

An Affair to Forget: The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists' Fateful Relationship with the Abwehr

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It was not until Soviet Union dissolved that a truly independent Ukraine emerged. Long before this, and long before geographic unification after the Second World War, there were those that fought for an independent Ukraine. In 1929 many of them formed the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). It faced immense obstacles, so it sought help wherever it could. In the 1930s this assistance came from the Abwehr, Germany's military intelligence service. The Abwehr wanted the OUN's help mainly in provocation and sabotage missions in enemy lands. In return the Abwehr promised to help the OUN create a Ukrainian state. The relationship looked promising, but its foundations were unstable. Neither were committed to the promises they made, and both focused on their own goals, while ignoring disparities between the Abwehr's declarations and official Nazi policy. Ultimately the relationship crumbled and proved to be a hindrance to both parties.

For centuries what we know as Ukraine was divided among various entities, confining the budding Ukrainian national consciousness largely to the western Ukrainian provinces. Myriad events between 1917 and 1921 coalesced to further complicate the Ukrainian situation.¹ The result was the failure of any bid during this time for Ukrainian unification and statehood. The eastern provinces, seemingly lacking in Ukrainian nationalist attachment, became Soviet Ukraine while the western provinces were subsumed into various successor states of Austria-Hungary. This impaired Ukrainian nationalism for two reasons: the only

¹ These events included the First World War, the Russian Revolutions of 1917, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the Russian Civil War, the treaties that concluded the world war, and various smaller territorial conflicts.

consolidated Ukraine identified not as Ukrainian but primarily as Soviet and states whose people's national struggles had succeeded absorbed nationalistic western Ukrainians, dooming them to minority status. Concentrated largely in an increasingly authoritarian Poland during the interwar period, inveterate Ukrainian nationalists formed the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), a group devoted to achieving unified independence. The question of how to do this became fairly unimportant, and Nazi Germany seemed potentially helpful. Because of the Nazi leadership's anti-Slavism, though, any German benefactors had to be peripheral figures. The OUN, therefore, connected with the only organization that would consider cooperating with it: the Abwehr, Germany's military intelligence service. The OUN and the Abwehr began a pragmatic collaboration in the 1930s based on a mutual hatred of the USSR; however, the feebleness of the partnership's founding logic, the eventual irreconcilability of their short-term goals, and the disparities present in Nazi policy ensured that the relationship was consumed by tension and confusion, ultimately proving to be counterproductive.

The ethnically Ukrainian provinces of Galicia, Volhynia, Transcarpathia, and Bukovyna were incorporated, at various times, into the Habsburg empire.² Here they were subject to "divide-and-rule nationality policies" that encouraged the empire's various peoples to pursue nation-building in order to focus grievances not on the throne but on each other.³

² Place names of Ukrainian areas and cities in this paper are transliterations to English from Ukrainian rather than from Russian, Polish, or German. Bukovyna is often seen as "Bukovina;" Kyiv is most recognized when transliterated as "Kiev;" and Lviv is often found as "Lvov", "Lwow", or "Lemberg."

³ Miroslav Yurkevich, "Galician Ukrainians in German Military Formations and in the German Administration," in *Ukraine During World War II: History*

Consequently, these provinces became Europeanized and nationalistic. This was particularly true of Galicia, making it the epicentre of Ukrainian nationalism. However, the western Ukrainians' eastern brethren, having been ruled by the autocratic Russian tsars who severely repressed their minorities' national development, felt little solidarity with the national plight. Following Russia's February Revolution of 1917, the Ukrainian People's Republic was formed and subsequently proclaimed independence. However, in the Great War and the Russian Civil War the eastern Ukrainians allied themselves with the new Soviet forces, which allowed the Soviets to claim the eastern Ukrainian lands. This result denied the western provinces support that may have made their bid for statehood successful. After Austria-Hungary lost the First World War, these betrayed provinces were granted to several of its successor states by way of various treaties. The post-war settlements proved that the world's democracies would not be offering their supposedly beloved principle of self-determination to the Ukrainian people.⁴ The liberal states, like the eastern Ukrainians, had deserted the Ukrainian national project, leaving its champions isolated.

