



the corvette

The Corvette

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SUBMISSIONS

The *Corvette* publishes the work of current and recently-graduated University of Victoria History Undergraduate students. The *Corvette* endeavours to publish articles that represent the best scholarship produced by UVic students concerning the past. We are interested in all methods and fields of inquiry.

PUBLISHING

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COVER IMAGE

Cultural heritage institutions often receive gifts with little to no formal documentation about provenance and custodial history, just as family members pass treasures from one generation to another, along with related stories, but sometimes without a paperwork trail. The stole featured on the cover of this issue of the *Corvette* is one such item. The stole was given to Justice Henry Pering Pellew Crease (1823-1905), and in turn, was given to the Diana M. Priestly Law Library by his descendant Laura Lindley Roff, an alumna of the UVic Faculty of Law. Little is known about this striking object, currently housed in an acid free box and awaiting further research, with the exception of the following note tucked inside the box: “This stole was presented to the Law Library by Miss L. Lindley Roff, class of 1984. She told us that it had been presented to her great grandfather, Mr. Justice Crease, when he was on circuit in the interior of the province. Miss Roff told us that she had been told that the Aboriginal people thought the black judicial robes were and needed brightening.” This compelling short paragraph provides enough details to point a savvy researcher towards further work, including determining who originally created and gifted this stole to Justice Crease. Justice Crease was a lawyer, judge, and politician who immigrated to Vancouver Island in December 1858 and who served as a judge to the Supreme Court of British Columbia between 1870 and 1896.

Please respect this artifact and do not reproduce photographs or images of it without permission of UVic Libraries. Donated to the Diana M. Priestly Law Library by L. Lindley Roff (UVic Faculty of Law, 1984).

Heather Dean
Associate Director
University of Victoria Special Collections



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President's Message

I am pleased to introduce the Spring 2017 issue of the *Corvette*, the University of Victoria's student-run history undergraduate journal.

Nurturing knowledge, truth and hope are important as we look to shape Canada's next 150 years and the kind of world we want to live in. This future will be shaped by creative and innovative people, with curiosity, critical thinking and problem solving skills. These are the skills of the researcher: the ability to take on a problem, to frame a question, to tackle queries in depth and with rigour, and to contribute to knowledge.

Where better to look than history to learn about how we got here and who we are in order to shape where we are going. For the past year, the student researchers in the *Corvette* have been doing just that – engaging in a process of deep inquiry to further their knowledge of history. These essays are from our finest undergraduate researchers who have had the opportunity to gain hands-on experience of the academic process through research, writing, and publishing, as well as acting as copy editors and peer reviewers. The result is an excellent collection of work from students who are directly engaged in research-inspired learning.

On the following pages, readers will learn of history from a variety of places, people and experiences – from Northern Ireland to pre-British India, from Nazi Germany to Victoria's Chinatown. As we move through discussions about morality to dragons to economic policy, we have the opportunity to engage

with excellent examples of dynamic scholarship and the diverse range of historical study on campus.

Congratulations to the *Corvette* and the dedicated UVic undergraduate students, graduate students, faculty and mentors who have created this remarkable collection of historical essays. Thank you for sharing your passion for knowledge and history with us.

Sincerely,

Professor Jamie Cassels, QC
President and Vice-Chancellor

Chair's Message

What if there was an educational opportunity where students could decide what they wanted to learn? What if, in that world, instead of professors describing a discipline like History to students, students actually did the disciplinary work and called on professors when they needed guidance? And, what if students wanted to share their learning and so raised the funds and learned the skills necessary to communicate it to a wider world? What if we called that world the “*Corvette*”?

The *Corvette* is the product of History students who have rejected the idea that students should come to university to be receptacles of faculty wisdom; this publication can only have come from students who have decided that the classroom is not the boundary of their educational experience, that their energy, talent, and scholarship are not bound to a single course or to be performed for a single professor. It is also a very generous gift of passion, time and skill by the editorial team, reviewers and authors to a history-loving audience who are invited to explore the past through the journal's contents.

Both as a professor and as the chair of the History Department at the University of Victoria, nothing excites me more, or makes me prouder of the department – students and faculty – than outcomes like the *Corvette*. It is the product of a dynamic learning environment that encourages excellence, experimentation, student initiative and student-directed learning, as well as engagement with the wider community. The interdisciplinary breadth of the UVic history experience is evident in the volume's range from the medieval to the 1990s,

from Palestine, India, Germany and Ireland, to the Chinatown exhibit in the Royal BC Museum here in Victoria, and taking in historiography, oral history, legal history, public history economic and cultural history and more.... The scholarship of the *Corvette*, and the vitality of its creators are the best possible indicators of the health of UVic's History Department.

I started my historical career by co-editing the first incarnation of the *Corvette* and so I appreciate its value as a learning experience for the editors and authors, but most of all, I can appreciate, better than most, the effort that went into creating this volume.

With thanks and congratulations!

John Lutz, chair
University of Victoria History Department
Co-Editor, *Ascendant Historian*, 1980 edition.

Editor's Introduction

I am honoured to introduce the fourth volume of the *Corvette*, the peer-reviewed History Undergraduate Journal of the University of Victoria. The pages of this edition reflect the creative curiosity with which our history students approach their research. The eight authors published here have vigorously questioned assumptions about the past and reflected on the contemporary relevance of their respective topics. For the past four years, the History Undergraduate Society (THUGS) has been providing fellow students with the opportunity to get their work published in this journal. My team and I are indebted to the previous editorial teams that have built a nexus of support and a sense of community that enables this process to unfold again every spring semester.

I invite you to read each of these essays. They have taught me to examine the narratives that weave together a museum exhibit, the tension between morality and historiography, the role of oral history in reflecting on the effects of war and in seeking to decolonize the Canadian legal system, and how the labels and perceptions of history are constructed. There are a few things that make this particular edition different. The editorial team and I allocated a fourth of the journal to a conversation piece on indigenous rights in Canada.¹ Two of our authors worked together with a copy-editor to write a joint conclusion. Additionally, the last page of our journal has

¹ Please see McConville's and Conrad's chapters in this work. Their joint-conclusion can be found on page 63.

beautifully coloured artwork relevant to the imagery discussed in our last chapter.²

Besides the work of the authors, this journal demonstrates the collaborative effort of crucial individuals. Our team of thirty peer-reviewers sifted through the forty-nine submissions we received. Dr. Peter Cook and Dr. Mitchell Lewis Hammond, our professor advisors, lent their expertise in selecting these eight papers for publishing. Our copy-editors worked alongside the authors to polish each essay. Specifically, I would like to thank Matthew Miskulin, Pier Brown, Wade MacAulay and Jesse Bachmann for their help throughout the entire process. I am indebted to Heather Dean from Special Collections at McPherson Library who patiently worked with me to find the right cover for this edition. I hope that someone does answer her invitation to research more about the beautiful stone housed in our library.³ I would also like to acknowledge the generosity of the UVic's Student Society in funding the journal. I am truly grateful to all of the individuals who have together crafted another excellent volume of the *Corvette*.

Thank you all,

Mariana Gallegos Dupuis
Editor-in-Chief of the *Corvette*, 2017

² Please see Fraser's chapter in this work.

³ Please see Heather Dean's words on page v.

Displaying the Inscrutable at the Royal BC Museum's Chinatown Gallery

ELSPETH GOW

This paper responds to David Chuenyan Lai's foundational research on Victoria's Chinatown in the nineteenth and early twentieth-centuries, which uncovered a hegemonic understanding of Chinatown as a 'forbidden city.' While this discourse had real-world effects for the Chinese community, scholars have critiqued Lai's understanding of Chinatown as a 'forbidden city' for assuming the dominant discourse was the only discourse, and that nineteenth and early-twentieth century Chinatown was as sealed and fixed as that discourse dictated. This paper performs a close reading of the Royal BC Museum's Chinatown gallery to explore the tension between two interpretations of the past: a 'forbidden city' narrative versus a narrative of porous boundaries and cultural mixing. It argues that Chinatown's self-conscious reproduction of the 'forbidden city' narrative re-inscribes a reductive view of 'otherness' that fails to address the nuanced cultural mixing and cohabitation in nineteenth-century social and urban spaces of Victoria.

The oldest Chinese settlement in Canada, Victoria's Chinatown, has become somewhat of an urban museum comprised of alleyways and storefronts dating from as early as 1858. While Chinatown is still home to many Chinese-owned businesses, social organizations, and community centres, the “town within a city” has become a major tourist attraction—as a memorial of the past.¹ The fluid boundaries of today's Chinatown juxtapose the self-sealed, Chinese-dominated community of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. David Chuenyan Lai's foundational research on Victoria's Chinatown of the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries has uncovered an ugly discourse perpetuated in dominant white society: Chinatown as an insidious, foreboding slum, full of

¹ David Lai, *Chinatowns: Towns within Cities in Canada*, Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1988.

untrustworthy, sub-human foreigners. While this discourse had real-world effects for the Chinese community, scholars have critiqued Lai's understanding of Chinatown as a 'forbidden city' for assuming the dominant discourse was the only discourse, and that nineteenth and early-twentieth century Chinatown was as sealed and fixed as that discourse dictated.

This paper explores the tension between two interpretations of the past: the 'forbidden city' narrative versus a narrative of porous boundaries and cultural mixing. I tease out these tensions through a close-reading of the Royal BC Museum's *Chinatown* gallery, which specifically aligns itself with the 'forbidden city' narrative. Visitors to this exhibit can stroll back in time to view a reconstruction of Victoria's historical streetscapes. Added in 1992 to the sprawling *Old Town* reconstruction of late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century downtown Victoria, *Chinatown* sought to promote a narrative of diversity, which would ultimately push the *Old Town* exhibit beyond exclusively white-settler 'heritage.'² But is *Chinatown* the right medium to promote a diverse and nuanced understanding of the past that is attentive to the complex construction of Chinese-Canadian identity?

I argue that *Chinatown's* self-conscious reproduction of the 'forbidden city' narrative re-inscribes a reductive view of 'otherness' that fails to address nuanced cultural mixing and cohabitation in nineteenth-century social and urban spaces of Victoria. Curiously, the narrative of exclusion presented by the museum helped to galvanize a Chinese community in the beginning of Chinatown's 'revitalization' in the 1980s and 1990s, the time of the exhibit's construction. *Chinatown*, therefore, reflects the needs of Victoria's Chinese-Canadian community of the 1980s and 1990s, but misses more recent paradigmatic shifts in understanding diaspora and immigrant identity, which recognize cultural mixing and fluidity, rendering the exhibit an outdated mode to represent Chinese-Canadian history in 2016. As it stands, the *Chinatown* gallery may be the most detailed and historically accurate part of the *Old Town* re-creation, but the elements chosen for display craft a one-sided narrative.

The first half of this paper traces the 'forbidden city' narrative and its opponents through the historiography of racial space in late-nineteenth and early-twentieth-century Victoria and British Columbia. Here, I explore the values and limitations in both the 'forbidden city'

² *Old Town* was installed in the 1970s.

interpretation and in the porous-boundary interpretation. I conclude that the 'forbidden city' narrative was indeed a dominant discourse, and is better supported by qualitative evidence, but the porous-boundary interpretation, although harder to prove with qualitative evidence, offers a sharper analysis that moves beyond hegemonic understandings of race and power. The second half of this paper evaluates *Chinatown* as at once a community-funded centre-piece of the Chinatown community, and as a medium that perpetuates a binary opposition of 'Chineseness' to 'whiteness.'

Throughout the twentieth century, memory of Victoria's pre-1910 Chinatown was wrapped up in myth and mystery. Harrowing stories of grisly death hung around the mythology of Chinatown, including the tale of a beheaded Chinese man whose blood stain could not be removed from one of the "labyrinthine" passages.³ As well, the pervasive 'hidden tunnel' myth provided fertile ground for the growth of ghost stories and paranoia. Legend has it that a complex system of secret tunnels, created by Chinese smugglers to circumvent prohibition and restrictions on opium, were carved through the underbelly of Victoria's 'forbidden city.' Produced by white paranoia at the turn of the century, this myth carried through to the 1950s, when members of an excavating city crew discovered what they thought to be one of the famed tunnels, but was actually part of a water reservoir system.

Lai debunks these myths and misconceptions in two major publications: *Chinatowns: Towns within Cities in Canada* (1988) and *The Forbidden City within Victoria: Myth, Symbol and Streetscape of Canada's Earliest Chinatown* (1991). In his second book, Lai disproves the 'hidden tunnel' myth. Instead of hidden tunnels, Victoria's Chinese population was able to slip through the fingers of raiding white authorities by ducking into secret hideouts and escape routes. Lai replaces the "tunnel myth with escape reality," claiming that "the former is mistaken, unreal and false; the latter is

³ David Lai, *Forbidden City within Victoria: Myth, Symbol and Streetscape of Canada's Earliest Chinatown* (Victoria: Orca Book Publishers, 1991), 36; N. de Bertrand Lurgin, "Victoria Chinatown Mysteries 50 Years Ago," *Victoria Sunday Times Magazine*, 25 August 1951, 3.

understandable, real and true.”⁴ Lai's main purpose of writing this book was to demystify Victoria's Chinatown for a wide readership, but he instead reinforces another disputable mythology around Chinatown: the ‘forbidden city.’

Dominant discourse dictated that Chinatown was a “filthy, unsanitary, overcrowded, sinister and insidious slum,”⁵ and the people of Chinatown were immoral “long-tailed rice-eating aliens.”⁶ The cultural gap was as real as it was nasty. One clergyman described “an almost impassable gulf of race, colour, language, and thought.”⁷ The most inflammatory of these accounts seem to be from clergy members or other elites, indicating that these stereotypes were perpetuated by the elite. Indeed, Lai gleans his evidence here from “local newspapers or the biased accounts of policemen or church people.”⁸ Whose voices does Lai miss or gloss over in focusing exclusively on these fragments of hegemonic discourse? Surely lived experience does not always reflect a carbon-copy of dominant stereotypes. How accurately can the ‘forbidden city’ label reflect lived experience of historical people in Victoria's Chinatown?

These questions are explored by Patrick A. Dunae et al. in their critique of Lai's conception of discrete racial spaces, “Making the Inscrutable, Scrutable: Race and Space in Victoria's Chinatown, 1891.” The authors use GIS data processing to map racial space in Victoria. Through an analysis dependent on statistical data instead of narrative material, Dunae et al. find a “transactional space where white landlords related to Chinese merchants, where Chinese merchants sold their wares to settler housewives, where bourgeois family men came to gamble” instead of the ‘forbidden city’ in which Chinese people lived entirely in a self-sufficient vacuum.⁹ The authors are careful not to underplay the racism in 1891 Chinatown, and certainly do not intend to reflect some sort of utopian society wherein everyone always plays nicely together. However, their view of the ‘un-forbidden city’ may be

⁴ Lai, *Chinatowns: Towns within Cities in Canada*, (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1988), 39.

⁵ Ibid, 37.

⁶ Ibid, 197.

⁷ Ibid, 37.

⁸ Ibid, 39.

⁹ Patrick A. Dunae, John Lutz, Donald J. Lafaniere, Jason A. Gilliland, “Making the Inscrutable, Scrutable: Race and Space in Victoria's Chinatown, 1891,” *BC Studies* 169 (2011), np.

overly optimistic. Raw data can only prove so much when unsubstantiated with qualitative evidence. The authors admit that GIS can determine physical space, but “delineating social space is more problematic” and requires qualitative, anecdotal, and narrative records.¹⁰

Here is where I think Dunae et al.’s critique might be stretched a little thin. The authors provide only two pieces of anecdotal evidence in the section on white tolerance of Chinese people. First, the authors discern that a number of white people were satisfied with the performance of their Chinese servants; second, the authors present accounts of 1890s tourists who found Chinatown easier to access than expected—one of whom was able to tour several Chinese emporiums, an opium factory, and, most notably, a joss house (Confucian or Buddhist temple).¹¹ Likely these tourists’ preconception of the impenetrability of Chinatown was coloured by racist rhetoric of the colonial state which sought to, as Kay Anderson points out in her book on racial space in Vancouver’s Chinatown, divide “races” both “epistemologically and geographically.”¹² Dunae et al.’s narrative sources listed above are excellent examples of how racial space was more porous than what has been previously suggested, but more evidence along this line is required to completely rewrite the geographic divides of ethnicity in nineteenth-century Victoria.

That said, there is still enough quantitative and qualitative evidence here to pose a serious threat to the ‘forbidden city’ narrative, even if the authors are unable to completely disprove the stark racial lines of 1890s Chinatown. The third decennial census reflects that about 70 percent of Chinatown’s population was Chinese; the other 30 percent included 600 people of European descent, and 100 Indigenous people. Instances of intermarriage between Chinese men and Indigenous women speak to degrees of cultural mixing, complicating racial structures elbowed out by Lai’s ‘forbidden city’ apparatus that

¹⁰ Dunae et al., “Making the Inscrutable, Scrutable,” np.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Kay Anderson, *Vancouver's Chinatown: Racial Discourse in Canada, 1875-1980* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1991), 41.

recognizes only 'Chineseness' and 'whiteness' in opposition to one another.¹³

Renisa Mawani has written extensively on cross-racial encounters in British Columbia, eschewing simplistic, binary renderings of how race was constructed and understood. Mawani critiques Anderson's conception of how government officials created "Chineseness against Europeaness." She offers, instead, a complex model of how "local bureaucrats generated racial order that rendered 'whites,' 'Indians,' 'Chinese,' 'Half-Breeds,' and 'Negroes' as discrete and immutable species ... physically, morally, and affectively incompatible."¹⁴ Incidentally, Dunae et al. also critiqued Anderson's depiction of Chinatown as the antithesis to biased whiteness (non-Christian, uncivilized, and amoral).¹⁵ Mawani urges us to consider how racial categories "were not determined against whiteness alone ... nor were ideas about race geographically bound."¹⁶ Mawani and Dunae et al. do not make exactly the same point; Dunae et al. refer to how hegemonic racializing rhetoric of the time may have been hyperbolic, while Mawani suggests that this rhetoric was more complicated and inter-relational than hinging on a racial binary.

But these points are not incommensurable. By understanding how race was not constructed by colonial officials in a linear back-and-forth between a dominant and subordinate culture, we can begin to see a multiplicity of ways in which the landscape of Chinatown was more complicated than Lai's construction of monolithic Chinese people living exclusively within the rigid confines of dominant discourse. Moreover, Mawani's thought demonstrates how carving out discrete

¹³ See Jean Barman, "Beyond Chinatown: Chinese Men and Indigenous Women in Early British Columbia," *BC Studies* vol 177 (Spring, 2013) for evidence of Chinese/Indigenous intermarriage. While intermarriage was virtually unheard of within Chinatowns, there are a number of accounts of Chinese/Indigenous marriage outside of Chinatowns in BC, including in Victoria. This cultural mixing appears not to jeopardize Lai's interpretation of a culturally vacuumous Chinatown as the marriages did not take place within Chinatown. But that Chinese men lived outside of Chinatown and mixed with other ethnic groups as early as the 1870s suggests a level of cultural mixing and porousness outside the limits of Lai's narrative.

¹⁴ Renisa Mawani, "Cross-Racial Encounters and Juridicial Truths: (Dis)Aggregating Race in British Columbia's Contact Zone," *BC Studies* 156/157 (Winter 2007), np.

¹⁵ Dunae et al., "Making the Inscrutable, Scrutable," np.

¹⁶ Mawani, "Cross-Racial Encounters and Juridicial Truths," np.

racial categories was entirely the task of colonial elite; race was a structure imposed from the colonial elites that may or may not have accurately reflected the lived experiences of common people. With this idea of dominant racial discourse in mind, let us return to Lai through the eyes of Dunae et al.: narrative accounts written by society's elites are misleading. The dominant discourse produced by the state had oppressive aims of separating and categorizing 'races,' emphasizing the essential 'otherness' of each group. The situation on the ground must have been 'mixed' enough to create anxieties in the state, causing colonial officials to exert racial control to manage who they saw as their subordinates. The evidence provided by Dunae et al. begins to clarify these tensions between dominant discourse and lived experience, and indeed has broken open the 'forbidden city' narrative for further scholarly debate. But since both Dunae's and Lai's respective interpretations of racial space have truths to them, and neither can be fully discredited, the question now becomes: what is the most responsible and accurate way to present these historical narratives to the public?

Even if the 'forbidden city' narrative cannot fully explain the diversity of lived experiences in colonial Victoria, members of the Chinese community embraced this narrative in 1992, when Virginia Careless and Bob Griffin teamed with Lai to curate a permanent Chinatown re-creation exhibit within the Royal BC Museum's *Old Town* gallery.¹⁷ *Chinatown* was funded in part by the Chinatown Lions Club, and other individuals from the Chinese community, including Quan Yong Foo, John Nipp, Paul Chen, and John Joe, who contributed their time and energy to recreate a richly textured pre-1910 Chinatown enclave. The curator chose to include businesses that reflected the internal strength of the Chinese community: a herbalist, grocer, tailor of Chinese workmen's clothing, an employment agency, etc.¹⁸ But does this effect of self-sufficiency go too far, even if it does serve to claim a past of autonomy for Chinese-Canadians? As Joan Seidl remarks in her otherwise glowing review of the exhibit, "Possibly the otherness is too

¹⁷ Joan Seidl, "Royal British Columbia Museum, Victoria, *Chinatown*," *Material Culture Review*, 40 (Fall 1994), np.

