Mapping the Conversation: Tracing Incommensurability and Solidarity in Theories of Indigenous and Diasporic Liberation.

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This paper traces incommensurability and solidarity in theories of Indigenous and Diasporic liberation. The author takes the position that Indigenous and diasporic forms of liberation are both deeply related and sharply divided. While these groups share histories of displacement and oppression—usually through settler-colonial, capitalist expropriation of lands, resources, and the exploitation of labour—their differences are equally prominent in their distinct formulation of liberation. While these groups both want to build a new world, the worlds they want to build are not the same. By mapping out the tensions between Indigenous and diasporic conceptions of liberation as they are addressed in theory and scholarship, we can glimpse a deeper understanding of the respective ontological ideals and stark differences in the worlds both groups aspire to build. Historically, however, people organizing have found ways to go beyond incommensurability in praxis where joint resistance becomes the only option for realizing liberation.

In her essay on Indigenous and diasporic solidarity, Soma Chatterjee argues that shared relationships and struggle with the state form a natural basis of solidarity between these groups. However, shared histories of oppression between two groups do not necessarily mean that those groups will share a vision for the future or a project for liberation. As a point of departure, this paper assumes that Indigenous and diasporic forms of liberation are both deeply related and sharply divided. While these groups share histories of displacement and oppression—usually through settler-colonial, capitalist expropriation of lands, resources, and the exploitation of labour—their differences are equally prominent in their distinct formulation of liberation. Assumptions of solidarity between groups can actually eclipse the tensions between Indigenous and diasporic liberation projects. By mapping out the tensions between Indigenous and diasporic conceptions of liberation as they are addressed in theory and scholarship, we can glimpse a deeper understanding of the respective ontological ideals and stark differences in the worlds both groups aspire to build; however, theory and practice are very different things. In the real world, people go beyond incommensurability in praxis where joint resistance becomes the only option for realizing liberation.

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Before exploring solidarity, I would like to identify my position in relation to this work. I am an uninvited settler living on Lək̓ʷəŋən territory. I was born Tk’emlúps te Secwépemc territory. My grandparents, coming from Italy, were the first of my relatives to settle in what is now called Canada. They were also uninvited. My grandmother entered Canada as a refugee and my other grandparents came here in the post-war period. I come to these bodies of work on liberation, Indigenous and diasporic, trying to navigate my own identity as a settler who is also part of a diaspora. The theorists and writers below offer me, and hopefully others, different modes of identifying positionality and relationality in the contemporary and future worlds. I am extremely grateful to be able to engage with this work.

To start, solidarity should not be assumed—especially solidarity based on shared oppression—because this assumption veils the tensions between Indigenous and diasporic modes of liberation. In fact, Bonita Lawrence and Enakshi Dua call for nonwhite members of diasporic communities to decolonize antiracist liberation projects and theory. In their argument, Lawrence and Dua bring attention to how antiracist projects (both movements and discourses) exclude Indigenous people and perspectives on decolonization by continually failing to honour and incorporate distinct aspects of Indigenous liberation. These authors position anyone who is not Indigenous as a settler and, thus, as part of the settler-colonial project. Their argument is explicit: regardless of how, when, or why a settler came here, the settler occupies stolen and contested land which implicates Indigenous sovereignty. The settler-colonial projects in the so-called Americas operate with political policies and cultural logics of extermination, displacement, and assimilation as a means of erasing Indigenous people and freeing the land for settlers to take their place.

