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Abraham Rotstein
THE WORLD UPSIDE DOWN

Stan Spyros Draenos
PSYCHOANALYSIS, EVOLUTION AND THE END OF METAPHYSICS

Henry Veltmeyer
DEPENDENCY AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT

Paul Phillips
VERNON C. FOWKE AND THE HINTERLAND PERSPECTIVE

DEBATES

THE "BLINDSPOT" THESIS
Graham Murdock — Dallas W. Smythe

ON CANADIAN CONSERVATISM
William Christian — Rod Preece

THE LIMITS OF LIBERALISM
Andrew Lawless — Phillip Hansen
Contents/Sommaire

The World Upside Down

*Abraham Rotstein* 5

Psychoanalysis, Evolution and the End of Metaphysics

*Stan Spyros Draenos* 31

Dependency and Underdevelopment: Some Questions and Problems

*Henry Veltmeyer* 55

The Hinterland Perspective: The Political Economy of Vernon C. Fowke

*Paul Phillips* 73

Review Articles/Comptes rendus

Nihilism and Modernity

*Barry Cooper* 97

The Canadian Left and Marxism

*Allen Mills* 104

Exchange/Echange

Blindspots About Western Marxism: A Reply to Dallas Smythe

*Graham Murdock* 109

Rejoinder to Graham Murdock

*Dallas W. Smythe* 120
A Note on Rod Preece and Red Tories
William Christian 128

Liberal-Conservatism and Feudalism in Canadian Politics: A Response to Christian
Rod Preece 135

T.H. Green and the British Liberal Tradition
Andrew Lawless 142

T.H. Green and the Limits of Liberalism:
A Response to Professor Lawless
Phillip Hansen 156

Books Received/Livres reçus 159
THE WORLD UPSIDE DOWN*

Abraham Rotstein

For the universal and homogeneous state to be a realisable political end, Christian theism had first to be negated... Thus the idea of the classless society, then, is a derivative of the Christian religion because modern philosophy in negating the Christian religion was aware of the truth present in that which it negated.

George Grant, Technology and Empire

George Grant moves among the circle of the great critics of modernity. From the vantage point of the Christian apocalypse, he attempts to come to terms with its startling recapitulation in the visions of modern secular society. Its chief embodiment perhaps is within the Marxist vision of a perfect community on earth — the universal socialist society.

Eric Voegelin is another exponent of this theme:

For it must never be forgotten that Western society is not all modern but that modernity is a growth within it, in opposition to the classic and Christian tradition.2

Such a modern society precludes an effective realization of Judaeo-Christian eschatology with its total reconciliation of God and man in perfect community. For Voegelin

* This essay will appear in a Festschrift in honour of George Grant's sixtieth birthday, edited by Professor A.E. Combs.
The spiritual destiny of man in the Christian sense cannot be represented on earth by the power organization of a political society; it can be represented only by the church.\(^3\)

Hence the displacement of the truths of Revelation into history is not only futile, but culminates in the modern totalitarian experience.

Other eminent philosophers have also taken up this theme. Michael Polanyi for example, has decreed that Marxism is a "spurious form of moral inversion" of Christianity\(^4\). Within the same stream, Reinhold Niebuhr has declared that:

Marxism is a secularized version of Christian apocalypse in which the beatitude "Blessed are the poor", becomes the basis of unqualified political and moral judgements.\(^5\)

There is a recurring vocabulary for this Christian critique and the terms "negation" and "inversion" are often used synonymously to convey the sense that the secular "kingdom" (or, in the language of Strauss and Kojève, "the universal and homogeneous state") is some form of mirror image of the original Christian vision.

One's vantage point in such a debate of course, is everything. Marx himself, would have found a surprisingly large area of agreement with these critics and had indeed, already made use of the same vocabulary. He would, however, have been looking through the mirror from the other side. The "Christian dialectic", he maintained, had issued from "an inverted world" (\textit{eine verkehrte Welt}) and was thus itself "an inverted world-consciousness" (\textit{ein verkehrtes Weltsbewusstsein}).\(^6\) He claimed in fact, that all ideology thus far has come to us as if it were filtered through a \textit{camera obscura}, a dark room, and thus appears upside-down, standing on its head.\(^7\) The point was of course, as in his famous reference to Hegel, that the social world as well as its beliefs and ideologies had properly to be stood on their feet once more. Thus he would have had no difficulty in agreeing with his Christian critics that communism was a "negation" of Christianity.

