Rarely do abstract academic theories provoke immediate and contentious reaction in the pragmatic world of competitive party politics. Practical politics, it is commonly supposed, consist in compromise, brokerage, patronage and, above all, electioneering; the traditions and modes of political thought are considered alien to the immediacy of political experience.

Yet political commentators, practising politicians amongst them, enlivened the televised proceedings of the February, 1976 Progressive Conservative leadership convention with a sometimes banal, sometimes illuminating, discussion of the philosophical complexities of the Red Tory phenomenon. And one 1976 leadership candidate demanded the expulsion of the Red Tories from the party — because their philosophy resembled too closely that of the Liberals, while a prominent journalist countered with the claim that the Red Tories were the only laudable members of the parliamentary party. Moreover, ‘chateau clique’ Conservatives — and even some of their less extremist colleagues — use ‘Red Tory’ as an expletive to denounce fellow caucus members with an aversion to the laissez-faire doctrine.

In all the discussion and the vigorous invective, however, no clear picture of the Red Tory emerges. On occasion he appears as a benevolent Conservative devoid of the stern virtues, on occasion as a Conservative who puts order before freedom. Sometimes he is seen as the defender of lower class rights, sometimes as the enemy of free enterprise. It is clear who the Red Tories in the Progressive Conservative Party are considered to be — Flora MacDonald, John Fraser and Gordon Fairweather are among the more obvious ‘Reds’. But it is not always as clear what distinguishing characteristics the Red Tories are deemed to possess, although “collectivist Conservative” and “socialist Conservative” are among the descriptions employed by their detractors inside the party and “compassionate Conservative” and “humanitarian Conservative” are epithets offered by their admirers.

What, then, is a Red Tory, and what importance does the concept have for understanding Canadian political practice? The term was employed by Gad Horowitz, and it received its widest currency in his Canadian Labour in Politics. Horowitz considers traditional Tory ideas to be “corporate-organic-collectivist” while those of liberalism are “rationalist-egalitarian” and “in-
dividualist". The Red Tory is "a conscious ideological Conservative with some "odd" socialist notions . . . or a conscious ideological socialist with some "odd" Tory notions". Such Conservatives and socialists are seen to have significantly more in common with each other than either has with the Liberals. "The tory and socialist minds have some crucial assumptions, orientations and values in common, so that from a certain angle they may appear not as enemies but as two different expressions of the same basic ideological outlook. Thus, at the very highest level, the red tory is a philosopher who combines elements of toryism and socialism so thoroughly in an integrated Weltanschauung that it is impossible to say that he is a proponent of either one as against the other." George Grant, as evidenced in his Lament for a Nation, is offered as an example of a thoroughgoing Red Tory, while W.L. Morton and Eugene Forsey (the latter before his conversion to Trudeauesque Liberalism) are viewed respectively as Conservative and socialist proponents of the Red Tory position.

For Horowitz, the "primary carrier" of the Tory ideology in Canada "has been the Conservative Party". He concedes that "It would not be correct to say that toryism is the ideology of the party or even that some Conservatives are pure tories . . . The primary component of the ideology of business-oriented parties is liberalism; but there are powerful traces of the old liberal outlook in the British Conservative party, and less powerful but still perceptible traces of it in the Canadian party." He adds that "It is possible to perceive in Canadian Conservatism not only the elements of business liberalism and orthodox elitist-collectivist toryism, but also an element of "tory democracy" or "tory radicalism" — a paternalistic concern for the condition of the working class and a picture of the Conservative Party as their champion against unenlightened elements of the bourgeoisie."

The Horowitz thesis has by now become a part of Canadian academic conventional wisdom, it has had a significant influence on subsequent writings on Canadian political thought (W. Christian and C. Campbell's Political Parties and Ideologies in Canada being the most notable recent example), and it serves to provide rationalizations for students who are unable to distinguish the behaviour of Canadian political parties. It is also entirely misleading with regard both to Conservative philosophy and Conservative practice and with respect both to the present and the past of Conservatism.

The thesis offered here is that Conservatism is explicitly more a form of Whig than Tory doctrine, and has been since its origins in the nineteenth century — and hence "business liberalism" is an integral not an alien aspect of Conservatism; that Grant, Horowitz, and Christian and Campbell confuse Conservatism with absolutism and romanticism; and that the Toryism they describe has had a negligible effect on English Canadian political practice, at least since the 1840's — and, for that matter, its influence on British Conservatism has been of only secondary significance.
The French Revolution was the catalyst not only of a new political order. As a rationalistic product of the radical Enlightenment, it transformed — some naively imagine that with Destutt de Tracy it introduced — political ideology. Henceforward, political philosophy would address itself to the assumptions, precepts and practices of the revolution. To be sure, the rationalist era had begun long before, with Bacon, Hobbes and Machiavelli. But the essentially individualistic elements of rationalism had appeared even earlier in the works of Aquinas, who, in his *Commentary on the Nichomachean Ethics*, had conceived of society not as analogous with an organism but as a unit of order which guaranteed and reinforced a significant sphere of individual independence. And in the *Summa contra gentiles* Aquinas had noted further that there is not only a communal good but also a "human good which does not consist in a community but pertains to each individual as a self". It would, of course, be unwarrantable to view St. Thomas as in any manner the father of revolution. Indeed, in the *Summa theologiae* he espoused the traditional Catholic view of society as a system of ends and purposes in which the lower serves the higher and the higher directs and guides the lower. Nonetheless, it is in St. Thomas' writings that we see the demise of feudal philosophy in which, to exaggerate the point, the individual existed solely for ends other than his own. It is indeed in Aquinas that we first witness the origins of the emancipation of the individual from feudalist fetters. With Aquinas the stage was being set for a philosophical climate in which the individual's self-realization would become the criterion of a successful polity. It was this mode of thought and its attendant conduct which, in the manner in which it was developed in the writings of Condorcet, Helvétius, Voltaire and the Encyclopaedists as the emancipation of the passions, culminated in the French Revolution.

