The “Conversion” of Benny Morris: Morality in the History of 1948 and the Creation of the Palestinian-Refugee Crisis

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The history surrounding the 1948 War and the creation of the Palestinian-refugee crisis continues to be contentious, political, and filled with questions of morality. This is especially true for Benny Morris’s historical work. As an Israeli historian, Morris has made significant contributions to the historiography of 1948, with most of his work focusing on the role that Jewish forces played in the expulsion of Palestinian Arabs in 1948 (something that the Israeli government had denied vehemently). Although celebrated for his historical work, following the collapse of the Palestinian-Israeli peace process in the early 2000s Morris publically announced his support for the expulsion of Palestinians in 1948 and argued that Jewish forces should have expelled every single Palestinian Arab. This paper discusses how a dual commitment to honest historical study and Zionism allowed Morris to announce his support for the atrocities that his own research had uncovered.

On November 29, 1947, the United Nations General Assembly passed Resolution 181, which approved the partition of Mandate Palestine, which had been under British rule since 1920. Although Arabs made up seventy-one per cent of the population, the partition plan allotted fifty-six per cent of the territory to a Jewish state with the Palestinian state receiving forty-two per cent.\(^1\) The proposed Jewish state would contain 499,000 Jews and 438,000 Arabs—a bare majority—while the proposed Palestinian state would have 818,000 Arabs and 10,000 Jews.\(^2\) The Jewish leadership accepted this plan; Arab representatives rejected it.

The few months following the passing of the partition plan are often described as a civil war between Jews and Palestinians. May 14, 1948, marked the official withdrawal of British forces and the end of the mandate. That same day, David Ben-Gurion, the head of the Jewish Agency (he would go on to be the first elected Israeli prime minister), declared the independent Jewish state of Israel. That next day, the surrounding Arab states, including Egypt, Trans-Jordan, Iraq, and Syria, invaded the former mandate. This invasion marks the beginning

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\(^1\) Jerusalem and the surrounding territory would be under an international administration, which makes up the last few per cents.

of the regional war, which would continue until July 1949 with the signing of a number of armistice agreements.

By that point, the established borders were much different from those put forward by the United Nations partition plan. The newly created Israeli state occupied roughly seventy per cent of the former mandate. In addition, over 700,000 Palestinians were now refugees. Some of them found themselves under Transjordan or Egyptian occupation in areas that would soon be termed the West Bank and the Gaza Strip respectively, while others had fled north into the neighbouring countries of Lebanon and Syria. Although the 1947 partition plan had allotted Palestinians forty-two per cent of Mandate Palestine, by 1949, Palestinians had no state at all.

In the preface of *The War for Palestine*, published in 2007, Eugene L. Rogan and Avi Shlaim state, “Our common purpose was to understand, not to impute shame or allocate blame.” This statement speaks to the degree to which the history of the 1948 War continues to be a charged, political subject. The legacy of the 1948 War and the resulting Palestinian-refugee problem is still obvious today as many Palestinians remain classified as refugees, and Israel continues to occupy the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, which it has held since 1967. Despite Rogan and Shlaim’s commitment to neutrality, most historians make their moral evaluation of the expulsion of Palestinians in 1948 clearly known. While some condemn the expulsion of Palestinians and the Zionist project—a political movement and ideology that believes that Jews have a right to a state of their own and maintains a commitment to preserving a Jewish state in Israel—others argue that expulsion was unavoidable in order to create a viable Jewish state.

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3 The United Nations estimates 711,000 Palestinians became refugees in this period.
4 This is an extremely simplified narrative of the 1948 conflict meant to give the reader some historical context. The complexities of this war would need a paper of their own to be adequately dealt with.
6 I write this paper on the premise that Palestinians were expelled between 1947 and 1949 from what would become the state of Israel and that, in many cases, this expulsion can be described as ethnic cleansing. As Benny Morris has directly stated his recognition of this (as will be shown later), I do not think it necessary to engage with details of that debate.
In this paper, I address the question of the place of morality in history by focusing on how Israeli historians frame morality in regards to the creation of the Palestinian-refugee problem in 1948. To do this, I focus on the work of Benny Morris and his moral “conversion.” Morris has made significant contributions to the historiography of the 1948 War, with most of his work focusing specifically on the Jewish role in the creation of the Palestinian-refugee problem. Although celebrated for his contributions, following the collapse of the Palestinian-Israeli peace process in the early 2000s Morris publically announced his support for the expulsion of Palestinians in 1948. In my analysis, I will establish his contributions to the history of the 1948 War and demonstrate how his approach to historical study has evolved from the late 1980s to the twenty-first century. Ultimately, I will attempt to explain what could cause a historian so familiar with the atrocities committed in 1948 to publically proclaim his support for those atrocities.

