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THE WORLD UPSIDE DOWN*

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> For the universal and homogeneous state to be a realisable political end, Christian theism had first to be negated . . . Thus the idea of the classless society, then, is a derivative of the Christian religion because modern philosophy in negating the Christian religion was aware of the truth present in that which it negated.
>
> George Grant, *Technology and Empire*[1]

George Grant moves among the circle of the great critics of modernity. From the vantage point of the Christian apocalypse, he attempts to come to terms with its startling recapitulation in the visions of modern secular society. Its chief embodiment perhaps is within the Marxist vision of a perfect community on earth — the universal socialist society.

Eric Voegelin is another exponent of this theme:

> For it must never be forgotten that Western society is not all modern but that modernity is a growth within it, in opposition to the classic and Christian tradition.[2]

Such a modern society precludes an effective realization of Judaeo-Christian eschatology with its total reconciliation of God and man in perfect community. For Voegelin

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> The spiritual destiny of man in the Christian sense cannot be represented on earth by the power organization of a political society; it can be represented only by the church.[3]

Hence the displacement of the truths of Revelation into history is not only futile, but culminates in the modern totalitarian experience.

Other eminent philosophers have also taken up this theme. Michael Polanyi for example, has decreed that Marxism is a "spurious form of moral inversion" of Christianity[4]. Within the same stream, Reinhold Niebuhr has declared that:

> Marxism is a secularized version of Christian apocalypse in which the beatitude "Blessed are the poor", becomes the basis of unqualified political and moral judgements.[5]

There is a recurring vocabulary for this Christian critique and the terms "negation" and "inversion" are often used synonymously to convey the sense that the secular "kingdom" (or, in the language of Strauss and Kojève, "the universal and homogeneous state") is some form of mirror image of the original Christian vision.

One's vantage point in such a debate of course, is everything. Marx himself, would have found a surprisingly large area of agreement with these critics and had indeed, already made use of the same vocabulary. He would, however, have been looking through the mirror from the other side. The "Christian dialectic", he maintained, had issued from "an inverted world" (*eine verkehrte Welt*) and was thus itself "an inverted world-consciousness" (*ein verkehrtes Weltbewusstsein*).[6] He claimed in fact, that all ideology thus far has come to us as if it were filtered through a *camera obscura*, a dark room, and thus appears upside-down, standing on its head.[7] The point was of course, as in his famous reference to Hegel, that the social world as well as its beliefs and ideologies had properly to be stood on their feet once more. Thus he would have had no difficulty in agreeing with his Christian critics that communism was a "negation" of Christianity.

My intention here is not to obliterate the vast differences between the two camps. But an underlying question begins to force its way through. If Voegelin is correct in his panoramic view of an entity called "Western society" with its opposing tendencies *within* that society, how should such a Western society be described over such vastly different millennia?

It may require an almost superhuman detachment from the long and vociferous history of internecine struggle to speak of a common tradition of

belief that runs from biblical religion through Marxist eschatology. In the attempt to come to grips with some of the strikingly similar features of this tradition (without denying the overwhelming differences), I revert to the phrase "the apocalyptic tradition". It is a consistent tradition whose many expressions are characterized by a common beginning and a common end. The world is conceived initially as the home of overwhelming domination and oppression (defined in characteristically different ways). But the oppressed in the end, are offered a vision of perfect community whether called the kingdom of God or socialism. Between the beginning and the end, lies an intermediate process of transfiguration that is largely unrecognized but is shared by all the main versions of this tradition.[8] Over the three millennia from Moses to Marx, the leading actors have changed but the basic script of the apocalyptic tradition and some of its vital vocabulary have endured.

Within the limitations of this essay, I shall touch with inordinate, if not unseemly brevity on the Old Testament, the New Testament, Luther, Hegel and Marx. The reader should bear in mind that there is no intention here to review their respective doctrines. Hence this is neither an essay on Revelation nor on revolution and I shall have little to add to our knowledge of either theology or socialism.

This is an essay on the extraordinary itinerary — one might even say the "calisthenics" — of certain types of language in the apocalyptic tradition. This interest in language is not strictly speaking, a linguistic or semantic interest as such. Several philosophers and social scientists hold that language is the key to consciousness and is indeed, the most direct and intimate expression available to us. Ernst Cassirer has suggested that the mind uses words and images "as *organs* of its own, and thereby recognizes them for what they really are: forms of its own self-revelation."[9] The Russian psychologist, Lev S. Vygotsky has come to the same conclusion from a different perspective: "Thought and language, which reflect reality in a way different from that of perception, are the key to the nature of human consciousness."[10]

A new and unexpected light has been thrown on this same matter by the distinguished work of Claude Lévi-Strauss. From the study of hundreds of primitive myths, Lévi-Strauss concludes that we may speak of an "architecture of the mind".[11] This is an arresting idea; he elaborates further that "the unconscious activity of the mind consists in imposing forms upon content . . . these forms (being) fundamentally the same for all minds."[12] Among these forms, Lévi-Strauss throws his main emphasis on the "universality of the binary code",[13] that is, the inherent capacity of the mind to "think by pairs of contraries, upwards and downwards, strong and weak, black and white."[14] These are referred to as "chains of binary oppositions".[15] The main process involved in the structure of myth is the setting up of contrasting pairs, the building up of a conflict and the move towards its resolution.

To treat the apocalyptic tradition, from the Bible to Marx, as a system of myth does not imply an intention that is either pejorative or reductionist. The validity of the truths revealed in this tradition is not compromised by the present analysis of the medium of their articulation. But the new issue that does arise is that of the role of the human mind as a hidden but vital protagonist throughout. In this study of the myth of the apocalyptic tradition, particularly in relation to the formal rhetorical properties of the language which it employs, we are engaged in a venture, not as stated earlier, in either theology or socialism, but ultimately in anthroplogy in its widest sense — the study of man.

II

I recognize that the attempt to view the apocalyptic tradition in some overall common perspective severely tests the reader's credulity. This challenge to the respective adherents of its various individual expressions may prove insurmountable. Yet if we are prepared to abandon our fixed vantage points even momentarily, a broader landscape comes into view with deep valleys as well as peaks.

Much of the drama of this tradition comes from the periodic schisms that seem virtually inherent in its existence. The New Testament grew out of the Old, Protestantism out of Catholicism, Marx out of Hegel who maintained throughout that he was a Lutheran. One cardinal rule prevailed in the schism. The previous version of the perfect community was transfigured and negated. This proved to be an indispensable feature of the new starting point, that is the new version of oppressive bondage. Rosemary Reuther has pointed out that in the early Christian church, "anti-Judaism was originally more than social polemic. It was an expression of Christian self-affirmation."[16] This was closely incorporated into Christian "antitheses" or "negations".[17]

But the Church in its turn was "negated" in the Protestant Reformation. T.S. Eliot has remarked that "the life of Protestantism depends on the survival of that against which it protests."

