conflicts could result from perceived slights to one's family name, resulting in the warring urban feudal factions previously referenced. Indeed, "family strength and loyalty were the lifeblood of Florentine society, perhaps its highest ideal."⁴ Moreover, the Medici family seems to have been structured more tightly than other Florentine houses. The Medicis

¹ Dale Kent, *Cosimo de' Medici and the Florentine Renaissance* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 3

² John M. Najemy, *A History of Florence 1200-1575* (West Sussex: Blackwell Publishing, 2008), 329

³ J.F. Padgett, C.K. Ansell, "Robust Action and the Rise of the Medici, 1400-1434," *American Journal of Sociology*, 98 no. 6, (1993): 1260

⁴ J.F. Padgett, C.K. Ansell, "Robust Action," 1278

developed a family structure that was highly centralized, yet had few relations among followers. Communication with authority would have been immediate, rather than through an indirect route, for the party “consisted almost entirely of direct ties to the Medici family”.⁵ The Medicis under Cosimo developed a top-down structure with a well-defined leadership and a chain of command.⁶ Cosimo would have been surrounded by an innermost cadre of trusted advisers that would certainly have been family members. In turn, he and his advisers would maintain communication with the various branches and associates of the family.

Cosimo cultivated associations with various elite families wisely by developing close rapports, often through marriage. Marriages linked the Medici to other prominent families, such as the Tornabuoni; Cosimo’s son Piero would wed Lucrezia Tornabuoni. One of Cosimo’s closest advisers was his first cousin, Averardo di Francesco de’ Medici; his three daughters were wed to members of the Salviati, Serristori, and Gianfigliuzzi families, thereby cementing an association.⁷ Cosimo himself married Contessina de’ Bardi, a member of the venerable Florentine banking clan. The Bardi had, along with the Peruzzi in the fourteenth century, extended a large loan to King Edward III of England to finance his endeavors in the Hundred Years’ War, which he had defaulted upon.⁸ In the fifteenth century, the Bardi remained a large and venerable family; Cosimo’s strategic marriage to Contessina was of great importance to the Medici. It split Bardi consensus, given that “some of [the Bardi] sided with the Albizzi,” the oligarchic opponents of the Medici.⁹ It also provided the Medici with allies in the Oltrarno district: a valuable expansion, given that the Medici cultivated partisans largely in their own quarter of San Giovanni.

Economic connections also drew other Florentine houses toward the Medici; personal loans were extended to the Ginori, Tornabuoni, Cocco-Donati, Guicciardini, and others.¹⁰ Cosimo, like all Florentine patrons, “helped people directly with debts, dowries, and business dealings; and with his influence he secured political offices, assisted in court cases, and mediated disputes.”¹¹ Cosimo’s patronage network, however, was more extensive than those of his fellow patrons, thus enabling him to establish connections with a greater number of elite families. Non-relatives could become established in positions of importance, too; although many of the Medici bank employees were family members, several in key positions were not. The manager of the Florentine branch was Ilarione de’ Bardi, while the Roman branch was managed by Bartolomeo de’ Bardi.¹²

⁵ J.F. Padgett, C.K. Ansell, “Robust Action,” 1278

⁶ Najemy, *A History of Florence*, 267

⁷ Najemy, *A History of Florence*, 268

⁸ Ferdinand Schevill, *The Medici* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1949), 30

⁹ Najemy, *A History of Florence*, 268

¹⁰ J.F. Padgett, C.K. Ansell, “Robust Action,” 1277

¹¹ Najemy, *A History of Florence*, 268

¹² Kent, *Cosimo de’ Medici*, 164

In these ways, families could become integrated into the Medici power structure, for the “microstructure of marriage and economics was central to the formation of parties in Florence.”¹³ To this rule, the Medici certainly were not an exception. The party that developed was more centralized and close-knit than those more representative of elites, with an inner cadre and few direct ties between the rank and file. The source of Cosimo’s philanthropy was the Medici bank; its longterm success was of high priority, and since it “flourished in the continuity between generations, and the loyalty and cooperation between members of the line,” the emphasis he placed on dynastic solidarity becomes understood. To strengthen the family, he made his friends and political supporters “honorary extensions of this group.”¹⁴

With the party structure and motivations for dynastic continuation established, we now can examine works in which this preoccupation is reflected. His greatest patronized works were arguably buildings; Machiavelli chronicles his accomplishments, asserting that Cosimo “not only restored but completely rebuilt the monasteries and churches of San Marco and San Lorenzo and the convent of Santa Verdiana in Florence, and San Girolamo and the Abbey in the hills of Fiesole [Badia at Fiesole].” He also sponsored renovations at the Franciscan convent of Bosco ai Frati, in the Mugello, as well as a novices’ chapel at Santa Croce in Florence. But not all of Cosimo’s buildings were ecclesiastical in nature: he had his own private houses: “one in the city, which was a suitable type for such a citizen, and four outside, at Careggi, Fiesole, Caffagiuolo, and Trebbio—all of which were palaces fit not for private citizens but kings.”¹⁵ San Marco, San Lorenzo, the Badia at Fiesole, Bosco ai Frati, the novices’ chapel at Santa Croce, and the Medici palace in Florence will be examined further.

San Lorenzo was the Medici parish church. As noted by Machiavelli, Cosimo’s patronage resulted in more of a reconstruction than a renovation; it “was unprecedented for an individual to assume financial responsibility for the building of an entire, and very large, church.”¹⁶ Within the new San Lorenzo, the *cappella maggiore* (major chapel), along with the sacristy and an adjoining chapel were Medici-sponsored. The other eight chapels were sponsored by families who were all “sworn friends of the Medici.”¹⁷ As Cosimo had largely financed the project, he was able to manipulate the list of chapel patrons. This allowing associate families, like the Dietsalvi-Neroni, Ginori, and Della Stufa an opportunity to exercise patronage within the Medici sphere. In this way, Cosimo ensured that ensuing generations of Medici would have opportunities for salvation, while allowing close friends to “assume patronage of their own family chapels, honoring their own dynasties and providing for the salvation of their souls.”¹⁸

¹³ J.F. Padgett, C.K. Ansell, “Robust Action,” 1277

¹⁴ Kent, *Cosimo de’ Medici*, 10

¹⁵ Niccolo Machiavelli, ed. Myron P. Gilmore, *The History of Florence* (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1970), 220

¹⁶ Najemy, *A History of Florence*, 329

¹⁷ Kent, *Cosimo de’ Medici*, 181

¹⁸ Kent, *Cosimo de’ Medici*, 180

Cosimo's sacristy at San Lorenzo, designed by Donatello, speaks to the perpetuation and commemoration of the Medici name. Although San Lorenzo was a public church, his father's tomb is placed in the center, beneath the domed ceiling: an intrusion of private interests into the public sphere. Throughout the sacristy are images of John the Evangelist, the patron saint of Cosimo's father, Giovanni di' Bicci. Also prominent are images of Cosmas, Damian, and Lorenzo, patron saints of Cosimo and his brother, Lorenzo. By displaying these name-saints in a linear order, the genealogical descent of the Medici line from Giovanni di Bicci to his sons can be clearly seen. This distinction was surely purposeful, for it causes us to "loo[k] at a succession of patriarchs and patrons."¹⁹

Cosmas and Damian were not used solely at San Lorenzo; they can be found, along with the Medici crest, on most of the architecture Cosimo sponsored. The two saints were "early Christian physicians, martyred in 286 for refusing to worship idols." Cosimo may have had a twin brother, Damiano, who died shortly after birth.²⁰ Evidently, Giovanni had named his sons after these patron saints; he may have done so as a pun by associating "Saints Cosmas and Damian, brothers and doctors, with the name of Medici (the doctors)."²¹ Although Cosimo was born on April 11, he and the saints became so intertwined that it was widely believed he was born on September 27, the saints' feast day. In *The History of Florence*, Machiavelli writes that "he was born in 1389, on the day of Saint Cosimo and Saint Damian."²² Cosimo ensured that Cosmas and Damian became strongly associated with the Medici; they became dynastic symbols, and publicity is a key to perpetuation of the lineage. Cosmas and Damian can be seen on the altarpieces of Bosco ai Frati, San Marco, the Novitate Chapel of Santa Croce, and at the family estate of Cafaggiolo. Their extensive use "undoubtedly served, and [was] intended, as effective reminders of the Medici presence and preeminence in Florence."²³

The Medici palace also betrays Cosimo's concern for familial continuity. After Giovanni's death and until Lorenzo's in 1440, the two brothers lived together with their wives and children. When Cosimo and his sons moved to the new palace, it was only a few doors down the Via Larga.²⁴ Its existence was a result of land acquired from friends and family over an extended period of time, allowing it to be built from scratch; a metaphor for the "solidarity and cooperation between the Medici family and their friends."²⁵ The new Medici palace, constructed by Michelozzo, was an imposing structure located in close proximity to their parish church, San Lorenzo. It is three stories tall: the first "bristling with immense, rough-hewn stone blocks, which invited assault

¹⁹ Kent, *Cosimo de' Medici*, 194

²⁰ C. Lawless, "Myth, Ritual and Orthodoxy: Cosimo de' Medici and Saint Peter Martyr", *Cultural and Social History* 2 no. 3, (2000): 275

²¹ Kent, *Cosimo de' Medici*, 142

²² Machiavelli, *History of Florence*, 222

²³ Kent, *Cosimo de' Medici*, 144

²⁴ Kent, *Cosimo de' Medici*, 10

²⁵ Kent, *Cosimo de' Medici*, 230

with a confident air.”²⁶ The second and third stories housed the family and are punctuated with bifurcated windows; the domestic purpose of these levels were conveyed through the use of smaller, more finely-shaped stones. The interior is airy, with many windows, a courtyard, garden and three loggias, dramatically offsetting the palace’s fortress-like exterior. In effect, it combined antique and contemporary elements; the bifurcated windows were taken from medieval times, while the loggia, popular in the trecento, had fallen out of favor by the 1440s and 1450s.²⁷ Simultaneously, its fortress-like appearance and rusticated facade were reminiscent of the Palazzo Vecchio; this could be seen as an appropriation of authority.²⁸ Moreover, the palace’s facade was decorated copiously with Medicean symbols, designed to communicate the importance of the occupants. Above the bifurcated windows are the Medici crest (five balls), the diamond ring, symbolizing eternity, and the rose: perhaps representing the Golden Rose of the Papacy, with which Cosimo established strong relations.²⁹

The Medici palace was intended to house Cosimo along with his close relatives; it would accommodate the patriarch and his wife, along with his sons, their wives, and their children. Three generations of Medici would live under the same roof. As such, it was designed with “regard not only to the needs of housing but those of defense.”³⁰ It has an extremely high wall enclosing the rear garden.³¹ Moreover, the “kneeling windows” along the rusticated ground level facade were a much later addition; originally there was just a single arched gate, highly likely as a defensive precaution.³²

Thus, we can see Cosimo’s preoccupation with dynastic solidarity through works he was directly involved in. But his patronization tells us much more. Cosimo extensively sponsored religious structures, as we have seen. His benevolence extended well beyond his own quarter and the church of San Lorenzo to the Mugello and Bosco ai Frati. He was religious enough to build a personal cell at San Marco. Yet he was not restricted to one order, sponsoring renovations at the Dominican convent of San Marco and the Franciscan Badia at Fiesole. This section will demonstrate Cosimo’s piety, his relationship with the papacy, and the Medici role as intercessors..

The vast majority of Cosimo’s patronized works were religious in nature. This was in accordance with the pious climate of Renaissance Florence. Cosimo’s motivations for sponsoring religious structures were manifold. Certainly, the Medici fortune was linked to close ties with the Papacy; in 1433/1434, 63% of the profits from the bank came from papal banking. Beside this, Cosimo had significant influence at the papal court, making him the “gateway to papal favor: many who

²⁶ Schevill, *The Medici*, 93

²⁷ Kent, *Cosimo de’ Medici*, 225

²⁸ Najemy, *A History of Florence*, 337

²⁹ Kent, *Cosimo de’ Medici*, 227

³⁰ Schevill, *The Medici*, 93

³¹ Kent, *Cosimo de’ Medici*, 226

³² Schevill, *The Medici*, 93

sought a pope's ear or attention appealed first to Cosimo, knowing that a good word from the pope's powerful banker could open many doors."³³ As such, patronizing ecclesiastical structures was, in part, a method of maintaining and strengthening this valuable association with the papacy. Cosimo may have been concerned about usury, the sin of making excessive profits; religious patronage might have been viewed as a way to counteract this. Patronage was also high-profile way to demonstrate Cosimo's commitment to religion, for he was pious, often attending the parish church, San Lorenzo. We cannot view Cosimo's works as simply acts of self-promotion, or based solely upon powerful religious conviction. For Cosimo, the two melded seamlessly.

At the Dominican convent of San Marco, Cosimo had a private double cell built for himself; at the time, the reservation of a cell for a private patron's exclusive use was quite extraordinary.³⁴ That he would build a private cell for personal contemplation indicative of Cosimo's piety. The cell is decorated with frescoes. One depicts Christ on the cross, with the words "Mulier ecce filius tuus" (woman, behold your son) coming from his mouth; the dying Christ is consigning his mother to St. John the Evangelist, featured in the scene.³⁵ But Mary is not looking at John: she is looking at Cosmas! Perhaps this is indicative of a rapport Cosimo felt between himself and Mary; perhaps it reveals that Cosmas, patron saint of Cosimo, is consigned to her care, as she is consigned to John's. In any case, it is indicative of Cosimo's strong religious conviction and of divine intercession.

During this same period, Cosimo developed strong relations with Eugenius IV, the pope who had been "influential in securing Cosimo's recall and political ascendancy."³⁶ For about a decade from June 1434, Eugenius resided intermittently in Florence; his apartments at Santa Maria Novella became, in practice, the center of papal government.³⁷ It was Eugenius who ordered the Silvestrines, a Benedictan order and former occupants of San Marco, to relinquish the property to the Dominicans.³⁸ Eugenius suggested that Cosimo spend 10,000 florins on San Marco's renovation to lift the burden of usury from his conscience. On his last evening in Florence, Eugenius reconsecrated San Marco to Cosmas and Damian and spent the night in Cosimo's cell at San Marco.³⁹ Eugenius had organized a council in Ferrara in 1438 upon the issue of conciliar reform; it was intended to reunite the Eastern and Western branches of Christendom. Due to the plague in Ferrara, it was moved in 1439 to Florence; Cosimo was influential in persuading Eugenius to transfer the council. He argued that the air was purer in Florence and that the city was ideal for both Eastern and Western delegates, being midway between the Mediterranean and the Adriatic. He provided the funds for the Herculean task of the transfer, including the provision

³³ Najemy, *A History of Florence*, 264

³⁴ Kent, *Cosimo de' Medici*, 153

³⁵ Lawless, "Myth, Ritual and Orthodoxy," 284

³⁶ Najemy, *A History of Florence*, 286

³⁷ Kent, *Cosimo de' Medici*, 167

³⁸ Lawless, "Myth, Ritual and Orthodoxy," 293

³⁹ Kent, *Cosimo de' Medici*, 172

of horse transport. It was Cosimo's offer of significant financial support that persuaded the chronically cash-strapped Eugenius that the transfer would be beneficial.⁴⁰ It was Medici funding that kept the council alive; indeed, the Byzantine emperor, John VIII Palaeologus, was housed in the palaces of figures exiled by Cosimo.⁴¹ It was the ultimate display of Medici power, bolstered by international prestige and apparent religious consecration.

Throughout the period of the 1430s and 1440s, while Cosimo was acquiring civic authority as well as religious through his association with Eugenius, he continued to fund ecclesiastical structures and artworks to consolidate his pious reputation. On the altarpiece of San Marco, Cosmas and Damian are prominently featured along with the saints Mark and Domenic, namesakes of the convent and the order it belonged to, respectively. Clear lines can be drawn between the kneeling martyrs and the Virgin and child, who they face.⁴² This is a reflection of the saints' role as intercessors in a time where Cosimo's influence upon the Pope was strengthening, as demonstrated: a connection that would have been hard to miss for contemporary audiences. Cosmas and Damian are also featured upon altarpieces at the Novitate Chapel at Santa Croce, and in the Medicis' private altarpieces at the palace and country villas, including Cafaggiolo. At the Franciscan convent of Bosco ai Frati, Cosmas and Damian appear yet again upon an altarpiece by Fra Angelico. Behind them are citrus trees, referred to at the time as 'male medica,' commonly believed to be a cure for illness.⁴³ Once again, this is a play on the Medici surname, indicating the family's role as doctors for civic ill. Cosimo's piety can again be witnessed in the public library he founded at San Marco. Cosimo surrounded himself with learned men of the humanist vein, including Niccolo Niccoli, who became bankrupt by purchasing manuscripts. Cosimo gave Niccoli unlimited credit at his bank, and upon Niccoli's death, paid off his debts in exchange for his six hundred manuscripts.⁴⁴ Four hundred texts, almost exclusively religious in nature, were then donated to San Marco; the rest were distributed among friends. Cosimo consulted Tommaso Parentucelli, who would later succeed Eugenius as Pope Nicholas V, to document what books would be necessary to create a complete collection. Cosimo then hired the humanist librarian Vespasiano da Bisticci to copy any volumes that could not be purchased. A team of forty-five was hired, and in twenty-two months, two hundred priceless manuscripts had been copied for public consumption at San Marco.⁴⁵ Importantly, they were all religious texts: liturgical chant and theology.

In a time where Cosimo's authority was increasing, his patronization of ecclesiastical structures also burgeoned. Through examination, we can see Cosimo's indisputable religiosity; his interest in religion was not simply a political facade. Shortly before his death in 1463, he wrote to his humanist protegee, Ficino, to come to Careggi with his lyre and show him the way to happiness

⁴⁰ Lawless, "Myth, Ritual and Orthodoxy," 296

⁴¹ Najemy, *A History of Florence*, 288

⁴² Lawless, "Myth, Ritual and Orthodoxy," 283

⁴³ Lawless, "Myth, Ritual and Orthodoxy," 281

⁴⁴ Janet Ross, *Lives of the Early Medici* (Boston: Gorham Press, 1911), 8

⁴⁵ Ross, *Lives of the Early Medici*, 8

through God.⁴⁶ It is this devoutness and search for theological contemplation that prompted him to build a personal cell at San Marco. His letter to Ficino tells us that, even in his final days, he was preoccupied with spiritual matters. His religiosity is apparent, but we can also see how Cosimo attempted to convey piety, often through his patron saints being depicted as intercessors or by sponsorship of public religious institutions, like San Marco. This connection was encouraged by liberal appearances of Cosmas and Damian, as well as other Medici saints, like Laurence (namesake of Lorenzo) and John the Evangelist (namesake of Giovanni de' Bicci) in Cosimo's sponsored works. As such, piety and political machinations could be fulfilled through patronage without apparent contradiction.

One must, however, address the overt political posturing that is oft evident. Cosimo knew that the key to long-lasting success was a good civic reputation. When he had been banished in 1433 by oligarchic enemies, fearful of his meteoric rise, he had carefully noted the public's unfavorable reaction. In a letter written to his cousin and close advisor, Averardo, he recounts how he had been recalled to Florence from Cafaggiulio; he writes "after some time I was told by order of the Signory to go upstairs, and by the Captain of the Infantry I was put into a room called the Barbaria, and locked in. On hearing this, the whole city rose."⁴⁷ When his brother Lorenzo came to Florence that day, he was sent away, having been warned by Florentines that the Signoria wanted him; in Pisa, Averardo fled, as the city had been given orders to seize him. Cosimo was aware of the grievous harm that would have been dealt to the Medici had they all been captured; he wrote to Averardo, "had they taken us all three, we should have been in evil plight."⁴⁸ Lastly, when Rinaldo degli Albizzi and those responsible for Cosimo's capture gathered on the piazza to read the terms of his exile, "few of the people were present, because in truth the mass of the citizens were ill-pleased."⁴⁹ Contrary to the anti-Mediceans' wishes, his empire did not dissolve in his absence, and his friends remained loyal. Cosimo's exile was indeed brief, and he made a triumphant return to Florence in 1434; instrumental in his comeback were a pro-Medicean Signoria, elected in September-October of 1434, and Pope Eugenius IV, who mediated with Rinaldo degli Albizzi and the anti-Mediceans.⁵⁰ Indeed, his return was only possible because of support in important places: Eugenius was conscious of the Medici role as papal bankers, as discussed previously. He was supported during his exile by various ruling families and communes, such as the Baglioni of Perugia, the Bentivogli of Bologna, and particularly Venice, where he was received more as an ambassador than an exile.⁵¹ From this episode, Cosimo never forgot how close he had come to losing everything; "for him and his family the memory of 1433 nourished the constant obsession with never losing control of politics and government."⁵² He was certainly aware of how instrumental his cordial relations with

⁴⁶ Kent, *Cosimo de' Medici*, 132

⁴⁷ Ross, *Early Medici*, 20

⁴⁸ Ross, *Early Medici*, 20

⁴⁹ Ross, *Early Medici*, 21

⁵⁰ Najemy, *A History of Florence*, 276

⁵¹ Najemy, *A History of Florence*, 275

⁵² Najemy, *A History of Florence*, 279

political figures had been in conducting his recall. Because of this, political self-aggrandizement is an element that is prevalent throughout Cosimo's patronized works.

