The Destabilising Impacts of the Portuguese Colonial War

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Abstract

The Portuguese Colonial War was a prolonged conflict that lasted from 1961 to 1974. It was fought between the Portuguese government attempting to retain control over its overseas imperial colonies and the nascent independence movements in Angola, Mozambique, and Portuguese Guinea. The conflict ended in 1974 with the Carnation Revolution, which brought an end to the far-right Estado Novo dictatorship in Portugal. This article reflects on the many disruptive impacts of the Portuguese Colonial War that destabilized the country and led to the Carnation Revolution. It places these impacts into three categories: international factors, domestic factors, and military factors. The international factors included the diplomatic pressure from the American and Soviet alliances against Portugal's imperialist war and the 1973 oil crisis that caused mass inflation in Portugal. The domestic factors included a metropole that was experiencing mass emigration as waves of young men fled the country to escape conscription, while the social safety net in the metropole was simultaneously overwhelmed with injured veterans returning from the front. Additionally, Portugal was industrialising its economy over the course of the war at an extreme clip, which disrupted the social cohesion built on its agricultural economy. The military also played a crucial role as relations between the civilian government and military leaders became increasingly tense over the course of the war, especially following the death of António de Oliveira Salazar. This article argues that these three sets of factors combined to destabilize the country thereby priming Portugal for the Carnation Revolution.

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Introduction

The Portuguese Colonial War was a prolonged conflict fought between the Portuguese military and the independence movements in Portuguese African colonies. It began on 4 February 1961 and proceeded to stretch over thirteen years in three different theatres, including Angola, Mozambique, and Portuguese Guinea. The human cost of the war included the death of 8,290 Portuguese soldiers, 5,797 of whom were from the metropole, and 2,493 from the colonies.\textsuperscript{179} This is in addition to roughly 1,000 Portuguese and 100,000 African civilians that died.\textsuperscript{180} The war also acted as a major financial drain on the Portuguese economy. When adjusted for 2018 pricing, the Portuguese government spent between 21.8 and 29.8 billion Euros on the war, or an average of 1.6 to 2.3 billion Euros per year for thirteen years.\textsuperscript{181} Military spending accounted for roughly half of the Portuguese state budget by the early 1970s.\textsuperscript{182} This meant that Portugal was spending more on its defense as a proportion of its overall budget than the United State during this period, and seven times more than the proportion being spent in Spain.\textsuperscript{183} The scope and consequences for the war were extensive. It ended on 25 April 1974, in what became known as the Carnation Revolution, which saw the collapse of the \textit{Estado Novo} dictatorship in Portugal.

Historians have debated over the exact relationship between the Portuguese Colonial War and the Carnation Revolution. The revolution has been explained as being caused by systemic inefficiencies, social unrest, pressure from the international community, political elites, and the military.\textsuperscript{184} This paper will scrutinize the relationship between the Portuguese Colonial War and the Carnation Revolution by examining the destabilising impacts that the war had on Portuguese society. These domestic impacts primed Portugal for revolution over the course of the war. This analysis will argue that the war created three sets of destabilising factors that came to a head by the time of the Carnation Revolution. The first were international factors that influenced Portugal both diplomatically and economically. The second was a set of domestic conditions that led to social and economic upheaval. The third was the war-weary Portuguese military and its deteriorating relationship with the civilian government.

International Influences

Three international factors interacted with Portugal during its colonial war in Africa. The first was the diplomatic pressure levied on Portugal to end the war, the second was the propaganda Portugal used in an attempt to avoid international criticism, and the third was the international oil shocks of 1973 and the subsequent spike in Portuguese inflation.

The first decade of the cold war saw Portugal maintain strong relations with the United States. The US established a military base on the island of Santa Maria in the Azores in 1944, and renewed its base rights in 1946, 1948, 1951, and 1957.\textsuperscript{185} On the surface, the 1960s seemed to promise a continuation of strong American-Luso relations. However, the outbreak of the Portuguese Colonial War in February of

\textsuperscript{182} Norrie MacQueen, \textit{The Decolonization of Portuguese Africa: Metropolitan Revolution and the Dissolution of Empire}, (New York: Longman, 1997), 50.
\textsuperscript{183} Ibid.
1961 changed this. The war intersected with the collapse of many European empires across Asia and Africa. As this period of imperialism was coming to an end, Portugal's insistence on keeping its overseas colonies made it an outlier in the international community.\textsuperscript{186} Both the US and USSR condemned Portugal's war and initially supported the Angolan independence movement.\textsuperscript{187}

