
The appearance of Russell Jacoby's *Social Amnesia* two years ago was in many ways like a breath of fresh air amidst the ever increasing haze produced by a rising "cult of subjectivity". This cult has appeared on at least two levels: first, as a cultural movement that permeates everyday existence, and second, as a new ideology which, like other movements, has its intellectual vanguard which attempts to render the movement plausible.

*Social Amnesia* argues that various strains of contemporary psychology reinforce the bondage of the individual by providing idealistic cures for patently material forms of exploitation. Here, Jacoby draws upon the Freudian Marxism of the original Frankfurt School theorists, most notably Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer and Herbert Marcuse. Jacoby suggests that a return to Freud would enable us — in the damaged historical present — to appreciate the deep-seated nature of modern domination. Jacoby argues for a remembrance of a forgotten past — specifically the seminal psychological insights of Freud — as a counterforce to current recipes for liberation as involving only a good attitude and a future-orientedness which refuses to examine the materiality of the present. Here *Social Amnesia'*s primary concern is to show how the theoretical weakness of much contemporary psychology leads to an ideological reproduction of the inhuman. Conformist psychology is theory which has its common denominator in a naive glorification of the individual, being unequipped and unwilling to find the alienating social and economic determinates of that very individuality. In breaking the individual out of the historical dynamic of individuation, conformist psychology freezes a moment in the process of individuation, taking historically-given inhumanity as ontologically-given humanity.

Sociologically, the cult of subjectivity has exhibited tendencies of social reintegration in that the "retreat" of the Left into subjective politics corresponded to some degree to the discovery of the "human" by the nonrevolutionary establishment. For most, the rediscovery of the "human" appeared as a new individuality, a new ideology of the good life to supplement the material good life that had increasing difficulties in compensating for the ravages of the anxiety and alienation that accompanied, and still accompanies, the combined pressure and boredom of late capitalist existence, especially in the more cybernated and advanced sectors. On the Left, where the cult often took different forms, it seemed a retreat from the austerity and difficulty of political life, an existence made psychologically strenuous by the immovable solidarity of the
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"silent majority". The discovery of the "human", however, was not a
discovery at all, but rather a kind of return to the refuge of interiority against an
imposing reality, a return to mysticism designed to make an emotionally im-
poverished life bearable. The general phenomenon is reflected in the rush of
other sectors and classes back to the womb of religion after less than en-
thusiastic religious participation in the 1960's no less than in the encounter-
group, primal therapy and yoga of the "enlightened" affluent.

The result of the resurrection of the "inner strength" of the human against
an alienating world is a seemingly willful forgetting of that world's existence.
The double damage incurs where the individual, failing to realize that his or
her humanity is something of a hollow shell within which social forces have set
up housekeeping, glorifies that very reflection of alienation as humanity itself.
Here, as T.W. Adorno and other Frankfurt School theorists have pointed out,
"the most individual is the most general".1 Where inhumanity becomes
humanity, the vital tension between is and ought, thought and reality, is lost.
Specifically, the repression of the individual and collective modes of retaining
the past — the memory and history which allow a critical function of the mind
— ensnares the individual within the present in such a way as to steal the ability
to transcend the present through consciousness. False consciousness is con-
sciousness that is overwhelmed by the present, as the leitmotif behind the
theme of Jacoby's book reminds: "all reification is a forgetting." 2

The cult of subjectivity is not an isolated phenomenon, but rather is symp-
tomatic of broader social and economic developments. The problematic of late
capitalist society is this: can monopoly capital, which relies increasingly on
planning and administration, allow for the irrationality and spontaneity of ac-
tive individuality? This is more than a rhetorical question; it is a serious
theoretical problem, for it concerns real power relations. This problematic lies
at the heart of the critical theory of the Frankfurt School, with Marx and Freud
as points of departure for locating the dialectical interaction and mutual
reproduction of individual and socio-economic environment of subject and ob-
ject. My purpose in this review is not simply to comment upon Jacoby's critique
of the ideology of the cult of subjectivity, but also to use his critique to suggest
a slightly different approach to the concept of the individual.