Old and New History

Prior to the late 1980s, Israelis and Palestinians had conflicting conceptions of the 1948 War. Palestinians refer to 1948 as al-Nakba, or “the catastrophe,” to convey their ultimate defeat and the destruction of Palestinian society. In contrast, Israeli state history, often termed “old history,” describes the “War of Independence” as a heroic battle between Jewish forces and evil Arab armies that aimed to “drive [Jews] into the sea.” Although engaged in a violent war, Israel had “purity of arms” as they used violence only to defend the Jewish homeland. In these accounts, Jewish forces miraculously managed to overcome all obstacles and adversaries to finally create their own state and achieve justice for hundreds of years of persecution, not to mention the Holocaust. When explaining the source of the Palestinian-refugee problem, these writers claimed that the hundreds of thousands

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9 Ibid., 287.
of Palestinians had fled, many in response to orders from Arab leaders, despite Jewish pleas for them to stay.

The late 1980s and early 1990s marked the emergence of the “new historians” who began to challenge the “old history” of 1948. Israel had adopted the British thirty-year rule for declassifying government documents. So in 1978, documents from 1948 became available. However, it took until the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon before Israelis actually began to consider challenging government-sponsored historical narratives. 10 Benny Morris, who had been sent as a journalist to cover the conflict, recalled that this was the first time he ever met with and interviewed Palestinian refugees. 11 In 1987, Morris published *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem* (hereon referred to as *The Birth*) where he challenged the traditional account that claimed Palestinians had fled their homes in 1948 on orders from the Arab leadership. He found no evidence of this. 12 While he did find multiple instances of dispossession and expulsion, he concluded that there was no evidence of a systematic expulsion plan, and that those who did flee did so due to natural consequences of war and fear. 13

In an article in *Tikkun*, Morris described “the new history of Israel” when discussing his own recent work and that of Simha Flapan, Ilan Pappe, and Avi Shlaim who were all engaged in challenging different aspects of the “old history” of 1948. 14 While they were not the first to challenge the “old history,” they were the first to do so using Israeli archival sources. While most academics have come to accept much (if not most) of this new history over the years, many have not. For example, Efraim Karsh continues to accuse the new historians of


12 Walid Khalidi and Erskine Childers independently disproved claims that Arab leaders had used radio stations to tell Palestinians to leave and suggested that it was actually the Jewish radio stations that had done so. See Walid Khalidi, “Plan Dalet: Master Plan for the Conquest of Palestine,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 18 no.1 (1988): 6.


14 Ibid., 112. The next year, Shabtai Teveth, David Ben-Gurion’s official biographer, used the term “new history” for the books they produced. He also rejected their findings and accused them of treason.
“fabricating the facts.”

As professor and head of Mediterranean Studies in London, Karsh has published many critical review articles of the works of new historians. However, very few take him seriously, and Morris has described him as, “a trigger-happy Wild West gun fighter out to make a name for himself, barging into the saloon of historiography with guns blazing.”

Although Morris has always claimed his loyalty to Zionism, critics of *The Birth* often interpreted his claims regarding 1948 as an anti-Zionist attempt to undermine the legitimacy of the state of Israel. However, Morris rejected these claims and argued that such critics “simply misread the book. They didn’t read it which the same detachment, the same moral neutrality, with which it was written.”

The “Conversion”

Following the breakdown of the peace process in the early 2000s and the outbreak of the second Palestinian intifada, Benny Morris’s personal beliefs underwent a significant shift as he renewed his commitment to Zionism. In an interview with Ari Shavit, published in *Haaretz* (an Israeli English-language newspaper), Morris blamed Palestinians for the breakdown of the peace process. He argued that their rejection of the agreements put forward in 2000 made clear that “[Palestinians] are unwilling to accept the two-state solution. They want it all.” In the interview, Morris argued that the expulsions in 1948 were necessary in order for the creation of a Jewish state to have

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20 Shavit, “Survival of the Fittest.”
been possible and that the Arabs would have destroyed the Jews if they could.

