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Editor’s Introduction

It is a tremendous pleasure to introduce the second issue and second edition of The Corvette, our second foray into digital-only publishing. Throughout this year, The Corvette has been proud to present the best research and writing by undergraduate students in fields related to history at the University of Victoria. This issue of The Corvette represents cooperation between students as they take part in a rigorous peer review followed by our copy editing process.

The essays in this edition focus on a wide range of topics, including essays about racial, art, political, military and indigenous history. Either through classes taught by the exceptional professors at this institution, or through scholarly opportunities such as the Jamie Cassels Undergraduate Research Awards, students at the University of Victoria are encouraged to pursue their research interests and hone their academic skills. This focus on research sharpens analytical thought, information synthesis, writing, and editing which is immensely useful in preparing students for further studies and employment.

Many people were involved in the creation of this edition of The Corvette. Our thanks for this journal go first to our wonderful authors. This edition garnered the highest amount of submissions we have ever received and we thank those who exhibited hard work and a passion for history. With this level of submissions, this edition would not have been possible without the dedicated team of volunteer peer reviewers and copy editors who spent a significant amount of time helping to determine our content and create this ambitious issue. The Corvette editorial team was guided once again by the expertise of our faculty advisor Dr. Mitchell Lewis Hammond and joined this term by Dr. Peter Cook. Scholarly librarian Inba Kehoe, History Department
chair Dr. Lynne Marks, and Dean of Humanities Dr. John Archibald were once again invaluable to our efforts in putting this journal together and we thank them for their support. We would also like to thank The History Undergraduate Society and the University of Victoria Students’ Society for their support and funding. Finally, the History Department staff and faculty provide incalculable support for their students and provide the encouragement and the resources to attain excellence and without them a journal of this scope could not be published.

As editors, it is our desire to have this journal inspire and challenge the undergraduate students of the University of Victoria to pursue excellence inside and outside of the classroom or seminar room. It is our hope that the journal will continue to grow with the students of this institution and continue to publish the finest academic research, so we thank you all for your support in this endeavor.

Sincerely,

Benjamin Fast
Editor-in-Chief

Rayleen Lister
Academic Editor
Reviving the Nomad: Racialized Wandering in Disneyland

ALISSA CARTWRIGHT

In the postwar period, from its opening in 1955 until the late 1960’s, Disneyland held great cultural significance to the psyche of Americans entrenched in the Cold War. The disappearance of the western frontier and the proliferation of racially homogenous suburbs during this era limited the ability of white Americans in particular to participate in racialized nomadic wandering. This paper will argue that Disneyland situated this wandering within the context of imagination and perpetuated it on a mass level. Ostensibly nomadic Indigenous peoples, as well as the natural landscapes associated with them, were held in an historical stasis in Disneyland. This allowed white Americans—the real nomads—to imaginatively explore manipulated Indigenous cultures, even as the mainstream values Disney promoted continued to psychologically anchor and comfort white Americans.

Disneyland, one of the most iconic symbols of American idealism, is a study in contrasts, merging artful illusion and reassuring tradition into an ostensibly seamless, and enticing, utopian dream world. As the nearly overwhelming droves of eager visitors in July of 1955 demonstrated, this dream world struck an emotional chord with the American public; Walt Disney had effortlessly “cast his spell” over a population which acquiesced quite contentedly to his enchantment.¹ This prompts one to consider the source of this seemingly boundless appeal: why did Americans flock in the millions to what was and is ultimately an “artifice,” consisting of only the palest imitations of

adventure, exploration, and discovery?\textsuperscript{2} Historians have supplied numerous answers to this question. The park’s tendency to cater to middle-class, postwar norms has been credited with creating a sense of reassurance, particularly in an era of rising Cold War tensions.\textsuperscript{3} Walt Disney’s status as a kind of populist icon, the lovable hero of the American family, further reinforced these ideals.\textsuperscript{4} Even before the opening of the Magic Kingdom’s gates, Disney and his corporation reigned over an empire of popular culture, based on cartoons, motion pictures, and television shows, which were incorporated into the Disney theme park.\textsuperscript{5} In turn, the miniaturized and intimate architecture of Disneyland evoked a sense of nostalgia, even as many of the park attractions celebrated technology and boundless progress.\textsuperscript{6} Perhaps most importantly, Disneyland convinced visitors that they had entered a world of wonder and adventure, distant from the monotony of daily

\textsuperscript{5} Watts, \textit{The Magic Kingdom}, 64-91; 391-392.  
realities. All of these observations share a common thread, namely that Disneyland managed to discern and embody the desires of the “American psyche,” as Richard Francaviglia terms it, with an uncanny accuracy.

With this in mind, one may consider Ann Curthoys and John Docker’s observation that throughout history it has been the colonizers, those “inveterate wanderers,” who traipsed across continents and sailed over oceans, who were in fact nomadic, while the Indigenous peoples who have been mythologized (often pejoratively) as itinerants were comparatively settled. By the time of Disneyland’s inauguration, such nomadic inclinations—along with the inevitable racial conflict they created—were an integral aspect of the collective American cultural identity, which the notion of a harsh, but conquerable, western frontier had long defined. Yet the postwar generation was also aware that such a frontier no longer existed on any tangible level. As one Vietnam veteran who grew up in 1950s suburbia commented, the United States had become a “land of salesmen and shopping centers,” where the adventurous wanderer could only dream of a more “savage, heroic time.” Indeed, white Americans in particular found themselves ensconced in racially homogenous suburban enclaves, enjoying comfortable but largely predictable middle-class lifestyles. Fittingly, Walt Disney, the “symbol of prosperous

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8 Francaviglia, “Walt Disney’s Frontierland,” 162.
postwar America,” would provide a new context for their nomadic desires.¹¹

As Steven Watts observes, Walt Disney possessed a “visceral instinct for the rhythms and emotions” of mainstream American culture.¹² Watts references Disney’s ability to enthral the nation through his cartoons and motion pictures, but his comment equally applies to the Disneyland theme park. Indeed, the Magic Kingdom manufactured a timely sense of fulfillment for the nomadic longings of Americans by satisfying them within a new and entirely accessible context: imagination. Disneyland was indeed a ‘Kingdom,’ and one in which the desires of white, middle-class Americans were sovereign; they were provided with endless opportunities for nomadic exploration even as they remained physically nestled in the bastion of mainstream culture that was Orange County, and psychologically anchored by the comforting values of Main Street, U.S.A. Those Indigenous peoples pejoratively deemed nomadic, as well as the natural landscapes often associated with them, were maintained in both a physical and historical stasis, allowing the real nomads, namely white Americans, to leisurely and imaginatively explore their cultures—or at least their Disney counterpart. Thus it was not American society, as Scott Bukatman argues, which was “reduced, frozen and sanitized,” but rather the cultures of the Indigenous peoples so disingenuously represented through Frontierland and Adventureland.¹³ Conversely, it was the mainstream American imagination which was aggrandized and freed of its inhibitions through racialized nomadic discovery.

¹¹ Watts, The Magic Kingdom, 280.
¹² Ibid., 33.
And, through imagination, the moral implications of this psychological wandering were concealed; after all, one had only to catch a glimpse of the looming Sleeping Beauty Castle to be reassured that the Disneyland experience was nothing more than a harmless fantasy.

The mid-twentieth century, with its unique interface between the “stabilized or normalized surface” of American mainstream culture and the postwar tensions which seethed just underneath, offered Disneyland the opportunity to harness popular imagination with unprecedented success.\(^\text{14}\) Yet, it was not the first entity which endeavored to “translate common desires into built environments.”\(^\text{15}\) As Michael Steiner notes, the popular Columbian Exposition of 1893 also attempted such a feat, and, like Disneyland decades later, fed upon the racial fantasies of white Americans to accomplish its goal.\(^\text{16}\) The Midway Plaisance offered the voyeuristic onlooker a glimpse of ostensibly barbarous cultures, the exhibitions of which were set up in a rough evolutionary progression that culminated in the technologically utopian White City.\(^\text{17}\) Visitors were prompted to admire the latter attraction before entering the salaciously exotic Midway, in the hopes that this sequence would demonstrate how white civilization had surpassed the intellectual achievements of other races.\(^\text{18}\) As will be discussed, stark contrasts between normative and inferior cultures in Disneyland would replace such gradual progressions of racial evolution, and the park would not prompt

\(^{14}\) Monica Ganas, *Under the Influence: California’s Intoxicating Spiritual and Cultural Impact on America* (Grand Rapids: Brazos Press, 2010), 133.

\(^{15}\) Michael Steiner, “Parables of Stone and Steel,” 44.

\(^{16}\) Steiner, “Parables of Stone and Steel,” 42; 52.

\(^{17}\) Ibid., 52.

so much as compel its guests to imbibe its racial lessons. The clearly delineated lines of their own cultural understandings would constrain the nomads of the 1950s and 1960s in their imaginative exploration. Similarly, Disneyland would avoid evoking the sense of “lurking anxiety” about progress which was present at the Columbian Exposition.\(^{19}\) Cody’s Wild West Shows glorified the victory of white civilization in the western frontier, yet simultaneously eulogized the loss of such an integral part of American identity. It is also worth noting that the Turner thesis was presented in conjunction with the Exposition.\(^{20}\) As well, larger-than-life statues sentimentally depicted images of nature, and the ultimate adversary of white progress, the ‘Indian.’\(^{21}\) Conversely, over half a century later, *Time* magazine would unabashedly crow that Walt Disney had transformed the untouched orange groves of Anaheim into a “pleasantly bustling city”; the imaginative nomads of the twentieth century were unwilling to be reminded that their voyeuristic exploration of nature and Indigenous culture was possible only through the marginalization of both.\(^{22}\)

Disneyland’s ability to create a sense of reassurance facilitated the manner in which the park subtly but inexorably funneled visitors through its “master narrative” of mainstream

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19 Steiner, “Parables of Stone and Steel,” 53-54.
21 Steiner, “Parables of Stone and Steel,” 53.
American values.23 The Columbian Exposition and Disneyland’s other significant predecessor, Coney Island, both lacked this reassurance. The latter, much like the Exposition with its “honky-tonk” Midway combination of racial exhibitions and cheap attractions, offered its visitors both a genteel glimpse of exotic cultures in Luna Park and a chance to experience the bawdy thrills (including a ride called the ‘Barrel of Love’) of the nearby Steeplechase.24 Coney Island quickly earned a reputation for possessing a seedy underbelly of promiscuity and moral laxity, which Walt Disney noted disgustedly when he visited there with his daughters.25 As Jones and Wills observe, Disney consciously eschewed such a “spontaneous, carnival-like atmosphere” in his theme park, instead striving to facilitate imaginative exploration by ensuring that the cultural assumptions of his white, middle-class visitors remained not only unthreatened but positively coddled.26 A staff of male “All-American types” and women who appeared to be prime candidates for “suburban motherhood” replaced leering hucksters.27 Furthermore, Disneyland’s Sleeping Beauty Castle drew the visitor’s eye, whereas at the Exposition the White City loomed and from Coney Island the Statue of Liberty captured one’s gaze.28 The latter sights, although containing their own comforting traits, were reminders of technology and reality, respectively, whereas the Castle visually

23 Marling, “Imagineering the Disney Theme Parks,” in Designing Disney’s Theme Parks, 86.
24 Rydell, All the World’s a Fair, 64; Jones and Wills, The Invention of the Park, 96.
25 Jones and Wills, The Invention of the Park, 97; 103.
26 Ibid., 105.
28 Rydell, All the World’s a Fair, 58; Jones and Wills, The Invention of the Park, 96.
reassured the visitor that they were in a world of innocence and fantasy, where moral complexity did not exist.

There are many parallels between the Columbian Exposition, Coney Island, and Disneyland, but the latter managed to reflect popular desires in an unprecedented manner. As Karal Ann Marling comments, Disneyland is so integral to the “American landscape” that it is difficult to envision a time before its construction.\(^\text{29}\) Her use of the term “landscape” is noteworthy, and prompts one to consider the manner in which changing American perceptions of the natural world contributed to Disneyland’s success. As a 1958 newspaper article noted incredulously, Disneyland’s attendance rivaled that of the “Grand Canyon, Yosemite, and Yellowstone National Parks combined,” the three most popular natural attractions in the nation.\(^\text{30}\) The article attributes this statistic to Disneyland’s ability to stimulate the imagination of its visitors.\(^\text{31}\) Clearly, exploration on an imaginative level competed with genuine interaction between humans and nature and even supplanted it. Indeed, the mid-twentieth century witnessed a noticeable decline in entertainment environments, such as ski resorts and seaside hotels, which reflected the “natural features of the landscape” surrounding them.\(^\text{32}\)

A burgeoning car culture enabled Americans to penetrate farther into the natural world, though their interactions with this world became limited to the visual experience the car window

\(^{29}\) Marling, “Imagineering the Disney Theme Parks,” in Designing Disney’s Theme Parks, 29.


\(^{31}\) Ibid.

offered.\textsuperscript{33} Considering that car tourism in the 1950s and 1960s instigated a clear desire for nomadic roving from within the safety of what Monica Ganas derisively terms “gated communities on wheels,” but that such exploration was generally a solely visual experience, the immense popularity of Disneyland is understandable.\textsuperscript{34} The Magic Kingdom, after all, was itself essentially a gated community, where nomadic exploration involved complete sensory immersion, with the bonus of guaranteed interactions involving exotic racial minorities. Thus Disneyland’s imaginative realm became, on some level, more than a mere re-creation of famous natural destinations; it was instead the destination itself, a development which intimated, alarmingly, that mainstream imaginings of nature and the Indigenous peoples associated with it were becoming equated with reality.

There was a rather terrible irony, as Jones and Wills point out, in the fact that Americans venerated every “vinyl leaf and plastic tree” in Disneyland even as they ignored genuine natural wonders, and California’s beauty made this incongruity all the more flagrant.\textsuperscript{35} Though a contemporary newspaper remarked in wonder that over forty percent of Disneyland’s visitors came from outside the state, it is perhaps more significant that over half of these visitors were therefore Californian.\textsuperscript{36} The Magic Kingdom had managed to find a home where its counterfeiting of natural landscapes would go largely un-criticized. Indeed, California was emblematic of both the cultural assumptions and anxieties which Disneyland’s proffered imaginative wandering would, respectively, reinforce and assuage. California may have been a

\textsuperscript{33} Ibid., 37.
\textsuperscript{34} Ganas, \textit{Under the Influence}, 68.
\textsuperscript{35} Jones and Wills, \textit{The Invention aof the Park}, 106.
\textsuperscript{36} Hill, “Disneyland Reports,” \textit{New York Times}. 

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land of “highest mountains” and “tallest redwoods,” but it was also the heartland of booming, Cold War induced military-industrial growth, which resulted in Orange County in particular becoming the epicenter of a veritable “gold-rush” for the economic opportunities presented by this “new frontier.” As such, Orange County experienced a proliferation of planned, suburban communities almost wholly populated by white, middle-class families. Minorities were segregated into separate neighborhoods. The area also boasted a vibrant, grassroots conservative movement that sought to uphold those traditions of private property and individual fulfillment which had made a middle-class, suburban, and racially homogenous lifestyle the apex of the American Dream. Yet one could conjecture that the achievement of this apex subverted the roving, adventurous desires of many Californians, whose taste for the frontier was not completely sated before they found themselves ensconced in suburbia. Thus, if many of Disneyland’s visitors had already ‘conquered’ their personal frontier, it is little wonder that they found the Magic Kingdom’s continued imaginative nomadic exploration so attractive.

As an imaginative conduit for changing American perceptions of nature, culture and personal fulfillment, Disneyland was incredibly effective. The theme park’s social perceptiveness must be, at least partially, attributed to Walt Disney, who, as Francaviglia suggests, could be viewed as the greatest “representative and shaper of twentieth century American

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39 Ibid., 43-5.
40 Ibid., 51-3.
The contemporary observers’ often adulatory language describing Walt Disney supports this statement, and even foreshadows the nomadic desires which his theme park would eventually fulfill. A 1954 article in *Time* magazine, for example, began with a brief, fictional story in which a witch doctor “2000 miles from civilization” in the “equatorial forest” of the Belgian Congo conjures the figure of Mickey Mouse, demonstrating a mere evocation of the power that “infinitely greater magician,” Walt Disney, wielded. The article further remarked admiringly on the ability of Disney’s merchandise to reach “the counters of the world.” Evidently, even before Disneyland’s inception, its creator was recognized as a symbol of the nomadic exploration into exotic cultures that white Americans craved. After his death, Disney was eulogized as a man who “refused to see life in the raw, to accept the end of innocence,” a powerful statement which contains an alarming implication; sustained naivety, if not tempered by knowledge of ‘raw’ reality, is perhaps akin to perpetuated ignorance. As Francaviglia astutely observes, Walt Disney’s brand of innocence was one capable of “envisioning new empires.” One could further add, however, that it was not capable of dispelling the racialized assumptions which made the very notion of empire permissible. Indeed, Disney’s “small-boy fascination with explorers, big-game animals, outlaws [and] Indians” ensured that the nomadic desires of Disneyland’s visitors

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41 Francaviglia, “Walt Disney’s Frontierland,” 161.
43 Ibid.
45 Francaviglia, “Walt Disney’s Frontierland,” 164.
were sated under the auspices of innocence and amusement, which served to thinly veil racial ignorance.\textsuperscript{46}

Walt Disney’s impact on the theme park’s formation is visible through Main Street, U.S.A., a streetscape he modelled after an idealized version of his hometown Marceline, Missouri, and more broadly on his conceptions of turn-of-the-century, small-town American life.\textsuperscript{47} Older generations reminisced as they strolled down this picturesque boulevard, while younger visitors caught glimpses of a lifestyle which suburban developments and urban decay were rapidly absorbing; one visiting family commented that Main Street was where adults “remember[ed] when” life was so idyllic, while children asked “why aren’t things like this today?”\textsuperscript{48} Such pleasurable ruminations were undoubtedly the intended result of this streetscape, which was Disneyland’s sole entrance and exit. Conversely, over half a century earlier, visitors to the Chicago Exposition had often erroneously assumed that Cody’s exceedingly popular Wild West Show marked the entrance to the fair.\textsuperscript{49} As has been discussed, the Exposition merely suggested that visitors experience the White City before venturing into the racially variegated Midway.\textsuperscript{50} Disneyland did not condone such misunderstandings, nor allow its guests any possibility of misconstruing the racial juxtapositions it offered; the physical inescapability of Main Street ensured that the nomadic wandering of white Americans was imaginatively initiated from a bastion of normative values.