In the courtyard of the Medici Palace, itself a dominating manifestation of Medici power, once stood a bronze statue of David by Donatello. On a high base, it would have been visible from the street when the portal was open.⁵³ But David had long been a symbol of republican defense and of the Florentine republic itself, with Donatello's previous marble version now at the palace of the priors. The inscription beneath Cosimo's statue of David reads: "the victor is whoever defends the fatherland. God crushes the wrath of an enormous foe. Behold! A boy overcame a great tyrant. Conquer, O citizens."⁵⁴ This links Cosimo with the republican rhetoric of civic virtues, particularly the opposition to tyranny and patriotism for the fatherland. By possessing a private statue of David, it could be seen as a transformation of a public emblem into a private one. But it was certainly a political calculation: it "represented an unprecedented appropriation by a single family of a corporate symbol of the state and informed the cognoscenti that true power resided several hundred meters north of the Palazzo della Signoria."⁵⁵

Political self-aggrandizement is evident in the Medici palace's private chapel. Cosimo had Benozzo Gozzoli paint the *Procession of the Magi* here, which portrays Medici family members integrated among the Magi, on their way to adore the infant Christ and accompanied by important contemporary figures.⁵⁶ The brightly-colored cavalcade winds its way across three walls of the chapel, incorporating Medici from across the generations.⁵⁷ Cosimo is represented, along with Piero the Gouty, his eldest son, and Piero's sons, Giuliano and Lorenzo (the Magnificent.) Cosimo's other sons, Giovanni, and the illegitimate Carlo, are depicted. Cosimo's humanist associate and family tutor, Marsilio Ficino, is part of the procession, along with John VIII Paleologus, the Byzantine Emperor, Gozzoli himself, and two political allies, the Lord of Rimini and Galeazzo Sforza, ruler of Milan.⁵⁸ Never before had a family incorporated itself so blatantly into sacred history.⁵⁹ Moreover, it immediately brought to mind the procession Cosimo had paid for during the Council of Florence: a spectacle marked by much pageantry. Thus, the *Procession of the Magi* has a dual importance: it implies a Medici role in Biblical history as participants, rather than witnesses, while providing a contemporary political framework for understanding the procession.

Political self-aggrandizement is visible in more insidious ways. It was, as demonstrated previously, linked with piety through the patronage of ecclesiastical structures. Virtually every structure sponsored by Cosimo is embellished liberally with the Medici symbols; at Bosco ai

⁵³ S.B. McHam, "Donatello's Bronze *David* and *Judith* as Metaphors of Medici Rule in Florence", *The Art Bulletin* 83 no. 1, (2001): 32

⁵⁴ McHam, "Donatello's Bronze *David*," 33

⁵⁵ Kent, *Cosimo de' Medici*, 19; McHam, "Donatello's Bronze *David*," 37

⁵⁶ Najemy, *A History of Florence*, 330

⁵⁷ M. Oxley, "The Medici and Gozzoli's Magi", *History Today* 44 no. 12, (1994): 17

⁵⁸ Oxley, "The Medici", 17

⁵⁹ Najemy, *A History of Florence*, 330

Frati, the Medici palle cover the pilasters of the choir, while at San Marco, the coat of arms is displayed on the facade and on the landings of the stairs.⁶⁰ Above the bifurcated windows at the palace are the Medicean symbols: the crest, the diamond ring, and the rose. In these structural features, the perpetuation of Cosimo's legacy was literally set in stone.

Examining works that Cosimo de' Medici patronized is a valuable way to gain insight into the major preoccupations of the *pater patriae*. It is doubly important when the historical context for his works is considered. Given that continued Medici success depended on the perpetuation of the line, dynastic solidarity and the formation of a close-knit kin-group would be an important design. Thus, it is explicable why Cosimo would allow associate families to build chapels within San Lorenzo; it was an opportunity for Medicean families to exercise patronage within Cosimo's sphere of influence. It also explains why the new palace was built: to accommodate future generations of Medici in a protected, outwardly-imposing environment. Given the pious nature of Florence during the Renaissance, it is also explicable why Cosimo would choose to predominantly patronize ecclesiastical structures. By portraying the Medici saints Cosmas and Damian as intercessors, Cosimo was able to convey a sense of divine authorization, presenting himself as a tangible intercessor with the papacy. Moreover, patronage could be both pious and political. By expanding the boundaries of acceptable patronage, both geographically and financially, Cosimo emerged as a frontrunner in contemporary political self-advertisement. Cosimo never forgot the events of 1433-1434, remaining aware that continued Medici success relied on good civic standing and the consolidation of control. Although his forays into the polity were largely behind the scenes, his political self-aggrandizement was far from subtle, as witnessed in the statue of David and the *Procession of the Magi*. He was not above appropriating republican values, such as opposition to tyranny and defense of the fatherland as seen in *David*, for patriotism and republican pride could be harnessed for political gain. Perhaps, then, it is no wonder that upon his death he was eulogized as *Pater Patriae*, or "Father of the Fatherland."

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⁶⁰ Najemy, *A History of Florence*, 178

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Reflection on the Reservoir: the Dark Side of 20th Century Hydro Development in B.C.

Mike Lenaghan

For a millennia, the mighty rivers of British Columbia sustained and supported vibrant First Nations societies and cultures, providing rich and varied food sources as well as important trade and communication networks. The arrival of the first European explorers however, marked the beginning of a gradual but dramatic change in perspective, as the river became increasingly viewed not as a source of sustenance, but as a source of power. Standing on the bank of the Peace River in 1793, Alexander Mackenzie described in his journal the awe inspiring power of the water rushing by.¹ One hundred years later, with European colonization in full swing, the first small-scale hydroelectric developments began in the province, serving as a symbol of modernity, progress and mankind's triumph over nature. In the Kootenays, energy demands from a small but thriving mining sector and a growing industrial economy spurred the construction of the Lower Bonington Dam in 1897.² Meanwhile in Victoria, electricity generated from damming Goldstream River in 1898 and Jordan River in 1911, provided power to the city's new street car service and expanded urban lighting system.³ In relatively short order, hydroelectricity grew from a mere novelty to a mature, reliable power generating technology and a dominant force for development in the province. Popular slogans like “Power to the People” and “Power means Progress!” captured the general optimism typical of high modernist social perspectives at the time.⁴

The insatiable demand for natural resources generated by the Allied war effort during the Second World War resulted in a sustained economic boom in BC, which continued unabated after the war's end. As a result, energy demands in the province continued to grow and in response, the province entered into a new era of hydroelectric development on an unprecedented scale.⁵ Almost overnight, once remote and isolated areas of the province found themselves on the cutting edge of modernity and human innovation;⁶ the WAC Bennet Dam was after all, the

¹ Meg Stanley, *Voices from Two Rivers: Harnessing the Power of the Peace and Columbia* (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 2010), 21.

² Jeremy Moot, *The Business of Power: Hydro-electricity in Southeastern British Columbia, 1897-1997* (Victoria: Sono Nis Press, 1997), 25-26, 73.

³ BC Hydro Power Pioneers (BCHPP). *Gaslights to Gigawatts: A Human History of BC Hydro and its Predecessors* (Vancouver: Hurricane Press, 1998), 16.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 73, 90.

⁵ J. E. Windsor and J. A. Mcvey, “Annihilation of both place and sense of place: the experience of the Cheslatta T’En Canadian First Nation within the context of large-scale environmental projects,” *The Geographical Journal* 171, no.2 (June 2005): 146.

⁶ Louise Avery, “Transportation in: Moving men, machines, and materials on the Kitimat Project,” *British Columbia History* 43, no. 2 (Summer 2010): 19.

biggest earth-filled dam in the world at the time of its completion.⁷ By the late 1970s, hydroelectricity had dramatically transformed the economy and society of British Columbia, attracting new industries and investors with the promise of cheap and reliable energy,⁸ and ushering in an era of industrialization and modernity that has shaped the province to this day. The rising reservoirs it seemed, had raised all boats, with more soon to follow. But then something changed.

In 1970, BC Hydro proposed a third and final hydroelectric project for the Peace River, known as the 'Site C Dam'. In 1980, they requested that the provincial government approve their proposal, which would allow construction on the project to begin. Despite the relative ease with which previous hydro developments had been pushed forth and approved, the Site C project was eventually shelved in 1993 after more than a decade of political debate.⁹ The death of Site C marked an end to the era of high modernist hydro development in BC that had in such short order, permanently transformed the province. In its place emerged new economic, social and environmental concerns culminating in a distinct shift of the values within British Columbian society. In 1984, BC Hydro completed its last major hydroelectric project, the Revelstoke Dam, and began an institutional transformation from construction to administration.¹⁰

Today, almost two decades after the original 'Site C' project was laid to rest, a 'new and improved' version has been exhumed, dusted off, and placed once more before the people of British Columbia for their approval. Similarly re-invigorated are the proponents of hydroelectric development who, like their 20th century forbearers, cite the economic and social benefits new dam construction will bring to the province. While such arguments certainly have merit, they tend to negate or disregard many of the negative impacts of hydro development that ultimately led public rejection of Site C, as well as other major hydro development, during the latter stages of the 20th Century. Drawing on a wide variety of academic and historical sources, this paper re-examines the negative economic, social and environmental impacts of 20th Century hydro development in British Columbia. By highlighting the darker side of hydro development, its aim is to create a more informed and enlightened public debate about the future of Site C and similar hydro projects in the province.

Hydro-Economics

If hydroelectricity had but one champion in British Columbia, it was Premier William Andrew Cecil (WAC) Bennett. A populist politician of immense popularity, Bennett promised British Columbians that he could transform their province into a highly modern, industrialized and urban

⁷ Earl K. Pollon and Shirlee Matheson, *This was Our Valley* (Calgary: Detselig Enterprises, 1989), 174.

⁸ Windsor and Mcvey, "Annihilation of both place and sense of place," 151.

⁹ Emily Yearwood-Lee, *The Site C Dam historic overview and key issues* (Victoria, B.C: Legislative Library of British Columbia, 2008), 3.

¹⁰ John Calvert, *Liquid gold : Energy Privatization in British Columbia* (Black Point, N.S: Fernwood Pub, 2007), 54.

society, a promise he delivered election after election. By the mid-1950s, Bennett had become convinced that hydroelectricity, first and foremost, would be the engine for economic growth and social transformation in the province. The premier's "Two-Rivers Strategy" emerged as the foundation for hydro development during his political career, a plan which artfully capitalized on American energy interests on the Columbia to promote simultaneous hydroelectric development on both the Peace and Columbia Rivers and their tributaries.¹¹ As promised, the major hydro developments of the Two Rivers Strategy generated significant economic and social benefits for the province. New supplies of abundant, reliable and cheap hydroelectricity quickly turned BC into a world leader in mining and metallurgy, particularly in energy intensive processes such as zinc production.¹² The economic impacts of such hydro projects also brought tremendous change to local communities. In Hudson Hope for example, the new \$300,000 Peace Glen Hotel, built to accommodate BC Hydro employees working on the nearby Peace River project, becoming a symbol of modernity in the once tiny 'backwater' town.¹³ Other small and remote communities experienced similar economic and population booms as a result of labour demands from nearby dam sites, resulting in chaotic expansions in local infrastructure, housing and services.¹⁴ At the same time, many communities located far from the dam sites experienced unprecedented growth throughout the 1960s as a result of new access to abundant electricity. Prince George's population for example, more than doubled in size from 13,877 in 1961 to 33,101 in 1971 while elsewhere, whole new settlements like the town of Mackenzie were made possible by access to hydroelectricity.¹⁵ Clearly, Bennett was delivering on his promise of 'progress', but the road to modernity was not without its potholes.

Sacrificing for the Greater Good

Throughout the mid-20th Century, most British Columbians generally supported the province's hydro mega-projects, accepting their negative consequences as necessary sacrifices¹⁶. Indeed the provincial government and BC Hydro relied heavily on the ethos of self-sacrifice and invocations of the 'greater good' in order to justify its hydroelectric agenda and the economic, social and environmental dislocation it produced. This was particularly the case when hydro developments required the forced eviction of settlers and First Nations located in the reservoir flood zone¹⁷. For the most part, its efforts to shame people in submission were successful; however the province could not eliminate all public resistance. In Hudson Hope, a town which seemingly had much to gain from hydro development on the Peace River, local resistance

¹¹ Tina Loo, "People In The Way: Modernity, Environment, and Society on the Arrow Lakes," *BC Studies* 142/143 (Summer/Autumn 2004): 163.

¹² Mouat, *The Business of Power*, 91.

¹³ Pollon and Matheson, *This was Our Valley*, 153.

¹⁴ Peter Nemetz and Susan Toller, "Assessing the Impact of Hydro Development: A Case Study of the Columbia River Basin in British Columbia," *BC Studies* 114 (Summer 1997): 15.

¹⁵ Stanley, *Voices from Two Rivers*, 120.

¹⁶ Loo, "People In The Way," 184-85.

¹⁷ Pollon and Matheson, *This was Our Valley*, 209.

coalesced quickly when it became apparent that the route for a new highway associated with the dam would require the destruction of the town's famous St. Peter's log church, built in the 1930s.¹⁸ Meanwhile on the Columbia, many locals accused the government of sacrificing their valleys and livelihoods for the sake of American interests and “thirty pieces of silver” noting that only one of the three Canadian storage dams on the Columbia was fitted with generating capacity.¹⁹ Despite such outcries however, hydroelectric projects under Bennett are remarkable for their general lack of coherent and sustained public protest, despite the many adverse effects that became apparent as the projects neared and reached completion.

Prioritizing Progress

The provincial government's justification for 20th century hydro mega-projects was as simple as it was single-minded: more dams equals more economic and social prosperity. Indeed the government's uncritical optimism towards hydro development throughout much of the 20th century, revealed a sort of religious conviction that belied any serious reflection; just as God created light where before was only darkness, hydroelectricity would create economic opportunity and growth in place of an economic vacuum. The reality however, is that such projects did not simply create local economies from scratch, rather they completely reconstituted existing economies based on the ideals of progress and modernity espoused by government politicians and bureaucrats. In other words, hydro development was less about economic progress per se, and more about economic prioritization as determined by a centralized government.

Prior to the construction of the Columbia River dams, the Columbia River Basin was a highly dynamic economic area, with ecologically rich valleys supporting large-scale timber production, recreational and sporting activities, as well as tourism and agriculture.²⁰ The Arrow Lakes region for example, was home to a highly productive and diverse agricultural economy that had developed over decades; the tiny hamlet of Renata alone produced a staggering 10% of the province's cherries in 1950. With the completion of the Arrow Lake Dam, Renata and the entire Arrow Lakes agricultural region was completely destroyed by flooding.²¹ The flooding caused by the hydro-electric development also devastated the forestry sector along the Columbia. The reservoir created by the Mica dam, for example, severely impacted the region's timber economy. It reduced annual harvests by 9% due to land-loss and inundating the 117km Big Bend Highway, the primary transportation route used by the local logging industry. As a result, a new two hundred kilometer transportation route was eventually constructed at great environmental and economic expense, permanently raising operating costs by almost doubling travel time for

¹⁸ Ibid., 166.

¹⁹ J. W. Wilson and Maureen Conn, “On Uprooting and Rerooting: Reflections on the Columbia River Project,” *BC Studies* 58 (Summer 1983): 46.

²⁰ Nemetz and Toller, “Assessing the Impact of Hydro Development,” 8.

²¹ Loo, “People In The Way,” 194.

logging trucks.²² While some of these economic impacts were offset by the growing economic activity in the industrial and mining sector, not all the promised benefits of dam construction came to be realized. As authors Nemetz and Toller have argued, even the predicted benefits to tourism turned out to be wishful thinking. They believe that “although dams and reservoirs were initially viewed as tourist assets, the flooding of forested land, loss of recreational fishing on inundated rapids and falls, and large reservoir drawdowns have all adversely affected tourism.”²³

In addition to promoting a certain economic vision, 20th century hydro development also enabled the BC government to project its political power and authority throughout the province. By inundating valuable farming, hunting and fishing habitats, BC's dams effectively curtailed or altogether eliminated the ability of many nearby communities to subsist independently of the wider provincial economy. This process of 'economic colonialism' occurred on three major fronts. Firstly, labour demands at dam sites resulted in large population spikes in local communities, creating a wage-based economic system that competed with less formal pre-existing local economies. Secondly, to meet the needs of these growing populations and the logistical demands of dam construction, public and private infrastructure within local communities was rapidly expanded, along with a host government services. Thirdly, the government then used these expanded public services to justify increasing tax rates on the public, thereby further projecting its physical presence and social authority in the area. Initially, these new government services were widely appreciated, however when the dams were completed and communities shrank due to job loss, the tax burden on remaining residents increased, forcing many people to seek permanent wage-based employment.²⁴ Ultimately, many local communities grew to resent the added tax burden they were forced to pay as a result of infrastructural and service investments in their area.²⁵ For the provincial government however, such developments were part of the success story behind BC's hydro development agenda; by destroying the capacity of remote BC communities for self-reliance through both physical pressure (flooding and migration) and economic pressure (increased taxation), the government effectively forced their assimilation into the wider provincial economic system from which it drew its power and legitimacy.

Remaking Society

Maintaining support for hydro development within democracies generally compels governments to spread the economic and social benefits of such projects as widely as possible, while simultaneously isolating the negative human and environmental impacts. This explains why in Canada in general, and BC in particular, major hydro developments have tended to occur in

²² Nemetz and Toller, “Assessing the Impact of Hydro Development,” 24-25.

²³ *Ibid.*, 21.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 15.

²⁵ Pollon and Matheson, *This was Our Valley*, 169.

remote areas, far away from major urban populations.²⁶ In this way, governments can ensure that the destructive elements of hydro development are borne by communities too small to pose a significant electoral threat to their power. So while cities like Victoria and Vancouver enjoyed the benefits of hydro development with no strings attached, rural communities located in the shadow of the dams were often subjected to economic dislocation through the literal inundation of traditional local industries such as agriculture and logging.²⁷ As destructive as the economic fallout of hydro development could be however, such concerns paled in comparison to the forced evictions many people faced as a result of dam construction.

By the mid-20th Century, both the federal and BC governments had a long history of subjecting First Nations to forced evictions seen most notably through the imposition of the reserve system. However, it was not until the era of high modernist hydro development that these practices were systematically employed on a large-scale to the province's non-native population. In the West Kootenays for example, the completion of the High Arrow Dam (today known as the Keenleyside Dam) raised upstream water levels by 76 ft., creating a reservoir that ultimately inundated fourteen communities as well as some 25,000 acres of arable land upon which the local economy was dependent.²⁸ For these 'hydro refugees', such evacuations were tragic and traumatic experiences. However, for the provincial government, they were viewed not only a necessary sacrifices for the 'greater good', but moreover as perfect opportunities to realize the modern social ideal. Once the 'primitive and disorganized' original settlements had been evacuated and destroyed, government and BC Hydro officials arrived, ready to rebuild idealic 'modern' communities. By imposing their plans for a suburban paradise, their aim was not only to reshape the physical structure of communities, but ultimately society itself.²⁹ It need not be explained that such impositions from Victoria and Vancouver were not always well-received by the affected communities.

Government efforts to compensate individuals and communities for land lost to flooding were often conducted with disregard for the needs or desires of the individuals who were affected. Officials tended to appraise soon-to-be-flooded land as precisely that, fixing value based on its inevitable destruction. As a result, many people felt they has not been adequately compensated for the land they had lost, while others felt no amount of money could account for the emotional loss they had suffered.³⁰ In the case of the WAC Bennet Dam, some residents resisted initial government offers and attempted to seek redress through the courts, but the government had time on their side, going ahead with the dam and letting the rising water levels force the issue to an inevitable conclusion. While only five expropriations were required to obtain the land needed to

²⁶ Windsor and Mcvey, "Annihilation of both place and sense of place," 152.