Lawrence and Dua go on to argue that antiracist praxis, as it presently appears, extends from the ongoing settler project. The authors see the antiracist project as upholding the settler projects in two ways: firstly antiracist projects fail to challenge states like Canada as colonial states, first and foremost. For example, when immigrant rights or civil rights activists challenge the federal government to be more inclusive, they give legitimacy to the state (giving the state power as an authority of the land) and, at the same time, undermine Indigenous sovereignty bypassing the authority of Indigenous title over the land. Anti-racist resistance, historically, has wanted to “improve” the settler state, which consequently contributes to the attempted displacement of Indigenous title. Secondly, by ignoring Indigenous sovereignty and the demands of Indigenous resistance,

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211 Ibid.
214 Lawrence and Dua, “Decolonizing Antiracism,” 135.
215 A central demand of Indigenous resistance is the the right to self-determination.
anti-racist projects participate in ongoing colonization by both propping up the Canadian state as well as relegating the project of colonization to the past, as if it were an already completed project.\textsuperscript{216} In other words, the practices of many anti-racist projects in Canada often (re)produce and imagine “Indian” figures whose political projects and nations are part of the pre-history of North America, whose sovereignty and political agency has long since disappeared from the geography.\textsuperscript{217} Because of this epistemological exclusion and disregard for Indigenous sovereignty, many Indigenous peoples do not see a place for themselves within the mainstream anti-racist context (both political and academic), and Indigenous activism happens without allies from racialized communities.\textsuperscript{218}

There are consequences in grouping all settlers as a monolithic group, as Lawrence and Dua do. Nandita Sharma and Cynthia Wright respond directly to Lawrence and Dua’s article for this reason. Sharma and Wright interrogate the conflation between processes of migration and those of colonialism. They ask if it is historically accurate to describe the forced movement of refugees, unfree indentured Asian people, enslaved African people, and subsequently displaced people from South America, Central America, and the Middle East (many of whom are themselves Indigenous) as settlers or as part of a process of settler colonialism.\textsuperscript{219} I agree with this line of thinking: there is a difference between the colonizer and the refugee or the enslaved, between those who arrive to pillage the land and those who arrive because they have nowhere else to go or were brought to the land against their will. That is, if the only way to avoid colonizing is to remain on the land that one is associated with, then what is meant to come of those who are stolen or forced from their lands, including Indigenous peoples? Sharma and Wright take this line of thinking further and argue that, in the era of global neoliberalism, much of global migration is a consequence of colonization and so-called “postcolonial” nationalist movements.\textsuperscript{220}

At the center of Sharma and Wright’s argument is the concern that discourses of autochthony create a binary between “Native” and “non-Native” that discriminates not so much against elite colonizers, but rather the most vulnerable diasporic populations. Autochthonous discourses rely on a dialectical difference between the category “Native” that has a natural connection to the land and the “non-Native” who disrupts the “natural” order.\textsuperscript{221} For Sharma and Wright, this narrative is part of a larger anti-immigrant sentiment that naturalizes xenophobia in both contemporary understandings of decolonial justice as well as in nationalist movements.\textsuperscript{222} In other words, in the oppositional categories of

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{216}Lawrence and Dua, “Decolonizing Antiracism,” 124.
  \item \textsuperscript{217}Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{218}Ibid, 122.
  \item \textsuperscript{220}Ibid, 123.
  \item \textsuperscript{221}Ibid, 124.
  \item \textsuperscript{222}Ibid, 126.
\end{itemize}
“Indigenous” or “Native” and “settler”, the vulnerable migrant becomes the enemy. Lawrence and Dua’s argument fails to acknowledge that the groups they target as complicit settlers are predominantly not actually the settlers who occupy oppositions of power. Largely, members of these groups fighting in the struggle for anti-racism are not part of the neoliberal, settler elite who benefit overwhelmingly from the exploitation of stolen land, resources, and anti-Indigenous violence (as well as migrant labour), but rather those who are oppressed by the settler state—the racialized settlers. In this way, contemporary ideals of “post-colonial” nationalism, including Indigenous sovereignty, can actually preserve the neoliberal order where the most vulnerable members of diasporic communities go unaccounted for and are positioned as expendable.