\textsuperscript{47} Watts, \textit{The Magic Kingdom}, 22.
\textsuperscript{48} Barstow Family, \textit{Disneyland Dream}, 1956, 22:00-22:15. \url{http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jZKHnAT_0c0}.
\textsuperscript{50} Rydell, \textit{All the World’s a Fair}, 62.
Indeed, with this in mind, one could posit that Main Street did not act as a “key” that “unlocked” the rest of Disneyland. Instead, it was a sort of psychological tether, preventing the imaginative nomad from wandering too far into the racialized netherworlds of Adventureland and Frontierland. As Walt Disney once commented, he wanted to create “a place where you can’t [could not] get lost.” For the imaginative adventurers who experienced the forced march down the Main Street synopsis of American values, becoming psychologically lost was undoubtedly difficult.

Even as Main Street acted as an imaginative anchor for the roving nomad, it contributed to the stark contrasts between normative and inferior cultures which made its comforting presence necessary. As Marling observes, Main Street terminated in a “Hub,” or circular area in front of the Sleeping Beauty Castle, from which the eager explorer could suddenly glimpse the entries to the other areas of the park, including the “Frontierland stockade,” and the “bamboo portals of Adventureland.” There was an evident visual and physical differentiation between the “familiar milieu” of mainstream hegemony in Main Street and the rest of the theme park. Disneyland would countenance none of the gradual racial progressions of the Chicago Exposition, instead plunging the imaginative nomad abruptly into the fantastic and—in the case of Adventureland and Frontierland—racialized realms of the Magic Kingdom. As Jiminy Cricket commented in *A Day at Disneyland*, the termination of Main Street was “the end of the

51 Francaviglia, “Walt Disney’s Frontierland,” 162.
53 Marling, “Imagineering the Disney Theme Parks,” in *Designing Disney’s Theme Parks*, 73; 74.
line,” a slightly foreboding remark which intimated that nomadic adventuring only truly began once the visitor had left the comforting embrace of Main Street.\textsuperscript{55} Thus Main Street did not serve as a “spatial mediator,” capable of arbitrating the differences between civilized American society and the “other cultures and landscapes of the park.”\textsuperscript{56} It was, instead, a spatial differentiator, serving to remind visitors of the inherent inequalities between these entities. Perhaps the only structure capable of ‘mediation’ in this context was the Sleeping Beauty Castle, which alone served to remind the psychological nomad that the overarching context of imagination made their roving exploration, from culture to culture and landscape to landscape, morally acceptable.

This sense of intrepid adventurousness, invoked by juxtapositions like the one between the normative Main Street and the exotic worlds of Adventureland and Tomorrowland, was purposefully manufactured.\textsuperscript{57} As one of Walt Disney’s former designers commented, the park was intended to allow visitors to triumph over adverse situations, thus assuring them of their ability to “handle the real challenges in life.”\textsuperscript{58} Despite the irony of such a contrived sense of reassurance, it was certainly a fitting fulfilment of the nomadic desires of a restless suburban population. Disneyland’s transportation, or lack thereof, fostered such feelings of capability and daring: once one reached the terminus of Main Street, the only means of proceeding were by

\textsuperscript{55} Walt Disney and Jiminy Cricket, \textit{Horse Car Ride Down Main Street U.S.A}, from \textit{A Day at Disneyland with Walt Disney and Jiminy Cricket}, 1957. TPAA636. Theme Park Audio Archives, 4:30-4:36. \url{http://www.themeparkaudioarchives.com/members/archives_disneyland_records_day_at_disneyland.html}

\textsuperscript{56} Wilson, \textit{The Culture of Nature}, 160.

\textsuperscript{57} Steiner, “Frontierland as Tomorrowland,” 11-12.

\textsuperscript{58} Ibid., 12.
foot or by train.\textsuperscript{59} The former implied a sense of engagement with the act of exploration, allowing the nomadic wanderer to correlate their imaginative roving with physical travel. The latter, which “girdled the theme park” much as trains had once encircled colonized areas, provided a less labour intensive but still symbolic means of exploration.\textsuperscript{60} Indeed, the train was perhaps the most apt emblem of the nomadic desires which Disneyland fulfilled; it was representative of white progress and civilization, yet it never actually travelled beyond the clearly delineated boundaries of an imaginary world. Likewise, the psychological nomad, who traversed new frontiers and voyeuristically experienced other cultures without ever deviating from the mainstream ethos of postwar American society, was limited to a purely imaginary experience.

As the train which endlessly encircled Disneyland further implied, there was simply no reason for an effective means of transportation when the desired destination had already been reached. For visitors like the Barstow family, who won a free trip to the Magic Kingdom in 1956 and recorded their adventures in the homemade documentary \textit{Disneyland Dream}, the theme park was undoubtedly such a destination, capable of reducing genuine natural wonders to mere subsidiary side notes.\textsuperscript{61} White and likely middle-class, the Barstow family jubilantly received the news of their free vacation while standing on the well-groomed lawn of their suburban-looking home, and their similarly white and respectable-looking neighbours wished them well on their adventure.\textsuperscript{62} Released from their racially homogenous suburban enclave, they began—somewhat ironically—their physical travel

\textsuperscript{59} Marling, “Disneyland, 1955,” 185.

\textsuperscript{60} Francaviglia, “Walt Disney’s Frontierland,” 179.

\textsuperscript{61} Barstow Family, \textit{Disneyland Dream}, 1956.

\textsuperscript{62} Ibid., 2:20-7:05.
towards their imaginative journey, flying from Connecticut to California.\(^\text{63}\) Though this initial portion of their trip was arguably more demonstrative of real nomadic exploration than Disneyland ever could be, they deemed it simply an enjoyable means to an end, glimpsing the “Mississippi River” and the “Great Plains,” but expressing no regret that they were unable to tangibly experience these natural wonders.\(^\text{64}\) Upon reaching their destination, they embarked on a quick expedition through California, viewing the orange groves that once blanketed Anaheim, and experiencing for the first time the waters of the Pacific Ocean.\(^\text{65}\) Yet even this nomadic wandering, offering a more palpable sense of exploration than their aerial glimpse of the American landscape, was still considered ancillary to the imaginative opportunities that awaited them. The cold waters of the Pacific merely “invigorated” the Barstows before they reached that “climax of [their] family dream journey,” Disneyland.\(^\text{66}\) As this demonstrates, imaginative exploration had managed to psychologically supplant genuine nomadic interactions with the natural world.

This appropriation of natural surroundings becomes all the more alarming when one considers its racialized implications. After all, Disneyland’s proffered imaginative exploration would not have thrilled its nomadic visitors had it not exposed them to ‘exotic’ natural landscapes, and, inevitably, the barbarous peoples which the popular mind imagined inhabited them. Indeed, the diction of contemporary observers, especially when commenting upon Adventureland, demonstrated that mainstream distinctions between Indigenous peoples and nature were disturbingly

\(^{63}\) Ibid., 7:10-7:30.
\(^{64}\) Ibid., 9:20-10:10.
\(^{65}\) Ibid., 13:40-52; 18:30-19:00.
\(^{66}\) Ibid., 18:50-18:56; 19:00-19:10.
muddled. One contemporary article mentioned offhandedly that both the “animals and savages” were mechanized in the Jungle Cruise attraction at Adventureland, while another noted that “trap-jawed crocodiles and painted warriors glare[d] menacingly” at the passing visitor.\(^{67}\) As these casual but telling comments suggest, exotic natural scenes and glimpses of racial minorities were equally likely to imaginatively tantalize the psychological nomad at Adventureland, despite the misrepresentation this fabrication entailed. Fittingly, in *A Day at Disneyland*, Adventureland was the area immediately experienced after the visitor had reached “the end of the line” at the terminus of Main Street, again emphasizing the contrast between normalcy and the “visceral, sensual experience[s]” this racialized realm offered.\(^{68}\) A more foreboding soundtrack replaced the jaunty and cheerful music which had accompanied Jiminy Cricket’s tour of Main Street once Adventureland’s threshold was crossed.\(^{69}\) Notably, however, this music took on a less menacing air when Walt Disney’s voice began its narration.\(^ {70}\) This provides a rather apt metaphor for the larger experience Adventureland offered, in which nomadic wanderers roved through distant, alien cultures, even as that incessant ‘voice’ of their own racialized assumptions helped them to remain comfortably bounded.

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\(^{69}\) Walt Disney and Jiminy Cricket, *A Boat Ride Through Adventureland*, Theme Park Audio Archives. 0:00-1:00.

\(^{70}\) Ibid.
Adventureland’s amalgamation of exotic peoples and landscapes proved a winning combination, and one which was particularly embodied in the Jungle Cruise ride, the “most popular of Disneyland’s 42 paid attractions” by the late 1950s.\textsuperscript{71} It offered visitors a quick and entertaining synopsis of a safari experience, without any of the “mosquitoes, monsoons and other misadventures” which plagued genuine explorers.\textsuperscript{72} Once the imaginative nomad had embarked upon their Jungle Cruise, their “skipper and guide” warned them to “take a last good look at the dock,” for, as they were jokingly reminded, they may never return.\textsuperscript{73} In this context, one could conjecture that the guide acted as a sort of psychological counterweight to the racialized netherworld which was visible outside the boat. Much as Walt Disney’s voice subsumed the foreboding music of Adventureland, and the Sleeping Beauty Castle mediated the contrasts between the normative Main Street and the more exotic areas of the park, the flippant comments of the guide reminded the nomadic wanderer that they remained in an imaginative, ostensibly guilt-free world in which their mainstream assumptions would go unchallenged. Fittingly, their guide thus ‘protected’ them from the dangers of Adventureland; as the cruise entered the ominous “cannibal country,” the skipper noted the menacing visage of an ‘Indian’ standing on the shore, who, seconds later, shot a crocodile which had suddenly appeared on the same bank.\textsuperscript{74}

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
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Wilson, \textit{The Culture of Nature}, 161.
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Thurl Ravenscroft, \textit{Jungle Cruise LP} from Side Two of \textit{Walt Disney’s Enchanted Tiki Room LP #ST-3966}, 1968. TPAA7. Theme Park Audio Archives. 0:10-0:25. \url{http://www.themeparkaudioarchives.com/members/archives_disneyland_adven
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Though the crocodile was targeted, the delineation between the two mechanical menaces is perilously thin, and one gathers that the ‘savage’ could have been as easily—and triumphantly—vanquished as the animal. Thus Mike Wallace’s comment that Disneyland convinced American visitors that the present had emerged “gently, naturally, and inevitably out of the past” is perhaps erroneous.\(^75\) Indeed, violent, abrupt, and inhumane aspects of nomadic exploration were blatantly and imaginatively perpetuated in the Magic Kingdom for the sake of entertainment.

In Frontierland, where the “faith, courage and ingenuity of the pioneers” who had traversed the “unsettled land” of the American frontier was unabashedly celebrated, guests witnessed an intensification of this insensitive parody of brutal white nomadic exploration.\(^76\) Such adulation implied that this particular imaginative realm perpetuated rather innocent—or perhaps ignorant is the more appropriate appellation—notions of westward expansion. As Ganas points out, California was the stage of ruthless exterminations of Indigenous tribes for the sake of an ever-progressing frontier.\(^77\) Thus Frontierland, symbolically located, as Francaviglia notes, in the western-most portion of the park, was emblematic of a profound irony.\(^78\) Those Indigenous peoples who had once been the ostensibly inadequate caretakers of an ‘unsettled land’ were now maintained in a physical stasis, allowing white Americans to imaginatively continue the nomadic exploration through which their roving ancestors had ‘settled’ this


\(^{78}\) Francaviglia, “Walt Disney’s Frontierland,” 162.
land. This seeming paradox was inserted into attractions like the steam boat ride through the rivers of Frontierland, in which visitors caught a quick glimpse of a burning settler’s cabin, explained in *A Day at Disneyland* by Jiminy Cricket’s mournful comment that “Indians must have done it.” Francaviglia astutely argues that onlookers must have “intuitively” realized that such destruction was emblematic of the inevitability of westward expansion; for every burning cabin there was another just waiting to be built. However, one could further add that the cabin signified the larger incongruities of Frontierland—it was, after all, an eternally static entity intended to symbolize a nomadic past—as well as the violence and brutality which Disneyland rarely bothered to expunge from its re-creations of explorative American history.

Even as ostensibly itinerant Indigenous peoples were maintained in a physical stasis in Frontierland—variously employed as “dancers, artisans, and canoe-paddlers”—their cultures were historically frozen to suit white visitors’ imaginative expectations. Indeed, one could conjecture that such stasis belied the still prevalent assimilationist beliefs of mainstream Americans, which the 1934 Native American Reorganization Act and its affirmation of tribal identity had only partially vanquished. As late as 1968, *Time* magazine asserted that it was the traditions and legal customs of “reservation Indian[s]” which hindered their ability to become “completely

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80 Francaviglia, “Walt Disney’s Frontierland,” 176.

81 Steiner, “Frontierland as Tomorrowland,” 13.

82 Francaviglia, “Walt Disney’s Frontierland,” 176-7.
assimilated by 20th century white society.” Conversely, the narrator of *Disneyland, U.S.A.*, a 1956 Disney Productions ‘documentary’ of the theme park, assured viewers that the “permanent and popular” Indian Village in Frontierland was where Native Americans could go to “perpetuate their ceremonial customs and centuries-old cultures.” The images the documentary presents quickly contradict the apparent magnanimity of this statement: predominantly white onlookers, both seated nearby and sailing past on the Mark Twain Steamboat, surround Indigenous peoples dressed in traditional clothing performing tribal dances. As this suggests, the cultural practices of Native Americans in Disneyland were only preserved for the sake of their entertainment value, much as the historical adversity they symbolized was perpetuated for the thrill it provided visitors. Thus the Magic Kingdom ultimately did not encourage the “assimilation and conformity” of racial minorities to mainstream, postwar norms or at least that it did not do so within the park. Indeed, the imaginative expectations of its white visitors made assimilationist policies untenable. After all, the psychological nomad would have found little satisfaction in Disneyland had they not been allowed to rove between cultures which both fit their pre-conceived notions and tantalized their sensibilities by the very unfamiliarity which assimilation would have nullified.

One may observe, of course, that the evocation of nomadic travel which Disneyland provided, with all of its resultant racial and cultural implications, was fundamentally

85 Ibid., 19:30-20:45.
86 Francaviglia, “Walt Disney’s Frontierland,” 177.
fake—little more than a mechanized, synthetic and rather feeble imitation of genuine adventure. Only on an imaginative level was one able to surmount natural obstacles, brave new wildernesses, or, on a more problematic but still applicable level, wander amongst and perhaps conquer ostensibly inferior cultures. As an executive of Sea World, a nearby and competing theme park, asked in frustration, “Have you ever tried to touch anything in Disneyland? Have you ever tried to sit on their grass?” Though his outburst was applied to Disneyland in the 1990s, it nonetheless encompasses the contradictions which the Magic Kingdom embodied in the 1950s and 1960s. It was, after all, merely a theme park which offered imaginary thrills in the guise of real experiences. Yet perhaps tangibility was immaterial; as Marling observes, there was still something “blessedly real” about Disneyland. Walt Disney had constructed a world in which imagination acted as the sole and sufficient conduit for the roving, nomadic, and often racialized desires of an increasingly middle-class and suburbanized population. They responded eagerly to his ability to both affirm and playfully threaten their notions of racial supremacy. For such psychological nomads’ roving pleasure, Indigenous peoples and their cultures, as well as the natural landscapes often connected with them, were held in a stasis which remained within the imaginative bounds of mainstream American norms, much as an endlessly circling train bordered the park. Thus, if Disneyland was a “global village,” as Richard Schickel rather hesitantly labels it, then it was a profoundly unequal one. The differences between the ‘permanent’ inhabitants and those

88 Marling, “Imagineering the Disney Theme Parks,” in Designing Disney’s Theme Parks, 31.
89 Schickel, The Disney Version, 325.
who were able to nomadically wander amongst them were clearly, if imaginatively, delineated. Indeed, the iniquities of this ‘village’ could only be disguised by placing them within the realm of the imaginary, by creating a “land of illusion.” If such illusions were shattered, if the benevolent presence of the Sleeping Beauty Castle failed to remind the nomad that their wandering was morally exonerated by the context of imagination, then perhaps Disneyland would have been exposed as little more than a mechanized side-show, unable to disguise its racialized tawdriness.

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Nineteenth Century Indigenous Prophets in the Northwest and the Elusive Space of Contact

ZACH McCANN-ARMITAGE

This paper is about the so-called "prophet dance movement" that emerged out of Indigenous communities in the Columbia River Plateau in the Nineteenth century. The paper argues that though the movement was distinctly rooted within oral Indigenous traditions, its gradual appropriation of Christian images into its practices situates it as a unique cultural encounter between Europeans and Indigenous peoples. Proposed is that the movement, as an unsystematic, unmediated manifestation of cultural exchange, defies easy classification and instead exists in a space of necessary ambiguity between cultures. Also examined is the way that the demographic and cultural effects of upheavals, specifically epidemic diseases, may be linked to the adopted popularity of the movement. Ultimately, the author suggests that the distinctive situation of the prophet dance movement could represent an alternative to the way that conventional historical narratives are constructed conceptualized, specifically in the context of British Columbian history.

The Prophet Dance Movement, a spontaneous spiritual movement that swept across Indigenous communities in British Columbia during the first half of the nineteenth century, has held fascination for numerous ethnographers and scholars since the turn of the twentieth century. Among the many varied records of the movement, some key elements remain consistent. While in a dead or dreaming state, someone visits the Land of the Dead; there, they receive a message and instructions from the Chief of the Dead; they then return to life and spread the Chief’s instructions to others and organize large performances of elaborate dance ceremonies. Although rooted in distinctly Indigenous practices and ideas, these ceremonies gradually appropriated Christian imagery around the mid-nineteenth
century. Many interpreters of the Prophet Dance Movement, both early and contemporary, have fumbled to decipher and categorize the phenomenon into a coherent historical and cultural narrative. Yet the movement’s very elusiveness and lack of coherent narrative embodies the ambiguities involved in the contact between Indigenous and European cultures that was taking place at this time period in British Columbia. It is therefore necessarily impossible to ascertain an absolute meaning from the movement because it exists as an articulation of the elusive, anarchic space of contact. Its rootedness within Indigenous traditions situates it firmly as a distinctly autonomous Indigenous strategy of conceptualizing the upheaval of their cultures, whilst its later appropriation of Christian elements reflects its existence as an undirected and spontaneous manifestation of cultural exchange.