My intention here is not to obliterate the vast differences between the two camps. But an underlying question begins to force its way through. If Voegelin is correct in his panoramic view of an entity called "Western society" with its opposing tendencies \textit{within} that society, how should such a Western society be described over such vastly different millennia?

It may require an almost superhuman detachment from the long and vociferous history of internecine struggle to speak of a common tradition of
belief that runs from biblical religion through Marxist eschatology. In the attempt to come to grips with some of the strikingly similar features of this tradition (without denying the overwhelming differences), I revert to the phrase "the apocalyptic tradition". It is a consistent tradition whose many expressions are characterized by a common beginning and a common end. The world is conceived initially as the home of overwhelming domination and oppression (defined in characteristically different ways). But the oppressed in the end are offered a vision of perfect community whether called the kingdom of God or socialism. Between the beginning and the end, lies an intermediate process of transfiguration that is largely unrecognized but is shared by all the main versions of this tradition.

Over the three millennia from Moses to Marx, the leading actors have changed but the basic script of the apocalyptic tradition and some of its vital vocabulary have endured.

Within the limitations of this essay, I shall touch with inordinate, if not unseemly brevity on the Old Testament, the New Testament, Luther, Hegel and Marx. The reader should bear in mind that there is no intention here to review their respective doctrines. Hence this is neither an essay on Revelation nor on revolution and I shall have little to add to our knowledge of either theology or socialism.

This is an essay on the extraordinary itinerary — one might even say the "calisthenics" — of certain types of language in the apocalyptic tradition. This interest in language is not strictly speaking, a linguistic or semantic interest as such. Several philosophers and social scientists hold that language is the key to consciousness and is indeed, the most direct and intimate expression available to us. Ernst Cassirer has suggested that the mind uses words and images "as organs of its own, and thereby recognizes them for what they really are: forms of its own self-revelation." The Russian psychologist, Lev S. Vygotsky has come to the same conclusion from a different perspective: "Thought and language, which reflect reality in a way different from that of perception, are the key to the nature of human consciousness." A new and unexpected light has been thrown on this same matter by the distinguished work of Claude Lévi-Strauss. From the study of hundreds of primitive myths, Lévi-Strauss concludes that we may speak of an "architecture of the mind". This is an arresting idea; he elaborates further that "the unconscious activity of the mind consists in imposing forms upon content... these forms (being) fundamentally the same for all minds." Among these forms, Lévi-Strauss throws his main emphasis on the "universality of the binary code", that is, the inherent capacity of the mind to "think by pairs of contraries, upwards and downwards, strong and weak, black and white." These are referred to as "chains of binary oppositions". The main process involved in the structure of myth is the setting up of contrasting pairs, the building up of a conflict and the move towards its resolution.
ABRAHAM ROTSTEIN

To treat the apocalyptic tradition, from the Bible to Marx, as a system of myth does not imply an intention that is either pejorative or reductionist. The validity of the truths revealed in this tradition is not compromised by the present analysis of the medium of their articulation. But the new issue that does arise is that of the role of the human mind as a hidden but vital protagonist throughout. In this study of the myth of the apocalyptic tradition, particularly in relation to the formal rhetorical properties of the language which it employs, we are engaged in a venture, not as stated earlier, in either theology or socialism, but ultimately in anthropology in its widest sense — the study of man.

II

I recognize that the attempt to view the apocalyptic tradition in some overall common perspective severely tests the reader’s credulity. This challenge to the respective adherents of its various individual expressions may prove insurmountable. Yet if we are prepared to abandon our fixed vantage points even momentarily, a broader landscape comes into view with deep valleys as well as peaks.

Much of the drama of this tradition comes from the periodic schisms that seem virtually inherent in its existence. The New Testament grew out of the Old, Protestantism out of Catholicism, Marx out of Hegel who maintained throughout that he was a Lutheran. One cardinal rule prevailed in the schism. The previous version of the perfect community was transfigured and negated. This proved to be an indispensable feature of the new starting point, that is the new version of oppressive bondage. Rosemary Reuther has pointed out that in the early Christian church, “anti-Judaism was originally more than social polemic. It was an expression of Christian self-affirmation.”16 This was closely incorporated into Christian “antitheses” or “negations”.17

But the Church in its turn was “negated” in the Protestant Reformation. T.S. Eliot has remarked that “the life of Protestantism depends on the survival of that against which it protests.”