The process of turning critical thought into uncritical ideology, Jacoby sug-
gests, is a willful forgetting of the critical insights of the past (Chapter I). Specif-
cally, psychologists of all political persuasions have played the ostrich
with respect to the critical thought of Freud. The new psychological theories
that "discover" alienation, and then proceed to cure the problem with a little
"self-help" or ethical preaching, Jacoby takes care to note, are really the
ideological reflections of the broader social phenomenon of the reification of
existence. The forgetting of critical insights of the past is paralleled in everyday
life by the necessary forgetfulness of reified existence, with its total immersion
in the awe-inspiring present. Jacoby argues rather for a "dialectical loyalty" to the past which appropriates and transcends critical thought. In the case of contemporary psychology, this would entail a critical examination of the essentials of Freudian theory: repression, the unconscious and infantile sexuality, postulates which deserve better than to be trashed without substantive comment.

The ego-psychology of Alfred Adler and his followers, for example (Chapter II), is a case in point. Adler, as others, posits the subject (the ego) as a pregiven entity which statically reacts to its environment; this surface-psychology casts aside the unpleasantries and complexities of the instinctual dynamic. The Freudian conception of the ego is that of a dialectical entity whose character is molded through instinctual conflict, repression and the demands of the unconscious, and whose function is to mediate between the demands of internal and external nature. Adler's ego-psychology becomes ideology where the concept of the ego loses this social and instinctual history, which collapses present and past, and allows the fragile and weak ego to be taken as a strong and fully individual one. The additional insult is that the surface ego is now put forth as a priori "fully human" by those that would cure social ills through positive thinking. With the post-Freudian humanist psychologists, Jacoby duplicates his analysis. In the psychological "insight" of Maslow, Allport, May and Rogers (Chapter III), one finds the perfection of what one might call the "boots traps" theory of the spiritual realm, with its pop existentialism and therapy that relies primarily on the power of positive thinking. "The individual is led to believe that with a little self-help alienation will be washed down the drain like dirt in a sparkling sink," Jacoby succinctly sums it up (p. 67).

Turning to the problem of interpreting Marx and Freud (Chapter IV), Jacoby points out that totally objective theories of society (notoriously, Marxism reduced to scientific determinism*) end up hypostatizing the subject by forgetting that subjectivity itself becomes history through its objectifications. In the spirit of the rest of the work, Jacoby argues that theory must retain a logic of society and a logic of the psyche, which must coexist without reduction or simplification until such time as the material contradiction of individual and society is resolved. The logic of the psyche Jacoby dubs "negative psychoanalysis", or, a psychoanalysis that analyzes and criticizes the subject, probing its damaged interior until it reveals its social and objective determinates, using the fundamentally critical and dialectical Freudian categories to understand the reproduction of the existing order within the individual's psyche. To this subject I will return, since nothing less is at stake than the way in which theory is to regard the means and ends of history itself: the individual.

In extending his critique to the politics of the New Left (Chapter V), Jacoby finds the same uncritical acceptance of individuality in its damaged forms. Both the empty sloganering of the professed political types and the Left's ver-
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sions of the cult of human sensitivity lack the theory to see that "freedom", "equality" and the immediacy of human sensitivity derive their content from the inhuman order itself; escape from domination must begin with a cataloging of the damages in order to salvage the positive. Finally, Jacoby points to the distinction and necessary tension between social praxis and individual therapy (Chapters VI and VII). While the individual victims of alienation must be treated, the origins of psychic damage are to be found in social processes that transcend the individual, necessitating a political praxis that must detach itself from the individual's problem in order to achieve the cure. Laing and Cooper are taken to task for a confusion of this point, specifically in their treatment of family dynamics as if they were identical with social dynamics. The mistake sees the family as causal, rather than as a point of mediation between individual and society, which leads to a confusion of family therapy and political praxis. This repeats the positivistic mistakes of other psychologists by superficially treating family relations as they exist as if they were family relations as such.