²⁷ Nemetz and Toller, "Assessing the Impact of Hydro Development," 23-24.

²⁸ Loo, "People In The Way," 167; Wilson and Conn, "On Uprooting and Rerooting," 41.

²⁹ Loo, "People In The Way," 169-173.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 189.

build the WAC Bennett Dam, this does not reflect actual public sentiment as many residents signed agreements half-heartedly, recognizing they had no other option.³¹

Just as the government's hydroelectric projects had served to assimilate remote regions of the province into the wider economic system, so too did they facilitate social assimilation based on an idealized image of a 'proper' and 'modern' society. In Hudson Hope, a modern new highway was seen, by the government, as more important than the community's history or culture as embodied in its 1930's log church. Furthermore, another example can be seen in the Arrow Lakes region, which prior to the Columbia River Project, has been a place forgotten by modernity, accessible only by "tortuous roads" and "archaic but functional ferries."³² Upon the completion of the Arrow Lakes Dam, the area was systematically 'modernized' by BC Hydro and the provincial government planners with new roads, highways, modern suburban housing, commercial real-estate and social services, all in an attempt to create the idealic modern community. Despite the expense and length of these efforts however, two surveys carried out in the region in 1970 and in 1981 found that Arrow Lakes residents viewed the area as less livable than the communities they had been forced to leave behind.³³ In reality, despite the high modernist social transformation envisioned by Bennett and his peers in Victoria and Vancouver, many rural and remote communities did not want enlightened change or modernity forced upon them.

While 20th century hydro development had tremendous economic and social benefits for many British Columbians, particularly those located far from their source, there were those who suffered tremendous social and economic dislocation as a result of the damming process. Many people lost their jobs, their heritage, their homes and their very way of life. For the First Nations unfortunate enough to live in the flood zone, the situation was even worse.

Hydroelectricity as the New Engine of Colonialism

Authors Windsor and Mcvey have argued that hydroelectric projects are among the most powerful and potent purveyors of 'topocide' employed throughout human history³⁴. The impacts of 20th Century hydro development on BC's First Nations clearly illustrates their point.

According to archeological evidence, the Rocky Mountain Trench region of BC, which includes both the Peace and Columbia Rivers and their many tributaries, has sustained human habitation for over 12,000 years.³⁵ For a millennia, the Columbia and Peace River systems provided First Nations societies with food, water and natural resources as well as an important transportation

³¹ Pollon and Matheson, *This was Our Valley*, 212-214.

³² Wilson and Conn, "On Uprooting and Rerooting," 40.

³³ *Ibid.*, 42-50.

³⁴ Windsor and Mcvey, "Annihilation of both place and sense of place," 157.

³⁵ Stanley, *Voices from Two Rivers*, 20.

network, facilitating trade, communication and cultural exchanges.³⁶ In this way, the river systems of the Rocky Mountain Trench formed the backbone of First Nations life and culture in the region, a fact not lost on government officials. Indeed before major hydro development began in the region, the Department of Indian Affairs expressed concern on behalf of the federal government, acknowledging that the flooding of certain areas as a result of dam construction would significantly alter or destroy First Nations' lands and thereby threaten their traditional way of life. Ultimately however, the federal government dropped its objections and gave a blanket approval for hydro development in BC on the principle that affected First Nations *could* be adequately compensated for their losses.³⁷ As a result, a new phase of colonialism began in British Columbia, in which provincial and private auditors were able to appraise and commodify First Nations 'assets' (their land, culture, history and traditional way of life) through the free-market, thereby providing 'appropriate' financial compensation for their assets destruction. Since only physical assets such as land and private property had any 'real value' in the modern economy, putting a financial value on the 'First Nations problem' effectively enabled the provincial government to negate the immaterial impacts of hydro development on indigenous communities altogether, passing them off as collateral damage. The racist rationalization of hydro development is further revealed by the fact that affected First Nation communities' received a fraction of the compensation given to their non-native counterparts. In compensation for land flooded by the Kenney Dam for example, Alcan gave non-native settlers in the region roughly \$1544 per hectare and paid their costs of relocation while the Cheslatta First Nation received an average of \$77.22 per hectare and no assistance in relocating.³⁸ The inherent racism with which hydro development occurred in BC was not lost on the province's First Nations people. An account from Andrew Woodsworth, a student working within the projected flood zone of the Williston reservoir was recorded by Meg Stanley, and helps to illustrate First Nations outrage:

When I met Andy Prince deep in the forest after the meeting, he shook his Winchester at me and shouted, 'The white man is taking our land!! Why don't the white man fuck off?' What a succinct summary! It turned out he had recieved something like \$2000 in exchange for the destruction of an important part of who he was, and he would completely lose access to his traditional trapping areas because it would be all flooded.³⁹

While the commodification of First Nations peoples was in itself an egregious act, worse still was the fact the both the provincial and federal governments made little or no attempt to prepare for, or assist in, First Nations relocation efforts. Indeed, once the decision to dam was made, it seems local indigenous people were all but forgotten. When, for example, the last two diversion

³⁶ Ibid., 20.

³⁷ Ibid., 106-107.

³⁸ Windsor and Mevey, "Annihilation of both place and sense of place," 155.

³⁹ Stanley, *Voices from Two Rivers*, 110.

tunnels were shut on the WAC Bennett dam and flooding began in 1968, the Tsek'ene peoples were caught completely off-guard. In the confused rush for high ground, many people were forced to leave behind their possessions, and had to survive the coming winter in hurriedly constructed makeshift shelters.⁴⁰ Despite years to plan accommodation and organize the relocation of the Tsek'ene, the provincial government and BC Hydro demonstrated almost total indifference to their plight, ultimately turning them and other First Nations in the region into 'refugees of indifference'. The damming of the Peace River by the WAC Bennett Dam also had devastating long-term impacts for the region's First Nations communities. The Williston Reservoir flooded many traditional hunting grounds, trap lines and berry fields as well as devastated the local animal populations both directly through mass drowning and indirectly through extensive habitat loss.⁴¹ As a result, the viability of traditional subsistence activities practiced by local First Nations was substantially diminished. This was a common consequence of hydro development throughout BC. However, perhaps the most striking example of the colonial and racist mentality underpinning 20th century hydro development in BC occurred more than a decade prior to the damming of the Peace, in the shadow of the Kenney Dam built to supply Alcan's aluminum smelter in Kitimat with an abundant supply of cheap energy.

On April 3rd, 1952, without any forewarning or prior consultation, Department of Indian Affairs officials informed the Cheslatta that they would have to immediately relocate due to imminent flooding. While white settlers in the region had been notified up to two years in advance that they would be forced to move, the Cheslatta were given five days; on April 8th the gates on the Kenney Dam were closed, and the area began to flood. To help speed up the evacuation process, Alcan encouraged the Cheslatta to leave the area immediately, promising to cover the costs of relocation, collect and transport their valuables, and exhume and relocate the community's historic burial ground. With the reservoir steadily rising, the Cheslatta had little option but to accept in good faith Alcan's promises and say a hurried farewell to their traditional homeland. Ultimately, Alcan failed to honour even one of these promises, and in a matter of days, the history, culture and livelihoods of the Cheslatta were washed away.⁴²

The Nechako Reservoir created by the Kenney Dam ultimately forced the Cheslatta to relocate to a new reservation located outside their traditional territory some 48km to the north, where the ecology of the area could not support their traditional lifestyle.⁴³ The societal impacts of this forced relocation on the Cheslatta people were tragic. Severed from their land, culture and history, they were unable to continue in their traditional practices, resulting in individual depression and social despair, culminating in alarmingly high rates of alcohol and drug-related deaths and suicides. According to authors Windsor and Mcvey, "by 1990, alcohol use amongst

⁴⁰ Ibid., 111.

⁴¹ Tim Lai, "First nation settles grievances with BC Hydro, government," Vancouver Sun, October 25, 2008, online edition.

⁴² Windsor and Mcvey, "Annihilation of both place and sense of place," 155; Jack Glen, *Once upon an Oldman: Special interest politics and the Oldman River Dam* (Vancouver, B.C: UBC Press, 1999), 186.

⁴³ Windsor and Mcvey, "Annihilation of both place and sense of place," 153-54.

the Cheslatta had reached epidemic proportions and welfare dependency was 95%.”⁴⁴ Based on these figures, they go on to argue that, “it is not an exaggeration to say that it has taken the Cheslatta fully half a century to recover sufficiently from the trauma and the depauperization of their diaspora, such that they can now begin to re-establish their heritage, their self-sufficient economy and a sense of place.”⁴⁵

The experience of BC First Nations like the Tseken and the Cheslatta have been fundamental in shaping modern First Nations political organization and legal resistance within the province. First Nations have achieved considerable political success in opposing further hydro developments such as the original Site C Project, and have also won a number of important legal battles seeking redress for their treatment under earlier hydro projects. In the 1990s, the Tsay Keh Dene Band reached a multi-million dollar settlement with the provincial government and BC Hydro over grievances resulting from the WAC Bennett Dam and the Williston Reservoir.⁴⁶ While similar legal settlements have continued in the first decade of the 21st Century, these historic injustices are far from being resolved.⁴⁷ Even if the courts can settle all related disputes however, it is clear that no level of financial compensation or admission of culpability on the part of government can replace the history, traditions and culture which have been lost. The same is true of the staggering ecological destruction which occurred throughout British Columbia as a result of 20th century hydro development.

The Environmental Fallout of Hydro Development

The environmental destruction caused by 20th Century hydro development in British Columbia cannot be overstated. The deaths of animals, habitat loss and ecological dislocation all occurred on a grand scale and in high concentrations around dam sites and corresponding flood zones. Though many of these ecological impacts are inherent consequences of any major hydro development, they increase dramatically in correlation to the size of the project in question. The WAC Bennett Dam, for example, flooded an area five times the size of Lake Okanagan, and as a result, led ecological destruction on an almost unimaginable scale.⁴⁸

Direct Impacts on Animal Populations

The direct and immediate impacts of dam construction on wildlife populations varies considerably depending on the size, scale and timeline of project construction, the specific ecological character of the affected area, and the extent to which ecological impacts were addressed and mitigated through project design. In general, earlier hydro projects in BC proceeded with little ecological concern or understanding, resulting in greater immediate impacts

⁴⁴ Ibid., 157.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 159.

⁴⁶ Lai, "First nation settles grievances with BC Hydro, government."

⁴⁷ Stanley, *Voices from Two Rivers*, 120.

⁴⁸ Pollon and Matheson, *This was Our Valley*, 223.

on wildlife populations. The Duncan Dam for example, was the first of the Columbia River Treaty dams to be completed in 1967 and was constructed without fish ladders. This resulted in the decimation of the local salmon run, with up to 2.8 million fish being obstructed from reaching their spawning ground.⁴⁹ In addition to barring fish migration, dams also tend to collect and withhold enormous amounts of nutrients in their flood zones, thereby depriving downstream ecosystems. For example, the Libby Dam, located on the on the Kootenai River in Montana, just south of the Canadian border, was found to withhold between 45% and 50% of all phosphorous that would otherwise travel downstream. To compensate for these impacts, state fisheries managers began to add nutrient supplements downstream in 1992 in order to maintain ecosystem functionality.⁵⁰ These two examples reveal how ecological design and human intervention can mitigate certain environmental impacts from hydro development. However, the vast majority of environmental damage caused by dams cannot be eliminated.

When a major dam's reservoir begins to flood, the number of animal drownings can be staggering. Throughout the 20th Century, many BC residents who witnessed such flooding reported seeing countless animals stranded on small high-ground areas by the rapidly rising water levels. The immensity of the reservoirs combined with the shocking amount of debris which rose to the surface of the water once flooding began, made swimming to safety all but impossible. Some local residents operated desperate rescue missions, collecting treed animals by boat and delivering them to the safety of the new shoreline. For most animals caught by the flood however, there was no escape.⁵¹ Pen Powell, a long-time resident and local pilot, recalled flying over the Williston Reservoir as it began to fill and witnessing “a large herd of moose that were trapped on a piece of high ground by floating debris and pulled-over trees. We counted well over 100 moose in about a 10-acre area. The next day we came back over the same area and it was completely covered with water, and we could see lots of dead moose floating among the debris.”⁵² While BC Hydro realized the risks posed by floating debris to both animal and human water traffic, it had made only token attempts to address the issue because the systematic clearing of organic material prior to flooding was deemed uneconomical.⁵³ As a result of this poor effort, many reservoir areas remained clogged by floating debris for years following construction, severely obstructing animal migration, human transportation and recreational usage.⁵⁴

Habitat Loss

In addition to mass animal drowning, BC's mega hydro projects also resulted in significant long term habitat destruction for both aquatic and terrestrial species. Fish spawning habitats located

⁴⁹Nemetz and Toller, “Assessing the Impact of Hydro Development,” 12.

⁵⁰Ibid., 14.

⁵¹Stanley, *Voices from Two Rivers*, 111-12.

⁵²Pollon and Matheson, *This was Our Valley*, 226.

⁵³Ibid., 231.

⁵⁴Nemetz and Toller, “Assessing the Impact of Hydro Development,” 15.

behind a newly constructed dam became either damaged or destroyed as a result of changing water levels, flows and temperatures. The widespread destruction of fish habitats not only affected fish populations, but also bird species which depended upon them for food. Despite considerable knowledge of how hydro projects would affect local ecosystems however, efforts to mitigate these impacts were an exception to the rule, often made half-heartedly by project planners in an attempt to appease particularly troublesome local interest groups. For example, when provincial fisheries biologists predicted that construction of the High Arrow Dam would result in the decline of Kokanee, Rainbow and Dolly Trout populations by 70%, and displace large numbers of beaver, muskrat, water fowl and other animals, BC Hydro responded by constructing an artificial spawning site for trout for the benefit of local fishing clubs, while leaving the other affected species to their fate.⁵⁵ The loss of habitat and food sources in the Arrow Lakes region as a result of the dam had such noticeable impacts on migratory bird patterns in years following the project's completion, that one local resident described the situation as the region's own version of "silent spring."⁵⁶

Flooding from hydro projects also results in large-scale habitat loss for many terrestrial animals that inhabit the ecologically rich riparian zones of river valleys. In many cases, these delicate ecosystems are then unable to re-establish themselves at the new reservoir shoreline due to irregular fluctuations in water levels.⁵⁷ The result is often a deadened reservoir shoreline characterized by treacherous sinkholes and rotting debris, which can pose a serious danger to animals seeking access to drinking water.⁵⁸ In addition to the impacts of upstream flooding, dams also create significant downstream ecological impacts. The WAC Bennett Dam on the Peace River withheld so much water from downstream ecosystems in early years, that the Peace-Athabasca Delta and associated marshland areas began to dry up during the late 1960s and 70s. This aridification resulted in widespread habitat loss and species decline for many animal including migratory water fowl and the endangered wood bison.⁵⁹

The combination and complex interrelation of population decline and habitat loss due to dam construction has led to some of the most dramatic ecological changes in the history of British Columbia. Despite a greater understanding of, and concern for, environmental issue, much of the ecological destruction caused by large-scale hydro developments is unavoidable. Generally, net primary production and ecological diversity decrease in the region upstream from a dam site, as highly productive terrestrial and aquatic habitats are destroyed or subjected to high levels of irregular disturbance due flooding and fluctuating water levels.⁶⁰ Low reservoir water levels during dry periods can produce tremendous dust storms that can last for days, resulting in a

⁵⁵ Loo, "People In The Way," 184.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 191.

⁵⁷ Wilson and Conn, "On Uprooting and Rerooting," 44.

⁵⁸ Loo, "People In The Way," 191.

⁵⁹ Stanley, *Voices from Two Rivers*, 117.

⁶⁰ Nemetz and Toller, "Assessing the Impact of Hydro Development," 11-12.

variety of health and safety problems for the human and animal populations.⁶¹ Finally, massive new reservoirs can affect local precipitation patterns, resulting in increased fog and humidity.⁶²

While it is difficult to fully account for the environmental impacts of 20th Century hydro development in British Columbia, the ecological fallout created by Mica Dam provides some indication of the scale of destruction. According to Nemetz and Toller, prior the dam's construction, government biologists estimated the project would result in,

a loss of 105,000 acres (42,500 ha) of wildlife habitat, including wetlands, riparian zones, and natural meadows. It was predicted that this habitat loss would cause reductions in populations of moose (70 per cent), deer (50 per cent), elk (40 per cent), and caribou (10 per cent) as well as the displacement of most aquatic animals and waterfowl.⁶³

Before the dam was completed in 1973 and flooding began, the wildlife resources of the Mica Basin were estimated at \$10.9 million dollars. This assessment was reduced by nearly half once the ecological impacts of flooding to the region had been assessed.⁶⁴

Conclusion

Despite a concerted effort by successive provincial governments to carry out major hydro developments in remote areas of British Columbia, the tremendous economic, social and ecological destruction created by such projects did eventually make it into mainstream public consciousness. Overtime, First Nations resistance to such high modernist projects became increasingly organized and influential within public debate and as a result, within government circles. The growing public concern for the treatment of First Nations peoples eventually altered the legal climate in the province enough that some communities affected by hydro development have since been able to seek legal redress for their experiences.⁶⁵

Meanwhile, the ecological impacts of hydro development helped give rise to the environmental movement in BC, which demanded change in the way such projects were carried out.⁶⁶ By the 1970s, environmental impact assessments had become a fundamental aspect of BC Hydro operations, and the company began to develop ways of mitigating some of the environmental impacts caused by hydro development such as adding fertilizer to make-up for nutrient loss, operating fish hatcheries, recreating spawning grounds, installing fish ladders, and regulating seasonal water levels to ensure salmon eggs remain inundated until hatched.⁶⁷ Perhaps the best

⁶¹ Loo, "People In The Way," 191; Stanley, *Voices from Two Rivers*, 112.

⁶² Yearwood-Lee, *The Site C Dam historic overview and key issues*, 4.

⁶³ Nemetz and Toller, "Assessing the Impact of Hydro Development," 14.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 15.

⁶⁵ Stanley, *Voices from Two Rivers*, 120.

⁶⁶ BCHPP, *Gaslights to Gigawatts*, 173-74.

⁶⁷ BC Hydro, *Water for fish, water for power: finding a balance* (Victoria, BC :BC Hydro, 1998), 1.

example of the environmental sea-change within BC Hydro however, came in 1989 when the company created its *Power Smart* plan, which contrary to conventional business models, encourages its customers to reduce their consumption of energy. Today the program remains “one of Hydro's best known and widely popular programs.”⁶⁸ Despite reform efforts on the part of the provincial government and BC Hydro however, public resistance to ongoing hydro development continued to rise, as many of the worst social and ecological impacts simply could not be eliminated. Ultimately, First Nations and environmental groups were instrumental in bringing about an end to 20th century high modernist hydro developments in the province, culminating in the defeat of the Site C proposal.

Today, with Site C back on the table, it is essential that British Columbian's revisit their collective past, and remember the why they came to oppose this particular project and reject the rationale of high modernist development. By exploring the historical economic, social and ecological fall-out of 20th century hydro development in BC, it is hoped that this paper will help stimulate a critical public debate on the issue. After all, only by studying the past can we be sure to avoid repeated tragedy in our future.

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⁶⁸ BCHPP, *Gaslights to Gigawatts*, 212.

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A Revolution in Death?: the Effects of Socialism and Revolution on Russian Death Culture from the End of Imperial Russia to the End of Bolshevism

Alysha Zawaduk

Nothing could be more universally human than the fact of death, a topic that has received much attention throughout the centuries from philosophers, theologians, anthropologists, and ordinary folk alike. It seems appropriate that it should also be investigated by historians because, although biological death has been the shared fate of every person from the very beginnings of our lineage, death is not merely a scientific concept and is, more importantly, a cultural and historical one. This reality means that the nonphysical sides of death are and always have been influenced by myriad factors such as religion, politics, and time. Consequently, a group's habits surrounding death are unique and do not remain static. One would expect the rate and degree of change to be more dramatic in times of rapid sociopolitical upheaval. Such was the case, to a certain extent, for Russia during its tumultuous first quarter of the twentieth century, but did this change constitute a revolution in death? Death in Russia altered significantly under the empire's last days and the Bolsheviks; however, for various reasons many features persisted, either in tune with their original manifestations -- often to the dismay of the government -- or as modified versions resulting from official policies and practices. Because the changes, though significant, were not enough to outweigh these preservations, a revolution in death did not occur.

