

the ascendant historian

UNDERGRADUATE HISTORY JOURNAL | VOLUME 3





the ascendant historian

University of Victoria
Undergraduate Journal of History
Volume 3 | 2024

Copyright © 2024

Authors contributing to *The Ascendant Historian* agree to release their articles under the Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 Unported license. This license allows anyone to share their work (copy, distribute, transmit) and to adapt it for non-commercial purposes provided that proper attribution is given, and that in the event of reuse or distribution, the terms of this license are made clear.

Authors retain copyright of their work and grant the journal the right of first publication. The articles in this journal are also published online as *The Ascendant Historian 3*.

Authors are able to enter into separate, additional contractual arrangements for the non-exclusive distribution of the journal's published version of the work (e.g., post it to an institutional repository or publish it in a book), with an acknowledgement of its initial publication in this journal.

JOURNAL ADMINISTRATION

Co-Editors-in-Chief

Maggie Dennis
Sarah Wald
Conner White
Gwendoline Hodges

Journal Committee

Maggie Dennis
Cheyenne Norman
Sarah Wald
Yuto Wei

Peer Reviewers

Vanessa Aase
Alessandra Azouri
Charlotte Conn
Patrick Ferreira
Taeja Liu
Grant Luttmann
Emily Romonko
Jakob Svorkdal

Copyeditors

Maggie Dennis
Sakiko Noda
Sarah Wald

Professor Panel

Dr. Peter Cook
Dr. Simon Devereaux
Dr. Andrea McKenzie

Cover Photo Credit

Rosetti Photographic Studios

TABLE OF CONTENTS

FRONT MATTER

1 – 7

AUTHOR BIOGRAPHIES

8 – 9

ARTICLES

11 – 118

**The Communist Crusade: How Covert Operations in Nicaragua
Undermined the War on Drugs**

Vanessa Aase

11 – 20

Stalin's War on Religion

James Coe

21 – 27

**The Erasure of Indigenous Presence in the Settler Geographic Imagination:
19th Century Vancouver Island**

Charlotte Conn

28 – 34

**Japanese Pan-Asianism... and... Hawai'i?: The omission of Hawai'i in
Japanese Pan-Asian Thinking**

Daniel Davenport

35 – 42

The Destabilizing Impacts of the Portuguese Colonial War

Patrick Ferreira

43 – 53

Rails to Ruin: The E&N and Settler Views of Vancouver Island

Samuel Holland

54 – 65

Holodomor: Understanding Joseph Stalin's Genocide

Matthew Kerr

66 – 71

The Preservation of Holocaust Memory during the War in Ukraine

Anika Luteijn

74 – 77

**Dangerous vs. Domestic: Cold War Representations of
Female Sexuality**

Braelyn McKim

78 – 86

The Mormon Trail: A Unique Phenomenon?

Meghan McQuay

87 – 93

**The Dutch Patriotic Revolution: Prussians, Patriots,
Orangists, and Frogs**

Kiri H. Powell

94 – 103

**Support for Napoleon's Empire: Maneuvering, Manipulating,
and Managing Public Opinion**

Nicholas Rabnett

104 – 111

A Lesbian Historiography of the French Revolution

Allison Wheeler

112 – 118

CHAIR'S MESSAGE

I am excited to introduce the 2024 issue of the UVic History Department's undergraduate journal, *The Ascendant Historian*. This volume features cutting-edge research completed by History students at the University of Victoria. With the post-pandemic reopening of the world (including for archival research and fieldwork), the talented authors of these articles have been able to ask questions, explore arguments, and access evidence to the full measure of their abilities. The work they have produced here should hearten us all in difficult times.

Over the past year, many of us have reflected on the shifting role of history in high education and society. As the world faces a range of upheavals—among them climate change, food insecurity, and assaults on democracy—many observers assume that the most important solutions will be technological and will emerge from the STEM disciplines. Yet the most pressing problems facing us today are driven by humans, and we must have humanists at the centre of those discussions. Moreover, whether we realize it or not, virtually every debate on the range of policies, issues, and crises in the public sphere is framed historically. In other words, the world needs historians now more than ever, and it needs them to engage publicly with their perspective and knowledge. If the pieces collectively herein are any measure, the historians of the future will be well prepared to fill that role.

As in previous volumes of *The Ascendant Historian*, the articles in this issue showcase the striking innovation and tenacity that UVic History students bring to their work. My colleagues and I applaud the authors for their work as well as the editors and peer reviewers who made this exemplary edition of *The Ascendant Historian* possible.

Jason Colby, Department Chair, August 2023

MESSAGES FROM THE CO-EDITORS-IN-CHIEF

I am honoured to have been chosen as the Co-Head-Editor in chief for the third volume of *The Ascendant Historian*. The journal is a testament to the amazing and insightful work the undergraduate history student body can produce here at the University of Victoria. This year we struggled due to a lack of volunteers, but thanks to the hard work of our team that was formed in the Spring semester the Ascendant Historian was able to provide a summer edition. I'd like to personally thank all those who were involved. As a fully student run journal we are built on the dedication and commitment of our members, authors, peer reviewers, copy editors, and faculty advisors.

This edition includes thirteen essays that represent the hard work and academic skill of our fellow students. *The Ascendant Historian* embodies the ideals of engaged inquiry and thorough research in working towards the dissemination of knowledge through the historical lens. This year we have a wide range of topics as our goal is to represent the diverse set of interests and areas of study within the history undergraduate body.

MAGGIE DENNIS

As Co-Editor-in-Chief of *The Ascendant Historian*, I have had the privilege of reading each of the student works submitted to this edition of the journal. Naturally, one of the most difficult tasks in this role is to help determine which submissions will make the cut. While I am pleased to present to you, the reader, a diverse cross-section of the work produced by our fellow history students, I would like to acknowledge the many other students who took the risk to be vulnerable and share their work with us and the grace with which they accepted rejection. For those whose papers were accepted, it is important that we recognize the amount of hard work and dedication that went into preparing their works for publication. Each author displayed a great deal of insightfulness and humility as myself and the other copyeditors relentlessly combed through their papers. This is a deeply humbling process for even the experienced author, let alone the fledgling historian, and it deserves proper recognition.

As for the content of these works, I believe their greatest value can be found in each paper's ability to encapsulate a point of inspiration for each author at the beginning of their academic career. Understandably, in the career of an academic, the brightest spotlight shines on one's dissertation and the work produced in the following years; these become our highest achievements. However, there is something deeply special about the spark that brought us to academia in the first place. These sparks reside in our early, often clumsy, undergraduate attempts to explore and answer our long-held questions about the world, how we remember it, and how we make sense of the path the world has taken. While these papers certainly demonstrate hard work, academic skill, and engaged inquiry worthy of admiration, I hope that, by sharing them with you and your fellow readers, they will also serve as a reminder of where each academic began and the fruitful path that lays before them.

SARAH WALD

AUTHOR BIOGRAPHIES

VANESSA AASE

Vanessa Aase is a fourth-year History Honours student at UVIC. She is currently in her last year of study, and upon completing her degree, she hopes to continue her studies at UVIC in the Juris Doctor and Masters of Public Administration Dual Degree Program. Her historical interests include substance and government policy, US-USSR Cold War Relations, and the Modern Middle East.

JAMES COE

James Coe is pursuing a major in History and minor in Political Science at the University of Victoria. His favourite historical period of study is the twentieth century with a particular emphasis on the United States, Soviet Union, and China. James also enjoys examining contemporary politics and great power relations.

CHARLOTTE CONN

Charlotte is a fourth year student at UVIC studying History with a focus on the history of British Columbia. She hopes to continue her work in the field of history by working in museum education.

DANIEL DAVENPORT

Daniel Davenport is a current student at the University of Victoria whose interests range across history from culture to energy. His program is in history and economics.

PATRICK FERREIRA

Patrick Ferreira is an undergraduate student in his final year of study at the University of Victoria pursuing a double major in political science and history. His academic areas of interest include political history, foreign policy, international relations, military history, ancient history, and American politics. He has also completed the political science Honours Program, and was the recipient of the 2022 Schuman Challenge, an essay contest that was sponsored by the European Union's delegation to Canada.

SAMUEL HOLLAND

Samuel Holland is a History and Environmental Studies double major with a love for environmental history and design.

MATTHEW KERR

Matthew Kerr is in his final year of studying History at the University of Victoria. His area of focus is on the Cold War and the relationship between the West and the Soviet Union. Matthew is thrilled to share his work, hoping to spread awareness on important historical topics so that we don't lose our touch with the past.

ANIKA LUTEIJN

Anika Luteijn completed her Bachelor of Arts degree in 2023, majoring in History, and has recently finished her tenure as co-president of the UVIC Ukrainian Students' Society. She is now looking at options towards commencing a graduate degree with a focus on 20th Century European History and Holocaust Studies.

BRAELYN MCKIM

Braelyn McKim is a fifth-year History Major with a Minor in Business. Her main historical interests include feminist history, the Cold War, and Nazi Germany. Braelyn is originally from Enderby, B.C. where her high school coursework initially struck her interest in history. She hopes to continue to further her knowledge of the Cold War and women's roles throughout history.

MEGHAN MCQUAY

Meghan McQuay completed her undergraduate degree in history in December 2022. Her areas of interest include British Columbia History, and more specifically, the history of education in BC and Canada as a whole. Since September 2022, they have been working as a research assistant in the Department of Curriculum and Instruction at UVic, and have been specializing in the history of education in BC.

KIRI H. POWELL

Kiri H. Powell is entering her fourth year as a History major and Religion, Culture and Society minor. Her historical interests are wide-ranging, with a specific interest in religion's impact on history, and the history of religions. Since 2022, she has been a research assistant on *Past Wrongs, Future Choices*.

NICHOLAS RABNETT

Nicholas Rabnett is a fourth year student in the Political Science Honours program at the University of Victoria. He is an avid learner of the politics of revolution, leading him to the History Minor program to further his study. He would like to thank his family, friends, and professors for their continued support in his learning.

ALLISON WHEELER

Allison Wheeler recently graduated from the University of Victoria with a B.A. in history and theatre. She was born and raised in Thomasville, Georgia, and has lived in Victoria, British Columbia, for 6 years.

The Communist Crusade: How Covert Operations in Nicaragua Undermined the War on Drugs

Vanessa Aase¹

vanessaaase@gmail.com

Abstract

One of the legacies of the Ronald Reagan Presidency was how his staunch anti-communist demeanour shaped American foreign diplomacy. Yet, a lesser-studied connection is established regarding how Reagan's international priorities influenced his domestic policies. In particular, this paper examines the case study that the overlapping but mutually incompatible goals of undermining communist influence in Nicaragua and domestically waging a "successful" war on drugs provide. As a result, Reagan's approaches to domestic and foreign policy are better understood as counterweights that mutually reinforce, contradict, and collide to create asymmetrical impacts. Reagan's Cold War involvement in Nicaragua reveals that marginalised and radicalised peoples suffered at the hands of foreign policy prioritisations. Reagan's overriding desire to eliminate the "evil" empire encouraged the administration to turn a blind eye to Nicaraguan anti-communist sympathisers who imported illicit drugs into America to fund the war effort. In turn, the American victory in the United States' ongoing War on Drugs proved increasingly elusive. Ultimately Reagan's paradoxical policies illuminate the danger of justifying and prioritizing foreign policy under the rationale of the ends justifying the means.

¹ I would like to acknowledge that I am an uninvited settler on the unceded territories of the Songhees, Esquimalt, and WSÁNEĆ peoples. I want to express my gratitude to my family for their unwavering support of my education. In addition, I would like to thank all the outstanding professors I have had the pleasure of having at UVIC who have pushed me and, in turn, improved my scholarship by leaps and bounds.

On 9 May 1984, President Ronald Reagan issued a speech warning the American public that communism was being installed by force in Nicaragua and to prevent Soviet “weapon[s] of subversion ... long-term American support for democratic development... was needed.”² Ultimately, Reagan argued that support for Nicaraguan “freedom fighters” was imperative because “it is in our national interest to do so and morally it is the only right thing to do.”³ Over two years later, Reagan and his wife Nancy issued a joint speech updating Americans on their “national crusade” efforts against drugs by highlighting the increased seizure of drugs and the incarceration of “10,000 drug criminals” in 1985.⁴ In addition, the Reagans re-stated their goal of treating “drug trafficking as a threat to our national security” and underscored to the public that Americans could not be “morally neutral against any form of tyranny” in the fight against drugs.⁵ To the naked eye, these speeches may seem unconnected. When examining American efforts to topple the Nicaraguan Sandinistas, however, the tension between Reagan’s domestic and foreign policy becomes apparent. As a result, this tension caused the administration to be complacent in, and later try to conceal, its knowledge that the CIA-Contra cabal sold drugs within the US to fund its movement. The rhetorical decision of the Reagan administration to frame anti-drug policies as a war reflected its desire to utilise aggressive solutions including expanding the law enforcement budget, implementing mandatory sentencing, and increasing incarceration rates. In addition, the necessity of the War on Drugs and Contra support is rooted in failures to redress imperialism and white supremacy within and outside the United States.

The Reagan administration supported Contra drug funds by three key means: first, by turning a blind eye to the importation of cocaine to America via aircraft from Nicaragua; second, by giving Contra-sympathetic drug dealers lighter sentences or immunity from prosecution; third, by preventing intelligence organisations from sharing findings that linked the CIA-Contras to the drug trade.⁶ Overall, Contra scholarship focuses on how the controversy reflects the rhetoric within the Reagan administration’s framing of foreign policy objectives.⁷ However, this paper will discuss a theme identified by the Reagan administration’s contradictory dynamics within their domestic and foreign policies: Reagan prioritised toppling the Sandinista Government abroad over the War on Drugs domestically, which undermined the latter. The Reagan administration’s support of the Contras, despite this group’s sparse Nicaraguan support and lack of a political agenda, demonstrates the President’s prioritisation of preserving an image of being tough against perceived communist threats, even at the cost of employing mutually incompatible foreign and domestic policies.⁸ The War on Drugs was hindered by the Contras because policy asymmetrically blamed domestic dealers and users, which led to mass incarceration. However, the administration overlooked Contra drug importation to the US, which thus applied a double standard to domestic residents and foreign allies.⁹ Furthermore, the sentencing disparities of 100:1 between crack and cocaine users, which Reagan enshrined into law, led many to interpret these policies as racially discriminatory because African Americans were more likely to buy and sell crack than white

² Ronald Reagan, “Address to the Nation on United States Policy in Central America,” Washington, DC, May 9, 1984. Ronald Reagan Presidential Library and Museum. 00:01:51, 00:04:58, 00:05:11.

³ Ibid., 00:05:51.

⁴ Reagan, Ronald. “Address to the Nation on the Campaign Against Drug Abuse [with Nancy Reagan].” Speech, Washington, DC, September 14, 1986, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library and Museum: 00:02:09, 00:10:27.

⁵ Ibid., 00:11:03, 00:19:04.

⁶ Peter Dale Scott and Jonathan Marshall, *Cocaine Politics: Drugs, Armies, and the CIA in Central America*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 10, 16, 23.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ David Bewley-Taylor, “Crack in the Lens: Hollywood, the CIA and the African-American Response to the 'Dark Alliance' Series,” *Intelligence and National Security* 23, no.1 (2008): 96; Thomas W. Walker, *Revolution & Counterrevolution in Nicaragua* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 333.

⁹ Jakob Miller, "Secrecy, Conspiracy, and the Media During the CIA-Contra Affair" (2022) Senior Theses, 535, 24. https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/senior_theses/535.

Americans.¹⁰ Moreover, Reagan's excessive prioritisation of fulfilling US interests in Nicaragua through supporting Contra "democratic freedom fighters" had the unintended consequences of revealing undemocratic tendencies within the Reagan administration. Importantly, this scandal uncovered a lack of presidential accountability, corruption within intelligence agencies, inequality before the law, forcing American will on a lesser power abroad, and discriminatory policymaking. Ultimately, the broader lesson this paper reveals is that studying foreign and domestic policy is not best understood by examining the two in isolation but as counterweights that mutually reinforce, contradict, and collide with each other.

The Carter administration's official policy towards Latin America stressed human rights and non-interventionism.¹¹ Yet the commitment to upholding these values in Nicaragua was constricted by other long-standing considerations—order and security. For decades, the Somoza dictatorship was guilty of human rights abuses, such as the illegal imprisonment of political dissidents; embezzlement of humanitarian aid following the 1972 Nicaraguan earthquake; and the torture, rape, and execution of civilians by the National Guard.¹² The Carter administration attempted to balance condoning the abuses of the Somoza dictatorship without supporting the rapidly growing Sandinista movement, given its Marxist and Cuban ties. Eventually, events in Nicaragua outpaced Carter's ability to forge democratic solutions. On 17 July 1979, Anastasio Somoza fled to Miami, and the Sandinistas marched into Managua and installed a new government.¹³ Still, Carter was determined to wield influence in Nicaragua by generating a \$75 million assistance package.¹⁴ However, Ronald Reagan replaced Carter's carrot with a heavy club.

In an address to the 1985 State of the Union, Reagan declared that the United States should not "break faith" with anti-Communist resistance movements.¹⁵ Two months later, political commentator Charles Krauthammer called this speech the declaration of the Reagan Doctrine.¹⁶ Three assumptions guided Reagan's foreign policy: 1) President Carter's policy of detente caused Soviet expansionism to go unchecked and spread; 2) communist movements in the "Third World" were not genuine expressions of anti-American nationalism but were orchestrated by Moscow; and 3) the risk of direct confrontation with the Soviet Union was minimal given that Nicaragua was located in the periphery of the "Third World."¹⁷ Guided by these assumptions, Reagan entered the Oval Office in 1981, determined to take an aggressive stance against communism to renew American strength and purpose.

However, encapsulating Reagan's foreign policy in simplistic terms does not consider the asymmetrical application of this supposed doctrine. For example, the Mujahideen in Afghanistan received substantial military aid and weaponry, while a similar anti-leftist movement in Mozambique received no US assistance.¹⁸ Thus, the varying willingness of Reagan to support "freedom fighters" was based on calculating local conditions, US security interests, and political circumstances. Ultimately, Reagan's National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane corroborates this characterization by recollecting that "policy emerged on a case-by-case basis" and not because of a "comprehensive plan" or a "set of standards to determine which insurgencies were deserving of US aid."¹⁹ Furthermore, although Reagan was an ardent Cold-War warrior, he recognized the limitations of Congressional support for armed conflict due to the effects of Vietnam syndrome on the American political landscape. As a result, Nicaragua was prioritised given its geopolitical and economic significance.

¹⁰ Ibid, 46.

¹¹ Kevin A. Katovich, "Human Rights and Policy Wrongs: United States Involvement in the Creation and Overthrow of the Somoza Regime," 1993, 1. https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/history_honproj/29 (accessed 29 November 2022).

¹² Ibid, 28.

¹³ Walker, *Revolution & Counterrevolution in Nicaragua*, 324.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Chester Pach, "The Reagan Doctrine: Principle, Pragmatism, and Policy," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 36, no. 1 (2006): 75. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/27552748>.

¹⁶ Ibid, 76.

¹⁷ Ibid, 80.

¹⁸ Ibid, 76.

¹⁹ Lou Cannon, *President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime* (New York: Public Affairs, 2000), 323.

In a 1986 address, Reagan urged Congress to support a \$100 million aid package.²⁰ Reagan's electoral coalition of economic and religious conservatives influenced his rhetorical framing of supporting the Nicaraguan Contras. Reagan argued that passing this legislation would prevent the Soviet Union from using Nicaragua as a base to "threaten the Panama Canal, interdict our vital Caribbean sea lanes, and, ultimately, move against Mexico."²¹ Furthermore, he appealed to religious conservatives by asserting that Nicaraguan Christianity was under siege using Evangelical pastor Prudencio Baltodano's story. Reagan described Baltodano's experience of being tied up, struck by a rifle butt in the forehead, stabbed in the neck and ear, and left for dead. Ultimately, Reagan's intricate understanding of his supporter's values and ability to captivate audiences using his acting experience ensured that on 17 October 1986, Congress approved the \$100 million aid.²²

Yet, the advent of US-Contra support occurred five years prior to this speech. The Reagan administration used the CIA to spearhead covert operations in Nicaragua without Congressional oversight. On 16 November 1981, the National Security Council met to consider a plan that would respond to the deterioration of American control in Central America.²³ The meeting resulted in National Security Decision Directive 17, which allotted the CIA \$19 million for Contra training and recruitment.²⁴ Reagan's support became an open secret that Congress strongly condemned and attempted to hamper by forcing Reagan to adhere to the Boland Amendments that proscribed US military aid to the Contras.²⁵

Later, Reagan attempted to re-garner public support by giving the aforementioned 1985 address to the State of the Union. In this speech, the President ignored allegations that the Contras were committing terrorist acts and receiving drug funds. Given his intimate support of the Contras, he was cognizant of these actions. Instead, Reagan praised the Contras as "freedom fighters" who were "the moral equal of our Founding Fathers."²⁶ Following this speech, on 20 August 1985, the Iran-Contra scandal rocked the nation. The administration would not submit to the limitations prescribed by the Boland Amendments. Thus, Reagan ordered Colonel Oliver North to maintain his Contra commitments by having North funnel nearly \$37 million to Contra forces through private donors and third-party countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Iran.²⁷ Ultimately, Reagan disobeyed the law out of desperation because he knew that the Contras were an unpopular movement whose survival hinged on the continuance of extensive US support. The discovery that North supplied arms to Iran in exchange for Contra funds led Congress to cease all but some non-lethal aid in 1987.²⁸ The widely televised nature of the Iran-Contra scandal overshadowed discussions of the more contentious US-Contra drug link.

During the Iran-Contra scandal, twelve Contra supporters were questioned concerning drug trafficking allegations.²⁹ The probe into the Contra drug connection arose when Reagan tried to pass a \$100 million Contra aid package. Backed into a corner, the administration admitted on 17 April 1986, its

²⁰ Ronald Reagan, "Address to the Nation on the Situation in Nicaragua," Washington, DC, March 16, 1986, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library and Museum: 00:03:01.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 00:00:43.

²² Miller, "Secrecy, Conspiracy," 18.

²³ William M. LeoGrande, *Our Own Backyard: The United States in Central America, 1977-1992* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 132.

²⁴ United States Government, "National Security Decision Directive Number 17," *Loyola University Chicago Digital Special Collections*, <http://www.lib.luc.edu/specialcollections/items/show/1338> (accessed 2 November 2022).

²⁵ Joseph Maheady, *The Boland Amendments: a Chronology of Congressional Action*, [Washington, D.C.] Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 1987.

²⁶ Ronald Reagan, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of Union" Speech, Washington, DC, February 6, 1985, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library and Museum.

²⁷ National Security Archive, "The Oliver North File," Oliver North's diaries, e-mail, and memos on the Kerry Report, February 26, 2004. <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB113/index.htm#doc1>.

²⁸ Scott and Marshall, *Cocaine Politics*, 8.

²⁹ Miller, "Secrecy, Conspiracy," 12.

knowledge of the Contra drug connection.³⁰ However, the administration's decision to preemptively release its report of guilt was a strategic attempt to influence the narrative. The report stated that the decision not to inform the public about Contra drug funding was because these funds pre-dated American support.³¹ In response to these allegations, Senators John Kerry and Christopher Dodd requested that hearings on Contra drug trafficking be conducted. Once approved, the Kerry Committee investigated drug trafficking in Nicaragua. In April 1989, the Kerry Committee released a report that outlined three crucial findings: 1) wars in Central America eroded already inadequate laws on drug trafficking; 2) no irrefutable evidence linked Contra leaders to drugs smuggling, but facets of the Contras (i.e. pilots, suppliers, and supporters) trafficked drugs through war zones; and 3) payments were given to drug traffickers by the US State Department using Congressional funds meant for Contra humanitarian assistance.³² The Kerry Committee was largely discredited by mass media because many of its sources were drug dealers, which led the public to discount its validity.

Despite Reagan's sensationalised claims about the Contras being the equivalents of Washington and Jefferson, the administration supported the Contras as allies of convenience who appealed to Reagan because of what they opposed rather than the values they championed. Reagan's overarching desire to destroy the "evil empire," the fatalistic assumption that any pro-US movement was automatically democratic, coupled with Nicaragua's geopolitical significance to the US, led the administration morally astray. In a riveting Human Rights Watch report (1989), the Contras were documented as "major and systematic violators of the most basic standards of the laws of armed conflict, including by launching indiscriminate attacks on civilians, selectively murdering non-combatants, and mistreating prisoners."³³ This characterisation of the Contras contrasts with Reagan's depiction of the movement as exercising its fundamental democratic principles. Edgar Chamorro, former Contra Director, cited that the guerrilla movement had failed because they were not a nationalist independent force. Instead, the Contras were a US creation forged to manufacture friendly regimes in Latin America reminiscent of the Monroe Doctrine (1823). As a result, Chamorro described the Contras as a "proxy army" that had "no plans for Nicaragua [because] we were working for American goals."³⁴ For Reagan, stopping communist expansionism within the Americas outweighed any moral calculation to shield Nicaraguans from war and terror.

Nicaraguan civilians were not the only racialised victims to suffer due to the administration's zealous prioritisation of fighting communism abroad. Most notably, African Americans suffered asymmetrically during the War on Drugs. The administration was complacent with the smuggling of cocaine into the US and the sale of cocaine's derivative, crack, to fund the Contras when Congress outlawed Contra funding.³⁵ Thus, instead of focusing on combating the importation of drugs, Reagan pressured law enforcement to concentrate on incarcerating domestic dealers and users. However, African Americans were overrepresented within these vulnerable populations. Fundamentally, these drug control initiatives failed to lower the number of users and dealers but were remarkably effective agents of social control in maintaining the strata of racial minorities and women. The War on Drugs strengthened institutionalised racism, perpetuated the overrepresentation of African American men in prison, and destroyed the black American nuclear family.

Crack's asymmetrical impact within the African American community was caused by the concentration of these populations in poor inner-urban areas and the reconstruction of the job market.³⁶

³⁰ "US Concedes Contras Linked to Drugs, But Denies Leadership Involved," *Associated Press*, April 17, 1986.

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² John F. Kerry, *Drugs, Law Enforcement and Foreign Policy: A Report*, Report prepared for the use of the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics, and International Operations of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 100th Cong., 2d sess., 1988, Committee Print, 2.

³³ Human Rights Watch. *Nicaragua World Report* (1989).

³⁴ Edgar Chamorro, *Packaging the Contras: A Case of CIA Disinformation* (New York: Institute for Media Analysis, 1987), 57.

³⁵ Miller, "Secrecy, Conspiracy," 15.

³⁶ Eloise Dunlap, Andrew Golub, and Bruce D. Johnson, "The Severely-Distressed African American Family in the Crack Era: Empowerment Is Not Enough," *Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare* 33, no.1 (2006): 115–139.

This hypersegregation occurred following World War I due to the migration of African Americans to cities in search of industrial labour. During the migration, they were forced into crowded, decrepit neighbourhoods due to restrictive covenants, violence, and discriminatory real estate agents.³⁷ Conversely, white families began to move into segregated suburban areas. In addition, the reconstruction of the job market towards university education occupations continued to deplete wealth from urban areas. Thus, impoverishment and long-term joblessness were associated with the consequences of poor health, PTSD, family dissolution, teen pregnancy, high school dropout, crime, and drug abuse.³⁸ Then, the crack era hit. Crack cocaine became popular among African American dealers and users because it was easy to make and inexpensive to buy. Moreover, the high obtained from crack lasted for 10 minutes, which generated users who purchased at high-frequency rates. Consequently, crack use led to interpersonal violence, increased prostitution, child neglect, and family dissolution.

Reagan expanded the drug war by introducing a mandatory sentence of five years for crack cocaine possession and created sentencing disparities between cocaine and crack. These disparities led to racial and class imbalances since Reagan's efforts focused on policing lower-socioeconomic urban areas that disproportionately housed African American families. Conversely, suburban white cocaine users were largely ignored by the news and police. In 1992, African American men represented 6% of the American population but constituted 46% of its prison population.³⁹ The administration further increased the power of the FBI, whose drug enforcement budget increased by 1087% between 1980-1984.⁴⁰ Thus, the Reagan administration prioritised penalization over treatment, which caused the incarceration rate for nonviolent drug offences to rise from 50,000 in 1980 to 400,000 in 1997.⁴¹ Ultimately, the administration's enshrinement of sentencing disparities for cocaine and crack cocaine, reinforced systemic racism in the justice system.

On 13 July 1989, Jennifer Johnson was the first woman to be criminally convicted for giving birth to a drug "exposed" infant.⁴² The prosecution argued that during the 60 to 90 seconds before the baby's umbilical cord was cut, Johnson had delivered a cocaine derivative through the cord. The court sentenced Johnson to 15 years.⁴³ This ruling came despite the criminal justice system's claim to protect children and not criminalise mothers. In many states, community members who knew of drug users that bore children must, by law, report them to the authorities as child abusers.⁴⁴ Yet, the threat of losing custody or the benefit of food stamps discouraged women from seeking treatment. African American women used crack more than any other group because of their disproportionate presence in urban centres and lack of paternal support due to incarceration.⁴⁵ From 1982 to 1999, African American children were twice as likely to be placed in foster care than white children.⁴⁶ Ultimately, drug policies under Reagan cast maternal users as criminals who victimised their children rather than treating those mothers as victims in their own respect. This case study illuminates the stark reality of who was targeted in this War on Drugs. It was not drug kingpins but vulnerable African American women who struggled below the poverty line, coped by using drugs, and, thus, became addicted.

The US-backed Contra drug scandal of the 1990s was a tumultuous time for race relations, cemented in the context of the Los Angeles Police Department beating Rodney King (3 March 1991) and the subsequent LA riots (29 April to 4 May 1992). Moreover, increased internet access transformed

³⁷ Ibid., 117-118.

³⁸ Ibid., 118.

³⁹ Mary F. Hall, "The 'War on Drugs': A Continuation of the War on the African American Family," *Smith College Studies in Social Work* 67, no.3 (1997): 612. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00377319709517509>.

⁴⁰ Miller, "Secrecy, Conspiracy," 24.

⁴¹ "A History of the Drug War." Drug Policy Alliance. Accessed November 29, 2022.

⁴² Hall, "The 'War on Drugs'," 612.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 613.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Effrosyni Kokaliari, "African American Perspectives on Racial Disparities in Child Removals," *Child Abuse and Neglect* 90 (2019): 139. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chiabu.2018.12.023>.

political discourse along racial lines, most famously illustrated in the O.J. Simpson verdict (3 October 1995).⁴⁷ This racial polarisation extended to the public's reception to the US-Contra drug connection. When *San Jose Mercury News* issued the web series *Dark Alliance* by Gary Webb, who alleged that the CIA had a hand in the spread of crack cocaine in South Central LA, it reaffirmed the suspicion that the American government perpetuated racial inequalities.⁴⁸ When some African Americans (who directly experienced crack addiction in their communities) read Webb's findings, it validated previously unsubstantiated beliefs. Adversely, mainstream media's response (which maintained a majority white audience) dismissed the reactions of African Americans to Webb's claims by characterising it as "black paranoia."⁴⁹ White Americans tended to view the scandal as a conspiracy theory because of the privilege and safety of their suburban neighbourhoods, which removed them from the drug war's reality.⁵⁰ In the case of the Contra drug link, however, where there was smoke, there was fire, and the so-called "black paranoia" was well-founded.⁵¹

A theme within the "great communicator's" speeches was Reagan's rhetorical signalling to the Second World War (WWII) when the American purpose was at its height. However, the end of WWII represented a new international order characterised by decolonisation. In its wake, foreign policy-making was complicated for the US because, despite possessing the world's most advanced military hardware, gunboat diplomacy was no longer internationally acceptable for securing domestic interests abroad. Decisive victories and objective "evils" no longer characterised foreign intervention efforts. Instead, Congressional constraints and changing cultural attitudes caused covert operations and neocolonial pressures to become necessary tools to assert the American foreign agenda.

The War on Drugs is a painstaking case of institutionalised racism perpetuated within American domestic policy. The overrepresentation of African Americans in prison and foster care led many to deem the drug war an attack on African American families. Given this context, any meaningful efforts to reduce users and dealers must address the structures of institutionalised racism and intergenerational trauma that caused African Americans to be overrepresented in the "war's" targets. Importantly, framing drug reduction policies as a war naturalises violence as an acceptable solution and transforms domestic users into state enemies. Incarceration is shown to have a negligible impact on decreasing the number of users, and prisons possess ineffective health structures to treat drug addictions.

In Nicaragua, the inability of Reagan to grapple with the consequences of American imperialism caused Nicaraguan politics to be framed within a greater American Cold War policy. The US had, since 1855 (through the filibustering of Nicaragua by William Walker), used its strength to shape Nicaraguan politics.⁵² The US tolerated human rights abuses committed by the Somoza regime so long as the country remained anti-communist. However, poverty and repression often fuelled the radical flame of local Nicaraguans. Instead of viewing a communist government as a consequence of American inadequacy to intervene against Somoza's long-standing abuses, the US immediately took steps to erode Nicaraguan sovereignty by sponsoring the Contras. Moreover, American intervention was justified based on supporting democratic "freedom fighters." However, the Reagan administration's operations in Nicaragua can be characterised as undemocratic because they were taken without Congressional oversight, financed through illegal means (i.e. drug trade), breached Nicaraguan sovereignty, and violated the laws of armed conflict.

The principle of the end justifying the means was apparent in the American Cold War policy. In Nicaragua, the White House turned a blind eye to the illegal activities of foreign actors and operatives in exchange for combating communism. Indeed, even the egregious act of funding these initiatives through the clandestine sale of cocaine to the US domestic market was allowed to prosper unchecked.

⁴⁷ Miller, "Secrecy, Conspiracy," 48.

⁴⁸ Bewley-Taylor, "Crack in the Lens," 85.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Bewley-Taylor, "Crack in the Lens," 85.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Katovich, "Human Rights and Policy Wrongs," 3.

Simultaneously, Reagan resurrected and intensified the War on Drugs. These efforts focused on expanding the budget of law enforcement to over-police urban areas of lower socioeconomic strata and measuring the war's success in incarceration rates. This inherent tension between foreign and domestic policies was damning when set against the backdrop of the US as an ethical and democratic nation. In the end, while these instances have undermined the legacy of the Reagan administration, the real victims of Reagan's foreign policy prioritisations were not those in the White House. Instead, the victims were the Nicaraguan civilians who died at the hands of Contra terrorism and the African American families who were fragmented by incarceration and the foster care system. The US Contra affair is an edifying example of how, when foreign policies take precedence over and direct domestic policies, vulnerable populations domestically and abroad are made to suffer.

Bibliography

- “A History of the Drug War.” Drug Policy Alliance. <https://drugpolicy.org/drug-war-history/> (accessed 29 November 2022).
- Bewley-Taylor, David. “Crack in the Lens: Hollywood, the CIA and the African-American Response to the ‘Dark Alliance’ Series.” *Intelligence and National Security* 23, no.1 (2008): 81-102. <https://doi.org/10.1080/02684520701798155>.
- Chamorro, Edgar. *Packaging the Contras: A Case of CIA Disinformation*. New York: Institute for Media Analysis, 1987.
- Dunlap, Eloise, Andrew Golub, and Bruce D, Johnson. “The Severely-Distressed African American Family in the Crack Era: Empowerment Is Not Enough.” *Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare* 33, no. 1 (2006): 115–139.
- Hall, Mary F. “The ‘War on Drugs’: A Continuation of the War on the African American Family.” *Smith College Studies in Social Work* 67, no. 3 (1997): 609–21. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00377319709517509>.
- Human Rights Watch. *Nicaragua World Report* (1989).
- Katovich, Kevin A., "Human Rights and Policy Wrongs: United States Involvement in the Creation and Overthrow of the Somoza Regime," 1993. https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/history_honproj/29 (accessed 29 November 2022).
- Kerry, John F. *Drugs, Law Enforcement and Foreign Policy: A Report*. Report prepared for the use of the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics, and International Operations of the Committee on Foreign Relations. 100th Cong., 2d sess., 1988. Committee Print 100-165.
- Kokaliari, Effrosyni D. “African American Perspectives on Racial Disparities in Child Removals.” *Child Abuse and Neglect* 90 (2019): 139-148. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chiabu.2018.12.023>.
- LeoGrande, William M. *Our Own Backyard: The United States in Central America, 1977-1992*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2009.
- Maheady, Joseph. *The Boland Amendments: a Chronology of Congressional Action*. [Washington, D.C.]: Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 1987.
- Miller, Jakob, "Secrecy, Conspiracy, and the Media During the CIA-Contra Affair" (2022). Senior Theses. 535. https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/senior_theses/535.
- National Security Archive. “The Oliver North File .” Oliver North's diaries, e-mail, and memos on the Kerry Report, February 26, 2004. <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB113/index.htm#doc1>.
- Pach, Chester. “The Reagan Doctrine: Principle, Pragmatism, and Policy.” *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 36, no.1 (2006): 75–88. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/27552748>.
- Reagan, Ronald. “Address to the Nation on United States Policy in Central America.” Speech, Washington, DC, May 9, 1984. Ronald Reagan Presidential Library and Museum. <https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/reagans/reagan-administration/president-reagans-addresses-nation>.
- Reagan, Ronald. “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of Union” Speech, Washington, DC, February 6, 1985. Ronald Reagan Presidential Library and Museum.
- Reagan, Ronald. “Address to the Nation on the Situation in Nicaragua.” Speech, Washington, DC, March 16, 1986. Ronald Reagan Presidential Library and Museum.

<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/reagans/reagan-administration/president-reagans-addresses-nation>

Reagan, Ronald. "Address to the Nation on the Campaign Against Drug Abuse [with Nancy Reagan]." Speech, Washington, DC, September 14, 1986. Ronald Reagan Presidential Library and Museum.
<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/reagans/reagan-administration/president-reagans-addresses-nation>.

Scott, Peter Dale, and Jonathan Marshall. *Cocaine Politics: Drugs, Armies, and the CIA in Central America*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998.

United States Government. "National Security Decision Directive Number 17." *Loyola University Chicago Digital Special Collections*. <http://www.lib.luc.edu/specialcollections/items/show/1338> (accessed 2 November 2022).

"US Concedes Contras Linked to Drugs, But Denies Leadership Involved." *Associated Press*, April 17, 1986.

Walker, Thomas W. *Revolution & Counterrevolution in Nicaragua*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1991

Stalin's War on Religion

James Coe⁵³

huma.now.official@gmail.com

Abstract

This paper examines the context, actions, and motivation of Joseph Stalin's war on religion between the years of 1929 and 1941. This paper documents Stalin's context through the works of Karl Marx, anti-religious precedents set by Vladimir Lenin, and Stalin's own personal views on religion. Anti-religious actions of Stalin examined within this paper include the Law on Religious Associations, reshaping of the Gregorian calendar, support for the League of Militant Godless, and the Great Purge. This paper argues that Stalin's extreme levels of religious repression were done not with the sole intention of fulfilling communist ideology but rather held a distinct power-oriented motive. Religion was a state-undermining influence to Stalin's communist regime through religious followers' allocation of authority to a higher power rather than Stalin and the Communist Party. Furthermore, religion propagated ideals contradictory to the state. Stalin eases his anti-religious policies during and after World War II when it aided in stabilising his position of power proving that following communist doctrine was not his sole motivation.

⁵³ I would like to thank Co-Editor-in-Chief of *The Ascendant Historian*, Sarah Wald, for her commitment to the copyediting process. I also acknowledge Dr. David Dolff for whom my essay was originally created and his role in furthering my education. Finally, I would like to thank my parents for their continued support and facilitation of my academic career.

The Soviet Union has an extensive history of persecuting followers of religion. However, between the years of 1929 and 1941, the Soviet Union experienced a period of heightened religious repression under Joseph Stalin's regime. Religious gatherings were suppressed and religious followers were targeted by the state in attempts to create an atheist society. Atheism was a longstanding goal of communist ideologues and Stalin was no exception. Although Stalin held communist beliefs, he targeted religion not with the sole intention of fulfilling his ideology but instead as a practical way of solidifying his own power. Stalin's process of religious repression may begin to be understood through communist doctrine itself. This includes the teachings of Karl Marx, the anti-religious precedent by Vladimir Lenin leading into Stalin's policies, and Stalin's own view on religion. The anti-religious policies taken by Stalin include direct actions such as his Law on Religious Associations and reshaping of the Gregorian calendar, social actions such as support of the League of Militant Godless' activity, and the culmination of anti-religious repression during the Great Purge. The proof of Stalin's power-oriented motive for repression of religion may be drawn from religion's state-undermining influence and Stalin's relaxation of aggressive anti-religious policies during and after World War II when it served his own interests.

The teachings of German philosopher Karl Marx were responsible for the political ideology of communism. Marx largely concerned himself with attempting to explain the laws of history, specifically with a focus on the economic means of production. Marx divided the world into oppressive bourgeois factory owners and the downtrodden working-class proletariat. In addition to economics, Marx also addressed the issue of religion, writing: "Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, and the soul of soulless conditions. It is the opium of the people."⁵⁴ To Marx, religion was illusory happiness which prevented true happiness by liberation in the form of communism from occurring.