That same month, Cambridge University Press published a revised version of Benny Morris’s 1987 book (hereon referred to as The Birth Revisited).\(^{21}\) Despite his public statements, Morris’s revised book contains new archival material that shows “there were far more acts of massacre than [Morris] had previously thought” and proved that Haganah units were ordered to uproot and expel villagers and destroy villages.\(^{22}\) Through his research, Morris identified at least twelve cases of Jewish soldiers raping Arab girls and twenty-four cases of massacre, with victims ranging from four to hundreds of Palestinians. Although still not convinced of a unified policy of ethnic cleansing, Morris agreed there were expulsion orders: “It’s a pattern. Apparently, various officers who took part in the operation understood that the expulsion order they received permitted them to do these deeds in order to encourage the population to take to the roads.”\(^{23}\) Morris also argued that David Ben-Gurion, the Jewish leader, fully supported population transfer as “he understood that there could be no Jewish state with a large and hostile Arab minority in its midst.”

In his interview with Shavit, Morris expressed his approval for Ben-Gurion’s stance because “without the uprooting of the Palestinians, a Jewish state would not have arisen.”\(^{24}\) When asked how he could justify all the things Jewish forces did in 1948, Morris replied, “There is no justification for acts for rape. There is no justification for acts of massacre. Those are war crimes. But in certain conditions, expulsion is not a war crime.”\(^{25}\) When Shavit interjects that this expulsion resulted in the killing of thousands of people and the destruction of an entire society, Morris responded with the following: “A society that aims to kill you forces you to destroy it. When the choice is between destroying or being destroyed, it’s better to destroy.”\(^{26}\)

After voicing support for ethnic cleansing and an understanding for the complicated choices that Jewish leaders were

\(^{22}\) Shavit, “Survival of the Fittest.”
\(^{23}\) Ibid.
\(^{24}\) Ibid.
\(^{25}\) Ibid.
\(^{26}\) Shavit, “Survival of the Fittest.”
facing in 1948, Morris stated, “I do not identify with Ben-Gurion. I think he made a serious historical mistake in 1948… he got cold feet during the war. In the end, he faltered.” Shavit asked for clarification to which Morris said, “If he was already engaged in expulsion, maybe he should have done a complete job… my feeling is that this place [Israel and surrounding areas] would be quieter and know less suffering if the matter had been resolved once and for all.” 27

Reacting to the “Conversion”

That interview and The Birth Revisited were published in the same year and many found themselves astounded by the apparent dual sides to Morris. Avi Shavit points out the inherent contradiction between what he identifies as “citizen Morris” and “historian Morris” and the apparent ability of these two Morrises to work “as though there is no connection between them, as though one was trying to save what the other insists on eradicating.” 28 Farid Abdel-Nour notes that other scholars have described the contradictions that Morris embodies as bordering on schizophrenia. 29

In addition to seeing Morris as a citizen of Israel versus as a historian of 1948, scholars also made a nostalgic distinction between the “old Morris” and the new Morris. Avi Shlaim argued that “The hallmark of [Benny Morris’s pre-2000] approach was to stick to as closely as possible to the documentary evidence, to record rather than to evaluate… he upheld the highest standards of historical scholarship, and he wrote with almost clinical detachment.” 30 Shlaim argues that this new Morris has betrayed the duty of the historian to evaluate all evidence, and he “seems to have swallowed the official Israeli-line on Camp David hook, line, and sinker.” Shlaim equates the official Israeli account of what happened at Camp David with the “national myths” that dominated Israeli popular memory prior to the late 1980s. 31

27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
31 Shlaim describes the official line as being that the Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak made a generous offer to the Palestinian leader, Yasser Arafat, at
Pappe, although defining pre-2000 Morris as not much more than a “data collector,” stated, “Now that we know all we want to about [Morris’s] views … we can only long for the old Morris.”

Understanding the “Conversion”

Ilan Pappe takes a self-consciously post-modernist approach to understanding the historiography of 1948 and he applied this analysis directly to Morris’s historical work. Pappe criticizes Morris’s claims to objectivity and stated that “an Israeli historian who justifies ethnic cleansing and writes about it in [both The Birth (1987) and The Birth Revisited (2004)] cannot claim to be a ‘neutral historian.’” Pappe argues that historical narratives are constructed, and while all historians “believe and hope that [their] narrative is a loyal reconstruction of what happened, … we cannot ride a train back in time to check it.” In this way, Pappe accuses Morris of failing to deconstruct power relationships in the history of 1948 and of making a false commitment to objectivity.