¹⁸ Ibid.

extreme, masking at least some of the connections that tied *Chinatown* and *Old Town* into a symbiotic relationship.”¹⁹ The construction of ‘otherness’ is evident in the exhibit’s proclaimed affective objective: “to make visitors experience the feelings of curiosity, mystery and ‘fear’ in strolling through Chinatown at dusk which was perceived as a ‘Forbidden City’ by the white public in the past.”²⁰

The exhibit is indeed as foreboding as it sets out to be; it is a claustrophobic space shrouded in darkness. The entrance to the Chinatown part of the *Old Town* reconstruction gallery is successfully inconspicuous, sequestered away under the steps to one of the main *Old Town* attractions, the Grand Central Hotel. The narrow, low-ceilinged entrance gives way to a sheltered enclave surrounded by tall buildings. Upon entering, the visitor feels as if they have taken a wrong turn and ended up in a place where they should not be. All the shop doors are shut, and one cannot properly make out the distant sounds of conversations in Chinese, cats meowing, and street noise layered in dim cacophony in the exhibit’s soundscape, even at the museum’s quietest hours. The space, although highly detailed and textured, appears inscrutable.

On my fieldwork trip to the museum, I overheard one visitor’s reactions to the exhibit. While I was standing in the enclave, a white mother and daughter approached the narrow entrance, the daughter running ahead. The mother exclaimed to her daughter, “Look! This is probably the most interesting part of the whole thing.” The mother did not seem to know why the exhibit was interesting she merely held a vague sense of awe and reverence in regards to a space so strikingly ‘other.’ She may have expected the exhibit to be an opportunity to foster an ethical and inclusive sense of the past in her daughter, but the exhibit was unable to deliver. After running through the precipice, the daughter stopped dead in her tracks, struck by the all-consuming sensory effect of the exhibit space, and cried, “It’s so blocked off!” The reverence of the mother and the child’s fear exemplify the effectiveness of this exhibit to “make visitors experience ... feelings of curiosity, mystery and fear.”²¹

The foreboding sensory effect was deliberate, and it was supported by the community. As Lai points out in his curatorial

¹⁹ Joan Seidl, “Royal British Columbia Museum, Victoria, *Chinatown*.”

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ David Lai, “The Chinatown Exhibit of the Royal BC Museum” *BC Historical News*, 27 no. 2 (Spring 1994), np.

statement: “The exhibit is unusual in the history of the museum exhibitions because the local community in Victoria has not only financially supported it but also actively participated in it.”²² Clearly, the ‘forbidden city’ narrative has a social purpose that served the construction and affirmation of Chinese-Canadian identity within the Victoria Chinatown community of the 1980s and 1990s. David Lai cautions against conflating the Chinese community of Victoria with the Chinatown community. Members of the Chinese community may or may not spend any time in Chinatown, or care about its present or future.²³ Therefore, it is important not to let the exhibit or indeed Chinatown itself speak for the entire Chinese community. But the Chinatown community, at least, were invested in the creation of *Chinatown*, and its narrative of self-sufficiency. Perhaps this was to reaffirm an idea of distinct ‘Chineseness’ against the dominant white culture in a Chinese community that by the 1980s had become more assimilated to Canadian life. The impulse to hold Chinese knowledge and history within the walls of the community seems understandable.

Chinatown reflects Chinese heritage that extends beyond the traditional bounds of “heritage as the aesthetic of history” and actually gives back to the community.²⁴ In Canadian public history, ‘heritage’ has become something of a dirty word, because it is usually accompanied by (racist) nationalism: an homage to white-settler origins that lacks depth and specificity. Heritage sites are discernible usually for their presentation of the past with an emphasis on sensory experience. While *Chinatown* certainly fulfils that requirement, its presentation encourages more critical reflection than the typical settler-heritage site (for instance, the rest of the *Old Town* gallery), because it represents the heritage of a minority within the hegemonic white narrative, and because it has a community-enriching purpose, rather than a wholly economic or political objective. But there is still a fragment of a political purpose: the exhibit’s self-conscious construction of the white visitor. The rest of the *Old Town* gallery

²² David Lai, “The Chinatown Exhibit of the Royal BC Museum.”

²³ Lai, *Chinatowns, Towns within Cities*, 257.

²⁴ Patricia K. Wood, “The Historic Site as a Cultural Text: A Geography of Heritage in Calgary Alberta,” *Material Culture Review* 52 (Fall, 2000), 34.

allows for entrance into the buildings; visitors can wander through intimate spaces of bedrooms, sitting rooms, and shops. But in *Chinatown*, the visitor is made to feel 'other' and excluded. Four buildings whose doors are locked to the public surround a dark courtyard where one can peer up at blocked windows on the residential upper floors of the tall buildings, or gawk through half-exposed alleyways. The exhibit is constructed deliberately through white-settler eyes.

Misao Dean interprets *Chinatown's* white visitor view-point as a subversion of racist division in British Columbia society, "making the visitors aware of their 'whiteness' and prompting them to feel themselves as part of an exclusive cultural community."²⁵ She contrasts the *Chinatown* exhibit visitor point of view to that of *Point Ellice House*, a Victorian-era heritage building where visitors are encouraged to enter from the servants' quarters, taking the vantage point of a Chinese houseboy. Dean finds the *Point Ellice* version of exhibiting diversity, by including a Chinese view-point, unsatisfying. She invokes Smaro Kambourelli's discussion of "sedative politics"—multiculturalism as merely the colourful backdrop to white Canadian dominant culture—to describe how predominantly white visitors peeking at the white-owned house through the eyes of a Chinese houseboy only reaffirms voyeuristic fetishization of the Victorian bourgeois lifestyle and marginalization of Chinese people.²⁶ Dean argues that *Chinatown*, on the other hand, specifically eschews voyeurism: everything is closed, and the role-reversal of a white audience to feel excluded, instead of a Chinese audience, effectively subverts power.²⁷ However, we can see in this inversion an affirmation of racial binary, like that projected in Kay Anderson's book, criticized by Dunae et al. and Mawani. *Chinatown* is useful insofar as it is subversive, but in what ways can we see this subversion as a simplistic construction of opposing 'others?'

Preservation of the past is always restricting; the act of defining a culture is by extension an act of confining "self-perception, self-definition, and self-identification."²⁸ The *Chinatown* exhibit

²⁵ Misao Dean, "Managing Diversity in the Representation of BC history: Point Ellice House and 'Chinatown'," *BC Studies* 136 (Winter 2002/2003), np.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Misao Dean, "Managing Diversity in the Representation of BC history," np.

²⁸ Wood, "The Historic Site as a Cultural Text," 34.

constructs a Chinese self-image in binary opposition to the visitor who, by extension, is always already white and 'other.' But if we are to consider Mawani's words that "knowledges of racial inferiority and superiority were not neatly organized along the orient/occident binary,"²⁹ we can see how flipping around a binary of white versus Chinese might only reaffirm simplistic renderings of racial categories. What of porous spaces?

The 'forbidden city' narrative encourages a certain amount of fetishizing of an exotic 'other.' As Le Han argues in an analysis of the Museum of Chinese America in New York, such a narrative reiterates old dichotomies of "the West [as] modern and the Chinese [as] traditional and historic."³⁰ Mawani corroborates: "authorities constituted these 'races' as static, unchanging, and homogenous populations who, for different reasons, were discerned to be 'inherently out of place in the historical time of modernity.'"³¹ To understand 'Chineseness' as an essential, non-adaptive, and non-fluid entity is to impose a teleology on Chinese identity, which remains pure and untainted in the 'archaic' first generation and eventually dies out in the more 'advanced' second generation. Herein lie the limitations of the 'forbidden city' narrative, which houses an idea of essential and mutually exclusive 'Chineseness' within the walls of Chinatown. This narrative purports that essential Chinese identity began to break down throughout the twentieth century as Chinese people became more assimilated more into the monoculture of mainstream society.

But maybe the *Chinatown* exhibit should not be completely tossed aside as a remnant of old historiography that missed paradigmatic shifts in how diaspora is theorized and how Chinese-Canadian identity is constructed. As Han reminds us, "the museum [in NY] itself is an integral part of the construction of a Chinese American identity."³² Indeed, museums can function as "parallel structures to social organizations such as traditional festivals, language schools, and

²⁹ Mawani, "Cross-Racial Encounters and Juridicial Truths," np.

³⁰ Le Han, "Our Home is Here: History, Memory, and Identity in the Museum of Chinese in America," *Communication, Culture & Critique* 6 no.1 (March 2013), 168.

³¹ Mawani "Cross-Racial Encounters and Juridical Truths," np.

³² Le Han, "Our Home is Here," 167.

family-based networks and organizations.”³³ If we see *Chinatown* as a social organization, perhaps its social value can outlive its outdated interpretation of diasporic identity. So the way forward from understanding the past in terms of racial binaries imposed by the lingering ‘forbidden city’ narrative may not lie in the revamping of *Chinatown*, but rather, the creation of a new community-engaged museum space to exist contemporaneously with the old.

Perhaps a dialogic, exhibit-box-based exhibition of Victoria's Chinatown and Chinese-Canadian culture could provide a more instructive and nuanced understanding of diasporic Chinese history in Canada. Such an exhibit might best function as an institution of its own, outside of *Old Town* and even the Royal BC Museum. A self-sufficient, community- and government-funded institution that does not function within the walls of an outdated, 1970s, white-settler reconstruction of the past could improve on the pedagogical problems of *Chinatown* by providing more explanatory text, oral histories, and a greater range of experience over time that addresses adaptation and cultural change. Such a project would of course be contingent on community incentive and support, and more research expanding and improving upon the work of Dunae et al. on the culturally-mixed environment of Victoria's Chinatown in the nineteenth and early-twentieth century.

In this paper I have demonstrated that two interpretations of Chinatown's past stand at odds against one another within the academy. In public history, only one interpretation of Chinatown's past exists. While *Chinatown* was supported by and was productive for the Chinatown community in the 1990s, perhaps a new museum space could better reflect changing academic discourse and new evidence. Recent shifts in how diaspora and how migrant identity is understood (as a fluid, non-fixed, adaptive phenomenon) contradict the former ‘forbidden city’ narrative. These theories, combined with new quantitative evidence unearthed by Dunae et al., urge academics and public historians alike to reconsider the history of Victoria's Chinatown and Chinese-Canadian identity, and to create more intellectually capacious academic work and museum spaces.

³³ Le Han, “Our Home is Here,” 162.

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The “Conversion” of Benny Morris: Morality in the History of 1948 and the Creation of the Palestinian-Refugee Crisis

JOSIE GRAY

The history surrounding the 1948 War and the creation of the Palestinian-refugee crisis continues to be contentious, political, and filled with questions of morality. This is especially true for Benny Morris’s historical work. As an Israeli historian, Morris has made significant contributions to the historiography of 1948, with most of his work focusing on the role that Jewish forces played in the expulsion of Palestinian Arabs in 1948 (something that the Israeli government had denied vehemently). Although celebrated for his historical work, following the collapse of the Palestinian-Israeli peace process in the early 2000s Morris publically announced his support for the expulsion of Palestinians in 1948 and argued that Jewish forces should have expelled every single Palestinian Arab. This paper discusses how a dual commitment to honest historical study and Zionism allowed Morris to announce his support for the atrocities that his own research had uncovered.

On November 29, 1947, the United Nations General Assembly passed Resolution 181, which approved the partition of Mandate Palestine, which had been under British rule since 1920. Although Arabs made up seventy-one per cent of the population, the partition plan allotted fifty-six per cent of the territory to a Jewish state with the Palestinian state receiving forty-two per cent.¹ The proposed Jewish state would contain 499,000 Jews and 438,000 Arabs—a bare majority—while the proposed Palestinian state would have 818,000 Arabs and 10,000 Jews.² The Jewish leadership accepted this plan; Arab representatives rejected it.

The few months following the passing of the partition plan are often described as a civil war between Jews and Palestinians. May 14, 1948, marked the official withdrawal of British forces and the end of the mandate. That same day, David Ben-Gurion, the head of the Jewish Agency (he would go on to be the first elected Israeli prime minister), declared the independent Jewish state of Israel. That next day, the surrounding Arab states, including Egypt, Trans-Jordan, Iraq, and Syria, invaded the former mandate. This invasion marks the beginning

¹ Jerusalem and the surrounding territory would be under an international administration, which makes up the last few per cents.

² Ilan Pappé. *The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine*, (London: Oneworld Publications Ltd., 2006), 35.

of the regional war, which would continue until July 1949 with the signing of a number of armistice agreements.

By that point, the established borders were much different from those put forward by the United Nation partition plan. The newly created Israeli state occupied roughly seventy per cent of the former mandate. In addition, over 700,000 Palestinians were now refugees.³ Some of them found themselves under Transjordan or Egyptian occupation in areas that would soon be termed the West Bank and the Gaza Strip respectively, while others had fled north into the neighbouring countries of Lebanon and Syria. Although the 1947 partition plan had allotted Palestinians forty-two per cent of Mandate Palestine, by 1949, Palestinians had no state at all.⁴

In the preface of *The War for Palestine*, published in 2007, Eugene L. Rogan and Avi Shlaim state, “Our common purpose was to understand, not to impute shame or allocate blame.”⁵ This statement speaks to the degree to which the history of the 1948 War continues to be a charged, political subject. The legacy of the 1948 War and the resulting Palestinian-refugee problem is still obvious today as many Palestinians remain classified as refugees, and Israel continues to occupy the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, which it has held since 1967. Despite Rogan and Shlaim’s commitment to neutrality, most historians make their moral evaluation of the expulsion of Palestinians in 1948 clearly known. While some condemn the expulsion of Palestinians and the Zionist project—a political movement and ideology that believes that Jews have a right to a state of their own and maintains a commitment to preserving a Jewish state in Israel—others argue that expulsion was unavoidable in order to create a viable Jewish state.⁶

³ The United Nations estimates 711,000 Palestinians became refugees in this period.

⁴ This is an extremely simplified narrative of the 1948 conflict meant give the reader some historical context. The complexities of this war would need a paper of their own to be adequately dealt with.

⁵ Eugene L. Rogan and Avi Shlaim, eds., *The War for Palestine*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), xvii.

⁶ I write this paper on the premise that Palestinians were expelled between 1947 and 1949 from what would become the state of Israel and that, in many

In this paper, I address the question of the place of morality in history by focusing on how Israeli historians frame morality in regards to the creation of the Palestinian-refugee problem in 1948. To do this, I focus on the work of Benny Morris and his moral “conversion.” Morris has made significant contributions to the historiography of the 1948 War, with most of his work focusing specifically on the Jewish role in the creation of the Palestinian-refugee problem. Although celebrated for his contributions, following the collapse of the Palestinian-Israeli peace process in the early 2000s Morris publically announced his support for the expulsion of Palestinians in 1948.⁷ In my analysis, I will establish his contributions to the history of the 1948 War and demonstrate how his approach to historical study has evolved from the late 1980s to the twenty-first century. Ultimately, I will attempt to explain what could cause a historian so familiar with the atrocities committed in 1948 to publically proclaim his support for those atrocities.

Old and New History

Prior to the late 1980s, Israelis and Palestinians had conflicting conceptions of the 1948 War. Palestinians refer to 1948 as *al-Nakba*, or “the catastrophe,” to convey their ultimate defeat and the destruction of Palestinian society.⁸ In contrast, Israeli state history, often termed “old history,” describes the “War of Independence” as a heroic battle between Jewish forces and evil Arab armies that aimed to “drive [Jews] into the sea.”⁹ Although engaged in a violent war, Israel had “purity of arms” as they used violence only to defend the Jewish homeland. In these accounts, Jewish forces miraculously managed to overcome all obstacles and adversaries to finally create their own state and achieve justice for hundreds of years of persecution, not to mention the Holocaust. When explaining the source of the Palestinian-refugee problem, these writers claimed that the hundreds of thousands

cases, this expulsion can be described as ethnic cleansing. As Benny Morris has directly stated his recognition of this (as will be shown later), I do not think it necessary to engage with details of that debate.

⁷ Ari Shavit, “Survival of the Fittest: Interview with Benny Morris,” *Haaretz*,

8 January 2004.

⁸ Avi Shlaim, “The Debate about 1948,” *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 27, (1995).

⁹ *Ibid.*, 287.

of Palestinians had fled, many in response to orders from Arab leaders, despite Jewish pleas for them to stay.

The late 1980s and early 1990s marked the emergence of the “new historians” who began to challenge the “old history” of 1948. Israel had adopted the British thirty-year rule for declassifying government documents. So in 1978, documents from 1948 became available. However, it took until the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon before Israelis actually began to consider challenging government-sponsored historical narratives.¹⁰ Benny Morris, who had been sent as a journalist to cover the conflict, recalled that this was the first time he ever met with and interviewed Palestinian refugees.¹¹ In 1987, Morris published *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem* (hereon referred to as *The Birth*) where he challenged the traditional account that claimed Palestinians had fled their homes in 1948 on orders from the Arab leadership. He found no evidence of this.¹² While he did find multiple instances of dispossession and expulsion, he concluded that there was no evidence of a systematic expulsion plan, and that those who did flee did so due to natural consequences of war and fear.¹³

In an article in *Tikkun*, Morris described “the new history of Israel” when discussing his own recent work and that of Simha Flapan, Ilan Pappé, and Avi Shlaim who were all engaged in challenging different aspects of the “old history” of 1948.¹⁴ While they were not the

¹⁰ Ilan Pappé, *The Idea of Israel: A History of Power and Knowledge* (London: Verso, 2015): 113. Many Israelis felt their government had lied to them about the motivation for the invasion and began to see their nation as an aggressor.

¹¹ Benny Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004): 3.

¹² Walid Khalidi and Erskine Childers independently disproved claims that Arab leaders had used radio stations to tell Palestinians to leave and suggested that it was actually the Jewish radio stations that had done so. See Walid Khalidi, “Plan Dalet: Master Plan for the Conquest of Palestine,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 18 no.1 (1988): 6.

¹³ Pappé, *The Idea of Israel*, 115.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 112. The next year, Shabtai Teveth, David Ben-Gurion’s official biographer, used the term “new history” for the books they produced. He also rejected their findings and accused them of treason.

first to challenge the “old history,” they were the first to do so using Israeli archival sources. While most academics have come to accept much (if not most) of this new history over the years, many have not. For example, Efraim Karsh continues to accuse the new historians of “fabricating the facts.”¹⁵ As professor and head of Mediterranean Studies in London, Karsh has published many critical review articles of the works of new historians.¹⁶ However, very few take him seriously, and Morris has described him as, “a trigger-happy Wild West gun fighter out to make a name for himself, barging into the saloon of historiography with guns blazing.”¹⁷

Although Morris has always claimed his loyalty to Zionism, critics of *The Birth* often interpreted his claims regarding 1948 as an anti-Zionist attempt to undermine the legitimacy of the state of Israel. However, Morris rejected these claims and argued that such critics “simply misread the book. They didn’t read it with the same detachment, the same moral neutrality, with which it was written.”¹⁸

The “Conversion”

Following the breakdown of the peace process in the early 2000s and the outbreak of the second Palestinian intifada, Benny Morris’s personal beliefs underwent a significant shift as he renewed his commitment to Zionism. In an interview with Ari Shavit, published in *Haaretz* (an Israeli English-language newspaper), Morris blamed Palestinians for the breakdown of the peace process.¹⁹ He argued that their rejection of the agreements put forward in 2000 made clear that “[Palestinians] are unwilling to accept the two-state solution. They want it all.”²⁰ In the interview, Morris argued that the expulsions in 1948 were necessary in order for the creation of a Jewish state to have

¹⁵ Benny Morris, “Review Essay: Refabricating 1948,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 27, no.2 (Winter 1998), 81. See also Pappe, *The Idea of Israel*, 280.

¹⁶ Efraim Karsh, “Resurrecting the Myth: Benny Morris, the Zionist Movement, and the ‘Transfer’ Idea,” *Israeli Affairs* 11, no.3 (2006). See also Karsh, “Falsifying the Record: Benny Morris, David Ben-Gurion, and the ‘Transfer’ Idea,” *Israel Affairs* 4, no. 2 (1997).

¹⁷ Morris, “A Review Essay,” 82.

¹⁸ Ari Shavit, “Survival of the Fittest: Interview with Benny Morris,” *Haaretz*, 8 January 2004.

¹⁹ Benny Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 2.

²⁰ Shavit, “Survival of the Fittest.”

been possible and that the Arabs would have destroyed the Jews if they could.

That same month, Cambridge University Press published a revised version of Benny Morris's 1987 book (hereon referred to as *The Birth Revisited*).²¹ Despite his public statements, Morris's revised book contains new archival material that shows "there were far more acts of massacre than [Morris] had previously thought" and proved that Hagenah units were ordered to uproot and expel villagers and destroy villages.²² Through his research, Morris identified at least twelve cases of Jewish soldiers raping Arab girls and twenty-four cases of massacre, with victims ranging from four to hundreds of Palestinians. Although still not convinced of a unified policy of ethnic cleansing, Morris agreed there were expulsion orders: "It's a pattern. Apparently, various officers who took part in the operation understood that the expulsion order they received permitted them to do these deeds in order to encourage the population to take to the roads."²³ Morris also argued that David Ben-Gurion, the Jewish leader, fully supported population transfer as "he understood that there could be no Jewish state with a large and hostile Arab minority in its midst."

In his interview with Shavit, Morris expressed his approval for Ben-Gurion's stance because "without the uprooting of the Palestinians, a Jewish state would not have arisen."²⁴ When asked how he could justify all the things Jewish forces did in 1948, Morris replied, "There is no justification for acts of rape. There is no justification for acts of massacre. Those are war crimes. But in certain conditions, expulsion is not a war crime."²⁵ When Shavit interjects that this expulsion resulted in the killing of thousands of people and the destruction of an entire society, Morris responded with the following: "A society that aims to kill you forces you to destroy it. When the

²¹ Benny Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

²² Shavit, "Survival of the Fittest."

