CONTENTS

EDITORIAL

01 Editor's Note
   Sophia Anderson, Alec Lazenby, Charlotte Clar

02 Chair's Message
   Dr. Jason Colby

03 Author Biographies

ARTICLES

05 Islamist Discontent in the Sadat Years: Considering the Structures of Anti-Sadat Islamist Thought
   Hamza Badsha

15 From Destruction to Deliverance: Shifting Allied Policies for the Occupation of Germany 1944-1955
   Jonah Burkart

25 The North British Society of Halifax, Nova Scotia And the Social Dominance of Imperial Scottishness
   Matthew Downey

35 Nuns in the Kitchen: Conventual Cuisine in Colonial Latin America
   Pascale Halliday

44 Gender Troubled: European Masculinity and Kaúxuma nútika on the Columbia Plateau
   Mira Harvey

54 More than a Fur Trading Post: Agricultural Development at Fort Victoria, 1846
   Collin Rennie

63 The Liberation of Greece from Ottoman Rule: Nationalism's Role in the Greek War of Independence
   Molly Rothwell

75 Victim or Vixen? Ambiguity and The Portrayal of Prostitution and The "New Woman" in The Films of G.W. Pabst
   Marley Sterner
EDITOR'S NOTE

The University of Victoria stands on the unceded and unsurrendered land of the Lekwungen peoples as well as the WSÁNEĆ, Esquimalt and Songhees people, whose relationships to the land are both historic and continuing. A large portion of the work presented in this journal was conducted on these same lands. We invite readers to remember and reflect upon the ongoing processes of settler-colonialism that exist within academia, and in particular the historical discipline, as you read this journal.

As part of our commitment to be consciously anti-racist in our work we, along with several other undergraduate journals at UVic led by On Politics, have sought to centre non-traditional narratives of history through our chosen selections. These papers feature a diverse range of accounts outside of the all too prevalent histories of Western white cis-gendered males, while also upholding the goal of the journal to publish the best scholarship produced by UVic History undergraduates.

We also want to extend our heartfelt thanks to the many people who have helped us create this edition of the journal. The final product of a project of this magnitude relies on the work and dedication of many members of the UVic History community. Thank you to every student who submitted a paper for consideration. Thank you to our peer reviewers and our editors, Wren Shaman, Tylor Mathers, Susanna Fong, Jordan Strate, and Ireland Good. Additionally, we would like to thank our professor advisors, Drs. Martin Bunton, Peter Cook and Mitchell Hammond, as well as Dr. Jason Colby, the Chair of the History Department, who has provided the opening statement to this edition of the journal.

We have immensely enjoyed the process of creating this edition of The Ascendant Historian, and we hope that you will get as much enjoyment out of reading it as we did in putting it together.

Sophia Anderson, Alec Lazenby, Charlotte Clar

CHAIR’S MESSAGE

It is my great pleasure to introduce this issue of the History Department’s undergraduate research journal, The Ascendant Historian. This longstanding publication (formerly named The Corvette) is an expression of the vibrant scholarship and tightknit community that undergraduate history students have consistently cultivated at the University of Victoria. Indeed, the energy and enthusiasm of our students play a major role in making the UVic History Department such a wonderful place to work, for faculty and staff alike. Over the past lonely year, we have badly missed seeing you in our classrooms and the halls of Clearihue. In that time span, I think we have all learned a hard truth: It is one thing to study history; it is quite another to live through historic times.

The past year was indeed extraordinary. It witnessed the spread of a frightening and disruptive pandemic as well as a range of climatic shocks and weather anomalies. But it also brought massive and inspiring mobilizations for racial and social justice as well as struggles to protect and extend democracy. In this context, what makes me particularly proud is how our students, through their learning, actions, and scholarship, have engaged deeply with the questions and issues that are reshaping our world. And that engagement is particularly in evidence in the work published here.

In this volume, we have a marvelous representation of the range of research undertaken by our history students. Topics include food culture in the convents of colonial Latin America, gendered aspects of colonial encounters on the Columbian Plateau, Islamist resistance in Sadat’s Egypt, and portrayals of women in the films of G.W. Pabst, among many others. This variety highlights not only the range of courses available in our program but also the passion and creativity that drives our students to explore their own research questions. You have done wonderful work, and it shows in the pages that follow.

On behalf of my colleagues, I salute the authors for their original research and compelling arguments, as well as the editors and peer reviewers, for all the work that went into publishing this journal.

Congratulations to everyone who made this issue of The Ascendant Historian possible.

Jason Colby, Department Chair, 2020-
Hamza Badsha is a fifth-year History student with a minor in Business in his final semester. His areas of interest include Indian Muslim history, broader Islamic religious history and theology, and all things South Asia. His most fond aspect of life at UVic outside of academics has been volunteering with UVic’s World University Services Canada (WUSC) local student committee.

Jonah Burkart is a fourth year History student also pursuing minors in both Business and Anthropology. During his second year at UVic he participated in an international exchange opportunity where he traveled to Singapore and studied at the National University of Singapore. Jonah is particularly passionate in the subjects of late stage imperialism and the First World War, and would like to someday get involved in the archeology of the First World War in Europe. Jonah is an avid surfer and tries to enjoy the natural wonder of Vancouver Island to the fullest.

Matthew Downey is an Honours History student at UVIC with a minor in Political Science. He is currently in his last year of his bachelor’s degree and is planning on pursuing further graduate studies at the masters and doctorate level. His main area of interest is British imperial history during the Victorian and Edwardian eras, with a focus on foreign policy.

Pascale Halliday is from Whitehorse, Yukon and is currently in her fourth year of study. A student in the History Honours program, Pascale is writing her thesis on the use of autopsy in early modern England. She is also a co-host of the Klondike Gold Rush History podcast. Pascale once won tickets to a monster truck rally at a trivia night and it remains her greatest accomplishment.

Mira Harvey is a third year History and Greek & Roman Studies major, and a settler originally from Treaty 6 territory, Saskatoon, Saskatchewan. They are interested in trans and queer histories, and early colonial history from the prairies and West coast of Turtle Island. In the other half of their degree, they study Greek prehistory and archeology. They plan to pursue graduate studies in library science and archives, with hopes to decolonize institutions in possession of Indigenous knowledge and material culture. In their spare time, they like to cook dinner for their roommate, try Victoria craft beer, and go canoeing.

Collin Rennie is a History and Environmental Studies student at the University of Victoria. Specializing in North American history, his fields of interest include the political and environmental history of the Pacific Northwest, as well as indigenous-settler relations within the region. Notable topics he has written about include the development of hydroelectric dams in British Columbia, the provinces land question, and the development of Fort Victoria. Upon completing his undergraduate degree, Collin is eager to spend some time working outdoors before returning to school to pursue a MA in Public History.

Molly Rothwell is a fourth-year student at the University of Victoria and is planning to graduate with a double major in English and History. Molly’s interests include Romantic literature and British history. Molly currently works as a research assistant for The Map of Early Modern London (MoEML). After graduation, Molly hopes to pursue a master’s degree in Library and Information Studies.

Marley Sterner is pursuing a Creative Writing Major and History Minor finishing her final year at the University of Victoria. Her passion for telling stories about the extraordinary experiences of ordinary people in the early to mid-20th century influences much of her writing. Marley is a commissioned playwright for Calgary’s Heritage Park Historical Village, and currently works in the film and television industry in Victoria. After graduating, she plans to continue pursuing a career in writing for television and with a desire to bring more historical stories to life on-screen.
Islamist Discontent in the Sadat Years: Considering the Structures of Anti-Sadat Islamist Thought

Hamza Badsha

This paper will consider the growing Islamist opposition to Anwar Sadat’s presidency in Egypt in the 1970s. It will explore the tenets for what became an extreme dimension of Islamism in the form of groups like Takfir wal-Hijrah and Egyptian Jihad, the latter being the organization of Sadat’s assassin Khalid Islambouli. This is done by tracing the ideological and social trajectories of Islamism in the country, and this paper engages with the thought of figures like Abd-as-Salam Faraj and Sayyid Qutb along with commentaries on their social and theological influence. Sadat’s own public comportment, policies like his Infitah (open door), and the accompanying sociological changes and economic malaise prompted a turn to Islamism and its potent ideological aspects by a disillusioned youth. In considering the interplay between ideology, structural realities, and Sadat’s government’s policies, this paper will demonstrate how the pervasive anti-Sadat sentiment from a crucial part of Egyptian society was realized.

Anwar Al-Sadat’s presidency marked a continuation of the Free Officers’ hegemony over Egyptian politics established by Gamal Abdel Nasser. Sadat’s presidency was marked by efforts to confirm his legitimacy as leader in the wake of Nasser’s death, the latter being the organization of Sadat’s assassin Khalid Islambouli. This is done by tracing the ideological and social trajectories of Islamism in the country, and this paper engages with the thought of figures like Abd-as-Salam Faraj and Sayyid Qutb along with commentaries on their social and theological influence. Sadat’s own public comportment, policies like his Infitah (open door), and the accompanying sociological changes and economic malaise prompted a turn to Islamism and its potent ideological aspects by a disillusioned youth. In considering the interplay between ideology, structural realities, and Sadat’s government’s policies, this paper will demonstrate how the pervasive anti-Sadat sentiment from a crucial part of Egyptian society was realized.

Sadat endeavoured to reintegrate Egypt into the world economy through his open-door *Infitah* policy and to secure Egypt’s foreign policy interests by pursuing a rapprochement with Israel. The Islamist movement that grew during the Sadat era, however, would prove substantial in fomenting dissent against Sadat’s policies, regime, and system of government. Lieutenant Khalid Islambouli, a member of the militant Egyptian Jihad Islamist group, assassinated Sadat on October 6, 1981. Many suggested his assassination was due to the unpopular Camp David Accords signed in 1979, which was seen as a betrayal of Arab solidarity. This foreign policy decision was undoubtedly a factor that exacerbated anti-Sadat sentiments, but the reasons for the fervent anti-Sadat currents go beyond his foreign policy decisions.

This paper will focus on the domestic conditions in Egypt that made Sadat and his regime increasingly unpopular with Islamist sections of Egyptian society. It will explore the growth of Islamist influence vis a vis domestic political, economic, and social conditions and the ideological and theological stances of key Islamist figures like Sayyid Qutb and Abd-al-Salam Faraj. In considering these points, this paper will demonstrate how Islamist dissidents gained substantial influence and posed a credible threat to Sadat’s regime. This paper argues that domestic structures and conditions in Egypt were significant enough to induce anti-Sadat Islamist activity and that foreign policy was not the sole feature around which Sadat’s Islamist detractors mobilized.

Mohamed Heikal, long-time editor-in-chief of the government-owned newspaper Al-Ahram, recalls Sadat’s personal conduct, as exhibited to the wider Egyptian populace, as the reason for his inadvertent emboldening of Islamic fundamentalism. According to Heikal, Sadat grew increasingly self-important when assuming a public religious guise. Both abroad and in Egypt, Sadat would borrow from Islamic language used to describe God, projecting the image of ‘the pious President’ whose directives were tempered by mercy, to the chagrin of “those who recognize mercy as God’s prerogative.” Heikal mentions that Sadat would paraphrase verses from the Quran to bolster his religious public persona. Reflecting on Sadat’s legacy in the early years after his death, Heikal states that Sadat, probably seeking to dismantle Nasser’s legacy, which had the potential to undermine his presidency, “divided Egypt against itself.” He outlines how Sadat compromised Egypt’s long-standing nationalism, which had existed since the early 19th century during Muhammad Ali’s reign, by utilizing religiosity in a bid to undermine his political opponents and detractors. Sadat adopted a devout persona to reach these ends while attempting to foster interreligious harmony between Muslims, Copts, and Jews.

As such, his efforts to propagandize religion to bolster his public image and political legitimacy among fundamentalist and militant Islamists, as his efforts at intercommunal harmony would have been irreconcilable with Islamist dogma. It is with this knowledge that we can understand Heikal’s remark that “It is not surprising that the freedom with which he used the term ‘atheist’ to abuse his political opponents should have encouraged others to apply the same term to himself.” Sadat normalized the use of religiosity to bolster political legitimacy, exposing the wider populace to a culture that in turn allowed Islamist trends to undermine his legitimacy as they called into question Sadat’s religiosity. Such ill-informed religious embellishment of his persona would have alienated Sadat from the broader religious populace of a majority Sunni country like Egypt.

Nazih Ayubi writes of how Sadat’s economic policy of *Infitah* brought about social conditions that exacerbated Islamist frustration. The Egyptian government under Sadat had sponsored and supported religious groups on university campuses in the hopes that they would neutralize leftist and Nasserite detractors. As Ayubi points out, however, Sadat’s use of the “religious weapon”—referring to Sadat’s instrumentaliza-
tion of religion to bolster political legitimacy—had emboldened Islamist student groups to the point where they harassed other groups on university campuses.5 This happened while Sadat remained ignorant of the growing disconnect between his religiously emboldened public persona and the growing Islamist trends on university campuses. Ayubi describes how young militant Islamists were enraged by the proliferation of nightclubs, bars, and other sites frequented by wealthy foreigners where activities counter to traditional Islamic norms of propriety occurred.6 Sadat’s conspicuous religiosity was not enough to satiate the religious youth as it “could not camouflage the economic crisis and the lack of jobs, the self-indulgent consumerism and unabashed corruption, and the [supposedly] uncritical subservience to the Israelis and the Americans.”7

Moshe Albo and Yoram Meital write about the Grand Imam of Al-Azhar Abd al-Halim Mahmud’s criticisms of Infitah. Mahmud articulated his concern over the growing influence of Western morals and values that threatened to replace traditional Egyptian Islamic morals in society. Mahmud wrote of Sadat’s complicity in the spread of a culture that, in his view, saw the rise of immodesty through cinema and was antithetical to traditional Egyptian society:

I have repeatedly argued that the president was the one who publicly declared his commitment to the general principle - the principle of faith, but he doesn’t keep close tabs on the implementation of these principles. Today, there is no social leader that can promulgate what these principles are and then spend his time meticulously tracking and inciting them among the citizens and the institutions that are bound to the Islamic faith.8

Albo and Meital note that Mahmud expressed concern over how Infitah required Egypt to cooperate economically with North America and Europe, consistent with Ayubi’s observation that Sadat’s policies required Egyptian deference to foreign interests. While Al-Azhar was fundamentally separate from the Islamist movement theologically and politically, Mahmud’s concerns over the apparent erosion of Islamic Egyptian society brought about by Infitah reinforces the notion that Sadat’s regime and policies alienated the religiously inclined. If the Grand Imam of Al-Azhar, Egypt’s foremost religious authority, and someone Sadat relied on for religious legitimacy, was critical of Infitah’s cultural impact, then we can understand how these societal changes could be extremely incendiary to militant Islamists. Mahmud “asserted that the adoption of materialistic and capitalist values by modern Egyptian society was responsible for the decline in the religious education system’s public standing.”9 These observations speak to the growing influence that Islamist groups potentially secured over religious youth due to Sadat’s regime alienating them economically whilst undermining traditional Islamic norms and, therefore, the conventional Islamic establishment. Young militant Islamists would not find Azhari modes of education appealing and would instead turn to more radical forms of religious organization.

While Abd al-Halim Mahmud was critical of policies like Infitah for their supposed undermining of Islamic values, he was also part of an established religious authority that served to reinforce Sadat’s political ends. The Grand Imam denounced the anti-government demonstrations in the 1977 riots, which were a response to government-cut subsidies to staple items like rice and oil.10 The complementary relationship between the formal religious establishment and Sadat’s regime furthered the disconnect between the masses and establishment figures like Mahmud, as evidenced by his unwillingness to criticize a widely unpopular move by Sadat. Gabriel Warburg writes of Sadat’s religiously motivated opportunism, stating:

Once religion became a legitimate political force in service of the regime it was not long before these same groups exploited religion in order to criticize and even attack Sadat’s own policies. This was especially true in the universities where the Islamic student groups, Sadat’s erstwhile allies, became his most vocal opponents.11

Mahmud and his implicit criticism of policies like Infitah—done through denouncing the emerging, supposedly un-Islamic Egyptian zeitgeist that emerged during the Sadat years—provided a position for Islamist and extremist opposition groups to incorporate into their criticism of Sadat’s regime. While simultaneously adopting a pro-government stance, figures like Mahmud ensured that the orthodox religious establishment did not invite institutional and religious currents which were critical of the government. These currents would then turn to the more radical, Islamist sphere in a political culture that questioned the religiosity of a group to undermine their political legitimacy, something Sadat himself partook in.

The March 21, 1980 plebiscite that introduced changes to the constitution determining sharia to be “the basis for legislation” was another significant move that contributed to an increasing atmosphere of religious extremism.12 The plebiscite saw some judges favour sharia over the application of civil law, with Speaker of Parliament Sufi Abu Talib recommending that sharia-influenced legislation be applied to Muslims and non-Muslims alike.13 Religious forces, having gained in-

6 Ibid., 75.
7 Ibid., 76.
11 Ibid.
12 Heikal, Autumn of Fury, 214.
13 Ibid., 216.
fluence in various levels of the bureaucracy and military, wanted to affirm Islam’s codified place in Egyptian politics. This led to increasing resentment within the Coptic community. Militant youths from the Jama’at al-Islamiya (collective Islamist society), according to Heikal, saw in their perception of “religion as the basis of the state” the right to call for the second-class status of Jews and Copts and adhere to fatwa from militant shuyukh that sanctioned crimes against these communities. Such a trend of affixing religion to politics would culminate in events like the communal riot of June 10, 1981 in Zawaya el-Hamra, which left ten dead. Heikal states that “This incident was symptomatic of a dangerous polarization which was taking place.” Religious extremism had entered the arena of Egyptian politics due to Sadat’s attempts to bolster his and his government’s legitimacy by using religion.

Abdullah Al-Arian notes that Sadat failed to manipulate Muslim Brotherhood members whom he had released from prison to serve his agenda, with leader Umar Tilimsani rejecting his offer to register the Brotherhood with the Ministry of Social Affairs. The Brotherhood periodical Al-Da’wa resumed publication in 1976 and by 1980 had become a great source of anxiety for Sadat. Da’wa had consistently opposed many of Sadat’s policies throughout the 1970s, and Arian argues that the 1980 Law of Shame was meant to address student and Islamist forms of dissent, both of which had Brotherhood presences. Sadat, in his last address to parliament, refuted Da’wa’s criticisms against him before ordering the infamous September 3, 1981 raid that saw thousands of political opponents, critics, Islamists, and religious leaders jailed. Sadat’s anxiety regarding the Brotherhood’s growing influence via Al-Da’wa was an indicator of how much the Islamist movement had grown during his presidency, with radicals like Omar Abd-al-Rahman emboldened to the point of issuing a fatwa for Sadat’s assassination, and Faraj and Islambouli organizing it.

