REIFICATION AND RECOLLECTION: EMANCIPATORY INTENTIONS AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE

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The sociology of knowledge is the spectre which haunts Marxism, or so it would seem from the amount of ink spilled in efforts to exorcise the demon. Beginning with the publication of Ideology and Utopia in 1929 Marxian critics have attempted time and again to indicate what precisely it is which distinguishes the study of ideology initiated by Mannheim from that proposed by Marx. At its worst the debate has shown the remarkable extent to which Marxism can remain non-problematic to itself, an exercise which has long since reached a type of scholastic perfection with Soviet Marxism. But, at its best, the presence of the sociology of knowledge has forced reflection on what constitutes the emancipatory intentions which Marxism claims to embody. By showing how such allegedly critical concepts as “ideology” and “class” could be appropriated into a non-Marxian frame of reference, the sociology of knowledge has forced its more acute Marxian critics to define the emancipatory core of Marxism which remains unassimilated in Mannheim’s project.

This article proceeds from a basic sympathy towards the efforts of a few of the sociology of knowledge’s critics: most specifically Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno. Yet a repetition of their position would be disloyal to the most important insights of their critique. Since the 1930s both the sociology of knowledge and society itself have altered. And the critical theory of society they proposed, which defined itself in opposition to Mannheim in its early years, has changed also, becoming more suspicious of its own premises, more critical of the emancipatory potential present even in the original Marxian program. Thus a reexamination of the sociology of knowledge cannot ignore recent efforts at reformulating the program of a sociology of knowledge, nor can the evaluation of Mannheim’s work made in the 1930s by Horkheimer and Adorno be taken over without reexamination.

The main thesis explored in this essay is that while the sociology of knowledge, as Mannheim conceived it, manifested what could be termed a “practical” or even “emancipatory” intent, these intentions were projected in a way which could not be preserved in more modern versions of the theory.
Through a comparison of Mannheim's work with that of two of his more recent heirs, Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, it is possible to outline the limits of one conception of "emancipatory theory", Mannheim's notion of "conjunctive thought". The more sympathetic critics of Mannheim's work, such as Kurt H. Wolff and David Kettler, have demonstrated the extent to which Mannheim's original intentions were a response to a constellation of problems in ethics, philosophy, and social theory. An examination of the present status of the sociology of knowledge, as evidenced by Berger and Luckmann's _The Social Construction of Reality_ reveals that these intentions have to a large extent vanished. The aim of this essay is to question if there is not at the heart of Mannheim's conception of the practical intent of the sociology of knowledge a disposition which leads to the problematic result of Berger and Luckmann's work.

I have chosen to focus on _The Social Construction of Reality_ as a major current work for four reasons. First, the book is symptomatic of a resurgent concern among social scientists with the possible contribution of phenomenology to a revitalization of social theory, an interest at the heart of many recent discussions. Second, unlike some of the works which have appeared as a result of this interest, it encompasses a fairly broad range of theoretical issues and does so in a presentation which is lucid enough to promote real criticism rather than simple misinterpretation. Third, the work concerns itself quite explicitly with the relationship between actor-meaning analysis and social-structural analysis, thus striving to avoid the onesidedness characteristic of many studies. Finally, and not of least importance, I doubt if there are many people today even vaguely concerned with these issues who have not at one time or another read, or even admired, the book. Any work which can claim this type of audience deserves an examination.

In what follows I begin by discussing the way in which the relationship between individual and society is posed both by Mannheim and by Berger and Luckmann. This rather abstract discussion will serve to situate more precisely the importance of "knowledge" in their works, the theme which will be discussed in the next section. I will then consider the function which social theory plays within this context and indicate the sense in which Mannheim's project can be said to have "emancipatory" intentions. In the final two sections I will raise two objections to both Mannheim and Berger and Luckmann, first with respect to their conception of social reproduction and second with respect to their conception of the role of theorizing.

**The Social Cultivation of the Individual**

An attempt to restore the original impetus behind the treatment of thought and society in the sociology of knowledge forces reflection on a classic problem
in social theory, the problem of how individual development is to be conceptualized within a social collectivity. In the German humanist tradition this question was explored through a discussion of the nature of Bildung, which must be translated rather poorly as either "cultivation" or "formation," there being no good English equivalent save "education" in the global sense. The question was eventually developed within a historical-philosophical framework by Hegel in his Phenomenology, resulting in the reconciliation of two prevalent divergent conceptions of cultivation: cultivation as the development of pre-given individual qualities and cultivation as the process by which the individual is formed in accordance with an external idea. Hegel overcame this dichotomy by viewing cultivation as a series of interactions between consciousness and world which result in the modification of both the subjective and objective moments of the process. This dialectical conception of cultivation is preserved in the work of both Mannheim and Berger and Luckmann in the form of an argument which, when abstracted, postulates three interrelated moments in the cultivation process: 1) an active positing subject, 2) a posited object, 3) a mediation of the subject by posited objects.