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid.

choice is between destroying or being destroyed, it's better to destroy.”²⁶

After voicing support for ethnic cleansing and an understanding for the complicated choices that Jewish leaders were facing in 1948, Morris stated, “I do not identify with Ben-Gurion. I think he made a serious historical mistake in 1948... he got cold feet during the war. In the end, he faltered.” Shavit asked for clarification to which Morris said, “If he was already engaged in expulsion, maybe he should have done a complete job... my feeling is that this place [Israel and surrounding areas] would be quieter and know less suffering if the matter had been resolved once and for all.”²⁷

Reacting to the “Conversion”

That interview and *The Birth Revisited* were published in the same year and many found themselves astounded by the apparent dual sides to Morris. Avi Shavit points out the inherent contradiction between what he identifies as “citizen Morris” and “historian Morris” and the apparent ability of these two Morrises to work “as though there is no connection between them, as though one was trying to save what the other insists on eradicating.”²⁸ Farid Abdel-Nour notes that other scholars have described the contradictions that Morris embodies as bordering on schizophrenia.²⁹

In addition to seeing Morris as a citizen of Israel versus as a historian of 1948, scholars also made a nostalgic distinction between the “old Morris” and the new Morris. Avi Shlaim argued that “The hallmark of [Benny Morris’s pre-2000] approach was to stick to as closely as possible to the documentary evidence, to record rather than to evaluate... he upheld the highest standards of historical scholarship, and he wrote with almost clinical detachment.”³⁰ Shlaim argues that this new Morris has betrayed the duty of the historian to evaluate all evidence, and he “seems to have swallowed the official Israeli-line on Camp David hook, line, and sinker.” Shlaim equates the official Israeli account of what happened at Camp David with the “national myths”

²⁶ Shavit, “Survival of the Fittest.”

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Farid Abdel-Nour, “From Critic to Cheerleader: The Clarifying Example of Benny Morris’ ‘Conversion,’” *Holy Land Studies* 12, no.1 (2013): 27.

³⁰ Avi Shlaim, “A Betrayal of History,” *The Guardian*. 22 February 2002.

that dominated Israeli popular memory prior to the late 1980s.³¹ Ilan Pappé, although defining pre-2000 Morris as not much more than a “data collector,” stated, “Now that we know all we want to about [Morris’s] views ... we can only long for the old Morris.”³²

Understanding the “Conversion”

Ilan Pappé takes a self-consciously post-modernist approach to understanding the historiography of 1948 and he applied this analysis directly to Morris’s historical work. Pappé criticizes Morris’s claims to objectivity and stated that “an Israeli historian who justifies ethnic cleansing and writes about it in [both *The Birth* (1987) and *The Birth Revisited* (2004)] cannot claim to be a ‘neutral historian.’” Pappé argues that historical narratives are constructed, and while all historians “believe and hope that [their] narrative is a loyal reconstruction of what happened, ...we cannot ride a train back in time to check it.”³³ In this way, Pappé accuses Morris of failing to deconstruct power relationships in the history of 1948 and of making a false commitment to objectivity.

Pappé argues that all Israeli historians who write about 1948 – including himself – are motivated by ideology or politics; the conflict is too personal for them not to be.³⁴ The ideology that Pappé refers to is Zionism. Pappé argues that the “new historians” writing in the 1980s and 1990s used “a new ideological approach” that challenged Zionist ideology even if they refused to recognize it.³⁵ However, Pappé sets himself apart from other new historians as he is willing to “engage with the impact of power on knowledge” that influences the debate on 1948. Ultimately, that power is Zionism and Pappé argues that Israeli

³¹ Shlaim describes the official line as being that the Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak made a generous offer to the Palestinian leader, Yasser Arafat, at Camp David, “only to be confronted with a flat rejection and a return to violence.”

³² Ilan Pappé, “Response to Benny Morris’ ‘Politics by other Means’ in the *New Republic*,” *The Electronic Intifada*, 30 March 2004.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Pappé, *The Idea of Israel*, 124.

³⁵ Ibid.

historians of 1948 cannot be neutral in their stance on Zionism; they must be either for it or against it.

Ilan Pappé defines post-Zionists as those who challenge Zionism as an ideology and reject the validity of expelling of hundreds of thousands of people in 1948 to create a Jewish state. Post-Zionists are often accused of challenging Israel’s right to exist. Leslie Stein, an Israeli historian, accused Ilan Pappé of being an “anti-Zionist... whose fabrications of Israel’s past and present are widely circulated and quoted.”³⁶ His implication here is that Pappé has abandoned all academic integrity to promote an anti-Israeli political ideology. However, Farid Abdel-Nour argues that even those who reject “the worthiness of the Zionist dream’s realisation in 1948” are not necessarily arguing that Israel has no legitimacy today, as “the legitimacy of states does not hang on the legitimacy of their founding.”³⁷ For this reason, Ilan Pappé identifies as a post-Zionist, not an anti-Zionist.

Pappé defines neo-Zionists as those who subscribe to Zionism despite accepting that the creation of the Israeli state was achieved by expelling Palestinians: “From the neo-Zionist perspective, acceptance of the factual claims of the new historians was accompanied by the categorical rejection (shared by the Israeli public at large) of the *contemporary* moral implications.”³⁸ Pappé puts Benny Morris into the neo-Zionist category because although Morris’s revised book, published in 2004, did demonstrate “the expulsion [in 1948] to be far more premeditated, systematic, and extensive” than his previous book did, Morris’s commitment to Zionism has left him to assign “justification for the 1948-49 expulsions.”³⁹

Farid Abdel-Nour takes a more balanced and concrete approach to his evaluation of Benny Morris’s “conversion.”⁴⁰ Although clearly condemning the “disturbing direction” Morris’s work has taken, Abdel-Nour’s main goal is to try to understand how such a shift could

³⁶ Leslie Stein, “How Anti-Zionism Seduced the Political Left,” *Quadrant Online*. 1 May 2012.

³⁷ Abdel-Nour, “From Critic to Cheerleader,” 39.

³⁸ Pappé, *The Idea of Israel*, 278. Emphasis in text.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 281.

⁴⁰ Abdel-Nour, “From Critic to Cheerleader,” 26. Abdel-Nour suggests that due to the time that has passed between Morris’s “scandalous” interview with Shavit in 2004, his analysis represents “a more dispassionate attempt at making sense of Morris’s conversion.”

occur.⁴¹ Ultimately, he focuses on Morris's commitment and belief in Zionism and traces the evolution of his historical work from *The Birth*, published in 1987, to *The Birth Revisited*, published in 2004. Abdel-Nour notes that while many Israelis went through a similar conversion after 2000, Benny Morris's is so significant because of his historical work on 1948. While Morris has not changed his main findings, "what he has changed is the moral message that his recent work has come to impart to his readers... namely, that unfortunate as Palestinian displacement may have been, it was still better than the alternative, and that all things considered, it was worth it: good that it happened."⁴²

Farid Abdel-Nour notes how Morris's research has brought attention to the role "Zionist forces" played in the expulsion of Palestinians in 1948. Indeed, *The Birth Revisited* contains an entire chapter outlining the presence of "transfer" thinking in Zionism before 1948. In 1948, Zionist leaders understood that they would never achieve a Jewish state with the bare majority that the UN partition boundaries had provided them.⁴³ Ultimately, through this research, Morris came to understand the choice that Zionist leaders were facing in 1948 and he had to make a choice of his own: "Either the dream of establishing a Jewish state in Palestine in 1948 was morally suspect and should not have been pursued; or the dream was so worthy that it justified the necessary means."⁴⁴

Abdel-Nour suggests that anyone who writes about 1948 must choose from a limited number of options if they want to hold "a coherent and stable position on the events of 1948."⁴⁵ In the case of Morris, his position is the only one possible "for someone like him who takes to heart the necessary connection between Zionism's goal in the 1940s and Palestinian displacement, while remaining committed to the worthiness of that goal."⁴⁶ Ultimately, Abdel-Nour argues that

⁴¹ Abdel-Nour, "From Critic to Cheerleader," 28. Abdel-Nour states that his analysis of Morris "relies on conjecture [as he has] no access to the inner workings of Morris's mind."

⁴² Ibid., 26.

⁴³ The proposed Jewish state was to have 499,000 Jews and 438,000 Arabs.

⁴⁴ Abdel-Nour, "From Critic the Cheerleader," 28.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 29.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

Morris’s conversion is understandable as someone who is accepting what the evidence tells him while still maintaining his commitment to Zionism.

Abdel-Nour suggests that Morris’s conversion is better understood in the context of the evolution of his research as opposed to the context of the breakdown of peace negotiations in 2000. He tracks the development and growth of the “inevitability thesis” in Morris’s work: this idea that the expulsion of Palestinians was inevitable if the creation of a Jewish state was to be realized.⁴⁷ In the 1987 edition of *The Birth*, Abdel-Nour identifies “a seed of that thesis”: a single paragraph where Morris states the creation of the Palestinian refugee problem was “almost inevitable.” However, Abdel-Nour argues that paragraph “does not fit in with the rest of the book’s emphasis” which stresses that the context of war was at fault for the flight of Palestinians.⁴⁸ Abdel-Nour suggests that *The Birth* contains “victims but no villains” which allows readers to identify with both Palestinians without criticizing Jewish forces or doubting the moral basis Zionism.⁴⁹

Over the next few years, Morris’s research only strengthened the inevitability thesis in his work while weakening his claims that Palestinians became refugees because of the war itself. As he uncovered the support that Zionist leaders had for population transfer, he could no longer argue that Israel played no organized role in the expulsion of Palestinians. Abdel-Nour notes that “with the evidence about the centrality of the idea of transfer in the thinking of Zionist military and political leaders in the 1930s and 1940s came also the reasoning that attracted them to it.”⁵⁰ Abdel-Nour cites Morris’s *Righteous Victims*, published in 1999, where Morris addresses the demographic problems facing Zionist leaders who knew a Jewish state could never be achieved while they remained a minority. Jewish immigration would not be enough, “Palestine would not be transformed into a Jewish state unless all or much of the Arab population was expelled.”⁵¹

⁴⁷ Abdel-Nour, “From Critic the Cheerleader,” 30.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 29.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 30.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 32.

⁵¹ Benny Morris, *Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-1999*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999), 658.

Ultimately, Abdel-Nour identifies three commitments that “anyone who wishes to adopt a coherent and stable position towards the events of 1948 must confront.”⁵² However, one cannot commit to them all, if one commits to two, he or she must reject the third:

The first is a commitment to considering the Palestinians who were alive in 1948 worthy of being treated as moral equals and not merely as means to others’ ends. The second is a commitment to the worthiness of the dream of realising Jewish self-determination by establishing a Jewish state in Palestine in 1948. The third is a commitment to facing head-on the judgment on which the historical record seems to converge: that the dream of establishing a Jewish state in Palestine at the time could have only been realised by means of Palestinian displacement.⁵³

Once Morris accepted that an Israeli state could never have been achieved without the expulsion of Palestinians in 1948, he had to either reject the morality of the Zionist dream or “endorse in retrospect the notion that it was proper to sacrifice Palestinians’ rights and interests for the sake of that dream’s realization.”⁵⁴

Conclusions

Morality is intrinsically wound up in the history of 1948 and it is foolish to try to argue otherwise. However, morality has consequences for how the history is understood. This is especially true in the case of the history of 1948. Benny Morris’s conversion was a public one, with his interview and the following debate appearing in prominent Israeli and western newspapers. However, despite Morris’s political beliefs and moral evaluations, he is still a good historian who remained committed to expressing the evidence he found in the sources. He has been instrumental in bringing to light many atrocities committed by Jewish forces in 1948 and has made a convincing

⁵² Morris, *Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-1999*, 38.

⁵³ Ibid.,

⁵⁴ Ibid.,

argument for the role Zionist leaders played in the expulsion of Palestinians.

How does one reconcile these two things? Benny Morris cannot simply be discredited as a historian, pushed aside, and easily forgotten. *The Birth Revisited* is a 600-page volume filled with a detailed account of the 1948 war and the expulsion of Palestinians and is a significant contribution to the historiography of 1948. If I were to argue that morality has no place in history, where does that put historians who take opposite moral stances, like Ilan Pappé? Or, how could a historian talk about the Holocaust with any authority without commenting on the immorality of genocide?

Ultimately, I cannot argue that Benny Morris is a bad historian. In addition, as argued by Abdel-Nour, his conversion cannot be directly attributed to a flawed understanding of the failure of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. However, those who read Benny Morris’s work must recognize his ideological standpoint and why he says what he does. Morris’s historical work must be understood based on his dual commitment to Zionism and his commitment to being a respectable historian.

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The Peoples' War: Three Oral Histories of the British Army in Northern Ireland

KATE RIORDON

In the late 1960s violence broke out on the city streets of Northern Ireland – a reaction to politically charged and religiously influenced tensions that had been building in the country for centuries. This paper, based on research of the popular history and supplemented by interviews conducted with veterans who served during “the Troubles,” explores the more personal side of the conflict. It discusses both the soldiers’ experiences as well as how the presence of the British Army affected the lives of the local Irish for both better and worse. Through the interviews, first-hand accounts serve to explain how a modern country with a reputation for joviality and amity spent decades in a civil war — a civil war that would determine Ireland’s standing as a country. Above all, this paper strives to understand how the cultural, political, and religious natures of Northern Ireland affected and continue to influence the people today.

The political and religious nature of Northern Ireland has a long and complicated history spanning centuries and remains an on-going issue. The outbreak of “the Troubles” in the late 1960s was a violent and dramatic segment of that history which caught the attention of the world. This relationship between society and religious orientation within the Christian faith has had a way of creating irreparable rifts among the population. However, despite this internal strife, the Irish people have also garnered a reputation for being welcoming hosts eager to share “a story and a pint” with anyone willing to listen. This contrast fostered feelings of frustration, confusion, and stress for the soldiers serving in the British Army during the height of the Troubles in the 1970s and 1980s.

These experiences will be explored via three interviews with men who served, in various positions, with the British Army in Northern Ireland. I met these men through a seminar class at the University of Victoria in the spring of 2016; the object of this course was to provide students with the opportunity to play an active role in the collection and preservation of military history. The first man I met with, Lieutenant-Colonel Don Stedeford, comes from a long heritage of Scottish soldiers. In Ireland he served as a private with the 33 Independent Field Squadron of the Royal Engineers and with the Intelligence Corps – when I met him, he was just weeks away from retirement. Colonel Peter Green was an English doctor who joined the

army as a student and served in both the British and Canadian Armies before retiring. He served during the early stages of the Troubles as a captain with the 7th Armoured Division, and was also his battalion's doctor. Finally, I met Major Richard Eaton, the only one of the three who was born a Canadian. He joined the British Army early in his career and served during the last years of the Troubles in an officer-level position with the 1 Parachute Regiment, before returning to Canada- where he now serves in the Canadian Army. In these interviews, there are overarching themes that were repeatedly expressed by each of these men, regardless of their varied backgrounds and the times during which they served. Going beyond the popular histories written about this conflict (which often focus on the political and religious aspects) these interviews help to shed light on teamwork among the British soldiers, interaction with the Irish people, and above all, how in this conflict there was no clear enemy, and therefore no straightforward solution. Yet from these interviews it is clear that the soldiers who served in Northern Ireland left knowing they were successfully able to reduce their military's involvement, allowing the Irish to find their own solutions.

Going into these interviews I realized I had a bias that would not be easily overcome: the entirety of my family heritage is Irish and I have grown up learning how the British in Northern Ireland were supposedly "the enemy." However, I have never garnered any ill-will towards the British; knowing that all three of these veterans also served in the Canadian Army¹ helped me to build an understanding with them. Yet in a conflict like this, driven by terrorist action on one side and politically motivated intervention on the other, it was crucial for me to put aside feelings of unease and thus focus on the individual experiences these men had. These interviews use the popular history of politics and religion as a backdrop in order to expose the conflict in Northern Ireland as one of a far more personal nature.

¹ After their service in the British Army, both Green and Stedeford transferred to the Canadian Army, where they remained until retirement. Eaton was born in Canada and started his military career with the British before joining the Canadian Army (where he remains part-time).

Meeting Don Stedeford, the first on my list of interviewees, came with a lot of “firsts:” with him living in Nanaimo, and my being without a car, it was the first time I got to take a Greyhound bus anywhere on Vancouver Island. Stedeford lives in a beautiful home overlooking the water, and from the squishy couches of his living room I asked and he answered the questions of the first interview either of us had ever done. His Scottish accent has softened during his years in Canada, but there is still enough of a lilt to lend a certain charm to the things he had to say about the Troubles. A few days later I met Peter Green, not at his home (as was the plan) but rather while walking down the road to his house, making sure I would find the right place. Looking quite like Mr. Rogers in his red sweater, Green pulled no punches – he painted a frank picture of the best and worst parts of his experiences as the battalion doctor in Belfast during the early years of the conflict. When all avenues of discussion had been exhausted and the recorder turned off, Green walked me through his collection of photos from Northern Ireland and even gave me some – plus a few homemade cookies – as a parting gift. Then on a brilliantly sunny March afternoon I met the third of my interviewees, Major Richard Eaton, eleven storeys above downtown Victoria in the office of his consulting business. Eaton is the youngest of the men I talked to and as such served in Northern Ireland towards the tail end of the conflict; still involved in the Canadian military, he spoke with the straightforwardness and clarity one might expect from a soldier. With a rather sharp wit, Eaton talked at length about the situation he experienced in Northern Ireland regarding the kinds of people he interacted with, civilian or otherwise. Above all else he was proud of what they were able to accomplish during that time and, most importantly, he was proud of the people behind those accomplishments.

Once the interviews had been completed, there was the task of summing up the main topics of discussion, time-stamping everything, and making sure the recordings themselves were clear and understandable. With everything in place, it was time to hand all of it over to the University so that it could be added to the Archive’s online database. The content of the interviews, and the men who shared their experiences, provide a focused and unique interpretation of a conflict that spanned decades and was driven by the complexities of a modern nation. They did not offer solutions to any of the problems presented, but did explore how those problems were manifested, and how they continue to be influential today.

The Troubles officially began in August of 1969 when tensions that had been building in the province of Ulster² broke out on the streets of Londonderry (known as Free Derry to Catholics)³ and Belfast. Catholic factions of the population that had felt suppressed by the British government rebelled violently within the predominantly Protestant neighbourhoods of these cities, causing an immediate and equally violent reaction – over the course of a single night the province had devolved into chaos.⁴ When the dust settled in the morning the situation was dire; British troops immediately flooded both cities, and would remain there as a buffer between the Protestants and the Catholics for the next twenty-seven years.⁵

Ireland, along with the rest of the British Isles, converted to Catholicism sometime in the 4th-5th century. This religion quickly became an important part of Gaelic culture. Since the English and the Irish retained their own distinct social and political structures, Catholicism was the only similarity shared by the two islands for centuries.⁶ However, later development of the Anglican Church and English colonization of Ireland caused rifts amongst the Irish.⁷ What developed over the following centuries were social, political, and religious differences so intense that the British-loyal north and the Irish independent south cut themselves off from each other in the early 20th century, to bring some kind of relief to the civil strife. In 1924 a border was officially laid, creating Northern Ireland as a province of the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland as an independent state in

² Six counties out of nine now composing the region of Northern Ireland.

³ The two names are both recognized by the city in order to ease tension still felt between the Catholic and Protestant neighbourhoods. Using the “wrong” name or listing them in the “wrong” order can still incite anger some among the local populace.

⁴ Charles Allen, *The Savage Wars of Peace: Soldiers’ Voices 1945-1989* (London: Futura Publications, 1991), 205.

⁵ Michael Dewar, *The British Army in Northern Ireland* (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1985), 33.

⁶ S.J. Connolly, *Contested Island: Ireland 1460-1630* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 17.

⁷ Bob Rowthorn and Naomi Wayne, *Northern Ireland: The Political Economy of Conflict* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988), 17-18.

the south.⁸ The new Republic retained its traditional Catholicism while in the north the majority adhered to Protestantism. Despite this division, minority populations continued to exist on both sides, and it was among radical Catholics in the north where the first signs of aggression broke out.⁹

When the British Army first arrived in Northern Ireland, Catholics welcomed them warmly, viewing them as saviours who would defend them against the Protestants.¹⁰ But it was not long before these sentiments changed, as the Army came to be viewed as a force for the *status quo*: it quickly became the opinion of both sides of the divide that if the British Army was not actively against their enemy, they were with the enemy.¹¹ Indeed, this added to the frustrations of the British Army, for there was no significant difference between an Irish Catholic and an Irish Protestant beyond their personal faith. The British Army thought the difference of religion alone was not a rational motivating factor for the kind of civil terrorism they were there to prevent.¹²

When Peter Green first arrived in Belfast in the autumn of 1971 as a captain in the Medical Corps he witnessed firsthand just how quickly local attitudes could turn against the British. At this point the 7th Armoured Division had already served one tour in Belfast and had enjoyed the hospitality of the locals; but in the brief time between their tours the situation had changed so much that the reactions they received upon their return caused a shock, taking almost a month to recover from.¹³ This was not unique to the 7th Armoured Division: in the popular histories mention is usually made of the initially kind reception, such as being brought tea and cookies by the ladies. The shock was that this had such an abrupt end, rendering British soldiers pariahs virtually overnight.¹⁴ News about day-to-day developments in Northern Ireland was sparse in these early days of the conflict. Inevitably, there were headlines on television and the radio about the

⁸ Dewar, *British Army*, 17.