Pappe argues that all Israeli historians who write about 1948 – including himself – are motivated by ideology or politics; the conflict is too personal for them not to be. The ideology that Pappe refers to is Zionism. Pappe argues that the “new historians” writing in the 1980s and 1990s used “a new ideological approach” that challenged Zionist ideology even if they refused to recognize it. However, Pappe sets himself apart from other new historians as he is willing to “engage with the impact of power on knowledge” that influences the debate on 1948. Ultimately, that power is Zionism and Pappe argues that Israeli historians of 1948 cannot be neutral in their stance on Zionism; they must be either for it or against it.

Ilan Pappe defines post-Zionists as those who challenge Zionism as an ideology and reject the validity of expelling hundreds of thousands of people in 1948 to create a Jewish state. Post-Zionists are often accused of challenging Israel’s right to exist. Leslie Stein, an Israeli historian, accused Ilan Pappe of being an “anti-Zionist… whose

Camp David, “only to be confronted with a flat rejection and a return to violence.”

33 Ibid.
34 Pappe, The Idea of Israel, 124.
35 Ibid.
fabrications of Israel’s past and present are widely circulated and quoted.” 36 His implication here is that Pappe has abandoned all academic integrity to promote an anti-Israeli political ideology. However, Farid Abdel-Nour argues that even those who reject “the worthiness of the Zionist dream’s realisation in 1948” are not necessarily arguing that Israel has no legitimacy today, as “the legitimacy of states does not hang on the legitimacy of their founding.” 37 For this reason, Ilan Pappe identifies as a post-Zionist, not an anti-Zionist.

Pappe defines neo-Zionists as those who subscribe to Zionism despite accepting that the creation of the Israeli state was achieved by expelling Palestinians: “From the neo-Zionist perspective, acceptance of the factual claims of the new historians was accompanied by the categorical rejection (shared by the Israeli public at large) of the contemporary moral implications.” 38 Pappe puts Benny Morris into the neo-Zionist category because although Morris’s revised book, published in 2004, did demonstrate “the expulsion [in 1948] to be far more premeditated, systematic, and extensive” than his previous book did, Morris’s commitment to Zionism has left him to assign “justification for the 1948-49 expulsions.” 39

Farid Abdel-Nour takes a more balanced and concrete approach to his evaluation of Benny Morris’s “conversion.” 40 Although clearly condemning the “disturbing direction” Morris’s work has taken, Abdel-Nour’s main goal is to try to understand how such a shift could occur. 41 Ultimately, he focuses on Morris’s commitment and belief in

36 Leslie Stein, “How Anti-Zionism Seduced the Political Left,” Quadrant Online. 1 May 2012.
37 Abdel-Nour, “From Critic to Cheerleader,” 39.
39 Ibid., 281.
40 Abdel-Nour, “From Critic to Cheerleader,” 26. Abdel-Nour suggests that due to the time that has passed between Morris’s “scandalous” interview with Shavit in 2004, his analysis represents “a more dispassionate attempt at making sense of Morris’s conversion.”
41 Abdel-Nour, “From Critic to Cheerleader,” 28. Abdel-Nour states that his analysis of Morris “relies on conjecture [as he has] no access to the inner workings of Morris’s mind.”
Zionism and traces the evolution of his historical work from *The Birth*, published in 1987, to *The Birth Revisited*, published in 2004. Abdel-Nour notes that while many Israelis went through a similar conversion after 2000, Benny Morris’s is so significant because of his historical work on 1948. While Morris has not changed his main findings, “what he has changed is the moral message that his recent work has come to impart to his readers… namely, that unfortunate as Palestinian displacement may have been, it was still better than the alternative, and that all things considered, it was worth it: good that it happened.”

Farid Abdel-Nour notes how Morris’s research has brought attention to the role “Zionist forces” played in the expulsion of Palestinians in 1948. Indeed, *The Birth Revisited* contains an entire chapter outlining the presence of “transfer” thinking in Zionism before 1948. In 1948, Zionist leaders understood that they would never achieve a Jewish state with the bare majority that the UN partition boundaries had provided them. Ultimately, through this research, Morris came to understand the choice that Zionist leaders were facing in 1948 and he had to make a choice of his own: “Either the dream of establishing a Jewish state in Palestine in 1948 was morally suspect and should not have been pursued; or the dream was so worthy that it justified the necessary means.”

Abdel-Nour suggests that anyone who writes about 1948 must choose from a limited number of options if they want to hold “a coherent and stable position on the events of 1948.” In the case of Morris, his position is the only one possible “for someone like him who takes to heart the necessary connection between Zionism’s goal in the 1940s and Palestinian displacement, while remaining committed to the worthiness of that goal.” Ultimately, Abdel-Nour argues that Morris’s conversion is understandable as someone who is accepting what the evidence tells him while still maintaining his commitment to Zionism.