In Berger and Luckmann these three moments appear explicitly as an attempt to apply the Hegelian notion of cultivation to society through the use of the concrete social analyses of Marx, Durkheim, and Weber, and the moments are designated as "Externalization," "Objectification," and "Internalization." In the first and second moments, individuals produce cultural and social artifacts, giving their intentions a sense of permanency by creating enduring objects that are accessible to others. In the analysis of society, this operation is called "Institutionalization," which is defined as the means by which humanly produced social products partake of an objective quality without becoming inhuman "things." This process of institutionalization occurs "whenever there is a reciprocal typification of habitualized actions by types of actors." Taking the second and third moments together, we find that these typifications, once objectified, exert a return force on individuals. "Socialization" is this process whereby a humanly created objective reality shapes and creates the individual as a social product. This process, which bridges the second and third moments of the triad, is accomplished by an individual's "taking over" of the world in which others already live. The pivot of the entire process rests on the moment of objectification since here we find a phenomenon which is both the creation of individuals (externalization-objectification) and the creator of individuals (objectification-internalization). This duality in objectification permits us to avoid positing the cultivation process either as a simple externalizing of pre-given qualities (as would be the case if only the first two moments were present) or as a simple taking-over of an image which completely transcends individual consciousness. Nevertheless, because of the temporal asymmetry of the process between the
JAMES SCHMIDT

social and individual levels and the primacy of internalization in the life of the individual, there is a decided slant in the latter direction.\textsuperscript{15}

Mannheim's relationship to this tradition is less immediately clear, especially given his curious reception into the English-speaking world. Through accident as well as design English translations of Mannheim have tended to replace a terminology deriving from German idealism or from the neo-Kantian tradition with a language less objectionable to Anglo-American social science.\textsuperscript{16} The price of this effort at making Mannheim "more accessible" to an earlier generation of social scientists has been the current remarkable neglect of a thinker whose work stands at the cross-roads of those aspects of German social theory (existentialism, hermeneutics, and Western Marxism) which have of late become of interest to Anglo-American social science. Ironically the "German Mannheim" is probably of more relevance to contemporary English speaking social scientists than the translated one.

In Mannheim's early essay "Soul and Culture" (1918), a work which more expressly spells out his concerns than later efforts, the three moments are developed in terms similar to those employed by his teacher Georg Simmel in his studies of culture.\textsuperscript{17} For Simmel, "culture" was "the path from closed unity through unfolded multiplicity to unfolded unity" which serves to mediate subjective consciousness and cultural products (objective Geist) into a cultivated, subjective Geist.\textsuperscript{18} "Soul and Culture" is firmly based on this general outlook, even to the point of borrowing characteristic expressions and examples from Simmel.\textsuperscript{19} In this version of the process the first two moments again represent an externalization of human intentions into the world in the form of a creation of objects, but the example of aesthetic creation is usually employed, rather than the process of institutionalization described in Berger and Luckmann.\textsuperscript{20} The movement from the second to the third moments, again depicted in aesthetic terms as the appreciation of an artistic object, is a process by which the multiplicity of the object is returned to a meaningful unity, a unity which is no longer the enclosed unity of the creative artist, but rather the unfolded unity of an object possessing an intersubjective, cultural significance.\textsuperscript{21} As was the case in Berger and Luckmann, the pivot point is the second moment, which Mannheim designates as the "Work". The Work enables the soul to find fulfillment through producing an externalization in an alien medium which is recognizable by other souls as containing human significance.\textsuperscript{22} Again, the alternatives of a simple externalization of pre-given qualities which are intuitively captured by other subjects, or of a simple treatment of cultural objects as objects on the same level as things of nature, are rejected.\textsuperscript{23} Given the formal similarity of the conceptualizations of the cultivation process present in the writings of Mannheim and Berger and Luckmann, it is important now to examine the specific attributes which are assigned to the moment of objectification so that the differences between their works may be appreciated.
REIFICATION AND RECOLLECTION

The Role of Knowledge in the Process of Objectification

At this point it is clear what concern Mannheim and Berger and Luckmann have with "knowledge". Rather than being an attempt to apply an already formulated methodology to a new problem area (i.e. intellectual objects), the sociology of knowledge is a means of exploring the functioning of society itself. "Knowledge", far from being an effect deduced from the causal analysis of social processes, is viewed as the key element in the process of social reproduction.24 Thus, "knowledge" is considered to be that peculiar objectification which is both a human product and a producer of humans.

Berger and Luckmann stress that in contrast to much of the traditional literature in the field, they are dealing with "non-theoretical knowledge" or "everyday common-sense" rather than with cultural products or the knowledge of intellectuals.25 It is possible to simplify their presentation without undue distortion by saying that there are two types of knowledge discussed as factors in the cultivation process: 1) explicit knowledge in the form of "symbolic universes", "finite provinces of meaning", and "legitimations"; that is, practices which express the cultivation process theoretically, permit movement from activity to activity within the process, and provide a rationale for continuing to participate in the process; and 2) a more primordial type of knowledge which is rarely thematized explicitly; the knowledge which is contained in the Lebenswelt.26 This second type of knowledge, which is the distinctive contribution of Alfred Schutz's social phenomenology, is employed by Berger and Luckmann as a means of indicating the most primary set of objectifications on which the cultivation process depends.27 The objectifications of the Lebenswelt exhibit a dual participation in the institutionalization and socialization processes. Within the former, the Lebenswelt objectivations "program" the process of externalization through language and a commonly held stock of knowledge given to individuals on a taken-for-granted, common-sense level.28

The power of the Lebenswelt in this account, a power which will become even clearer once we note the problems Mannheim has in the absence of such a concept, lies in the fact that it is a type of knowledge which only rarely can be placed in question.29 While theoretical knowledge may be doubted and refuted, it is impossible to question the Lebenswelt without leaving it for the realm of highly abstract theorizing.30 The Lebenswelt, existing as it does on a mundane atheoretic level and dominated by a pragmatic rather than a theoretical consistency, provides the basis which even abstract theorizing must presuppose even at the very moment it attempts to question its validity.31 In short, the Lebenswelt performs all of the tasks which were once assigned by Husserl to the transcendental ego: it grounds all aspects of conscious human
endeavor, and even resolves that most problematic of Husserl's dilemmas, the knowledge of the Other.  

