



the corvette

The Corvette

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The *Corvette* publishes the work of current and recently-graduated University of Victoria History Undergraduate students. The *Corvette* endeavours to publish articles that represent the best scholarship produced by UVic students concerning the past. We are interested in all methods and fields of inquiry.

PUBLISHING

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COVER IMAGE

The image on the cover of this edition of the *Corvette* is a detail of a photograph which comes to us from the University of Victoria Archives' Historical Photograph Collection. Following the advice of Heather Dean at Special Collections in McPherson Library, Colin Mooney and I began searching the Historical Photograph Collection for an historical image that illustrated some familiar campus scene. The Historical Photograph Collection offers dozens of images which met our criteria, and I hope that our readers will take some time to browse them online at the address provided below.

Of all the images we saw in the Historical Photograph Collection, one felt so familiar that it could not be ignored. The image was taken in September of 1968, and shows students protesting a lack of affordable housing by participating in a 'tent-in' on the lawn of the Student Union Building at the University of Victoria. They are asking for housing options and for a place to call home. They are occupying the space in much the same way as those living in the 'tent cities' of today's Victoria, the resemblance is striking.

I hope that the reader will carry this image, this feeling of familiarity with the past (however recent) with them as they consider each chapter of this journal.

Pier Olivia Brown
Editor-in-chief, the *Corvette* 2018

You can see more of the University of Victoria Archives' Historical Photograph Collection by visiting:

<http://archives.library.uvic.ca/hpc/index.php/>




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President's Message

I am pleased to introduce the fifth edition of *The Corvette*, the University of Victoria's student-run history undergraduate journal.

At UVic, we aspire to be the Canadian research university that best integrates outstanding scholarship, engaged learning, and real-life involvement to contribute to the betterment of society. The future of society, people and the planet will be shaped by creative and innovative people, with curiosity, critical thinking and problem-solving skills. These key skills—the ability to take on a problem, to frame a question, to tackle queries in depth and with rigour, and to contribute to knowledge—are those of a researcher.

Deepening our knowledge of history will help us shape and impact the future. For the past year, student researchers in *The Corvette* have been engaging in a process of inquiry to further their knowledge. These essays showcase our finest undergraduate researchers who have had an opportunity to gain hands-on experience of the academic process through research, writing, and publishing, as well as acting as copy editors and peer reviewers. The result is an excellent collection of work from students who are directly engaged in research-inspired learning.

Readers will learn of history from a selection of places, people and experiences with discussions about masculinity, historiography, politics, periods of war and more. In the following pages, we have the opportunity to engage with examples of dynamic scholarship and the range of historical study on campus. The diversity of our campus and our ideas, and the ability to challenge one another to become thoughtful, engaged citizens and leaders, is central to nurturing our extraordinary academic environment.

Congratulations to *The Corvette* and the dedicated UVic undergraduate students, graduate students, faculty and mentors who have created this remarkable collection of historical essays.

Sincerely,

Professor Jamie Cassels, QC
President and Vice-Chancellor

Chair's Message

The Corvette may seem like an odd name for a journal full of a smorgasbord of tasty historical offerings, none of which actually mention Corvettes the ships or cars. While the journal may share a kinship with the small but mighty WWII vessels that herded and protected a myriad of convoy ships, as the editors shepherded the authors and reviewers here; and while it may, for the author/editors carry some of the power and prestige of the Chevrolet Corvette convertible, not to mention some of its raw sex appeal, these are not what the name conjures for me.

I see the Corvette in the light of its origin in Middle French meaning “little basket” and linked to its predecessor, the Latin “*corbita*,” a basket hoisted as a symbol or ensign by ancient Egyptian ships to signal they were carrying grain.

On the one hand, this corvette you are holding in your other hand is clearly a basket, a container made of *paper* (remember – from *papyrus* – the reeds that were used in ancient Egypt to make paper, baskets and boats). It holds food for thought and is engraved with stories that comprise the memories of times and places past. Of all the senses, memory is the most important for without it, we know not what we see, hear, touch or smell. This basket contains a feast for the memory.

On the other, it is also a *corbita*, an ensign, for UVic's Department of History. There is no better “flag ship” for any department than a journal of scholarship produced by students and showcasing student work. It can only be the result of the potent combination of engaged faculty sharing their enthusiasm for history, alongside dynamic, skilled students with a commitment to excellence in research, writing, and communicating.

Moreover, the breadth of the memory work here, from Bolshevism to Post-Modernism, Nazi-Occupied Poland to Italian-occupied Powell River, political history to environmental history, mirrors the breadth and depth of the department.

My first work of historical scholarship was bound up in a basket like this -- the first incarnation of the *Corvette* and so I appreciate that it is also a vessel which hones the skills of editors and writers – skills that get more valuable every day in our world awash with tweets, posts and blogs.

With thanks for this gift basket with the fruits of much labour generously shared -- and hearty congratulations!

John Lutz, chair
University of Victoria History Department
Co-Editor, *Ascendant Historian*, 1980 edition.

Editor's Introduction

It is my great joy to present to you the fifth edition of the *Corvette*. This journal represents a most valuable opportunity for collaboration among the ranks of the University of Victoria's History department. The *Corvette* is where student research and writing finds a home after it has been graded and handed back from a stack of papers on a lectern. This is a place for UVic History students to share what they discover as undergraduates with a wider audience. Within the remaining pages of this edition of the *Corvette*, you will find a showcase of seven essays whose authors have been inspired to share the past.

I hope that while reading each chapter you take the opportunity to reflect upon the times and places our authors will lead you to. The early policies which shaped the Cold War, the autonomy given by Hitler to his administrators in Poland, a larger than life character in Gilded Age New York City, then to the impact of industry in Powell River. From a secularization campaign in rural Russia to the quandary of language in postmodernism, and finally to the political career of Quebec's René Lévesque.

The *Corvette* stands upon a strong foundation, the network of resources and guidance I inherited from previous editorial teams has been absolutely essential. Our Faculty Advisors, Dr. Mitchell Lewis Hammond and Dr. Peter Cook, have been volunteering their time and expertise for all three years that I have been involved with the *Corvette*. I cannot thank them enough for their contribution. Neither can I overstate my gratitude for the peer-reviewers, the copy editors, and the History

Undergraduate Society (THUGS) who took time during the ever-busy school year to work on this issue.

I want to personally thank Colin Mooney, Alex Battenhausen, Lindy Marks, Ezekiah Ditoro, Mariana Gallegos Dupuis, and Jocelyn Remple. Thank you to Heather Dean of Special Collections at McPherson Library for her help finding us a cover image for this issue, and to the University of Victoria Student Society (UVSS) for funding the *Corvette*.

Now turn the page and get started!

With gratitude,

Pier Olivia Brown
Editor-in-chief, the *Corvette* 2018

The Impact of NSC-68 on American Foreign Policy During the Cold War

TAO BROWNE

Following the end of World War II, the strenuous relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, which had arisen due to the urgent need to counter the Nazi German threat during WWII, disintegrated and hostilities between the US and USSR erupted. The resulting post-WWII international order constituted a bipolar system, which was characterized by the establishment of the two superpowers of the capitalist USA and the communist USSR. This international order pitted the two superpowers against one another and launched the global competition for power and prestige, which would persist until the collapse of the USSR in December 1991, and the ensuing conclusion of the Cold War. This competition for global supremacy produces the question: what guided American foreign policy throughout the Cold War? This paper examines the policies and recommendations contained within the National Security Report 68 (NSC-68) and analyses how this document constituted the guiding framework for the US' foreign policy decisions throughout the Cold War. To demonstrate the connection between NSC-68 and American foreign policy in the Cold War, the paper begins by examining the content within NSC-68 and then proceeds to apply NSC-68's policies and recommendations to the decisions that America made during the Cold War, which include: the massive buildup of the US's military, the pursuit of containment, the development of the thermonuclear bomb, and finally the decision to enter Vietnam. Throughout these analyses, the paper asserts that the policies within NSC-68 constituted the principal guiding force behind American foreign policy decisions throughout the Cold War, regardless of the Party or President in power.

Introduction

Following the end of World War II there was a distinct shift in the global order marked by the creation of two superpowers: the USA and USSR. Unlike prior world orders, which had historically been composed of a balance of power between multiple states, after WWII power was divided in a bipolar fashion, pitting the socialist USSR against the capitalist USA. The creation of this bipolar world saw the rise of determination, on both sides, to dominate the other and spread their ideology on a global scale. This paper will demonstrate that the National Security Report 68's principal policies of containment, military expansion and foreign aid to the free world guided and influenced American foreign policy and American interactions with the

USSR throughout the Cold War and also brought the US into Vietnam. This essay will focus on the National Security Report 68's (NSC-68) influence on American foreign policy during the Cold War as well as NSC-68's connection to American military planning, which sought to contain communist expansion across the globe. This paper will first define NSC-68 and examine key policies within the document, then analyze the influence NSC-68 had on the creation of a new American foreign policy and finally examine how the application of NSC-68 in American foreign policy brought the US into the Vietnam War.

Definition of NSC-68

Following the victory of communist forces in China and the USSR's successful detonation of the atomic bomb, Secretary of State Dean Acheson tasked the Policy Planning Staff to review the United States' national security strategy.¹ Led by Paul Nitze, the Policy Planning Staff constructed NSC-68 based on their perceptions of the Kremlin's outlook and foreign policy behaviour.² The report was presented to President Truman on April 11th, 1950 and was approved as a statement of America's national policy for the next four-to-five years by the National Security Council on September 29th, 1950.³ NSC-68 entered into effect following Truman's approval on September 30th, 1950.⁴ The creators of NSC-68 examined the fundamental intentions of the Kremlin and the consequential conflict of values between the two superpowers, analyzed Soviet territorial intentions and capabilities in comparison with those of the United States and finally provided four

¹ Luke Fletcher, "The Collapse of the Western World: Acheson, Nitze, and the NSC68/Rearmament Decision," *Diplomatic History* 40, no.4 (2016): 750.

² Paul H. Nitze, *Forging The Strategy of Containment*, (Washington: National Defence University Press, 1994), 11.

³ Following the presentation of NSC-68 to President Truman on April 11, 1950, Truman submitted the paper to the National Security Council (NSC) for review. The review process ended on September 29 when the NSC approved NSC-68, Truman approved the decision on September 30, 1950. (Samuel F. Wells, "Sounding the Tocsin: NSC 68 and the Soviet Threat," *International Security* 4, no.2 (1979): 131.)

⁴ Wells, "Sounding the Tocsin," 138.

possible courses of action for the US to pursue.⁵ NSC-68 claimed the fundamental design of the Kremlin was to retain and solidify absolute power, initially within the Soviet Union itself and then in territories under its control; the report warned that the Kremlin's plan entailed the complete subversion of governments in countries outside of the Soviet world and their replacement with a government which was subservient to and controlled by the Kremlin.⁶ The authors of NSC-68 concluded that in order for the Kremlin to achieve its fundamental goals the US, as the principal centre of power in the non-Soviet world, must either be "subverted or destroyed."⁷ NSC-68 illustrated the nature of the Kremlin's policies towards areas that were not under its control; these policies required the elimination of resistance towards the will of the USSR and the extension of the Kremlin's influence and control.⁸ The authors of NSC-68 concluded that the Kremlin's strategic and tactical policies were affected by the Soviet concern towards the capabilities of the United States; the report stated that not only was the US the greatest obstacle impeding Soviet global domination but also the only power which could, through the use of force, destroy the USSR.⁹ NSC-68 provided four possible courses of action for the US to follow in the ongoing situation at the time. These were the following:

- a. Continuation of current policies, with current and currently projected programs for carrying out these policies;
- b. Isolation;
- c. War; and
- d. A more rapid building up of the political, economic, and military strength of the free world than provided under a, with the purpose of reaching, if possible, a tolerable state of order among nations without war and of preparing to defend ourselves in the event that the free world is attacked.¹⁰

⁵ National Security Council Report, NSC 68, "United States Objectives and Programs for National Security," History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive (1950), 44.

⁶ Ibid.6

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid. 13

⁹ National, "United States Objectives and Programs for National Security," 14.

¹⁰ Ibid., 44

The continuation of current policies, from the military point of view, would produce an American military which would become less and less effective as a war deterrent against the USSR. NSC-68 claimed that the improvement of state readiness was of urgent importance in order to prevent the USSR from launching war.¹¹ The Report stated that a buildup of American military strength was a precondition for the prevention of the spread of communism into the free world as well as the protection of the United States.¹² In regard to the option of isolation, NSC-68 stated that entering an isolated position would allow the USSR to dominate Eurasia without meeting armed resistance and thereby dwarf the United States in both power and size.¹³ NSC-68 predicted that in this scenario the USSR would use this new power to eliminate the power of the US and thus remove the obstacle to the Soviet's imposition of global supremacy.¹⁴ NSC-68 stated that there was no way for the US to make itself inoffensive to the USSR other than by complete surrender to its will; moreover, isolation would eventually condemn the US to either submit or to fight defensively, without allies and with significantly more limited offensive capabilities than that of the USSR.¹⁵ As for the possibility of war, NSC-68 stated that the ability of the US to conduct effective offensive operations was limited to the use of atomic weapons.¹⁶ NSC-68 claimed that although a powerful strike could be delivered on the USSR, it alone would neither force or persuade the Kremlin to surrender.¹⁷ The Report stated that, in this scenario, the Kremlin would still retain its ability to use the forces under its control to dominate Eurasia; furthermore, NSC-68 cautioned that this scenario would produce a long and difficult struggle, which would destroy freedom-loving people and the free institutions within Western Europe.¹⁸ The final course of action proposed within NSC-68 was that of a rapid buildup of political,

¹¹ Ibid., 49

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid., 52

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ National, "United States Objectives and Programs for National Security," 52.

¹⁶ Ibid., 53

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid.

economic, and military strength in the free world.¹⁹ This plan reflected the belief that the frustration of the Kremlin's plans required the free world to construct a functioning political and economic system and to pursue a political offensive against the USSR; moreover, in order to successfully develop a functioning political and economic system, the free world required a military shield to protect it from Soviet expansion.²⁰ The objective of this course of action was to postpone and avert the disastrous circumstances, which might arise in 1954 due to the USSR's predicted fission and thermonuclear capabilities, through the construction of a successful economic and political system that was supported by adequate military strength.²¹

The influence NSC-68 on American foreign policy

Following the adoption of NSC-68 by the National Security Council on September 29th, 1950, Truman approved the decision and ordered the executive departments and agencies within the U.S government to implement the study's conclusions into their policies.²² Although the National Security Council approved the conclusions of NSC-68 as a statement of policy to be followed for the next four-to-five years, NSC-68 continued to be vital factor in influencing American foreign policy throughout the duration of the Cold War. Rather than returning to a post-war isolationist foreign policy as it had following WWI the United States constructed a new foreign policy focused on the buildup of the American military, the containment of the expanding Soviet Union and the expansion of foreign aid towards Western Europe.

Following the adoption of NSC-68 in September of 1950, the recommendations contained within the document began to significantly influence President Truman's policies, particularly in regard to the rapid buildup of the American military strength. Truman launched a mass buildup of America's military in both personnel and technology.²³ The fear of Soviet expansion into the free world, which was aggravated by the Korean War, led Truman to order a mass

¹⁹ Ibid., 54

²⁰ Ibid., 55

²¹ Ibid., 59.

²² Steven Casey, "Selling the NSC-68: The Truman Administration, Public Opinion, and the Politics of Mobilization, 1950-1951," *Diplomatic History* 29, no.4 (2005): 682.

²³ Nitze, *Forging The Strategy of Containment*, 98.

buildup of American conventional forces. Between 1950 and 1951 the size of the US military doubled from 1,495,000 to 3,249,400; furthermore, the military budget was increased from \$13.5 billion in 1950 to \$48 billion²⁴ in 1951.²⁵ The increase in both American military personnel and budget reflected American involvement in the ongoing Korean War, which in turn was stipulated by the recommendations within NSC-68. The Korea War fit perfectly with the concerns within NSC-68. Beginning in June 1950 the communist North Korean regime launched an invasion into capitalist South Korea.²⁶ Despite the reality that the USSR was hardly supporting the DPRK in their adventure into South Korea, American leaders remained oblivious to this reality and saw the North Korean invasion as another limb of the Communist Octopus.²⁷ By September, North Korean forces controlled the majority of South Korea and had pinned down South Korean and American forces into the Pusan Perimeter.²⁸ This situation in Korea gave Truman and the Congress the impetus to accept and endorse the policies within NSC-68. In addition to increasing the size and budget of the US army, Truman also launched the development of thermonuclear bomb.²⁹ Compared to the atomic bomb, which splits unstable uranium/plutonium atoms and creates a devastating blast of energy, the thermonuclear bomb uses a second phase of reactions that can be up to a thousand times more powerful than that of an atomic bomb.³⁰ Truman's decision illustrated the influence of NSC-68 in American policy making once again; NSC-68 stated that if the USSR developed a thermonuclear weapon before the US, Soviet pressure against the free world or an attack on the US

²⁴ In 1951 US dollars

²⁵ Raymond Ojserkis, *The United States & The Beginning Of The Cold War Arms Race: The Truman Administration's Arms Build-Up of 1950-1951*, (Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group Inc., 2003), 254.

²⁶ David T. Fautua, "The "Long Pull" Army: NSC 68, the Korean War, and the Creation of the Cold War U.S. Army," *The Journal of Military History* 61, no.1 (1997):110.

²⁷ Wells, "Sounding the Tocsin," 140.

²⁸ Casey, "Selling the NSC-68," 667.

²⁹ Wells, "Sounding the Tocsin," 125.

³⁰ Buckley, "What's the Difference Between a Hydrogen Bomb and a Regular Atomic Bomb?"

would be significantly increased.³¹ Whereas, according to NSC-68, if the US developed a thermonuclear weapon ahead of the USSR the US would be able to increase its pressure on the USSR.³² Following the recommendations of NSC-68, which called for the development and stockpiling of thermonuclear weapons, Truman increased the Department of Defense's nuclear budget from \$39 billion in 1950 to \$102 billion³³ in 1951 for the purpose of researching thermonuclear weapons.³⁴ Thus, in terms of a mass military buildup and the rapid development of America's nuclear program, it is evident that NSC-68 had an immediate impact on the formation of American policy.