Abdel-Nour suggests that Morris’s conversion is better understood in the context of the evolution of his research as opposed to the context of the breakdown of peace negotiations in 2000. He tracks the development and growth of the “inevitability thesis” in Morris’s

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42 Ibid., 26.
43 The proposed Jewish state was to have 499,000 Jews and 438,000 Arabs.
44 Abdel-Nour, “From Critic the Cheerleader,” 28.
46 Ibid.
work: this idea that the expulsion of Palestinians was inevitable if the creation of a Jewish state was to be realized. In the 1987 edition of *The Birth*, Abdel-Nour identifies “a seed of that thesis”: a single paragraph where Morris states the creation of the Palestinian refugee problem was “almost inevitable.” However, Abdel-Nour argues that paragraph “does not fit in with the rest of the book’s emphasis” which stresses that the context of war was at fault for the flight of Palestinians. Abdel-Nour suggests that *The Birth* contains “victims but no villains” which allows readers to identify with both Palestinians without criticizing Jewish forces or doubting the moral basis of Zionism.

Over the next few years, Morris’s research only strengthened the inevitability thesis in his work while weakening his claims that Palestinians became refugees because of the war itself. As he uncovered the support that Zionist leaders had for population transfer, he could no longer argue that Israel played no organized role in the expulsion of Palestinians. Abdel-Nour notes that “with the evidence about the centrality of the idea of transfer in the thinking of Zionist military and political leaders in the 1930s and 1940s came also the reasoning that attracted them to it.”

Abdel-Nour cites Morris’s *Righteous Victims*, published in 1999, where Morris addresses the demographic problems facing Zionist leaders who knew a Jewish state could never be achieved while they remained a minority. Jewish immigration would not be enough, “Palestine would not be transformed into a Jewish state unless all or much of the Arab population was expelled.”

Ultimately, Abdel-Nour identifies three commitments that “anyone who wishes to adopt a coherent and stable position towards the events of 1948 must confront.” However, one cannot commit to them all, if one commits to two, he or she must reject the third:

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47 Abdel-Nour, “From Critic the Cheerleader,” 30.
48 Ibid., 29.
49 Ibid., 30.
50 Ibid., 32.
The first is a commitment to considering the Palestinians who were alive in 1948 worthy of being treated as moral equals and not merely as means to others’ ends. The second is a commitment to the worthiness of the dream of realising Jewish self-determination by establishing a Jewish state in Palestine in 1948. The third is a commitment to facing head-on the judgment on which the historical record seems to converge: that the dream of establishing a Jewish state in Palestine at the time could have only been realised by means of Palestinian displacement.\textsuperscript{53}

Once Morris accepted that an Israeli state could never have been achieved without the expulsion of Palestinians in 1948, he had to either reject the morality of the Zionist dream or “endorse in retrospect the notion that it was proper to sacrifice Palestinians’ rights and interests for the sake of that dream’s realization.”\textsuperscript{54}

**Conclusions**

Morality is intrinsically wound up in the history of 1948 and it is foolish to try to argue otherwise. However, morality has consequences for how the history is understood. This is especially true in the case of the history of 1948. Benny Morris’s conversion was a public one, with his interview and the following debate appearing in prominent Israeli and western newspapers. However, despite Morris’s political beliefs and moral evaluations, he is still a good historian who remained committed to expressing the evidence he found in the sources. He has been instrumental in bringing to light many atrocities committed by Jewish forces in 1948 and has made a convincing argument for the role Zionist leaders played in the expulsion of Palestinians.

How does one reconcile these two things? Benny Morris cannot simply be discredited as a historian, pushed aside, and easily forgotten. *The Birth Revisited* is a 600-page volume filled with a detailed account of the 1948 war and the expulsion of Palestinians and is a significant contribution to the historiography of 1948. If I were to argue that morality has no place in history, where does that put historians who take opposite moral stances, like Ilan Pappe? Or, how

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\textsuperscript{53} Ibid.,

\textsuperscript{54} Ibid.,
could a historian talk about the Holocaust with any authority without commenting on the immorality of genocide?

Ultimately, I cannot argue that Benny Morris is a bad historian. In addition, as argued by Abdel-Nour, his conversion cannot be directly attributed to a flawed understanding of the failure of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. However, those who read Benny Morris’s work must recognize his ideological standpoint and why he says what he does. Morris’s historical work must be understood based on his dual commitment to Zionism and his commitment to being a respectable historian.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