The early twentieth century ethnographers who made records of these ceremonies tended to censure or demean their Indigenous sources to reinforce their own suppositions of Indigenous peoples’ traditions and practices. For instance, in a criticism of one story told to him, Walter Cline in “The Sinkaetk or Southern Okanagon of Washington” writes that his source Suszen “is responsible for the infusion of Christian theology, but the tale as a whole is undoubtedly in traditional form.”\(^1\) Cline here is reflecting a historical paradigm of seeking out a specific ethnographic delineation of so-called “traditional,” or pre-contact, Indigenous cultures. More broadly, this passage reveals the underlying struggle of reading through both the way information is contextualized and relayed by Cline in the text, and also the way information has been contextualized and relayed to him by

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his own sources. Indigenous oral sources then are not only mediated through the text they have been assigned into, but also have their own distance from what they are recollecting. The late eighteenth century and early nineteenth century saw dramatic changes to Indigenous worlds through two instances of epidemic outbreaks before extensive contact with Europeans had even occurred. Anthropologist Robert Boyd pinpoints that the first occurred sometime in the 1770s and estimates that at least thirty percent of the Northwest population died. The second outbreak occurred from 1800 to 1801. These demographic upheavals no doubt had effects on the way former events and ways of life were subsequently interpreted by Indigenous peoples themselves. Therefore, from the sources available there will always remain ambiguities in assertions about the absolute nature of the dance movement.

However, some elements of the Prophet Dance Movement ceremonies can be traced back to definite roots within Indigenous traditions, having emerged from within a pre-existing framework of cultural understandings rather than as an absolute product of encounters with Europeans. Elizabeth Vibert compels this argument in one of the chapters of her book *Traders’ Tales*, which focuses on the correlation between the demographic and cultural upheavals and the emergence of the Prophet Dance Movement. Vibert draws parallels between the prophet’s journey to the Land of the Dead and subsequent return with moral instructions and the vision quest tradition of seeking out guidance from a guardian spirit. She writes, “[t]he child who achieved a spirit vision returned from the quest with a song, a dance, a name, and a medicine bundle of sacred tokens bestowed by the spirit

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partner,” whilst prophets similarly “returned with songs, dances, and supernaturally inspired instructions” from the Land of the Dead.³

Another element to the prophecy narratives that can be traced to a distinctly Indigenous background is the ambiguous figure most commonly referred to as the Chief of the Dead. The Chief watches over the Land of the Dead, delivers messages of instruction to the prophets, and would one day lead the dead souls in the Land of the Dead back to earth with Coyote. Though the role he inhabits is consistent, his definite identity varies and seems to have eventually evolved into the Christian figure of God with the further addition of Christian elements into the prophecies by the mid-nineteenth century. James Teit, an ethnographer working among the Interior Salish First Nations during the early twentieth century, notes in the Lillooet Indians: “[e]ven at the present day, some of the old people of the Upper Lillooet have very vague and confused ideas of God. They confound the attributes and actions of God, the Chief of the Dead, and the Old Man [also called Old One] or Transformer of mythology.”⁴ His identity and role as Old One, the Transformer who created the world, seems to exist independent from his explicit role in the prophecies, as he is frequently mentioned in stories from Teit’s collection Mythology of the Thompson Indians. In one creation story, for instance, Old One addresses his two daughters, who will give birth to and populate the world with both evil and good people:

‘You will be sisters, and from you all people will spring. Your children will be male and female, and your descendants will cover the earth. The offspring of Evil will be most numerous at first, but at last the children of Good will outnumber them. Good will prevail, and Evil finally disappear. Then I will collect all people, both dead and alive. Earth and her sisters will assume their original forms, and all together will become changed and new.’ In this manner will come the end of the world, and this is why both bad and good people are found in the world at the present day.\(^5\)

Though the story appears quite different from any role Old One plays in the prophecies, he is definitely associated here with both the creation and the destruction of the world. His place as a Transformer independent of the Prophet Dance Movement whilst also inhabiting an explicit and principle role in the prophecies further works to situate the movement in a pre-existing Indigenous framework. Along with Vibert’s connection of the prophecy narratives with vision quest narratives, this establishes that the Prophet Dance Movement is fundamentally an expression of Indigenous cultural ideas. It thus exists as a phenomenon within autonomous Indigenous societies – prompted perhaps by contact with outside forces, but not as a direct product of European interactions with Indigenous peoples.

As previously noted, central to the Prophet Dance Movement was an apparent sense of urgency and imminence for what Leslie Spier, the first early twentieth century ethnographer to compile accounts of the Prophet Dance Movement into a coherent “complex,” calls “an old belief in the impending

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destruction and renewal of the world.”⁶ Spier fixates on this element of predicted apocalypse or upheaval as pre-existing in Indigenous cultures before encounters with Europeans, but is unable to situate the movement as an evolving, non-static entity in a context of a shared Indigenous and European history. Specifically, Spier, like his contemporary ethnographers, seeks to wholly distinguish the later addition of Christian elements into the movement from an earlier, supposedly more traditional incarnation of the ceremonies; about one later prophet narrative involving Christian imagery, he writes that “we must prefer to interpret this as a revival of interest in the cult with the introduction of new elements.”⁷ Consequently, interpretation of these elements of destruction and renewal are limited to one aspect or the other. For instance, James Teit in his descriptions of the ceremonies does not mention destruction, but instead writes that the dances were performed, under the instruction by the Chief of the Dead, in order “to hasten the return to earth of the souls of the departed, and the beginning of a golden age, when every one would lead a life of ease and happiness, and when the dead would be re-united with the living.”⁸ In contrast, Walter Cline records one prophet narrative from the Okanagan that emphasizes apocalyptic destruction, but that is also situated in a self-conscious relationship with Europeans:

The Creator-God Qölüncötn told the dreamer that after a certain period the world would ‘break up,’ and that the

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Indians would go to a new and better land in which the dead would join them. [Cline’s source] called the God who appeared to the dreamer a ‘white chief.’ This chief declared that white men like himself would come into the region, take the best lands, from the Indians, exterminate the game, bring fatal diseases, and introduce railways, automobiles, and airplanes. The land would dry up and the Indians finally pass away.9

In the specific context of the nineteenth century popularity of the movement, the element of destruction and renewal to the dances can be understood as a kind of strategy in Indigenous peoples’ struggle to conceptualize the dramatic changes that were occurring to their worlds, most traumatically through the spread of epidemic diseases. As mentioned earlier through the work of Robert Boyd, two smallpox epidemics had occurred in the 1770’s and in 1800, before Europeans had even arrived in British Columbia. The after-effects of these epidemics are acknowledged frequently throughout early explorer, fur trade and ethnographic records as truly devastating to the Indigenous population of the Northwest.10 Vibert’s reading of the effects within Columbian Plateau Indigenous cultural worlds is useful, in that she emphasizes that epidemics were not directly linked to the arrival of Europeans but instead were conceptualized within an inner spiritual upheaval of Indigenous societies. She writes: “To link the prophetic movements of a particular era to contemporary epidemic is not necessarily to cast them as reactions to the colonial incursion.”11 It is the continuous situation of upheaval, Vibert argues, that allowed the Prophet Dance Movement and its

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11 Elizabeth Vibert, “‘The Natives Were Strong to Live,’” 59.
urgent belief in both the end and renewal of the world to develop so strongly within Indigenous communities. The Prophet Dance Movement then can be seen as merely one strategy of conceptualizing the physical upheavals within pre-existing belief systems.

Works of even some contemporary scholars remain indicative of early twentieth century ethnographers’ struggles in prescribing a definite narrative onto the movement. Larry Cebula in his book *Plateau Indians and the Quest for Spiritual Power* refers to the hybridized Christian and Indigenous manifestation of the Columbia Plateau Prophet Dance Movement as the “Colombian Religion.” Yet Cebula’s use of the word “religion” seems to blatantly disregard some fundamental elements of the Prophet Dance Movement: it was not an organized, static or homogenous movement. Rather, it precisely defies the neat classification that Cebula, like Walter Cline and Leslie Spier before him, attempts. The fact that it did change from its oral Indigenous framework in the early 1830s to appropriate Christian elements into its beliefs and ceremonies is proof of its syncretic elusiveness.

However, Cebula does make the useful insight that fur traders themselves indirectly introduced Christian ideas to the Indigenous peoples through their everyday interactions with them during the fur trade. Leslie Spier associates this spread of Christian elements into the Prophet Dance Movement with a Catholic group of twenty-four Iroquois who settled in Montana sometime in the 1820’s among the Flathead. He then traces the “amalgamation” of Christianity into the Prophet Dance Movement northward into British Columbia in the early 1830’s.  

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This is perhaps reinforced by James Teit’s ethnographic work. Describing the gradual adoption of various Christian elements by the Lillooet into prophet dances and ceremonies, Teit writes:

Eventually, about the year 1850, they began to use the term ‘Father, Son, and Good Spirit’ when they prayed at the dances. These terms were introduced, it is said, at the instigation of officials of the Hudson Bay Company.

In contrast to later missionaries’ interactions with Indigenous peoples, religion was not central to the fur traders’ primarily economic and material interactions with Indigenous peoples, making the exchange of religious ideas much more spontaneous and fluid, rather than self-conscious and deliberate. The fur traders’ religious beliefs were not homogenous either; there were French Canadian Catholic traders, Iroquois Catholic traders, British Anglican traders, to name a few. The variety of different forms of Christianity may even have manifested themselves differently in the way that fur traders practiced them, some traders being stricter in their practice than others. Ultimately, a plurality of religious influences was presented and enforced upon Indigenous people, which may have allowed a degree of fluidity to the Indigenous appropriation of Christian ideas into their own established belief-systems.

The appropriation of Christian elements into the Prophet Dance Movement should be interpreted less as a direct consequence of the imposition of European cultural ideas upon Indigenous groups, and more as a product of the syncretic nature of Indigenous cultures themselves. In her book The Heavens are Changing: Nineteenth-Century Protestant Missions and

Tsimshian Christianity, Susan Neylan notes about the Witsuwit’en prophet Bini:

It is significant that Native informants always described Bini in such a way as to connect him closely to Christianity or some kind of syncretic melding of Native and Christian beliefs; prophets, so their reasoning went, display the indigenous openness to kinds of spiritual transformation. Such a viewpoint supports the findings of this study that Native groups have never viewed themselves as passive recipients of Christianity. It also confirms the evidence amassed here that Native peoples rarely accepted Christianity as an ‘all or nothing’ proposition, at the individual level or for group and communal transformations.\(^{15}\)

Within Indigenous narratives of first encounters between Europeans and Indigenous peoples too, Europeans often are identified and conceptualized within Indigenous cultural frameworks. For instance, James Teit records a Nlak:apamux’o’ë woman’s story of the Indigenous encounter with Simon Fraser’s 1808 expedition down the Fraser River:

> very many people thought they were beings spoken of in tales of the mythological period, who had taken a notion to travel again over the earth; and they often wondered what object they had in view, and what results would follow. They believed their appearance foreboded some great change or events of prime importance to the Indians, but in what way they did not know.\(^{16}\)


Similarly, Teit reports that “[w]hen the [Shushwap] Indians saw the first priests, they believed them to be Coyote and his assistants, presaging this important event” of the renewal of the world.\textsuperscript{17} Like the epidemics were interpreted as manifestations of imminent upheavals, these stories show Indigenous people appropriated contact with Europeans within pre-existing Indigenous beliefs.

Both twentieth century ethnographers and later contemporary scholars have puzzled over the Prophet Dance Movement, attempting to assert coherent narratives onto the spiritual movement. Ultimately, however, its essence remains necessarily elusive. John Lutz conceives analyzing contact encounters as “looking at how people behaved ‘rationally’ within the context of their own cultural definitions.”\textsuperscript{18} This idea of a cultural encounter is useful, though it could be conceived that in the nineteenth century the very “cultural definitions” of British Columbian Indigenous peoples were shifting. The Prophet Dance Movement’s amorphous character then can be seen within the frame of a contact encounter whilst still being firmly rooted as an autonomous expression of Indigenous cultural conceptualization of change. The Prophet Dance Movement ultimately represents an intriguing prospect for the history of British Columbia as an experience of changing Indigenous worlds within an unmediated, undirected space of contact in the midst of epidemic diseases and the fur trade, which subsequently refuses to be prescribed into a clear narrative.

\textsuperscript{17} James Teit, \textit{The Shushwap}, 612.

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Art and Identity: Ataturk and the End of the Ottoman Empire

ELSIE MOUNTFORD

Following the end of the First World War, Kemal Ataturk sought to create a new sense of national identity through the promotion of the arts. The reforms issued by Ataturk during his presidency sought to create a united Turkish state distinct from the remains of the Ottoman Empire. While his changes included the usual political, economic, and educational reforms, he also instituted a series of cultural and artistic reforms that drastically changed how the Turkish people would identify themselves.

When Kemal Ataturk became the president of Turkey in 1923, he instituted reforms designed to create a Turkish state distinct and separate from what was left of the Ottoman Empire. His efforts to create a national identity from the pieces left after the First World War arose from the need to continue the past modernizing efforts of the nineteenth century. Along with economic, political, religious, and educational reforms, Ataturk implemented a series of cultural and artistic changes designed to blur the lines between the diverse communities of Turkey and unite them under one Turkish banner. Leaving the Ottoman

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1 Ataturk was born Mustafa in Selânik (today Thessaloniki, Greece). Due to Islamic naming traditions, he did not have a last name. When he entered school he chose the last name Kemal and is recorded as Mustafa Kemal. Later, in 1934, a law was passed requiring all citizens to have surnames. The Republic chose Ataturk for Mustafa Kemal with his blessing. Ataturk means “father of the Turks” and was chosen as for “him and used for him alone.” As Ataturk fashioned himself as the father of the Turks, I have used his chosen name throughout this essay. Information regarding his naming comes from: Andrew Mango, “Ataturk,” in The Cambridge History of Turkey, ed. Resat Kasaba (n.p.: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 4: 148, 165, accessed December 13, 2013, doi:10.1017/CHOL9780520963.007.
Empire and its varied traditions behind was a critical step in creating a Turkish national identity from the ashes of the Ottoman legacy.

When Ibn Khaldun wrote *The Muqaddimah* in the fourteenth century, the Ottoman Empire had yet to conquer Constantinople. The Ottoman’s story, however, would hardly have surprised this astute observer of history. The Ottoman Turks originating from the Anatolian plains stormed the Islamic and Byzantine worlds in the fourteenth century, bringing with them a long lasting dynasty comprised of such notable rulers as Suleiman the Magnificent and Mehmed the V. The arts flourished under the Ottomans: painting, Iznik pottery, and architectural monuments such as the Blue Mosque, Topkapi Palace, and Suleymaniye Complex appeared in the landscape of Turkey. However, the Ottoman Empire was subject to the same principles as other dynasties, a recurring theme that Ibn Khaldun astutely notes: "... eventually, a great change takes place in the world…. [and] royal authority is transferred from one group to another."

The long lasting Ottoman dynasty experienced the same rise, plateau, and fall as many of the other dynasties Ibn Khaldun wrote about in *The Muqaddimah*. The last Ottoman Sultan and second to last Islamic Caliph, Mehmed VI, left Turkey in 1922.

The last traces of the Ottoman Empire disappeared in the 1920s as the Turkish Republic began to assert itself. By 1924, the Caliphate, the highest office of Islam, was abolished. The new leader of the Republic, and the instigator of these political and religious changes, Ataturk, implemented a program of

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modernization designed to create a “greater degree of social cohesiveness than the [previous] Ottoman reformers had done.”

Before the Great War, beginning in the early nineteenth century, Sultan Mahmut II implemented a series of cultural and political reforms designed to maintain and stop the Ottoman Empire’s decline without reducing the power of the caliphate and sultanate. The reforms, known as the Tanzimat, were an attempt to modernize the empire’s institutions. The Tanzimat era began with decisive steps towards European-styled institutional models. This shift entailed a gradual move away from Islamic law and embraced equality for all nations under Ottoman rule. These early reforms instigated the first phase of a modern Turkey, and influenced Ataturk’s strict cultural policies of the post-war era.

If Mahmut II’s Tanzimat reforms sought to revive the Ottoman Empire, Ataturk aggressively transformed it. Ataturk’s cultural, political, and religious reforms altered Ottoman Turkey into a rapidly modernizing state. Influenced by Ziya Gökalp’s ideas on Turkish Nationalism, Ataturk worked to separate religion from national identity. According to Gökalp, a person’s religion and nationality were different entities that together constitute nationalism, but religion was “supranational,” meaning it connected the nation to a wider international community, but did not create a strong national identity within the state. Ataturk believed that the state would only survive if it adopted Western

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6 Holod and Evin, introduction to Modern Turkish Architecture, 4.
7 Ibid.
8 Bozdogan, Modernism and Nation Building, 35.
9 Bozdogan, Modernism and Nation Building, 35.
institutions and created a new national identity based on Turks, not Islam.\(^\text{10}\) This required a definitive split from Ottoman culture, and a movement towards establishing a new Turkish Republic with a strong national identity based on internal secular arts and folk culture.\(^\text{11}\) Producing a feeling of national unity, based on similarities and not religious fervour, was paramount in Atatürk’s creation of a strong state; Atatürk was essentially creating Ibn Khaldun’s “asabiyah” on a grander scale.\(^\text{12}\) However, for an empire as old and large as that of the Ottomans, there were several barriers to overcome.

By the end of the First World War, it seemed inevitable that the Sikes Picot agreement would divide the Ottoman Empire amongst the Western allies.\(^\text{13}\) Atatürk, seeing his country threatened, refused to recognize the Sultan’s authority and continued to fight to create an independent Turkish nation. The difficulty, however, lay in the fact that the Ottoman Empire (and now Turkey) held within it many different nations.\(^\text{14}\) Within the borders of Turkey, diverse populations identifying themselves as Armenian, Kurdish, Arabic, Greek, and Turkish created distinctly different communities, even within the same villages and cities.