Three major oppositional strains emerged from the Revolution: the self-interested rationalizations of the threatened and the dispossessed — *absolutism*; *political romanticism*; and *Burkean Whiggism*. All three have been, and are, commonly labeled 'conservative', although they are discrete and usually contradictory phenomena. This commonality of label, however, has led to a continued misunderstanding of the nature of the conservatism which has influenced Canada, Britain and, to a lesser but not insignificant degree, the United States.

The longest-lived and most successful version of *reactionary absolutism* was in the successive and confused Germanic regimes of the nineteenth century. Despite the prevalence of liberal nationalist ideals, at least amongst the intelligentsia, the inability to overcome the petty particularism of the minor principalities forced liberal thinkers to be devoid of lasting influence or to side equivocally and despairingly with the Hapsburgs or the Hohenzollerns in order
to ensure the creation of some form of Germanic national state in which they — perhaps naively — believed their liberal ideals could be developed. The consequence, of course, was that Austria and Prussia could afford to ignore liberal philosophy and continue to conduct domestic politics almost as if the revolution had never occurred; and if they needed any intellectual sustenance it was to be found in the persuasive rhetoric of Friedrich von Gentz and Georg Hegel.

Von Gentz employed the "principle of legitimacy" to defend the regimes and practices of Metternich and the Holy Alliance. The principle of legitimacy amounts to no more than a resurrection of the mediaeval dictum that something is justifiable if it has been sanctioned by history; previous practice is itself a guarantee of appropriateness. Prima facie this resembles Burke's view of prescription whereby a constitution has legitimacy "because it is a constitution whose sole authority is that it has existed time out of mind." The difference is that, for Burke, the prescriptive constitution was the appropriate vehicle for reform, albeit reform with a delicate touch; for von Gentz, the principle of legitimacy was the means to evade reform. Von Gentz stressed tradition, order and stability, as did Edmund Burke, but whereas Burke developed these principles as the means to liberty, von Gentz employed them to avoid the necessity of liberty. Indeed, von Gentz translated and popularized Burke's Reflections on the Revolution in France and added a commentary depicting Burke as a defender not just of the constitution of the ancien régime (which in some measure he was) but of its aims and values (which in good measure he was not). Von Gentz was, however, not a philosopher but a publicist, an employee of Prince Metternich and secretary to the successive congresses of Vienna, Aachen, Troppau, Laibach and Verona. His was the task of defending the interests of his masters, not the task of propagating values in themselves. It is, indeed, the tragedy of conservative philosophy that it lends itself to the ready rationalizations of the unscrupulous. H.M. Drucker is wrong to assert that, for Burke, "tradition per se is sacred" — as Burke himself notes, in that case the frequency of crime would be an argument of innocence — but Drucker is right to claim that through Burke we "get a defence useful to every established tyranny" provided it is recognized that it is only through a dishonest — or at best unwitting — manipulation of Burke's words that such a defence is possible. It was such a defence that von Gentz provided — wittingly or unwittingly — to the benefit of the absolutist Hapsburgs and against the Burkean balanced constitution, derived from Locke and Montesquieu.

In Prussia the Baron vom Stein's reforms of 1807 — abolition of serfdom, free exchange and disposal of landed property, and the free choice of occupation — seemed to toll the death knell of the old absolutism, but after the defeat of Napoleon, the disillusionment engendered by the crop failures of 1816-17, and the economic crisis which followed the adoption of freer trade policies, reaction set in, vom Stein's reforms were nullified, and absolutism was
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— more or less — restored. Prussia remained an unregenerate and unrepentant
autocracy which found nourishment in the turgid but compelling prose of
Hegel. Unlike von Gentz, Hegel was nobody’s dupe but he wove such a tangle-
ed web of philosophical intrigue that freedom was fulfilled in its own nega-
tion. For Hegel, the state was the possessor of infallible knowledge, tolerance
thus became a ‘‘criminal weakness’’, and the individual achieved his freedom
in subordinating himself to the state, for the aggrandizement of which he ex-
isted and acted through ‘‘the cunning of reason’’, and which, as ‘‘God walking
upon the earth’’, was the embodiment of morality, reason and spirit. There is,
of course, much more to Hegel than his theory of the state — his justifiably
renowned critical dialectic, for example. But in so far as Hegel was a conservative
and in so far as German conservatives acknowledged their indebtedness to
Hegel, it was Hegel’s absolutist Staatstheorie which was significant: If Hegel
was not the rationalizer of Hohenzollern dynastic interests, nonetheless the
Hohenzollerns could have wished for no better champion.

With Hegel — at least with Hegel as he was interpreted by his contem-
poraries — we have the epitomized proponent of Horowitz’ ‘‘corporate-
organic-collectivist’’ philosophy, although there is no Red Tory element, no
defence of the interests of the underprivileged. Indeed, for Hegel, no defence
is necessary. The prince represents the spirit and will of the whole people.
Universal freedom is achieved only when it is realized in an individual but there
are no necessary conflicts among individuals or among classes. Distinctive
classes exist as organic wholes, each with its own intrinsic honour, but the ob-
jective freedom of all is realized not in the mobility to transcend class, nor in
the individual pursuit of excellence within a class, but in acquiescence in one’s
estate and submission to the absolute state in which all conflicts subside.