⁹ Roger H. Hull, *The Irish Triangle: Conflict in Northern Ireland* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 41.

¹⁰ Allen, *Savage Wars*, 205.

¹¹ Hull, *Irish Triangle*, 58.

¹² Major Richard Eaton, interviewed by Kate Riordon, March 8 2016, Victoria, 10:00.

¹³ Colonel Peter Green, interviewed by Kate Riordon, February 25 2016, Cordova Bay, 8:03.

¹⁴ Allen, *Savage Wars*, 209-210.

most important, eye-catching topics, but these kinds of reports did not prepare soldiers for the reactions they would receive from the populace.¹⁵ The level of importance the Irish placed on the religious aspect of the conflict scarcely entered British media and was of little concern to the Army; a terrorist was a terrorist regardless of his faith.¹⁶ As such, since cultural awareness was absent from British preparations, and since soldiers encountered hostility where they had previously been welcomed, it made a harsh impression on them. Green commented at one point: generals can only prepare for the previous war, just as these battalions could only prepare for their previous experience.¹⁷ These soldiers were not prepared for the hostile reception they received.

In early 1972 the government declared a policy of internment without cause, giving the military free reign to arrest and detain anyone that they deemed to be a threat to the safety of the civilians. This was (quite understandably) not well-received by the locals as very few of them were ever actually involved with terrorist cells. Young men were typically the ones targeted by soldiers; in the wake of internment anyone walking the streets could be subjected to a random search.¹⁸ Groups like the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) were a huge cause for concern as they favoured things like high-powered explosives and shootings in cities, where they could cause maximum effect. It was the goal of groups like this to cause so much unrest that the government in London would view the situation as a lost cause, pull their troops out, and leave the Irish to establish their own governmental systems. Of course, by this time Britain was already very heavily involved in the situation and was not going to simply abandon the civilians of Northern Ireland.¹⁹ In an attempt to get ahead of the situation, the British Intelligence Corps began gathering information on all potential aggressors as a preventative measure against further

¹⁵ Allen, *Savage Wars*, 213.

¹⁶ Lieutenant-Colonel Don Stedeford, interviewed by Kate Riordon, February 20 2016, Nanaimo BC, 5:25 (3REC).

¹⁷ Colonel Green, 10:00.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 17:30.

¹⁹ Hull, *The Irish Triangle*, 58.

violence. The priority, as the British government saw it, was to prevent those they saw as their own citizens from causing further harm.²⁰

While on his third tour in the area of South Armagh with the 1st Parachute Regiment in 1988, Richard Eaton came into very close contact with some of the most violent terrorist cells. Having been largely forced out of the cities and into the countryside, these groups made it their mission to eliminate the local police force, and when the army prevented this, the terrorists would attack soldiers. The best thing that the British Army could do for Irish civilians by that time was to help bring about independent stability by re-establishing local police strength to the point where the soldiers were no longer needed.²¹ The aim of the British government was to move the issues in Northern Ireland away from the military and into the political realm. Around this same time many nationalist groups in the cities came together in organized political parties that could stand in a position to deal directly with London. Leaders in both Ireland and Britain were beginning to realize that a military victory was not achievable, and negotiations began.²² This was all well and good for the future of the country, but until that time, the men on the ground would face far more serious challenges.

Of course, existing alongside the violent factions of the population was everyone else: Irish civilians who wanted nothing more than to live their daily lives in peace. From the outset of British involvement in Northern Ireland the primary and overarching objective was to make sure that they would be able to do just that.²³ Within that capacity, the British Army sent in specialists in various capacities that would be able to work far more closely with locals than the soldiers in uniform could. Don Stedeford was able to interact with the people of Lisburn²⁴ while serving tours both as part of a uniformed group and with the Intelligence Corps. During his first tour with the 33 Independent Field Squadron, of the Royal Engineers, he talked a lot

²⁰ Rowthorn and Wayne, *Northern Ireland*, 53.

²¹ Major Richard Eaton, 15:55.

²² Jim Smyth, "Dropping Slow: The Emergence of the Irish Peace Process," in *Political Violence in Northern Ireland: Conflict and Conflict Resolution*, ed. Alan O'Day (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 1997), 76.

²³ Joseph Ruane and Jennifer Todd, *The Dynamics of Conflict in Northern Ireland: Power, Conflict and Emancipation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 129.

²⁴ Southwest of Belfast.

about being able to go out on the “local economy:” visiting bars to find the best Guinness and playing soccer.²⁵ Although the soldiers were able to hold amicable relations with the people around them – of course, always dependent on the official threat level in the area – there were precautions that had to be taken into consideration:

You had to be very careful about what kind of bar you went to... The whole Troubles was based on sectarian issues and race, or *racism*, so you would not go to some bars where they were either staunchly Catholic or staunchly Protestant and where you’d get in trouble in a heartbeat.²⁶

This continues to hold true for Ireland even today; while it may not illicit the same kind of reactions from the “offended” party, failure to acknowledge the religion of a certain area can result in an extreme amount of discomfort for any foreigner.

In his work with the Royal Engineers, Stedeford came into contact with the more aggressive side of the population as much as the peaceful one. One of his responsibilities involved the construction of “site screens,” a corrugated metal defense around military bases. These screens had to be constructed on site, which meant building it up above street level to the point where the soldiers putting them up could become the target of enemy snipers. While there were patrol teams in the blocks around where the screens were going up, providing cover to the soldiers, there was always the potential for danger. Soldiers would erect the skeleton and then rivet the metal sheeting into place:

And you’d think, ‘Did I drill that hole? I didn’t drill that hole.’ Because all you hear is *ting* as the hole appears and then you hear the weapon report, if you hear it at all, later. And you’d realize somebody’s actually, you know, having a go at you. So you wanna do those things as quick as you can.²⁷

²⁵ Lieutenant-Colonel Don Stedeford, 25:25.

²⁶ Ibid., 5:19.

²⁷ Ibid., 15:59 (2REC).

All of the men that I spoke to had stories about times when they came under fire, and while narratives along this stream are not hard to find in the popular histories, what is more often than not left out is the feeling of *safety* within a team. Both Eaton and Green deployed to Northern Ireland as part of an established battalion that trained together beforehand; Stedeford deployed as an individual and was placed with a battalion once there. What is important to remember when looking at a conflict like the one in Northern Ireland is that there was no clear indication of who the enemy was; in fact, the entire concept of “the enemy” was fluid and subject to rapid change. One faction wanted a unified and totally independent Ireland, another wanted a unified Ireland that existed as part of the United Kingdom, and the British Army wanted to keep everyone from tearing each other to pieces.²⁸ Within a conflict so divided it was crucial for the British soldiers to work together as a cohesive and solid team.

Green talked fondly about his battalion, the 1st Battalion Green Howards, and how they were a quintessential British force: a group with tradition. The men who served in this battalion all came from the same part of southern England, so they all had the same accents and had gone through years of training together. Like so many other well-trained armies, service in demanding and stressful situations built trust and made them an effective force.²⁹ Through Green’s position as the battalion’s doctor he had a bit more contact with other companies, and shows that his idea of the Green Howards proved applicable to most other British regiments.³⁰

Eaton served in theatre at an officer level and often spoke of the importance of leading his company by example; inspiring the men around him to be the most effective soldiers they could be. He commented that this was a huge responsibility, but it brought immense satisfaction when the hard work put into a plan paid off.³¹ He stressed the importance of breaking habits, especially while on patrol, so as to remain an unpredictable target for their opponents. He even joked about his men’s reactions:

As an Officer it was my job to break up peoples’ habits. I used to call it Screw People Around, which [ticked] them off; they would come in

²⁸ Hull, *Irish Triangle*, 70.

²⁹ Colonel Green, 41:38.

³⁰ Ibid., 43:35.

³¹ Major Eaton, 27:45.

after a patrol and I'd go, "No, no, you're going out again for 20 minutes, go back out." [Which would be met with grumbles.] 'I don't care! Get out.' Because that would break up our habits and our routines and throw the terrorists off. [The terrorists'] aim was not to die a hero, it was to be effective and get away.³²

Green had a similar method of dealing with habits, but in a way that came off as a kind of "sixth sense" to his men. The patrols that he would do around Belfast were in armoured ambulances with armed rovers for protection; the front seat beside the driver was the one typically occupied by an officer and would therefore often be the target of attacks, so no one wanted to sit there. Green would sit in the back with the others. However, after a while he would tell the driver to take them down a different route, because he no longer felt comfortable stopping at a particular stop sign or going through a particular intersection. So they would take new routes for their patrols, and usually within the next couple days there would be a report about how another patrol was attacked while stopped at that same stop sign or intersection.³³

Considering that there was about ten to fifteen years' difference between when Green and Eaton served, it stands as a prime example of how well the British Army was able to adapt to the situation and make sure that further along in the conflict their men were as well-prepared as possible. What may have started as intuition in the 1970s became standard procedure, as per Eaton, a decade later. Even though the Northern Ireland conflict is commonly referred to as a political struggle between Parliament in London and the nationalist groups in Northern Ireland, the reality was that this was a guerrilla war waged on the streets of a modern country.

The Troubles stemmed in part from Ireland's relationship with Britain; the latter was not able to comprehend this conflict politically because they did not completely understand the former's mentality regarding national identity. Ireland had been subject to the colonial process exercised elsewhere in the British Empire but, as Joseph Ruane and Jennifer Todd explain,

³² Major Eaton, 23:14.

³³ Colonel Green, 35:00.

Irish differences always appeared – to the British at least – less inevitable and more reconcilable than those of the other colonies... [the line of thought was] Irish instability would run its course and the greater part of the island would secede. But, in hindsight, Irish secession appears less inevitable than that of the rest of the empire.³⁴

As the three veterans I interviewed often commented, there really was not much difference between the Irish and the rest of Great Britain other than how the Irish viewed their situation. In such a modern world, one where the British Empire is diminished, it makes sense that some Irish would also want total independence, while the British would fight to protect people they saw as part of Great Britain from violent radicals.

Everyone involved in the Troubles had their own reasons for being there: be it nationalism, colonialism, protection, or otherwise. One thing that Stedeford pointed out was that in Northern Ireland, Britain was not the only major influence. America has had long historical ties with Ireland and in the 1970s the issues across the Atlantic looked a lot like those they had seen in Vietnam. Stedeford commented that from a British standpoint, it looked like the Americans thought what was going on in Northern Ireland was a revolution; the downtrodden people were going to throw off their oppressor's yoke. This manifested itself in huge amounts of funding being provided to groups like PIRA, only serving to make the situation worse by adding more explosives, more guns, and more casualties.³⁵ And yet despite the rampant danger, people were largely able to go about their normal lives. By the time Eaton served in the late 1980s the situation had reached a whole new level of abnormality:

I was astonished at the extent to which most people didn't really know what was going on. I remember stopping and searching some cars and [this guy] said, 'What's the Army doing here?' And we were like, 'uh, you heard about the Troubles?' [laughs] It was amazing; to the extent that our operations were going on, we didn't have much impact on peoples' regular lives, which was great.³⁶

³⁴ Ruane and Todd, *Dynamics of Conflict*, 213.

³⁵ Lieutenant-Colonel Stedeford, 1:04 (3REC).

³⁶ Major Eaton, 39:14.

The ultimate goal was to be able to leave Northern Ireland in a situation where it would be able to take care of itself. By the early 1990s much of the actual fighting had stopped, though there were still army patrols around the country to help keep a lid on the lingering militant groups. However, much of the conflict had moved into the political sphere: outspoken Irish nationalist figures had joined established political parties and talks began with London about putting the situation to rest. For many who had served in the army this was fantastic: the action was moving away from military involvement. The Troubles had been going on for so long they had created a reality where something horrible like a bomb going off in London could be traced back to Ireland, and that was not how the Irish people wanted to be seen by the world.³⁷

The Irish and the British had reached a place where neither side could advance their cause any further. They were tired of the constant threat of violence and the presence of British soldiers on Irish streets. As with all compromise, no one was able to walk away from the 1992-94 peace discussions with the specific results that they wanted, but they were able to end the worst of it and begin working on ways to peacefully coexist.³⁸

It was interesting to hear the opinions of these three men on the situation in Northern Ireland since the Downing Street Documents of 1994. As per Don Stedeford:

You've got quite a bit of tourism there now... using the Troubles as a backdrop. 'Come and see the Shankill and the Fall's Road and look at all the paintings on the walls and things.' That's just a reminder to me of, I think, the worst in people.³⁹

Stedeford is not of the opinion that the Troubles are being remembered in the most appropriate way; instead of using them as a cautionary tale, they are being glorified, used to draw tourists into the country. Peter

³⁷ Ibid., 40:05.

³⁸ Paul Bew, "Making Peace Work," in *Political Violence in Northern Ireland: Conflict and Conflict Resolution*, ed. Alan O'Day (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1997), 98-99.

³⁹ Lieutenant-Colonel Stedeford, 8:21 (3REC).

Green is of a similar mind, alluding to the idea that the way in which the Troubles are being remembered is preventing Ireland from finding a more inclusive solution to their cultural differences.⁴⁰

For my own part, having been to Belfast and Londonderry, and having seen the paintings and the walls and noticing the political atmosphere that still permeates the country, I can understand why these men feel this way. Ireland is a beautiful country filled with people who are genuinely happy to talk to foreigners and share their stories (“Most Irishmen are instant historians”⁴¹), but there is always a tension just below the surface.

When remembering the events and the issues involved in the Troubles it is important to always bear in mind that this was a multi-faceted conflict that involved so much more than just the British Army and Irish terrorists. The accounts of these veterans show a far more well-rounded view of what it was like in the streets of Northern Ireland than many popular histories that focus on just the political aspect or singular events that survive in collective memory. They show that this conflict is not one that is easily understood. Interviews and popular histories together prove that there were far more important aspects of the conflict than just the actions of terrorists and the reactions of respective governments.

The British Army was able to go into a situation where the sentiments of the people they were protecting could change in an afternoon, and while it may have been difficult for individuals to cope with initially, it made the British Army an extremely effective fighting force. With a reduced likelihood of finding sympathy among the civilian population around them, British soldiers had to depend on each other more than ever. The lack of a clearly defined opponent which did not operate by the conventional rules of war, created the need for a far more individualized approach to warfare. These British soldiers were able to leave Northern Ireland in a place where military intervention was no longer required by not allowing themselves to get tangled up in religious and political conflict.

⁴⁰ Colonel Green, 56:44.

⁴¹ Dewar, *British Army*, 11.

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A Note from the Editors:

In selecting the final papers for the 2017 Edition of the *Corvette*, the editorial team was uncertain whether to devote a considerable portion of the journal to two essays each on a landmark indigenous rights case: *Calder v. British Columbia* and *R v. Gladstone*. After some discussion, we came to see this as an opportunity to form a dialogue that would study the changes in the relationship between the Canadian legal system and indigenous rights over the last decades. We thought these topics particularly relevant to contemporary issues. Each of these authors has wrestled with the implications of colonialism in Canada; we have truly enjoyed working with them to craft this conversation.

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The Calder Case: Setting A Precedent for Indigenous Canadian Constitutional Relations

SEAMUS McCONVILLE

Indigenous-State Relations around land claims in Canada have been an area of significant debate throughout the past fifty years. Often, the land claims process that the Indigenous nations had to work through was one that was not conducive to a proper settlement. In the case of the Nisga'a and their land claims case during the 1970s, the Nation challenged the system that had held them from asserting their sovereignty, providing a way for the Nisga'a and other Indigenous nations to not only sign treaties, but assert their own rights as well. This landmark case ultimately saw the Nisga'a utilize their oral histories to prove their occupancy on the lands, helping invalidate the state's claim that the lands had been empty prior to the arrival of settlers in the 19th century.

The 1973 court case of *Calder et al. v. Attorney General of British Columbia* was a landmark case for Indigenous peoples in Canada, as it challenged the Canadian Constitution and the structure that defined how First Nations land claims were administered. In this case, the Nisga'a addressed positions related to the use of the land and the lack of a treaty, in order to reassert their determination for sovereignty over their territories. The Nisga'a faced many hurdles as part of this claim, with the limitations of the Canadian Constitution, as well as language and precedents of the legal system providing a challenging battle. From the results of the Calder Case, the Nisga'a were able to assert their rights to their land, and ultimately pave the way for a treaty between the Nisga'a Nation and Canada in the 1990s. While the Nisga'a suffered an initial defeat in 1973 by way of a technicality in this case, the ripples that resulted from the Calder trial would have an effect on Canadian-First Nations relations for years to come.

The Calder Case was based on a historical issue of the status of Nisga'a Land. In the eyes of the British Columbian Government, the lands that the Nisga'a had resided upon had been automatically ceded

to the settlers upon their arrival in the Nisga'a Territories.¹ For the Nisga'a, this issue of residence was the core of their case, to prove that their title to the land was one that had not been extinguished and their claim to the land still stood due to the lack of any formal agreements.² Many years of debate and discussion between various levels of Government and the Nisga'a Nation often led to stalemate and deadlock, with no acceptable settlement presenting itself. In 1969, Chief Frank Calder³ of the Nisga'a Nation launched a court action to confirm that the Nisga'a still were in control of their land. The heart of the argument presented by Calder was that the Nisga'a Nation still had a standing, unextinguished aboriginal right to the lands that had been seized by the Canadian Government.⁴ Calder's belief was that since the rights had not been extinguished under treaty, the lands were still Nisga'a territory and therefore a treaty was required if the Crown was to gain control of the territory. The main thrust of the Nisga'a argument was their claim of legal ownership to the land that stemmed from time immemorial. This idea suggests that from this prior occupancy, the Nisga'a were still in control of their lands especially due to the fact that a treaty had never been signed.⁵ With this argument relying heavily on their oral histories to prove their claim, the Nisga'a were moving boldly into an uncertain part of the land claims process. Despite having the initial claim denied, the Calder decision ultimately helped the Nisga'a Nation bring the two levels of Government together in order to negotiate a treaty between the Nisga'a and the rest of Canada.

While the majority of the Calder Case would be considered a victory for the Nisga'a, the fact that this lawsuit was rejected

¹ J.R Miller, *Compact, Contract, Covenant: Aboriginal Treaty Making in Canada*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009), 251.

² The Nisga'a Territories referenced in the paper refer to the areas north of Terrace, B.C., known as the Nass Valley. This territory follows the Nass river, from the Pacific Coast to the Kispiox River east of Terrace.

³ Chief Frank Calder was a Nisga'a Chief, but was also, at the time of the *Calder Case* the MLA in the British Columbia Legislature for the Bulkey-Stikine Riding, where the Nass Homelands were located. He was the person who took the lead for the Nisga'a in the case.

⁴ Michael Asch, "From Calder to Van der Peet: Aboriginal Rights and Canadian Law, 1973-96," in *Indigenous Peoples Rights in Australia, Canada and New Zealand*, ed. Paul Haveman (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1999), 430.

⁵ Miller, *Contract, Compact, Contract, Covenant*, 255.

demonstrated one of the major issues that faced First Nations looking for a legal settlement in Canada. When the final ruling on the case was delivered, three judges had decided in favour of the Nisga'a, with three pronouncing against, while one other judge had ruled against the Nisga'a due to a technicality in the process.⁶ The judges who had ruled against the Nisga'a were of the belief that any Nisga'a rights to the land had been extinguished upon colonization and Confederation.⁷ This did not align with Nisga'a beliefs, which were still strongly rooted to the idea that the land had never left their ownership. The courts made this assumption as a result of ambiguity in the British North America Act (BNA Act.) The Act did not allow for any protections for First Nations and their sovereignty; to provide for such protection the Canadian Government would have required the consent of the affected peoples in order to proceed with their actions.⁸ With the courts considering the precedents from the BNA Act, the Nisga'a claim in the 1973 case was rejected. The act suggested that if a First Nation was to have its sovereignty protected, it would more than likely need a treaty with the Federal Government. This did not account for how the Federal Government applied its power post Confederation, as the Government of the settlers became responsible for First Nations and their territories, further stripping influence and control from them. As the powers of the BNA Act were applied after Confederation, the legitimacy of the First Nations governance structure was diminished, leaving the question of aboriginal sovereignty to be completely moot.⁹ With the Constitution of the time, there seemed to be no way for any sort of First Nations control of sovereignty, as every aspect of their existence had become dominated by the Federal Government after it had taken their lands without any sort of agreement. With the courts ultimately ruling against the Nisga'a, this should have been a resounding defeat for the Nation. From this legal setback however, a significant change to the narrative around the lands claims process would be set in motion.

⁶ Miller, *Contract, Compact, Contract, Covenant*, 255.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Patrick Macklem, *Indigenous Differences and the Constitution of Canada*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001), 115.

⁹ Macklem, *Indigenous Differences and the Constitution of Canada*, 115.