Vladimir Lenin, the Soviet Union's first leader, implemented anti-religious policies that were justified by the teachings of Marx and helped to lay the groundwork for Stalin's policies. Lenin proclaimed that the entire Marxist outlook on religion should be based upon Marx's "opium of the people" quotation.⁵⁵ Lenin elaborated, writing that "Marxism has always regarded all modern religions and churches, and each and every religious organisation, as instruments of bourgeois reaction that serve to defend exploitation and to befuddle the working class."⁵⁶ It was clear to Lenin and his Bolshevik party that religion was used by the ruling class to keep the masses in thrall.⁵⁷

When the Bolsheviks came to power in 1917, they promised to create a new civilization and sweep away the old.⁵⁸ In addition to economic, cultural, and political restructuring, religion was targeted. In order to achieve his communist utopia, Lenin adopted the policy of "gosateizm," or, in English, "state atheism". Atheism in the Soviet Union was not the same as the emotionless "bourgeoisie atheism" which saw God as a philosophical question; instead, Soviet atheism was seen as a scientific truth and deliberately partisan just like communism.⁵⁹ Lenin declared a separation between church and state on 20 January

⁵⁴ Karl Marx, "Introduction," in *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, ed. Joseph O'Malley, trans. Annette Jolin and Joseph O'Malley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970).
<https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1843/critique-hpr/>.

⁵⁵ Vladimir Lenin, "The Attitude of the Worker's Party Towards Religion," in *Lenin Collected Works*, trans. Andrew Rothstein and Bernard Isaacs, vol. 15, March 1908-August 1909 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1973), 402.
<https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/cw/pdf/lenin-cw-vol-15.pdf>

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 403.

⁵⁷ Stephen Smith, "Communism and Religion," in *The Cambridge History of Communism*, ed. Juliane Fürst, Silvio Poons, and Mark Selden (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 312.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316471821>.

⁵⁸ Daniel Peris, "Introduction," in *Storming the Heavens: The Soviet League of Militant Godless* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), 1. <https://doi-org/10.7591/9781501735196>.

⁵⁹ William van den Bercken, *Ideology and Atheism in the Soviet Union* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1989), 125.
<https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110857375>.

1918. The Decree on Separation of Church and State nationalised church property; removed recognition of religious entities as legal entities; ended religious education in schools; turned birth, marriage, and death into civil matters; removed religious symbols and rituals from public life; and allowed for the following of any or no religion.⁶⁰ Priests were targeted during this time and were consequently denied the right to vote, forced to pay higher taxes, and given restricted access to state resources such as rations and housing.⁶¹ Due to this treatment, many religious officials aligned with the White Army during the Russian Civil War, a decision that would lead to the death of 28 bishops and several thousand clergymen at the hands of Lenin's secret police, "the Cheka," and the Red Army.⁶² After the civil war, religious organisations were seen by Lenin as a remnant of the enemy and a final threat to his consolidation of state power. Although Lenin engaged in anti-religious policies such as sending soldiers to seize religious artefacts and sell them for famine aid in 1922, there was not a clear consensus among Bolsheviks on how to remove religion from society. There were debates as to whether religion would simply wither away as society progressed; if long-term education of science and rationality was the answer; or if the state should forcefully eliminate religion through ideological, legal, and repressive means.⁶³ Lenin's successor, Stalin, would opt for the latter.

Stalin's view on religion shaped his aggressive anti-religious policies. Stalin was first introduced to Marxism in his youth while attending Tiflis Theological Seminary. Stalin was eventually expelled from the seminary school when he became a Marxist. After a period of political activism in the Caucasus, Stalin became known to Lenin and slowly made his way into the Bolshevik Party structure. Given his close ties to Lenin and the theories of Marx, it is unsurprising that Stalin developed similar anti-religious thoughts. Stalin's view differed, however, as he took a much more repressive approach to dealing with religion. Marx only provided an ideological basis for religion's removal and Lenin failed to completely remove religion from Soviet society. Stalin believed that like the *kulaks*, an economically above-average peasant class, religion could be liquidated.⁶⁴ In 1932, the League of Militant Godless, an organisation founded in 1925 to promote atheism, announced, under the orders of Stalin, that by 1937, "not a single house of prayer shall remain in the territory of the USSR, and the very concept of God must be banished from the Soviet Union."⁶⁵ Stalin's government saw religion as the only legally existing counterrevolutionary force.⁶⁶ Such a hardline view of atheism encapsulates Stalin's anti-religious policy and his war on religion.

Soon after consolidating his power over the Soviet Union, Stalin would implement laws to directly repress religious citizens. While Lenin tended to target religious institutions, Stalin shifted focus towards denouncing religion as a whole.⁶⁷ The Law on Religious Associations, issued on 8 April 1929, was one of Stalin's early and most significant anti-religious policies. It sought to remove religion by narrowing its borders of legality within the Soviet Union and to bring all aspects of religious life under state control.⁶⁸ The Law on Religious Associations resulted in the banning of public worship, closing of religious buildings, removal of church bells, heavy taxation on functioning congregations, and the mass

⁶⁰ Smith, "Communism and Religion," 308-09.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 309.

⁶² *Ibid.*

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 312.

⁶⁴ Denzil Harber, "Religion in the Soviet Union," *Workers International News* 6, no. 1 (October 1945): 31. <https://www.marxists.org/history/etol/newspaper/win/v06n01-oct-1945-workers-intl-news.pdf>.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶ Victoria Smolkin, "The Religious Front: Militant Atheism under Lenin and Stalin," in *A Sacred Space Is Never Empty: A History of Soviet Atheism*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018), 46. <https://doi-org/10.2307/j.ctt1zgb089>.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

arrest of clergymen.⁶⁹ Furthermore, almost every religious activity was made illegal, including producing or distributing religious literature and raising money for charity.⁷⁰ Religious associations of at least twenty adults would face difficulty obtaining legitimacy by having to apply for permission to operate and prove they have a religious building in which they would worship.⁷¹ These local associations were the only legal religious structure recognized by the Soviet Union. In the same year, Stalin introduced the continuous five-day week. The five-day week reshaped the previous Gregorian calendar into 365 days with six five-day weeks equating into one month. Citizens were assigned different days of work and days off. Stalin enacted this dramatic change to increase factory production; however, there was a deliberate anti-religious element. Sunday, a shared day of rest when Christians could gather at church, no longer existed. Similarly, Friday no longer existed for Muslims as a holy day and Saturday no longer existed for Jews. There were no designated religious holidays, instead only five revolutionary holidays. Such actions by Stalin damaged the ability for individuals to exercise religious observance.

In addition to state law, Stalin also fostered social anti-religious behaviour. Decentralised movements were encouraged to promote anti-religious propaganda so that Stalin's atheist objective would appear to be a spontaneous desire of the masses rather than a government initiative.⁷² As previously noted, one of the most prominent anti-religious social organisations was the League of Militant Godless. Although the League of Militant Godless were founded in 1925, in June 1929, they gained extensive powers by Stalin to launch their renewed campaign to destroy religion.⁷³ By 1932, the League had five and a half million members, two million more than the Communist Party itself.⁷⁴ The League sought to bring atheism to the masses by promoting anti-religious propaganda through their newspaper entitled "*Bezbozhnik*," or in English "The Godless," as well as through journals, posters, lectures, and demonstrations.⁷⁵ One of their posters reads "the struggle against religion is the struggle for socialism" while depicting two strong red-coloured men who are about to drive their tractor over various religious caricatures.⁷⁶

A key part of society targeted by Stalin and his social organisations was academia. Lenin removed religion in schools, yet it was not replaced by atheism. Instead, schools became irreligious.⁷⁷ However, under Stalin, higher educational institutions were made actively anti-religious resulting in purges.⁷⁸ Additionally, The League contributed to the attack on academia by establishing anti-religious departments within the universities.⁷⁹

The repressive laws and social attitudes of Stalin's regime culminated between the years of 1937 and 1938 in what came to be known as the Great Purge. During the Great Purge, Stalin's paranoia infiltrated all aspects of civil life, resulting in the death or imprisonment of one and a half to five million Soviet citizens. If a citizen was arrested, their friends and family were targeted soon after. Stalin sought to purge any allegedly dissident element of society, and, due to the historical context of communist doctrine, religious members were a prime target. The Orthodox Church was accused of collaborating with domestic

⁶⁹ Smith, "Communism and Religion," 313.

⁷⁰ Philip Walters, "A Survey of Soviet Religious Policy," in *Religious Policy in the Soviet Union*, ed. Sabrina Petra Ramet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 13. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511598272.002>.

⁷¹ *Ibid.* 13-14.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 14.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 13.

⁷⁴ Peris, "Introduction," 2.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

⁷⁶ "The Brutal Art of Early Soviet Antireligious Propaganda Posters, 1920-1940," Rare Historical Photos, accessed November 11, 2022, <https://rarehistoricalphotos.com/soviet-antireligious-propaganda-posters/>.

⁷⁷ Smolkin, "The Religious Front," 33.

⁷⁸ Walters, "A survey of Soviet religious policy," 14.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

religious underground organisations and counterrevolutionary agents abroad.⁸⁰ The 1929 Law on Religious Associations was seen as too permissive towards religion and anti-religious policy was further intensified. Between 1937 and 1938, 14,000 churches were closed and 35,000 “servants of religious cults” were arrested.⁸¹ 168,300 members of the Orthodox Church clergy were arrested and 106,300 were killed.⁸² Despite such an extreme war on religion waged by Stalin, religion prevailed. A 1937 census of 98,412 people saw 56.17% of respondents identify as believers; this number rose to two thirds in rural areas.⁸³ In 1939, the census removed the question on religion to avoid this social reality, however, when they requested “citizen of which state,” various respondents wrote “Christian” or “Orthodox.”⁸⁴

Stalin’s reference to communist doctrine during his war on religion was convenient and duplicitous. His true motive was to solidify his own power. Stalin attempted to depict religious followers as subversive to the revolution and incompatible with a communist utopia. In reality, many religious individuals worshipped in the Soviet Union without posing any threat to the governing authority; this was especially true in the countryside. Given this is the case, why would Stalin delegate the amount of effort he did into targeting followers of religion? Religion undermined Stalin’s power. Instead of being a strong counter-revolutionary force, religion provided a guide to life for the individual distinct from that of the communist state. God’s authority was placed above the state giving Him more power than Stalin. The Torah, Bible, and Quran’s teachings transcended the teachings of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin giving religious texts more authority than those in which the state based their rule upon. Without religion the state decides social moral principles which citizens must adhere to. For example, the mass murder of alleged enemies of the revolution is acceptable under Stalin’s moral code but goes against the fundamental tenets of most religions, notably, in Exodus, the sixth of ten commandments: “You shall not kill.”⁸⁵ Holding a religious based moral code contradictory to that of the state posed a threat to Stalin’s supreme rule by potentially undermining his violent policies. The war on religion would solidify Stalin’s political power by halting the political influence of religious institutions and, thereby, suppressing the beliefs of individual religious followers.

Further evidence that Stalin’s war on religion was based on his desire for power rather than following of communist doctrine can be seen with his shift in attitude during World War II. When German soldiers occupied parts of the Soviet Union, they began to encourage the revival of religion among inhabitants by reopening churches.⁸⁶ This was a deliberate attempt to undermine Stalin’s regime. In June 1941, at the time of Germany’s invasion there were several hundred churches across German-occupied Soviet territory, such as Ukraine and Belorussia; by 1944 this number reached approximately 10,000.⁸⁷ Continuing to pursue anti-religious policy would hurt Stalin’s rule as it could encourage Nazi sympathy among Christian followers within occupied lands. Inside Soviet-controlled territories, the Nazi invasion created a rise in patriotism among Orthodox Church followers.⁸⁸ Stalin recognised that he could use religion for his own power by tying the Orthodox Church to Russian national identity. In this process, Stalin relaxed many of his anti-religious policies. Although the church was unable to practise social welfare and education, they were able to grow their clergy and parishes, reopen a small number of monasteries and theological schools, raise income, and rent or construct buildings.⁸⁹ In September 1943,

⁸⁰ Smolkin, “The Religious Front,” 47.

⁸¹ Smolkin, “The Religious Front,”

⁸² Alexander Yakovlev, “The Clergy,” in *A Century of Violence in the Soviet Union* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 165.

⁸³ Smolkin, “The Religious Front,” 48.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Exodus 20:13 King James Version.

⁸⁶ Smith, “Communism and Religion,” 313.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Ibid., 314.

Stalin allowed the election of the Patriarch of the Orthodox Church to transpire; this marked a significant shift in Stalin's relationship with religion. Stalin undermined the anti-religious communist doctrine upon which he based his own previous anti-religious policies when it helped him to maintain his power.

Stalin's pre-World War II regime saw a period of heightened repression through the suppression of religious gatherings and the persecution of religious individuals. Stalin attempted to create an atheist society as justified by communist doctrine, but covertly fuelled by his quest for personal power. The basis for Stalin's actions can be understood through the teachings of Marx, the anti-religious precedent by Lenin, and Stalin's own view on religion. Stalin's anti-religious policies can be analysed by examining direct actions such as his Law on Religious Associations and reshaping of the calendar; social action such as support of the League of Militant Godless' activity; and the culmination of anti-religious repression through the Great Purge. By understanding the context from which Stalin operated and his subsequent actions in relation to the state undermining influence of religion, it is clear through juxtaposition with his eventual relaxation of anti-religious policies, that Stalin's war on religion was ultimately waged to maintain his own position of political power.

Bibliography

- Harber, Denzil. "Religion in the Soviet Union," *Workers International News* 6, no. 1 (October 1945): 29-31.
<https://www.marxists.org/history/etol/newspape/win/v06n01-oct-1945-workers-intl-news.pdf>.
- Lenin, Vladimir. "The Attitude of the Worker's Party Towards Religion." In *Lenin Collected Works*, 402-413.
 Translated by Andrew Rothstein and Bernard Issacs. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1973. Originally published in *Proletary*, May 13, 1909.
<https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/cw/pdf/lenin-cw-vol-15.pdf>
- Marx, Karl. "Introduction." In *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, edited by Joseph O'Malley. Translated by Annette Jolin and Joseph O'Malley. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970.
<https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1843/critique-hpr/>.
- Peris, Daniel. *Storming the Heavens: The Soviet League of Militant Godless*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998.
<https://doi.org/10.7591/9781501735196>.
- Rare Historical Photos. "The brutal art of early Soviet antireligious propaganda posters, 1920-1940." Accessed November 11, 2022. <https://rarehistoricalphotos.com/soviet-antireligious-propaganda-posters/>.
- Smith, Stephen. "Communism and Religion." In *The Cambridge History of Communism*, edited by Juliane Fürst, Silvio Pons, and Mark Selden, 307-332. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316471821>.
- Smolkin, Victoria. "The Religious Front: Militant Atheism under Lenin and Stalin." In *A Sacred Space Is Never Empty: A History of Soviet Atheism*, 21-56. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018.
<https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt1zgb089>.
- van den Bercken, William. *Ideology and Atheism in the Soviet Union*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1989.
<https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110857375>.
- Walters, Philip. "A survey of Soviet religious policy." In *Religious Policy in the Soviet Union*, edited by Sabrina Petra Ramet, 3-30. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511598272.002>.
- Yakovlev, Alexander. "The Clergy." In *A Century of Violence in the Soviet Union*, 153-169. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002.

The Erasure of Indigenous Presence in the Settler Geographic Imagination: 19th Century Vancouver Island

Charlotte Conn

charlottedconn@gmail.com

Abstract

This essay examines the colonial constructions of Indigenous land usage on Vancouver Island in the 19th century. It turns first to the historiography of Indigenous presence in the Pacific-Northwest region to understand how Indigenous people had been represented in scholarship in the 19th and 20th centuries. For decades it was believed that Indigenous groups did not participate in the stewardship of their land or did not greatly impact it with their presence. By examining more recent scholarship on Indigenous agriculture this is proved to be a misrepresentation. It then turns to cartographic and ethnographic material produced by colonial officials and settlers that depicts Indigenous land usage and occupation in the mid-19th century, which used the purposeful erasure of Indigenous presence to justify colonial settlement. It combines the social stereotypes of the era with the perceived legitimising character of maps and photographs to understand how the settler's geographic imagination did not include the presence of Indigenous peoples on Vancouver Island. These cartographic and ethnographic materials created inaccurate representations of how Indigenous peoples managed and lived on their lands, confining them to small and untouched areas. It was only through the purposeful space created in these documents that a view of British Columbia and Vancouver Island being pristine, untouched, and untapped wildernesses could be born. The photographs of E.S. Curtis and colonial era maps of Victoria will be pivotal to this research, bringing to focus the world view of the Vancouver Island settler.

The colonial government of Vancouver Island and later, British Columbia, inevitably had to define and redefine the land they intended to occupy to manifest the white and resource-packed province they desired. Indigenous presence in this region therefore became caught in the crossfires of an aggressive and determined colonial government. This essay will prove that colonial construction of Indigenous land usage and occupation in the mid-19th century used the purposeful erasure of Indigenous presence to justify colonial settlement. On Vancouver Island specifically, government sanctioned cartography, ignorance of agricultural practices and social stereotypes of a lazy and vanishing Indigenous population legitimised this erasure, which functioned to create necessary space for settlers.

This essay will first acknowledge Douglas Deur and Nancy Turner's analysis of the historiography of Indigenous presence in the Pacific Northwest to understand how this topic has been misrepresented in previous scholarship. The authors make clear that scholars of plant cultivation and agriculture in North America's Pacific Northwest region have continuously overlooked the contributions of Indigenous groups.⁹⁰ Throughout the 19th and 20th Century scholars would sooner suggest that Indigenous peoples had little or no impact on the land which they occupied than depict the significant alterations they did undertake for their own agricultural purposes.⁹¹ There was a carried assumption in historical analysis of these cultures that they did not tamper with the land in any way that resembled European agricultural practices.⁹² In this narrative, Indigenous peoples remained wholly hunter-gatherers who took what they could get from the land when it was available to them. These ideas, which informed scholarly texts for decades, were based on limited exposure to both Indigenous people and their cultivation practices from very early contact in the fur trade era of British Columbia and Vancouver Island. Captain George Vancouver's words are an apt example of this idea, as he states

I could not possibly believe any uncultivated country had ever been discovered exhibiting so rich a picture. Stately forests . . . pleasingly clothed its eminences and chequered its vallies; presenting in many places, extensive spaces that wore the appearance of having been cleared by art . . . [we]had no reason to imagine this country had ever been indebted for its decoration to the hand of man.⁹³

Evidently, it was deeply imbued into the mind of European explorers that this land before them was uncultivated. This quote is ironic, as Vancouver can hardly believe that such a plentiful and abundant environment was rendered this way through some artistic grace alone. That is because it is unbelievable; It was not untouched land. Captain James Cook and John Meare's journals fueled these narratives as well, despite their complementary narrow view of how Indigenous peoples did occupy and use their land.⁹⁴ The encounters permeated an ethnocentric bias into much of the historiographical work done in this era. It continued to then attribute European influence to any evidence of plant cultivation that was noted by early fur-traders.⁹⁵

Deur notes one American anthropologist, Ruth Benedict, who carried this line of thought through his work when he stated "Their civilization was built upon an ample supply of goods, inexhaustible, and obtained without expenditure of labour."⁹⁶ This quote from 1934 is significant as it plays into two different and dangerous stereotypes surrounding Indigenous land use: one, that they did not have to modify great swaths of their environment to support themselves, and two, that they did not perform arduous labour to do so. Labour soon became a tool through which Europeans could define other racial groups. For example, it allowed Indigenous peoples on Vancouver Island to be distinctly positioned

⁹⁰ Douglas Deur and Nancy J. Turner, *Keeping it Living: Traditions of Plant Use and Cultivation on the Northwest Coast of North America* (Washington: Washington University Press, 2006), 3.

⁹¹ Deur and Turner, *Keeping it Living*, 3.

⁹² *Ibid.*

⁹³ *Ibid.*, 22.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 4.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 5.

against the character of Europeans, who were endlessly industrious.⁹⁷ This kind of historical work has also defined that Indigenous labour is unreliable and inconsistent.⁹⁸ However, from various other fur-trader reports of Indigenous behaviour, it becomes clear that this assumption stood on thin ice; they were often observed working long days harvesting their own food.⁹⁹ If these depictions are untrue, what is actually at work here is a European effort to define race, and to create an ‘other’ through this definition. In creating the image of an anti-labour Indigenous person who takes from the land what they need with little effort, Europeans began a process of creating and maintaining racial boundaries and definitions.¹⁰⁰

In reality, many communities native to the Pacific Northwest employed vast agricultural measures to their land. Most notably, Indigenous peoples of Vancouver Island harvested camas, and to do so, required extensive burning and clearings.¹⁰¹ They harvested many other edible plants in ways that required their direct intervention, an idea which clearly opposes European thought. Upwards of 300 species were utilised by those Indigenous to the Pacific Northwest for food, medicine, and clothing.¹⁰² Though to fully acknowledge the legitimacy of these practices, European explorers, fur traders and settlers would have had to employ a non-Western lens onto these unrecognisable methods of agriculture, which was not extensively undertaken. What was undertaken was this effort to construct an early version of wilderness, one in which Europeans saw North America as a pristine and untouched stretch of land, and thus relatively unoccupied.¹⁰³ This idea becomes increasingly important as the focus shifts from interacting with Indigenous people for fur-trade purposes, to settling their land. These narratives surrounding Indigenous peoples thus become notable as they came to help justify colonial settlement of many areas which were already occupied, including Vancouver Island. These depictions of Indigenous people were advanced in cartographic and photographic material as well as treaty creation in the coming century.

The colonial settlement of Vancouver Island occurring in the mid 1800’s meant that it was subject to an ethnographical phenomenon known as the “Vanishing Indian.” One settler, photographer, and amateur anthropologist, George Dawson, is a clear example of how this theory played out in practice. The concept of the ‘Vanishing Indian’ encompassed the sentiment of colonial governments as well as settlers in the late 19th century that “the native peoples encountered in the course of ... scientific surveying were in an irreversible state of decline and that their 'traditional' customs and material culture should be preserved through texts, photographs and museum-bound artefacts before they completely disappeared.”¹⁰⁴ Dawson’s photographs, and later ethnographies, of the Haida population thus fell within this trend of a European effort to capture Indigenous North Americans, which they perceived as wasting away.¹⁰⁵ His work culminated in a result like many European efforts to immortalise something that had not gone anywhere: it pre-emptively removed the Haida population from their land in the minds of settlers.¹⁰⁶ By removing Indigenous people from this imagined colonial geography, Dawson participated in justifying their erasure, and thus settler occupancy of this “empty” land. At this time, Indigenous populations were on the decline overall, which is accepted now to be because of exposure to disease brought by Europeans. But Dawson’s work was not preoccupied with this reality. Instead, it functioned to legitimise British Columbia, Vancouver Island, and their surrounding territories as plentiful resourceful

⁹⁷ John Lutz, "Making the Lazy Indian," in *Makúk: A New History of Aboriginal-White Relations* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2009), 33.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 36.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 34.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 36.

¹⁰¹ Deur and Turner, *Keeping it Living*, 11.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 13.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, 4.

¹⁰⁴ Jason Grek-Martin, “Vanishing the Haida: George Dawson’s Ethnographic Vision and the Making of settler space on the Queen Charlotte Islands in the late Nineteenth Century,” *The Canadian Geographer* 51, no.3 (Autumn 2007), 376.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 374.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

landscapes, which, without the burden of supporting their Indigenous people, were able to be settled by others.¹⁰⁷

This cumulative lack of acknowledgement of Indigenous land usage allowed for European settlers, specifically James Douglas and his administration, to remove them from their land and carve out space for a growing settler population. In his work “Making Native Space; Colonialism, Resistance and Reserves in British Columbia,” Cole Harris situates the creation of these colonial documents within a larger context of a governmental effort to create a settler-welcoming colony that aligned with British ideals. After the establishment of the colony of Vancouver Island in 1849, the colonial government held the assumption that Indigenous peoples did not have the ability to be assimilated.¹⁰⁸ Therefore, to promote settler security, which was of utmost importance, Indigenous peoples must be concretely suppressed.¹⁰⁹ The colonial office held very specific ideas of what constituted, among many things, land. Therefore, this question of how to handle the problem of Indigenous people on this new found land became of paramount importance.¹¹⁰ There emerged from this a sense of settler anxiety around ‘wasting’ land. In their view, the perceived lack of land utilisation on the part of Indigenous groups took from their ability to support much larger numbers of settlers.¹¹¹ This feeling became clear in newspapers where writings would describe Indigenous peoples as an inferior race, and felt they had an obligation to turn this untouched “wilderness” into a more productive landscape.¹¹² As previously stated, this was not true. Indigenous peoples were making use of the land, simply in a way not overtly recognizable to the colonial administration. Nevertheless, the very presence of Indigenous people on this land seemed to burden the crown’s sovereignty of this land.¹¹³

James Douglas had to ensure that the society he created did not pronounce Indigenous presence, but rather diminished it.¹¹⁴ This is where the Douglas treaties become relevant. Beginning in 1850, these written and oral agreements were a proponent of this initiative to clear Indigenous presence from the settler imagination. For example, many of these treaties did define space for Indigenous villages and reserves, however, most Indigenous peoples lived in a way that did not equate to a European understanding of a village.¹¹⁵ Here, the colonial language in these official documents obfuscated the ways in which Indigenous peoples took up space on Vancouver Island. To further this, the vast meadows which Indigenous people burned and used for camas harvesting were not able to be categorised properly under the language of “enclosed fields” that the government chose to use in some treaties, leaving ambiguity imbued in these texts.¹¹⁶ Along with these treaties came the production of many colonial maps, which among records are distinct in their erasure of Indigenous presence.

As Historian J. B. Harley would say “maps constituted an important disciplinary technology of colonial power,” which the colonial government of Vancouver Island fully accepted and utilised to their advantage.¹¹⁷ Douglas’ maps overlaid themselves in entirely arbitrary ways across well-established Indigenous territories. Their lines were not conducive to the expansive ways on which Indigenous peoples interacted with the land around them. When they confined Indigenous peoples to reserves and small village sites and later maps, they stripped them of their livelihoods, in what Jason Grek-Martin would call

¹⁰⁷ Grek-Martin, “Vanishing the Haida,” 378.

¹⁰⁸ Cole Harris, *Making Native Space: Colonialism, Resistance, and Reserves in British Columbia* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2002), 4.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 6.

¹¹¹ Ibid., 9.

¹¹² John Lutz, “Relating to the Country’: The Lekwammen and the Extension of European Settlement, 1843-1911,” in *Beyond the City Limits: Rural History in British Columbia* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1999), 18.

¹¹³ Harris, *Making Native Space*, 17.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., 24.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 25.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 26.

¹¹⁷ J. B. Harley, “Deconstructing the Map” in *The New Nature of Maps: Essays in the History of Cartography* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), 3.

"cartographic erasure."¹¹⁸ The reason these maps held the amount of power they did lies again in Harley's analysis of mapping. Maps tend to carry a certain respect or legitimacy with them that is allowed for by their objective and scientific nature.¹¹⁹ But, these colonial maps are far from objective, they simply carry the weight of the crown, of science, of measurement, and of writing behind them, which lend to their apparent superiority to Indigenous ways of knowing land.

On Vancouver Island there are many examples of such cartographic erasure. In fact, most colonial maps produced that predate the creation of reserves confined Indigenous presence to small black blocks that often represented their winter village sites.¹²⁰ They were seldom represented even by the name the colonial government had ascribed to them, such as the Songhees on the southern end of the Island.¹²¹ This emerges as a trend within these maps, where Indigenous presence is confined to a fraction of the space we now know they occupied and utilised. Douglas himself produced maps that promoted similar ideas of Indigenous occupation. In his map of the southern region of Vancouver Island, there is no reference to the fields that existed for agricultural purposes by the Lekwammen people.¹²² Much like other maps it confines their presence to small village sites. The precision of line and measurement of colonial property and land ownership comes into stark contrast with less structured Indigenous territories here. While not necessarily intentional, this certainly highlights the difference between how these colonial officials and cartographers conceptualised land in comparison to Indigenous peoples.¹²³ These maps also accentuate the relatively small and arbitrary spaces reserves afforded Indigenous groups within colonial Vancouver Island compared to, for example, public parks for settlers.¹²⁴ These seemingly small cartographic details held vast consequences for these communities.

Photographer E.S Curtis played a similar role in constructing the premature image of a "Vanishing Indian" into the social imaginations of settlers. To reach this construction, the settler imagination needed to expand its capacity to view far off and unfamiliar lands as manageable.¹²⁵ Both Dawson and Curtis were able to establish this capacity and thus facilitate the creation of an effective colony. Curtis's early photographs and Dawsons extensive ethnographic reports were especially effective. In particular, Dawson's reports on the Queen Charlotte Islands make barely any significant mention of the Haida occupancy of this space.¹²⁶ Curtis' photos in the early 20th century have much the same effect, supplying to the minds of settlers a visual representation of sweeping resource landscapes, with consistently primitive depictions of Indigenous peoples. These physical manifestations of colonial aspirations solidified them into reality.¹²⁷ Settler colonialism on Vancouver Island became justified through these kinds of documentary actions.

The question then becomes what effect these maps and other colonial paperwork could have had over Indigenous people in the past, as well as in the creation of this province as it developed. It was in this "assumed link between reality and representation" that maps gained their power.¹²⁸ The professional edge

¹¹⁸ Grek-Martin, "Vanishing the Haida," 379.

¹¹⁹ Harley, "Deconstructing the Map," 3.

¹²⁰ "Plan of Victoria District Lot 24-Sec. 18," Land Title and Survey of British Columbia Maps, https://vault.library.uvic.ca/concern/generic_works/0e18a3f8-ee5c-44c2-918c-1adc84081d5e (17 October 2011); "Map of the City of Victoria, Vancouver Island [1863]," Land Title and Survey of British Columbia Maps, https://vault.library.uvic.ca/concern/generic_works/7afac2e2-146f-420a-bea0-f3d00c863bb0 (13 January 2011); "North Saanich," Land Title and Survey of British Columbia Maps, https://vault.library.uvic.ca/concern/generic_works/675e7fa7-7132-4ffe-b676-80dced2fd97f (22 October 2008).

¹²¹ "Map of South-eastern Districts of Vancouver Island," Land Title and Survey of British Columbia Maps, https://vault.library.uvic.ca/concern/generic_works/c368470b-a2e5-4e2b-96fa-a601b2416201 (24 January 2012).

¹²² Lutz, "Relating to the Country," 19.

¹²³ "Map of the City of Victoria, Vancouver Island [1863]," 13 January 2011.

¹²⁴ "Map of the south-eastern Districts of Vancouver Island," 24 January 2012.

¹²⁵ Grek-Martin, "Vanishing the Haida," 378.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, 379.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, 378.

¹²⁸ Harley, "Deconstructing the Map," 3.

they held allowed them to permeate the minds of settlers as fact. This created a depiction of Indigenous peoples as much smaller, and much more stereotypically primitive than truly existed. Harley suggests that the map can be understood as reflecting the true nature of things back to the observer, which certainly transpired in BC.¹²⁹ I will extend this analysis of maps to encompass photographs from men such as E.S. Curtis and ethnographic reports like Dawson's. They all operate discreetly under a guise of neutrality and of objectivity which served to justify colonial settlement of Vancouver Island as well as its surrounding territories. Therefore, by pairing a cartographically miniscule representation of Indigenous populations with a social imagination of a 'lazy and disappearing Indian,' maps become a dangerous colonial tool in racialization and justifying white colonial settlement.

From fur-trade to colonial eras, markers and measurements were blanketed over Indigenous territory in response to an external need of the colony to legitimise their settlement and use of this 'unoccupied' land. Journals and ethnographies depicting Indigenous people created a Eurocentric and inaccurate representation of them, which was purposefully continued in the creation of official maps and photographs in the late 1800's. This framework created the necessary space in the settler imagination for the colony of Vancouver Island and eventually British Columbia to become seen as an expansive, pristine, and empty land ready for white occupation.

¹²⁹ Harley, "Deconstructing the Map," 4.

Bibliography

- Deur, Douglas and Nancy J. Turner. *Keeping it Living: Traditions of Plant Use and Cultivation on the Northwest Coast of North America*. Washington: University of Washington Press, 2006.
- Grek-Martin, Jason. "Vanishing the Haida: George Dawson's Ethnographic Vision and the Making of Settler Space on the Queen Charlotte Islands in the late Nineteenth Century." *The Canadian Geographer* 51, no.3 (Autumn 2007): 373-398.
- Harley, J. B. "Deconstructing the Map" in *The New Nature of Maps: Essays in the History of Cartography*, 149-168. United Kingdom: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002.
- Harris, Cole. *Making Native Space: Colonialism, Resistance, and Reserves in British Columbia*. Vancouver: UBC Press, 2002.
- Lutz, John. "Making the Lazy Indian." In *Makúk: A New History of Aboriginal-White Relations*, 31-48. Vancouver: UBC Press, 2009.
- Lutz, John. "'Relating to the Country': The Lekwammen and the Extension of European Settlement, 1843-1911" in *Beyond the City Limits: Rural History in British Columbia*, 17-32. Vancouver: UBC Press, 1999.

**Japanese Pan-Asianism and ... Hawai'i?:
How Japan's Anti-Colonial Ideology Worked to Legitimise the Colonisation of Hawai'i**

Daniel Davenport¹³⁰

ddavenport@fastmail.com

Abstract

Pan-Asianism, a Twentieth-Century Japanese ideology, provides a robust explanation for Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor. It proposed an encompassing identity for Asia that placed Japan at the centre and appealed to many in Japan. A militant version of the ideology became dominant and became the framework for Japan's justification of its expansionist policy to rid Asia of Western influence. On the surface, this ideology has sometimes appeared genuinely anti-colonial in theory if not in practice. However, scholarship on Pan-Asianism has failed to take into account the place of Hawai'i, the site of Japan's attack against the United States. There were two main approaches to Hawai'i in Japanese thought at the time. Firstly, the mainstream Pan-Asian propaganda ignored Hawai'i and presented the attack on Pearl Harbor as an attack on the United State in general. Nevertheless, an additional specific thread of Pan-Asian thought at the time considered Hawai'i to be a part of Asia and in need of incorporation into Japan's Pan-Asian project. In some corners of Japanese thinking in the wake of the opening of hostilities, thinkers drafted plans for the governance of the islands under Japan. These two contrasting strands of thought and rhetoric show the colonial nature of the Pan-Asian ideology as it imposed whatever identity on Hawai'i that Japan found most convenient. For Japan, Hawai'i was a part of the United States when Japan needed to demonstrate victory over the West and it was a colonised Asian territory when Japan needed to justify annexation plans. Scholarship on Hawai'i demonstrates that the islands and their Indigenous people are Pacific Islanders rather than Asians in need of Japanese liberation. This research helps us understand Japan's ideology, the Pacific War, and the important place of Hawai'i in Pacific and global history.

¹³⁰ The author would like to thank Dr. Goto-Jones for his phenomenal class *Japan and the Overcoming of Modernity* that this paper was originally written for.

Pan-Asianism in early-Twentieth-Century Japan was an ideology that opposed Western colonialism and promoted an encompassing Asian identity. This ideology helps explain Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor in Hawai'i. It was a key cultural and political framework that proposed an anti-colonial identity for East Asia which appealed to many Japanese thinkers as a justification for a morally necessary war against the West. Current literature on Pan-Asianism does not address the ideology's approach to Hawai'i, the site of the beginning of Japan's war with the West and a colonized nation at the periphery of both Japanese and American thinking. The Hawaiian Islands occupy an overlooked place in Pan-Asian discourse. Some Japanese Pan-Asian thinking early in the war focused on Hawai'i and saw it as a colony of the United States in need of liberation; however, this thinking remained at the edge of Japanese rhetoric which generally saw the islands as little more than the base for the American Pacific Fleet.

At the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor, some American commentators proclaimed Japan had simply gone insane, making statements such as "Whether Japan has yielded at last to pressure from Hitler, ... or whether this is ... an independent Japanese adventure, launched by a military clique in Tokyo whose powers of self-deception now rise to a state of sublime insanity, we cannot know until events have given more perspective" said one New York Times article.¹³¹ Time and historical work have given us more perspective. The intellectual background of Pan-Asian thinking provides a better explanation for the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Japan did not reason for war based on minimising risk and maximising gains; cultural and spiritual motives played the key role. Pan-Asianism ideas placed Japan in the centre of a compelling story which described how Japan could create a "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" (Co-Prosperity Sphere) that would uplift Asia and throw out the influences of the oppressive colonial West, with Japan as the leading nation.¹³² A critical step in this was the elimination of the Pacific Fleet of the United States of America, the most powerful Western military force in the Pacific, and the greatest threat to Japan's hegemony.

While this militarist Pan-Asianism became the dominant form, it was not the only strand of Pan-Asian thought. One other interpretation known as Teatism, used tea as a symbol of a shared identity across East Asia. Teatism held that the tea ceremony, which spread from China was emblematically Asian in culture and aesthetic.¹³³ This idea offered a shared sense of home across Asia based on cultural unity that was distinct from the West. This version was the most peaceful interpretation of Pan-Asianism and was about proposing a sense of a shared identity and sense of home and place.¹³⁴

Another interpretation of Pan-Asianism saw China as the centre of Asia. For Japan, Sinic Pan-Asianism focused on the cultural relationship between Japan and China. Sinics saw China as a cultural benefactor of Japan, worthy of Japanese respect. This type of Pan-Asianism rested on the idea that Chinese culture was a common core of a Pan-Asian Identity.¹³⁵ This view abhorred Japanese military action against China, because China represented many of Japan's cultural antecedents such as the Chinese script, poetry, philosophy, and literature.¹³⁶ Sinic Pan-Asianism did not mean that China would necessarily dominate Asia, but its historical influence would provide a common thread of understanding.

Finally, Meishu was the form of Pan-Asianism that ultimately became the imperial framework for Japan's Asian conquests. It placed Japan at the centre of Asia to push the rest of Asia towards modern civilisation.¹³⁷ It also focused on Japanese grievances with the West, such as American President Woodrow Wilson's decision to prevent the addition of a racial equality clause during important

¹³¹ This newspaper article does not seriously consider the possibility that Hitler's influence was the primary factor, hinting that Japan had lost all sense of reason. The New York Times, "War with Japan," 8 December 1941. <http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.library.uvic.ca/historical-newspapers/war-with-japan/docview/105646819/se-2>. (Accessed 2021-12-12).

¹³² Christopher Goto-Jones, *Modern Japan: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford University Press, 2009), 83.

¹³³ Eri Hotta, *Pan-Asianism and Japan's War 1931-1945* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2007), 37-39.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, 30.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, 48.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, 38.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, 8.

negotiations.¹³⁸ Japanese leaders and thinkers interpreted actions such as this as evidence of the West's contempt and bad-faith intentions. It reinforced Japan's status as an outsider nation in the international order and helped create a sense amongst Japanese decision-makers that Japan could not accomplish its goals through negotiations.¹³⁹ It became a symbol of Western disdain for Japan and its people. Meishu focused on a Japanese empire in the image of a benevolent, peaceful, and anti-imperial version of military might in contrast and opposition to the West. Meishu-style Pan-Asianism seemed to make Japanese dominion over Asia not just acceptable, but part of a necessary mission to rid East Asia of Western colonial influence.¹⁴⁰

Meishu thinking painted a picture of Americans as decadent, materialist, and unable to muster a martial spirit such as that of Japan.¹⁴¹ The idea of the Bushido spirit, which draws inspiration from the moral code of samurai in the Edo period, focused on the idea of a warrior identity for Japan; this became part of Japanese modern imperial ideology with a focus on national identity, martial virtue, and refusal to surrender.¹⁴² Thus, with America's lack of Bushido spirit, Japanese leaders would not need to note munitions output of American factories if American soldiers would be unwilling to properly fight and swift Japanese victories would force the American government to negotiate. Under this framework, Japanese leadership was not focused on determining if its hard power was sufficient to challenge the United States, but rather, they were thinking of Japan as a uniquely capable member of the East Asian region of nations whose neighbours needed Pan-Asian liberation.¹⁴³ Despite the clear link between these strains of Pan-Asianism and Japan's actions in the War, many historians and public figures still use the sublime insanity hypothesis, describing Japan's war against the United States as no more than a mad bid of overconfidence. Although Japan's actions were arrogant and dangerous, a simple explanation of madness is facile. If we assume nations act only to maximise their national strategic position, we struggle to explain the attack. Indeed, much of the Japanese public and many intellectuals supported the quest against the West. A substantial number of intellectuals welcomed the end of the dissonance between anti-Western rhetoric in Japan and ongoing war in China. Honda Akira, one such thinker, said "the proclamation of war against the United States and Britain has cleared up my mind. Thanks to it, the meaning of a "holy war" has become clear."¹⁴⁴ Takeuchi Yoshimi, a prominent Japanese scholar of Chinese literature, transitioned towards a pro-war stance, saying "History was made. ... We felt a sudden fit of something that cannot quite be named springing up in our heart [sic]. ... Our Japan was not afraid of the strong after all ... It is now our determination to labour, without stint, for the true goal of creating a new order in East Asia."¹⁴⁵ Although Japanese intellectuals were often stridently anti-war with China on Sinic grounds, many of these intellectuals were in favour of war with the United States on anti-colonial grounds.

As Yoshimoto Takaaki, a Japanese philosopher and university student at the time of the war argued, the image of Japan taking the helm to provide expertise, technology, and capital to close gaps in wealth and power between the West and East Asia was morally sound.¹⁴⁶ To accomplish this with violence was more difficult to justify, but a legacy of colonial oppression forces contemporary historians to consider if it might be at least partly reasonable. Nevertheless, in the implementation of the Pan-Asian ideal, Japan became a short-lived and brutal failed empire.¹⁴⁷

By understanding that, from a contemporary Japanese perspective, many in Japan saw the war as

¹³⁸ Goto-Jones, *Modern Japan*, 74.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, 75.