Turkey’s cultural demographics changed significantly during the Great War. The Armenian population of Turkey fled or was killed in 1915, while the Greeks of Turkey left at the war’s

\(^{10}\) Kedourie, "The End of the Ottoman," 21.
\(^{11}\) Since the Ottoman dynasty ruled the empire as both sultans and caliphs, Atatürk’s move to abolish the caliphate affected more than just the Turkish. Atatürk effectively separated his country from centuries of Islamic tradition and from other Middle Eastern and Mediterranean countries still practicing it.\(^\text{12}\) Ibn Khaldun, “On Dynasties, Royal Authority, the Caliphate, Government Ranks, and all that Goes with These Things…” in The Muqaddimah, 123-132.
\(^{14}\) Ibid., 376.
The Turkish Greeks, under the 1922 Lausanne Treaty, were sent to Greece in exchange for Greece’s Turkish population. When Ataturk gained control of Turkey in 1923, the skilled and learned population had decreased significantly, meaning that the majority of the Turkish population was illiterate and “deficient in modern skills.” This mass population exchange left a country that primarily identified itself as Turkish. Ataturk’s cultural reforms consisted of “political- organizational and cultural-artistic aims,” to create an efficient bureaucracy while at the same time establishing a single national Turkish identity. Ataturk’s reforms targeted everything from the fez, to the educational systems, to art and architecture.

Ataturk promoted the arts as a “national ideal.” He valued both the arts and crafts equally, disparagingly commenting on the ignorance of Ottoman rulers for having allowed artists and artisans to leave the Empire and work in other nations. Ataturk believed that art was necessary for the survival of a nation, indirectly suggesting that his Ottoman predecessor’s abuse of art was one of the reasons for its downfall. He invited artists and artisans to participate in the creation of a Turkish national identity. Ataturk took inspiration from Gökalp, and earlier European national movements, embracing certain aspects of Turkey’s cultural history while avoiding others. Gökalp’s

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16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
influential “culture theory” considers every nation to be a two-part entity based on civilization (scientific and technological), and the national culture built by the people of a nation.\textsuperscript{22} According to Gökalp, civilization is an international phenomenon, while culture is inherent and unique to the nation.\textsuperscript{23} Based on these theories, Gökalp and Ataturk valued folk culture and arts over the imperial Ottoman culture, believing it possible to create a technologically forward-looking nation on principles of a historic national identity.

The arts provide an avenue to communicate broad-based cultural values. For instance, when Islam first developed its artistic and cultural identity, the coin was one of the first mediums through which they demonstrated their values; based on the Byzantine coin, the Muslims removed the figural imagery and put calligraphic inscriptions in its place.\textsuperscript{24} When Ataturk took over the government of Turkey, the currency changed once again, but this time with symbols of nationalism. For Ataturk, the symbolic power of art served as a way to unite Turkish identity, and signify to citizens and visitors alike that the old regime was gone.

An Ottoman coin, (Figure 1) held by the Coins and Medals department of the British Museum, provides an example of how the Turkish Republic pulled away from Ottoman culture. The coins date to the nineteenth century, during Mahmud II’s reign, and demonstrate a style of coinage used by the Muslims for centuries. Mahmud’s coins do not feature figural imagery. One side contains the signature of the Sultan. In previous centuries, dynasties like the Umayyad's included the shahada on the

\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., 5.
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid.
opposite side. The shahada, an Islamic statement of faith reads: "there is no god but Allah, Muhammad is the messenger of God." This very simple but effective imagery demonstrates both the Ottoman ruler’s ideological beliefs and his preservation of tradition.

![Ottoman Coin](http://www.britishmuseum.org)

**Figure 1:** Ottoman Coin, early 19th c, silver, Coins and Medals, The British Museum. Photograph from [www.britishmuseum.org](http://www.britishmuseum.org).

The first bills produced by the Turkish Republic contain a very different sort of imagery. Introduced in 1927, Ataturk’s bills (Figures 2 and 3) contained imagery symbolic of the nation of Turkey instead of a singular religious identity. They were symbols of “independence of sovereignty of state.” The single

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25 Anthony Welch, “Sana Treasure” (Lecture, HA 357, University of Victoria, Victoria, BC, September 20, 2013).
Figure 2 and 3: 1 Turkish Lira, Front and back image, 1927, Turkiye Cumhuriyet Merkez Bankasi. Photograph from: www.tcm.gov.tr/yeni/banknote/E1/6.htm.

Turkish Lira bills featured the “House of Parliament in the Citadel of Ankara,” a plowing farmer on the front, and the “Former Building of Prime Ministry” on the back. Choosing to depict Ankara, the new Turkish Capital, signifies the new government’s desire to emphasize the nation and not the individual. The ploughman evokes imagery of the common person, and indicates value placed on the people of Turkey. It is important to note the Arabic script featured on these notes. These bills were in

28 Moving the capital to Ankara provided Ataturk with an important opportunity to develop new cultural and artistic styles away from centuries’ worth of imperial and religious iconography and politics in Istanbul. Ataturk encouraged designs and buildings with European influences and figural statues that oppose the very core of Islamic understanding.
circulation before Ataturk converted the Arabic alphabet to the Latin one. While the Arabic script does not demonstrate Ataturk’s move to westernize the nation, it does illustrate the first attempts towards uniting the Turkish state under a common Turkish identity and not an Islamic/Ottoman one.

Coins and banknotes act as one of the most influential forms of art in a new nation because they circulate widely, passing through many hands. Currency performs a similar function in communicating basic cultural ideas to a mass audience as public art. Ataturk’s statuary and architecture worked in the same way to distinguish the new Turkish state from the Ottoman one.

Statuary, while forbidden in the Ottoman era as a sign of paganism, flourished in the new Turkish Republic. The highly aniconic Islamic religion forbade figural representations, while many Islamic arts and artisans painted or created two dimensional representations of people for private secular use, three dimensional representations became dangerously akin to the icons of the Christians. While some figurative statues were allowable in graveyards, they were limited to an abstract style. Walking past graves near Suleyman’s mausoleum in Istanbul, one can readily see abstract imagery. Sculpted turbans and fezzes appear in Islamic graveyards where crosses and angels would appear in Christian ones. The absence or presence of statues became a way for Christians and Muslims to understand each other’s constructed identities. By the time Ataturk installed a secular government, the majority of Turkish Muslims would have little contact with

30 Ibid., 344.
31 Ibid.
the statuary styles prevalent in Europe. Statuary has always been influential in establishing and legitimizing government. Statues, like currency, are a form of public art that unequivocally state their nation’s beliefs and values. The statues and monuments erected by the new Turkish Republic of Ataturk (Figure 4) visibly divorced the new regime from that of the Ottomans, and added another layer to the construction of the Turkish national identity.

Figure 4: Statue of Ataturk, Gulhane Park, Istanbul, Turkey. 2013. Photograph by the author.

The Kemalist model was intended to create a modern, European-style, secular state. Ataturk firmly believed that religion should stay in the home or the mosque. Ataturk’s

32 Ibid.
reforms changed the way in which religion functioned in Turkey. The arts of Turkey prior to Ataturk’s reforms participated in Islamic tradition. Istanbul, the capital of the Ottoman Empire, was steeped in Islamic architectural and artistic practices centuries old. Ibn Khaldun in *The Muqaddimah* describes the difficulty of destroying the monuments of a strong dynasty by listing the great Umayyad Mosque in Cordoba and the Mosque of al-Walid as some of those monuments that following dynasties were unable to destroy, simply because of their size and importance.\(^3^3\)

Ibn Khaldun, writing several centuries earlier, pointed out one of the problems Ataturk would face in the construction of his new nation. The characteristic architecture of the Great Sinan in the Suleymaniye Complex of Istanbul, and the Selimiye in Edirne, represented a challenge to the Christian Hagia Sophia and declared a victory for the beauty of Islam and the power of the Ottoman Empire. This imperial and religious architecture, however, also challenged the growing identity of the new state of Turkey. In a way, Ataturk’s move to transform the Hagia Sophia from a mosque into a museum visibly demonstrated his secular victory over the Ottoman Empire and the Greek nationalists who desired to return the building to its former Christian glory.\(^3^4\)

Ataturk continued to challenge the Ottoman Empire and the power of Islam by encouraging Turkey to modernize its art. The end of the Ottoman Empire saw the rise of the new Turkish Republic. In order to make a strong national identity, Ataturk implemented reforms that embraced Westernization. His political, religious, and culturally based changes led to different art forms as folk art and the artists of the nation were called upon to reinvent Turkey. Ataturk respected the preceding arts and

\(^{33}\) Ibn Khaldun, *The Muqaddimah*, 143.

culture, but saw change as necessary in order to compete on a global scale. Many of his public art movements rejected the Islamic artistic program of previous years, and decisions such as including figures on the currency and statues in parks reinforced Ataturk’s reforms. Although Ibn Khaldun wrote about group feeling in the context of the rise and fall of dynasties, Ataturk’s reforms worked to create “asabiyah” on a national scale, which, in accordance with Ibn Khaldun’s ideas, necessarily meant leaving much of the Ottoman culture behind.

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Citizenship in Germany: Europeanization or Domestic Process?

GALEN MURRAY

This article investigates the influence of the European Union in liberalizing Germany’s citizenship laws. It does so by tracing the legalities of German citizenship and domestic social concepts of it since the early 20th century. In particular, it investigates the contrast between the basis of Germany’s citizenship laws as a ‘community of descent’ and the growing number of those born in Germany still considered ‘foreigners’ via this concept of citizenship. This article considers the conversations within Germany in light of this contrast and the growing liberalization of similar policies within other member states to conclude that national identity is the dominant influence in regard to Germany’s citizenship laws.

For much of the twentieth century, Germany’s laws regarding citizenship have been based primarily upon descent. In light of the growth in numbers of foreigners residing within German borders, coupled with the increasing social policies created by the European Union, German citizenship has faced increasing pressure for reform. While citizenship laws have been liberalized, they still remain moderately restrictive, particularly in the area of dual citizenship. This paper will examine the domestic and international factors that have contributed to the changes to German citizenship policy. It will then analyze the influence of Europeanization on Germany’s citizenship policy to determine the extent to which they have changed as a result.

To begin, it is necessary to discuss citizenship in the context of the nation state as well as in the context of the European Union (EU). Since the inception of the sovereign nation-state in the seventeenth century, citizenship has been associated with the territorial authority of the state. EU citizenship is a unique concept in that the EU is not a unified
territory, it does not possess a body of citizens loyal to its institutions alone, nor is its authority absolute over member-states. The EU functions under a system through which member-states have pooled sovereignty in specific areas and have delegated it to EU institutions. By contrast, Germany is a sovereign state and retains control over citizenship within its borders. This control directly relates to the EU level in that only citizens of member-states and recognized refugees are granted EU citizenship. The concept of citizenship remains closely related to that of nationality and it remains a rarity to have one without the other, as in the case of the EU. Further, it is possible that concepts of citizenship vary in each nation, which poses a further challenge to coordination of policies at the EU level. This contributes to the persisting importance of national identity, as will be discussed below.

Until reforms in the late 1990s, Germany’s citizenship laws remained intact, for the most part, from the Nationality Law of 1913. The principle of this law was that to be German was to belong to a ‘community of descent,’ embracing the principle of *jus sanguinis*, based upon lineage rather than birthplace. Following the First World War and the Paris Peace Conference, this law was enshrined in Germany’s constitution. Between this period and 1933, naturalization was a process that crossed regional and federal levels of bureaucracy and, as a result, was largely a discretionary decision on the part of the authorities. But

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upon the Nazi ascension to power, citizenship was determined explicitly along racial lines. Using the same principle of *jus sanguinis*, the Nazis revoked the citizenship or naturalized status of those who they deemed undesirable and those who did not fit in with the Nazi ideal of what it meant to be ‘German’ with the introduction of the racist Nuremberg Laws.\(^3\) Despite the mass murder committed with the manipulation of these citizenship laws, they remained the laws governing citizenship in democratic West Germany, with the exception of the Nuremberg Laws. This included the reinstatement of the bureaucratic process for naturalization.

The redrawing of European borders during and after the war led to the displacement of enclaves of those who identified as ethnically German beyond the post-war boundaries of Germany. West Germany maintained the principle of descent as a basis for citizenship in an effort to aid those ethnic Germans left outside its borders, primarily to the East, who were facing persecution as a result of their ethnicity. The ethnic basis for citizenship allowed those Germans to be ‘repatriated’ if they could prove their German heritage, despite the fact that many had never lived in Germany.\(^4\) Although other immigrants to Germany did not receive the full rights permitted with citizenship, they were not without protection. The constitution of West Germany, the Basic Law of 1949, guaranteed human rights protection to non-citizens within Germany as well as generous asylum provisions.\(^5\) In contrast, East Germany had no formal citizenship structure prior

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\(^4\) Howard, “Causes and Consequences,” 42.

\(^5\) Palmowski, “In search of the German nation,” 553.
to 1967. In the period between the end of the war and 1967, citizenship in East Germany was based upon a post-capitalism socialist ideal whereby basic rights existed without a legal guarantee. Yet, despite the lack of official distinction based upon ethnic lines, East Germany did reflect the ethnic ideal of pre-1945 laws in that foreigners were often segregated from the German population socially and physically. The formalization of a citizenship law in 1967 legalized the socialist ideal of citizenship in community participation, but discrimination prevented the full participation of foreigners. In 1990, the Basic Law was adopted as the constitution for the reunified Germany.

Conversations regarding the liberalisation of German citizenship policy became more pressing as the number of foreigners within Germany increased during the 1990s. The ‘guest worker’ program had brought hundreds of thousands of workers to West Germany from several Southern European countries as well as Turkey between the 1950s and early 1970s. In East Germany, guest workers came from other communist countries, such as Vietnam. The intention of these programs was for the workers to remain in the country temporarily, as the name suggests, to assist with the booming post-war economy. These workers were often housed separately from the rest of the German population. However, following the end of the program, approximately 3 million of these workers, primarily from Turkey, remained in Germany and with the assistance of German federal court rulings, were able to bring their families to live in Germany as well. In addition, German laws regarding asylum had granted admittance to a large number of those fleeing the Balkans during

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6 Ibid., 551-552.
7 Palmowski, “In search of the German nation,” 552.
8 Ibid., 553.
9 Howard, “Causes and Consequences,” 44.
the wars of the 1990s. This group contributed to the relatively large portion of the population in Germany that remained ‘foreign.’\textsuperscript{10} While naturalization was possible, the process was considered to be a means of assimilation into German culture. Contingent to the process was the usefulness of the applicant to German society, as was the guarantee that loyalty would be singularly with Germany.\textsuperscript{11} This perspective substantiated the absence of the possibility for dual citizenship. The resulting situation was a paradox in that approximately nine per cent of the population were permanently residing within Germany without legal citizenship rights despite some having been born there, while at the same time ethnic Germans from the East, who in same cases did not even speak the language, were granted citizenship.\textsuperscript{12,13}

The percentage of foreigners that made up Germany’s population in the 1980s and 1990s, combined with the increasing integration of the EU, led to discussions within Germany as to the liberalisation of citizenship policy. With the establishment of the European Union and integration beyond simply economic factors between member-states came EU citizenship. EU citizenship was established with the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, which was extended to those individuals with citizenship in EU member-states, including recognized refugees. As EU citizenship evolved through the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997, it included the right to

\textsuperscript{10} Ibid., 45.
\textsuperscript{12} Howard, “Causes and Consequences,” 44.
free movement within the EU, to stand in elections in the European Parliament and at the local level, to receive diplomatic and consular services in third countries, the right to petition European Parliament and other EU institutions in one’s own language, and a principle of non-discrimination based on nationality. EU citizenship was not intended to replace national citizenship, but meant to add another layer to existing citizenship. The Maastricht Treaty also illustrated the growing role of the EU and its various institutions in member-states to include social policy. Arguably, the granting of EU citizenship was meant to contribute to a shared identity among member-states. However, the member-states still retain the right to determine who is permitted national citizenship, meaning that EU citizenship is also determined in this manner, illustrating the limits of Europeanization.

Germany was not the only country to face pressure to liberalise its policies regarding citizenship as the EU began to attempt to coordinate social policies. However, it faced particular scrutiny in the context of the Nazi past and of the reforms that had taken place in other member-states, such as the Netherlands and Portugal. Yet, despite this awareness of past transgressions as well as the liberalised persuasion of EU citizenship and changes occurring elsewhere, Germany maintained much of its original 1913 citizenship regulations until 2000. This is largely due to the domestic situation within Germany, both socially and politically. Following the Third Reich, Germany was left to question its identity in a cultural context. According to Palmowski:

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In each of the German political systems of the twentieth century, the legal definition of citizenship reflected an uneasy compromise between political and ideological preferences of a governing elite, administrative and bureaucratic exigencies, and, to a lesser extent, popular demands.\textsuperscript{16}

This meant that attempts to make any changes to citizenship policy within Germany were heavily debated and difficult to achieve. As a further challenge to the situation, it was also widely accepted that Germany was not a country of immigration.\textsuperscript{17} While the EU began to play more of a role in social policy-making and creating its own citizenship, at the national level Germany was unable to come to an agreement regarding citizenship reform in a liberal direction as a result of complex politics and post-war German identity.

Domestically, Germany was divided politically in regards to citizenship and how reform should to take place, if at all. A Federal Constitutional Court ruling in 1989 regarding voting rights of foreigners added legitimacy to arguments for the liberalisation of citizenship policy. It did so by stating that voting in local elections by foreigners was unconstitutional, but that the nationality law governing citizenship should be changed to allow permanent residents of Germany to obtain citizenship.\textsuperscript{18} Moderate reforms to the Aliens Act were introduced in 1990 to make citizenship easier to obtain for those migrant workers who had been in Germany for more than 15 years. This was done with the easing of language requirements and the ability of families to naturalize with the worker. Additionally, those children and grandchildren of migrant workers between the ages of 16 and 23

\textsuperscript{16} Palmowski, “In search of the German nation,” 554.
\textsuperscript{17} Hoffman, "The Reform of the Law on Citizenship ," 196.
\textsuperscript{18} Howard, “Causes and Consequences,” 45-46.
were able to obtain naturalized status as well, providing the first instance of \textit{jus soli}, the territorial right to citizenship, in Germany. However, even with these changes, dual citizenship was still not permitted.\textsuperscript{19} These political debates surrounding citizenship reform had been kept at an elite level until the late 1990s.