While the Calder decision did reset the precedent of the land claims process, one of the unique challenges was that it came before the arrival of the 1982 Constitution Act. As part of the legislation that made up the act, the Canadian Government made it clear that it intended on affirming and recognizing Aboriginal and Treaty rights.¹⁰ For the Calder decision, this affirmation came nine years too late to be codified into the Canadian Constitution, with the introduction of the Constitution being the first time the Federal Government made such an assertion.¹¹ The Supreme Court, in its 1973 ruling agreed that the Nisga'a had that inherent right to their land- since there had been no treaty. This ran counter to previous interpretations of the Constitution, which did not confirm that the Indigenous peoples of Canada had title to those lands. In some cases, First Nations in Canada saw their lands fall under the control of the crown despite the lack of a treaty, but would have some use of the land granted to them via an easement provided by the crown.¹² For many First Nations in Canada, this provided an easier approach to negotiate a potential land claim. While this was true in many cases in the eastern part of the Country, in British Columbia, Governor James Douglas's method of working with the First Nations saw a slightly different process in place. With Douglas's approach, First Nations in B.C. were afforded the same rights, including the pre-emption of those tracts that were vacant Crown land.¹³ In a roundabout way, the B.C. Government did recognize for a brief moment that the Nisga'a could utilize and claim their lands for homesteads and settlement, but did not acknowledge that the Nisga'a were in control of their lands. In the eyes of the Crown, those members of the Nisga'a Nation had ceased to be an independent member of that nation, and instead were considered to be just another group of colonial citizens who were setting up a homestead or a village. With the decision from the Calder Case, the idea of tenancy could be abolished, with the ownership of the lands being confirmed in the hands of the Nisga'a. From the point of view of the court, that ownership of lands was bundled in with common law rights due to that possession of the

¹⁰ Peter H. Russell, *Constitutional Odyssey: Can Canadians Become a Sovereign People?*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012), 262.

¹¹ Tom Molly and Donald B. Ward, *The World is Our Witness: The Historic Journey of the Nisga'a into Canada*, (Calgary: Fifth House Press 2000), 118.

¹² Tom Flanagan, *First Nations, Second Thoughts?* (Montreal: McGill: Queens University Press, 2000), 123.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 124.

land since time immemorial.¹⁴ With these two developments, it appears that accommodation for First Nations and their rights did exist in the framework, but would conflict with the Federal Government's goal of assimilation that had been present from the very beginning of contact with the Nisga'a.

The directions the state took in order to reach a land and title conclusion were also challenged as a result of Calder. The Nisga'a relied heavily upon oral traditions and histories to prove their accounts of land ownership throughout their case, a connection that the settlers who had arrived in the 19th century would not have experienced in their short time on Nisga'a land.¹⁵ While aboriginal right is something that has emerged as a result of the courts' translation, this particular piece of testimony was something that challenged the assumptions that the state had set forward. The Nisga'a claim focused on oral traditions which had been passed down from generation to generation, making for a record which the courts had trouble translating into the settler system.¹⁶ Looking at how this intersects with the aboriginal rights assertion is interesting, as the case suggests that the Nisga'a had a right to claim traditional use of the land, but less of a claim of ownership to the land. By examining this theme, a further case could be made that the Canadian Government had failed in its obligation when considering the status of Indigenous peoples. In the 1990s, a lawyer named Bruce Clark claimed that the Canadian Government had systematically ignored its own rules, which were based in the Royal Proclamation, when dealing with First Nation's lands, a situation that he stated led to an occupation of Canada's First Nation's lands.¹⁷ The lack of sanction for this occupation is something that kept appearing, with the language constantly focused on the fact that the Nisga'a had a right to the land, and not just a claim to it due to that ignorance of oral tradition.

¹⁴ Macklem, *Indigenous Differences and the Constitution of Canada*, 268.

¹⁵ Lorraine Weir, "'Time Immemorial' and Indigenous Rights: A Genealogy and Three Case Studies (Calder, Van Der Peet, Tsilhqot'in) from British Columbia," in *Journal of Historical Sociology* 26, No.3 (September 2013), 394.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Greg Poelzer and Kenneth Coates, *From Treaty Peoples to Treaty Nation: A Road Map For All Canadians*, (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2015), 86.

With the Calder Case, evidence supporting the Nisga'a claim brought to attention the approach towards land use before colonization. For the Nisga'a, there was no real aspect of owning land in the sense of holding title. Instead, the Nisga'a team argued that since parts of the valley were designated for village sites and food gathering, it demonstrated that there was a firm plan of use for the area.¹⁸ This argument would naturally challenge how the court saw title being held, with the accounts of the traditional use of the land by the Nisga'a being used to prove that this was indeed their territory. For the court, this proved problematic as there had been limited precedent delivered for a land claim set in the rights to the use of the land. This acknowledgement did not come until much later, after the Calder Case had been settled, conveyed as part of the Van der Peet case of 1990. Here, the Crown had an opportunity to analyze the 1982 addendum to the Constitution, where upholding Aboriginal rights was codified. In this case, the Supreme Court determined that the protection of Aboriginal rights involved protecting aboriginality, including activities that occurred on their lands.¹⁹ For the Calder Case, this was the piece that had been missing; the definition of aboriginality had not been determined at this point, and the protections of the Canadian Constitution would not be brought into effect until 1982. This idea of Aboriginal Rights continued to haunt the Canadian Government's constitutional dealings, as well as the pursuit of a treaty by the Nisga'a until well after the Calder Case had been settled and the Constitution repatriated. In the *Sparrow Case* of the 1990s, it became clear that past British Columbian Governments had often made policy that affected the Nisga'a, even though Aboriginal rights had been infringed upon without a valid public policy reason, a determination that was transmitted through this particular case.²⁰ This idea of infringement was something that had been brought to the foreground after 1982. In the context of the Calder Case, the Nisga'a argument stated that their rights to use the land for their own practice were being infringed upon due to the state's inability to create a treaty. From that argument, the concept of land use was something that was now considered a First Nation right.

¹⁸ Molloy and Ward, *The World Is Our Witness*, 113.

¹⁹ Dimitrios Panagos, "The Plurality of Meanings Shouldered by the Term 'Aboriginality': a look at the Delgamuukw Case," in *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 40, no. 3, (Sept 2007): 592.

²⁰ Miller, *Compact, Contract, Covenant*, 273.

The 1982 Constitution and its reaffirmation of Aboriginal rights is something that would have pushed through the Nisga'a's case with much more ease. This declaration only came into being after the Calder Case had been settled in 1973, but it did have a tangible effect on other cases moving forward. As part of this act, rights were affirmed by identifying the Aboriginal peoples as communities with political and social infrastructure.²¹ This term would have been all encompassing, especially considering the fact that the Indigenous nations all had their own social infrastructure, as well as governance systems in place pre-contact. During the Calder Case, the structures used by the Nisga'a's related to their own governance were brought into question quite frequently. The Calder Case is an early example where the courts challenged the idea of primitive societies and overly primitive structures, ultimately embracing them as part of the perception of the right to the land.²² For First Nations across Canada, this situation was one that would be beneficial to their causes, as the courts accepted the fact that their governance structures existed before colonization. This new approach was ultimately made into Government policy at the conclusion of the Calder Case later in October 1973. Following the judicial ruling, Indian Affairs minister Jean Chrétien announced that the Canadian Government was willing to negotiate a settlement based in traditional use as a result of the precedent set by the case.²³ The arguments made by the Nisga'a were ultimately seen as strong enough, leading to the acceptance of the use of their oral histories, despite the previous affirmation that those oral traditions of First Nations were inferior to the history recorded by the settlers. The change in opinion related to oral histories gave other First Nations groups much more room to assert their rights to territory they claimed.

The Calder Case forced a major adjustment to the lands and rights claim process that Indigenous peoples in Canada had to work through. While the initial case did not succeed, it did provide the

²¹ Paul L.A.H. Chartrand, "The 'Race' for Recognition Towards a Policy of Recognition of Aboriginal Peoples in Canada," in *Aboriginal Title and Indigenous Peoples* (Vancouver: UBC Press 2010), 135.

²² Weir, "'Time Immemorial'" and Indigenous Rights," 390.

²³ Molloy and Ward, *The World Is Our Witness*, 118.

foundation for a long-term victory for the Nisga'a. The case challenged the notions laid out by the British North America Act, and confronted the Crown's right to the land that the Nisga'a held. The Nisga'a also managed to disprove the idea of *terra nullius*²⁴ and prove an indigenous existence via oral tradition, something that had been unheard of when it came to land claims in the past. It also demonstrated that the First Nations of Canada had something much more than a claim to the land, but a right to the land instead, owing to that longstanding historical connection. This protection of Aboriginal rights would ultimately be enshrined as part of the 1982 Constitution. While the Calder Case did not get the Nisga'a a settlement and treaty at the time of the court ruling, the case did help to pave the way for an eventual Nisga'a treaty, and also provided a blueprint for many other First Nations to challenge their own situations within the state in order to provide for a future where they could have greater opportunity to assert their sovereignty.

²⁴ This was the concept used by initial settlers that the lands of the Indigenous Peoples of North America were vacant upon the arrival of Europeans.

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Subsistence or Sale?: An Analysis of Historical Questions Raised in *R v. Gladstone*

AIDAN CONRAD

This paper takes an analytical look at the historical basis behind the 1996 decision of the Supreme Court of Canada to recognize that the Heiltsuk had a historic right to harvest and sale of Pacific herring. In examining the history of the Heiltsuk spawn trade the paper traces the evolution of federal fisheries legislation and its ultimate effects on the wider indigenous fishery in British Columbia. The ultimate purpose of this paper is to show how history as a tool can help bring clarity to indigenous rights and pave the way for a healthier relationship between the indigenous peoples of British Columbia and the Canadian government.

In 1988 the brothers William and Donald Gladstone, two members of the Heiltsuk community of Bella Bella British Columbia, were charged in violation of section 20(3) of the *Pacific Herring Fishery Regulations* for the attempt of sale of up to 4,200 pounds of herring spawn without a commercial licence. These charges led the Gladstone brothers to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada claiming that they had a constitutional right to the sale of herring spawn in accordance to section 35(1) as laid out in the *Constitution Act of 1982*. While the court ruled that the Heiltsuk did in fact have a right to continue a commercial herring spawn on kelp fishery it also recommended an inquiry into whether the licencing system was sufficient in allowing aboriginal fisheries to sustain themselves.¹ In coming to this ruling the presiding Justices raised many questions regarding indigenous fishing rights in relation to commercial trade in Canada. These questions required a great deal of historical analysis and would determine if the Heiltsuk had a substantial herring spawn trade prior to European contact, the importance of the herring trade to Heiltsuk society, whether this right to trade was restricted by legislation and to what effect do conservation regulations have on the Heiltsuk nation's right to control their own sustainable fisheries. In defining the historical importance of the herring to the Heiltsuk way of life the right of the Gladstone Brothers to continue their traditional harvest can be cemented. This essay will explore the answers to these

¹ Canada, Supreme Court of Canada, *R. v. Gladstone*, [1996] 2 SCR 723, 1996 CanLII 160.

questions while also emphasizing the importance of the herring spawn trade to the Heiltsuk and how legislation can not only affect the Heiltsuk fishery economically but also environmentally. Through showing the historic importance of the herring catch as not only a cultural but also as an economic mainstay of the Heiltsuk community I hope to shed further light on the historical basis of the decision made by the Supreme Court of Canada on the Gladstone appeal.

One of the central questions raised by the presiding Justices in the Gladstone Case of 1996 was whether the Heiltsuk people had a substantial herring trade before European contact and how important was this trade to the community as a whole. In attempting to determine the Heiltsuk right to fish herring it is imperative to consider that the Heiltsuk people have been harvesting herring on their traditional fishing grounds² for centuries, long before contact with European society.³ To the Heiltsuk the Pacific herring was a central aspect of their society both culturally and economically. In the early spring when the herring would come into shallow inlets and streams to spawn, communities would come together to harvest this important fish. As a result, many traditional methods developed that involved the use of either a dip net or a tool known as a “fish rake”.⁴ Aside from consuming the actual meat of the herring the native communities on the Pacific northwest including the Heiltsuk would develop a taste for herring spawn and would create a substantial fishery devoted to its collection as a result.⁵ The harvest of herring spawn would prove a convenient practice due to the fact that spawning herring would attach their fertilized eggs to seaweed or other objects found in the

² Located along the central coast of British Columbia around the communities of Bella Bella and Ocean Falls.

³ Dianne Newell, *Tangled Webs of History: Indians and the Law in Canada's Pacific Coast Fisheries*. Toronto, ON, CAN: University of Toronto Press, 1993. Accessed February 4, 2016. ProQuest ebrary. 189.

⁴ One of the more popular of these tools was the fish rake which usually consisted of a long bow of wood in which was lined with a series of bone teeth. Fishermen would paddle their canoes into schools of herring and could yield a substantial catch by simply sweeping the water with the rake.

⁵ Newell, *Tangled Webs of History: Indians and the Law in Canada's Pacific Coast Fisheries*, 189.

shallow inlets that they were spawning in. The Heiltsuk and other indigenous communities would then harvest these eggs off of the kelp and would even develop techniques that involved placing pre-set frames of wood or kelp into these inlets to collect the herring spawn.⁶ To indigenous communities on the Pacific northwest herring spawn was typically consumed on the seaweed it was harvested from and was considered a delicacy central to feasts and celebrations.⁷ To the Heiltsuk people this delicacy would be increasingly important due to the fact that feasts were central to the culture and societal structure of their communities being held on many occasions such as tombstone erections, marriages and the giving of a new name.⁸

While some of the spawn was consumed directly by the community the Heiltsuk would reserve most of the spawn for trade with other nations found on the west coast.⁹ The result would see the development of a complex trade network up and down the coast of British Columbia that would be essential to indigenous communities as it accounted for the fluctuations in the abundance of certain resources.¹⁰ Due to the fact that the strain of kelp that the herring were spawning on greatly influenced the flavour of the eggs, nations like the Heiltsuk would be able to develop a certain demand for their Herring spawn among other nations dependent on the type of kelp they used.¹¹

⁶ Newell, *Tangled Webs of History: Indians and the Law in Canada's Pacific Coast Fisheries*, 189.

⁷ Nancy J. Turner, Fikret Berkes, Janet Stephenson, and Jonathan Dick, "Blundering Intruders: Extraneous Impacts on Two Indigenous Food Systems." *Human Ecology* 41, no. 4 (2013): 566.

⁸ Martha Black, "Looking for Bella Bella: The RW Large Collection and Heiltsuk Art History." *The Canadian Journal of Native Studies* 9, no. 2 (1989): 276.

⁹ Newell, *Tangled Webs of History: Indians and the Law in Canada's Pacific Coast Fisheries*, 190.

¹⁰ Dianne Newell, Ommer and Rosemary, E. *Fishing Places, Fishing People: Traditions and Issues in Canadian Small-Scale Fisheries*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999. 122.

¹¹ The Heiltsuk particularly were famous for the spawn that they harvested off of Boa kelp and Giant kelp and would be able to open up trade with nations that had a desire for that particular flavour of herring spawn. Perhaps the best example of this differentiation in the spawn trade was the trade between the Heiltsuk of Bella Bella and their Nuxalk counterparts in Bella Coola as the latter often traded specifically for the Heiltsuk Boa Kelp spawn but not for the Giant Kelp spawn; Newell and Ommer, *Fishing Places, Fishing People: Traditions and Issues in Canadian Small-Scale Fisheries*, 127.

Many early European explorers in the area such as Captain James Cook took notice of this consumption of herring spawn in indigenous communities throughout the 18th century as Europeans would increasingly come into contact with indigenous societies on the Pacific northwest.¹² Throughout the 18th and 19th centuries these European accounts would continue to be recorded and Europeans working in Heiltsuk lands would often write about the large quantities of preserved spawn that the Heiltsuk would routinely trade.¹³ These annual harvests and trade networks would continue to function alongside European expansion as the Heiltsuk would continue to trade their Boa Kelp spawn to the Nuxalk people for Eulachon grease right up into the 1950's.¹⁴ In the late 18th century as the European presence became more established on the Pacific Northwest they would find themselves becoming increasingly integrated into a well established and complex trade network that spanned the Pacific coast. The Heiltsuk adapted to this new trade partner and regularly traded with the Hudson Bay Company at Fort McLaughlin on Campbell Island.¹⁵ As it was common for the local indigenous communities to supply Hudson Bay Company forts with food it is reasonable to assume that the Hudson Bay Company would have at one point or another bartered with the Heiltsuk for seafood such as preserved Herring spawn at Fort McLaughlin.¹⁶ This indigenous trade in which the Heiltsuk had been central to for so many years would continue until 1974 when government would steer its attention towards the commercial potential of the herring spawn in a global market.

¹² Newell, *Tangled Webs of History: Indians and the Law in Canada's Pacific Coast Fisheries*, 190.

¹³ Ibid., 191.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Black, "Looking for Bella Bella: The RW Large Collection and Heiltsuk Art History," 275.

¹⁶ Even after fishing regulations began being established in British Columbia in the late 19th century the Heiltsuk would not only trade with other nations on the coast but also with Japanese Canadian communities in which they would receive soya sauce for their lucrative herring spawn; Newell, *Tangled Webs of History: Indians and the Law in Canada's Pacific Coast Fisheries*, 191.

In order to develop an understanding on how such an essential trade to aboriginal societies on the Pacific Northwest could become so dominated and regulated by government institutions it is imperative to examine the development of these institutions and their resulting effect on the indigenous fishery in British Columbia as a whole. The genesis of a government fishery policy in British Columbia came in 1877 with the implementation of Ottawa's *Fisheries Act of 1868* in the waters of the Pacific Northwest.¹⁷ This was a policy that had cut its teeth in the freshwater fishing disputes that had occurred earlier that century in the Great Lakes between indigenous communities and the settler population of Upper Canada. These policies had originally emerged under the colonial government of Upper Canada in order to protect indigenous fishing grounds in accordance with treaties signed in the area in the early 19th century. However, the growing influx of settlers moving into the Great Lakes region led to a series of amendments to the previously made fisheries legislation that would begin to open up traditional fishing sites to non-native fisheries. These amendments would be reaffirmed by the new federal government in 1868 as a part of their fishery policy for the new nation of Canada. As a consequence when British Columbia inherited the federal *Fisheries Act of 1868* it was inheriting a policy that had been developing for many years towards a consumerist fishery that placed native fishing rights under the control and protection of the government.¹⁸ The new federal policy in British Columbia meant that a strict licencing system was now implemented for an increasing commercial fishery and in 1888 the government passed policies to allow natives to fish without licence as long as it was purely a food based fishery.¹⁹ This created a substantial restriction on communities like the Heiltsuk who had relied on the trade of seafood as the economic staple of their community. However native communities' persistence in exercising their age old trade networks would soon lead to conflicts with the federal fisheries policies such as in 1890 when the Lowe Inlet Canning Company was charged by fisheries officers for buying from unlicensed native fishers.²⁰ The federal government would cement its control over

¹⁷ Douglas C. Harris, *Landing Native Fisheries: Indian Reserves and Fishing Rights in British Columbia, 1849-1925*, (UBC Press, 2009), 106.

¹⁸ Harris, *Landing Native Fisheries: Indian Reserves and Fishing Rights in British Columbia, 1849-1925*, 107.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 109.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 99.

indigenous fisheries in 1894 when regulations were extended to make it mandatory that indigenous fishers carry a permit in order to participate in the food fishery. With the once lucrative indigenous seafood trade network now reduced to a fishery of subsistence many communities including the Heiltsuk were forced to operate outside the law with lowered prices in order to facilitate an economy. Despite these complications the Heiltsuk spawn on kelp trade had continued to thrive without regulation because government interest in the industry was relatively low.²¹ However in 1974 due to increased commercial interest in the herring spawn on kelp fishery the government opened a fishery to the public.²² This fishery was heavily regulated and was not exclusive to indigenous fisheries, all one needed to obtain to harvest herring spawn commercially was a “J” licence and the licencing system that was now driven by market.²³ In this licencing system indigenous fisheries were no longer protected. Access to licenses would go to whoever could afford one. Regardless of that fact indigenous fishers still managed to hold most licences in this fishery. However, in 1978 due to overfishing the government stopped issuing new “J” licences and only 28 of the previously issued licences could be renewed. Even though indigenous fishers had a large portion of the licences in the spawn fishery there was still a great number of indigenous communities in British Columbia that had relied on the herring spawn trade traditionally that were now blocked out of the now closed licencing system.²⁴ Although the Crown claimed in the Gladstone appeal that this was done for conservation purposes and not to extinguish the rights of the indigenous fishing communities these regulations did however inadvertently take away one of the economic mainstays of indigenous communities in British Columbia including the Heiltsuk nation.

²¹ In 1955 the government had even reserved the spawn on kelp fishery for indigenous communities on a subsistence basis; Newell and Ommer, *Fishing Places, Fishing People: Traditions and Issues in Canadian Small-Scale Fisheries*, 128.

²² Ibid., 191.

²³ Ibid., 129.

²⁴ Newell and Ommer, *Fishing Places, Fishing People: Traditions and Issues in Canadian Small-Scale Fisheries*, 139.

With the establishment of a highly regulated Herring Spawn on kelp fishery as mentioned previously it is important to examine not only the effects of these regulations but also of the herring fishery as a whole on the Heiltsuk both environmentally and economically. In the herring fishery there are two predominant methods to harvest the eggs.²⁵ The herring roe fishery can be extremely detrimental to herring fish stocks due to the fact that the fish are killed during the harvest of the roe. The industrialization of the herring roe fishery in the late 1960s lead to the major decline of the Pacific herring populations in the Pacific northwest.²⁶ This was probably due to the vulnerability of Herring populations to large-scale net fisheries that were required to maintain quota with the catch of impregnated female herring.²⁷ This industrial element of the herring roe fishery in the 1970's spill over into the newly government regulated herring spawn on kelp fishery that in the beginning put a higher value on markets than the conservation.²⁸ The result be the closing of "J" licences by the government in 1978 as mentioned earlier due to decimated Pacific Herring populations. The high regulation of the herring spawn on kelp fishery lead to the exclusion of many of the harvesting techniques that had been implemented by the Heiltsuk prior to European contact.²⁹ Like other indigenous communities on the Pacific Northwest the Heiltsuk had for centuries managed a sustainable fishery before European contact through the practice of selective harvesting and habitat creation.³⁰ The Heiltsuk had maintained their fishery through their laws of Gvi'ilas that assured that their resources were harvested

²⁵ Nancy J. Turner, Fikret Berkes, Janet Stephenson, and Jonathan Dick. "Blundering Intruders: Extraneous Impacts on Two Indigenous Food Systems." *Human Ecology* 41, no. 4 (2013): 566.