Jeffrey Kenney identifies the radical militant Islamists responsible for Sadat’s assassination as approximating Kharjities, adopting Islamic nomenclature referring to rebels who assassinated the fourth Caliph Ali bin Abu Talib during the first Fitnah (civil strife) in the medieval Islamic period. Kenney likens groups like Egyptian Jihad, the group directly responsible for Sadat’s assassination by Khaled Islambouli, and Takfir wal-Hijra to these early Muslim rebels who sought to dethrone a legitimate ruler. Even though the Muslim Brotherhood in large part denounced violent action against Sadat, it is useful to situate the politico-religious prerogatives of groups like Jihad and Takfir in the broader context of growing Islamism under Sadat, of which the Brotherhood is a part. Groups like Jihad and Takfir represented the extreme end of Islamist sentiment, markedly violent in their outlook when compared to groups like the Brotherhood. This growing current of Islamism had its roots in Nasser’s era. Prior to his execution in 1966, Muslim Brotherhood leader Sayyid Qutb was also the organization’s chief ideologue. Qutb was wary of bringing into his Quranic exegesis the idea of the Kharjities, excluding them from the interpretation of a verse that would typically implicate them as recalcitrant unbelievers in the normative Sunni tradition. The verse in question is as follows: “Whose judges not according to what God has sent down— they are the unbelievers.” Kenney suggests that Qutb instead chose to interpret this in a manner that criticized contemporary Egyptian leadership on the basis of their supposed jahiliyya (ignorance or un-Islamic conduct), eschewing any ideological connection with Kharjities. Qutb’s refusal to acknowledge the seditious history of Kharjities while using the verse to criticize the legitimate rulers who Kharjities would typically target marked a development in Islamist theology that framed the ruling political establishment as an antagonistic object. Qutb’s theological outlook shines a light on emerging Islamist modes of thought that considered Egypt’s political establishment to be illegitimate and in need of removal.

Kenney writes of the ideological schism within the Brotherhood caused by the ‘prison debates’ following the 1965 suppression of Brotherhood individuals including Qutb. While imprisoned, Brotherhood member Hasan Ismail al-Hudaybi argued for moderation within the Brotherhood, as their extremism led to the government crackdown in 1965. Hudaybi opposed the militant branch’s tactic of pronouncing takfir (status of unbeliever) on the government figures they were critical of. His 1969 Propagandists...Not Judges refuted Qutb’s treatise Milestones Along the Way in which Qutb outlined his critique of the government. Hudaybi had reformist intentions in acknowledging Kharjiti trends in the Brotherhood, and his critiques of key Brotherhood figures like Qutb and admission of the organization’s extremism point to the very real militant Islamist trends developing in the Brotherhood. Hamied Ansari mentions “There is documentary evidence that some of the Tanzim (umbrella term referring to openly avowed militant Islamists like Takfir and Jihad) members at one time had close connections with the Muslim Brotherhood.” Ansari states that Ahmed Shukri Mustafa, the leader of Takfir, belonged to the young militant offshoot of the Brotherhood in which Qutb’s ideas of opposing a government based on jahiliyya took root. We see a direct genealogy from Qutb’s ideological contributions to the Brotherhood and the emergence of smaller but significant militant groups like

14 Heikal, Autumn of Fury, 217.
15 Ibid., 221.
16 Ibid., 222.
17 Ibid.
19 Ibid., 174.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid., 121.
23 Ibid., 121, 123.
Takfir. In 1977, Takfir kidnapped and murdered Sheikh Hussein al-Dhahabi. Al-Dhahabi refuted their tactic of pronouncing takfir and ihabiliyya against political leadership in his 1976 publication Deviant Trends in the Interpretation of the Quran and the Azhari booklet Firebrands from the Divine Guidance of Islam. Takfir exhibited the growing modus of Kharjite (to use Kenney’s terminology) militant Islamism during Sadat’s era. This current posed a real threat as evidenced by the assassination of minister al-Dhahabi. Egyptian Jihad’s chief ideologue Abd-al-Salam Faraj represented another iteration of this tangible and acute extremism that was becoming a feature of certain Islamist groups. Faraj authored The Neglected Duty, a call for Muslims to wage jihad against contemporary Muslim leaders whom he considered apostates.

This was despite the fact that he belonged to the Brotherhood offshoot that sought “to demonstrate their moderation to President Sadat and strike a modus vivendi with the regime.” Nonetheless, Faraj’s extremist ideology found expression when he successfully coordinated Sadat’s assassination by directing Islamouli’s operation.

Examining Islamist groups in terms of their demography helps to understand how they grew in influence. Uri M. Kupferschmidt mentions that along with the culture shock and socio-economic hardship that rural migrants experienced in urban centers like Cairo, they made concerted efforts to learn more about religion. As such, Islamic societies by the 1970s opened centers of instruction in religion to cater to these rural migrants. Kupferschmidt suggests that fundamentalist organizations like the Muslim Brotherhood, the majority of whose members were educated, literate, and urban, could influence this incoming demographic and, in doing so, open them up to “the influence of representatives of underground militant cells.” We can consider this, along with Warburg’s observations in which he identifies the strong centralizing tendencies of Nasser’s and Sadat’s regimes, as preventing any economic or social basis of mobilization from emerging in rural Egypt. Warburg notes that religion remained “the only meaningful unit in Egyptian villages.” Like the urban lower classes, rural denizens did not respond to “the religious establishment [which] had lost the remnants of its economic independence while its credibility had been further undermined [making it] a servile part of the feared, but remote, center.” The Muslim Brotherhood was a viable alter-native for lower-class and rural Egyptians to receive religious instruction, providing a fundamentalist and potentially Islamist theology that was accessible to the masses.

Hamied Ansari points out Colonel Abdub al-Zomor’s and lieutenant Khalid Islamouli’s rural origins and draws the link between rural elites and militant Islamists. The Zomor family were part of the rural elite that Sadat’s regime tried to appease in order to cement their legitimacy in the countryside. This was also a way to roll back Nasser’s influence as the Zomors had been targeted in 1966 by the Higher Committee for the Liquidation of Feudalism for land sequestration. The state-funded Zomor’s mother’s hajj contributed five thousand pounds to Abdub’s cousin Tariq’s mosque. This is one example of Sadat’s repeated appeasement of Islamist groups to offset opposition from leftists and Nasserites who were deemed a greater threat to the regime. While not the foremost feature of their activism, militant Islamists like Egypt’s rural population were significant enough to influence people like Islamouli and Zomor, the two most instrumental figures in Sadat’s assassination and proof that Islamist influence could enter even the military institution. Kupferschmidt mentions “rising educational standards” accompanying the increased reception of fundamentalist ideology in villages. He also points out how improved communications and educational infrastructure in small towns like Tan-ta, Abu Tig, and Luxor contributed to the dissemination of Islamist ideas to an increasingly literate rural populace.

Education as a driving factor towards Islamism can be observed by looking at Tanzim demographics, with students and professionals comprising 56.4% of the membership while 87.5% were aged thirty or younger. From the analyses considered, we see the cultural impact that Sadat’s national policy of Infitah had on Egyptian society. Only those with connections to Sadat’s establishment had reasonable opportunity to achieve economic prosperity. A young segment of the population alienated from economic prosperity saw a concomitant rise in social conditions antithetical (in their view) to Islamic morals and norms. Sadat’s openly professed religiosity was irreconcilable to militant Islamists, who saw his regime’s tolerance of Western immorality and collusion with Western powers as responsible for Egypt’s economic and social malaise. Sadat’s attempts to co-opt the religious establishment’s authority in order to legitimize his rule was ineffective and only undermined the traditional institutional credibility of religious schools like Al-Azhar. Even Grand Imam Mahmud could not co-sign everything Sadat’s regime enacted, and this incomplete alliance of views is an indicator of the cynicism and resentment young militants could feel. Qubb’s and Faraj’s ideological and theological stances give us an understanding of the express goals of militant Islamist movements. They constructed their ontological view of what Egypt should look like based on Islamist theology. The significance of such ideological trends can be found

26 Kenney, Muslim Rebels, 130.
27 Ibid., 127.
28 Ibid., 135.
29 Ansari, “The Islamic Militants,” 135.
31 Ibid., 409.
32 Ibid.
33 Warburg, “Islam and Politics in Egypt,” 134. ‘Unit’ here is employed in a socio-political sense, referring to an identity marker with a commonality amongst rural denizens around which they could mobilize.
in that those who subscribed to them were moved to violent action against political figures like Dhahabi and Sadat. Conditions of modernity gave educated Islamists such as the Muslim Brotherhood exposure to increasingly literate Egyptians. Sadat’s enabling of religious fundamentalism to assert his legitimacy in the face of Leftist and Nasserite detractors would push young militants towards the radicalizing trends that ultimately denounced him. Therefore, the reasons for militant anti-Sadat Islamist movements go beyond foreign policy and can be considered in a separate domestic context. All of the factors observed give credence to the notion that Egypt was rife with internal and domestic conditions that begot such a fervent, radical anti-Sadat Islamist opposition. It was the ideological potency of Islamist groups, Sadat’s policies as they related to the nation, and changing social conditions that indicate that Islamist extremist activity was deeply rooted in conditions endemic to Egypt.

Bibliography


In the wake of the Second World War the nations of the world wished to tear down and destroy Germany and its industrial capacity, dividing the nation up and imposing harsh policies upon it in an attempt to ‘denazify’ the country and to prevent it from ever achieving power again. Due to the destructive nature of these policies and rising tensions during the Cold War, Allied policy shifted to recovery and rehabilitation. By examining the division of Germany and the policies both proposed and imposed by the Allies, this paper seeks to examine the shift in Western Allied occupation policy from the demilitarization and denazification of Germany to policies of support and partnership. Moreover, the paper looks to analyze the extent to which harsh Western Allied occupation policies forced the Allies to eventually turn back on those policies and support the German economy to undo the damage which they had caused.

After the conclusion of the Second World War and the defeat of Nazi Germany, Europe was left ravaged and war-torn, struggling with economic collapse, while trying to come to terms with what had occurred. The Nazi Party left behind a horrific legacy of tyranny and genocide, and the rest of the world was determined to exact retribution for the destruction which Hitler’s war had caused. One of the key Allied occupation policies rested on the denazification of Europe. In the context of postwar Europe, denazification meant not only the erasure of Nazi ideologies, but taking judicial action against former Nazi Party members and removing anyone associated with the Party from civil service positions, dividing Germany, and crippling its economy to ensure that Germany could never make war again. The former Nazi state was split into four zones of occupation, each administered by one of the victorious Allies: Britain, France, the USA, and the USSR. In the immediate aftermath of the war, the major Allied goals in Europe were the denazification of Germany, the insurance of reparations for the losses the Allied nations had suffered, and the disarmament and disruption of German military and industrial capacity. These goals were achieved through punitive economic policies that were intended to ensure that Germany would never be able to rise to its former power again. Alongside punitive economic policies, the Allies committed to judicial efforts including large scale internment and collaboration trials to ensure that all Nazi leaders and former Nazi Party supporters were properly punished. The destructive and draconian nature of these policies took their toll on Germany, and the country slipped further towards starvation and destitution. At this point, the Western Allies were forced to adopt more supportive policies towards their occupied zones, thus they began to shift away from punishment and towards recovery and rehabilitation. This shift was also necessitated by the looming threat of the Cold War, which solidified simmering tensions between the Western Allies (Britain, France, and the USA) and the Soviet Union. The Western Allies recognized that a divided and crippled Germany was in danger of falling under communist influence, therefore their policies shifted towards cooperation between West Germany and the rest of Europe, eventually leading to European unification. In the 1950s, under Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, Germany ended its programs of denazification and began to rearm, which was supported by the Western Allies. This paper will examine the shift in Allied occupation policy in West Germany from its initial policies of demilitarization and denazification to ones of rearmament and economic revitalization and partnership. In doing so, this paper seeks to analyze the extent to which stringent Western Allied occupation policies in the immediate postwar period forced them to eventually turn back on those policies and support the German economy to undo the damage which it had caused. Even before the official Nazi surrender on May 8, 1945, Allied plans were already in place for the dismemberment of the former Nazi state. Much like the Versailles Treaty of 1919, initial Allied plans looked to eliminate German capacity for industrialization and rearmament; thereby disabling the shattered German economy completely. One such plan was put forth in 1944 by American Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Morgenthau. Morgenthau proposed an especially punitive occupation policy which aimed to destroy German military and industrial capacity, essentially returning Germany to an agrarian state.¹ The proposed plan followed five major points. First, the immediate demilitarization of Germany and destruction of key military industries; second, the partitioning of Germany between the victors and the division of smaller autonomous German states; third, the stripping of the Ruhr Valley and complete destruction of its mines and factories; fourth, restitution and reparations through the return of taken German territory and property, the transfer of German industrial equipment stripped from the Ruhr Valley to other devastated countries, and the use of forced German labour in other surrounding countries; and fifth, intellectual reform affected by shutting down all schools and universities as well as all media outlets such as newspapers and radio until an appropriate program can be put in place.² Although many wanted to punish Germany for the crimes of the Nazis, this plan was met with shock and opposition by most other occupation planners as they foresaw the economic consequences of the plan and its disastrous repercussions for the rest of Europe. Germany ended its programs of denazification and began to rearm, which was supported by the Western Allies. This paper will examine the shift in Allied occupation policy in West Germany from its initial policies of demilitarization and denazification to ones of rearmament and economic revitalization and partnership. In doing so, this paper seeks to analyze the extent to which stringent Western Allied occupation policies in the immediate postwar period forced them to eventually turn back on those policies and support the German economy to undo the damage which it had caused.

many was an important producer of many resources including coal and bauxite, and the country was a significant exporter of industrial goods. This meant that destroying the German economy also meant harming the economies of other European countries. Even Winston Churchill, who had originally approved the Morgenthau Plan, expressed his objections on the grounds of how the policy would affect the people:

“If our treatment of Germany’s internal economy is such as to leave eighty million people virtually starving, are we to sit still and say, ‘It serves you right,’ or will we be required to keep them alive? If so, who is going to pay for that? . . . If you have a horse and you want him to pull the wagon you have to provide him with a certain amount of corn—or at least hay.”

Although the Morgenthau Plan was never adopted, it did guide US policy within Germany until around 1947, with the adoption of the Marshall Plan. On May 10, 1945, President Truman approved JCS1067, a policy created by the Joint Chiefs of Staff which directed the American forces occupying Germany to “Take no steps (a) looking toward the economic rehabilitation of Germany, or (b) designed to maintain or strengthen the German economy.” Similarly, a plan developed by Jean Monnet was put forward in 1945 and adopted by the French President, Charles de Gaulle, in 1946. The plan aimed to modernize and resuscitate the French economy, and by using cheap German prison labor, along with harvesting the region’s coal and coke, the French planned to use their occupation zone essentially as an economic colony. Although these harsh denazification policies aimed at ruining German economic potential were later shifted to fit into the new goal of a strengthened Germany, their influence and adoption in these critical postwar years crippled the economy enough to force many Germans into starvation, making such a policy adjustment a critical concern.

Alongside economic policies, the Western powers pursued reprisals against individuals who were involved in the Nazi party. This was done through multiple different channels, including military tribunals for higher ranking Nazi officials as well as concentration camp guards and doctors, and directives and laws put forward by the Control Council removing and detaining those were deemed to have been “more than nominal participants in [Nazi Party] activities.” One major step towards denazification was to deal with the surviving Nazi leaders. While Hitler himself; his propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels; Reichsführer of the Schutzstaffel, Heinrich Himmler; and the director of the German Labor Front Robert Ley had all committed suicide, there remained a significant number who could stand trial for their involvement with the Nazi party. Twenty-one senior Nazi officials were put on trial for conspiracy to commit aggression, war crimes, and crimes against humanity before a four-power International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg. What resulted was the acquittal of three individuals, four sentences of 10–20 years of imprisonment, three life sentences, and twelve executions. What became known as the Nuremberg Trials received some international criticism: although none questioned the guilt of the accused, nor objected to harsh punishment, issues were raised stemming from an interpretation of victor’s justice, where laws were created *ex post facto*. Despite their criticism, the Nuremberg trials were an effective statement by the victors that the Nazi Party was utterly defeated and destroyed and would never be allowed to rise again. Moreover, collaboration trials were also conducted in many other countries throughout Europe as a means of denazifying previously occupied territories. In France, there were nearly 125,000 collaboration cases tried after the liberation, followed by nearly 10,000 executions, 26,289 prison sentences, 13,211 sentences of forced labor, and 40,249 punishments of “national degradation.”

As part of the Allied denazification and demilitarization policies, hundreds of thousands of captured German soldiers were held in internment camps along the Rhine. These camps were established to help keep control over the vast number of disarmed combatants following the conclusion of the war, but they were also intended to prevent any German insurgency attempts by guerrilla forces against allied occupation (such as those conducted by Wermacht units). The Allied Control Council served as the governing body of the Allied Occupation Zones, working to create postwar plans for the country as well as prioritizing the denazification of societal, military and legal structures. Such an effort came in the form of Directive 24, which was applied to German occupation zones on January 12, 1946, and was aimed at the “Removal from office and from positions of responsibility of Nazis and of people hostile to Allied purposes.” The definitions of those deemed Nazis or otherwise hostile to

---

4 Dietrich, *The Morgenthau Plan*, 64.
5 Ibid.
9 Ibid., 427.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
14 Ibid., 253-254.
15 Coordinating Committee, and Germany, *Enactments and Approved Papers of the Control Council and Coordinating Committee*, 16.
the Allied occupation extended to those who had joined the party before 1937 when membership became compulsory, and those who in any way had "voluntarily given material or moral support or political assistance of any kind to the Nazi Party or Nazi officials and leaders."16 This classification extended to millions of German citizens, and by the end of the winter of 1945–46, 42% of public officials had been removed from their posts.17 The denazification policies of the occupying powers removed millions of citizens from their positions, clearing the way for new political institutions and new political elites. However, the harsh justice of the purges wreaked havoc on the German economy and its population as millions were detained or removed from their jobs, causing the country to slip further into destitution and starvation. In stark contrast to the early plans for the Allied occupation of Germany which focused on Germany’s dismemberment and overtly opposed revitalization, the dynamic of Allied policy in West Germany by 1946 had clearly shifted towards promoting economic rehabilitation and supporting the people who were suffering in the shattered ruins of the war-torn nation. This assessment is not applicable to the Soviet occupied zone of East Germany, where the USSR continued to extract reparations for the losses it had suffered at the hands of the Nazis. It had been agreed upon by the occupying powers that, as historian Tom Buchanan states: "repairs would be taken in kind by each power from its own zone, such that the German people would be left with sufficient resources to subsist without external support."18 However, the Soviets continued to focus on squeezing out maximal reparations from its territory, eventually leading to their refusal to allow Western access to food supplies from the east. The Soviet controlled eastern region had traditionally been the source of food and grain for the rest of Germany. Once the Soviets shut the eastern zone off from the rest of the nation, Britain and the USA were forced to provide resources to their occupation zone from alternative sources. The introduction of food subsidization was the beginning of a shift in policies leading away from punishment and towards supporting Germany. To the Western Allies, it became clear that an economically weak Germany serves no purpose and would continue to hinder the rest of the European economy. An oppressed and starving Germany would also be more likely to embrace communism, a point which concerned American military officials, notably General Clay who said in March 1946: "There is no choice between becoming a communist on 1,500 calories [a day] and a believer in democracy on 1,000 calories."19

As divisions grew between the Western powers and the Soviets, the Western Allies began to look towards unification and cooperation. On January 1, 1947, Britain and the USA merged their occupation zones to form the 'Bizone' which was a major step towards unified German statehood.20 The most blatant indicator of change in Allied occupation policy was the enactment of the Marshall Plan (officially the European Recovery Program). Proposed by the US Secretary of State George Marshall on June 5, 1947, the plan aimed to rebuild war-torn regions, increase European industrial and agricultural capacity, improve European prosperity, and to encourage cooperation between European states. In essence, the Marshall Plan was a complete rejection of the Morgenthau Plan with regards to Germany, as it sought to build up and restore the economic capacity and strength of the nation instead of actively destroying it. As historian Manfred Knapp points out, West Germany was a key component of the Marshall Plan, since if West Germany was integrated into a broad European recovery plan it would be held accountable by the other nations, while also relying on them to hasten its own recovery.21 What Knapp fails to observe however, is that Germany’s need for aid was in large part exacerbated by the draconian policies of the early occupation period, including those influenced by the Morgenthau Plan, which he writes off as merely "controversial."22 The Marshall Plan came into effect on April 3, 1948, and over the next 4 years it delivered $12.5 billion in US aid to sixteen European countries to stimulate recovery as well as to stave off communist advances in the region. In March of 1948, the USSR withdrew its representatives to the Allied Control Council, which effectively ended any attempts at a consolidated governance of occupied Germany between the four powers. In response to the aid delivered by the Marshall Plan, alongside currency reforms instituted by the USA in Germany on June 20, 1948, the Soviets blockaded Western access to Berlin, which was entirely situated in the Soviet zone, forcing the Allies to supply the city with provisions in a daring airlift. Although the blockade was eventually lifted, the growing division between the East and West helped to further influence Western policy towards the rehabilitation and eventual rearmament of Germany as a strong independent buffer state to the USSR.