Another significant role of American foreign policy following the end of World War II and the rise of the Cold War was the policy of containment. The severance of the alliance between the US and the USSR post WWII introduced a world order controlled by two opposing superpowers, leading to the formation of a bipolar world order. The fear of Soviet expansion into Western Europe escalated following the USSR's successful atomic bomb test in August 1949, the victory of Mao Zedong in China and the launch of the Korean War; these three events aroused concern that America was unable to curtail the aggressive spread of communist forces.³⁵ To prevent the spread of the Soviet Union, particularly into Western Europe, NSC-68 called for an increase in conventional armaments in Western European nations.³⁶ In February 1951, Paul Nitze, the Director of Policy Planning, stated the primary goal of American foreign policy was the rearmament of Europe and that the US should supply 60 divisions to Western Europe to deter the threat of a Soviet invasion.³⁷ Following Nitze's recommendation Truman authorized the deployment of four divisions to Europe. By autumn of 1951 these deployments were completed with over 250,000 American soldiers deployed throughout Europe,

³¹ National, "United States Objectives and Programs for National Security", 38.

³² Ibid.

³³ In 1996 US Dollars

³⁴ Stephen I. Schwartz, *Atomic Audit: The Costs and Consequences of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Since 1940*. (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 1998), 8.

³⁵ George C. Herring, "America and Vietnam: The Unending War," *Foreign Affairs* 70, no.5 (1991):107.

³⁶ Fletcher, "The Collapse of the Western World," 770.

³⁷ Ibid.

over 176,000 of which were stationed in West Germany.³⁸ NSC-68 claimed that unless the military strength of Western European states was significantly increased, they would be unable to effectively defend themselves against the USSR.³⁹ It appears evident that the policies outlined in the NSC-68 document played a highly influential role in America's containment strategy within Western Europe.

Another vital area of American foreign policy throughout the Cold War was the United States' supply of foreign aid to Western Europe and other countries, which were seen as vulnerable to communism. The authors of NSC-68 reflected the ideas of George Kennan in the construction of economic policies designed to both support America's allies and limit the strength of her opponents.⁴⁰ NSC-68 called for the American government to provide financial assistance for Western Europe in order to help it recover and construct a stable economy, and to other free countries threatened by communist forces.⁴¹ On October 10th, 1951, President Truman signed the Mutual Security Act, which replaced the European Recovery Program and marked a new phase in American foreign aid.⁴² Unlike the earlier European Recovery Program, which focused on the recovery of Western European economies via a direct injection of currency, the Mutual Security Act (MSA) called for the US to maintain and promote its foreign policy through the provision of military, economic and technical assistance to non-communist countries.⁴³ In terms of military aid, under Truman the first provision of military assistance was to Yugoslavia as per the 1951 Military Assistance Agreement.⁴⁴ This agreement was designed to help Yugoslavia buildup a strong military in order to deter the Soviets from launching an invasion into

³⁸ Wells, "Sounding the Tocsin," 140.

³⁹ John L. Gaddis and Paul Nitze, "NSC 68 and the Soviet Threat Reconsidered," *International Security* 4, no.4 (1980):172.

⁴⁰ Ibid. 174.

⁴¹ National, "United States Objectives and Programs for National Security," 54

⁴² Aurelius Morgner, "The American Foreign Aid Program: Costs, Accomplishments, Alternatives?" *The Review of Politics* 29, no.1 (1967):66

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Bojan Dimitrijevic, "The mutual defense aid program in Tito's Yugoslavia, 1951-1958, and its technical impact," *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 10, no.2 (1997):20.

Yugoslavia.⁴⁵ The Military Assistance Agreement between the US and Yugoslavia stated that all Yugoslav orders for military equipment would be provided by the US.⁴⁶ By 1952 Yugoslavia was receiving shipments of military equipment including M-2 12.7mm anti-aircraft guns, M-47 tanks and F-84G jets.⁴⁷ In regard to economic aid, Congress authorized the allocation of \$1.4 billion to be used for aid towards countries of the free world, the free world, in turn, was defined as an alliance of democratic and independent countries.⁴⁸ Economic aid under the MSA ties into the final term of technical assistance, or Point Four. In this instance, the MSA sought to strengthen peace via the reversal of economic conditions, which in historical cases, such as Weimar Germany, had led to social and political instability and war.⁴⁹ Point Four sought to achieve what the ERP had accomplished in Western Europe during the late 1940's throughout rest of the undeveloped free world, especially in newly decolonized states in Asia and Africa.⁵⁰ This style of American foreign aid throughout the 1950's was designed with the distinctive purpose of preventing the expansion of communism into the free world; aid was not given to countries within the Soviet Union nor was it given to other non-Soviet communist states such as China.⁵¹

NSC-68 and the Vietnam War

The adoption of NSC-68 into the formal policy of the US government in September of 1950 illustrated the official reversal of US interactions within the international system. Unlike the period leading up to WWII where the US had been in a position of isolation, NSC-68 displayed to American politicians that America could no longer afford to return to this position in the wake of the expanding USSR. Rather, the US would have to pursue an aggressive foreign policy based on the premise of defeating and containing communism wherever it should

⁴⁵ Ibid., 21

⁴⁶ Ibid., 20

⁴⁷ Ibid., 23

⁴⁸ Robert A. Packenham, *Liberal America and the Third World: Political Development Idea in Foreign Aid and Social Science*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973),49.

⁴⁹ Packenham, *Liberal America and the Third World: Political Development Idea in Foreign Aid and Social Science*, 50

⁵⁰ Ibid., 49

⁵¹ Ibid.

arise. This section of the paper will analyze how the content within NSC-68 brought the US into Indochina and culminated into the Vietnam War.

Following the rise of the Cold War, the US government sought to combat and defeat the encroachment of communism wherever it was perceived to exist. The pursuit of this style of aggressive foreign policy soon led to the US entry into the conflict in Indochina between the French and the communist Viet Minh.⁵² During the initial stages of the conflict in Indochina the US was reluctant to support France as American politicians sought to avoid direct involvement in a colonial war; however, the fall of Chiang Kai-Shek in October 1949 sparked fears that a Chinese invasion into Indochina was imminent.⁵³ Reflecting this belief, in December 1950 the CIA issued a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), which stated that a direct invasion of Chinese Communist troops into Indochina could occur at any time.⁵⁴ The CIA reported that in resisting communist forces, the US was the only country to which France could turn for support.⁵⁵ The CIA's reports reflected the fundamental pillars within NSC-68: that communist forces would try to dominate Eurasia and that only the US could prevent the expansion of communism.⁵⁶ Amidst the Korean War and the rise of communist China, the US began funding French operations in Indochina.⁵⁷ As the conflict in Indochina progressed the US continued to increase its support of France, by the time France withdrew in 1954 the US was paying for 80% of French war costs.⁵⁸ Following the withdrawal of French troops and the partitioning of Vietnam at the 1954 Geneva Accords, the next major escalation of the US in Vietnam came in 1961 following the infiltration of communist

⁵² Herring, "America and Vietnam," 107.

⁵³ U.S National Archives and Records Administration, "U.S. Involvement in the Franco-Viet Minh War, 1950-1954," Report of the Office of the Secretary of Defence Vietnam Task Force, File 5890485, (January 1969), 1

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 48

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 7

⁵⁶ National, "United States Objectives and Programs for National Security," 6.

⁵⁷ U.S., "U.S Involvement in the Franco-Viet Minh War, 1950-1954," 10

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 2.

guerrilla forces from North Vietnam.⁵⁹ To combat this threat President John Kennedy sent American military advisors and equipment to South Vietnam, by 1963 Kennedy had sent over 16,000 military advisers to South Vietnam to strengthen defences against communist expansion from North Vietnam.⁶⁰ When analysing Kennedy's decision to ship American personnel to Vietnam it is evident that the concerns illustrated within NSC-68 played a key role in influencing Kennedy's decision; a communist victory in Vietnam would be a major blow to US prestige and influence throughout the world and would illustrate to leaders of other countries that the US was an unreliable ally. A communist victory in Vietnam would endanger the credibility of the US and would demonstrate to other countries facing the threat of communism that they were on their own, leading to a sense of distrust towards the US and a feeling of isolation within these countries.⁶¹ In history, feelings such as these had led to detrimental results, such as in 1939 when the USSR, following the failure of Britain and France to prevent the German occupation of Czechoslovakia in March of 1939, signed a neutrality pact with Germany.⁶² The US felt that if communism took hold in South Vietnam it could lead to a situation in which countries across the globe which felt threatened by communist forces, selected to avoid confrontations and accept a communist victory without offering any form of resistance. The increase of American involvement in Vietnam throughout the 1960s, reflected the recommendations contained within NSC-68. The fourth course of action proposed by NSC-68 called for the US to rapidly buildup the political, economic and military strength of the free world, as well as provide a military shield to protect the free world from Soviet aggression.⁶³ American involvement in South Vietnam mirrored this NSC-68 guideline, American troops were initially tasked with protecting the "democratic" South Vietnamese government and

⁵⁹ George C. Herring, "The Cold War and Vietnam," *Organization of American Historians Magazine of History* 18, no.5 (2004):19.

⁶⁰ Stanley Karnow, *Vietnam: A History*, (New York: The Viking Press, 1983), 679.

⁶¹ Robert H. Miller, "Vietnam: Folly, quagmire, or inevitability?" *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 15, no.2 (1992): 121.

⁶² Geoffrey Roberts, "The Soviet decision for a Pact with Nazi Germany," *Soviet Studies* 44, no.1 (1992):67.

⁶³ National, "United States Objectives and Programs for National Security," 54.

training the South Vietnamese army.⁶⁴ In addition to military aid Vietnam was also one of the largest recipients of American economic assistance in the world, ranking as the third largest non-NATO recipient of aid and seventh largest recipient worldwide.⁶⁵ Continuing with their strategy of containment American military efforts intensified significantly following the launch of North Vietnamese aggression in 1964.⁶⁶ The threat of a communist takeover of the South posed a considerable threat by the end of 1964; at this stage there were approximately 170,000 Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army (NVA) forces in the South, which were waging coordinated attacks on South Vietnamese forces.⁶⁷ Following the attack on the USS Maddox in August of 1964, Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which authorized President Johnson to use conventional military force in Southeast Asia.⁶⁸ This resolution resulted in the launch of Operation Rolling Thunder in March 1965. Operation Rolling Thunder was a gradual and sustained aerial bombardment conducted by the US Airforce over North Vietnam, which culminated in increasing numbers of American personnel in South Vietnam, totaling 184,300 by the end of 1965.⁶⁹ Following the mass deployment of American troops to Vietnam in 1965, the United States Assistant Secretary for the International Security Affairs, John McNaughton, stated the priorities of America's foreign policy towards Vietnam: 70% was to avoid a humiliating US defeat to their reputation as a guarantor, 20% was to prevent South Vietnam from falling under China's control, and 10% of American foreign policy priorities was to ensure the South Vietnamese people maintained a free way of life.⁷⁰ These three priorities reflect important policies put forward by NSC-68: upholding America's reputation, preventing the spread of communism and protecting the integrity of free societies. Mirroring the majority of American foreign policy priorities towards the situation in Vietnam, avoiding a

⁶⁴ Miller, "Vietnam," 110.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Karnow, *Vietnam: A History*, 397.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 400.

⁶⁸ Miller, "Vietnam," 118.

⁶⁹ Karnow, *Vietnam: A History*, 680.

⁷⁰ Poowin Bunyavejchewin, "American motives behind the Vietnam War: a neo-realist perspective," *Veridian E-Journal* 4, no.1 (2011):370.

humiliating defeat, was NSC-68's objective of upholding the credibility of the US; NSC-68 stated that the US must maintain its integrity in the international system as any lapse in American credibility would weaken the resolve of free societies facing communist encroachment.⁷¹ Reflecting the objectives of NSC-68 once again was the intent of keeping Vietnam from falling into the hands of the Chinese communists. One of the vital policies within NSC-68 was the policy of containment, which called on the US to prevent and contain the encroachment of communist forces into the free world.⁷² Finally, in regard to the priority of maintaining a free way of life within South Vietnam, NSC-68 stated that one of the primary objectives of US was to ensure the protection of free peoples.⁷³ Through these analyses it is evident that the American strategy in Vietnam mirrored the policies and recommendations contained within NSC-68 and thus demonstrates the guiding role of NSC-68 in American foreign policy during the Cold War.

Conclusion

As is clearly demonstrated throughout this essay, the policies contained within NSC-68 played a guiding role in the formation of a new and distinct American foreign policy in the post World War II era. It can be argued that NSC-68 was successful in so far that by pursuing the suggestions contained within NSC-68 the US was able to remain ahead of the USSR in nuclear technology and also established deterrents against a Soviet invasion of Western Europe via the deployment of 250,000 soldiers to states in Western Europe, which in turn, maintained American confidence and reduced the likelihood of America pursuing drastic actions to defeat the USSR due to their perceived inferiority. However, the policy suggestions within NSC-68 guided America into the Vietnam War, which was a significant military defeat for the US and saw 58,220 American military casualties. Through the thorough examination of NSC-68's key policies of containment, military expansion, and foreign aid to free societies, it is evident that during the Cold War NSC-68 heavily influenced American foreign policy, American interactions with the USSR, and guided America's entry into Vietnam. In short, NSC-68

⁷¹ National, "United States Objectives and Programs for National Security," 36.

⁷² Ibid., 30

⁷³ Ibid., 9

marked the launch of a new and distinct American foreign policy which saw the formal abandonment of American post-war isolationism and rather America's adoption of the role of the protector of the free world.

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‘Germanization’ in Occupied Poland: Disunity, Inconsistency, and Contradiction within the Nazi Administration.

BEN MOSHER

Following the invasion of Poland in September 1939, the Nazi’s began a program designed to Germanize the territory in which they occupied. The Germanization program involved reordering Polish society, and its people, according to the requirements of Nazi racial theory, thus bringing it in line with Hitler’s vision for the German Reich. However, Hitler’s grand vision for Poland was not implemented with any uniformity, and the Germanization program was plagued by internal inconsistency and contradiction from the outset. Drawing upon Ian Kershaw’s work, this paper will advance a reconceptualization of Hitler’s role as leader of the Nazi administration, emphasizing his characteristic detachment from the everyday functions of the Nazi bureaucracy. Instead of working from the dictates of their Fuehrer, Nazi officials worked to advance Hitler’s general vision with their own personalized policies. As a consequence, in Poland, the Germanization program varied tremendously according to the personal judgment of individual Nazi administrators. This point is illustrated through an analysis of Hitler’s laissez-faire brand of administrative rule, the autonomous competition that was cultivated amongst Nazi officials, and the ambiguities associated with the ‘racial status’ of the Polish population. This paper demonstrates that the fragmented nature of the Nazi Germanization program stems from Hitler’s non-interventionist brand of leadership, which afforded district officials with the administrative autonomy to enact his vision as they saw fit.

On October 8, 1939, Adolf Hitler issued the Annexation Decree, officially commencing what would become a 6-year Nazi occupation of Polish territory. Hitler’s goal was not only to re-establish German rule over the areas of Poland that belonged to Germany prior to WWI, but also to reorder the region, and its people, based upon the tenets of Nazi racial theory.

¹ To enact Hitler’s grand vision for Poland, the Nazis pursued a program of Germanization in the annexed territories. This involved completely reforming Polish existence in a way that met the economic, political, cultural, racial, and ethnic requirements of a truly German empire. As such, one would expect a cohesive and consistent Germanization policy that systematically met the goals of “the

¹ Jackson J. Spielvogel and David Redles, *Hitler and Nazi Germany*, 7th. ed. (New Jersey: Pearson Education, 2014), 256.

Fuehrer".² However, this was not the case. Germanization policies in Poland varied greatly, and disunity, improvisation, and inconsistency between Nazi districts characterized the majority of their practical application. To understand why this was the case, it is important to analyze Hitler's laissez-faire brand of administrative rule, the autonomous competition that was cultivated amongst Nazi officials, and the ambiguities associated with the 'racial status' of the Polish population. Ultimately, the fragmented nature of the Nazi Germanization program stems from Hitler's non-interventionist brand of leadership, which afforded his district officials with the administrative autonomy to enact his vision as they saw fit.

Following the annexation of Poland, the Nazis immediately began partitioning the country into *Reichsgaus* (territorial districts). Each district was governed by a Nazi administrative official, or *Gauleiter* (district leader).³ The three largest districts in Poland were: Danzig-West Prussia in the North West, which was headed by Albert Forster, the Wartheland in West-central Poland, which was headed by Arthur Greiser, and the so-called General Government in the South, which was led by Hans Frank.⁴

On October 12, 1939, the Nazis issued a decree automatically revoking all Polish national citizenship, rendering the population affectively stateless.⁵ This paved the way for the imposition of the Germanization program, whereby the Nazis embarked on the complete destruction of Polish life and culture, which was to be replaced by an ethnically German national community. With the entire Polish population stripped of its citizenship, rights, and statehood, the Nazi

² Ian Kerhsaw, "Working Towards the Fuehrer. Reflections on the Nature of the Hitler Dictatorship," *Contemporary European History* 2, no. 2 (July 1993): 103, <http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.library.uvic.ca/stable/20081474>.

³ *The Nazis: A Warning from History*, Directed by Laurence Rees, London UK: BBC 2, 2005, DVD.

⁴ Catherine Epstein, *Model Nazi: Arthur Greiser and the Occupation of Western Poland* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 141.

⁵ Diemut Majer. 'Non-Germans' Under the Third Reich: *The Nazi Judicial and Administrative System in Germany and Occupied Eastern Europe, with Special Regard to Occupied Poland, 1939-1945*, (Washington D.C: The John Hopkins University Press, 1993), 236; "Trial of Gauleiter Arthur Greiser: Supreme National Tribunal of Poland 21st June- 7th July, 1946." WorldCourts. CASE No. 74, Accessed March 2, 2017: 71.

administration could begin to pick and choose which Poles could be Germanized and which ones had to be removed or eliminated.⁶

Heinrich Himmler, given authority by Hitler to colonize the East, oversaw the Germanization program in Poland.⁷ Under him, Arthur Greiser and Albert Forster spearheaded Germanization in their respective districts. Both Greiser and Forster independently implemented policies that brought about the ethnic cleansing of both Poles and Jews.⁸ Although both men perpetrated horrific crimes upon the population, Greiser was especially brutal in his efforts to Germanize the Wartheland and was by far the most radical of the Eastern *Gauleiters*.⁹ He was a staunch believer in Nazi racial theory, and embarked on a program of rigid discrimination against Poles and Jews in an attempt to construct a racially pure “model Gau of the Great German Reich”.¹⁰ He evicted and relocated some 700,000 ethnic Poles to the “racial dumping ground” in the South, brought in over 500,000 German nationals to populate the Wartheland, ghettoized and enslaved 183,000 Jews in Lodz, and segregated Poles from all German spheres of activity, reducing them to a life of forced labor.¹¹

Forster, on the other hand, embarked upon a comparatively moderate Germanization program. Instead of rigidly racially discriminating against the Poles, Forster instituted Germanization lists, which forced ethnic Poles to abandon their cultural heritage and accept German citizenship.¹² Furthermore, he deported far fewer Poles from his *Reichsgau* and was quite tentative towards the resettlement of German nationals in his district.¹³ Forster certainly did engage in atrocious acts of murder and slavery, especially against Polish Jews, but on the whole his specific Germanization initiative was much more assimilative in nature than what was experienced in the Wartheland. The contrast between Greiser and Forster highlights the numerous

⁶ Majer, *Non-Germans*, 243.