¹⁴⁰ Hotta, *Pan-Asianism and Japan's War 1931-1945*, 67.

¹⁴¹ Goto-Jones, *Modern Japan*, 83.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, 34.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁴ Hotta, *Pan-Asianism and Japan's War 1931-1945*, 194.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 193.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 192.

¹⁴⁷ Some examples of the brutal nature of the Japanese Empire include economic exploitation in Manchukuo and Korea, the Rape of Nanking, the treatment of prisoners of war, and the occupation of the Philippines.

just and necessary, it is easier to understand why Japanese leaders decided to fight this war and why so many Japanese people supported it. In attacking the United States, Japan, albeit briefly, cemented a popular interpretation of Japanese identity that saw Japan as a liberator on a mission to use its might as the foremost Asian nation to free Asia from oppression and forge a bright new future.

There is, however, an aspect of Japanese Pan-Asian thinking and scholarship that is missing— the place where this war started: Hawai‘i. From my text searches of her leading book on this subject, *Pan-Asianism and Japan's War*, Eri Hotta mentions “Pearl Harbor” forty-three times, but “Hawai‘i” once (only while quoting).¹⁴⁸ This likely stems from the Japanese omission of Hawai‘i in mainstream Pan-Asian rhetoric Hotta examines. The Japanese discussions Hotta cites do not focus on Hawai‘i, but rather focus on the attack at Pearl Harbor as a site of Japanese military victory over the West.¹⁴⁹ In this way, Japan’s thinkers saw Hawai‘i as a legitimate part of the West (rather than as an Asian territory occupied by the United States). In the background of Japanese thinking there were plans for Hawai‘i in the Co-Prosperity sphere as a liberated Asian nation.¹⁵⁰ This clash is particularly interesting; Japanese rhetoric saw Hawai‘i as both part of the West attacked for the good of Asia and an Asian place in need of liberation.¹⁵¹ When describing Japanese victory, Japanese sources did not distinguish Hawai‘i from the rest of the United States. Some Japanese theorists drew up plans for a liberated Hawai‘i under Japan’s influence (sometimes justified by the large Japanese population on the islands, and sometimes justified based on a perceived Asian identity for Hawaiians).

Hawai‘i had connections to Japan before becoming a US territory; independent Hawai‘i made advances to Emperor Meiji of Japan as the country exited the period of isolationism.¹⁵² There were large numbers of Japanese settlers early in Hawai‘i’s colonial period.¹⁵³ Hawai‘i and Japan had good relations, but later drifted apart.¹⁵⁴ Japan had the opportunity to critique America's hold on Hawai‘i on the grounds of colonisation. American and British business interests, supported by the American Government, overthrew the Hawaiian Kingdom in 1893, only forty-eight years before the attack on Pearl Harbor.¹⁵⁵ Yet, in the Japanese rhetoric as reported by Hotta, Japan considered Pearl Harbor to be little more than an American Navy base.¹⁵⁶ Japanese sources do not say Pearl Harbor was on Hawaiian land that Japan would liberate, rather, sources report that Japan attacked America (not an American outpost or American colony).¹⁵⁷ The salient question here is how, in an environment eager for critique of the West, was Hawai‘i forgotten.

John Stephan provides a critical piece of context: that the war planners of Japan did have a framework for integrating Hawai‘i on Pan-Asian lines. He describes how Hawai‘i was to be incorporated into a close ring of the Co-Prosperity sphere, out from under oppressive American colonialism.¹⁵⁸ Japan, however, did not see the large population of Japanese people on Hawai‘i as part of the colonisation of

¹⁴⁸ Hotta says “The poet [Saitō Mokichi, an influential intellectual] then went on to record in his diary: ‘The red blood of my old age is now bursting with life’ because ‘the formidable imperial forces spectacularly attacked Hawai‘i!’” Which shows that even sober intellectuals were brimming with war fever. Hotta, *Pan-Asianism and Japan's War 1931-1945*, 190.

¹⁴⁹ American histories also omit Hawaiian perspectives, focusing on an attack against a unified United States.

¹⁵⁰ John J Stephan, *Hawaii Under the Rising Sun* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1984), 3.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 139.

¹⁵² Stephan, *Hawaii Under the Rising Sun*, 17.

¹⁵³ Eleanor C. Nordyke and Y. Scott Matsumoto, "The Japanese in Hawaii: A Historical and Demographic Perspective," *The Hawaiian Journal of History* 11 (1977) 162-174.

¹⁵⁴ Stephan, *Hawaii Under the Rising Sun*, 12.

¹⁵⁵ Christine Skwiot, ‘Hawai‘i’, in *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008),

<https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/acref/9780195176322.001.0001/acref-9780195176322-e-693>.

¹⁵⁶ Hotta, *Pan-Asianism and Japan's War 1931-1945*, 190.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 190.

¹⁵⁸ Stephan, *Hawaii Under the Rising Sun*, 3.

Hawai‘i.¹⁵⁹ Japanese plans indicated an intention for a Japanese occupation of Hawai‘i on Pan-Asian grounds.¹⁶⁰ In this branch of Japanese planning, Japan attempted to show that the antecedents of Hawai‘i were to be found in Asia, and that Hawai‘i’s natural home was in a Pan-Asian sphere.¹⁶¹ Stephan summarises the thinking of Japanese academics and planners as “Hawaiians [are] Polynesians; Polynesians are Asians; therefore, Hawaiians are Asians.”¹⁶² Further to this line of thinking, Tsurumi Yusuke, a member of the Japanese Diet (Parliament) and promoter of a Pan-Pacific sphere for Japan within political circles, argued that Hawai‘i must be part of Japan’s greater East Asian sphere because Hawaiians are related to the Japanese.¹⁶³ Japanese wartime journalist Haga Takeshi attempted to take this further by working to cement a Japanese claim to Hawai‘i by arguing that Japan’s long-standing relationship with Hawai‘i had resulted in Japanese-Hawaiian intermarriage and consequently the Hawaiian people were “an extension of the Japanese race.”¹⁶⁴

Although Japanese officials and thinkers developed this line of thinking, they did not disseminate it widely; the liberation of Hawai‘i did not play a major part in Japanese rhetoric.¹⁶⁵ Stephan’s evidence is found on the edges of Japanese thinking, brushed to the side of archives and reports. It is best to see two goals for Japanese Pan-Asianism in attacking Pearl Harbor that produce mutually exclusive rhetoric. The first and most important was to win victory over the West, and the second and less important was to bring Hawai‘i, as they saw it, back into Asia and under Japan. In this way we see how Japan’s thinkers could see Hawai‘i both as part of the West (the site of their victory over the United States on American territory) and as part of Asia (a future part of the Co-Prosperity Sphere with the conquest legitimized by Pan-Asianism).

As Japan’s inter-service rivalries and political factionalism demonstrate, just because some Pan-Asian planners and thinkers wanted to include Hawai‘i does not mean it was a priority of national policy, even if the idea held merit for one branch of the government or military. Japan’s focus after the attack on Pearl Harbor was their victory over the United States Navy, the discussion regarding Hawaiian liberation were short-lived.¹⁶⁶ The logic of Pan-Asianism provided a framework to invade Hawai‘i, but the priorities of the Japanese leadership and the realities of the conflict (in particular, after the Battle of Midway in 1942 wherein Japan lost irreplaceable navel assets it needed to win the war) meant that Japan at first did not, then could not, prioritise an attack on Hawai‘i or its incorporation into the Co-Prosperity Sphere.¹⁶⁷ Instead, Japan looked to disable the United States Navy at Pearl Harbor, and then to invade closer Asian nations like Malaysia and the Philippines.¹⁶⁸

To understand the colonial context of the Japanese view of Hawai‘i as a future part of the Co-Prosperity Sphere we must look to Hawaiian perspectives on whether Hawai‘i is even a part of Asia. Lisa Kahaleole Hall, the University of Victoria’s director of the Indigenous Studies program and an expert on race, colonialism, and Hawaiian culture, points out that Pacific Islanders, including Hawaiians, are not Asian, and that present and past attempts to view Hawaiians as Asians is an imposition on Hawaiians who do not see themselves as such.¹⁶⁹ She describes Pacific Islanders as distinct from any Asian group.¹⁷⁰ Hall emphasises that Asian-Americans are one of the largest groups of settlers on Hawaiian land (Japan did not recognize this), and that profound cultural and historical differences between the experiences of Asians

¹⁵⁹ Stephan, *Hawaii Under the Rising Sun*, 142, 156.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 2.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 1-9, 135-147.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, 140.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, 46.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 140.

¹⁶⁵ Hotta, *Pan-Asianism and Japan’s War 1931-1945*, 190.

¹⁶⁶ Hotta, *Pan-Asianism and Japan’s War 1931-1945*, 177; Stephan, *Hawaii Under the Rising Sun*, 167.

¹⁶⁷ Goto-Jones, *Modern Japan*, 85.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 83.

¹⁶⁹ Lisa Kahaleole Hall, "Which of These Things Is Not Like the Other: Hawaiians and Other Pacific Islanders Are Not Asian Americans, and All Pacific Islanders Are Not Hawaiian," *American Quarterly* 67, no.3 (2015): 727–747.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

living in Hawai‘i and Indigenous Hawaiians mean that a conflation of identities is inaccurate and harmful.¹⁷¹ Under this framework, by forcibly identifying Hawaiians with Asia, Japanese ideology unsees the Hawaiian people.¹⁷² This position is relevant to Japanese Pan-Asianism as when Japanese thinking offered any attention to Hawai‘i, it was to conflate Pacific Islanders and East Asians. When Japan offered recognition to Hawai‘i, it was to propose a framework that assumed a shared Asian heritage despite a cultural and historical gulf between them.¹⁷³ Hall’s shows that Hawaiians were not hewn from a rightful place in Asia but rather that they are part of a group of Pacific Islanders who share cultural and historical commonalities, but are not homogeneous, and certainly not Asian.¹⁷⁴ Considering the streams of Teatist and Sinic Pan-Asianism, it is hard to see Hawai‘i in a Pan-Asian sphere. There is little evidence for a Teatist cross-regional identity, and there is no evidence to support a Sinic view that China is the cultural benefactor of the Hawaiian people.

When Japanese wartime thinking did not ignore Hawai‘i, as in the intellectual and political discourse Stephan discusses, Japanese Pan-Asianism assumed the identity for the Hawaiian people that was most convenient.¹⁷⁵ Pan-Asian ideology was sometimes sympathetic when its aims were considered however, here we find an element that is not sympathetic even in theoretical terms. Had Japan’s conquest of Hawai‘i been successful it likely would have, in classic colonial style, projected the identity it required onto Hawaiians to legitimise Japanese conquest. At the same time, we can assume that Japan would have kept its primary focus on its defeat of the West in Hawai‘i rather than focus on Hawai‘i as indigenous Hawaiian land. Therefore, Japanese Pan-Asianism addressed Hawai‘i by erasing Hawai‘i to present Pearl Harbor as an attack on the heart of the West and by insisting on an Asian identity for Hawaiians regardless of Hawaiian history or identity. Although contradictory, both strands of thought were present in Japan in the discussions on the nature of Japan’s empire. The issues underlying these points were less serious than the need for Japanese Pan-Asianism to be both an attack on the West and liberating for non-Western people at the same time.

Under Meishu Pan-Asianism, Japan’s plan was to use Hawai‘i as a bulwark for the defence and benefit of Japan.¹⁷⁶ There was no intention of respect for Hawaiian sovereignty. We can therefore see that this model of Pan-Asianism is colonial. Pan-Asianism is a complex phenomenon that becomes no less so when we try to include other perspectives, yet the analysis is both illuminating and important. Understanding Pan-Asianism is worth the attempt to overcome the complexity of the material, and there appears to be opportunities for further research into Hawaiian and Japanese perspectives on what it means to be Asian.

By understanding Pan-Asianism, we can better recognize Japan's ownership of its actions. Attributing Japan's action to “sublime insanity” overlooks the complexities and reality of Japanese decision-making. It would be logically challenging to hold Japan and its leaders accountable for wartime actions if the cause of the war truly was insanity. Japan justified the war on anti-colonial grounds that are more complex than they first appear. In Japan, this imperial ideology became popular based on an aggressive interpretation of Pan-Asian thought. The idea that Japan could build an anti-colonial empire to free Asia was intoxicating to Japanese soldiers, intellectuals, political leaders, and spiritual leaders, and provides a better explanation for the attack on Pearl Harbor.¹⁷⁷

The example of Hawai‘i is needed to provide context and insight to Pan-Asianism. Hawai‘i sits at a place both inside and outside of the West. Japanese Pan-Asianism’s failure to deal with this shows the complexities of Pan-Asianism and the difficulties (practically and morally) of forging an identity and ideology that imposes the participation of others who may not wish to participate. The erasure of the

¹⁷¹ Hall, "Which of These Things," 727–747.

¹⁷² Note the work of Proctor and Schiebinger on this in *The Making and Unmaking of Ignorance*.

¹⁷³ Stephan, *Hawaii Under the Rising Sun*, 46.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 141.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 137.

¹⁷⁷ Hotta, *Pan-Asianism and Japan's War 1931-1945*, 236.

Hawaiian people in the presentation of Hawai'i, and the projection of Asian identity onto Hawai'i by Japan's thinkers and planners reveals imperialism within the dominant Meishu branch of Japanese Pan-Asian thought itself, rather than just in the implementation of the ideology. Ultimately, whether forgetting Hawai'i or insisting on an identity that best suited Japan, Japanese Pan-Asianism could not allow Hawai'i to exist on its own terms.

Bibliography

- Goto-Jones, Christopher. *Modern Japan: A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
- Hall, Lisa Kahaleole. "Which of These Things Is Not Like the Other: Hawaiians and Other Pacific Islanders Are Not Asian Americans, and All Pacific Islanders Are Not Hawaiian." *American Quarterly* 67, no.3 (2015): 727-47. <https://doi.org/10.1353/aq.2015.0050>.
- Hotta, Eri. *Pan-Asianism and Japan's War 1931-1945*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2007. <https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230609921>.
- The New York Times. "War with Japan." 8 December 1941. <http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.library.uvic.ca/historical-newspapers/war-with-japan/docview/105646819/se-2>. (Accessed 2021-12-12).
- Nordyke, Eleanor C., and Y. Scott Matsumoto. "The Japanese in Hawaii: A Historical and Demographic Perspective." *The Hawaiian Journal of History* 11 (1977) 162-174.
- Skwiot, Christine. 'Hawai'i.' In *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern World*. Oxford University Press, 2008. <https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/acref/9780195176322.001.0001/acref-9780195176322e-693>

The Destabilising Impacts of the Portuguese Colonial War

Patrick Ferreira¹⁷⁸

patrickroyferreira@gmail.com

Abstract

The Portuguese Colonial War was a prolonged conflict that lasted from 1961 to 1974. It was fought between the Portuguese government attempting to retain control over its overseas imperial colonies and the nascent independence movements in Angola, Mozambique, and Portuguese Guinea. The conflict ended in 1974 with the Carnation Revolution, which brought an end to the far-right Estado Novo dictatorship in Portugal. This article reflects on the many disruptive impacts of the Portuguese Colonial War that destabilized the country and led to the Carnation Revolution. It places these impacts into three categories: international factors, domestic factors, and military factors. The international factors included the diplomatic pressure from the American and Soviet alliances against Portugal's imperialist war and the 1973 oil crisis that caused mass inflation in Portugal. The domestic factors included a metropole that was experiencing mass emigration as waves of young men fled the country to escape conscription, while the social safety net in the metropole was simultaneously overwhelmed with injured veterans returning from the front. Additionally, Portugal was industrialising its economy over the course of the war at an extreme clip, which disrupted the social cohesion built on its agricultural economy. The military also played a crucial role as relations between the civilian government and military leaders became increasingly tense over the course of the war, especially following the death of António de Oliveira Salazar. This article argues that these three sets of factors combined to destabilize the country thereby priming Portugal for the Carnation Revolution.

¹⁷⁸ I would like to thank Dr. Christian Lieb, who reinvigorated my love of history at Camosun College; Dr. David Dolf, whose classes provided a bastion of enjoyment for me during the pandemic; and Dr. Gregory Rowe, a teacher whose passion and optimism re-engaged my interest in ancient history.

Introduction

The Portuguese Colonial War was a prolonged conflict fought between the Portuguese military and the independence movements in Portuguese African colonies. It began on 4 February 1961 and proceeded to stretch over thirteen years in three different theatres, including Angola, Mozambique, and Portuguese Guinea. The human cost of the war included the death of 8,290 Portuguese soldiers, 5,797 of whom were from the metropole, and 2,493 from the colonies.¹⁷⁹ This is in addition to roughly 1,000 Portuguese and 100,000 African civilians that died.¹⁸⁰ The war also acted as a major financial drain on the Portuguese economy. When adjusted for 2018 pricing, the Portuguese government spent between 21.8 and 29.8 billion Euros on the war, or an average of 1.6 to 2.3 billion Euros per year for thirteen years.¹⁸¹ Military spending accounted for roughly half of the Portuguese state budget by the early 1970s.¹⁸² This meant that Portugal was spending more on its defense as a proportion of its overall budget than the United States during this period, and seven times more than the proportion being spent in Spain.¹⁸³ The scope and consequences for the war were extensive. It ended on 25 April 1974, in what became known as the Carnation Revolution, which saw the collapse of the *Estado Novo* dictatorship in Portugal.

Historians have debated over the exact relationship between the Portuguese Colonial War and the Carnation Revolution. The revolution has been explained as being caused by systemic inefficiencies, social unrest, pressure from the international community, political elites, and the military.¹⁸⁴ This paper will scrutinize the relationship between the Portuguese Colonial War and the Carnation Revolution by examining the destabilising impacts that the war had on Portuguese society. These domestic impacts primed Portugal for revolution over the course of the war. This analysis will argue that the war created three sets of destabilising factors that came to a head by the time of the Carnation Revolution. The first were international factors that influenced Portugal both diplomatically and economically. The second was a set of domestic conditions that led to social and economic upheaval. The third was the war-weary Portuguese military and its deteriorating relationship with the civilian government.

International Influences

Three international factors interacted with Portugal during its colonial war in Africa. The first was the diplomatic pressure levied on Portugal to end the war, the second was the propaganda Portugal used in an attempt to avoid international criticism, and the third was the international oil shocks of 1973 and the subsequent spike in Portuguese inflation.

The first decade of the cold war saw Portugal maintain strong relations with the United States. The US established a military base on the island of Santa Maria in the Azores in 1944, and renewed its base rights in 1946, 1948, 1951, and 1957.¹⁸⁵ On the surface, the 1960s seemed to promise a continuation of strong American-Luso relations. However, the outbreak of the Portuguese Colonial War in February of

¹⁷⁹ John P. Cann, *Counterinsurgency in Africa: The Portuguese Way of War, 1961-1974* (Westport: Greenwood, 1997), 325.

¹⁸⁰ José Luís Garcia, Chandrika Kaul, Filipa Subtil and Alexandra Santos, "The Portuguese Empire: An Introduction," in *Media and the Portuguese Empire*, ed. José Luís Garcia, Chandrika Kaul, Filipa Subtil, and Alexandra Dias Santos (Secaucus: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 16.

¹⁸¹ Ricardo Ferraz, "The Financial Costs of the Portuguese Colonial War, 1961-1974: Analysis and Applied Study," *Revista De Historia Económica* 40, no.2 (2022): 257.

¹⁸² Norrie MacQueen, *The Decolonization of Portuguese Africa: Metropolitan Revolution and the Dissolution of Empire*, (New York: Longman, 1997), 50.

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁴ José Javier Olivás Osuna, "The Deep Roots of the Carnation Revolution: 150 Years of Military Interventionism in Portugal," *Portuguese Journal of Social Science* 13, no. 2 (2014): 216.

¹⁸⁵ Luís Nuno Rodrigues, "The International Dimensions of Portuguese Colonial Crisis," in *The Ends of European Colonial Empires: Cases and Comparisons*, eds. Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo and António Costa Pinto (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 243-244.

1961 changed this. The war intersected with the collapse of many European empires across Asia and Africa. As this period of imperialism was coming to an end, Portugal's insistence on keeping its overseas colonies made it an outlier in the international community.¹⁸⁶ Both the US and USSR condemned Portugal's war and initially supported the Angolan independence movement.¹⁸⁷

António de Oliveira Salazar, then the leader of the *Estado Novo* regime in Lisbon, took note of this and, in an interview in May 1962 with the *Washington Evening Star*, stated that the US base in the Azores would not have its base rights renewed that year.¹⁸⁸ Salazar also threatened to shut down the Free Europe radio station in Lisbon that the US used to send broadcasts into Eastern Europe.¹⁸⁹ Salazar was putting the newly-elected American President, John F. Kennedy, in a bind by making these threats. The American base in the Azores was of vital strategic importance for the US military presence in Europe and North Africa. However, by this point Kennedy had already condemned Portugal, and did not want to be seen as upholding the last vestiges of imperialism in Africa. Ultimately, Kennedy chose to turn a blind eye to Portugal's war. Kennedy approved major financial contributions to Portugal in 1962 with the American Export-Import Bank, which financed the export of \$55 million in US steel to Portugal.¹⁹⁰ In exchange, the US was allowed to renew its base in the Azores in 1962.

Nonetheless, international pressure for Portugal to end its colonial war was maintained throughout its duration. Portugal had long maintained that its overseas colonies were actually provinces of one larger state.¹⁹¹ Dr. Norrie MacQueen, a historian of Portuguese colonial history and international relations, describes how

the "colonial empire" (*Impeârio Colonial*) of the 1930 Act became, by fiat, a series of "overseas provinces" (*Provôncias Ultramares*) of "one state single and indivisible" (*um estado uno e indivisôável*). Salazar's rationale was that only colonial states can decolonise and no state could be required to participate in its own disintegration. This breathtakingly disingenuous formulation was produced partly to meet the growing demands of the United Nations for an accounting for colonialism in general.¹⁹²

The excuse that Portugal's African colonies were merely overseas provinces hardly circumvented criticism. As mentioned earlier, Portugal was able to manage its relationship with the Americans during the war, but it failed in spinning the war with the USSR and other socialist countries. As noted, the USSR had condemned Portugal's decision to fight the independence movements in Africa.¹⁹³ Other countries in the Eastern bloc, such as Czechoslovakia, criticised Portugal for its colonial war yet maintained trade relations with Portugal.¹⁹⁴ Szobi argues that, in the case of the Czechs, the criticism against Portugal was merely rhetorical.¹⁹⁵ Despite the influence of these external pressures and criticisms, Portugal was not deterred from continuing its war. Nonetheless the ongoing international pressure from the UN and USSR for Portugal to end its war cannot be discounted.

The *Estado Novo* regime in Portugal also attempted to circumvent the criticisms of its colonial war through use of propaganda and censorship. Since the *Estado Novo* regime was one of the longest dictatorships in European history (lasting forty-eight years from 1926 to 1974), it had mastered the use of

¹⁸⁶ Rodrigues, "The International Dimensions," 243-244.

¹⁸⁷ Arslan Humbaraci and Nicole Muchnik, *Portugal's African Wars: Angola, Guinea Bissao, Mozambique* (New York: Third Press, 1974), 188.

¹⁸⁸ Rodrigues, "The International Dimensions," 248.

¹⁸⁹ Humbaraci and Muchnik, *Portugal's African Wars*, 188.

¹⁹⁰ Rodrigues, "The International Dimensions," 249.

¹⁹¹ Norrie MacQueen, "Portugal's First Domino: 'Pluricontinentalism' and Colonial War in Guiné-Bissau, 1963-1974," *Contemporary European History* 8, no. 2 (1999): 210.

¹⁹² *Ibid.*

¹⁹³ Humbaraci and Muchnik, *Portugal's African Wars*, 188.

¹⁹⁴ Pavel Szobi, "From Enemies to Allies? Portugal's Carnation Revolution and Czechoslovakia, 1968-1989," *Contemporary European History* 26, no. 4 (2017): 676.

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

censorship.¹⁹⁶ The regime had created a complex series of censorship policies that extended to newspapers, books, cultural performance industries, and most modes of communication.¹⁹⁷ The type of censorship ranged from pre-publication, to post-publication, and self-censorship.¹⁹⁸ Traditionally, these tools had been used by the regime via the press and the education system to prevent counternarratives that could delegitimise the imperialist system.¹⁹⁹ During the war, censorship became a tool of the state for two purposes. The first was to shroud the conditions of the war from the domestic public by barring images of dead bodies, forbidding any criticisms of Portuguese soldiers, and removing all references to potential negotiations with the insurgents in Africa.²⁰⁰ The regime also successfully used a combination of propaganda and indoctrination in Portuguese schools across the metropole to spin the war in favour of the regime.²⁰¹ The second purpose was to shield Portugal from international criticism, which ultimately failed. Once the rebellion in Angola had begun on 4 February 1961, the censors sought to use the national and international media to interpret the independence movement and the violent responses of the white settlers in favour of Portugal.²⁰² However, the international community was not convinced by Portugal's narrative of racial harmony in its colonies.²⁰³ This is because, as mentioned earlier, Portugal's Colonial War took place during a period of European decline across Africa. The international community was far more amenable to supporting the independence movements in Africa than the declining colonial regimes. This was especially the case with regard to Portugal, which had decided to wage war on its colonies. Because of this, while Portugal attempted to control the narrative on the war and was able to do so domestically, it was unable to control this narrative internationally. Lastly, the international economy and oil shocks of 1973-1974 also influenced Portugal to end the war. The 1973 oil shock occurred at the same time that General António Sebastião Ribeiro de Spínola released his manifesto, *Portugal and the Future (Portugal e o Futuro)*.²⁰⁴ The release of Spínola's book was one of the most immediate catalysts for the Carnation Revolution. The left-wing officer group that led the revolution, the *Movimento das Forças Armadas* (MFA), formed partially in response to the release of Spínola's book. However, the impacts of the international economy and the oil shocks of 1973 cannot be discounted. Spínola returned to Portugal from service in the war in August 1973, and released his book in January of 1974.²⁰⁵ The oil shock crisis of 1973 broke out in October during the intervening period between Spínola's return to Portugal and the release of his book.²⁰⁶ Spínola thus provided much of the political impetus, while the oil shocks acted as a strong economic catalyst. The oil crisis resulted in an explosion of inflation in Portugal—20% by 1974.²⁰⁷ This illustrates how the domestic political events in Portugal lined up with international economic crises of the time to produce the Carnation Revolution.

Domestic Conditions

Under the *Estado Novo* regime, previous to the onset of the war, Portugal had a protectionist

¹⁹⁶ Daniel Melo, "Imperial Taboos: Salazarist Censorship in the Portuguese Colonies," in *Media and the Portuguese Empire*, eds. José Luís Garcia, Chandrika Kaul, Filipa Subtil, and Alexandra Dias Santos (Secaucus: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 161.

¹⁹⁷ Melo, "Imperial Taboos," 161.

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 164.

¹⁹⁹ Garcia, et al., "The Portuguese Empire," 13.

²⁰⁰ Melo, "Imperial Taboos," 169.

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 164.

²⁰² Garcia et al., "The Portuguese Empire," 14.

²⁰³ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁴ Edward George, *The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991: From Che Guevara to Cuito Cuanavale* (London: Frank Cass, 2005), 50.

²⁰⁵ Eric Solsten and Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, *Portugal, a Country Study*, 2nd ed (Washington: US Government Publishing Office, 1994), 170-171.

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁷ Cann, *Counterinsurgency in Africa*, 329.

economy that relied on a mercantilist empire. Portugal's African colonies acted as a protected market for the metropolis.²⁰⁸ Raw materials were extracted in Africa that were suited to Portugal's economy, then shipped to the metropole, and refined into finished goods that the colonies bought back.²⁰⁹ This process left Portugal's metropole highly underdeveloped, with most citizens living as rural agricultural workers. Portugal's economy was thus highly underdeveloped and poor, but also stabilised up until the start of the 1960s.

The 1960s brought an end to this period of stability. In 1960, Portugal joined the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), which began the process of globalisation and brought an end to Portugal's protectionist economy.²¹⁰ The onset of the war in 1961 further upset the established system, as Portugal opened its economy to foreign lines of credit and capital for the first time, while in Africa foreign companies were allowed 100% control over mineral extraction.²¹¹ This set off a decade of rapid economic growth and industrialization in the Portuguese metropole. From 1950 to 1973, Portugal saw an average GDP growth of over 6% per year due to industrialization.²¹² The 1960s became a period of crisis and upheaval for Portugal.²¹³ Urbanisation, emigration, the growth of the working class, and the emergence of a large middle class, all occurred simultaneously as the economy expanded and protectionism came to an end.²¹⁴ While the economy continued to expand, the war also continued to eat into the national budget. Portugal began losing money on the colonies during this period, while the gains in the home economy were spent to cover deficits in the colonies abroad.²¹⁵ Portugal's exports to the EFTA increased from 40.3% in 1959, to 50.9% in 1969, and to 60.5% in 1973.²¹⁶ Meanwhile exports to the colonies declined from 29.8% in 1959, to 24.4% in 1969, and to 14.8% in 1973.²¹⁷ The period of the Portuguese Colonial War was thus a complete upheaval for the Portuguese economy, which acted as an important background for the lead-up to the Carnation Revolution. Historians have debated over the exact role of the economy in the Portuguese Colonial War. The most common explanation is that the economic growth of the 1960s was used to pay for the costs of the war.²¹⁸ Another view is that protectionism was eased to allow foreign money in, which kept the population happy as an exchange to allow for the lengthy war.²¹⁹ Both are equally plausible explanations and not mutually exclusive. Either way, the war coincided with rapid economic changes to daily life across the metropole.

The economic industrialisation of the metropole along with the threat of conscription also caused a mass movement of migration over the duration of the war. On the one hand, the metropole was not prepared for the vast intake of 27,919 injured soldiers that returned from the wars abroad and overwhelmed Portuguese hospitals and social services.²²⁰ While flows of injured soldiers came into the metropole, the threat of conscription caused an outpouring of young men to emigrate from the country. MacQueen notes how "the countryside underwent extensive depopulation through out-migration, [with] two out of three migrants [seeking] work abroad rather than in the urban sector in Portugal."²²¹ In total 1.5 million migrants left Portugal over the duration of its overseas military campaigns.²²² The military responded to the lack of manpower by befriending the local populations wherever possible and enlisting

²⁰⁸ Humbaraci and Muchnik, *Portugal's African Wars*, 105.

²⁰⁹ Ibid.

²¹⁰ MacQueen, *The Decolonization of Portuguese Africa*, 50.

²¹¹ Ibid, 49-50.

²¹² Ferraz, "The Financial Costs," 249.

²¹³ Solsten and Library of Congress, *Portugal*, 170.

²¹⁴ Ibid.

²¹⁵ MacQueen, *The Decolonization of Portuguese Africa*, 50.

²¹⁶ Ibid, 51.

²¹⁷ Ibid.

²¹⁸ Ibid, 50.

²¹⁹ Ibid.

²²⁰ Cann, *Counterinsurgency in Africa*, 328.

²²¹ MacQueen, *The Decolonization of Portuguese Africa*, 49.

²²² Cann, *Counterinsurgency in Africa*, 329.

Africans into the army.²²³ These migration flows heavily destabilised the Portuguese metropole and society, and acted as another stress factor that caused upheaval for Portugal during the 1960s.

The Military

A brief synopsis of the historical relationship between Portugal's military and its civilian government over the course of the twentieth century is necessary to contextualise the Carnation Revolution. The Carnation Revolution can be seen as part of a broader pattern within Portuguese history. Dr. José Javier Olivas Osuna, a historian of Spanish and Portuguese military history, argues that Portugal has had a long history of its military dictating political outcomes by using either military declarations (*pronunciamentos*) or coups, as in the Carnation Revolution.²²⁴ Portugal had three coups led by its military over the course of the twentieth century. The first coup ended the First Portuguese Republic on 28 May 1926; the second coup solidified the *Ditadura Nacional* into the *Estado Novo* regime on 19 March 1933; and the third coup ended the *Estado Novo* regime on 25 April 1974. Furthermore, there was often a direct overlap between the ruling elite of Portugal and its military officials. In fact, "the involvement of the military in politics became so entrenched that from the enactment of the constitution of 1822 until the foundation of the New State in 1933 a large majority of Portuguese prime ministers were military: 31 different military men led the government, several of them enjoying more than one mandate."²²⁵ From this perspective, the argument laid out by Osuna is not only logical, but based on an empirical trend. Thus, the Carnation Revolution was part of a broader tendency throughout nineteenth and twentieth century Portuguese history wherein the military used coups to produce political outcomes that it deemed desirable.

The Portuguese military also grew increasingly disaffected with the logic that underpinned the war. In turn, this disaffection caused tensions to arise between the military and civilian leadership. Many members of the officer corps in the Portuguese military held left-wing, revolutionary ideologies that led them to sympathise with the Africans they had been sent to oppress.²²⁶ The officer corps also disagreed with the civilian government on the conduct of the war. Local military commanders in the colonies including "Spínola in Guinea, Kaúlza in Mozambique and Luiz Cunha in Angola,"²²⁷ did not follow government policies in their strategy, which led to incoherence between government war plans and the plans of military commanders.²²⁸ Friction between the civilian and military leadership reached a tipping point once Salazar had to step down due to illness. Salazar became incapacitated from a stroke in August of 1968 and was quickly replaced by Marcello José das Neves Alves Caetano. Unlike Franco in Spain, Salazar had made no attempt to prepare a successor.²²⁹ Some historians, including Osuna, argue that Caetano's replacement marked a turning point because he was less respected by military commanders.²³⁰ George has argued that it was specifically the left-wing members of the officer corps that experienced tension with Caetano, as they wanted to negotiate with the insurgents to end the war, which Caetano opposed.²³¹ Lastly, MacQueen has argued that it was the difference in temperament between Salazar and Caetano that caused conflict with military leadership. MacQueen notes how Caetano was "indecisive, vacillating, on occasion simply timid, [and] he proved unable to confront the redoubts of Salazarism in the regime and lead the movement for political modernization from the front."²³² This difference in temperament combined with the lack of preparation by Salazar meant that Caetano had no political base

²²³ Cann, *Counterinsurgency in Africa*, 323.

²²⁴ Osuna, "The Deep Roots," 216.

²²⁵ Osuna, "The Deep Roots," 216-217.

²²⁶ *Ibid.*, 223.

²²⁷ *Ibid.*, 222-223.

²²⁸ *Ibid.*

²²⁹ *Ibid.*

²³⁰ *Ibid.*

²³¹ George, *The Cuban Intervention in Angola*, 50.

²³² MacQueen, "Portugal's First Domino," 206.

upon his ascension to power in 1968.²³³ Whichever the case is, there is widespread agreement among historians that Caetano's ascension led to an increase in tension between the military leadership conducting the war and the civilian government in Lisbon. This deteriorating relationship between the military and the civilian government is an important factor leading up to the Carnation Revolution.

As already mentioned, the military officer corps had also grown weary over the course of the war. The military did not become demoralised because Portugal was losing the war; on the contrary, Portugal was fairly effective in its conduct. As previously highlighted, there were close relationships that were maintained between the Portuguese military and the local populations in Portuguese colonies wherever possible. The Portuguese based their tactics on counterinsurgency techniques learned from the British and French armies.²³⁴ This included attempts by the military to befriend local populations as often as possible using social projects to increase the local standard of living.²³⁵ The military also enlisted locals into the army to deal with the gradual decrease in manpower over the course of the war.²³⁶ This close relationship with local African populations, combined with the military's counterinsurgency tactics, produced effective results on the battlefield. Cann points out that Portugal had relatively low losses as a result of good training, good leadership, and battle plans that were understood by all of the units involved.²³⁷ The Portuguese military was thus mostly effective in its strategy and conduct.

Yet, it is important to note that, despite the effectiveness of the tactics used, the war nonetheless took its toll on the military as it dragged on with no end in sight. The length of military service was extended during the course of the war, which made it less desirable for young men.²³⁸ At its peak, the war stretched over 150,000 troops across three theatres, causing the Portuguese military to reach its limits in terms of manpower.²³⁹ The psychological trauma suffered by the soldiers also wore down the Portuguese military over the course of the war.²⁴⁰ This is reflected in the high desertion rate for conscripted soldiers, which steadily increased as the population became exhausted by the war.²⁴¹ These factors show that, despite the effectiveness of the Portuguese military's strategy and tactics, it was also thinly stretched and overburdened as the war dragged on. Portugal had been at war for thirteen years by the time of the Carnation Revolution in 1974. The desire for an end to the war had reached a zenith among the many soldiers by the time of the revolution. This was in direct opposition to the dictates of the leadership of the civilian government in Lisbon that stubbornly refused to negotiate with the insurgency movements in the colonies.

Discussion and Conclusion

This article has analyzed three categories of factors, including international determinants, domestic determinants, and the military. It is worth noting that these events did not occur in isolation from one another. The domestic upheaval in the Portuguese economy occurred simultaneously alongside growing international pressure to end the war, while the relationship between the exhausted officers and the government in Lisbon was also deteriorating. The Portuguese Colonial War had profound impacts that cascaded from one aspect of Portuguese society to the next.

The cost of the war fuelled economic industrialisation and the end of domestic protectionist economic policies. The *Estado Novo* regime, which had blocked foreign investment for three decades, opened itself up to foreign investment for the first time during the 1960s to fuel the wartime defence budget. Foreign investors were quick to invest in what had been a highly protected and isolated

²³³ MacQueen, "Portugal's First Domino," 230.

²³⁴ Cann, *Counterinsurgency in Africa*, 136-137.

²³⁵ *Ibid*, 323.

²³⁶ *Ibid*.

²³⁷ Cann, *Counterinsurgency in Africa*, 326.

²³⁸ Osuna, "The Deep Roots," 223.

²³⁹ George, *The Cuban Intervention in Angola*, 49-50.

²⁴⁰ *Ibid*.

²⁴¹ Solsten and Library of Congress, *Portugal*, 230-231.

Portuguese market. Nonetheless, while international actors facilitated foreign investment into Portugal during the war, the war caused much diplomatic consternation among the international community. Portugal's attempt to maintain its overseas colonies came during a period of de-colonisation across Africa and Asia. Portugal responded to circumvent international pressure through its use of media censorship and propaganda that was successful for its domestic audience, but a complete failure in the international context.

While the war fuelled economic industrialisation and expansion at home, it also caused a rapid increase to the rate of emigration over the course of the war. Mass waves of emigrants fled conscription by moving abroad, while Portuguese hospitals and social services became overwhelmed with waves of injured soldiers arriving back at the metropole. During the 1960s, Portugal became a country with a rapidly depleting workforce due to emigration, an overwhelmed social safety net trying to relocate its injured veterans, and an economy that was moving from agricultural to industrialised modes of production at lightning speed. These combined factors caused the 1960s to become a period of extreme turbulence for Portugal. This was quickly followed and heightened by the 1973 oil shock that caused the yearly inflation rate to rise as high as 20% by 1974. These domestic factors became the background that propelled Portugal into the Carnation Revolution.

Besides these domestic factors, the revolution was also deeply linked to the Portuguese military. Relations between the Portuguese military and the civilian government deteriorated over the course of the war, especially with the replacement of Salazar with Caetano. Salazar had earned the respect of the military over the course of his dictatorship, but made no effort to groom a successor. This led to rising friction between Caetano and the military leadership, which was aggravated by the sympathies held by many left-wing officers for the African insurgence movements. The length of the war also caused significant war weariness among the troops, who increasingly supported attempts to negotiate with the independence movements against the wishes of the civilian government in Lisbon.

These three sets of factors combined together by 1974 after a decade of war, economic turbulence, and mass emigration. Taken in isolation, no single factor can be considered the cause for the Carnation Revolution. However, when considering the totality of the events that took place over the course of the Portuguese Colonial War, these factors worked in tandem to destabilise and prime the country for the Carnation Revolution. This analysis has reviewed these impacts to show the direct causal connections between the Portuguese Colonial War and the Carnation Revolution that brought an end to the *Estado Novo* regime.

Bibliography

- Cann, John P. *Counterinsurgency in Africa: The Portuguese Way of War, 1961-1974*. Westport: Greenwood, 1997.
- Ferraz, Ricardo. "The Financial Costs of the Portuguese Colonial War, 1961-1974: Analysis and Applied Study." *Revista De Historia Económica* 40, no.2 (2022): 243-272.
- Garcia, José Luís, Chandrika Kaul, Filipa Subtil and Alexandra Santos. "The Portuguese Empire: An Introduction." In *Media and the Portuguese Empire*, edited by José Luís Garcia, Chandrika Kaul, Filipa Subtil and Alexandra Dias Santos, 1-28. Secaucus: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017.
- George, Edward. *The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991: From Che Guevara to Cuito Cuanavale*. London: Frank Cass, 2005.
- Humbaraci, Arslan and Nicole Muchnik. *Portugal's African Wars: Angola, Guinea Bissao, Mozambique*. New York: Third Press, 1974.
- MacQueen, Norrie. "Portugal's First Domino: 'Pluricontinentalism' and Colonial War in Guiné-Bissau, 1963–1974." *Contemporary European History* 8, no. 2 (1999): 209-230.
- MacQueen, Norrie. *The Decolonization of Portuguese Africa: Metropolitan Revolution and the Dissolution of Empire*. New York: Longman, 1997.
- Melo, Daniel. "Imperial Taboos: Salazarist Censorship in the Portuguese Colonies." In *Media and the Portuguese Empire*, edited by José Luís Garcia, Chandrika Kaul, Filipa Subtil and Alexandra Dias Santos, 161-178. Secaucus: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017.
- Rodrigues, Luís Nuno. "The International Dimensions of Portuguese Colonial Crisis." In *The Ends of European Colonial Empires: Cases and Comparisons*, edited by Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo and António Costa Pinto, 243-267. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015.
- Osuna, José Javier Olivas. "The Deep Roots of the Carnation Revolution: 150 Years of Military Interventionism in Portugal." *Portuguese Journal of Social Science* 13, no. 2 (2014): 215-231.
- Solsten, Eric, and Library of Congress. Federal Research Division. *Portugal, a Country Study*. 2nd Edition. Washington: US Government Publishing Office, 1994.
- Szobi, Pavel. "From Enemies to Allies? Portugal's Carnation Revolution and Czechoslovakia, 1968–1989." *Contemporary European History* 26, no. 4 (2017): 669-690.