The 1950s marked the greatest changes in Allied occupation policy as Europe moved towards unification and cooperation. Although the Marshall Plan introduced much needed capital into the war-ravaged continent, the nations there would have to lead their own recoveries by creating comprehensive recovery plans and cooperating with other states if they wished to rebuild their economies. France had been guided by the influence of the Monnet Plan for much of their occupation period up to 1950, remaining focused on exploiting German labour, resources, and industrial capacity as a platform for France’s own economic recovery and modernization. However, as it became clear that both the USA and Britain were no longer interested in oppressing the German economy but rather in supporting it, France concluded that

16 Coordinating Committee, and Germany, Enactments and Approved Papers of the Control Council and Coordinating Committee, 16.
18 Tom Buchanan, Europe’s Troubled Peace, 37.
19 Ibid., 40
22 Ibid., 417.
the German economy could not be controlled forever and that it was in their own best interest to follow policies of cooperation and partnership. The Schuman Declaration of May 9, 1950, was a proposal to create a Franco-German coal and steel production agreement, within the context of an organization which would be open to the participation of other interested European nations.\(^{23}\) Besides the goal of encouraging economic growth within the partner nations, the Schuman Declaration also aimed to create a lasting peace within Europe, namely between France and Germany who were longstanding enemies. The Declaration also had the goal of creating common markets and establishing a European Federation based on supranationalism and leading to the unification of the continent. The Schuman Declaration led to the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) which was formally established in 1951 by the Treaty of Paris, signed by Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and West Germany.\(^{24}\) Although France was behind the initial proposal for the ECSC, West Germany was extremely keen on agreeing to such a partnership not just for the benefit of their economy, but to legitimize a new sovereign democratic Germany on the world stage. Only years before, Germany had been responsible for plunging the world into a devastating conflict, so their inclusion in a supranational organization such as the ECSC was welcomed by the newly formed Federal Republic of Germany.

Beginning in 1949, the period which became known as the Adenauer Era brought about immense social and economic change in Germany, as the new West German state worked towards ending denazification programs, rearmament, and cementing relations with the Western powers. Konrad Adenauer was the first Chancellor of the newly formed Federal Republic of Germany and oversaw the transition of West Germany from an occupied territory to a sovereign, democratic state. Adenauer had served as the mayor of Cologne from 1917 until his removal from power in 1933 by the Nazis, who also detained him on multiple occasions throughout the war. Adenauer was restored to mayor of Cologne by the liberating American forces, but his opposition to British occupation policies again resulted in his removal. He was, however, made president of a temporary parliamentary council which drafted the new constitution for the Western zones of Germany, and soon after was elected as the first chancellor of the new republic.\(^{25}\) As chancellor, Adenauer worked to shift the focus from denazification to recovery and rehabilitation instead of punishment. High ranking Nazi officials and those who had been classified as major offenders, however, did not receive amnesty.

One of the greatest adjustments in Western Allied occupation policy was demonstrated by their active support of German rearmament beginning in the 1950’s. In the face of the growing threat of the Cold War, and disturbed by the communist North Korean invasion of South Korea in 1950, the Western Allies abandoned their goal of destroying German military capacity in favour of its rearmament as a buffer state to the Soviet Union. Since the Allies and other European states remained distrustful of German militarization, the new army of the Federal Republic was to function under the military wing of the European Defence Community. The German rearmament movement was also closely tied to ending denazification, as Adenauer stressed that German military strength could only be achieved by incorporating former Wehrmacht soldiers who were still detained by the Allies.\(^{27}\) German rearmament led to further integration into the world stage, as they joined the NATO alliance in 1955.

In conclusion, the drastic measures taken by the Allies in 1945/46 of full demilitarization and denazification of Germany exacerbated economic and social issues in a war-ravaged country. The harsh retributive policies enacted upon Germany brought the nation to a point of such desperation that the Allies deemed it necessary to actively intervene to correct the course of Germany’s future away from economic devastation and towards revitalization. Alongside denazification policies and directives which removed millions from their jobs, draconian measures of economic incapacitation such as the highly influential Morgenthau Plan pushed Germany towards starvation and social collapse. It is clear however that after 1946, the Western Allies realized that they could not allow Germany to slide into ruin, and could no longer pursue such oppressive occupation policies, thus they shifted their intentions towards economic and social recovery in Germany. This was exemplified by their provision of food aid to West Germany and West Berlin, as well as the delivery of billions of dollars in economic aid to Germany and other European nations through the Marshall Plan. Europe also sought interaction and cooperation with a new democratic Germany, leading to the formation of the ECSC in 1951. This community allowed for the economic unification of former enemies and created the building blocks for a supranational future. The 1950’s also marked the end of denazification and demilitarization, as Germany looked to transition towards recovery and reintegration in the international community by throwing off the punitive measures enforced upon them by the Allies.


\(^{24}\) Ibid.


\(^{27}\) Goda, Tales from Spandau, 101.
Bibliography


The North British Society of Halifax, Nova Scotia
And the Social Dominance of Imperial Scottishness

Matthew Downey

Over the course of the 19th century, Nova Scotia established a Scottish identity that was unique among the British Empire. Its Scottishness can be traced back to 1621, with the Royal Charter given to Sir William Alexander to establish a Scotch colony there. However, the region did not actually see a significant number of Scottish people until the early 19th century. The North British Society, established in 1768 in Halifax, worked to establish identifiable Scottish links that did not necessarily rely on ethnic connection with Scotland. This paper examines the role of the North British Society in Halifax during the latter half of the 19th century as an agent of imperial consolidation in the province. During the mid-Victorian era, when the percentage of ethnic Scots in Halifax lessened, the North British Society was active to promote the Scottish character of the city in a way that simultaneously reflected imperial loyalty. Thereby, the Society reflected a specific pan-imperial culture rooted in a mythic Scottishness.

Scottish Highlander culture, effectively from the end of the Battle of Culloden in 1746, was throughout the growth of the British Empire in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries not only a distinct feature of Scottish identity. Rather, it was essentially commandeered in order to carry far wider-reaching Imperial implications. As an Empire-wide identity being forged throughout Britain and her colonies overseas, Scots culture was a useful tool. The North British Society, founded in Halifax, Nova Scotia on 26 March 1768, is among the most successful examples of such endeavours at pursuing coalescent Scottish and Imperial identity in British North America. Founded ten years before the much larger scale Highland Society of London, the North British Society was a pioneering imperialist influence in what would later become the Dominion of Canada. In the Victorian Era, a time when the British Empire was to reach extraordinary cultural heights, the North British Society of Halifax would play a more relatively locally orientated yet highly influential role in establishing and consolidating a strong Scottish identity in that city which further cemented its Imperial ties. Accordingly, the North British Society fostered one of the greatest examples of cultural consolidation in the entire Empire, as it became an integral part of Halifax’s cultural society in general by the late nineteenth century.

Despite the fact that the North British Society can claim to have existed in Halifax since 1768, only nineteen years after the city’s founding, it has been pointed out by scholars such as Michael Vance that, “by the end of the eighteenth century, although the name Nova Scotia had been employed for almost two centuries, there was little that one could identify as especially Scottish about the colony.” Indeed, though the Scottish nature of Nova Scotia had its roots in a Royal Charter given to the Scot Sir William Alexander in 1621, the province was primarily populated by the indigenous Mi’kmaq, French Acadians, and British soldiers and settlers until the early nineteenth century. From 1815 to 1838 that began to change with a strong growth in Scottish communities in Nova Scotia through steady immigration. However, as for the rest of the nineteenth century, Scottish immigration to the province then fell comparatively below that of non-Scots; it is clear that that time in the early nineteenth century was integral in establishing the dominance of Scottish identity there. This situation created by the contrasting factors of Scottish cultural prominence and the reality of non-Scottish ethnic domination is important to an understanding of the role of that culture in establishing Imperial ties. In Victorian era Nova Scotia, “as Scottishness became more formalised,” in Imperial terms, “the original Gaelic culture,” representing independent Celtic Scots identity, “began its precipitous decline.” The goals of the North British Society coalesced with that reality; it was less a closed ethnic brotherhood than a national society which represented community interests. As such, though the province of Nova Scotia’s Scottishness may have been more mythic than truly substantiated at the dawn of the Victorian era, that did not inhibit the North British or other Scottish societies from their aspirations. The mythic Scottishness of the province created an ideal setting for the establishment of a tailored version of Scottish diasporic culture which would engender Imperial ties among the local elite. The very name of the society alludes to a specifically British

3 McCullough, “Building the Highland Empire,” 1: The society in London having been founded in May 1778.

5 Ibid.
6 Ibid., 157-9.
7 Ibid., 159.
8 Ibid., 160
ish-unionist perspective on Scots culture, a fact which further highlights its intentions. Other contemporary societies did not have such a potentially broad appeal. Groups such as the Halifax Caledonian Club were much more of a closed ethnically oriented group bent on perpetuating Scottishness in a stricter sense. Even the Highland Society of London and its Canadian branch were more overt about “preserving the martial spirit, language, dress, music, and antiquities of the ancient Caledonians” than the North British Society was. This does not mean that those more Gael-centric groups necessarily played a different role than the North British in creating a transatlantic connection. However, the North British Society was much more imperially minded in its language, with its goals to aid in establishing connections between new emigrants, merchants, and the local “kindred societies.” Establishing community connections took precedence over the preservation of distinct Gaelic customs.

From its inception, the North British Society’s membership was composed of the “Scottish professional and mercantile elite and, as a group, exerted considerable influence on local and provincial politics.” The Society’s members over the years included some of the most influential figures in Nova Scotia as well as endorsements from honorary members of like-minded Imperial figures such as Lord Selkirk and Lord Lorne. The status of its membership underpins the essentially paternalistic nature of the North British Society with both its initial mission of settling Highland Scots as well as its cultural role of perpetuating unity through Imperialistic Scottishness. The endorsement of Lord Selkirk in 1804, though it was more in spirit than in actual involvement, helps one to understand the Society better through their shared values. Selkirk famously made several attempts at settling displaced Highland Scots throughout British North America in distinct new colonies. That endeavour was indeed in line with the charitable spirit of the North British Society. Lord Lorne’s endorsement during his tenure as Governor General of Canada in the 1870s as well has some symbolic meaning; for, as the heir to the Campbell clan as well as an Imperial statesman he embodied the sort of cohesion between Scottishness and Empire that the North British Society perpetuated. In practical terms, the local elite who made up the active membership of the Society worked greatly to wield cultural influence in Nova Scotia. Men of great historical significance such as Alexander Keith and Sir Sandford Fleming graced the Society with their membership. The high society of Halifax often engaged with the North British Society even if they were not Scots themselves; the Lieutenant Governor could be found attending the Society’s events and Joseph Howe was also known to be a featured speaker. By becoming the bastion of elite status in Victorian Halifax, the North British Society was able to rise above being simply a cultural organization for helping immigrants having come from the old world in adjusting to the new. Like other Scottish societies, the North British Society indeed existed as a platform from which to create a transatlantic network of shared culture. However, unlike groups such as the Highland Society of London and its affiliates, the North British Society was able to claim, if not a monopoly, an immense amount of influence in the elite class of Halifax. The North British Society had such a wide-ranging appeal that even non-Scots were often affiliated in unofficial terms. Despite being essentially a society for the benefit of Scots, the North British found an appeal that rose above its mission; its active investment in cultural monuments aided them greatly in that appeal.

Celebrations of Scottish culture played a large role in Highland and Scots societies’ activities in the Victorian era, and the North British Society was no different. The North British Society was active in working together with other groups to engage the public with Scottish culture. Events such as the centenary Burns’ Day celebration speaks here to the paternalistic charity practiced by most Scots societies; the North British Society was not different from other societies in those regards, however in Halifax it enjoyed more influence than other rival societies.

ierce connections took precedence over the preservation of distinct Gaelic customs. This does not mean that those more Gael-centric groups necessarily played a different role than the North British in creating a transatlantic connection. However, the North British Society was much more imperially minded in its language, with its goals to aid in establishing connections between new emigrants, merchants, and the local “kindred societies.” Establishing community connections took precedence over the preservation of distinct Gaelic customs.

From its inception, the North British Society’s membership was composed of the “Scottish professional and mercantile elite and, as a group, exerted considerable influence on local and provincial politics.” The Society’s members over the years included some of the most influential figures in Nova Scotia as well as endorsements from honorary members of like-minded Imperial figures such as Lord Selkirk and Lord Lorne. The status of its membership underpins the essentially paternalistic nature of the North British Society with both its initial mission of settling Highland Scots as well as its cultural role of perpetuating unity through Imperialistic Scottishness. The endorsement

of Lord Selkirk in 1804, though it was more in spirit than in actual involvement, helps one to understand the Society better through their shared values. Selkirk famously made several attempts at settling displaced Highland Scots throughout British North America in distinct new colonies. That endeavour was indeed in line with the charitable spirit of the North British Society. Lord Lorne’s endorsement during his tenure as Governor General of Canada in the 1870s as well has some symbolic meaning; for, as the heir to the Campbell clan as well as an Imperial statesman he embodied the sort of cohesion between Scottishness and Empire that the North British Society perpetuated. In practical terms, the local elite who made up the active membership of the Society worked greatly to wield cultural influence in Nova Scotia. Men of great historical significance such as Alexander Keith and Sir Sandford Fleming graced the Society with their membership. The high society of Halifax often engaged with the North British Society even if they were not Scots themselves; the Lieutenant Governor could be found attending the Society’s events and Joseph Howe was also known to be a featured speaker. By becoming the bastion of elite status in Victorian Halifax, the North British Society was able to rise above being simply a cultural organization for helping immigrants having come from the old world in adjusting to the new. Like other Scottish societies, the North British Society indeed existed as a platform from which to create a transatlantic network of shared culture. However, unlike groups such as the Highland Society of London and its affiliates, the North British Society was able to claim, if not a monopoly, an immense amount of influence in the elite class of Halifax. The North British Society had such a wide-ranging appeal that even non-Scots were often affiliated in unofficial terms. Despite being essentially a society for the benefit of Scots, the North British found an appeal that rose above its mission; its active investment in cultural monuments aided them greatly in that appeal.

Celebrations of Scottish culture played a large role in Highland and Scots societies’ activities in the Victorian era, and the North British Society was no different. The North British Society was active in working together with other groups to engage the public with Scottish culture. Events such as the centenary Burns’ Day celebration speaks here to the paternalistic charity practiced by most Scots societies; the North British Society was not different from other societies in those regards, however in Halifax it enjoyed more influence than other rival societies.


made aware of their province’s perceived historical and ongoing Scottishness. Though fuelled by elites, the North British Society pushed through a message that all Nova Scotsians were not simply a menagerie of colonials—they were Scots, they were Britons.

The North British Society thus acted as an agent of imperialism. Through the growth of the British Empire in its geographic and cultural scope during the Victorian era, the strengthening of cohesive identity became increasingly important. In British North America the Imperial machinations in forging British identity were seen in both successes and failures. The importance of maintaining strong ties to the Empire in the face of colonial desires for self-determination were evident in consideration of the provinces’ proximity to the United States and the contemporary republican threats of the 1837-1838 Canadian Rebellions. By establishing such a strong social presence as a charitable foundation as well as a cultural heritage organisation, the North British Society was able to achieve a third goal: the maintenance of British Imperial paternalism in the presence of Haligonians, Nova Scotians, and Canadians. Clearly, the Society viewed itself as having a special role in Halifax. In an excerpt from their Annals which encompasses the paternalist viewpoint of its members, the author writes “[t]he history and progress of our Society is so intimately entwined with the rise and progress of Halifax, that every public act of our organisation serves to recall some phrase of the growth of the city and the life of its people.” That viewpoint illustrates that the Society viewed itself as not simply serving the Scottish population of the city but rather the city in its entirety. Two major points should be highlighted as such, the Society served the entire city through its Scottish cultural exploits, and the result of those exploits was the city’s success. Vance describes the notion that Scots identity was highly beneficial to British North American society well when he writes, “the ideals held by the Scottish element in the nation were essential if Canada was to resist the corrosive influence of the individualistic materialism emanating from the United States. Indeed, it was the Scots’ patriotic duty to celebrate and promote Scottish influence”.