Hegel, while continually avowing his Protestant affiliation attempted to overturn, in a gnostic fashion, the forms of self-understanding of Protestant theology. These outmoded forms, the myths, miracles and legends he felt, had now to be abandoned and his own aim was to turn "the language of religious myth into that of thought."[18]

Marx rejected Hegel's "dialectic of negativity" as itself too mystical. Man's bondage in history was as much to his religious self-expression as to his social institutions. Marx wished to overturn virtually all that had gone before.

Thus the great expressions of the apocalyptic tradition are necessarily as well its great schisms. It may be argued that Marx's ultimate break with any vestige of theism is the great divide in this tradition — its total secularization. Yet it grew almost *naturally*, perhaps inevitably, out of Hegel's attempt to relocate the enduring element of Protestant truth within a gnostic, immanentist tradition. For Hegel, the self-consciousness of the individual, as well as the rule of Spirit in the universe bore witness to the essential Christian truth.

What is so unexpected however, is the remarkable consistency of the schismatic argument, despite the widely different contexts in which it arose. Whether one or another version of theism was at issue, or whether, as with Marx, total secularization was propounded, the mode of reasoning was always the same. On the one hand, the previous "perfect community" had to be incorporated in the new oppressive bondage. On the other, a great deal of what had gone before was retained and reaffirmed in the new context.

Much of this inner process of schismatic articulation can be summed up in Hegel's notion of *aufheben* with its dual connotation of "abolishing" and "preserving" simultaneously. This dual, antithetical process is often hidden in the English translation of *aufheben* in Hegel and Marx usually rendered simply as "transcend."

The first and perhaps the most dramatic instance of schism is in the New Testament. It is the model for virtually all that came afterwards. Let us first recapitulate briefly the related structure of the Old Testament.

The high point of the Old Testament is the Covenant at Sinai. The rhetorical origins of the event however, lie in Pharoah's tyrannical domination and in the oppressive bondage of the Jews to state slavery in Egypt. The rhetoric is explicit: "Then thou shalt say unto thy son, we were slaves unto Pharaoh in Egypt" (Deuteronomy 6:21).

Yahweh conquers Pharaoh and replaces a tyrannical and evil lordship with an exalted lordship of justice and righteousness. The Jews in turn are transformed from oppressed slaves to Pharaoh to exalted slaves to Yahweh as in God's statement: "For unto me the children of Israel are slaves; they are my slaves . . ." (*avadei*; Leviticus 25:55). While the same Hebrew word *eved* is retained to connote slavery to Pharaoh as well as slavery to Yahweh, its significance has been completely inverted. In the first instance it connotes bitter overwhelming oppression, in the second instance total salvation, man's highest and most exalted vocation.

This hidden inversion of *eved* or slave, is the precedent for other forms of inversion which constitute the route to perfect community. Another mode of inversion for example, is used to represent the status of the "chosen" (i.e. blessed) people:

> And the Lord shall make thee the head, and not the tail; and thou shalt be above only, and thou shalt not be beneath. (Deuteronomy 28:13).

The Jews are now "called by the name of the Lord" (Deuteronomy 28:10) despite the fact that they are still his "slaves" and thus enter into the apocalyptic resolution of perfect community. As "lords" they are to exist in a community of total obedience, a complementary image of the supreme Lord. At the foot of Mount Sinai, Moses relays God's promise as follows:

> Ye have seen what I did unto the Egyptians, and how I bore you on eagles' wings, and brought you unto myself.
>
> Now therefore, if ye will obey my voice indeed, and keep my covenant, then ye shall be a peculiar treasure unto me above all people: for all the earth is mine:
>
> And ye shall be unto me a kingdom of priests, and an holy nation. (Exodus 19:4-6)

Metaphors of inversion are scattered throughout the Old Testament: "The Lord bringeth low, and lifteth up" (I Samuel 2:7); "Behold the Lord maketh the earth empty and maketh it waste, and turneth it upside down . . ." (Isaiah 24:1).

The New Testament follows this very same route to perfect community except for one vital change — the shift in the definition of bondage. In place of Pharaoh, the oppressive bondage in this instance is to the body and to man's mortality. Paul refers (literally) to our "having been enslaved under the elements of the world" (Galatians 4:3). The Greek word for "slave", *doulos* is now transfigured in precisely the same way as the Hebrew *eved.* Hence the "slaves (*douloi*) . . . of sin unto death" (Romans 6:16) become, in their inverted (exalted) status, the "slaves of Christ" (*douloi Christou*, Ephesians 6:6).

Similarly, just as Yahweh defeats Pharaoh, Christ abolishes death which is "swallowed up in victory" (I Corinthians 15:54). Death's domination is inverted and Christ brings "immortality to light through the gospel" (II Timothy 1:10). Christians become "heirs of God, and joint-heirs with Christ" (Romans 8:17); the Christian is "lord of all" (*kyrios panton*, Galatians 4:1). This is closely modelled on the Old Testament:

> But ye are a chosen generation, a royal priesthood, an holy nation, a peculiar people [i.e. a people for His possession] (I Peter 2:9).

This inversion from slave to lord is now the prelude to the apocalyptic resolution of the kingdom of God. Christians enter the kingdom as "fellow-citizens with the saints and of the household of God" (Ephesians 2:19).

But the schismatic character of the New Testament is highlighted as well. The oppressive bondage of the Christian is not only to man's mortality: the body, sin and death, but also to what had gone before, the law. The commandments and the Mosaic code had been the key to perfect community among the Jews: "Blessed is the man . . . (whose) delight is in the law of the Lord" (Psalms 1:1-2). But for Christians, "Christ is the end of the law for righteousness to every one that believeth" (Romans 10:4). Thus Christ "is made, not after the law of a carnal commandment, but after the power of an endless life" (Hebrews 7:16). The law enters into the redefined realm of the Christian view of oppression. Hence (in Hebrews 7:18), the commandments are "annulled" (*aufgehoben* in Luther's translation). But the inner significance of this annulment soon becomes clear in Paul: "Do we then make void (*heben . . . auf*) the law through faith? God forbid: yea we establish the law" (Romans 3:31). Jesus is explicit on the matter: "Think not that I am come to destroy the law, or the prophets: I am not come to destroy but to fulfil" (Matthew 5:17).

The complaints of the Jews were vociferous. After Paul had preached his revolutionary doctrine for three sabbath days in the synagogue at Thessalonica, the Jews made representations to the local authorities: "These that have turned the world upside down are come hither also" (Acts 17:6). "The world upside down" was a metaphor that was to be re-echoed in various ways, in all the schismatic battles of the apocalyptic tradition we are considering, whether by the theistic or the secular tradition. It was to reappear as a casual figure of speech, a metaphor for an oppressed world, as well as a metaphor for revolution. With Luther and Hegel it reached its highest form as a metaphor for God's power.