Rails to Ruin: The E&N and Settler Views of Vancouver Island

Sam Holland²⁴²

sam@samuelholland.ca

Abstract

The construction and operation of the Esquimalt and Nanaimo railway (E&N) on Vancouver Island is a relatively understudied area of British Columbia history. This is despite the place of the E&N in effectively creating the current systems of industrial exploitation and recreational use on Vancouver Island. The E&N and its land grant shaped the legal, political, military, ecological, and geographic history of the region. Legally and politically, the construction of the E&N was the impetus for mass land seizure by the Provincial government. Militarily, the railroad was important in securing the British Empire's operations in the Pacific, supplying an important coaling station. Ecologically, the E&N opened much of the island to exploitation in the form of mining and logging, as well as settlement. Geographically, the E&N connected the island to Victoria by land, transforming the relationship of people to the island both temporally (it was faster to travel than on steamship) and conceptually (new stops along the line participated in placemaking for settlers and visitors). I examine the place of the E&N in these historical areas and contextualize the seizure of aboriginal title on Vancouver Island in terms of three competing views of landscape: pastoral, industrial, and recreational. These three views provide an excellent lens for understanding the transformation of Vancouver Island throughout the 20th century, including the displacement of Indigenous peoples, the development of industry, recreational uses, and even early conservationist views.

²⁴² This paper was written on the territories of the lək'wəŋən and WSÁNEĆ peoples, and directly concerns the history of land claims on Vancouver island. While I have tried my best to address this history with a decolonial mindset, I am a settler working with historical settler records, and this paper should be read as such.

Introduction

Railways are places of connection, tools of economic and demographic change, assertions of sovereignty, facilitators of control, and weapons on the diplomatic, political and geographic battlefield of colonialism and governance.²⁴³ Even if they are largely forgotten, railways often continue to shape the histories, conflicts, and development of land and sea.²⁴⁴ The Esquimalt & Nanaimo (E&N) Railway, an early railway initially between two burgeoning cities on Vancouver Island, is an example *par excellence* of the way railways can transform physical and ontological space, affecting people's relationship to the environment.²⁴⁵ As a railroad of empire, the railroad was designed to tie Vancouver Island and British Columbia more tightly to the new Dominion of Canada while strengthening the position of settlers in the often fraught circumstances of the Pacific coast.²⁴⁶ The construction of the railroad, accompanying attacks on Indigenous title, and waves of settlement not only changed the map of Vancouver Island and surrounding waters, but altered what that map *meant*. Examining the railroad as part of a multilayered borderland shaped by conflict, trade, and differing understandings of landscapes, we can better understand these changes on the land, to the land, and 'in' the land from the 1850s to the 1910s. These perspectives build a more comprehensive history of the railway, and in turn, Vancouver Island. Through this, we can see that the construction of the railway altered the complex web of relationships between settlers, Indigenous peoples, and landscapes.

While there is an extensive literature on the economic and colonial history of the E&N railway, discussion of the inseparable ecological and geographic changes (changes to the landscape) wrought by the railway and its relationship to the ontological erasure (colonial unknowing/unseeing) of Indigenous peoples is slim.²⁴⁷ Similarly, E&N authors tend to place emphasis on railway stories, colonial successes, resource extraction, and Euro-Canadian 'Canadiana' rather than the often uncomfortable narratives of

²⁴³ Michael Ekers, "Financiers in the Forests on Vancouver Island, British Columbia: On Fixes and Colonial Enclosures," *Journal of Agrarian Change* 19, no.2 (2018): 270–94; Donald G. Janelle, "Spatial Reorganization: A Model and Concept," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 59, no.2 (June 1969): 348–64, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8306.1969.tb00675.x>; Malcolm McLeod, ed., *The Pacific Railway: Britannicus' Letters from the Ottawa Citizen* (Ottawa: A. S. Woodburn, 1875); Paul Tennant, *Aboriginal Peoples and Politics: The Indian Land Question in British Columbia, 1849-1989* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1990); Randy W. Widdis, "Railways and Borderland Spaces: The Canada–US Case," *The Canadian Geographer / Le Géographe Canadien* 63, no.1 (March 1, 2019): 11–26.

²⁴⁴ Ekers, "Financiers in the Forests on Vancouver Island, British Columbia"; Michael Ekers et al., "The Coloniality of Private Forest Lands: Harvesting Levels, Land Grants, and Neoliberalism on Vancouver Island," *The Canadian Geographer / Le Géographe Canadien* Early Access (August 16, 2020), <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/cag.12643>; Hul'qumi'num Treaty Group, "Petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights" (University of Arizona Rogers College of Law Indigenous Peoples Law and Policy Program, 2007), <https://docslib.org/doc/10330514/hulquminum-treaty-group-petition>; A. A. Den Otter, *The Philosophy of Railways: The Transcontinental Railway Idea in British North America* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997); Widdis, "Railways and Borderland Spaces: The Canada–US Case".

²⁴⁵ Leslie Main Johnson and Iain Davidson-Hunt, "Ethnoecology and Landscapes," in *Ethnobotany* (John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 2011), 267–84; Widdis, "Railways and Borderland Spaces: The Canada–US Case"; J.F. Bosher, "Vancouver Island in the Empire," *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 33 (2005): 349–68, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03086530500185845>.

²⁴⁶ Roger MacLean, ed., *Extracts From Debates in Dominion Parliament and British Columbia Legislative Council* (Ottawa: MacLean, Roger & Co., 1880); Tennant, *Aboriginal Peoples and Politics*, 46–47.

²⁴⁷ Ekers et al., "The Coloniality of Private Forest Lands"; Glen A. Mofford, *Along the E&N: A Journey Back to the Historic Hotels of Vancouver Island* (Calgary: Touchwood, 2019), 226–230; Manu Vimalassery, Juliana Hu Pegues, and Alyosha Goldstein, "On Colonial Unknowing," *Theory and Event* 19, no.4 (2016), <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/633283>.

land seizure or even narratives of Vancouver Island as a multicultural or Imperial crossroads.²⁴⁸ Non-colonial narratives, especially Indigenous narratives, are often underrepresented or ignored, severing the historical connection between Indigenous peoples (and non-white peoples in general) and the environment. There has been some work on the effect of the E&N on forestry management, settlement, and its effect on Indigenous land title; however, in the context of how the railway transformed space and conceptions of space, the construction and conception of the railway has not been placed in a more complete environmental history framework that connects people to the environment.²⁴⁹

Fortunately, a large body of primary source documents survive that discuss in detail early colonial conceptions of the region, political and social conflicts over the ‘Indian Land Question’, legal and illegal settlement, and changing economic, social, and environmental circumstances on the Island. Firstly, we have access to provincial and Dominion government documents and transcriptions of the time. A disunited colonial legislature called for the publication of correspondence on the ‘Indian Land Question’ and an investigation into the unjust treatment of affected Indigenous peoples, giving us a view into competing visions of the surveyors and government officials, as well as Indigenous agency that shaped land policy in the colony.²⁵⁰ Speeches, editorials, and other texts of the time establish the political and economic value of the railway.²⁵¹ These primary sources will facilitate discussions of changing settler understandings of the Vancouver Island borderlands and landscape. These primary sources provide important insight into the changing relationships between settlers, Indigenous peoples, and the environment, and provide the basis of examining the E&N through a borderlands perspective.

Vancouver Island

Nineteenth-century Vancouver Island was many things: a homeland, a colony, a ‘wilderness,’ a place of refuge, and a place of trade. It was a homeland to many Indigenous peoples: speakers of Kwakwaka’wakw in the north, Nuu-chal-nulth speakers in the West, and Coast Salish groups in the South, and their tribes, villages, clans, and lineages who relied on and transformed the island and the sea around it for many thousands of years.²⁵² To the recent arrivals, Europeans, Asians, Polynesians, Africans, Indigenous Americans from far-flung places of Turtle Island, Vancouver Island was a colony and trading post at the edge of empire, the edge of ‘wilderness’.²⁵³ To free Blacks and escaped Black slaves, the Island

²⁴⁸ Boshier, “Vancouver Island in the Empire”; John R. Hinde, *When Coal Was King: Ladysmith and the Coal-Mining Industry on Vancouver Island* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2003); Richard Somerset Mackie, *Island Timber: A Social History of the Comox Logging Company* (Victoria: Sono Nis Press, 2000); Mofford, *Along the E&N*; Robert D. Turner, *Vancouver Island Railroads*, Second Edition (Victoria: Sono Nis Press, 1997); May Q. Wong, *City in Colour: Rediscovered Stories of Victoria’s Multicultural Past* (Calgary: Touchwood, 2018).

²⁴⁹ Ekers, “Financiers in the Forests on Vancouver Island, British Columbia”; Ekers et al., “The Coloniality of Private Forest Lands”; R. W. Sandwell, *Beyond the City Limits: Rural History in British Columbia* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1998); Tennant, *Aboriginal Peoples and Politics*; Brian Thom, “Reframing Indigenous Territories: Private Property, Human Rights, and Overlapping Claims,” *American Indian Culture and Research Journal* 38, no.4 (2014): 3–28, <https://doi.org/10.17953/aicr.38.4.6372163053512w6x>.

²⁵⁰ Tennant, *Aboriginal Peoples and Politics*, 47-48; Richard Wolfenden, ed., *Papers Connected with the Indian Land Question* (Government Printing Office, 1875), <https://doi.org/10.14288/1.0060734>; “First Provincial Legislative Assembly,” *Daily British Colonist*, April 14, 1875, <http://britishcolonist.ca> (accessed 2021-08-01).

²⁵¹ J. Friesen and H.K. Ralston, eds., *Historical Essays on British Columbia*, Second Edition (Ottawa: Gage Publishing Limited, 1980); MacLean, ed., *Extracts From Debates in Dominion Parliament and British Columbia Legislative Council*; Roger MacLean, “Speech of Mr. DeCosmos on the Pacific Railway Route in British Columbia” (Parliamentary and Departmental Printers, 1878), BC Provincial Library, https://archive.org/details/cihm_14908; McLeod, ed., *The Pacific Railway: Britannicus’ Letters from the Ottawa Citizen*; Matthew Macfie, *Vancouver Island and British Columbia: Their History, Resources, and Prospects* (London: Longman, Green, Longman, Roberts, & Green, 1865).

²⁵² John Sutton Lutz, *Makúk; A New History of Aboriginal-White Relations* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008) 3-15.

²⁵³ Roderick Nash, “The Value of Wilderness,” *Environmental Review* 1, no.3 (1976): 12–25.

was a refuge from a law that would at best discriminate and at worst take them back into the hell of chattel slavery in a land only separated from the island by an 11 mile strait, the United States of America (US).²⁵⁴ By the 1880s, Vancouver Island was situated in the province of British Columbia (BC), in the newly confederated Dominion of Canada.²⁵⁵

The rugged physical geography of Vancouver Island made travel overland difficult, especially in comparison to travel by steamship or canoe between numerous natural harbours. Settlers established a coal mine near Nanaimo, a sawmill and a small community of around two hundred people in what is now Port Alberni, farms in the Cowichan Valley, a small timber operation in Fort Rupert, and the small town and provincial capital of Victoria by 1871.²⁵⁶ These settlers often lived alongside large Indigenous settlements, as despite massive depopulation the Indigenous population still significantly outnumbered the settler population and would for some time; in 1871 there were an estimated 45,000 Indigenous peoples on the mainland and only 20,000 settlers on the mainland and the Island combined.²⁵⁷ The small settler population didn't stop the BC government from engaging in brinkmanship and tough negotiation with the Dominion government; not least among the demands that the Dominion accepted was the construction of a transcontinental railroad, a railroad with its terminus on Vancouver Island.²⁵⁸

Legal Consequences

The terms of the contract for the construction of the railroad bore far-reaching consequences even before the construction of the railroad. The first governor of British Columbia, Governor James Douglas, followed a land policy of negotiating treaties with Indigenous peoples, in accordance with the legal principle that Indigenous title could only be extinguished by treaty. Although he tried to limit settlement in areas with no treaties, this was extremely unpopular with the growing settler population of British Columbia, who wanted cheap access to more land. The growing power of the BC Legislature, the province's legislative body, and Douglas' retirement marked a shift to a new land policy, a policy under which "Native title would not be considered and reserves would be small."²⁵⁹ This policy was implemented by the Chief Commissioner of Lands and Works, Joseph Trutch. He ordered that reserves deemed "too extensive, and in some cases extravagantly so," should be shrunk often against the loud protest of Indigenous peoples who had agreed or acclimated to earlier negotiated boundaries, or in many cases held different understandings of what they had agreed to.²⁶⁰ Confederation with Canada completed the transfer of power from the colonial authorities to the civilian government, clearing the way for further violations of previously recognized Indigenous title.²⁶¹

This disregard for Indigenous title ties into the contract for the construction of the E&N. The province did not intend to directly fund the construction of the railroad; rather, the builder of the railroad would instead be rewarded, by an act of the Legislature of British Columbia, with:

²⁵⁴ Wong, *City in Colour*, 97-99.

²⁵⁵ Tennant, *Aboriginal People and Politics*, 44.

²⁵⁶ Macfie, *Vancouver Island and British Columbia*, 39-52.

²⁵⁷ Adele Perry, *On the Edge of Empire: Gender, Race, and the Making of British Columbia, 1849-1871* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001), 13.

²⁵⁸ MacLachlan, *The Esquimalt and Nanaimo Railway*, 13.

²⁵⁹ Cole Harris, "The Native Land Policies of Governor James Douglas," *BC Studies*, no.174 (2012) 101-122, <https://doi.org/10.14288/bcs.v0i174.182681>.

²⁶⁰ Tennant, *Aboriginal People and Politics*, 17-25; Wolfenden, ed., *Papers Connected with the Indian Land Question*, 46

²⁶¹ Peter H Pease, "Evolution of the Forest Tenure System in British Columbia" (Vancouver: BC Government, February 1992), <https://www.for.gov.bc.ca/hfd/library/documents/bib49592.pdf>.

one million nine hundred thousand acre (more or less) of public lands comprise within the area described by the following boundaries, namely:—on the south by a straight line drawn from the head of Saanich Inlet to Muir Creek [some 10 km west of Sooke Inlet], on the Straits of Fuca; on the west by a straight line drawn from Muir Creek, aforesaid to Crown Mountain [west of Upper Campbell lake]; on the north by a straight line from Crown Mountain to Seymour Narrows; and on the east by the coast line of Vancouver Island to the point of commencement. And including all coal, coal oil, ores, stones, clay, marble, slate, mines, minerals, and substances whatsoever, thereupon, therein, and thereunder.²⁶²

The Act assumes either that Indigenous title never existed, or that it had been previously extinguished. It also legitimised the rights of “bona fide squatters” and afforded them the right to buy up to 160 acres of the land grant at a dollar an acre.²⁶³ This “great land grab” set up the framework for legal conflicts of the next 150 years, many of which are still ongoing.²⁶⁴ It also transformed the east coast of Vancouver Island into an abstraction defined by lines on a map, an important process of settler colonialism that “turns land into fungible property, commodifies it, but also renders the land vacant by racialising the land holding of... indigenous people abstracted into savages.”²⁶⁵ The ownership and usufruct rights of Indigenous people could then easily be denied by implementing a racialised land ownership process of registration or purchase by which Indigenous people could not be land owners because they were not white.²⁶⁶ The legal implications of the E&N land grant bore many political, economic, and ecological consequences for Vancouver Island.

Political Implications

While the legal effects of the land grant were far-reaching, the most immediate implications of the railroad were political and were driven by one question: would British Columbia consider annexation into the United States? Vancouver Island in the latter half of the nineteenth century situated competing and conflicting ideas of national identity, and the Island itself was situated on the border of the Salish Sea, an area contested for most of the century between the US and the British Empire.²⁶⁷ The Terms of Union called for a railway “to connect the seaboard of British Columbia with the railway system of Canada... within ten years from the date of the Union”, and the complete lack of progress on the issue by 1873 drove the provincial government to represent to the Dominion “a feeling of anxiety and discouragement.”²⁶⁸ Editorials and political grandstanding on annexation into the US abounded. This was not an entirely empty threat. Fenians, American immigrants, and disenfranchised French Canadians had often advocated for US annexation, and in 1869 ninety-four prominent Victorians, including former HBC Chief Factor William McNeill, wealthy real

²⁶² “The Vancouver Land and Railway Company Act, 1882” (1882),

<https://www.bclaws.gov.bc.ca/civix/document/id/hstats/hstats/748458212> (accessed 2021-08-04).

²⁶³ “An Act Relating to the Island Railway, the Graving Dock, and Railway Lands of the Province, 1883,” No.51 (1883), <https://www.bclaws.gov.bc.ca/civix/document/id/hstats/hstats/1003191769>.

²⁶⁴ Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group, “Petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights” (University of Arizona Rogers College of Law Indigenous Peoples Law and Policy Program, 2007).

²⁶⁵ Henry Jones, “Property, Territory, and Colonialism: An International Legal History of Enclosure,” *Legal Studies* 39, no.2 (June 2019), 187–203, <https://doi.org/10.1017/lst.2018.22>.

²⁶⁶ Jones, “Property, Territory, and Colonialism: An International Legal History of Enclosure”.

²⁶⁷ Leonard J. Evenden and Daniel E. Turbeville, “The Pacific Coast as Borderlands and Frontier,” in *The Borderlands of the American and Canadian Wests* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2006).

²⁶⁸ Order of Her Majesty in Council admitting British Columbia into the Union, dated the 16th day of May, 1871. May

16, 1871. <https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/csj-sjc/constitution/lawreg-loireg/p1t41.html> (accessed 2021-08-05)

estate agent Leopold Lowenburg, and other prominent businessmen, signed a petition to US President Ulysses Grant asking for his assistance in annexation.²⁶⁹ Canadian concern over annexation was compounded by American Secretary of State William Seward's demands for the annexation of British Columbia.²⁷⁰ While the popularity of annexation waxed and waned with the economic and political fortunes of the US and the Dominion, it posed a serious enough threat to motivate Prime Minister John A. Macdonald to secure the completion of a railroad across the Rockies and along Vancouver Island, with a steamship connection to the mainland.²⁷¹ The construction of the E&N was situated in a complex political landscape where the stakes were nothing less than the American or Canadian future of British Columbia. The construction of the railroad quieted calls for US annexation and cemented Vancouver Island's place in the Salish Sea borderlands, firmly on the Canadian side of the border, a border that would have cascading influences on the people and the ecology of the Salish Sea.²⁷²

Military Geography

Vancouver Island was in theory well-defended. On the seas, this was true. Esquimalt Harbour was the home base of the British Navy's Pacific Station, and several formidable warships could be found in the harbour on a given day. However, despite the importance of Esquimalt as the only coaling station on British soil "between Esquimalt and the Falkland Islands," the Admiralty in the 1870s found the harbour to be "virtually unprotected."²⁷³ The harbour defences were inadequate, and the naval base depended on steamships to either bring high-quality Welsh coal around Cape Horn or lower quality coal from Nanaimo, made expensive by a perpetual shortage of labour (local labour had to compete with the prospective income of the gold fields in the interior).²⁷⁴ Both routes were vulnerable to piracy, sabotage, or attack.²⁷⁵ The solution was clear: a railroad connecting Esquimalt to the coal mines at Nanaimo.²⁷⁶ This would counterbalance the threat of invasion from the United States and the presence of American troops on San Juan Island that "seriously threaten[ed] Victoria."²⁷⁷ The clash of colonial ambitions forced the solidification of the border where it was possible, as British, Canadian, and American officials sought to define the Salish Sea in terms of national space, a form of tenure that would secure control over marine and terrestrial resources.²⁷⁸

Ecologies, Geologies, and Land Use

While the E&N played an important role in the legal, political, and military histories of Vancouver Island and the Salish Sea, it also drastically changed the ecologies and geographies of the region. As the railroad wended from Victoria and along Langford Lake, it transformed watersheds; when the rails reached the Malahat, it moved the boundary of wilderness.²⁷⁹ The farther the railroad reached, the

²⁶⁹ Donald Creighton, *John A. Macdonald: The Young Politician, The Old Chieftain* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999) 45, 408; Willard E. Ireland, ed., "The Annexation Petition of 1869," *BC Studies: The British Columbian Quarterly* 4 (October 1940), <https://doi.org/10.14288/1.0190529>.

²⁷⁰ David E Shi, "Seward's Attempt to Annex British Columbia, 1865-1869," *Pacific Historical Review* 47, no.2 (1978): 217-38, <https://doi.org/10.2307/3637972>.

²⁷¹ Donald F. Warner, *Idea of Continental Union: Agitation for the Annexation of Canada to the United States, 1849-1893* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1960), 148-150.

²⁷² Wadewitz, *The Nature of Borders*.

²⁷³ Gough, *Britannia's Navy on the West Coast of North America, 1812-1914*, 284-294.

²⁷⁴ John S. Lutz, *Makúk: A New History of Aboriginal-White Relations* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008), 166-178.

²⁷⁵ Gough, *Britannia's Navy on the West Coast of North America, 1812-1914*, 133, 294.

²⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 279.

²⁷⁷ *Morning Oregonian*, 11-23-1872, <https://newspaperarchive.com> (accessed 2021-08-06).

²⁷⁸ Jones, "Property, territory, and colonialism".

²⁷⁹ Kristi Carter and Dawn Roumieu, "Langford Lake (1973-2004)" (BC Lake Stewardship and Monitoring Program, 2004).

greater the change. While Dunsmuir used the railway to transport coal from his Nanaimo mines, the railway swiftly became the backbone of a growing logging industry; the railroad built branch lines to facilitate the transport of quarried stone, lime, bricks, copper ore, cannery fish, logs, lumber, explosives, iron, consumer goods, and people.²⁸⁰ Additionally, the railway facilitated the expansion of settlers into many areas previously difficult to reach, such as Shawnigan Lake and the Cowichan Valley, and brought something relatively new to Vancouver Island—tourism. This transformation of how goods and people could move and live on the Island created two conflicting settler views of the Island: one in which land needed to be exploited and transformed via industrial processes, and one in which the land was to be enjoyed recreationally and protected.

The ecological impact of the E&N should not be understated. From the 1880s to the present, the railway fundamentally transformed the relationship between people and the environment. Beyond legal changes in land tenure that worked to separate Coast Salish and Kwakwaka'wakw peoples from traditional methods of managing, harvesting, and living on the land, the railroad brought extractive industries on a new and bigger scale, as well as a fresh influx of settlers and labourers. At the time, logging and mining were fundamentally tied to water and rail. There were realistically no other ways to move large loads inland than canal or rail; early Island loggers were confined to logging riverbanks and shorelines. As colonial policy drove railways west and north, they facilitated the profitability of mines and logging camps in previously inaccessible areas.²⁸¹ The ecological effects of the railway are immediately apparent from an overview of old growth on Vancouver Island: almost all old growth has been logged within the E&N land grant whereas a significant (but small) portion can still be seen outside of the grant.²⁸²

The industrial legacy of the railway—pulp mills, mines, factories, shipping—heavily polluted Vancouver Island waterways. Alberni Inlet, for example, was itself an early “model” case study of inshore pollution, heavily contaminated with human and animal carcinogens flushed from a pulp mill originally made possible by the railway.²⁸³ Coal mining in the Nanaimo region left heavy deposits of aluminium, antimony, arsenic, cadmium, iron, lead, selenium, sodium, and thallium in well water, likely contributing to ill health in the area.²⁸⁴ Ironically, Victoria Harbour, the railway terminus and now a major departure point for whale watching, is the most polluted harbour on the BC coast, with high levels of mercury, PCBs, lead, cadmium, and pesticides in marine sediment.²⁸⁵ The changes wrought by industry, made possible by the railway, are so ingrained in the landscape that they reach deep underground and deep underwater.

The industrial transformations of Vancouver Island created geographic changes in how colonial governments and settlers experienced land and sea. Beyond new and fast-growing colonial settlements in the late nineteenth century, the newfound accessibility of Vancouver Island introduced new and often conflicting ideas of how land should be used. Early views of the island as represented by James Douglas and his superiors focused on a vision of small freehold landowners who would be virtually self-sufficient and who would come from a section of Victorian society that could afford to purchase land and undertake the relatively expensive journey from the metropole. The arrival of thousands of poor miners and speculators in the gold rushes of the 1850s and 60s made any such elite vision increasingly unlikely; the assertive popular government that was ascendant by the time of BC's entry into Confederation in 1871 buried any possibility of such a pattern of settlement. Instead, a new industrial view of nature prevailed,

²⁸⁰ Turner and MacLachlan, *The Esquimalt and Nanaimo Railway: The CPR Steam Years: 1905-1949*, (2012), 23-37; MacLachlan, *The Esquimalt and Nanaimo Railway: The Dunsmuir Years: 1884-1905*, 95-109.

²⁸¹ Mackie, *Island Timber*, 32-64; Otter, *The Philosophy of Railways in British North America*, 3-31.

²⁸² Ekers, “Financiers in the forests on Vancouver Island, British Columbia”.

²⁸³ Arn M. Keeling, “The Effluent Society: Water Pollution and Environmental Politics in British Columbia, 1889-1980” (The University of British Columbia, July 2004), <https://doi.org/10.14288/1.0091830>; Jan Peterson, *Port Alberni: More Than Just a Mill Town* (Victoria: Heritage House Publishing, 2014), 17.

²⁸⁴ Karla Joy Biagioni, “The Negative Impact of Abandoned Coal Mine Workings on Drinking Water Quality and the Health of Residents on Vancouver Island” (University of Victoria, 2006), <http://hdl.handle.net/1828/1760>.

²⁸⁵ Ocean Wise, “Pollution Tracker,” December 2020, <https://pollutiontracker.org> (accessed 2021-08-06).

one where “nature’s sole function was to provide for man’s ambitions,” and the role of the political was to assist in meeting a religious obligation to maximise productivity by “stepping up exploitation.”²⁸⁶ But as industrial exploitation shortened perceptions of distance and opened new areas to casual travellers or tourists, a recreational view of landscape took hold.²⁸⁷

A Pastoral View

The HBC intended to settle Vancouver Island with those “who will exert a sound and wholesome influence on society” and envisioned an island cultivated by freehold rather than tenant farmers, supplemented by paid Indigenous labour.²⁸⁸ This followed Douglas’ general plan of coexistence with Indigenous peoples.²⁸⁹ The view also represents a pastoral or Arcadian conception of the landscape captured by Douglas’ statement that Vancouver Island was “a perfect Eden” inhabited by the “children of the forest.”²⁹⁰ This view emphasised the simplicity and goodness of pious rural life rather than a programme of exploitation or conquest.²⁹¹ This colonial programme demanded colonists with the means to sustain themselves for several years as well as pay for the journey, and could not compete with US offers of cheap land in the Willamette Valley.²⁹² The colonial endeavour failed to attract more than a thousand settlers to the Island by 1855, exposing Douglas to criticism. In British Columbia, the pastoral or Arcadian view of land broadly did not survive the E&N.²⁹³

Industrial Exploitation

Alternative, more industrial views of land to Douglas’ pastoralism clearly existed on Vancouver Island even if they were not entirely represented in colonial policy under Douglas. An exploitative or industrial view is apparent as early as 1859 in a report to the Royal Geographical Society:

the extent of rich or cultivable land is thus extremely limited, and the timber of the woodland is so inferior to what is found on the neighbouring coasts that the principal resources of the island must, I think, be said to be the mineral wealth of its rocks and the fisheries of its seas. The latter, if properly developed, might be made extremely profitable, the fish, if caught and cured under European superintendence, and with European means, might be exported profitably to Australia, where salmon and herring are both in demand, and the two distant extremities of the British empire might thus be made to join hands, with mutual benefit to each other. Of minerals, coal is the only one which has as yet been profitably worked. The coal-fields are extensive.²⁹⁴

This view demonstrates several clear differences from that of Douglas. Firstly, Indigenous labour has been replaced with European labour. Secondly, the report focuses on the possibilities of large-scale exploitation rather than a yeoman ideal. This view of land, combined with progressive industrial views of technology, was a key part of what Der Otter calls “technological nationalism”: the idea of harnessing the technology

²⁸⁶ Donald Worster, *Nature’s Economy: A History of Ecological Ideas*, Second Edition (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994) 52-53.

²⁸⁷ Worster, *Nature’s Economy*.

²⁸⁸ Hartwell Bowsfield, ed., *Fort Victoria Letters 1846-1851* (Winnipeg: Saults & Pollard Limited, 1979) 44.

²⁸⁹ Harris, “The Native Land Policies of Governor James Douglas”.

²⁹⁰ Bowsfield, ed., *Fort Victoria Letters 1846-1851*, 39; Worster, *Nature’s Economy*, 3-25.

²⁹¹ Worster, *Nature’s Economy*, 3-25.

²⁹² Bowsfield, ed., *Fort Victoria Letters 1846-1851*.

²⁹³ Perry, *On the Edge of Empire: Gender, Race, and the Making of British Columbia, 1849-1871*, 14-20.

²⁹⁴ W. C. Grant, “Remarks on Vancouver Island, Principally Concerning Townsites and Native Population,” *Journal of the Royal Geographical Society of London* 31 (1861): 208, <https://doi.org/10.2307/1798261>.

of exploitation to justify and legitimise the Canadian state.²⁹⁵ John A. Macdonald turned to this technological nationalism to secure Vancouver Island and British Columbia within Confederation. The construction of the E&N and the cross-continental railway was part of a “divine” mission to civilise (exploit) the Canadian west.²⁹⁶ In this sense, the competition of the railroad was the fulfilment of a moral and religious mission to better exploit the landscape. While this vision was present before the construction of the E&N, its implementation was facilitated by the construction of the railway.

Hunting and Shooting

While the colonial exploitation of Vancouver Island resulted from the E&N and this industrial view of landscape, cheap access for middle class and upper class tourists to perceived wilderness had an effect overlooked by technological nationalists: tourism. The idea of tourism was not new to British Columbians; the *British Colonist* reported repeatedly on the presence of tourists (and sometimes their detrimental impact), especially in Paris.²⁹⁷ Travel writers and guide editors had several times commented on the beauty, “freshness, and calm” of the Victoria area in the 1870s.²⁹⁸ These early tourists were confined to the Victoria area and to mainland navigable rivers; one account recalls the “trial trip of four days on foot” required to reach Sooke Inlet via Albert Head and Matheson Lake, while a steamship tour from Victoria to the Fraser River canyon began in 1874.²⁹⁹ Tourism was therefore not an important aspect of land use on the Island until the railway brought a tourism and hospitality boom in the late 1880s. Even before the railway had been extended from Esquimalt to Victoria Harbour in 1888, five new hotels had been established along its route to Nanaimo including in the previously remote Shawnigan Lake area.³⁰⁰ These hotels and resorts introduced the Vancouver Island backcountry to middle and upper class visitors for walking, hunting, and fishing, but it also put them face to face with the industrial exploitation of the landscape. Duncan, a town boasting three “significant” hotels by 1901, was surrounded by clearcut.³⁰¹ Backcountry became frontcountry.

The introduction of tourism and the accompanying views of land as a place to hunt, fish, and explore, were naturally in opposition to the goals of industrial exploitation. Sports fishing, hunting, and backpacking have long been recreational interests aligned with ideas of conservation, setting aside land from industrial exploitation.³⁰² Strathcona Park, the Island’s first provincial park, opened in 1911 and immediately drew crowds of sport fishers. A stark change in bourgeois views of industrial exploitation is on show in the 1906 *Daily Colonist* publication of the mystery story “Arncliffe Puzzle”, where George Lester, a sports fisherman looking for trout, refers to the “bloated colliery magnate [that] probably owns the neighbouring property and the fish” and who mismanages his “vista of rolling parkland” by “encouraging otters, weasels, stoats, and other destructive creatures.... perfect pests in a well stocked river.”³⁰³ Lester’s view of landscape is reflective of an understanding of landscape as a place of recreation,

²⁹⁵ Den Otter, *The Philosophy of Railways*, 7.

²⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 27.

²⁹⁷ “Varieties,” *British Colonist*, 1869-02-09, <https://britishcolonist.ca> (accessed 2021-08-06).

²⁹⁸ “Scenery and Resources,” *British Colonist*, 1872-06-07, <https://britishcolonist.ca> (accessed 2021-08-06); “The Portland ‘Oregonian’ Don’t Take Any Stock in the Annexation Movement,” *British Colonist*, 1872-11-29, <https://britishcolonist.ca> (accessed 2021-08-06).

²⁹⁹ “Knapsack Excursion on Vancouver Island,” *British Colonist*, 1873-05-23, <https://britishcolonist.ca> (accessed 2021-08-06); “Tourist Tickets, To the Canyons of the Fraser,” *British Colonist*, 1874-06-02, <https://britishcolonist.ca> (accessed 2021-08-06).

³⁰⁰ Mofford, *Along the E&N*, Appendix A.

³⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 63-72.

³⁰² Dorceta E. Taylor, *The Rise of the American Conservation Movement: Power, Privilege, and Environmental Protection* (Duke University Press, 2016).

³⁰³ Louis Tracy, “The Arncliffe Puzzle,” *The Daily Colonist*, November 8, 1906, <https://britishcolonist.ca> (accessed 2021-08-05).

where “hounds” are required to maximise the enjoyment of fishers and onlookers.³⁰⁴ This is in line with views of conservation at the time where industrial exploitation became an enemy of enjoyment of the land.³⁰⁵

Conclusion

While this paper has not addressed Indigenous perspectives on changing land use, it has worked to fill a gap left by historical scholarship on the changing settler understandings of landscape created and facilitated by the Esquimalt & Nanaimo Railway. The railway is an important piece of local history with deep ties to ideologies of control, exploitation, and enjoyment of nature. As the E&N effectively created the current system of industrial exploitation on Vancouver Island, it is vital to understand how the railway and its land grant shaped the legal, political, military, ecological, and geographic history of the Island. The railway is part of a settler ontology of exploitation and conservation. The goals of nineteenth- and twentieth-century industrialists play an often-uncomfortable role in the founding stories of Canada and the United States. As long as this settler ontology and industrial role is poorly understood, there will be a crucial part missing from a historical understanding of Vancouver Island and, by extension, the Salish Sea. The E&N changed what was done on the land, what could be done on the land, and most importantly it changed what people saw as the purpose of the land. These changes mirrored societal trends in North America, but with unique local representations that still reverberate today.

³⁰⁴ Tracy, “The Arncliffe Puzzle.”

³⁰⁵ Taylor, *The Rise of the American Conservation Movement*, 290-292; Worster, *Nature's Economy*, 258-291.

Bibliography

- An Act relating to the Island railway, the Graving Dock, and Railway Lands of the Province, 1883, Pub. L. No.51 (1883). <https://www.bclaws.gov.bc.ca/civix/document/id/hstats/hstats/1003191769>
- Biagioni, Karla Joy. "The Negative Impact of Abandoned Coal Mine Workings on Drinking Water Quality and the Health of Residents on Vancouver Island." University of Victoria, 2006. <http://hdl.handle.net/1828/1760>.
- Bosher, J.F. "Vancouver Island in the Empire." *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 33 (2005): 349–68. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03086530500185845>
- Bowsfield, Hartwell, ed. *Fort Victoria Letters 1846-1851*. Winnipeg: Saults & Pollard Limited, 1979.
- Creighton, Donald. *John A. Macdonald: The Young Politician, The Old Chieftain*. Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press, 1998
- DeCosmos, Amor. "Speech of Mr. DeCosmos on the Pacific Railway." Edited by Roger MacLean. Parliamentary and Departmental Printers, 1878. https://archive.org/details/cihm_14908
- DeCosmos Amor. *Extracts From Debates in Dominion Parliament and British Columbia Legislative Council*. Ottawa: MacLean, Roger & Co., 1880.
- Ekers, Michael. "Financiers in the Forests on Vancouver Island, British Columbia: On Fixes and Colonial Enclosures." *Journal of Agrarian Change* 19, no.2 (2018): 270–94. <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/joac.12294>
- Ekers, Michael, Glenn Brauen, Tian Lin, and Saman Goudarzi. "The Coloniality of Private Forest Lands: Harvesting Levels, Land Grants, and Neoliberalism on Vancouver Island." *The Canadian Geographer / Le Géographe Canadien* Early Access (August 16, 2020). <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/cag.12643>
- Evenden, Leonard J., and Daniel E. Turbeville. "The Pacific Coast as Borderlands and Frontier." In *The Borderlands of the American and Canadian Wests*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2006.
- "First Provincial Legislative Assembly." *Daily British Colonist*. April 14, 1875. <http://britishcolonist.ca> (accessed 2021-08-01).
- Friesen, J., and H.K Ralston, eds. *Historical Essays on British Columbia*. Second Edition. Ottawa: Gage Publishing Limited, 1980.
- Gough, Barry. *Britannia's Navy on the West Coast of North America, 1812-1914*. Nanoose Bay: Heritage House Publishing, 2016.
- Grant, W. C. "Remarks on Vancouver Island, Principally Concerning Townsites and Native Population." *Journal of the Royal Geographical Society of London* 31 (1861): 208-213. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1798261>
- Harris, Cole. "The Native Land Policies of Governor James Douglas." *BC Studies*, no.174 (2012): 101-122. <https://doi.org/10.14288/bcs.v0i174.182681>.
- Hinde, John R. *When Coal Was King : Ladysmith and the Coal-Mining Industry on Vancouver Island*. Vancouver: UBC Press, 2003.