By asserting Scottishness as a creed of ideas and values rather than ethnic heritage, Scots societies were able to appeal broadly in an Imperial setting. Furthermore, the Scots, “The Scots Charitable Foundation,” The Scots, http://www.thescots.ca/index.php/make-a-donation/the-scots-charitable-foundation (Accessed 4 April 2020); Nova Scotia

in 1859 provided great opportunities during which the North British Society could work with other organisations in advertising and asserting Scots culture to the public of Halifax. The particular example of Robert Burns and the holiday celebrating his life and works pertains greatly to the idea of Scots culture being used to foster Imperial identity. In the case of Burns being used in a manner which celebrates both Scottishness and Empire, Ann Rigney highlights the complexity of the poet’s legacy in play at the centenary when she writes, “while the principal frame in the Nova Scotian capital was Scottish, other imagined communities were also invoked as the need arose: Britishness, the empire, and the English-speaking world.” Thus, while ostensibly holding an event strictly in commemoration of a Scottish national hero, the North British Society was able to invoke the Empire an equal amount as they did Burns, with numerous toasts to the Queen-Empress and the Lieutenant Governor being featured with a speech during which he celebrated the Empire and its values. St. Andrew’s Day also presented an opportunity for the Society to throw celebration dinners to which the influential members of society would be invited. At such dinners, honoured guests would come and sometimes make speeches of their pride in Scotland and its influence throughout the Empire—one need not be Scottish in a strict sense in order to say such things. Indeed, events such as Burn’s Day and St. Andrew’s Day allowed for annual exhibitions through which the North British Society could flaunt its elite influence and use that influence toward publicising continued cultural unity with the motherland. More permanent celebrations of the values of the North British Society were achieved through investment in public monuments, which included the commissioning of a portrait of Prince Edward the Duke of Kent which would hang in Province House. Through an admixture of hosting events and investing in the installation of physical monuments throughout the city of Halifax, the North British Society was able to engrain itself socially into Nova Scotia’s capital even more so than it could by simply inviting the membership of the elite Scottish members of society. Indeed, the population at large was

27 Ibid. A Lt. General from Ulster is said to have made such a speech at the St. Andrew’s Day celebration mentioned in this excerpt.
28 Macdonald, “Annals, 1768-1903,” 76-82; Macdonald, “Annals… 1768, to the Festival of St. Andrew, 1893,” 349: Portraits were often commissioned of notable members and patrons of the Society; this excerpt mentions such portraits in describing the Society’s investment in a permanent headquarters building.

25th January [sic], 1859,”
33 Colin Kidd, “Race, Empire, and the Limits of Nineteenth-Century Scottish Nationhood,”

27 Ibid. A Lt. General from Ulster is said to have made such a speech at the St. Andrew’s Day celebration mentioned in this excerpt.
28 Macdonald, “Annals, 1768-1903,” 76-82; Macdonald, “Annals… 1768, to the Festival of St. Andrew, 1893,” 349: Portraits were often commissioned of notable members and patrons of the Society; this excerpt mentions such portraits in describing the Society’s investment in a permanent headquarters building.

33 Colin Kidd, “Race, Empire, and the Limits of Nineteenth-Century Scottish Nationhood,”

27 Ibid. A Lt. General from Ulster is said to have made such a speech at the St. Andrew’s Day celebration mentioned in this excerpt.
28 Macdonald, “Annals, 1768-1903,” 76-82; Macdonald, “Annals… 1768, to the Festival of St. Andrew, 1893,” 349: Portraits were often commissioned of notable members and patrons of the Society; this excerpt mentions such portraits in describing the Society’s investment in a permanent headquarters building.

25th January [sic], 1859,”
33 Colin Kidd, “Race, Empire, and the Limits of Nineteenth-Century Scottish Nationhood,”
in the case of the North British Society, its appeal was so great that it was a major social feature of the upper classes of Nova Scotia.\textsuperscript{34} That aspect of the Society’s success may be attributed to its early foundation in the city, which may subsequently be attributed to the mythic Scottishness of the province.\textsuperscript{35} The Scottish nature of Nova Scotia had its roots in a Royal Charter given to the Scottish Sir William Alexander in 1621 when the region was still under the French.\textsuperscript{36} Accordingly, the culture of Halifax wasn’t truly Scottish in nature until long after the North British Society was founded.\textsuperscript{37} The entire premise of Nova Scotia is based around a Scottishness embedded in British Imperial identity; the North British Society was a reflection of the arbitrary strength of that Scottishness. The name bestowed on the organisation at its creation, North British, is emblematic of the appropriation of Scotland’s distinct national culture into the British Imperial fold.\textsuperscript{38} The immense amount of influence enjoyed by the North British Society in Nova Scotia was relatively disproportionate to the number of actual ethnic Scots in the province; its influence was rather a result of the pervasive ideas of Scottishness.\textsuperscript{39} The contrived sense of Scottish identity, justified by the actual influx of Scottish immigrants in the early nineteenth century, was played up especially after those immigration levels died down in relative terms.\textsuperscript{40} All that the appearance of actual Scottish immigrants provided was rhetorical justification for the publicly evident celebrations of that culture. The actual effect of those celebrations was to further entrench the Imperial ties ingrained in that engineered Scottishness.

In the early Victorian era, as the British Empire grew in scale geographically and culturally, forging a generally unified Imperial identity was of great importance. Scottish Societies across the Empire helped in this endeavour due to their wide reach and easily identifiable attributes. Imperial Scottishness became more of an idea than strictly an ethnic attribute; the pervasive Highlander cultural presence in the military helped to extend it worldwide.\textsuperscript{41} The North British Society in Halifax exemplified the attributes of an Imperially minded Scottish society perhaps greater than any other group. Its existence in an area imbued with a sense of mythic historical Scottish identity—as well as a considerable actual population of Scots—allowed for an amount of continuing prominent cultural relevance that few other societies could boast. Moreover, its membership could claim active representatives of the local provincial elite as well as honorary members and endorsements from Imperial aristocracy. Even non-Scottish members of the upper class in Halifax would find it presumably unavoidable in actively engaging with the Society.\textsuperscript{42} Such prominent engagement allowed the Society to invest greatly in events celebrating Scottish holidays as well as physical monuments to Scottish figures. The North British Society was able to strengthen Imperial ties and foster a long-lasting identity of Scottishness in Halifax and Nova Scotia at large through its appeal to the community elites and subsequent investment in cultural awareness. The group’s appeal beyond its home province is highlighted by its claimed position “as the Senior national benevolent association of the Dominion.”\textsuperscript{43}

\textsuperscript{34} David A. Sutherland, “Voluntary Societies and the Process of Middle-class Formation in Early-Victorian Halifax, Nova Scotia,” \textit{Journal of the Canadian Historical Association}, 5, no. 1 (1994): 241. This article illustrates how it was relatively rare for voluntary societies at that time to have such an active prominence among the “ruling elite”. Thus, the North British Society was unique in those regards, as the prominent members of the elite such as the Lieutenant Governor were a constant presence.

\textsuperscript{35} Vance, “Powerful Pathos,” 157.

\textsuperscript{36} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{38} Ward, \textit{Britishness Since 1870}, 149.

\textsuperscript{39} Vance, “Powerful Pathos,” 159. The disproportion is highlighted by Vance when he points out, “… Scots were outnumbered by those from other immigrant groups for the remainder of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Indeed, by the 1921 census Nova Scotians of Scottish origin represented just over 28 percent of the total population, while those of English origin constituted nearly 39 percent.”

\textsuperscript{40} Vance, “Powerful Pathos,” 159.

\textsuperscript{41} McCullough, “Founding the Highlander Empire,” 106.

\textsuperscript{42} Macdonald, “Annals, 1768-1903,” 259-60.

\textsuperscript{43} Macdonald, “Annals… 1768, to the Festival of St. Andrew, 1893,” 350.
Bibliography


Nuns in the Kitchen: Conventual Cuisine in Colonial Latin America

Pascale Halliday

In examining the cuisine of convents in colonial Latin America, one also investigates the complicated racial hierarchy and rules the colonial authorities imposed, and the ways that lived experience often differed from these guidelines. From the debate over the use of tortillas in the Eucharist to the attempted regulation of chocolate during fast days, the diet of nuns clearly had larger significance than mere sustenance. Examining the conventual kitchen and the women who worked and ate there offers insight into the ways that colonialism and enslavement impacted Latin America during this era, illustrating the way that our basic needs are often charged with much more significance than we realize.

Go, eat your food with gladness, and drink your wine with a joyful heart, for God has already approved what you do.

-Ecclesiastes 9:7-12
New International Version

For colonial settlers in Latin America, food possessed a meaning beyond sustenance. It could be a memory of the land left behind, or the bounty of the world that was now their home. Food became a racially charged product, one that either showed one’s rigid devotion to European customs or demonstrated the human ability to adapt to new surroundings. The Catholic Church, intensely involved in everyday life in colonial Latin America, raged with debate over the classification of chocolate or the use of corn in the Eucharist, arguments that illustrate the greater church dilemma of how much Indigenous tradition could be added to Christianity before it became a new animal all together. While European or church authorities may have attempted to impose rigid ethnic based rules on colonial Latin American society, the reality was more racially fluid and complex. Nowhere was this clearer than in the convent kitchen. The cooks and the food created in these kitchens can be used as a representative for colonial Latin American culture at large, mixing Indigenous, African, and European elements guided by imported Christian traditions. The convent kitchen also replicated the complicated racial hierarchy of colonial society. At first only women of European descent could become nuns, until 1724 when the first convent especially for Indigenous women was created in Mexico. African women could not take full vows at all during the colonial period. Much of the labour within these convents was provided by slaves or servants of African descent, especially within the kitchen and the garden, meaning that the average convent had women from each of the main ethnic groups of colonial Latin America. The kitchens of Latin American convents during the colonial era can be seen as a micro-cosmos of Latin America society at large during this time, from the ingredients growing in the garden to the women working in the kitchen to the final dishes on the dining table. Through examining the cuisine of convents during this era, it is clear that Latin American cuisine was its own animal, not entirely European nor Indigenous, nor African, but a melting pot of each of these cultures, much like Latin American culture at large.

Although Europeans from the Iberian Peninsula had travelled to the Americas in search of labour, land, and resources to extract, they were not immediately enthusiastic about the food in their new territories. Apart from general apprehension when met with an unfamiliar product, many Europeans also assigned racial significance to certain food, even going so far as to credit food with creating the difference between Europeans and other races. During the 17th century, Spanish writers suggested that it was diet that created the physical differences between Europeans and Indigenous people of Latin America. Some, like Gregorio García, suggested that diet was the main factor in assuring that Spanish settlers did not lose their European characteristics, such as their beards. “The Spaniards were unlikely to lose their beards because the ‘temperance and virtues that the Spaniards born in the Indies inherited from their fathers and grandfathers’ were continually reinforced through the consumption of Spanish food.” However, this suggestion seems unrealistic in daily life. The bulk of the conquistadores diet was maize, whether it be in the form of porridge or tortillas. For each ethnic group to restrict themselves only to their ethnic menu is not only highly inconvenient, but ignores the fact that the chef and the consumer were not always, and in fact were rarely, of the same ethnic origin. This was certainly the case within the convent kitchen. Although nuns were meant to lead lives of sacrifice and simplicity, many convents had as much help as elite secular households. In order for nuns to focus on their piety and their eternal souls, there had to be people to take care of earthly matters. If, as the Catholic Church suggested, African and Indigenous peoples relied on Europeans for their religious salvation, Europeans relied on these people of colour for their daily bread. The inclusion of Indigenous food in the diets of colonial nuns illustrates the way that Europeans relied on people of colour for their sustenance. The first convents in Latin America were founded by nuns born in Europe, coming across the ocean to establish convents in the new territories. While they hoped to impose their traditions on this new land and its inhabitants, they soon found that this was not to be the case. It was impossible to not shift habits or shape recipes to adapt to

2 Ibid.
the ingredients available in their new home. “After making their own perilous ship voyage, they soon found themselves trading their homey stews for spicy dishes flavored with unfamiliar tomatoes and chili peppers.”

Many of their fasting practices were simply not possible, especially during the difficult journey when any food was a blessing. Capuchin nuns, for example, did not eat meat according to their vows. However, during their first voyage to New Spain the alternative was starvation, especially since they had no Indigenous servants to cook native plants for them. The pious nature of their mission gave them dispensation to bend their vows. “Their main goal was to make it to the new convent in Peru, and if the nuns had to eat meat to survive the final months of the pilgrimage, then so be it.”

Soon, it seems, the nuns integrated native foods into their diet, despite early complaints about the impact on their bodies. While in Spain, they may have eaten garlic, bread, and cheese for their meal, now they ate “nopales (prickly pear cactus) or squash and a piece of fish.”

Once settled in their new convents, the nuns did not return to fully European diets. It was simply not sustainable. Instead, their diets, like their lives, would now contain a mixture of Europe and Indigenous elements.

The cultural diversity of Latin America was amply evident in the convent cuisine, both in the cooks and in the ingredients. In order to reduce contact with the outside world, convents attempted to provide as many ingredients as they could within their walls. “The almost complete self-sufficiency of the lifestyle of convents in New Spain also required that there be plenty of outbuildings, gardens and orchards.”

The convent garden strove to grow all the ingredients the nuns might need, which included native plants as well as European imports. After arriving in Latin America, Spanish conquistadores and settlers found a multitude of new ingredients from future staples like potatoes and corn to more decadent fruits like chirimoya and plan tains. The Europeans also brought their own ingredients, including sugar, cheese, and meats like beef and chicken. The convent garden might contain all of these, growing them in the fertile soil that led some to compare the New World to the Garden of Eden. The culture left out of the flora of the convent garden was Latin America’s significant African community, both enslaved and free. Despite their lack of inclusion in the garden, there was no shortage of African influence in the convent kitchen.

It is impossible to discuss the cuisine of the Latin American convent in the colonial era without examining who stood at the stove. While there were orders that operated with a strict hierarchy, filling their vows to God in front of the stove rather than in front of the altar, this does not mean that more elite nuns never entered the kitchen. Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz, for instance, a prestigious nun and former lady-in-waiting, wrote about cooking “as a symbol of her high position in the church.”

Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz, “Response to Sor Filotea” 1691.

Donadas served God through their service of the nuns, and partook in fast days and prayers. They occupied a place below the nuns in the conventual hierarchy, filling their vows to God in front of the stove rather than in front of the altar. In some convents, this role was not possible, especially during the difficult journey when any food was a blessing.

African, and therefore unable to take full vows to become nuns. For African women, becoming a donada was the closest thing to becoming a nun available to them. “By the seventeenth century, monasteries and convents throughout Latin America were home to thousands of free and enslaved men and women of African descent.”

Although donadas held a social position over their counterparts in secular homes, their position still represented the racial subjugation of African peoples within colonial Latin America. “There is no question that the title ‘donada’ symbolized the hierarchical, unequal nature of social relations based on the extraction of their labour for the benefit of others, but it also represented the opportunity to serve God and Christ honorably.”

Donadas served God through their service of the nuns, and partook in fast days and prayers. They occupied a place below the nuns in the conventual hierarchy, filling their vows to God in front of the stove rather than in front of the altar.

While donadas or other servants likely did the bulk of the cooking within the convent, this does not mean that more elite nuns never entered the kitchen. Sor Juana, for instance, a prestigious nun and former lady-in-waiting, wrote about cooking several times. In her “Response to Sor Filotea” she mentions her observations on cooking eggs and observes, “If Aristotle had cooked, he would have written much more.”

Nuns seem to have been especially involved in making the sweet treats associated with religious holidays, and seem to have participated more in this type of cooking than in making the daily fare of the convent. This division of food preparation was mirrored in secular households of the time as well. “The colonial ladies of the house, the senoras, left the basic cooking of soups, stews and vegetables to their cooks while they concentrated on the sweet things: puddings, jellies, cakes and biscuits.”

As these foods were tied to religious holidays, they were of no small sig-

4 Ibid., 285.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid., 287.
11 Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz, “Response to Sor Filotea” 1691.
12 Elisabeth Lambert Ortiz and Nick Caistor. “ ‘Desserts.’ The Flavour of Latin America:
nificance to nuns. "Food, one of the few sensual pleasures permitted in some small degree to the nuns (for instance, particular sweets were associated with specific holidays), relieved the tedium and monotony of convent life."13 The amount of sugar in these treats was also an example of the way that religious holidays morphed to adapt to the territory in which they were celebrated. While refined sugar was scarce and expensive in most convents in Europe, sugar cane was bountiful in parts of Latin America, especially Mexico. Early Spanish settlers had attempted to establish huge sugar plantations in the area. However, these plantations had been unable to compete with Brazil in terms of European export of sugar, therefore leaving a large surplus of the product for Mexican use. This influenced the creation of new iconic Mexican desserts, like the sugar skulls of Días de Los Muertos.14 These foods often display great cultural blending in their appearance as well. Pan de Muertos, the bread eaten on Días de los Muertos, is a sweet bread often decorated with crosses or bones, symbols associated with Aztec ideas concerning death and regeneration, displaying the way that the holiday infuses a Christian holiday with pre-contact Indigenous symbols.

Cuisine is not simply a matter of putting calories into one’s body. For inhabitants of colonial Latin America, it was intertwined with race and religion. Food was one way in which colonial authorities and the Roman Catholic Church attempted to impose their will and maintain racial divide, to limited success. While some members of the Catholic Church attempted to enforce European diets on Indigenous peoples, it is clear that these movements did not succeed. Although, they do speak to the condescension some church members showed to the very people they attempted to convert. Franciscan friar Bernardino de Sahagún admonished Indigenous people to not eat, for they know well what is edible.”15 However, this does not seem to have had much effect. The lack of impact this censure had on both Indigenous and Spanish is illustrated by the popularity of chocolate. The Catholic Church seems to have held a special grudge towards the drink, even going so far as to ban Catholics from drinking it during Mass (although this was not reflected in a papal bull, meaning that each church could decide for themselves whether they allowed parishioners to drink it). In 1651, one Friar Francisco Ortiz was sent before the Inquisition for drinking it before Mass. “He might have escaped detection except on one occasion, when he deserted the altar to drink with women for half an hour before returning to complete the mass.”16 Women seem to have especially drawn ire for drinking chocolate. An English priest Thomas Gage refers to “the chocolate-confectioning donnas” of Chiapas who drew the critical eye of the local bishop for drinking chocolate in church.17

He continued by recording that the women, rather than putting their immortal souls in danger or giving up “taking chocolate” in church, instead chose to attend their neighbourhood chapels where the local nuns and friars appeared to be less troubled by refreshments being served during mass times.18

We do know that some nuns ingested chocolate, especially in the form of mole poblano. There does not seem to be consensus concerning chocolate in convents. Some convents ate it prodigiously and sent boxes of chocolates back to their confessors in Spain. One convent in Mexico City spent “2,916 pesos on chocolate for themselves, the sacristans, and the priests, while only spending 390 pesos on poultry, eggs, and wine.”19 Other convents banned it entirely. "When they [a group of nuns travelling from Madrid] stopped for a few days in the Toledo convent…, they had to receive special permission to partake in this frothy beverage; a treat normally prohibited in that community.”20 There were multiple aspects of chocolate that were challenging to religious authorities, from its association with Indigenous nobility to its ability to be consumed as a solid or a liquid. Debates raged over whether chocolate was considered a liquid product, and therefore appropriate to consume while fasting, or whether it was a melted solid. “For the Catholic Church, classification proved to be especially vexing, as the growing popularity of chocolate in either form potentially threatened the moral standing of its parishioners.”21 Chocolate as a foodstuff illustrates the way religious life changed in the Americas, forcing nuns to adapt to their new world, one that refused to be confined to European ideas.