In Mannheim's conception of the process of cultivation the category of "knowledge" refers to intellectual and cultural objectifications rather than to common sense knowledge. It is only at a thematic level that objectifications exist which are suited to the type of reflection which Mannheim terms "conjunctive thought": the derivation of ethical-practical orientation through the contemplation of objects. Mannheim contrasts "conjunctive" with "communicative" thought in a manner analogous to the distinction between verstehen (understanding) and erklären (explanation) or between the Geisteswissenschaften (cultural sciences) and Naturwissenschaften (natural sciences). Conjunctive thought deals with a world of human meanings which must be understood, rather than with natural objects which are only explained with the end of technical manipulation in mind. In opposition to communicative thought, which proceeds by breaking objects into their component parts for analysis, conjunctive thought utilizes an Einheitschau, a "comprehensive intuition", which ties meanings together into a unity. Conjunctive thought cannot claim the abstract precision of communicative thought nor is it as universally communicable; it is thus situationally relative to a particular community. Hence, any attempt at practical intervention by intellectuals must avoid a simple rejection of conjunctive thought as muddled or imprecise if it is to accomplish more than a move to communicative thought, which, while precise, is devoid of practical intentions. Mannheim thus proposes that intellectuals must relativize and appreciate such cultural expressions and, thereby, surpass them with a more comprehensive hermeneutic.

Putting this in the context we have been exploring, it appears that as before cultural objectifications are seen as uniting two contradictory aspects: they are objects in the spatio-temporal world and yet also expressions of human intentions and meanings. Conjunctive thought must preserve both sides of this duality or any hope of gaining orientation will be lost, leaving only disorganized facts or reifications of human processes. It is important to note that while Berger and Luckmann require a similar dual vision (social reality as meaning and as object), they ground this vision in the everyday practices of the Lebenswelt. But for Mannheim there is no assurance that this synthesis actually takes place, rather, its achievement being both problematic and contingent; the sociology of knowledge arises in response to this problem.

Consequently, Mannheim's main concern is not the regular, orderly, everyday bridging of the two processes in the life world of practical activity, but rather the problem of what an individual has to do to continue living in a culture which can no longer provide an unproblematic ethical and practical orientation. This loss of orientation is traced by Mannheim, at different points in his career, to two separate sources. In his earlier works the problem of
REIFICATION AND RECOLLECTION

historical flux seems to be the major threat to the ability to comprehend the "ethos" of cultural objectifications. But later this was coupled with the insight that not only the relativity of temporal and historical situations but also the conflicting nature of class situations and the resultant development of "debunking" practices robbed the intellectual world of any universal meaning.

Thus for both Mannheim and Berger and Luckmann the object which the sociology of knowledge investigates is that "knowledge" without which the normative order of society could not survive. But this normative order is conceptualized differently in each case. For Berger and Luckmann social norms are encoded on a pre-thematic level which remains profoundly non-problematic, with the exception of marginal cases. For Mannheim the normative order remains a task to be achieved, an imperative which still must be decoded and which calls for a theory with a practical and emancipatory intent.

The Function of Social Theory

From these differing conceptions of the way in which "knowledge" functions as a moment in the process of cultivation issue two different perspectives on the functions of the sociology of knowledge. If one assumes that the cultivation process does not confront fundamental contradictions, the sociology of knowledge can maintain a contemplative attitude towards the process. But if the cultivation process itself seems to be threatened, and if the disruption of the process is conceptualized in such a way as to allow social theory itself to have an impact on cultivation, then social theorizing can manifest a "practical" or even "emancipatory" intent.

Mannheim views cultural objectifications as partial aspects of a truth which remains present despite altering historical and social perspectives. History is conceived as a process which leads through a series of dialectical negations of partial truths, negations which are viewed neither as simple reposings of the same problems nor as simple linear progressions, but rather as a constant recentering of problems which incorporates all of the previous moments within a new setting. The carrier of this type of process in a society is ultimately designated as "the utopian mentality" in Ideology and Utopia, and the problematic nature of the present day process of cultivation finds its social origins in the disappearance of utopian thought as the result of ideological "debunkings".

Mannheim's conception of the tasks to be performed by the sociology of knowledge must be placed in this context. As David Kettlet has shown, Mannheim's early search for "conjunctive knowledge" remains a constant theme in his attempts to come to terms with the crises of his age. The classic pattern,
which recurs throughout Mannheim's works, has been outlined by Kettler as consisting of a

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\text{. . . diagnosis of a crisis, with its implicit threat and promise, produced by necessary historical forces, the renovating mission of a group needing to become conscious of itself, and the requirement that the group carry out the dictates of the historical moment without attempting to anticipate future development.}^{40}
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Mannheim considered that the dictates of the time demanded a "dynamic intellectual mediation" of cultural phenomena. The sociology of knowledge attempted to provide this by going beyond one-sided, ideological views to the total truth which lies beyond the competing ideologies.\(^{41}\) This mediation took the form of an evaluational critique which surpasses the limitations of the various perspectives by indicating a more inclusive synthesis.\(^{42}\)