Hegel, while continually avowing his Protestant affiliation attempted to overturn, in a gnostic fashion, the forms of self-understanding of Protestant theology. These outmoded forms, the myths, miracles and legends he felt, had now to be abandoned and his own aim was to turn “the language of religious myth into that of thought.”18

Marx rejected Hegel’s “dialectic of negativity” as itself too mystical. Man’s bondage in history was as much to his religious self-expression as to his social institutions. Marx wished to overturn virtually all that had gone before.
THE WORLD UPSIDE DOWN

Thus the great expressions of the apocalyptic tradition are necessarily as well its great schisms. It may be argued that Marx's ultimate break with any vestige of theism is the great divide in this tradition — its total secularization. Yet it grew almost naturally, perhaps inevitably, out of Hegel's attempt to relocate the enduring element of Protestant truth within a gnostic, immanentist tradition. For Hegel, the self-consciousness of the individual, as well as the rule of Spirit in the universe bore witness to the essential Christian truth.

What is so unexpected however, is the remarkable consistency of the schismatic argument, despite the widely different contexts in which it arose. Whether one or another version of theism was at issue, or whether, as with Marx, total secularization was propounded, the mode of reasoning was always the same. On the one hand, the previous "perfect community" had to be incorporated in the new oppressive bondage. On the other, a great deal of what had gone before was retained and reaffirmed in the new context.

Much of this inner process of schismatic articulation can be summed up in Hegel's notion of aufheben with its dual connotation of "abolishing" and "preserving" simultaneously. This dual, antithetical process is often hidden in the English translation of aufheben in Hegel and Marx usually rendered simply as "transcend."

The first and perhaps the most dramatic instance of schism is in the New Testament. It is the model for virtually all that came afterwards. Let us first recapitulate briefly the related structure of the Old Testament.

The high point of the Old Testament is the Covenant at Sinai. The rhetorical origins of the event however, lie in Pharaoh's tyrannical domination and in the oppressive bondage of the Jews to state slavery in Egypt. The rhetoric is explicit: "Then thou shalt say unto thy son, we were slaves unto Pharaoh in Egypt" (Deuteronomy 6:21).

Yahweh conquers Pharaoh and replaces a tyrannical and evil lordship with an exalted lordship of justice and righteousness. The Jews in turn are transformed from oppressed slaves to Pharaoh to exalted slaves to Yahweh as in God's statement: "For unto me the children of Israel are slaves; they are my slaves . . . " (avadei; Leviticus 25:55). While the same Hebrew word eved is retained to connote slavery to Pharaoh as well as slavery to Yahweh, its significance has been completely inverted. In the first instance it connotes bitter overwhelming oppression, in the second instance total salvation, man's highest and most exalted vocation.

This hidden inversion of eved or slave, is the precedent for other forms of inversion which constitute the route to perfect community. Another mode of inversion for example, is used to represent the status of the "chosen" (i.e. blessed) people:
And the Lord shall make thee the head, and not the tail; and thou shalt be above only, and thou shalt not be beneath. (Deuteronomy 28:13).

The Jews are now "called by the name of the Lord" (Deuteronomy 28:10) despite the fact that they are still his "slaves" and thus enter into the apocalyptic resolution of perfect community. As "lords" they are to exist in a community of total obedience, a complementary image of the supreme Lord. At the foot of Mount Sinai, Moses relays God's promise as follows:

Ye have seen what I did unto the Egyptians, and how I bore you on eagles' wings, and brought you unto myself. Now therefore, if ye will obey my voice indeed, and keep my covenant, then ye shall be a peculiar treasure unto me above all people: for all the earth is mine: And ye shall be unto me a kingdom of priests, and an holy nation. (Exodus 19:4-6)

Metaphors of inversion are scattered throughout the Old Testament: "The Lord bringeth low, and lifteth up" (I Samuel 2:7); "Behold the Lord maketh the earth empty and maketh it waste, and turneth it upside down . . ." (Isaiah 24:1).

The New Testament follows this very same route to perfect community except for one vital change — the shift in the definition of bondage. In place of Pharaoh, the oppressive bondage in this instance is to the body and to man's mortality. Paul refers (literally) to our "having been enslaved under the elements of the world" (Galatians 4:3). The Greek word for "slave", doulos is now transfigured in precisely the same way as the Hebrew eved. Hence the "slaves (douloi) . . . of sin unto death" (Romans 6:16) become, in their inverted (exalted) status, the "slaves of Christ" (douloi Christou, Ephesians 6:6).