- Hul'qumi'num Treaty Group. "Petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights." University of Arizona Rogers College of Law Indigenous Peoples Law and Policy Program, 2007.
<https://docslib.org/doc/10330514/hulquminum-treaty-group-petition>
- Ireland, Willard E., ed. "The Annexation Petition of 1869." *BC Studies: The British Columbian Quarterly* 4 (October 1940). <https://doi.org/10.14288/1.0190529>
- Janelle, Donald G. "Spatial Reorganization: A Model and Concept." *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 59, no.2 (June 1969): 348–64. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8306.1969.tb00675.x>
- Johnson, Leslie Main, and Iain Davidson-Hunt. "Ethnoecology and Landscapes." In *Ethnobotany*, 267–84. John Wiley and Sones, Inc., 2011.
- Jones, Henry. "Property, Territory, and Colonialism: An International Legal History of Enclosure." *Legal Studies* 39, no.2 (June 2019): 187–203. <https://doi.org/10.1017/lst.2018.22>.
- Keeling, Arn M. "The Effluent Society: Water Pollution and Environmental Politics in British Columbia, 1889-1980." The University of British Columbia, July 2004. <https://doi.org/10.14288/1.0091830>.
- "Knapsack Excursion on Vancouver Island." *British Colonist*. 1873-05-23. <https://britishcolonist.ca> (accessed 2021-08-06).
- Louis Tracy. "The Arncliffe Puzzle." *The Daily Colonist*. November 8, 1906. <https://britishcolonist.ca> (accessed 2021-08-05).
- Lutz, John Sutton. *Makúk; A New History of Aboriginal-White Relations*. Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008.
- Macfie, Matthew. *Vancouver Island and British Columbia: Their History, Resources, and Prospects*. London: Longman, Green, Longman, Roberts, & Green, 1865.
- Mackie, Richard Somerset. *Island Timber: A Social History of the Comox Logging Company*. Victoria: Sono Nis Press, 2000.
- MacLachlan, Donald F. *The Esquimalt and Nanaimo Railway: The Dunsmuir Years: 1884-1905*. Victoria: British Columbia Railway Historical Association, 1986.
- McLeod, Malcolm, ed. *The Pacific Railway: Britannicus' Letters from the Ottawa Citizen*. Ottawa: A. S. Woodburn, 1875.
- Mofford, Glen A. *Along the E&N: A Journey Back to the Historic Hotels of Vancouver Island*. Calgary: Touchwood, 2019.
- "Morning Oregonian." November 23, 1872. <https://newspaperarchive.com> (accessed 2021-08-06).
- Ocean Wise. "Pollution Tracker," December 2020. <https://pollutiontracker.org>. (accessed 2021-08-06)
- Otter, A. A. Den. *The Philosophy of Railways: The Transcontinental Railway Idea in British North America*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997.
- Order of Her Majesty in Council admitting British Columbia into the Union, dated the 16th day of May, 1871. May 16, 1871. <https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/csj-sjc/constitution/lawreg-loireg/p1t41.html> (accessed 2021-08-05)

- Pease, Peter H. "Evolution of the Forest Tenure System in British Columbia." Vancouver: BC Government, February 1992. <https://www.for.gov.bc.ca/hfd/library/documents/bib49592.pdf>
- Perry, Adele. *On the Edge of Empire: Gender, Race, and the Making of British Columbia, 1849-1871*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001.
- Peterson, Jan. *Black Diamond City*. Surrey: Heritage House Publishing, 2002.
- . *Port Alberni: More Than Just a Mill Town*. Victoria: Heritage House Publishing, 2014.
- Powell, Israel Wood. *Report of the Superintendent of Indian Affairs for British Columbia for 1872 & 1873*. Ottawa: L.B. Taylor, 1873.
- Prentice, J.D. "Inquiry into Grievances of Settlers, E&N Railway Lands." Victoria: Provincial Secretary's Office, January 4, 1901. <https://doi.org/10.14288/1.0064148>.
- Sandwell, R. W. *Beyond the City Limits: Rural History in British Columbia* Vancouver, UBC Press, 1998. "Scenery and Resources." *British Colonist*. 1872-06-07. <https://britishcolonist.ca> (accessed 2021-08-06).
- Shi, David E. "Seward's Attempt to Annex British Columbia, 1865-1869." *Pacific Historical Review* 47, no.2 (1978): 217-38. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3637972>.
- Taylor, Dorceta E. *The Rise of the American Conservation Movement: Power, Privilege, and Environmental Protection*. Duke University Press, 2016.
- Taylor, W.A. "Crown Land Grants: A History of the Esquimalt and Nanaimo Railway Land Grants, the Railway Belt, and the Peace River Block." BC Ministry of Environment, Lands, and Parks, 1975. <https://ltsa.ca/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Crown-Land-Grants-A-History-of-the-E-and-N.pdf>
- Tennant, Paul. *Aboriginal Peoples and Politics: The Indian Land Question in British Columbia, 1849-1989*. Vancouver: UBC Press, 1990.
- "The Portland 'Oregonian' Don't Take Any Stock in the Annexation Movement." *British Colonist*. 1872-11-29. <https://britishcolonist.ca> (accessed 2021-08-06).
- Thom, Brian. "Reframing Indigenous Territories: Private Property, Human Rights, and Overlapping Claims." *American Indian Culture and Research Journal* 38, no.4 (2014): 3-28. <https://doi.org/10.17953/aicr.38.4.6372163053512w6x>
- "Tourist Tickets, To the Canyons of the Fraser." *British Colonist*. 1874-06-02. <https://britishcolonist.ca> (accessed 2021-08-06).
- Turner, Robert D. *Vancouver Island Railroads*. Second Edition. Victoria: Sono Nis Press, 1997.
- Turner, Robert D., and Donald F. MacLachlan. *The Esquimalt and Nanaimo Railway: The Canadian Pacific, Via Rail, & Shoreline Years: 1949-2013*. Winlaw: Sono Nis Press, 2013.
- . *The Esquimalt and Nanaimo Railway: The CPR Steam Years: 1905-1949*. Winlaw: Sono Nis Press, 2012.
- Vancouver Land and Railway Company Act, 1882 (1882). <https://www.bclaws.gov.bc.ca/civix/document/id/hstats/hstats/748458212> (accessed 2021-08-04).
- "Varieties." *British Colonist*. 1869-02-09. <https://britishcolonist.ca> (accessed 2021-08-06).
- Vimalassery, Manu, Juliana Hu Pegues, and Alyosha Goldstein. "On Colonial Unknowing." *Theory and Event* 19, no.4 (2016). <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/633283>.

- Vogt, David, and David Alexander Gamble. ““You Don’t Suppose the Dominion Government Wants to Cheat the Indians’: The Grand Trunk Pacific Railway and the Fort George Reserve, 1908-12.” *BC Studies* Summer 2010, no.166 (2010): 55–72, 127–28. <https://doi.org/10.14288/bcs.v0i166.288>
- Wadewitz, Lissa K. *The Nature of Borders: Salmon, Boundaries, and Bandits on the Salish Sea*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2012.
- Warner, Donald F. *Idea of Continental Union: Agitation for the Annexation of Canada to the United States, 1849-1893*. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1960.
- Widdis, Randy W. “Railways and Borderland Spaces: The Canada–US Case.” *The Canadian Geographer / Le Géographe Canadien* 63, no.1 (March 1, 2019): 11–26.
- Wolfenden, Richard, ed. *Papers Connected with the Indian Land Question*. Government Printing Office, 1875. <https://doi.org/10.14288/1.0060734>
- Wong, May Q. *City in Colour: Rediscovered Stories of Victoria’s Multicultural Past*. Calgary: Touchwood, 2018.
- Worster, Donald. *Nature’s Economy: A History of Ecological Ideas*. Second Edition. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

Holodomor: Understanding Joseph Stalin's Genocide

Matthew Kerr³⁰⁶

matthewjakerr@gmail.com

Abstract

The Holodomor, Ukrainian for “death by hunger,” was one of the deadliest famines known to man: over 4 million Ukrainian lives perished during this famine. Ninety years later, this famine remains an important reminder of the brutality suffered by people under the regime of Joseph Stalin. As a result of the push for increased industrialisation in the wake of World War I, collectivisation was implemented under Stalin’s Five Year Plan. This practice saw the collectivisation of peasant-run farms into state-owned farms, removing individual autonomy and leading to popular outrage. By 1932 harvests had taken a large hit, leading to several years of poor grain production. Needing food to fuel industrialisation, Stalin brought forth brutal measures of food procurement targeted against the peasant farmer population, taking personal food stores and retaliating against those who resisted. The Ukrainian peasant population, which was the single largest producer of grain, was hit much harder than other areas within the USSR and suffered unique discrimination not felt by other groups. Based on the United Nations’ definition of “genocide,” this paper analyses how Stalin purposely targeted the Ukrainian peasant population with food procurement, internal isolation, and refusal of aid to answer the question: is the Holodomor definable as genocide?

³⁰⁶ I would like to thank my parents for their support in my academic journey; my professors, Dr. David Dolff and Dr. Serhy Yekelchuk, for fuelling my love of history; and *The Ascendant Historian* for giving me this amazing opportunity.

The people of Ukraine have suffered many tragic events throughout their history, living through both World Wars, the Chernobyl nuclear disaster, and the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War. However, one of the most devastating events in Ukrainian history was the 1932-1933 man-made famine orchestrated by Joseph Stalin and his communist regime, commonly known as the Holodomor. Ukrainian for “death by hunger,” Holodomor is an appropriate name for the famine that resulted in the deaths of an estimated four million Ukrainians plus many more throughout the USSR.³⁰⁷ This famine was a result of Stalin’s first Five-Year plan in 1928, which called for the collectivisation of agriculture to support rapid industrialisation. This plan impacted Ukrainian peasants especially hard because they were the primary agricultural workforce in the USSR. As a result, many peasants tried to resist collectivisation, leading to the confiscation of peasant property by the state, being labelled kulaks and enemies of the USSR, and the deportation of thousands from their homes.³⁰⁸ Initially referring to members of the upper-class peasantry, the term kulak would later come to define anyone who resisted collectivisation. Once the government established collectivisation, the flaws in Stalin’s Five-Year Plan made themselves known. In 1932, due to impossibly high grain quotas, authorities began confiscating grain and taking foodstuffs as a fine for failing to meet the demand.³⁰⁹ The series of events described above are what led to the starvation of millions of Ukrainian peasants and, subsequently, one of the most important scholarly debates surrounding the Holodomor: can the Holodomor be classified as genocide? The United Nations defines a crime against humanity as “a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population.”³¹⁰ Unlike genocide, a crime against humanity does not involve the attempted destruction of the victimised group. In the context of the early stages of the famine, the crimes against the peasants of Ukraine would have included deportation, imprisonment, and proxy murder at the minimum.³¹¹ In contrast, the term “genocide” was defined by the United Nations General Assembly in 1946 and the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide as “acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.”³¹² Through this definition, the two key elements that make up the crime of genocide are shown: a mental element and a physical element. The mental element, “with intent to destroy,” can be difficult to determine as there must be proven intent to commit genocide. The physical element refers to the act of genocide itself through “acts committed... to destroy, in whole or in part.”³¹³ To be definable as genocide, at least one of five acts must be committed: killing members of the group; causing serious physical or mental harm to members of the group; deliberately inflicting conditions of life meant to destroy the group in whole or in part; imposing measures to prevent births within the group; and forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.³¹⁴ This paper argues that, by examining the evolution of the Holodomor, its escalation from crime against humanity to genocide against the Ukrainian peasantry is unmistakable.

The crimes that would eventually lead to the Holodomor famine began with Stalin’s first Five-Year plan in 1928. This plan was designed to rapidly increase the industrial strength of the USSR to match that of Western Europe. One of the main reasons for rapid industrialisation was to create an

³⁰⁷ Bohdan Klid, “Holodomor: Holodomor and UN Genocide Convention Criteria,” in *Modern Genocide: Understanding Causes and Consequences* (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2013) quoted in Holodomor Research and Education Consortium, “Was Holodomor a Genocide?” Holodomor Research and Education Consortium, <https://holodomor.ca/resource/was-the-holodomor-a-genocide/> (accessed 27 July 2020); Rudnytskyi et al., “The 1921–1923 Famine and the Holodomor of 1932–1933 in Ukraine: Common and Distinctive Features,” *Nationalities Papers* 48, no.3 (2020): 561, <https://doi.org/10.1017/nps.2019.81>.

³⁰⁸ Klid, “Holodomor.”

³⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

³¹⁰ United Nations, “Crimes Against Humanity,” Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect, <https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/genocide.shtml> (accessed 10 November 2022).

³¹¹ *Ibid.*

³¹² *Ibid.*

³¹³ *Ibid.*

³¹⁴ *Ibid.*

industrial economy that could support increased military might. This was a key goal of Stalin who sought to avoid future military losses like those suffered in the First World War. To support this rapid industrial growth, the regime collectivised all agriculture, and by extension the peasantry, to take control of the grain harvest.³¹⁵ Collectivisation saw the removal of private farms and the creation of collective farms, known as *kolkhoz*, which were owned by the state and operated by peasant families. By taking control of the harvest and its bounty, the regime could feed the growing urban population who worked in the industrial centres and finance the purchase of machinery from abroad to further support the industrial drive.³¹⁶ However, most peasants in the USSR were opposed to collectivisation because of its removal of land ownership and negative impact on the livelihood of the peasantry.

The peasant desire for autonomy and private land ownership can be seen during the civil war in 1919-1921 when peasants used force to claim their own plots of land. This was allowed by the early Bolsheviks who sought rural support; however, with Stalin's push for collectivisation, most peasants would lose their privately owned land. This loss of land ownership severely impacted the peasant work ethic as they no longer had anything to work for. "[T]here was no need to work hard as the state took all the harvest anyway, leaving the grain farmers starving."³¹⁷ The strict collectivisation of the harvest severely impacted the livelihood of peasants such that many now faced starvation. Because Ukraine was the agricultural epicentre of the USSR, the resistance towards collectivisation was more prevalent there. In fact, "in the first seven months of 1932, out of the 1,630 registered peasant uprisings in the whole USSR, there were 923 peasant uprisings in Ukraine" alone.³¹⁸ To combat this resistance and enforce collectivisation, the regime attacked the "*kulaks*" and forcefully imprisoned and deported thousands: Not only did this attack lead to the deportation of thousands of potential workers to the gulag labour camps, but also increased the peasants' disdain for collectivisation and further demoralised them. Forced deportation was a common fate met by those who resisted the regime. The significance of this tactic is emphasised by top Communist official Lazar Kaganovich who stated, "We will resettle all those to the North who refuse to sow now!"³¹⁹ As a result of this policy, "during November 1932 more than 60,000 peasants and Cossacks were deported from the Kuban," and, while the Kuban is not in Ukraine, it was home to a majority Ukrainian peasant population.³²⁰

As illustrated above, the build-up to the Holodomor was undeniably a crime against humanity as defined by the United Nations. To force the peasant population into collectivisation, largely in Ukraine or involving those of Ukrainian origin, the Soviet regime attacked civilians through famine, forced deportation, imprisonment, and, as this paper argues, proxy murder. Still, this early stage cannot be classified as genocide as there was no clear intent to destroy the Ukrainian peasantry. However, these crimes against humanity and the early ruthlessness surrounding collectivisation would lay the foundation for what would become the genocide of the Ukrainian peasantry.

To show how the Holodomor became a genocide against the Ukrainian peasantry, the mental element of intent and the physical element of the act itself must be determined. Both can be clearly seen through the regime's constant awareness of the famine leading to genocidal policies of increased food requisition, refusing to acknowledge the famine and accept foreign aid, and internally isolating the Ukrainian peasantry. In April 1933, the novelist Mikhail Sholokhov wrote to Stalin to alert him to the famine occurring in Ukraine. Stalin responded, "[t]hese people [the peasants] deliberately tried to undermine the Soviet state. It is a fight to the death Comrade Sholokhov!"³²¹ Not only does this challenge

³¹⁵ Norman M. Naimark, "The Holodomor," in *Stalin's Genocides*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 71. <https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400836062-006>.

³¹⁶ Klid, "Holodomor."

³¹⁷ Rudnytskyi et al., "The 1921–1923 Famine," 560.

³¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 561.

³¹⁹ Stanislav V. Kulchytskyi, *Holodomor and Gorta Mór: Histories, Memories and Representations of Famine in Ukraine and Ireland* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 23. <https://doi.org/10.7135/UPO9780857282231.0.02>.

³²⁰ *Ibid.*

³²¹ Kulchytskyi, *Holodomor and Gorta Mór*, 23.

doubt whether Stalin was aware of the famine taking place, but is evidence that he actively encouraged it. Indeed, Stalin saw the Ukrainian peasantry as a threat due to their resistance and rebellious nature. In particular, Stalin's wariness toward Ukrainian defiance and rebelliousness stemmed from their brief period of independence from 1918 to 1920 that emphasised the Ukrainians' strong national pride and drive for autonomy.³²² So prevalent was Stalin's concern over Ukraine, that in August 1932, Stalin wrote to Kaganovich, "we may lose Ukraine."³²³ As explored above, losing Ukraine would have been a disaster for Stalin as it was the primary agricultural producer and home to invaluable resources like iron and coal. Yet, the Kremlin's awareness of the famine and Stalin's enthusiasm in its perpetuation does not prove that its goal was the destruction of the Ukrainian people, it directly led to what would become the genocidal policies designed to destroy the Ukrainian peasantry.

As outlined earlier, the increases in food requisition can be traced back to the failings of collectivisation and its negative impact on peasant families. As a result, grain production in Ukraine decreased. The quotas, however, remained. The strict collection of grain was heightened by Stalin, who "insisted that grain should be collected from the Ukrainian peasants 'at all costs.'"³²⁴ To do this, special teams were sent to the Ukrainian countryside to collect any remaining grain, seed, and personal food stores: "[t]hose who survived the Holodomor report that during these searches not only potatoes and meat were taken... but all edible products."³²⁵ The seizure of personal food stores from the already starving peasants suggests the willingness to destroy the Ukrainian peasantry through the genocidal acts of causing serious bodily harm: deliberately inflicting starvation with the intent to destroy. As a result, these actions killed an estimated four million Ukrainian peasants.³²⁶ Furthermore, these additional seizures were ordered by the Kremlin, who, as shown above, were fully aware of the famine in Ukraine and had additional motivation to quell Ukrainian resistance to secure the state for resource extraction. As said by a Ukrainian scientist in September 1932, "[t]his is a policy aimed at breaking the Ukrainian nation completely as the only national force capable of serious resistance."³²⁷

The Soviet regime's denial of the famine's existence and subsequent refusal of aid further shows the intent to destroy the Ukrainian peasantry through acts of genocide. Despite this denial, Ukrainian correspondence to family outside the USSR and the testimony of international journalists who witnessed the famine first hand alerted the world to the famine taking place. As a result of this knowledge, both independent groups and foreign countries sent numerous offers of assistance to the USSR with the specific intent to feed the people of Ukraine. However, these offers were denied by the authorities as the Soviet government insisted that "there is no famine or prospect of one, that the relief is not needed and that the campaigns themselves are a form of anti-Soviet propaganda."³²⁸ Strikingly, these offers of aid came at limited financial expense to the state, yet were still refused. For example, "in November 1933, the Soviet regime was said to have refused 'bread from abroad even when half of the shipment was to be given to the state for free.'"³²⁹ Thus, the regime was offered support to save the starving peasants of Ukraine, but refused every offer, instead choosing to let millions starve to death. Through Soviet diplomatic actions, the presence of an act of genocide is clear. The genocidal acts of purposely killing members of the Ukrainian peasantry, causing serious bodily and mental harm to them, and deliberately inflicting on them conditions of life designed to bring about their physical destruction were committed.³³⁰

³²² Klid, "Holodomor."

³²³ Naimark, "The Holodomor," 71-72.

³²⁴ *Ibid.*, 72.

³²⁵ Klid, "Holodomor"; Kulchyt'skyi, *Holodomor and Gorta Mór*, 31.

³²⁶ Klid, "Holodomor."

³²⁷ Rudnytskyi et al., "The 1921–1923 Famine," 560-561.

³²⁸ Serge Cipko, *Starving Ukraine: The Holodomor and Canada's Response* (Regina: Regina University Press, 2018), 172. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2020.1764771>.

³²⁹ Cipko, *Starving Ukraine*, 167.

³³⁰ United Nations, "Genocide," Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect, <https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/genocide.shtml> (accessed 9 November 2022).

The targeted internal isolation of the Ukrainian peasantry is another key policy that demonstrates both the mental intent and physical acts of genocide committed by the Soviet regime. In February 1932, right before the outbreak of the Holodomor, the *Toronto Star* reported “that forty Ukrainian peasants, fleeing ‘an impending famine,’ were shot by Soviet frontier guardsmen as they attempted to swim across the river into Romania.”³³¹ While authorities were given strict, but informal, instructions not to let Ukrainian peasants flee the state, on 22 January 1933 Stalin signed an order that would “prevent peasants leaving Ukraine and the North Caucasus in search of food in other parts of the Soviet Union.”³³² This order led to the arrest of over 220,000 Ukrainian peasants for attempting to flee their villages in February 1933.³³³ Thousands of these peasants were sent to the gulags, where death rates were extraordinarily high, while the rest were sent back to their villages, “which meant they were essentially condemned to death.”³³⁴ Not only were peasants unable to leave Ukraine to find food, but they were also prevented from entering Ukrainian cities where food was sometimes available.³³⁵ The bans preventing the peasantry from leaving Ukraine and preventing them from entering the city centres shows how this genocide deliberately targeted the Ukrainian peasantry. Granted, it did not target Ukrainians as a whole, yet these acts clearly demonstrate the intent of the Soviet regime to destroy the Ukrainian peasantry through starvation, thereby enacting a genocidal state policy.

In exploring the evolution of the Holodomor, its escalation from crime against humanity to genocide against the Ukrainian peasantry is clear. In the early stages of the Holodomor, deportation, imprisonment, proxy murder against the Ukrainian peasantry to enforce strict grain quotas, and violent state response towards Ukrainian resistance to collectivisation are emblematic of crimes against humanity. Of course, this itself cannot be classified as genocide as there is no clear evidence to suggest that these initial measures were intended to destroy the Ukrainian peasantry, but rather the result of enforcing rapid collectivisation. However, from 1932-1933, Stalin’s regime intentionally committed several acts against the Ukrainian peasantry designed to destroy them. Correspondence within the regime shows the mental element of genocide, while the acts themselves show the physical element. The presence of both the mental and physical elements working in tandem constitute genocide. During the Holodomor, these elements are exhibited by the regime’s awareness of the famine in Ukraine and subsequent increase of food requisitions, denial of foreign aid, and restriction of Ukrainian peasants’ freedom of travel. In other words, the Soviet regime committed three acts of genocide against the Ukrainian peasantry according to international law: causing serious physical and mental harm; deliberately inflicting conditions of life (starvation) meant to destroy a population in whole or in part; and the successful killing of members of that population.³³⁶ The Holodomor casts an ever-present shadow over Ukraine due to its immense impact on the nation and her people and it remains a critical event in understanding the brutality and devastation that was commonplace in the USSR under Joseph Stalin’s regime.

³³¹ Cipko, *Starving Ukraine*, viii.

³³² *Ibid.*, ix.

³³³ Naimark, “The Holodomor,” 73.

³³⁴ *Ibid.*

³³⁵ *Ibid.*

³³⁶ Klid, “Holodomor.”

Bibliography

- Cipko, Serge. *Starving Ukraine: The Holodomor and Canada's Response*. Regina: Regina University Press, 2018. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2020.1764771>.
- Klid, Bohdan. "Holodomor: Holodomor and UN Genocide Convention Criteria. In *Modern Genocide: Understanding Causes and Consequences*. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2013. Quoted in Holodomor Research and Education Consortium. "Was the Holodomor a Genocide?" *Holodomor Research and Education Consortium*. <https://holodomor.ca/resource/was-the-holodomor-a-genocide/> (accessed 27 July 2020).
- Kulchytskyi, Stanislav V. *Holodomor and Gorta Mór: Histories, Memories and Representations of Famine in Ukraine and Ireland*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. <https://doi.org/10.7135/UPO9780857282231.002>.
- Naimark, Norman M. "The Holodomor." In *Stalin's Genocides*, 70-79. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010. <https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400836062-006>.
- Rudnytskyi, Omelian, Stanislav Kulchytskyi, Oleksandr Gladun, and Natalia Kulyk. "The 1921–1923 Famine and the Holodomor of 1932–1933 in Ukraine: Common and Distinctive Features." *Nationalities Papers* 48, no. 3 (2020): 549–568. <https://doi.org/10.1017/nps.2019.81>.
- United Nations. "Crimes Against Humanity." Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect. <https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/genocide.shtml> (accessed 10 November 2022).
- United Nations. "Genocide." Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect. <https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/genocide.shtml> (accessed 9 November 2022).

The Preservation of Holocaust Memory during the War in Ukraine

Anika Luteijn³³⁷

ajluteijn17@gmail.com

Abstract

On 24 February 2022, the Russian Federation illegally invaded the free and democratic nation of Ukraine. Amidst the devastating destruction and bloodshed, Ukrainian civilians and officials have been fighting hard to preserve their nation's culture and history from the invaders who wish to erase all trace of Ukraine's unique identity. This fight includes the preservation of Holocaust memory in Ukraine. After a missile strike severely damaged the Drobytsky Yar Holocaust monument in Kharkiv in March 2022, the question has been raised of how to effectively preserve Holocaust memory during times of modern warfare. To attempt to answer this unprecedented question, it is necessary to refer back to the history of the Holocaust in Ukraine, the decades long fight for proper Holocaust memorialization, and what is currently being done by Ukrainians as they fight to protect their homeland, their history, and their cultural identity.

³³⁷ To the many individuals in Ukraine fighting to keep Holocaust memory alive, and to the courageous people of Ukraine who fight to protect their homeland, and the world, against a tyrannical terrorist state. Слава Україна.

Ukraine has a complex history regarding the memorialisation of the Holocaust. While discussions of the Holocaust were censored during the Soviet era, significant efforts have been made since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 to properly memorialise the Jewish individuals killed on Ukrainian soil.³³⁸ Unfortunately, this work is in jeopardy due to the invasion of Ukraine by Russian forces that occurred on 24 February 2022. The question of how to properly protect and preserve Holocaust memory during times of modern warfare was sparked after an artillery strike damaged the Babyn Yar Memorial Park on 1 of March 2022, followed only a few days later by the destruction of the Drobytsky Yar Menorah Monument.³³⁹ The strikes on these monuments have been perceived as attacks on the historical memory of the Holocaust in Ukraine.³⁴⁰ The Ukrainian people and their allies have been fighting to protect their Holocaust artefacts, monuments, and history so that they are not destroyed by the conflict. Considering that the war in Ukraine is a constantly-evolving event, it is challenging to find a definitive answer of how to preserve Ukrainian Holocaust memory in times of modern warfare. In order for the profound significance of this question to be fully realised, it is necessary to look back on the history of the Holocaust in Ukraine, as well as the history of Holocaust memorialisation in Ukraine. Two specific events during the Second World War are of particular relevance to the question of preserving Ukrainian Holocaust memory in times of modern warfare: the massacres of Babyn Yar and Drobytsky Yar.

When German forces invaded Ukraine in 1941, the Germans were initially greeted as liberators due to the tyranny that Ukrainian civilians had experienced under Soviet rule.³⁴¹ The opinion of the Ukrainian people quickly shifted when they realized that one occupier had replaced another. On 29 September 1941, only ten days after the occupation of Kyiv, the Holocaust by Bullets began for the Jews of Ukraine.³⁴² Ukrainian Jews in Kyiv were told to report with their personal documents and valuables to the intersection of Melnikova and Dehtiarivska, before they were led to the Babyn Yar ravine, where German soldiers had dug pits.³⁴³ Approximately 34,000 Ukrainian Jews were shot and killed at Babyn Yar over the course of two days before the city of Kyiv was declared to be *Judenfrei* (free of Jews) by the Nazis.³⁴⁴ Just a few months later, on 27 December 1941, another 12,000 Jewish adults and children were killed at Drobytsky Yar outside of Kharkiv.³⁴⁵

Although the massacre at Babyn Yar remains “the biggest single mass execution of the Holocaust,” Ukraine only began to directly memorialise the Holocaust at the end of the twentieth century.³⁴⁶ During the country’s time under the dominion of the Soviet Union, any reference to the Holocaust was strictly prohibited and the only memorials permitted in Ukraine identified the people killed

³³⁸ Masha Gessen, “The Holocaust Memorial Undone by Another War,” *New Yorker*, April 18, 2022, <https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2022/04/18/the-holocaust-memorial-undone-by-another-war> (accessed 14 November 2022).

³³⁹ Tiffany Wertheimer, “Babyn Yar: Anger as Kyiv’s Holocaust Memorial is Damaged,” *BBC News*, March 3, 2022, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60588885> (accessed 14 November 2022).

³⁴⁰ Roman Rukomeda, “Only Fascists Can Destroy World War II and Holocaust Memorials,” *Euractiv*, March 31, 2022, <https://www.euractiv.com/section/europe-s-east/opinion/only-fascists-can-destroy-world-war-ii-and-holocaust-memorials/> (accessed 14 November 2022).

³⁴¹ Peter Hayes, *Why? Explaining the Holocaust* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2017), 227.

³⁴² Aleksandr Burakovskiy, “Holocaust Remembrance in Ukraine: Memorialization of the Jewish Tragedy at Babi Yar,” *Nationalities Papers* 39, no.3 (May 2011): 373. <http://doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2011.565316>.

³⁴³ Timothy Snyder, *Black Earth: The Holocaust as History and Warning* (New York: Tim Duggan Books, 2015), 175-176; Gessen, “The Holocaust Memorial.”

³⁴⁴ Burakovskiy, “Holocaust Remembrance,” 373; Hayes, *Why?*, 89.

³⁴⁵ Paul-Robert Magocsi and Yohanan Petrovsky-Shtern, *Jews and Ukrainians: A Millennium of Co-Existence* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016), 72; Snyder, *Black Earth*, 184; Ukrainian Institute, “Drobytsky Yar,” *Ukrainian Institute*, <https://ui.org.ua/en/postcard/drobytsky-yar-en/> (accessed 20 November 20).

³⁴⁶ Gessen, “The Holocaust Memorial.”

during the Second World War as “citizens of the Soviet Union”.³⁴⁷ There was no mention of the persecution of Jewish individuals on Ukrainian soil, no mention of Babyn Yar, nor the tens of thousands of Jews who were massacred there. The Babyn Yar ravine was made to be unrecognisable after being filled in by the Soviets and obscured by years of industrial construction.³⁴⁸

The silence surrounding the massacre at Babyn Yar after the war was eventually broken in 1961 with the publication of the poem ‘Babi Yar’ by Evgenii Evtushenko.³⁴⁹ The publication of this poem represented the beginning of the efforts for the memorialisation of the Babyn Yar massacre, with a symphony of the same name premiering in Moscow in 1962, and an eye-witness account being published in 1966.³⁵⁰ As the poem and symphony had caused a stir abroad, Soviet officials were forced to finally acknowledge the tragedy and arrange for the development of a monument.³⁵¹ Two separate competitions found winning designs for the new monument, yet Soviet Party officials rejected both winners, instead commissioning the blueprints for their own monument in 1972.³⁵² The monument was successfully fabricated and unveiled in 1976, but the plaque read “here, in 1941-1943, German fascist occupiers executed more than a hundred thousand citizens of Kiev and prisoners of war,” with no direct mention of their Jewish identities or the Holocaust itself.³⁵³

It was only after the dissolution of the Soviet Union that real effort was made towards memorialising the Jews who were murdered in Ukraine. With the 50th anniversary of the Babyn Yar massacre approaching, calls for a new design competition began in the spring of 1991; yet, while a winning design was chosen in the subsequent competition, the intended memorial was again not built.³⁵⁴ Instead, a small bronze menorah was unveiled on 29 September 1991, but markers denoting the other groups of victims who were killed at Babyn Yar were gradually deposited next to it, thus undermining the monument’s intended purpose of drawing attention to the Jews murdered there.³⁵⁵ The error has since been rectified with the establishment of several monuments in Ukraine’s largest cities, such as Kyiv, Odesa, Lviv, and Kharkiv, with the sole intention of memorialising the Ukrainian Jews who were killed during the Holocaust.³⁵⁶

Many decades of work have gone towards the memorialisation of the Holocaust in Ukraine. Thus, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has sparked concern regarding the survival of these memorials, artefacts, and museums as destruction rains indiscriminately upon Ukrainian soil. It has become clear in countless instances that the Russian forces are set upon destroying all pieces of culture and history unique to Ukraine, and to have the historical memory of the Holocaust in Ukraine be compromised by invaders who refused to even acknowledge the tragedy would be a further devastation.³⁵⁷ The question then arises as to how Holocaust scholars, museum employees, and the general public can preserve Holocaust memory in times of unprecedented modern warfare. The Russian Federation’s aggression towards Ukraine is not a new development, and has increased drastically in the years following the illegal Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, has intentionally promoted propaganda which claims Ukraine is a nation populated by Nazis and is rife with antisemitism, despite the fact that Ukraine has a large Jewish population and a significant Jewish-Ukrainian history dating back centuries.³⁵⁸ His baseless claims continued even after the election of President Volodymyr Zelensky, a Jewish Ukrainian whose

³⁴⁷ Gessen, “The Holocaust Memorial.”

³⁴⁸ Burakovskiy, “Holocaust Remembrance” 374; Gessen, “The Holocaust Memorial.”

³⁴⁹ Burakovskiy, “Holocaust Remembrance,” 372.

³⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 375.

³⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 376.

³⁵² *Ibid.*, 376, 377.

³⁵³ Gessen, “The Holocaust Memorial.”; Burakovskiy, “Holocaust Remembrance,” 372.

³⁵⁴ Burakovskiy, “Holocaust Remembrance,” 378.

³⁵⁵ Gessen, “The Holocaust Memorial.”; Burakovskiy, “Holocaust Remembrance,” 378-379.

³⁵⁶ Magocsi and Petrovsky-Shtern, *Jews and Ukrainians*, 268.

³⁵⁷ Rukomeda, “Only Fascists.”; Ukrainian Institute, “Drobytsky Yar.”

³⁵⁸ Wertheimer, “Babyn Yar.”; Magocsi and Petrovsky-Shtern, *Jews and Ukrainians*, 277.

family suffered tremendously during the Nazi occupation.³⁵⁹ Tensions reached a boiling point when Russian troops invaded Ukrainian territory on 24 February 2022. Less than a week later, on 1 March, a Russian missile hit a sports complex in Kyiv, killing five civilians and damaging the nearby Babyn Yar Memorial Park.³⁶⁰ While the many memorial structures throughout the 140-acre park were unscathed, an unused museum building caught fire, and significant damage was noted across the grounds.³⁶¹ Monuments such as the Mirror Field, a masterpiece of remembrance made of light and sound, continue to be at risk of being destroyed by further artillery strikes.³⁶² Only a few weeks after the strike upon the Babyn Yar Memorial Park, the 20-meter tall Drobytsky Yar Menorah Monument located at the entrance of the memorial complex was severely damaged during shelling.³⁶³ Whether intentional or not, the Russian forces were destroying monuments to the progress that Ukraine had fought to achieve over the past eighty years in regards to national Holocaust memorialisation. A Twitter post by the Babyn Yar Holocaust Memorial Center declared that Russian forces were attacking “not only the civilian population of Ukraine, but also the places of remembrance.”³⁶⁴ By doing this, political analyst Roman Rukomeda argues that Russia is also simultaneously attempting to destroy Ukraine’s historical memory of the Second World War.³⁶⁵

The preservation of Holocaust artefacts within museums has also been a topic of concern, sparked by the destruction of the Ivankiv Museum during the early days of the Russian invasion.³⁶⁶ The museum housed archaeological and folk art items, including approximately twenty-five pieces of artwork by the famous Ukrainian artist, Maria Prymachenko, all of which were lost in the blaze.³⁶⁷ Hoping to avoid this same fate, The National Museum of the History of Ukraine in the Second World War in Kyiv began an emergency evacuation of their collection of approximately 400,000 objects, with their more valuable artefacts being hidden away for preservation in museum storage or sent to neighboring countries.³⁶⁸ Among these evacuated artefacts is an integral piece of Ukrainian Holocaust memory: a piano which was used by a family in Mariupol to shelter a young Jewish boy named Veniamin Boryskovsky.³⁶⁹ The evacuation of these objects was a difficult and arduous task, as the evacuation process in Ukraine was based on outdated documents and protocols that were created during the Soviet era.³⁷⁰ Despite this, the museum employees have succeeded in safeguarding these collections thus far.

Amidst a near-constant barrage of heavy bombings, the National Museum of the History of Ukraine in the Second World War has been conducting business as usual and remains open to the public.

³⁵⁹ Wertheimer, “Babyn Yar.”

³⁶⁰ Gessen, “The Holocaust Memorial.”; Wertheimer, “Babyn Yar.”

³⁶¹ Wertheimer, “Babyn Yar.”

³⁶² Gessen, “The Holocaust Memorial.”

³⁶³ Rukomeda, “Only Fascists.”; Ukrainian Institute, “Drobytsky Yar.”

³⁶⁴ Cassandra Vinograd, “Russian Forces Damage Holocaust Memorial Site, Ukraine Says,” *NBC News*, March 26, 2022,

<https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/russian-forces-damage-holocaust-memorial-site-ukraine-says-rcna21676> (accessed 14 November 2022).

³⁶⁵ Rukomeda, “Only Fascists.”

³⁶⁶ Irene Galea, “Museums in Ukraine Scrambling to Protect Historical Artifacts during Russian Invasion,” *Globe and Mail*, March 4, 2022,

<https://www.theglobeandmail.com/arts/art-and-architecture/article-museums-in-ukraine-scrambling-to-protect-historical-artifacts-amid/> (accessed 20 November 2022).

³⁶⁷ Galea, “Museums in Ukraine.”

³⁶⁸ European Holocaust Research Infrastructure, “Ukraine’s War Museum during the Russian Aggression,” *European Holocaust Research Infrastructure*, September 28, 2022,

<https://www.ehri-project.eu/ukraines-war-museum-during-russian-aggression> (accessed 20 November 2022); Galea, “Museums in Ukraine.”

³⁶⁹ National Museum of the History of Ukraine in the Second World War, “Holocaust,” National Museum of the History of Ukraine in the Second World War, https://warmuseum.kyiv.ua/_eng/expositions/current_exhibitions/ (accessed 20 November 2022).

³⁷⁰ Galea, “Museums in Ukraine.”

On its website, visitors are advised against bringing firearms or explosive materials into the museum, and are assured that, in the case of a sudden artillery bombardment, there are shelter accommodations, as well as firefighting equipment.³⁷¹ The museum's Holocaust exhibit, which was dedicated "to the 80th anniversary of the mass shootings of the Jews by the Nazis on the territory of Ukraine and the 80th anniversary of the Babyn Yar tragedy," remains available for viewing, both in person and online, sending a clear message that not even war can diminish the museum's dedication to Holocaust memory.³⁷²

Staff at the National Museum of the History of Ukraine in the Second World War have also been putting their own lives at risk by collecting evidence of Russian atrocities and war crimes from recently liberated or attacked areas of Ukraine.³⁷³ These pieces of evidence have already been put to use in new exhibits that the museum has created since the war broke out, such as the "Ukraine – Crucifixion" exhibition, containing more than 1,776 items collected over the course of a month.³⁷⁴ The staff of the Babyn Yar Memorial Center have also been gathering evidence; interviewing witnesses and survivors of Russian war crimes; and relocating vulnerable Ukrainians civilians, including Holocaust survivors.³⁷⁵ Similar efforts have been made by individuals across the globe, such as Julia Entin in Los Angeles, the granddaughter of a Ukrainian Holocaust survivor, who has been coordinating the safe passage of Holocaust survivors out of Ukraine.³⁷⁶ While it is difficult enough to sort out transport for able-bodied civilians, getting Holocaust survivors out of Ukraine is made all the more complicated due to their advanced age and health issues, which has some survivors refusing to leave, as they're afraid they may die along the way.³⁷⁷

The loss of Holocaust artifacts, monuments, and survivors' stories will irrevocably change the way that the Holocaust is perceived and remembered in Ukraine. While there is no foolproof way to ensure the preservation of Holocaust memory within war zones, it is clear that Ukrainians and others have been working tirelessly to protect Holocaust memory so that it may leave a lasting legacy and continue to educate future generations. Through the evacuation of Holocaust survivors and artefacts to safety, dedication to public education, and ongoing efforts to document the impacts of the conflict, Ukrainians and their allies are attempting to preserve Holocaust memory in the midst of modern warfare.

³⁷¹ National Museum of the History of Ukraine in the Second World War, "Holocaust."

³⁷² Ibid.

³⁷³ European Holocaust Research Infrastructure, "Ukraine's War Museum."

³⁷⁴ National Museum of the History of Ukraine in the Second World War, "Holocaust."

³⁷⁵ Gessen, "The Holocaust Memorial."

³⁷⁶ Deepa Bharath, "Grassroots Groups Help Rescue Holocaust Survivors in Ukraine," *Globe and Mail*, March 19, 2022,

<https://www.theglobeandmail.com/world/article-grassroots-groups-help-rescue-holocaust-survivors-in-ukraine-2/> (accessed 14 November 2022)..

³⁷⁷ Bharath, "Grassroots Groups."

Bibliography

- Bharath, Deepa. "Grassroots groups help rescue Holocaust survivors in Ukraine." *Globe and Mail*, March 19, 2022, <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/world/article-grassroots-groups-help-rescue-holocaust-survivors-in-ukraine-2/> (accessed 14 November 2022).
- Burakovskiy, Aleksandr. "Holocaust Remembrance in Ukraine: Memorialization of the Jewish Tragedy at Babi Yar." *Nationalities Papers* 39, no.3 (May 2011): 371-389. <http://doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2011.565316>
- European Holocaust Research Infrastructure. "Ukraine's War Museum during the Russian Aggression." *European Holocaust Research Infrastructure*, September 28, 2022. <https://www.ehri-project.eu/ukraines-war-museum-during-russian-aggression> (accessed 20 November 2022).
- Galea, Irene. "Museums in Ukraine Scrambling to Protect Historical Artifacts during Russian Invasion." *Globe and Mail*, March 4, 2022. <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/arts/art-and-architecture/article-museums-in-ukraine-scrambling-to-protect-historical-artifacts-amid/> (accessed 20 November 2022).
- Gessen, Masha. "The Holocaust Memorial Undone by Another War." *New Yorker*, April 18, 2022. <https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2022/04/18/the-holocaust-memorial-undone-by-another-war> (accessed 14 November 2022).
- Hayes, Peter. *Why? Explaining the Holocaust*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2017.
- Magocsi, Paul-Robert and Yohanan Petrovsky-Shtern. *Jews and Ukrainians: A Millennium of Co-Existence*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016.
- National Museum of the History of Ukraine in the Second World War. "Holocaust." National Museum of the History of Ukraine in the Second World War. https://warmuseum.kyiv.ua/eng/expositions/current_exhibitions/ (accessed 20 November 2022).
- Rukomeda, Roman. "Only Fascists Can Destroy World War II and Holocaust Memorials." *Euractiv*, March 31, 2022, <https://www.euractiv.com/section/europe-s-east/opinion/only-fascists-can-destroy-world-war-ii-and-holocaust-memorials/> (accessed 14 November 2022).
- Snyder, Timothy, *Black Earth: The Holocaust as History and Warning*. New York: Tim Duggan Books, 2015.
- Ukrainian Institute. "Drobytsky Yar." *Ukrainian Institute*. <https://ui.org.ua/en/postcard/drobytsky-yar-en/> (accessed 20 November 2022).
- Vinograd, Cassandra. "Russian Forces Damage Holocaust Memorial Site, Ukraine Says." *NBC News*, March 26, 2022. <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/russian-forces-damage-holocaust-memorial-site-ukraine-says-rcna21676> (accessed 14 November 2022).
- Wertheimer, Tiffany. "Babyn Yar: Anger as Kyiv's Holocaust Memorial is Damaged." *BBC News*, March 3, 2022. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60588885> (accessed 14 November 2022)

Dangerous vs. Domestic: Cold War Representations of Female Sexuality

Braelyn McKim

braelynmckim40@gmail.com

Abstract

As the Cold War continued to develop and the threat of the atomic bomb loomed, atomic age anxieties surrounding the bomb bled into the public sphere and references to the bomb were seen throughout popular culture. Comparisons between female sexuality and the bomb were particularly popular. These representations tended to take two distinct forms: the sexually liberated, unwed “bombshell” and the domestic, submissive housewife. The popularity of the term “bombshell” directly attributed beautiful women to something both dangerous and intriguing while the housewife represented the “taming” of this force. Following the end of the second World War, the American people desired to return to stable and peaceful times. With this came the embracing of traditional values and the stressed importance of a strong family unit. Soon, any behaviour that did not align with the constraints of these “family values” were seen as immoral and associated with communism. This pressure was focused heavily on women who did not adhere to these societal standards. This paper will analyse the different representations of female sexuality through the lens of popular culture. In particular, it will focus on the dangerous, sexually charged “bombshell” and the submissive, domesticated housewife.