⁷ Spielvogel and Redles, *Hitler and Nazi*, 256.

⁸ Timothy Snyder, “The Causes of Ukrainian-Polish Ethnic Cleansing 1943,” *Past and Present* 179 (May 2003): 197-234, 197.

⁹ Epstein, *Model Nazi*, 267.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 7.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 2; “The Nazis: A Warning from History”; Spielvogel and Redles, *Hitler and Nazi*, 257.

¹² “The Nazis: A Warning from History.”

¹³ Mark Mazower, *Hitler’s Empire: How the Nazis Ruled Europe* (New York: The Penguin Press), 2008, 85.

different, even contradictory, forms that Germanization took during the Nazi occupation. To understand why this is the case, one must take a deeper look into the internal structure of the Nazi administration and its impact on the reality of Germanization in Poland.

As a leader, Hitler despised all forms of administrative bureaucracy.¹⁴ He often described the German political administration as over organized and felt that an overabundance of rules set down by the judiciary and ministerial bureaucracy imposed a severe hindrance to individual agency and the adaptability of Nazi policy.¹⁵ He once stated, "The Wehrmacht provides the highest distinction for one who – acting against orders- salvages a situation by means of his own insight and determination".¹⁶ This adequately captures the nature of Hitler's unique brand of authoritarianism. Instead of passing down strict orders and regulations to his subordinates, Hitler would often delegate authority to multiple Nazi officials and provide them with only broad or ambiguous orders from which to work.¹⁷ Hitler provided his general vision for the Third Reich, but kept himself substantially removed from the day-to-day functions of the Nazi regime.

Germanization in Poland was no different. Each *Gauleiter* was given the authority to enact their own Germanization policy, and received only the most basic guidelines from Hitler. Hitler even reportedly stated, "every Reichsgau should have its own face according to the personality of its leader and the particular problems of the population".¹⁸ Since each *Gauleiter* was given the freedom to form and reform his district as he saw fit, the given policies between districts varied just as much as the personalities of their leaders. Therefore, Germanization policy was also able to manifest itself in many different ways, since consistency was not even the expectation Hitler himself. That is why Arthur Greiser was able to embark upon a radical program of genocide and mass deportation, while Forster was able to undertake a program focused mainly on Polish assimilation. Moreover, when it came to the Germanization of the Polish districts and the authority of

¹⁴ Kerhsaw, "Working Towards," 112.

¹⁵ Majer, *Non-Germans*, 1; Robert G.L.Waite, *Hitler and Nazi Germany*, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston), 1965, 60.

¹⁶ Majer, *Non-Germans*, 2.

¹⁷ Kershaw, "Working Towards," 109.

¹⁸ Epstein, *Model Nazi*, 6.

the *Gauleiters*, Hitler specifically stated that “no questions would be asked regarding their methods”.¹⁹ In November, 1942, Greiser sent a letter to Himmler pertaining to the Jewish situation in the Wartheland in which he had this to say about Hitler’s involvement: “I personally don’t think, that we have to consult the Fuehrer again in this matter, all the more since he told me at the last interview concerning the Jews, that I should act according to my own judgment”.²⁰ This perfectly captures both the non-interventionist approach Hitler took towards bureaucratic administration, and the high level of autonomy that was afforded to his district officials. It also helps explain why Germanization policy in Poland varied so greatly, and why inconsistencies between separate *Reichsgaus* were common.

A side effect of Hitler’s characteristic detachment from actual policy making, and his over-delegating of authority, was fierce competition between Nazi officials to win Hitler’s favor. The competition between Forster and Greiser in the enactment of the Germanization order was particularly divisive. Hitler told his *Gauleiters* that in ten years each of their territorial districts should be fully Germanized.²¹ This instigated a “competition in brutality” between Forster and Greiser over who could report in the shortest time that the racial struggle had been won and full Germanization achieved.²² As such, both men initiated Germanization policies that were radically different from one another in order to distinguish themselves in the eyes of Hitler, and ultimately win the Germanization race.²³

Greiser took the radical route, which he believed would best elicit the jubilant approval of the Fuehrer.²⁴ With the support of Himmler, he began removing the ethnic Polish population from his district in an effort to clear the territory, and thus make way for incoming German settlers. However, this was a slow and arduous process, and Greiser himself, realizing that the exploitation of Polish slave labor was a valuable asset, was reluctant to expel all of the Poles

¹⁹ “The Nazis: A Warning from History.”

²⁰ Kershaw, “Working Towards,” 116; “Nuremberg Document Number 249. Letter to Heinrich Himmler concerning the ‘special treatment’ (extermination) of tubercular Poles,” Harvard Law School Nuremberg Trials Project.

²¹ Kershaw, “Working Towards,” 115.

²² *Ibid.*, 115.

²³ Epstein, *Model Nazi*, 6.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 6.

from his district.²⁵ Forster, on the other hand, was successfully Germanizing large segments of the Polish population by forcing German citizenship upon them. On paper, it seemed as though he was winning the race to Germanize his *Reichsgau*.²⁶ When Greiser and Himmler complained to Hitler about Forster's lack of adherence to the tenets of Nazi racial theory, Hitler, in characteristic fashion, told them to resolve the problem amongst themselves.²⁷ Hitler's detachment from administrative duties, and the resulting autonomy that was afforded to his *Gauleiters*, instigated a high level of contention between Forster and Greiser. That contention, in turn, caused the two Nazi officials to pursue vastly different Germanization policies in an attempt to outdo one another.

This administrative inconsistency was also, in part, generated and perpetuated by the conceptual ambiguity surrounding the 'racial status' of the ethnic Pole. There was a consistent lack of unity within the Nazi ranks over what to do with the Poles, and whether they were, or were not, fit for Germanization.²⁸ To clarify the situation, Himmler imposed a 4-point ethnic classification list, which sought to determine how various members of the Polish population should be dealt with. Those with full German blood should be made immediate national citizens; those with German blood but unfamiliar with German culture should be re-educated and made citizens; those with partial German blood should be reacquired by the nation through Germanization and eventual citizenship; and those with non-German blood should be removed, segregated, or eliminated.²⁹ Contrary to its desired purpose, this classification list only further muddied the waters, and raised questions regarding how one ought to determine into which category a Polish person should be placed.³⁰

Despite the confusion, no legal regulations were ever implemented regarding the 'racial status' of the Polish population.³¹

²⁵ Ibid., 10; "Trial of Gauleiter," 72.

²⁶ "The Nazis: A Warning from History."

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Harry K. Rosenthal, *German and Pole: National Conflict and Modern Myth* (Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1976), 111.

²⁹ Ibid., 116.

³⁰ Ibid., 116.

³¹ Majer, *Non-Germans*, 244.

Furthermore, the *Gauleiters* insisted on their administrative autonomy, and frequently rejected recommendations from the Reich Ministry of the Interior in Berlin on the Polish question.³² Thus, local authorities were given a mandate to treat the Poles as they saw fit, usually through internal case-by-case guidelines.³³ Racially categorizing the Polish population remained an ambiguous task, and the responsibility ultimately fell to the discretion of each *Reichsgau* administration. Some *Gauleiters*, like Forster, took the more liberal view that in cases of doubt regarding racial heritage the reclamation of German blood should take priority. This re-enforced the sentiment that “no German blood should be lost” during the Germanization efforts, lest the initiative lose sight of its original purpose.³⁴ As a result, a higher percentage of Poles were considered eligible for Germanization in districts that employed a more liberal approach to German reclamation.³⁵ By contrast, some *Reichsgaus*, like Greiser’s for example, initiated a much more rigid policy towards Polish racial categorization. Strict racial examinations were imposed upon large segments of the population, and as a result many more Poles were considered unfit for Germanization.³⁶ The consequence of this persistent racial ambiguity was that the “concepts and conditions for deciding Germanization remained unsolved, vague, and fluid right up to the end of the Third Reich”.³⁷

Hitler’s ultimate plan was to annihilate all remnants of Polish society, thereby creating the necessary conditions to re-build the region as a ‘pure’ German nation.³⁸ Therefore, Germanizing Polish territory and its people –at least those who were deemed racially acceptable–took top priority. However, what Germanization truly meant, what form it should take, and especially who should and should not be Germanized, was never clearly established. As a result, each *Reichsgau* administration pursued unique and often contradictory Germanization policies with varying degrees of intensity. Hitler’s anti-bureaucratic approach afforded high levels of autonomy to individual *Gauleiters*, which prevented the construction of a unified Germanization model. It

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid., 236.

³⁴ Ibid., 242.

³⁵ Ibid., 242.

³⁶ Ibid., 242.

³⁷ Ibid., 243.

³⁸ Waite, *Hitler and Nazi Germany*, 15.

also cultivated fierce competition between district officials –namely, Greiser and Forster- who fought for Hitler's approval by distinguishing themselves from one another with personalized policy strategies. Finally, the ambiguous 'racial status' of the Polish population created an atmosphere of uncertainty regarding their eligibility for Germanization, which resulted in a range of policy guidelines that were both inconsistent and arbitrarily implemented. Hitler's brand of detached leadership led to a significant degree of administrative disunity within the Nazi hierarchy. As a consequence, the Germanization program in Poland was plagued with an internal ambiguity and inconsistency that persisted throughout the entirety of the Nazi occupation.

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The Rajah of the Great White Way: The Self-Made Man, Conspicuous Consumption, and Competitive Masculinity in Gilded Age New York City

TIM CUNNINGHAM

A larger-than-life figure in the raucous, display-oriented social world of Gilded Age New York, James Buchanan “Diamond Jim” Brady was a man of prodigious appetites. Famed for his realization of the American Dream, his penchant for flashy displays of diamonds, and his animalistic appetite for almost unimaginable quantities of food, Brady conveyed a specific competitive masculinity in a time of male self-mastery and restraint – a competitive masculinity inextricably bound to questions of economic class, wealth display, and conspicuous consumption. This article critically examines aspects of Brady’s embodied gender presentation, and shines a light on the wider, gendered performance of Gilded Age, leisure class masculinity by a new class of ‘robber barons,’ and nouveau riche in turn-of-the-century New York City.

By all accounts, James Buchanan “Diamond Jim” Brady was a man of prodigious appetites. A prolific patron of Broadway theater, a self-made entrepreneurial millionaire, a daily consumer of almost unimaginable quantities of food, a man never found without company of the most beautiful women of his age or his eponymous adornment of choice – Jim Brady epitomized large-living masculinity in the heyday of American conspicuous consumption. The dawn of the twentieth century saw masculinity in a time of flux: the rise of industrial capitalism, women’s suffrage and wealth divisions began to restructure society and class, and gave rise to disparate ideas and anxieties around manhood and maleness. Brady embodied the “American Dream” of self-made manhood, building his fortune through the explicitly and discursively masculine world of entrepreneurial business and sales. From his new position as a member of what economic theorist Thorstein Veblen called “the leisure class,” Brady also constructed manhood around conspicuous consumption, most notably through his highly visible intake of stomach-turning amounts of food.¹

¹ Thorstein Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class: An Economic Study of Institutions*. (New York, NY: The Macmillan Company, 1899). 1.

Furthermore, “Diamond Jim” utilized his physical body to showcase and display a competing masculinity at odds with the hegemonic “strenuous” manhood of his era, in trumpeting his self-made and consumptive manliness through jewel-encrusted adornment, sartorial fashion, and public spectacle. Throughout his life both on and off New York’s Broadway, “Diamond Jim” Brady embodied (and more importantly, displayed) a highly visible masculinity, one that provides insight into competing masculinities, and into the new phenomenon of the masculine leisure class in turn-of-the-century Gilded Age New York.

Brady’s meteoric rise to the upper echelons of wealth and New York society characterized the masculine self-making process that came part and parcel with the free-market capital economy of the late nineteenth century. In the heady age of a rapidly closing Western frontier and solidifying pecuniary interests, businessmen like Brady sought their fortunes in an unregulated free-market financial system. For many of these turn-of-the-century capitalists, monetary gain involved commerce, manufacturing, or heavy industry. For Brady, sales provided a quicker ticket to the zenith of New York’s business and social circles. In a testimonial given before the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1914, Brady spoke of his humble origins and ascendancy to wealth:

I am in business alone, and if I made vouchers and kept books somebody might get my business away from me. I began work when I was 11 years old, and now I am going on 58. Even with average intelligence I ought to have made some money and I do with it what I please, just so I don’t break the law. I don’t propose to give my business to anybody as long as I live.²

Brady’s business acumen and tenacious personality, along with more than a fair share of lucky breaks, led to his rapid ascendancy in the free-for-all environment of Gilded Age economics. He came from humble origins, being the son of a dockyard saloonkeeper near Cedar Street on Manhattan’s Lower East Side. Brady “began his career as a messenger boy in the offices of the New York Central Railroad,”

² “Diamond Jim Testifies.” *Washington Herald* (Washington, D.C.), 2 May 1914.

before “[finding] employment with the firm of Manning, Maxwell, and Moore, machinery manufacturers.”³ Through the ensuing years, Brady accrued a practical education while moving ever higher in the ranks of the company, eventually becoming a salesman of specialized handsaws, with which to cut rails down to size. It was in this fast-paced world of business that Brady first donned his eponymous jewelry, the glittering emblems of wealth and prestige that would earn him the nickname ‘The Rajah of the Great White Way.’ “More necessary to traveling man of those days than his valise or sample case,” writes Parker Morell in *Diamond Jim: The Life and Times of James Buchanan Brady*, “was a diamond ring.”⁴ Used as collateral as well as status symbols, diamonds became indispensable to Brady in his early years and earned him entrance into an exclusive club of moneyed clerks and railway officials, and thus connections to wealthier investors. “If you wanted to be successful in that grossly materialistic era,” writes historian John Burke, “you... flashed and sparkled with diamonds, you spoke in a loud, self-confident voice, and you ordered drinks for the house.”⁵ In this way, Brady’s own presentation of gender (and its strategic deployment as a means by which to signify his relative economic power) was shaped by contemporary standards of capital-based masculinity, centered around independence, visibility, materiality, and monetary prowess.

Brady’s burgeoning sales career coincided with the American railway boom of the 1880s, during which the mileage of track laid in the country more than doubled in ten years.⁶ His encyclopedic knowledge of all things rail-related and his high degree of self-taught business proficiency meant he was in the vanguard of this expansion. Morell writes, “...the Eighties were the climax of all previous decades,

³ “Diamond Jim Brady, Steel Magnate, Dies.” *Sun*. (New York, NY), 14 April 1917.

⁴ Parker Morell, *Diamond Jim: The Life and Times of James Buchanan Brady* (New York, New York: Garden City Publishing, 1934), 22.

⁵ John Burke, *Duet in Diamonds: The Flamboyant Saga of Lillian Russell and Diamond Jim Brady in America’s Gilded Age*. (New York, NY: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1972), 59.

⁶ Parker Morell in *Diamond Jim: The Life and Times of James Buchanan Brady* (New York, NY: Garden City Publishing, 1934), 24.

the joyous, sprawling close of America's pioneer age."⁷ Men like Brady unleashed themselves on "a virgin continent...[that] was being wastefully exploited; the swaggering, blustering men whose fortunes it was making were eager to play," writes Morell. "It was an age of easy come, easy go, easy honor, easy morals."⁸ It was through masculine bravado and bluster, as well as the leverage of connections gleaned from years as a traveling salesman, that Brady "became identified with the Fox Pressed Steel Car Company, and subsequently...The Standard Car Company."⁹ With the pressed steel under-trucks that the Standard Car Company produced, freight trains could carry heavier loads at higher speeds – and with this innovative design in his salesman's valise, Brady quickly set to work hobnobbing with railroad owners on the Pennsylvania Line.¹⁰ He met with great success. "He was regarded as the best salesman in the United States," reads the *Washington Evening Star* upon news of his death, "having won the admiration of the business world by his marvelous success in selling railroad supplies."¹¹ An advertisement placed in the *West Virginian* of Fairmont, West Virginia, pays testament to his skill, prowess and renown. Promoting a series of lectures, the advertisement is entitled "The Ladder of Success: How Best to Climb It Will Be Told By America's Most Successful Men."¹² Among names such as steel magnate Charles Schwab and former President Taft, "Diamond Jim" Brady's name appears at the top of the list. Here, Brady is included in a list of powerful people, exclusively men, with an underlying schema of a fundamentally hierarchical "ladder." Through this explicit metaphor, one can see the significance of relationships of power based on vertical social and economic relationships, and Brady's own place on this very real hierarchy – as one of "America's most successful men."¹³

⁷ Ibid., 57.

⁸ Parker Morell in *Diamond Jim: The Life and Times of James Buchanan Brady* (New York, NY: Garden City Publishing, 1934), 57.

⁹ "Diamond Jim Brady, Steel Magnate, Dies." *Sun*. (New York, NY), 14 April 1917

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ "James B. Brady Dies of Bright's Disease." *Evening Star* (Washington, DC), 13 April, 1917.

¹² "The Ladder of Success: How Best to Climb It Will Be Told By America's Most Successful Men." *West Virginian* (Fairmont, WV), 29 July 1916.

¹³ Joan Scott, "Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis." *The American Historical Review* 91, no. 5 (December 1986): 1056.

From virtually penniless origins, Brady accrued a fortune estimated at between “\$10,000,000 and \$15,000,000;” or close to four hundred million USD today – a true success story of the American free-market capitalist system.¹⁴ In doing so, Brady’s bodily presentation of male bravado and salesman bluster fit perfectly with the conflation of masculinity and economics *du jour*. Historian Bret E. Carroll notes that popular conceptions of race and gender at the time defined white men alone as possessing the competitive nature and ambition necessary to succeed, and were thus “naturally suited to the amoral roughness of the marketplace.”¹⁵ He continues, “Americans effectively defined the public world of economic exchange as a masculine sphere of activity; financial success was thus seen as a masculine achievement.”¹⁶ This gendered commercial environment was the perfect atmosphere for Brady’s economically oriented and self-made manhood, as “[there was] a renewed belief in the power of the American businessman and in the ability of the business community to overcome social problems,” writes New York City historian Lewis Erenberg.¹⁷ The triumphs of the American trade system allowed these men the opportunity to indulge in greater leisure and affluence, which Erenberg terms “the fruits of a powerful economic empire.”¹⁸ Through highly visible achievement in this male-dominated arena of public life, and by displaying the sort of brash, blustering and glitteringly materialistic independence that characterized success, Brady defined his masculinity by the ways and means he knew America valued—entrepreneurial spirit, self-advertisement and most of all, monetary gain.