António de Oliveira Salazar, then the leader of the \textit{Estado Novo} regime in Lisbon, took note of this and, in an interview in May 1962 with the \textit{Washington Evening Star}, stated that the US base in the Azores would not have its base rights renewed that year.\textsuperscript{188} Salazar also threatened to shut down the Free Europe radio station in Lisbon that the US used to send broadcasts into Eastern Europe.\textsuperscript{189} Salazar was putting the newly-elected American President, John F. Kennedy, in a bind by making these threats. The American base in the Azores was of vital strategic importance for the US military presence in Europe and North Africa. However, by this point Kennedy had already condemned Portugal, and did not want to be seen as upholding the last vestiges of imperialism in Africa. Ultimately, Kennedy chose to turn a blind eye to Portugal's war. Kennedy approved major financial contributions to Portugal in 1962 with the American Export-Import Bank, which financed the export of $55 million in US steel to Portugal.\textsuperscript{190} In exchange, the US was allowed to renew its base in the Azores in 1962.

Nonetheless, international pressure for Portugal to end its colonial war was maintained throughout its duration. Portugal had long maintained that its overseas colonies were actually provinces of one larger state.\textsuperscript{191} Dr. Norrie MacQueen, a historian of Portuguese colonial history and international relations, describes how

the "colonial empire" (\textit{Impeário Colonial}) of the 1930 Act became, by fiat, a series of "overseas provinces" (\textit{Províncias Ultramaras}) of "one state single and indivisible" (\textit{um estado uno e indivisível}). Salazar's rationale was that only colonial states can decolonise and no state could be required to participate in its own disintegration. This breathtakingly disingenuous formulation was produced partly to meet the growing demands of the United Nations for an accounting for colonialism in general.\textsuperscript{192}

The excuse that Portugal's African colonies were merely overseas provinces hardly circumvented criticism. As mentioned earlier, Portugal was able to manage its relationship with the Americans during the war, but it failed in spinning the war with the USSR and other socialist countries. As noted, the USSR had condemned Portugal's decision to fight the independence movements in Africa.\textsuperscript{193} Other countries in the Eastern bloc, such as Czechoslovakia, criticised Portugal for its colonial war yet maintained trade relations with Portugal.\textsuperscript{194} Szobi argues that, in the case of the Czechs, the criticism against Portugal was merely rhetorical.\textsuperscript{195} Despite the influence of these external pressures and criticisms, Portugal was not deterred from continuing its war. Nonetheless the ongoing international pressure from the UN and USSR for Portugal to end its war cannot be discounted.

The \textit{Estado Novo} regime in Portugal also attempted to circumvent the criticisms of its colonial war through use of propaganda and censorship. Since the \textit{Estado Novo} regime was one of the longest dictatorships in European history (lasting forty-eight years from 1926 to 1974), it had mastered the use of

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\item\textsuperscript{186} Rodrigues, “The International Dimensions,” 243-244.
\item\textsuperscript{187} Arslan Humbaraci and Nicole Muchnik, \textit{Portugal's African Wars: Angola, Guinea Bissao, Mozambique} (New York: Third Press, 1974), 188.
\item\textsuperscript{188} Rodrigues, “The International Dimensions,” 248.
\item\textsuperscript{189} Humbaraci and Muchnik, \textit{Portugal's African Wars}, 188.
\item\textsuperscript{190} Rodrigues, “The International Dimensions,” 249.
\item\textsuperscript{192} Ibid.
\item\textsuperscript{193} Humbaraci and Muchnik, \textit{Portugal's African Wars}, 188.
\item\textsuperscript{195} Ibid.
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The regime had created a complex series of censorship policies that extended to newspapers, books, cultural performance industries, and most modes of communication.\textsuperscript{197} The type of censorship ranged from pre-publication, to post-publication, and self-censorship.\textsuperscript{198} Traditionally, these tools had been used by the regime via the press and the education system to prevent counternarratives that could delegitimise the imperialist system.\textsuperscript{199} During the war, censorship became a tool of the state for two purposes. The first was to shroud the conditions of the war from the domestic public by barring images of dead bodies, forbidding any criticisms of Portuguese soldiers, and removing all references to potential negotiations with the insurgents in Africa.\textsuperscript{200} The regime also successfully used a combination of propaganda and indoctrination in Portuguese schools across the metropole to spin the war in favour of the regime.\textsuperscript{201} The second purpose was to shield Portugal from international criticism, which ultimately failed. Once the rebellion in Angola had begun on 4 February 1961, the censors sought to use the national and international media to interpret the independence movement and the violent responses of the white settlers in favour of Portugal.\textsuperscript{202} However, the international community was not convinced by Portugal’s narrative of racial harmony in its colonies.\textsuperscript{203} This is because, as mentioned earlier, Portugal’s Colonial War took place during a period of European decline across Africa. The international community was far more amenable to supporting the independence movements in Africa than the declining colonial regimes. This was especially the case with regard to Portugal, which had decided to wage war on its colonies. Because of this, while Portugal attempted to control the narrative on the war and was able to do so domestically, it was unable to control this narrative internationally. Lastly, the international economy and oil shocks of 1973-1974 also influenced Portugal to end the war. The 1973 oil shock occurred at the same time that General António Sebastião Ribeiro de Spinola released his manifesto, Portugal and the Future (Portugal e o Futuro).\textsuperscript{204} The release of Spinola’s book was one of the most immediate catalysts for the Carnation Revolution. The left-wing officer group that led the revolution, the Movimento das Forças Armadas (MFA), formed partially in response to the release of Spinola’s book. However, the impacts of the international economy and the oil shocks of 1973 cannot be discounted. Spinola returned to Portugal from service in the war in August 1973, and released his book in January of 1974.\textsuperscript{205} The oil shock crisis of 1973 broke out in October during the intervening period between Spinola’s return to Portugal and the release of his book.\textsuperscript{206} Spinola thus provided much of the political impetus, while the oil shocks acted as a strong economic catalyst. The oil crisis resulted in an explosion of inflation in Portugal—20% by 1974.\textsuperscript{207} This illustrates how the domestic political events in Portugal lined up with international economic crises of the time to produce the Carnation Revolution.