Why was this metaphor of inversion so congenial and intimate a form of expression for the apocalyptic tradition? Does it act, following Cassirer's insight, as an expression of the mind's self-revelation? We touch on this question once more in the conclusion.

The new vision of perfect community was embodied in the Church. For Voegelin, articulating the Catholic position, the church was "the universal spiritual organization of saints and sinners who professed faith in Christ, as the representative of the *civitas Dei* in history, as the flash of eternity into time."[19]

The Protestant revolution, Hegel, Marx and all that was to follow resulted, according to Voegelin from an "inner-Christian tension", the bursting forth of "components that were suppressed as heretical by the universal church."[20] The Reformation led the way to a "successful invasion of Western institutions by Gnostic movements . . .", the splitting of the universal church and the "gradual conquest of the political institutions in the national states."[21] This "Gnostic dream world" as Voegelin calls it, became "the civil theology of Western society."[22]

Voegelin was right in my view, to see the steady unfolding and direct line between Luther, Hegel and Marx. I shall attempt to recapitulate very briefly this inner continuity in terms of what had been "annulled" in each case and what had been "preserved".

But for those who prefer to view the apocalyptic drama of Western society in the larger context set out here, this "inner-Christian tension" rehearsed on a much larger stage what had already taken place once before. "These that have turned the world upside down" was, as we recall, the cry against the first of the schisms of the apocalyptic tradition.

Luther may have been the most important of "the divine redeemers of the Gnostic empires"[23] but the drama throughout was remarkably faithful to its underlying script. Luther affirmed the basic structure of Pauline theology around the pair of contrary terms "lord and servant" and incorporated the previous vision of perfect community into his new view of oppressive bondage.

The cornerstone of Lutheran theology is his most important essay, "On the Freedom of a Christian" (1520). The essay contrasts the paradoxical status of the Christian who is "a perfectly free lord of all subject to none" and at the same time "a perfectly dutiful servant of all subject to all."[24]

The terms "lord" and "servant" (*Herr* and *Knecht*) are offered once more in the biblical context discussed earlier. The free Christian, following in Christ's path, and in bondage in his mortal existence, "ought in this liberty to empty himself again" and serve his neighbour.[25] Thus the Christian servant or *Knecht* inverts his initial bondage to bodily existence to become free in the very service (or bondage) of his fellow man.

Now the characteristic second inversion takes place where the Christian servant, through faith also becomes a lord:

> every Christian is by faith so exalted (*erhaben*) above all things that, by virtue of a spiritual power, he is lord (*eyn herr wirt geystlich*) of all things without exception, so that nothing can do him any harm.[26]

This reiterates Paul's position where as we have seen, the Christian is "lord of all" (Galatians 4:1). Lord and servant are now united in the same person within his Christian freedom. As Luther summed up the paradox at a different point: "In Christ the lord and servant are one" — *Das ynn Christo, herr und knecht eyn ding sey.*[27]

Luther draws out the inner antithesis of the pair of terms lord and servant, and is often led to comment more generally on the role that "antithesis" plays in Paul: "*Antithesin facit Apostolus*", the Apostle creates an antithesis.[28] Luther observes as well in his debate with Erasmus that "Scripture speaks through antithesis" and that everything that is opposed to Christ reigns in him.[29] The resolution of the problem of the two opposite natures of Christ (lord and servant) was one of Luther's lifelong preoccupations, the matrix of many of his doctrines.

To lead the attack on the Church, particularly on the practice of indulgences, Luther developed as his central doctrine, the theology of the cross. It proved to be the theological springboard of the Protestant "heresy". "*CRUX sola est nostra Theologia*", the cross alone is our theology, states Luther.[30] It is the true theology, the *theologia crucis* which stands in sharp opposition to the *theologia gloriae*, the theology of glory characteristic of the Catholic church. In the theology of glory, God is known by his glory, his power and his works. But God wishes however, to be known by the precise opposite, namely his suffering and his weakness. Hence the two natures of Christ became the theological battleground. It is to Christ's "alien" image (*alienum*) that Luther turns, namely "the cross, labor, all kinds of punishment, finally death and hell in the flesh . . ."[31] Thus, "whoever does not take up his own cross and follow Him, is not worthy of Him, even if he were filled with all kinds of indulgences."[32]

God's salvation follows only when man, in pursuit of Christ's alien path, reaches his low point:

> He, however, who has emptied himself [*Cf.* Phil. 2:7] through suffering no longer does works but knows that God works and does all things in him . . . He knows that it is sufficient if he suffers and is brought low by the cross in order to be annihilated all the more. It is this that Christ says in John 3 [:7] "You must be born anew."[33]

From the low point of man's "annihilation" there was to emerge his salvation.

Luther's complaint against the Catholic church and against the indulgences was summed up in a familiar metaphor: "The theology of the cross has been abrogated, and everything has been completely turned upside down"

(*evacuata est Theologia crucis suntque omnia plane perversa*).[34] Luther used a similar metaphor in his quarrel with the Catholic church on the confessional: "*Szo kerestu es umb unnd wilt mich zum knecht machenn . . . Sihe, das ist vorkeret ding*" — thus you turn things upside down and wish to make a slave out of me . . . See, this is upside down.[35] It was one of Luther's favorite metaphors but it had many variations.[36] Chiefly however, it was the metaphor for transfiguring and negating the previous "perfect community", the Catholic church — for Luther an upside down world.

But the power held by Luther's Supreme Being was closely akin; it was the power to set the world right side up once more. Out of the theology of the cross there emerges a view of God's power as the *negativa essentia*, the negative essence. It is "the negation of all things which can be felt, held and comprehended . . ."[37] The origins of this doctrine are ascribed to Paul:

> For everything in us is weak and worthless: but in that nothingness and worthlessness, so to speak, God shows His strength, according to the saying (II Corinthians 12:9) "My power is made perfect in weakness."[38]

It is the very annihilation to nothingness that is the prelude as Luther states to being born anew. In the essay "On the Bondage of the Will", the path chosen for the elect *(electos)* is, "that being humbled and brought back to nothingness by this means they may be saved."[39]

The *negativa essentia*, God's power, is the power of inversion. A leading Lutheran scholar, Paul Althaus, sums up Luther's view of the divine power as follows:

> (God) is the power that creates out of nothing or out of its opposite. It is manifested by the inversion *(Umkehrung)* of all earthly standards and relationships.[40]

The two opposite natures of Christ were also the matrix of Luther's route to the two kingdoms, the spiritual and the worldly — but we must bypass a detailed discussion. Suffice it to say that this was the central theological problem that haunted him all his life. "Though his nature may be two-fold", Luther asserted, "yet his person is not divided."[41] How these two natures could still be one person he thought, was ultimately "inscrutable" and "foolish reason" was to no avail. But in a rare and flashing insight he provided a vital

clue to the paradox. We were dealing here, he stated, with the *regulae dialecticae*, the rules of dialectics.[42]

The "dialectic of negativity" as well as the process of inversion and negation re-emerged at the heart of the Hegelian system. We can only touch briefly on some of the Lutheran doctrines of this vast philosophical enterprise. The theology of the cross was preserved in the new "scientific" language of the Enlightenment, even while its religious form *(Vorstellung)* was annulled. Hegel stated that:

> It was with Luther first of all that freedom of spirit began to exist in embryo, and its *form* indicated that it would remain in embryo.[43]

Religion had preceded philosophical science in expressing "what spirit is". But, "this science alone is the perfect form in which the spirit truly knows itself."[44] Hence man's liberation was contingent on bringing to light the kernel of this religion, hidden within the outer archaic shell.