²⁶ The first being as spawn and the second being as roe. Spawn is a form of herring egg that has been laid and fertilized before it is harvested; this harvest of herring spawn has no direct consequence for the fish that is laying the eggs. The roe however is the unfertilized egg and it can only be harvested by extracting the eggs directly from the body of an impregnated female; Ibid.

²⁷ Newell, *Tangled Webs of History: Indians and the Law in Canada's Pacific Coast Fisheries*, 192.

²⁸ Newell and Ommer, *Fishing Places, Fishing People: Traditions and Issues in Canadian Small-Scale Fisheries*, 141.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Turner, Berkes, Stephenson, and Dick. "Blundering Intruders: Extraneous Impacts on Two Indigenous Food Systems," 565.

sustainably.³¹ In doing so traditional techniques proved to have offered a lower mortality rate for herring populations.³² Their techniques contrasted greatly to the new harmful industrial method of the impoundment fishery.³³ Along with this new more aggressive method of harvesting herring spawn the increased access to the once protected indigenous fishery would lead to the over consumption of herring spawn. The dismantlement of the Heiltsuk tribe's ability to control the destiny of its own fishery along with the opening of a coastal commons and the establishment of a government controlled fishery would lead to the decline in fish stock across the Pacific Northwest.³⁴ As a result, the regulations placed on the indigenous fisheries by the government actually suppressed the ability of groups like the Heiltsuk to maintain a sustainable fishery on their traditional lands.

Even though the Gladstone appeal was ruled upon favourably in 1996 for the Heiltsuk commercial right to harvest Herring spawn, the Heiltsuk communities like Bella Bella continue to struggle to maintain a sustainable fishing based economy. As government legislation continues to limit indigenous control over their fisheries and infringe upon the aboriginal right to maintain a fishery for economic fairness.³⁵ After the Gladstone case affirmed the Heiltsuk commercial

³¹ Anonymous. "Heiltsuk." First Nations: Land Rights and Environmentalism in British Columbia.

³² These practices were essential to the survival of the Pacific herring due to the fact that the herring spawning behaviour is especially vulnerable to overconsumption. Specifically in the herring spawn on kelp fishery the Heiltsuk used open pond techniques that allowed herring to enter pre-set spawning grounds and leave at their own will; Newell and Ommer, *Fishing Places, Fishing People: Traditions and Issues in Canadian Small-Scale Fisheries*, 140.

³³ For instance, the herring were herded by fishing boats into compounds where they are kept and bred for spawn and then released, this method had a high mortality rate for the herring involved; Newell and Ommer, *Fishing Places, Fishing People: Traditions and Issues in Canadian Small-Scale Fisheries*, 129.

³⁴ Turner, Berkes, Stephenson, and Dick. "Blundering Intruders: Extraneous Impacts on Two Indigenous Food Systems," 565.

³⁵ Parnesh Sharma, *Aboriginal Fishing Rights: Laws, Courts, and Politics*. Halifax, NS: Fernwood, 1998. 93-94.

right to harvest Herring spawn, their community is still plagued by high unemployment rates and futile attempts to remove the restrictive licences on their fisheries.³⁶ With this lack of control over their fishing grounds the Heiltsuk nation continued in the 21st century to suffer from depleted catch due to overfishing of herring for the roe industry. In 2004 the Heiltsuk and KITASCO nation united to form a 50 boat blockade of their traditional fishing grounds preventing the entry of a herring roe fishing fleet. The community not only has trouble preventing overfishing in their waters but also preventing the pollution of their traditional waters. The main source of the pollution in Heiltsuk fishing grounds are a result of aquaculture facilities like the Panfish-Omega fish farm that was established at Ocean Falls another traditional Heiltsuk community in 2003.³⁷ In 2006 the Heiltsuk nation testified before a British Columbian government panel in Bella Bella regarding the effects that aquaculture had on their communities. The testimony raised many concerns regarding the contamination of water due to the nearby hatchery that was damaging local marine life.³⁸ With the testimony the members of the community provided a detailed list of all the aquatic species that are essential to their way of life, one of the species that was mentioned as being negatively impacted by water contamination was the Pacific Herring.³⁹ The testimonies of the Heiltsuk also confirmed that seafood was still essential to their community as it provided families with food on a weekly basis.⁴⁰ From the information provided by testimonies of members from the Heiltsuk community and the reduction of the Herring fishery by overfishing it is clear that although the regulations placed on indigenous fisheries of the Pacific Northwest were intended to protect fisheries it also inhibited communities like the Heiltsuk from taking action to protect their sustainable fishery from exterior threats to fish populations like they had been doing for centuries before European contact.

Though the Heiltsuk are still struggling to this day to reduce restrictions on their fishery, the Gladstone case of 1996 was crucial in

³⁶ Heiltsuk Will Assert Aboriginal Right During the Herring Spawn on Kelp Fishery. (2001, Feb 27). *Canada NewsWire*.

³⁷ Anonymous. "Heiltsuk." First Nations: Land Rights and Environmentalism in British Columbia.

³⁸ Canada, The Legislative Assembly of British Columbia, *Report on Proceedings: Sustainable Aquaculture*, Robin, Austin., 5 October 2006, 493.

³⁹ Ibid., 492.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 510.

not only identifying the effects of fishery legislation on indigenous communities but also to defining the right of indigenous communities to harvest traditional resources to maintain a degree of stability in their communities. The Gladstone case raised important historical questions which still to this day define the nature of indigenous fishing rights: Did the Heiltsuk engaged in trade prior to European contact; how important this activity was to the society; whether or not this activity had been extinguished by government legislation and how do conservation regulations effect the Heiltsuk community as a whole? Although seemingly simple these questions can require extensive research by archeologists, historians, ecologists and legal scholars in order to even begin to discover the answer. In finding the answer however history plays an integral role in fitting all these schools of thought together into a cohesive narrative that can help a court to understand not only the temporal priority behind the rights of the Heiltsuk to trade but also the economic and environmental repercussions of regulations placed on Heiltsuk fisheries. Not only does history provide us insight into the rights of the Heiltsuk to exercise a degree of control over their fishery but it also offers solutions for future policies that can come to light through the examination of sustainable and successful Heiltsuk fisheries in the past. This outlook of history will be increasingly important as we move into a future that is plagued by not only overfishing but also contamination of seawater due to industries such as aquaculture. Through the lessons of history, the Gladstone ruling stands as an example of the importance of the recognition of the indigenous rights in the fisheries and the importance of an open government-indigenous dialogue that relies on the willingness to learn and grow together for a collective interest in maintaining a healthy fishery for years to come.

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A Joint Conclusion by two Authors:

These two essays reflect on the interaction between indigenous rights, history, and the Canadian legal system. Although these cases concerned different issues around indigenous communities in British Columbia, we believe that there are key similarities between their respective legacies. Each was a landmark case in Indigenous law, giving Indigenous nations in British Columbia greater control over their rights. In *Calder v. British Columbia* [1973], the Nisga'a asserted their sovereignty by demonstrating through the use of oral tradition that they had occupied the land since time immemorial. This set a precedent upon which other First Nations could rely in asserting their own land claims. While the *Calder* case concerned Indigenous land title in British Columbia, the *R v. Gladstone* [1996] focused primarily on the right of Indigenous communities such as the Heiltsuk to practice their traditional fisheries. The case raised questions concerning the power of the Canadian government to limit Indigenous fisheries for the sake of environmental protection. Despite their differences, both cases demonstrated the need for an open and transparent dialogue between indigenous peoples and the Canadian government in future negotiations.

Seamus McConville and Aidan Conrad

The Nazi Economy (1933 – 1939): Unemployment, Autarky and the Working-Class

RIJK ERIC MOLLEMA

My paper contextualizes and evaluates the interwar economic policies of the National Socialist Workers' Party (NSDAP). I consider economic policies relating to unemployment, autarky, the working-class, as well their standard of living. I argue against the idea perpetuated by Nazi propaganda that the Party was able to achieve an 'economic miracle,' by 1939. Instead, I posit that the economic agenda of the NSDAP was not sustainable in the long-term and could only produce short-term measures to serious structural economic issues. Specifically, I posit that the NSDAP prioritized autarky through rearmament and the acquisition of Lebensraum, which was only sustainable in the case of a German victory in the Second World War. Furthermore, I argue that the working-class was especially affected by these policies. Yet, I concede that in some instances the standard of living did improve under the NSDAP. In sum, however, I believe the so-called 'economic miracle' was nothing more than a temporary mirage.

The interwar period in Europe can be defined largely as an era of economic instability. The effects of the First World War crippled many nations through inflation, scarce resources, high unemployment and a lack of international trade. These effects were exacerbated with the onset of the Great Depression in October of 1929. In Germany, these economic circumstances played a large role in the downfall of the Weimar Republic and the eventual election of the National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP). The NSDAP transformed the German economic agenda between 1933 and 1939. The outcome of the new economic agenda depended significantly on the outcome of the Second World War. Nonetheless, domestic propaganda praised the economic shift and attempted to characterize it as an 'economic miracle.' Yet, the reality presented by the relevant statistical data is certainly more ambiguous. The prewar economic policies enacted by the NSDAP lowered unemployment with considerable success, attempted to reach autarky through rearmament with less success, and profoundly shaped the standard of living for the working-class.

The debate on the nature of the Nazi Economy has captured the mind of historians, and to some degree the general public, since the end of the Second World War. The Nazi Economy has undoubtedly

been the subject of intense study and disagreement. Marxist historians have characterized the NSDAP as the agents of capitalism, their economy as the suppressive tool of the *petit bourgeoisie*, and their ultimate goal to be the total defeat of Communism.¹ Other historians, such as Adam Tooze, have characterized the Nazi Economy as a purely reactive force and a product of limited pragmatic choice.² Still other historians, such as Ian Kershaw, have characterized the Nazi Economy as a product of ideology and pragmatism.³ The historiographical debate continues in a contemporary context with valuable discussions on ethical and ideological outcomes. My paper, however, will largely avoid discussion on the nature of the Nazi Economy and focus instead on an evaluation and contextualization of the enacted interwar policies.

The most immediate and visible economic issue facing the NSDAP in 1933 was the increasingly high unemployment rate (estimated at six million unemployed).⁴ Since the end of the First World War, the German economy had suffered under the reparation payments stipulated by the Treaty of Versailles (1919). The economic turmoil worsened when French troops invaded the Ruhr Valley in 1923, a German industrial epicenter, leading to hyperinflation and further unemployment. Through the implementation of the Dawes Plan (1924) and complicated diplomacy, the Weimar Government was able to stabilize the situation.⁵ Thereafter, Weimar Germany experienced a so-called ‘Golden Age,’ although such terminology is historically problematic. When the Great Depression began to affect the German economy in the early months of 1930 unemployment quickly intensified. By 1932, over thirty percent of the German workforce was unemployed.⁶

President Paul von Hindenburg appointed Adolf Hitler Chancellor of Germany on January 30th of 1933. Hitler was acutely

¹ Tooze, Adam, *The Wages of Destruction*, (London: Allen Lane, 2006) 23.

² Ibid., 12.

³ Kershaw, Ian, *Hitler*, (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1991) 220.

⁴ Rogers, Kelly and Jo Thomas, *20th Century World History: Causes, Practices and Effects of Wars* (London: Pearson Education Limited, 2010), 113.

⁵ Rogers, *20th Century World History*, 114.

⁶ Ibid.

aware of the role high unemployment played in the collapse of the Weimar Republic and acted quickly to change economic strategy. In his inaugural address, Hitler stated, “*It is an appalling inheritance which we are taking over... Farmers, workers, and the middle class must unite to contribute the bricks wherewith to build the new Reich.*”⁷ Hitler quickly embraced the Keynesian model of economic recovery, which called for an increase in governmental stimulus spending. The *Arbeitsschlacht* (Battle for Work) was declared and the primary objective was to end unemployment in Germany.⁸

The primary strategy implemented by the NSDAP to combat unemployment was the increase in funding for public works programs. The Reinhardt Plan was approved in June of 1933, which provided 1 billion Reichsmarks for improved infrastructure, most importantly through the *Reichsautobahn* project under the direction of Fritz Todt.⁹ The autobahn highway system was initiated under the Weimar State, but would be significantly expanded under Todt’s direction. The project avoided the use of advanced technologies in favor of hard labour and wider employment practices. Yet, it is estimated that only 250,000 jobs were created directly or indirectly as a result of the program.¹⁰ Nonetheless, the project stimulated the German automobile industry, as well as the interest of the German public. Public work programs such as the *Reichsbahn* (railway systems) and *Reichspost* (postal service) provided further governmental subsidized employment for the working-class.¹¹ Consequently, the NSDAP was able to stimulate the labor force while achieving the practical goal of improving infrastructure. Funding for the Reinhardt Program, however, was largely abandoned in 1934 in favor of massive rearmament programs.

The strategy to combat unemployment in Germany dramatically changed in 1934 after the *Machtergreifung* or consolidation of power by the NSDAP. Capital was now directed toward the building of a war economy, and would have a significant impact on unemployment. The New Plan (1934) replaced the Reinhardt

⁷ Hitler, Adolf, “Appeal to the German People,” *German History in Documents and Images* (31 January 1933), Nazi Germany 1933 – 1945.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Redles, David and Jackson J. Spielvogel, *Hitler and Nazi Germany: A History*. 7th ed. (Boston, MA: Pearson Education Incorporated, 2014), 90.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.

Plan and opted to run a trade deficit in order to import raw materials for the expansion the domestic armaments industry.¹² The processing of the raw materials, in turn, created a greater domestic need for labour. The short-term effect of the strategy was the achievement of full employment by 1939 as war became increasingly likely.¹³ However, the solution was by no means permanent, as it could not be sustained without further acquisition of *Lebensraum*, or living space, in Eastern Europe. Hitler's ultimate goal of autarky made employment through trade impossible and created a need for war to sustain economic growth.

It is crucial to question the validity of the full employment achieved by the NSDAP in 1939. First, women were not included in the assessment of the domestically unemployed.¹⁴ Fascist ideology confined women exclusively to the private sphere, with a few notable exceptions (such as Leni Riefenstahl in the film industry). Second, those considered 'work-shy' by the State for various reasons were simply taken to concentration camps - as many as 500,000 by 1933 (twice as many as employed by the *Autobahn* program).¹⁵ Those of Jewish descent were also excluded from the unemployed as a result of the Careers Civil Service Act (1933) and the Nuremberg Race Laws (1935), which revoked their citizenship.¹⁶ Finally, the Reich Labour Service (RAD) mandated that male Germans from the ages of 18 to 25 join the organization for a minimum of 6 months, excluding them from unemployment figures.¹⁷ The NSDAP believed, "*We are overpopulated and cannot feed ourselves from our own resources... a higher percentage of the people must gradually be deducted from the*

¹² Buchheim, Christoph. "The Role of Private Property in the Nazi Economy: The Case of Industry." *The Journal of Economic History* 66, no. 2 (2006): 390.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Redles and Spielvogel, *Hitler and Nazi Germany*, 264.

¹⁵ Ibid., 265.

¹⁶ Ibid., 102.

¹⁷ Ibid., 91.

body of our nation.”¹⁸ The manipulation of statistical data brings into question the actual effect of the economic policies on unemployment.

No sustainable long-term strategy was pursued by the NSDAP to lower unemployment. Public works programs were abandoned in favor of rearmament, and its success depended on the outcome of the Second World War. Short-term strategies, such as public works programs or rearmament, would likely not have created viable long-term economic industries, which could sustain significant employment indefinitely. Progress was made in employment, but not to the scale that would constitute an ‘economic miracle.’ Nonetheless, the Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda vehemently presented an image of success and growth. For example, Hitler was often pictured opening highways or conversing with the working-class in an attempt to further the myth of the ‘economic miracle.’¹⁹ Moreover, the State acted aggressively to perpetuate the myth in public discourse through media and image.

The ultimate economic goal of the NSDAP was to achieve total autarky. To do so required the ability of the German nation to continually sustain and defend itself. Consequently, the principles of autarky and rearmament must be viewed as interdependent and inseparable. To reach autarky capital had to be directed toward the building of a war economy in the short-term, and the acquisition of *Lebensraum* would be required in the long-term. The process by which autarky was pursued came to define the economic agenda of the NSDAP after 1934.

The first and most crucial step in reaching autarky was the process of rearmament. The Treaty of Versailles limited the *Wehrmacht* to 100,000 soldiers, severely restricted the *Kriegsmarine* and *Luftwaffe*, and demilitarized various border regions such as the Rhineland.²⁰ The Weimar Republic, however, was able to bypass these restrictions in various minor instances. For example, the Socialist Democratic Party (SPD) signed the Treaty of Rapallo (1923) with the Soviet Union (USSR), which allowed the *Wehrmacht* to operate military technology in Soviet territories.²¹ Thereafter, Heinrich Brüning was able to create the Voluntary Labour Force (FAD) in 1931, which

¹⁸ Hitler, Adolf, “Appeal to the German People,” *German History in Documents and Images* (31 January 1933), Nazi Germany 1933 – 1945.

¹⁹ Lee, Stephen, *Hitler and Nazi Germany*, (New York: Routledge, 1998) 46.

²⁰ Rogers, *20th Century World History*, 75.

²¹ Redles and Spielvogel, *Hitler and Nazi Germany*, 22.

circumvented the soldier restrictions imposed on the *Wehrmacht* by training unpaid volunteers.²² Thus, despite restrictions by the Treaty of Versailles the German military did not ever become entirely irrelevant.

The NSDAP pursued vastly more aggressive rearmament policies. As discussed in conjunction with unemployment, rearmament began with the implementation of the New Plan in 1934. In the first phase of rearmament, the stockpiling of raw materials through trade would be crucial, despite the trade deficit that it created. Trade between Germany and the Balkans, as well as South America, increased dramatically.²³ Balkan trading partners were critical in the rearmament process. The Balkans could provide Germany with the required raw materials for their armaments factories, whereas Western European nations were unlikely to engage in such trade. The increased trade between the Balkans and Germany created an economic dependency, which perhaps made the annexation of the Balkans more desirable by 1940. The New Plan was limited, however, as it could not directly acquire military technologies. The stockpiling of raw materials was certainly questionable, but ultimately defensible through cautious diplomacy.

Rearmament entered the second and most aggressive phase after March 7th of 1936 when Germany remilitarized the Rhineland openly violating the Treaty of Versailles without major military consequence.²⁴ Thereafter, the NSDAP began to pursue rearmament more intently and more visibly. Consequently, the Four Year Plan was introduced in August of 1936. Hermann Goering replaced Hjalmar Schacht as Minister of Economics, and autarky became the predominant focus of the economic agenda.²⁵ The import of raw materials slowed as research into the creation of synthetic materials increased.²⁶ The focus on the creation of synthetic materials attracted

²² Redles and Spielvogel, *Hitler and Nazi Germany*, 22.

²³ Ritschl, Albrecht. "Deficit Spending in the Nazi Recovery, 1933 – 1938: A Critical Reassessment." *Journal of the Japanese and International Economies* 16, no.1 (2002): 575.

²⁴ Rogers, *20th Century World History*, 116.

²⁵ Lee, Stephen, *Hitler and Nazi Germany*, 59.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 60.

large investment from the State. However, the project yielded minimal results, and the capital would likely have been best used elsewhere.

The long-term solution for autarky would have to be the acquisition of *Lebensraum* through military action. To achieve this, “the German army must be operational in four years. The German economy must be fit for war within four years.”²⁷ German military expenditure increased from 750 million Reichsmarks in 1934 to 17 billion Reichsmarks in 1939.²⁸ By 1939, the military gained 65 new warships, 8214 new airplanes, and around 850,000 new soldiers.²⁹ The expansion was in large part achieved by military contracting given out by the NSDAP to large international businesses, such as IG Farben.³⁰ Thus, despite antagonistic rhetoric toward big businesses before 1933, the NSDAP had come to rely completely on their capital. Marxist historians have focused on this topic as it lends credibility to the idea that the Nazi Economy was a functionary of big armament businesses.

Autarky could only be achieved with the development and growth of German agriculture. Aryan ideology often emphasized the agrarian tradition and it was likewise valued by the NSDAP. Farmland, then, was to be owned by Aryans exclusively. The NSDAP seized on such ideology with the support slogan ‘blood and soil,’ advocating for the idealized relationship between German farmers and farmland.³¹ Racial ideology influenced legislation in 1933 with the *Reich Hereditary Farm Law*, which required birth documentation for the sale of farmland.³² Farm labour, however, was often delegated to non-Germans without monetary compensation. Agricultural yields remained inadequate to achieve autarky before the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939.³³ With the annexation of land in Eastern Europe by 1941 agricultural yields had increased, but was directly dependent on the continued control of the invaded territories.

The economic success of the NSDAP in regards to autarky was extremely limited and largely unsustainable. Autarky was completely

²⁷ Anonymous, “Hitler’s Confidential Memo on Autarky,” *German History in Documents and Images* (August 1936), Nazi Germany 1933 – 1945.