¹⁴ “Has Millions But Can’t Eat: Diamond Jim Brady Pays for being a Gormand.” *Charlevoix County Herald* (East Jordan, Mich.), 19 October, 1917.

¹⁵ Bret E. Carroll, *American Masculinities: A Historical Encyclopedia*. (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2003), 3.

¹⁶ Lewis Erenberg, *Steppin’ Out: New York Nightlife and the Transformation of American Culture*. (Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 47.

¹⁷ Lewis Erenberg, *Steppin’ Out: New York Nightlife and the Transformation of American Culture*. (Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 47.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

Another more visible and perhaps more famed expression of masculinity came from Brady's conspicuous consumption of food. The man ate more than anyone else, and he wanted the world to know it. A 1912 Sunday morning issue of the *Salt Lake Tribune* exhibits the degree of fascination Americans took in Brady's larger than life consumption habits: "According to statisticians...Diamond Jim Brady has been daily, and sometimes oftener, dining in the great lobster palaces along and around and about the Great White Way,"¹⁹ the article reads. This highly visible choice of venue underlines the display-oriented aspect of Brady's eating – he was to be seen ostentatiously consuming, as only a man of his social station could. The article goes on to catalogue Brady's intake - between 1890 and 1912, by the paper's estimation, Brady had eaten "7,600 lobsters, 42,000 nude clams, 16,000 shrimp, 21,000 soft-shelled crabs and 752 golden bucks, as well as eight gallons of Worcestershire sauce and twelve gallons of ketchup."²⁰ George Rector, proprietor of New York's prestigious French-inspired restaurant Rector's, once described Brady as "the best twenty-five customers I've ever had."²¹ This highly visible and impressive level of consumption, however, constituted a fundamental irregularity in a time of middle-class 'strenuous manhood' and increased anxiety around feminization of American culture.²² "The close affinity," writes historian Bill Osgerby, "that developed during the late nineteenth century between constructions of femininity and modern consumerism ensured that the...practices of commodity consumption were a problematic territory for men."²³ As women's suffrage movements began to erode divisions between gendered public and private spheres, women became aligned with the new practice of conspicuous commercial consumption, while men were expected to define their public role through self-moderation, hard work and

¹⁹ "Diamond Jim's \$250,000 Stomach." *Salt Lake Tribune*. (Salt Lake City, Utah), 08 Sept. 1912.

²⁰ "Diamond Jim's \$250,000 Stomach." *Salt Lake Tribune*. (Salt Lake City, Utah), 08 Sept. 1912.

²¹ "Brady of Broadway – He Draws A Salary of A Fortune A Year!" *Salt Lake Tribune* (Salt Lake City, Utah), 24 December, 1911.

²² Bret E. Carroll, *American Masculinities: A Historical Encyclopedia*. (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2003), 3.

²³ Bill Osgerby, "A Pedigree of the Consuming Male: Masculinity, Consumption, and the American Leisure Class," in B. Benwell (ed.) *Masculinity and Men's Lifestyle Magazines*, (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2003), 60.

breadwinner status.²⁴ Osgerby notes, however, “dominant articulations of masculinity have always had to contend with competing masculine identities.”²⁵ Through a theoretical rejection of the historical existence of a monolithic and static masculinity, one sees Brady’s own selection and rejection of dominant masculine archetypical traits come into fuller focus. “Masculinity,” continues Osgerby, “is a multiform, mobile, and historically variable construction.”²⁶ Brady’s performance of ingestion thus constitutes an example of a competing masculinity, in which “hedonistic consumption [was] painstakingly signposted as a bastion of robust masculine heterosexuality.”²⁷ In the process, Brady situated himself squarely within what, in 1899, economic theorist Thorstein Veblen termed “the leisure class.”²⁸ Far from modest, middle-class masculinity based around family, moderation and hard work, members of this new urban leisure class marked their cultural and economic ascendance through extravagant displays of consumption – the more valuable the goods consumed, the better. “Conspicuous consumption of valuable goods is a means of reputability to a gentleman of leisure,” wrote Veblen, analyzing the “pecuniary culture” of the upper-echelon leisure class.²⁹ Brady’s consumption – so notable as to be repeatedly covered across the nation in news columns – thus proved his masculine reputability and class status. Brady often conflated his rise to economic independence through food imagery – “I began to eat away downtown,” he once remarked to an interviewer from the *New York Sun*, “where corned beef and beans cost a dime a plate... Finally I arrived right among you gentlemen. Since then I’ve eaten everything in sight except the tablecloths.”³⁰ By explaining the masculine self-

²⁴ Anthony E. Rotundo, *American Manhood: Transformations in Masculinity from the Revolution to the Modern Era*. (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1994), 45.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 61.

²⁶ Anthony E. Rotundo, *American Manhood: Transformations in Masculinity from the Revolution to the Modern Era*. (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1994), 45.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 62

²⁸ Thorstein Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class: An Economic Study of Institutions*. (New York, NY: The Macmillan Company, 1899). 1.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 158.

³⁰ “Diamond Jim Brady, Steel Magnate, Dies.” *Sun*. (New York, NY), 14 April 1917.

making process through the extended metaphor of food, Brady explicitly interlaces the two – food to him became symbolic of his social standing, and his ability to consume more than any other man underlined his masculine supremacy in a niche and gendered social class defined by its consumption. Historian Lewis Erenberg corroborates:

Diamond Jim stood as a symbol of a man who could conspicuously consume more than others...[he] mastered dining as if [he was] mastering nature. In this age of consolidation, nature was controlled and conquered in the name of progress and civilization. For...Brady, eating was a way of storing up gratification, mastering it.³¹

Through Brady's mastery of immense amounts of food at the tables of Broadway's famed restaurants, including Rector's, Sherry's, and Delmonico's, a specific and conspicuous consumption-based masculinity emerged. "These restaurants were showplaces that glorified material pleasures," writes Lewis Erenburg, "...The Broadway restaurants helped make the life of conspicuous consumption available."³² Newspapers painted vivid pictures of Brady, "seated in restaurants before quantities of food so appalling" that "nearby diners" sat aghast, "watch[ing] him demolish dozens of raw clams or oysters and the piles of bread and catsup" while he patiently waited for "the soup and the birds and the double steaks and vegetables that always followed." After his sumptuous repast, "he would finish a pound box of candy in five minutes."³³ As sheaves of newsprint will corroborate, Brady's highly visible and prodigious intake of high-value goods became an embodiment of his masculine mastery, his self-conscious positioning in the new urban leisure class, and his own carefully controlled and negotiated manhood in the sphere of consumption.

Diamond Jim's physical body, in this way, became the nexus of a performed and presented masculinity – a masculinity to be seen,

³¹ Lewis Erenberg, *Steppin' Out: New York Nightlife and the Transformation of American Culture*. (Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 50.

³² *Ibid.*, 41.

³³ "Diamond Jim Brady, Steel Magnate, Dies." *Sun*. (New York, NY), 14 April 1917

experienced and talked about. Here, Brady's physical body becomes an epitome of Judith Butler's theory of the process of gender formation. "Gender," writes Butler, "is the repeated stylization of the body, a set of repeated acts within a highly rigid regulatory frame that congeal over time to produce the appearance of substance, of a natural sort of being."³⁴ Nothing underscores this idea more than Brady's eponymous jewelry, a stylized fashion accessory that he was seldom seen without. "He had thirty sets, each composed of twenty items," writes Lloyd Morris in *Incredible New York*, "and collectively they included more than twenty thousand diamonds, as well as six thousand other precious stones. 'Them as has 'em, wears 'em,' he explained."³⁵ Here, one can see Brady's statement of conspicuous display and consumption laid plain – "Them as has 'em, wears 'em" is tantamount to a performative speech act, constitutive of Brady's "congealed" gendered identity – inextricably tied to stylized consumption, display, and embodied power. As Joan Scott has established in her influential essay "Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis," gender is a primary means of signifying power relations – Brady here signifies elevated power position through ostentatious display and performance of masculine wealth.³⁶ Brady first began collecting diamonds and other precious stones during his days on the road as a salesman, where, as seen above, they were used as collateral and status symbols. This tendency continued in the man as he accrued his millions and expanded the scale of his operations.

One particular anecdote illustrates Brady's propensity for crystalline display and exhibition of his own prosperity. According to an issue of *Goodwin's Weekly* published in 1917, Brady visited San Francisco during the 1915 International Exposition. During his return from a characteristically enormous dinner toward his hotel room, he noticed an illuminated American flag on the façade of a nearby building. Without skipping a beat, he remarked, "I'm going to have a flag like that in my collection of jewels!" The article continues, "not

³⁴ Judith Butler, *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity*. (New York, NY: Routledge, 1990), 45.

³⁵ Lloyd Morris, *Incredible New York: High Life and Low Life from 1850 to 1950*. (NY: Syracuse University Press, 1996), 263.

³⁶ Joan Scott, "Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis." *The American Historical Review* 91, no. 5 (December 1986): 1067.

only did Diamond Jim order a jeweled flag for himself, but he had a number of others made for his friends. It is said that he gave away ten thousand dollars worth of them!”³⁷ These conspicuous and well-publicized displays of largesse became a trademark of Brady’s, as well as a means by which to exert his display-based and leisure class masculinity. Accounts throughout his life pay testament to a man who was not afraid to spend money to create and expand his masculine brand and position of gendered power. One particular story stands out, in which Brady, while sitting on a grand jury, took pity on a female victim of a robbery, and tossed from the jury box a one hundred dollar bill – a newspaper-worthy act and one that benefited his reputation as much as the woman in question.³⁸ “He was Broadway’s master of revels,” writes Lloyd Morris in *Incredible New York*, “All America knew James Buchanan Brady, the Rajah of the Great White Way, by sight as well as reputation...he resolved to keep on buying diamonds and wearing them until all the world knew him at first glance.”³⁹ According to the Charlevoix County Herald in 1917, Brady’s “immaculate persona and glittering array of jewelry spell prosperity with a capital P”⁴⁰ – a testament to Brady’s repeated performative stylization of the body, visible consumption, and ostentatious display to bulwark a distinctive, leisure-class masculinity.

Brady’s use of his body to present manhood did not stop at diamonds and money. A man of means with aspirations of aestheticism, his hefty figure was always found tailored in fashions of his own design, another means by which to self-advertise and underscore a masculinity expressed by its competition with the norm. The February 29, 1908 edition of New York’s *The Evening World* attests to the degree of self-defined sartorial resplendence the man displayed, and the explicitly monetary degree of consumption attendant to displaying such garb.

Mr. Brady is universally noted for the correctness of his attire. He makes his own styles. If others do not follow them he cares not. He is a man of ideas, and is

³⁷ “Diamond Jim’s Flags.” *Goodwin’s Weekly* (Salt Lake City, Utah), 26 May, 1917.

³⁸ “Some Touch.” *Day Book* (Chicago, Ill.), 17 March, 1915.

³⁹ Lloyd Morris, *Incredible New York: High Life and Low Life from 1850 to 1950*. (NY: Syracuse University Press, 1996), 262.

⁴⁰ “Has Millions But Can’t Eat: Diamond Jim Brady Pays for being a Gormand.” *Charlevoix County Herald* (East Jordan, Mich.), 19 October, 1917.

content to exploit them in his own graceful way...[One night,] Mr. Brady wore a salmon-pink satin waistcoat, embroidered with subdued but pronounced flowers. Under his chin was carelessly but effectively tied a flaring salmon-pink cravat...He was his own spotlight...As Mr. Brady was leaving the Astor, two large, square-toed, square-faced men joined him and surrounded him in a protective fashion. 'Bodyguard,' explained Mr. Brady. 'Good God, man, I've got \$250,000 worth of ice on me.'⁴¹

Here, one can see the continued theme of the masculine self-made and leisure-class persona, untroubled by bothersome mainstream conventions of dress. By "making his own styles," Brady used his body as a physical symbol of his own particular brand of competitive masculinity, as well as a means by which to project gendered power and prestige. By explicitly and vocally assigning monetary value to his appearance (\$250,000 worth of 'ice'), he becomes a physical embodiment of his own masculinized consumption habits and economic prowess. As Morell remarks, "'At a time when men's clothing was still mediocre in design and tailoring, Jim was in the vanguard of a new school which contended that a perfectly fitting suit was smart as well as comfortable.'⁴² Here, one sees a resistant masculinity, predicated chiefly around stylized appearance and speech which, when repeated, congeal to form a resistant identity. The Grand Forks *Evening Times* describes, "...the silk hats, without which he never appeared in public, [that] were imported from London. Mark Herald, a famous haberdasher of the day, made his shirts...and Budd, his neckties."⁴³ Again, one can see the monetary value and prestige attached to Brady's physical body – his hulking frame became a literal walking advertisement for his wealth, influence, and self-made, consumptive masculinity. In addition, the fact that Brady's dress did

⁴¹ "Diamond Jim Brady, Trimmed Up With \$250,000 Worth of "Ice," Would Turn 'Bath-House John' Green with Envy." *Evening World* (New York, NY), 29 February 1908.

⁴² Parker Morell, *Diamond Jim: The Life and Times of James Buchanan Brady* (New York, New York: Garden City Publishing, 1934), 57.

⁴³ "Only One New York." *Morning Astorian* (Astoria, Or.), 15 March, 1908.

not align with contemporary male standards of apparel further buttresses the competitive nature of his own masculine performance and presentation – by repeatedly and ostentatiously defining his own maleness against the norm, Brady became an embodiment of competitive leisure class masculinity. Brady, too, utilized the bodies of others to complement his own competitive masculinity. He surrounded himself with the most beautiful women of the age, and was “fond of giving supper parties for pretty girls of the musical comedies” during his nightly forays onto Broadway’s Great White Way.⁴⁴ In fact, “a friend” of Brady’s is quoted in the Grand Forks Evening Times as saying “Brady doesn’t like to sit down to table after eleven o’ clock unless there are a dozen pretty women there to keep in him company.”⁴⁵ By collecting and displaying fashionable women much as he displayed his jewelry, Brady incorporated female bodies into a schema of consumption and performance, expounding on his own masculine self-worth in the process. It is Brady that is described in the numerous contemporaneous news articles, while the women he surrounded himself with are relegated to nameless, faceless currency, described similarly to his clothing, his diamonds, or his money. For example, when the cycling craze hit New York City in 1890s, Brady commissioned several custom bicycles to add to his collection of status symbols. When he heard of a six-man bicycle being designed for the Brooklyn Germania Cycle Club, he barked, “Hell! What’s the use of having six *men* on a bicycle? What you want are *women!* [emphasis in original]”⁴⁶ Brady’s use of women as objects of brazen display is underlined through another of his more unsavory practices – “...[Brady] made a rule that no woman was ever to be employed in his office. Females had a definite place in the landing of some of his contracts, but that place was not in a business office.”⁴⁷ Thus, Brady collected women much as he collected diamonds, utilizing them as an integral component of his gender performance and tools of business, while denying them basic agency. Based, as his manly persona was, around display, consumption, and masculinized business-centric

⁴⁴ “Scientific Mixer is J. Buchanan Brady.” *Sun* (New York, N.Y.), 6 May 1913.

⁴⁵ “New York Day by Day.” *Evening Times* (Grand Forks, N.D.), 8 May 1913.

⁴⁶ Parker Morell, *Diamond Jim: The Life and Times of James Buchanan Brady* (New York, New York: Garden City Publishing, 1934), 100.

⁴⁷ Parker Morell, *Diamond Jim: The Life and Times of James Buchanan Brady* (New York, New York: Garden City Publishing, 1934), 131.

discourse, Brady's lifestyle left no room for women to enjoy self-defined personhood, even as he used them as props to accentuate and complement a masculinity based on customized sartorial sophistication, larger-than-life appearance, and business prowess.

Through repeated stylization of his body and persona, James Buchanan "Diamond Jim" Brady came to define his own gendered public body through a variety of avenues. Through the "self-made man" ideal, Brady epitomized the aggressive, blustering male business persona that characterized contemporary capitalism and high-status commerce at the time. Through prodigious displays of conspicuous consumption with regards to food, diamonds, dress and women, Brady defined a masculinity in competition with the hegemonic conception of contemporary manliness, while firmly placing himself within a group of contemporaries that made up the new "leisure class" of the end of the nineteenth century. Through deployment of his own body (as well as those of others) as a display for the consumptive and self-making aspects of his gendered persona, Brady defined his own masculinity in highly visible and ostentatious manner. By all accounts, "Diamond Jim" Brady was a man of prodigious appetites – appetites that became defining characteristics of the carefully performed and conspicuously displayed masculinity of the Rajah of the Great White Way.

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“The Persistence of the Visionaries”: Forestry, Ecotourism and the Commodification of Nature in Powell River, BC.

DALTON PAGANI

Throughout the twentieth century, Powell River, B.C. has been a textbook example of a “company town.” With the incorporation of the Powell River Paper Company in October 1909, a prosperous pulp and paper mill shaped the emerging community. Today, rapidly changing social and economic realities have caused many forestry-driven communities to look for new ways to diversify their economies. Ecotourism represents one way for company towns to re-commodify nature, which involves changing how it is utilized and valued. The Sunshine Coast Trail, for instance, demonstrates the potential for ecotourism to transform Powell River in new ways. While it can be a challenge for single-industry communities to redefine their relationship to nature, it is a worthwhile to explore the possible role of ecotourism in Powell River’s future.

The following essay explores the economic and social impact of Powell River’s mill, and the challenges it faces today. Then, discussion turns to the opportunities and risks that ecotourism offers, particularly through an analysis of trail-building. Finally, two case studies of company towns in B.C. shed light on the possible outcomes of re-commodifying nature in a Powell River.

Introduction

Nature is commodified in many different ways. For over a century, the landscape surrounding Powell River has been valued for its role in the forest industry, particularly through extraction and manufacture. For decades, the pulp and paper mill has shaped the economic and social life of Powell River. Like many of British Columbia’s “company towns,” however, Powell River is currently “in the throes of a profound restructuring.”¹ In the face of new economic and social realities, old industries are being challenged and new perspectives on the environment and economy are being introduced. With a vast and beautiful landscape, Powell River is a prime candidate for ecotourism,² defined as “an enlightening nature travel experience

¹ Tanya Behrisch, Roger Hayter, and Trevor Barnes, “I don’t really like the mill; in fact, I hate the mill’: Changing Youth Vocationalism Under Fordism and Post-Fordism in Powell River, British Columbia,” *BC Studies* no. 136 (Winter 2002/03): 73.

² Jenny Clayton, “Chapter 7: Volunteer Trail and Bridge Builders in Powell River since 1988,” in *Making Recreational Space: Citizen Involvement in*

that contributes to conservation of the ecosystem, while respecting the integrity of host communities.”³ For a community historically defined by a single industry, such a re-commodification of nature may be a challenge; however, it is useful to consider why and how ecotourism may attain a larger role Powell River’s future.