Similarly, just as Yahweh defeats Pharaoh, Christ abolishes death which is "swallowed up in victory" (I Corinthians 15:54). Death's domination is inverted and Christ brings "immortality to light through the gospel" (II Timothy 1:10). Christians become "heirs of God, and joint-heirs with Christ" (Romans 8:17); the Christian is "lord of all" (kyrios panton, Galatians 4:1). This is closely modelled on the Old Testament:

THE WORLD UPSIDE DOWN

But ye are a chosen generation, a royal priesthood, an holy nation, a peculiar people [i.e. a people for His possession] (1 Peter 2:9).

This inversion from slave to lord is now the prelude to the apocalyptic resolution of the kingdom of God. Christians enter the kingdom as “fellow-citizens with the saints and of the household of God” (Ephesians 2:19).

But the schismatic character of the New Testament is highlighted as well. The oppressive bondage of the Christian is not only to man’s mortality: the body, sin and death, but also to what had gone before, the law. The commandments and the Mosaic code had been the key to perfect community among the Jews: “Blessed is the man . . . (whose) delight is in the law of the Lord” (Psalms 1:1-2). But for Christians, “Christ is the end of the law for righteousness to every one that believeth” (Romans 10:4). Thus Christ “is made, not after the law of a carnal commandment, but after the power of an endless life” (Hebrews 7:16). The law enters into the redefined realm of the Christian view of oppression. Hence (in Hebrews 7:18), the commandments are “annulled” (aufgehoben in Luther’s translation). But the inner significance of this annulment soon becomes clear in Paul: “Do we then make void (heben . . . auf) the law through faith? God forbid: yea we establish the law” (Romans 3:31). Jesus is explicit on the matter: “Think not that I am come to destroy the law, or the prophets: I am not come to destroy but to fulfil” (Matthew 5:17).

The complaints of the Jews were vociferous. After Paul had preached his revolutionary doctrine for three sabbath days in the synagogue at Thessalonica, the Jews made representations to the local authorities: “These that have turned the world upside down are come hither also” (Acts 17:6). “The world upside down” was a metaphor that was to be re-echoed in various ways, in all the schismatic battles of the apocalyptic tradition we are considering, whether by the theistic or the secular tradition. It was to reappear as a casual figure of speech, a metaphor for an oppressed world, as well as a metaphor for revolution. With Luther and Hegel it reached its highest form as a metaphor for God’s power.

Why was this metaphor of inversion so congenial and intimate a form of expression for the apocalyptic tradition? Does it act, following Cassirer’s insight, as an expression of the mind’s self-revelation? We touch on this question once more in the conclusion.

The new vision of perfect community was embodied in the Church. For Voegelin, articulating the Catholic position, the church was “the universal spiritual organization of saints and sinners who professed faith in Christ, as the representative of the civitas Dei in history, as the flash of eternity into time.” 19
The Protestant revolution, Hegel, Marx and all that was to follow resulted, according to Voegelin from an "inner-Christian tension", the bursting forth of "components that were suppressed as heretical by the universal church." The Reformation led the way to a "successful invasion of Western institutions by Gnostic movements . . .", the splitting of the universal church and the "gradual conquest of the political institutions in the national states." This "Gnostic dream world" as Voegelin calls it, became "the civil theology of Western society."

Voegelin was right in my view, to see the steady unfolding and direct line between Luther, Hegel and Marx. I shall attempt to recapitulate very briefly this inner continuity in terms of what had been "annulled" in each case and what had been "preserved".

But for those who prefer to view the apocalyptic drama of Western society in the larger context set out here, this "inner-Christian tension" rehearsed on a much larger stage what had already taken place once before. "These that have turned the world upside down" was, as we recall, the cry against the first of the schisms of the apocalyptic tradition.

Luther may have been the most important of "the divine redeemers of the Gnostic empires" but the drama throughout was remarkably faithful to its underlying script. Luther affirmed the basic structure of Pauline theology around the pair of contrary terms "lord and servant" and incorporated the previous vision of perfect community into his new view of oppressive bondage.

The cornerstone of Lutheran theology is his most important essay, "On the Freedom of a Christian" (1520). The essay contrasts the paradoxical status of the Christian who is "a perfectly free lord of all subject to none" and at the same time "a perfectly dutiful servant of all subject to all."

The terms "lord" and "servant" (Herr and Knecht) are offered once more in the biblical context discussed earlier. The free Christian, following in Christ's path, and in bondage in his mortal existence, "ought in this liberty to empty himself again" and serve his neighbour. Thus the Christian servant or Knecht inverts his initial bondage to bodily existence to become free in the very service (or bondage) of his fellow man.