**Domestic Conditions**

Under the Estado Novo regime, previous to the onset of the war, Portugal had a protectionist


\textsuperscript{197} Melo, “Imperial Taboos,” 161.

\textsuperscript{198} Ibid., 164.


\textsuperscript{200} Melo, “Imperial Taboos,” 169.

\textsuperscript{201} Ibid., 164.


\textsuperscript{203} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{206} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{207} Cann, Counterinsurgency in Africa, 329.
economy that relied on a mercantilist empire. Portugal’s African colonies acted as a protected market for the metropolis. Raw materials were extracted in Africa that were suited to Portugal's economy, then shipped to the metropole, and refined into finished goods that the colonies bought back. This process left Portugal's metropole highly underdeveloped, with most citizens living as rural agricultural workers. Portugal's economy was thus highly underdeveloped and poor, but also stabilised up until the start of the 1960s.

The 1960s brought an end to this period of stability. In 1960, Portugal joined the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), which began the process of globalisation and brought an end to Portugal’s protectionist economy. The onset of the war in 1961 further upset the established system, as Portugal opened its economy to foreign lines of credit and capital for the first time, while in Africa foreign companies were allowed 100% control over mineral extraction. This set off a decade of rapid economic growth and industrialization in the Portuguese metropole. From 1950 to 1973, Portugal saw an average GDP growth of over 6% per year due to industrialization. The 1960s became a period of crisis and upheaval for Portugal. Urbanisation, emigration, the growth of the working class, and the emergence of a large middle class, all occurred simultaneously as the economy expanded and protectionism came to an end. While the economy continued to expand, the war also continued to eat into the national budget. Portugal began losing money on the colonies during this period, while the gains in the home economy were spent to cover deficits in the colonies abroad. Portugal’s exports to the EFTA increased from 40.3% in 1959, to 50.9% in 1969, and to 60.5% in 1973. Meanwhile exports to the colonies declined from 29.8% in 1959, to 24.4% in 1969, and to 14.8% in 1973. The period of the Portuguese Colonial War was thus a complete upheaval for the Portuguese economy, which acted as an important background for the lead-up to the Carnation Revolution. Historians have debated over the exact role of the economy in the Portuguese Colonial War. The most common explanation is that the economic growth of the 1960s was used to pay for the costs of the war. Another view is that protectionism was eased to allow foreign money in, which kept the population happy as an exchange to allow for the lengthy war. Both are equally plausible explanations and not mutually exclusive. Either way, the war coincided with rapid economic changes to daily life across the metropole.