Hegel’s thought was, indeed, grist to the mill of absolutism. However, in-
sofar as Hegel’s philosophy of the state may be described as conservative —
though reactionary or absolutist might be more appropriate categories — it is
not a conservatism which has had any influence on Canadian thought or prac-
tice. There were no British collectivist Hegelians to influence British North
America or the nascent Canadian state. To be sure, British idealists such as
Green, Bosanquet and Hobhouse owed a measure of acknowledged debt to
Hegel, and Bosanquet espoused certain elements of his statism, but none could
in any significant measure be described as ‘‘corporate-organic-collectivist’’.

To find a philosopher remotely representing ‘‘corporate-organic-collectivist’’
thinking in British ideational history, other perhaps than Bosanquet and
Hobhouse (both of whom were liberals, not conservatives), one has to resort to
work prior to the revolution of 1688, to the hapless Robert Filmer and his
Patriarcha published in 1680. Filmer preached the divine right of kings and the
duty of passive obedience to the monarch. Already an anachronism when it was
written, Patriarcha’s only significance was the easy sport it afforded Algernon
Sidney and John Locke in refuting its every point. Probably the last reputable defence of mediaeval and feudal conceptions of society in Britain were Sir Thomas More’s *Utopia* (1516), in which was advocated a cooperative commonwealth inimical to emerging capitalist principles, (whereby it was becoming morally laudable to “buy abroad very cheap and sell again exceeding dear”), and Richard Hooker’s *Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity* (1594-97 and posthumously) in which were defended the rights of the established church via a necessary obedience of all citizens to the law for all time because “corporations are immortal”. For Hooker, “There is no way in which a society can withdraw its consent from an authority which it has set up”. It would nonetheless be an exaggeration to view these philosophies in Horowitz’ collectivist terms, although collectivist elements are clearly contained within them.

After Filmer, English philosophy lost the remaining vestiges of its Tory ideas — at least if Tory meant “corporate-organic-collectivist”. Certainly, Tory ideas might have continued to flourish without any sophisticated literature to bolster their cause. But already by the early eighteenth century Montesquieu was describing England as the nation par excellence of liberty and of capitalism and the nation where individualism abounded. By our modern standards we might consider Montesquieu to have exaggerated the point, but it is clear that insofar as liberty, capitalism and individualism flourished more in England than elsewhere they were accompanied by a demise in that “corporate-organic-collectivist” ideology that would have denounced them. Toryism as a philosophy in Britain was moribund by 1688; as an ideology even, it was ceasing to have influence by 1789, though it would be revived in novel form in the Victorian era by Carlyle and Disraeli.

The second reaction against the French Revolution is to be found in political romanticism which had its origins in the French religious traditionalists: Joseph de Maistre, Louis de Bonald and Félicité de Lamennais. Theirs was the belief that all societal ills could be ascribed to the French Revolution and the radical Enlightenment which had spawned it. Theirs was a feudal belief in the virtues of absolutist royalism and paternalistic religion, in the need for man to be governed, and in the need for him to be governed according to transcendental, and usually ultramontanist, principles. Above all, they despised the unsatisfying pretensions of individual liberty, the greedy materialism of capitalism and the arrogant pretended omniscience of scientific thought.

The more elaborate political romanticism which emerged from traditionalism was developed mainly in the social, political and economic confusion that was Germany and took various forms in the writings of Schleiermacher, F.W. von Schelling and von Savigny, but its most complete and influential spokesman was Adam Muller who thought of the corporative society of mediaeval feudalism as an absolute ideal. Yet, like Hegel, he glorified the
state, describing it as "a moral personality" and as "the eternal alliance of men among themselves":

The state is not a mere industry, an estate, an insurance agency or a commercial establishment; it is the earnest association of the total physical and spiritual needs, the total physical and spiritual property, the total domestic and external life of a nation in one great energetic, infinite and active whole.\(^1\)

The political romantics denied the inherent equality of all human beings, rejected economic competition and its attendant law of supply and demand, and demanded the reimposition of the authoritarian constitutive principles of the pre-absolutist mediaeval state. As Kurt Reinhardt has expressed it, "The state was no longer considered as a mechanical aggregation of individuals but as an organic whole whose functions were not confined to the maintenance of law and order but included the political, social, moral, and religious education of its citizens. Human society in its concrete historic manifestations was to be strictly delimited by a community of linguistic, moral, and racial characteristics".\(^1\)

It is this philosophy which most closely resembles Horowitz' Red Toryism; and which is akin to the ideas espoused by Grant in his *Lament for a Nation*. It rejects both industrialism — whereby, in Müller's words, the proletarian "loses the simple, natural feeling of well-being which is the hallmark of the uncorrupted peasant, and receives nothing in exchange"\(^2\) — and capitalism. As a precursor to Marx, and in language later borrowed by Herbert Marcuse, Müller railed against the division of labour and the one-dimensional man it produces:

When the division of labour in the large cities and manufacturing and mining regions dissect men — fully free men — into wheels, cogs, cylinders, spokes, spindles and the like, it restricts them to a totally one-dimensional sphere of the already one-dimensional sphere of the satisfaction of a single need.\(^2\)

The fundamental difference is that, while Marx foresees a radicalization of the nature of industrial economy through a proletarian revolution, Müller rejects industrialism and eulogizes the feudal agricultural community.\(^2\) Whereas
Marx considers the state to function as the executive committee of the bourgeoisie and to be destined as the temporary embodiment of proletarian interests before it withers away, for Müller it is an eternal alliance representing the interests of the totality of the people.

Political romanticism, then, involves a static conception of society in which order ousts liberty, solidarity replaces individuality and duties predetermine rights. The major proponent of this philosophy in Britain was Thomas Carlyle who attacked laissez-faire theory and parliamentary government and espoused the strong, paternalistic state. In his *Past and Present* (1843) Carlyle contrasted the disorder of contemporary society with the security and stability of twelfth century England. The English romantics (Coleridge, Southey, Kingsley and Ruskin among them) rejected modernity and its discomfiting economic practices. They wanted a return to the feudal agricultural community. Not so Burke, who recognized the worth of the eighteenth century land enclosures.