Now the characteristic second inversion takes place where the Christian servant, through faith also becomes a lord:

every Christian is by faith so exalted (erhaben) above all things that, by virtue of a spiritual power, he is lord (eyn herr wirt geystlich) of all things without exception, so that nothing can do him any harm.
THE WORLD UPSIDE DOWN

This reiterates Paul’s position where as we have seen, the Christian is “lord of all” (Galatians 4:1). Lord and servant are now united in the same person within his Christian freedom. As Luther summed up the paradox at a different point: “In Christ the lord and servant are one” — Das ynn Christo, herr und knecht eyn ding sey.27

Luther draws out the inner antithesis of the pair of terms lord and servant, and is often led to comment more generally on the role that “antithesis” plays in Paul: “Antithesin facit Apostolus”, the Apostle creates an antithesis.28 Luther observes as well in his debate with Erasmus that “Scripture speaks through antithesis” and that everything that is opposed to Christ reigns in him.29 The resolution of the problem of the two opposite natures of Christ (lord and servant) was one of Luther’s lifelong preoccupations, the matrix of many of his doctrines.

To lead the attack on the Church, particularly on the practice of indulgences, Luther developed as his central doctrine, the theology of the cross. It proved to be the theological springboard of the Protestant “heresy”. “CRUX sola est nostra Theologia”, the cross alone is our theology, states Luther.30 It is the true theology, the theologia crucis which stands in sharp opposition to the theologia gloriae, the theology of glory characteristic of the Catholic church. In the theology of glory, God is known by his glory, his power and his works. But God wishes however, to be known by the precise opposite, namely his suffering and his weakness. Hence the two natures of Christ became the theological battleground. It is to Christ’s “alien” image (alienum) that Luther turns, namely “the cross, labor, all kinds of punishment, finally death and hell in the flesh . . .”31 Thus, “whoever does not take up his own cross and follow Him, is not worthy of Him, even if he were filled with all kinds of indulgences.”32

God’s salvation follows only when man, in pursuit of Christ’s alien path, reaches his low point:

He, however, who has emptied himself [Cf. Phil. 2:7] through suffering no longer does works but knows that God works and does all things in him . . . He knows that it is sufficient if he suffers and is brought low by the cross in order to be annihilated all the more. It is this that Christ says in John 3 [:7] “You must be born anew.”33

From the low point of man’s “annihilation” there was to emerge his salvation.

Luther’s complaint against the Catholic church and against the indulgences was summed up in a familiar metaphor: “The theology of the cross has been abrogated, and everything has been completely turned upside down”
ABRAHAM ROTSTEIN

(evacuata est Theologia crucis suntque omnia plane perversa). Luther used a similar metaphor in his quarrel with the Catholic church on the confessional: "Szo kerestu es umb unnd wilt mich zum knecht machenn . . . Sibe, das ist vorkeret ding" — thus you turn things upside down and wish to make a slave out of me . . . See, this is upside down. It was one of Luther’s favorite metaphors but it had many variations. Chiefly however, it was the metaphor for transfiguring and negating the previous “perfect community”, the Catholic church — for Luther an upside down world.

But the power held by Luther’s Supreme Being was closely akin; it was the power to set the world right side up once more. Out of the theology of the cross there emerges a view of God’s power as the negativa essentia, the negative essence. It is “the negation of all things which can be felt, held and comprehended . . .”. The origins of this doctrine are ascribed to Paul:

For everything in us is weak and worthless: but in that nothingness and worthlessness, so to speak, God shows His strength, according to the saying (II Corinthians 12:9) “My power is made perfect in weakness.”

It is the very annihilation to nothingness that is the prelude as Luther states to being born anew. In the essay “On the Bondage of the Will”, the path chosen for the elect (electos) is, “that being humbled and brought back to nothingness by this means they may be saved.”

The negativa essentia, God’s power, is the power of inversion. A leading Lutheran scholar, Paul Althaus, sums up Luther’s view of the divine power as follows:

(God) is the power that creates out of nothing or out of its opposite. It is manifested by the inversion (Umkehrung) of all earthly standards and relationships.