Understandably, this embittered the staunch Ukrainian nationalists as they saw all those states that had been awarded Ukrainian territory -- Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union -- as occupying powers.⁵ However, the continued division and occupation of Ukrainian territories also strengthened the nationalists' resolve. In 1921, members of the betrayed and

and its Aftermath - A Symposium, ed. Yury Boshyk (Edmonton, AB: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1986), 67.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 67-69.

⁵ Marc Jansen and Ben de Jong, "Stalin's Hand in Rotterdam: The Murder of Ukrainian Nationalist Yevhen Konovalts in May 1938," *Intelligence and National Security* 9, no. 4 (January 2008): 678.

short-lived independent Ukraine formed the Ukrainian Military Organization (UMO), which committed open acts of violence in Galicia and Volhynia against their new Polish regime.⁶ The UMO, under the leadership of Colonel Yevhen Konovalets, became the premier Ukrainian national movement when Symon Petliura, the leader of another (unnamed) movement, was murdered in 1926.⁷ Although the UMO believed the occupation of Ukrainian territories was unjust and in need of correction, it did not have a single mission or plan, making the acts of political terror it committed somewhat directionless. This would eventually change as in 1929 the UMO united with student nationalist groups from various western Ukrainian territories to form the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN).⁸

The OUN possessed a more concrete doctrine and agenda. When political affiliations had developed in Ukrainian territories in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, nationalist Ukrainians, by default and definition, subscribed to more right-wing ideals. They elaborated on these politics in the interwar period, and the OUN ideology came to resemble those of various contemporaneous pseudo- and actual fascists. It did not, however, self-identify as fascist but rather as integral nationalist,⁹ and was careful in disassociating itself from foreign movements while still sharing characteristics with them.¹⁰ As explained by Ukrainian historian Bohdan Krawchenko, overall the OUN:

⁶ Yurkevich, "Galician Ukrainians," 68.

⁷ Jansen and de Jong, "Stalin's Hand in Rotterdam," 678.

⁸ Yurkevich, "Galician Ukrainians," 68.

⁹ David Marples, *Heroes and Villains: Creating National History in Contemporary Ukraine* (New York, NY: Central European University Press, 2007), 79.

¹⁰ Yurkevich, "Galician Ukrainians," 68.

propagated a brand of revolutionary integral nationalism, emphasizing volunteerism, self-sacrifice, discipline, and obedience to the leadership. Apart from a militant attachment to Ukrainian independence, its political and social program was confused with an unimaginative recast of Italian fascism within an essentially populist framework.¹¹

In addition to these and the acceptance of terrorist measures, their beliefs also included vehement anti-communism and anti-Semitism, convictions more synchronized with Nazism.¹² Several prominent OUN members, however, denounced the Nazis' imperialistic, racist, and anti-Christian tendencies.¹³ Like the Nazis and other interwar European nationalist or fascist groups, though, the OUN rejected the principles of liberal democracy.¹⁴ Aside from the necessities of ultra-nationalist politics, this is unsurprising given that liberal democracy had already rejected Ukrainian nationalism. The ultimate goal of the OUN's leadership implied by this set of principles was to forge an independent, dictatorial Ukraine by any means necessary, hence their willingness to commit terrorist acts. Over the course of the 1930s, the organization, with varying levels of success, attempted to assassinate various Polish officials in an effort to achieve their goals.¹⁵

Like the OUN's predecessor, the UMO, the *Abwehr* was founded in 1921 as a sort of rebirth, a glorious disconnect with

¹¹ Bohdan Krawchenko, "Soviet Ukraine Under Nazi Occupation, 1941-1944," in *Ukraine: The Challenges of World War II*, ed. Taras Hunczak and Dmytro Shtohryn (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2003), 40.

¹² Kate Brown, *Biography of No Place: From Ethnic Borderland to Soviet Hinterland* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), 214.