The economic industrialisation of the metropole along with the threat of conscription also caused a mass movement of migration over the duration of the war. On the one hand, the metropole was not prepared for the vast intake of 27,919 injured soldiers that returned from the wars abroad and overwhelmed Portuguese hospitals and social services. While flows of injured soldiers came into the metropole, the threat of conscription caused an outpouring of young men to emigrate from the country. MacQueen notes how “the countryside underwent extensive depopulation through out-migration, [with] two out of three migrants [seeking] work abroad rather than in the urban sector in Portugal.” In total 1.5 million migrants left Portugal over the duration of its overseas military campaigns. The military responded to the lack of manpower by befriending the local populations wherever possible and enlisting

208 Humbaraci and Muchnik, Portugal’s African Wars, 105.
209 Ibid.
210 MacQueen, The Decolonization of Portuguese Africa, 50.
211 Ibid, 49-50.
214 Ibid.
215 MacQueen, The Decolonization of Portuguese Africa, 50.
216 Ibid, 51.
217 Ibid.
218 Ibid, 50.
219 Ibid.
220 Cann, Counterinsurgency in Africa, 328.
221 MacQueen, The Decolonization of Portuguese Africa, 49.
222 Cann, Counterinsurgency in Africa, 329.
Africans into the army. These migration flows heavily destabilised the Portuguese metropole and society, and acted as another stress factor that caused upheaval for Portugal during the 1960s.

The Military

A brief synopsis of the historical relationship between Portugal’s military and its civilian government over the course of the twentieth century is necessary to contextualise the Carnation Revolution. The Carnation Revolution can be seen as part of a broader pattern within Portuguese history. Dr. José Javier Olivas Osuna, a historian of Spanish and Portuguese military history, argues that Portugal has had a long history of its military dictating political outcomes by using either military declarations (pronunciamentos) or coups, as in the Carnation Revolution. Portugal had three coups led by its military over the course of the twentieth century. The first coup ended the First Portuguese Republic on 28 May 1926; the second coup solidified the Ditadura Nacional into the Estado Novo regime on 19 March 1933; and the third coup ended the Estado Novo regime on 25 April 1974. Furthermore, there was often a direct overlap between the ruling elite of Portugal and its military officials. In fact, “the involvement of the military in politics became so entrenched that from the enactment of the constitution of 1822 until the foundation of the New State in 1933 a large majority of Portuguese prime ministers were military: 31 different military men led the government, several of them enjoying more than one mandate.” From this perspective, the argument laid out by Osuna is not only logical, but based on an empirical trend. Thus, the Carnation Revolution was part of a broader tendency throughout nineteenth and twentieth century Portuguese history wherein the military used coups to produce political outcomes that it deemed desirable.

The Portuguese military also grew increasingly disaffected with the logic that underpinned the war. In turn, this disaffection caused tensions to arise between the military and civilian leadership. Many members of the officer corps in the Portuguese military held left-wing, revolutionary ideologies that led them to sympathise with the Africans they had been sent to oppress. The officer corps also disagreed with the civilian government on the conduct of the war. Local military commanders in the colonies including “Spinola in Guinea, Kaulza in Mozambique and Luiz Cunha in Angola,” did not follow government policies in their strategy, which led to incoherence between government war plans and the plans of military commanders. Friction between the civilian and military leadership reached a tipping point once Salazar had to step down due to illness. Salazar became incapacitated from a stroke in August of 1968 and was quickly replaced by Marcello José das Neves Alves Caetano. Unlike Franco in Spain, Salazar had made no attempt to prepare a successor. Some historians, including Osuna, argue that Caetano’s replacement marked a turning point because he was less respected by military commanders. George has argued that it was specifically the left-wing members of the officer corps that experienced tension with Caetano, as they wanted to negotiate with the insurgents to end the war, which Caetano opposed. Lastly, MacQueen has argued that it was the difference in temperament between Salazar and Caetano that caused conflict with military leadership. MacQueen notes how Caetano was “indecisive, vacillating, on occasion simply timid, [and] he proved unable to confront the doubts of Salazarism in the regime and lead the movement for political modernization from the front.” This difference in temperament combined with the lack of preparation by Salazar meant that Caetano had no political base

223 Cann, Counterinsurgency in Africa, 323.
225 Ibid., 216-217.
226 Ibid., 223.
227 Ibid. 222-223.
228 Ibid.
229 Ibid.
230 Ibid.
231 Ibid.
232 MacQueen, "Portugal's First Domino," 206.
upon his ascension to power in 1968. Whichever the case is, there is widespread agreement among historians that Caetano’s ascension led to an increase in tension between the military leadership conducting the war and the civilian government in Lisbon. This deteriorating relationship between the military and the civilian government is an important factor leading up to the Carnation Revolution.