Like the romantics, Disraeli in his novels *Tancred, Sybil* and *Coningsby* espoused a philosophy of an organic feudal union of the classes of England under the leadership of the traditional landed aristocracy — which Burke had castigated as "an austere and insolent domination". After a period as a Radical with three promising but unsuccessful attempts against Whigs to secure a parliamentary seat Disraeli was accepted by the Tories and joined an anachronistic elitist group called 'Young England' whose "creed was an escapist, romantic belief in the virtues of the old feudal system under which, as they maintained, the nobleman and his peasants were bound by ties of mutual loyalty and benevolence, the Church was an integral part of society, and the monarch not only reigned but ruled". 23

Disraeli was, indeed, a Tory, not a conservative, at least in his writings if not always in his political practice. His was the desire to resurrect the pre-1688 paternalistic state, to realize his image of a humanitarian feudalism which, in fact, had not previously existed, and to negate the recent British history so admired by Montesquieu, Locke and Burke. Conservatism, in the British sense, was a new phenomenon now castigated by Disraeli. Indeed, it was in response to the writings of Edmund Burke that a conscious principled conservatism first achieved any political influence. Burke's French disciples coined the term 'conservative' which was adopted by the new British party that was now a mixture of old Whigs and liberal Tories once the followers of Pitt and Portland had united.

The Conservatism which superseded Toryism was a synthesis of waxing Whig and waning Tory doctrines, sympathetic to the burgeoning capitalism, favourable to greater religious toleration and amenable to, if not enthusiastic about, the political emancipation of the middle classes. It was this novel phenomenon, inspired by Pitt's policies at the end of the eighteenth century and brought to fruition by Peel in the 1830's and '40's which was repudiated
by Disraeli. As he told the House of Commons, "a Conservative government is an organized hypocrisy" — for abandoning its commitment to the "Gentlemen of England". Certainly, Disraeli was an anachronism in the British Conservative Party, a relic of a past that had died before the close of the eighteenth century and a phenomenon that was not to be repeated in the Conservative Party after the Victorian age of equipoise had closed, but he was an anachronism that has confounded the analysts of British conservatism. Thus W.H. Greenleaf, perplexed by the contradiction between a Disraelitype of collectivist conservatism and a Robert Cecil type of individualistic conservatism ("I have a fanatical belief in individual freedom", Cecil told the House of Commons in 1913, "I believe it is a vital thing for this country, and I believe it is the cornerstone upon which our prosperity and existence is built") is led to conclude that "a party's unity has to be found elsewhere than in its doctrines". However, although there are statist and mildly organicist elements in the British Conservative Party, since Lloyd George's "collectivist" Liberalism in the early decades of this century, Conservatives have been consistently less statist than either Liberals or Labourites. The debate in the British Conservative Party has been about the degree to which individualism should be curbed, not about whether individual freedom and responsibility are in principle to be approved. And in Canada the Conservatives have been at least equally libertarian since the nineteenth century.

The third type of oppositional strain against the French Revolution — and the one to have had the most profound effect on the politics of the English-speaking democracies — is epitomized in the writings of Edmund Burke and is one which was friendly to the ordered emancipation of individuality — diversity of human character, variety of human action, greater individual economic responsibility — if decidedly not to an aggressive individualism. Burke was revered by nineteenth century Liberals who "claimed him for their own" and it is also generally accepted that "in so far as conservatism had a political philosophy it was derived from Burke". American Conservatives, such as Russell Kirk and Peter Viereck, regard him as their chief mentor, and George Sabine asserts, in admittedly less than convincing manner, that "the conservatism of Disraeli [is] derived substantially from Burke".

If the Gladstonian Liberal Viscount Morley's laudatory biography of Burke, where the eighteenth century Anglo-Irish philosopher-politician is applauded as a classical liberal thinker, and J.R. White's view of Burke as the philosophical founder of modern British Conservatism, are compatible, then the current castigation of many modern Progressive Conservatives as unwitting classical liberals is unfounded, for conservatism and classical liberalism may be merely different emphases within the same general doctrine.

In fact, in his An Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs, Burke is quite explicit on the classification of his own philosophy. He regarded it as the
philosophy of the old Whigs — the "Old Corps", as he called them — the philosophy of the moderate Revolutionaries of 1688, of those who understood that one reformed the errors of the past with due deference to the wisdom of the past, of those who understood that the iniquities of a monarchy demanded amendment not abolition. The supporter of the American Revolution and advocate of greater respect for the traditions of India and Quebec in their colonial government opposed the French Revolution because it failed to show due deference to French history, not because all of its reformist ideals were illusory but because a revolution which rejected its own history would produce, as Burke accurately predicted, a reign of terror rather than an effective institutionalization of liberty. "People will not look forward to posterity", he admonished, "who never look backward to their ancestors".

Burke was adamantly not opposed to reform:

A state without the means of some change is without the means of its conservation. Without such means it might even risk the loss of that part of the Constitution which it wished the most religiously to preserve. The two principles of conservation and correction operated strongly at the two critical periods of the Restoration and Revolution, when England found itself without a king. At both those periods the nation had lost the bond of union in their ancient edifice: they did not, however, dissolve the whole fabric. On the contrary, in both cases they regenerated the deficient part of the old Constitution through the parts which were not impaired. They kept these old parts exactly as they were, that the part recovered might be suited to them.

Indeed, Burke espoused reform — a disposition to preserve and the ability to improve was his criterion of a good statesman — but he insisted that "A spirit of reformation is never more consistent with itself than when it refused to be rendered the means of destruction".