During the atomic age, depictions of women tended to take two forms: the domestic housewife and the dangerous bombshell.³⁷⁸ These depictions revealed the attitudes and ideas the American public held toward women and their sexuality. The association of the unwed, sexually liberated woman with the atomic bomb created danger and intrigue. In contrast, the beautiful, subservient housewife was the “harnessing” of this dangerous weapon. These influences spread throughout the public sphere, as a direct result of atomic age anxieties.³⁷⁹ The link of women to the atomic bomb and an emphasis on the way in which it could be tamed attempted to dismiss any fears of nuclear energy.³⁸⁰ This attempt did not erase American fear of the atomic bomb; however, it did solidify the connection between women and nuclear power. Female sexuality was now tied to the bomb and this idea spread throughout popular culture during the atomic age. From celebrities to beauty queens, film to music, the atom bomb dominated popular culture in the United States. Through the exploration of corresponding evidence - mainly photographs, film, music, and advertisements - this essay will explore the different representations of female sexuality and their comparisons to atomic weapons during the Cold War. In particular, this essay will focus on the dangerous, sexually charged “bombshell” and the submissive, domesticated housewife.

In the 1930s, the term “bombshell” was coined as a way to describe a sexually attractive woman; however, with the development of the atomic bomb, this word gained stronger and more powerful connotations with female sexuality.³⁸¹ As the Cold War progressed, other slang for the “devastating power” of female sexuality followed, including “knockout” and a “dynamite” woman, though neither gained the same infamy as the “bombshell.”³⁸² The bombshell was irresistible, combining both physical beauty and sexual prowess into the complete package. The bombshell was the ideal woman of the atomic age; her power was both alluring and dangerous.³⁸³

Following the end of World War II, the American people were desperate to experience peaceful and prosperous times.³⁸⁴ With this, came the desire to have a stable family life, leading American men and women to embrace the traditional roles of breadwinner and homemaker.³⁸⁵ The shift in traditional gender roles that had begun during the Great Depression and expanded during the war was seemingly neglected following the end of the war.³⁸⁶ With the rapidly changing world around them, the men and women of the atomic age sought the stability that marriage and domesticity was thought to provide. The desire to return to “normalcy” following the end of the war made traditional gender roles seem more appealing and caused anything that fell outside of these constraints to be considered immoral.³⁸⁷ This so-called “immoral” behaviour became an object of much debate during the Cold War and soon nonmarital sexual behaviour was associated with the threat of communism.³⁸⁸ In particular, the women who did not adhere to societal norms were placed at the forefront of these atomic age anxieties.

The threat of the unrestrained sexuality of the single woman caused anxiety among the public, who believed that these unwed, unchecked women could negatively impact both society and the

³⁷⁸ Kristina Zarlengo, “Civilian Threat, the Suburban Citadel, and Atomic Age American Women.” *Signs* 24, no.4 (1999), 950. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3175598>.

³⁷⁹ Katerina JJ. Vuletich, “What Makes: Marilyn Monroe and Representations of Femininity in Early Cold War Era America,” (Honours Thesis., Regis University, 2015), 8. <https://epublications.regis.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1655&context=theses>

³⁸⁰ Zarlengo, “Civilian Threat, the Suburban Citadel, and Atomic Age American Women,” 950.

³⁸¹ Allan M. Winker, *Life Under a Cloud: American Anxiety About the Atom* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 141.

³⁸² Elaine Tyler May, *Homeward Bound American Families in the Cold War Era*, (Fully rev. and updated 20th anniv. ed. / with a new post 9/11 epilogue. New York: Basic Bks., 2008), 106.

³⁸³ Zarlengo, “Civilian Threat,” 946.

³⁸⁴ May, *Homeward Bound American Families in the Cold War Era*, 6.

³⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 5, 20.

³⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 5, 6.

³⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 95, 96.

³⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 94.

American family unit.³⁸⁹ These women, when not contained within the home, had the potential to become destructive forces.³⁹⁰ This potentially destructive power tied the bombshell to the atomic bomb. The fear of the atomic bomb was reflected in the fear of the bombshell. It became key that the sexual force of the bombshell be contained within marriage to prevent nuclear-level destruction.³⁹¹ With the right man, the power of the bombshell could be harnessed and domesticated for the good of society.³⁹² The fear surrounding the bombshell, however, did not overshadow the excitement. Soon, associations between beautiful women and the bomb were seen throughout popular culture in the United States.

In 1945, Life Magazine crowned actress Linda Christians as the “Anatomic Bomb”, where atomic power and beauty met as one.³⁹³ The photograph features Christians lounging by the side of a pool sunbathing. With her head to the side and eyes closed, it is almost as if the viewer is seeing the aftermath of the bomb. The spreading of her arms adds a certain gracefulness to something destructive. Even the way the light is hitting her body adds to this effect. The relationship between beautiful women and nuclear power increased throughout the atomic age and had major influences on culture in the United States.

In 1946, a pinup image of Hollywood actress Rita Hayworth as her character “Gilda” from the movie of the same name was attached to the side of the *Able* bomb.³⁹⁴ The movie in question launched Hayworth to the status of a sex symbol, increasing her popularity at the time. The photo shows Hayworth in a strapless, black dress lounging on what appears to be a desk or table. The seductive image of Hayworth attached to the *Able* bomb brings a more literal meaning to the popular nickname “bombshell.”

The influence of the atomic bomb can be seen in the changes in fashion and popular clothing during the atomic period. In 1946, French designer Louis Réard showcased his design, which he called the “bikini”, modelled by nude model Micheline Bernardini.³⁹⁵ The bikini was named after Bikini Atoll, which was the location of a site for nuclear testing. The bathing suit was considered scandalous at the time, baring more skin than the typical bathing suit of the time. The choice of using a nude model shows just how risqué the bikini was at the time. Naming the bathing suit after the Bikini Atoll nuclear testing site directly tied the bomb to something sexy and desirable. The designer himself claimed to have named the bikini for its “explosive potential” further solidifying the relationship between female sexuality and nuclear power.³⁹⁶

The comparison of women to the atom bomb gained traction throughout popular culture, taking many shapes and forms. The depiction of Lee Merlin in her mushroom cloud bathing suit right after she was crowned “Miss Atomic Bomb” is only one of them³⁹⁷. This representation, in a similar form

³⁸⁹ Vuletich, "What Makes: Marilyn Monroe and Representations of Femininity in Early Cold War Era America," 8, 9.

³⁹⁰ May, *Homeward Bound American Families in the Cold War Era*, 105.

³⁹¹ Zarlengo, “Civilian Threat,” 950.

³⁹² Vuletich, "What Makes: Marilyn Monroe and Representations of Femininity in Early Cold War Era America," 9.

³⁹³ Peter Stackpole. Linda Christians as the “Anatomic Bomb” in a Life Magazine Feature. c.1945, in “Civilian Threat, the Suburban Citadel, and Atomic Age American Women”, Zarlengo, Kristina. *Signs* 24, no.4 (1999), 947-946, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3175598> (accessed 24 November 2022).

³⁹⁴ Peter Karan. *Rita Hayworth’s image attached to the side of the bomb used in the Able test*, June 30, 1946, Bikini Atoll, reproduced on “America at the Atomic Crossroads” *The New Yorker*, <<https://www.newyorker.com/tech/annals-of-technology/america-at-the-atomic-crossroads>> (accessed 4 November 2022).

³⁹⁵ Bettmann. *Nude Dancer Micheline Bernardini Models the First Bikini*, July 5, 1946, Paris, France, reproduced on “How the Summer of Atomic Bomb Testing Turned the Bikini Into a Phenomenon” *Smithsonian Magazine*, <<https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smithsonian-institution/how-wake-testing-atomic-bomb-bikini-became-thing-180955346/>> (accessed 4 November 2022).

³⁹⁶ Zarlengo, “Civilian Threat,” 948.

³⁹⁷ Don English, *Copa Room Showgirl Lee Merlin in Her Mushroom Cloud Dress as She is Crowned Miss Atomic Bomb*, c.1957, Las Vegas, Nevada, *Las Vegas Sun*, <<https://lasvegassun.com/photos/1905/may/15/4120/>> (accessed 4 November 2022).

to the bikini, takes something that would be feared (the mushroom cloud) and transforms it into something desirable. The posing of Merlin, with a carefree, almost playful smile, and hands tussling her blonde curls, creates a different vision of the mushroom cloud; transforming a signal of destruction into a symbol of a beautiful, sexually attractive woman. This perceived sexual attractiveness is shown further in the mushroom cloud bathing suit itself. The shaping of the cloud, which mimics a full bosom before barely covering Merlin's hips, adds to this appeal. Through Merlin, the power of the mushroom cloud is shaped into something that men of the era would want to harness for themselves.

The naming of beautiful women as "Miss Atomic Bomb" grew in popularity in Las Vegas when tensions surrounding the arms race with the Soviet Union reached its peak.³⁹⁸ The depiction of women as the atomic bomb linked the power of the bomb to the sexual attraction of these women.³⁹⁹ Merlin herself was the most famous of these women and was described by reporters as the "girl they [the reporters] would most like to survive the A-bomb."⁴⁰⁰ This description of Merlin can be attributed to the perceived relationship between these beautiful women and atomic weapons. Though there were many representations of women and the atom bomb, "Miss Atomic Bomb" and the women who wore that title remain the most sexualized.⁴⁰¹ Combining the atom bomb and the bodies of beautiful women transformed the bomb's harmful power into something attractive and desirable while also highlighting its ability to be tamed and harnessed.⁴⁰² The link between female sexual power and atomic power is shown through multiple depictions, with emphasis placed on its ability to be tamed.

While most depictions of the bombshell in American culture showcased it in a more playful, sexy way, Henry Hathaway's 1953 film *Niagara* starring one of the most iconic bombshells, Marilyn Monroe, shows the potential negative consequences of female sexuality.⁴⁰³ In the film, Monroe plays a woman who is unsatisfied with her married life, and plots with her lover to murder her husband. In the end, Monroe's untamed sexuality leads to the death of not only her lover, but herself and her husband as well. The film paints Monroe's character as a sexual temptress, whose lack of subservience to her husband is the cause of both their respective downfalls. In this case, Monroe's sexuality was more than her husband could handle, which can be attributed to their destruction. The film shows that within a home, without a dominant husband powerful sexuality can become volatile and even deadly.⁴⁰⁴

The relationship between women and atomic power was demonstrated as late as 1972, with the release of a civil defence pamphlet depicting three radioactive rays as beautiful women.⁴⁰⁵ These women are shown in what appears to be black bathing suits which showcase their ample bosoms. Each of the "rays" has a seductive smile upon their faces and are posed in sexually suggestive ways. The "alpha" ray is shown running her hands through her hair, while the "beta" ray seems to be basking, with her head dropped to the side and her hand on her forehead. Only the third "gamma" ray is standing upright, though it seems that she has the largest bust out of the three, so the choice to have her standing straight was likely to draw attention to this. The use of the sash to display the title of *alpha*, *beta*, and *gamma* also draws a comparison to the beauty queens of the time. Showcasing these "rays" as beauty queens helps to frame the dangerous power of the radioactive ray as something sexual and desirable.

The sexually suggestive nature of the image connects to the idea that so-called "sexually liberated" women had destructive capabilities if they were left untamed. However, their power could be used for good if tamed by a strong man.⁴⁰⁶ The correlation between the fear of atomic power and the fear

³⁹⁸ Masako Nakamura, "'Miss Atom Bomb' Contests in Nagasaki and Nevada: The Politics of Beauty, Memory, and the Cold War." *U.S.-Japan Women's Journal*, no.37 (2009), 132, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/42772003>.

³⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 132.

⁴⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 134.

⁴⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 135.

⁴⁰² *Ibid.*, 135.

⁴⁰³ *Niagara*, DVD, directed by Henry Hathaway (20th Century Fox, 1953).

⁴⁰⁴ May, *Homeward Bound American Families in the Cold War Era*, 105.

⁴⁰⁵ *Three radioactive rays depicted as beautiful women in civil defense pamphlet*, c.1972, in "Homeward Bound American Families in the Cold War Era," Elaine Tyler May (New York: Basic Bks., 2008), 105.

⁴⁰⁶ May, *Homeward Bound American Families in the Cold War Era* 106.

of the sexually liberated unwed woman is made clear in this depiction.⁴⁰⁷ If the untamed sexuality of unmarried women was the disease, domestication and marriage to a “strong” male breadwinner was the cure. These dangerous “bombshells” were transformed within the domestic sphere into loving, beautiful wives.

In the 1957 musical *Silk Stockings*, the stern, humourless main character Ninotchka Yoshchenko (a Russian) falls for the charm of American film producer Steve Canfield.⁴⁰⁸ Through their love, Ninotchka’s harsh, tough personality is transformed into something more soft and feminine. The taming of the main character draws comparisons to the taming of the bombshell; both of which are softened into something more domestic and docile. The progression of Ninotchka throughout the film is, as historian Helen Laville observes, “a deeply gendered one, indicated by [her] changing representation from masculine identification to a feminine [one].”⁴⁰⁹ The scene that depicts Ninotchka shedding her wool stockings in exchange for silk ones represents her acceptance of the delights of the West and what it has to offer. The fact that the main character is Russian only adds to this message. Similar to the bombshell, the main character is potentially “dangerous” until her “power” is “harnessed” by a strong man, whose love encourages her to embrace her femininity.

The ideological atmosphere of the Cold War changed how Americans thought of family life and gender roles which placed greater importance on these ideals.⁴¹⁰ The importance placed upon the housewife goes beyond societal expectations and norms and intersects with Cold War-era paranoia and fears. The comparison of female sexuality to the atom bomb is contrasted with the “tamed” woman as the harnessing of this atomic energy.⁴¹¹ The idea that the bomb could be used for positive purposes helped assuage some of the Cold War-era anxieties and paranoia. Within the home, the “unleashing” of female sexuality could be used to create a stimulating sex life between a husband and wife; however, if left unchecked, it could prove to be dangerous.⁴¹² This idea of “sexual-containment” was introduced by historian Elaine Tyler May as a way to describe the establishment of a submissive, sexually-liberated (within the home) housewife.⁴¹³ Sexual-containment acted as the combatant to more worrisome developments if female sexuality was left to run wild. The excitement surrounding this contained liberation is highlighted in both music and film.

In the 1955 song “Thirteen Women (And Only One Man in Town)” by Bill Haley & His Comets, the singer describes a man who dreams about the H-bomb detonating and wakes up as the only man in town with thirteen women.⁴¹⁴ These women complete acts of service for him, and the man describes himself as feeling as if he is in Heaven. The sexualized fantasy of being the only man with thirteen submissive women is representative of the sexual-containment idea. Having thirteen women willing to do anything for one man, and only one man, makes it the ideal male fantasy. The idea of the perfect housewife is seen throughout the lyrics, with the singer describing the women completing mundane tasks for him such as “sweetening his tea” and “buttering his bread.” His description of the women as a “lively pack” suggests that these women complete not only household tasks, but sexual ones as well. These women are sexually liberated towards the singer but inside the proverbial “home.” This song describes the potential “benefits” of nuclear power if it led to being the only man surrounded by beautiful, submissive women who were willing to do anything for the man.

⁴⁰⁷ Ibid., 106.

⁴⁰⁸ *Silk Stockings*, DVD, directed by Rouben Mamoulian (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 1957).

⁴⁰⁹ Helen Laville, “‘Our Country Endangered by Underwear’: Fashion, Femininity, and the Seduction Narrative in ‘Ninotchka’ and ‘Silk Stockings.’” *Diplomatic History* 30, no.4 (2006), 642, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24915078>.

⁴¹⁰ Susan Stoudinger Northcutt, “Women and the Bomb: Domestication of the Atomic Bomb in the United States,” *International Social Science Review* 74, no.3/4 (1999), 131, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41887009>.

⁴¹¹ May, *Homeward Bound American Families in the Cold War Era*, 108.

⁴¹² Ibid., 108.

⁴¹³ Ibid., 99.

⁴¹⁴ Bill Haley & His Comets, “Thirteen Women (And Only One Man in Town),” track #4 on *Rock Around The Clock*, UMG Recordings Inc., 1955, Spotify Music.

Stanley Kubrick's 1964 film, *Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb*, features a scene in which the characters discuss the need for a ratio of ten women to every one man in the doomsday bunkers.⁴¹⁵ The title character describes how the selected women will need to have "highly stimulating" sexual characteristics as the men will be required to repopulate quickly for the sake of the human race. This idea receives an enthusiastic response from the male characters, who enjoy the fantasy of being the only man with ten sexually charged women. The excitement behind this idea stems from the fact that these women are submissive to the one man; sexually liberated, but only for him.

With the "atomic age" came new meaning and ideology to the domestic sphere.⁴¹⁶ The hard-working, attractive housewife was linked to the might of the United States itself.⁴¹⁷ In the now-famous meeting between President Richard Nixon and the USSR's Nikita Khrushchev, Nixon highlighted how American women utilised their charm and beauty, while thriving within the home.⁴¹⁸ Here, with the support of a strong, successful husband, was where American freedom was showcased.⁴¹⁹ While the bombshell was sexy, the housewife cultivated beauty and was a powerful force in the home.⁴²⁰ Within the home, women took on the role of caretaker to support the development and happiness of both husband and children.⁴²¹ The "atomic energy" of the tamed woman was used not only to have a sexually satisfied husband, but also to keep a nice home with strong, healthy children. The "perfect" housewife was showcased throughout the popular culture of the atomic age.

The use of a celebrity to show the image of the domesticated, female housewife highlighted its importance and prominence in popular culture. The image of Hollywood star Joan Crawford completing household tasks shows her transformation from an independent, sexually-charged woman to a content, domesticated homemaker.⁴²² The parallel between Crawford as a Hollywood superstar and her within the home is representative of the taming of a strong woman for domestic purposes. Crawford, dressed demurely in her apron with perfectly done hair and makeup, glamourised the image of the housewife. If Crawford can achieve this level of beauty while completing mundane tasks, why should the average American housewife not be able to do the same? With all the success Crawford had in Hollywood, for her to still want to complete her domestic duties, and seemingly enjoy doing so, gave an allure to the prospect of being in the home. It appears this image was contrived to show that even the most famous of women still had their place in the home-making sphere.

Companies of the era reflected the attitudes towards women and the housewife in their advertisements. These images tended to feature a beautiful woman serving both the husband and the home. The woman, always fashionably dressed with hair perfectly done, featured a demure or joyful expression on her face while completing whichever task the advertisement depicted. Two examples of this are further explored within the next sections.

In 1951, the *Van Heusen* clothing brand released a tie advertisement, which depicts a woman serving a man (presumably her husband) breakfast on her knees, while he relaxes in bed.⁴²³ The tagline

⁴¹⁵ "Ratio of Ten Women to Each Man," *Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb* DVD, directed by Stanley Kubrick (Hawk Films, 1964).

⁴¹⁶ Traci Brynne Voyles, "Anatomic Bombs: The Sexual Life of Nuclearism, 1945–57." *American Quarterly* 72, no.3 (September 2020), 654, <https://doi.org/10.1353/aq.2020.0039>.

⁴¹⁷ Anne M. Boylan, review of *Containment on the Home Front: American Families During the Cold War*, by Elaine Tyler May. *Reviews in American History* 17, no.2 (1989), 301, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2702934>.

⁴¹⁸ May, *Homeward Bound American Families in the Cold War Era*, 22.

⁴¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 22.

⁴²⁰ Zarlengo, "Civilian Threat, the Suburban Citadel, and Atomic Age American Women," 943.

⁴²¹ Geoffrey S. Smith, "National Security and Personal Isolation: Sex, Gender, and Disease in the Cold-War United States," *The International History Review* 14, no.2 (1992), 309, <https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.1992.9640616>

⁴²² *Joan Crawford completes her domestic duties*, c.1940s, in "Homeward Bound American Families in the Cold War Era", Elaine Tyler May (New York: Basic Bks., 2008), 63–64.

⁴²³ *Van Heusen Clothing Company Advertisement*, c.1951, reproduced on "Show Her It's a Man's World" The Society Pages, <https://thesocietypages.org/socimages/2011/07/24/show-her-its-a-mans-world/> (accessed 26 November 2022).

“show her it’s a man’s world” reveals the commonplace ideas surrounding domesticity and submission to which women at the time were supposed to adhere. The eroticized representation of the woman on her knees with the man lounging with his hands behind his head speaks to the idea of “sexual-containment” that May highlights in her work. The expectant look on the housewife’s face, contrasted with the smug and satisfied look on her husband’s, emphasises their respective gender roles within the house; the woman waiting eagerly for the commands of her husband, and him ready to dole them out. This ad is characteristic of the idea that women should wholeheartedly devote themselves to their family and household.⁴²⁴

In 1956, dish soap brand *Lux* released an advertisement with the bolded tagline “Get out of the kitchen sooner!”⁴²⁵ The advertisement features a woman wearing an apron surrounded by giant piles of dishes, with some of them almost reaching her height. The woman is shown looking slightly concerned with the dishes around her, but underneath the main picture, she is shown looking thrilled once she uses the *Lux* brand dish soap. The tagline suggesting that the woman will spend less time in the kitchen if she buys the featured brand accentuates the ideas surrounding domesticity and gender roles that dominated the era. Surrounding the dishes in smaller font, the ad describes how many dishes each member of the family uses per month, but exclaims that it is the wife who washes them all. Furthering these gender roles while the woman is slaving away in the kitchen, the husband is shown lounging with the children in the other room. The husband’s carefree, happy expression is striking compared to the unhappy look on the woman’s face. The woman is shown as a hardworking homemaker who is subservient to her husband. While she may be exhausted, the woman still serves her husband and family while “harnessing” her power for the good of the home.

The influence of the perfect housewife in popular culture provided an almost calming effect to the supposed danger of both the bombshell and the atomic bomb itself. The idea that the bomb could be used for positive purposes helped dissuade some of the Cold War-era anxieties and paranoia. The lens of popular culture allowed the American people to consume atomic ideas in a controlled environment. While the bombshell’s unrestrained sexuality might have been considered dangerous, it also offered a level of excitement. The representation of sexually liberated women within the home draws parallels to the harnessing of nuclear energy. If the sexually charged unwed woman was the bomb, the domesticated, sexually-liberated housewife was the harnessing of this energy for the good of mankind. The fascination with female sexuality and the bomb is shown through the lens of popular culture, these connotations are revealed and demonstrate how a woman’s sexuality was observed during the Cold War.

⁴²⁴ Zarlengo, “Civilian Threat, the Suburban Citadel, and Atomic Age American Women,” 945.

⁴²⁵ *Lux dishsoap advertisement*, c.1956, reproduced on “26 Sexist Ads of the ‘Mad Men’ Era That Companies Wish We’d Forget” Business Insider, <https://www.businessinsider.com/26-sexist-ads-of-the-mad-men-era-2014-5> (accessed 1 December 2022).

Bibliography

Niagara. DVD. Directed by Henry Hathaway. 20th Century Fox, 1953.

Silk Stockings. DVD. Directed by Rouben Mamoulian. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 1957.

“Ratio of Ten Women to Each Man,” *Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb*. DVD. Directed by Stanley Kubrick. Hawk Films, 1964.

Bill Haley & His Comets, “Thirteen Women (And Only One Man in Town),” track #4 on *Rock Around The Clock*, UMG Recordings Inc., 1955, Spotify Music.

Kuran, Peter. *Rita Hayworth’s image attached to the side of the bomb used in the Able test*, June 30, 1946, Bikini Atoll, reproduced on “America at the Atomic Crossroads” *The New Yorker*, <https://www.newyorker.com/tech/annals-of-technology/america-at-the-atomic-crossroads> (accessed 4 November 2022).

Bettmann. *Nude dancer Micheline Bernardini models the first bikini*, July 5, 1946, Paris, France, reproduced on “How the Summer of Atomic Bomb Testing Turned the Bikini Into a Phenomenon” *Smithsonian Magazine*, <https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smithsonian-institution/how-wake-testing-atomic-bomb-bikini-became-thing-180955346/> (accessed 4 November 2022).

English, Don. *Copa Room showgirl Lee Merlin in her mushroom cloud dress as she is crowned Miss Atomic Bomb*, c.1957, Las Vegas, Nevada, Las Vegas Sun, <https://lasvegassun.com/photos/1905/may/15/4120/> (accessed 4 November 2022).

Van Heusen clothing company advertisement, c.1951, reproduced on “Show Her It’s a Man’s World” *The Society Pages*, <https://thesocietypages.org/socimages/2011/07/24/show-her-its-a-mans-world/> (accessed 26 November 2022).

Lux dish soap advertisement, c.1956, reproduced on “26 Sexist Ads of the ‘Mad Men’ Era That Companies Wish We’d Forget” *Business Insider*, <https://www.businessinsider.com/26-sexist-ads-of-the-mad-men-era-2014-5> (accessed 1 December 2022).

Joan Crawford completes her domestic duties, c.1940s, in “Homeward Bound American Families in the Cold War Era”, May, Elaine Tyler. New York: Basic Bks., 2008, 64.

Three radioactive rays are depicted as beautiful women in the civil defense pamphlet. c.1972, in “Homeward Bound American Families in the Cold War Era”, May, Elaine Tyler. New York: Basic Bks., 2008, 105.

Stackpole, Peter. *Linda Christians as the “Anatomic Bomb” in a Life Magazine Feature*. c.1945, in “Civilian Threat, the Suburban Citadel, and Atomic Age American Women”, Zarlengo, Kristina. *Signs* 24, no.4 (1999), 947. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3175598>. (accessed 24 November 2022).

Boylan, Anne M. Review of *Containment on the Home Front: American Families During the Cold War*, by Elaine Tyler May. *Reviews in American History* 17, no.2 (1989): 301–5. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2702934>.

Laville, Helen. “‘Our Country Endangered by Underwear’: Fashion, Femininity, and the Seduction Narrative in ‘Ninotchka’ and ‘Silk Stockings.’” *Diplomatic History* 30, no.4 (2006): 623–44. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24915078>.

May, Elaine Tyler. *Homeward Bound American Families in the Cold War Era*. Fully rev. and updated 20th anniv. ed. / with a new post 9/11 epilogue. New York: Basic Bks., 2008.

Nakamura, Masako. “‘Miss Atom Bomb’ Contests in Nagasaki and Nevada: The Politics of Beauty, Memory, and the Cold War.” *U.S.-Japan Women’s Journal*, no.37 (2009): 117–43. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/42772003>.

Northcutt, Susan Stouinger. "Women and The Bomb: Domestication of The Atomic Bomb in The United States." *International Social Science Review* 74, no.3/4 (1999): 129–39. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41887009>.

Smith, Geoffrey S. "National Security and Personal Isolation: Sex, Gender, and Disease in the Cold-War United States." *The International History Review* 14, no.2 (1992): 307-337. <https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.1992.9640616>

Voyles, Traci Brynne. "Anatomic Bombs: The Sexual Life of Nuclearism, 1945–57." *American Quarterly* 72, no.3 (September 2020): [doi:10.1353/aq.2020.0039](https://doi.org/10.1353/aq.2020.0039).

Vuletich, Katerina JJ. "What Makes: Marilyn Monroe and Representations of Femininity in Early Cold War Era America." Honours Thesis., Regis University, 2015. <https://epublications.regis.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1655&context=theses>.

Winkler, Allan M. *Life Under a Cloud: American Anxiety About the Atom*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.

Zarlengo, Kristina. "Civilian Threat, the Suburban Citadel, and Atomic Age American Women." *Signs* 24, no.4 (1999): 925–58. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3175598>

The Mormon Trail: A Unique Phenomenon?

Meghan McQuay

meghan.mcquay@gmail.com

Abstract

Contemporary scholars focusing on Mormonism continue to compare the Mormon Trail to the Israelite Exile, as well as emphasising that the trail was more of an anomaly compared to the Oregon and California trails. This notion is explored in this paper and aims to prove that Mormon tradition and collective memory has been changed to fit this comparison. As a result of focusing solely on the differences of the Mormon Trail between other trails, scholars have neglected to include it within the pattern of westward migrations during the 19th century. This paper aims to do the above, thereby situating The Mormon Trail within the context of the large migration patterns that occurred during the 19th century, as well as outlining aspects that make the trail distinct. While the Mormon trail indeed exhibited differences from the other trails, it must be mentioned that some commonalities can be found. The trail however, proves to be unique in the context of the Mormon faith and family organisation. Difficulties with travelling, responses to violence and the persecution of their faith, were some of the elements that set the Mormons apart from the other migration trails explored in this paper. The importance that the family played along the trek to Utah is also delved into. Children often assisted with various tasks on the journey. The role that diseases such as Scurvy and Cholera played in these westward migrations is also explored, which proves to be a linking factor between the Oregon, California and Mormon trails.

From Nauvoo, Illinois to present-day Salt Lake City Utah, The Mormon Trail forms a significant part of what it means to be Mormon. The story of the Mormons being driven out from Nauvoo and forced to emigrate elsewhere is compared by many contemporary Mormon scholars to the exile of the Israelites. This notion, coupled with the perception that The Mormon Trail was a unique migration, continues to be argued. While some aspects of the trail were unique, some scholars have failed to properly historicize The Mormon Trail, and to place it within its wider historical context. This paper aims to prove that the Mormon trail exhibits many commonalities with its other trail counterparts, such as the Oregon and California trails. It also aims to reveal that The Mormon trail is a unique phenomenon due to the unique faith and organisation of the Mormons on the trail. It places the Mormon trail in the appropriate historical context by revealing how it is also similar to other trails, as it is reflective of the wider westward migrations that characterised the 19th century which formed a common experience among pioneer Americans.

Many Mormon scholars have compared the journey on the trail to the Exodus of the Israelites. The promised land, or Zion as Mormons referred to it as, was the Salt Lake Valley. While this comparison of the Mormons to the Israelites indeed existed at the time of their journey, Mormon tradition and memory has been altered to fit a specific narrative that places the Mormons in the context that makes their journey appeal more to the Israelite narrative. Namely, the common belief of Mormon tradition is that the area of the Great Basin, The Plains and the Wasatch Oasis were cruel, treacherous and barren lands.⁴²⁶ However, personal accounts of people who had made the trek had different reactions. These personal accounts record the Great Basin as pleasant and picturesque.⁴²⁷ Popular memory and tradition appear to have been formed by the past being viewed as idyllic.⁴²⁸ In addition, Mormon tradition emphasises that Brigham Young was prompted to travel to the Great Basin for settlement by way of divine revelation.⁴²⁹ He supposedly had no outside influence on this decision apart from God revealing this to him. However, it is mentioned that Joseph Smith, who was the founder of Mormonism, and Young had surveyed and planned where they would settle the new Zion before they even left Illinois.⁴³⁰ This is apparent through the advertisements that were also put forth to inform the Mormons of how idyllic the land by the rocky mountains was.⁴³¹

As personal accounts by Mormons began to shift from the perception of the beautiful land to the barren desert, some Mormon apostles such as George A. Smith went as far as to state that the Mormon journey was not even comparable to the Israelites' Exodus.⁴³² Another comparison to the Israelites was made by a Mormon in 1852, stating that the crossing of the desert was the next best miracle since the parting of the Red Sea.⁴³³ Mormon leaders began to accept these falsehoods in their history as doctrine. Since their unique beliefs were persecuted, such as labelling the Great Basin as the desert, it boasts their claim that they are truly the Latter Day Israelites.⁴³⁴ Furthermore, these notions of altered tradition and unique doctrine place the journey of the Mormons on the trail as unique. However, the psyche of the American frontier that is present today continues to fuel this change in tradition.

In terms of its differences between other trails of its time such as the Oregon and California trails, the Mormon Trail exhibits unique characteristics such as the role of religion in their migration. However, a

⁴²⁶ R. H, Jackson, "The Mormon Experience: The Plains as Sinai, the Great Salt Lake as the Dead Sea, and the Great Basin as Desert-Cum-Promised Land," *Journal of Historical Geography* 18, no.1 (1992): 41.

⁴²⁷ *Ibid.*, 41.

⁴²⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴²⁹ *Ibid.*, 45.

⁴³⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴³¹ *Ibid.*

⁴³² George A. Smith, "Prosperity of Zion," Etc, *Journal of Discourses* 9, no.14.

⁴³³ Jackson, "The Mormon Experience" 49.

⁴³⁴ *Ibid.*, 52.

significant amount of similarities can be traced between all three trails. One of the main commonalities between the three trails is the fact that the trails are part of a pattern of westward migration in 19th century America. Scholar William E. Hill claims that the Mormon trail experience was unique when compared to other trail experiences.⁴³⁵ Hill states that the combination of religion, demographics of travellers, transportation and wagon companies were what made the Mormon trek distinct.⁴³⁶ He also offers a great deal of analysis regarding the specifics of the Mormon Trail organisation and how religion was the main factor in their migration.⁴³⁷ While religion did play a significant role in the migration, as evident from their unique doctrine and experiences of persecution, it still does not change the fact that the Mormons are essentially like the other American pioneers who headed West to places like Oregon, California and Washington. The Mormons can essentially be placed within the context of the 19th-century migration patterns. The Mormons went from an old life in Illinois, to a new life in the Salt Lake Valley, and this directly coincides with the American pioneer notion. While Hill recognizes the unique aspects of the Mormon trail experience, he fails to place the migration into the wider context of 19th-century migration patterns, which is vital in order to understand the Mormons and their trail.

Regarding the organisation on the trail, Mormons were increasingly more systematic and organised than the other trails. Namely, wagon companies, which carried Mormons along the trail had systems in place that other wagon companies for the Oregon Trail did not.⁴³⁸ People travelling with these Mormon wagon companies were each given assigned tasks, with daily schedules and Sunday as a day of rest.⁴³⁹ Every person was obligated to fulfil their duty, and most people followed through with these obligations. Due to Mormon leaders being appointed instead of elected, Mormons believed that their leaders were prophets in whom God spoke through.⁴⁴⁰ Therefore, people would not speak out against these leaders, which explains the successful organisation of the travellers. The animals used in Mormon travel also contributed to their successful organisation. Oxen were often used instead of mules or horses due to the inexpensive cost.⁴⁴¹ Oxen were generally stronger and had the ability to consume different foods in the wild that other animals such as horses, were unable to.⁴⁴² The system of handcarts were also generally only used by the Mormons and were a cheaper alternative to the Conestoga wagon in terms of manufacturing, which was used in other trails.⁴⁴³ While the handcarts were potentially back-breaking for the Mormons due to them often having to push it themselves, they were ultimately able to move faster across the plains.⁴⁴⁴ The Mormon church also assisted with financing the manufacturing of these carts which aided European converts wanting to journey to Utah.⁴⁴⁵ Ferries were also assembled to assist emigrants with getting across rivers and ensuring their safety.⁴⁴⁶ Along with the financing of the handcarts, the church began to increase funds for Mormons that wanted to go to Utah.⁴⁴⁷ The first fund was the Perpetual Emigration Fund System that assisted Mormons who could not afford to transport themselves.⁴⁴⁸ If an emigrant benefited from these funds, it was necessary for them to pay the system back.⁴⁴⁹ These donations and giving back to the community was ensured by the highly organised nature of the church. Church members were organised into wards, and then put into a larger group called stakes in

⁴³⁵ William E. Hill, *The Mormon Trail: Yesterday and Today*, (Utah State University Press 1996), 1.

⁴³⁶ Hill, *The Mormon Trail*, 1.

⁴³⁷ *Ibid.*, 4.

⁴³⁸ *Ibid.*, 7.

⁴³⁹ *Ibid.*, 9.

⁴⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 8.

⁴⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 11.

⁴⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴⁴³ *Ibid.*, 12.

⁴⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 13.

⁴⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 10.

⁴⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

order to divide members geographically.⁴⁵⁰ Roughly ten wards formed a stake. Each ward was tasked with providing products to assist future emigrants, which made it easier for them since purchasing supplies was unnecessary.⁴⁵¹ Mormons' desire to make travelling along the trail simpler, more organised, and more efficient for future travellers is one of the ways that the Mormon Trail was distinguished from the systems of the Oregon and California trails.

Concerning the organisation of companies, the Oregon and California trails were very different. The companies and ships that took passengers to San Francisco were often one way,⁴⁵² they did not return passengers like the Mormon trail wagon companies did.⁴⁵³ While the Mormons assisted future emigrants by making the trail easier, California wagon companies often attempted to make the trail significantly worse in order to slow migrants down.⁴⁵⁴ By slowing them down, they would not get to the gold in time. There also were no funds put in place to assist travellers, unlike with the Mormon church.

In terms of the demographics of the Mormon, Oregon and California trails, there were more differences than similarities. For example, the Mormons travelled on the trail in families and the family unit itself was crucial to the journey. Along with families relying on companies for support, parents and children often had to rely on each other.⁴⁵⁵ Responsibilities were often given to children, such as cooking or assisting with travelling.⁴⁵⁶ The centrality of the family in the Mormon faith is what made the trek to Utah possible.⁴⁵⁷ The Oregon wagon companies were more similar to the Mormon companies since they were also mainly composed of families.⁴⁵⁸ However, what sets the Mormons apart from the Oregon migrants is the fact that the Oregon families were in search of a new and hopefully prosperous life, as well as fertile ground to cultivate crops.⁴⁵⁹ This not only sets the Mormons apart from these Oregon migrants, but it also places the Mormons in the same category as the Oregon migrants in terms of the overall large scale migration to the American west. The biggest difference in demographics lies between the Mormons and the migrants of the California trail. The migrants were mainly miners in search of gold who travelled to California strictly for economic purposes.⁴⁶⁰ Once they earned enough money, their goal was to go back East to their families.⁴⁶¹ In addition, farmers and traders often headed along the California trail in order to sell their products.⁴⁶² They were primarily the ones who became rich. As a result, the California trail was motivated more by economic gains than the Mormon Trail, which made them distinctive from the Mormons in this respect.⁴⁶³

Regarding violence present on the Mormon, California and Oregon trails, a variety of similarities and differences can be found. What distinguishes the Mormon Trail from the other two trails mainly pertains to its organisation. Disruptive behaviour was generally present on all three trails, even when rules and regulations were implemented.⁴⁶⁴ Everyday experiences such as tiredness, lack of supplies, and an immense amount of uncertainty regarding travel logistics and circumstances ahead were common across all trail migrations during the 19th century.⁴⁶⁵ It is obvious that the usual stress and uncertainty associated

⁴⁵⁰ Hill, *The Mormon Trail*, 12.

⁴⁵¹ Ibid.

⁴⁵² Ibid.

⁴⁵³ David L. Clark, "Violence and Disruptive Behavior on the Difficult Trail to Utah, 1847-1868," *BYU Studies Quarterly* 53 no.4 (2014): 106.

⁴⁵⁴ Ibid., 108.

⁴⁵⁵ Jill Jacobsen Andros, "Children on the Mormon Trail," (MA thesis, Brigham Young University, 1997), 81.

⁴⁵⁶ Ibid., 16, 81.

⁴⁵⁷ Ibid., 81.

⁴⁵⁸ Clark, "Violence and Disruptive Behavior on the Difficult Trail to Utah, 1847-1868," 106.

⁴⁵⁹ Hill, *The Mormon Trail*, 2.

⁴⁶⁰ Ibid., 106.

⁴⁶¹ Ibid., 3.

⁴⁶² Ibid., 3.

⁴⁶³ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁴ Clark, "Violence and Disruptive Behavior on the Difficult Trail to Utah, 1847-1868," 88.

⁴⁶⁵ Ibid., 88.

with migration across the plains in a wagon would have most likely induced some violent behaviour, and would have been common across the Oregon, California and Mormon trails.⁴⁶⁶ However, the Oregon and California trail companies experienced violence at a greater magnitude than those on the Mormon Trail.⁴⁶⁷ The leading cause of murders along the Oregon and California trails were usually a result of disputes that led to fighting.⁴⁶⁸ Various other methods aside from direct bodily harm were also utilised, such as abandoning people on the trails.⁴⁶⁹ Due to more passengers travelling as individuals without families on the California and Oregon trails, violence was more likely to occur.⁴⁷⁰ As with the Mormons, since they travelled in families and had a company authority present, fights were less likely to arise.⁴⁷¹ People had to rely on the company for their basic needs and spiritual guidance.⁴⁷² When issues did arise, the companies would do their best to remedy the situation. In contrast, even though families mostly made up the migrants, as mentioned, the Oregon companies did not have any authority in place to answer to, therefore more often resulting in fights.⁴⁷³ There have been virtually no recorded deaths on the Mormon Trail that relate to violence;⁴⁷⁴ violence did occur, but the Mormons on the trail were more united due to their one common goal of reaching Zion and their theology of being the Latter Day Saints.⁴⁷⁵ Furthermore, while travel stresses were the same on all three trails, the reactions to the stress were different. The notion of violence on the Mormon trail reveals that the Mormons did indeed have very similar experiences to the migrants on the Oregon and California trails, but the unique travel and doctrinal circumstances of the Mormons are ultimately what made them distinct.