An investigation of death cannot be undertaken without considering religion's status in it; this consideration is of remarkable importance when examining alterations in death in Russia from the last days of the monarchy to the end of Bolshevism. From the time of Russia's Christianization the Orthodox Church was central, more or less, in Russian death culture as it played an overall central role in life.¹ During imperial times religion essentially monopolized the sphere of ritualized death. The major exception to this was the tsar's funeral where ritual would be focused as much on the dead monarch and political pomp as the proper religious ceremony,² showing that rigid social hierarchy was not only embedded in life but applied posthumously as well. Funerary customs, then, were implements blatantly used to reinforce social, economic, and political disparity among the classes.³

¹ Of course religions other than Russian Orthodoxy were active, but focusing on the impact of these on death culture would be too exhaustive for the purposes of this paper, so focus will be on Orthodoxy as it was the main religious factor acting upon *Russian* society

² Nina Tumarkin, *Lenin Lives!: The Lenin Cult in Soviet Russia* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983) 139.

³ Catherine Merridale, *Night of Stone: Death and Memory in Russia* (London, UK: Granta Books, 2000), 33-4.

Among the common folk, however, funerals followed a widespread pattern characterized by religious rites. The more urban of the ordinary Russians adhered, more or less, to familiar religious, largely Russian Orthodox, funerary rites. Alternatively, the typical peasant death rites, like popular peasant religion in general, blended centuries-old pagan customs with traditional Orthodox ones. The Church, as an entity, was not highly favoured by the peasants, but they did welcome Orthodox doctrine and, as far as everyday life went, Orthodoxy was a highly incorporated component and a central constituent of funerals.⁴ The key reason self-described devoutly Orthodox peasants maintained pagan rituals was because they believed the pagan ceremonies did not infringe on, but rather fell under, their Orthodox belief set.⁵ The foremost issue of peasant burials, as dictated by Orthodox tradition, was final Judgment Day and the corresponding resurrection of the dead. The decedent's body was washed so it could be in good condition for its later resurrection and presentation before God. Additionally, it was expected that the place of burial, where future resurrection would occur, would be maintained by the family.⁶ The Church forbade cremation because destroying the body blatantly violated the resurrection concept; consequently, everyone was inhumed.⁷

Other aspects of official Orthodox ritual included formal prayer for the deceased's soul and holding ceremonial feast days not just on the day of the funeral, but also on the ninth, twentieth, and fortieth days after the death.⁸ The funeral itself was held three days following the death and, as mentioned, a final ceremony was held forty days after death. These correspond to the day of the soul's withdrawal from earth and the day of the soul's preliminary judgement, respectively.⁹ Continued prayer was crucial because it could mean the soul's salvation upon the final reckoning when all souls would be unalterably judged. This included frequent ordinary prayer as well as observance of the more important religious days, such as Easter, and the anniversaries of deaths.¹⁰ Tending to the grave's maintenance and leaving food at the grave were important on these days because although the spirit had departed the earth, it would return intermittently, feeling hungry. These regular ceremonies benefitted not only the dead but the living, too, as graves functioned as essential places for the living to socially interact with each other and the dead.¹¹

⁴ Ibid., 45-47.

⁵ Michael Bouchard, "Graveyards: Russian Ritual and Belief Pertaining to the Dead," *Religion* 34, no. 4 (October 2004): 347.

⁶ Ibid., 350.

⁷ Merridale, *Night of Stone*, 33.

⁸ Julius Hecker, *Religion and Communism: A Study of Religion and Atheism in Soviet Russia* (Westport, CT: Hyperion Press, 1933), 117.

⁹ Merridale, *Night of Stone*, 32. There is a difference between initial and final judgment that needs to be recognized: The soul does not face *final* judgment on the fortieth day, as final judgment is the universal day of reckoning when the dead are resurrected and given ultimately sentenced to either Heaven or Hell. The first judgment, on the fortieth day after death, is merely temporary and alterable and long as the world exists, until final Judgment Day.

¹⁰ Ibid., 32-3.

¹¹ Orlando Figes, *Natasha's Dance: A Cultural History of Russia* (New York, NY: Picador, 2002), 352-3.

Peasant pagan traditions included superstitions and associated practices regarding death. For example, in one's dying moments, those present placed a candle in the dying person's hands, lit the wick, and extinguished the flame immediately following the moment of death. It was believed that the drifting smoke indicated which way the soul left the body. There were also a few beliefs involving the dead and money. In instances where the deceased's eyes were still open the family placed an object -- frequently a coin -- over them as the open eyes were believed to be looking for an eternal partner for the soul.¹² Following the notion that life after death reflected life before death, small sums of money were buried with the body to ensure that the soul would be able to feed itself -- as the living family could not feed it for eternity -- in the afterlife by buying small plot of land to cultivate as it had done while alive.¹³ People also went to lengths to ensure the deceased did not take them along into death, such as regulating the size of coffins to be just enough room for one body. They also sought to prevent haunting by taking precautions such as, when moving the body from the home to the graveyard, passing the body not out the door but out the window to disorient the spirit and prevent it from finding its way back in.¹⁴ Fearing vampirism they would even, albeit rarely, mutilate and dismember a corpse to prevent it from rising again.¹⁵ Obviously, though they confronted death directly and never discounted the fact of its inevitability, peasants did not take it lightly.

The higher echelons of Russian society, though also mainly performing Orthodox funerals and holding to similar religious beliefs regarding death (minus the pagan traditions), had a much more casual approach to the non-ritualized part of death. Anyone who has read Tolstoy's novella *The Death of Ivan Ilyich* should be able to conclude that an aristocratic attitude toward one's own death involved denial during life and self-pitying despair along with spiritual and existential agony while dying.¹⁶ Death was simply unacceptable to them, an inconvenient interruption in their cushy, distracting lives and therefore was something to be feared. Afraid that their own death would be brought by doing so, many aristocrats would avoid use of the word "death," particularly in writing.¹⁷ When forced to address their own mortality because of imminent death, it was quite common for the bourgeoisie to seek comfort not only in priests that delivered final rites but also, and sometimes more importantly, from their servants. These servants, who came from peasant backgrounds and therefore possessed the more accepting view of death, used their attitudes to counsel their masters and help them bravely confront death.¹⁸ In terms of ceremony and burial, the upper classes held more elaborate, public, and rigidly Orthodox deaths as Church and state were bound together; therefore, the closer one was to the top social tier, the more he or she had to adhere to officially prescribed practices. The different social classes even had distinct burial grounds. The aristocracy, nobility, and clergy had separate cemeteries from the

¹² Hecker, *Religion and Communism*, 16.

¹³ Figes, *Natasha's Dance*, 352.

¹⁴ Merridale, *Night of Stone*, 50.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 55.

¹⁶ Leo Tolstoy, *The Death of Ivan Ilyich* (Toronto: Bantam Books, 1981).

¹⁷ Figes, *Natasha's Dance*, 324.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 350.

commoners, and the royals had their own burial sites. These segregated cemeteries, along with seven cost-based funeral ranks, ensured that social hierarchy applied even after death.¹⁹

New death rites were introduced and expanded with the rise of socialism; this was particularly true in the early 1900s when revolutionary feeling was ever-present and growing. These funerals did not replace the traditional ones nor did they adopt radically different forms. They essentially used traditional forms but radically altered the symbolism and language to provide atheistic funerals. Atheism was a natural tenet of socialism as religion, according to Marx, was merely one of the many fruits of economics, the foundation of social life; those that controlled the economy therefore controlled religion, one of the economy's social byproducts, and exploited the proletariat with it. Under socialism religion would supposedly be naturally eradicated because the means of class exploitation were to vanish with classes themselves.²⁰ To revolutionaries, then, traditional funerals were seen as wholly inappropriate and needed to be secularized. Resulting from this attitude, beginning in the 1870s, was the advent of "Red Funerals." These public funerals were a means of mourning for fellow revolutionaries who sacrificed themselves for the cause while being used mainly for public protest.²¹ Because the tsarist government could not censor mourning ceremonies like other public meetings, collective grieving became one of the only admissible types of gathering that allowed for collective revolutionary expression.²²

Red Funerals used legitimate mourning for fallen comrades as an outlet for propagandizing against the regime. The colour used to characterize traditional aristocratic funerals was white, a colour closely tied to the Christian concept of "the other light."²³ Red Funerals were focused on earthly concepts, and their colour was not one of hope for the soul's future but of remembrance for the heroic life and sacrifices of the dead; red represented the deceased's blood that he selflessly let flow in the streets during the battle for revolution.²⁴ Blazing red banners brandished slogans that, along with revolutionary funeral hymns, expressed grief and political feeling simultaneously.²⁵ One of the most popular of these funeral hymns, "You Fell Victims,"²⁶ clearly highlighted the importance of the cause over grief for the individual. These ceremonies, while sizable and public, were neither pompous nor gaudy like tsarist state funerals but were more

¹⁹ Katya Vladimirov, "Dead Men Walking: Soviet Elite Cemeteries and Social Control," *Forum on Public Policy: A Journal of the Oxford Round Table* (Summer 2008), 2.

²⁰ Hecker, *Religion and Communism*, 175-7.

²¹ Richard Stites, "The Origins of Soviet Ritual Style: Symbol and Festival in the Russian Revolution," in *Symbols of Power: The Esthetics of Political Legitimacy in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe*, ed. Claes Arvidsson and Lars Erik Blomqvist (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1987), 24.

²² Monika Love, "Underground Revolution: Managing the Dead in the 20th Century Russia," *Inter-Disciplinary.Net: A Global Network for Dynamic Research and Publishing*, <http://www.inter-disciplinary.net/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/lovedpaper.pdf> (accessed 25 October, 2011), 4.

Merridale, *Night of Stone*, 104.

²³ Merridale, *Night of Stone*, 107.

²⁴ Love, "Underground Revolution," 5.

²⁵ Stites, "The Origins of Soviet Ritual Style," 24.

²⁶ Anton Amosov, "You Fell Victims," (1878), <http://www.marxists.org/history/ussr/sounds/lyrics/vy-zhertvoiu.htm> (accessed November 9, 2011).

subdued; nonetheless, their impact would have been powerful. These ceremonies drew considerable attention due to their unfamiliar and highly exposed nature and because of their sheer visual impact. Hundreds of people dressed in dark coats, carrying bright red banners, walked through the wintry white streets of Moscow or St. Petersburg -- the red against the snow would certainly evoke images of the spilt blood of socialist martyrs. The older, more traditional family members of the dead, though fairly unsatisfied with Red Funerals and desiring the customary Orthodox ceremony, did generally appreciate the great honour that was being bestowed upon their loved ones.²⁷

After Tsar Nicholas II's abdication in 1917, Red Funerals adopted a new meaning. Following this they were no longer used purely for protest -- monarchical tyranny had fallen after all -- but primarily for celebrating the achievements of the cause to date by showing gratitude for the sacrifices of the fallen. The form was quite similar to older Red Funerals, but the newer ones were grander in scale and powerfully blended lamentation and popular demonstration with military procession, a trifold form previously unused that the Bolsheviks would adopt thereafter for prominent party members.²⁸ The first was held for three students of the Military Cyclist Academy on 4 March 1917 who perished during the street fighting the previous month. The Provisional Government and the Petrograd Soviet were inspired by this Red burial to hold a massive ceremonial funeral. Deemed "the Burial of the Martyrs", it was held three weeks after Nicholas's abdication and represented the first government-sanctioned public commemoration of the February Revolution.²⁹ The 184 people that died in February for the revolution were given a secularized ceremonial funeral attended by upwards of one million people from all levels of society minus all clergymen. This burial, though it included members of all classes, was clearly by and for the proletariat as it was still Red -- the same red banners with the same slogans flew as the workers, virtually the only group stationed in the centre of Petrograd, sang their funeral dirges.³⁰

The socialists were conscious that the deaths of their brethren could be potent political tools and never stopped using public funerals and socialist martyrdom as propaganda. However, while Red Funerals during the Dual Power were celebrations of revolutionary achievements, they were, at least at the national level, simply reassertions of the Bolsheviks' power following the October Revolution. Figures selected to have memorial statuary celebrating them erected were carefully chosen by Lenin and the party. Because there was not always a freshly dead hero for the party to extol, annual festivities -- mainly those of May Day and the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution -- would suffice by commemorating the older dead, almost reiterating past funerals. Many revolutionaries found this exaltation and elevation of heroes to be entirely inappropriate

²⁷ Merridale, *Night of Stone*, 108.

²⁸ Stites, "The Origins of Soviet Ritual Style," 25-6.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 26.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 27.

for the newly socialist society, but the party needed somehow to secure historical legitimacy for its one party revolution.³¹

It was not only funerals of exemplary socialists that fell under the new Bolshevik program's jurisdiction but all funerals, at least theoretically. During the initial disorder of Bolshevik rule the issue of death went virtually unacknowledged; the party simply did could not afford to waste valuable time pondering death while fighting the Great War, facing impending civil war, and trying to manage the highly unstable political and economic environment. The party had ideas regarding death due to their atheistic nature and adopted death rituals for their own ranks but had no definite intentions for the masses.³² The main obstacle to imposing their ideas of death on their people was religion, a subject of considerable debate among party members at the time of the revolution. Some saw it as necessary to attack the Church and outlaw religious expression outright while others believed religion would gradually disappear as a logical result of classlessness.³³

An anti-religious agenda, however, was pushed. It began in January 1918 with the official separation of church and state. All religions were officially equal and religious practices, including funerals, were allowed so long as such practices were mindful of public peace and the rights of others. It did not, however, allow any remnants of religious rites in state affairs -- the populace was not forced to secularize, at least not yet, but the state was.³⁴ Many people did adopt the atheistic line, but these were primarily party members and proletarians; rural dwellers tended to adhere vehemently to their customary religious practices.³⁵ A more significant step towards secularization of death was taken in December 1918 with the Decree of the Burials, one aspect of nationalization under War Communism. The state monopolized the funeral industry, including Church-controlled cemeteries, to secularize it, making it tougher to perform religious rituals. The Decree was also, by abolishing cost-based funerals and offering free standardized burials to all, a step in establishing egalitarianism.³⁶ Hecker argued that in some cases where people did retain traditional religious ceremonies they did so not out of lasting genuine religious feeling, though for most peasants this was certainly true, but rather because of learned tradition -- the religious rites were the only ones they knew how to employ.³⁷ Others may have abandoned their former religious convictions and cultural customs but refused to perform the new ceremonies because they viewed them as dispassionate and uncaring toward the dead.³⁸ Those who did abide by the

³¹ Ibid., 34-5.

³² Merridale, *Night of Stone*, 180.

³³ Heather Coleman, "Atheism versus Secularization? Religion in Soviet Russia, 1917-1961," *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 1, no. 3 (summer 2000), 549.

³⁴ Hecker, *Religion and Communism*, 202-3.

³⁵ Ibid., 235.

³⁶ Vladimirov, "Dead Men Walking," 2.

³⁷ Hecker, *Religion and Communism*, 229.

³⁸ Jennifer McDowell, "Soviet Civil Ceremonies," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 13, no. 3 (September 1974), 275.

new rituals did so for various reasons including the desire to fit in with the collective's expectations and genuine abandonment of religious conviction.³⁹

The pure logistics of body disposal became an obvious problem for the Bolshevik regime. Death was pandemic due to world war, civil war, terror, famine, and disease; people were dying on a larger scale than seen before in Russia and bodies kept accumulating in literal heaps at mortuaries and cemetery grounds. The new bureaucracy was also simply awful at managing death records and body disposal.⁴⁰ The government recognized that these piles of bodies posed a problem. The initial response was to instigate the use of mass graves, but this solution was far from perfect. People willing to dig these morbid pits were scarce, and digging them was a slow and arduous process in the cold winter months when the ground was frozen. The state's answer to this was cremation, a less expensive and cleaner method of disposal than inhumation, not to mention it would assist in further undermining the Church.⁴¹ There was one main problem with this: Russia's religious past and present.

No crematorium existed in Russia because, under the imperial Orthodox tradition, any proposal to construct one was disregarded out of disgust.⁴² The Bolsheviks' attempts to build crematoria in Moscow and Petrograd faced many obstacles, such as site selection and technical difficulties, in addition to persisting religious outrage at the idea. The first crematorium, opened in December 1920, was a converted bathhouse in Petrograd and was meant to dispose of the anonymous dead. This experiment was a miserable failure -- it was a wood-burning crematorium when wood to burn was scarce, making it horribly inefficient. Not surprisingly, it burned to the ground roughly two months after opening.⁴³ A working crematorium did not open until 1927 in Moscow, but the government had discerned long before this that cremation was not the remedy it had hoped. The New Economic Policy re-privatized the funeral industry, and this helped to overcome some of the problems associated with the former state monopoly and increased the number of religious funerals. Though religious rites became costly -- as only those who provided exclusively secular ceremonies were offered government funding -- many overlooked the expense and welcomed the opportunity to openly hold religious ceremonies again.⁴⁴ By the late 1920s only about one-third of burials were free from religious rites; the other two-thirds retained a religious nature.⁴⁵ Despite the Bolsheviks' attempts at secularization, religious funerals were not largely abandoned until Stalin came to power and vigorously attacked the church and renationalized the funeral

³⁹ Merridale, *Night of Stone*, 12.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 167.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 169.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 170.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 172.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 177.

⁴⁵ Hecker, *Religion and Communism*, 229.

industry, enforcing the practice of secular rituals by giving people no other choice and threatening them with reprimands.⁴⁶

The politics of death were much easier for the Bolsheviks to manage than disposal proved to be. They were highly adept at using something like a high-ranking official's natural death for their political purposes and were much more masterful at this than the tsars had been. Perhaps the most important singular death used as party propaganda was Lenin's. The rest of the party feared that his death would prompt political disintegration, forcing the government to confront its largest hurdle since the chaos of civil war. Lenin, as principal legitimating source of the regime, could not be allowed to vanish, so his legacy would have to suffice in his place.⁴⁷ Though the Cult of Lenin began in 1918 following Fanya Kaplan's assassination attempt, Lenin's death in 1924 intensified it exponentially.⁴⁸ It became a mass campaign that used emotion to arouse in the people faithful allegiance to the regime to keep them controlled and willing to accept the remaining party members as Lenin's appropriate heirs.⁴⁹ With Lenin dead and the party constantly bombarding the public with the glory that was Lenin, nobody could see any fault in his leadership and therefore could not see error in those who claimed to preserve his sublime legacy.

Lenin would have found the cult of worship conferred upon him abhorrent -- it was starkly underscored by language and practices evocative of Russian Orthodoxy and severely undermined the communist doctrine of social equality. The funeral itself and subsequent lying-in-state, arguably the most important displays of the Cult of Lenin, were highly reminiscent of imperial funerals in everything from the massive procession, the lengthy period for viewing the body, and the idea of a leader that was physically dead but whose legacy continued to care for his people. Alexander III, the last tsar to perish before the revolution, was embalmed and laid out for the country to see and mourn for three months.⁵⁰ The Bolsheviks, after careful consideration, chose to embalm Lenin, but he was to be perpetually preserved as a constant reminder that he, and therefore the legitimacy of communist rule, survived in his heirs whereas Alexander's body eventually decayed, giving in to a new tsar's reign. The successful embalming and re-embalming of Lenin also helped the regime by proving its scientific prowess to the Soviet Union and the rest of the world.⁵¹

Lenin's preserved body, however, defied communism's anti-religious spirit as it resembled an "uncorrupted" body -- one requirement of canonization. Disallowing Lenin's body to decompose essentially turned him into a communist saint, and portraying him as an eternal entity turned him into a character redolent of Jesus. The Lenin Mausoleum in Red Square became a massive shrine

⁴⁶ Merridale, *Night of Stone*, 178.

⁴⁷ Tumarkin, *Lenin Lives!*, 135.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 80.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 2.

⁵⁰ Merridale, *Night of Stone*, 34-5.