²⁸ Rogers, *20th Century World History*, 220.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Lee, Stephen, *Hitler and Nazi Germany*, 46.

³¹ Jaskot, Paul B. “Building the Nazi Economy: Adam Tooze and a Cultural Critique of Hitler’s Plans for War,” *Historical Materialism* 22, no.3 (2014): 324.

³² Ibid., 322.

³³ Redles and Spielvogel, *Hitler and Nazi Germany*, 99.

dependent on certain raw materials that Germany severely lacked. Although there were several strategies implemented by the NSDAP to acquire these raw materials, only modest success was achieved. The stockpiling of raw materials became unsustainable by 1934 and capital directed toward the creation of synthetic materials ultimately yielded no significant results. Furthermore, the remilitarization of the Rhineland in 1935 made trade more difficult, and land annexation more necessary. The lack of domestic agricultural development further limited the viability of autarky. Essentially, autarky depended the acquisition of *Lebensraum*, which in turn relied on the success of rearmament.

The economic policies implemented by the NSDAP directly affected the German working-class, as well as their standard of living. The expanding working-class would enjoy various benefits through State sponsored programs, while at the same time experiencing a significant loss of civil liberties. The working-class was consolidated by the NSDAP into a singular organization by the end of 1933. Trade unions were outlawed on May 2nd of 1933 and all German workers were integrated into the newly created German Labour Front (DAF).³⁴ Under the leadership of Robert Ley, the DAF came to encompass and coordinate all labour, while at the same time serving as a tool for indoctrination against Communist ideology.

The DAF functioned through sub-organizations such as the Beauty of Labour (SdA), Strength through Joy (KdF), and the Reich Labour Service (RAD) in an attempt to improve the quality of life for German workers. Beauty of Labour (SdA) aimed to improve working conditions, specifically inside armament factories.³⁵ Regardless of the ideological or political aims, the SdA achieved significant and pragmatic improvements. For example, workers safety conditions were improved, infrastructure was rebuilt, social recreational areas created and meals were provided. It has been argued that the improvements were superficial and merely completed as a means of neutralizing the working-class. Yet, such improvements must not be undervalued or

³⁴ Redles and Spielvogel, *Hitler and Nazi Germany*, 94.

³⁵ Ibid.

ignored as they set a precedent from which to build after the Second World War.

Strength through Joy (KdF) was the most popular sub-organization of the DAF. KdF aimed to increase and better the leisure time of the working-class. As the name suggests, KdF proposed increased luxury amenities for the working-class in order to increase productivity. KdF offered the working-class paid-for destination vacations around Germany, Scandinavia and later in Austria.³⁶ The program was later extended to include leisure cruises, which became especially popular. It is estimated that over 7 million Germans took part in the KdF tour vacations.³⁷ Thus, in terms of participation, it was one of the most successful NSDAP programs. However, KdF was exclusively available to those deemed to be 'pure-blooded,' and destinations served to illustrate the achievements of the Nazism. There is no empirical evidence, however, to suggest that productivity increased as a result of KdF.

NSDAP subsidies and concessions were awarded to the working-class in an attempt to consolidate support by bettering their standard of living. Through KdF, working individuals were able to take advantage of a savings plan to purchase the *Volkswagen Beetle* (described by Hitler as the 'people's car').³⁸ Then, radios were often subsidized by the State and provided to the working-class as a means of propaganda, but was also used for entertainment purposes.³⁹ Paid holidays increased from three to twelve by 1939, as well as the slight increase in general wages.⁴⁰ In sum, the NSDAP often acted through subsidization in order to increase the general standard of living.

NSDAP interwar economic policy focused on the needs of the proclaimed *volksgemeinschaft* (German people's community). Yet, it is worth briefly considering those who were excluded from such an ideological conception of community. Aryan racial ideology did not imagine the inclusion of Jews, homosexuals, the mentally ill, certain Eastern ethnicities or political dissidents in the *volksgemeinschaft*. Consequently, the NSDAP prewar economic agenda reflected such an ideological exclusion. It is worth questioning the ethical dimension when we consider the outcomes of NSDAP economic policy.

³⁶ Redles and Spielvogel, *Hitler and Nazi Germany*, 41.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid., 96.

³⁹ Ibid., 160.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 96.

Essentially, it is imperative that we acknowledge the human cost of economic progress, especially in relation to the Nazi era.

The long-term success of the Nazi economy depended on attaining autarky through the procurement of *Lebensraum*. To achieve this end rapid rearmament and the support of the working-class would be critical. The invasion of Poland on September 1st 1939 began the attempted acquisition of *Lebensraum* by Nazi Germany. However, the defeat of Nazi Germany by the Allied Powers effectively ended the possibility of autarky. Instead, the German economy was partitioned into a Communist system in the East, and Capitalist system in the West. The illusion of the so-called 'economic miracle' vanished as everyday Germans were left in the shadow of the Nazi legacy.

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On the Origin of Thuggee: Determining the Existence of Thugs in Pre-British India

DARREN REID

The thugs of India have captured Western imaginations since their crimes were discovered by British administrators in the early 19th century. Since that time, the thugs have been represented in various ways within Western historiography, ranging from the trope of 'thugs as a satanic cult' to the conception of 'thugs as the imagined constructions of British orientalist colonizers.' This paper challenges both representations by searching pre-British Indian primary sources for evidence of the existence of thugs before the arrival of the British in the late 18th century. Locating thugs in these primary sources illustrates that the thugs were neither an imagined construction of British imaginations nor a demon-worshipping cult dedicated to human sacrifice, but rather a group of highly fraternal, highly superstitious criminals dedicated to highway robbery and murder.

Upon India's independence in 1947, there were 128 tribes, constituting 3,500,000 individuals, officially classified as criminal tribes.¹ Established in Regulation XXVII of 1871, the Criminal Tribes Act (CTA) sought to identify, surveil, and 'rehabilitate' groups of Indians who, due to their itinerancy, presented a challenge to British authority. As such, tribes deemed 'criminal' typically included travelling craftsmen, traders, entertainers, and displaced peasants, and measures to combat their itinerancy included forced settlement, roll calls, and travel passes.² However, the CTA could not have been passed without the precedent having been set of understanding crime in India on an organized, hereditary level, and this precedent came in the form of thuggee. Thuggee was discovered by the British administration in the early 19th century as a distinctly Hindu form of highway robbery. 'Thugs,' or the individuals of a secret sect who worshiped the Hindu

¹ Andrew J. Major, "State and Criminal Tribes in Colonial Punjab: Surveillance, Control and Reclamation of the 'Dangerous Classes,'" *Modern Asian Studies* 33, no. 3 (2000): 657.

² Anastasia Piliavsky, "The 'Criminal Tribe' in India Before the British," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 57, no. 2 (2015): 327.

goddess Kali, were discovered to be responsible for numerous murders which had taken place on Indian highways.³ In order to arrest, prosecute, and eradicate the secret society of thugs, the British administration passed the Thuggee Act of 1836, which set a legal precedent because it allowed individuals to be convicted based solely on affiliation to a criminal group, with no evidence of having committed a crime.⁴ In recent decades, historians have begun to revisit the British administration's campaign against thuggee, with many arguing that thuggee was an orientalist construction formed with the intention of legitimizing increased British judicial power in India.⁵ Because the Thuggee Act of 1836 set the legal precedent which eventually led to the Criminal Tribes Act of 1871, this argument has important ramifications for the legitimacy of the Criminal Tribes Act. This paper serves as an inquiry into the origins of the idea of criminal tribes by asking the following question: was thuggee a valid, extant criminal activity in India prior to British arrival, or was it an orientalist construction created to legitimize increased judicial power? After a brief overview of the historiographical work done in this field, this paper will utilize analyses of native Indian texts, which pre-date British arrival, to prove that thuggee was an actual Indian phenomenon. However, it will also be shown that, although thuggee existed prior to British arrival, it *was* manipulated into a distinctly Hindu crime to reinforce ideas of racial superiority. Therefore, thuggee, as defined by the Thuggee Act, was both legitimate as an extant group of criminals, and constructed as a Hindu religious practice. As a note, multiple spellings and misinterpretations have confused discussions of thuggee. The word thuggee is derived from the Hindi word *thagi*, which means 'deception' or 'trickery.' Yet thuggee is a British appellation, as native Indians generally refer to thugs as *phansigars*, or stranglers, from the

³ Kim A. Wagner, *Thuggee: Banditry and the British in Early Nineteenth-Century India* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 1.

⁴ Radhika Singha, *A Despotism of Law: Crime and Justice in Early Colonial India* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 214-5.

⁵ In Edward Said's *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage Books, 2003), he defines orientalism as: "the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient--dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient." An orientalist construction in this context is therefore an understanding of India that is not based upon reality but upon the Western mission to categorize and subjugate India.

Hindi word *phasi*, which means ‘noose.’ This paper refers to thuggee as the crime of highway murder, and thugs as the individuals who committed thuggee.

The thuggee campaign has given rise to three schools of historical interpretation: the orthodox, the revisionist, and the post-revisionist.⁶ Orthodox histories, written immediately following the discovery and eradication of thuggee in 1836, take for granted the accuracy of British sources and conclude that thuggee was a demonic cult which required cleansing by the British Empire.⁷ The revisionists wrote primarily in the second half of the 20th century and were influenced by post-orientalists such as Edward Said. They argue that the thuggee described in the orthodox histories was, at best, an insignificant phenomenon manipulated to further colonial interests. At worst, they denounce thuggee as a complete fabrication by William Sleeman, the head of the Anti-Thuggee Department.⁸ This interpretation continues to attract adherents into the present, such as Henry Schwartz, who, in his 2010 monograph, argues that the ‘fact’ of thuggee was nothing more than a manifestation of interplay between

⁶ This periodization of historiographical approaches to thuggee was first introduced by Alexander Lyon Macfie in his article, “Thuggee, an Orientalist Construction?,” *Rethinking History: The Journal of Theory and Practice* 12, no. 3 (2008): 390. I have adapted his periodization by applying the terms “orthodox,” “revisionist,” and “post-revisionist.” These terms do not relate to any accepted historiographical periods, but rather encapsulate the relative nature of each progressive historiographical approach; the terms “orientalist,” “anti-orientalist,” and “neo-orientalist” are another possible terminology.

⁷ See Edward Thornton, *Illustration of the History and Practices of the Thugs* (London: W.H. Allen, 1837), James Sleeman, *Thug, or a Million Murders* (London: Sampson Low, 1933), and George L. Bruce, *The Stranglers: The Cult of Thuggee and its Overthrow in British India* (London: Longmans, 1968).

⁸ See Stewart N. Gordon, “Scarf and Sword: Thugs, Marauders, and State-formation in Eighteenth-century Malwa,” *The Indian Economic & Social History Review* 6, no. 4 (1969): 403-429, Amal Chatterjee, *Representation of India, 1740-1840: The Creation of India in the Colonial Imagination* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), but especially Parama Roy, “Discovering India, Imagining Thuggee” *The Yale Journal Criticism* 9, no. 1 (1996): 121-145.

notions of British superiority and fears of native resistance.⁹ Recently, a post-revisionist interpretation has found a middle ground between the polar opposites of orthodoxy and revisionism, arguing that, through careful analysis and by using a wider array of sources, historians can separate the facts of thuggee from the misrepresentations of British orientalist writers. Yet these post-revisionists, such as Kim Wagner, Avinash Singh, and Martine van Woerkins, are restricted by their anti-orientalism. They argue that, while thuggee did exist, it was not a pre-existing part of Indian culture but a result of British interference in India's social structures.¹⁰ This is certainly a step away from the knee-jerk revisionism of earlier decades, but it does not go far enough in recognizing the existence of thuggee prior to British arrival.

Before we can search for the existence of thuggee prior to British arrival, however, we must determine exactly how the British defined thuggee. The first mention of thuggee in British archives is during murder investigations in 1809, in the Indian region of Etawah. Magistrate James Law's report to Commander-in-Chief William Dowdeswell described all that was known of the thugs. Namely, that they were a "strongly leagued together" organization, that they were ancient, and that they were highly secretive.¹¹ A month later, in Judge of the Court of Circuit T. Brooke's report to Dowdeswell, thuggee was further defined as a crime in which unsuspecting travelers were approached in disguise, strangled with a scarf or catgut string, looted, and hidden.¹² This is essentially the same definition of thuggee outlined in Richard Sherwood's 1819 report, which emphasized that thuggee was a hereditary profession, that groups of thugs were highly diverse, involving multiple castes, religions, and ethnicities, and

⁹ Kavita Daiya, review of *Constructing the Criminal Tribe in India*, by Henry Schwarz, *South Asia History and Culture* 2, no. 3 (2011): 448.

¹⁰ See Kim Wagner, *Thuggee: Banditry and the British in Early Nineteenth-Century India* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), Martin van Woerkins, *The Strangled Traveler: Colonial Imaginings and the Thugs of India*, trans. by Catherine Tihanyi (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), and Radhika Singha, *A Despotism of Law: Crime and Justice in Early Colonial India* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).

¹¹ Law to Dowdeswell, 23 December 1809, in *Stranglers and Bandits: A Historical Anthology of Thuggee*, ed. by Kim A. Wagner (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 68.

¹² Brooke to Dowdeswell, 23 January 1810, in *Strangers and Bandits*, ed. by Kim Wagner, 69.

therefore that thugs were identifiable by their criminality alone.¹³ It is not until William Sleeman's anonymously published article in 1830 that thuggee came to be understood as a religious practice. He claimed that thuggee was "an organized system of religious and civil polity prepared to receive converts from all religions and sects and to urge them to the murder of their fellow creatures under the assurance of high rewards in this world and the other."¹⁴ These five characteristics—strangulation, secrecy, organization, antiquity, and religiosity—distinguished thuggee from other categories of criminality and provided the basis on which the Thuggee Act of 1836 prosecuted thuggee separately from other crimes. Thus, it is these characteristics that we must search for in native records to determine the existence of thuggee before British arrival.

In the *Upadesamala*, a 12th century Jain text, there is an allegorical story about the sacking of a city called Avanitala by "a horde of thieves intensely well practiced in *thagavidya* [author's emphasis], " *thaga* meaning deceitfulness and being the origin of the word thuggee, and *vidya* meaning worship.¹⁵ Though allegorical, this offers evidence that in the 12th century there were notions of groups of thieves identified with the word *thaga* and defined by a connection between spirituality and theft. Even more revealing is Ziauddin Barani's 14th century history of Sultan Jalálu-d dín Fíroz Khiljí's reign (1290-1296), in which he describes how "thieves were often brought before him [the Sultan]....In his reign some *thags* were taken in the city, and a man belonging to that *fraternity* was the means of about a

¹³ Richard Sherwood, "Of the Murderers called Phansigars," in *Ramaseeana, or A Vocabulary of the Peculiar Language Used by the Thugs*, by William Sleeman (Calcutta: Military Orphan Press, 1836), 327.

¹⁴ William Sleeman, "To the Editor of the Calcutta Literary Gazette," *Calcutta Literary Gazette* (3 October 1830), in *Stranglers and Bandits*, ed. by Kim Wagner, 176.

¹⁵ Paul Dundas, "Some Jain References to the Thags and the Samsaramocaka," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 115, no. 2 (1995): 282.

thousand being captured [emphasis mine].”¹⁶ This passage proves that there was a group of thieves called ‘thags’ in existence in the 13th century, and the use of the word ‘fraternity’ indicates that the thags were organized into groups connected through familial relations. Furthermore, it suggests that these fraternities were organized tightly enough that a thousand could be caught based on the intelligence of only one. Finally, there is a record of Aurangzeb’s farman, or royal order/directive, to the diwan of Gujrat on 16 June 1672. This farman outlines a portion of the Mughal penal code, and the tenth law of the code reads:

10. A strangler whose act of strangulation has been legally proved should be chastised and confined till he repents. But if he is habituated to the work and the fact is proved, ... then execute him.¹⁷

This law indicates the existence of habitual stranglers at least one hundred years before the beginning of the Raj. It is impossible to know for sure whether the habitual stranglers referred to in the 17th century were also the familial, organized, thieving groups of thags referenced in the 12th and 14th century texts. Nonetheless, these sources prove that groups of criminals which identified with four of the five thuggee characteristics - strangulation, organization, secrecy, and antiquity - existed in India long before the British began imposing institutional reforms. Therefore, the post-revisionist argument that thuggee was a product of British interference in Indian social structures becomes untenable.

However, there remains the missing characteristic of religiosity. As mentioned, there is no reference to thuggee as religious murder until Sleeman’s 1830 article.¹⁸ Yet it was this idea of religious murder which became the essence of thuggee’s infamy worldwide, and popular works from the Philip Taylor’s contemporaneous *Confessions of a Thug*¹⁹ to the cinematic block-buster *Indiana Jones and the Temple*

¹⁶ H.M. Elliot, *The History of India: as Told by its Own Historians: the Muhammadan Period: The Posthumous Papers of H.M. Elliot* (Calcutta: Susil Gupta (India) Ltd., 1953), 54.

¹⁷ Jadunath Sarkar, *Mughal Administration*, (Calcutta: M.C. Sarkar, 1935), 127-8.

¹⁸ William Sleeman, “To the Editor,” in *Stranglers and Bandits*, ed. by Wagner, 176.

¹⁹ Philip Taylor, *Confessions of a Thug* (London: Richard Bentley, 1839).

*of Doom*²⁰ have represented thuggee as first and foremost an evil cult,²¹ and revisionists and post-revisionists alike have pointed to how the British administration used the image of thuggee, as tied to the Hindu religion, to prove the backwardness of India and justify colonization.²² There was no pre-British reference to a thuggee religion and British primary sources themselves suggested that thuggee was not explicitly religious as much as it had a specific set of superstitions which co-existed with the religions of individual thugs. Much of what we know about thuggee comes from interviews of thugs-turned-informers conducted by William Sleeman. In Sleeman's interviews, the informers testified that they believe in a deity named Bhowanee, also known as Bhavani, who mandates murder through omens.²³ They admitted to believing that adherence to these omens was what allowed thugs to avoid capture, as well as that because they killed on the sanction of their deity, their murders were not morally wrong.

Q.- Do you ever recollect any misfortune arising from going on when a hare crossed the road before you?

Nasir, of Singnapore.- Yes; when General Doveton commanded the troops at Jhalna we were advancing towards his Camp; a hare crossed the road; we disregarded the omen, though the hare actually screamed in crossing, and went on. The very next day I, with seventeen of our gang, were seized....

Q.- And you think these signs are all mandates from the deity, and if properly attended to, no harm can befall you?

²⁰ *Indiana Jones and the Temple of Doom*, directed by Steven Spielberg (Paramount Pictures, 1989).

²¹ Alexander Lyon Macfie, "Thuggee: An Orientalist Construction?" *Rethinking History: The Journal of Theory and Practice* 12, no. 3 (2008): 386-7.

²² See Avinash Singh, "State and Criminality: the Colonial Campaign Against Thuggee and the Suppression of Sikh Militancy in Postcolonial India," *Sikh Formations* 8, no. 1 (2012): 37-58, and Kim Wagner, *Thuggee: Banditry and the British in Early Nineteenth-Century India* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).

²³ William Sleeman, *Ramaseeana, or A Vocabulary of the Peculiar Language Used by the Thugs* (Calcutta: Military Orphan Press, 1836), 141-2.

Nasir. - Certainly; no one doubts it.²⁴

...

Q.- Then do you never feel any dread of punishment hereafter?

Sahib [a Muslim thug].- Never; we never murder unless the omens are favorable; and we consider favorable omens as the mandates of the deity...and what she orders in this world, we believe, that God will not punish in the next.²⁵

This belief in the patronage of Bhavani via adherence to omens is a very different thing from the systematized religion Sleeman describes in 1830, in which “[Bhavani’s] temple at Bindachul...is constantly filled with murderers from every quarter of India,” and thugs make “pilgrimages to her temple...generally in the latter end of the rainy season.”²⁶ This description finds no support in Sleeman’s interviews, and is explicitly repudiated by one informant. This informant claimed that he to never made offerings to Bhavani, nor to ever having sought advice from temple priests. Yet he fervently believed that by obeying omens sent by Bhavani, he would be forgiven for his murders in the next life.²⁷ Furthermore, Richard Sherwood wrote in his 1816 report that the thugs “pay the most servile regard to omens...Cali or Marriatta is regarded as their tutelary deity...and the goddess is entreated to reveal to them, whether she approves of the expedition they are meditating.”²⁸ He makes no reference to any of the temples, cult worshipping, or human sacrifices which became pivotal characteristics of thuggee in British orthodox histories. We can therefore conclude that, while thugs did hold on to certain superstitions regarding their crimes, thuggee was not an essentially religious practice before or after British arrival in India.

In the pursuit of determining whether thuggee was a legitimate phenomenon or an orientalist construction, this paper has found that orthodox and revisionist historians have failed to approach the actual nature of thuggee because of their respective historiographical environments. The former were restricted by insufficient access to native sources and held back by ideological presumptions of

²⁴ William Sleeman, *Ramaseeana*, 141.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 146.

²⁶ William Sleeman, “To the Editor,” in *Strangers and Bandits*, ed. Kim Wagner, 176.

²⁷ William Sleeman, *Ramaseeana*, 150.