My purpose here, as mentioned, is not to be comprehensive in presenting or reviewing the contents of Jacoby's basically well-written, well-argued and hard-hitting critique, but rather to address the concept of subjectivity itself, for I believe that in some ways the theoretical universe sketched by Jacoby is inadequate to the task faced by critical theory. 4

Taken at face value, the problem appears in Jacoby's tendency to totalize the power of the social universe so that theory is left in a purely negative stance. Theory here becomes critique without recourse to affirmation, due to the nature of the immediacy with which it is confronted, an immediacy which is not immediate at all, but rather is mediated and permeated by the universal nature of exchange relations in all of its unabashed nihilism and impoverishment. The truly immediate is a term that ought to be reserved for "that which bad immediacy can be", rather than indiscriminately applied to all social "facts" in their appearance to the unimpressed eye of the social scientist. This bad immediacy of facticity is, after all, nonimmediate in the best sense, for it is most often molded by the unreal, phantom objectivity of reification. With true human immediacy, reflected in the aesthetic, the passions, the timeless and the gestalt, one leaves the realm of positivistic science, which has never been equipped to make distinctions between the qualities of facts anyway. And with good reason, for positivistic science was the science appropriate to the leveling induced by the expansion of exchange relations. This negative stance towards immediacy Jacoby borrows from Adorno; the dilemma is inherited from the social condition.

"The whole is the false", Adorno grimly noted in 1944 in Minima Moralia, a work which might be considered the classical and comprehensive statement about the eclipse of the subject in an exchange economy and commodity culture. 5 This situates Hegelian-inspired thought in a precarious position vis-à-
vis its object, for essence now becomes the negation of untrue appearance, left
with the hope that if pressed by history and critique, the object will relinquish
the truly immediate and essential in the future. Hence Jacoby’s use of the term
“negative psychoanalysis”; psychoanalysis proper must be said to be obsolete
in the sense that the bad immediacy of the self is no longer the “bourgeois in-
dividual” consisting in a psyche of id, ego and integrated superego (always
problematic, Jacoby correctly notes), but is, rather, the post-individual con-
sisting psychologically in an alliance of id and externalized superego with a
weak and regressive ego.6

Jacoby states of critical theory’s stance towards psychoanalysis:

Psychoanalysis as a science of the individual survives exactly as long as the individual survives; it is historically situated where the individual is situated. It was unknown where the individual was yet to emerge as a semiprivate be-
ing, and it is becoming unknown and forgotten in the “post” bourgeois order where the individual is superfluous. (pp. 37-38)

[Negative psychoanalysis is] a study of remnants; it ex-
plores a subject whose subjectivity is being administered out of existence . . . Negative psychoanalysis knows only a negative relationship; it examines the psychic forms that have diverted, impeded or dissolved a historical or class consciousness. (p. 99)

Negative psychoanalysis is psychoanalysis in the era of syn-
chronized capitalism; it is the theory of the individual in
eclipse . . . Negative psychoanalysis is “twice” objective
in that it traces at first the objective content of subjectivity and second, discovers that there is only an objective con-
figuration to subjectivity. Today there is “no” subjectivi-
ty. (p. 80)

The neatness of Jacoby’s argument is appealing insofar as the description of
the phenomenon contains a great deal of truth. As a general tendency, the
average ego increasingly finds itself in a regressive stance towards externality.
Shattered by confrontations with damaging realities, the critical mediating
functions of the ego are given up as it returns to the illusory perceptions and
gratifications offered by the hallucinations of the primary process. Where the
ego gives up its functions in favour of regressive relations to the external world, the masses indeed appear massified, as a sleepy and hypnotic false consciousness passively accepts never-ending fixes of television, underarm deodorant and new cars as if they were the offerings of mother herself (although we should be careful to note that ego-function is retained in a shallow, calculating manner that is not without its consequences?). What has been noticed, together with rampant false consciousness, are objective trends that increasingly seem to turn ego into id, reversing Freud's dictum about the progress of civilization: where id, now ego. This supplies fertile psychological soil for the cult of subjectivity to prey upon, yet, having noticed the phenomenon, the analysis of subjectivity is not exhausted.

To claim that subjectivity is fully objective at this point would be to avoid the analysis of the development of social antagonisms and their contradictions as reflected within the subject itself. It would constitute a failure to address historical process as reflected in the psychodynamic contradictions of the "whole" psyche, id, ego and superego; in consciousness and the unconscious in their historical modifications.