Hegel continues: "The process of carrying forward this form of knowledge of itself is the task which spirit accomplishes as actual History."[45] The aim of that history was to "gain freedom and independence" and this was achieved through "the portentous power of the negative".[46]

What Spirit confronted was man's physical, finite incarnation hemmed in by a material universe. This is what Hegel discerned as an "inverted world" *(verkehrte Welt)*, the world of sensuous perception in both its immediate and universal aspects.[47] Man's bondage lay in his finitude *(Endlichkeit)* and in the physical laws of the universe to which he was subject. Hegel's view of bondage related ultimately (through a circuitous route) to Paul's "bondage under the elements of the world" (Galatians 4:3).[48] But how was the freedom from that bondage to be achieved? Hegel's answer was rooted in Luther's injunction some three centuries earlier; "to forsake and empty ourselves, keeping nothing of our senses, but negating everything" *(nos ipsos deserere et exinanire, nihil de nostro sensu retinendo, sed totum abnegando)*.[49]

Luther's essay "On The Freedom of a Christian" and his theology generally, provide an important key to Hegel's famous parable of Lordship and Bondage, the heart of *The Phenomemology of Mind*. Here, the prototypical slave appears "in the form or shape of thinghood" *(Gestalt der Dingheit)*[50] and he is beset by "the fear of death, the sovereign master", i.e. the lord.[51] The parable itself is a long and enigmatic excursion whose full explication we must bypass here. Two essential clues however to the identity of Hegel's mysterious lord and servant come from the Old and New Testament respectively. Hegel's text

includes the sentence "the fear of the lord is the beginning of wisdom", an almost exact rendering of Psalm 111:10[52]. But the identity of the lord is further revealed in the New Testament. In Paul's Epistle to the Hebrews (2:15) we read, "and deliver them who through fear of death were all their lifetime subject to bondage". For Hegel, death "the sovereign master" is the inverted form of this passage; as lord, death rules over those who are subject to his bondage.

Though death rules as the sovereign master, what precisely is his power? Luther's notion of the *negativa essentia* reappears in German as Hegel's *negatives Wesen*. Thus Hegel's second indication of the power of the lord in the parable, is *"die reine negative Macht, der das Ding nichts ist"*; "the negative power without qualification, a power to which the thing is naught".[53]

The power of the lord is the power of the negative — a purely Lutheran position. But as we will recall, the material world of sensuous perception is, for Hegel, an "inverted world". Hence, the encounter of Spirit with the material, finite world is designated as the "negative of the negative",[54] a phrase that was to be closely echoed in Marx' movement toward communism.

In another designation, Spirit is explicitly called "this process of inversion", *dieser Umkehrung*,[55] and is prefigured for mankind in Christ's Passion. Christ's death is explicitly called an inversion *(Umkehrung)* and serves as a paradigm for each individual where he yields up his natural will.[56]

What is the resolution of man's dilemma that Hegel offers in the parable of Lordship and Bondage? "Bondage will, when completed, pass into the opposite of what it immediately is . . . and change round into real and true independence."[57] It is in the self-differentiation from this world in dialectical fashion, the inward retreat, that full self-consciousness is achieved by the individual, "the true return (of consciousness) into itself" *(Seine warhe Ruckkehr . . . in sich selbst)*.[58]

Thus Paul's bondage to mortality and Luther's notion of the divine power as the *negativa essentia* are brought together in Hegel. Hegel maintains:

> This is the Lutheran faith . . . God is thus in spirit alone, He is not a beyond but the truest reality of the individual.[59]

A very elaborate recasting of the Pauline proposition of the inner and outer man to be sure, but Hegel's position is ultimately, a philosophical vindication of Christian Protestant theology with its promise of Christian liberty and the Christian Kingdom. Typically Luther's spiritual Kingdom is transfigured once more and becomes an earthly kingdom.

While self-consciousness pursues its ultimate inward retreat, man as finite being incarnates himself in the institutions of society. For Hegel, the state is "the actuality of concrete freedom"[60] also called "finite" or "secular" freedom. Here the all-embracing perfect community achieves its final historical existence: "The private interest of its citizens is one with the common interest of the state."[61] Hence the state for Hegel, is the embodiment of Spirit in history, a process that unites "the kingdom of God and the socially Moral world as one Idea."[62] History culminates in the ideal Protestant state:

> In the Protestant state, the constitution and the code, as well as their several applications, embody the principle and the development of the moral life, which proceeds and can only proceed from the truth of religion . . . and in that way . . . first become actual.[63]

This was an ideal conception of the state as embodied perfect community — Hegel's testament to the promise of the emerging liberal society. The significance of the events to which he was witness, "is known through the Spirit, for the Spirit is revealed in this history . . . world-history has in it found its end."[64]

Marx fought an unrelenting battle with theology and religion qualified occasionally by grudging praise and perceptive insight. Much of his outlook was derivative of the Hegelian corpus of work on which he relied. He understood intimately the "Christian dialectic" which had located man's oppression in the bondage of the body. In the debate with Max Stirner he states:

> The only reason why Christianity wanted to free us from the domination of the flesh *(Herrschaft des Fleisches)* . . . was because it regards our flesh, our desires as something foreign to us . . .[65]

Marx could even excuse partially, the distorted perspectives of religion, since, as noted earlier, it had issued forth from "an inverted world". What was principally at stake however was a new definition of "bondage" which Marx invoked to replace the Christian bondage to mortality, (or Hegel's closely-related bondage to finite existence). Man instead was in bondage to the social and economic order under which he lived. Hegel's ideal Protestant state, the

paean to an evolving liberal society, was now to be turned into the new oppressive bondage, the bondage to capitalism.