The turning point in the political debate regarding citizenship in Germany came in 1998. As in most European countries, parties on the Left had been responsible for pursuing the liberalisation of citizenship. The 1998 German federal election brought to power the coalition of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Greens. With this came the promise of citizenship reform by the new Chancellor, Gerhard Schröder. The proposed changes would grant \textit{jus soli} citizenship to those born on German soil to foreign parents, the easing of the naturalization process and the granting of dual citizenship by allowing foreigners to obtain German citizenship without giving up their current status.\textsuperscript{20} Upon this announcement, the debate regarding citizenship reforms was no longer limited to political elites and quickly spread to the public domain. The opposition Christian Democratic Party (CDU) and Christian Democrats (CSU) publicly condemned the proposed legislation with claims that dual citizenship would lead to citizens whose loyalty would be divided, stoking the popularly held anti-immigration sentiments of a large portion of the population.\textsuperscript{21} These sentiments had conveniently remained private while the citizenship debates had been kept at the elite level. During the regional elections in Hessen, the CDU spearheaded a petition campaign against dual citizenship, thus directly involving the electorate in the discussion of citizenship reform. This tactic contributed to the success of the

\textsuperscript{19} Hoffman, “Reform of the Law of Citizenship,” 197.
\textsuperscript{20} Howard, “Germany’s Citizenship Policy,” 44.
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., 46.
CDU in the election, with the petition gaining over five million signatures and the SPD losing its majority in the upper house of parliament and thus, losing the ability to pass the legislation.\textsuperscript{22} The result was a compromise of the original reforms set out by the SPD-Green coalition. The Nationality Act of 2000 provided German citizenship provisions for those born in Germany to foreign parents, in addition to the citizenship of the parents, as long as one parent has been living in Germany for a period of eight years or longer, with the stipulation that between the ages of 18 and 23 they will choose between the two. For those not born in Germany and wishing to obtain citizenship through naturalization, they must have lived within Germany legally for at least eight years and must meet the qualifications outlined in both the Aliens Act as well as the Nationality Act, which include gainful employment, working knowledge of the German language, a clear criminal record, relinquishment of other citizenship, in most cases, and an adherence to the Basic Law. In certain cases, such as those residing in Germany under the provisions of asylum, the length of residence may be shortened to six years.\textsuperscript{23} But perhaps more importantly, it had been demonstrated that the German public would mobilise to defend its national identity, which was still viewed as a ‘community of descent’ and thus, largely anti-immigrant.

Despite the liberalisation of citizenship policies within Germany, they are still viewed as restrictive. A particular point of contention, especially among Germany’s Turkish population, is that children born to foreigners within Germany must choose one citizenship. In contrast, those born to citizens of other EU member-states or Switzerland are permitted to retain dual

\textsuperscript{22} Howard, “Causes and Consequences,” 51-52.

citizenship their entire lives. This has led to the accusation that the law creates two classes of citizens within Germany. Further, the bureaucratic process and various exceptions are blamed for making it difficult to administer the policy. Reliance upon the other country of citizenship to release these would-be Germans from their citizenship can be restrictive as well, depending on the length of time it takes to process the request, as some have missed the deadline of the 23rd birthday, resulting in the involuntary loss of German citizenship. For these residents of Germany, Europeanization has had very little positive impact.

The ongoing debate in Germany regarding citizenship policy has remained closely tied to national identity, leaving little room for the influence of the EU. Germany has faced pressure to liberalise citizenship policy, not strictly from the EU, but rather from the international community at large. Germany’s unique history has put it in a precarious situation in regard to its own identity, whereby the tradition of a ‘community of descent’ was taken to a murderous extreme during the Third Reich, thus challenging the legitimacy of this concept. In light of this tradition, the growing number of foreigners without citizenship throughout the post-war era in Germany led to recognition at the national level that liberalisation must take place. However, this was divisive amongst the population and political elites, as there remained an anti-immigration sentiment despite the large number of foreigners already residing within Germany. Top-down Europeanization thus helped to initiate the conversation, but it was unable to provide further influence.

While citizenship reform within Germany was partially the result of external pressures of the development of EU citizenship, it was limited by domestic factors. EU citizenship and the rights it has bestowed upon citizens of other member-states led Germany to the realization that its citizenship policies were out of sync, particularly in light of the large population of foreigners residing within the country. Though German national citizenship has adopted measures to become more inclusive, these measures are still somewhat restrictive as a direct result of national identity in the post-war era. Europeanization has had a moderate effect on citizenship policy in Germany; however, the domestic political and social landscape has proven the limits to the extent of this process.

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African American Servicemen in Vietnam: Clashes of Race and Generation

THOMAS SHEPHERD

During the Vietnam War a disproportionate number of African Americans served in combat positions and the lowest ranks. All black servicemen faced institutional racism, but age and rank determined their response. Older servicemen and officers understood that whites had a better chance at promotions and fair treatment but they overlooked these flaws in favour of social mobility and steady employment. By the mid-to-late sixties, witnesses of urban riots and civil rights activism along with proponents of Black Power and Black Nationalism reached Vietnam and changed how young black men interacted with each other, their superiors, and their white peers.

The United States integrated all branches of the military by 1954, six years after President Harry Truman signed Executive Order 9981.1 Although the Vietnam War was the first American war fought entirely with integrated units, institutional racism relegated most African Americans to low-ranking positions.2 A high proportion of African Americans served in combat units and the junior non-commissioned officer corps. Furthermore, white commanders frequently assigned less appealing jobs to African American servicemen. High casualty rates between 1965 and 1967, together with high draft calls for black youth, stoked fears of institutional genocide. Slow rates of promotions and lopsided military justice frustrated the expectations of many black servicemen. Black Power and Black Nationalism gave young African Americans a sense of solidarity and strength in opposition to white control of the military. Although some servicemen

2 Ibid., 90-1.
considered the armed forces a means of social mobility and opportunity, they tended to be older servicemen and officers.\(^3\) The arrival of new recruits in the mid-to-late 1960s marked a radical shift in thinking for young Vietnam servicemen: Black Power, Black Nationalism, and racial solidarity supplanted older notions of social mobility through service and sacrifice for the nation.

The primary reason that young African Americans accepted military service was limited employment opportunities.\(^4\) In 1961, 13.8 percent of African American workers were unemployed, compared to 7 percent of white workers.\(^5\) In 1964, young black men had an unemployment rate of almost 25.5 percent; for whites, a rate of 14 percent.\(^6\) Reginald Edwards, “the first person in [his] family to finish high school,” explains that “I couldn’t go to college because my folks couldn’t afford it. I only weighed 117 pounds, and nobody’s gonna hire me to work for them. So the only thing left to do was go into the service.” He enlisted in the Marines in 1963.\(^7\) Paradoxically, many African American men enlisted because they believed the odds of the draft were against them. In their minds it was “better to serve two years out of choice than three years through the draft.”\(^8\) Judges offered “punitive enlistment” to African American convicts, and many took up the offer.\(^9\) The military advertised a tangible way to achieve and measure manhood.\(^10\) Edwards thought “the Marines

\(^3\) Graham, 101-2.
\(^5\) Phillips, 191.
\(^6\) Ibid., 203.
\(^8\) Phillips, 192.
\(^10\) Graham, 23.
was [sic] bad. The Marines built men.”11 Many black servicemen reenlisted for lack of better prospects in the civilian sector.12 Two-thirds of African American servicemen reenlisted in 1966, compared with 20 percent of whites. In 1967 this rate decreased to 32 percent, but whites reenlisted at a rate of only 12 percent in the same year.13 In light of the few economic opportunities available to African American men, Veteran Lonnie Alexander recounted in 1974 that “we [black GIs] was really fucking up our lives, you know, by coming out of the bush.”14

The draft affected African Americans more than whites. Young middle class whites gained the bulk of college and professional deferments in large part because only about 5 percent of African American men attended college in the 1960s. Only full-time studies qualified a student for deferment. White, middle class veterans staffed most local draft boards, and they usually turned down African American requests for service exemptions. Furthermore, historian Kimberly Phillips reveals that “nearly every black neighbourhood in the North, Midwest, and West Coast cities had recruiting offices staffed by black sergeants.”15 Twelve percent of draft-age men were black, but in 1963 they made up 18.5 percent of draftees; in 1967 black Americans still comprised 16.3 percent of draftees. Moreover, eligible black men were twice as likely to be drafted as eligible white men. Black men scored lower on the Armed Forces Qualifying Test (AFQT) because they had less access to health care and education.16 Beginning in 1965, the Selective Service lowered the minimum test scores for qualification. Forty one percent of the African

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11 Edwards, 6.
12 Phillips, 206.
13 Graham, 24-5.
14 Ibid., 26.
15 Phillips, 199.
16 Graham, 16-17.
American men that the Armed Forces admitted in 1965 scored in the two lowest categories of the AFQT, which are IV and V.\textsuperscript{17}

Project 100,000, a draft call for recruits with low AFQT scores which ran from 1966 to 1971, drew a disproportionate number of black Americans into the military.\textsuperscript{18} In response to Project 100,000, the Selective Service discarded the national test for college deferments. This change made it easier for middle class whites to gain deferments.\textsuperscript{19} The Department of Defense halved the acceptable AFQT score, and because African Americans scored the lowest they represented a huge segment of Project 100,000 draftees. Black men made up 10 percent of the military and 40 percent of Project 100,000 soldiers. Project 100,000 also trained a higher percentage of men for combat: 40 percent compared with 25 percent for all the enlisted ranks. Most importantly, these men died at double the rate compared to the overall military.\textsuperscript{20}

Very few African Americans entered domestic military service during the Vietnam War. Many whites entered the reserves or the National Guard to escape more dangerous duties abroad. Only 15,000 men in these branches served in Vietnam. African American men made up a large proportion of the many working class Americans who did not know about domestic alternatives to service abroad or who did not have access to the necessary connections in these domestic branches of the military. Among the enlisted ranks, three times as many college graduates served in the reserves than in the regular army. In 1964, black

\textsuperscript{18} Phillips, 203.
\textsuperscript{19} Graham, 20.
\textsuperscript{20} Appy, 33.
Americans made up 1.45 percent of the National Guard, and this figure dropped to 1.26 percent by 1968.21 Despite the Johnson Administration’s claim to racial equality in the military, racial disparity emerged as soon as basic training. Army Specialist Arthur Woodley recounted that “[w]e Bloods slept on separate sides of the barracks. And it seemed like the dark-skinned brothers got most of the dirty details, like sweepin’ up underneath the barracks or KP, while the light-skinned brothers and Europeans got the easy chores.”22 White drill instructors used racially charged labels such as “nigger.”23 In 1968, Stanley Goff came across many black drill sergeants during Advanced Infantry Training, and the racial composition of his company reflected the overrepresentation of African Americans in lower infantry positions.24 During boot camp Haywood Kirkland’s instructors “told us not to call them Vietnamese. Call them gooks, dinks [...] they wouldn’t allow you to talk about them as if they were people.”25 Military-sanctioned racial discrimination against the Vietnamese reminded African Americans of their own experiences with discrimination and contributed to racial tensions in the military.26

The frontline offered more opportunities for interracial friendship and cooperation than the rear camps. Survival trumped racial differences. Terry Whitmore remembers that “in combat the squad was the more important group. No matter what kinds of guys and colors were in the squad, it had to run smoothly if we’re

21 Appy, 37.
22 Terry, 245.
23 Graham, 34.
25 Terry, 94.
26 Graham, 42.
Service alongside white soldiers taught one black serviceman that “the white soldier ‘was just another dude without all those things to back him up and make him bigger than he is – things like a police department, big job, or salary.’ ” Although white soldiers also reported a sense of social levelling during combat missions, interracial friendships faded in the rear bases. Men who fought in the same units developed separate social groups in base camp according to race and generation. Whitmore recalls that “in the Nam we blacks pretty much kept to ourselves, no matter how close we were to our squads. The real bullshitting was always done with other blacks. Jiving about our blocks.”

Music was another dividing interest. De facto segregation in the rear camps extended to Saigon’s nightlife, where black GIs frequented a district called Soul Alley.

Black servicemen sustained more than their share of combat deaths. The African American proportion of American combat deaths in Vietnam was 13.1 percent from 1961 to 1972. This ratio started off much higher at the beginning of the conflict. From 1965 to 1967 black servicemen made up over 20 percent of American combat deaths even though draft-age black men made up only 12.5 percent of the draft-age population. The Selective Service designated a higher proportion of black servicemen to the army and marines than to the navy or air force. These branches of the military sustained more casualties during the war. Moreover,

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27 Phillips, 221.
28 Graham, 46-7.
29 Ibid., 64.
30 Phillips, 221.
31 Graham, 64.
33 Graham, 21.
34 Appy, 19-20.
black soldiers enrolled in elite combat units in higher proportions than white soldiers. Extra pay and status led African Americans to represent 40 to 50 percent of most elite combat units. In 1968 about 25 percent of paratrooper deaths were African American. By the end of 1967 the black proportion of combat deaths fell to 13 percent, and from 1970 to 1972 the figure was under 10 percent.

A large segment of black servicemen found themselves in dangerous or less desirable jobs. The military often channelled African Americans with low AFQT scores into combat positions, and in 1971 black servicemen made up 16.3 percent of service positions and 19.3 percent of supply positions in the military. White commanders gave African American servicemen the dirtiest jobs more often than their white peers, as was the case for Arthur Woodley in boot camp. Furthermore, Private James Barnes spoke for many African Americans when he complained that “it’s always the Negro who’s walking point (up front),” which is the most dangerous job in a platoon. On the other hand, those who volunteered for point positions rose through the ranks faster. Although some in point may have volunteered for the position, when the decision arose over who to put in point, white commanders chose African Americans more often than whites.

White servicemen with the same or lower level of experience as black servicemen had a better chance at promotions. In 1971 African Americans represented 12.1 percent of enlisted men, 15.7 percent of the second-lowest ranks, and only 4.2 percent of the highest enlisted ranks. Serviceman Joel Davis

35 Phillips, 190.
36 Graham, 21.
37 Appy, 21.
38 Graham, 90-1; 153.
39 Ibid., 91.
40 Ibid., 52.
believed that “you’re one-fourth of a white, because you have to do twice as much to get one-half of what he has.” Charles Griffin, an enlisted soldier, explained that in exchange for “the little rank we get we have to do twice as much as the white man to get it and we have to wait twice as long.” Specialist W. H. Cooper protested that “I am disgusted and sick of being a second class soldier because of my black face.” Since equal opportunity officers and inspector generals answered to the base commander, complaints of discrimination often went nowhere.\textsuperscript{41}

Racial inequality was even more obvious in the officer corps. In 1970 African Americans represented 10.5 percent of the enlisted ranks and 2.1 percent of officers. Furthermore, few African American officers rose above the rank of captain. Most African Americans who entered the military did not have the education to become officers. Those fortunate enough to become officers lost out on vital social and work networks that prepared white officers for promotion. Mentors and ties with promotion board members gave white officers a huge advantage over their African American peers. Captain Burns informed the Congressional Black Caucus in 1971 that supervisors to black officers waited until an official review to report mistakes; white officers received feedback well in advance of reviews.\textsuperscript{42}

Some white commanders also used the military justice system to punish African American servicemen whose dress and behaviour offended them. Historian James E. Westheider tells how “good officers used Article 15 hearings or Captain’s Masts judiciously.” However, many white commanders gave warnings to white soldiers and official punishments to black soldiers for similar infractions of base rules. A common cause for an Article

\textsuperscript{41} Graham, 92-3.

\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., 93-4.
15, a nonjudicial punishment, was violation of uniform or hair-length standards. White commanders sometimes tolerated jewellery, peace symbols, longer hair, and helmets with slogans in chalk among white soldiers but persecuted black soldiers for Afros, armbands, and their own chalk sayings. In some units commanders used Article 15 against African American soldiers with “Black Power” chalked on their helmets without paying mind to white soldiers with “Fuck the War” inscribed on theirs.\textsuperscript{43} Soldiers with an Article 15 infraction in their file were vulnerable to less-than-honourable discharges; few received promotions. Veterans who accepted less-than-honourable discharges did not receive benefits and found it even harder than other vets to find a job.\textsuperscript{44}

World heavyweight champion Muhammad Ali gave African American servicemen a powerful new role model who espoused “militant antiwar politics rather than the hegemonic warrior role.”\textsuperscript{45} He gave masculine credence to antiwar and anti-draft sentiment.\textsuperscript{46} Ali refused induction into the military on 28 April 1967 and became the most prominent African American draft resister.\textsuperscript{47} He denounced the war as a “white man’s war,” which led many servicemen to reflect on their role in the war and their identity as black men.\textsuperscript{48} Historian Herman Graham explains that “Ali’s public opposition to the Vietnam War validated latent antiwar sentiments of black soldiers” and “probably meant more to enlisted men [. . .] than did the philosophical opposition of established black leaders like Martin Luther King Jr.” At the same time, African American NCOs were less likely to sympathize

\textsuperscript{44} Graham, 95-6.
\textsuperscript{45} \textit{Ibid.}, 67.
\textsuperscript{46} \textit{Ibid.}, 74.
\textsuperscript{47} \textit{Ibid.}, 78; 82.
\textsuperscript{48} \textit{Ibid.}, 83.
with Ali’s resistance to the draft and the war because they invested more of their identity and career in the military.49

Continued racial discrimination in the military and at home led many African American servicemen by the late 1960s to frame their lives in terms of Black Power. The movement began in the United States and followed many black servicemen into Vietnam. Black Power encouraged African Americans to assert their independence from white control and to rely on each other for support. In the rear echelons, black soldiers embraced their racial identity over their military one. They formed social gatherings called “soul sessions.”50 Servicemen began to call themselves “black” instead of “Negro” and referred to the group as “brothers,” “soul brothers,” and “bloods.” Homosocial ties also undercut the importance of rank.

Older servicemen and NCOs were more likely to accept the military’s definition of manhood and to avoid outward demonstrations of Black Power. For many career soldiers, the military was a means of upward mobility rather than a source of inequality.51 African American GIs that espoused Black Power suspected that their African American superiors had marginalized their black identity to achieve promotions. Black Powerites often accused career soldiers of being “Uncle Toms,” a derogatory name for black men complicit in the oppression of their kin. Specialist Laurence Wallace found the term “Uncle Tom” too harsh: “the name ‘Tom’ is the lowest you can call a black man.” Black NCOs in charge of African American GIs had to navigate the expectations of both white superiors and black soldiers. Black GIs saw their African American superiors more as equals and in

49 Ibid., 84.
50 Graham, 99-100.
51 Ibid., 101-2.
Sergeant Walter Ambrose’s case, “they fe[lt] I should be more lenient.”