While Sharma and Wright make an important intervention in the formulation of a unified, all-encompassing “settler” identity, their analysis of Indigenous sovereignty is problematic because they understand the concept of sovereignty within the Western epistemological standpoint and evacuate it of the historical specificities of settler colonialism in what is now called North America. In her work on ethnographic refusal, Audra Simpson, in agreement with Taiaiake Alfred, argues that sovereignty is a problematic concept because it is rooted in Western forms of domination that involve a singular, hegemonic authority over the land and its resources. Simpson argues that the Western concept of sovereignty is completely foreign to Haudenosaunee and most other Indigenous philosophical traditions. In fact, Western formulations of sovereignty perhaps as much as military might, drive the process of colonialism. As Simpson argues, Western knowledges imagine and speak for an Indigenous “other” as a means of fixing, essentializing, limiting, ordering, ranking, governing, and possessing Indigenous lifeways, which are otherwise dynamic, changing, and relational. Simply put, Western knowledge aims to achieve an epistemological dominance, or what Simpson calls the “ontological endgame” that positions Western lifeways (such as Western formulations of sovereignty) as dominant and natural. This is the not-so-subtle form of aggression that settler-colonial logics produce in order to dispossess Indigenous people of their land. Simpson, Sharma, and Wright could all agree that the concept of sovereignty is anchored in Western aggression and violence.

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223 Ibid, 128.
224 Ibid.
226 Ibid, 105.
228 Ibid, 98.
229 Ibid, 97.
However, Simpson does not dispense with the term sovereignty altogether; rather, Simpson refuses Western articulations of it. Simpson posits the idea that the term sovereignty matters because it represents the nature of jurisdictional authority, as in the right to speak or to refuse. Specifically, Simpson argues that sovereignty, when conceptualized in contrast to western assumptions, matters at the level of representation and methodology because it relates to how power is distributed and how we understand that distribution. In other words, sovereignty matters as a system of conduct. For example, speaking about Kahnawà:ke Mohawk nationhood and citizenship, Simpson shows how territorial jurisdiction (as in the articulation of sovereign lifeways on the land) transcends the imagined border between the United States and Canada and disrupts the sovereignty claimed by said settler-colonial nations. By refusing colonial sovereignty, both the border between settler-colonial nations and the borders of the reserve, the Kahnawà:ke Mohawks articulate their sovereignty not over the land, but as the protectors and defenders of it. Thus, the refusal of Western knowledges, the associated imagining of borders, and articulations of sovereignty reveal the asymmetrical power relations and colonial histories in North America as well as the colonial systems of knowledge production. Mohawk articulations of sovereignty, then, disrupt Western knowledge production and settler dominance over the land. This is a very different conception of sovereignty than the one articulated by Sharma and Wright.

Yet, at the same time, there is an absence in Simpson’s formulation of articulations of sovereignty: where are all the non-white settlers? In Simpson’s formulation, the settler-colonial state is white and informed by European notions of sovereignty. I enthusiastically agree with Simpson about the problematic concept of sovereignty based on how different articulations of sovereignty operate; however, as Amy Fung points out, settler-colonial theory and scholarship overwhelmingly favour a dialectical understanding between a white settler and Indigenous peoples. This is an important observation because at times the scholarship speaks unequivocally about how any settler is complicit in the settler-colonial project, no matter how they joined it. At other times, however, the settler in question is the one who benefits most from the settler-colonial project, specifically a European settler. That is, the term “settler” can stretch far enough to make racialized diasporic groups responsible for colonization but also operates without them, as a stand-in for whiteness. As Fung notes, while it is not the fault of any individual scholar, the dominant scholarship relies on a binary between a settler group and an Indigenous group, where the settler side toggles between including and

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230 Ibid, 104.
231 Ibid.
232 Ibid, 102.
233 Ibid, 106.
excluding racialized settlers: scholars include diasporic communities to explicate the force of the larger settler project and exclude them when considering specifics of colonialism. In the context of slavery, indentured labour, and exclusionary immigration policy primarily targeted at Black, Brown and Asian people from nations with their respective histories of colonial exploitation, the diasporic identity acts as an instrument in the settler-colonial project without ever belonging in settler societies.