Once more as in the biblical paradigm, the argument was structured initially as a contrasting pair of terms in antithesis, namely capital and labour. Domination for Marx *(Herrschaft)* refers to changing forms of private property, and oppressive bondage *(Knechtschaft)* refers to different forms of alienated labour, *entäusserte*[*n*] *Arbeit.*[66] At the end of the second manuscript of the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, Marx conveys in a few elliptic notes how capital and labour evolve as *Herr* and *Knecht* (lord and servant). They evolve at first in a complementary fashion, even though separate and estranged and "promote each other as positive conditions". But a threshold is reached after which they develop in contradiction or opposition. The motive force of change is "the antithesis of labour and capital" *(der Gegensatz der Arbeit und des Kapitals).*[67] It is Act I of the drama which now unfolds to the typical apocalyptic climax. As Marx states, this antithesis is a "dynamic relationship moving to its resolution."[68]

Marx' schema, starting as it does from an alienated world where man's human essence has been completely undermined, requires to set things right through a systematic process of inversion. The mediating role is played by the proletariat. The proletariat moves from its own "complete loss of humanity and can only redeem itself through the total redemption of humanity"; the German text contrasts *völlige*[*r*] *Verlust* — complete loss — and *völlige Wiedergewinnung* — complete redemption.[69] A dehumanized and enslaved proletariat becomes a redeemed proletariat. Recalling that the proletariat is Marx' *Knecht* or slave, we see here the characteristic paradigm, the inversion from oppressive to exalted bondage.

The exalted bondage now goes through the second inversion, and the exalted "slave" becomes a "lord". Marx refers several times in the Communist Manifesto to the *lordship* of the proletariat — its *Herrschaft* or supremacy. His graphic instruction reads: "The first step in the revolution by the working class, is to raise the proletariat to the position of ruling class . . ."[70] This differed little in its rhetoric from Moses' promise to the Jews:

> and the Lord shall make thee the head, and not the tail; and thou shalt be above only, and thou shalt not be beneath (Deuteronomy 28:13).

Compare as well Paul's expression "for in nothing am I behind the very chiefest apostles, though I be nothing" (II Corinthians 12:11). In Luther's translation: *da ich doch nicht weniger bin, als die hohen Apostel sind, wiewohl*

ich nichts bin. It had close echoes in Marx' ringing challenge, the "revolutionary boldness which flings at its adversary the defiant phrase: I am nothing and I should be everything", *Ich bin nichts, und ich müsste alles sein.*[71]

For Marx, capitalism was pictured as an upside-down world at its most extreme. *"Everything"*, Marx stated, *"appears upside down in competition"*.[72] But in attempting to set the world right side up once more, Marx fell back on a rhetoric of striking similarity to everything he disavowed: Hegel, Luther, the Bible — all were characteristically present in the mode in which man would now once more *invert* his bondage and move to yet another version of the perfect community.

Lodged within this evolving antithesis is a vast and complex network of social and economic development to which I can hardly to justice here. But some suggestive notions can be offered of the way that Marx viewed money, capitalist economic relations and the course of revolution.

Money, for Marx, is "the alienated ability of mankind".[73] It is designated by Marx as "this overturning power" *(diese verkehrende Macht)* and he elaborates on money's peculiar inverting properties. Money is:

> the general overturning *(allgemeine Verkehrung)* of individualities which turns them into their contrary *(in ihr Gegenteil umkehrt)* and adds contradictory attributes to the attributes.[74]

In the *Grundrisse*, the same tendency proves to be characteristic of the capitalist mode of production in general. Marx notes that "inversion *(Verkherung)* is the foundation of the capitalist mode of production, not only of its distribution". He states that "this twisting and inversion *(Verdrehung und Verkehrung)* is the *real* [*phenomenon*], not a merely *supposed one* existing merely in the imagination of the workers and the capitalists".[75]

As this notion emerges in the fully developed version of *Capital*, Marx maintains that "capitalist production begets, with the inexorability of a law of Nature, its own negation. It is the negation of negation".[76] Further, "it is evident that the laws of appropriation or of private property . . . become by their own inner and inexorable dialectic changed into their very opposite."[77]

The Hegelian and Lutheran influence of "negation" and "inversion" persist through both the early and the mature Marx. Emancipation will come about as the result of:

> the formation of a class with radical chains . . . a class that is the dissolution of all classes, a sphere of society having a universal character because of its universal suffering . . . because . . . unqualified wrong is perpetrated on it . . .[78]

The proletariat already embodies "the negative result of society", and (in a characteristic reversal) "merely elevates into a principle of society what society had advanced as the principle of the proletariat . . .", namely, "the negation of private property."[79] The call for revolution in the Communist Manifesto was a call to invert historical development as it had proceeded thus far.[80]

There are characteristic words in Marx that capture this apocalyptic resolution, that is the abrupt leap or inversion where the underlying contradiction is suspended and transformed into its opposite. Communism, as man's total salvation, will happen " 'all at once' and simultaneously . . ." *(auf einmal)*.[81] One of Marx' favourite words is *Umschlag*, "the turn into its opposite."[82] He also refers to "*dieser dialektische Umschlag*", "the dialectical reversal."[83]

This use of language is reminiscent of one of Luther's characteristic words *umbkeren* — to overturn or invert: "Our Lord God can immediately overturn things despite the Emperor or the Pope." *(Unser Herr Gott kans bald umbkeren trotz Keiser, Bapst)*.[84]

We will recall as well that out of Luther's battle with the Catholic church where "everything has been completely turned up-side-down", there emerged the theology of the cross centered on God's power as the *negativa essentia*, the power of inversion. Marx in turn, regarded capitalism as "an enchanted, perverted (read "inverted"), topsy-turvy world" *(die verzauberte, verkehrte und auf den Kopf gestellte Welt)*[85] but communism "overturns the basis of all earlier relations of production and exchange."[86]

The apocalyptic resolution of perfect community is recapitulated in Marx in the explicit abolition of power. Political power, Marx claims, is merely the result of class antagonisms and with the abolition of the latter, a society will evolve where, "there will be no further political power as such."[87] In a well-known passage from the Communist Manifesto, he reiterates this notion:

> When, in the course of development, class distinctions have disappeared, and all production has been concentrated in the hands of a vast association of the whole nation, the public power will lose its political character. Political power, properly so called, is merely the organized power of one class for oppressing another. If the proletariat

> during its contest with the bourgeoisie is compelled, by the force of circumstances to organize itself as a class, if, by means of a revolution, it makes itself the ruling class, and, as such, sweeps away by force the old conditions of production, then it will, along with these conditions, have swept away the conditions for the existence of class antagonisms, and of classes generally, and will thereby have abolished its own supremacy as a class.[88]

The German text of this last clause reads: *"hebt . . . damit seine eigene Herrschaft als Klasse auf.*[89] Compare this with Paul's prescription for the kingdom of God when Christ "shall have put down all rule and all authority and power" (I Corinthians 15:24). In Luther's translation (1546): *"Wenn er auffheben wird alle herrschaft, und alle oberkeit und Gewalt."*

This comparison reveals the characteristic culmination of the apocalyptic vision. In its rhetorical structure, Marx' socialism is as comprehensive and all-embracing a vision of community as the "holy nation" of the Old Testament, as the *totus Christus* of the New Testament, as Luther's spiritual kingdom or Hegel's ideal Protestant state. This final vision of socialism repeats the classical and systematic process of inversion of the basic antithesis of lordship and bondage. It promises once more, perfect community without power and conflict.