¹³ Yurkevich, "Galician Ukrainians," 69.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 68.

¹⁵ Brown, *Biography of No Place*, 214.

the recent embarrassing past.¹⁶ While the UMO was to rejuvenate Ukrainian nationalism on the ashes of the defeated Ukrainian state for the sake of a future one, the Abwehr was meant to rejuvenate German military intelligence on the ashes of the defeated Second Reich for the sake of the new Weimar Republic. Despite these intentions it quickly became nearly defunct due to an extreme lack of resources. The Treaty of Versailles severely limited the new German military, thus also limiting its intelligence service.¹⁷ During the first two years of Nazi rule, the Abwehr remained small, though it presided over the tasks of keeping secret Germany's furtive military expansion and surveilling future Reich territory. Its resources, duties, and prestige were expanded beginning in 1935 when Germany began open rearmament and remilitarization.¹⁸ Expanding the military necessitated the expansion of its intelligence service; however, because the Abwehr was created during the Weimar period and was not a Nazi Party body, it was consistently overlooked and crippled by other, firmly pro-Nazi intelligence agencies within Germany.¹⁹

The Abwehr's missions following Adolf Hitler's open renunciation of Versailles included establishing and running intelligence networks and pro-Nazi propaganda campaigns in lands that were to be occupied or annexed by the Reich; commando raids and acts of sabotage; disseminating false information to Germany's enemies regarding its plans; penetrating foreign intelligence services and planting agents

¹⁶ Christopher Jörgensen, *Hitler's Espionage Machine: German Intelligence Agencies and Operations During World War II* (Kent, UK: Brown Reference Group, 2004), 25.

¹⁷ Luran Paine, *German Military Intelligence in World War II: The Abwehr* (New York, NY: Stein and Day, 1984), 6.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 8.

¹⁹ Jörgensen, *Hitler's Espionage Machine*, 25.

within them; and counter-intelligence.²⁰ Because Germany's other intelligence services were not mandated to work outside Germany, the Abwehr was ostensibly intended to be integral to Germany's war preparations.²¹ The lack of regard and oversight by the highest echelons of the Party, however, decreased the Abwehr's significance but also granted it a decent amount of license regarding its chosen affiliates. This allowed it to establish relations with the OUN in the mid-to-late 1930s regardless of Hitler's open disdain for the Slavic people and his well-known ambitions regarding the Ukrainian territories.²²

The OUN's rationale for accepting the Abwehr's assistance was quite simple and pragmatic. The Treaty of Versailles had maintained and entrenched Ukrainian fragmentation and overturning it seemed like the logical way to unify Ukraine and claim independence, and Nazi Germany was, as of 1935, overtly disobeying and dismantling the treaty. Other countries' regimes, such as Italy's, were more aligned with the OUN's overall brand of nationalism and also sought to topple Versailles but lacked the power to do so, leaving Germany as the OUN's only choice for benefactor. Moreover, because most Ukrainian territory was in a Soviet stranglehold, war with the USSR was seen as the only way to liberate this mass of Ukrainian land and war with the USSR was what Germany desired.²³ The Ukrainian nationalists' earlier connections with Germany

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 27.

²¹ Paine, *German Military Intelligence in World War II*, 9.

²² Ukrainian territories were crucial in Hitler's *Lebensraum* visions. Ukrainian cities were to be razed to the ground, the people made into slaves of the Reich, and the rich Ukrainian land used to feed the people of Germany. This was a policy area closed for discussion, as Hitler vividly recalled that during the First World War, the Allied Blockade had hurt Germany so much because it was unable to access the wheat fields of Ukraine. Hitler was not willing to relive this mistake.