The same problem arises with respect to the project of Social Amnesia itself. Jacoby's book is a critique of the ideology of conformist psychology, claiming to be limited in scope, attempting to remain critique and negation. If the ego itself is in the process of dissolution, the project of ideological critique, where it seems to claim sufficiency for negation, begins to lose significance. Critique of ideology under these conditions is necessary, but insufficient. Where the commodity becomes its own ideology, where the gratification becomes its own justification and where there is an illusory identity between individual and social needs, the realm of ideology as a set of coherent intellectual propositions against which a particular reality can be measured begins to dissolve. Indeed, the statement made by the North American social science establishment that we have reached "the end of ideology" ironically contains this truth. Where the ego loses its grip against the power of blind social forces, ideology begins to appear as nothing more than rationalization; a simple, mechanically performed psychic function that attempts to smooth over the injured narcissism of the ego for reasons of psychic comfort. Since ideologies are not what they used to be, they cannot be dealt with as they used to be. With respect to the ideology of commodity gratification, we may revive some of the Frankfurt School's comments concerning fascist propaganda. "The critique of totalitarian ideologies," they write,

has not its task to refute them, for they make no claim to autonomy or consistency at all, or only in the most transparent fashion. What is indicated in this case is rather
to analyze on what human dispositions they are speculating and what they wish to evoke from these — and this is hellishly far removed from such official declama-
tions. Furthermore, there remains the question, why and in what manner modern society produces human beings who respond to such stimuli, and whose spokesmen to a large extent are the "Führers" and demagogues of all varieties. The development which leads to such changes in ideology has the character of necessity and not the content and coherence of the ideologies themselves.8

The ideology of the commodity, as well as the ideology of endangered "psychic property" — the cult of subjectivity — are totalitarian in this sense: they speak not to the ego, but to the id. Or, rather, they speak to an ego that regresses to the id under the pressure of the externalized superego. The ego becomes the degraded inheritor of the project of rationalizing what has already been decided, while it continues as an agency of repression, masochistically imposing upon itself what it knows from experience to be forthcoming from the environment, and graciously accepting the administered (repressive) desublimation that makes its sleep less fitful in response to the laws of libidinal economics.

Where this ego-function takes the place of the critical capacity, psychoanalysis, having announced the dissolution of the ego, inherits another project, as suggested by the Frankfurt position. One might call this a "critique of the interest of the libido", to correspond to critiques of the interest of the repressive whole. It is a project beyond the critique of the realm of ideology. Critique of ideology itself becomes degraded where ideology is too obviously apologetic, too obviously contradictory and too obviously desperate, as a function not of thought, but of "coping" with anxiety, frustration and trauma.

As critical theory moves from critique of ideology proper to critique of the interest of the libido, its use of psychoanalysis in negatively probing the remnants of the subject encounters the seeds of its positive function, the utopian wish of the id — the ultimate intention of the primary process. By pushing the negative to its limits, we find the seeds of its dissolution in the recesses of the psyche.

The dialectic of the subject could be restored for theory by taking Jacoby's category of the reified psyche, as distinct from reified (false) consciousness, to its logical conclusion. "Reification in Marxism", says Jacoby,

refers to an illusion that is objectively manufactured by society. This social illusion works to preserve the status quo
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by presenting the human and social relations of society as natural — and unchangeable — relations between things. What is often ignored in expositions of the concept of reification is the psychological dimension: amnesia — a forgetting and repression of the human and social activity that makes and can remake society. The social loss of memory is a type of reification — better: it is the primal form of reification. (P. 4)