It would be no great exaggeration to read Burke’s writings as a corrective commentary on John Locke’s *Two Treatises on Civil Government* — though they are, of course, not only that. Locke’s *Two Treatises* anticipated the assumptions of the 1688 Revolution which Burke believed to provide the foundation of Britain’s balanced constitution. Locke advocated limited monarchy; Burke was concerned that further diminutions of the monarch’s powers might disturb the delicate balance of the constitution, though he was quick to de-
nounce George III's excesses and thus described the American revolution as "a revolution not made, but prevented". Locke emphasized moderation, tolerance and reason; Burke refined moderation into a sophisticated theory of cautious and pragmatic reform, noting that "every prudent act . . . is founded on compromise and barter"; he reiterated the precept of tolerance, but warned that "There is, however, a limit at which forbearance ceases to be a virtue"; and he railed against the abstract reason of the Enlightenment which was derived from "a certain intemperance of intellect [which was] the disease of the time, and the source of all its other diseases". "It is with man in the concrete; it is with common human life, and human actions you are to be concerned".

Locke developed a contract theory of society and Burke elevated it to a higher plane as:

a clause in the great primaeval contract of eternal society, linking the lower with the higher natures, connecting the visible and invisible world, according to a fixed contract sanctioned by the invisible oath which holds all physical and all moral natures, each in their appointed place. This law is not subject to the will of those, who by an obligation above them, and infinitely superior, are bound to submit their will to that law.

Locke espoused the principle of individual rights; Burke confirmed their importance but demanded that real rather than imaginary, concrete rather than formal and abstract grievances be remedied to ensure those rights. "Wise men", he exhorted, "will apply their remedies to vices, not to names". Locke and Burke concurred on the importance of private property and Locke advocated greater individualistic economic freedoms while Burke acknowledged his indebtedness to the laissez faire theories of Adam Smith. For Locke, rebellion "was justified, but only after a long train of abuses, not every little mismanagement" while, for Burke, tyranny should be opposed but "Governments must be abused and deranged indeed . . . before revolution can be thought of; and the prospect of the future must be as bad as the experience of the past."

For Locke:

liberty is to be free from restraint and violence from others, which cannot be where there is not law; but freedom is not, as we are told: a liberty for every man to do what he
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lists — for who could be free, when every other man’s humour might domineer over him? — but a liberty to dispose and order as he lists his person, actions, possessions and his whole property, within the allowance of those laws under which he is, and therein not to be subject to the arbitrary will of another, but freely follow his own.42

For Burke, on the other hand, liberty is secured not only by law but by order and tradition, by Prescription and Providence. As Francis Canavan has expressed it:

Burke conceived of men’s rights and liberties as concrete parts of an actual social order on which their existence depended. Rights have meaning and effect only when they exist in a society structured by rank and property, ordered by law, and supported by long-standing sentiments and prejudices. In Burke’s social philosophy, therefore, the idea of order is primary.43

Burke provides, indeed, a healthy measure of conservative restraint on the Lockean Whig ideals of individual liberty, individual rights, the power of human reason, and even to a degree on individuality itself. Burkean Conservatism restricts liberty by order (‘manly, moral, regulated liberty’, Burke calls it), rights by duties, individual reason by the wisdom of ages, and individuality by community. It espouses the sterner virtues of self-restraint — “constancy, gravity, magnanimity, fortitude, fidelity and firmness [which are closely allied to [the] . . . disagreeable quality [of] . . . obstinacy’’.44 These ‘‘virtues which restrain the appetite’’ Burke contrasts with the values of the philosophers of the Enlightenment who:

substitute a virtue which they call humanity or benevolence. But this means their morality has no idea in it of restraint, or indeed of a distinct settled principle of any kind.45

In the final analysis, Burkean conservatism is concerned with the balance among competing but objective goods46:
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We see that the parts of the system do not clash. The evils latent in the most promising contrivances are provided for as they arise. One advantage is as little as possible sacrificed to another. We compensate, we reconcile, we balance. We are enabled to unite into a consistent whole the various anomalies and contending principles that are found in the minds and affairs of man. From hence arises, not an excellence in simplicity, but one far superior, an excellence in composition.47

In Burke’s various works the notion of a “corporate-organic-collectivist” philosophy is decidedly absent. Unlike the romantics who denounced a philosophy of individual rights and liberties, Burke only diminished them to make them more effectively realized. Unlike the romantics who abhorred the free market economy, Burke welcomed it, but noted that “Mere parsimony is not economy . . . Expense and great expense, may be essential part of true economy”.48 Unlike the romantics who espoused the strongest possible state, Burke asserted that while “abstractedly speaking, government . . . is good”49 and while government is natural and the state is a divinely ordained moral essence, nonetheless “Whatever each man can separately do, without trespassing upon others, he has a right to do for himself”.50 If Locke is, as is commonly assumed, the stimulus for a moderate liberal Whiggism, Burke is the philosopher of a moderate conservative Whiggism.

III

It is undeniably true that in general Progressive Conservatives today espouse free enterprise principles significantly more enthusiastically than do Liberals. Indeed, any casual visit to a Progressive Conservative riding association meeting should convince the visitor that it is their espousal of individual responsibility, sterner virtues and free enterprise which the members believe distinguishes them from their political adversaries. And G.W. Baldwin, Alberta Progressive Conservative M.P., claims that the essential difference between Conservatives and others is that the Conservatives are more individualistic,51 while what behaviouralist research has been done on party attitudes bears out this conclusion.52

If early Conservative philosophy was in some measure and manner “corporate-organic-collectivist” then we are forced to the conclusion that modern Conservatives deny their own heritage; they must be seen to be repudiating their own history. W. Christian and C. Campbell assert that
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"Toryism is one important strand of Canadian Conservatism, and is the most important element which distinguishes it from Liberalism. To the Liberal belief in individualism and freedom, the Conservative adds a belief in collectivism and privilege". But surely, whatever the supposed founding philosophies of the parties, it is the Liberal who is less individualistic, who more willingly proffers collectivist solutions to social problems, at least if we are to believe everyday journalism and the conclusions of empirical research which soothe the prejudices of our common sense observations. If Christian and Campbell's view is correct we are constrained to accept the improbable thesis not only that both parties have renounced their own past but that each has taken as its own the position formerly held by the other.