No such practical task presents itself to the sociology of knowledge proposed by Berger and Luckmann, since, for them, the process of cultivation takes place in a non-problematic fashion, supported and sustained by the non-problematic Lebenswelt. The primary problem facing this system — that is, the only "crisis" in the process of cultivation which they foresee — consists of shocks which threaten the individual's sense of the legitimacy of the world which is to be assimilated. The coming of new generations, the diversity of individual experience because of the division of labour, and the individual "marginal experiences" of death fears, insanity, and ecstasy all threaten the functioning of the system and call for a resolution which will keep the social totality from dissolving into a series of non-legitimated demands and institutions. For the sake of convenience we may analyze the two major types of procedures Berger and Luckmann discuss ("legitimations" and "universe maintaining" activities) together, since both address the problem of creating or restoring a meaningful assimilation of objectified institutions by individuals.\(^{43}\)

In both cases the manner in which society achieves integration is far less a Mannheimian synthesis of conflicting perspectives than a reduction of the individual problem to a particular aspect of an already existing whole. In other words, my vivid nightmare or my fear of death are explained as merely "a nightmare" or "a death fear" — i.e. everyday occurrences which are not viewed as anything extraordinary. Similarly, the entry of each new child into the society is not a totally contingent occurrence but rather a particular incident in the general metamorphosis of society. Hence, individuals who have doubts about the legitimacy of the normative order are reintegrated through processes
which rewrite each deviant occurrence in the language of an accepted symbolic universe or through nihilation processes which dismiss the deviant events and perceptions as unreal.\textsuperscript{44} In both cases concrete particularity is absorbed into formal identity.

Consequently, an intervention by social theory to preserve the process of cultivation is unnecessary, since according to the model proposed by Berger and Luckmann the process draws its strength from the pre-thematic store of meanings encoded in the Lebenswelt. Should this primordial Lebenswelt be disrupted, no amount of theoretical intervention by intellectuals could restore the balance. The sociology of knowledge is thus a theoretical rather than practical discipline. It carries out a phenomenological analysis of the way in which cultivation proceeds, but this process of theorizing has no impact on the actual cultivation process.\textsuperscript{45}

I have stated the contrasts here between the ways in which Mannheim and Berger and Luckmann understand the intentions of the sociology of knowledge. But we have also seen in an earlier section that the model of the cultivation process which each employs is structurally the same. What I would now like to argue is that the loss of a practical role for the sociology of knowledge in Berger and Luckmann’s presentation is not an accidental feature of the theory but is rooted in the very conception of the cultivation process which they share with Mannheim. In short, I want to argue that Mannheim’s notion of cultivation cannot support his practical project.

**Idealized Cultivation and the Tropism Towards Identity Theory**

The view of the cultivation process which is shared by Mannheim and Berger and Luckmann is susceptible to criticism on the grounds that it distorts in a fundamental way the character of social reproduction. Above all, one should be suspicious of the way in which the term “knowledge” is used — the term is adapted to such a wide range of phenomena that it obfuscates rather than explicates the manner in which social identity is maintained. In both cases we find that “knowledge” can be assigned a major constitutive role in the society only at the price of expanding the term far beyond what can reasonably be covered by it in any ordinary sense. Despite the fact that Berger and Luckmann charge that their predecessors in the sociology of knowledge overestimate the significance of “theoretical ideas”\textsuperscript{46} (i.e. knowledge in the most literal sense), one finds a blurring of the boundaries of the term present even in Mannheim’s work. In his 1921-22 paper “On the Interpretation of Weltanschauungen” Mannheim explicitly states that the Weltanschauungen which constitute the basis of all cultural objectifications are “irrational” and “atheoretical”, and in his 1925 paper “The Problem of a Sociology of Knowledge” he insists that the
ultimate "substructure" on which the intellectual "superstructure" rests is not "matter" but rather a "mind-in-the-superstructure" or "milieu". Thus, although Mannheim does assign the primary responsibility for the functioning of the cultivation process to "intellectual ideas", he nevertheless roots these ideas in a pre-theoretic type of knowledge.

But Mannheim's basic allegiance to the liberal ideal of rational criticism prevented him from assigning the total task of social reproduction to the pre-thematic level. A society which could offer no rational legitimation of its practices would strike him as a society in crisis. Yet Berger and Luckmann's model of cultivation takes the step Mannheim backed away from, thus completing the process of idealizing social reproduction by transforming the Lebenswelt into an ordering mechanism which is still "knowledge", albeit "knowledge" which is no longer capable of accounting for itself rationally. Since the concept of "Lebenswelt" undergoes an interesting evolution from Husserl, through Schutz, and finally to Berger and Luckmann, an examination of its metamorphosis will help to illustrate how the cultivation process is idealized.

Husserl employs the term "Lebenswelt" in the Crisis to denote a "realm of original self-evidences", that original experiential world (Erfahrungswelt) which precedes every philosophic or scientific category. For Husserl, the concept has a primarily critical function in that it acts as a negation of formal abstractions and called for an examination of the particular concrete activities which precede that theorizing. But this negative significance is lost as later theorists concentrated only on the "positive" aspects of the Lebenswelt, i.e. its alleged regular structures, an impetus which is to be sure present in Husserl, but tied as it is to the still present project of a transcendental egology, manifests a different intention than that of contemporary phenomenological sociology. In the work of Alfred Schutz the Lebenswelt has become characterized as a field of primordial meanings. And in Berger and Luckmann's discussion of how language structures the Lebenswelt through fundamental categories, the process of converting the term from a negation of formal structure to a positing of a new level of formal structuring is completed.