In addition to debating what foods should be allowed for those of religious orders in the New World, there were also arguments over which European food practices must absolutely be observed. One place where there was no space for non-European ingredients was the Eucharist. As the Catholic church considers the bread used for communion to be the literal body of Christ transformed through transubstantiation, the question of bread was also the question of the sanctity of communion. Thomas Aquinas, a 13th century Dominican friar, had clearly outlined in his Summa Theologica that “wheaten bread is the proper matter for this sacrament,” that is to say: no

13 Electra Arenal and Stacey Schlau, as quoted by Owens, "Food, Fasting, and Itinerant Nuns".
15 Bernardino de Sahagún, as quoted by Earle, “If You Eat Their Food”, 708.
16 Jeffrey M. Pilcher, Que Vivam Los Tamales!: Food and the Making of Mexican Identity.
19 Ibid., 42.
21 Ibid.

maize tortilla. This was stressed in conversion practices throughout Latin America. "Thus a 1687 Venezuelan catechism offered a clear answer to the question 'Of what material is the Eucharist consecrated?' The response was 'of true bread, made with wheat flour and water, and of true wine from grapes.'" This campaign was, for the most part, successful. Most convents, even in rural areas, held wheat bread for communion. Convents were more orthodox than independent churches, which at times attempted to preserve both Christian and traditional Indigenous religious practices. "But these leaves often sat beside tamales, indicating the continued veneration of Young Lord Maize Cob." Foods associated with Indigenous religious practice drew specific censure from colonial authorities. Amaranth, which was made into a dough and shaped into models of gods during the Aztec festival Panquetzaliztli, is just one example of the foods that held special religious significance for the Indigenous peoples. "To facilitate the extirpation of idolatry, Diego Durán compiled a lengthy list of suspect pre-Columbian feasts and their associated dishes. Amaranth stood out as anathema because the Indians shaped it into idols and ate it for communion." However, not every aspect of the Catholic ceremony resisted its new converts and their foodstuffs. The Nahuatl translation of the Lord's Prayer line "Give us this day our daily bread" literally translates to "May ye give us now our daily tortillas." This change illustrates the complex difficulties of religious life in colonial Latin America, as Catholic clergy attempted to convert as many as possible without risking blasphemy. Although the typical diet of the nuns was meant to be spartan, the multitude of religious holidays on the Roman Catholic calendar created the opportunity for feasts of delicious foods, some of which were invented in the convent kitchen. Perhaps the food that best illustrates the cultural melting pot that was the colonial convent kitchen is mole poblano. This spicy, chocolatey sauce is not a traditional Indigenous food, nor is it based on the mother sauces of European cuisine. Instead it is a creation on its own, the combination of ingredients from two cultures to create something entirely new. The name itself derives from the Nahuatl word for sauce: molli. The origin of Mole Poblano, often touted as the culinary emblem of Mexican Mestiza culture, is shrouded in mystery. The majority of origin stories attribute it to a nun of the Dominican order who, in attempting to create a dish for a visit from Viceroy Tomás Antonio de la Cerda y Aragó, combined chiles, fragrant spices, tomatoes, and chocolate to create the sauce. "From the Native American grinding stone she turned to the Old World spice rack, selecting cloves, cinnamon, peppercorns, and coriander and sesame seeds...Andrea cast about the ceramic-tiled kitchen for inspi-

---

23 Ibid.
24 Pilcher, Que Vivan Los Tamales, 35.
25 Ibid.
26 Owens, "Food, Fasting, and Itenerant Nuns," 706.
27 Pilcher, Que Vivan Los Tamales, 35.
28 Ibid., 45.
Gender Troubled: European Masculinity and Kaúxuma núpika on the Columbia Plateau

Mira Harvey

Kaúxuma núpika was a Ktunaxa guide, prophet and mediator from the Columbia Plateau in the early 19th century that appears in multiple Euro-American fur trader journals and narratives. He left his community as a young woman, and returned a year later as a man, who gained significant political and spiritual influence across the Plateau. Fur traders that hired Kaúxuma núpika as a translator, mediator and guide interpreted him as a man, and often only discovered that he was born a woman long after they had parted ways. Kaúxuma núpika, knowingly or not, was performing a masculinity entirely legible to these traders—and within their narratives they are constantly trying to remind both themselves, and the reader, that this man is not actually a man.

Kaúxuma núpika was a Ktunaxa guide, prophet, mediator, hunter, and warrior on the Columbia Plateau, whose life was partially recorded by European fur traders during the early 19th century. As a young woman, Kaúxuma núpika left her community to marry a white fur trader. A year later, he returned as a man. Kaúxuma núpika took on masculine roles in his Ktunaxa community, and went on further to guide white fur traders, mediate disputes between warring Indigenous peoples, and prophesy across the Plateau. He was multilingual, a skilled mediator and warrior, and by the time of his death and after greatly respected by many Indigenous peoples.

The specifics of Kaúxuma núpika’s life are difficult to know - what written records do exist are traders’ journals and subsequent narratives, which are far from reliable sources, as Elizabeth Vibert has proven.

But through both trader’s accounts and ethnographic data, a fuller picture of Kaúxuma núpika’s life may be elaborated on. In this picture, an interesting phenomenon starts to take shape. While traders spend much of their narratives adopting dismissive attitudes towards Kaúxuma núpika’s masculinity, Kaúxuma núpika is actually performing a kind of masculinity that is familiar to traders: a masculinity marked by attributes like spiritual power, independence, and involvement in warfare.

3 Suzanne Crawford O’Brien, “Gone to the Spirits: A Transgender Prophet on the Columbia Plateau.” Theology & Sexuality 12, no.2, 125-143 is, in my opinion, the best overview of Kaúxuma núpika’s life and career.

---

Bibliography


Pilcher, Jeffrey M. 'Que Vivan Los Tamales!: Food and the Making of Mexican Identity. (UNM Press, 1998)

Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz, “Response to Sor Filotea” 169.

Throughout Euro-American narratives, Kaúxuma núpika is doing a very good job at displaying qualities that traders understand to be ‘inherently’ masculine. Even more interestingly, Kaúxuma núpika’s Ktunaxa culture does not inherently gender spiritual power, independence, or warfare. So what we have is a Ktunaxa man performing a masculinity that is legible to the very European traders that refuse to equate anything but sex with gender, but these activities are not gendered in his own community. Whether Kaúxuma núpika knew what he was doing in relation to the traders is another question, one unanswerable in the way that History as a discipline demands. But in fur trader journals and narratives, there is a distinct gendered tension to be unearthed as they interpret this prophet, guide, and warrior. Kaúxuma núpika’s activities actually affirmed his masculinity in the eyes of European traders, as he demonstrated spiritual power, independence, and involvement in warfare.

A note on scholarship, ‘transgender’ and pronouns

Scholars have written about Kaúxuma núpika in a variety of ways - from the dismissive tone of Schaeffer, to Vibert’s continued use of she/her pronouns, until most recently O’Brien’s use of he/him pronouns, and use of the term ‘transgender.’ My positionality, as a white, trans settler in ‘Canada’ has influenced how I wish to approach writing about Kaúxuma núpika, as has writing within an academic tradition that has historically dismissed and derided Kaúxuma núpika’s gender. Firstly, I refer to Kaúxuma núpika as a man, and use he/him pronouns. From what documentation I can access, it appears that Kaúxuma núpika lived and was interpreted as a man. I believe that using she/her pronouns is confusing, inaccurate, and potentially disrespectful to this person—especially if it comes from a settler scholar like myself. Additionally, I am writing in English, and I do not know the Ktunaxa language. This limits my ability to fully elucidate and understand Kaúxuma núpika’s inner experience of gender, and for that reason this essay focuses on fur trader reactions to him. I am not the person to explore the personal, inner or cultural aspect of his life—that work, if undertaken, should be done by a Ktunaxa person, and perhaps not necessarily in a settler colonial academic format.

Secondly, I will not be using the term transgender to describe Kaúxuma núpika, as O’Brien does. I am of the opinion that applying that term would be an anachronism and culturally inaccurate. It is tempting, as it provides modern readers with an easy term to understand, but neither the fur traders nor Ktunaxa people would have understood Kaúxuma núpika this way. It is important to recognise that our categories and identifiers of gender are cultural constructions: the binary sex/gender model popularized in Europe is largely absent from most Indigenous societies on Turtle Island, who instead have complex and diverse traditions of gender that vary by culture.

3 This paper utilizes Butler’s theory of gender performativity, see Judith Butler, Gender Trouble (New York: Routledge, 1999).

4 Additionally, quotations will be replacing she/her pronouns with he/him in brackets, for the sake of clarity, in the same format as O’Brien.


9 John Franklin and John Richardson, Narrative of the Second Expedition to the Shores of the Polar Sea in the Years 1825, 1826, and 1827 (London: John Murray, 1829), 306. The detail of Kaúxuma ‘falling into discredit’ after his death is not mentioned in other narratives.

10 Ross, Adventures of the First Settlers, 145.


12 David Thompson, David Thompson’s Narrative of His Explorations in Western America 1784–1812, ed. J. B. Tyrrell (Toronto: The Champlain Society, 1916), 513.

13 Kaúxuma núpika largely unfavourably: he was a liar and a cheat, who invented supernatural predictions and ultimately “fell into discredit” in his own community. Despite this, traders very clearly recognised his spiritual power and influence. Alexander Ross, about Kaúxuma núpika and his wife, says “they were the objects of attraction at every village and camp on the way: nor could we, for a long time, account for the cordial reception they met with from the natives, who loaded them for their good tidings with the most valuable articles they possessed—horses, robes, leather, and higua.”

14 Thompson’s narrative gives a bit more context to this encounter, where apparently Kaúxuma núpika predicted diseases to the Chinooks, “which made some of them threaten [his] life.” John Franklin claims that Kaúxuma núpika had followers that “received whatever [he] said with implicit faith,” and that his prophecies
“quickly spread through the whole northern district.” When traders met Kaúxuma núpika, they saw a powerful person—perhaps not one that had religious power in the way they understood it, but one that had spiritual power and influence on the Plateau. In European society, religion was led and controlled by men. Women could, and did, exercise influence to varying degrees depending on the religion, but they did so within a patriarchal patriarchy. For Kaúxuma núpika to have as much spiritual influence as he did, as O’Brien has proven, was foreign to Europeans. As outlined above, traders attempted to discredit Kaúxuma núpika in their own narratives, but they could not control the reaction of Plateau communities, who seem to have largely welcomed and respected him as a spiritual leader. Indeed, according to Simon Francis, an informant of Schaeffer, the Blackfoot warriors that killed Kaúxuma núpika understood his power: “Men, you must realise this woman’s spirit continues to haunt us. We have killed a powerful woman.” To traders, who see religion and its associated power and influence as a male domain, Kaúxuma núpika’s spiritual power would support his claims to masculinity. This is a masculinity that is constantly derided and dismissed, as Thompson tells Indigenous peoples that Kaúxuma núpika is lying, or Franklin claims his prophecies to be discredited, but spiritual power to Europeans is masculine all the same. This point is poignantly proven, I would argue, in that Kaúxuma núpika had wife(s). It is hard to track the individual identities of these women, as traders were uninterested in them, but women travelled with Kaúxuma núpika and were involved in the same spiritual endeavours. When Ross describes the gifts given to Kaúxuma núpika for his prophesying, he describes Kaúxuma núpika and his wife equally participating, and receiving, equal share of the subsequent influence: “These stories, so agreeable to the Indian ear, were circulated far and wide; and not only received as truths, but procured so much celebrity for the two cheats…” Ross is the only trader to mention Kaúxuma núpika’s wife participating in these spiritual endeavours somewhat equally, the rest focus solely on Kaúxuma núpika and only mention his wife in passing. It is entirely possible that Kaúxuma núpika’s partner was fully involved in their spiritual journeys across the Plateau, as access to spiritual power in Plateau culture was “almost identical for both men and women.” Children searched for and acquired spirit guardians, and both men and women were reported to have spiritual power. Neither gender had to necessarily ‘transition’ to the other in order to do certain activities or spiritual roles, although individuals who experienced a change in gender identity were understood to be spiritually powerful in Plateau and Plains cultures. But traders focus on Kaúxuma núpika and his spiritual influence, and largely conceal or ignore the role of his wife(s). In that strange way, once again they affirm his masculinity within an Euro-American framework of gender. I am not arguing that either traders nor Kaúxuma núpika intended this, but rather, that the result—emphasising Kaúxuma núpika at the expense of his wife(s)—does affirm and confer a kind of masculinity to him in Euro-American contexts. Euro-American texts tell us that Kaúxuma núpika, the ‘man’, is important: the actor, the agent, the subject, and his wife is dependent, submissive, and a possession. Kaúxuma núpika is made visible in the historical record because of his gender, his wife(s) invisible: a trend that continues to this day, as scholars focus on Kaúxuma núpika’s gender and spiritual power with little to no attention given to his partner(s) and their spiritual gifts.

“Bold and Adventurous”

Kaúxuma núpika is an independent character in trader’s narratives and journals. Despite what derisive or invalidating comments are made, he is undoubtedly an autonomous individual who could travel, provide, and make decisions not only independently, but effectively. Alexander Ross and Gabriel Franchère provide the first documentation of Kaúxuma núpika’s exploits, in an episode where he and his wife deliver a letter to the party: “Notwithstanding, we learned from them that they had been sent by a Mr. Finnin M’Donald…that having lost their way, they had followed the course of the Tacousah Tessah (the Indian name of the Columbia), that when they arrived at the Falls, the natives made them understand that there were white men at the mouth of the river; and not doubting that the person to whom the letter was addressed would be found there, they had come to deliver it.” Ross elaborates: “The trader, you understand, did not control the reaction of Plateau communities, who seem to have largely welcomed and respected him as a spiritual leader. Indeed, according to Simon Francis, an informant of Schaeffer, the Blackfoot warriors that killed Kaúxuma núpika understood his power: “Men, you must realise this woman’s spirit continues to haunt us. We have killed a powerful woman.” To traders, who see religion and its associated power and influence as a male domain, Kaúxuma núpika’s spiritual power would support his claims to masculinity. This is a masculinity that is constantly derided and dismissed, as Thompson tells Indigenous peoples that Kaúxuma núpika is lying, or Franklin claims his prophecies to be discredited, but spiritual power to Europeans is masculine all the same.

This point is poignantly proven, I would argue, in that Kaúxuma núpika had wife(s). It is hard to track the individual identities of these women, as traders were uninterested in them, but women travelled with Kaúxuma núpika and were involved in the same spiritual endeavours. When Ross describes the gifts given to Kaúxuma núpika for his prophesying, he describes Kaúxuma núpika and his wife equally participating, and receiving, equal share of the subsequent influence: “These stories, so agreeable to the Indian ear, were circulated far and wide; and not only received as truths, but procured so much celebrity for the two cheats…” Ross is the only trader to mention Kaúxuma núpika’s wife participating in these spiritual endeavours somewhat equally, the rest focus solely on Kaúxuma núpika and only mention his wife in passing. It is entirely possible that Kaúxuma núpika’s partner was fully involved in their spiritual journeys across the Plateau, as access to spiritual power in Plateau culture was “almost identical for both men and women.” Children searched for and acquired spirit guardians, and both men and women were reported to have spiritual power. Neither gender had to necessarily ‘transition’ to the other in order to do certain activities or spiritual roles, although individuals who experienced a change in gender identity were understood to be spiritually powerful in Plateau and Plains cultures. But traders focus on Kaúxuma núpika and his spiritual influence, and largely conceal or ignore the role of his wife(s). In that strange way, once again they affirm his masculinity within an Euro-American framework of gender.

I am not arguing that either traders nor Kaúxuma núpika intended this, but rather, that the result—emphasising Kaúxuma núpika at the expense of his wife(s)—does affirm and confer a kind of masculinity to him in Euro-American contexts. Euro-American texts tell us that Kaúxuma núpika, the ‘man’, is important: the actor, the agent, the subject, and his wife is dependent, submissive, and a possession. Kaúxuma núpika is made visible in the historical record because of his gender, his wife(s) invisible: a trend that continues to this day, as scholars focus on Kaúxuma núpika’s gender and spiritual power with little to no attention given to his partner(s) and their spiritual gifts.

“Bold and Adventurous”

Kaúxuma núpika is an independent character in trader’s narratives and journals. Despite what derisive or invalidating comments are made, he is undoubtedly an autonomous individual who could travel, provide, and make decisions not only independently, but effectively. Alexander Ross and Gabriel Franchère provide the first documentation of Kaúxuma núpika’s exploits, in an episode where he and his wife deliver a letter to the party: “Notwithstanding, we learned from them that they had been sent by a Mr. Finnin M’Donald…that having lost their way, they had followed the course of the Tacousah Tessah (the Indian name of the Columbia), that when they arrived at the Falls, the natives made them understand that there were white men at the mouth of the river; and not doubting that the person to whom the letter was addressed would be found there, they had come to deliver it.” Ross elaborates: “The trader, you understand, did not control the reaction of Plateau communities, who seem to have largely welcomed and respected him as a spiritual leader.
orates: “Among the many visitors who every now and then presented themselves, were two strange Indians, in the character of man and wife, from the vicinity of the Rocky Mountains...The husband, named Ko-come-ne-pe-ca28, was a very shrewd and intelligent Indian, who addressed us in the Algonquin and gave us much information respecting the interior of the country.”29 Later, Ross characterises Kaúxuma núpika and his wife as “…bold adventurous amazons... In accompanying us, they sometimes shot ahead, and at other times loitered behind, as suited their plans.”30 Kaúxuma núpika’s independent nature affirmed his masculinity in the eyes of these traders. He carried a letter for considerable distances, and was obviously a highly skilled person that could travel extensive distances between forts, speak multiple languages, and exercise autonomy—shooting ahead, loitering behind, as suitting his plans.31 He certainly did not need a male guardian, and he quite obviously not only took care of himself but also was able to provide for his wife. None of these attributes are gendered in Ktunaxa or Plateau cultures: self-sufficiency, skill and independence are highly valued for men and women.32 Women were responsible for 70% of the Plateau diet’s caloric intake through plant gathering, participated in trade, and owned their own property, including horses, goods, and their mat lodges. Neither husband nor wife could claim the property of the other. Women were fully capable of divorce, as were men, and women had the choice of moving back with kin or living independently, which, as mentioned above, was fully capable of doing.33 As noted by O’Brien, it could be argued that men were more dependent on women and women’s associated skills.34 But to the Euro-American trader, none of this is understood. An ideology of ‘delicate womanhood’ pervaded European thought, so when confronted with Indigenous women who did ‘a man’s work’, traders had two popular discursive responses.35 Indigenous women were either exploited ‘beasts of burden’ for the work they did, or they were overemphasised as ‘exceptional’.36 Ross employs 1811, 1812, 1813, and 1814, etc., trans. J. V. Huntington (New York: Redfield, 1854), 118-119. 28 Schaeffer, “The Kutenai Female Berdache,” 206/207. A version of a name that Kaúxuma Nupika reportedly took: Qánqon kámek klaúla, ‘Sitting-in-the-Water Grizzly’. 29 Ross, Adventures of the First Settlers, 85. 27 Ibid., 144. 28 Schaeffer, “The Kutenai Female Berdache,” 212. By Schaeffer’s estimates, the travel that Kaúxuma Nupika and his wife would have undertaken to deliver the letter to Astoria would have been exceptionally difficult. 29 Ackerman, “Complementary but Equal,” 83. 30 Ibid., 86. Vibert, Traders’ Tales, 137. Schaeffer, “The Kutenai Female Berdache,” 201. This is also attested in Schaeffer’s ethnography: one of Kaúxuma’s wives leaves him after a fight in a canoe, telling him that she will pitch her lodge alone and Kaúxuma can go his own way. 31 O’Brien, “Gone to the Spirits,” 138. 32 Vibert, Traders’ Tales, 128. 33 Philip Levy, Fellow Travellers: Indians and Europeans Contesting the Early American Trail (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2007), 121-122. the latter discourse as he refers to Kaúxuma núpika and his wife as “bold and adventurous amazons.”37 Philip Levy notes that when European men witnessed women as independent, autonomous, capable actors, it produced a distinct gendered anxiety for the trader because these things were, supposedly, inherently masculine.38 Independence, mobility and the ‘trail’ are so masculine that some traders attempt to justify Kaúxuma núpika’s gender by explaining that he dressed as a man in order to travel with more safety.39 Safety from what would be the question, but these arguments are not logical—they are built on a gendered order that says women cannot be independent and effective actors without being a man, or at least looking like a man. So when Kaúxuma núpika travels incredible distances, provides, translates, and acts autonomously... his masculinity is affirmed in the eyes of the traders that meet him.