As already mentioned, the military officer corps had also grown weary over the course of the war. The military did not become demoralised because Portugal was losing the war; on the contrary, Portugal was fairly effective in its conduct. As previously highlighted, there were close relationships that were maintained between the Portuguese military and the local populations in Portuguese colonies wherever possible. The Portuguese based their tactics on counterinsurgency techniques learned from the British and French armies. This included attempts by the military to befriend local populations as often as possible using social projects to increase the local standard of living. The military also enlisted locals into the army to deal with the gradual decrease in manpower over the course of the war. This close relationship with local African populations, combined with the military’s counterinsurgency tactics, produced effective results on the battlefield. Cann points out that Portugal had relatively low losses as a result of good training, good leadership, and battle plans that were understood by all of the units involved. The Portuguese military was thus mostly effective in its strategy and conduct.

Yet, it is important to note that, despite the effectiveness of the tactics used, the war nonetheless took its toll on the military as it dragged on with no end in sight. The length of military service was extended during the course of the war, which made it less desirable for young men. At its peak, the war stretched over 150,000 troops across three theatres, causing the Portuguese military to reach its limits in terms of manpower. The psychological trauma suffered by the soldiers also wore down the Portuguese military over the course of the war. This is reflected in the high desertion rate for conscripted soldiers, which steadily increased as the population became exhausted by the war. These factors show that, despite the effectiveness of the Portuguese military’s strategy and tactics, it was also thinly stretched and overburdened as the war dragged on. Portugal had been at war for thirteen years by the time of the Carnation Revolution in 1974. The desire for an end to the war had reached a zenith among the many soldiers by the time of the revolution. This was in direct opposition to the dictates of the leadership of the civilian government in Lisbon that stubbornly refused to negotiate with the insurgency movements in the colonies.

**Discussion and Conclusion**

This article has analyzed three categories of factors, including international determinants, domestic determinants, and the military. It is worth noting that these events did not occur in isolation from one another. The domestic upheaval in the Portuguese economy occurred simultaneously alongside growing international pressure to end the war, while the relationship between the exhausted officers and the government in Lisbon was also deteriorating. The Portuguese Colonial War had profound impacts that cascaded from one aspect of Portuguese society to the next.

The cost of the war fuelled economic industrialisation and the end of domestic protectionist economic policies. The *Estado Novo* regime, which had blocked foreign investment for three decades, opened itself up to foreign investment for the first time during the 1960s to fuel the wartime defence budget. Foreign investors were quick to invest in what had been a highly protected and isolated

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233 MacQueen, “Portugal's First Domino,” 230.
235 Ibid, 323.
236 Ibid.
237 Cann, *Counterinsurgency in Africa*, 326.
240 Ibid.
Portuguese market. Nonetheless, while international actors facilitated foreign investment into Portugal during the war, the war caused much diplomatic consternation among the international community. Portugal’s attempt to maintain its overseas colonies came during a period of de-colonisation across Africa and Asia. Portugal responded to circumvent international pressure through its use of media censorship and propaganda that was successful for its domestic audience, but a complete failure in the international context.

While the war fuelled economic industrialisation and expansion at home, it also caused a rapid increase to the rate of emigration over the course of the war. Mass waves of emigrants fled conscription by moving abroad, while Portuguese hospitals and social services became overwhelmed with waves of injured soldiers arriving back at the metropole. During the 1960s, Portugal became a country with a rapidly depleting workforce due to emigration, an overwhelmed social safety net trying to relocate its injured veterans, and an economy that was moving from agricultural to industrialised modes of production at lightning speed. These combined factors caused the 1960s to become a period of extreme turbulence for Portugal. This was quickly followed and heightened by the 1973 oil shock that caused the yearly inflation rate to rise as high as 20% by 1974. These domestic factors became the background that propelled Portugal into the Carnation Revolution.

Besides these domestic factors, the revolution was also deeply linked to the Portuguese military. Relations between the Portuguese military and the civilian government deteriorated over the course of the war, especially with the replacement of Salazar with Caetano. Salazar had earned the respect of the military over the course of his dictatorship, but made no effort to groom a successor. This led to rising friction between Caetano and the military leadership, which was aggravated by the sympathies held by many left-wing officers for the African insurgency movements. The length of the war also caused significant war weariness among the troops, who increasingly supported attempts to negotiate with the independence movements against the wishes of the civilian government in Lisbon.

These three sets of factors combined together by 1974 after a decade of war, economic turbulence, and mass emigration. Taken in isolation, no single factor can be considered the cause for the Carnation Revolution. However, when considering the totality of the events that took place over the course of the Portuguese Colonial War, these factors worked in tandem to destabilise and prime the country for the Carnation Revolution. This analysis has reviewed these impacts to show the direct causal connections between the Portuguese Colonial War and the Carnation Revolution that brought an end to the Estado Novo regime.
Bibliography