Hence, in the case of Berger and Luckmann and, to a lesser extent, in that of Mannheim this expansion of the domain described as "meaning" is carried out through the use of a category which leads a rather shady existence as "pre-knowledge". It is like theoretical knowledge in the sense that it contains meanings and works on reality through symbolic practices, but it is not as explicit, as fully articulated, or as logically structured as theoretical knowledge. It is not an exaggeration to describe the category as functioning as a "quasi-transcendental" guarantee that any temporary problems of integration will be solved through primarily symbolic means. We are given a series of intellectual phenomena (Mannheim's cultural objects, Berger and Luckmann's finite provinces of meaning) which must be linked together into a unity. This unity is assured by
REIFICATION AND RECOLLECTION

arguing that if these phenomena are present at all, they must partake of a
deeper symbolic unity which is either actually and non-problematically present
or given as a task to be realized.

It is in its critique of these assumptions that the analysis by Horkheimer and
Adorno is still of importance today. Horkheimer's 1930 review of *Ideology and
Utopia* questioned whether such a description of the cultivation process does
not lead to an account of the present which mystifies the actual process of social
reproduction. Real poverty and suffering are concealed under the codewords
"need and crisis" and the social and political crisis of the present is turned into
a problem facing "categories of the absolute". Horkheimer claims that the
resultant transformation of social conflict into a clash of "worlds" recasts com-
plex issues of the organization of processes of social reproduction into a form
more easily suited to mediation by the intelligensia. Social harmony is viewed
as merely a problem of elite education and rational planning. As Adorno later
noted,

Mannheim's use of the concept of the social totality serves
not so much to emphasize the intricate dependence of
men within the totality as to glorify the social process itself
as an evening-out of the contradictions in the whole. In
this balance, theoretically, the contradictions disappear.

These criticisms of Mannheim's work are even more applicable to Berger and
Luckmann, who have carried out a similar idealization of society while arguing
that their approach avoids the intellectualism present in Mannheim's ap-
proach. For the most part, crises are presented in their work as problems of
socializing deviancy, that is, as a problem of a lack of agreement on how a
situation is to be defined. The problem here is not that "deviance" carries a
negative connotation, rather the question I would raise is whether their notion
of deviance can be at all useful as a model of social conflict. What is particularly
problematic is their discussion of the enforcement of social norms. Berger and
Luckmann argue that "the integration of an institutional order can be
understood only in terms of the 'knowledge' that its members have of it." This
knowledge consists of "'what everybody knows' about a social world, an
assemblage of maxims, morals, proverbial nuggets of wisdom, values and
beliefs, myths, and so forth ..." Adorno, in contrast, suggests that the
ultimate foundations of the social order cannot be described in terms of
"proverbial nuggets of wisdom" but rather requires an approach sensitive to
non-intellectual psychological correlates of the social structure, such as fear.
Fear (Angst) constitutes a more crucial and subjective motive of objective rationality. It is mediated. Today anyone who fails to comply with the economic rules will seldom go under straight away. But the fate of the declassé looms on the horizon... In the course of history this fear has become second nature... What is lost when one discusses the process of individual cultivation in terms of a model which places "knowledge" at the fulcrum is this sense that behind knowledge, society and culture, nature still exercises a blind force. Freud's recognition that a hermeneutic of consciousness had to be supplemented by an "energetics" of desire serves as a sign that social reproduction cannot be adequately conceptualized within a single logic. The logic of individual and social development remains a logic of non-identity, a non-identity which a conjunctive hermeneutic would falsify. The parallel between conjunctive and communicative thought and between verstehen and erklären must be questioned, since verstehen alone seems inadequate to comprehend the unintended meanings which permeate social reality. The framing of a social theory with practical intentions in terms of such a hermeneutic fails because it ignores the extent to which the verstehen/klären and Natur/Geist distinctions are abstract. Socio-cultural reality cannot be approached as if it were Geist since it is shot through with a nature-like necessity. It is this face of socio-cultural reality which Mannheim's approach has not adequately conceptualized. Nor do Berger and Luckmann seem to do much better.

The model of cultivation which both Mannheim and Berger and Luckmann share remains attached to the ideal of "identity theory", the one legacy of German idealism which is not confronted critically in their work. Both conceptualize the cultivation process as primarily an enrichment of identity. Mannheim, drawing on Simmel's definition of culture as a passage from "closed" to "unfolded" unity shows a loyalty to the classical German notion of self-cultivation, while Berger and Luckmann trace a passage from the pre-thematic unity of the Lebenswelt to the more explicit and articulated social unity of institutions. While undoubtedly the reestablishment of identity (individual and social) is an important component of any process of social reproduction, it is questionable whether such a logic can deal adequately with the relationship of personal and social identity in periods of social disintegration.

Since my concern in this essay is to discuss the fate of the emancipatory intentions of the sociology of knowledge, I will not dwell on the problem of establishing an adequate scheme to explain how individual and social identity are achieved in society. What is important to me about the models I have sketched in Mannheim and Berger and Luckmann is that they help to explain
why Mannheim's emancipatory intention has vanished from Berger and Luckmann's work. In pursuing this point we must examine the limitations of "conjunctive knowledge" as an ideal for emancipatory social theory.

Reification and the Limits of Conjunctive Knowledge

I have suggested that the absence of a practical intent in Berger and Luckmann's work may be traced to a basic inadequacy in the theory of social reproduction they share with Mannheim. Having indicated some of the problems of this theory as an account of social reproduction it remains to be shown how this model vitiates Mannheim's project of a sociology of knowledge with a practical intent. This can best be done by examining how both Mannheim and Berger and Luckmann approach the problem of reification, since in different ways the concept is central to their work.