The two opposite natures of Christ were also the matrix of Luther’s route to the two kingdoms, the spiritual and the worldly — but we must bypass a detailed discussion. Suffice it to say that this was the central theological problem that haunted him all his life. “Though his nature may be two-fold”, Luther asserted, “yet his person is not divided.” How these two natures could still be one person he thought, was ultimately “inscrutable” and “foolish reason” was to no avail. But in a rare and flashing insight he provided a vital
due to the paradox. We were dealing here, he stated, with the *regulae dialecticae*, the rules of dialectics.42

The "dialectic of negativity" as well as the process of inversion and negation re-emerged at the heart of the Hegelian system. We can only touch briefly on some of the Lutheran doctrines of this vast philosophical enterprise. The theology of the cross was preserved in the new "scientific" language of the Enlightenment, even while its religious form (*Vorstellung*) was annulled. Hegel stated that:

It was with Luther first of all that freedom of spirit began to exist in embryo, and its form indicated that it would remain in embryo.43

Religion had preceded philosophical science in expressing "what spirit is". But, "this science alone is the perfect form in which the spirit truly knows itself."44 Hence man's liberation was contingent on bringing to light the kernel of this religion, hidden within the outer archaic shell.

Hegel continues: "The process of carrying forward this form of knowledge of itself is the task which spirit accomplishes as actual History."45 The aim of that history was to "gain freedom and independence" and this was achieved through "the portentous power of the negative".46

What Spirit confronted was man's physical, finite incarnation hemmed in by a material universe. This is what Hegel discerned as an "inverted world" (*verkehrte Welt*), the world of sensuous perception in both its immediate and universal aspects.47 Man's bondage lay in his finitude (*Endlichkeit*) and in the physical laws of the universe to which he was subject. Hegel's view of bondage related ultimately (through a circuitous route) to Paul's "bondage under the elements of the world" (Galatians 4:3).48 But how was the freedom from that bondage to be achieved? Hegel's answer was rooted in Luther's injunction some three centuries earlier; "to forsake and empty ourselves, keeping nothing of our senses, but negating everything" (*nos ipsos deserere et exinanire, nihil de nostro sensu retinendo, sed totum abnegando*).49

Luther's essay "On The Freedom of a Christian" and his theology generally, provide an important key to Hegel's famous parable of Lordship and Bondage, the heart of *The Phenomenology of Mind*. Here, the prototypical slave appears "in the form or shape of thinghood" (*Gestalt der Dingheit*) and he is beset by "the fear of death, the sovereign master", i.e. the lord.51 The parable itself is a long and enigmatic excursion whose full explication we must bypass here. Two essential clues however to the identity of Hegel's mysterious lord and servant come from the Old and New Testament respectively. Hegel's text
includes the sentence "the fear of the lord is the beginning of wisdom", an almost exact rendering of Psalm 111:10. But the identity of the lord is further revealed in the New Testament. In Paul's Epistle to the Hebrews (2:15) we read, "and deliver them who through fear of death were all their lifetime subject to bondage". For Hegel, death "the sovereign master" is the inverted form of this passage; as lord, death rules over those who are subject to his bondage.

Though death rules as the sovereign master, what precisely is his power? Luther's notion of the negativa essentia reappears in German as Hegel's negatives Wesen. Thus Hegel's second indication of the power of the lord in the parable, is "die reine negative Macht, der das Ding nichts ist"; "the negative power without qualification, a power to which the thing is naught".

The power of the lord is the power of the negative — a purely Lutheran position. But as we will recall, the material world of sensuous perception is, for Hegel, an "inverted world". Hence, the encounter of Spirit with the material, finite world is designated as the "negative of the negative", a phrase that was to be closely echoed in Marx' movement toward communism.

In another designation, Spirit is explicitly called "this process of inversion", dieser Umkehrung, and is prefigured for mankind in Christ's Passion. Christ's death is explicitly called an inversion (Umkehrung) and serves as a paradigm for each individual where he yields up his natural will.

What is the resolution of man's dilemma that Hegel offers in the parable of Lordship and Bondage? "Bondage will, when completed, pass into the opposite of what it immediately is . . . and change round into real and true independence." It is in the self-differentiation from this world in dialectical fashion, the inward retreat, that full self-consciousness is achieved by the individual, "the true return (of consciousness) into itself" (Seine warbe Ruckkehr in sich selbst).

Thus Paul's bondage to mortality and Luther's notion of the divine power as the negativa essentia are brought together in Hegel. Hegel maintains:

This is the Lutheran faith . . . God is thus in spirit alone,
He is not a beyond but the truest reality of the individual.