Jacoby points here to a psychodynamic process that “underlies” false consciousness, something that goes deeper than the historically-given appearance of the consciousness of the subject. We may say that false consciousness itself forms the kernel within the individual that corresponds to the cultural forms of reification (ideology, for example). False consciousness, to borrow from Joseph Gabel, is very closely tied to the individual existential situation described as “schizophrenic” in the phenomenological sense.9 Schizophrenia describes an existential universe which has lost its dialectical qualities; being fractured, externality has lost its “ego-qualities” in psychoanalytic terms. It is a universe in which the ego does not recognize objects as its own, thus lacking the means of its own confirmation. Such a universe is socially manufactured by the flux, mobility and outright theft of the wage-labour process and by its complementary cultural forms (universalized exchange relations) which culminate in reified human relations. Socially manufactured schizophrenia, the impoverishment of existence by depriving it of its means of confirmation, necessarily affects individual perception. As Lukács has noted, the contemplative stance taken by the worker towards the technological apparatus is marked by a consciousness that “reduces space and time to a common denominator and degrades time to the dimension of space.”10 The schizophrenic consciousness is an ahistorical consciousness: ideology as the social production of illusion in the collective is paralleled by the social production of schizophrenic, “sub-real” perception in individual consciousness. However, behind the phenomenon of the fractured existential universe with its schizophrenic attributes, however, lies a psychodynamic process that attempts to cope with this state of affairs through reunification. Psychoanalysis calls this the normal form of neurosis, the general form that the reified psyche assumes in the twentieth century.

The normal neurotic displays a sickness as a result of the objective inaccessibility of the environment to the demands of the body-ego. This inaccessibility exists both as the complications of internalized instinctual conflict (which is only as individual as modes of child-rearing) and as the general phenomenon of the renunciation required by adult life, which combine to form patterns of defensive regression. The attempt at “self-cure” through
regression exists as the "psychic territory" which is susceptible to exploitation by social forces. The ego, to review briefly a form that such a psychodynamic process of reification might take, is charged with the responsibility of gratifying the demands of the id, and therefore exercises its functions by probing reality in an attempt to find gratification. Libido is flexible; the ego transforms and neutralizes it in such a way as to suit available objects. Available objects are those that allow gratification of the instincts as well as lead to a confirmation of the narcissistic needs of the ego; they are objects with ego-qualities. Where reality lacks such objects and becomes inaccessible to the ego, the ego represses the demands of the id. Where the demands of the id are persistently frustrated, the ego spends most of its energies repressing, and learns (especially in childhood) to co-opt the forthcoming displeasure by masochistically giving up the ego as an agency capable of imposing its will upon externality.

However, the demands of the instincts are not foregone; the primary process operates under its own rationality of libidinal economics. The pleasure principle opts for illusory gratifications where true ones are not obtainable; the neurotic individual manufactures ties to externality in imagination where true ones are damaged, and the mechanism at work is regression to earlier fixations and memories that exist in the unconscious. Narcissistic libido, having lost its object, now spills over onto an introjected, external superego, a superego which has lost its appropriate position as an appendium of the now regressed ego, recalling its original identification with an authority figure. Through identification with the external superego, the illusion is gained of a dialectical and gratifying relation to objects, as is the illusion of gratification of narcissistic need through the new confusion with the identified object (movie star, image of the playboy, etc.). As the ego regresses to infantile memories, the neurotic individual here takes on the character of the narcissistic, oral type that is common in late capitalist society.\footnote{11}

The point of the above example is to suggest that while identity is achieved in consciousness, the demands of the id are not fully malleable. The subject, in the sense that he or she is the embodiment of drives, is not susceptible to eclipse; indeed, the more illusory are the gratifications, the more precarious is the psychic balance. The utopian wish of the id ultimately is intolerant of social necessity. Adorno, writing in the context of the psychodynamic success of fascist propaganda, suggested that certain social forces (collectivization, institutionalization) would require increasing phoniness in the illusory identifications offered to the injured ego by society:

Socialized hypnosis breeds within itself the forces which will do away with the spook of regression through remote control, and in the end awaken those who keep their eyes shut though they are no longer asleep.\footnote{12}
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Furthermore, with respect to commodity society, it might be suggested that where ideology is heavily dependent upon supplies of commodities (therapists included), ideology becomes heavily dependent upon economic fluctuations, making it as fragile as the psychic balance that complements it.\(^{13}\)