"Carrying a Bow and Quiver of Arrows..."

Kaúxuma núpika was not only spiritually powerful and independent, but a warrior. He was a formidable leader of raiding parties and warfare. Franklin writes, Having procured a gun, a bow and arrows, and a horse [he] sallied forth to join a party of [his] countrymen then going to war; and in [his] first essay, displayed so much courage as to attract general regard, which was so much heightened by [his] subsequent feats of bravery, that many young men put themselves under [his] command. Their example was soon generally followed, and at length [he] became the principal leader of the tribe, under the designation of ‘Manlike Woman’.34

The exact facts of this account can be disputed, but Schaeffer’s Ktunaxa informants generally agree that Kaúxuma núpika had significant skill in both raiding and mediation among warring groups.35 While Kaúxuma núpika is not necessarily engaged in warfare when travelling with Thompson and Ross, his skills in mediation and diplomacy is evident. In carrying the letter to Fort Astoria, he and his wife would have had to cross miles of territory occupied by friendly or not-so-friendly communities, a danger that would have been recognised by the traders.36

He also acted as a diplomat, translator and mediator for traders as they crossed into unfamiliar territory. John Work highlights Kaúxuma núpika’s skill in interpretation when he translates for Work’s party—Work also mentions that Kaúxuma núpika “is of some note among [the Kootenay].”37 Kaúxuma núpika eventually dies in the context of warfare and raiding between the Blackfoot and Flathead. W.H. Gray’s ac-
count relates that Kaúxuma núpika was killed by the Blackfoot while attempting a peace negotiation: "[he] has hitherto been permitted to go from all the camps, without molestation, to carry any message to [him] by either camp." 41 Schaeffer's informants assign cause of death to a Blackfoot ambush—Simon Francis describes how Kaúxuma núpika was a formidable warrior and that it took incredible effort to kill this "powerful woman." 42 While these events occurred after Kaúxuma núpika's meeting with Thompson, Thompson does do something interesting when writing about Kaúxuma núpika in both his journal and narrative: the way in which Kaúxuma núpika is armed is always included. Thompson, in recounting the episode where in Kaúxuma núpika came to his tent for protection, states that he was "carrying a Bow and Quiver of Arrows" 43 and that after he declared his sex changed, he "dressed, and armed [himself] as such." 44 Later, Thompson claims he describes Kaúxuma núpika to several parties of Natives, and his description is short and to the point: "the Woman that carried a Bow and Arrows and had a Wife." 45 Clearly, to Thompson and other Euro-Americans like Franklin, Kaúxuma núpika's weapons are of interest. 46

In European society, weapons were a potent symbol of masculinity. Weapons were strongly associated with either military contexts or upper-class/imperial hunting contexts, both of which women were disallowed from participating in. 47 In contrast, the 'masculine ideal' of most Plateau culture groups was not traditionally a warrior, but a skilled hunter or fisher. 48 In Kaúxuma núpika's lifetime, conflict with the Blackfoot increased and warriors became more important in Ktunaxa society, 49 but survival on the Plateau meant that hunting and/or fishing was still highly valued. Both men and women had responsibilities related to hunting and/or fishing on the Plateau, mostly separate, but with flexibility in roles for those with gifts or abilities. 50 Similarly, both men and women could participate in raiding or warfare, although it is less documented on the Plateau than on the Plains. 51 However, Europeans coming into contact with Plateau and Coastal peoples interpreted their way of life through a gendered and hierarchical lens, casting fishing peoples as the 'lower,' lazi-

---

42 Schaeffer, "The Kutenai Female Berdache," 216.
43 Thompson, David Thompson's Narrative, 512.
44 Ibid., 513.
46 Franklin and Richardson, Narrative of the Second Expedition, 305. "Hunting procured a gun, a bow and arrows...."
47 Vibert, Traders' Tales, 257, 261.
49 Vibert, Traders' Tales, 211.
50 Ackerman, "Complementary but Equal," 81-82.
51 Ibid., 90.
52 Schaeffer, "The Kutenai Female Berdache," 203.
Bibliography

Primary
Franchère, Gabriel. Narrative of a Voyage to the Northwest Coast of America in the Years 1811, 1812, 1813, and 1814, etc., Translated and edited by J. V. Huntington. New York: Redfield, 1854.
Franklin, John and John Richardson. Narrative of the Second Expedition to the Shores of the Polar Sea in the Years 1825, 1826, and 1827. London: John Murray, 1828.

Secondary
Schaeffer, Claude. ”The Kutenai Female Berdache: Courier, Guide, Prophetess, and Warrior.” Ethnohistory 12, no.3 (Summer 1965), 195-236.

More than a Fur Trading Post:
Agricultural Development at Fort Victoria, 1846

Collin Rennie

Just three years after the establishment of Fort Victoria accounts made by Chief Factor Roderick Finlayson in the Fort Victoria Journal show that fur trading was infrequent at best. The first year of journal entries, which provides the closest look at what life at the fort consisted of in its formative years, shows that only 18 days included mention of a significant trade occurring; however, in that same year employees at the fort produced thousands of bushels of vegetables. The forts role as an agricultural hub was discounted by the colony’s first Governor, Richard Blanshard, who commented in 1851 that the fort was nothing more than a fur trading post – a comment that has had an undue influence on historical writing about Fort Victoria. After considering why the fort was designated as a main depot and examining how the Lekwungen People’s land management practices incentivized the HBC to appropriate and reorganize land for company farming, this essay challenges Blanshard’s comment, suggesting that Fort Victoria was much more than a fur trading post.

To a great extent, the history of the first half of the nineteenth century in the Pacific Northwest has been defined by the Hudson’s Bay Company’s involvement in the region’s fur trade. Until recently, the history of agriculture in the region has mostly been absent from the literature. Except for a few sources, most notably James R. Gibson’s 1985 book Farming the Frontier: The Agricultural Opening of the Oregon Country, 1786-1846, it wasn’t until an archived Hudson’s Bay Company Journal from Fort Victoria was made public that agricultural development at Company forts was more critically examined. In 2009, Dr. John Lutz and a collection of students at the University of Victoria began transcribing the Journal and published it online. Written by Hudson’s Bay Company (hereafter referred to as HBC) employee Roderick Finlayson, the journal details the daily activities of those living and working at the Fort from 1846 to 1850, revealing the prominence of the Company’s agricultural efforts there. Despite the importance of agriculture at Fort Victoria, this topic has been the focus of few scholarly works and more should be done to unpack why farming became more significant at Fort Victoria than it did at other HBC forts. In this work the terms agricultural development and farming are used interchangeably.

2 In this work these historical events are used interchangeably.

Ascendant Historian | 53
1846 show that agriculture was well established only a few years after the construction of the fort and that farming was a product of the fort being a HBC general depot.

In Robin Fisher's 1992 book *Contact and Conflict: Indian-European Relations in British Columbia, 1774-1890*, a chapter is dedicated to what Fisher calls the 'transitional years'—the first decade of the colony of Vancouver Island, which was established in 1849. Governor Richard Blanshard, appointed by the Colonial Office, became increasingly frustrated with HBC practices and, after a year and a half, left the colony complaining that it was "nothing more than a fur trading post." Fisher agrees with this assessment, noting in his book that he believes Blanshard's observations were correct.4

This is problematic, as Fort Victoria was much more than a trading post - from its conception through to the period that Blanshard was Governor, the Fort was, among other things, an important centre of agricultural production for the HBC. Finlayson's *Journal* shows that agricultural labour was often the most common labour activity at the fort. In his 1891 biography, Finlayson acknowledges this, stating that by the late 1840's farming had assumed a large proportion of their operations and had become "the centre of the company's trade west of the Rocky Mountains." As helpful as these sources are in confirming that daily operations were largely agricultural, they lack any sort of explanation as to why farming became more significant at Fort Victoria than it did at other HBC forts. Answering this question relies on contextualizing the Journal with sources that provide insight about relevant conditions, such as the HBC's long-term plans in the Northwest and the state of Aboriginal land use in the region. The HBC was having trouble finding a quality harbour with adjacent arable land that could accommodate large-scale farming in the Puget Sound—it was a requirement that the Company's depot must have access to "an extensive tract of...land suitable for tillage." This all changed when the Company expanded its search north and arrived in Port Camosun (the harbour that would become the location of Fort Victoria). In 1843 HBC employee James Douglas described the region as a "perfect Eden" suitable for settlement. Southern Vancouver Island appeared to be a suitable location for a new Company depot that could provide great agricultural advantages. Despite Douglas' description, it's important to recognize that this 'Eden' was not natural—it was an anthropogenic landscape. Lekwungen people had lived around Port Camosun for thousands of years before the HBC's arrival and had well-developed Aboriginal agricultural practices.9

Literature on the development of Fort Victoria and the Colony of Vancouver Island published in the twentieth century often relied solely on settler accounts and colonial institutions to inform their work, leaving racial biases unchecked. While it may not have been the author's intentions, this practice allowed for the perpetuation of what modern historians are increasingly confronting and labeling as colonial origin narratives. As Fisher rightly notes, these narratives worked to disestablish Indigenous control of territory and often portrayed Indigenous actors as hostile savages.10 More recently, historians focusing on Indigenous-Settler relations have written about the Vancouver Island Treaties and territory dispossession in ways that work to re-assert Indigenous agency in the historiography of the Pacific Northwest. This paper draws from two books, one by Lamb and the other by Gibson, which lack acknowledgement of how the HBC functioned as an oppressive colonial institution, appropriated Indigenous territory, and contributed to the degeneration of Indigenous culture. Addressing the HBC's contribution to Indigenous oppression in the literature on the history of the Pacific Northwest is wholly necessary. Looking at the first year of Finlayson's *Fort Victoria Journal*, it's clear that Vancouver Island would not have been profitable solely as a fur trading post. Considering the Journals first month, May of 1846, one can see that fur trading was infrequent at best. The first mention of trade isn't until the fourth entry, in which Finlayson writes that "little or nothing done in the way of trade with the Natives" was occurring.11 A day later, on May 13, 1846, Finlayson notes that most people at the Fort were employed planting potatoes.12 Out of the 245 journal entries from 1846, there are only 18 days that mention significant trades occurring. Out of the remaining 227 days, 29 saw some sort of smaller trade, whether it was trading for salmon with the local Lekwungen people or small cash transactions with Fort employees.13 At one point, there was a period of 20 consecutive days without a single trade mentioned in the Journal.14 Finlayson often wrote phrases such as "no trade worth mentioning." In mid-July, during peak trade season, Finlayson remarked that the fur trade

4 Ibid.
10 Fisher, *Contact and Conflict*, 94.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 "Fort Victoria Journal,” Hudson’s Bay Company Archives, B.226/ a/1.
15 Ibid.

- 9
- 9
- 9
- 9
- 9
- 9
- 9
- 9
- 9
- 9
- 9
was "quite dull at present." On the last day of November Finlayson notes that the weather had affected trade prospects and "nothing was coming in." Indeed, it was quite common for there to be an extended period without any note of significant trading; however, almost every Journal entry had detailed notes about farming operations.

By 1846, the scale of farming at Fort Victoria was significant—there were several hundred acres under cultivation by the time of the first Journal entries. Throughout the first year of the Journal, one can find evidence of the production of turnips, potatoes, oats, barley, wheat, cabbage, carrots, and peas, along with the planting of fruit trees—specifically apples, pears, and peaches. There was also a sizeable population of cattle on the plains near the fort, which produced meat for HBC employees around the Northwest. While Finlayson provides insight on the state of trading and farming in the Journal, this source doesn’t explain why the Fort’s location on the southern tip of Vancouver Island was chosen by HBC officials in the first place—for this, W. Kaye Lamb’s 1945 article on the founding of Fort Victoria provides much insight.

Throughout the 1830’s, HBC officials had been debating what the best location for a Pacific general depot would be. While George Simpson, the company’s Governor, believed the main depot should be further north than the Columbia River, Fort Vancouver’s Chief Factor John McLoughlin was adamant that his fort functioned well as the depot and that no changes should be made. The debate centered around two main considerations, the first being the logistical problems with Fort Vancouver. As the Fort was considerably inland along the Columbia River, all arriving ships had to pass through the treacherous mouth of the river, which had multiple large sand bars that were known to wreck ships. Seeing as the HBC relied heavily on the success of shipments between their depots and London, a sunken ship posed a significant threat to the company’s profitability in the Northwest. The second issue that influenced the debate was the state of the Anglo-American border dispute. Uncertainty regarding where the borderline would be drawn made Simpson increasingly interested in shifting the depot further north. As Lamb notes, Simpson recognized that it was "most desirable that the main depot should be located in territory which would ultimately become British." By 1835, Simpson instructed McLoughlin to send a group north to the Puget Sound to look for a suitable location; however, none of the bays investigated offered good agricultural land, which was one of the essential requirements for a depot. The search was extended to the southern end of Vancouver Island, and in the summer of 1837 an expeditionary group commanded by W.H. McNeill arrived at Port Camosun. The crew was impressed with the harbour and mentioned it to their superiors; however, it would be another six years until the HBC would decide to build a fort at this “unequalled” location. In this time it became clear that the boundary question would cement Simpson’s decision to move forward with Fort Victoria. By the early 1840’s a large influx of migrants had entered the Willamette Valley south of Fort Vancouver and escalated pressure on the HBC to move its main depot—it was becoming increasingly clear that the United States would push to claim land further north than the Columbia River. In fact, in 1842 Simpson expressed that he believed the Strait of Juan de Fuca would constitute the border once things were settled because the Americans would want a “Northern Harbour and… the British would be pressured to give them all of Puget Sound.” To the same end, HBC control of the southern end of Vancouver Island would help reinforce British claim of everything north of the Strait, protecting the entire island (which became the colony of Vancouver Island in 1849) and the region of New Caledonia (which became the colony of British Columbia in 1858). Long-held logistical concerns about Fort Vancouver combined with political concerns about the Anglo-American borderline influenced the decision to move the depot to Port Camosun.

In his letter to Governor Simpson about the 1837 survey of southern Vancouver Island, James Douglas wrote that the country surrounding Port Camosun was beautiful, presenting a succession of plains and groves covered with luxuriant vegetation. Today, Victoria has remained characterized by its picturesque environment. Reflecting Douglas’s description, the city is affectionately known by many as the City of Gardens. In his letter to Governor Simpson about the 1837 survey of southern Vancouver Island, James Douglas wrote that the country surrounding Port Camosun was beautiful, presenting a succession of plains and groves covered with luxuriant vegetation. Today, Victoria has remained characterized by its picturesque environment. Reflecting Douglas’s description, the city is affectionately known by many as the City of Gardens. Victoria is located in a MM-CDF Climatic zone (Moist, Maritime Coastal Douglas Fir), an extraordinarily small area around the southern tip of the Island that experiences more sun and is much drier and warmer than its surrounding regions. This climate also provides the conditions for unique flora such as Arbutus and Garry Oak trees. Acknowledgement of these unique trees can be found in the accounts of HBC company employees and visitors in these first few years at Fort Victoria. Douglas noted the prevalence of oak and pine trees in his

25 Lamb, “The Founding of Fort Victoria, 73.
26 Gibson, Farming the Frontier, 61.
27 Ibid., 203.
29 Fisher, Contact and Conflict, 58.
The racial biases towards Indigenous Peoples in accounts by Douglas and Seemen– especially HBC employees such as Douglas—were noted by Lutz. He mentions that the Lekwungen people had “as of yet lost no trait of their natural bar-

dacity.” 34 Lutz uses the example of camas cultivation in the plains as an example of how

physical manipulation of the land by Lekwungen people made the area more appeal-

ing for colonial development. 35 It’s likely that HBC employees such as Douglas ignored

signs of aboriginal agricultural development that would have been visible when they

arrived, as they knew that the HBC would soon make efforts to appropriate the fields.

The racial biases towards Indigenous Peoples in accounts by Douglas and See-

mann cannot be ignored. In Douglas’s 1845 correspondence to John Hargrave, he men-

tions that the Lekwungen people had “as [of] yet lost no trait of their natural bar-

barity.”36 Reference to this supposed incivility is more direct in Seemann’s Narrative, in

which he claims that development around Fort Victoria had “encroached upon the

beautiful domain”, so that the “savage could no longer exist in all his grossness.”37 The

grand irony here is that the very beauty Seemann references was the product of Indigene-

ous industriousness. A key example of how Europeans at Fort Victoria misunder-

stood Indigenous relations to their environment is the act of “burning the woods.”42

Under the entry for August 11, 1846 in the Fort Victoria Journal, Finlayson records

that “the Indians [sic] are now beginning to set the plains on fire,” and that the Com-

pany’s hay stockpile was nearly burnt by it.43 Two more entries on August 12th and

August 20th refer to the prolonged burning, which Finlayson notes “ran [in] all direc-

tions.”44 Though it’s not explicitly stated, Finlayson insinuates the Lekwungen peo-

ple were acting recklessly and indicates that the burning was not welcomed by those

at the Fort. Lutz notes in “Preparing Eden” that burning such as the one described

by Finlayson created the plains that subsequently enticed the HBC to settle in the

area. To maintain the plains, fires were set annually to clear out the undergrowth.45 In

fact, the annual burning performed by the Lekwungen people was a form of fertiliza-

tion, and as a complementary effect created more browsing room for deer and elk.46

In review, the prime agricultural land created and maintained for generations by

the Lekwungen people was one of the main reasons the HBC chose to build Fort Victoria

at Fort Camosun. As the Fort grew larger and the farm expanded outward a new prob-

lem arose for Finlayson; the Company was competing for land use with the locals. Lutz

references this when discussing the appropriation of camas fields, most notably ‘Me-

equon’, one of the Pacific Northwest’s prime camas fields.47 This competition for land

was exemplified by Finlayson’s Journal entry on July 28, 1846, which states some Lekwun-

gen people were “beginning to steal [the HBC’s] potatoes and sell them to the ships.”48

Of course, the HBC had appropriated the land they were growing their potatoes on.