To begin, this essay outlines the history of Powell River’s pulp and paper mill, particularly its economic presence and social perception. With this historical context in mind, analysis turns to challenges that currently face the mill. Then, the essay introduces ecotourism. After a brief discussion of tourism, the essay explores how trail-building in Powell River shows some of the opportunities and barriers for ecotourism. Finally, to understand the possibilities of ecotourism, the essay examines two other company towns in BC that have undergone similar processes: McBride and Chemainus. Overall, this essay seeks to explore if, at Powell River’s current economic juncture, it is possible to diversify the economy and explore new, less-harmful ways to value nature.

Setting the Stage: Powell River as a “Company Town”

As J.A. Lundie notes in *Powell River’s First 50 Years*: “no story of [the] Powell River area would be complete without mention of the [Powell River Company’s] role in that story.”⁴ For the purposes of this paper, an extensive, chronological account of Powell River and its mill is unnecessary, since several comprehensive histories already exist, including Donald MacKay’s *Empire of Wood*, Roger Hayter’s *MacMillan Bloedel: Corporate Restructuring and the Search for Flexible Mass Production*, and Karen Southern’s *Pulp, Paper and People*.

Rather, the following three sections explore specific aspects of this history to create a foundation for the discussion of ecotourism: the

Outdoor Recreation and Park Establishment in British Columbia, 1900-2000, (PHD thesis, University of Victoria, 2009), 239.

³ “Feasibility Study and Business Plan,” prepared for: Powell River Parks and Wilderness Society (PRPAWS), Community Futures Development Corporation of the Powell River Region, and Human Resources Development Canada, *Synergy Management Group Ltd. and ADR Forestry Systems/Shearwater Ltd.* (Jan. 2000), 0.

⁴ Harry Taylor, *Powell River’s First 50 Years* (Powell River, BC: Windflower Books & Stationery, 1960), not paginated.

economic presence and social perception of the mill, and how both have been challenged. In general, this summary illustrates the mill's economic importance throughout Powell River's history, how the mill's social influence contributes to its image, and how current realities challenge this image.

Economic Presence of the Mill

It must be acknowledged that the City of Powell River would not exist without the mill. In 1908, the Brooks-Scanlon Lumber Company of Minnesota recognized the economic potential of the region and purchased "local water and land rights" to construct the first pulp and paper mill in western Canada.⁵ Following the incorporation of the Powell River Paper Company in October 1909,⁶ the company directors began work on the mill, as well as "an entirely new industrial city."⁷ After some initial challenges,⁸ the first batch of paper rolled out on April 12, 1912.⁹ As a "model company town,"¹⁰ Powell River developed under a "boom market and rising prices" during World War I, which sustained it through the Great Depression and kept it in "firm financial position" through World War II.¹¹ Overall, people recognized "the Powell River pulp mill was a winner...creating a prosperous new coastal city around it."¹²

In 1960, the mill underwent a major change when the Powell River Company merged with MacMillan & Bloedel.¹³ The new company, later known as MacMillan Bloedel Limited [MB], became a leader in BC's forest economy.¹⁴ Under Fordist practices, it utilized a

⁵ Karen Southern and Peggy Bird, *Pulp, Paper and People: 75 Years of Powell River* (Powell River Heritage Association: Friesen Printers, 1988), xxi.

⁶ *Ibid.*, xxi.

⁷ Taylor, *Powell River's First 50 Years*.

⁸ Donald MacKay, *Empire of Wood: The MacMillan Bloedel Story* (Vancouver, BC: Douglas and McIntyre, 1982), 49-50.

⁹ Southern and Bird, *Pulp, Paper and People*, xii.

¹⁰ MacKay, *Empire of Wood*, 52.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 53, 65.

¹² Howard White, *The Sunshine Coast: From Gibsons to Powell River*, 2nd ed. (Madeira Park, BC: Harbour Publishing Co., 2011), 137.

¹³ MacKay, *Empire of Wood*, 163.

¹⁴ Roger Hayter, "MacMillan Bloedel: Corporate Restructuring and the Search for Flexible Mass Production," in *Flexible Crossroads: The Restructuring of British Columbia's Forest Economy* (Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 2000), 107.

large workforce in a system of mass production,¹⁵ and the mill expanded in both jobs and output.¹⁶ Following losses in the mid-1970s and a recession in the early 1980s, restructuring was soon needed.¹⁷ Thus, MB shifted toward flexible production, which allowed the mill to redefine itself through a “diversified range of higher-quality papers for a wider range of markets.”¹⁸ Increased productivity, however, came at the cost of cutbacks.¹⁹ While new techniques like thermomechanical production effectively modernized the mill, far fewer machines and workers were needed.²⁰ As a result, employment fell from 2,600 in 1973 to 1,275 in 1994.²¹ Despite this diminished workforce, MB’s modernization redefined and sustained the mill in a changing global economy.²²

Following Wyerhaeuser’s takeover of MB in October 1999, and several subsequent acquisitions,²³ the mill once again hopes to “revitalize its operations” under a new name: Catalyst Paper.²⁴ In the face of continued market and technological changes, division vice president and general manager Fred Chin confirmed his optimism regarding the mill’s future in an April 19, 2017 interview.²⁵ Moreover, despite a reduction from seven to two paper machines, and only 360 employees,²⁶ the mill still remains the community’s largest employer.²⁷

¹⁵ Behrisch, Hayter, and Barnes, “I don’t really like the mill; in fact, I hate the mill,” 74.

¹⁶ Roger Hayter, “High-Performance Organizations and Employment Flexibility: A Case Study of *In Situ* Change at the Powell River Paper Mill, 1980-1994,” *Canadian Geographer* 41, no. 1 (Spring 1997): 31.

¹⁷ Hayter, “MacMillan Bloedel,” 108.

¹⁸ Hayter, “MacMillan Bloedel,” 108; Hayter, “High-Performance Organizations and Employment Flexibility,” 28.

¹⁹ Hayter, “High-Performance Organizations and Employment Flexibility,” 28.

²⁰ “Powell River Environmental Effects Monitoring (EEM) Pre-Design Reference Document,” prepared for: MacMillan Bloedel Limited, Powell River Division, *Hatfield Consultants Ltd.* (June 1994), 6/1-4.

²¹ Clayton, “Chapter 7,” 214.

²² Hayter, “MacMillan Bloedel,” 108, 147.

²³ *Ibid.*, 108.

²⁴ Chris Bolster, “Catalyst Paper Corporation optimistic about Powell River mill’s future,” *Powell River Peak*, April 19, 2017, Business, not paginated.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ *Ibid.*

Nonetheless, as mayor Dave Formosa aptly notes, “[the mill’s] future is far from certain.”²⁸

Overall, the Powell River mill shaped the town and its economy through highs and lows; however, in the face of continued downsizing, one must consider the role of social capital to help the mill maintain a relatively positive image in the community.

Social Influence of the Mill

Even in economic difficulties, the mill has maintained a positive perception among residents. Since Powell River’s inception, “the company exerted economic, material, and cultural leverage over its employees, making decisions not only about employment but also regarding housing, consumer goods, education and recreational activities.”²⁹ The mill, for example, played a role in rehabilitating WWI and WWII veterans by offering them jobs and support upon their return.³⁰ Indeed, the resident manager stood at “the peak of the community pyramid” for many decades.³¹ Today, Catalyst continues to promote its “[support for] local programs and organizations” through donations and fundraising, which allows the mill to maintain social capital in the community.³² The mill has certainly contributed to the strengthening of Powell River’s social fabric, but local histories reveal how nostalgia may influence people’s perception of the mill today.

Most notably, Karen Southern’s *Pulp, Paper and People* “[traces] the progress and regress of the community with each expansion and cut-back of their lifeline, the pulp and paper plant.”³³ Backed by MB, Southern frames the mill’s development and the town’s development as parallel throughout the book. In other books, the mill’s presence is not as explicit, but nostalgia and the “pioneering spirit” still shape authors’ views of the company. For instance, in *Powell River’s First 50 Years*, Harry Taylor attributes Powell River’s economic and social success “solely to the vision and perseverance of

²⁷ Canada, *British Columbia Newcomers’ Guide to Resources and Services, Powell River Edition*, Welcome BC (2014), 6.

²⁸ Bolster, “Catalyst Paper Corporation optimistic about Powell River mill’s future.”

²⁹ Clayton, “Chapter 7,” 209.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 95.

³¹ Southern and Bird, *Pulp, Paper and People*, 140.

³² “Our Mills: Powell River, BC,” *Catalyst Paper* (2013), not paginated.

³³ Southern and Bird, *Pulp, Paper and People*, vii, inside cover.

those men, who in the first decade of the century risked their capital and reputation to pioneer the newsprint industry in our province.”³⁴ Bill Thompson use similar rhetoric in *Once Upon a Stump* and *Boats, Bucksaws, and Blisters*, which position H.R. MacMillan as a pioneering figure in British Columbia and the forest industry.³⁵ This impulse toward nostalgia is also present in a speech given by J.V. Clyne to the Newcomen Society in April 1965. In detailing MB’s history, he notes the company’s “virile, adventurous, and exciting [past],” and even makes a comparison to the Roman republic.³⁶

To this day, this idealization of the mill continues to permeate Powell River’s local memory, as seen in Howard White’s *Sunshine Coast*. In the book, White notes how the “language of Powell Riverites is shaped by this historic perception of the mill and town.”³⁷ Phrases like “south of town,” used to denote different areas, “[hark] back to the day when the mill and the company that ran it were supreme.”³⁸ Similarly, many residents continue to “mark off the periods of their lives” by the operations of the mill, since it was in the forefront during the economic and social transformations of their lives.³⁹ In all, the presence of the mill, even in economic decline, continues to be shaped by residents’ perceptions of a more stable, prosperous past. Such notions, however, have been increasingly challenged.

New Realities, Changing Perceptions

As early as 1977, skepticism of the mill’s future is evident in an “Economic Base Study of Powell River.” The study, prepared for the Powell River Economic Adjustment Committee, was sponsored in part by MB to “identify those economic and social factors that influence the Powell River community and to determine their impact on the future economic development of the community.”⁴⁰ In

³⁴ Taylor, *Powell River’s First 50 Years*.

³⁵ Bill Thompson, *Boats, Bucksaws and Blisters: Pioneer Tales of the Powell River Area* (Powell River Heritage Research Association: Friesen Printers, 1990), 243-244.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 27.

³⁷ White, *The Sunshine Coast*, 146.

³⁸ White, 146.

³⁹ White, 147.

⁴⁰ UVic SC, “An Economic Base Study of the Powell River Region,” Prepared by Karen R. Boyer, *Regional and Resource Planner*, July 1977. Prepared for

discussing the “expansion, cut backs, and stabilization” of the mill, it was concluded that continued modernization would lead to further layoffs.⁴¹ This proved to be true. Additionally, due to a “lack of diversity in the Powell River region economy,”⁴² the study argued that tourism has been “neglected” and its potential “lies virtually untapped.”⁴³ As discussed below, there are barriers to making tourism or ecotourism part of Powell River’s economy, but this study demonstrates an early indication of the growing concern over low employment and a need to diversify.⁴⁴

Another challenge to the mill’s supremacy can be found in an article on youth vocationalism in Powell River. As mentioned earlier, the shift toward post-Fordist practices in the 1980s involved smaller, more flexible workforces, which reduced employment significantly by 2002.⁴⁵ In the article, Tanya Behrisch, Roger Hayter, and Trevor Barnes examine how the expectations of students and the content of high school programs has been influenced by “the new economic reality of forest towns.”⁴⁶ In “labour market expectations,” the authors conclude that both students and schools do not place the mill high.⁴⁷ Essentially, in a post-Fordist labour market, the students are looking for alternative employment and the schools are accommodating this shift. Today, Brooks Secondary School and Vancouver Island University boast a range of Trades and Applied Technology Programs, including welding, carpentry, hairdressing, and culinary arts.⁴⁸ Also, there is an “enriched outdoor education program” called the Coast Mountain Academy, which makes “outdoor adventure tourism” a part of education.⁴⁹

Powell River Economic Study Adjustment Committee, Call Number HC117 P65B68, 2.

⁴¹ Ibid., 68.

⁴² Ibid., 148, 155.

⁴³ Ibid., 107.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 155.

⁴⁵ Behrisch, Hayter, and Barnes, “I don’t really like the mill; in fact, I hate the mill,” 75.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 73.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 91.

⁴⁸ “Personalized Learning Programs,” School District 47, <https://www.sd47.bc.ca/dualcredit/programs/Pages/default.aspx> (accessed 15 November 2017).

⁴⁹ Ibid.

Moreover, the mill no longer holds the same economic and social power it once did, especially among the younger generation. Rather, in this new context, alternative options like ecotourism are being pursued and promoted.

Enter: Ecotourism

Throughout Powell River’s history, the mill has shaped how the community understands its relationship to nature. Now, as the mill continues to struggle and the community looks to diversify its economy, ecotourism has an opportunity to gain attention and transform how the environment is valued. To understand the possibilities it presents, one must first contextualize ecotourism within the tourism industry in general. Then, it is useful to discuss an aspect of ecotourism that is already developing in Powell River: trail-building. Finally, two case studies of other company towns in BC offer insight into Powell River’s current situation and the potential of ecotourism to redefine the community.

Tourism in Powell River

In Powell River, an industry like ecotourism presents both opportunities and risks. From vast forests and majestic mountains, to winding rivers and thundering waterfalls, Powell River is a beautiful place with great potential for “tourists and outdoor recreationists.”⁵⁰ Despite the advantage of scenery, Powell River’s isolation poses problems.⁵¹ While there are two a BC Ferries’ routes to Powell River, along the Sunshine Coast and from Vancouver Island, it is not on any major transportation routes.⁵² As noted in a 2008 report by Tourism BC, 95% of visitors go to Powell River with the intent of spending time, not just passing through.⁵³ With little tourist traffic flowing through, they must be “enticed” to stay.⁵⁴

As a result, Powell River’s growing tourism and a service industry, which includes fine dining and attractions,⁵⁵ has so far been

⁵⁰ UVic SC, “An Economic Base Study of the Powell River Region,” 98.

⁵¹ Clayton, “Chapter 7,” 214.

⁵² UVic SC, “An Economic Base Study of the Powell River Region,” 107.

⁵³ *Value of the Powell River Visitor Centre: Study Results – For Distribution*. Tourism British Columbia, Research and Planning (April 2008) 47.

⁵⁴ UVic SC, “An Economic Base Study of the Powell River Region,” 107.

⁵⁵ Joe Wiebe, “Powell River,” *The Province*, May 13, 2012, Travel, E.6, 2.

aided by a strong arts and culture presence. Kathaumixw, for instance, is an internationally known choral music festival that draws people from all over the world every two years.⁵⁶ Ecotourism, on the other hand, is still developing. On the water, Powell River promotes several kayaking, diving, and sailing areas, as well as a weeklong canoe route that “follows a circle of lakes surrounding the town.”⁵⁷ For this discussion, however, it is necessary to consider how trees, the primary resource upon which Powell River was built, may be re-commodified through ecotourism.

Trail-building: From the Bomb Squad to the Sunshine Coast Trail

In Powell River, trail-building is worth exploring for two key reasons. First, it shows how volunteer groups can exercise agency and encourage new activities, which can later yield social and economic benefits. Second, it shows how Powell River’s forests, which have been viewed in mainly extractive-terms for the last century, can be valued in entirely new ways. From the Bomb Squad in the mid-1980s to the Sunshine Coast Trail today, it seems that Powell River may be able to re-commodify its forests and make ecotourism a profitable venture.

The relationship between forests and tourism is not new. Indeed, the 1977-1978 MacMillan Bloedel Forestry Recreation Guide invites visitors to “explore and enjoy the forest lands under management of MacMillan Bloedel.”⁵⁸ Through such initiatives, MB sought to demonstrate their “progressive forest management,” especially multiple use practices.⁵⁹ Interestingly, this coincides with the increased popularity of hiking in the 1970s and 1980s,⁶⁰ which leads into a discussion of the Bomb Squad: a group of volunteer trail-builders.

Jenny Clayton’s *Making Recreational Space*, a dissertation on BC’s “outdoor recreation and the social construction of wilderness,” includes a chapter devoted to Powell River and the Bomb Squad.⁶¹ As the mill restructured and downsized in the 1980s and 1990s, the

⁵⁶ White, *The Sunshine Coast*, 147.

⁵⁷ Wiebe, “Powell River,” E.6.

⁵⁸ BCA, Map, Item 14943A sh. 1, “A MacMillan Bloedel Forestry Recreation Guide, 1977-78.”

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰ Clayton, “Chapter 7,” 234.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, iii.

“Bloody Old Men’s Brigade,” which included many former mill employees, began building trails and bridges.⁶² Initially, the group did not have permission to operate on Forest Service lands,⁶³ but since the labour cost nothing and the wood they used was salvaged, logging companies and the Forest Service benefited from and thus supported the group’s activities.⁶⁴ As Clayton notes, “[t]he Bomb Squad points to new directions for nature-based tourism strategies that can help company towns adapt to new economic configurations.”⁶⁵ Today, they continue to work hard to develop the recreational potential of forests, with some observers recently calling the Millennium Park trail system the “Stanley Park” of Powell River.⁶⁶

Following in the footsteps of the Bomb Squad, the Powell River Parks and Wilderness Society [PAWS], represents another step toward ecotourism.⁶⁷ In 1992, also using volunteers, PAWS began work on the Sunshine Coast Trail [SCT]: “a 180-kilometre back country hiking experience that stretches from Sarah Point in Desolation Sound to SALTERY BAY.”⁶⁸ With 13 huts so far, it is “the longest hut-to-hut hiking experience in Canada,” and the only free one.⁶⁹ In 2000, Synergy Management Group and ADR Forestry Systems created a “Feasibility Study and Business Plan” for PAWS. The study, which examined the trail’s potential and various aspects of ecotourism and trail tourism, concludes that the trail offers “exceptional potential economic stimulus to the area” and could become “one of BC’s and Canada’s premier wilderness trails with national and international following.”⁷⁰ In regards to the economic component, the study notes how Powell River is “a key component of the Sunshine Coast tour route and is positioned to benefit from marketing initiatives that

⁶² Ibid., 214.

⁶³ Ibid., 228-229.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 233.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 239.

⁶⁶ Dave Brindle, “Groups complete new Millennium Park trail system,” *Powell River Peak*, June 1, 2016, not paginated.

⁶⁷ “Sunshine Coast Trail,” Powell River Parks and Wilderness Society (PAWS), 2017, <http://sunshinecoast-trail.com> (accessed 14 November 2017).