With that, Fung does not actually absolve the racialized diasporic settler from the settler project nor does she imagine a sort of violence inherent to Indigenous sovereignty that Sharma and Wright imply. Rather, Fung argues that diasporic projects risk complicity in settler-colonialism in two primary ways: firstly, civil and immigrant rights movements, while benefiting diasporic communities, only lend legitimacy to the settler state and its institutions that occupy stolen land. Secondly, the mobilization of liberal discourses of multiculturalism occludes Indigenous calls for decolonization. For Fung, the position of “settler” in the settler-colonial state must be understood as fundamentally an economic identity where the subject works toward inclusion into white society, thus naturalizing the settler state and white-supremacist capitalism.

Fung calls for diasporic communities to “unbecome” settlers by rejecting privilege and educating themselves in the history of the given territory that they occupy as a means of pursuing anti-colonial justice. While the notion of “unbecoming” a settler is interesting as an ethic, it does not seem to offer any real route toward decolonization with respect to Indigenous sovereignty. In fact, in their essay, Tuck and Yang argue that decolonizing the person or the mind is not so much a decolonial move as it is a settler move toward innocence. Tuck and Yang argue that the term decolonization is too often used as a metaphor “for other things that we want to do to improve our societies and schools.” In fact, decolonization exclusively involves the return of Indigenous land and lifeways. For Tuck and Yang, using the terminology of decolonization without the returning of land makes it a metaphor by hollowing out the meaning and allowing settler-colonial power to persist unbothered. Tuck and Yang reject the way metaphor both “invades decolonization” and absorbs it into

\[\text{Ibid, 125.} \]
\[\text{Ibid, 123.} \]
\[\text{Ibid, 117.} \]
\[\text{Ibid.} \]
\[\text{Ibid.} \]
\[\text{Ibid, 124.} \]
\[Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang, “Decolonization Is Not a Metaphor,” Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society 1, no. 1 (2012): 19. “Decolonizing the mind” is identified as a settler move to innocence wherein the settler absolves themselves from past and ongoing colonization through education and a sort of self fulfillment.} \]
\[Ibid, 2. \]
\[Ibid, 2. \]
\[Ibid, 5. \]
the colonial framework.\textsuperscript{245} The two argue that this absorption happens through the aforementioned “settler moves to innocence”, a process where settlers (white and non-white) use the rhetoric of decolonization to absolve their guilt and responsibility in the colonization process without returning land.\textsuperscript{246} The scholars acknowledge that education and pedagogy can be used to aid people’s learning about settler colonialism, how to recognize it and how to critique it; however, until land is relinquished, education cannot disrupt or change settler colonialism.\textsuperscript{247} For these scholars, decolonization is extremely unsettling: it offers different perspectives to human rights, post-colonial, and civil rights approaches to justice that bypass the issues of land return.\textsuperscript{248} In fact, Tuck and Yang’s formulation of decolonization is incommensurable with other forms of justice and liberation: in their words, “decolonization is not an ‘and’. It is an elsewhere.”\textsuperscript{249} Liberation might not be a joint effort in this world, but, perhaps, by building a new world, we can imagine something more equitable.

Tuck and Yang’s essay is obviously a very influential contribution to the scholarship. In the neoliberal era, the language of decolonization is used, and abused, by corporate entities, institutions of power (such as the western academic system), and individuals.\textsuperscript{250} Tuck and Yang’s argument positions the return of the land to Indigenous people at the centre of decolonization. This argument, it seems to me, is a world-making project. In other words, Tuck and Yang’s work inspires a future by outlining a new world, one that normalizes the repatriation of Indigenous land and lifeways. At the same time, this future that they inspire is extremely difficult to achieve, vague in focus, and seemingly impossible without some form of commensurability. It is hard to dream of a future where people with power, of any amount, voluntarily give up their power and dislocate themselves in order to return land to Indigenous people. I use the word dislocate not to suggest that the authors ask settlers to leave—the authors never say that. They do say, however, that we need to disrupt and discard the current world and dream of a better one through land repatriation. Tuck and Yang make clear that the future of decolonization is not something decolonization needs to answer for because decolonization does not answer to settler futures, only Indigenous futures.\textsuperscript{251} Positioning the return of land at the center of decolonization, as the essence of the project, permits us to dream of something better.