Recognizing that the subject taken in the sense of the emancipatory demands of the id is not susceptible to eclipse, however, should not obscure the fact that such a subject existed as the psychic territory exploited by Third Reich national racism no less than by late capitalism attempting to get rid of its surplus production in a repressive manner. The theoretical point remains a theoretical point insofar as the surface phenomena continue to appear one-dimensional. Nevertheless, theory finds within the reified psyche (vis-à-vis reified consciousness) a material basis for contradiction, preserving both the repressive identity of individual and society with its analysis of the objective molding of individual desire (Jacoby’s negative psychoanalysis) and the ultimate non-identity of individual and society that resides in the material contradiction between the utopian wish of the id and the gratifications provided by a surplus repressive order. Jacoby, to be sure, mentions this second use of psychoanalysis in a few phrases (e.g., p. 100, p. 117), but as rhetorical afterthought rather than as an intrinsic part of critical theory’s use of psychoanalysis. The negativity required of thought by critical theory is here materialized as the utopian reason of the pleasure principle as against the rationality of exchange value; historical tensions find their embodiment in the contradictions of the psychodynamic process itself. “He alone,” Adorno said of Freud, “who could situate utopia in blind somatic pleasure, which, satisfying the ultimate intention, is intentionless, has a stable and valid idea of the truth.”\(^{14}\)

The problem of a subjective dialectic reappears in some of Jacoby’s suggestions concerning the rise and fall of the subject as a process of historical development. Insofar as the subject of the autonomous ego is concerned, (whose past existence we must take care not to glorify, since it probably existed only in certain more privileged classes and sectors), Jacoby’s pronouncements are probably correct. Yet this eclipse of the bourgeois ego, whose birth remains significant in the history of individuation, is not an eclipse of subjectivity per se inasmuch as our concern is with the development of the body-ego. Here Jacoby’s emphasis upon critique and negative psychoanalysis (p. 150) tends to be at the detriment of the analysis of historical process that ends in critical theory. One wishes to uphold the usefulness of Marx’s proposition that, in certain ways, history behaves much like a sewer, in which “nothing can emerge at the end of the process which did not appear at the beginning. But, on the other hand, everything also has to come out.”\(^{15}\) One wishes to appraise critically both the organization and development of the instinctual dynamic, for capital both creates and colonizes the soul of the social individual.\(^{16}\) This is not the place for any such analysis, but rather merely to offer an example by way of suggesting
that without its positive, utopian moment, psychoanalysis is in no position to carry out a progressive-regressive analysis of the historical process, such as Jacoby himself offers in a plea to the Left to retain the progressive content of the monogamous marriage (pp. 107-115).

Of particular importance for the analysis of the instinctual dynamic as historical process should be the institutionalization of childhood in the twentieth century, since psychoanalysis holds childhood as predominant both in the development of the infantile (utopian) wish and in forming, individuating and repressing the instincts, thereby becoming a locus for both individuation and regression. Otto Fenichel offers a dialectical formulation of the progressive-repressive content of this aspect of the subjective dynamic:

Probably the same circumstance which has to a great degree made possible the differentiation and higher development of man — viz., the long period of physiological dependence of the child — has also provided the possibility that if his ego runs up against difficulties it may give up its function and activities and long for, or magically try to bring back, the time in which there was an all-powerful being in the outer world who gave to him love and food and by so doing smoothed out all difficulties.

The social reproduction of neurotic madness within the individual presupposed the development of an individual with new and different, yet confused, instinctual needs, which could only be the product of a socially-determined childhood, and which are then organized by social interests in correspondingly new and different ways. Neurosis, which takes the form of a kind of narcissistic frigidity and desire in the “post” bourgeois order, is still a product of the development of the socio-economic tendencies of capital.

The concept of subjectivity as I have been using it, as psychic reification made to cough up the remainders of the positive subject, as utopian wish and repression, lodges the estrangement from reality required by critical thought within the material development of history itself — where it belongs. It materializes by making self-conscious the theorist’s stance towards reality insofar as the object is always read by the theorist through (more or less perverse) combinations of symbol and desire, originating in the primary process itself. Although the conception of the utopian wish is abstract, as the primary process itself is abstract, it serves as a standpoint from which to judge the quality of individual immediacy. Critical theory need not simply resist “the lure of the immediate which becomes irresistible as society hardens and rigidifies”, as Jacoby
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would have it (p. 150), for the issue is not immediacy or spontaneity as such, but good or bad immediacy, spontaneity that is individual and liberatory or spontaneity that reeks of exchange-value and its ravages, play and praxis or the frozen gestures and expressions of the reified ego.