A very elaborate recasting of the Pauline proposition of the inner and outer man to be sure, but Hegel's position is ultimately, a philosophical vindication of Christian Protestant theology with its promise of Christian liberty and the Christian Kingdom. Typically Luther's spiritual Kingdom is transfigured once more and becomes an earthly kingdom.
While self-consciousness pursues its ultimate inward retreat, man as finite being incarnates himself in the institutions of society. For Hegel, the state is "the actuality of concrete freedom" also called "finite" or "secular" freedom. Here the all-embracing perfect community achieves its final historical existence: "The private interest of its citizens is one with the common interest of the state." Hence the state for Hegel, is the embodiment of Spirit in history, a process that unites "the kingdom of God and the socially Moral world as one Idea." History culminates in the ideal Protestant state:

In the Protestant state, the constitution and the code, as well as their several applications, embody the principle and the development of the moral life, which proceeds and can only proceed from the truth of religion... and in that way... first become actual.

This was an ideal conception of the state as embodied perfect community — Hegel’s testament to the promise of the emerging liberal society. The significance of the events to which he was witness, "is known through the Spirit, for the Spirit is revealed in this history... world-history has in it found its end."

Marx fought an unrelenting battle with theology and religion qualified occasionally by grudging praise and perceptive insight. Much of his outlook was derivative of the Hegelian corpus of work on which he relied. He understood intimately the "Christian dialectic" which had located man’s oppression in the bondage of the body. In the debate with Max Stirner he states:

The only reason why Christianity wanted to free us from the domination of the flesh (Herrschaft des Fleisches)... was because it regards our flesh, our desires as something foreign to us... 

Marx could even excuse partially, the distorted perspectives of religion, since, as noted earlier, it had issued forth from "an inverted world". What was principally at stake however was a new definition of "bondage" which Marx invoked to replace the Christian bondage to mortality, (or Hegel’s closely-related bondage to finite existence). Man instead was in bondage to the social and economic order under which he lived. Hegel’s ideal Protestant state, the
ABRAHAM ROTSTEIN

paean to an evolving liberal society, was now to be turned into the new oppressive bondage, the bondage to capitalism.

Once more as in the biblical paradigm, the argument was structured initially as a contrasting pair of terms in antithesis, namely capital and labour. Domination for Marx (Herrschaft) refers to changing forms of private property, and oppressive bondage (Knechtschaft) refers to different forms of alienated labour, entäusserte[n] Arbeit. At the end of the second manuscript of the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, Marx conveys in a few elliptic notes how capital and labour evolve as Herr and Knecht (lord and servant). They evolve at first in a complementary fashion, even though separate and estranged and “promote each other as positive conditions”. But a threshold is reached after which they develop in contradiction or opposition. The motive force of change is “the antithesis of labour and capital” (der Gegensatz der Arbeit und des Kapitals). It is Act I of the drama which now unfolds to the typical apocalyptic climax. As Marx states, this antithesis is a “dynamic relationship moving to its resolution.”

Marx' schema, starting as it does from an alienated world where man’s human essence has been completely undermined, requires to set things right through a systematic process of inversion. The mediating role is played by the proletariat. The proletariat moves from its own “complete loss of humanity and can only redeem itself through the total redemption of humanity”; the German text contrasts vollge[r] Verlust — complete loss — and vollige Wiedergewinnung — complete redemption. A dehumanized and enslaved proletariat becomes a redeemed proletariat. Recalling that the proletariat is Marx' Knecht or slave, we see here the characteristic paradigm, the inversion from oppressive to exalted bondage.

The exalted bondage now goes through the second inversion, and the exalted "slave" becomes a "lord". Marx refers several times in the Communist Manifesto to the lordship of the proletariat — its Herrschaft or supremacy. His graphic instruction reads: "The first step in the revolution by the working class, is to raise the proletariat to the position of ruling class . . ." This differed little in its rhetoric from Moses' promise to the Jews:

and the Lord shall make thee the head, and not the tail;
and thou shalt be above only, and thou shalt not be beneath (Deuteronomy 28:13).

Compare as well Paul's expression "'for in nothing am I behind the very chiefest apostles, though I be nothing' (II Corinthians 12:11). In Luther's translation: da ich doch nicht weniger bin, als die hohen Apostel sind, wiewohl
ich nichts bin. It had close echoes in Marx’ ringing challenge, the “revolutionary boldness which flings at its adversary the defiant phrase: I am nothing and I should be everything”, Ich bin nichts, und ich müsste alles sein. ⁷¹

For Marx, capitalism was pictured as an upside-down world at its most extreme. “Everything”, Marx stated, “appears upside down in competition”. ⁷² But in attempting to set the world right side up once more, Marx fell back on a rhetoric of striking similarity to everything he disavowed: Hegel, Luther, the Bible — all were characteristically present in the mode in which man would now once more invert his bondage and move to yet another version of the perfect community.