III

In the short compass of this paper I have tried to deal, not with the substantive doctrines of some of the main expressions of the apocalyptic tradition, nor with its "truths", but with its forms and the structures of its rhetoric. These have been remarkably consistent over three millennia. We have the positing of the contrasting pair of opposites, lord and servant, and subsequently, the resolution of this opposition through negation and inversion into a vision of perfect community. It is this characteristic rhetorical structure that has given to the apocalyptic tradition its intimate and arresting appeal.

But it is also on this very same structure and vocabulary that schism invariably drew. This negation of the previous vision of perfect community became, in Rosemary Reuther's language, the left hand of the new round of self-affirmation in yet another vision of perfect community.

Each such vision attempts to write "finis" to history. On the theistic side, the kingdom is "beyond history" as decreed in Revelation; on the secular side,

history itself is suspended as in Hegel and Marx. Yet for those who wish to appraise the more limited and finite question of the unfolding of the apocalypic tradition *within history*, both camps can be seen as labouring under a dramatic blind spot. By foreclosing history in their different ways, they fail to anticipate the extraordinary internal momentum yet to surge forth in the next round, already, if invisibly in a state of gestation.

In my view, the evidence is consistent. Schism is inherent in the apocalyptic tradition, a latent force virtually as powerful as that of the given doctrinal orthodoxy. It is difficult to distinguish the language that leads to perfect community from the language that leads away from it to yet another characteristic embodiment; inversion and negation in its various forms and expressions is the characteristic rhetorical mode of both. Hence we must assign a far more significant place to the role of schismatic movements within the heart of this tradition since they form a consistent and integral part of its millennial history.

The postulate of the ultimate cosmic unity of God's and man's intentions (in theological language), or the total harmony of the state with the intrinsic goals of the proletariat (in the communist version), contains within it, the fatal rift for those who live in history. Sooner or later must come the revelation of an abyss which can only be bridged by yet another schism, an apocalyptic trajectory (or springboard) to a new cosmic harmony. A new vision of domination and oppression is proclaimed and then perceived and "felt".

However "dialectically" we tend to see such an unfolding, the height of utopianism is contained in the expectation that society on the one side and (dialectical) consciousness on the other, can move in tandem in compatible forms. The resultant strain between the two, building to a dramatic threshold, is the ultimate source of the new schism. In the train of the new vision, there moves forward yet another "perfect community", the quintessential catalyst of political mobilization. The depth of present injustice awaits its inversion into yet another round of perfection.

What role does the hidden structure of human consciousness play in the formulation of this vision; what role does it play in generating the seeds of this vision's schismatic fate? We can do little more here than attempt to establish this question on the present agenda of modernity. The acceptance of such a question does not imply either a new determinism or the assumption that consciousness alone is all that there is. Such a question attempts only to identify the mediating role that consciousness exercises in this millennial cycle.

In theological language, the only assumption that need be made here is the fallibility or imperfection inherent in the human perception and transmission of divine Revelation. To assume the opposite would indeed be presumptuous. But the question now being put is whether such fallibility or imperfection in human consciousness is necessarily a random or fortuitous affair. Is it indeed

possible that there is order and consistency in the structure, that is, in the very limitations of human consciousness?

Voegelin vents much of his wrath on those engaged, in gnostic fashion, in immanentizing the eschaton — that is in locating the divine spirit and its promise within human consciousness.[90] The prior and more limited question raised here however, separates the issue of the human structure of that consciousness from the events of Revelation. The theological debate around gnosticism unites the two issues and thus obscures the shape of the finite.

In Marxist language, the same question comes up in a radically different perspective. How do we account for the extraordinary consistency of this mode of perception of "domination and oppression" and the mode of its resolution? This occurs, as we have seen, in widely different settings over three millennia, amidst very different class structures and very different relations to the ownership of the means of production. Even though, as Marx states, the ideologists of bourgeois society "inevitably put the thing upside-down" *(auf den Kopf stellen)*[91] the similarity of the *image* being inverted is unmistakeable.

From the side of both theism and Marxism a common issue begins to arise in our present confrontation with modernity. One of the crucial features of modernity is the reiteration of the imperious and resonant expectations of consciousness, running towards perfection along its apocalyptic track. This recurs persistently despite the inertia of our economic and political institutions with which it is in collision. In the complex undergrowth of bureaucratic and technological systems, the demands of coordination, stability, growth and even equity generate internal momenta of their own. These are often contradictory and antithetical to the pristine harmonies and dialectics of the apocalyptic mode of thought. Both the Pauline and Marxian views of power which were cited above are only one illustration of temporal innocence.

The proliferation of left-wing and liberation movements in the last decade and a half has exhibited even more vigorous schismatic tendencies than we had seen previously. Marcuse and the radical movements of our own day are no less the unexpected (and to some, unwelcome) heirs of the apocalyptic tradition than their millennial forbears. They reincarnate the old apocalyptic legacy of "domination and oppression" and charge once more into the anonymous tyranny of our bureaucracies despite the doctrinal "birth control" of the established left and the cries of heresy and excommunication. Yet the recent outcome of these liberation movements had a more transient character than ever before. A sense of futility now haunts these apocalyptic step-children.

We cannot in my view, hope to deal with the issues they raise as long as we remain innocent of the hidden relation of the apocalyptic tradition to human consciousness. Our continuing commitment to this tradition in the largest sense, has rooted within it, the seeds of periodic eruption as we re-echo in doctrinal forms the latent structures of the mind. Hence Voeglin's focus on the

"inner-Christian tension", the struggle with heresy in the universal church and the powerful momentum of gnosticism in Western society, can be regarded as one phase of a still larger question.

The problem that was suspended almost two millennia ago has now been forced upon us by this encounter of the apocalyptic tradition with modernity. Jesus had stated to Pilate "My kingdom is not of this world: if my kingdom were of this world, then would my servants fight . . ." (John 18:36). Two thousand years later we can no longer fail to recognize the enduring reality of the biblical legacy in history — in "this world".

George Grant's inspiration continues among us in myriad ways. In writing recently about Simone Weil, he charted a course which each of us may pursue in his own way:

> Just because western Christianity has realized its destiny of becoming secularized, it is essential to tear oneself free of the causes of that destiny, without removing oneself from the necessities of our present or from the reality of Christ.[92]

The causes of that "destiny" in my view, lie in the projection of the inner structure of human consciousness. Its articulation in all its inspired, recurring brilliance, forms the history of the apocalyptic tradition in Western society. But now, in the fullness of its millennial history, the *forms* of this tradition have now to be reviewed — or more appropriately, *aufgehoben.* It was Hegel who first pointed us towards the last dark continent of the mind. That, in my view, remains the question of our time.