Enlisted servicemen in the lower ranks adopted a handshake called “the dap.” Because there were more white officers than black in the military, when black servicemen saluted they often saluted a white man. The military salute became a symbol of black submission to whites. Black GIs adopted the dap to express social and cultural connection with their African American peers. Some commanders saw the dap as a threat to military hegemony and banned the handshake. Since the ritual could last several minutes, servicemen also used the handshake to hold up mess lines and demonstrate black solidarity and power in public areas. One serviceman described the dap as “a way to piss white people off, and anytime we could do that, we felt good.” Some black GIs did not adopt the dap because they saw the handshake as a threat to their friendships with white GIs.

Those black servicemen who withheld criticism of the American effort and the racial inequities of the war felt more inclined to open up after the Tet Offensive. More GIs questioned anti-Communist rhetoric and their participation in the war. They had hoped to gain full citizenship as servicemen and believed in the benefit of fighting in an integrated armed forces. However, few promotions, unequal military justice, and lower-ranking jobs made an impression on black servicemen. Beginning in late 1966, recruits were younger and less invested in the military as a means of social mobility. Black Nationalism offered compelling reasons for why African Americans were second-class citizens.

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52 Ibid., 102-3.
53 Graham, 105-6.
54 Ibid., 107; Phillips, 223.
55 Ibid., 112-3.
and why the Vietnam War was not their fight.\textsuperscript{57} In August 1967 David Parks wrote in his journal that “[I] read about the riots back in the States in some clippings [my girlfriend] sent. They leave me confused, the police brutality and all. It makes me wonder whether we’re fighting the right war.”\textsuperscript{58} African Americans perceived the occupation of rioting cities by predominantly white National Guard and police forces as colonization.\textsuperscript{59} Private James Barnes understood in May 1968 that “they say we’re fighting to free the people of South Vietnam. But Newark wasn’t free. Was Watts? Was Detroit? I mean, which is more important, home or here?” Private Wendell Hill raised the spectre of slavery and the Jim Crow South when he addressed his fellow soldiers in a December 1969 letter to \textit{Sepia} that argued “it was not a Communist society that lynched your fathers and brothers, and raped your mothers and sisters.”\textsuperscript{60}

Black Power advocates referred to the Vietnam conflict as a “race war” and reworked the slogan of the Double V Campaign of World War II into the Vietnam context. During WWII the two enemies were fascism abroad and fascism at home, but in Vietnam the enemies became “Charlie and Whitey.”\textsuperscript{61} On the other hand, Black Nationalism taught that the situation of African Americans had parallels with the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese Army. French colonialism and then American imperialism prevented the Vietnamese people from gaining independence, and in the United States continuing discrimination in employment, housing, and education, police occupation of neighbourhoods, and de facto segregation made African

\textsuperscript{57} Graham, 113.
\textsuperscript{59} Phillips, 224.
\textsuperscript{60} Graham, 113.
\textsuperscript{61} Phillips, 24; Graham, 114.
Americans second-class citizens. Black Nationalism identified white imperialism as the oppressor in both Vietnam and the United States.\(^{62}\)

Black soldiers witnessed the poor living conditions of the Vietnamese and many soldiers had experienced poverty firsthand: ninety percent of African American soldiers in Vietnam came from working-class and poor families.\(^{63}\) David Parks noted that “this is a real poor country. Everywhere you go people are on their knees begging. Some of the Whiteys dig this sort of thing and make a game of it.”\(^{64}\) Specialist Emmanuel Holloman explained that “the majority of people who came over there looked down on the Vietnamese [. . . but] I could understand poverty.”\(^{65}\) Some soldiers thought the African American and Vietnamese experiences represented a shared hardship of people of colour.

On the other hand, many black GIs did not trust the Vietnamese because it was difficult to identify the enemy.\(^{66}\) Rumours circulated about instances where the Vietcong and the NVA spared African American soldiers from death. A few of these stories are true, but whether servicemen placed much stock in them is unclear. Historian James Westheider argues that “few blacks believed the stories,” but Herman Graham points out that these rumours were popular and had “currency” among African American GIs.\(^{67}\)

Rumours that the Vietnam War was genocide against African Americans gained even more traction with servicemen. Early in 1967 Stokely Carmichael of the Student Nonviolent

\(^{62}\) Graham, 113.

\(^{63}\) Ibid., 115; Appy, 22.

\(^{64}\) Taylor, 178.

\(^{65}\) Terry, 87.

\(^{66}\) Graham, 115-6

\(^{67}\) Westheider, *Fighting on Two Fronts*, 156-7; Graham, 118.

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Coordinating Committee (SNCC) called Project 100,000 “urban removal” in a speech at Morgan State. In May 1967 Cleveland Sellers, another member of SNCC, labelled the draft “a plan to commit calculated genocide.” Stan Goff remembers that “word was going around, and it wasn’t a quiet word, that blacks were being drafted for genocidal purposes [. . .] And we believed it. There was a general consensus in 1968 that there must be a conspiracy against black youth.” Rumours of genocide linked the inequities of the draft with the dangers of combat duties. The process of circulating these rumours led African American servicemen to reconsider their role in the war and its racial implications.

In 1968 racial animosities exploded in the form of riots, protests, and disruptions. Martin Luther King Jr.’s assassination followed the end of the first phase of the Tet Offensive and deeply disheartened many black soldiers. White soldiers made disparaging comments about King’s death within earshot of black troops. Occasionally, southern white soldiers displayed signs of white supremacy such as Klan robes and burning crosses, but Confederate flags became the most common display of white supremacy. Between 1968 and 1972 hundreds of incidents of violence broke out in prisons and ships in and near Vietnam. Black prisoners in the overcrowded Long Binh prison near Saigon comprised almost half of the 719 inmates. Military police tortured and beat prisoners to compensate for a shortage of staff. African American inmates responded by stockpiling resources and attacking commanders and white inmates. The riot lasted from

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68 Taylor, 271.
69 Graham, 27; 144.
70 Goff, 11.
71 Graham, 115.
72 Phillips, 225.
73 Graham, 65.
August to September 1968. In October, smaller riots broke out among prisoners on a base in Da Nang. Units in Vietnam accounted for many of the racial incidents in the Marines, of which there were over 1000 in 1970.74 At Camp Baxter in Da Nang in 1971, white soldiers retreated to their barracks and armed themselves with M-60 machine guns in response to African American protests against racial discrimination. At Camp Tien Sha white soldiers and black protesters almost broke into a firefight.75

The worst racial incidents in the navy took place in 1972. Black sailors fought with marines and white sailors on the aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk in October, and another racial fight broke out a few days later on the oiler Hassayampa. Black sailors staged a strike against racial discrimination on a different aircraft carrier, the Constellation, in November.76 In 1971 black sailors represented 5.5 percent of the enlisted personnel in the navy, and black officers made up 0.67 percent of naval officers. To attract more African Americans the navy launched an advertising campaign and set up officer training programs at two southern black colleges. One poster suggested to prospective recruits that “You can be Black, and Navy too.” By 1972, black sailors represented 12 percent of the enlisted ranks, but most of these new recruits found themselves doing menial or dirty jobs.77 De facto segregation separated the higher decks with technicians and commanders from the lower decks with the facilities for menial jobs like laundry. Although many black sailors scored low on the AFQT, lack of education often did not explain why many white commanders chose white sailors over black sailors for promotions

74 Phillips, 226.
75 Graham, 65.
76 Ibid., 120.
to non-technical positions.\textsuperscript{78} White commanders did not want to yield power to the new black sailors.\textsuperscript{79}

On the \textit{Kitty Hawk}, African American sailors lost faith in the military justice system. In contrast to GIs, sailors depended less on each other for survival and lacked close combat ties. White sailors commonly made racist comments in front of black sailors, and those who confronted the perpetrators often suffered a reprimand.\textsuperscript{80} Commanders frequently used the military justice system against black sailors and often gave them harsher penalties. In one instance, the Captain of the \textit{Kitty Hawk} punished two black sailors for assault but gave a lighter penalty to a white sailor with the same charge. In a second assault case, the Captain let a white sailor go without punishment.\textsuperscript{81}

On 11 October 1972 a fight broke out between black and white sailors in the de facto segregated entertainment district of Subric Bay in the Philippines. Marines used tear gas to break up the brawl. On the next day investigative officers summoned only the black sailors to explain themselves. Afterwards, African American sailors formed a large social gathering in the mess hall and disrupted mess lines with the dap. White and black sailors began shoving each other, and the marines arrived to quell the fight.\textsuperscript{82} When black sailors refused to disperse, the marines beat them. On 12 and 13 October black sailors armed themselves for a riot, but hours of negotiations between the highest-ranking African American officer present and the black dissidents defused the conflict. Black sailors accused Commander Benjamin Cloud of being “a boy of the white man,” but Cloud called on the sailors

\textsuperscript{78} Graham, 121-2.  
\textsuperscript{79} Ibid., 123.  
\textsuperscript{80} Ibid., 125-6.  
\textsuperscript{81} Ibid., 127-8.  
\textsuperscript{82} Ibid., 128-9.
to follow the nonviolent example of Martin Luther King Jr. He removed his shirt and returned black power salutes to gain the confidence of the dissident sailors. Cloud helped bring an end to the *Kitty Hawk* riots, but he lost esteem with black sailors soon after when he embraced military hierarchy over black homosocial ties.\(^{83}\)

In late 1966, younger black recruits who grew up in the context of urban riots and civil rights activism began to arrive in Vietnam with minds more receptive to Black Power and Black Nationalism. This represented a significant shift from the earlier generation of Vietnam servicemen, who came from a similar social fabric but who privileged their parents’ conception of military service as a duty to your country and a way to earn a living. By the time of the Tet Offensive and the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. in early 1968, many black servicemen began to doubt the strategic value of the American mission in Vietnam and anti-Communist rhetoric, and they weighed the racial implications of white and black men killing Asians. Tired of patterns of institutional racism and armed with new models of masculinity in Muhammad Ali and Black Power, African American servicemen spoke out against white control of the military and against the war. At the same time, not all black servicemen shared the Black Powerites’ skepticism over the war and the military establishment: older soldiers and officers valued the military’s model of the individual who works within the hierarchy of the armed forces to take advantage of what his country has to offer. Furthermore, black soldiers shared combat experiences with their white peers and often shared a distrust of Vietnamese people. Black soldiers also shared death, atrocities, bravery, and acts of goodwill with white soldiers, but generation

\(^{83}\) Graham, 130-2.
and race often distanced black soldiers from their superiors and their white peers in the rear camps.

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Italian Jews and the Catholic Reformation: Ghettoization, Restriction, and Demarcation in Rome, Venice, and Florence

SPIRIT WAITE

Instability had characterized the lives of Italian Jews long before the Catholic Reformation broke out in the early sixteenth-century. However, once reforming zeal was kindled in earnest, Italian Jews became targets of the heightened hostility toward non-Catholics. The popular attitudes and official policies that developed throughout the politically fractured Italian peninsula during this era demonstrate that hostility toward Jews increased dramatically during the zenith of the Catholic Reformation, and that tremendous variance existed in the manifestations and severity of this hostility from state to state.

For centuries before the Catholic Reformation ushered in an era of religious reform in the early decades of the sixteenth-century, instability had characterized the lives of Italian Jews. This tumult resulted from the perpetual election of new popes, whose individual proclivities determined to a great extent how many rights and privileges, if any, the Jews in their dominion enjoyed. Just as new pontiffs continually changed the status of Jews, Italy’s political fragmentation throughout the early modern period complicated it further. Indeed, Jews living outside the Papal States were subject to the laws of other rulers. Even during the most favorable pontificates, political rivals sometimes used their Jewish subjects to rebuff papal authority. As the Catholic Reformation flourished during the last three quarters of the sixteenth-century, reformist attitudes and policies concerning Jews as religious outsiders destabilized their position throughout the peninsula further still. An examination of popular sentiments and official policies concerning the Jews in three separately
governed Italian cities – Rome, Florence, and Venice – Demonstrates that, although both personal and political sentiments became more consistently hostile toward Jews during the zenith of the Catholic Reformation, they nevertheless differed throughout the peninsula as they reflected the proclivities and motives of various regional rulers.

As a religious minority outnumbered by a vast Catholic majority, early modern Italian Jews had tenuous relationships with the states in which they resided. Although their presence in Christian realms was technically abominable, many Catholic leaders held a paradoxical conception of the Jews, which posited that Jewish financiers and merchants simultaneously benefited Christian economies while also threatening their desired religious conformity. Thus, the presence of Jews in Christian dominions demanded justification, and one of the most famous defences posited that Jewish moneylenders filled a vital economic function.\(^1\) The stereotype of the Jewish usurer is a remarkably well-preserved medieval trope considering, as Robert Bonfil has convincingly argued, that Jews did not own or operate Italy’s largest banks, but instead “filled the vacuums left by Christian financiers, who were forbidden by local authorities with increasing zeal as the fifteenth-century progressed to number among their economic activities small consumer loans.”\(^2\) Despite the exaggeration of Jewish financial prowess, even Bonfil concedes that money lending was a visible minority occupation among Italian Jews. Indeed, doctrinally speaking, Jews made


convenient lenders, as the Bible condemns the practice of lending at interest between persons of the same faith.\(^3\) As non-Christians, Jews could fill the need for small loans while simultaneously protecting Catholics from the sin of usury.\(^4\)

Predictably, lenders were often unpopular among their debtors, and as visible religious ‘others’ collecting on debts, Jews became intrinsically linked with popular conceptions of avarice and usury. Thus, Jews throughout the peninsula were targets for popular hostility, and zealous mendicant friars exploited this resentment to excite audiences against the presence of Jews in their communities.\(^5\) In his analysis of two seminal fourteenth-century mendicant friars, Giovanni Dominici and Bernardino da Sienna, Nirit Ben-Aryen Debby demonstrates how the anti-Jewish polemic of these men became foundational for the generations of Catholic reformers that emerged in force in the fifteenth- and sixteenth-centuries.\(^6\) Indeed, the fiery preaching of their successors sometimes resulted in pogroms, as in Florence in 1448, as well as malicious allegations of ritual murder. The most notorious such accusation concerned the death of a Christian child called Simon, whose body was found by two Jews in Trent in 1475 following the ill-timed preaching of Fra Bernardino de Feltre against the blood libel (the fictitious allegation that Jews

\(^3\) Robert C. Davis and Benjamin Ravid, eds. The Jews of Early Modern Venice (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press), 8, 55.
\(^4\) Ibid., 12, 55. Although this excuse satisfied the need for justification, as Bonfil notes in Jewish Life, Christian banks provided the majority of large loans.
\(^6\) Nirit Ben-Aryeh Debby, “Jews and Judaism in the Rhetoric of Popular Preachers: The Florentine Sermons of Giovanni Dominici (1356-1419) and Bernardino da Siena (1380-1444)” Jewish History 14, no. 2 (January 2000): 175. A notable beneficiary of their combined anti-Jewish polemic was the Dominican Girolamo Savonarola, who affected the expulsion of the Florentine Jewry in 1494.
killed Christian children and used their blood in their religious rituals). After being imprisoned and tortured, thirteen Jews were executed for the child’s murder.\footnote{Sam Waagenaar, The Pope’s Jews (La Salle: Open Court Publishers, 1974), 126-128.} Although the incident in Trent has received particular attention, scholars and archivists have identified at least twelve similar accusations from the second half of the fifteenth-century.\footnote{Bonfil, Jewish Life, 25, 28.} Such violent outbreaks were both serious and frequent enough to elicit admonitions from Rome. Popes Martin V (1417-1431) and Eugene IV (1431-1447) both wrote multiple letters ordering provocative preachers not to incite violence with anti-Jewish polemic.\footnote{Debby, “Jews and Judaism,” 187.} These incidents of violence demonstrate that enough hostility against Jews prevailed in pre-Reformation Italy for charismatic preachers to move their audiences from passive hostility to acts of violence.\footnote{Bonfil, Jewish Life, 28.}

As the Catholic Reformation began in earnest, unsanctioned outbursts of hostility transformed into formal actions such as Talmud burnings. Papal concerns about heresy and religious non-conformity began to increase dramatically in the fifteenth-century. As reformers disseminated unorthodox interpretations of the Bible, proponents of orthodoxy feared that those Hebrew writings that directly contradict Catholic doctrines could exacerbate the problem.\footnote{Seigmund, The Medici State, 78.} Intent on stamping out ever-growing subversion, the Cardinal and Inquisitor Giovanni Pietro Carafa, who would later become Pope Paul IV, instructed the Roman Inquisition to burn the Talmud in 1553, and, as Sam Waagenaar has noted, the poverty of literacy in Hebrew among the middling officials who collected copies of the text led to an
“indiscriminate confiscation of Jewish books.”\textsuperscript{12} Inconsiderate of the blow to Hebrew culture, Pope Julius III sanctioned Carafa’s decree and, in addition to the Papal States, his order was carried out in Florence and Venice, which hosted a subsequent mass burning of Hebrew texts in 1568.\textsuperscript{13}