²³ Krawchenko, "Soviet Ukraine Under Nazi Occupation, 1941-1944," 40.

probably also contributed to the close connection the OUN established with the Abwehr. Germany had sponsored the brief Ukrainian republic in exchange for considerable influence over its administration, and Weimar Germany had continued to be almost the last bastion of hope for Ukrainian nationalists in the 1920s.²⁴ This was despite the Weimar government's standing as a liberal democracy created by the same people that kept Ukraine fractured; its frequent socialist leanings; its economic collapse; and the amiable connections it made with the USSR. If the Ukrainian nationalists could continue to place their hopes on Germany throughout this period, the OUN's supposition that Nazi Germany, which it shared far more with ideologically than Weimar Germany, appears logical. Besides, as was already mentioned, the OUN was willing to do whatever was necessary to achieve Ukrainian independence. This included not only acts of violence but also a willingness to collaborate with anyone deemed potentially useful. Nazi Germany, as Soviet Russia's antithesis, fit this description best; this notion was reinforced throughout the 1930s, first with the famine in Soviet Ukraine then with the Stalinist terror, when the anti-Soviet sentiments of the Ukrainian national movement were buttressed further.²⁵

The Abwehr's reasoning was equally simple and pragmatic. Because it represented a sort of continuity with Weimar and was not directly affixed to the Nazi Party, the ideological commitment of its personnel was frequently either

²⁴ Timothy Mulligan, *The Politics and Illusion of Empire: German Occupation Policy in the Soviet Union, 1942-1943* (New York, NY: Praeger Publishers, 1988), 61.

²⁵ Per Rudling, "Historical Representation of the Wartime Accounts of the Activities of the OUN-UPA (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists - Ukrainian Insurgent Army)," *East European Jewish Affairs* 36, no. 2 (November 2006): 165.

nonexistent or questionable.²⁶ Even for those officials who were pro-Nazi, the reality of what needed to be done to achieve Germany's goals took precedence over ideology. Like the OUN, then, the Abwehr was willing to get involved with whomever was necessary for its own success. Knowing that one of the agency's most important missions was to prepare Ukrainian territory for the German "liberators," a task that required the support of the Ukrainian people, it followed that the best way to do this would be to enlist the help of actual Ukrainians. Accepting the OUN into the German orbit, then, made sense. It was fighting the hardest against foreign rule of Ukrainian territories and, accordingly, was expected to be able to garner support while gathering information on and sabotaging enemies of Germany, particularly the Poles. For these reasons the Abwehr sought out Ukrainian nationalists to deploy as agents, saboteurs, and provocateurs, primarily in Galicia,²⁷ who proved particularly useful in relaying information on the Polish government.²⁸ When war became imminent, the Abwehr increased its employment of willing OUN members in preparation. In exchange for the OUN's cooperation, the Abwehr promised its support for the OUN's efforts to establish a pro-German Ukrainian state and provided money and training for OUN activities.²⁹ An immediate, concrete manifestation of this support was the Abwehr's training, beginning in 1938, of the OUN's more militant and revolutionary elements under prominent member Stepan Bandera.

Though the OUN-Abwehr relationship looked promising, there were various indications that Nazi Germany at large would not honour any victories that Ukrainian nationalists might claim.

²⁶ Jørgensen, *Hitler's Espionage Machine*, 25.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 122.

²⁸ Yurkeyvich, "Galician Ukrainians," 69.

²⁹ Brown, *A Biography of No Place*, 214.

The most obvious was Hitler's vision for Ukraine and the related stream of Germany's anti-Slavic propaganda. However, because the OUN was dealing solely with the Abwehr -- which had offered assurance of Germany's support for Ukrainian statehood -- and not with more powerful Party officials, it was able to naively and temporarily ignore the racist, anti-Slavic, and imperialist nature of Nazi visions for the East.³⁰ This would not last long.

