meaning of that double end, however, will not be identical: Quebec alone will have perished nobly, with honour, and clear about its purpose. Dumont at least knows the attitude he ought to adopt.

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*Essays on Politics and Society* by John Stuart Mill. Edited by J.M. Robson, University of Toronto Press, 1977, pp. xcv, 780, 2 vol., $60.00 cloth.

No one more than John Stuart Mill was struck by the difference in temperament between himself and Jeremy Bentham. Indeed, in his rather uncharitable essay, "Bentham" (1838), Mill describes his mentor as an emotionally impoverished, unsympathetic and unimaginative man. Mill had none of these defects, and as well his writing in contrast to Bentham's exhibits a non-dogmatic tentativeness. On substantive issues such as qualitative differences in pleasure or the heuristic value of social contract theory, Mill appears to advance utilitarianism both in terms of plausibility and humaneness. But as the present volumes demonstrate, Mill is a Benthamite philosophically if not at heart. Where he goes beyond Bentham, he goes beyond what can be rationally defended given his basic presuppositions. This is not to say that Mill's non-Benthamite claims should be dismissed, but rather that they require a firmer foundation than that provided by Mill.

These two volumes, *Essays on Politics and Society*, represent the latest results of Professor Robson's and the University of Toronto Press' ambitious project, the publication of J.S. Mill's collected works. And, like the earlier volumes in the series, they maintain a very high standard of scholarship and publishing. Robson's textual introduction, both meticulous and clear, renders this the definitive edition of Mill's writings on political themes. The contents, in addition to Mill's major monographs "On Liberty" and "Considerations on Representative Government", include otherwise inaccessible review articles on important theoretical and practical political works of the day. It is in these that one is struck by the persistence of dominant themes which give coherence and continuity to Mill's political thought. For, although much has been made of the divergence of Mill's later from his earlier writing, what is more striking is his long-term consistency regarding the fundamental nature of political theory and the good society. Thus his misgivings concerning popular democracy eloquently stated in "On Liberty" (1859) appear substantially in the same form in
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the neglected essay “Civilization” (1836). In the early review article “Use and Abuse of Political Terms” (1832), Mill states the principles — largely ordinary language principles — of correct definition that he retains throughout the many editions of his System of Logic. Thus on such basic and determinant issues as the standards of meaning of core concepts in our political vocabulary, Mill’s position is constant. But of much greater significance is the striking similarity between Mill’s views on meaning and those of Bentham. In criticism of the vagueness of French political theory Mill wrote: “It proceeds from an infirmity of the French mind which has been one main cause of the miscarriages of the French Nation in its pursuits of liberty and progress; that of being led away by phrases and treating abstractions as if they were realities . . .”. These are not merely Bentham’s sentiments, they are almost the words he employs in Anarchical Fallacies. It would, I think, be a mistake though to ignore the very real differences between Mill and Bentham. Indeed, an adequate account of the reasons for these differences — if such exist — would be an important contribution to the history of ideas.

Three approaches to Mill and orthodox utilitarianism present themselves: one can stress the consistency between them, one can explain their differences in terms of the rational development of utilitarian principles, or one can argue that Mill’s richer appreciation of social and political reality is the result of non-rational accretions to Benthamism. Alexander Brady, in his extensive and scholarly introduction, takes this third tack. Brady cites historical evidence of, and psychological explanations for Mill’s disaffection with the cold mechanism of Bentham’s social vision. The image Brady presents is of a man who supplemented his utilitarian political reason with the communal sensibility of Carlyle’s and Coleridge’s romantic toryism. And, of course, conclusive evidence for this view exists in Mill’s own writing, not only in the essay “Bentham”, but throughout his mature works, and most strikingly in his Autobiography. But I think that Brady, in describing the later Mill as an eclectic liberal makes too much of the rift, for in a discursive contest between sensibility and reason, it is reason that inevitably prevails. And Mill’s chosen medium was the philosophic essay, not poetry. Thus, for all Mill’s hankerings after tradition and community, it is the satisfaction of individual interests that is the raison d’etre of political action. All else is but a means to this end.