In Adorno's famous definition, "all reification is forgetting" — we would do well to inquire what each theorist feels is "forgotten" and what each sees as in need of recollection by social theory. In Mannheim's work, the danger of reification, discussed in the closing pages of his essay on Utopia, is that it represents the loss of an important aspect of the cultural objectification which is to be internalized. As I have noted above, cultural objectifications in Mannheim are unities of material and ideal aspects which permit our grasping them as having not only an object-like status or an ideal-expressive status, but also an ethos: an orientation granting aspect. Reification threatens to rob objectifications of their expressive, human value, reducing them to mere things devoid of sense and orientation. In Berger and Luckmann reification is dangerous because it might lead individuals to misinterpret an essentially human process such as that of cultivation as an interaction of structures independent of human will. Thus, while for Mannheim reification leads to an inability of the cultivation process to maintain itself, since cultural hieroglyphs have turned into mute things, for Berger and Luckmann reification does not halt the reproduction process, but rather makes it appear as a process devoid of human will.

To the extent that social reproduction continues, despite the crisis Mannheim envisaged in the 1930s, Berger and Luckmann's position has been vindicated. But the vindication is surely a bitter one, as Adorno has noted.

Men have come to be — triumph of integration! — identified in their innermost behaviour pattern with their fate in modern society. In a mockery of all the hopes of philosophy, subject and object have attained ultimate reconciliation.
The practical intent of Mannheim's project has evaporated in the work of Berger and Luckmann because — in a mockery of Mannheim's hopes — it has been realized. No longer need one fear that encounters with objects will be devoid of an orienting ethos; rather the danger today is that it is difficult to free objects from a non-problematic context. The problem with "conjunctive thought" is that it seems capable of finding the most banal (and therefore ironic) realizations. Like the often reactionary complaint that the modern age lacks a unified cultural style, the notion that orienting meanings have been lost gives too little credit to the ability of modern industrial societies to rationalize even the production of a unifying ethos. Adorno and Horkheimer's provisional study of the "culture industry" in America in the late 1940s already noted the extent to which nothing seems free from being smothered by prefabricated meanings. Even sunbeams "almost beg to have the name of a soap or toothpaste emblazoned on them . . ." This production of meanings throws into question the separation between verstehen and erklären for here we have cultural objects which owe their origins to instrumental strategies yet which produce their effects in the sphere of symbolic interaction. Faced with such a situation, "conjunctive knowledge" must resign the field; a relativizing and surpassing of the various claims made by political candidates leads to no more comprehensive political position. At best it can only iron out the differences in the styles recommended by the public relations firms hired by the candidates. And even if one attempted to transform this "conjunctive" sociology of knowledge into a "debunking" one, the potential power of the insights gained is not at all clear. When ideas can no longer be separated from the immediate process of social reproduction, pointing out this fact quickly begins begging the obvious.

What is thrown into question is the validity of the model of how individual and social identity are achieved which Hegel proposed in the second decade of the nineteenth century. Hegel's discussion of "civil society" in the *Philosophy of Right* not only shattered the identification of "political society" and "civil society" which had dominated western political thought since Aristotle, and thus recognized the significance of a realm of human activity which produced a universal, though unintended, will ("society" in the modern sense), it also displaced the classical idea of *paideia* from the "political" domain to the domain of civil society. His discussion of the significance of *Bildung* in civil society in paragraph 187 of the *Philosophy of Right* removes "cultivation" from the domain of pedagogy and suggests that this end is achieved not through the asocial interaction of tutor and student, shielded from the domain of material production, but rather takes place at the heart of civil society as independent Bürger interact to satisfy their wants. Civil society, conceived as the realm of particular, subjective needs and wants thus assures that individuality and subjectivity, the great advances which distinguish the modern world from antiqui-
REIFICATION AND RECOLLECTION

ty, will be embodied and preserved within a rational state. But Hegel's paean to civil society does not uncover the ground of property and non-property which makes this play of interests possible. Marx's inquiry into the structures which ground civil society anticipates the Frankfurt School's investigations of the changing structure of civil society in advanced industrial society. The response of the Frankfurt School to Mannheim cannot be understood unless one sees how an alteration of the function of civil society radically calls into question a strategy of "emancipatory theory" which merely transposes "Marxian" categories without asking if they are still applicable once the anatomy of civil society has been transformed. Once the exchanges in civil society have been rationalized from above (a possibility already latent in Hegel's model), civil society loses its characteristics of individuality and particularity. Bildung no longer is achieved through individuals shaping their willing, knowing, and acting in a universal way, as Hegel suggested, affirming the ideal of the individual as an autonomous, calculating ego within the sphere of exchange. Rather, with the rationalization of circulation and exchange individual wants and needs are directly aligned to the universal and the "labour of Bildung" becomes a direct shaping of interests and needs by the "culture industry". In such a situation, attempts to establish an "orienting ethos" through conjunctive thought miss the point: integration is not so much to be achieved as to be avoided. Any emancipatory strategy would first have to restore some measure of autonomy before it could even begin to worry about creating a community of interests.