Nazi Germany demonstrated quite clearly in 1939 that it was not nearly as supportive of the OUN's ambitions as the Abwehr had indicated. First, Transcarpathia was granted to Hungary after Germany invaded and dismembered Czechoslovakia in March of 1939, demonstrating that Hungarian support was more important to the Nazis than Ukrainian support. This gave the Ukrainian nationalists "their first glimpse of the two faces of German policy, and they could expect more."³¹ The next glimpse came only months later in August 1939 with the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.³² Not only had Germany demonstrated a preference for Hungary, a hesitant ally, but now it was seemingly renouncing its aggressive stance towards the Soviet Union, the position that originally attracted the Ukrainian nationalists to the German orbit. Beyond that, the Pact's secret protocols placed Galicia and Volhynia into Soviet Ukraine when the dual invasion of Poland occurred and allowed the USSR to claim Bukovyna in June 1940. This meant that every Ukrainian territory, save for Transcarpathia, had been absorbed into the USSR with significant assistance from the OUN's supposed patron. The logic that held the OUN and the Abwehr together --

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Gerald Reitlinger, *The House Built on Sand: The Conflicts of German Policy in Russia, 1939-1945* (London, UK: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1960), 164.

³² Jörgensen, *Hitler's Espionage Machine*, 123.

seething hatred of the USSR -- was beginning to show its practical weakness in the face of Nazi Germany's frequent discontinuity in policy.

This appeared to spell the end of the OUN's ambitions for an independent Ukraine, or at least a German-sponsored one, particularly since Hitler ordered, in accordance with the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreements, an end to the Abwehr's training of Ukrainian nationalists.³³ Additionally, Joachim von Ribbentrop, Germany's foreign minister and signatory to the original Pact, was made to sign a supplementary secret protocol on 28 September 1939 that "obliged the German government to 'suppress all agitation in their territories which affected the territory of the other Party.'"³⁴ Germany's intelligence services were to cease operations in Soviet territory, effectively ending the Abwehr's involvement with the OUN -- but this break was short-lived.³⁵ After a year, near the end of 1940, Germany began its planning for Operation Barbarossa, the upcoming invasion of the Soviet Union. This was incredibly encouraging to the OUN as it revealed that the non-aggression pact had in fact been insincere.

The preparations for Barbarossa meant a rekindling of OUN-Abwehr relations, and the prospect of establishing a Ukrainian state became promising once again. There was, however, one important event from that year of inactivity regarding the relationship: the OUN's split into two rival factions, which was to have serious implications for OUN-Abwehr relations. Konovalts had been murdered in 1938 by Soviet forces and two members -- Andriy Melnyk and Stepan Bandera -- rose to fill the ensuing leadership vacuum. However, Melnyk and Bandera had different ideas regarding policy, strategy, and

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Reitlinger, *The House Built on Sand*, 165.

³⁵ Ibid.

composition of the organization's leadership.³⁶ Correspondingly, each had different support bases. Melnyk's supporters came mostly from the older, more intellectual, and less reactionary base of the OUN whose involvement in the organization was often policy-related and fairly removed from the group's daily actions. Bandera's supporters were younger, more militant members that had, essentially, been tasked with carrying out the theories and policies of Melnyk's supporters.³⁷ The two groups could not be reconciled. After the schism, Melnyk's faction (OUN-M) sought to achieve its goals by submitting to Germany's direction, while Bandera's faction (OUN-B) took a more radical approach, seeking to manipulate Germany and use it to obtain independence for Ukraine more immediately and in a more dramatic, overtly revolutionary fashion.³⁸ When the Abwehr reenlisted the OUN's services in its Barbarossa preparations, it was forced to do so considering this new situation. Though it initially recruited from both factions, the radical and youthful nature of the OUN-B was more appealing for the purposes of invasion and thus it was employed more extensively, while the OUN-M became virtually excluded from German operations.³⁹

The main way in which the Abwehr now incorporated OUN members into German service was to create and train two Ukrainian military units -- named Roland and Nachtigall -- that would participate in the invasion of Soviet Ukraine. They were intended to make the Wehrmacht's advance into and occupation

³⁶ Wolodymyr Stojko, "Ukrainian National Aspirations and German Designs on Ukraine, 1940-1941," in *Ukraine: The Challenges of World War II*, ed. Taras Hunczak Dmytro Shtohryn (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2003), 15.