⁵¹ Tumarkin, *Lenin Lives!*, 185.

and Lenin Corners became smaller ones, with Lenin's biography and writings becoming Communist scripture and artistic depictions of him becoming Communist icons.⁵² The funeral was not quite as grandiose as imperial funerals, but it managed to establish the fact that social equality, though espoused, was absent in Russia as it had been in the past, reenforced by the tsars' funerals. This was not new -- previous funerals of higher-ranking officials, which had already used a different form than those of the common dead, and special burial grounds, such as the Kremlin wall, asserted their special status -- nor was this very different from the burial practices of the imperial period.⁵³

Government-contrived death was also something that the Bolsheviks were much better at than the royals; death by official design was transformed into a much more streamlined process than ever before.⁵⁴ Executions were not random, haphazard or used for only occasional political messages under the Bolsheviks but were rather used consistently for keeping order and were seen as necessary for political stability. Life was cheap to the Bolsheviks because the cause came first, so it was natural for them to view mass killing of potential opposition -- whether real or imagined -- as an inevitable measure to be taken for the benefit of the cause.⁵⁵ The tsars had certainly orchestrated death but did so in a fairly disorderly manner, and the extent to which they executed people was much less. The tsars also chose very particular targets in order to send their political message; the Bolsheviks, on the other hand, in actually keeping with their egalitarian spirit, offered equal-opportunity terror -- no groups were exempt from their highly organized executions.⁵⁶

Despite what the Bolsheviks wanted and the changes their revolution brought, death, unlike the many other aspects of Russian culture and society, was not revolutionized. In the mid-late 1920s, before Stalin ascended to supremacy, death rather closely resembled what it was during the monarchy's descent -- most people maintained religious death rites, state funerals still asserted social disparity, cremation remained on the fringe, and the language of martyrdom and idolatry persisted despite anti-religious ideology. The most apparent change in death was scale -- more people were dying under the Bolsheviks and more bodies piled up, but this does not imply revolution. The changes that did occur -- including those in state-engineered death, which actually retained its more profoundly altered and evolved character through the NEP period -- though not revolutionary themselves, did set the foundation for the more radical transformations in death that Stalin's "Revolution from Above" imposed. Death waits for no man, but it had to wait for its Russian Revolution.

⁵² Ibid., 3.

⁵³ Vladimirov, "Dead Men Walking," 2-3.

⁵⁴ Nicholas Eberstadt, "The Soviet Way of Death," *World Affairs* 158, no. 2 (October 1995), 100.

⁵⁵ Merridale, *Night of Stone*, 135.

⁵⁶ R.J. Rummel, *Death by Government* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1994), 80.

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*Ukraine and the Post-Cold War Global Arms Bazaar: A
Tale of Corruption, Misery, Anarchy, Poverty and War.
You'll Laugh, You'll Cry, You'll Lose
Faith in Humanity, and Hopefully You Won't Get Bored
Before the End.*

Andrew Farris

Of all the weapons in the vast soviet arsenal, nothing was more profitable than Avtomat Kalashnikova model of 1947. More commonly known as the AK-47, or Kalashnikov. It's the world's most popular assault rifle. A weapon all fighters love. An elegantly simple 9 pound amalgamation of forged steel and plywood. It doesn't break, jam, or overheat. It'll shoot whether it's covered in mud or filled with sand. It's so easy, even a child can use it; and they do. The Soviets put the gun on a coin. Mozambique put it on their flag. Since the end of the Cold War, the Kalashnikov has become the Russian people's greatest export. After that comes vodka, caviar, and suicidal novelists. One thing is for sure, no one was lining up to buy their cars.¹

The collapse of the Soviet Union coincided with a flood of Eastern Bloc arms into the world's conflict zones. Many of these arms, primarily small arms but also heavy equipment such as tanks and helicopters, simply vanished from East European storehouses, and these arms were not simply exports of Russia. Arguably playing an even more prominent role in this black market trade was the Ukraine, the country where the man who spoke the lines above acquired all of his AK-47s. This essay will focus in on the role the Ukraine played in this underground arms smuggling ring. We will start at the factories and the warehouses in the Ukraine, move to the warzones of Africa, and meet the individuals who move the weapons in between. Finally we will discuss the role the Ukrainian government has played in this dark trade and what the authorities have done to crack down these illegal arms dealers (The answer is virtually nothing). This is a tragic tale, one that shines a spotlight on a decade that in the West was widely touted as one of the most peaceful and prosperous in modern history, but in much of the rest of the world, living in the wreckage of the Cold War, was lamented as a time of depression, cynicism, and civil war.

When an independent Ukraine was born in August 1991 it inherited one of the largest and best equipped militaries in the world with virtually inexhaustible stockpiles of tanks, helicopters, artillery pieces, assault rifles, land mines and ammunition.

¹ Andrew Niccol. Lord of War. DVD. Directed by Andrew Niccol. (Los Angeles, CA.: Lions Gate Films, 2005.)

There were several reasons for this windfall inheritance. The first was that because of the sheer size of the Soviet military behind the Iron Curtain, Ukraine was bound to be left with huge military stockpiles. Through the latter decades of the Cold War the Soviets had maintained conventional armed forces intended to be at parity with the armies of the NATO alliance. A level of military preparedness this absurdly high was come to dominate the Soviet economy, accounting for somewhere between 17 and 19 per cent of the Union's GDP in the 1980s. This investment that translated into an armed forces of four million men, 40,000 tanks and artillery pieces and 10,000 combat aircraft.²

Of these forces, a disproportionately high number were stationed in the Ukraine; a result of Soviet grand strategy. Soviet military doctrine was determined to avoid a rerun of the catastrophe of the summer of 1941 where the bulk of the Red Army's best divisions, lined up at the shared border with the Third Reich, were encircled and annihilated in a matter of weeks. To be able to react to an attack and launch counter-offensives, most Soviet troops were stationed in the buffer regions west of the Russian heartland - primarily the Ukraine and Belarus - but still well back of the border with the Western alliance in East Germany and Czechoslovakia.³

These troops in the Ukraine were some of the best equipped: the 1st Guards Army, 13th Army, 38th Army, 6th Guards Tank Army, 8th Tank Army and 32nd Army Corps.⁴ They could count on 6,052 tanks, 3,602 artillery pieces, 1,650 combat aircraft, 75 attack helicopters and a large (to put it mildly) supply of small arms.⁵

For our story, it only became important that the troops were stationed in the Ukraine in 1991. It was then that the debate ignited over what to do with the massive military of the former Soviet Union's now sovereign states. While Russia and the Central Asian states wanted to keep the military united under the overall control of the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States), "Ukraine placed itself at the forefront of efforts to divide the military assets of the former Union."⁶ The Ukrainians wanted all the military assets on her new national territory to revert to the just-created Ukrainian armed forces. Russia - being in no position to challenge this demand that was quickly echoed by most of the other republics - caved. When it was set down in a treaty several years later, it was determined that Ukraine got a military 780,000 strong with \$89 billion worth of the Union's military equipment. At the same time they repatriated the 2,500 nuclear

²International Institute for Strategic Studies. *The Military Balance 1993-1994*. (London: Brassey's for the IISS, 1993.), 252.

³David M. Glantz. *Military Strategy of the Soviet Union: A History*. (London, UK; Cassel Military History, 1992.), 324.

⁴Vladimir Feskov. *The Soviet Army in the Period of the Cold War*. (Tomsk: Tomsk University Press, 2004.), 25 & 32.

⁵Roy Allison. *Military Forces in the Soviet Successor States: analysis of the military policies, force dispositions and evolving threat perceptions of the former Soviet states*. (London, U.K.: Brassey's for International Institute for Strategic Studies,; 1993), 86.

⁶Allison. *Military Forces in the Soviet Successor States*, 10.

weapons on Ukrainian soil back to Russia, wanting nothing to do with nuclear weaponry after Chernobyl.⁷

The new armed forces were immediately beset by problems. Elaborating these problems will help us answer the question of what conditions could have allowed for the wholesale theft of billions of dollars of state property from the Ukraine.

In the movie *Lord of War*, the Ukrainian – former Soviet – General Dmitri Orlov sells a seemingly endless stream of military equipment to the freewheeling arms dealer played by Nicholas Cage. At one point General Orlov even offers the arms dealer a bargain: for every ten T-72's he buys from his military stores, he will throw in an eleventh free. Instances like this, where men entrusted with hugely expensive and deadly equipment blatantly abused their authority, appear to have been commonplace. There were probably three main reasons for it. First, the military was plunged into administrative chaos following the creation of the new Ukrainian armed forces. Second, many members of the military were severely disillusioned with the Soviet system and retained little loyalty to the new Ukrainian government. Finally, the economic catastrophe that engulfed the country in the decade following independence had a knock on effect that left many officers worried about their job security and looking to make a quick buck.

The initial creation of the Ukrainian military command structure actually began a collapse in central authority that was mirrored in most of the post-Soviet republics—though it was particularly acute in Ukraine. It was precipitated when the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada (parliament) in 1992 legislated a “Ukrainian Armed Forces Command” into existence and placed under its “full jurisdiction... all former Soviet military formations and units in the republic.”⁸ No such command structure had ever existed before: the units now under Ukrainian command had been under the direct control of Stavka in Moscow. As a result, commanders were left in the dark for lengthy periods about who they were answering to and whether they would even have jobs in the months ahead.

To further complicate matters the language of the Soviet military had been Russian, but the new Ukrainian Armed Forces Command was to work in Ukrainian even though many of the army's officers could not even speak it. Given these factors, it is unsurprising that the chain of command decisively broke down. In this atmosphere how was oversight and accountability to be enforced?

⁷ A Dec. 2005 Rada inquiry found that some nuclear weapons with a combined yield of 20 megatons recorded as sent back to Russia in the 1990s were never actually received on the Russian side. The claim was denied by the Russian and Ukrainian military authorities. This was the third incident in which such claims have been made since the break-up of the Soviet Union.

(Nikolai Sokov. “Russian and Ukrainian officials deny new allegations that nuclear warheads were lost in the 1990s,” *WMD Insights*, May 2006, accessed Nov. 3, 2011, http://www.wmdinsights.com/I5/R4_RussiaandUkranian.htm.)

⁸ Andrew K. Fesiak. *Nationalism and the Ukrainian Military*. (Ottawa, ON.: Carleton University Press, 1998.), 53.

The second reason, widespread disillusionment with the system, was hardly surprising. When the Soviet system collapsed there were not many who mourned its passing, least of all in the Ukraine; a referendum on the question of independence was answered positively by 90 per cent of Ukrainian voters.⁹ Another measure, membership in the Communist Party of the Ukraine, is indicative of widespread dissatisfaction with the Soviet system and the bankruptcy of the communist ideology. Before it was banned in August 1991, the CPU could boast four million members. When it was re-legalized just two years later only 150,000 rejoined – 5 per cent.¹⁰ People simply did not believe in the Soviet system anymore. Ukrainians had many grievances with the Soviet government, chief among them the mistreatment of Ukrainian troops in the armed forces. Conscripts in the Soviet Army were never treated well and Ukrainians suffered disproportionately compared to their Russian counterparts. Many Ukrainian units were put at the forefront of fighting in the Afghan War, or quelling hot spots of rebellion across the Warsaw Pact. The new free press brought to light the brutal hazing practices, *Dedovshchina*, that were endemic in the armed forces.¹¹ The other burning issue driving Ukrainians away from communism was the government's handling of the Chernobyl disaster. One historian wrote, "While an independent post-Soviet Ukraine may be years off, the old regime collapsed, practically and metaphorically, at 1:23 A.M., April 26, 1986, the moment of the nuclear accident at Chernobyl."¹²

When the old regime collapsed, any optimism about the new country's future was immediately burdened by the bleak economic outlook. Even today the idea of a Ukrainian consciousness has struggled to gain traction in a country that experienced negative growth for nine years following independence. A recent study even shows Ukrainians beginning to have nostalgia for the hated communist past: "59% of Ukrainian citizens," it reads, "feel their country's interests would be best served if the government 'sought confederation with Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus and other former Soviet Republics.' If Ukrainians were at all nationalistic, the polls would certainly show a different result."¹³

The result, writes Ukrainian scholar Taras Kuzio, was a decade of disillusionment with the new as well as the old. "The 1990s were characterized in Ukraine, Russia and the post-Soviet region as one of cynicism, ruthlessness, callousness, and disrespect for human life."¹⁴ Cynicism goes a long way to explaining the attitude of General Orlov and certainly helps to better explain the actions of the hundreds of army officers, soldiers, politicians, border officials, and port

⁹ Fesiak, *Nationalism and the Ukrainian Military*, 60.

¹⁰ Taras Kuzio, "Ukrainian Officials, Illicit Arms Sales and International Responsibility," (paper presented at Harriman Institute of Columbia University, New York, 18-19 April 2008), accessed Oct. 28, 2011, http://www.taraskuzio.net/conferences2_files/UkraineArmsAfrica.pdf

¹¹ Fesiak, *Nationalism and the Ukrainian Military*, 54.

¹² David Remnick. *Lenin's Tomb: The Last Days of the Soviet Empire*. (New York: Random House Publishing, 1994), 244.

¹³ Fesiak, *Nationalism and the Ukrainian Military*, 57.

¹⁴ Kuzio, "Ukrainian Officials, Illicit Arms Sales and International Responsibility."

authorities who must have been complicit in theft of military equipment for it to occur on such a gigantic scale.

More than anything else, the primary enabling factor for the illegal arms trade from the Ukraine was the economic collapse. The end of the Soviet empire dealt a catastrophic blow to an already struggling economy in the Ukraine. Highly integrated within the Soviet economy as a whole, the split with the other republics came as a shock: Hyperinflation and unemployment were widespread. Some former government managers sold off the state's assets en masse, making private fortunes as the economy crumbled around them. One observer contrasted this aggressive, plutocratic form of privatization with Western equivalents and coined the term "grabization".¹⁵ The defense industry was hit particularly hard since it employed over a third of the population.¹⁶ Over the next decade the economy contracted by a shocking 60 percent. These numbers can however, be deceptive as estimates of the size of the informal sector or black market, which is beyond government regulation and taxation, have ranged as high as two thirds of the total GDP.¹⁷ The fact that such a huge portion of the economy went underground, and the lines between legal and illegal business practices were so blurred, undoubtedly made stealing military equipment easier.

The economic collapse meant the country had absolutely no way to pay for the three quarters of a million men and women under arms. Initially the government intended to maintain armed forces of around 450,000 and began demobilizing the remaining 300,000 troops but it was almost immediately apparent that even this was a preposterously high number given the state of the country's finances.¹⁸ It was obvious that a painful downsizing was inevitable. The mass demobilizations created more unemployment and gave those who remained in the forces a fatalistic view of their own futures, desperate to find any way to make money; selling their weapons, often times their only assets, was a predictable response. Today the Ukrainian military conforms more closely to budgetary realities - it is only 159,000 strong.¹⁹

So far we have laid out the supply side of our story: the equipment available to spur on an illegal arms trade, and the conditions that allowed that trade to flourish. Now we will take a brief look at the next piece of the puzzle: the buyers.

It was disturbingly fortuitous that the collapse of the same system that left huge stockpiles of armaments available for sale at bargain basement prices also helped spark a surge in small and

¹⁵ Kuzio, "Ukrainian Officials, Illicit Arms Sales and International Responsibility."

¹⁶ Global Security. "Ukraine Defense Industry," accessed Nov. 10, 2011, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/ukraine/industry.htm>.

¹⁷ D. Farah and S. Braun. *Merchant of Death: Money, Guns, Planes and the Man Who Makes War Possible*. (Hoboken, NJ.: John Wiley & Sons Inc., 2007), 47.

¹⁸ Allison, *Military of the Soviet Successor States*, 43.

¹⁹ Ministry of Defence and the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. *Ministry of Defence White Book 2009*. (Kiev: Ministry of Defence, 2010), accessed Nov. 2, 2011, http://www.mil.gov.ua/files/white_book/Book_WP_2009_eng.pdf.

civil wars throughout the Third World. As the New York Times' East African bureau chief wrote, "The Cold War's end bred state collapse and chaos. Where meddling great powers once found dominoes that needed to be kept from falling, they suddenly saw no national interest at all."²⁰ The Soviet Union and United States, who had been using vast sums of money and military aid to prop up national governments, completely halted all support, as in the former's case, or scaled it back enormously, as in the latter. The corresponding weakening of centralized power in Third World states made the 1990s a time of intense civil strife where long simmering ethnic and religious conflicts boiled to the surface. Many of these conflicts persist to this day.

It is well documented that since 1991 Ukrainian arms have turned up in the hands of rebel groups, tin-pot dictators and everywhere in-between. Taras Kuzio asserts it is public knowledge that "Ukrainian arms were exported to Iraq, Iran, and South Yemen. In Latin America Ukrainian arms ended up in Peru. In Asia, they were exported to Sri Lanka, Burma (despite an international embargo in place), China and Pakistan. In the latter case, some weapons could have been sent to Taliban-ruled Afghanistan."²¹

But nowhere did the flood gates open harder and faster, and cause more horror and misery, than in Africa. From 1990 to the present, Africa has burned. The catalogue of wars, civil wars, genocides, rebellions and violent coups is shocking. Rather than listing them, their extent is better illustrated by the map below. (The map was made with information gleaned from individual country profiles on the CIA World Factbook.²²)

Oftentimes there was not even a clear motivation for warfare. As the NYT reporter explains:


What we are seeing is the decline of the classic African liberation movement and the proliferation of something else -- something wilder, messier, more violent, and harder to wrap our heads around. If you'd like to call this war, fine. But what is spreading across Africa like a viral pandemic is actually just opportunistic, heavily armed banditry. My job as the New York Times' East Africa bureau chief is to cover news and feature stories in 12 countries. But most of my time is spent immersed in these un-wars. I've witnessed up close -- often way too close -- how combat has morphed from soldier vs. soldier (now a rarity in Africa) to soldier vs. civilian. Most of today's African fighters are not rebels with a cause; they're predators.²³

²⁰Jerry Gettleman. "Africa's Forever Wars: Why the continent's conflicts never end." *Foreign Policy Magazine*, March/April 2010, accessed Nov. 3, 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/02/22/africas_forever_wars.

²¹ Kuzio, "Ukrainian Officials, Illicit Arms Sales and International Responsibility."

²² CIA World Factbook. "Background" (For all 54 countries in Africa), accessed Nov. 3, 2011, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/wfbExt/region_afr.html.

²³ Gettleman, "Africa's Forever Wars".



These ‘predators,’ exemplified by the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda and Liberia’s President Charles Taylor, were easily able to prolong their reigns of terror thanks to access to cheap Eastern Bloc weaponry which, more often than not, originated from the Ukraine. These weapons, more than anything the AK-47 assault rifle, gave these men – and often children – many times the destructive power than had previously been possible. The majority of the almost four million thought to have died in the Second Congo War from 1998 to 2004 are thought to have met their

demise at the end of a bullet. The weapons are so common that the price has plummeted: One commentator noted that in the Kenyan town of Kolowa, an AK-47 could be bought for fifteen cows in 1986. By 2005 it had dropped to four.²⁴

The money for these weapons comes from the rich natural resources of the African continent. The most notorious and well documented instance of African resources for Ukrainian guns was Sierra Leone's so-called 'blood diamonds', now synonymous with the horrors of West Africa in the last decade of the 20th Century. In Angola the UNITA rebel movement, though forced into the bush in the country's interior, could still afford delivery of planeloads of small arms and attack helicopters because the narrow strip of otherwise strategically worthless land they held contained a huge diamond mine.²⁵ Though many African countries were subjected to UN-backed arms embargoes, great powers rarely invested in enforcing them. The many parties in Africa clamoring for guns could rely on shadowy middlemen – the arms dealers – to skirt any restrictions and meet the demands. It is to examining the methods of these arms dealers that we now turn.

Details about Ukraine's illegal arms trade, beyond what's been described, are sketchy. There is no doubt that the Ukraine held thousands of tons in military stockpiles, and many of those weapons have wound up in African conflict zones. How they get there and who was responsible are much more difficult questions to answer. Profiling the lives of two suspected arms traffickers - Leonid Minin arrested by Italian police in 2000 and Viktor Bout by Thai police in 2008 - can help shed some light on the inner workings of this illegal trade in weaponry.

Leonid Minin was born in the Ukrainian port of Odessa in the 1970s. Working as a transporter of oil and timber in a number of countries across Latin America, Africa, and Europe, he was subjected to fraud and money laundering investigations during the early 1990s. As his import/export ventures around the world multiplied, so too did the white collar criminal investigations. Suddenly in 1999 Minin's name shot to the surface of an investigation into arms smuggling when an Antonov-124 (formerly of the Soviet air force) transported 68 tons of small arms from Kiev to Liberia, via Burkina Faso. The plane had been chartered by Minin. French intelligence service were looking to find out how Charles Taylor's rebel group in Liberia, which was supported by the Cote d'Ivoire, was getting its hands on arms despite a UN arms embargo and they set about investigating. When a second shipment of 113 tons arrived in the Cote d'Ivoire's capital Abidjan months later, taking the final leg of the trip on Minin's personal jet, the Italian police had the pretext they needed to swoop in on the paunchy Ukrainian. They arrested him in a posh Milanese hotel with four prostitutes, 20 grams of cocaine, half a million

²⁴ Moises Naim, "ILLICIT: How Smugglers, Traffickers, and Copycats Are Hijacking the Global Economy." (Transcript of a speech author gave discussing his book at the Carnegie Council Public Affairs Program, New York City, November 9, 2005), accessed online Nov. 3, 2011, <http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/resources/transcripts/5279.html>.