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ “Feasibility Study and Business Plan,” 146.

promote the region.”⁷¹ This study, therefore, relates to two previously discussed issues: the SCT could be a way to entice people to visit, and, in turn, Powell River could benefit as people pass through for amenities or stay for longer visits. While more research is required to fully explore the current or future economic impact of the SCT, the trail is already gaining popularity with hikers from around the world.⁷²

Through a re-commodification of nature, the volunteer-based Bomb Squad and PAWS reveal the potential of ecotourism to attract visitors and gain revenue in new ways. More studies are needed to understand the extent of ecotourism’s potential in Powell River, but until such studies are undertaken, the experiences of two forestry-driven communities may offer some insights. First, McBride explores the tension between forestry and ecotourism, and how trail-building fits into this dynamic. Second, Chemainus illustrates how a company town can diversify its economy through the introduction of a new industry. Together, these case studies further demonstrate the opportunities and challenges that face Powell River.

Ecotourism in British Columbia

In “Ecotourism and Forestry,” David J. Connell et. al. examine growing tensions in McBride as the community attempts to “reduce its dependence on forestry” and diversify through ecotourism.⁷³ In particular, the article discusses the Robson Valley, which, like Powell River, is relatively isolated and has relied on forestry for the last century.⁷⁴ Today, as ecotourism becomes a viable possibility in other parts of northern British Columbia,⁷⁵ increased attention has been placed on the Robson Valley’s Ancient Forest Trail [AFT]: “a recently established nature trail located in a globally unique stand of old-growth cedars.”⁷⁶ While a clear connection can be made to the SCT, this article also examines to the tension between ecotourism and forestry in company towns.

⁷¹ Ibid., 50.

⁷² “Sunshine Coast Trail,” PAWS.

⁷³ David J. Connell, John Hall, and John Shultis, “Ecotourism and Forestry: A Study of Tension in a Peripheral Region of British Columbia, Canada,” *Journal of Ecotourism* 16, no. 2 (2017): 170.

⁷⁴ Ibid., 172.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 171.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 170.

Interviews with stakeholders in forestry, tourism and recreation, and economic development revealed an acknowledgement that McBride’s economy is in transition, and new industries are needed for diversification.⁷⁷ During discussions, point of contention arose in regards to the AFT’s potential to provide enough local jobs and revenue.⁷⁸ Such concerns can similarly be expressed in Powell River. During the interviews, a “lack of education and skills in tourism” and “entrenched institutional legacies” also made some respondents skeptical of ecotourism.⁷⁹ Clearly, economic and social barriers can emerge as traditionally forestry-driven communities grapple with change.

A noteworthy point in regards to this tension is the potential for the coexistence of ecotourism and forestry. Often termed “multiple-use,” such policies reflect a desire to manage land for more than one purpose.⁸⁰ In the aforementioned 1977-78 Recreation Guide by MacMillan-Bloedel, the phrase “multiple-use” was featured several times.⁸¹ While the McBride case study does not offer much information on the potential for this cooperation, another company town in British Columbia does: Chemainus.

Although Chemainus has not turned to ecotourism, it nonetheless serves as an example of how a traditionally single-resource community can incorporate a new industry. Like Powell River and McBride, Chemainus is a forestry town. The book *Water Over the Wheel* by W.H. Olsen is quite similar to the local histories of Powell River, with a focus on pioneers, the role of the mill, and so on.⁸² While Chemainus has recently become best known for its murals, an article by Stanley Meisler demonstrates how the mill and murals have actually operated as a “dynamic duo.”⁸³ As early as 1994, Meisler noted how, “[b]y diversifying its economy, Chemainus took a vital step that other British Columbia forestry towns may be forced to take sometime

⁷⁷ Ibid., 178, 180.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 182.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 184, 187.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 183.

⁸¹ BCA, “A MacMillan Bloedel Forestry Recreation Guide.”

⁸² W. H. Olsen, *Water Over the Wheel* (Chemainus Valley Historical Society: Peninsula Printing Co., 1963).

⁸³ Stanley Meisler, “Take a look at a town that wouldn’t lie down and die,” *Smithsonian* 00377333 25, no. 2 (May 1994), not paginated.

soon.”⁸⁴ Even in the “era of the murals,” Meisler argues, “Chemainus has always kept in step with the main business of the province.”⁸⁵ While the murals are not ecotourist attractions, this cooperation between traditional and new industries has proved to be quite significant for Chemainus, with one resident arguing that the town’s revitalization “surely depended on both mill and murals.”⁸⁶

While these two case studies cannot be applied directly to Powell River, both indicate how ecotourism may continue to develop. It is unclear whether increased tensions will emerge, or if Powell River will achieve cooperation between the mill and ecotourism. Regardless, it will be important for those invested in forestry, ecotourism, economic development, and environmental sustainability to look at how such conversations are taking shape and what they may say about Powell River’s future.

Conclusion

As noted in the introduction, nature is commodified in many different ways. Over a century ago, Brooks and Scanlon looked to the trees, lakes, and rivers of Powell River and saw profit in nature’s manufacture and export. Today, trail-builders also look to the forests, but see its value much differently. It is hard to know what Powell River will look like in another hundred years. In many ways, the mill is still idealized and ecotourism is still disregarded, which continues to shape how the environment is viewed and used. But, as Clayton notes, attitudes toward local nature can change over time.⁸⁷ Thus, it is worth considering, how ecotourism may lead to a re-commodification of nature, and how this may influence Powell River moving forward. In 1912, it was due to “the persistence of the visionaries” that the first batch of paper was produced and a city was born.⁸⁸ Perhaps in 2018, it is once again up to visionaries to put their plans into action and transform this place we call home.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Clayton, “Chapter 7,” 239.

⁸⁸ Southern and Bird, *Pulp, Paper and People*, xii.

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***“Religion is the opium of the people”*: The political intentions behind the Bolshevik anti-religion campaign of 1917-1929.**

DARREN REID

This paper challenges the prevailing assumption that the 1917-1929 anti-religion campaign, carried out by the Bolsheviks in the Russian countryside, was primarily intended to secularize the peasantry. Using a variety of primary and secondary sources, this paper analyzes the two main tactics of the anti-religion campaign within the context of spiritual belief in rural Soviet Russia: the persecution of the clergy and the seizure of religious property. I argue that the campaign was not designed to secularize the peasantry, but to undermine the political autonomy of Russian villages.

The Marxist attitude views religion as a symptom of socioeconomic exploitation rather than as a disease itself; Marx considered religion to be “a way of dealing with an intolerable situation.”¹ To Lenin, religion was both a symptom and a disease. He wrote, “we may believe that a god or the gods will provide us succor under trial...Yet, we are deluded, for these beliefs serve to make us content...to stay the hand of justice.”² Lenin distinguished between the personal spirituality of religious people, with which he took little offense, and the institutional religion of those who propagated contentedness under oppression. Marx’s and Lenin’s ideological understanding of religion is the context that the Bolshevik anti-religious campaigns of 1917-1929 must be viewed through. There is a divergence between the Marxist and the Leninist understanding of religion, which sought to raise people above the yolk of religious belief, and the Bolsheviks’ anti-religious campaign, that worked under the guise of Marxist and Leninist thought to destroy the autonomy of peasant villages and bring the countryside under Bolshevik control. There were two major tactics within the 1917-1929 campaign: the persecution of the clergy and the appropriation of religious land and property. This paper will analyze both tactics and their impact on village cultural, political, and spiritual life, arguing that the 1917-1929 anti-religious campaign was an attack on village political and cultural autonomy,

¹ Robert Boer, *Lenin, Religion, and Theology* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 10

² Boer, *Lenin, Religion, and Theology*, 11

and not an attempt to end rural superstition.

The distinction between personal and institutional religion is a very common method within analyses of religion in Russia. Sergey Stepniak, an early revolutionary, argued in 1894 that Russian peasants are deeply spiritual yet entirely lacking in theology, and so were simultaneously very religious yet indisputably non-Christian.³ The 1922-46 Renovatianist movement in Russia, also known as the ‘Living Church,’ sought to replace Old Church Slavonic (the ancient language that prayers and hymns were written in) with modern Russian and end the blind veneration of relics, under the recognition that Christianity was essentially incomprehensible to peasant Christians.⁴ As recently as 1998, Daniel Peris argued that when studying rural Russia, “we need to distinguish between institutional religion and private religious beliefs.”⁵ Through this distinction, the general historical consensus has been that the 1920s anti-religion campaign was successful in damaging institutional religion by persecuting the clergy and appropriating religious property but failed to affect personal beliefs. However, this consensus has been based on a misunderstanding - and overestimation - of the roles that clergy and religious property actually played in rural life.

Firstly, the Russian clergy had very little to do with the peasantry’s personal beliefs, and so persecuting them could not have been expected to impact peasant religion. There were myriad ways in which the clergy was persecuted, and Bishops and ascetics were targeted most heavily. On the eve of the October Revolution of 1917, there were about one hundred and thirty bishops and assistant bishops; fifty were executed between 1923-1926 and sixty-six were either in prison or exile by the winter of 1924-25.⁶ Glennys Young argues that this persecution brought

³ Sergey Stepniak, *The Russian Peasantry*, 3rd ed, (London: S. Sonnenschein & Co, 1894), 341-4.

⁴ Gregory Freeze, “Counter-Reformation in Russian Orthodoxy: Popular Response to Religious Innovation, 1922-1925,” *Slavic Review* 54 (July 1995): 312-3.

⁵ Daniel Peris, *Storming the Heavens: The Soviet League of the Militant Godless* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), 6.

⁶ Glennys Young, *Power and the Sacred in Revolutionary Russia: Religious Activists in the Village* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), 148.

indirect hardship on the rural villages by making the upper-clergy dependent on parish funding and manpower, but, strictly speaking, the bishops were very much removed from rural life. Belliustan, a Russian parish priest, recounted in his 1858 memoirs, “To put it briefly, bishops not only do not want to see priests as servitors of the Heavenly Father, as their co-workers in the great cause of pastorship, or even as human beings.”⁷ Thus, while the Bolsheviks successfully eviscerated the upper-clergy and shut down many monasteries, this had little effect on life in the countryside.

The persecution of parish priests, on the other hand, directly affected the villages. Prior to the revolution, village priests were supported entirely by their congregation. Village assemblies, the formal political authorities since 1861, raised money for the upkeep of their priest and church property, and priests charged fees for dispensing religious sacraments (i.e. baptism, confirmation, eucharist, penance, anointing of the Sick, taking holy orders, and matrimony).⁸ After the revolution, the 1918 Decree on Separation of Church and State stripped parishes of all money and property, with a 1929 amendment that outlawed priests from charging fees for performing sacraments, and the 1918 Constitution of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic excluded priests from collecting food rations.⁹ Tax rates were also exorbitantly higher for priests than for laymen. Throughout the 1920s priests were paying about 1,780 rubles per year, compared to a worker’s 320 rubles per year.¹⁰ The combination of losing their savings and property, losing the ability to charge for their services, being refused rations, and bearing absurd tax burdens made it nearly impossible for parish priests to survive, leading to a flood of priests forsaking their vows and abandoning their villages. From this perspective, the Bolshevik’s anti-religion campaign appears to have been successful in undermining institutional religion for, unlike with

⁷ I.S. Belliustan and Gregory Freeze, *Description of the Clergy in Rural Russia: The Memoir of a Nineteenth-Century Parish Priest* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), 169.

⁸ Young, *Power and the Sacred*, 21-5.

⁹ John Curtiss, *The Russian Church and Soviet State, 1917-1950* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1953), 61.

¹⁰ Curtiss, *The Russian Church and Soviet State*, 230, 273.

the upper-clergy, parish priests did play active roles in their villages.

However, parish priests had little influence on the personal beliefs of the peasantry. Parish priests were in general not respected as pious, religious figures, but were seen, in the words of Vissarion Belinsky in the early nineteenth century, as “symbol[s] of gluttony, avarice, sycophancy [, and] bawdiness.”¹¹ Belliustan explained that “for him [the parish priest] the epitome of pleasure is to fraternize with the peasants in noisy, wild drinking bouts,”¹² and in response to a 1911 survey on clerical morality, one peasant from Vladimir province replied that “the clergy gives sermons from time to time, but their influence seems to be little, and in general, respect for the clergy by the people is remarkable undermined, because they themselves drink even more than the people.”¹³ Parish priests were essentially used for their ability to perform sacraments.¹⁴ Yet even this ability was not always needed, as in the case when, in the village of Korshevo in 1930, a priest refused to bless a group of peasants who were about to attack the local Bolshevik authorities. In response, the peasants broke into the church and commandeered some religious artifacts in order to bless themselves.¹⁵ Clearly, a priest’s role in a village was not overly pastoral.

As the most educated people in a village, parish priests served an important secular, and increasingly politicized, role in the countryside. Peasants and landlords alike looked to priests for advice in law, economics, and agriculture. An 1880 autobiography by Aleksander Romanov, a priest in Saratov province, recounted:

The priest became his [the peasant’s] lecturer and advisor in all of his affairs; if the miller needed to lease some land from him, [the landowner] would first ask the priest about it; if he wanted to buy some

¹¹ Young, *Power and the Sacred*, 13.

¹² Belliustan and Freeze, *Description of the Clergy*, 126-7.

¹³ Patricia Herlihy, *The Alcoholic Empire: Vodka and Politics in Late Imperial Russia* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 88.

¹⁴ Young, *Power and the Sacred*, 12-3.

¹⁵ Richard L. Hernandez, “Good Shepherds: The Public Authority of Parish Clergy in the Era of Collectivization,” *Russian History* 32 (2005): 200.

forest land, he would first try to see the priest; if a peasant committed an offence, he would go for protection to the clergy; if he wanted to get his son exempted from military service, he would go to petition the priest.¹⁶

Priestly secular authority was more dangerous to the Bolshevik regime than religious authority, because the Bolsheviks had to compete directly with priests for influence over peasant life. When the state began monopolizing trade in grain, some priests instructed farmers to sell their grain to the highest bidder.¹⁷ When the Komosol and the League of the Godless, a Bolshevik youth wing and anti-religious group, respectively, began holding ‘disputes,’ or public show-debates between anti-religious activists and Christians, priests were not only vastly superior debaters but their presence emboldened the peasantry to speak up for themselves.¹⁸ This phenomenon continued into village assemblies. One first-hand account of a Bolshevik during a village Soviet meeting recalls how “the mood noticeably changed for the worse” once the village priest arrived, and the murmurs that followed him eventually “turned to shouts of defiance” against requisitioning.¹⁹ The same Bolshevik complained that the priest “taught peasants to ask delicate questions...about the grain requisitioning.”²⁰ At the extreme, parish priests organized armed resistance to Bolshevik intrusion into the villages. For example, on June 25, 1929, the priest in the village of Zhruovka organized four hundred peasants in his church to attack local Bolsheviks in response to the ever-increasing taxes. There was a similar event on December 9, 1929, when the priest in the village of Gvazdy organized six hundred villagers to drive off some Bolsheviks who had come to close down the church.²¹ From these examples, parish priests were clearly dangerous to the Bolshevik regime, not because of their religious authority, but because of their political authority.

From the beginning of the revolution, the Bolsheviks had

¹⁶ Young, *Power and the Sacred*, 20.

¹⁷ Hernandez, “Good Shepherds,” 205.

¹⁸ Young, *Power and the Sacred*, 99.

¹⁹ Hernandez, “Good Shepherds,” 210.

²⁰ *Ibid*, 210.

²¹ *Ibid*, 200-1.

recognized that, in order to bring about a socialist state in a peasant country, they would have to bring the peasants under their direct control. Young argues that the 1924-5 policies of “revival of villages soviets” and “face to the countryside” were both explicitly intended to destroy village autonomy.²² In this context, since bishops and priests had little to no religious/moral authority among the people, the persecution of clergy should be considered, not as a means of rooting out religion, but as yet one more means of undermining village autonomy by removing them as political authority figures. One only has to examine the trial record of Father Ivanov, from the village of Verkhonii-Mamon, in which there is no reference to him spreading superstition or deluding the peasantry. Rather, the accusations and testimony focused exclusively on him “as a competing rational authority, one whose presence and rhetoric in the village belied their [the Bolsheviks’] own claims to rationality.”²³

The second major element of the anti-religious campaign was the closing and appropriation of religious buildings by the state. On January 3, 1919, a Circular on the Problem and the Separation of Church and State granted village soviets the authority to shut down or take control of religious property if they decided that it was not being taken care of properly, or if they needed a building for public purposes. Later, on April 4, 1924, a second circular took this authority from local soviets and gave it directly to the Central Committee.²⁴ It should be noted that the power to close churches was not entirely coercive or arbitrary. There are certainly instances of extrajudicial closures, especially by over-enthusiastic Komsomol members, but these were condemned by the state, and, for the most part, consent had to be given through a vote in the village soviet before 1924, and even after 1924 it was possible for peasants to successfully petition the Central Committee to keep their church open.²⁵ Thus, in 1925, the League of the Godless was tasked with persuading the peasantry to allow their churches to be closed.²⁶ Although it largely failed to do so, the League did succeed in achieving increased church closures

²² Young, *Power and the Sacred*, 110-1.

²³ Hernandez, “Good Shepherd,” 209.

²⁴ Young, *Power and the Sacred*, 226-7.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 227-8.

²⁶ Peris, *Storming the Heavens*, 10, 120.

by subterfuge. For example, when meetings were being planned to discuss the closing of a church, League members would omit the topic from the meeting agendas, or change the meeting locations to unusual places at the last minute, so that anybody who otherwise would have opposed the closure would not know about it until it was too late.²⁷ Additionally, the League would threaten would-be opposition with persecution as kulaks or by withholding pension payments.²⁸ The campaign to close churches was slow at first, with about four thousand closed by 1929, but this would increase exponentially to forty thousand by 1938.

What, then, was the importance of shutting down these buildings? Certainly, the church was an integral part of peasant religion. People flocked there on weekends and religious holidays for sermons, and baptism and marriage were important events in village life. Yet, the church was so much more than just a religious space. The church was at the very core of village identity and culture. It was, in the words of Lynn Viola, “a symbol of village solidarity” and “an icon of the village’s history, traditions, and major life events.”²⁹ As evidence of this, consider the sacrament of matrimony among loyal socialists. The Bolsheviks specifically outlawed church marriages in the 1918 Code on Marriage, the Family, and Guardianship, providing legal status to civil marriage only. However, both the Komsomol and the League of the Godless, each considered a vanguard of secularization in the countryside, discovered that most of their members continued, not only to be baptized, but also married in their village churches.³⁰ Young contends that this is proof that anti-religion activists were not whole-heartedly opposed to religion. The simpler implication is that Komsomol and League members did not consider marriage and baptism to be entirely religious practices, but rather cultural traditions which were fundamental to the village’s group identity. Consider, also, the somewhat surprisingly well-documented importance of church bells to rural life. Hernandez points out that church bells marked the cycles of village time, announcing, to

²⁷ Ibid, 135.