From a purely philosophical perspective, one would be hard pressed to justify this fine new edition of Mill’s works. In epistemology, psychology and logic Mill really makes no great advance on Hume, James Mill or his other predecessors in the empiricist tradition. And, if it is true that his social and political writing is really disguised Benthamism, then it would seem that there are no compelling reasons for this lavish attention. The explanation for the sustained interest in Mill in Canada, and thus the justification for the present series is, of course, that Mill, more than any other thinker, represents the actual
political theory and practice of this country. Historically, the connection between Mill and Canada can be seen in his enthusiastic support of Lord Durham. The "Report on the Affairs of British North America" and Considerations on Representative Government are companion pieces. Further, Mill’s detailed discussion of nationality and federalism in this work are naturally of interest here. But, most significantly, Mill’s theoretical perspective in all its tension and apparent contradiction is a mirror of Canada’s psyche. For, if Professor Horowitz’s account of Canada as an amalgam of liberal and tory fragments has any validity, then it is to be expected that Mill, who attempts to meld liberal and tory principles, would find a receptive Canadian audience. To paraphrase Plato’s happy metaphor, Canada is Mill writ large.

Although through judicious selection both democratic socialists and Libertarians can find theoretical support in Mill’s works, it is generally held that as Mill matured he tended towards a socialist view of the human condition. Unsurprisingly, socialists see this as a humane development away from narrow individualistic Benthamism. But if, as I have argued, Mill’s departure from Bentham is more apparent than real, then perhaps a socialism based on Mill is necessarily defective. For to ground socialism in individualistic hedonism is an unlikely project. In the Autobiography, Mill presents what L.T. Hobhouse has described as the best summary statement of Liberal Socialism that we possess:

The social problem of the future we considered to be, how to unite the greatest individual liberty of action, with a common ownership in the raw material of the globe, and an equal participation of all in the benefits of combined labour. (Everyman ed., p. 196).

These words could be included in the "Regina Manifesto" with no sense of anomaly simply because the founders of the C.C.F. owe their basic societal view to Mill and his Fabian followers. This is most obvious in the political life and work of the Manifesto’s chief draughtsman, Frank Underhill. Throughout his career, Underhill maintained a consistent commitment to Mill’s views, so much so that at the end of it he could say, "John Stuart Mill I have never got beyond, he is the ultimate truth" (as quoted in Canadian Forum, Nov. 1971, p. 13). Underhill’s critics might claim that he showed no such consistency in practice, moving as he did from the radical socialism of the Thirties to the establishment liberalism of the Sixties. But in any case, what is clear is that Mill’s ideas are sufficiently encompassing to ground a large part of the spectrum of political practice in Canada. Thus, no one who has the slightest pretensions to the understanding of political thought in Canada can legitimately ignore Mill.
There is a widespread belief, especially in countries with a liberal tradition, that persons who have gained power have compromised their political principles. But in the case of Underhill, it is a defect in his principles, not his character, that explains his drift from his early socialism. Indeed, his apparent duplicity can be accounted for in terms of his commitment to Mill’s political theory. For both Underhill and Mill, community and group solidarity are not ends in themselves, but are rather means for the achievement of individual interests. While one’s party is powerless — as in the case of the early C.C.F. — this feature of liberal theory is inevitably obscured because one tends to identify one’s present political activity with political reality. Thus, during the formative years of the co-operative movement or of labour unionism, the union or co-op is treated by its members as an intrinsic, and not merely an instrumental good. But to the extent that one succeeds in acquiring political and economic power, given the logic of liberal theory, it becomes less relevant to stress the worth of the means, and more important to focus upon the end, viz. individual satisfactions. This makes sense of why liberals out of power appear more committed to communal goods than the same people are once the elections have been won. It is not simply true that liberals who gain power have sold out their ideals. Rather, their change in circumstance has made clear what their ideals really are. Means are circumstantially variable, not absolute, and thus, for a liberal, communal values are always negotiable. This analysis also explains how it is possible for a successful candidate who had campaigned on the merits of participatory democracy to become an elitist with neither remorse nor embarrassment. To be a liberal out of power in Canada today is to be allowed the luxury of those sentimental aspects of Mill’s philosophy which makes it at one and the same time more attractive and less obviously consistent. Incidentally, it provides one with the credentials for being a member in good standing of the New Democratic Party.

On deeper analysis, then, the apparent contradiction between tory and liberal elements in Mill’s theory can be resolved. For, at bottom, all values save the satisfaction of individual interests are only of instrumental worth. But the consistency thus obtained hardly makes Mill’s liberalism more palatable. For, if communal values really are of intrinsic worth, then to be a liberal is necessarily to be guilty of self deception, or simply deception. And the humane face of Mill’s liberalism can be seen as nothing but attractive make-up unconsciously applied and casually removed once the wooing is over.

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