Not wishing to be unfair to Jacoby on this point, it should be noted that his remarks concerning New Left subjectivity implicitly contain a conception of good immediacy and good praxis, yet they remain unnecessarily mystical to the extent to which they lack a foundation in the emancipatory reasoning of what we might call a "materially utopian consciousness", a consciousness that takes cognizance of the aesthetic of the pleasure principle by finding it at the root of every psychodynamic process, while not retreating from existent one-dimensionality. It must have involved a certain amount of wishful thinking (not bad in itself) for Marcuse to have published *Eros and Civilization* (the standpoint from which I have been arguing) in 1955. Yet it served as a premonition, an abstract utopianism that had at least the potential to become concretized in attempts at praxis by certain New Left segments. Theory that proclaims that "liberation is so close that it can almost be tasted; and it is no longer comprehensible why it is not here" (p. 151), cannot afford not to judge from the standpoint of a materially utopian consciousness. Jacoby's failure to mention Marcuse's *An Essay on Liberation* and *Counterrevolution and Revolt*, whatever mistakes may have been made there in judgement of historical currents, is indicative of a historical rupture and transcendence made all the more mystical.

What was inconceivable after Auschwitz, namely utopian pronouncements concerning individuality, seems somewhat more conceivable after the 1960's attempts at praxis, although hope occurs only against the background of Attica (Jacoby's closing image), Kent State, the October Crisis in Québec, Viet Nam, Indonesia, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Iran and countless other examples of domestic and exported terror, together with the amnesia that necessarily affirms these ongoing incidents. Even Adorno, in a radio lecture shortly before his death concerning the culture industry and leisure-time, tentatively concluded:

It seems that the integration of consciousness and leisure time is not yet complete after all. The real interests of individuals are still strong enough to resist total manipulation up to a point. This analysis would be in tune with the prognosis that consciousness cannot be totally integrated in a society in which the basic contradictions remain un-

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The cult of subjectivity may have its moments of truth as do other mass cultural phenomena, but theory must be able to recognize the real thing, singling out the historically latent from the mediations of seemingly endless and monotonous conformity with which we are confronted at present. Jacoby’s book, however, remains a powerful reminder of the presently victorious forces that would trivialize and banalize thought, willingly or unwillingly aiding and abetting the social reproduction of the inhuman. One hopes that such ego as we are left with will, without being seduced in its imagination or frozen into abstract negativity, react critically to the cheap thrills of the late seventies.

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Notes


4. See especially Erica Sherover's review of *Social Amnesia*, *Telos*, no. 25, Fall 1975 and Joel Kovel's comments upon the same in "Freud the Revolutionary", *Psychoanalytic Review*, vol. 63, no. 2, 1976. Sherover's comments concerning the relationship between theory and therapy would tend to cast doubt upon Jacoby's interpretation of Laing and Cooper.


9. Joseph Gabel, *False Consciousness, An Essay on Reification*, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1975. "Schizophrenia" is an ambiguous concept. Gabel's usage is broader than the psychoanalytic usage. Taken especially from Minkowski, Gabel's usage of the term refers existentially to a fractured universe and its parallel consciousness. In psychoanalysis, schizophrenia is a psychotic mechanism of defence: a schizophrenic breaks off relations with the world in a particular way. The neurotic, on the other hand, attempts to cope with a split universe by hallucinating relations to reality, keeping relations to the world, but in damaged form. Gabel uses clinical examples of schizophrenia in particular to highlight attributes of false consciousness and ideology in general. The cultural phenomenon of reification, for Gabel, has a schizophrenic structure: schizophrenia in the clinical manifestation is reification par excellence.

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16. An excellent summary of this process is given by Joel Kovel, ‘‘Therapy in Late Capitalism’’, *Telos*, no. 30, Winter 1976-77.