Adorno's approach to socio-cultural phenomena is cognizant of this altered situation. Indeed, his procedures are so antithetical to those of Mannheim that one could well call his a "disjunctive" approach. His efforts do not deny that cultural phenomena are intimately tied to social reproduction; such a connection is his starting point. But his method rarely remains content with noting a functional correspondence of ideas and social reality. Rather, he proceeds against the identity to record the extent to which this correspondence is always a forced and, hence, ambivalent one. For instance, it is not enough for Adorno to note that Beethoven's Missa Solemnis "corresponds" in some fashion to the crisis of individual and society in the early bourgeois era. Such a vacant identity misses the far more important aspects of the work for Adorno. The contradictory unity of the Missa Solemnis, when explored in its own right, displays part-whole tensions, frustrated attempts at integration, and the still present hopes for reconciliation which tell us far more about social reality than any attempt at "class imputation" possibly could. In approaching each phenomenon as a totality in its own right, Adorno explodes the contradictions of the macrocosm from within the microcosm. By apprehending reality as a concrete totality, each of whose parts throws light on the whole, Adorno is able to avoid any flirtation with conjunctive or integrative approaches which would surpass the particular
from some transcendent Archimedean point. That such a task is not an easy one is made abundantly clear by Adorno's own worst efforts: e.g. his lumping of something imprecisely termed "jazz" into the pigeon-hole waiting for it in the theory of the regressive character of modern audiences or his failure to grasp the specific relationship of Stravinsky's music to a non-Germanic tradition. But his failures confirm his central insight — Adorno is led to disaster by foresaking a careful micrology for a more global and superficial attempt at imputation.

I began this essay by suggesting that the sociology of knowledge haunts Marxism. In view of the demons which Marxism has bred within its own house, perhaps this outside aid should be welcomed since it provides a chance to see the consequences of a simple preservation of Marxian catch-phrases without a careful analysis of their role within the theory itself. Mannheim's attempt to utilize the notions of ideology and imputation of social class without examining the extent to which such notions are in turn dependent on a particular constellation of social factors (i.e. a civil society distinct from the state) and the consequent loss of a practical intent in recent efforts in the sociology of knowledge suggest that the emancipatory potential of Marxian categories is always context dependent. A reformulated critical theory of society, devoted to securing some measure of individual autonomy in the face of increasingly direct intervention and rationalization from above, even if it appeared to abandon the most sacred of Marx's concepts, would remain more loyal to the emancipatory intentions at the heart of Marx's work than an unreflective continuance of their use.
REIFICATION AND RECOLLECTION

Notes

1. This is a revised version of a paper first read at the meetings of the International Society for the Sociology of Knowledge held during the Eighth World Congress of Sociology in Toronto in 1974. I have since benefitted from criticisms and suggestions by Russell Jacoby, David Kettler, and Bertell Ollman. My exchange with Martin Jay in Telos (cited below), though heated, also generated some light. My work in this area is indebted, in particular, to Kurt H. Wolff.


5. I have not ventured beyond this book in the present discussion. Certainly a discussion of Berger’s work on the problem of modernization is also of interest, particularly as a counterfoil to Mannheim’s later writings on planning. But since Berger claims that his later work derives from the approach outlined in The Social Construction of Reality it seems permissible to concentrate on this work. Cf. Peter Berger, Brigitte Berger, and Hansfried Kellner, The Homeless Mind (New York, 1974) pp. 11-12 and 63-82, and Peter Berger, Pyramids of Sacrifice (New York, 1976) pp. 183 ff.

6. I have briefly discussed the origin of the idea, its first formulations and problems in translation in From Tragedy to Dialectics: On the Theoretical Significance of Lukács’ Path from Simmel to Marx (unpublished PhD dissertation, Political Science Department, M.I.T., Cambridge, Mass., 1974).

7. These two aspects are developed in a study by an associate of Mannheim’s, Hans Weil, Die Entstehung des Deutschen Bildungsprinzips (1930), (Bonn, 1967).


9. Berger and Luckmann, pp. 61, 187. Berger and Luckmann would, I assume, argue that analytic aspects of the Bildung-process can be detached from its “moral-philosophical” aspects.

10. Ibid. pp. 60-61, 18. It is this last point, the retention of the sense of human origins, which distinguishes the term “objectification” from reification, p. 89.

11. Ibid. p. 54.

12. Ibid. p. 61, 89.

13. Ibid. p. 130.

14. Berger and Luckmann explicitly reject a notion of a pre-given “human essence” in the form of a specialized, highly developed series of drives or needs, pp. 47-52.

15. Ibid. p. 129.

16. It has long been known that the translation of Ideology and Utopia is misleading, but recently David Kettler has discovered that many of the alterations in meaning were proposed in letters from Mannheim to his translators Louis Wirth and Edward Shils. Among other problems in the Anglo-American Mannheim reception is the failure to publish Mannheim’s important 1924 writings on Heidegger and Lukács, discussed by Kettler in his Political Science Quarterly article and the failure to make available the unpublished German original of Mannheim’s Sociology of Culture. Cf. Wolff’s Introduction to From Karl Mannheim p. lxxxvii.
17. Mannheim, "Seele und Kultur", trans. from the Hungarian by Ernest Mannheim, in 
pp. 66 ff. For this discussion, the most significant of Simmel’s works are “Die Begriff und die 
Tragodie der Kultur”, (1911) in Philosophische Kultur (Leipzig, 1911), and “Von Wesen der 
Kultur” trans. by Donald N. Levine as “Subjective Culture” in Simmel, On Individuality 
stresses the importance of this early work for an understanding of Mannheim’s later efforts.


23. On the final point see Simmel, “Begriff und Tragodie . . .” p. 247. “Subjective Culture” p. 230, as well as Mannheim’s discussion of the need to go beyond a simple interpretation of 
“actor meaning” in “On the Interpretation of Weltanschauung” (hereafter “Weltanschauung”) (1921-22) in From Karl Mannheim pp. 18-22 and developed in various 
forms in “Structural Analysis of Epistemology’” (1922) in Mannheim, Essays on Sociology 
and Social Psychology (London, 1953), p. 46 and “The Ideological and Sociological Inter-
pretation of Intellectual Phenomena” (hereafter “Interpretation”) in From Karl Mannheim, 
des Geldes, 4th ed. (Berlin, 1922), p. 532 as well as the Mannheim works cited above.