Common sense tells us that the Liberals are, in fact, the heirs to the moderate utilitarian liberalism of John Stuart Mill with its social democratic overtones, to the allegedly "collectivist" liberal ideas brought to early fruition by David Lloyd George in Britain and aired in Canada by Mackenzie King in his Industry and Humanity; and if those ideas remained unrealized for sometime in Canada it is in part because Mackenzie King appeared to believe that the humanitarian expression of an idea already entailed its implementation — but that is altogether another story. Canadian Conservatives, on the other hand, are — and have continuously been — the legitimate heirs to John Locke, to the Whigs, and to what we sometimes perhaps misleadingly call classical liberalism, by the way of Burkean restraints on the "new" Whiggism. And if there is little validity in that thesis then the claims of the many renowned Conservatives who have criticized the party at various times for not living up to its laissez-faire traditions — Lord Atholston, Sir William Mackenzie, Richard Bennett and Arthur Meighen amongst them — are not only exaggerations — which they undoubtedly are — but they must indicate also that such Conservatives had a surprisingly erroneous view not only of their own party's recent history but of the very political world they inhabited.

What evidence, then, do Horowitz and Christian and Campbell offer for their belief in the significant collectivist element in Canadian Conservatism? Horowitz tells us that "figures such as R.B. Bennett, Arthur Meighen, and George Drew cannot be understood simply as Canadian versions of William McKinley, Herbert Hoover and Robert Taft...The Canadian Conservatives lack the American aura of rugged individualism. Theirs is not the characteristically American conservatism which conserves only liberal values". Yet Arthur Meighen asserted: "I am an individualist" and he denounced the increasing statism of Canada:

There has spread through the world in recent times a creed that Governments must be the director and protector of
everybody, and in some way bring about equalization by destroying self-reliance and self-responsibility. Charity does not mean protection through life's storms. It does not mean shelter from the battle and a withering of the wrestling thews. It does not even mean benefaction, or bounty, or paternalism; and anyway, benefaction, or bounty, or paternalism are hardly ever of value. Paternalism can produce only greenhouse plants, and a greenhouse generation will surely go down in the battle of the strong.56

For Meighen, man's appropriate destiny lay in "self-reliance and self-responsibility"; the modern conflict was between "the State on the one hand and the free man on the other". From Bennett's correspondence we read:

The difficulty...is that too much reliance is being placed upon the Government. The people are not bearing their share of the load. Half a century ago people would work their way out of their difficulties rather than look to a government to take care of them. The fibre of some of our people has grown softer and they are not willing to turn in and save themselves. They now complain because they have no money. When they were earning money many of them spent it in speculation and in luxury. 'Luxury' means anything a man has not an immediate need for, having regard to his financial position.

I do not know what the present movement may be, but unless it induces men and women to think in terms of honest toil rather than in terms of bewilderment because of conditions which they helped to create, the end of organized society is not far distant.57

And George Drew announced that:

Economic freedom is the essence of competitive enterprise, and competitive enterprise is the foundation of our democratic system. We believe in the widest possible measure of personal liberty consistent with law, order and the general welfare.58
If all three are not rugged individualists in the American manner they come perilously close to it.

Horowitz notes that "Morton exhorts Canadian Conservatives to embrace the welfare state on the ground that 'laissez-faire and rugged individualism' are foreign to 'conservative principles'." And, indeed, a good case can be made that they are. On conservative principles "laissez-faire" must be subordinated to the national interest, to the principles of order. But this means only that free enterprise is in principle to be approved but restricted when necessary. As the conservative devotee of laissez-faire, Michael Oakeshott, has pointed out, the doctrine is frequently confused with "that imaginary condition of wholly unfettered competition", and it is perfectly compatible with the doctrine to believe that "undertakings in which competition cannot be made to work as the agency of control must be transferred to public operation". Certainly, when the Conservatives first espoused some of the principles of the welfare state at the unofficial Port Hope convention of 1942 they thought them quite consistent with the adopted resolution that Conservatives should:

strongly advocate the strengthening of the basic Canadian tradition of individual initiative and individual enterprise and opportunity and the freeing of economic activities from bureaucratic controls.

Nor were they inconsistent; for effective individual initiative and enterprise may be seen to be dependent on a minimal equality whereby none is deprived ab initio of the opportunity to strive effectively.

Horowitz asks "Can one conceive of a respected philosopher of Republicanism denouncing 'rugged individualism' as foreign to traditional Republican principles?" Indeed one can; at least if Republicanism is equated with American conservatism. And the more reputable the more likely. Russell Kirk, Clinton Rossiter, Harry Jaffa and Peter Viereck immediately come to my mind. To take but one instance at random, in his Conservatism Revisited Viereck denounces the excesses of Barry Goldwater's "Old Guard Republicanism" as inimical to the principles of American Conservatism. The difference between the American and the Canadian Conservative is that the latter has more easily accepted the Burkean restrictions on radical Whiggism; and at least some American philosophical conservatives strongly regret Republican excesses. While it is certainly true that American conservatives are more inclined to aggressive individualism than their Canadian counterparts, the difference is one of degree not of kind, although that difference makes for a significantly different political practice. It is no unfathomable paradox that the
best-known contemporary American philosopher of conservatism, Russell Kirk, is a Burke scholar, an exponent of the principles of reverence, prudence and prescription, who frequently scolds the best-known contemporary British conservative philosopher, Michael Oakeshott, for being too deeply imbued with Thomas Hobbes and laissez-faire. Nor is it poor historiography when Kirk describes the conservatism of John Adams, John Randolph, John Quincy Adams and Orestes Brownson — to mention a few — as conservatism in — more or less — the Burkean manner.