In 1846 there were significant farming operations in progress at Fort Victoria

and several hundred acres were under cultivation.49 There were multiple factors that

made Fort Victoria such a significant and successful agricultural centre. Had the HBC

not been looking to relocate their main depot in the early nineteenth century, one

could argue that Fort Victoria might never have been established; however, increasing

pressure from the United States to place the international border north of the Columbia

River combined with concern about the safety of ships travelling to Fort Vancouver led

George Simpson to look to Vancouver Island for a viable replacement location. Since

it was a requirement that the new depot had to have extensive agricultural land, Fort

Victoria was destined to develop extensive agricultural operations. In only a few years,

farming at Fort Victoria had grown to a point where it was able to provide supplies for

other HBC forts in the Pacific Northwest.50 By the end of 1846, the Fort had produced

letters many times regarding the importance of fortifying the new depot.51 This

pressure led Simpson to build Fort Victoria in 1846.

By the end of 1846, the Fort had produced

letters many times regarding the importance of fortifying the new depot.51 This

pressure led Simpson to build Fort Victoria in 1846.

32 Glazebrook, eds., The Hargrave Correspondence, 420.
34 Berthold Seemann, Narrative of the Voyage of H.M.S. Herald During the Years 1845-1851: Under the Command of Captain Henry Kellett Being a Circumnavigation of the Globe, and Three Cruizes to the Arctic Regions in Search of Sir John Franklin, Volume 1, (Waterloo: Reeves and Company, 1853), 102.
36 Ibid., 114.
39 Ibid.
40 Glazebrook, eds., The Hargrave Correspondence, 421.
41 Seemann, Narrative of the Voyage of H.M.S. Herald, 102.
42 “Fort Victoria Journal,” August 11, 1846, Hudson’s Bay Company Archives, B.226/ a/1.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid., 120.
49 Gibson, Farming the Frontier, 64.
50 Ibid.
2100 bushels of potatoes, 800 of wheat, 400 of oat, 300 of peas, and had butchered 63 cows. Far from being “nothing more than a fur trading post,” in a short period of time Fort Victoria had become a significant agricultural producer in the region.

§

Bibliography

Primary Sources:


Secondary Sources:


51 Gibson, Farming the Frontier, 64.
Reasons for Rebellion: Nationalism’s Role in the Greek War of Independence

Molly Rothwell

Because the Greek War of Independence led to the creation of a Greek nation-state, it is important to examine the role nationalism played in the Greek rebellion. During the Greek War of Independence, national rhetoric was used to create international support for the Greek cause; however, the portrayal of a united Greek nation was not fully formed in reality. Furthermore, the intervention of major European powers in the Greek War of Independence appears to have been based more on geo-strategic factors rather than fostering ideas of the "Greek-nation." Through an analysis of the religious, economic, educational, and international factors that led to the Greek rebellion, this essay argues that national sentiment was not the primary motive behind the Greek War of Independence.

The influence of nationalism in the Greek War of Independence is challenging to accurately measure; many factors outside of nationalism need to be considered when studying the creation of the Greek nation. When the Greek War of Independence began in 1821, creating a Greek nation-state was a novel idea, diverging from the basic principle of state "legitimacy" established by the major European powers during the Vienna Settlement. After Greek independence was achieved, liberals and nationalists around the world used Greece as an example for creating a successful nation-state and Greece soon became a universal symbol for the promotion of nationalism world-wide.

Despite nineteenth-century understandings of the Greek War of Independence, the effect nationalism had in the war is now regularly debated. For example, R.S. Alexander notes that "Greek nationalism was confined to a small minority who adopted it mostly to appeal to Western sensibilities for aid." The Greek cause was regularly linked to nationalism by the West, where preconceptions of Greek nationality were valorized through the Philhellenic movement. Before the Greek War of Independence, a sense of Greek identity was loosely established by those who practiced Greek religion and spoke the Greek language. However, while a small number of these "Greeks" were spurred on by national sentiment, economic, religious, political, and international affairs appear to have played a larger role in the Greek War of Independence.

When analyzing the impact national thought had in the Greek War of Independence, nationalism must be placed into an early nineteenth-century historical context. Modern-day supporters of nationalism have often attempted to link national consciousness to the past to further ideas of a shared sense of community. History can be reconstructed to spark national sentiment, which is why Benedict Anderson defines a nation as "the imagined community." By describing nations as imagined, Anderson is not arguing that national sentiment is fabricated or falsified. Instead, Anderson sees nationalism as "envisioning something that we cannot see, but which is nonetheless real." However, Anderson’s depiction of nationalism as an abstract concept is countered by historians who argue that nationalism is based on real-life political and social factors. For example, in Nations and Nationalism Ernest Gellner and John Breuilly argue that nationalism is born out of "economic, social, and cultural factors," making it a fundamentally modern phenomenon.

In the nineteenth century, the advocacy for a single nation’s political sovereignty became popular in European political thought. In his 1994 book Nationalism, Anderson’s depiction of nationalism as an abstract concept is countered by historians who argue that nationalism is based on real-life political and social factors.

1 Clark, Legitimacy in International Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Incorporated (2005): 93; Robert S. Alexander, Europe’s Uncertain Path 1814-1914. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, (2012): 4. The Vienna Settlement was the result of the 1814-15 Congress of Vienna, which constructed a new political order in Europe after the Napoleonic Wars. The principle of state "legitimacy" that was supported by the Vienna Settlement was largely based on the French Foreign Minister Talleyrand’s claim that a government’s authority was only lawful if its form and function were “consolidated and consecrated by a long succession of years.” As a result, the Vienna Settlement repudiated the changes that occurred in European during the French revolution and the Napoleonic Wars and “loosely implied that the regimes overthrown from 1789 onward should be reconstituted”.


3 Alexander, Europe’s Uncertain Path 1814-1914, 37.

4 Lekas, “The Greek War of Independence from the Perspective of Historical Sociology,” 164. Philhellenism was an intellectual movement that was prominent in Western Europe during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Philhellenes idolized Greek culture because they believed all of Western civilization originated from Greece.


6 Diamandouros, Hellenism and the First Greek War of Liberation (1821-1830), 21.


9 Ibid.


11 Ibid.
and the State, John Breuilly defines a "nation" as a homogeneous group striving for political sovereignty who feel strongly that they are unique and distinct from "others." 12 Breuilly argues that "nationalism" is the act of prioritizing the nation’s needs and values above all other needs and values. 13 Discrepancies between Greek motivations in the Greek War of Independence and Breuilly’s definition of nationalism quickly arise. Greek fighters lacked unity; self-interest was often prioritized in the rebellion and many of the rebels did not identify with a distinct “Greek nation.” Rather than being a cohesive self-aware nation, Greeks who participated in the War of Independence remained torn by factionalism based on clashing religious, regional, familial and social issues. 14 Greeks who rose against Ottoman rule did not have a unified plan for state leadership after the rebellion. 15 There were three main options for the future Greek state: the creation of a multinational state, a nation-state, or a grouping of Greek principalities. 16 National and universal sentiments were simultaneously operating when fighting began in 1821, despite the conflicting outcomes of these two lines of thought. 17 Whereas a universal outlook would lead to the formation of a multinational state under the control of an imperial power, a national outlook supported the creation of an autonomous, self-governing nation-state. 18 A large section of universalists who fought in the Greek War of Independence were not attempting to grant the Greek population political sovereignty and were therefore at odds with national streams of political thought. Conflicting ideas surrounding future Greek leadership highlight the confusing and often weak ties to nationalism that Greek rebels possessed. 19 The mixed motives of those who took part in the Greek rebellion and the fragmentary nature of Greece after the Greek War of Independence show that the Greek rebellion did not occur solely because of rising Greek nationalism. Greek discontent under Ottoman rule was largely due to religious conflict, as the majority of Greeks were Orthodox Christians living under the rule of a Muslim Sultan. 20 The Orthodox Church was granted a large level of autonomy under Ottoman rule and the weakening administrative power of the Ottoman Empire led to the maintenance of a “theocratic basis of Greek unity.” 21 As the leader of the Greek Orthodox community, the Patriarch of Constantinople was regarded as a high official by the Ottoman government and was granted legal, administrative, and educational responsibilities. 22 In return for these powers, the Patriarch was expected to promote good conduct in the Greek Orthodox community. 23 While the Sultan’s decision to govern through the institution of the Orthodox Church worked when the Church remained loyal to the Ottoman Empire, it failed when the Church abandoned its commitment to Ottoman rule. 24 Although the Orthodox Church was granted a large amount of autonomy, the legal subjugation of Christians under Ottoman rule angered Greeks. 25 Furthermore, religious autonomy allowed leaders in the Orthodox Church to gain political experience and consciousness. 26 In his book The Greek War of Independence, C.M. Woodhouse notes that it was “under the leadership of the heads of the Church, that the first impulse came to rebel.” 27 Weakness in the Ottoman Empire’s law-enforcing and bureaucratic capacities allowed Muslim landowners to oppress Christians in the Empire without restrictions. 28 Many Christians who were under the control of Muslim landowners fled and found refuge in mountainous regions where they would be free from Muslim subjugation. 29 Groups of Christian communities in the mountains were originally helpful to the Ottoman Empire. 30 For example, the “Armatoli,” a militia largely composed of Christian peasants who lived in the mountains, was used for defence of the Empire. However, as the Ottoman Empire grew weaker, the Sultan began to cut back on the number of Christian militia forces the Empire employed, angering many Christian soldiers trained in mountain warfare. During the Greek War of Independence, large numbers of the Christian militia turned on the Sultan, using guerrilla warfare tactics that were hard to suppress. 31 Because most Greeks and Turks in the Ottoman Empire were unaware of the “complex ideas relating to territorial boundaries and cultural and linguistic uniformity which makes up the European concept of a nation-state,” the tensions between

---

13 Ibid.
14 Diamandouros, Hellenism and the First Greek War of Liberation (1821-1830), 31.
15 Ibid., 25.
16 Ibid., 23.
18 Ibid.
19 Diamandouros, Hellenism and the First Greek War of Liberation (1821-1830), 27.
these communities appear to be predominantly based on religious rather than national differences.\textsuperscript{33} Christian discontent largely stemmed from their inability to access land. In an agricultural society where land was coveted, Muslims were granted the majority of the farmable property despite being the minority in the area.\textsuperscript{34} Many Greek peasants revolted against the Sultan’s rule because they resented the harsh conditions Christians were placed under by Muslim landowners.\textsuperscript{35} Throughout the war, Greek rebels plundered Muslim-owned land, leaving Christian landowners alone. These attacks appear to be based on religious tensions and “land hunger” rather than national sentiment.\textsuperscript{36} It was the systematic oppression of Christian peasants and their inability to access land that spurred many Greek peasants into revolt.

International intervention in the Greek War also had religious factors, as many states rationalized Greek intervention through the use of crusade rhetoric, claiming that they were helping Christian Greeks shake off their Muslim oppressors.\textsuperscript{37} Tsar Alexander’s international policy supported “legitimate authority” over any rebel groups; however, Russia was motivated to intervene on the side of the Greek rebels based on their shared religion.\textsuperscript{38} During the Greek War of Independence, the “civilized-barbarian binary” was used to legitimize the Greek cause.\textsuperscript{39} International coverage of the war often emphasized the atrocities of the Muslim oppressors while ignoring or valorizing the violence of Christian rebels, bolstering notions of Muslim barbarity and Christian civility.\textsuperscript{40} Although nationalistic sentiment helped foster international sympathy and support for the Greek cause, religious discord was also crucial in shaping the international community’s opinion on the Greek War of Independence.\textsuperscript{41}

The Greek War of Independence would not have occurred without the growth of Greek political consciousness. In Hellenism and the First Greek War of Liberation (1821-1830), Nikiforos Diamandouros argues that the Ottoman Empire placed Greeks under eight conditions that restricted their autonomy and limited their attempts to form a resistance to Ottoman control.\textsuperscript{42} “Political disenfranchisement,” “simplification of class structure,” “economic impoverishment,” “ethnic dilution,” “religious retreat,” “legal disenfranchisement,” “deformalization of culture,” and “cultural isolation” constrained Greeks under Ottoman rule.\textsuperscript{43} These conditions stunted the Greek people’s ability to form a strong political community, which might have otherwise fostered Greek national sentiment.\textsuperscript{44} However, Diamandouros notes that by the time the Greek rebellion broke out in 1821, only legal and political disenfranchisement remained in the way of Greek autonomy.\textsuperscript{45} This was because the Ottoman Empire’s authority was dissolving and failed attempts by Sultan Mahmud II to reform led to a decentralization of power in the Empire.\textsuperscript{46} Greeks were given increased autonomy, which allowed them to become more prosperous.\textsuperscript{47} Having gained increased security in life, ambitions for legal and political enfranchisement began to enter Greek consciousness.\textsuperscript{48}

Historians often attribute economic prosperity and increasing education rates to the growth of a politically conscious Greek society.\textsuperscript{49} Abroad, exiled Greeks had set up communities that were foundational to the Greek economic revival.\textsuperscript{50} In The Making of Modern Greece, Dionysios Zakythinos argues that the Greeks of the diaspora created an economic ruling class of Greeks outside of the Ottoman empire, who “combined … a passion for moneymaking with a passion for their country.”\textsuperscript{51} These men influenced the opinions of the rising urban class merchants in Greece, who were in contact with Greek communities outside of the Ottoman Empire through trade.\textsuperscript{52} In the Greek islands, maritime trade led to prosperity since Turks permitted many forms of self-govern in commerce.\textsuperscript{53} Furthermore, because the Greek communities who lived on the maritime islands were granted a large amount of political autonomy, they acquired skills in governance that allowed them to become “natural leaders” for the rebellion and for leadership after the war.\textsuperscript{54} For the Greek economy to flourish, they had to shift their trade outside of the weakening Ottoman Empire and into the West, where they could.
were increasingly in contact with liberal ideas from the American and French revolutions. Rising living standards occurred as a result of economic success, allowing Greeks to “break the monotony of life” and focus on the formation of political ideas. Furthermore, increased economic prosperity led to a growth in the “merchant bourgeoisie,” a group directly influenced by nationalist ideas. Members of the prosperous Greek merchant communities often possessed liberal and nationalist ideas; however, they made up a very small percent of the Greeks who rebelled against Ottoman rule. The majority of Greeks lived in agricultural-based communities and were not directly influenced by the increase of wealth and ideas coming into Greece through the merchant community. While a small number of Greeks became urbanized and Westernized, the majority of the Greek masses were not exposed to liberal and national ideas.

Education played a crucial role in paving the way for Greek independence since the Greeks were allowed almost full autonomy in their education system under Ottoman rule. The Greek education system used the Greek language and religion, promoting the idea that the Greek community existed independently from the rest of the Ottoman Empire. Educational reforms led to an increasingly literate Greek population; as education spread, ideas of a shared culture began to reach larger parts of Greek society. Literature helped spread national sentiment; for example, the language of Hellas was revived in Greek communities, linking Greeks to an ancient tradition and forming a perception that the Greek community possessed a longstanding culture. Education spread national consciousness and Greeks began to see their “cultural heritage . . . [as] the special possession of Greek-speaking people.” However, despite extensive educational reforms and the rise of literacy, historians have noted that only a small percent of Greeks were influenced by the “neo-Hellenic enlightenment.” The neo-Hellenic movement was the emergence of a perceived Greek culture linked to ancient Greece and was more popular abroad, where liberals, nationalists, and the Greeks of diaspora fostered ideas of a Greek identity in the international community.

In his study of Greek life under Ottoman rule, Richard Clogg claims that ballads and folklore were more effective in shaping the Greek peasant and urban artisan classes’ perceptions of Greek liberation than the neo-Hellenic movement. Whereas the neo-Hellenic movement emphasized ideas of a Greek nation, ballads and prophecies, and oracles regularly foretold Christian liberation from the “Hagarene yoke,” stressing the idea that Greek liberty would be achieved through divine intervention. Education reforms fostered the sense of a shared Greek community; however, when the Greek War of Independence broke out, the Greek masses were still viewing Greek independence in religious or personal terms rather than from a nationalistic point of view.

While historians’ opinions vary on the extent to which the West impacted the Greek War of Independence, Western influence is regularly cited as a key component in the rebellion. In his 2006 article “The Greek War of Independence from the Perspective of Historical Sociology,” Padelis Lekas claims that it is doubtful that Greek independence would have been achieved without the West. For Padelis, Western influence is key to understanding Greece’s transition into an increasingly modern way of life. Waning Ottoman authority allowed more Western influence into the area that would later become Greece and as a result, Greeks became increasingly aware of the disparities between their standard of life compared to the West. Merchants were often “‘modernised’, ‘de-regionalised’ and ‘nationalised’ by intellectuals abroad.” However, despite Western influence, the Greek War of Independence cannot be defined simply as a fight for modernization or Westernization. Many Greeks opposed the movement towards a secularized liberal state that was being promoted in revolutionary rhetoric abroad and many Greeks lacked connections to Western ideas.