²⁵ Farah and Braun, *Merchant of Death*, 13.

dollars' worth of 'blood diamonds' and tens of thousands of dollars in Mauritanian, American and European currency. At the time of his arrest he had seven known aliases and five passports.

Among the findings in the hotel room was a sheaf of documents detailing Minin's dealings in illegal arms, exposing the shady business of arms dealing to the Western press. The documents showed Minin had just visited Ivorian dictator Robert Guei and promised him shipment of 10,500 Ukrainian AK-47s, 330 grenade launchers, sniper rifles, night vision equipment and five million bullets. They were to be transported by Moscow-based air cargo firm, Aviatrend, an outfit run by former Soviet test pilot and friend of Minin's Valery Cherny.

The Ukrainian government decried the arrests, claiming the legally issued end-user certificates specified Burkina Faso – a country not under any arms sanctions -- as the destination of the deadly cargo. End user certificates, documents certifying the buyer of military equipment and what they plans to use the equipment for, were, and still are, one of the primary tools used by police authorities to enforce arms embargoes. Luckily for arms dealers, corrupt governments (Djibouti, Eritrea, Peru and Burkina Faso are popular choices) could sell false end-user certificates for as cheap as \$50,000.²⁶ Once the weapons arrive in that country (in this case, Burkina Faso) they can be easily forwarded to embargoed nations. Despite the protests, Minin was sentenced to two years in prison in 2002.²⁷ Though his arrest was well publicized, I could not find any information regarding his imprisonment and presumably he was released in 2004.

Far more infamous is Viktor Bout, dubbed the 'merchant of death' by the human rights groups, government officials and journalists who have been tracking him for over the past 15 years. Born in the Turkmen city of Dushanbe, Bout served in a military air transport regiment in the Soviet Air Force and acted as an advisor to Soviet client governments in Africa, spending two years in Mozambique. Some commentators believe that Bout was working for the KGB in Angola when the Soviet Union fell apart in 1991. After the collapse he bought three huge Antonov cargo planes sitting idle on Eastern European airfields for a measly \$120,000 and almost immediately began moving arms.²⁸ Bout's previous experience made him well placed to profit heavily from the rapidly developing business of selling ex-Warsaw Pact arms. A remarkable New York Times profile on the man written in 2003 explained:

Arms traffickers inherited not only the Soviet Union's cold-war weapons supply but also its fully operational systems of clandestine transport, replete with money channels, people who understood how to use them and, most important, established shipping pipelines -- what Robert Gelbard, assistant secretary of state for international narcotics and law enforcement under President Clinton, calls "the

²⁶ Peter Landesman. "Profile of Viktor Bout from the New York Times Magazine." *New York Times*, Aug. 17, 2003, accessed Nov. 4, 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/06/world/europe/06iht-06bout.10775886.html>.

²⁷ Ian Traynor, "The International Dealers in Death." *The Guardian*. July 9, 2001, accessed Nov. 4, 2011, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2001/jul/09/armstrade.iantraynor>.

²⁸ Farah and Braun. *Merchant of Death*, 4.

tubing." "The tubing can carry different kinds of things," he told me, "drugs, humans, money -- or weapons." Victor Bout was master of the tubing.²⁹

Making money hand over fist, Bout's cargo fleet rapidly expanded to 60 planes (larger than many of the world's flag carriers). Based in the free trade zone at Sharjah in the UAE, the lax import/export regulations allowed him to easily operate under a veil of secrecy. As the 1990s wore on it became clear to Western intelligence agencies that Bout was a very big deal in the smuggling of weapons. "Though Bout denies his involvement in arms trafficking, he has been persistently and publicly linked to weapons shipments, charges supported by paper and money trails, confessions, eyewitness accounts and multiple intelligence reports."³⁰

Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s Bout was likely to have been the largest and most successful arms dealer in the world.³¹ Unlike Minin, Bout procured arms from virtually every country once in the Warsaw Pact. Arms he transported are suspected to have wound up in the majority of the conflict-ridden states depicted in the map above as well as everywhere else. Oftentimes his planes carried other goods -- flowers, frozen chicken, mining equipment, even UN peacekeepers -- but that was simply a matter of keeping his planes from ever flying anywhere without a profit-making cargo. These legitimate flights were often useful as a cover for his illicit and deadly activities.

When Bout sat for his New York Times interview in Moscow in 2003, he was the second most wanted man in the world, after Osama bin Laden, yet he was free in Russia. In the interview he makes numerous veiled and not-so-veiled references to the support his trans-national criminal network received from the Russian government. As one author noted: "His access to former Soviet arsenals, aircraft, and crews would not have been possible without state protection."³² It was only in 2008 that Bout was arrested by Thai authorities while attempting to orchestrate a sale of sophisticated anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons to Colombia's FARC rebels. Russia has reacted angrily to all American attempts to extradite him to the U.S. for trial as an assault upon their own sovereignty.³³

Profiles of these two arms dealers paint pictures of complicated international criminal networks that distort the line between legal and illegal, state and non-state actors. The difficult question for the Ukraine is the extent of government involvement in these deals. It is easy to understand why the Ukrainian authorities could get involved: Warsaw Pact countries left with huge military industrial complexes found weapons were their only real source of foreign hard currency. If the buyers were under international arms embargoes they could be charged higher prices.

²⁹ Landesman. "Profile of Viktor Bout."

³⁰ Landesman. "Profile of Viktor Bout."

³¹ Farah and Braun. *Merchant of Death*, Inset cover.

³² Douglas Farah. "What Does Viktor Bout Know?" *Foreign Policy*, Aug. 20, 2010, accessed Nov. 4, 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/08/20/what_does_viktor_bout_know.

³³ Farah, "What Does Viktor Bout Know?"

In 1994 it was an open secret that Ukraine's Cold-War warehouses were being emptied for private profit and the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada ordered a commission to conduct inventory of all the young state's military equipment. The last inventory was taken in 1992 when the independent Ukrainian military was formed; at that time its assets were valued at \$89 billion. The second inventory took four years, and it was not for lack of effort. The commission's head Lieutenant-General Oleksandr Ihnatenko complained bitterly of being blocked by opaque, self-serving bureaucracy and denied access to military installations. When they finally finished their inventory they concluded \$32 billion worth of military equipment had been stolen.³⁴ When you consider that in 2001 Ukraine's total military budget was \$550 million, this was not an insignificant sum.³⁵ Officially, the government of President Leonid Kuchma declined to comment.

Tellingly, Ihnatenko was demoted and "threatened with court martial for divulging 'military secrets.'"³⁶ He sought to get word out to the press by leaking a 27-page summary of the commission's voluminous findings. When the story ran in one Kiev daily newsletter, the journalist responsible was attacked by an unidentified gunman outside his home who demanded that he "stay out of politics."³⁷ When the journalist refused, the attacker shot him in the leg.³⁸ As for the report it was swept under the carpet, and I have been unable to find it or the summary that was published in the Kiev newsletter.

"Individuals who know too much have been routinely disposed of," Taras Kuzio laments. "The head of the state Ukrainian arms export agency Valeriy Malyev died in one of many suspicious car accidents as an arms transfer scandal unfolded."³⁹ Clear cut evidence that this corruption goes all the way to the top was revealed to the world by the release of the so-called "Kuchmagate" tapes. Recorded by a presidential bodyguard in 1998, the tapes purportedly recorded President Leonid Kuchma discussing the sale of four advanced radar systems to Saddam Hussein in contravention of a UN arms embargo. When an aide mentioned that Georgy Gongadze, editor of *Ukrainska Pravda*, had been asking too many pointed questions on the matter, Kuchma ominously said "he has gone too far already," and ordered his aide to "take care of him." Gongadze's headless corpse was found outside Kiev several weeks later.⁴⁰

The release of the tapes led to political fallout that helped derail Kuchma's government and contributed to the Orange Revolution several years later that catapulted reformer Viktor Yushchenko to power in 2004. Sadly for Ukrainians, Yushchenko's rule did not lead to the fresh

³⁴ Dave Gilson. "Ukraine: Cashing in on Illegal Arms." *PBS: Frontline/World*, May 2002, accessed Nov. 8, 2011, <http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/sierraleone/context.html>.

³⁵ Ministry of Defence and the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. "White book 2009," 42.

³⁶ Kuzio, "Ukrainian Officials, Illicit Arms Sales and International Responsibility."

³⁷ Kuzio, "Ukrainian Officials, Illicit Arms Sales and International Responsibility."

³⁸ Gilson. "Ukraine: Cashing in on Illegal Arms."

³⁹ Kuzio, "Ukrainian Officials, Illicit Arms Sales and International Responsibility."

⁴⁰ David Marples. "Ukraine's Kuchma-gate." Stasiuk Program for the Study of Contemporary Ukraine, {Dec. 6, 2000}: Accessed November 9, 2011, <http://www.ualberta.ca/CIUS/stasiuk/st-articles/an-kuchmagate.htm>

start many had hoped for. He dissolved his cabinet, many of them holdovers from the Kuchma-era, because of accusations of corruption and illegally dissolved parliament twice. His approval rating stood at 10 per cent when he lost reelection last year to Viktor Yanukovich, widely seen as Kuchma's protégé and a strong backer of big business. To date no further inquiry has been held into illegal arms smuggling or political murders, and not a single conviction on charges of arms trafficking has been brought in the Ukraine in the past 20 years.

As Kuzio says, "No country can move on if it fails to deal with the skeletons in its closet, especially when a country's weapons have brought untold misery on the peoples of Western Africa."⁴¹ In Ukraine's current political climate, it is questionable whether any meaningful action on arms smuggling will take place in the foreseeable future.

This essay has attempted to shine light on a shadowy business where most of those involved would be much happier without the scrutiny. While many newspapers, government agencies, and NGOs have described pieces of the puzzle, rarely do they effectively assemble the pieces into a coherent whole (the exception, surprisingly, is the Hollywood blockbuster *Lord of War*, whose protagonist is based on the life of the above-mentioned arms smuggler Leonid Minin.) But the story is not one that should have come as a surprise to anyone familiar with the Ukraine in the 1990s. Ukraine was turned into a vast military storehouse by Warsaw Pact defensive doctrine, and when she became independent she retained all of the equipment and soldiers on her soil. When she converted this into a massive national armed forces out of all proportion of her ability to maintain it, the result was predictably chaotic. The cynicism, economic and psychological depression and plutocratic conversion to capitalism all contributed to the disrespect for government property. When the rest of the world was clamoring for weapons to settle long simmering conflicts, especially in Africa, the Ukraine was more than happy to oblige with its massive military surpluses. What she needed, though, were men willing to secrete these weapons out of the post-Soviet bloc. That is where the gunrunners, men like Leonid Minin and Viktor Bout, came in. They were able to capitalize on the chaos in the Ukraine as well as the leftover Soviet "tubing" to send ship- and plane-loads of arms wherever they were wanted. Revelations like 'Kuchmagate' and the Ihnatenko Inquiry show the level of government collusion in these matters and make it obvious why there was no concerted government effort to stop it: to many people were benefiting. Though the flow seems to be slowing today, the damage has been done and of the estimated 550 million small arms in circulation today, the Ukraine bears responsibility for more than its fair share.⁴²

⁴¹ Kuzio, "Ukrainian Officials, Illicit Arms Sales and International Responsibility."

⁴² Traynor, "The International Dealers in Death."

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Sex, Security and Power: Sex Scandals in a Cold War

Michelle Legassicke

Political scandals can be understood in Theodore Lowi's definition, that a scandal is corruption and the breach of virtue being exposed.¹ In Canadian history, the biggest 'Sex Scandal' was the Munsinger affair, an affair which involved an East German and two high level Conservatives, which occurred from 1959-61 but was not publically exposed until 1966. A few years prior to the affair's exposure, in 1964, the Presidential elections in the United States were rocked by the same-sex Jenkins scandal. Although scandals can vary in their detail, "most include the same components: an alleged transgression of public morality occurs ... followed by some combination of rumor, cover-up, denial, confession, and a ruined career."² In the Munsinger scandal, the events were covered up for five years, while the Jenkins scandal broke immediately after it happened. Both of these scandals threatened national security, as it was perceived in each country. However, the focus in the Jenkins scandal was on the commitment of homosexual acts, while in Canada with the Munsinger scandal the act of covering up the affair was what transgressed public morality. Therefore, although these scandals occurred in the same time period, they each became scandals for different reasons, illustrating the different public expectations of morality towards those holding political power in Canada and the United States. By looking at two similar scandals, the Munsinger affair and the Jenkins scandal, similarities are there, however, more differences can be found in how these scandals were treated, and how they came to affect the political system.

A substantive scandal, according to Lowi, is "the first news break... in which there is a breach of an actual norm, such as taking the money, giving the money ... or entering into a conspiracy to gain or maintain power without playing by the rules."³ A procedural scandal is a collection of second level actions that are done in order to ensure that the substantive conduct is not revealed, in other words covering up the scandal.⁴ In this way, a procedural scandal will always come after a substantive scandal; however, it is the procedural scandal that lengthens the coverage of a substantive scandal. In some cases, the procedural scandal can be more controversial than the substantive scandal. Lowi's framework of substantive and procedural scandals can be applied to sex scandals in Canada and the United States. Crucial to the understanding of political sex scandals is taking into consideration contemporary morality. As such, something that was considered scandalous in the 1920s, would not garner public attention today. Theodore Lowi explains that it is difficult to discuss scandals across different countries, as scandals are dependent on culture: "politically relevant moral values vary from culture to culture and country

¹ Andrei S. Markovits and Mark Silverstein, *The Politics of Scandal: Power and Process in Liberal Democracies*, (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1988), Vii.

² Craig M. Loftin, "Political Scandals" in *Encyclopedia of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgendered History in America*, ed. Marc Stein, Vol. 2 (Detroit: Charles Scribner's Sons, 2004), 394.

³ Markovits and Silverstein, *the Politics of Scandal*, viii.

⁴ Ibid.

to country, conduct that offends values deeply and widely enough to become a serious scandal will vary accordingly.”⁵ However, by looking at similar scandals in similar time periods, morality should be broadly more comparable across different countries.

On March 4, 1966 Lucien Cardin, then Justice Minister under the Pearson Government, was facing pressure by John Diefenbaker about whether or not the government was going to hold a public inquiry over the Spencer Scandal, which involved a Vancouver postal worker working as a low level Soviet spy.⁶ Under pressure, Cardin shouted that Diefenbaker was “the very last person in the House who can afford to give advice on the handling of security cases.”⁷ Cardin went on to demanded “Right Honourable Gentlemen to tell the House about his participation in the Monseignor case when he was prime minister of the country.”⁸ In such, the first veiled mention – in which Cardin later had to clarify to the press the proper spelling of Munsinger - of the Munsinger affair had wrapped it in the narrative of national security. This accusation “stunned the House of Commons,” as Cardin had publically revealed a scandal that had only been discussed in close circles in Ottawa.⁹

The Affair involved Gerda Munsinger, an East German that escaped from the eastern zone in the early 1950s.¹⁰ She arrived in Canada in August 1955, in which a divorce led her to apply under her ex-husbands last name rather than her maiden name Heseler.¹¹ Over the next four years, she would work her way up the social ladder, starting at the bottom, where her “path crossed those of figures in Montreal’s underworld” and culminating in her introduction to Pierre Sévigny in August 1959.¹² According to Munsinger, she had an affair with both Pierre Sévigny, as well as George Hees - then Minister of Trade and Commerce.¹³ However, Munsinger’s relationship with Cabinet Minister Hees did not last very long. They met at Ottawa’s Chateau Laurier Hotel and the relationship lasted only long enough for Munsinger to procure an invitation to the St. Andrew’s Ball.¹⁴ The affair with Sévigny from September through December was the climax of the affair. By January 1960 Sévigny had heard that Munsinger was “loose-lipped in reference to him” leading Sévigny to try and remove himself from the situation.¹⁵ Her ‘loose lips’ led to her using both Hees and Sévigny as references for citizenship, which drew attention and subsequent monitoring by the RCMP. Then Justice Minister Edmund Fulton was forced to inform Diefenbaker on December 12-13 that the RCMP feared that she presented a security risk, causing

⁵ Ibid., ix.

⁶ J.L. Granatstein, *Canada 1957-1967: The Years of Uncertainty and Innovation* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1986), 287-88.

⁷ Bryan D. Palmer, *Canada’s 1960s: The Ironies of Identity in a Rebellious Era* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009), 98.

⁸ Ibid., 98.

⁹ “Cardin Charges PCs hid sex, spy scandal”, *Globe and Mail* March 5, 1966, Front Page.

¹⁰ Palmer, *Canada’s 1960s*, 82.

¹¹ Ibid., 83-84.

¹² Ibid., 86.

¹³ Granatstein, *Canada 1957-1967*, 289.

¹⁴ Palmer, *Canada’s 1960s*, 88.

¹⁵ Ibid., 89.

Diefenbaker to confront Sévigny to end the relationship.¹⁶ Munsinger was denied citizenship to Canada, causing her to leave on February 5th, 1961.¹⁷ After subsequent meetings with the RCMP, which ended on February 16th of the same year, Fulton met with Diefenbaker where it was decided, “there had been no breach of security, Sévigny was not formally disciplined or asked to resign.”¹⁸ The affair was handled outside the public’s knowledge, in hope that it would stay that way.

The 1960s were far more tumultuous in the United States than in Canada. Social instability was caused by “sustained struggles over foreign policy, Civil Rights, labour relations and popular culture, especially rock-&-role music.”¹⁹ However, much like Canada, the United States had taken on a Cold War mentality. As such, national security was a major concern. National security was defined broadly in the United States, as were actions that could put national security in jeopardy. Sexual indiscretion, especially homosexual sexual indiscretion, was easily used as blackmail.²⁰ Furthermore, Cold War mentalities led to many who were involved in ‘deviant’ behaviour being associated with communists. However, in the United States, political scandals affected the individuals involved, but they did not always affect the political party they were associated with. Such an example was seen on October 7, 1964, when Walter Jenkins, then chief of staff for President Lyndon Johnson, was arrested because he committed “‘lewd acts’ with another man in a Washington, D.C.”²¹

Jenkins was arrested for disorderly conduct because he was caught having sex with Andy Choka in a public washroom at the local YMCA.²² The event occurred weeks before the 1964 election between Lyndon Johnson and Barry Goldwater, which was heating up as the voting date drew nearer. The Republican campaign “learned of the incident and gave the story to United Press International (UPI)”, who were the first to break the News on October 14th - it quickly became national news.²³ The press discovered that Jenkins was found engaging in homosexual activity with a resident of the YMCA.²⁴ When the story broke as a national scandal, it was revealed that Jenkins had a previous arrest for the same offense. Although the story shamed him and his family, and led to a subsequent emotional breakdown, hospitalization, and his departure from politics, “the revelation had no noticeable effect on the election” which Johnson ended up winning in a landslide victory.²⁵ It helped that once the story broke, Johnson - who was surprised upon hearing the news - distanced himself from Jenkins in hopes of protecting his political

¹⁶ Ibid., 93.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid., 94.

¹⁹ David Rosen, *Sex Scandal America: Politics & the Ritual of Public Shaming* (Toronto: Key Publishing House, 2009), 115.

²⁰ Rosen, *Sex Scandal America*, 116.

²¹ Loftin, “Political Scandals”, 396

²² Rosen, *Sex Scandal America*, 128.

²³ Loftin, “Political Scandals”, 396.

²⁴ Shelley Ross, *Fall From Grace: Sex, Scandal, and Corruption in American Politics from 1702 to the Present* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1988), 212.