In addition to these various manifestations of anti-Jewish prejudice, the lack of consistent papal attitude toward Jews and Judaism made life in the popes’ dominion unpredictable for the Italian Jewry. Whenever a pope died, Roman Jews could not be sure whether the newest pontiff would treat them kindly, indifferently, or harshly. In the fifteen-tens Julius II (1503-1513), who was committed to converting the Jews, advocated kindness, and by the fifteen-twenties his position was entrenched, as evidenced by more than five hundred papal letters that reflect his position.\textsuperscript{14} Despite the establishment of this gentle policy, subsequent Popes departed from it during the zenith of the Catholic Reformation, and living conditions for Italian Jews, especially those residing in Papal States, correspondingly deteriorated. Revealing their reforming spirits, Paul IV (1555-1559) and Pius V (1566-1572) were particularly hostile and restrictive.\textsuperscript{15} Even the more lenient pontificate of Pius IV, who served between them, offered little respite.\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{12} Waagenaar, \textit{The Pope’s Jews}, 166.
\textsuperscript{14} Stow, “The Papacy and the Jews: Catholic Reformation and Beyond,” \textit{Jewish History} 6, 1/2 (January 1992): 258, 262, 268. Julius II’s policy actually echoed the ninety-year old position of Martin V, which indicates that enough deviation had occurred between their pontificates to necessitate an admonition against cruelty.
\textsuperscript{15} Siegmund, \textit{The Medici State}, 57; Bonfil, \textit{Jewish Life}, 65.
\textsuperscript{16} Siegmund, \textit{The Medici State}, 57.
By the time Paul IV was elected it was evident that passivity was failing to deliver satisfying numbers of converts. Thus, fostered by the enthusiasm of the Catholic Reformation, the papacy inverted its strategy from one of gentleness to one of brutality.\textsuperscript{17} Less than two months after his election, Paul IV demonstrated that time had not tempered his anti-Jewish prejudice: issuing the papal bull \textit{Cum Nimis Absurdum}, he ordered the Papal States to observe diligently existing canons that subjugated the Jews.\textsuperscript{18} Among its fifteen tenets, the most relevant here are those that demanded that Jews always wear “a hat or some obvious marking” to distinguish them from Christians, restricted employment options (and by extension, livelihoods), and called for ghettoization.\textsuperscript{19} Paul IV did not decree that all non-papal states must abide by the bull; however, Pius V, who first reaffirmed \textit{Cum Nimis Absurdum} and then expanded it with his own bull of expulsion, \textit{Romanus pontifex}, did.\textsuperscript{20}

It was in this atmosphere of zealous reform that the Roman Jewry was confined to a repugnant ghetto to facilitate conversion; however, the papacy was not content simply to segregate the Jews and wait. Indulging the Jews had failed, and thus the new strategy was to make life so unpleasant that conversion seemed preferable.\textsuperscript{21} Yet, despite the vile and unsanitary living conditions, the restriction to earning a living by dealing second hand items, and the forced sermons wherein preachers beseeched them to abandon their false rejection of

\textsuperscript{17} Stow, “The Papacy and the Jews,” 263.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{19} Benjamin Ravid, “Cum Nimis Absurdum and the Ancona Auto-da-Fé Revisited: Their Impact on Venice and Some Wider Reflections” \textit{Jewish History} 26, no. 1/2 (May 2012): 86.
\textsuperscript{20} Siegmund, \textit{The Medici State}, 55, 57. Once again this Bull excluded from expulsion the Jews confined to ghettos in Rome and Ancona.
\textsuperscript{21} Stow, “The Papacy and the Jews,” 263.
Christ, few Jews chose to convert. To the chagrin of the reforming popes, most of the Jews were, as Waagenaar writes, “bad joiners.” Although it failed to instigate mass conversions, *Cum Nimis Absurdum* was the tool with which the papacy tried to instigate uniformity concerning the position of Jews across all Catholic states. Its timely reinforcement of existing anti-Jewish canons reflects the reforming desire to neutralize Judaism as a potential threat to Catholic orthodoxy.

While Pius V exempted Roman Jews from expulsion with the aim of converting them, their coreligionists in the Papal States trading city of Ancona were likewise confined rather than banned, although toward a different end. Since the expulsion of Jews from Portugal and Spain in 1492 and 1497 respectively, many Jews had journeyed east to the Ottoman Empire, and some of these exiles later removed to Italian trade cities. Ancona was only one of several cities that tried to attract Jewish merchants who might bring with them mercantile relationships with the Ottomans. Paul III had invited “merchants of various origins,” including Jews, to Ancona for trade, thereby setting a precedent of Jewish residency which was later exploited, rather than undone, by reformist popes.

Unlike Rome, where ghettoization followed the issue of *Cum Nimis Absurdum*, Venetian Jews had already been confined to a ghetto since 1516, one year before Martin Luther posted his inflammatory theses, and decades before the decrees of the reformist popes. Indeed, the term *ghetto* seems to have been a

23 Ibid., 195.
Venetian invention of uncertain origins. Similar to Ancona, many of the Jews who migrated to Venice had been banished from Spain and Portugal and had subsequently spent time in the Ottoman Empire. Venetian rulers hoped that these Jews, if controlled, could promote profitable trade in the state; however, as the number of Jewish merchants in Venice increased, discontent grew among its Catholic majority. A ghetto was created as a compromise. Yet, by 1541 there were enough Jews in Venice to necessitate a second ghetto. Already banned from owning real estate in Venice since 1423, once segregated Jews could not buy homes even in the ghetto. They also faced employment restrictions confining them to specific trades, and had to wear distinguishing apparel at all times. Such loathsome garments had a long history within European Jewry, and this legacy of visible distinction did not make them more welcome. By the time that Venice instituted its second ghetto the state had already established its reputation for rebuffing papal authority, and it should be noted that the state did not restrict its Jews as much as either Paul IV or Pius V recommended. It was perhaps some consolation that, after the issue of Cum Nimis Absurdum, Venetian Jews, who were already living in ghettos, continued to enjoy the freedom to practice Judaism and to have synagogues within the ghetto walls.

Throughout the fifteen-forties the Venetian Senate continually issued short-term contracts, permitting Jewish merchants to trade. In addition to these merchants, the Venetian

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29 Arbel, Trading Nations, 3; Ravid, “The First Charter,” 188.
31 Ibid., 190.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid., 190-191.
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state also wished to exploit Jewish moneylenders. As early as 1516 the Senate began negotiating five-year contracts with the ghettoized Jewry, who obtained small concessions that allowed physicians to leave the ghetto after nightfall to treat patients and reduced the number of night-time hours the gates were locked in return for making loans.\(^{35}\) Through these negotiations, Jewish lenders effectively became pawnbrokers in 1523, when they agreed to pay ten thousand ducats per year in exchange for issuing pledge-based loans at fifteen per cent interest and selling *strazzaria* (literally, rags; colloquially, second hand goods) inside the ghetto.\(^{36}\) The Senate granted similar charters as each one lapsed until 1565, when the senators briefly decided to let it expire.\(^{37}\) This decision, made while the Tridentine reforms were still relatively fresh, meant that those Jews who were no longer under contract would have to leave the ghetto once the charter expired. However, pecuniary concerns overcame other reformist considerations, and the contract was renewed just before its expiry “in light of the realization that the Christian poor... had nowhere else to turn.”\(^{38}\)

Regardless of these partial concessions, the perceived economic usefulness of the Jews did not nullify the long-standing anxiety that many Catholics held about the presence of religious outsiders. On the contrary, the prevalence of acute anti-Jewish sentiment during the Catholic Reformation is evidenced by discussions that commenced between Venice and the Papal States in 1570 with regards to expelling the Jews from Venice and Ancona simultaneously. The idea was to remove them from both cities without either competitor gaining a long-term advantage.

\(^{35}\) Davis and Ravid, *The Jews*, 10.

\(^{36}\) Ibid., 11.

\(^{37}\) Ibid., 12.

\(^{38}\) Ibid.
from their trade connections.\textsuperscript{39} Such an expulsion was not realized, but other restrictions continued to plague the Venetian Jewry.

Like Venice, Florence was unwilling to yield completely to papal authority. In her work on the Florentine ghetto, Stefanie B. Siegmund argues that it was primarily “statecraft” that drove the ghettoization of the Medici State.\textsuperscript{40} According to Siegmund, Cosimo de’ Medici, who became duke in 1537 and continued to enjoy de facto power after abdicating in favour of his son in 1574, was a cunning statesman whose self-promotion induced him to defer to papal authority while simultaneously asserting his own power within Florence in order to negate any need for papal interference.\textsuperscript{41} Toward this end, in 1570 Cosimo made Florence the first city outside of the Papal States to establish a ghetto in accordance with Pius V’s papal bull, thereby demonstrating esteem for the papacy, while simultaneously affirming his control over the city.\textsuperscript{42}

Despite Siegmund’s emphasis on political motivations, the ghettoization of Florence was still fostered by the climate of Catholic reform. Regardless of his motives, Cosimo exploited the heightened anti-Jewish hostilities and anxieties of the moment to curry papal favour. This is evidenced, as Siegmund herself concedes, by the sudden change in Cosimo’s position toward his Jewish subjects that followed the conclusion of the Council of Trent. From the beginning of his ducal reign, Cosimo had encouraged and even invited Jewish merchants into his realm in order to grow its trade economy, and he maintained this pragmatically neutral approach for the first three decades of his

\textsuperscript{39} Arbel, \textit{Trading Nations}, 69.
\textsuperscript{40} Siegmund, \textit{The Medici State}, 55.
\textsuperscript{41} Ibid., 58.
\textsuperscript{42} Ibid.
rule. Despite the relatively favourable environment that Cosimo had fostered in Florence, his position toward the Jews changed radically in the post-Tridentine years. In 1563 he acquiesced to papal policy by ordering his Jewish subjects to wear distinguishing garments, and 1570, in accordance with Pius V’s sweeping call for ghettoization or expulsion, the duke initiated the segregation of the Florentine Jewry.

The reforming zeal of post-Tridentine Italy affected Cosimo’s subjects as well as the duke himself. Indeed, the men who administrated the creation of the ghetto, in particular Carlo Pitti, invoked “the language, feeling and faith concerns of the Catholic Reformation and of longstanding anti-Semitic traditions” as they prepared to sequester the Jews. Pitti, who actually favoured expulsion, worked for the Magistrato Supremo investigating the Jews, and in this position he collected materials that claimed to demonstrate Jewish crimes. The existence of such an investigation demonstrates the prevalence of hostile suspicion toward the Florentine Jewry. Moreover, Pitti, like his master Cosimo, exploited this unfriendly climate to advance himself socially and politically. Although Siegmund downplays the role of virulent anti-Jewish sentiments in post-Tridetine Florence in favour of her “statecraft” hypothesis, it is clear that they were present and that they worked in concert with individualistic political manoeuvring. In their acts of self-advancement, Florentine politicians exploited the popular anti-Jewish sentiments that the Catholic Reformation had bolstered, expressing anti-Jewish sentiments and pursuing anti-Jewish

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43 Ibid., 51-52.
44 Ibid., 56.
46 Ibid., 70.
policies. By their very expressions and actions against Florence’s Jewish population, notwithstanding their own personal prejudices, these politicians reinforced and likely heightened the anxieties that the population held concerning Jews as harmful Others.

As a testament to the fervour and spirit of the Catholic Reformation, cities and towns with Jewish populations throughout the Italian peninsula followed the example of Venice, Rome, Ancona, and Florence, and built the ghettos that would continue to confine Italian Jews for centuries. Whether the religious and secular leaders who established the ghettos and restricted their occupants were simply prejudiced against religious Others, as the case seems to be with Popes Paul IV and Pius V, or whether they dispassionately capitalized on the desire for religious conformity and the heightened sense of religious insecurity of the period, as Cosimo di Medici did, the Catholic Reformation played a vital role in both inspiring and facilitating the sudden shift from hostile indifference, peppered with bursts of violence, to widespread systematic subjugation. With the general population increasingly hostile toward Jews, and governmental institutions simultaneously unwilling to suffer the financial loses that they feared would result from total expulsion, religious and secular institutions alike settled instead for a grim compromise; by controlling the movements, occupations, and even apparel worn by their Jewish populations, the leaders of Rome, Venice, and Florence attempted to negotiate the precarious relationship between their Catholic states and the undesirable but seemingly necessary Jews that resided within them.

47 Ibid., 55.
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An Affair to Forget: The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists’ Fateful Relationship with the Abwehr

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It was not until Soviet Union dissolved that a truly independent Ukraine emerged. Long before this, and long before geographic unification after the Second World War, there were those that fought for an independent Ukraine. In 1929 many of them formed the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). It faced immense obstacles, so it sought help wherever it could. In the 1930s this assistance came from the Abwehr, Germany’s military intelligence service. The Abwehr wanted the OUN’s help mainly in provocation and sabotage missions in enemy lands. In return the Abwehr promised to help the OUN create a Ukrainian state. The relationship looked promising, but its foundations were unstable. Neither were committed to the promises they made, and both focused on their own goals, while ignoring disparities between the Abwehr’s declarations and official Nazi policy. Ultimately the relationship crumbled and proved to be a hindrance to both parties.

For centuries what we know as Ukraine was divided among various entities, confining the budding Ukrainian national consciousness largely to the western Ukrainian provinces. Myriad events between 1917 and 1921 coalesced to further complicate the Ukrainian situation.¹ The result was the failure of any bid during this time for Ukrainian unification and statehood. The eastern provinces, seemingly lacking in Ukrainian nationalist attachment, became Soviet Ukraine while the western provinces were subsumed into various successor states of Austria-Hungary. This impaired Ukrainian nationalism for two reasons: the only

¹ These events included the First World War, the Russian Revolutions of 1917, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the Russian Civil War, the treaties that concluded the world war, and various smaller territorial conflicts.
consolidated Ukraine identified not as Ukrainian but primarily as Soviet and states whose people’s national struggles had succeeded absorbed nationalistic western Ukrainians, dooming them to minority status. Concentrated largely in an increasingly authoritarian Poland during the interwar period, inveterate Ukrainian nationalists formed the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), a group devoted to achieving unified independence. The question of how to do this became fairly unimportant, and Nazi Germany seemed potentially helpful. Because of the Nazi leadership’s anti-Slavism, though, any German benefactors had to be peripheral figures. The OUN, therefore, connected with the only organization that would consider cooperating with it: the Abwehr, Germany’s military intelligence service. The OUN and the Abwehr began a pragmatic collaboration in the 1930s based on a mutual hatred of the USSR; however, the feebleness of the partnership’s founding logic, the eventual irreconcilability of their short-term goals, and the disparities present in Nazi policy ensured that the relationship was consumed by tension and confusion, ultimately proving to be counterproductive.

The ethnically Ukrainian provinces of Galicia, Volhynia, Transcarpathia, and Bukovyna were incorporated, at various times, into the Habsburg empire. Here they were subject to “divide-and-rule nationality policies” that encouraged the empire’s various peoples to pursue nation-building in order to focus grievances not on the throne but on each other.  

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2 Place names of Ukrainian areas and cities in this paper are transliterations to English from Ukrainian rather than from Russian, Polish, or German. Bukovyna is often seen as “Bukovina;” Kyiv is most recognized when transliterated as “Kiev;” and Lviv is often found as “Lvov”, “Lwow”, or “Lemberg.”

3 Miroslav Yurkevich, “Galician Ukrainians in German Military Formations and in the German Administration,” in Ukraine During World War II: History
Consequently, these provinces became Europeanized and nationalistic. This was particularly true of Galicia, making it the epicentre of Ukrainian nationalism. However, the western Ukrainians’ eastern brethren, having been ruled by the autocratic Russian tsars who severely repressed their minorities’ national development, felt little solidarity with the national plight. Following Russia’s February Revolution of 1917, the Ukrainian People’s Republic was formed and subsequently proclaimed independence. However, in the Great War and the Russian Civil War the eastern Ukrainians allied themselves with the new Soviet forces, which allowed the Soviets to claim the eastern Ukrainian lands. This result denied the western provinces support that may have made their bid for statehood successful. After Austria-Hungary lost the First World War, these betrayed provinces were granted to several of its successor states by way of various treaties. The post-war settlements proved that the world’s democracies would not be offering their supposedly beloved principle of self-determination to the Ukrainian people.\(^4\) The liberal states, like the eastern Ukrainians, had deserted the Ukrainian national project, leaving its champions isolated.

Understandably, this embittered the staunch Ukrainian nationalists as they saw all those states that had been awarded Ukrainian territory -- Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union -- as occupying powers.\(^5\) However, the continued division and occupation of Ukrainian territories also strengthened the nationalists’ resolve. In 1921, members of the betrayed and

\(^4\) Ibid., 67-69.

short-lived independent Ukraine formed the Ukrainian Military Organization (UMO), which committed open acts of violence in Galicia and Volhynia against their new Polish regime.\(^6\) The UMO, under the leadership of Colonel Yevhen Konovalets, became the premier Ukrainian national movement when Symon Petliura, the leader of another (unnamed) movement, was murdered in 1926.\(^7\) Although the UMO believed the occupation of Ukrainian territories was unjust and in need of correction, it did not have a single mission or plan, making the acts of political terror it committed somewhat directionless. This would eventually change as in 1929 the UMO united with student nationalist groups from various western Ukrainian territories to form the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN).\(^8\)

The OUN possessed a more concrete doctrine and agenda. When political affiliations had developed in Ukrainian territories in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, nationalist Ukrainians, by default and definition, subscribed to more right-wing ideals. They elaborated on these politics in the interwar period, and the OUN ideology came to resemble those of various contemporaneous pseudo- and actual fascists. It did not, however, self-identify as fascist but rather as integral nationalist,\(^9\) and was careful in disassociating itself from foreign movements while still sharing characteristics with them.\(^10\) As explained by Ukrainian historian Bohdan Krawchenko, overall the OUN:

\[^{6}\text{Yurkevich, “Galician Ukrainians,” 68.}\]
\[^{7}\text{Jansen and de Jong, “Stalin’s Hand in Rotterdam,” 678.}\]
\[^{8}\text{Yurkeyvich, “Galician Ukrainians,” 68.}\]
\[^{9}\text{David Marples, Heroes and Villains: Creating National History in Contemporary Ukraine (New York, NY: Central European University Press, 2007), 79.}\]
\[^{10}\text{Yurkevich, “Galician Ukrainians,” 68.}\]
propagated a brand of revolutionary integral nationalism, emphasizing volunteerism, self-sacrifice, discipline, and obedience to the leadership. Apart from a militant attachment to Ukrainian independence, its political and social program was confused with an unimaginative recast of Italian fascism within an essentially populist framework.\textsuperscript{11}

In addition to these and the acceptance of terrorist measures, their beliefs also included vehement anti-communism and anti-Semitism, convictions more synchronized with Nazism.\textsuperscript{12} Several prominent OUN members, however, denounced the Nazis’ imperialistic, racist, and anti-Christian tendencies.\textsuperscript{13} Like the Nazis and other interwar European nationalist or fascist groups, though, the OUN rejected the principles of liberal democracy.\textsuperscript{14} Aside from the necessities of ultra-nationalist politics, this is unsurprising given that liberal democracy had already rejected Ukrainian nationalism. The ultimate goal of the OUN’s leadership implied by this set of principles was to forge an independent, dictatorial Ukraine by any means necessary, hence their willingness to commit terrorist acts. Over the course of the 1930s, the organization, with varying levels of success, attempted to assassinate various Polish officials in an effort to achieve their goals.\textsuperscript{15}

Like the OUN’s predecessor, the UMO, the Abwehr was founded in 1921 as a sort of rebirth, a glorious disconnect with

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  \item \textsuperscript{12} Kate Brown, Biography of No Place: From Ethnic Borderland to Soviet Hinterland (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), 214.
  \item \textsuperscript{13} Yurkevich, “Galician Ukrainians,’ 69.
  \item \textsuperscript{14} Ibid., 68.
  \item \textsuperscript{15} Brown, Biography of No Place, 214.
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the recent embarrassing past.\textsuperscript{16} While the UMO was to rejuvenate Ukrainian nationalism on the ashes of the defeated Ukrainian state for the sake of a future one, the Abwehr was meant to rejuvenate German military intelligence on the ashes of the defeated Second Reich for the sake of the new Weimar Republic. Despite these intentions it quickly became nearly defunct due to an extreme lack of resources. The Treaty of Versailles severely limited the new German military, thus also limiting its intelligence service.\textsuperscript{17} During the first two years of Nazi rule, the Abwehr remained small, though it presided over the tasks of keeping secret Germany’s furtive military expansion and surveilling future Reich territory. Its resources, duties, and prestige were expanded beginning in 1935 when Germany began open rearmament and remilitarization.\textsuperscript{18} Expanding the military necessitated the expansion of its intelligence service; however, because the Abwehr was created during the Weimar period and was not a Nazi Party body, it was consistently overlooked and crippled by other, firmly pro-Nazi intelligence agencies within Germany.\textsuperscript{19}

The Abwehr’s missions following Adolf Hitler’s open renunciation of Versailles included establishing and running intelligence networks and pro-Nazi propaganda campaigns in lands that were to be occupied or annexed by the Reich; commando raids and acts of sabotage; disseminating false information to Germany’s enemies regarding its plans; penetrating foreign intelligence services and planting agents

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\item[16] Christopher Jörgensen, Hitler’s Espionage Machine: German Intelligence Agencies and Operations During World War II (Kent, UK: Brown Reference Group, 2004), 25.
\item[18] Ibid., 8.
\end{footnotes}
within them; and counter-intelligence. Because Germany’s other intelligence services were not mandated to work outside Germany, the Abwehr was ostensibly intended to be integral to Germany’s war preparations. The lack of regard and oversight by the highest echelons of the Party, however, decreased the Abwehr’s significance but also granted it a decent amount of license regarding its chosen affiliates. This allowed it to establish relations with the OUN in the mid-to-late 1930s regardless of Hitler’s open disdain for the Slavic people and his well-known ambitions regarding the Ukrainian territories.