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THE WORLD UPSIDE DOWN

Notes

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I have drawn on much of the same research for the present paper, but addressed it to a somewhat different theme.

My debt to many friends and to my research assistants will be acknowledged in a forthcoming book that will elaborate the present argument.

1. George Grant, *Technology and Empire, Perspectives on North America*, House of Anansi, Toronto: 1969, p. 88.

2. Eric Voegelin, *The New Science of Politics, An Introduction*, the University of Chicago Press, Chicago: 1952, p. 176.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 106.

4. Michael Polanyi, *Personal Knowledge, Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London: 1958, pp. 233-239.

5. Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Irony of American History*, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York: 1952, p. 163.

6. Karl Marx, *Critique of Hegel's 'Philosophy of Right'*, ed. J. O'Malley, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 1970, p. 131. (This will be cited subsequently as O'Malley.) *Frühe Schriften*, ed. H.J. Lieber and P. Furth, Cotta Verlag, Stuttgart: 1962, Bd. I, p. 488.

7. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *The German Ideology*, Progress Publishers, Moscow: 1964, p. 37. (This will be cited subsequently as *G.Id.*)

8. I have expanded at greater length on this intermediate process in my forthcoming paper "The Apocalyptic Tradition: Luther and Marx" referred to above.

9. Ernst Cassirer, *Language and Myth*, Dover Publications, New York: 1953, p. 99.

10. L.S. Vygotsky, *Thought and Language*, The M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts: 1962, p. 153.

11. Claude Lévi-Strauss, *From Honey to Ashes*, Jonathan Cape, London: 1973, p. 473. *Cf.* also, *The Elementary Structures of Kinship*, Eyre and Spottiswoode, London: 1969, p. 84 for "certain fundamental structures of the human mind."

12. Claude Lévi-Strauss, *Structural Anthropology*, vol. 1, Basic Books, New York: 1963, p. 21.

13. Claude Lévi-Strauss, *L'Homme Nu*, Plon, Paris: 1971, p. 611.

14. Claude Lévi-Strauss, *Totemism*, Beacon Press, Boston: 1963, p. 90.

15. André Akoun et al; "The Father of Structural Anthropology — A Conversation with C. Lévi-Strauss", *Psychology Today*, 5:12 (May 1972), p. 76.

16. Rosemary R. Reuther, *Faith and Fratricide, The Theological Roots of Anti-Semitism*, The Seabury Press, New York: 1974, p. 228.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 229.

18. *"Wir die religiöse Vorstellung in Gedanken fassen"*, G.W.F. Hegel, *Werke*, Duncker und Humblot, Berlin: 1840-47, Vol. 9, p. 25. (This edition will be cited subsequently as *Werke*.) *Cf. The Philosophy of History*, trans. J. Sibree, Dover Publications, New York: 1956, p. 20. (This will be cited subsequently as *Phil. Hist.*)

19. Eric Voegelin, *op. cit.*, p. 109.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 107.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 134.

22. *Ibid.*, pp. 161, 178 respectively.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 131.

24. J.J. Pelikan and H.T. Lehman, *Luther's Works; American Edition*, Muhlenberg Press, St. Louis and Philadelphia: 1955-, Vol. 31, p. 344. (This edition will be cited subsequently as *L.W.*) The German edition of Luther's work used here is *D. Martin Luthers Werke, Kritische Gesammtausgabe*, Weimar: 1883-. (This edition will be cited as *W.A.* Luther's spelling is retained in the original which often differs from modern German.)

25. *"Debet tamen rursus se exinanire hac in libertate . . ."* *W.A.* 7, p. 65. *Cf.* also *evacuatur a seipso, W.A.* 2, p. 564. Luther inverts the term for servant and slave, *Knecht*, in precisely the same way as the equivalent *eved* in the Old Testament and *doulos* in the New Testament. *Knecht* is in fact Luther's translation for both the Hebrew and Greek terms.

26. *L.W.* 31, p. 354; *W.A.* 7, p. 27.

27. *W.A.* 18, p. 327.

28. *W.A.* 56, p. 366. *Cf. Observanda autem hic est Antithesis, W.A.* 40, II, p. 423; also *ibid.*, pp. 409, 414.

29. *Si Scripturas per contentionem loqui concedis . . . W.A.* 18, p. 779. Gerhard Ebeling comments as follows: "Luther's thought always contains an antithesis, tension between strongly opposed but related polarities . . ." *Luther, An Introduction to His Thought*, trans. R.A. Wilson, Fortress Press, Philadelphia: 1970, p. 25.

30. *W.A.* 5, p. 176.

31. *L.W.* 31, pp 224, 225.

32. *L.W.* 31, p. 225.

33. *L.W.* 31, p. 55.

34. *L.W.* 31, p. 225; *W.A.* 1, p. 613.

35. *W.A.* 8, p. 157.

36. In relation to *umbkeren*, to overturn, the editors of Luther's works comment: *"Sehr oft bei Luther"*, frequently found in Luther, *W.A.* 34, II, p. 317, Note 1.

37. *L.W.* 25, p. 383. For *negativa essentia cf. W.A.* 56, p. 393.

38. *L.W.* 5, p. 227; *W.A.* 43, p. 585. *Cf.* "the Lord of all who is the same as nothing . . ." *L.W.* 5, p. 219.

39. *Ut, isto modo humiliati et in nihilum redacti, salvi fiant, W.A.* 18, p. 633.

40. Sie ist die Macht, aus dem Nichts, aus dem Gegenteil zu schaffen. Sie erweist sich gerade in der Umkehrung aller irdischen Massstäbe und Verhältnisse. Paul Althaus, *Die Theologie Martin Luthers*, Gütersloher Verlagshaus, Gerd Mohn, Gütersloh: 1962, p. 41.

41. *Duplex quidem est natura, sed persona non est divisa, W.A.* 43, p. 580.

42. *W.A.* 39, II, p. 279.

43. *Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, trans. E.S. Haldane and F.H. Simson, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London: 1896, reprinted 1955; vol. 3, p. 148, my italics. (This will be cited subsequently as *Hist. Phil.*)

44. *The Phenomenology of Mind*, trans. J.B. Baillie, Harper Torchbooks, New York: 1967, p. 801. (This edition will be cited subsequently as *Phen.*) The German edition used here is *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, Suhrkamp Verlag, 3, Frankfurt: 1970. (This will be cited subsequently as *Phän.*)

45. *Phen.*, p. 801.

46. *Phen.*, p. 93. *Cf. "die ungeheure Macht des Negativen, Phän.*, p. 36.

47. *Cf.* "The changeless kingdom of laws, the immediate ectype and copy of the world of perception", *Phen.*, p. 203; also p. 207.