²⁵ Rosen, *Sex Scandal America*, 129.

position.²⁶ Furthermore, in one of his first actions on the matter, Johnson asked immediately for Jenkins' resignation which ended their 25-year working relationship.²⁷ The Republicans had hoped that by exposing the story, they could "portray the Johnson administration as "'soft' on communism"²⁸ as he had a homosexual working for him, which was believed at the time to be a major security risk as well as a political liability.²⁹

The scandal involving Jenkins in the United States was discovered and exposed as a scandal immediately. Furthermore, there was no attempt to cover up the scandal. Abe Fortas did ask the editors of major papers to hold off until Jenkins had the opportunity to inform his family of the matter and resign, but the UPI thwarted this as they broke the story immediately.³⁰ This was unusual, as "Prior to the 1970s, the mainstream press rarely reported anything unfavorable about the private lives of politicians."³¹ However, immediate media coverage is not necessarily needed, as "sometimes scandals are not reported until years after they have occurred."³² The Munsinger affair did not come to light until 6 years after the fact. The cover up of the affair would classify the affair as procedural scandal. Enough people knew of the scandal, and could have exposed it. However, by hiding the scandal, it made it that much more sensational once it did come into the limelight. There was also a substantive scandal, the fact that Sévigny and Hees slept with Munsinger, which could possibly jeopardize national security; however the scandalous event was the fact that there had been a possible breach in national security which was not publicized. The Jenkins scandal did not involve any procedural scandals; it came to light almost immediately after it occurred, and Jenkins did not try to deny the charges. An such, the Jenkins scandal was entirely a substantive scandal, where the only issue was the actual breaking of the social norm, in this case, committing homosexual acts while in a high political position.

Both of these scandals were equally viewed as national security scandals, albeit for different reasons. In the case of the Munsinger scandal, the national security issue was that there was the possibility that Munsinger had been a spy, and even though this seemed highly unlikely, she was at the very least involved with many deplorable characters, including organized crime figures she had met in the late 1950s and 1960s.³³ In the Munsinger scandal, the focus was on Gerda as the national security threat, but the sex was not the primary issue, at least not in the initial investigation. The affair came to light only because the RCMP were following Gerda after she had used both ministers as references for citizenship when she applied in June 1960.³⁴ This led to suspicion resulting in the surveillance and discovery of the affairs. The fear by the RCMP that Gerda could know national security information was one of the major issues in the scandal, there

²⁶ Ibid., 129.

²⁷ Loftin, "Political Scandals", 396.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ross, *Fall From Grace*, 212.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Loftin, "Political Scandals", 394.

³² Loftin, "Political Scandals", 394.

³³ Palmer, *Canada's 1960s*, 90.

³⁴ Ibid., 90.

were no perceived wrongdoings in the fact that Pierre Sévigny and George Hees had slept with Gerda. Concern with the ‘Sex’ part of the scandal only occurred once the story broke in 1966. It was the general public, and their interest in the ‘sex scandal’, and their subsequent interest in Gerda that led to the popularization of the sexual nature of the scandal. In the case of the Jenkins scandal, the infringement on national security came from the 1953 prohibition of “employing homosexuals in sensitive positions because of their alleged susceptibility to blackmail by communist spies.”³⁵ This was due to the fact that homosexuals lacked moral fiber, causing them to engage in activities seen as a violating moral codes.³⁶ Unfortunately, as Jenkins was a presidential advisor: this caused him to be seen as a security threat due to the fact that he had security clearance and was privy to high-level security information. The Jenkins scandal focused solely on him, and the fact that he himself was a security threat. The man he had sex with does not feature prominently in the unfolding of the scandal.

Although Lowi believes that norms might not cross countries, the 1960s provided a space in which external events caused Canada and the United States to have converging social norms. The United States was just coming to terms with the Cuban missile crisis, which occurred only two years before the Jenkins scandal occurred. The last thing that Johnson would want would be to seem soft on fighting communism, especially in an election year. Canada was similarly trying to overcome Diefenbaker’s short falls in the view of Canada’s allies. Diefenbaker was viewed as useless by his allies.³⁷ Cold war mentality was a key aspect to why the investigation into Munsinger began in the first place.³⁸ In a March 10, 1966 press conference, Cardin stated that “Gerda Munsinger had engaged in espionage before coming to Canada and that both Diefenbaker and Davie Fulton, his Minister of Justice, had known of the affair and had not referred it to the law officers of the Crown.”³⁹ There was a fear that this “East German woman”, who was very much believed to be a spy at one time, could take it up again due to her possible exposure to classified information.⁴⁰ The exposure of the affair was seen in newspaper reports like that that announced that the “spirit of Senator Joseph McCarthy has moved onto Parliament Hill.”⁴¹ This was due to the fact that some perceived the actions of Cardin as defamatory, especially due to the fact that he did not have much evidence or knowledge on the issue beyond what was discussed with Pearson.

Both of these scandals broke at a time where the major parties in each respective country had tense relations. After the 1963 Federal election, “Pearson and Diefenbaker were still at the head of their parties, and so long as the two remained the bitterness that dominated the daily struggle

³⁵ Loftin, “Political Scandals”, 396.

³⁶ Ross, *Fall From Grace*, 212.

³⁷ Michael Bliss, *Right Honourable Men: The Descent of Canadian Politics from Macdonald to Chrétien* (Toronto: HarperPerennialCanada, 2004), 209.

³⁸ Palmer, *Canada’s 1960s*, 91.

³⁹ Granatstein, *Canada 1957-1967*, 288.

⁴⁰ Anthony Westell, “PM Offers Munsinger Inquiry”, *Globe and Mail* March 11, 1966, Front Page.

⁴¹ “The House and Cardinism”, *Globe and Mail* March 11, 1966.

in the House was certain to continue.”⁴² The Pearson government was preoccupied with their own scandals, which the Tories consistently were attacking the Liberal government with, causing instability within the cabinet, and press attention on the Liberals for their scandals.⁴³ It was not a surprise to Diefenbaker that the Liberals knew of the affair that had occurred under his stewardship from August 1959 until early 1961. On the front page of the Monday March 7th *Globe and Mail* is the first mention of Diefenbaker’s accusations that the liberals were blackmailing him with the affair.⁴⁴ However, the accusations of blackmailing did not receive considerable attention as the Canadian public finally had a sex scandal of their own to follow. Favreau had approached Fulton, and hinted that the Liberals knew of the affair, and that it would be advisable for the Tories attacks in the House of Commons to stop.⁴⁵ Favreau pointed to this as evidence that the House of Commons blurt was not accidental.⁴⁶ In the case of Johnson, he was facing a staunch anti-communist conservative in an election. Barry Goldwater used opportunities while on the campaign trail to attempt to revive the Jenkins scandal and keep it in the public consciousness on Johnson and his “curious crew.”⁴⁷ However, Goldwater’s persistence proved unsuccessful in changing public opinion

Both the Jenkins and the Munsinger sex scandals were wrapped in 1960s narratives of national security, framed by political opponents in hopes of damaging Johnson and the Diefenbaker respectively. In Johnson’s case, his presidential campaign was not affected, but the scandal ruined the political life of Jenkins. Diefenbaker and the Progressive Conservatives received a lot of bad press because of the scandal and their handling of the initial affair, affecting the party politically for quite some time. In Canada, the actual ‘sexual’ act was not seen as breaking any established social norms but rather it was the procedural method of hiding the scandal that broke the established norms that were expected of those in power. Jenkins’ sexual act was seen as breaking the social norms, in that by committing homosexual acts, he did not have the same moral fiber and therefore could not be trusted in a position of political power. Although both sex scandals affected in some way the political system, the manner in which they are connected is primarily in their status as national security issues and the fact that political opponents used both scandals as tools. Otherwise, the substantive and procedural matters of the scandals differ greatly, as do the public norms that they broke. These examples do show an ability to compare political scandals, at least on a few tangible similarities.

⁴² Granatstein, *Canada 1957-1967*, 286.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 281.

⁴⁴ “Something fishy about Spencer case”, *Globe and Mail* March 7, 1966, Front Page.

⁴⁵ Granatstein, *Canada 1957-1967*, 288.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 289.

⁴⁷ Ross, *Fall From Grace*, 213.

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Arabism and Arab Nationalism in Syria During and After World War One

Cameron Carswell

The last decade of Ottoman control of Syria and other Arab provinces of the Empire, from 1908-1918, were a tumultuous time. For many reasons, only some of which are discussed here, the Ottoman Empire was being picked apart by European imperial powers. After the loss of Ottoman territories in the Balkan wars of 1912, the empire was made up of only Turkic and Arabic provinces. The world changing events of World War One forcibly removed the Arab provinces from the Ottoman Empire, and it remained a solely Turkish state. In Anatolia the modern nation-state of Turkey would emerge under the nationalist leadership of Mustafa Kemal, known as Ataturk. For the first time in four hundred years the Arab peoples in Greater Syria and the Arabian Peninsula were separated politically, economically and culturally from Asia Minor. The conclusion of this division resulted in the creation of European mandates which brought direct European rule to the region of Greater Syria for the first time. The events of this period led to dramatic changes in the political, ideological and cultural life of the inhabitants of the region. Intellectuals, urban notables, and rural leaders of varying importance within and outside of Syria had to re-form loyalties and ideologies to protect or further their own interests. It is these changes and negotiations of identities that would shape Syria during the First World War and the ensuing French mandate.

The dominant ideology in the Ottoman Empire was Ottomanism, the idea that the best way to defend Islam from the encroachment of European Christian powers was to strengthen and support the Ottoman Empire.¹ Predominantly all of the leading political and religious leaders in the Ottoman Empire adhered to some form of Ottomanism or another prior to the First World War. After the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 and the overthrow of Sultan ‘Abd al-Hamid II, many leading political figures turned to a new emerging ideology called Arabism that put emphasis on greater decentralisation within the Ottoman Empire in Arab provinces. However, Arabist leaders got removed from positions of power by the Ottoman authorities, and when the Empire joined the First World War in November 1914, the most prominent positions were held by adherents to the Ottomanist ideology.² When the Ottoman Empire did lose control of the Arab provinces, Ottomanism was no longer valid, and Arabism and Arab nationalism was adopted as the leading political ideology. Surprisingly, the most successful source of emerging Arab nationalism came from the rural province of the Hejaz, in the form of the Arab revolt led by the Sharif Husayn of the Hashemite family. The failure of Faysal’s Syrian state due to internal

¹ C. Ernest Dawn, *From Ottomanism to Arabism: Essays on the Origins of Arab Nationalism*, (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1973), 148-149.

² Philip S. Khoury, *Urban Notables and Arab Nationalism: the Politics of Damascus, 1860-1920*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 74.

and external forces and the creation of the French Mandate further anguished and fuelled the emerging Syrian form of Arab nationalism.

In this paper I argue that in the period prior to, during, and after the First World War, identities were reshaped and articulated, particularly among the elite, in the region of Greater Syria to meet immediate political and military needs. I argue that regional identities clashed with Sharif Husayn and Emir Faysal's Hashemite version of Arab nationalism and that no notion of pan-Arab identity was agreed upon. The fluid nature of identities in Syria during this period would lead to the development of a Syrian Arab nationalism, which included many regional and familial loyalties, to combat French colonial rule. I will begin by examining the relationship between Ottomanism and Arabism and the latter's dominance as a result of Ottoman defeat in the First World War. Then I will expand on the Hashemite ideology of Pan-Arabism and the results of the Arab revolt. Thirdly, Faysal's Arab Kingdom and how it was unable to gain support from Syrian and Damascene notables will be analysed, showing how Arab Nationalists would eventually take over the leadership from Faysal until the French invasion in July 1920. Lastly, I will look into the beginning of the French Mandate period and how Syrian national identity had become more solidified as Syrians combated French colonial power.

Before World War One, Damascus was the seat of most Arabist activity within the Empire:³ the "hotbed of pre-war Arabism."⁴ Arabism developed out of, and was essentially a branch of, Ottomanism. Ottomanism was expressed along religious lines as the only way to protect Islam from encroaching European powers. Philip Khoury establishes that the Ottoman reforms in the late 19th century benefited an emerging bureaucratic landowning class who took power in Damascus and other Syrian cities. This landowning class, called notables, "came to identify with the ideology of Ottomanism and emerged as the agent of Ottoman centralisation and modernisation."⁵ However, the Young Turk Revolution in 1908, and its secular centralised modernisation policies, turned many Arab notables and intellectuals, or 'ulama, away from Ottomanism.⁶ The new Young Turk government, known as the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), increased the use of the Turkish language throughout Arab provinces in the empire and Arab political and religious leaders disliked this wave of Turkification.⁷ They perceived that "the conservative Ottomanism of 'Abd al-Hamid II and the modernist Ottomanism of the Young Turks both appeared ineffectual in the face of Europe."⁸ Therefore, they turned to Arabism.

The ideology of Arabism essentially had the same purpose as Ottomanism: to defend Islam from the Europeans. However, its means of achieving this goal differed. As Arabs were the first propagators of Islam and the Quran was written in Arabic, prominent 'ulama, such as Rashid

³ Martin Kramer, "Arab Nationalism: Mistaken Identity," *Daedalus*, Vol. 122, No. 3 (1993): 175-176.

⁴ Khoury, *Urban Notables and Arab Nationalism: the Politics of Damascus, 1860-1920*, 59.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 53.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 56.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 57-58.

⁸ Dawn, *From Ottomanism to Arabism: Essays on the Origins of Arab Nationalism*, 148-149.

Rida, believed that Islam could be revitalised with the strengthening of the Arab nation. Many of these *'ulama* viewed Islam and Arabism as synonymous. They blamed the Ottoman government for the weakening of Islam and thought that the strengthening of Arabs would strengthen Islam.⁹ Albert Hourani describes this new ideology of Arabism, which he calls Arab nationalism, as emerging from “the revival of consciousness of the Arab past in the new schools and the emphasis placed by Islamic reformers on the early period of Islamic history, the period when Arabs had been predominant.”¹⁰ Rashid Rida and other *'ulama* believed that the Ottoman Empire was going to stay around, and so worked “to improve relations and promote cooperation between Turks and Arabs in the framework of the Ottoman Empire.”¹¹ Arabism did not imply the independence of the Empire’s Arab provinces. It did imply greater decentralisation away from Istanbul and, after the Young Turk Revolution, an end to policies of Turkification.

In this sense, Arabism prior to World War One cannot be seen as “Arab nationalism” as it worked within the context of the Ottoman Empire. Its main tenant was that the Turkish government in Istanbul had lost the ability to properly defend Islam and that to reform Islam, further decentralisation of power had to occur. Anthony Smith describes nationalism as “an ideology that places the nation at the centre of its concerns and seeks to promote its... national autonomy, national unity and national identity.”¹² While Smith goes on to debate definitions of nation, nationalism and national movement, his definition of nationalism is adequate for us to use in this context. As Arabism had very limited goals in unity and autonomy comparative to the demand of Arab nationalists that were to come, it was not truly “nationalism”. As Roger Owen articulately puts it, Arabism was not the dominant ideology as “Arabness was just one of a number of possible identities at this time, and usually less important than that of belonging to a particular family or tribe or region or town.”¹³ Arab national identity did not dominate and Arabism did not place the Arab nation as the centre of concern. Instead, Arabism, like Ottomanism, placed Islam and the continuation of an Islamic empire as the center of its concern. Arabism had been promulgated among the *'ulama* and Arabist notables in urban centres in Syria, but Ottomanism remained the dominant ideology in the Arab provinces of the empire. This was largely because the CUP sought to replace Arabist notables in Damascus and other Syrian urban centres with Ottomanist notables as they perceived Arabism as a threat to their power. Initially Arabist notables had beaten CUP Ottomanist notables in parliamentary elections in 1908.¹⁴ The CUP called for new parliamentary elections in 1912 and had it arranged so their supporters won,

⁹ Sami Zubaida, “Islam and Nationalism: Continuities and Contradictions,” *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol. 10, No. 4 (2004): 410.

¹⁰ Albert Hourani, *A History of the Arab Peoples*. (Cambridge, Mass: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2002), 309.

¹¹ Eyal Zisser, “Rashid Rida: On the way to Syrian nationalism in the shade of Islam and Arabism,” in *The Origins of Syrian Nationhood: Histories, pioneers and identity*, edited by Adel Bashara (London; New York: Routledge, 2011), 127.

¹² Anthony D. Smith, *Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001), 9.

¹³ Roger Owen, *State, Power, and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East*, 3rd edition (London: Routledge, 2004.), 57.

¹⁴ Khoury, *Urban Notables and Arab Nationalism: the Politics of Damascus, 1860-1920*, 57.

and by 1914 they had alienated and bribed Arabists to support them and had effectively divided the Arabist opposition.¹⁵ This led to Syria having predominantly Ottomanist notables in positions of power on the outbreak and during the war. Although Arabism was unable to achieve its political goals prior to World War One, it would become a necessary ideology after the war because of the failure of the Ottoman state, and therefore Ottomanism, to defend the Arab provinces from European military domination.

During World War One, Syrians remained loyal to the Ottoman Empire and very few Syrian Arabists joined the Hashemite armies until the outcome of the war became evident.¹⁶ The few active Syrian Arabists or emerging Syrian Arab nationalists that were in Syria fled the region or were imprisoned by the authorities. They did not have a significant role in the Arab national movement that would occur.¹⁷ An articulate form of Arab nationalism was promulgated by the Sharif Husayn of the Hejaz when he revolted against the Ottomans. This would be known as the Arab Revolt of 1916. The fact that the Arab revolt occurred outside of Syria is one of the greatest ironies of the development of Arabism and Arab nationalism in Syria. However, calling Sharif Husayn's revolt as an "Arab revolt" is problematic as the choice to revolt was made mostly due to political reasons and the revolt was made up predominantly by Hejazi and Iraqi warriors. As we will see, the Hashemites would come to spearhead the Arab nationalist movement and the transition from Arabism within an Ottoman framework to Arab nationalism and independence.

The Arab revolt has become aggrandised in the memorisation of Arab nationalism. Aziz Al-Azmeh brings attention to the fact that "the genealogy of this movement should be sought elsewhere than in the factors that made for the rise of Arab nationalism."¹⁸ Indeed, the success of the revolt was hampered by the fact that "Arabness" was not the dominant identity amongst members of the Greater Syrian region.¹⁹ Nevertheless, the revolt was portrayed as an Arab national renewal, or as George Antonius phrases it, an "Arab Awakening."²⁰ Antonius is considered one of the first historians writing on Arab nationalism and in his 1938 book he writes a detailed account of the Arab revolt and portrays the movement as the coming of age of the Arab nation.²¹ However, his framing of the Arab revolt as a purely nationalist movement is misleading and does not reflect the reality of the complicated set of identities and motives that existed on the ground. Antonius presented the Arab national movement as inevitable, and as the Arab people waiting to overthrow their Ottoman overseers.²² This was not particularly true, as

¹⁵ Khoury, *Urban Notables and Arab Nationalism: the Politics of Damascus, 1860-1920*, 62 and 66-67.

¹⁶ Dawn, *From Ottomanism to Arabism: Essays on the Origins of Arab Nationalism*, 155.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 153-156.

¹⁸ Aziz Al-Azmeh, "Nationalism and the Arabs," in *Arab Nation, Arab Nationalism*, edited by Derek Hopwood, (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan Press LTD; New York: St. Martin's Press INC, 2000), 70.

¹⁹ Owen, *State, Power, and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East*, 3rd edition, 57.

²⁰ George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab National Movement* (Beirut: Khayats, 1938).

²¹ C. Ernest Dawn, "The Quality of Arab Nationalism," in *Arab Nation, Arab Nationalism*, edited by Derek Hopwood, (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan Press LTD; New York: St. Martin's Press INC, 2000), 41.

²² George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab National Movement*. Pages 13-20 give a sense of Antonius' interpretation of the Arab national movement. Also see C. Ernest Dawn, "The Quality of Arab

the Hashemite revolt was initially framed along religious lines and did not lead to an upheaval in the Ottoman's Arab provinces.

As the Sharif and Emir of Mecca, Husayn held one of the most prestigious political and religious positions within the Empire.²³ Husayn had originally strengthened his position by expressing loyalty to the Sultan and thus was able to beat out rival families and clans with Ottoman support. He legitimated his post by his ability to control the Bedouin tribes and thus protect the pilgrimage route to Mecca and Medina.²⁴ He and his family were fully entrenched in Ottomanism, believing the Sultan and the Empire were the best way to protect and further Islam. The Young Turk Revolution changed this relationship. Husayn became at odds with the Turkish authorities in Istanbul and their policies of secularisation, centralisation and Turkification. At the beginning of the war Husayn was under the threat of losing his position as Emir and Sharif of Mecca by either Turkish or foreign powers.²⁵ As C. Ernest Dawn puts it "The Unionists [CUP], with their determination to create a centralised government, were the most obvious threat to Husayn's desire to maintain his traditional authority and to make it hereditary in his family."²⁶ Husayn revolted for political and self-interest reasons and to protect his position. He was a late comer to Arabism and Arab nationalism, and began negotiating with Arab nationalists from Syria and with British forces fighting the Ottomans. After preparations were made and the ambiguous Husayn-McMahon correspondence of 1915 was agreed to, Husayn was ready to launch his revolt.