The experience of disease was common to all three trails and had very negative effects on a significant number of people. One of the diseases that saw a great loss of life was Scurvy.⁴⁷⁶ The Mormons in particular experienced a significant lack of nutrition on the Mormon trail. During the summer, the Mormons were able to feed off of grapes, berries and plums, but when the Fall arrived, these fruits were no longer in season, resulting in a severe lack of fruits and vegetables.⁴⁷⁷ Cornmeal, milk and meats primarily made up their diet.⁴⁷⁸ Scurvy had been noted to be the number one cause of death during this period of emigration towards Utah.⁴⁷⁹ Potatoes as a result became the antidote to the problem, as George A. Smith would go on to proclaim the healing properties of the potato.⁴⁸⁰ However, this discovery of the healing remedy of the potato would prove to be too late, since hundreds of Mormons had already passed.⁴⁸¹

Aside from Scurvy, Cholera proved to be another deadly disease on all three trails. It was also rampant on ships and in towns where people were crammed into tight places without sanitation.⁴⁸² The combination of poor sanitation and overall lack of cleanliness, including food being cooked over buffalo

⁴⁶⁶ Clark, "Violence and Disruptive Behavior on the Difficult Trail to Utah, 1847-1868," 88.

⁴⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 104.

⁴⁶⁸ John Phillip Reid, *Policing the Elephant: Crime, Punishment, and Social Behavior on the Overland Trail*, (San Marino: Huntington Library, 1997), 76-77.

⁴⁶⁹ Clark, "Violence and Disruptive Behavior on the Difficult Trail to Utah, 1847-1868," 105.

⁴⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 106.

⁴⁷¹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷² *Ibid.*

⁴⁷³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 107.

⁴⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷⁶ Jeffrey S. Hampl, Carol S. Johnston, and Robert A. Mills, "Scourge of Black-leg (Scurvy) on the Mormon Trail," *Nutrition* 17, no.5 (2001): 417.

⁴⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 417.

⁴⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸¹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸² Patricia Rushton, "Cholera and Its Impact on Nineteenth-Century Mormon Migration," *Brigham Young University Studies* 44, no.2 (2005): 129.

excrement, exacerbated the situation.⁴⁸³ Hands were rarely washed, and if they were, it was in contaminated water.⁴⁸⁴ Water was often boiled, but not to get rid of Cholera bacteria rather, it was to remove the insects living in the water.⁴⁸⁵ Many migrants were plagued with a variety of different types of diarrhoea as they travelled and camped near contaminated water or freshly deceased carcasses which were often placed beside water sources.⁴⁸⁶ Many other factors also aided in the spread of Cholera such as population movement, weather, and flooding.⁴⁸⁷ The 19th century saw an increase in migrations that would contribute to Cholera outbreaks across the world.⁴⁸⁸ As people headed into rural areas, encounters with hidden diseases would have risen again and further spread amongst travellers.⁴⁸⁹ In the case of flooding, the nutrients in the soil would have been a breeding ground for bacteria.⁴⁹⁰ If the flood was bigger, the spread would have been greater due to more moisture being present.⁴⁹¹ Regarding the effects of weather on all the trails, the winter would have arrived and brought snow; Cholera bacteria would not live, and periods of respite would occur.⁴⁹² When summer arrived, Cholera would return. Therefore, through the exploration of diseases pertaining to the Mormon Trail, it is evident that common experiences of disease were also felt by migrants on the California and Oregon trails, and are not unique to the Mormon experience on the Mormon Trail.

It is clear that the Mormon Trail exhibits qualities that make the migration unique in comparison to other trails such as the Oregon and California trails. These unique aspects pertain to the organisation of the Mormons on the trail, the approach to travel stresses and reactions of violence, and namely, the unique faith and persecution that the Mormons faced that drove them out of Illinois. However, similarities can be found on all three trails such as the experience of disease and namely, the notion of starting a new life in the American West. While it is crucial to recognize the unique aspects of the Mormon migration, it is of utmost importance to recognize the framework that it falls under, and that is, that the Mormons are a part of the large migration patterns that swept across the 19th century.

⁴⁸³ Rushton, "Cholera and Its Impact," 129.

⁴⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁸⁶ Brian Altonen, Weblog entry on "Cholera on the Oregon Trail (thesis)," Brian Altonen mph, posted June 7, 2013, <https://brianaltonemph.com/6-history-of-medicine-and-pharmacy/oregon-trail-1837-1857/cholera-on-the-oregon-trail-thesis/> (accessed 2022-02-25).

⁴⁸⁷ Rushton, "Cholera and Its Impact on Nineteenth-Century Mormon Migration," 129.

⁴⁸⁸ Ibid., 130.

⁴⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁴⁹¹ Ibid.

⁴⁹² Ibid., 131.

Bibliography

- Brian Altonen. Weblog entry on "Cholera on the Oregon Trail (thesis)." *Brian Altonen mph*, posted June 7, 2013. <https://brianaltonenmph.com/6-history-of-medicine-and-pharmacy/oregon-trail-1837-1857/cholera-on-the-oregon-trail-thesis/> (accessed 2022-02-25).
- Andros, Jill Jacobsen. "Children on the Mormon Trail." MA thesis, Brigham Young University, 1997. <https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/etd/4481>.
- Bashore, Melvin L., H. Dennis Tolley, and BYU Pioneer Mortality Team. "Mortality on the Mormon Trail, 1847-1868." *BYU Studies Quarterly* 53, no.4 (2014): 109–23. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/43957154>.
- Melvin L. Bashore. *Where the Prophets of God Live: A Brief Overview of the Mormon Trail Experience*. Trails of Hope: Overland Diaries and Letters, 1846–1869, Digital Collections, HBLL. http://overlandtrails.lib.byu.edu/essay_mtrail.php.
- Clark, David L. "Violence and Disruptive Behavior on the Difficult Trail to Utah, 1847-1868." *BYU Studies Quarterly* 53, no.4 (2014): 81–108. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/43957153>.
- Hampl, Jeffrey S., Carol S. Johnston, and Robert A. Mills. "Scourge of Black-leg (Scurvy) on the Mormon Trail." *Nutrition* 17, no.5 (2001): [https://doi-org.ezproxy.library.uvic.ca/10.1016/S0899-9007\(01\)00512-3](https://doi-org.ezproxy.library.uvic.ca/10.1016/S0899-9007(01)00512-3) 416-18.
- Hill, William E. *The Mormon Trail: Yesterday and Today*. Utah State University Press, 1996.
- Jackson, R. H. "The Mormon Experience: The Plains as Sinai, the Great Salt Lake as the Dead Sea, and the Great Basin as Desert-Cum-Promised Land." *Journal of Historical Geography* 18, no.1 (1992): 41-58.
- Lawrence, Deborah, and Jon Lawrence. "The Great Medicine Road: Narratives of the Oregon, California, and Mormon Trails, Part 4: 1856–1869 Ed. by Michael L. Tate." *Western American Literature* 56, no.2 (2021): 195-96. <https://muse-jhu-edu.ezproxy.library.uvic.ca/article/802172>
- Lloyd-Jones, I. "The Mormons in American History." *History Today* 6 (March 1956): 164. <https://www.proquest.com/docview/1299014389?pq-origsite=primo>
- Patterson, Sara M. *Pioneers in the Attic: Place and Memory along the Mormon Trail*. Oxford University Press, 2020.
- Smith, George A. "Prosperity of Zion." *Journal of Discourses* 9, no.14. <https://journalofdiscourses.com/9/14>.
- Reid, John Phillip. *Policing the Elephant: Crime, Punishment, and Social Behavior on the Overland Trail*. San Marino: Huntington Library, 1997.
- Rushton, Patricia. "Cholera and Its Impact on Nineteenth-Century Mormon Migration." *Brigham Young University Studies* 44, no.2 (2005): 123–44. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/43044444>.

The Dutch Patriotic Revolution: Prussians, Patriots, Orangists and Frogs

Kiri H. Powell

kir.powl@gmail.com

Abstract

*Often overshadowed, and sometimes forgotten, the Dutch Patriot Revolution in 1787 is seen by modern historians today as an influential and important step towards democracy in Europe. The United Dutch Provinces, a rare republic in eighteenth-century Europe, began a slow revolution in 1781 after a pamphlet was published and distributed – *Aan het Volk van Nederlands (An Address to the People of the Netherlands)* – which lit the (already built) fire of revolution. The revolution climaxed in 1787 after a 10-day siege of Amsterdam and the invasion of a 26,000-strong Prussian army. This paper examines how the attitudes and concerns of the Dutch people allowed the Address to mobilise the Republic into action. This work also surveys the major developments of the revolution during its six-year span with a focus on two specific issues identified in the Address – repeated alliances with England and a dysfunctional military. By examining a set of four contemporary prints, this paper attempts to determine whether or not the revolutionaries were successful in meeting the goals diagnosed in the Address.*

Eighteenth-century Europe experienced a dizzying bombardment of change. Nothing epitomises this change like the French Revolution in 1789. Who has not heard the stories of the French citizens rising and storming the Bastille? Or how King Louis XVI and his wife Marie-Antoinette were beheaded? The complete upending of society caused by the French Revolution has overshadowed and completely sidelined other revolutionary movements of the age, including the revolution in the United Dutch Provinces (the Dutch Republic) in the 1780s. Like Switzerland, the Dutch Republic was an anomaly in eighteenth-century Europe. Since the Union of Utrecht in 1579, the United Provinces were separate – but not independent – from the Spanish Crown.⁴⁹³ The Republic was a group of seven provinces: Holland, Gelderland, Zeeland, Utrecht, Friesland, Overijssel and Groningen. Each province technically functioned similarly to Canadian provinces today; they all had their own representative assemblies and also sent provincial representatives to the Estates-General (the federal assembly). The caveat with this system was that the provinces' Estates and the Estates-General were firmly controlled by oligarchies. The aristocrats who controlled the governments were known as “regents;” everyone else were “burghers,” or “inhabitants.”⁴⁹⁴ The provinces also nominated a Stadholder who was the “chief executive” in charge of the armed forces.⁴⁹⁵

On 26 September 1781, a pamphlet appeared overnight in all the major towns of the Dutch Republic called *Aan het Volk van Nederlands* (An Address to the People of the Netherlands).⁴⁹⁶ Within its pages, the (anonymous) author provides a brief history of the Dutch Republic, calls for a new alliance with France and the new United States of America (cutting ties with England) and reforms to the army.⁴⁹⁷ After reading the Address, the question that immediately springs to mind is “were these goals realised?” Or, “were they successful?” To answer these questions, an examination needs to be made of the political context that motivated the publication of the *Address*, an exploration of whose goals were expressed in the *Address*, and what happened to actualize these goals. Using contemporary, non-Dutch sources, this essay examines the popular perception of the results that show that, while the goals were met, they did not achieve what the author of the address had hoped.

The Dutch Republic in the 1700s and a Brief Survey of the Patriot Revolution

The 1770s were a decade of shifting attitudes in the Dutch Republic. Still a major player in the financial world, in 1777 the Republic held 40 percent of the British national debt, equalling £65 million; and in 1796, all of the United States' foreign national debt was owed to the Republic.⁴⁹⁸ The international relations of England and the Dutch Republic had been interwoven since the stadholdership of William III, which became a major reason for the demands for governmental change after the events of the American Revolution.⁴⁹⁹ By 1770 the establishment of political journals and the acknowledgment of political discourse, outside of high-class political circles, became apparent.⁵⁰⁰ It is at this time that citizens like J. D. van der Capellen tot de Pol started to “openly favour” the American rebels.⁵⁰¹ First making himself known

⁴⁹³ Maarten Prak, “Citizen Radicalism and Democracy in the Dutch Republic: The Patriot Movement of the 1780s,” *Theory and society* 20, no.1 (1991), 77.

⁴⁹⁴ R. R. Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution Book: A Political History of Europe and America, 1760-1800*, (Princeton University Press, 2014), 45.

⁴⁹⁵ Graeme Callister, *War, Public Opinion and Policy in Britain, France and the Netherlands, 1785-1815*, (Cham: Springer International Publishing AG, 2017), 41.

⁴⁹⁶ Simon Schama, *Patriots and Liberators: Revolution in the Netherlands, 1780-1813*, (London: Collins, 1977), 64.

⁴⁹⁷ Joann van der Capellen, *An Address to the People of the Netherlands*, (London: Printed for J. Stockdale, 1782), 129, 136,

⁴⁹⁸ Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution Book*, 243; Stefan E Oppers, “The Interest Rate Effect of Dutch Money in Eighteenth-Century Britain,” *The Journal of Economic History* 53, no.1 (1993): 27.

⁴⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 243, 244.

⁵⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 244.

⁵⁰¹ Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution Book: A Political History of Europe and America, 1760-1800*. 244.

in 1775, he stopped the dispatch of the Scotch Brigade to help the English fight in the Americas and personally lent thousands of *livres* to the Americans.⁵⁰² Van der Capellen was not the only pro-American Dutchman. Around him gathered others, mainly burghers, who were dissatisfied with the current Dutch conditions.⁵⁰³ Although William V –the Stadholder at the time– remained a strong supporter of the English, the growing pro-rebellion and anti-British sentiment were seen in unsanctioned trade between the Dutch and rebel colonists and in the general unwillingness to help Britain.⁵⁰⁴ These actions, along with the possibility of the Dutch joining the Russian League of Armed Neutrality, caused concern within Britain and led to the English starting the Fourth Anglo-Dutch war in 1780.⁵⁰⁵ The Dutch did poorly in the war, emphasising the decline in the Dutch Empire, and the blame fell on William V, who as Stadholder, was commander-in-chief.⁵⁰⁶ It was these circumstances that prompted the writing and publishing of the *Address*, which was taken up as the catalyst for the Dutch Revolt by the so-called Patriots.

There were two main opposing groups in the Dutch Revolt. On the revolutionary side were the Patriots; hence, the revolt was also called the Patriotic Revolution. The Patriots were not centrally organised or unitary but were “a coalescence of people who followed a broadly similar discourse in demanding political and social reform.”⁵⁰⁷ Although most rebels were urban workers, some regents were supportive of the Patriots and formed the Assembly of Patriot Regents in 1786.⁵⁰⁸ Because the Patriots were not one organised group, they did not have agreement across the provinces for their goals, but they were mainly anti-Prince of Orange and the “inefficiency of the Stadholder government.”⁵⁰⁹ This included wanting to “remove or restrain the arbitrary powers of the Stadholder.”⁵¹⁰ Simon Schama has noted that Patriot ideology “looked forward to the *rebirth* of a primitive democracy,” and to be successful the Old Republic needed “to be rescued from its infirmity and rejuvenated in the image of its heroic beginnings.”⁵¹¹ For Patriots, these general goals were turned into action by the publication of the *Address*, which offered readers

a single, plausible explanation - the megalomania of the Prince of Orange - for a host of domestic problems that might otherwise have seemed completely unrelated to the War, but more importantly, [the author] offered his readers a plan of action - the election of citizens' committees and the formation of free militias - designed to reduce the overarching influence of the Prince and his "fawning lot of grandees."⁵¹²

On the other side of the Revolution were the Orangists, taking their name from their support of the Princes of Orange. The Orangists were a varied group, ranging from Regents to farmers. Ironically, although the Orangists were supportive of the Stadholder and rejected Patriotism, Graeme Callister has noted that “the Orangists were not simply conservatives or anti-reformers. Orangism as much as Patriotism sought to restore the old glory and prosperity of the Dutch Republic, but the two philosophies fundamentally disagreed only on how to do this.”⁵¹³

The actual progression of the Patriot Revolution was slow. Officially beginning in 1781 with the publication of the *Address*, the revolt could be “understood as, at bottom, a series of municipal revolutions,

⁵⁰²Ibid.

⁵⁰³ Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution Book*, 244.

⁵⁰⁴ Callister, *War, Public Opinion and Policy*, 45.

⁵⁰⁵ Ibid., 45.

⁵⁰⁶ Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution Book*, 45.

⁵⁰⁷ Callister, *War, Public Opinion and Policy, 1785-1815*, 45.

⁵⁰⁸ Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution Book*, 252.

⁵⁰⁹ Callister, *War, Public Opinion and Policy*, 45.

⁵¹⁰ Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution Book*, 46.

⁵¹¹ Schama, *Patriots and Liberators: Revolution in the Netherlands, 1780-1813*, 67, 68.

⁵¹² Wayne P. Te. Brake, “Popular Politics and the Dutch Patriot Revolution,” *Theory and Society* 14, no.2 (1985): 204.

⁵¹³ Callister, *War, Public Opinion and Policy*, 46.

which were an essential precondition to structural changes at the provincial and national levels.⁵¹⁴ Over the next six years towns and cities in each province were forced into fairer elections; or, in rare cases, were overthrown with new council members elected to serve.⁵¹⁵ By 1784 the Patriots “represented a force to be reckoned with...Patriot petitions signed by...thousands...[represented] an effective means of communicating the ‘will of the People,’...the movement must have seemed invincible, at least to the local governments to whom the petitions were most often addressed.”⁵¹⁶ The other significant event at this time was the formation of the Free Corps (*Vrijcorps*). Two core features of the Free Corps were that they were open to anyone – including Catholics who were excluded from government office – and would be independent and self-governing.⁵¹⁷ These militia groups started forming around the country and “adopted uniforms, drilled, listened to speeches, and sent delegates to national meetings.”⁵¹⁸ The Corps was guarding against dangers inside and outside the Republic such as a threat from the ancient militia commanded by the Orangists and aristocrats, as well as the British, Austrians and Belgians.⁵¹⁹ The Corps never fought any of these three countries, although the British were involved behind the scenes. Neither France nor Britain wanted to get directly involved with the Dutch Revolution. They both saw the Dutch Republic as a useful ally; most importantly, they were concerned that the Republic did not ally with their long-standing enemy.⁵²⁰ Because of this, both countries did eventually get involved, but on opposing sides.

By 1787, the United Provinces were completely split: Groningen, Overijssel and Holland were controlled by the Patriots, Zeeland and Gelderland by the Organists and Utrecht and Friesland were divided.⁵²¹ The Orangists were receiving English support in the sum of 90,000 pounds; the Patriots were receiving money from the French.⁵²² In the end, it was the capture of Princess Wilhelmina in June – she was the sister of the new Prussian King Frederick William II – by the Patriots that set into motion the final stages of the Revolution.⁵²³ On 13 September 1787, Frederick William II sent 26,000 troops to the Dutch border and invaded the Republic.⁵²⁴

Calls to Action in the Address

It is important to contextualise the *Address* before looking at its goal because the problems and solutions identified by the author relate to a particular person/group. The author, while unknown at the time, was Baron Joann van der Capellen; he was discussed earlier in reference to his support of the American colonies during their Revolution.⁵²⁵ It is then important to bear in mind that, while his solutions were not applicable for everybody, they were acknowledged as part of the Patriot movement.

The first problem and solution of the *Address* was the disenchantment with the consistent alliance with England that had been in place since William III became the English king. Van der Capellen complains that

our Republic...was in a continual war with France, in which we spent our blood and money, for the sole advantage of the perfidious England...That William, by keeping us

⁵¹⁴ Brake, “Popular Politics and the Dutch Patriot Revolution,” 212.

⁵¹⁵ Wayne P. te Brake, “Provincial Histories and National Revolution in the Dutch Republic,” In *The Dutch Republic in the Eighteenth-Century*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2020), 87.

⁵¹⁶ Brake, “Popular Politics and the Dutch Patriot Revolution,” 209.

⁵¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 209.

⁵¹⁸ Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution Book*, 249.

⁵¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 249.

⁵²⁰ Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution Book*, 254.

⁵²¹ Brake, “Popular Politics and the Dutch Patriot Revolution,” 214.

⁵²² Callister, *War, Public Opinion and Policy*, 51.

⁵²³ Schama, *Patriots and Liberators: Revolution in the Netherlands, 1780-1813*, 127.

⁵²⁴ *Ibid.*, 129.

⁵²⁵ *Ibid.*, 64.

constantly at war with France, gave irreparable blows to our commerce and welfare, and at the same time oppressed us with innumerable debts.⁵²⁶

He sees this alliance as specifically detrimental in the Austrian War of Succession in 1742 when “we again entered into a close alliance with the perfidious English...who were highly pleased, that we were again foolish enough to exhaust ourselves for their advantage...and bring us again under their influence and command.”⁵²⁷ The author continues to blame William for neglecting Dutch interests in favour of the English in a possible Russian alliance situation. The *Address* claims that

the Empress of Russia offered us a defensive alliance. She sent her ships in order to join ours. Are not *you* alone the cause that we did not directly enter into the alliance? Have not you, by your shameful delay, given time to your friends the English, to try their briberies and other arts, and thus to make that well-planned alliance vanish into smoke?⁵²⁸

The fear of this Russian alliance was one of the reasons that the British started the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War.⁵²⁹ Van der Capellen’s solution to the England problem was to cut ties with the English and “form an alliance with France and America.”⁵³⁰ This first goal of ending the alliance with England leads directly into another of the author’s complaints: the Stadholder’s management of the army and the lack of troops.

The second problem and solution identified by van der Capellen was the need for an overhaul of the current military system. Generally, he discusses the need to have a standing army because the other European powers possessed them.⁵³¹ Following suit with his previous remarks, van der Capellen attacks William’s apparent disregard for the current military because of the lack of salary increases, invoking emotional appeals when asking if

you ever pitied the hard fat of 36,000 men, who for the miserable pittance of 28d had sold their liberties and lives, and are literally slaves? Have you ensured to us the affection of these men, by a permanent augmentation of pay, in consequence of Baron *Van der Capellen’s* [referring to himself] proposal in Overijssel, in 1773, or by the liberal grant of 700,000 florins, which the city of Amsterdam assigned you for that purpose?⁵³²

Van der Capellen continues to complain about how William has replaced officers with “young adventurers” rendering the army “useless for publick service.”⁵³³ Van der Capellen forges ahead in his attack claiming that William is personally responsible for driving men away from military service, thus forcing the ranks to be filled with mercenaries.⁵³⁴ Luckily, Van der Capellen has a solution to how to maintain a standing army and to rid the army of foreign soldiers which comes from Article VIII of the Union of Utrecht. The passage that is quoted in the *Address* is as follows:

⁵²⁶ Van der Capellen, *An Address to the People of the Netherlands*, 64.

⁵²⁷ Van der Capellen, *An Address to the People of the Netherlands*, 69.

⁵²⁸ *Ibid.*, 109.

⁵²⁹ Callister, *War, Public Opinion and Policy*, 45.

⁵³⁰ Van der Capellen, *An Address to the People of the Netherlands*, 37.

⁵³¹ Van der Capellen, *An Address to the People of the Netherlands*, 35.

⁵³² *Ibid.*, 102.

⁵³³ *Ibid.*, 102.

⁵³⁴ *Ibid.*, 104.

in order to have at all times a public defense, the inhabitants of every one of these United Provinces, cities and places in the country, shall be reviewed and registered, at farthest within a month after the date hereof, viz. all those that are between eighteen and sixty years of age; that their dwellings and numbers being thus known, they may, at the next meeting of this Union, be further ordered and commanded, as shall be found most proper for the protection and security of these United Provinces.⁵³⁵

Thus, van der Capellen's solution was a universal citizens' militia.⁵³⁶ To maintain the integrity of this militia, the *Address* suggests that all troops should have quality firelocks, bayonets and swords and let each regiment choose its own officers which would "prevent [citizens'] oppression and subjugation by the commander of their own troops, by their own captain-general."⁵³⁷ In short, everyone should be part of the militia, be able to choose their commanders and have the resources required to ensure that said commanders would not become too powerful.

Resulting Actions from the Address

When investigating whether these goals were met, a resulting language barrier occurred as none of the primary sources that are cited in books and articles about the Patriot Revolution have been translated from Dutch to English; however, a set of four satirical prints solved this issue with a contemporary critique on the Patriots and their revolution. Before diving into the content of the prints themselves, more context needs to be explored. All four were drawn by Johan Heinrich Ramberg. Ramberg was a Hanoverian painter, etcher, caricaturist and draughtsman who studied at the Royal Academy in London from 1781-88, supported by King George III.⁵³⁸ They were published by Thomas Harmar, a "publisher of satires," who had a shop in Piccadilly from the 1770s-90s.⁵³⁹ The prints are titled *Rehearsal in Holland* (dated 18 October 1787), *Politics inside out a Farce* (dated 21 October 1787), *Military Recreation in Holland* (dated 24 October 1787) and *Performance in Holland* (undated but captioned September and October 1787). Given the dates of Ramberg's time at the Royal Academy in London, the dates on the prints themselves and the language of the captions on the drawings (English), it is safe to assume they were intended for an English audience. Knowing that England was supportive of the Orangists in the conflict, helps explain why – as will be seen – the prints are unflattering towards the Patriots and their French allies.

After 1781, the Patriots got what they wanted in an alliance with France. This is seen in all four of Ramberg's prints: *Rehearsal*, *Military Recreation*, *Performance* and *Politics*. *Politics* provides a very clear explanation of both the English perspective of the Patriot Revolution and the various parties involved in the revolution in general. The print focuses on four men, three standing and one kneeling in the middle.⁵⁴⁰ The two men standing on the left can be identified as a Prussian soldier and an Englishman from the captions under the figures. Under the Englishman reads "English: confess yourself a French dog!"⁵⁴¹ Under the Prussian reads "Prussian: Orange for ever! and respect to the Ladies..." alluding to Frederick William's reasoning for getting directly involved in the conflict – the capture of his sister the Princess of Orange.⁵⁴²

⁵³⁵ Van der Capellen, *An Address to the People of the Netherlands*, 36.

⁵³⁶ Brake, "Popular Politics and the Dutch Patriot Revolution," 209.

⁵³⁷ Van der Capellen, *An Address to the People of the Netherlands*, 102.

⁵³⁸ The British Museum, "Johann Heinrich Ramberg," Information Page via <https://www.britishmuseum.org/collection/term/BIOG43056>.

⁵³⁹ The British Museum, "Thomas Harmar," Information Page via <https://www.britishmuseum.org/collection/term/BIOG146980>.

⁵⁴⁰ Johann Heinrich Ramberg, "Politics inside-out- a farce," Published by Thomas Harmar, 1787, The British Museum.

⁵⁴¹ *Ibid.*,

⁵⁴² *Ibid.*,

The English and Prussian working together symbolise the English and Prussian-backed Orangists. The other two figures represent the failed French-backed Patriot alliance. The kneeling man can be identified as a Patriot by his hat and the caption directly under the figure which reads “Dutch: help me out Monsieur! you brought me in...”⁵⁴³ The final figure is a man standing on the right holding his hat under his arm and presenting an empty bag or netting of sorts.⁵⁴⁴ Under the Frenchman reads “Frenchm: Me beg to be excused. Bygar me have nothing to give; & me remember the Duke of Bronsvic, Pitt, Rosbac & Minden.” Based on the way Ramberg drew the Frenchman in *Politics*, the figure can also be seen in the background of *Performance* and *Military Recreation*.

Rehearsal and *Performance* show the French unflatteringly mimicking the Patriots. In both prints, there are Dutch Patriots with weapons fighting and fleeing.⁵⁴⁵ On the ground, and crawling up their legs, are a collection of frogs – frogs being a classic allusion to the French.⁵⁴⁶ In *Rehearsal*, three of the frogs standing on the bank of the water can be seen holding sticks.⁵⁴⁷ Two of the frogs are standing at attention with their stick on their shoulder, mimicking how a soldier is at attention, while the third is squatting pointing the stick, similar to how one of the Patriots is holding his gun.⁵⁴⁸ Upon close examination, the frogs have also been drawn in *Performance*; while the Patriots are fleeing from the mounted Prussian soldier, the frogs are on the ground.⁵⁴⁹ One is on its back, perhaps dead, while the others – again copying the Patriots – are crawling over each other trying to escape; the expressions of fear on the Patriots' faces are mirrored on those of the frogs.⁵⁵⁰ In the background of *Performance*, there is a wigged man with his hat under his arm, hands in the air running away; almost identical to the *Politics* drawing of a Frenchman, it can be deduced that this is also a Frenchman retreating.⁵⁵¹ *Military Recreation* shows the same English and French figures from *Politics* but this time standing on a wall looking down at Prussian soldiers throwing a Patriot around on a sheet.⁵⁵² The Englishman is holding the Frenchman's wig, forcing him to look down at the Prussians. The Frenchman's face is terrified, and he has even dropped his snuffbox at the sight.⁵⁵³ The Englishman by contrast is looking a little smug and happy to rub France's nose in losing another conflict to the English.

The prints also provide perspective on the realities of van der Capellen's desire for military reform. As discussed, one of the *Address*' complaints about the military under the current Stadholder regime was the waiving of Article VIII in the original 1579 Union of Utrecht agreement.⁵⁵⁴ The creation of the Free Corps shows that van der Capellen's suggestion of a citizen militia was met. Although most transitions of power were peaceful throughout the provinces, the Free Corps was seemingly feeling confident in themselves which can be seen in *Rehearsal*.⁵⁵⁵ As its name suggests, *Rehearsal in Holland* is a print of Dutch Patriots and French frogs rehearsing for conflict. If the print is divided into vertical thirds, the right third shows a stone wall with a crude drawing of an advancing Prussian soldier.⁵⁵⁶ The middle third shows Patriots shooting their rifles at the advancing Prussian, and the left third shows an abundance of Patriots

⁵⁴³ Ibid.,

⁵⁴⁴ Ramberg, “Politics inside-out- a farce.”

⁵⁴⁵ Johann Heinrich Ramberg, “Performance in Holland in Sept. & Oct. 1787,” Published by Thomas Harmar, 1787, The British Museum; Johann Heinrich Ramberg, “Rehearsal in Holland 1787,” Published by Thomas Harmar, 1787, The British Museum.

⁵⁴⁶ Ramberg, “Performance in Holland in Sept. & Oct. 1787”; Ramberg, “Rehearsal in Holland 1787.”

⁵⁴⁷ Ramberg, “Rehearsal in Holland 1787.”

⁵⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁴⁹ Ramberg, “Performance in Holland in Sept. & Oct. 1787.”

⁵⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵⁵¹ Ramberg, “Performance in Holland in Sept. & Oct. 1787”; Ramberg, “Politics inside-out- a farce.”

⁵⁵² Johann Heinrich Ramberg, “Military Recreation in Holland,” Published by Thomas Harmar, 1787, The British Museum.

⁵⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁵⁴ Nicolaas C. F. van de Sas, “The Patriot Revolution: New Perspectives,” In *The Dutch Republic in the Eighteenth-Century*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2020), 110.

⁵⁵⁵ Brake, “Popular Politics and the Dutch Patriot Revolution,” 214.

⁵⁵⁶ Ramberg, “Rehearsal in Holland 1787.”

with assorted weapons, and a trumpet, waiting for their turn.⁵⁵⁷ In the background, behind the stone wall with the Prussian drawing is a windmill – an explicit sign that the soldiers are in the Dutch Republic. The underlying sentiment in this print is the cockiness with which the Patriots are practising and preparing for war. None look too worried; some even appear happy and excited for their turn to shoot at the Prussian. Contrasting the confidence shown in *Rehearsal, Performance* and *Military Recreation*, shows what happened when the Prussians did arrive.

Performance shows the domination of the Prussian forces when they invaded the Dutch Republic. Again, dividing the print into vertical thirds, on the right third is a fearsome Prussian soldier mounted on a rearing horse, waving his sword.⁵⁵⁸ In the middle third, there are four distinct figures. In the foreground is a Patriot who has fallen over and is laying on his back.⁵⁵⁹ Behind him are three Patriots falling over each other trying to turn and run away from the Prussian – all with terrified expressions on their faces.⁵⁶⁰ Finally, in the left third is a collection of Patriots kneeling with their hands clasped together in prayer; behind the praying Patriots are the backs of men running away.⁵⁶¹ In front, the French frogs are hopping away as fast as possible. Gone is the cockiness and excitement for battle. In its place, the Free Corps are being shown as unprepared amateurs frightened by conflict. As already explained in *Military Recreation*, there are a group of Prussian soldiers tossing a Dutch Patriot in the air on a sheet.⁵⁶² This shows that instead of training, or fighting, the Prussian army is playing with their supposed opposition. In the print, the Prussian soldiers all have smiles on their faces, emphasising the ease with which they overran the Patriot forces. The title also indicates that the Prussian army had time for recreational activities in Holland – ‘recreational’ being the key word because it means the Prussians did not feel the need to be working (fighting) the entire time. The implication of these two prints is clear: not only did the Patriots lose, but the Prussians completely and totally dominated.

Conclusion

On 10 October 1787, after a 10-day siege of Amsterdam, the last Patriot resistance fell; against the 26,000 Prussians, the 9,000 Patriot soldiers froze and “years of parades, drills, Free Corps manoeuvres, and martial ballyhoo simply disappeared in the general terror at the advancement of the Prussian armies.”⁵⁶³ With this invasion, six years of revolutionary activity ended in one fell swoop because William V was reinstated with all his original powers as Stadholder and the Patriots were driven out of the Republic.⁵⁶⁴ Although commonly overlooked now – and very much overshadowed by the French Revolution that started two years later – the Patriotic Revolution deserves acknowledgement. Wayne Brake has described it as the “most forceful challenge to Europe’s old regime before the French revolution of 1789.”⁵⁶⁵ *Aan het Volk van Nederlands* became the rousing call to action, an instruction manual that deserves recognition as a publication that achieved what it set out to do – in the short term at least.

The Patriots were successful in ending their alliance with England in favour of one with France. It was unfortunate for the Patriots that the English went on to support their enemies, but there is no arguing that the first of van der Capellen’s goals was achieved. The second, a revamping of the military, also happened. There were groups of Free Corps participants in towns and cities across the country. The Corps was filled with everyday citizens, just like Article VIII had stipulated. Johann Heinrich Ramberg’s prints published in the weeks following the fall of Amsterdam articulate, albeit from an unflattering

⁵⁵⁷ Ramberg, “Rehearsal in Holland 1787.”

⁵⁵⁸ Ramberg, “Performance in Holland in Sept. & Oct. 1787.”

⁵⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁵⁶¹ Ibid.

⁵⁶² Ramberg, “Military Recreation in Holland.”

⁵⁶³ Schama, *Patriots and Liberators: Revolution in the Netherlands, 1780-1813*, 129.

⁵⁶⁴ Ibid., 131.

⁵⁶⁵ Brake, “Provincial Histories and National Revolution in the Dutch Republic,” 61.

English-Orangist perspective, the successes and failures of the Patriots concerning the *Address's* original goals. The prints show the Patriots' alliance with France and the newly created Free Corps preparing for battle. They also show the completely disastrous ending for the Patriots, signalling the failure of the sought-after alliance with France; this abrupt ending may overshadow the Patriots' achievements up to September 1787, but the revolution from 1781-1787 showed an ardent desire for change which reappeared in the 1790s.

Bibliography

- Brake, Wayne P. Te. "Provincial Histories and National Revolution in the Dutch Republic." In *The Dutch Republic in the Eighteenth-Century*, 60–90. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2020.
- Brake, Wayne P. Te. "Popular Politics and the Dutch Patriot Revolution." *Theory and Society* 14, no.2 (1985): 199–222. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/657090>.
- Callister, Graeme. *War, Public Opinion and Policy in Britain, France and the Netherlands, 1785-1815*. Cham: Springer International Publishing AG, 2017.
- Capellen, Joann, van der. *An Address to the People of the Netherlands, on the Present Alarming and Most Dangerous Situation of the Republic of Holland: Showing the True Motives of the Most Unpardonable Delays of the Executive Power in Putting the Republic into a Proper State of Defence, and the Advantage of an Alliance with Holland, France and America. Translated from the Dutch Original. Making of the Modern World*. London: Printed for J. Stockdale, 1782. <https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/U0101923573/MOME?u=uvictoria&sid=bookmark-MOME&xid=179da7d4&pg=1>
- Oppers, Stefan E. "The Interest Rate Effect of Dutch Money in Eighteenth-Century Britain." *The Journal of Economic History* 53, no.1 (1993): 25–43. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2123174>.
- Palmer, R. R. *The Age of the Democratic Revolution Book: A Political History of Europe and America, 1760-1800*. Princeton University Press, 2014.
- Prak, Maarten. "Citizen Radicalism and Democracy in the Dutch Republic: The Patriot Movement of the 1780s." *Theory and society* 20, no.1 (1991): 73–102. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/657488>
- Ramberg, Johann Heinrich. *Rehearsal in Holland 1787*. Published by Thomas Harmar, 1787. The British Museum. https://www.britishmuseum.org/collection/object/P_1868-0808-10315 (accessed November 8, 2022)
- Ramberg, Johann Heinrich. *Performance in Holland in Sept. & Oct. 1787*. Published by Thomas Harmar, 1787. The British Museum. https://www.britishmuseum.org/collection/object/P_1868-0808-10316 (accessed November 8, 2022)
- Ramberg, Johann Heinrich. *Military Recreation in Holland*. Published by Thomas Harmar, 1787. The British Museum. https://www.britishmuseum.org/collection/object/P_1868-0808-5662 (accessed november 8, 2022)
- Ramberg, Johann Heinrich. *Politics inside-out- a farce*. Published by Thomas Harmar, 1787. The British Museum. https://www.britishmuseum.org/collection/object/P_1868-0808-5661 (accessed November 8, 2022)
- Sas, Nicolaas C. F. van. "The Patriot Revolution: New Perspectives." In *The Dutch Republic in the Eighteenth-Century*, 91–120. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2020.
- Schama, Simon. *Patriots and Liberators: Revolution in the Netherlands, 1780-1813*. London: Collins, 1977.
- The British Museum. "Johann Heinrich Ramberg." <https://www.britishmuseum.org/collection/term/BIOG43056> (accessed November 8, 2022)
- The British Museum. "Thomas Harmar." <https://www.britishmuseum.org/collection/term/BIOG146980> (accessed November 8, 2022)

Support for Napoleon's Empire: Manoeuvring, Manipulating, and Managing Public Opinion

Nicholas Rabnett

NicholasAJRabnett@outlook.com

Abstract

When Napoleon I crowned himself the Emperor of France, he had seemingly brought an end to the First French Republic under the auspices of public support. In his ascendancy from Consul, he had employed plebiscites, invoked his military victories, and appealed to French Catholics. However, the public opinion of Napoleon I was not always as positive as it seemed, requiring political manoeuvring for the purpose of maintaining a visage of popular support. "Support for Napoleon's Empire: Manoeuvring, Manipulating and Managing Public Opinion" is an analysis of the sources and mechanisms of support that allowed Napoleon I to rise from Consul to Emperor of France. Focusing primarily on the period of 1799 to 1804, this essay takes a textual analysis approach, examining secondary sources for two purposes. The first purpose is to determine where public support for Napoleon was legitimate, and where public opinion was managed, while the second purpose is to understand what mechanisms were employed in order to manage this public opinion. The essay begins with an analysis of the negative perception of the Directory among the French population, particularly its economic and democratic instability, to understand why support for a new regime arose. In the next section, the essay examines the plebiscites of 1800, 1802, and 1804, to identify and analyse the mechanisms that created the image of widespread support for Napoleon I, such as the simple design of the plebiscites and the public nature in which they were carried out. Finally, the essay concludes with an analysis of the organic and inorganic support that Napoleon I could draw on from within the French populace, focusing on that which was derived from Napoleon I's military record, the Concordat with the Catholic Church, and a significant propaganda campaign.

Over the course of the 18th and 19th of Brumaire in Year VIII, a tectonic shift occurred in the governmental structure of the French state. Where before there was the Directory, with its elected legislative bodies embodying the gains of the French Revolution since 1789, there now stood a Consulate of three executives, ushered in through an inherently undemocratic coup d'état. Then, within only a few years, the Consulate would give way to an empire, with Napoleon Bonaparte as its dictator. The Coup of 18 Brumaire, while meeting initial resistance from both the Council of Five Hundred and the Council of Elders, was successful and not necessarily unpopular. When, in 1800, the citizens of France were asked to justify the coup by voting for the establishment of a new governmental structure through a new constitution, the result was positive and the citizens appeared responsive. How could it be that the citizens of France, after persevering through a decade of revolution which saw the execution of an absolute monarch and the establishment of enlightened constitutions, were willing to take a significant step backwards from political freedom and towards dictatorship? Furthermore, how could these citizens continue to support the regime when, in 1804, they would be asked to vote on the establishment of a hereditary empire?

While the plebiscites of the years 1800, 1802, and 1804 all revealed significant support for the abolishment of the Directory and the establishment of Napoleon's dictatorship, there is good reason to question the legitimacy of the image of homogenous support which these plebiscites provide. However, this is not to say that Napoleon was devoid of support. To what extent did the French public support the leadership of Napoleon Bonaparte, and what key factors contributed to their support in his ascendancy from General to Consul to Emperor? In this essay, it will be argued that between 1799 and 1804, despite the existence of opposition, Napoleon expertly manoeuvred, manipulated and managed public opinion in order to maintain significant, if not fluctuating, levels of support which provided his regime with legitimacy. Through an analysis of the unpopularity of and apathy towards the Directory, the processes of the three plebiscites, and the effects that censorship, military success, and the Concordat with the Catholic Church had on Napoleon's reputation, it should become evident as to what extent Napoleon manoeuvred, manipulated and managed public opinion to maintain significant levels of support.