Philhellenism and the belief in uniting all Greeks based on a shared culture were more popular abroad than in Greece. The Philhellenic movement was promoted by "Hagarene", "Ishmaelites", "Hagarenes" or "Arabs"; Simon Hadler. “Europe’s other? The Turks and shifting borders of memory,” European Review of History: Revue européenne d’histoire, 24:4, (2017): 507. 10.1080/13507486.2017.1307814

59 Diamandouros, Hellenism and the First Greek War of Liberation (1821-1830), 113.
60 Ibid., 123.
62 Ibid.
64 Phillips, The War of Greek Independence, 16.
65 Diamandouros, Hellenism and the First Greek War of Liberation (1821-1830), 24.
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid. The term “Hagarene” was used in Christian literature to describe the Arabs who conquered Syria, Egypt, and Mesopotamia. European Christians often defined the Ottoman Empire using descriptions that were already applied to “former foreign empires with names such as ‘Saraceni’, ‘Ishmaelites’, ‘Hagarenes’ or ‘Arabs’”; Simon Hadler. “Europe’s other? The Turks and shifting borders of memory,” European Review of History: Revue européenne d’histoire, 24:4, (2017): 507. 10.1080/13507486.2017.1307814
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid., 167.
77 Ibid., 182.
78 Ibid., 175.
in the international community by liberals, nationalists, and by Greeks living outside of Ottoman rule.79 Diasporic Greeks often fled to other parts of Europe, where they formed communities that upheld formal Greek culture.80 These communities often used Philhellenic sentiment to gain sympathy for Greeks in the international community, promoting their cause through nationalistic rhetoric.81 When the war broke out, thousands of “Philhellenes” from abroad joined the fight on the Greek’s side, feeling closely tied to the Greek cause through the Romantic notion that ancient Greece was the birthplace of Western culture.82 Diasporic Greeks promoted ideas of a “Greek nation” to gain international support and increase the Greek war-effort.83 The international Greek community had been attempting to gain Greek liberation from Ottoman rule for decades before the Greek War of Independence.84 However, Greeks in the diaspora often reasoned that in order to gain freedom from the Turks, Greeks would have to submit to Western rule.85 Creating a nation-state or an independent Greek state was not always crucial to Greek perceptions of liberation.86 In fact, many Greeks seemed content with imperial rule if it resulted in increased Greek agency and liberty.87

In order to gauge nationalism’s impact on the Greek War of Independence, a study into the motives of the powers who intervened in the Greek rebellion is required. International intervention played a major role in ensuring Greek victory in the War of Independence. The Philhellenic movement helped shape international opinions on the Greek war, since “European and American public opinion had been on the Greek side almost from the beginning.”88 Citizens from Italy, France, England, Scotland, Ireland, Germany, Poland, Scandinavia, America, Spain, Portugal, Hungary, and other countries volunteered in the Greek War of Independence as they felt deeply connected to the Greek cause.89 However, it is crucial to note that the international community felt connected to the Greek cause for a variety of reasons and their sympathy for the Greeks was not always based on national sentiment. This multifaceted connection to the Greeks was illustrated in Russia, where many citizens and policymakers identified with the Greeks because of their shared belief in Orthodox Christianity.90 Furthermore, many European and American citizens felt attached to the Greek cause because they viewed the Greeks as descendants of the founders of Western civilization.91 It was a cumulation of religious, universal, and Romantic ideals that made international opinion favourable towards the Greek cause.

While connections between the Greek War of Independence and nationalism were made by the international community, nationalism played a small role in state policymakers’ decisions to join the Greek cause. Russia proposed intervention in Greece as early as 1824 on the basis of upholding Christian principles, although geo-strategic territorial and commercial interests were key to Tsar Alexander’s decision to intervene.92 Through the 1826 St. Petersburg Protocol, Britain agreed to intervene in Greece alongside Russia.93 The British foreign minister, George Canning, joined the Greek War of Independence largely because of geostrategic reasons.94 Fearing that Russia would gain too much territory, Britain wanted to increase its interests in the Balkans and limit Russian expansion in that area.95 Furthermore, Britain wanted to form an independent Greek state that had close ties to Britain while keeping the Ottoman Empire intact. France joined Russia and Britain’s intervention plan in July 1827 and was hoping to sign a treaty based on the St. Petersburg protocol that would check both England and Russia.96 The three-power intervention in the Greek War of Independence was formed largely off of geostrategic decisions since Russia, Britain, and France all wanted to maintain the “balance of powers” in the European periphery.97 While the international public supported Greeks because of Philhellenism and humanitarianism sentiment, state policymakers’ motives appear to have had a “mixture of humanitarian and instrumental motives” for intervening in Greece.98

The Greek War of Independence was spurred on by religious, economic, and international factors that were not always based on national ideals. Many Greeks who rebelled in the Greek War of Independence did not possess a sense of national consciousness.99 Greeks in the diaspora and the international community of liberals and nationalists often used national rhetoric to spur international support for the Greek cause, creating the perception of a united Greek nation that was not fully formed in reality.100 Although the international community often promoted the notion of the “Greek nation” through the Philhellenic movement, the intervention of the major

80 Diamandouros, Hellenism and the First Greek War of Liberation (1821-1830), 22.
84 Diamandouros, Hellenism and the First Greek War of Liberation (1821-1830), 22.
85 Ibid.
87 Ibid.
89 Ibid.
90 Alexander, Europe’s Uncertain Path 1814-1914, 36.
powers in the Greek war appears to have been based more on geostrategic factors than fostering ideas of the "Greek-nation." Understanding the role of nationalism is crucial in understanding the Greek War of Independence since the war resulted in the creation of a Greek nation-state; however, it appears that national sentiment played a small role in the Greek War of Independence and the resulting formation of Greece.

§

Bibliography


Victim or Vixen? Ambiguity and The Portrayal of Prostitution and The “New Woman” in The Films of G.W. Pabst

Marley Sterner

This paper examines the ambiguous portrayal of prostitution in Weimar Germany through the films of German film director G.W. Pabst. The women prostitute characters in Joyless Streets (1925), Diary of a Lost Girl (1929), and Pandora’s Box (1929) reveal the extent to which class lines began to blur for prostitutes during the economic crisis in the Weimar Republic. Pabst’s films explore the different circumstances that steered women into prostitution, and how the prostitutes’ behaviors affect whether they are intended to be perceived by the audience as “victims” of financial desperation or sexually manipulative “vixens.” The paper further investigates the existence of an unofficial criteria in Pabst’s films that decides whether a prostitute character will have a fortunate or tragic end, and whether this criterion exists to appease the concern of censor boards that the existence of prostitutes as protagonists in film made the profession appear desirable.

In the newly-formed Weimar Republic, endless economic struggles, the conception of the emancipated “New Woman,” and the embrace of human sexuality turned the spotlight onto a classically demonized profession that now seemed to fit within the shades of grey of this new society—the prostitute. Were prostitutes in the Weimar Republic seen as victims of the same challenges faced by a whole nation, or, were they viewed as manipulators driven by sexual desire and wealth, and therefore deserving of punishment for their sins? While many films of the era explore the prostitute character, no director examines the ambiguous nature of her existence in society quite like G.W. Pabst in Joyless Street (1925), Pandora’s Box (1929), and Diary of a Lost Girl (1929). Through an examination of the women in these films, this paper will discuss the facets of ambiguity in the portrayal of prostitution in Weimar cinema, and how these layers create a character that is never purely a victim nor a sinner. Crucial to the establishment of the prostitute character in Weimar film were the circumstances that brought her into the profession—was she a prostitute for work or for pleasure? Pabst’s films portray prostitutes in both of these capacities. Due to increased financial desperation, especially for those of the working and white-collar classes, in the 1920s prostitution became a last resort for many women in order to provide for themselves or their families. Traditionally, prostitution was associated with lower classes, but as bourgeois morality trickled down through the working class in the 20th century, the lower classes began to distance themselves from a direct connection to prostitution. As a result, the profession of prostitution was no longer attached to a specific social class, but rather came to exist in-between the working class and the bourgeois “new woman.” The prostitutes of Pabst’s films belong to a range of classes, demonstrating the “in-between status” of prostitution that blurred class lines for women involved in the profession.

Of the three films, Joyless Street most directly addresses the personalized socioeconomic circumstances that caused women of various classes to resort to prostitution in order to survive. Else—a new mother with an unemployed husband—sells her body to the butcher in order to acquire meat to feed her baby. Greta—the daughter of a civil servant who loses her pension on a risky investment—joins the cabaret after using all of her money to pay her father’s debts. Marie—the daughter of a working-class family—pimps herself in order to help pay the debts of the man she desires. It is important to note, however, that the sexual objectification of these women begins well before they enter the sex trade. Thomas J. Saunders suggests that “the nexus of sex and cash permeates or threatens to permeate all social and economic transactions,” and this is especially apparent in Greta’s story. She is fired from her secretarial job, a traditional white-collar profession for women, because she refuses her boss’ sexual advances after he wrongly assumes from the quality of her new coat that she has prostituted herself. It is therefore ironic that Greta is ultimately forced to join Madame Gill’s cabaret as a result of losing her job.

In her discussion on the relationship between white-collar women and prostitution in the Weimar Republic, Jill Suzanne Smith draws attention to the novel Münchens im Hotel and the way in which the character of Flämmchen—a white-collar woman driven by financial desperation into the sex trade—is neither victim nor whore but a savvy, determined young woman who is very aware of the tradeoffs involved in the work she takes. Some prostitutes, such as Greta, are clearly portrayed as “victims” of their financial circumstances; however, some of Pabst’s other prostitute characters are more similar to Flämmchen. These characters enter prostitution under similarly desperate conditions, but once in the profession their actions are layered with an element of playfulness and manipulation. A subtle, yet important, scene in Diary of a Lost Girl

4 Ibid.
alludes to this principle. Once the film’s homeless and desperate protagonist, Thymian, is introduced to the life of prostitution, she has the opportunity to taste champagne for the first time. Her facial expressions illustrate the allure of prostitution and its transformative potential on young women—uncertainty, curiosity, intrigue, and excitement.6

In the first half of Pandora’s Box, Lulu is the embodiment of the playful and, perhaps unintentionally, manipulative prostitute. The men in her world are her playground; she enjoys the attention and the comfort of the bourgeois lifestyle, but also will not hesitate to use her sexuality in a child-like way to ensure those affections never disappear. This is particularly evident when she ruins Schön’s engagement to a government official’s daughter by throwing a tantrum and seducing him in a closet, and when she is described in court as the mythical figure Pandora because of the way she manipulates men.7 While in the first half of the film Lulu’s character does not appear to hold the same financial desperation as the women of Joyless Street, her refusal to leave Schön could be interpreted as her attempt to cling to a life of financial security. Saunders suggests prostitution was both a form of employment and personal identity, therefore at stake for Lulu, both when Schön attempts to leave her and when she is almost “sold” as a commodity in the casino, is her ability to control her own freedom and sexual payment.8 Pabst presents a set of female characters driven into an “in-between status” because of their socioeconomic struggles, but at the same time he prevents these women from being seen as pure victims by drawing attention to the playful and manipulative aspects of prostitution.

Much of the ambiguity present in the portrayal of prostitution in the films of Weimar Germany arises from the fact that a woman’s motivations for becoming a prostitute do not necessarily decide whether she, as a character, is to be perceived as a ‘victim’ or ‘vixen.’ This becomes clear when the characters of Lulu and Thymian—both played by actress Louise Brooks—are contrasted in their respective films. In the original stage play of Pandora’s Box, creator Wedekind saw Lulu as a “sweet creature” that “inspires evil unaware” because of her sexuality.9 At first glance, Lulu seems to live up to her description as the temptress that unleashes the evils of Pandora’s Box onto the world—and yet, Louise Brooks viewed Lulu as a simple girl who was a victim of the sexualization of the “new woman.”10 While it is evident that Lulu causes


the lives of those around her to unravel—she sabotages Schön’s engagement, kills him when she herself is threatened, and ultimately drags Alwa, Schigolch, and Roberto down with her—it is worth noting that all of her actions resemble childlike tantrums. Is Lulu the manipulative, femme fatale of popular myth, or an embodiment of the sexually free “new woman” turned victim?21 Most authors that examine her character agree that she fits neither box, but is rather an “indefinable creature” created through the techniques used in Pabst’s directing and Brooks’ acting.12

The ambiguity around Lulu’s character is rooted in Pabst’s directorial choices. He never places the camera too close to Lulu, she is rarely alone in a scene, and she consistently displays either a playful smile or pouting frown in reaction to the characters around her. Thomas Elsaesser notes that in most scenes, Lulu is shown between two characters, never allowing the audience to experience an intimate moment with her.13 A prominent example of Pabst’s ambiguous point of view occurs when Lulu kills Schön. In Schön’s final moments, Pabst keeps the gun out of the camera frame so the audience cannot know for certain who pulled the trigger, sustaining Lulu’s childlike appeal while also showing the capacity to which she can embody the monster “Pandora.” Brooks complements Pabst’s use of indirect camera angles by providing the audience with a Lulu that has no gaze.14 By rarely directing her attention to the camera or the character opposite of her in the scene, Brooks defies the common expectation of German cinema that character development should be linear and inspire empathy from the audience.15

Whereas Lulu is a victim rendered with a lack of intimacy, Thymian, in Diary of a Lost Girl, is also a victim of the same circumstances but is presented in a very different light. Pabst and Brooks collaborate again to create a distinct point of view that portrays its own type of ambiguity. In contrast to Lulu’s limited spectrum of expression, Pabst places Thymian close to the camera in order to expose all of her reactions and emotions. One such example occurs when the camera closes in on Thymian’s shocked expression as she learns of the death of her child. Russell Campbell notes that the “pathos generated by the story of a woman of good character reduced to selling her body had an obvious appeal” to viewers, and it establishes Thymian as a much more empathetic character—especially when she “falls” into prostitution.16

Pabst once again uses the concept of the female gaze in order to establish character and contrast in the life of prostitution. Throughout most of the film, Thymian, unlike Lulu, addresses characters directly, and Pabst’s camera angles support her in this regard. However, once Thymian has established herself at the brothel, she takes

7 Pandora’s Box, end of Act 5. Lulu is tried for the murder of Schön, with the defending lawyer arguing she is a victim that acted out of self-defence. The prosecutor describes Lulu as ‘Pandora’, a figure in mythology whose curiosity caused her to open a box that released several plagues on the world.
8 Saunders, “The Sexual Economy and the New Woman,” 6, 8.
11 The term femme fatale refers to an attractive woman fated to bring chaos and catastrophe to the life of any man she seduces.
14 Ibid., 279.
on a 'Lulu-esque' gaze and smile as she surveys the crowd. Sabine Hake describes this effect on both Lulu and Thymian as the "mask of femininity" that makes it difficult to differentiate between "appearance and truth" in the portrayal of the female characters in Pabst's films. In this particular scene with Thymian, her mask is only broken when she sees her father sitting in the crowd, and once again the directness of her gaze returns. The concept of a "mask of femininity" is also apparent when Thymian faints before every on-screen sexual encounter. Since the audience never sees her consent to sex—both when the pharmacist rapes her and when the madam at the brothel sends her off with a client—Thymian becomes "neither an example of female oppression nor of erotic liberation." Ultimately, Lulu and Thymian represent two female stereotypes—the "femme fatale" and the "modern girl"—but Pabst's portrayal of the ambiguous prostitute is strengthened when Lulu and Thymian are considered in tandem, for together they demonstrate Brooks' ability to present two contrasting sides of femininity.

Pabst's portrayal of prostitution and masculinity in his films unnerved censor boards as well as the patriarchy itself. In order to uphold moral norms, the prostitute character traditionally faced death or isolation for her crimes, but given shifting sexual attitudes in the 1920s, filmmakers began to experiment with different prostitute narratives—much to the chagrin of censors. A significant amount of Diary of a Lost Girl was banned by the Prussian Board of Censors out of concern that the film made prostitution appear desirable and easily escaped from, and that it might entice younger audiences to explore the profession. Joyless Street drew a large amount of public attention because of its frank depiction of the economic struggles of post-war Austria and the extent women had to go to survive. However, it was heavily censored in parts of Germany and America, to the point that Pabst was forced to cut parts of the film moments before its first screening in Germany. In order to pass the censor gatekeepers, all three films examined here contain criteria that determine whether their heroines will be saved or punished for their sexual sins. This next section will examine what conditions allowed Greta and Thymian to live, and caused Else, Marie, and Lulu to face legal or fatal repercussions for their behaviour in their respective stories.

One of the fundamental conditions to be "saved" in these films is for the prostitutes to ultimately take actions that condemns prostitution, and thus reaffirm the erotic liberation. As a result of these decisions, the women follow parallel stories. Marie murders one of Egon's other lovers and is asked to join the board of the reformatory that once imprisoned her. Instead of taking the staunch attitude of the other board members, Thymian shows kindness and empathy for the struggles of the girls in the reformatory. Campbell suggests that what "these women may really be guilty of, in the patriarchal mind, is enjoying their sexualities" and that only the "reformed prostitute" will be saved by the love and charity of men. This holds true in Joyless Street and Diary of a Lost Girl. Greta is first scorned by her American love interest for joining the cabaret, but when her circumstances are revealed, he rescues her from the brothel. Thymian is first saved from the reformatory by Count Osdorff, and her marriage to him allows her to start a new life. After Osdorff's suicide, his uncle steps in to ensure Thymian is able to live in financial and social security. While Thymian still makes her own decisions, she loses her independence and her status becomes tied to the tolerance of the patriarchy. Campbell suggests women that demonstrate an ability to survive on their own through prostitution must meet a tragic end because they offer "too much of...
Lulu is a prime example of this principle in Pandora’s Box. Throughout the film, Lulu’s very existence twists traditional patriarchal figures into her unintentional slaves—Schon commits social suicide to marry Lulu, Alwa loses everything to run off with his father’s murderer, and Schigolch and Rodrigo get roped into the scheme because of their connection to her. Perhaps the inclusion of the Countess as one of the figures infatuated with Lulu was orchestrated in order to lessen the attack on masculine audiences by suggesting that even women could fall victim to Lulu’s charms. Both Campbell and Roberta Perkins stress that in the analysis of prostitute narratives, it is important to consider the influence of the male perspectives that created such narratives, as well as the films’ intended audience.

Censor boards were careful to ensure these films did not paint prostitution in a positive light for the young women already influenced by the image of the free and independent “new woman.” Subsequently, there was also concern about wounding the already fragile egos of a financially struggling white-collar class of males. As a result, films centred on prostitution had to strike a delicate balance between establishing the prostitute as an object of desire for male viewers, but also as “an object of hatred, symbolizing everything in the female other he wishes to deny or destroy.” Based on these principles, Lulu—a character that drags the men around her down the social ladder—is not permitted to survive the film. Her death at the hands of Jack the Ripper, after offering him sex without payment, contains the perfect amount of irony to appease the uncertainties of male audiences. By ending the film on an image of ‘proper’ women volunteers for the Salvation Army, Lulu’s death is denied the attention befitting of a tragic heroine, and strips her of the victim status that unsettled critics of the film.

G.W. Pabst’s Joyless Street, Pandora’s Box, and Diary of a Lost Girl are films that confront the image of prostitution in a society of change. While all three films are based on novels or plays, the source materials for Pandora’s Box and Diary of a Lost Girl were published in 1904 and 1905 respectively. This suggests that Pabst intentionally reinterpreted the source material and shot the films to reflect the societal values and issues of Weimar Germany specifically. Bound to an extent by the expectations of censors and the public, Pabst creates an ambiguous image of the Weimar prostitute that indicates a dichotomy between motivations of financial desperation and pleasure, a blurred definition of victimization, and ultimately establishes a set of criteria that decide whether the prostitute will experience moral redemption or condemnation. The debate on the victimization of prostitutes in Weimar film can be summarized into a question posed by Russell Campbell: “Did she jump, or was she pushed?” Pabst’s films suggest that women could enter prostitution under either circumstance. However, perhaps the greater problem lies in society’s tendency to turn a blind-eye to the circumstances of the woman poised on the precipice—only when she falls is she acknowledged, and then blamed for her plummet from propriety.

---

29 Campbell, Marked Women, 27.
Filmography

Joyless Streets (1925) directed by G.W. Pabst
Pandora’s Box (1929) directed by G.W. Pabst
Diary of a Lost Girl (1929) directed by G.W. Pabst

Bibliography