²⁸ Ibid, 135.

²⁹ Lynn Viola, *Peasant Rebels Under Stalin: Collectivization and the Culture of Peasant Resistance* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 39.

³⁰ Young, *Power and the Sacred*, 87-90.

everyone for miles around, the time to plow, plant, and harvest their plots. The bells also sounded emergency alarms, rallying people in defense of their village or to combat a fire.³¹ Most importantly, church bells were often hundreds of years old and unique to the village they occupied, and thus were important symbols of tradition and identity.³² “This symbolism was so potent in Russia,” argues Hernandez, “that the bell eventually served ‘at large’ as a peculiar bearer of Russian national identity long before the Bolshevik Revolution produced alternative symbols for this purpose.”³³ To the Bolsheviks, who wanted to recreate Russia into an entirely socialist society that identified monolithically with the Party, the survival of autonomous village cultural identities was essentially anti-socialist. The centrality of church bells to village tradition is all the more important to recognize in light of the Bolsheviks’ specific targeting of these bells for destruction. The state demanded that church bells be melted down for industrial use. On December 15, 1929, the All-union Central Executive Committee gave local soviets the power to control when the bells could ring. Most strikingly, Komsomol and League members forcibly removed and destroyed village church bells, taking ‘selfies’ while standing beside the ruins of these gigantic bells.³⁴ Given the importance of churches to village cultural identity through the examples of marriage ceremonies and church bells, the Bolshevik’s campaign to close churches cannot be approached as a purely anti-religious campaign, but also an attack on the traditional culture and autonomy of village identity.

The two major elements of the Bolshevik anti-religion campaign of 1917-1929 that have been discussed, the persecution of clergy and the closure of religious buildings, had far-reaching effects on peasant life that cannot be reconciled with Marxist-Leninist condemnations of religion. According to the writings of both Marx and Lenin, religion was undesirable because it encouraged the people to blindly accept the issues of the world

³¹ Richard L. Hernandez, “Sacred Sound and Sacred Substance: Church Bells and the Auditory Culture of Russian Villages during the Bolshevik Velikii Perelom,” *The American Historical Review* 109 (December 2004):1478-80.

³² Hernandez, “Sacred Sound,” 1478.

³³ *Ibid*, 1482.

³⁴ Peris, *Storming the Heavens*, 83.

(inequality, disease, etc.) instead of working to solve them. According to Marxism-Leninism, education in science would bring an end to superstition, and the Bolsheviks did make attempts at educating the peasantry. However, they also went beyond the demands of Marxism by targeting the clergy and religious property, which had a much larger effect on peasant culture and identity than their religion, and by doing so revealed that their intent was not merely to end religion, but to bring the peasantry under party control. In terms of the persecution of clergy, the upper-clergy (bishops, assistant bishops, monks, etc.) were successfully repressed, yet Belliustan's memoirs illustrate how the upper-clergy had no relationship with rural religion. Similarly, parish priests had little sway in moral and religious matters due to their vice and corruption. They did, however, play an important political role as the most educated in the village, providing peasants and landlords with legal advice, leadership, and support in resistance to Bolshevik incursion into the countryside. As such, the persecution of clergy affected peasant political capacity instead of peasant religion. As for the closure of religious property, churches were important for their utility and symbolic importance; they were more important as sites of village identity than of religion. The continued practice of baptism and church marriage among the members of the Komsomol and the League of the Godless illustrates how these practices were not considered to be primarily religious in nature, but rather as traditional rituals that fostered a cultural group identity. In view of these facts, the Bolsheviks' specific targeting of religious property illustrates how the anti-religion campaign worked more to undermine village autonomy than to end rural superstition.

“Religion is the opium of the people”: The political intentions behind the Bolshevik anti-religion campaign of 1917-1929

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“Language on Holiday:” Wittgenstein and the Language-Reality Gap in Historical Narratives

ARI FINNSSON

The role of language in historical representations is a crucial issue. Empiricist and realist understandings of historical studies were vastly complicated by new theories of language developed in the last century and a half. Important works by Ferdinand de Saussure, Roland Barthes, and Michel Foucault, among others, threw into doubt the ability of language to correspond to reality. This posed major problems for the ability of the historical discipline to represent the reality of the past. Various modernist theorists have challenged the conclusions of postmodernist linguistic and historical theories, arguing that they leave the possibility for knowledge about the reality of the past in serious doubt because of a gap they open up between the language used to describe the past and the reality of the past itself. Frank Ankersmit provides a key re-envisioning of the nature of language in the historical discipline to attempt to accommodate this change in the understanding of the nature of the relationship of language to reality. This paper will use Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later language theory to interrogate Ankersmit’s historical theories as well as criticisms directed towards Ankersmit’s and other postmodernist theories. I argue that a revised conception of the nature of language based on Wittgenstein’s language theory, while it disagrees with elements of Ankersmit’s theory, does enable the postmodern historian to answer crucial modernist critiques.

The problem of language in history was brought up as early as by the Prussian philosopher Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767-1835), who argued that language is the “formative organ of thought” – historical understanding is dependent upon language.¹ Language, however, plays a relatively unproblematic role in conventional histories. The nature of language is traditionally explained in roughly in two ways: reocentric and psychocentric semantics. In reocentric semantics, words derive their meaning from things in the external world. Words stand in for things in the world. The correlation of words to reality is not in doubt, and the problem of language for the historian is merged with the problem of truth. In psychocentric semantics, words stand in for ideas in the mind rather than things in the external world and may or may not provide an accurate picture of the world, although they are still unproblematically linked to the world insofar as ideas in the mind are

¹ Alun Munslow, *The New History* (Harlow: Pearson Longman, 2003), 46.

thought to be directly related to their subjects in the physical world.² In both of these systems, the relationship of language to reality is indubitable – “the facts” can be reasonably regarded as unmediated and can be accurately written down and recorded.³

The role of the conventional or modernist historian is to “reconstruct to the best of his ability the past as it ‘actually was’.”⁴ History is admitted to be fallible on three counts: the fallibility of the historical record, the subjectivity of the historian, and the selectivity inherent in the writing of history. The past remains, to some degree, irretrievable to the historian and cannot be “recaptured in its entirety.”⁵ What is rarely at question are three fundamental assumptions: that there is an essential and discoverable reality to the past, that historians are able to, at least partially, represent this reality through language, and that the truth of a statement is derived from its correspondence to reality. The philosophy at the heart of conventional histories is realism – the belief that historical inquiry refers to a past reality that existed once, but does no longer, and that written histories are truthful to the extent that they accurately correspond to the past.⁶

The Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure’s (1857-1913) foundational linguistic theories complicated traditional conceptions of language and the historical discipline. Saussure’s key insight was to think in terms of signs instead of words. Languages are re-defined as sign systems where a sign is anything that stands for something other than itself (e.g. a word or a picture.) Language is, therefore, not restricted to words, nor is it a naming system where words correspond to things. Signs come into existence through interaction, not through an individual creative process wherein humans create words for their ideas. Signs, for Saussure, gain their meaning through relationships and oppositions to other signs. No sign stands on its own; signs work only as part of a complex sign system. The meaning of a sign depends on something more than its simple correspondence to the world.

² Roy Harris, *The Linguistics of History* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004), 6-7.

³ Munslow, *The New History*, 53.

⁴ Gertrude Hammelfarb, "Postmodernist History," in *Reconstructing History*, ed. Elizabeth Fox-Genovese and Elisabeth Lasch-Quinn (New York: Routledge, 1999), 72.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 73.

⁶ Robert F. Berkhofer, *Beyond the Great Story: History as Text and Discourse* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 47.

Saussure separated the sign system into three categories: the signifier, signified, and object. The signifier is the word in the language, the signified is the mental concept to which the signifier refers. The actual object (i.e. the thing in the world) is external to the sign system. The relationship of the sign to the object was complicated by Saussure's observation that the linguistic sign is arbitrarily chosen and in no way resembles the object that it denotes. Consequently, the certainty and permanence of the link between the sign and the object was thrown into doubt. Language, for Saussure, is characterized by an arbitrary link between the signifier and the signified and an arbitrary link between the signified to its object. Language is no longer unproblematically correspondent to reality.⁷ This raises an important problem for the historian with regards to the ability of language – in the form of historical narratives – to refer to past objects and events.⁸

Roland Barthes' (1915-1980) work on semiotics further complicated matters. Barthes, a French literary theorist and philosopher, introduced a two-stage process of meaning creation. In the primary signification stage, the signifier denotes a signified to create a sign. This primary stage corresponds roughly to Saussure's system. This process is only possible because the sign instantly belongs as a signified in a secondary signification of a large myth system. The myth is an accepted part of a culture that is understood by everybody within the culture. Signs and signs systems are, therefore, embedded codes with normative meanings.⁹ For Barthes, everything is a sign, even "the most direct product of nature is as subject to signification as the most socialized institutions."¹⁰ By way of example, the red on a traffic light symbolizes "stop" only means "stop" insofar as the green light below it means "go." Signs, therefore, are related to their signifier, to a reservoir of other signs (an "organized memory" of forms from which it is distinguished) that they may be drawn from in order to enter the discourse, and to their actual neighbours in the world.¹¹

⁷ Callum G. Brown, *Postmodernism for Historians* (Harlow: Pearson Longman, 2005), 33-37.

⁸ Murray G. Murphey, *Our Knowledge of the Historical Past* (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1973), 1.

⁹ Brown, *Postmodernism for Historians*, 39-40.

¹⁰ Roland Barthes, "The World as Object," in *A Barthes Reader*, ed. Susan Sontag, (New York: Hill & Wang, 1982), 68.

¹¹ Roland Barthes, "The Imagination of the Sign," in *A Barthes Reader*, edited by Susan Sontag, (New York: Hill & Wang, 1982), 211.

Barthes' theories have important ramifications for the relationship of language to reality. Barthes key insight is that the signifier comes before the signified. For Barthes, the signifier does not disappear once the signified is discovered. The signified is socially constructed by its circulation between the user and the consumer of the sign. In this way, language determines the order of the world, not the other way around. Signs are the building blocks of what we think of as reality; reality is something made in culture with signs, myths, discourses, and texts that are created by that culture. In essence, since language defines the world and language is culturally defined, the world is culturally defined. There exists no single shared reality. Historical representations can only be attempted by ordering culturally defined signs (i.e. words) into culturally defined narratives (i.e. histories) which did not exist in reality and which bear no resemblance to it. A human representation of the complex relations of reality can never be complete. Historical events can never be pieced together in a neutrally observed, complete, and verifiable account. This is because there is no central reality to be discovered and put back together. The past cannot, therefore, be reconstructed nor can its reality be portrayed through linguistic historical study.¹²

Michel Foucault's (1926-1984) historical theory builds on the linguistic theories of Saussure and Barthes through his emphasis on language. Foucault agrees with Barthes that the historian has no unmediated access to the past. All attempts to represent the past are shaped by language. Foucault argues that language is itself shaped by a framework of power dynamics. Language is, like for Barthes, an arbitrary system of culturally constructed sign-signifier-signified relationships between words and the world. Knowledge, including historical knowledge, is shaped by a system of rules governing the generation and utilization of knowledge that is particular to each historical epoch. History is, at its essence, an act of imagination by the historian. Rather than attempting to represent historical events, Foucault argues that historians should seek to examine the narrative statements that constitute history. Foucault's historical project will not produce objective truths about the reality of the past, but will reveal the interplay of narrative and linguistic interpretation.¹³ Language, not the world of things, becomes the focus of historical study.

¹² Brown, *Postmodernism for Historians*, 40-47.

¹³ Alun Munslow, *Deconstructing History* (London: Routledge, 2006) Accessed April 11, 2017, Taylor & Francis E-Books, 129-133.

The work of important thinkers, including Saussure, Barthes, and Foucault, on the theory of language raises the issue of the gap between language and reality. Saussure's division between the signifier, signified, and object complicates the relationship of language to reality. Language is separated from reality and the link between the two becomes tenuous and arbitrary. Barthes' work argued that the relationship between language and the world runs the other way; instead of reality defining language, language defines reality. Foucault's theories about the rules governing the production of knowledge shaped his historical theory that placed the emphasis of historical study on language. Language, far from being an uncomplicated and unmediated method of speaking about the world, becomes a complicated system that makes the re-discovery of a single and essential past impossible.

Postmodern historical theories have been heavily criticized by modernist historians. The chief criticism of post-modernist theories is that they deny the reality of the past. For these critics, postmodernism denies the correspondence between language and reality and therefore, of any kind of truth about reality.¹⁴ Ankersmit's historical theory provides one important attempt to bridge the language-reality gap.

Frank Ankersmit (1945-), a Dutch historical theorist and intellectual historian, seeks to redefine the task of the historian by distinguishing between descriptions and representations. In broad terms, a description refers to reality and a representation is about reality. Descriptions are simple statements about states of affairs, such as "the cat is black." Representations, however, are unfixed and are defined by the set of descriptions within it. A historical representation of the Renaissance would not be something that refers to an object in the past, but would "be about" something in the past; the term "the Renaissance" doesn't refer to any object in the past, but is "about" events in the past.¹⁵ Ultimately, since representations are composed of descriptions, the ability of language to refer to the past is maintained in historical representations. Ankersmit makes another distinction between knowledge from the compulsion of experience, what reality demonstrates to be true, and knowledge from the compulsion of language, what we hold to be true on the basis of a priori, analytical, or philosophical arguments. In essence, Ankersmit argues that "language

¹⁴ Hammelfarb, "Postmodernist History," 72.

¹⁵ Frank Ankersmit, "The Linguistic Turn: Literary Theory and Historical Theory," *Historical Representation* (2001), 41.

can be a truth maker no less than reality.”¹⁶ Ankersmit argues that these historical representations of the past should be conceived of as proposals for representing a certain part of the reality of the past with a certain set of language. These proposals should be judged against one another, not against the past itself.¹⁷ Ankersmit’s theory attempts to bridge the language-reality gap by elevating historical discourse above simple descriptions to the level of representations. Since historical representations do not have to correspond directly to the reality of the past in order to gain meaning, Ankersmit is able to side-step the problem of the language-reality gap at the level of representation. Ankersmit’s descriptions, however, still refer to the past and the epistemological gap between bits of descriptive language and the things that they refer to re-emerges.

Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein’s (1889-1951) later philosophy of language differs importantly from previous thinkers and can help resolve the problem of linguistic reference to reality. Wittgenstein considers language and the activities into which language is woven as language-games.¹⁸ For Wittgenstein, “the speaking of a language is part of an activity, or of a form of life.”¹⁹ Language becomes a part of human behaviour, not something external to the material world. Like Barthes and Saussure, he rejects the view of language as a naming system. The meaning of a word does not come from the object that corresponds to it, or even from an idea in the mind. Wittgenstein thinks that to conceive of words as meaning what they correspond to is to confuse the meaning of a word with its bearer.²⁰ We can speak of an object that no longer exists because the meaning of a word is not its bearer. Wittgenstein rejects the view of language as a referential system of signs. Instead, “[f]or a *large* class of cases of the employment of the word ‘meaning’ – though not for *all* – this word can be explained in this way: the meaning of a word is its use in the language.”²¹ Wittgenstein does not wish to define the meaning of a

¹⁶ Ibid., 32.

¹⁷ Frank Ankersmit, “In Praise of Subjectivity,” *Historical Representation* (2001), 92-96.

¹⁸ Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, P. M. S. Hacker, and Joachim Schulte, ed. P. M.S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte, 4th ed. (Chichester, West Sussex, U.K.: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 8.

¹⁹ Ibid., 15.

²⁰ Ibid., 24.

²¹ Ibid., 25.

word as its use, the meaning of a word is merely explained by its use. Wittgenstein wants to resist the impulse to define anything in terms of its essential qualities. In the example of the category of games, Wittgenstein argues that there is no essential set of features that define “games” in a way that includes all things that we call games and excludes all others. Rather, Wittgenstein argues that games share a kind of “family resemblance”: a complicated network of similarities.²² The concept of family resemblance applies well to problems in the historical discipline. Ankersmit argues that the way in which the word “revolution” is defined determines what the results of a historical study into revolutions will be. Wittgenstein would argue that any attempt to define “revolution” would be futile, as there is no such thing as the essence of revolution.

Wittgenstein thinks that philosophical problems, such as the gap between language and reality, arise when “language goes on holiday”. Only then does naming appear as a “strange connection of a word with an object.”²³ Wittgenstein argues that there is nothing extraordinary going on in language; there is no language-reality gap that must be bridged. Language, as an element of human behaviour, is a part of reality and does not need to correspond to or represent reality. Ultimately, “a *misunderstanding* makes it look to us as if a proposition *did* something strange.”²⁴

For Wittgenstein, Ankersmit’s distinction between representation and description is a false dichotomy. Even simple descriptive sentences such as “the cat is black” are not referential. There is no need for a distinction between descriptive statements and representations; both are fundamentally the same kind of sets of language. Likewise, Ankersmit’s division of knowledge into two categories, knowledge from the compulsion of experience as opposed to the compulsion of language, would also be seen as an artificial distinction. Wittgenstein does not see language as distinct from reality, and knowledge gained from language would, therefore, not be of a fundamentally different nature to knowledge gained from experience.

The meaning of historical narratives, for Wittgenstein, would be derived from their use in the language-game of history. Any attempt to theorize a connection to the past through historical narratives, whether through direct correspondence or through Ankersmit’s

²² Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, 36.

²³ *Ibid.*, 23.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 48.

representation, would be, for Wittgenstein, doomed to fail. Since statements do not derive their meaning from any kind of correspondence to reality, it follows that historical narratives do not gain their meaning from a correspondence to the reality of the past. This approach fits well with Ankersmit's argument for comparing historical narratives against one another, rather than against the past.

Wittgenstein's re-envisioning of language as a type of human behaviour can bridge the language reality gap. When language is conceived of as apart from reality and having to correspond to it, then the postmodern emphasis on language does seem to be a denial of the reality of the past, or at least an attempt to ignore it. Language, however, according to Wittgenstein, does not correspond to reality, or to ideas in the mind of the language-user, but is a part of reality. The language of the past is part of the reality of the past, and is the only part available in the present. To study history through linguistic texts is to study the reality of the past, insofar as language constitutes a part of reality. History can be seen as a literary artifact as the sources that we have are artifacts of language. Thus, the language-reality gap fades away.