First, it should be understood that the failures of the Directory, with all the unpopularity and apathy it inspired, played a key role in Napoleon and his co-conspirators' ability to seize power in the Coup of 18 Brumaire. There would appear to be three major factors contributing to the unpopular attitude towards the Directory: governmental instability, governmental inefficiency, and the Directory's precedent of undemocratic behaviour. With cognizance of the dangers held by a strong executive with unchecked power, as embodied by the Committee of Public Safety, the Directory's executive body was designed to be weak; for example, yearly elections were held within the legislature to replace some of the five seats in the executive body, and which seats would be up for election was decided by random chance.⁵⁶⁶ Such instability within the executive ensured the constant turnover of interests exercising power, which would greatly damage abilities for coalition-building and cohesive decision making. The problem with this systematic turnover within the apparatus of the state was not missed by observers. French observer Pierre Jean Georges Cabanis would state in the fallout of the Coup of 18 Brumaire that "annual elections put the people in a fever state at least six months out of twelve [...]".⁵⁶⁷ The instability of such a system was a known quantity, and it inspired a desire for change in the strength of the executive. This would also create a consistent cycle of shifting the balance of power from the left of the political spectrum to the right, and vice-versa, which was also existent within the legislative bodies themselves.⁵⁶⁸ This constant turnover in

⁵⁶⁶ Martyn Lyons, *Napoleon Bonaparte and the Legacy of the French Revolution* (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1994), 32.

⁵⁶⁷ Lynn Hunt, David Lansky, and Paul Hanson, "The Failure of the Liberal Republic in France, 1795-1799: The Road to Brumaire," *The Journal of Modern History* 51, no.4 (1979): 737.

⁵⁶⁸ Lyons, *Napoleon Bonaparte and the Legacy of the French Revolution*, 31; William A. Pelz, "The Rise of the Third Estate: The French People Revolt," in *A People's History of Modern Europe* (Pluto Press, 2016), 50.

the executive and legislative bodies of the Directory regime, in conjunction with repeated shifts between the left-wing and the right-wing, ensured that the regime would be characterised by instability.

Despite finding some successes by 1799 in handling the multitude of problems facing the state, such as the economic maladies which were solved by writing off the state's debt and putting an end to the *assignat* currency, the Directory, in part due to its instability, was seen as ineffectual.⁵⁶⁹ There were larger economic anxieties, particularly in the labour market, which had been created by the Revolution and the abolishment of the ancient regime system. For example, the *livret*, a passbook for labourers which was surrendered to employers at the commencement of employment and which tied labourers to their employers and ensured good behaviour, had been eliminated.⁵⁷⁰ The return to such a system would be of great benefit to employers who, with the labourer's *livret*, would be able to exert much more control over the activities of their workers. Furthermore, with the abolishment of slavery in the French colonies, a source of cheap exploitable labour had been greatly damaged. Napoleon was thus seen as an opportunity to restore economic stability, an opportunity which he capitalised on through, among other measures, re-establishing the *livret* and the institution of slavery in the French colonies in 1802.⁵⁷¹ Additionally, the Directory was seen as ineffective at administering to the *départments* of France, and at establishing law and order. Karl Loewenstein hints at an undercurrent of French opinion that held disdain for the weak governing apparatuses of the *départments* when he states that Napoleon, after reorganising the *préfets* administering the *départments*, had provided "a most efficient and impartial administration" within the *départments*.⁵⁷² Such an image of inefficiency prior to Napoleon's restructuring was compounded by the problem of the Chouan rebellion. The peasant rebellion localised in the western *départments* of France had not been entirely defeated, and the violence that the rebellion fostered was a significant blight on the image of the Directory.⁵⁷³ With the numerous problems which the Directory was unable to properly address, further unpopularity with the regime was undoubtedly fostered.

If the Directory was to be an enlightenment system of government in which the rule of democracy was to be respected, then it had failed in this regard as well. Two major undemocratic aspects of the Directory were its willingness to revise electoral results and the prevalence of coups during its existence. Revision of electoral results occurred under the Directory through both subtle and overt methods. If the agents of the Directory felt that there were extremist elements making political gains in the *départments*, propaganda would be issued to discredit the extremists, the divisions among ideological groups within the *départments* would be exploited, and, in more extreme cases, lists of candidates approved by the agents of the Directory themselves would be provided to the electoral assemblies within troublesome *départments*.⁵⁷⁴ Meddling in the democratic affairs of electoral assemblies betrayed the spirit of democracy that the Revolution suggested and that the Directory based itself upon, and would likely be a cause of great distrust.

More extreme, however, was when the Directory annulled electoral results in 1797 and 1798. During the former, known as the Fructidor Coup, after gains had been made by rightists in the legislature, the electoral results of forty-nine *départments* were annulled, excluding 177 deputies from office.⁵⁷⁵ Regarding the latter, known as the Floreal Coup that was prompted by a response to leftist gains, electoral results were once again annulled, barring 121 elected deputies from the offices they were elected

⁵⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 29.

⁵⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 119.

⁵⁷¹ Naomi J. Andrews and Jennifer E. Sessions, "Introduction: The Politics of Empire in Post-Revolutionary France," *French Politics, Culture & Society* 33, no.1 (2015): 4; Lyons, 119; Pelz, 51.

⁵⁷² Karl Loewenstein, "Opposition and Public Opinion under the Dictatorship of Napoleon the First," *Social Research* 4, no.4 (1937): 462-463.

⁵⁷³ Lyons, Lyons, *Napoleon Bonaparte and the Legacy of the French Revolution*, 33.

⁵⁷⁴ Hunt, Lansky, and Hanson, "The Failure of the Liberal Republic in France," 741.

⁵⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

to.⁵⁷⁶ Whereas the subtle methods of revising electoral results were relatively lighter attempts at election meddling, the annulling of electoral results, the barring of deputies from their elected office, and the illegal overextension of power were overt and disastrous for the image of an elected democratic regime. Such examples provoked Napoleon to state to the Council of Elders, upon the onset of the Coup of 18 Brumaire, “can [the Constitution] still offer any guarantee to the French People? You violated it on 18 Fructidor, you violated it on 22 Floreal [...] The Constitution has been invoked and then violated by every single faction”.⁵⁷⁷ The strength in such a statement is that, regardless of Napoleon’s intentions, it was not a lie; the Directory had maintained itself through unconstitutional and undemocratic methods, and thus it could appeal to neither the Constitution nor democratic ideals to defend itself.

Upon the conclusion of the Coup of 18 Brumaire, Napoleon sought to justify his and his co-conspirators’ extrajudicial seizure of power through an appeal to public opinion. To do so, in 1800 he deployed a plebiscite to the citizens of France to vote on whether a new constitution ought to be created to establish a new regime with a stronger executive, a process he would repeat in both 1802 and 1804.⁵⁷⁸ The results suggest significant support for Napoleon’s leadership and, if taken at face value, presents an image of homogeneity among the citizens of France for such support. In 1800, on the question of establishing the Consulate of Three, over 1.5 million citizens voted in support of the Consulate against 1,562 voting no.⁵⁷⁹ In 1802, on the question of Napoleon becoming First Consul for life, an even larger turnout of 3.6 million citizens voted for Napoleon, with 8,272 citizens voting against it.⁵⁸⁰ In 1804, the plebiscite which would return France to hereditary dictatorship with the establishment of the Napoleonic Empire found the support of 3.5 million citizens, compared to the 2,569 citizens who voted against it.⁵⁸¹ Such overwhelming support was crucial to Napoleon’s legitimacy, as he could point to the public opinion of the citizens as his key support in his regime; he used a democratic method to create a deeply undemocratic system. However, as has been stated, there is great reason to doubt, if not the validity, then the ethicality, of these plebiscites. Napoleon, shrewd in his manipulation of the expression of public opinion, had multiple strategies to ensure the results he wanted were provided.

First and foremost, the plebiscites were designed to be as simple as possible. This simplicity worked in two ways. First, the plebiscites were one question: in the case of 1802, the question was “should Napoleon Bonaparte be Consul for life?”⁵⁸² Such a simple question, while at first appearing like an efficient method of collecting public opinion, is actually more insidious on closer inspection. This simplicity betrays an understanding of what actual changes would occur from voting yes.⁵⁸³ While obviously it would give Napoleon the mandate to exert greater control over the Consulate in his lifetime, it does not describe what institutional changes would occur as a result, nor does it explain Napoleon’s intentions for pursuing the lifetime position. Further, in the case of 1800, it is unknown what the result would be if the majority of voters had voted no. Would Napoleon and his co-conspirators return their seized power to the executive of the Directory, and what chaos and instability would result in the meantime? Such unclear outcomes and the simplicity of the question thus would appear to create more upsides for voting in favour than in voting against. Second, the simplicity in responses was also beneficial to Napoleon. Voters did not have any input on the plebiscites beyond providing a yes or a no to the plebiscites’ question.⁵⁸⁴ For example, again referencing the 1802 plebiscite, voters could not accept that

⁵⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷⁷ Lyons, *Napoleon Bonaparte and the Legacy of the French Revolution*, 39-40.

⁵⁷⁸ Loewenstein, “Opposition and Public Opinion,” 464; Lyons, *Napoleon Bonaparte and the Legacy of the French Revolution*, 111.

⁵⁷⁹ Lyons, *Napoleon Bonaparte and the Legacy of the French Revolution*, 113.

⁵⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁵⁸¹ Ibid.

⁵⁸² Ibid., 112.

⁵⁸³ Ibid.

⁵⁸⁴ Ibid.

Napoleon could receive greater powers than the other consuls but reject a lifetime term for his role as First Consul. Without room for nuance and discussion, the binary options were either complete acceptance of Napoleon's will or the complete rejection of it. Further, there was pressure in place to deter such a rejection.

The second strategy on which Napoleon relied in his use of plebiscites was that of the lack of a secret ballot. There was no way to vote on a plebiscite in private; unlike ticking a box and submitting it to an official, these plebiscites were registers in which individual voters would sign their name in the column pertaining to their vote.⁵⁸⁵ Such a system meant that, if you were to deviate from the clear intentions of Napoleon and vote no, your name would be known publicly to anyone who reviewed the register. For those brave enough to vote no the threat of persecution for such an action was real; having identified one's self as being against the wills of the regime, local authorities and secret police would record your deviation, and would supervise and harass such individuals.⁵⁸⁶ The threat of persecution and repression by the state and its policing apparatuses were thus a strong deterrence on any detractors, representing a serious downside to expressing opposition publicly, and incentivized individuals who did not support the plebiscite to remain in silent opposition. Such an effect suggests that, were the conditions of the non-secret ballot changed, and had there been greater discussion than the binary options had allowed for, the "no" votes on these plebiscites might have been much higher, and betrayed this image of homogeneity.⁵⁸⁷ Thus, as we can see in the results of the plebiscites, Napoleon manoeuvred and managed public opinion into a form that was useful for his purposes; this suggests that if the numbers of supporters for the regime are accurate, there is at least the likely possibility that there was a greater number of dissenters.

Finally, the strength of Napoleon's reputation should not be understated in his ability to command support. There are three reasons for the strength of Napoleon's reputation, the first of which being inorganic. Napoleon, with help from Fouché, the Minister of Police, was adept at state repression and censorship. While initially appearing to a certain degree as liberal in his temperament following the Coup of 18 Brumaire, on December 24, 1800, Napoleon narrowly survived an assassination attempt at the rue St. Nicaise; it is at this point that the machine of state repression was unleashed upon citizens of France perceived as enemies.⁵⁸⁸ Citizens who were perceived as being hostile to the state could face any number of punishments, ranging from arbitrary imprisonment for an indefinite period of time to deportation to a French colony.⁵⁸⁹ While repression would likely not be considered conducive to gaining support for his regime, Napoleon's support was instead bolstered by the lack of expression of opposition towards him. Such repression had this effect, and the opposition was forced into passive acceptance of the regime.⁵⁹⁰ This passive acceptance was further bolstered by the employment of censorship in literature. Much as how the non-secret ballot system utilised in the plebiscites obscured any level of opposition to the regime, the censorship of newspapers and journals continued to portray an image of homogenous support for Napoleon. Censorship was expressed in several ways. Editors were either selected by the state itself or forced to prove their allegiance to the regime, and all drafts had to be submitted to state censors; punishments for producing literature that was unenthusiastic towards Napoleon's regime ranged from fines to imprisonment.⁵⁹¹ Through such methods Napoleon managed to suppress opposition to maintain an image of homogenous support within French society.

⁵⁸⁵ Loewenstein, "Opposition and Public Opinion," 465; Lyons, *Napoleon Bonaparte and the Legacy of the French Revolution*, 112.

⁵⁸⁶ Lyons, *Napoleon Bonaparte and the Legacy of the French Revolution*, 112-113.

⁵⁸⁷ Loewenstein, "Opposition and Public Opinion," 465.

⁵⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 467-468.

⁵⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 468.

⁵⁹⁰ Loewenstein, "Opposition and Public Opinion," 468.

⁵⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 470.

This is, however, not to suggest that there was no organic support for Napoleon. On the contrary, Napoleon's military successes were received positively, and he was perceived as an individual who could restore order in France. In particular, his successes in the second Italian campaign in 1800, as well as his signing of the Treaty of Campo Formio in 1797, were seen as validation for his ability to bring order and glory to France.⁵⁹² Such sentiments, which suggested that Napoleon had saved the Republic and staved off chaos, survived the recommencement of hostilities with England in 1803, and lasted for long enough to impact the success of the 1804 plebiscite at least.⁵⁹³ In conjunction with the aforementioned desire for order that arose from the inefficiencies of the Directory, the ascendancy of Napoleon from General to Consul likely had significant support from the French citizens, who saw Napoleon as a purveyor of order. Among the groups within France that supported Napoleon for this ability to bring order, the two most important were the military and the neo-monarchists. For example, General Soult, when asked how the army would respond to the establishment of an empire under Napoleon, is reported to have said that the army "desired and demanded that you be proclaimed Emperor of the Gauls."⁵⁹⁴ This was echoed by the neo-monarchists who, on Napoleon's return from the second Italian campaign, urged him to establish a hereditary position, which they saw as the best option to maintain order.⁵⁹⁵ Among these groups it should not be a surprise that a strongman representing law and order would be supported. But even among the commonfolk there was support for the order that Napoleon could bring, as evidenced by the thousands of letters he received expressing their support and patriotic zeal.⁵⁹⁶ Thus, it is clear that in large sections of the French citizenry, genuine support for Napoleon arose due to the reputation of his ability to restore order and glory for France.

Finally, there was one last crucial organic cleavage of support which Napoleon's reputation allowed him access to: the followers of Catholicism and Protestantism. After the Civil Constitution of the Clergy in 1790, the relationship between church and state in France became more and more precarious, and was also greatly damaged by the dechristianization efforts undertaken by the Committee of Public Safety.⁵⁹⁷ While he was aware not to allow the church's power to subvert his own, Napoleon saw that the authority of the pope would further cement his leadership in France through appeasing the vast number of Christians.⁵⁹⁸ Napoleon secured a new Concordat with the Catholic church which restored some of its authority while ensuring that it was still limited enough so as to not pose a challenge to his own legitimacy. This balancing act is evident in the Organic Articles of the Concordat, which included provisions that increased Napoleon's control over the lower clergy and secured the recognition of a Protestant minority in France; the net effect was the excitement of the French people for a period of religious peace.⁵⁹⁹ It is plain to see why the reception of the Concordat was so positive: such religious tolerance by the state was alien to the enlightened Revolution, which had oscillated between separation of power and complete dechristianization, while also uplifting the Protestant minority to recognition. Thus, even though in the later years of Napoleon's Empire new problems would arise which challenged this relationship with the Catholic church, Napoleon secured another vital source of support for his regime.

Throughout this essay it has been argued that between 1799 and 1804 Napoleon expertly manoeuvred, manipulated and managed public opinion in order to maintain significant levels of support.

⁵⁹² Philip G. Dwyer, "Napoleon and the Foundation of the Empire," *The Historical Journal* 53, no.2 (2010): 342; Stephanie Jones and Jonathan Gosling, "Coup d'Etat: Brumaire and End of the Directory, 1799: The Precariousness of Hanging on to Seized Power," in *Napoleonic Leadership: A Study in Power* (London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2015): 3.

⁵⁹³ Dwyer, "Napoleon and the Foundation of the Empire," 345-346.

⁵⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 351.

⁵⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 342.

⁵⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 354.

⁵⁹⁷ Lewis Rayapen and Gordon Anderson, "Napoleon and the Church," *International Social Science Review* 66, no.3 (1991): 118-119.

⁵⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 121, 124.

⁵⁹⁹ Rayapen and Anderson, "Napoleon and the Church," 121-122.

The instability, inefficiency, and undemocratic shortcomings of the Directory created an atmosphere of unpopularity and apathy which presented a key opportunity for Napoleon and his co-conspirators to seize power with public opinion on their side. The plebiscites, while displaying a certain level of opposition, purposefully obscured the extent to which opposition existed to create an image of homogeneity, which, in conjunction with the threat of persecution, ensured that any opposition was silent and did not detract from his support. Finally, through his use of censorship, as well as his military and ecclesiastical successes, he maintained control of public opinion and established a significant base of support. As such, it is clear that Napoleon manoeuvred, manipulated, and maintained public opinion to a great extent, and that this was critical to his success in ascending from General to Consul to Emperor. From our modern perspective, as a new war of imperialism erupts in Europe, it is pertinent that an understanding of the role public opinion can play in the devolution from democracy to autocracy is ascertained. If we do not have a proper understanding, how can we ensure that democracy can survive the influence of the autocrats of the 21st Century?

Bibliography

- Andrews, Naomi J., and Jennifer E. Sessions. "Introduction: The Politics of Empire in Post-Revolutionary France." *French Politics, Culture & Society* 33, no.1 (2015): 1–10. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26378214>.
- Dwyer, Philip G. "Napoleon and the Foundation of the Empire." *The Historical Journal* 53, no.2 (2010): 339–58. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40865691>.
- Hunt, Lynn, David Lansky, and Paul Hanson. "The Failure of the Liberal Republic in France, 1795-1799: The Road to Brumaire." *The Journal of Modern History* 51, no.4 (1979): 734–59. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1877164>.
- Jones, Stephanie, and Jonathan Gosling. "Coup d'Etat: Brumaire and End of the Directory, 1799: The Precariousness of Hanging on to Seized Power." In *Napoleonic Leadership: A Study in Power*, 1-8. London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2015. <https://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781473921238.n5>.
- Loewenstein, Karl. "Opposition and Public Opinion Under the Dictatorship of Napoleon the First." *Social Research* 4, no.4 (1937): 461–77. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40981576>.
- Lyons, Martyn. *Napoleon Bonaparte and the Legacy of the French Revolution*. London: The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1994.
- Pelz, William A. "The Rise of the Third Estate: The French People Revolt." In *A People's History of Modern Europe*, 40–51. Pluto Press, 2016. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1c2crfj.8>.
- Rayapen, Lewis, and Gordon Anderson. "Napoleon and the Church." *International Social Science Review* 66, no.3 (1991): 117–27. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41882000>.

A Lesbian Historiography of the French Revolution

Allison Wheeler⁶⁰⁰

aewheeler99@gmail.com

Abstract

Flings between the Queen of France and an actress at the Comédie Française, philosophical pornographic pamphleteers, and secret sapphic societies that threatened male supremacy formed a small yet rich historiography of lesbianism in 18th-century France. "A Lesbian Historiography of the French Revolution" analyses the works of various historians such as Susan S. Lanser, Jeffrey Merrick, and Bryant T. Ragan Jr concerning these topics. By analysing the shifting attitudes towards lesbianism, investigating the legal ramifications of homosexuality, studying novels and pamphlets from the time, and profiling those accused of lesbianism, historians have uncovered a rich history of lesbianism before and during the French Revolution. Though homosexuality was decriminalised during the revolution, lesbianism's close association with the second estate was used to condemn both members of the nobility and homosexuality.

Keywords: French Revolution, The Enlightenment, Lesbianism, Homosexuality, Marie Antoinette

⁶⁰⁰ I would like to express my gratitude to *The Ascendant Historian* editors, Maggie Dennis and Sarah Wald, my professor, Dr. Jill Walshaw; and my supportive parents.

There is a small yet rich historiography discussing homosexuality among women leading up to and during the French Revolution. Lesbianism was a hot topic of debate before and throughout the French Revolution. Most historians argue there was a distinct shift in attitudes towards lesbianism during the Revolution, echoing Valerie Traub's idea of "cycles of salience"; that is, the proposition that the lesbian is of most cultural significance in times and places on the verge of significant change or revolution.⁶⁰¹ Historians approach the subject of homosexuality among women during the French Revolution by studying shifting attitudes towards lesbianism during the Enlightenment and Revolution, interrogating the legal ramifications of homosexuality, analysing novels and pamphlets from the time, and profiling various women who were accused of or openly admitted to lesbianism, mainly Marie Antoinette and Madame de Raucourt.

A note on language; lesbian is used to identify the subject matter, not force an identity onto past subjects or imply that lesbianism has always existed in its current state.⁶⁰² Women engaging in homosexuality would not have self-identified as lesbians or any distinct sexual identity during the French Revolution or prior. Tamsin Wilson argues that naming is at the heart of lesbian studies, but focusing on precise language hinders historical narratives.⁶⁰³ Susan Lanser argues that lesbian is no more historically contingent than "family," "marriage," or "slave."⁶⁰⁴ No matter how rigid one is with language usage, all history involves a degree of interpretation.

Though recent scholarship argues that the term lesbian was used in the eighteenth century, similar to its current use, most argue that other terms were more commonly used to discuss homosexual activity between women in the eighteenth century. The most common term describing homosexual activity among women in eighteenth-century France was "tribade," from the Greek word "to rub."⁶⁰⁵ The earliest definition for the word tribade, found in Richelet's dictionary of 1680, defines tribade as one "who mates with another person of her sex and imitates a man."⁶⁰⁶ This definition implies a difference between the women who were "active" and "passive" participants in sex. A lesser-used term for homosexual activity among women was "anandrine," meaning "anti-male." These various terms give the modern historian an understanding of how homosexuality among women was viewed during the eighteenth century.

In the Introduction to *Homosexuality in Modern France*, Bryant T. Ragan and Jeffrey Merrick argue that the material conditions of women in 18th-century France inhibited homosexual activity among women. Gay men could achieve economic freedom, which freed them from their families' influence. Women bound to their fathers or husbands could not achieve this freedom.⁶⁰⁷ Lesbianism has always been contingent on the material conditions of women.

Bryant T. Ragan's "The Enlightenment Confronts Homosexuality," in *Homosexuality in Modern France*, looks into how people viewed homosexuality leading up to the French Revolution and how the Enlightenment shifted views about homosexuality. Philosophes spoke openly about homosexuality because the church had restricted speech on homosexuality.⁶⁰⁸ During services, priests would not name homosexuality, fearing naming the sin would tempt people into sin.⁶⁰⁹ Philosophes pushed forward various ideas about homosexual behaviours in men and women, sometimes using the same language and sometimes differentiating between the two acts. Philosophes discussed the naturalness of male and female

⁶⁰¹ Susan S. Lanser, *The Sexuality of History Modernity and the Sapphic* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014), 11.

⁶⁰² Jeffrey Merrick, and Bryant T. Ragan Jr., *Homosexuality in Modern France*, ed. Bryant T. Ragan and Jeffrey Merrick (Oxford University Press, 1996), 5.

⁶⁰³ Tasmin Wilton, *Lesbian Studies: Setting an Agenda*, (New York: Routledge, 2002), 49.

⁶⁰⁴ Lanser, *The Sexuality of History*, 15.

⁶⁰⁵ Carla Freccero, "The Queer Time of Lesbian Literature," in *The Cambridge Companion to Lesbian Literature*, ed. Jodie Medd (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 19.

⁶⁰⁶ Lanser, *The Sexuality of History*, 105.

⁶⁰⁷ Merrick and Ragan, *Homosexuality in Modern France*, 7.

⁶⁰⁸ Bryant T. Ragan, "The Enlightenment Confronts Homosexuality," In *Homosexuality in Modern France*. ed. Jeffrey Merrick, and Bryant T. Ragan Jr., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 10.

⁶⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 8-9.

homosexuality and acknowledged that same-sex behaviour was a common part of human history. Philosophes may not have supported homosexuality as a whole but did not believe the church could determine what was and was not virtuous.⁶¹⁰

Though Ragan's piece looks at homosexuality more broadly, he discusses in detail the philosophes' opinions about homosexuality among women. Philosophes' opinions on lesbianism varied wildly; some saw it as harmless, while others found it threatening or even titillating. Some even suggested lesbianism was less harmless than the act of sodomy.⁶¹¹ Men were also excited by lesbian sex with many fantasy novels including lesbian sex acts.⁶¹² Mirabeau wrote various sex scenes between women from a male perspective. Mirabeau interestingly suggested that during lesbian sex, the thought of men enhanced the women's pleasure.⁶¹³ Pornography created during the French Revolution differs from our modern understanding of pornography. Unlike today's pornography exclusively meant to arouse the reader, eighteenth-century pornography propagated radical philosophical statements while depicting titillating sexual acts.⁶¹⁴ Some philosophes searched for a physiological cause or a psychological cause. It was a commonly held belief that enlarged clitorises were a cause of lesbianism. Porn pamphleteers propagated the idea that women would use their enlarged clitoris to penetrate their partners. Ideas about enlarged clitorises went along with the idea that lesbians were not only women attracted to women, but women who wanted to be men. Other philosophes argued lesbian sex could enhance women's femininity rather than masculinize them.⁶¹⁵ Some even pushed forward the notion that lesbianism resulted from an unnatural separation between the sexes, like nuns in a convent and wives of soldiers who were left alone for extended periods.⁶¹⁶ Despite individual philosophes' opinions on homosexuality, their debates and pamphlets made homosexual activity among women more known to the general public.

Finally, Ragan details Randolph Trumbach's idea of a four-gender paradigm consisting of man, woman, sodomite, and sapphist. This new sexual model emerged around 1700-1720 and propagated the notion that a woman was someone who solely engaged in sex with men, while the sapphist exclusively had sex with another sapphist.⁶¹⁷ The four-gender paradigm was the beginning of distinct sexual identities, particularly for sodomites who began to see themselves as distinctly different from other men.⁶¹⁸

Susan Lanser's book *History of Sexuality* dives deep into various aspects and conversations about female homosexuality in revolutionary France, particularly in her chapter "Sapphic Sects and the Rites of Revolution." Due to homosexuality's close association with the second estate, many revolutionaries viewed lesbianism as an aristocratic institution that was not fit for the new republic, coded as anti-male and anti-progressive.⁶¹⁹ Lanser argues that revolutionaries saw tribadism as the "epitome of the secretive, regressive, aristocratic, woman-powered counterrevolutionaries."⁶²⁰ Lesbians were not just individuals engaging in homosexual activities but members of a secret society that threatened male supremacy. Whether the lesbians of the French Revolution were or were not revolutionary, there was no place for them in the new virtuous republic.⁶²¹ The heightened tensions of the French Revolution led to the "sex panic of the 1790s" that resulted in changing political attitudes around gender and sex.⁶²² Despite the decriminalisation of homosexuality, it could be possible that familiar policing of lesbian activities was heightened during the revolution.

⁶¹⁰ Bryant T. Ragan, "The Enlightenment Confronts Homosexuality," 11.

⁶¹¹ Ibid., 16.

⁶¹² Ibid., 20.

⁶¹³ Ibid., 15.

⁶¹⁴ Ibid., 14.

⁶¹⁵ Ibid., 11.

⁶¹⁶ Ibid., 20.

⁶¹⁷ Ibid., 12.

⁶¹⁸ Ibid., 13.

⁶¹⁹ Lanser, *The Sexuality of History*, 215.

⁶²⁰ Ibid., 214.

⁶²¹ Ibid., 215.

⁶²² Ibid., 216.

Louis Crompton challenges the commonly held belief that the law ignored lesbians in "The Myth of Lesbian Impunity."⁶²³ Crompton shows evidence of lesbian persecution throughout European history, countering the commonly held belief that only gay men were victims of capital punishment. Prosecution of women for homosexual activity existed in France for centuries before the French Revolution. The earliest secular law persecuting lesbian activity in France appeared in 1270.⁶²⁴ Evidence shows that lesbianism was punished by death multiple times during French history. By the eighteenth century, there was only evidence of men being arrested and punished for sodomy. The lack of arrest records against lesbians in eighteenth-century France does not necessarily indicate an acceptance of lesbianism or an absence of lesbianism. Instead, the scarcity of arrest records shows that women's lack of mobility restricted their ability to participate in lesbian activities.⁶²⁵ Men were arrested because they were actively seeking other men in public. Women did not have this same freedom. French authorities confirmed that at the time, despite the lack of arrest; the law could prosecute women for lesbianism. Indeed, French legal authority Pierre-François Muyart de Vouglans wrote in 1754 on lesbianism, "This crime, which derives its name from that abominable city, which is mentioned in Holy Scripture, is committed by a man with a man, or by a woman with a woman... The law... ordains that those who fall into this crime should be punished by being burned alive. This penalty which our jurisprudence has adopted, is equally applicable to women as to men."⁶²⁶ Crompton's article illuminates the differences between the homosexual history of men and women. The decriminalisation of homosexuality in 1791 liberated gay men more than lesbians but helped prevent legal persecution in the future.

In "Bourdet vs. Quentin de Villiers: Tribadism and Propriety in French Legal Discourse, 1783–1784," Jeffrey Merrick covers accusations of tribadism in the divorce proceedings of Jean Philbert Quentin de Champlost and Louise Bourdet. Champlost's lawyer used charges of tribadism in court and the press to slander Bourdet's name.⁶²⁷ There is no evidence to suggest this was a valid claim, but the fallout from the lawyer's accusation reveals attitudes about lesbianism leading up to the Revolution. The magistrates of the Grande Chambre suppressed the accusation "as contrary to good morals and public decency."⁶²⁸ The magistrates feared the discussion of her charges would accidentally endorse tribadism. Interestingly, the lawyer's accusation did not employ common beliefs about the enlarged clitoris or sexual segregation leading to sapphic activities.⁶²⁹ Merrick's article does not strictly relate to the French Revolution. However, it gives insight into the attitudes about homosexuality leading up to the revolution and how negative connotations were used to demonise all women, not just those who actively participated in homosexuality.

Literary studies dominate lesbian history.⁶³⁰ The French Revolution is no exception, especially for anglophone scholars.⁶³¹ Lesbian literature flourished in Britain and France throughout the eighteenth century.⁶³² A central question of lesbian literary studies is what gives a text its lesbianism. Is lesbianism found in the author, subject matter, or reader?⁶³³ The lesbian literary analysis of the French Revolution does not cover the lesbian reader as it is too difficult to trace readership during the 18th century. There is a

⁶²³ Louis Crompton, "The Myth of Lesbian Impunity: Capital Laws from 1270 to 1791," *Journal of Homosexuality* 6, no.1-2 (1981): 11.

⁶²⁴ *Ibid.*, 13.

⁶²⁵ *Ibid.*, 11-12.

⁶²⁶ *Ibid.*, 21.

⁶²⁷ Jeffrey Merrick, "Bourdet vs. Quentin de Villiers: Tribadism and Propriety in French Legal Discourse, 1783–1784," *Eighteenth-Century Studies* 52, no.3 (2019), 283.

⁶²⁸ *Ibid.*, 290.

⁶²⁹ *Ibid.*, 292.

⁶³⁰ Wilton, *Lesbian Studies: Setting an Agenda*, 110.

⁶³¹ Merrick and Ragan, *Homosexuality in Modern France*, 4.

⁶³² Caroline Gonda, "Writing Lesbian Desire in the Long 18th Century," in *The Cambridge Companion to Lesbian Literature*, ed. Jodie Medd (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 110.

⁶³³ Wilton, *Lesbian Studies: Setting an Agenda*, 133.

greater possibility of finding lesbian writers, but this subject has not been covered. Therefore, the lesbian literary analysis of 18th century France covers lesbian subject matter.

Caroline Gonda argues in "Writing Lesbian Desire in the Long 18th Century," that lesbian desire was a hot literary topic during the long eighteenth century. A novel would not have used labels like "sapphist" or "lesbian" as readily as satirical pamphlets, and its depiction of lesbian sex often reinforced that homosexual intercourse was unnatural.⁶³⁴ Still, eighteenth-century literature offered windows into an imagined world of "(im)possibilities."⁶³⁵ Gonda goes on to discuss that lesbianism did not only exist in the imagination of men or novels but was a genuine practice for the women of France. Bed-sharing was common in eighteenth-century France and likely led to many homosexual encounters between women. Gonda suggests that the spread of pornographic pamphlets helped spread sexual knowledge about homosexuality to women.

Susan Lanser dives into literary analysis in her article "Au Sein de Vos Pareilles: Sapphic Separatism in Late Eighteenth-Century France." Various books from the time suggested that tribades were members of secret societies which sought to overthrow male supremacy. The most famous text on secret female societies is *Confessions D'une Jeune Fille* from 1778. The book follows Mademoiselle de Raucourt as a member of an all-female community as she initiates a young girl, "Mademoiselle Sapho," into the anandrine sect through an elaborate initiation process.⁶³⁶ Lanser argues the revolutionary manifesto featured in *The Confession D'une Jeune Fille* reads like a lesbian feminist separatist social contract.⁶³⁷ The idea of tribades as a member of secret societies would be used to condemn women during the French Revolution.

Leading up to and during the French Revolution, many women were famous for their sapphic reputation with a varying degree of truth to it. Marie Antoinette is featured in almost every article discussing female homosexuality and the French Revolution. However, most historians make it clear that there is no definitive proof that Marie Antoinette ever engaged directly in homosexual behaviours. Instead, historians focus on how rumours of homosexuality demonise the Austrian queen or how her homosexual legacy has inspired generations of women-loving women. Marie Antoinette was aware of the rumours from the beginning, writing to her mother, the Empress Maria Theresa of Austria, "They have been liberal enough to accuse me of having a taste for both women and lovers."⁶³⁸ Hester Piozzi wrote in her diary, "The Queen of France is at the head of a set of monsters called by each other Sapphists."⁶³⁹ Whether this is true or not, Piozzi employing "sapphist" as an external identity is fascinating. After the brutal murder and mutilation of Princess de Lamballe during the September Massacres, a mob took her head on a bloody pike to where Marie Antoinette was staying, hoping they could force her to "kiss the lips of her intimate."⁶⁴⁰ Rumours of Marie Antoinette's homosexual behaviours were used to condemn her in the minds of the French public.

Elizabeth Colwill's "Pass as a Woman, Act Like a Man: Marie-Antoinette as Tribade in the Pornography of the French Revolution," in *Homosexuality in Modern France*, discusses the pamphlets that spread sapphic rumours about Marie Antoinette. Reports of her lesbian affairs began early with pornographic pamphlets showing Marie Antoinette with various partners and in multiple positions.⁶⁴¹ Lists of Marie Antoinette's rumoured lovers, female and male, filled French newspapers. The Princess de Lamballe and Comtesse de Polignac were most commonly associated with the queen and her sapphic

⁶³⁴ Gonda, "Writing Lesbian Desire in the Long 18th Century," 115.

⁶³⁵ Ibid., 117.

⁶³⁶ Susan Lanser, "Au Sein de Vos Pareilles' Sapphic Separatism in Late Eighteenth-Century France," *Journal of Homosexuality* 41, no.3-4 (2002): 107.

⁶³⁷ Ibid., 107.

⁶³⁸ Terry Castle, *The Apparitional Lesbian: Female Homosexuality and Modern Culture*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 128.

⁶³⁹ Gonda, "Writing Lesbian Desire in the Long 18th Century," 111.

⁶⁴⁰ Castle, *The Apparitional Lesbian*, 131.

⁶⁴¹ Elizabeth Colwill, "Pass as a Woman, Act like a Man," In *Homosexuality in Modern France*, ed. Jeffrey Merrick, and Bryant T. Ragan Jr., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 54.

activities.⁶⁴² Colwill argues that accusations of lesbianism were levelled at Marie Antoinette and many other noblewomen to weaken their power.

Terry Castle's book, *The Apparitional Lesbian*, contains a chapter on "Marie Antoinette Obsession." Castle's chapter focuses on Marie Antoinette as a literary figure in nineteenth and twentieth-century lesbian literature, arguing that "the homosexuality of Marie Antoinette is in fact a kind of communal topos in lesbian writing of the early twentieth century: a shared underground motif or commonplace." Castle describes various books that feature Marie Antoinette as a "potent ancestor spirit." Notably, Marie Antoinette was featured in what is considered the first lesbian novel, *The Well of Loneliness*. The "Marie Antoinette Obsession" ends with her being described "as a kind of lesbian Oscar Wilde: a rallying point for sentiment and collective emotional intransigence."⁶⁴³ Castle's chapter successfully argues whether the rumours of Marie Antoinette's lesbianism were true; her reputation has inspired generations of lesbian literature.

Mademoiselle de Raucourt, an actress at the Comedie de France, is the second most discussed lesbian after Marie Antoinette. Jeffery Merrick's chapter in *Homosexuality in Modern France* opens with a quote from *Memoires Secrets* in 1784, "Tribadism has always been in vogue among women, like pederasty among men, but these vices, have never been flaunted with as much scandal and show as today."⁶⁴⁴ Long before the revolution, Mademoiselle de Raucourt's reputation was notorious among the people of Paris.⁶⁴⁵ Raucourt was known for dressing in men's clothes and made no secret of her relationship with women.⁶⁴⁶ She was best known for playing queens on stage and would soon be a favourite of Marie Antoinette. Raucourt's name appeared frequently on the various lists of Marie Antoinette's lovers.⁶⁴⁷ The actress did not support the revolution. Her earlier work would confirm royalist sympathies, and she would be later imprisoned during the Revolution.⁶⁴⁸ Raucourt's unapologetic tribadism showed that one could live a life of sapphic pleasure in late eighteenth-century France, but not without scandal.

Through analysing shifting attitudes towards lesbianism, investigating the legal ramifications of homosexuality, studying novels and pamphlets from the time, and profiling those accused of tribadism, historians have uncovered a rich history of lesbianism before and during the French Revolution. Lesbianism is not a creation of the modern world but a subject with a long history surrounding it. Whether it is a history of men's fantasies or a genuine lesbian relationship, lesbianism has always existed in some form or another.

⁶⁴² Castle, *The Apparitional Lesbian*, 127.

⁶⁴³ Castle, *The Apparitional Lesbian*, 149.

⁶⁴⁴ Merrick, "The Marquis de Villette and Mademoiselle de Raucourt: Representations of Male and Female Sexual Deviance in Late Eighteenth-century France," in *Homosexuality in Modern France*. ed. Jeffrey Merrick, and Bryant T. Ragan Jr., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 30.

⁶⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 41.

⁶⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 43.

⁶⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 44.

⁶⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 45.

Bibliography

- Castle, Terry. *The Apparitional Lesbian: Female Homosexuality and Modern Culture*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993.
- Colwill, Elizabeth. "Pass as a Woman, Act like a Man." in *Homosexuality in Modern France*, edited by Jeffrey Merrick, and Bryant T. Ragan Jr., 54-73 Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.
- Crompton, Louis. "The Myth of Lesbian Impunity: Capital Laws from 1270 to 1791." *Journal of Homosexuality* 6, no.1-2 (1981): 11-25.
- Freccero, Carla. "The Queer Time of Lesbian Literature" in *The Cambridge Companion to Lesbian Literature*, Edited by Jodie Medd, 19-31. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.
- Gonda, Caroline. "Writing Lesbian Desire in the Long 18th Century." in *The Cambridge Companion to Lesbian Literature*, edited by Jodie Medd, 54-73. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.
- Lanser, Susan. "Au Sein de Vos Pareilles' Sapphic Separatism in Late Eighteenth-Century France." *Journal of Homosexuality* 41, no.3-4 (2001): 105-116.
- Lanser, Susan S. *The Sexuality of History: Modernity and the Sapphic, 1565-1830*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014.
- Merrick, Jeffrey. "Bourdet vs. Quentin de Villiers: Tribadism and Propriety in French Legal Discourse, 1783–1784." *Eighteenth-Century Studies* 52, no.3 (2019): 281-297.
- Merrick, Jeffrey. "The Marquis de Villette and Mademoiselle de Raucourt: Representation of Male and Female Sexual Deviance in Late Eighteenth-century France," in *Homosexuality in Modern France*, edited by Jeffrey Merrick, and Bryant T. Ragan Jr., 30-53. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.
- Merrick, Jeffrey, and Bryant T. Ragan Jr. *Homosexuality in Modern France*. Edited by Bryant T. Ragan and Jeffrey Merrick. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.
- Ragan, Bryant T. "The Enlightenment Confronts Homosexuality." In *Homosexuality in Modern France*, edited by Jeffrey Merrick and Bryant T. Ragan Jr., 8-29. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.
- Wilton, Tamsin. *Lesbian Studies: Setting an Agenda*. New York: Routledge, 2002.

FEATURING

VANESSA AASE | JAMES COE | CHARLOTTE CONN
DANIEL DAVENPORT | PATRICK FERREIRA
SAMUEL HOLLAND | MATTHEW KERR | ANIKA LUTEIJN
BRAELYN MCKIM | MEGHAN MCQUAY | KIRI H. POWELL
NICHOLAS RABNETT | ALLISON WHEELER