The OUN’s rationale for accepting the Abwehr’s assistance was quite simple and pragmatic. The Treaty of Versailles had maintained and entrenched Ukrainian fragmentation and overturning it seemed like the logical way to unify Ukraine and claim independence, and Nazi Germany was, as of 1935, overtly disobeying and dismantling the treaty. Other countries’ regimes, such as Italy’s, were more aligned with the OUN’s overall brand of nationalism and also sought to topple Versailles but lacked the power to do so, leaving Germany as the OUN’s only choice for benefactor. Moreover, because most Ukrainian territory was in a Soviet stranglehold, war with the USSR was seen as the only way to liberate this mass of Ukrainian land and war with the USSR was what Germany desired. The Ukrainian nationalists’ earlier connections with Germany

20 Ibid., 27.
21 Paine, German Military Intelligence in World War II, 9.
22 Ukrainian territories were crucial in Hitler’s Lebensraum visions. Ukrainian cities were to be razed to the ground, the people made into slaves of the Reich, and the rich Ukrainian land used to feed the people of Germany. This was a policy area closed for discussion, as Hitler vividly recalled that during the First World War, the Allied Blockade had hurt Germany so much because it was unable to access the wheat fields of Ukraine. Hitler was not willing to relive this mistake.
probably also contributed to the close connection the OUN established with the Abwehr. Germany had sponsored the brief Ukrainian republic in exchange for considerable influence over its administration, and Weimar Germany had continued to be almost the last bastion of hope for Ukrainian nationalists in the 1920s.24 This was despite the Weimar government’s standing as a liberal democracy created by the same people that kept Ukraine fractured; its frequent socialist leanings; its economics collapse; and the amiable connections it made with the USSR. If the Ukrainian nationalists could continue to place their hopes on Germany throughout this period, the OUN’s supposition that Nazi Germany, which it shared far more with ideologically than Weimar Germany, appears logical. Besides, as was already mentioned, the OUN was willing to do whatever was necessary to achieve Ukrainian independence. This included not only acts of violence but also a willingness to collaborate with anyone deemed potentially useful. Nazi Germany, as Soviet Russia’s antithesis, fit this description best; this notion was reinforced throughout the 1930s, first with the famine in Soviet Ukraine then with the Stalinist terror, when the anti-Soviet sentiments of the Ukrainian national movement were buttressed further.25

The Abwehr’s reasoning was equally simple and pragmatic. Because it represented a sort of continuity with Weimar and was not directly affixed to the Nazi Party, the ideological commitment of its personnel was frequently either

25 Per Rudling, “Historical Representation of the Wartime Accounts of the Activities of the OUN-UPA (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists - Ukrainian Insurgent Army),” East European Jewish Affairs 36, no. 2 (November 2006): 165.
nonexistent or questionable.\textsuperscript{26} Even for those officials who were pro-Nazi, the reality of what needed to be done to achieve Germany’s goals took precedence over ideology. Like the OUN, then, the Abwehr was willing to get involved with whomever was necessary for its own success. Knowing that one of the agency’s most important missions was to prepare Ukrainian territory for the German “liberators,” a task that required the support of the Ukrainian people, it followed that the best way to do this would be to enlist the help of actual Ukrainians. Accepting the OUN into the German orbit, then, made sense. It was fighting the hardest against foreign rule of Ukrainian territories and, accordingly, was expected to be able to garner support while gathering information on and sabotaging enemies of Germany, particularly the Poles. For these reasons the Abwehr sought out Ukrainian nationalists to deploy as agents, saboteurs, and provocateurs, primarily in Galicia,\textsuperscript{27} who proved particularly useful in relaying information on the Polish government.\textsuperscript{28} When war became imminent, the Abwehr increased its employment of willing OUN members in preparation. In exchange for the OUN’s cooperation, the Abwehr promised its support for the OUN’s efforts to establish a pro-German Ukrainian state and provided money and training for OUN activities.\textsuperscript{29} An immediate, concrete manifestation of this support was the Abwehr’s training, beginning in 1938, of the OUN’s more militant and revolutionary elements under prominent member Stepan Bandera.

Though the OUN-Abwehr relationship looked promising, there were various indications that Nazi Germany at large would not honour any victories that Ukrainian nationalists might claim.

\textsuperscript{26} Jörgensen, Hitler’s Espionage Machine, 25.
\textsuperscript{27} Ibid., 122.
\textsuperscript{28} Yurkevych, “Galician Ukrainians,” 69.
\textsuperscript{29} Brown, A Biography of No Place, 214.
The most obvious was Hitler’s vision for Ukraine and the related stream of Germany’s anti-Slavic propaganda. However, because the OUN was dealing solely with the Abwehr -- which had offered assurance of Germany’s support for Ukrainian statehood - - and not with more powerful Party officials, it was able to naively and temporarily ignore the racist, anti-Slavic, and imperialist nature of Nazi visions for the East.\textsuperscript{30} This would not last long.

Nazi Germany demonstrated quite clearly in 1939 that it was not nearly as supportive of the OUN’s ambitions as the Abwehr had indicated. First, Transcarpathia was granted to Hungary after Germany invaded and dismembered Czechoslovakia in March of 1939, demonstrating that Hungarian support was more important to the Nazis than Ukrainian support. This gave the Ukrainian nationalists “their first glimpse of the two faces of German policy, and they could expect more.”\textsuperscript{31} The next glimpse came only months later in August 1939 with the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.\textsuperscript{32} Not only had Germany demonstrated a preference for Hungary, a hesitant ally, but now it was seemingly renouncing its aggressive stance towards the Soviet Union, the position that originally attracted the Ukrainian nationalists to the German orbit. Beyond that, the Pact’s secret protocols placed Galicia and Volhynia into Soviet Ukraine when the dual invasion of Poland occurred and allowed the USSR to claim Bukovyna in June 1940. This meant that every Ukrainian territory, save for Transcarpathia, had been absorbed into the USSR with significant assistance from the OUN’s supposed patron. The logic that held the OUN and the Abwehr together --

\textsuperscript{30} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{32} Jörgensen, Hitler’s Espionage Machine, 123.
seething hatred of the USSR -- was beginning to show its practical weakness in the face of Nazi Germany’s frequent discontinuity in policy.

This appeared to spell the end of the OUN’s ambitions for an independent Ukraine, or at least a German-sponsored one, particularly since Hitler ordered, in accordance with the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreements, an end to the Abwehr’s training of Ukrainian nationalists. Additionally, Joachim von Ribbentrop, Germany’s foreign minister and signatory to the original Pact, was made to sign a supplementary secret protocol on 28 September 1939 that “obliged the German government to ‘suppress all agitation in their territories which affected the territory of the other Party.’” Germany’s intelligence services were to cease operations in Soviet territory, effectively ending the Abwehr’s involvement with the OUN -- but this break was short-lived. After a year, near the end of 1940, Germany began its planning for Operation Barbarossa, the upcoming invasion of the Soviet Union. This was incredibly encouraging to the OUN as it revealed that the non-aggression pact had in fact been insincere.

The preparations for Barbarossa meant a rekindling of OUN-Abwehr relations, and the prospect of establishing a Ukrainian state became promising once again. There was, however, one important event from that year of inactivity regarding the relationship: the OUN’s split into two rival factions, which was to have serious implications for OUN-Abwehr relations. Konovalets had been murdered in 1938 by Soviet forces and two members -- Andriy Melnyk and Stepan Bandera -- rose to fill the ensuing leadership vacuum. However, Melnyk and Bandera had different ideas regarding policy, strategy, and

33 Ibid.
34 Reitlinger, The House Built on Sand, 165.
35 Ibid.
composition of the organization’s leadership. Correspondingly, each had different support bases. Melnyk’s supporters came mostly from the older, more intellectual, and less reactionary base of the OUN whose involvement in the organization was often policy-related and fairly removed from the group’s daily actions. Bandera’s supporters were younger, more militant members that had, essentially, been tasked with carrying out the theories and policies of Melnyk’s supporters. The two groups could not be reconciled. After the schism, Melnyk’s faction (OUN-M) sought to achieve its goals by submitting to Germany’s direction, while Bandera’s faction (OUN-B) took a more radical approach, seeking to manipulate Germany and use it to obtain independence for Ukraine more immediately and in a more dramatic, overtly revolutionary fashion. When the Abwehr reenlisted the OUN’s services in its Barbarossa preparations, it was forced to do so considering this new situation. Though it initially recruited from both factions, the radical and youthful nature of the OUN-B was more appealing for the purposes of invasion and thus it was employed more extensively, while the OUN-M became virtually excluded from German operations.

The main way in which the Abwehr now incorporated OUN members into German service was to create and train two Ukrainian military units -- named Roland and Nachtigall -- that would participate in the invasion of Soviet Ukraine. They were intended to make the Wehrmacht’s advance into and occupation

37 Yurkevich, “Galician Ukrainians,” 70.
of Ukraine easier by fostering anti-Soviet and pro-German feelings in the local population and by fighting the Red Army and anti-German partisans.\textsuperscript{40} This is why the Abwehr preferred to select Ukrainian agents and fighters from the OUN-B -- Melnyk’s supporters were mostly older and less fit for military duty, making them less prepared to physically fight for Ukraine.\textsuperscript{41} However, the OUN-B’s more radical nature and physical capabilities, though useful for Germany in the short-term, became an important factor in the unravelling of its relationship with the Abwehr.

There were various reasons for the OUN to find this new relationship promising. The Abwehr had assured the OUN that in exchange for encouraging Ukrainian support for Germany and anti-Soviet activity, it would assist in establishing an independent Ukraine. Although Bandera agreed to the Abwehr’s proposal, he intended to rally support not for Germany but rather purely for Ukrainian independence. The German invasion of Soviet Ukraine with the inclusion of Roland and Nachtigall became a convenient entry method into Ukrainian territory for the nationalists, and the Abwehr’s expert training of the units was a way to train OUN-B forces for action against anyone, once in Soviet Ukraine, who stood opposed to their plans.\textsuperscript{42} Although Bandera remained pledged to Ukraine rather than to the German Reich, and was prepared to abandon ties with Germany should they be an obstacle to independence,\textsuperscript{43} he initially believed that the Abwehr, and perhaps other German forces, would assist in the foundation

\textsuperscript{40} Basil Dmytryshyn, “The SS Division Galicia, 1943-1945,” in Ukraine: The Challenges of World War II, ed. Taras Hunczak and Dmytro Shtohryn (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2003), 211.
\textsuperscript{41} Jörgensen, Hitler’s Espionage Machine, 123.
\textsuperscript{42} Dmytryshyn, “The SS Division Galicia,” 211.
\textsuperscript{43} Stojko, “Ukrainian National Aspirations,” 16.
of the Ukrainian state. The Abwehr, after all, had promised to do so for some time and had appeared to at least tacitly endorse the rousing of pro-Ukrainian sentiments, as did other German entities. The decision to invade the Soviet Union, violating the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, seemed to indicate that the Nazi leadership’s anti-Sovietism did trump its hatred of other Slavic peoples and that perhaps the suppression of anyone who came out as anti-Soviet would not be a priority. Additionally, Alfred Rosenberg, one of the Nazis’ leading Lebensraum ideologues, had crafted a potential plan for a conquered Ukraine in which it would be independent with close German supervision until the time was ripe for outright colonization, though this was clause would be kept secret from Ukrainians.44 He had even, in April 1941, transmitted these ideas to top Wehrmacht and Abwehr officials, who would be the ones in charge of implementing high policy.45

Thus to the OUN, more important and influential sectors of Nazi Germany appeared to support the plans they had agreed to with the Abwehr.

However, Hitler held the ultimate power to make decisions about the eastern territories. Even eminent ideologues and officials such as Rosenberg, let alone the lowly Abwehr, had no right to propagate such ideas because the highest Party officials remained unabashedly opposed to the existence of a Ukrainian state because of Hitler’s long-established racial principles,46 something the OUN and the Abwehr naively ignored. When Barbarossa began, though, this became astonishingly clear.

45 Mulligan, The Politics of Illusion and Empire, 10.
and their relationship quickly disintegrated. Because the invasion was proceeding with wild success, Berlin no longer needed to allow the use of OUN services. Many Ukrainians were already grateful to be freed from the Soviet yoke,\(^47\) and those that opposed the German presence could be easily crushed. Germany believed at the beginning of the occupation of Soviet Ukraine that it did not need to court Ukrainians and, accordingly, could abandon any facade of its endorsement of the Ukrainian national movement.

The actions of the OUN also departed from the plans made between itself and the Abwehr. As soon as OUN-B forces crossed into Ukrainian territory, they promptly organized a Ukrainian National Committee to “serve as an instrument for organizing all Ukrainian national forces for the liberation of the homeland” to turn anti-Soviet sentiments not into pro-German feeling but rather support for the Ukrainian nation.\(^48\) The biggest assertion of the OUN-B’s intentions, however, came on 30 June 1941 when it proclaimed Ukraine’s independence in Lviv, the capital of Galicia. The Abwehr and the Wehrmacht did support the proclamation -- as both they and the OUN believed the proclamation reflected their agreed upon plan, thus not viewing it as necessarily anti-German -- but Nazi leaders thought otherwise and quickly cracked down on the OUN. The Gestapo and the Sicherheitsdienst (SD) arrested OUN-B leaders, including Bandera, and interred them in concentration camps when they refused to renounce the 30 June proclamation. Shortly thereafter, the OUN-M’s leaders were also arrested and sent to concentration camps before they could proclaim independence in Kyiv.

\(^{47}\) Samuel Mitcham, Jr., Crumbling Empire: The German Defeat in the East, 1944 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2001), 69.

\(^{48}\) Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism, 53.
Hereafter both factions would be comprehensively repressed.49 Within only several weeks of the start of Barbarossa, then, the German high command managed to utterly destroy any OUN-Abwehr connections. The radical character of the OUN-B that the Abwehr favoured so much had ultimately hindered the ability of either party to achieve what they had intended and proved to be an important factor in the relatively easy obliteration of their cordial relations.

This ease of destruction is understandable, however, considering that their relationship was neither transparent nor built on honest mutual support but rather upon insincere, pragmatic motivations or, at best, a mutual misunderstanding of German high policy. It was only after the 30 June proclamation that either party grasped this, and this realization together with the fallout of the rupture further reinforced the fragility of their relationship. The wholesale repression of the OUN, unsurprisingly, caused both factions to turn against the Germans for the duration of the war. Even with their leaders incarcerated and the organization forced underground, OUN members began actively and indiscriminately working against the Germans. They did so by not only fostering intense anti-German sentiments among local populations and making recruitment of locals for administrative assistance increasingly difficult,50 but also by actively and violently resisting the German forces with the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), the name given to Ukrainian nationalist partisan formations created in 1942 under the auspices of the OUN.51

The UPA’s activities -- the ultimate result of the OUN-Abwehr relationship -- proved to be a hindrance for the Abwehr

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50 Dymytryshyn, “The SS Division Galicia,” 212.
51 Reitlinger, The House Built on Sand, 169.
and the Wehrmacht and, ironically, the Ukrainian nationalists themselves. It made the duties and advancement of the Abwehr and the Wehrmacht more difficult even though the Abwehr’s collaboration with the OUN had been designed to make Ukraine easier to subdue. As for the Ukrainian nationalists, though more committed than ever to the Ukrainian nation, these insurgent activities hindered their ability to create it as their resistance against the Germans distracted from anti-Soviet activity. A lack of consolidated, consistent resistance against the Red Army possibly contributed to the USSR’s victory in the war and its subsequent occupation of territories that firmly placed all of Ukraine in the Soviet Union. This was exactly what the OUN had fought so hard against for so long, yet its mismanaged and unstable relationship with German military intelligence led directly to its inability to effectively fight the Soviets. In other words, the OUN became an obstacle not only to its only patron but also to itself.

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