24. Perhaps this tendency to convert the sociology of knowledge into a causal type analysis can be 
found even in the way “Wissenssoziologie” has been translated. The form “sociology of 
knowledge” makes “knowledge” appear as an object of study rather than permitting 
sociology to stand modified by the term “knowledge” as is the case in “empirical sociology” .
“formal sociology”, etc. cf. Wolff, ‘The Sociology of Knowledge and Sociological Theory”. 
p. 568.


26. This type of knowledge is discussed at length in Ibid. Ch. 1, which is a summary of Schutz’s 
work on the subject.

27. Ibid. p. 20.

28. Ibid. p. 66.
JAMES SCHMIDT


34. Mannheim, I&U pp. 253, 262-63. The previously mentioned requirement that analysis aim not merely at expressive but at documentary meaning is not explicitly discussed here, but must be presumed to be still in effect since by the time of I&U Mannheim had identified the sociology of knowledge with the tasks earlier assigned to conjunctive thought.


36. See “Problem”, pp. 106-107, 62-64. The theme dominates I&U.

37. A theory with a “practical intent” is one which sees itself as part of systems of practical or social learning, cf. Jürgen Habermas, *Theory and Practice,* pp. 1-3, 41 ff. To the extent that Mannheim views the sociology of knowledge as freeing individuals from the domination of ossified symbolic structures it is possible to attribute to him an “emancipatory intent” in the sense employed by Habermas in *Knowledge and Human Interests,* trans. Jeremy Shapiro (Boston, 1971) pp. 189 ff.

38. In “Historicism” this truth is said to be “identical in itself” p. 105 but a dynamic rather than a formal absolute, p. 130. In “Problem” it is described as a “dynamic, generic totality”, p. 86, while in I&U it is a fundamental “flux” or “becoming”.


108
REIFICATION AND RECOLLECTION


42. I&U pp. 46, 188-89.

43. For Berger and Luckmann's discussion see pp. 105-106, 58, 103.

44. Ibid. pp. 112-115. Individuals may also be "incompletely socialized" hence the possibility of a clash of Lebenswelten discussed in Berger's later work, cf. P. Berger, B. Berger, and H. Kellner, op. cit. pp. 63-82. This idea of mutually incompatible Lebenswelten seems to fly in the face of the Schutz inspired analysis of the Social Construction of Reality.

45. This founds Berger's belief that it is possible to have an "objective" or "value-neutral" study of social interaction which is spelled out most explicitly in his Facing Up to Modernity (New York, 1977) pp. x-xix. If one assumes that social theorizing is intimately connected with the process of social reproduction, then this type of distinction is much more difficult to draw, as Habermas' distinction between "technical" and "practical" interests has made clear.


49. Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, all editions. Section 34d.

50. Schutz, Papers I, pp. 57, 127, 133, 149.


53. Horkheimer, p. 28.


59. Their rejection of Freud as unsuitable for Hegelian-Marxian inspired approaches is symptomatic. Cf. Berger and Luckmann, pp. 193-94. By coming to a halt before Freud's "biologism" they miss the real importance of Freud's discoveries: the recognition that communicative interaction is burdened with a significance which is not reducible to the actor's conscious intentions but is rather grounded in repressed aspects of the actor's corporeal existence. As Ricoeur, Lacan, and Merleau-Ponty have realized, such a dimension is important for the construction of any hermeneutic of social action.


66. This point is well demonstrated in Manfred Riedel, "Hegels Begriff der 'Bürgerlichen Gesellschaft' und das problem seines geschichtlichen Ursprungs" in his *Studien zu Hegels Rechtsphilosophie* (Frankfurt, 1969) pp. 135 ff.
REIFICATION AND RECOLLECTION


68. Cf. Gillian Rose, "'How is Critical Theory Possible?'" Political Studies XXIV:1, esp. pp. 73-75 and Susan Buck-Morss, "T.W. Adorno and the Dilemma of Bourgeois Philosophy" Salamagundi No. 36 (Winter 1977), esp. pp. 88 ff. Martin Jay's use of Werner Stark's distinctions between "functionalist" and "Elective Affinity" conceptions of the connection between ideas and reality still seems inaccurate with respect to Adorno, despite Jay's clarifications in Telos #22, p. 109. Stark's notion of "Elective Affinity" implies that there is a gradual convergence between substructures and superstructures, not coherence ab initio. Like will search for, and when found, link up with, like. " Stark, The Sociology of Knowledge (London, 1958) p. 257. I have difficulties in seeing how anything in this resembles Adorno's position in Negative Dialectics (as Jay claims in Telos #20, pp. 87-88). If anything Adorno proceeds in the opposite direction — from an affinity (assuredly more forced than "elected"!) he searches for traces of a utopia which, far from being a synoptic view on a reconciled totality, would be a "togetherness in diversity" cf. Negative Dialectics p. 150. That Adorno had no illusions about his own views not being equally threatened by their immersion in an oppressive reality is evident throughout Minima Moralia (London, 1974), cf. especially "On the morality of thinking" pp. 73-75.


71. Since such a micrology is grounded in the object itself, it remains somewhat contingent, as Adorno himself realizes in "The Culture Industry Reconsidered" in New German Critique #6 (1975) pp. 12 ff. Obviously a more comprehensive theory of social evolution, such as that with which Habermas and his associates are now engaged, would serve to clarify the significance of critical endeavors such as Adorno's. But it is naive to think that all efforts at critical interpretations must halt until the entire edifice has been grounded.