48. Hegel uses the word "finite" in apposition to the word "evil": "the natural . . . the finite, evil, in fact is destroyed". *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, trans. E.B. Speirs and J.B. Sanderson, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner, London: 1895, vol. 3, p. 96. (This will be cited subsequently as *Phil. Rel.*) *Cf.* as well, finitude *(Endlichkeit)* used synonymously with externality or outwardness *(Äusserlichkeit);* otherness or other-being *(Anderseyn)* and imperfection *(Unvollkommenheit)*, *Werke* 12, p. 330. The imperfection attributed to finitude consists in the fact that man "can exist in a way which is not in conformity with (his) inner substantial nature . . . his inwardness" *Phil. Rel.* 3, p. 123.

In "the language of faith", Hegel's statement on finitude runs as follows:

> Christ assumed (human) finitude, finitude *(Endlichkeit)* in all its forms, which is the final tapering point of evil *(das Böse ist . . .). Werke* 12, p. 301, my translation. *Cf. Phil. Rel.* 3, pp 92-93.

49. *W.A.* 1, p. 29.

50. *Phen.*, p. 234; *Phän.*, p. 150.

51. *Phen.*, p. 237.

52. *Phen.*, p. 238. *Cf.* also *Job* 28:28 and *Proverbs* 9:10.

53. *Phän.* p. 152; *Phen.* p. 236. In other designations Hegel refers to the lord as "absolute universal being as . . . mere nothingness" *(allgemeine Wesen als der Nichtigkeit), Phen.*, p.

263; *Phän.*, p. 173; "the negative essence", *(negatives Wesen)* or simply "nothingness" *(Nichtigkeit), Phen.*, p. 225; *Phän.*, p. 143. *Cf.* also "absolute negativity", *Phen.*, pp. 233, 237; "absolute negation of this existence", *Phen.*, p. 246; "absolute negation", *Phen*, p. 226.

54. *Phil. Rel.* 3, p. 91, note 1. *Cf.* also "Spirit . . . constructs not merely one world, but a twofold world, divided and self-opposed." *Phen.*, p. 510.

55. *Phil. Rel.* 2, p. 255; *Werke* 12, p. 125.

56. *Werke* 12, p. 303.

57. *Phen.*, p. 237.

58. *Phen.*, p. 251; *Phän.*, p. 163. *Cf.* H.G. Gadamer, *Hegel's Dialectic, Five Hermeneutical Studies*, Trans. P.C. Smith, Yale University Press, New Haven, Connecticut: 1976, p. 53: "We must now grasp that the "inverted world" is in fact the real world . . ." Also p. 67: "Hegel's dialectical analysis . . . seeks out the dialectical reversal within the self-consciousness of the master . . .".

59. *Hist. Phil.* 3, p. 159.

60. *Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, trans. T.M. Knox, Oxford University Press, New York: 1967, p. 160.

61. *Phil. Hist.*, p. 24.

62. *Phil. Hist.*, p. 380.

63. *Hegel's Philosophy of Mind*, trans. W. Wallace, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 1971, p. 291.

64. *Hist. Phil.* 3, p. 16.

65. *G. Id.*, p. 274. *Karl Marx, Friederich Engels Werke*, Dietz Verlag, Berlin: Bd. 3, p. 237. (This edition of Marx' work will be cited subsequently as *M.E.W.*)

66. Karl Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, ed. D.J. Struik, trans. Martin Milligan, International Publishers, New York: 1964, p. 118. (This will be cited subsequently as *E.P.M.*) *Frühe Schriften*, I, p. 574.

67. *E.P.M.*, p. 132; *Frühe Schriften* I, p. 590.

68. *E.P.M.*, p. 132.

69. O'Malley, pp. 141-142; *Frühe Schriften* I, pp. 503-504.

70. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works* (in two volumes), Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow: 1958, vol. I, pp. 51, 53. (This will be cited subsequently as *Selected Works.*) *Frühe Schriften* II, pp. 839, 842.

71. O'Malley, p. 140; *Frühe Schriften* I, p. 501.

72. Karl Marx, *Capital, A Critique of Political Economy*, trans. S. Moore and E. Aveling, (in three volumes), C.H. Kerr, Chicago: 1906, vol. III, p. 244, italics in the text. (This will be cited subsequently as *Capital.*) *Es erscheint also in der Konkurrenz alles verkehrt, M.E.W.* 25, p. 219.

73. *E.P.M.*, p. 168.

74. *E.P.M.*, p. 169; *Frühe Schriften* I, p. 635.

75. Karl Marx, *Grundrisse, Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy*, trans. Martin Nicolaus, Vintage Books, New York: 1973, p. 831. (This will be cited subsequently as *Grundrisse*.)The German edition is *Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Okonomie*, (Rohentwurf), Dietz Verlag, Berlin: 1953, pp. 715-716.

76. *Capital* I, p. 837.

77. *Capital* I, p. 639.

78. O'Malley, p. 141.

79. O'Malley, p. 142.

80. *Frühe Schriften* II, pp. 830-31.

81. *G.Id.*, p. 47; *M.E.W.* 3, p. 35.

82. *Grundrisse*, p. 674; *Cf.* Martin Nicolaus' "Introduction", p. 32. I do not include here the financial or accounting usage of *Umschlag* meaning "turnover" as used in *Capital.*

83. *M.E.W.* 23, p. 610, n. 23; *Capital* I, p. 640, n. 1.

84. *W.A.* 33, p. 348.

85. *Capital* III, p. 966; *M.E.W.* 25, p. 838.

86. *G.Id.*, p. 86.

87. *M.E.W.* 4, p. 182; my translation. The full passage reads:

> In the course of its development to replace the old bourgeois society, the working class will establish an association that excludes classes and their antagonism *(Gegensatz)*, and there will be no further political power as such; since it is political power that is the official expression of class antagonism within the bourgeois society. *Cf. The Poverty of Philosophy*, Progress Publishers, Moscow: 1973, 151. Compare also "the communist revolution abolishes the rule *(Herrschaft)* of all classes with the classes themselves . . ." *G.Id.* p. 85; *M.E.W.* 3, p. 70.

88. *Selected Works* I, p. 54. A similar passage in Engels' *Socialism, Utopian and Scientific* reads as follows:

> *The proletariat seizes political power and turns the means of production into state property.*
>
> But, in doing this, it abolishes itself as proletariat, abolishes all class distinctions and class antagonisms, abolishes also the state as state . . . When at last it becomes the real representative of the whole of society, it renders itself unnecessary. *Selected Works*, II, p. 150.

89. *Frühe Schriften*, II, p. 843.

90. Eric Voegelin, *op. cit.*, pp. 163-166:

> The immanentization of the Christian eschaton made it possible to endow society in its natural existence with a meaning which Christianity denied to it. And the totalitarianism of our time must be understood as journey's end of the Gnostic search for a civil theology (p. 163).

91. *G.Id.*, p. 462; *M.E.W.* 3, p. 405.

92. *The Globe and Mail*, Toronto: February 12, 1977, p. 43.