However, if Tuck and Yang’s vision of the future comes from the incommensurability of Indigenous ontologies with other liberation projects, Jared Sexton wants a world where everyone is free because nobody is sovereign. Sexton interrogates the political goals of Indigenous sovereignty and decolonization and argues that abolition is a
stronger project. He argues that Indigenous decolonization is fixed by a desire for “resurgence, recovery, and recuperation.” These are uncompromising formulations of sovereignty. Indigenous peoples can still claim, name, and pursue land based on their indigeneity to it, so of course land is central to Indigenous liberation. However, for members of the Black diaspora, indigeneity (a rootedness in the lands of one’s origin) is an impossible claim that can, at best, be acknowledged in the abstract. It is irrecoverable in the history of both transatlantic slavery and global anti-Blackness, so something else, something baseless, must be central to Black liberation. In fact, territorial sovereignty, in the contemporary world, relies on modalities of inclusion and exclusion as a means of realizing sovereignty. Sexton actually rejects the argument that because Indigenous sovereignty is qualitatively different from other forms of sovereignty that it mitigates this formula of inclusion and exclusion. I tend to agree with Sexton: on some level, sovereignty is the right to indicate what lifeways are allowed and which are not on a given territory. This is what Sexton is pushing back against.

Sexton argues that the politics of abolition, specifically “degeneration, decline, and dissolution,” rejects some of the central claims of decolonization. For Sexton, Black impulses toward abolition lead to a baseless form of politics that assumes “nothing for no one” in an equitable way that is liberatory for all. Sexton argues that the racialized Black body is a formation of the non-human in the contemporary world because sovereign states need an antithesis for the human, for the sovereign. In this sense, territorial sovereignty is inherently anti-Black. For Sexton, Black liberation does not come from gaining sovereignty—one that recovers language, lineage, land, or any lifeways—because there are no dialects of loss and recovery, but rather dialects of the loss of loss and recovery. For Sexton, we must dream of a future of the unsovereign. This formulation of liberation offers a compelling dream of the future too. In the contemporary moment, the power of Western nations—albeit a declining power—relies on the subjugation of the vulnerable (the vulnerable being both citizens and not, and a myriad of identities on top of that), the extraction of resources from the land and the concentration of wealth in few hands, and the sovereignty that the elites have to do so. This is the white-supremacist project: to dominate the world, its resources, and those who live in it. Sexton’s dream world does more than subvert the possibility of the sovereign, it actually abolishes it. To quote Sexton: “No

252 Jared Sexton, “The Vel of Slavery: Tracking the Figure of the Unsovereign,” in Otherwise Worlds: Against Settler Colonialism and Anti-Blackness, (Durham, London: Duke University Press, 2020) 100.
253 Ibid, 97.
254 Ibid, 104.
255 Ibid.
256 Ibid.
258 Ibid, 103.
259 Ibid, 108.
ground for identity, no ground to stand (on). Everyone has a claim to everything until no one has a claim to anything. No claim. This is not a politics of despair brought about by a failure to lament a loss, because it is not rooted in hope of winning. The flesh of the earth demands it: the landless inhabitation of selfless existence." A world without land-based identities is a world where borders do not pose as life-or-death barricades for migrants to survive; where the most vulnerable do not need to use the master’s tools to dismantle the master’s house; and where civil rights are not reducible to demands upon the state, but on demands for common humanity. Sexton’s future is a radical one, and his ideal world is something entirely otherwise from the one we currently live in.