In truth, Horowitz has chosen poor examples of his un-American Canadian Conservatives. He would have been better served by Macdonald and Borden. Nonetheless, even there, the conservative virtues of prudence, order, moderation and balance may be seen as infringements on individualism, not as essentially inimical to it. When Horowitz does turn his attention to Macdonald he demonstrates the immediate speciousness of his thesis. He asserts that “Sir John A. Macdonald’s approach to the emergent working class was in some respects similar to Disraeli’s”. In fact, Macdonald believed in a restricted middle-class franchise, though he was forced to concede almost manhood suffrage in 1885, and the legislation he introduced in 1872 to protect trade unions was an almost verbatim reproduction of Gladstone’s 1871 Trade Union Act in the United Kingdom. And the Gladstone who so admired Burke — he believed Burke was right on all the major issues of his time save the French Revolution — was the philosophical as well as the political opponent of Disraeli. If Macdonald’s approach was “in some respects similar to Disraeli’s”, it was far more similar in approach to others.

As an example of the “tory touch” in English Canada Horowitz notes:

the far greater willingness of English-Canadian political and business elites to use the power of the state for the purpose of developing and controlling the economy. This willingness is especially notable in the history of Canada’s Conservative party, and is one of the primary characteristics differentiating Canadian conservatism (touched with toryism) from purely individualistic, purely liberal American conservatism. As George Grant puts it, conservatism uses “public power to achieve national purposes. The Conservative party . . . after all, created Ontario Hydro, the CNR, the Bank of Canada and the CBC.”

We have, however, already seen that laissez-faire theorists accept the desirability of public ownership in certain circumstances. In the case of Ontario Hydro
public ownership was undertaken to evade American ownership of our natural resources which may have proved beyond the resources of Canadian private capital to develop. In the case of the CNR nationalization was necessary to prevent a CPR monopoly. The choice, as Borden put it, was between "a railway-owned government and a government-owned railway", though, it must be conceded, Borden was more favourably disposed to public ownership in principle than previous or later federal Conservative leaders. In the case of the Bank of Canada the government was merely repeating what the supposedly solely liberal and individualistic Americans had done in 1912 with the Federal Reserve System. And in the case of the CBC the Conservative government watered down the "collectivist" recommendation of the Liberal-sponsored Aird Commission and permitted private commercial radio stations to broadcast alongside the CBC which, in turn, soon included advertisements in its own programmes. It should be perfectly clear that the occasional use of the state by the Conservatives should give us no reason to believe that they had a "corporate-organic-collectivist" ideology, or any remnants of one.

Christian and Campbell use, as many have before, Macdonald's National Policy as an example of the collectivist aspect of "Macdonald's Conservative ideology" which, they claim, "was a skilful blend of toryism and liberalism". However, as John Weir has pointed out:

While Sir John A. Macdonald is best remembered as the architect of Canada's National Policy, it is not often emphasized that before its adoption Macdonald was an advocate of reciprocity with the United States. When the Washington Treaty was signed in 1871 between the United States and Great Britain, Macdonald attended to argue for a restoration of the reciprocal trade arrangements which had existed between Canada and the United States in the period 1854-1866.

Clearly, on the face of it, there is a contradiction between the Macdonald of 1871 and the Macdonald of the "National Policy" of 1876, and also of the Macdonald of 1849 who proclaimed the principles of the British North American League as:

Protection to native industry and home manufacturers — connection with Great Britain — Reciprocity with the United States in agricultural products — and Repeal of the Municipal and Tariff monstrosities of last session.
Even after the National Policy had been decided upon and announced by resolution in the House of Commons on March 10, 1876 as the party's policy, Macdonald made it perfectly clear that the new policy was expediency not principle. As Macdonald told a picnic gathering of some twenty thousand in London in June, 1877:

The question of the day is that of the protection of our farmers from the unfair competition of foreign produce, and the protection of our manufacturers. I am in favour of reciprocal free trade if it can be obtained, but so long as the policy of the United States closes the markets to our products we should have a policy of our own as well, and consult only our own interests.70

Again, there is nothing in the National Policy remotely to suggest a collectivist orientation.

IV

The Conservative Party in Canada is, it would appear, predominantly a Whig party and scarcely at all a Tory party. None of the evidence offered for a collectivist interpretation seems to support the case. What, then, is the Red Tory? In Horowitz' terms there would appear to be none — at least none who are politically active. George Grant, Gad Horowitz' apogee of the Red Tory, has denounced the party as inimical to what he views as conservative ideals. Eugene Forsey, seeing Pierre Trudeau as the saviour of Canada, has become a Liberal Senator — which at least hints the lie to the Horowitz thesis of the socialist Red Tory as one "who prefers the Conservatives to the Liberals".71 Horowitz' first choice failed the first test. And W.L. Morton's belief in greater individual responsibility places him squarely in the Whig camp.

Yet surely the media and the public have some characteristics in mind when they employ the term, and they certainly appear to find politicians to whom they can effectively apply the label. In fact, there appear to be three types who fit into the general classification. The first is, quite simply, the individual who finds himself in the Conservative Party out of familial, regional or opportunistic chance and who would be equally, or perhaps more, at home in the Liberal Party. David MacDonald from Prince Edward Island would be an example. The second category would be those who believe that the first duty of government is to support the interests of the small businessman and of the farmer, of "the average Canadian", not merely to protect him but to ensure
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that the small man is in a position to make his individual initiative and respon-
sibility effective. The most obvious example would be John Diefenbaker.