³⁷ Yurkevich, "Galician Ukrainians," 70.

³⁸ Stojko, "Ukrainian National Aspirations," 15.

³⁹ John Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 3rd ed. (Inglewood, CO: Ukrainian Academic Press, 1990), 51.

of Ukraine easier by fostering anti-Soviet and pro-German feelings in the local population and by fighting the Red Army and anti-German partisans.⁴⁰ This is why the Abwehr preferred to select Ukrainian agents and fighters from the OUN-B -- Melnyk's supporters were mostly older and less fit for military duty, making them less prepared to physically fight for Ukraine.⁴¹ However, the OUN-B's more radical nature and physical capabilities, though useful for Germany in the short-term, became an important factor in the unravelling of its relationship with the Abwehr.

There were various reasons for the OUN to find this new relationship promising. The Abwehr had assured the OUN that in exchange for encouraging Ukrainian support for Germany and anti-Soviet activity, it would assist in establishing an independent Ukraine. Although Bandera agreed to the Abwehr's proposal, he intended to rally support not for Germany but rather purely for Ukrainian independence. The German invasion of Soviet Ukraine with the inclusion of Roland and Nachtigall became a convenient entry method into Ukrainian territory for the nationalists, and the Abwehr's expert training of the units was a way to train OUN-B forces for action against anyone, once in Soviet Ukraine, who stood opposed to their plans.⁴² Although Bandera remained pledged to Ukraine rather than to the German Reich, and was prepared to abandon ties with Germany should they be an obstacle to independence,⁴³ he initially believed that the Abwehr, and perhaps other German forces, would assist in the foundation

⁴⁰ Basil Dmytryshyn, "The SS Division Galicia, 1943-1945," in *Ukraine: The Challenges of World War II*, ed. Taras Hunczak and Dmytro Shtohryn (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2003), 211.

⁴¹ Jörgensen, *Hitler's Espionage Machine*, 123.

⁴² Dmytryshyn, "The SS Division Galicia," 211.

⁴³ Stojko, "Ukrainian National Aspirations," 16.

of the Ukrainian state. The Abwehr, after all, had promised to do so for some time and had appeared to at least tacitly endorse the rousing of pro-Ukrainian sentiments, as did other German entities. The decision to invade the Soviet Union, violating the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, seemed to indicate that the Nazi leadership's anti-Sovietism did trump its hatred of other Slavic peoples and that perhaps the suppression of anyone who came out as anti-Soviet would not be a priority. Additionally, Alfred Rosenberg, one of the Nazis' leading Lebensraum ideologues, had crafted a potential plan for a conquered Ukraine in which it would be independent with close German supervision until the time was ripe for outright colonization, though this was clause would be kept secret from Ukrainians.⁴⁴ He had even, in April 1941, transmitted these ideas to top Wehrmacht and Abwehr officials, who would be the ones in charge of implementing high policy.⁴⁵ Thus to the OUN, more important and influential sectors of Nazi Germany appeared to support the plans they had agreed to with the Abwehr.

However, Hitler held the ultimate power to make decisions about the eastern territories. Even eminent ideologues and officials such as Rosenberg, let alone the lowly Abwehr, had no right to propagate such ideas because the highest Party officials remained unabashedly opposed to the existence of a Ukrainian state because of Hitler's long-established racial principles,⁴⁶ something the OUN and the Abwehr naively ignored. When Barbarossa began, though, this became astonishingly clear

⁴⁴ Ihor Kamenetsky, *Hitler's Occupation of Ukraine, 1941-1944: A Study of Totalitarian Imperialism* (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 1956), 24.

⁴⁵ Mulligan, *The Politics of Illusion and Empire*, 10..