Important developments in the philosophy of language since the end of the 19th century have hugely complicated the historian's task. Language in conventional histories is regarded as relatively unproblematic, and deficiencies in the representation of the past are due to the fallibility of the historian themselves or to the evidence used. The nature of the relationship of language to reality is rarely in doubt. Works by Saussure, Barthes, and Foucault, however, raise important issues with regards to the correspondence of language to reality. A reconceptualization of language as a complex system of culturally defined sign-signifier-object relationships made the prospect of representing the past through language not just impossible, but also fundamentally misguided. Fundamental assumptions about historical truth as reliant on correspondence to the past and language as an unmediated generator of knowledge were eroded. Language and reality were separated and their relationship was made ambiguous. Not only was the correspondence of language to reality undermined but, rather than reality defining language, language became seen as defining reality. Frank Ankersmit attempts to reconcile this view of language by making distinctions between referential descriptions and representation, which do not refer to the past. Theories like Ankersmit's, however, are often criticized for appearing to deny the reality of the past. Wittgenstein's later language theory, through its

redefinition of language as a part of human behaviour can bridge the language-reality gap. Ultimately, accusations of a postmodernist denial of the reality of the past are dependent on a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of language. Words do not refer to the world, nor do they gain their meaning or truthfulness through a correspondence to the world. Instead, Wittgenstein argues that language is a form of human life, a language-game that is a part of reality. A revised understanding of Ankersmit's theory on the basis of Wittgenstein's theory of language would suggest that all language sets fall under the category of representation. Historical narratives and descriptive statements alike should not be evaluated according to their correspondence to reality. Proposals for the representations of the reality of the past should be understood as moves in the language game of history and can be judged against one another for their usefulness. Once language is understood as an element of reality it no longer needs to correspond to reality. To study language is to study reality.

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Rebel with a Cause: The rise of René Lévesque

KATHRYN LEBERE

In 1976, the Parti Québécois won a majority in Quebec under the leadership of René Lévesque. Short of stature, balding, and with a cigarette in hand, Lévesque seemed like an unlikely personality to become premier at first glance. However, by embracing Quebec nationalism and remaining determined through times of hardship, Lévesque was able to prove himself as a politician. Through the analysis of his political career from 1960 to 1976, it becomes clear that Lévesque rose to power because of the reputation he fostered in Jean Lesage's cabinet, the decision he made to leave the Quebec Liberal Party in 1967, and the changes he made to the Parti Québécois after the 1974 election.

Even before Lévesque officially became a politician, it was clear that his reputation would play an integral role in his rise. Lévesque became interested in becoming an active participant in Quebec politics in the fall of 1959.¹ Timing was ideal for a man like Lévesque; Jean Lesage, the leader of the Liberal Party, was in the process of “gather[ing] outstanding men,”² so he could create a team of Liberals capable of defeating the Union Nationale. A French-language war correspondent for the CBC during the Korean War, Lévesque had already made a name for himself before his political debut.³ He was a front-ranking Quebec journalist, and the “people in French Canada were quite simply infatuated with him” because of his “mastery of the spoken word.”⁴ In addition, Lévesque had covered many elections and political conventions during his career, giving him insight on the inner workings of politics.⁵ After witnessing the conservative and nationalist Union Nationale dominate Quebec, Lévesque was attracted to the Liberal Party's platform of modernizing the province.⁶ Lesage recognized that Lévesque's popularity could be of benefit to his party,

¹ Jean Provencher, *Rene Levesque: Portrait of a Quebecois*, trans. David Ellis (Gage Publishing, 1975), 131.

² Marguerite Paulin, *René Lévesque: Charismatic Leader*, trans. Jonathan Kaplansky (Montreal: XYZ Publishing, 2004), 60.

³ Edward Cowan, “Leader of Quebec Separatists: Rene Levesque,” *New York Times*, April 29, 1970.

⁴ Provencher, *Rene Levesque: Portrait of a Quebecois*, 80.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.*, 134.

and Lévesque was eager to become a key player in the Liberal's campaign.⁷

It was in Lesage's Liberal government that Lévesque proved his capabilities as a politician, building the reputation he needed to eventually become premier. Since Lévesque was a newcomer to politics and had a clean public image, Lesage assigned him the portfolio of Public Works; it had been a place of patronage under the Union Nationale, and was in need of a fresh start.⁸ However, although Lévesque's "mind was concentrating on Public Works, his heart was more concerned with hydraulic resources."⁹ A Quebec nationalist, Lévesque wanted to find ways of promoting Quebec's interests. He believed that nationalization of Hydro-Quebec was necessary in order for the province to become more economically independent.¹⁰ His objective was for Hydro-Quebec to become the sole producer and distributor of electricity in the province.¹¹ This would allow French-Canadians more opportunities to move into top managerial positions—something they had yet to experience under private ownership.¹²

The nationalization of Hydro-Quebec was one of the most important feats of Lévesque's career because it was originally not supported by the Liberals. He was largely alone in his thinking and faced a lot of opposition. Some cabinet ministers regarded Lévesque's plan as "an abuse of ministerial responsibility,"¹³ and Lesage was concerned with the financial implications of the project, which would cost upwards of 6 million dollars.¹⁴ Nevertheless, Lévesque remained determined. In an attempt to make his proposal seem more attractive, Lévesque appealed to Quebecers' pride. Rather than emphasizing the monetary benefits of nationalization, he shifted the argument, turning it into a debate on French patriotism.¹⁵ Unlike others in the Liberal Party, Lévesque realized that by the 1960s, the French public was less willing to passively accept economic inequality; the 1961 census had revealed

⁷ Provencher, *Rene Levesque: Portrait of a Quebecois*, 141.

⁸ Peter Desbarats, *René: A Canadian in Search of a Country* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1976), 36.

⁹ Provencher, *Rene Levesque: Portrait of a Quebecois*, 160.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 170.

¹¹ Paulin, *René Lévesque: Charismatic Leader*, 66.

¹² Norman Penner, "Quebec Explodes a Bombshell: René Lévesque and the Challenge of Separatism," *The Round Table* 67, no.266 (1977): 155.

¹³ Provencher, *Rene Levesque: Portrait of a Quebecois*, 182.

¹⁴ Provencher, *Rene Levesque: Portrait of a Quebecois*, 191.

¹⁵ Desbarats, *René: A Canadian in Search of a Country*, 40.

that Anglophone Montrealers were earning higher salaries than their French counterparts.¹⁶ Since the government of Quebec was under the control of French Canadians, Lévesque believed that the public should see it as the primary institution capable of looking after the provinces interests.¹⁷ He asserted that the French Canadians “shouldn’t have to apologize now for wanting their place in the sun,”¹⁸ and worked diligently to gain their support.

Although the nationalization of Hydro-Quebec had originally been met with criticism, Lévesque’s determination eventually convinced Georges-Emile Lapalme, the Attorney-General in Lesage’s Cabinet, of the plan’s value.¹⁹ At a meeting at Lac-à-l’Epaule in 1962, Lapalme persuaded Lesage to listen to Lévesque. Two affirmative decisions were made: Hydro-Quebec would be nationalized, and an election would be called as soon as possible.²⁰ When the news of the two decisions broke two weeks later, many were taken by surprise. Not only had Lévesque convinced the premier of his idea, but the Liberals made the plan the focal point of their upcoming election platform.²¹ Throughout the spring and summer of 1962, Lévesque took his case to the public, once again appealing to a sense of French-Canadian pride to make his argument.²² His campaigning worked; the Liberals won more ridings in the election of 1962 than they had during the election of 1960. By May of 1963, Hydro-Quebec took possession of power companies covered by the nationalization scheme, and Lévesque rejoiced.²³

Considered the “most ambitious economic decision ever taken by a Quebec government,”²⁴ Lévesque’s victory proved his political acumen. Not only had he survived his first serious challenge as a politician—he had thrived. After only a couple years in politics, Lévesque had managed to single-handedly convince the Liberals of his plan, earning him a reputation as a daring politician.²⁵ In addition,

¹⁶ Ibid, 35.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Provencher, *Rene Levesque: Portrait of a Quebecois*, 189.

¹⁹ Desbarats, *René: A Canadian in Search of a Country*, 48.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Graham Fraser, *René Lévesque and the Parti Québécois in Power* (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2001), 28.

²² Desbarats, *René: A Canadian in Search of a Country*, 39.

²³ Provencher, *Rene Levesque: Portrait of a Quebecois*, 191.

²⁴ Desbarats, *René: A Canadian in Search of a Country*, 33.

²⁵ Ibid, 31.

Lévesque had proven his commitment to Quebec nationalism. Considered the “bright star of Quebec nationalism in the Lesage constellation,”²⁶ separatists in the province began to view Lévesque as a potential leader for their cause. The respect Lévesque achieved during his first couple of years as a Liberal was crucial to his success; the sentiment of the public at the time was that Lévesque could go wherever he wanted to in Canadian politics.²⁷ Lévesque had an image that would benefit him in the next significant decision of his career: what to do when the Liberals fell out of power.

The election of 1966 was significant for Lévesque for a multitude of reasons. After the nationalization of Hydro-Quebec, Lesage’s Liberals had continued to implement great change in the province: the state was strengthened, the public service was reorganized, the education system was reformed, and a foundation was laid for new social and cultural policies.²⁸ However, by 1966, the public began to become concerned with the direction of the “Quiet Revolution,” and many believed that Lesage had become overconfident in his position as premier.²⁹ These sentiments resulted in the Liberals losing the election, leaving the party fractured and wanting to find people to blame for their failure.³⁰ For Lévesque, the importance of the election was not only because of the result, but because of the reason for the defeat. Although they only received 9% of the vote and won no seats, the two existing separatist parties, the Rassemblement pour l’Indépendance Nationale (R.I.N.) and the Ralliement National (R.N.) had shown strength in certain constituencies, contributing to the Liberals’ loss.³¹ Even when he was a Lesage Liberal, Lévesque had shown separatist tendencies. In 1963, he told the *Financial Post* that he “saw Canada as a union of two nations rather than ten provinces,”³² and in 1964, he claimed in a speech that he was “not a separatist, but [he] could become one.”³³ The mild success of the R.I.N. and the R.N.

²⁶ Edward M. Corbett, *Quebec Confronts Canada* (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1967), 95.

²⁷ Desbarats, *René: A Canadian in Search of a Country*, 55.

²⁸ Ibid, 117.

²⁹ Fraser, *René Lévesque and the Parti Québécois in Power*, 39.

³⁰ Paulin, *René Lévesque: Charismatic Leader*, 73.

³¹ Penner, “Quebec Explodes a Bombshell,” 157.

³² Provencher, *Rene Levesque: Portrait of a Quebecois*, 199.

³³ Fraser, *René Lévesque and the Parti Québécois in Power*, 32.

helped convince Lévesque that Quebecers were growing more accepting of a separatist agenda.³⁴

1967 was an important year for Lévesque, as he decided to leave the Liberal Party. This decision was integral to Lévesque eventually becoming premier because his split from the Liberals allowed him to create his own party. In April, Lévesque met with a group of about twenty Liberals at Mont Tremblant to discuss the future of the Liberal Party. By September of the same year, Lévesque presented his “Option for Quebec.”³⁵ The speech, which was supposed to confirm that his Laurier riding-association would endorse the Liberals in the upcoming party convention, turned into a three-hour rant about his vision of Quebec’s future.³⁶ His time spent in Lesage’s government had shown him the degree in which Quebec affairs were “left to the hands of outsiders.”³⁷ Since Lévesque had proven his capabilities under Lesage, there was a group of Liberals who believed in his leadership. During the Liberal Convention in October, Lévesque left the party—one hundred of his followers leaving with him.³⁸

As soon as he left the Liberals, Lévesque began working on the creation of his own party. He had been inspired by the success of the separatists, and believed that the only logical direction for his career was to move towards independence for Quebec.³⁹ The separatists had regarded Lévesque as a possible leader of their cause since he had pushed his nationalization scheme. However, Lévesque wanted a fresh start outside of the existing separatist movements. The creation of the Mouvement Souveraineté-Association (M.S.A) was the first step towards a united party.⁴⁰ The M.S.A. eventually merged with the R.N., resulting in the creation of the Parti Québécois.⁴¹ According to the *Globe and Mail*, there was “no serious challenge to [Lévesque’s] authority”⁴² at the convention, revealing the sentiment that Lévesque

³⁴ Penner, “Quebec Explodes a Bombshell,” 157.

³⁵ Desbarats, *René: A Canadian in Search of a Country*, 129.

³⁶ Fraser, René Lévesque and the Parti Québécois in Power, 42.

³⁷ Desbarats, *René: A Canadian in Search of a Country*, 125.

³⁸ Penner, “Quebec Explodes a Bombshell,” 157.

³⁹ Desbarats, *René: A Canadian in Search of a Country*, 141.

⁴⁰ *Ibid*, 159.

⁴¹ *Ibid*, 169.

⁴² Frank Howard, “Rene Levesque: the leader who has found a party,” *Globe and Mail*, October 15, 1968.

was the ideal leader of the separatists. A week after the convention, the R.I.N. dissolved, many of its members joining the Parti Québécois.⁴³

The formation of the Parti Québécois was a significant step in Lévesque's career. Since he was the founder of the party, the platform was formed around his ideas.⁴⁴ Because of this, Lévesque became the first separatist leader to be viewed as "indispensable."⁴⁵ In addition, by creating a new party rather than simply joining an existing one, the separatist movements in Quebec were able to combine into a cohesive force. Although Lévesque considered himself left in his political leanings, he was welcoming to other points of view. This inclusiveness allowed Lévesque to seize control of almost the entirety of the Quebec separatist movement, as only a handful of far-right and far-left separatists refused to join the Parti Québécois.⁴⁶ Lévesque's reputation as a charismatic politician was also of extreme importance to the separatist movement. His leadership gave the new party a level of respectability which the separatist movements had consistently lacked in the past.⁴⁷ Lévesque now had the party he needed to seize power; however, there were still some changes that had to be made before the Parti Québécois was elected.

The Parti Québécois participated in two elections prior to 1976, and was not particularly successful in either. In 1970, the party emerged second in popular vote; however, their success was not translated into seats. Although the party increased its popular support in 1973, it lost a seat.⁴⁸ Bourassa's Liberals had received a majority in 1973. Because of this, some of the Liberal backbenchers were left with "time on their hands to cultivate their private and public vices."⁴⁹ The Liberals were plagued with a series of scandals, and the party gained a careless image. The main problem with the Liberals, however, was their inability to inspire.⁵⁰ Unable to define themselves in the minds of voters, Lévesque recognized that the Parti Québécois could capitalize on the Liberals' shortcomings by redefining themselves as a party.

⁴³ James William Hagy, "René Lévesque and the Quebec Separatists," *The Western Political Quarterly* 24, no.1 (1971): 57.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 58.

⁴⁵ Desbarats, *René: A Canadian in Search of a Country*, 171.

⁴⁶ Hagy, "René Lévesque and the Quebec Separatists," 58.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 59.

⁴⁸ Penner, "Quebec Explodes a Bombshell," 157.

⁴⁹ Pierre Dupont and Sheila Fischman, *How Levesque Won* (James Lorimer & Company Limited, 1977), 10.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

It was because of the changes made to the Parti Québécois after the election of 1973 and the campaign for the election of 1976 that brought the party to power. One of the main failings of the Parti Québécois had been its disorganization, so Michel Carpentier was appointed as a full-time chief organizer.⁵¹ The party was also decentralized and local organizations were set up in various regions of Quebec. This allowed the Parti Québécois to attract new members who had previous political experience.⁵² In order to differentiate itself from the scandalous Liberals, Lévesque did his best to promote the Parti Québécois as a clean alternative. The party was only financed by its members and sympathizers, and large rallies were avoided because they could make the party seem too dominating.⁵³ Membership increased because of the Parti Québécois' "democratic" image, since the public felt like their voices would be better heard in a new party.

The Parti Québécois changed significantly in a short period of time; the most important decision, however, made by Lévesque before the 1976 campaign was on the issue of separatism. In 1973, the election had been fought almost purely on the basis of Quebec independence. Playing on fear, Bourassa warned Quebecers that leaving confederation would have dire economic consequences for the province. In response, the Parti Québécois had defended their ideas by producing a detailed budget.⁵⁴ The Parti Québécois realized that its platform of separating from Canada alienated some of the possible electorate; therefore, in 1974, the party promised that it would not move towards independence without a referendum.⁵⁵ This decision created rifts in the Parti Québécois because it had been built on the concept of Quebec independence; however, the decision also allowed for a significant increase in support for the party. With the addition of Lévesque's charisma and reputation as a leader, the Parti Québécois began to emerge as a serious political contender.

The campaign ran by the Parti Québécois in 1976 was the last step in bringing Lévesque to power. Since the Liberals had been successful in 1973, Bourassa decided that his party would follow a similar strategy in 1976. However, since the Parti Québécois had promised a referendum on separatism, the Liberals were less able to

⁵¹ Dupont and Fischman, *How Levesque Won*, 36.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Ibid, 38.

⁵⁴ Penner, "Quebec Explodes a Bombshell," 158.

⁵⁵ Fraser, *René Lévesque and the Parti Québécois in Power*, 65.

condemn its agenda.⁵⁶ The party attacked the Liberals for their scandals, and dominated the media by spreading their election promises throughout the 28 day campaign.⁵⁷ The public's focus was shifted onto the party's social-democratic platform and the corruption of the Liberals. Bourassa was put on the defensive, and Lévesque became hopeful. On the night of the election, Lévesque assumed that the Parti Québécois would be able to win at least 40 seats. He was wrong; the party won a 71 seat majority.⁵⁸ After the victory, the *New York Times* claimed that Lévesque was "universally respected" in Quebec, even by the "strongest adversaries of his ideal independence."⁵⁹ The name Lévesque had built for himself expanded outside the separatist movement. In a speech made two months after the election, Lévesque reminisced on his party's success, complimenting it on its "ferocious determination."⁶⁰ The victory of the Parti Québécois was only the beginning; Lévesque would continue to embody this "ferocious determination" throughout the remainder of his political career.

From his political debut, it became clear that René Lévesque's perseverance would take him far. The success he achieved through the nationalization of Hydro-Quebec gave Lévesque the respectability he needed to rise to power. Embracing his reputation as a Quebec nationalist, Lévesque was able to unify the Quebec separatist movements and create his own party. The changes made to the Parti Québécois after the election of 1974 helped the party run a successful campaign in 1976, resulting in Lévesque becoming premier. Although Lévesque may have been gruff, and at times controversial, his unwavering commitment to his Québécois identity made him an instrumental force in Canadian history.

⁵⁶ Dupont and Fischman, *How Levesque Won*, 38.

⁵⁷ *Ibid*, 41.

⁵⁸ Fraser, *René Lévesque and the Parti Québécois in Power*, 67.

⁵⁹ "Separatist Who Will Govern Quebec: Rene Levesque," *New York Times*, November 17, 1976.

⁶⁰ René Lévesque, "Quebec: A Good Neighbor in Transition" *Vital Speeches of the Day* 43, no.9 (1977): 284.

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