The third category, and from a philosophical and historical standpoint the
most interesting, is exemplified by Robert Stanfield. In Stanfield’s writings,
although he is critical of Burke’s attitude to the French Revolution, he adopts
nonetheless an explicitly Burkean stance towards the excesses of his radical
“Whig” colleagues. His 1974 paper to the Progressive Conservative caucus, en-
titled ‘Some Comments on Conservative Principles and Philosophy’, is a
simplified equivalence of Burke’s *Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs*.
(Burke was, of course, an “Old Whig” and the confusion in the title is because
Burke wrote it anonymously and in the third person to disguise — quite ine-
effectively — its source).

Since the 1920’s many Conservatives have become devotees of an
unrestricted capitalism, of the weak state, of total competition among in-
dividuals. Although one must not press the analogy too far, they are the ‘‘new
Whigs’’ of the late eighteenth century in Britain; they lack prudence, a sense of
compromise, a notion of order; they are the ‘‘classical liberals’’, who have
always had a significant place in the Conservative Parties in the United
Kingdom and in Canada since their foundings in the nineteenth century.

To define Whiggism is not easy; it has eluded the efforts of many competent
minds. But one can at least say that the Whigs were loyal monarchists who
nonetheless denounced all forms of absolutism; they were linked with the com-
mercial entrepreneurs of the day and welcomed England’s emergence as a mid-
dle class and capitalist nation; they espoused freedom under law and a healthy
measure of religious toleration, without accepting equality of religion; they
believed in sterner virtues, liberty and low taxation; and they rejected
democracy. In Burke’s day, however, some Whigs seemed captivated by the
liberté, égalité, fraternité of the Revolution, they were losing their sense of
moderation and balance and it was to this that Burke offered his corrections.

Although Stanfield thinks his position is akin to that of George Grant, it is
in fact more closely analogous to that of the old Whigs. Many present Conser-
vatives indeed espouse an unrestrained version of the Whig values of the eight-
eenth century and, for Stanfield, these excesses must be restricted by a concern
with order, as exemplified by traditional British Conservatives:

British Conservative thinkers traditionally stressed the im-
portance of order, not merely “‘law and order’”, but social
order. This does not mean that they were opposed to
freedom for the individual; far from it. They believed that
a decent civilized life requires a framework of order.
Conservatives did not take that kind of order for granted. It seemed to them quite rare in the world and therefore quite precious. This is still the case. Conservatives attached importance to the economy and to enterprise and to property, but private enterprise was not the central principle of traditional British conservatism.72

Stanfield does not however take up the position of the statist, does not become a romantic Conservative. "It is also", he says, "good Conservatism not to push regulation too far — to undermine self-reliance".73 He continues at some length in this vein and concludes that:

It would certainly be appropriate for a Conservative to suggest that we must achieve some kind of order if we are to avoid chaos; an order which is stable, but not static; an order therefore which is reasonably acceptable and which among other things provides a framework in which enterprise can flourish.74

In truth, Stanfield is no Red Tory. Like other Canadian Conservatives he is a Whig but one who recognizes with Burke that unrestricted free enterprise, individual initiative and striving and the weak state will produce only chaos and destroy the security and stability of society, which are prerequisites of a society "in which enterprise can flourish".

Indeed, in Canada, the Red Tory is a myth. The Progressive Conservative Party is a Whig party and within it there are various proponents of different styles of Whiggery. But none denounces the Whig tradition. There are no absolutists, no Hegelians, no romantics, no "corporate-organic-collectivist" elements. There are just Lockes, Hobbes and Burkes and the occasional Charles James Fox.
Notes

1. Flora MacDonald has, however, made it clear that she has mixed feelings about the term being applied to her. See Alvin Armstrong, Flora MacDonald, Toronto: Dent, 1976, pp. 202-3.

2. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968, Chapter 1 'Conservatism, Liberalism and Socialism in Canada', pp. 3-57.


5. Loc. cit.


11. I, 1, 5-6; VI, 7, 1200.


13. Ia, 2ac, 90-108.

14. I suppose one might make a prior claim for John of Salisbury in his Policraticus but his defence of tyrannicide and his subjection of the king to law contain only indefinite implications for individual emancipation.


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17. Spirit of the Laws, Books XI-XIII.


20. Adam Müller, Teilung der Arbeit, in Baumhauer, loc. cit. Author’s translation.


31. See, for example, George Grant, Lament for a Nation, passim., and W. Christian and C. Campbell, Political Parties and Ideologies in Canada, Chapter IV.


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34. An Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs, in Hill, op. cit., p. 367.

35. Speech on Conciliation with America, March 22, 1775.


37. Works, VI, 61.


42. Second Treatise, in Curtis, op. cit., p. 341.


45. Wentworth Woodhouse Papers, I, 623.


48. Letter to a Noble Lord, 1796.


53. *Political Parties and Ideologies in Canada*, p. 76.


55. *Canadian Labour in Politics*, pp. 18-19.


57. *Public Archives of Canada*, R.B. Bennett Papers, Bennett to J.G. Bennett, 21, October, 1931.


64. *Canadian Labour in Politics*, p. 21.


66. For a detailed development of the historical evidence for these assertions, which lack of space forbids here, see Preece and Koerner, *op. cit.*, chapters 4&5.

67. *Political Parties and Ideologies in Canada*, p. 86.


71. Canadian Labour in Politics, p. 23.

72. 'Some Comments on Conservative Principles and Philosophy' Leader of the Opposition's Office, November 14, 1974, p. 4.