⁴⁶ Grzegorz Rossoliski-Liebe, "The 'Ukrainian National Revolution' of 1941: Discourse and Practice of a Fascist Movement," *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 12, no. 1 (winter 2011), 90.

and their relationship quickly disintegrated. Because the invasion was proceeding with wild success, Berlin no longer needed to allow the use of OUN services. Many Ukrainians were already grateful to be freed from the Soviet yoke,⁴⁷ and those that opposed the German presence could be easily crushed. Germany believed at the beginning of the occupation of Soviet Ukraine that it did not need to court Ukrainians and, accordingly, could abandon any facade of its endorsement of the Ukrainian national movement.

The actions of the OUN also departed from the plans made between itself and the Abwehr. As soon as OUN-B forces crossed into Ukrainian territory, they promptly organized a Ukrainian National Committee to “serve as an instrument for organizing all Ukrainian national forces for the liberation of the homeland” to turn anti-Soviet sentiments not into pro-German feeling but rather support for the Ukrainian nation.⁴⁸ The biggest assertion of the OUN-B’s intentions, however, came on 30 June 1941 when it proclaimed Ukraine’s independence in Lviv, the capital of Galicia. The Abwehr and the Wehrmacht did support the proclamation -- as both they and the OUN believed the proclamation reflected their agreed upon plan, thus not viewing it as necessarily anti-German -- but Nazi leaders thought otherwise and quickly cracked down on the OUN. The Gestapo and the Sicherheitsdienst (SD) arrested OUN-B leaders, including Bandera, and interred them in concentration camps when they refused to renounce the 30 June proclamation. Shortly thereafter, the OUN-M’s leaders were also arrested and sent to concentration camps before they could proclaim independence in Kyiv.

⁴⁷ Samuel Mitcham, Jr., *Crumbling Empire: The German Defeat in the East, 1944* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2001), 69.

⁴⁸ Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 53.

Hereafter both factions would be comprehensively repressed.⁴⁹ Within only several weeks of the start of Barbarossa, then, the German high command managed to utterly destroy any OUN-Abwehr connections. The radical character of the OUN-B that the Abwehr favoured so much had ultimately hindered the ability of either party to achieve what they had intended and proved to be an important factor in the relatively easy obliteration of their cordial relations.

This ease of destruction is understandable, however, considering that their relationship was neither transparent nor built on honest mutual support but rather upon insincere, pragmatic motivations or, at best, a mutual misunderstanding of German high policy. It was only after the 30 June proclamation that either party grasped this, and this realization together with the fallout of the rupture further reinforced the fragility of their relationship. The wholesale repression of the OUN, unsurprisingly, caused both factions to turn against the Germans for the duration of the war. Even with their leaders incarcerated and the organization forced underground, OUN members began actively and indiscriminately working against the Germans. They did so by not only fostering intense anti-German sentiments among local populations and making recruitment of locals for administrative assistance increasingly difficult,⁵⁰ but also by actively and violently resisting the German forces with the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), the name given to Ukrainian nationalist partisan formations created in 1942 under the auspices of the OUN.⁵¹

The UPA's activities -- the ultimate result of the OUN-Abwehr relationship -- proved to be a hindrance for the Abwehr

⁴⁹ Yurkevich, "Galician Ukrainians," 72.

⁵⁰ Dymytryshyn, "The SS Division Galicia," 212.

⁵¹ Reitlinger, *The House Built on Sand*, 169.

and the Wehrmacht and, ironically, the Ukrainian nationalists themselves. It made the duties and advancement of the Abwehr and the Wehrmacht more difficult even though the Abwehr's collaboration with the OUN had been designed to make Ukraine easier to subdue. As for the Ukrainian nationalists, though more committed than ever to the Ukrainian nation, these insurgent activities hindered their ability to create it as their resistance against the Germans distracted from anti-Soviet activity. A lack of consolidated, consistent resistance against the Red Army possibly contributed to the USSR's victory in the war and its subsequent occupation of territories that firmly placed all of Ukraine in the Soviet Union. This was exactly what the OUN had fought so hard against for so long, yet its mismanaged and unstable relationship with German military intelligence led directly to its inability to effectively fight the Soviets. In other words, the OUN became an obstacle not only to its only patron but also to itself.

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