With the different, at times irreconcilable, theories of future worlds posed by Tuck and Yang and Sexton in mind, Sandy Hudson shows us how joint projects for liberation, even if the solidarity between groups is not perfect, are key for contemporary resistance. Hudson argues that the colonial state relies on white supremacist logics to produce and maintain colonial power and shows the liberatory power that comes when Black and Indigenous people resist these logics together. Hudson looks specifically at how solidarity, while imperfect, worked in practice at #BLMTOTENTCITY as an antidote to white supremacist logics. Hudson points to three formulations of these logics, specifically: the logic of Disappearance, the logic of Slaveability, and the logic of One True History. The logic of Disappearance is a mythology that the white settler and the settler state peddles to make themselves “native” to the land. At the center of this logic is the tactic of disappearing Indigenous people from the land. Be it land theft, the reserve system, residential school, or sexualized violence and murder, disappearance is central to this logic of white supremacy. The logic of Slaveability is one that the white settler and settler state use to dehumanize the Black body by reducing the human to an object to justify multiplying an enslaved workforce. Enslavement, lynchings, the “One Drop” rule, the prison industrial complex all point to dehumanization being central to this logic. Finally, the logic of One True History produces and maintains the hegemonic status of white supremacy by erasing other histories, especially those of Indigenous, Black, and other racialized communities. The logic of One True History is the logic that dislocates the history of anti-Blackness in Canada and, at the same time, glorifies Canada’s history in

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260 Ibid.
262 Ibid.
263 Ibid.
264 Ibid.
265 Ibid.
266 Ibid.
267 Ibid.
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the Underground railroad.\textsuperscript{268} It is also the logic that relegates the history of colonialism in the past, denies ongoing colonialism, and peddles a myth of multiculturalism in Canada.

Hudson then shows how Indigenous and Black solidarity in practice subverted these logics at the anti-police actions at #BLMTOTENTCITY. When Indigenous, specifically Mohawk, organizers joined the tent city in support of BLM, respect developed between the histories of struggle that are shared by Black and Indigenous people.\textsuperscript{269} A relationship formed that rejected the logics of white supremacy because of the public display of Indigenous visibility, Black humanity, and historical multiplicity. As Hudson puts it, it was respect for one another that facilitated the powerful relationship at tent city.\textsuperscript{270} So, BLM saw the need for Mohawk leaders and elders to bring medicines, prayer, and stories into the tent city and Indigenous leaders and elders chose to show up for and with BLM while respecting and honouring BLM’s leadership on the land.\textsuperscript{271} Together Indigenous and Black people empowered each other’s resistance to the logics of white supremacy.

The reading from Sandy Hudson transcends the limitation of theory that is presented above. The solidarity between Indigenous and Black activists that Hudson shows is not a perfect one. There is no returning of land in this action, and the Canadian state maintains its illegal sovereignty. However, the action offers one type of disruption to white supremacist logics: Black and Indigenous activism working in tandem. Hudson’s contribution shows us how Indigenous and Black liberation projects, working together, can move beyond incommensurability by honouring separate forms of liberation in practice and overcome limitations that exist in theoretical discourses. BLM acknowledged the necessity of Mohawk visibility in the Black liberation project that happens on stolen land. At the same time, Mohawk leadership acknowledged that the BLM anti-police movement is bigger than a resettlement project and that it actually transcends calls for reforming the settler state. From my perspective, Hudson reveals how Black and Indigenous forms of liberation are imbricated at the level of praxis; each moves against the logics of white supremacy in pursuit of joint liberation.

Often, in the writing about the relationship between diasporic and Indigenous formulations of liberation, there is an assumption of solidarity based on the shared experience of oppression in societies built on white supremacy and settler colonialism. However, by assuming oppression is the basis for solidarity, we risk assuming that liberation looks the same in both Indigenous and diasporic formations. One the end of the spectrum, some writers view the relationship between Indigenous and diasporic groups as an inherently antagonistic one based on the implication of the goals of each respective mode of liberation. It seems to me that this type of theory, while essential, is removed from

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{268}Ibid, 300.
\item \textsuperscript{269}Ibid, 302.
\item \textsuperscript{270}Ibid, 303.
\item \textsuperscript{271}Ibid, 303.
\end{itemize}
activism as it materializes on the ground. The ideals and the imaginative capacity of theory break down in real life, and allow for powerful spaces of creativity and relationship building to be constructed. As Hudson’s work implies, theory can inform praxis in ways that lead to joint liberation while, at the same, preserving differences.

**Bibliography**