The ideology of the Arab revolt did not articulate Arab independence over Arabism. The Ottoman government had lost its legitimacy because it could not defend Islam, and Arab independence was not a given. Arabism was now the most viable ideological option as "the requirements of Arabism are fulfilled by membership in an Islamic state which enforces the Koran and the sunnah, rather than by possessing a separate, independent Arab state."²⁷ Ottomanism had been unsuccessful under the increasingly secular Turkish Ottoman government because of its failure to fight European powers. Therefore, Arabs had to take control of the responsibility of protecting Islam and governing the caliphate. Thus, the revolt was legitimated along religious lines. Arab independence was a by-product of the results of the war, not an inherent objective of the Arab revolt. The objectives and goals of the revolt were framed along protecting Islam, not realising Arab nationalist aspirations. Al-Azmeh argues that "none of the proclamations or statements or speeches launching the 1917 mutiny or following it was Arab nationalist in any sense: They were universalist Caliphal statements specifying the usurpation by the Ottomans of the Caliphate from its rightful holders – not the Arabs, but the holy family of

Nationalism," in *Arab Nation, Arab Nationalism*, edited by Derek Hopwood and Al-Azmeh, "Nationalism and the Arabs," in *Arab Nation, Arab Nationalism*, edited by Derek Hopwood, for more interpretation on Antonius' work.

²³ Dawn, *From Ottomanism to Arabism: Essays on the Origins of Arab Nationalism*, 3.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 6.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 40-41.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 49-50.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 71.

Arabs.”²⁸ However, over the course of World War One and the British military successes against the Ottomans, the goals of the Arab revolt, and its ideology, would change and grow. The revolt would later take on a pan-Arab ideology, culminating in the creation of the Arab kingdom of Syria under Faysal. But as Sami Zubaida argues, “pan-Arabism developed alongside notions of pan-Islamism and a renewed caliphate, preferably an Arab caliphate,” and “many Arab nationalists and many Arab Islamists have argued that there is no contradiction between Arabism and Islam.”²⁹ It is important to see that even this pan-Arab identity was based within the Islamic tradition.

As successful as the Arab revolt was militarily, it did not achieve the results that its adherents and supporters, British military planners in particular, wanted it to. It was unable to lead to an Arab overthrow of the Ottoman Turks. Even though identities across Syria were being reformed, regional loyalties to families, clans, tribes or cities still dominated the fluid negotiation of identities. The Arab armies were made up predominately by Hejazi’s and had minimal Syrian and Palestinian membership because the pan-Arab sentiment did not take hold across Greater Syria. Owen states that “in spite of the fact that its apologists try to present Arab nationalism as a single movement with a single objective, there was, from the outset, no general agreement about how Arabism should be combined with the more local loyalties to be found in Damascus, Baghdad and the other cities of the Fertile Crescent.”³⁰ Theoretically speaking, there was no agreed upon conscious nation or community that dominated, and multiple identities prevailed.³¹ Therefore, writers such as Al-Azmeh and Dawn argue that the Arab Revolt was indeed not an Arab revolt, but a Hashemite revolt.³² Al-Azmeh argues that “it was an Islamist rebellion, undertaken in the name not of Arabs, but of a Meccan Caliphate under the Sharif Husayn b. Ali,”³³ while Dawn states that “nationalism may be regarded as significant to the Arab revolt only to the extent that the Hashemites may be regarded as nationalists.”³⁴ Most importantly, the Arab revolt was not corroborated by all, or even a majority of Arabs in the region. The decision to revolt was made because of political reasons by the Sharif Husayn and it was legitimated by appealing to Islamic tradition and continuity. Ultimately, Husayn “conceived of his action as an attempt to resurrect traditionalist ‘Ottomanism’ and to revive Islam, and more practically, as the best way to defeat hostile tribal neighbours in Arabia.”³⁵ Therefore, most Syrian elites, both conservative former Ottomanist notables and Arab nationalists, did not support or trust the Hejazi Hashemite government that would take power at the end of the war.

²⁸ Al-Azmeh, “Nationalism and the Arabs,” in *Arab Nation, Arab Nationalism*, edited by Derek Hopwood, 70.

²⁹ Zubaida, “Islam and Nationalism: Continuities and Contradictions,” 409.

³⁰ Owen, *State, Power, and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East*, 3rd edition, 58-59.

³¹ Al-Azmeh, “Nationalism and the Arabs,” in *Arab Nation, Arab Nationalism*, edited by Derek Hopwood, 73-75.

³² *Ibid.*, 69-70; and Dawn, *From Ottomanism to Arabism: Essays on the Origins of Arab Nationalism*, 1-3. See the first and third chapter of his book for expansion of his argument about origin and ideological nature of the Arab revolt.

³³ Al-Azmeh, “Nationalism and the Arabs,” in *Arab Nation, Arab Nationalism*, 69.

³⁴ Dawn, *From Ottomanism to Arabism: Essays on the Origins of Arab Nationalism*, 2.

³⁵ Khoury, *Urban Notables and Arab Nationalism: the Politics of Damascus, 1860-1920*, 79.

On October 1 1918, Damascus was surrendered to Australian troops by Damascene notables who hoped to play a leading role in the subsequent Syrian state. However, they were pushed aside by Faysal's supporters and when Faysal set up a government these Ottomanist notables lost their traditional seats of power.³⁶ Emir Faysal came to power because he led the northern Arab armies and because British and commonwealth forces were able to militarily defeat Turkish forces in Syria. Faysal and his supporters set up their government in the Damascus, the "hotbed" of Arabism and Arab nationalism, and initially Faysal was considered the "champion of Arab nationalism."³⁷ Logically, the Syrians should have been supportive of Faysal and his Arab Kingdom, as Damascus had the highest number of Arabists and Arab nationalists. Unfortunately for Faysal's new government, the Syrians did not want to be ruled by a Hashemite from the Hejaz, which was considered a backwater province of the Arab world. Faysal had the extra challenge of being an outsider. He faced prejudice from Syrian notables and even nationalist supporters, and had to learn the complexities of Damascene political life.³⁸ Faysal's government was set up on the same premise of how the Ottomans had ruled, and as Sami Zubaida describes it, most Middle Eastern states had been ruled. She states that generally Middle Eastern states consisted "of a ruling dynasty whose direct rule does not extend far beyond the capital or seat of power, but which exercises (variable) authority over its (theoretical) territory by uneasy alliances with local power structures in different parts of the territory."³⁹ Therefore, "the Faysal administration was only new in terms of its personnel" and not in its ruling structure.⁴⁰ Nevertheless, he formed a government consisting of Hejazi and Iraqi members of his Arab army, whom he owed favours to, as well as pre-war Arab nationalists.

As the war turned for the worse for the Ottomans, the Syrian political elite had to change from Ottomanism to Arabism, as Ottomanism was no longer a valid ideology to legitimate political power. For notables who had integrated with the Turkic ruling class this was a hard turnover to do. It was exasperated because of the exile or forced removal of Arabist notables prior to and during the war. These Arabist notables and Arab nationalist intellectuals would have a prominent role in Faysal's new government, much to the chagrin of the traditional Ottomanist notables.⁴¹ Faysal gave government positions to his supporters and he had to greatly increase the bureaucracy to create enough posts. Despite a healthy British subsidy of 150 000 pounds, Faysal's government was short of funds because of nepotism and corruption, which only furthered the straining of relations between the Syrian populace and the new Arab government.⁴² Faysal had to leave the governing of Syria to his followers, while he took on the unenviable task

³⁶ Khoury, *Urban Notables and Arab Nationalism: the Politics of Damascus, 1860-1920*, 79-80.

³⁷ Muhannad Salhi, "Faysal: The first king of Syria," in *The Origins of Syrian Nationhood: Histories, pioneers and identity*, edited by Adel Bashara (London; New York: Routledge, 2011), 255.

³⁸ Salhi, "Faysal: The first king of Syria," in *The Origins of Syrian Nationhood: Histories, pioneers and identity*, edited by Adel Bashara, 255-256.

³⁹ Sami Zubaida, *Islam, the People, and the State: Political Ideas and Movements in the Middle East* (London: I.B. Tauris and Co LTD; New York: St. Martin's Press INC, 2001), 124.

⁴⁰ Khoury, *Urban Notables and Arab Nationalism: the Politics of Damascus, 1860-1920*, 82.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 75-76.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 82-83.

of gaining international recognition for his new state at the peace conference in Paris as the war came to an end.

By and large, Faysal was unable to gain the international backing he would have needed to protect the young Arab state. This was largely due to French war aims to gain Syria as a prize for its sacrifice during the war and Britain's withdrawal of support for Faysal. Faysal was, as Muhannad Salhi describes it, dealing "with formidable European foes, superior to him in every way, determined to implement their longstanding plans for the region under the guise of 'international law.'" ⁴³ Faysal had no experience dealing with these British and French diplomats and was unskilled in the extravagant art of European diplomacy. Nevertheless, he devoted most of his efforts to obtaining British support. First he approached the Zionists to discuss Jewish immigration in Palestine. Prior to his arrival in Damascus, Faysal met with Chaim Weizmann, the president of the Zionist delegation in Palestine, on June 4 1918. The meeting went well and the relationship between the two parties was benevolent, although no actual agreement was made. ⁴⁴ Faysal was aware of the strength that the Zionist community had in lobbying the British authorities, and so wished to gain an ally to aid him in acquiring further British support. They later reached an agreement in January 1919 that agreed to increased Jewish immigration, but the question of allowing a Jewish national homeland was still on the table for negotiation. ⁴⁵ While this agreement put Faysal in a positive light to British sympathisers, it knocked his reputation down in Syria. Indeed, "Faysal had miscalculated the Palestinian reaction" as Palestinians at this time were very aware of the growing Jewish population in Palestine and Zionist plans to create a Jewish state. ⁴⁶ As Syrians perceived him as "the new hero of the Arab cause," Faysal's agreement to allow for greater Jewish immigration in Palestine "was therefore tantamount to blasphemy." ⁴⁷ This was because Palestine and Palestinian Arabs were considered by Syrian nationalists as part of Syria, and as Faysal represented Syrian nationalists, this agreement caused outrage in Damascus against Faysal.

The reaction towards the Faysal-Weizmann agreement is understandable considering the emergence of Arab nationalism and its concentration on protecting the traditional role of Islam in Arab speaking provinces. The result was greater anti-Zionist sentiment and agitation in Syria and Palestine, as well as ruining any credibility Faysal could have had with the British as a result of signing the agreement. ⁴⁸ Faysal's plan had backfired. This incident reflected the reality of identities and power on the ground in Greater Syria. Salhi gives an account sympathetic to Faysal and his actions, arguing that "Faysal's position vis a vis the Zionists can be understood from the perspective of a Hijazi prince ultimately representing Hashemite interests; from both the Arab

⁴³ Salhi, "Faysal: The first king of Syria," in *The Origins of Syrian Nationhood: Histories, pioneers and identity*, edited by Adel Bashara, 257.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 259-260.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 267-268.

⁴⁶ Khoury, *Urban Notables and Arab Nationalism: the Politics of Damascus, 1860-1920*, 83.

⁴⁷ Salhi, "Faysal: The first king of Syria," in *The Origins of Syrian Nationhood: Histories, pioneers and identity*, edited by Adel Bashara, 269.

⁴⁸ Khoury, *Urban Notables and Arab Nationalism: the Politics of Damascus, 1860-1920*, 84.

and Syrian nationalist point of view, however, negotiating away any Arab or Syrian land, let alone Palestine, was anathema.⁴⁹ Although it appears that Faysal did not quite understand this, or he was hedging his bets, Arabs in Palestine were consciously aware of and acted upon their identification with a Greater Syrian identity. It appears that Faysal's interpretation of the Arab nation differed from conceptions of the Arab nation held by Syrian and Palestinian nationalists.

In Paris, Faysal was unable to defeat the French diplomatically, and the French coveted his Syrian state. The French perceived Faysal to be a British puppet, and that Britain would still have influence in the region if Faysal remained in power.⁵⁰ However, Britain had no more cards to play. It had exhausted its diplomatic resources and essentially made too many promises to many different parties. After a long period of negotiations in 1919 between British Prime Minister Lloyd George and French Prime Minister Clemenceau, Britain agreed to allow France to take possession of Syria, which had been within the French area of influence in the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916.⁵¹ On September 15, Lloyd George announced that British troops would be withdrawn from Syria, and Faysal "had no choice but to negotiate exclusively with the French to maintain his government in Damascus."⁵² While Faysal was trying to reach an agreement with the French he lost control of his government, as Arab nationalists called for independence. The Syrian Congress, which had been elected earlier in 1919 and first convened on June 6th, was dominated by Arab nationalists.⁵³ Most of these nationalists were members of al-Fatat, the Young Arab Society, and part of its front party called the Istiqlal party. Al-Fatat was an Arab nationalist organisation that had been founded prior to the war in 1909 in Paris.⁵⁴ These Arab nationalists in the Syrian Congress declared Greater Syria, which included Palestine, the Independent Kingdom of Syria on March 8 1920, and Faysal was declared it's King.⁵⁵ To the French, this declaration of independence was unacceptable. Fearing that the situation could get worse and with British forces out of the region, France prepared to send in an army. After the conference at San Remo in April 1920, France's mandate was set up under international law and by mid-July French troops entered Syria.⁵⁶

The only monumental battle, the battle of Maysalun, occurred on July 24th with Faysal's minister of war, Yusuf al-Azmah, leading a small and ineffective Syrian army against the French. By July 28th Faysal had fled Syria and his Kingdom was no more.⁵⁷ The French established their mandate administration and modeled it after their experience in Morocco, where they supported

⁴⁹ Salhi, "Faysal: The first king of Syria," in *The Origins of Syrian Nationhood: Histories, pioneers and identity*, edited by Adel Bashara, 269.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 276.

⁵¹ Philip S. Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate: The Politics of Arab Nationalism, 1920-1945*, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1987), 34-36.

⁵² Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate: The Politics of Arab Nationalism, 1920-1945*, 37.

⁵³ Khoury, *Urban Notables and Arab Nationalism: the Politics of Damascus, 1860-1920*, 86-88.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 1860-1920, 64.

⁵⁵ Salhi, "Faysal: The first king of Syria," in *The Origins of Syrian Nationhood: Histories, pioneers and identity*, edited by Adel Bashara, 275.

⁵⁶ Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate: The Politics of Arab Nationalism, 1920-1945*, 40-41.

⁵⁷ Zisser, "Rashid Rida: On the way to Syrian nationalism in the shade of Islam and Arabism," in *The Origins of Syrian Nationhood: Histories, pioneers and identity*, edited by Adel Bashara, 136.

cultural and religious minorities and played regional elites off of each other to gain loyalty and stability.⁵⁸ The French government was pushed to acquire the Syrian mandate because of politics within France. The Clemenceau government was forced to resign in January 1920, and a new government under Prime Minister Alexandre Millerand was more favourable to a lobbying group aptly named The Colonial Party.⁵⁹ Thus the French government was willing to invest time, energy and military might to hold onto Syria despite the fact that it was an economic drain. Regardless, they were never perceived as a legitimate ruler in Syria. The Ottoman Empire and Emir Faysal's Arab Kingdom were legitimated by their claim to represent and protect Islam and Arabs respectively. The French had no legitimising claim among the Syrian populace, and regional identities would, to an extent, combine with a new Syrian identity to resist French occupation.

After the French set up control in Syria, they divided the region into different administrative territories. Firstly, they divided the Mt. Lebanon region from Greater Syria and gave preference to the Christian Maronite population, which France had supported during the 19th century. They continued this policy of divide and conquer in the rest of Syria, favouring the mountainous minorities such as the Maronites, Alawites and Druzes.⁶⁰ They also ruled through the traditional Ottoman notable system, with the notables playing the role of mediator between the ruler and the people. Ironically, the Alawite and Druze minorities would be staunch resisters to the French mandate. The French found that "it was not the interior towns – the centers of nationalist activity – which posed a challenge" but "rather it was the countryside."⁶¹ Alawite resistance in North Eastern Syria proved strong. Led by Shaykh Salih al-'Ali, the resistance movement was not put down until late 1921.⁶² Resistance led by Ibrahim Hananu also came from the countryside surrounding Aleppo, which would be known as the Hananu revolt.⁶³ However, it was the rural Druze resistance in the southern Hawran region which would lead to the Syrian Revolt of 1925-1927.⁶⁴ Once again it was not Syrian nationalists in Damascus that would lead nationalist mobilisation, but it was external factors that would allow for nationalism to be used for political mobilisation.⁶⁵ The revolt would grow, culminating with resistance in the cities, and only after two years of military intervention were the French able to end the revolt. Although the Syrian revolt was ultimately unsuccessful, it would live on in Syrian nationalist discourse as a nationalist movement for independence.

⁵⁸ Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate: The Politics of Arab Nationalism, 1920-1945*, 55-57.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 1920-1945, 38-39.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 1920-1945, 52-53.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 1920-1945, 99.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 1920-1945, 99-102.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 1920-1945, 102-110.

⁶⁴ Michael Provence, *The Great Syrian Revolt: and the Rise of Arab Nationalism*, (Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 2005), 4.

⁶⁵ See Provence, *The Great Syrian Revolt: and the Rise of Arab Nationalism*. See Page 18-20 for his examination of the historiography of Syrian nationalism in the French Mandate and the relationship between rural and urban nationalist expressions and consciousness.

The conception by Syrian intellectuals and masses of belonging to a unique historical tradition, Islam, and to a unique historical lineage, the Arab nation, would lead to the development of a Syrian national identity during the French mandate period. As Smith describes, the nation, while based on an ethnic community, is different from an ethnic community as it is “a named human community occupying a homeland, and having common myths and a shared history, a common public culture, a single economy, and common rights and duties for all members.”⁶⁶ As we can see, Syrians conceptualised themselves as belonging to a Syrian nation as well as to the larger Arab ethnic community by the time the French had set up their mandate. This removed whatever legitimacy the French might have had in governing Syria and inspired nationalist sentiment. Michael Provence argues that the “Syrian revolt was a catalyst for the formation of popular notions of Syrian-Arab identity.”⁶⁷ However, as Khoury points out, “interwar nationalism was contradictory and poorly articulated” and it would be not until the end of the Second World War before Syria would be independent.⁶⁸ Nonetheless, the development of Arab consciousness prior to and during the First World War, and the strength of a distinct regional Syrian identity, would expand to create a Syrian national identity during the mandate period. Eyal Zisser, in an article on the life of Rashid Rida, argues that, along with Islam and Arabism, “we should also list Syrianism – this is to say Syrian particular identity – as sources of Syria’s modern national identity and character.”⁶⁹

The development of political Syrian nationalism and ultimately the Syrian nation came from the intellectual roots of Arabism and Arab nationalism. The shift from Ottomanism to Arabism came slowly as a reaction towards increasing Turkification and Ottoman failures against European powers in protecting and furthering Islam. Damascene notables and Islamic scholars began to associate themselves with Arabism, but this brought on Ottoman persecution of Arabist politicians. Therefore, Arab nationalism in Syria was put on hold until the Arab, or Hashemite, revolt of 1916-1918, which led to the creation of the Arab kingdom of Syria under Emir Faysal. While Faysal espoused a clearly nationalist agenda, and his government was made up predominantly of Arab nationalists, his ideas of pan-Arabism were not accepted in Syria. Faysal and his Hejazi and Iraqi followers were deemed outsiders and Faysal’s actions, particularly the debacle of the Faysal-Weizmann agreement, proved that his form of Arab national identity, or pan-Arab identity, was not compatible with the strong Syrian regional identities. Regardless, it was the Arab nationalists who took control of Faysal and his government, and the French quickly acted to end the short lived kingdom. The multiple different groups within Syria would all resent French colonial rule, and the fluidity of identities would allow them to combat French rule and meld into a loose identification with the Syrian nation. It is this identification that would be the outcome of this turbulent time in Syrian history, and this Syrian identity would shape modern Syrian nationalism.

⁶⁶ Smith, *Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History*, 13.

⁶⁷ Provence, *The Great Syrian Revolt: and the Rise of Arab Nationalism*, 21.

⁶⁸ Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate: The Politics of Arab Nationalism, 1920-1945*, 6.

⁶⁹ Zisser, “Rashid Rida: On the way to Syrian nationalism in the shade of Islam and Arabism,” in *The Origins of Syrian Nationhood: Histories, pioneers and identity*, edited by Adel Bashara, 123.

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