²⁸ Richard Sherwood, “Of the Murderers called Phansigars,” in *Ramaseeana*, by William Sleeman, 341.

superiority, while the latter were burdened by the need to break free from orientalism and promote Indian nationalism. With modern access to native sources, post-revisionist historians gained the opportunity to delve deeper into the true nature of thuggee. In response to the post-revisionist debate over whether thuggee was an orientalist construction or a result of British institutional reform, this paper has utilized references to thuggee within the 12th century Upadesamala, the 14th century history of Ziauddin Barani, and the 17th century farman of Araunzeb to prove that thuggee did exist in India before British arrival. Yet this paper found that the existence of thuggee before British arrival is not equivalent to British conceptions of a characteristically religious cult. While the British built up thuggee to be an essentially religious crime, the lack of pre-British references to religiosity, and the data from Sleeman's own interviews, indicates that thuggee was not centered around religious belief or worship, but rather merely encompassed a specific set of superstitions. While the 12th century revisionist desire to undo injustices of oriental colonialism is commendable, this paper illustrates how their excessive revisionism led them to deny the reality of a legitimately provable historical phenomenon. There can be no more doubt that, despite the exaggerated religious nature of thuggee, the crime of thuggee *did* exist, and thugs did operate *before* the arrival of the British.

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Saint George and the Dragon: Saintly and Othered Bodies

LORINDA FRASER

During the late-medieval and early-modern period, increasing travel, trade, and contact with peoples of different cultures, religions, and ethnicities within Western European territories challenged Christian understandings of the human body. This paper investigates whether such contemplations and fears, as established in the legend of Saint George and the Dragon, were a reflection of such changing conceptions about bodies. I consider how the legend reinforced the superiority of Caucasian, Christian, masculine ideals and argue that representations of the dragon reflected expanding cultural notions which marginalized anyone outside of those norms as Other.

Within Europe, the Christian church was the ultimate authority for determining and controlling who was considered 'normal.' Religious, physical, and cultural judgments became dangerous for those with non-normative bodies. Feminization through the punishment of the beast is a natural extension of systems which served to control active female sexuality as a threat to purity and holiness. Ethnic differences were also used to establish political and religious control based on stereotyped physical characteristics and skin colour. I argue that the dragon symbolized those human bodies deemed unqualified for belonging to 'humankind' and, therefore, ineligible for religious conversion and salvation.

Thus as they spake together the dragon appeared and came running to them, and S. George was upon his horse, and drew out his sword and garnished him with the sign of the cross, and rode hardily against the dragon which came towards him, and smote him with his spear and hurt him sore and threw him to the ground.

—Jacobus de Voragine, *The Golden Legend*

Scholarship in recent decades has shown that medieval bodies were highly charged with meaning.¹ As a time of increasing travel,

¹ Monica H. Green, "Introduction," in *A Cultural History of the Human Body in the Medieval Age*, ed. Linda Kalof (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014), 1-2. See Caroline Walker Bynum, "Why All the Fuss about the Body? A Medievalist's Perspective," *Critical Inquiry* 22 (Autumn 1995): 1-33;

trade, and contact with peoples of different cultures, religions, and ethnicities during the later Middle Ages, the Western European understanding of the human body was challenged.² Late medieval contemplations and fears about bodies and the addition of Saint George's battle with a dragon to his hagiography (his sacred biography) was a reflection of changing ways of thinking about the variations possible among human bodies and where the limits of 'humanness' were drawn. Both text and images were used to reinforce the superiority of suitably human bodies—those which conformed to Caucasian, Christian, masculine ideals—in turn, marginalizing anyone outside of those norms as Other.³ This article begins by offering a brief history of Saint George and his heroic battle and common images of the defeat of the dragon whose monstrous presence was employed to symbolically caution Christians against the evils of sin. The literary development of the legend and its visual representations in the Middle Ages reflected expanding cultural notions of the monstrous Other and its use to signify the 'grotesque,' the racialized, the feminized, and the pagan⁴—in other words, all those who fell outside the norms of medieval European Christianity.

Early History of Saint George

Saint George was born in Cappadocia—"the crossroads of Byzantine, Arab, and Transcaucasian worlds"—around the year 270 CE.⁵ His popularity as a soldier saint grew throughout the Crusades

reprinted in *After the Cultural Turn*, ed. Victoria Bonnell and Lynn Hunter (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999).

² Monica H. Green, "The Diversity of Human Kind," in *A Cultural History of the Human Body in the Medieval Age*, ed. Linda Kalof (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014), 163-4.

³ Ibid., 173-4.

⁴ For the purposes of this paper the term 'pagan' refers to all those who held religious beliefs other than Christianity.

⁵ Elizabeth Oke Gordon, *Saint George, Champion of Christendom and Patron Saint of England* (London: S. Sonnenschein and Company, 1907), 3, 23; Sara Kuehn, *The Dragon in Medieval East Christian and Islamic Art*, vol. 86 (Boston: Brill, 2011), 106; Peter Murray, Linda Murray, and Tom Devonshire Jones, editors, "George, Saint," *the Oxford Dictionary of Christian Art and Architecture*, 2013. Oxford Reference (accessed 11 November 2016). He was martyred at Lydda (present day Diospoli, Palestine) by Emperor Diocletian on April 23, 304. Often associated with other warrior saints, Demetrios and Theodore, George's cult was prevalent in Byzantium, Syria, Egypt, Armenia,

(1095-1291 CE), during which he was first associated with dragon slaying in an 11th century Georgian manuscript.⁶ The legendary battle with the dragon was formally added to Saint George's history in Jacobus de Voragine's *The Golden Legend* (ca. 1260 CE).⁷ As the centuries unfolded, Saint George's battle came to represent a period when European Christians increasingly encountered people with unfamiliar faiths and bodies within their own territories. This led to the construction of fear-based notions about such Others and the development of tales which feature the annihilation of non-Christians, feminized adversaries, and racialized groups as forms of reassurance.⁸

The Legend of *Saint George and the Dragon*

The legend begins with a dragon terrorizing the ancient city of Selena in Libya. To keep the creature appeased, the local people fed it two sheep every day. When the sheep ran out, human victims were then offered, drawn by lottery. However, when the king's daughter was chosen he tried to offer the people his wealth in exchange. The citizens, having already given children of their own, refused his offer and the virgin maiden was sent to the marsh of the dragon's lair. While she awaited her fate, Saint George happened by, and, determining the situation, made the sign of the cross, stabbed the approaching dragon with his lance, and used the maiden's girdle to tame the beast. The princess was then able to quietly lead it into the city, although this action terrified the citizens and the king. There, Saint George promised to kill the beast if the people converted from their pagan beliefs to

and Ethiopia during the 6th century. During the 14th century, George became the patron saint of England, Genoa, Barcelona, Portugal, Venice, the Order of the Garter, the Spanish Order of Calatrava, and soldiers and armourers.

⁶ Kuehn, *The Dragon in Medieval East Christian and Islamic Art*, 109-10; Oya Pancaroğlu, "The Itinerant Dragon-Slayer: Forging Paths of Image and Identity in Medieval Anatolia," *Gesta* 43 (2004): 153.

⁷ Murray, Murray, and Jones, "George, Saint," George Ferguson, *Signs and Symbols of Christian Art* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1954), 121-2.

⁸ Stuart Hall, "Introduction," in *Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices*, eds. Stuart Hall and Open University (Thousand Oaks, CA, London: Sage and Open University, 1997) 9-11.

Christianity and agreed to be baptised. Once this was done, Saint George cut off the dragon's head and continued on with his travels.

Representations of the Legend

Paintings and other visual depictions of the legend remained fairly standardized over the centuries. As can be seen in artworks such as Paolo Uccello's *Saint George and the Dragon* (ca. 1470) (Fig. 1), Saint George typically wears the armour of a Roman soldier or a medieval knight, which may or may not include his sign, a red cross on a white background, as a sign of chivalry and Christianity's protection against evil. He rides a horse, which is typically but not always white (as a symbol of purity), and tramples the dragon beneath its front hooves as an allusion to the domination of the church.⁹ Though he penetrates the dragon with his lance—symbolizing the weapon used to pierce the side of Jesus during the Passion—Saint George also carries the sword of the warrior.¹⁰ The saint is also typically shown with a halo, or, as in the case of Tintoretto's *Saint George and the Dragon* (ca. 1555) (Fig. 2), the halo is replaced with swirling masses of clouds centered around an amorphous human figure in the sky, which alludes to God's offer of his divine assistance, and endorsement of the dragon's slaughter. There are frequently visible remains of previous victims scattered about as a further indication of the dragon's reign of terror. Depictions of a far-off city or civilians may also be included, sometimes in "eastern dress and turbans" as can be seen in Vittore Carpaccio's *Triumph of St George* (1502-1507) (Fig. 3).¹¹

Many, but not all, representations of the legend include a depiction of the rescued princess, often avoiding the fray while remaining in the background praying for salvation. In depictions where the dragon has already been lanced, the beast is shown subdued by the maiden's girdle. During the medieval period, the female figure was often used to personify a city or town.¹² The girdle was a unisex item worn over the outer layers of clothing and "served as a purse, protection, and ornament."¹³ For women, the girdle was additionally a

⁹ Ferguson, *Signs and Symbols of Christian Art*, 169-70; James Hall, *Dictionary of Subjects and Symbols in Art*, Revised Edition (Bury St Edmunds, UK: St Edmundsbury Press, 1979), 136-7.

¹⁰ Ibid., 177 and 182.

¹¹ Hall, *Dictionary of Subjects and Symbols*, 136-7.

¹² Ibid., 306.

¹³ Ferguson, *Signs and Symbols of Christian Art*, 174. "Christ used [the girdle]

sign of their chastity and honour.¹⁴ Thus, the princess's body came to symbolize the pagan city about to be converted as well as the virtues of female virginity. By saving the life of the maiden, Saint George is seen as winning the faith of the citizens of the city while also aligning himself with the purity expected of both women and saints of the medieval period.

Monstrous Bodies as the Other

Visual representations of the dragon offer insight into how notions of Othered bodies were feared, stigmatized, and negatively depicted as propaganda to medieval audiences. Monstrous adversaries were conceived to focus and embody those collective fears. Prior to the 11th century, Saint George's foe was a man, frequently bound and prostrated and often understood to be his persecutor Emperor Diocletian.¹⁵ However, spiritual crises within the church, class struggles, conflicts with the Muslim world, rising anti-Semitism, the inquisition, and "frenzied obsession with the antichrist" led to paranoia and anxiety within medieval Christendom.¹⁶ The serpent, which has represented the devil since the *Book of Genesis*, and its variant, the dragon, became a far more sinister symbol and focal point for addressing such tensions and began replacing representations of human foes. Dragons were a motif familiar to medieval audiences from 1st century BCE Celtic cultures, as well as ancient Asian beliefs, where such creatures were commonly a benevolent deity or good omen.¹⁷ Depicted with any combination of a number of horns, claws, heads, tails, and wings, dragons have proven to be adaptable to numerous cultures and characteristics over the centuries. They became a powerfully symbolic proxy for the human bodies that incited collective Christian fears of spiritual and physical harm.¹⁸

to symbolize preparation for any service that God might require of his Children."

¹⁴ Ferguson, *Signs and Symbols of Christian Art*, 175.

¹⁵ Kuehn, *The Dragon in Medieval East Christian and Islamic Art*, 108.

¹⁶ Ariane Delacampagne and Christian Delacampagne, *Here Be Dragons: A Fantastical Bestiary* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), 162-3.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 133-4.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 126 and 133.

As pressures in medieval European Christendom mounted, increasing questions about ‘human nature’ and unfamiliar human bodies were raised—particularly whether such monstrous and grotesque bodies should be considered human at all.¹⁹ The term ‘monster’ originates from the words *monere* (“warn”) and *monstrare* (“show”).²⁰ Between the 12th and 15th centuries distinctions between humans and animals also grew. Visual representations of the devil and all non-human creatures, including animals other than the lamb and unicorn, came to be seen as morally inferior to humans and linked with bestial sins of lust and temptation.²¹ While some theologians argued that all creatures created by God were divine, the monstrous remained broadly stigmatized as abnormal and, therefore, immoral and deserving of eradication.²² The bodies of Christian soldier saints and their adversaries were increasingly used as a system of visual and textual representations for juxtaposing Christian supremacy over paganism and evil.²³ By representing the legend’s invader as a non-human, monstrous Other, Saint George’s valour was even more heroic by comparison. His light-skinned, human/saint’s body, cast in the form of God, was elevated in contrast to the dark, animalistic body of the dragon.

Ethnic Differences

In the 13th century, Chinese refugees fleeing Genghis Khan intermingled with the Muslim world and expanded upon already long-established trade routes.²⁴ Likewise, exchanges between Christians and Muslim merchants and traders had occurred for centuries in places such as Spain, Damascus, and Constantinople.²⁵ However, increasing encounters with unfamiliar realms of people by Western Europeans within their own territories put additional strain on Christian belief

¹⁹ Green, “The Diversity of Human Kind,” 163, 169. As Green states on page 163, “All these places were filled with human bodies. But were they even fully “human,” or did they partake only in some partial way the character of humanness?... At what point did [a body] stop being human and become something monstrous or even bestial?”

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid., 122.

²² Delacampagne and Delacampagne, *Here Be Dragons*, 49.

²³ Pancaroğlu, “The Itinerant Dragon-Slayer,” 152.

²⁴ Ibid., 151.

²⁵ Delacampagne and Delacampagne, *Here Be Dragons*, 151-2; Green, “The Diversity of Human Kind,” 163-4.

systems. The first instance of “state experiments in tagging and herding people, and ruling on their bodies with the violence of law” began in 1215 with Canon 68 of the Fourth Lateran Council, in which the church demanded that all Jews and Muslims be visually distinguishable from Christians.²⁶ Ethnic differences were further qualified to establish distinct races for the maintenance of political and religious control. Medieval bodies were demarcated by a hierarchy of physical traits that were thought to distinguish one’s morality or capabilities and therefore their legal rights and treatment by secular and religious authorities. Some deviations were stereotyped physical characteristics, such as the caricatured ‘Jewish-shaped nose,’ whereas other categories were based upon a continuum of skin colour in which white was seen as “a visual marker of inner courage” while black was “the colour of devils and demons.”²⁷ In medieval Christian representations the dragon is demarcated as threatening by its dark, earth-toned skin in contrast to the pure whiteness of Saint George and the princess. By depicting the Other as a dark-toned monster, artists and viewers were able to easily distinguish such bodies from Christians—a dragon’s body did not require the additional adornment of clothing or badges to visually signify its threatening presence.²⁸

Feminization and Deviant Female Desires

Another form of establishing and maintaining power in the medieval period was through the use of gender roles. As early as Aristotle (384-322 BCE), the difference between ‘form’ as masculinity and intellect and ‘matter’ as femininity and physicality meant that women were also considered “the first sign of monstrosity.”²⁹ Subsequently, a Christian binary system of male and female was established, grounded in man (Adam) being first and therefore the

²⁶ Geraldine Heng, “The Invention of Race in the European Middle Ages I: Race Studies, Modernity, and the Middle,” *Literature Compass* 8 (2011): 315, 318. England was the first country to evoke a law requiring Jews to wear badges in 1218 and the first to expel all non-converted Jews in 1290.

²⁷ Green, “The Diversity of Human Kind,” 178; Heng, “The Invention of Race in the European Middle Ages,” 315, 318, 324-5.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 173-4, 178.

²⁹ Delacampagne and Delacampagne, *Here Be Dragons*, 48.

norm and woman as non-male and abnormal. During the medieval period, having a 'male body' meant that one would naturally engage in active, masculine behaviour in all areas of life, including the penetrating of another during sexual intercourse, while those with female bodies would naturally be passive and seek to be penetrated as part of their "biological nature."³⁰ In her research on the legend, Samantha Riches has discovered over fifty representations in which the dragon is clearly depicted with female anatomy.³¹ For example, the illuminated miniature *St. George, with Red Cross Emblem and Dragon* (ca. 1440-1450) (Fig. 4) shows a dragon lying prostate on the ground exposing an obvious genital orifice. Though breasts are less frequent, they can be found works such as Albrecht Altdorfer's *Saint George Killing the Dragon* (1511) (Fig. 5) in which the dragon displays four breasts.³² If notions of passive yet lustful female sexuality and the monstrous female body were common during this period, representations of a feminized monster seems a reasonable outcome.³³ Within all accounts of the tale, the beast is penetrated by the saint's pseudo-phallic lance in an 'arguably coded' act of male aggression upon a submissive but wicked creature.³⁴ Feminization through the punishment of the beast seems a natural extension of visual programs which served to control active female sexuality as a threat to purity and holiness. Immoral female desire is symbolized by the denigrated

³⁰ Ruth Mazo Karras and Jacqueline Murray, "The Sexual Body," in *A Cultural History of the Human Body in the Medieval Age*, ed. Linda Kalof (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014), 60-1. Though it was considered to be in a woman's nature to be passive, it was also believed that "women were more lustful than men and were always ready to engage in sex." Additionally, within homosexual relationships, only the participant being acted upon—penetrated—was considered to be feminized.

³¹ Andrew Lawless, "Gendered Monsters—Art and Politics in the Representation of St. George and the Dragon: An Interview with Dr. Samantha Riches," *Three Monkeys Online*, 2016.

³² Ibid.

³³ Samantha Riches and Bettina Bildhauer, "Cultural Representations of the Body," in *A Cultural History of the Human Body in the Medieval Age*, ed. Linda Kalof (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014), 193, 197, 199.

³⁴ Riches and Bildhauer, "Cultural Representations of the Body," 199; Pancaroğlu, "The Itinerant Dragon-Slayer," 152. The destruction of the monstrous female body by holy riders can be traced back to 6th century Byzantine amulets on which iconography depicted a "prostrate female demon with long hair" being penetrated with a spear.

dragon and female purity through the girdle and noted virginity of the rescued princess, both of whom are constructed in relation to the chaste and noble Saint George.

Christian Conversion and Salvation

Lastly, the legend questions the apparent supremacy of the Christian faith and the limitations of religious conversion by those people with Other bodies. The Christian church was the ultimate authority for determining and controlling who fell outside the boundaries of its religious, physical, and cultural norms. The church's judgements on what was considered common and 'normal' became dangerous for those who did not live within normative bodies.³⁵ Two categories were formed to differentiate such unfamiliar bodies. First, 'human monsters' were those who differed only slightly from normal humans and were, therefore, considered capable of rational behaviour and salvation.³⁶ Within the legend, this included the king and citizens of Selena.³⁷ The second group, animal-like monsters, were seen as beyond redemption.³⁸ The dragon's body acted as a proxy for those people deemed by the church as unqualified for belonging to 'humankind' and ineligible for conversion or salvation.³⁹ Like the dragon, frequently the submission and civilization of some human Others was not enough, and annihilation became their fate.

Conclusion

...and the people fled by mountains and valleys, and said: Alas!
 alas! we shall all be dead. Then S. George said to them: ne
 doubt ye no thing, without more, believe ye in God, Jesu Christ,

³⁵ Delacampagne and Delacampagne, *Here Be Dragons*, 48, 55; Green, "The Diversity of Human Kind," 173-4.

³⁶ Green, "The Diversity of Human Kind," 170. The category of 'human monster' could include "hermaphrodites, giants, those with extra digits, Ethiopians...satyrs, sirens, centaurs, and various Plinian races."

³⁷ It should be noted, that by bringing the dragon into the pagan city its citizens' deaths were now only preventable *if* they converted from their pagan beliefs to Christianity.

³⁸ Green, "The Diversity of Human Kind," 170-1.

³⁹ Ibid.

and do ye to be baptized and I shall slay the dragon. Then the king was baptized and all his people, and S. George slew the dragon and smote off his head...

—Jacobus de Voragine, *The Golden Legend*

The legend of *Saint George and the Dragon* is just one possible site for critically examining the many ways in which medieval bodies were thought to express meaning. Increased contact with unfamiliar types of bodies during this time led to anxieties and fears about what defined the human body and to new ways of evaluating, judging, and labeling those who fell outside of conventional, normative expectations.⁴⁰ As new encounters and tensions grew, so too did the hagiography of Saint George, resulting in the addition of his dragon-slaying battle. The legend was created to provide a symbolic narrative for medieval fears and anxieties about the spiritual and physical dangers of Others' bodies and the implications for how medieval Christians thought about their own bodies.⁴¹ Saint George's body came to symbolize the moral protection and supremacy of the Christian faith and white Western European male superiority. The body of the princess worked as a sign for the city, vulnerability, purity, and the inaction and powerlessness of women in subordination to men and the temptations of sin.⁴² Most importantly, however, the dragon's monstrous body acted as a proxy for the grotesque, the racialized, the feminized, and the pagan. In other words, all those who fell outside European Christian definitions of 'normal' within an ever-expanding medieval world.

⁴⁰ Green, "The Diversity of Human Kind," 163-4.

⁴¹ Kuehn, *The Dragon in Medieval East Christian and Islamic Art*, 109-10.

⁴² Stuart Hall, "The Work of Representation," in *Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices*, eds. Stuart Hall and Open University (Thousand Oaks, CA, London: Sage and Open University, 1997) 30-1.

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Illustrations



Figure 1.
Paolo Uccello,
*Saint George
and the
Dragon*. Oil
on canvas,
55.6 x 74.2
cm, ca. 1470.
National
Gallery,
London,
England.
<http://www.nationalgallery.org.uk/painting/s/paolo-uccello-saint-george-and-the-dragon>



Figure 2. *St. George,
with Red Cross
Emblem and Dragon*.
Ink on parchment, 29.3
x 20 cm, ca. 1440-
1450. Bodleian
Library, Oxford,
England.
<http://bodley30.bodley>.