Lodged within this evolving antithesis is a vast and complex network of social and economic development to which I can hardly do justice here. But some suggestive notions can be offered of the way that Marx viewed money, capitalist economic relations and the course of revolution.

Money, for Marx, is “the alienated ability of mankind”. ⁷³ It is designated by Marx as “this overturning power” (diese verkehrende Macht) and he elaborates on money’s peculiar inverting properties. Money is:

the general overturning (allgemeine Verkehrung) of individualities which turns them into their contrary (in ihr Gegenteil umkehrt) and adds contradictory attributes to the attributes. ⁷⁴

In the Grundrisse, the same tendency proves to be characteristic of the capitalist mode of production in general. Marx notes that “inversion (Verkehrung) is the foundation of the capitalist mode of production, not only of its distribution”. He states that “this twisting and inversion (Verdrehung und Verkehrung) is the real [phenomenon], not a merely supposed one existing merely in the imagination of the workers and the capitalists”. ⁷⁵

As this notion emerges in the fully developed version of Capital, Marx maintains that “capitalist production begets, with the inexorability of a law of Nature, its own negation. It is the negation of negation”. ⁷⁶ Further, “it is evident that the laws of appropriation or of private property ... become by their own inner and inexorable dialectic changed into their very opposite.” ⁷⁷

The Hegelian and Lutheran influence of “negation” and “inversion” persist through both the early and the mature Marx. Emancipation will come about as the result of:
the formation of a class with radical chains . . . a class that is the dissolution of all classes, a sphere of society having a universal character because of its universal suffering . . . because . . . unqualified wrong is perpetrated on it . . .

The proletariat already embodies “the negative result of society”, and (in a characteristic reversal) “merely elevates into a principle of society what society had advanced as the principle of the proletariat . . .”, namely, “the negation of private property.” The call for revolution in the Communist Manifesto was a call to invert historical development as it had proceeded thus far.

There are characteristic words in Marx that capture this apocalyptic resolution, that is the abrupt leap or inversion where the underlying contradiction is suspended and transformed into its opposite. Communism, as man’s total salvation, will happen “‘all at once’ and simultaneously . . .” (auf einmal). One of Marx’ favourite words is Umschlag, “the turn into its opposite.” He also refers to “dieser dialektische Umschlag”, “the dialectical reversal.”

This use of language is reminiscent of one of Luther’s characteristic words umbkeren — to overturn or invert: “Our Lord God can immediately overturn things despite the Emperor or the Pope.” (Unser Herr Gott kans bald umbkeren trotz Keiser, Bapst).

We will recall as well that out of Luther’s battle with the Catholic church where “everything has been completely turned up-side-down”, there emerged the theology of the cross centered on God’s power as the negativa essentia, the power of inversion. Marx in turn, regarded capitalism as “an enchanted, perverted (read ‘inverted’), topsy-turvy world” (die verzauberte, verkehrte und auf den Kopf gestellte Welt) but communism “overturns the basis of all earlier relations of production and exchange.”

The apocalyptic resolution of perfect community is recapitulated in Marx in the explicit abolition of power. Political power, Marx claims, is merely the result of class antagonisms and with the abolition of the latter, a society will evolve where, “there will be no further political power as such.” In a well-known passage from the Communist Manifesto, he reiterates this notion:

When, in the course of development, class distinctions have disappeared, and all production has been concentrated in the hands of a vast association of the whole nation, the public power will lose its political character. Political power, properly so called, is merely the organized power of one class for oppressing another. If the proletariat
THE WORLD UPSIDE DOWN

during its contest with the bourgeoisie is compelled, by the force of circumstances to organize itself as a class, if, by means of a revolution, it makes itself the ruling class, and, as such, sweeps away by force the old conditions of production, then it will, along with these conditions, have swept away the conditions for the existence of class antagonisms, and of classes generally, and will thereby have abolished its own supremacy as a class.\textsuperscript{88}

The German text of this last clause reads: \textquote{hebt \ldots \textit{damit seine eigene Herrschaft als Klasse auf}}.\textsuperscript{89} Compare this with Paul's prescription for the kingdom of God when Christ \textquote{shall have put down all rule and all authority and power} (I Corinthians 15:24). In Luther's translation (1546): \textquote{\textit{Wenn er außheben wird alle herrschaft, und alle oberkeit und Gewalt.}}

This comparison reveals the characteristic culmination of the apocalyptic vision. In its rhetorical structure, Marx's socialism is as comprehensive and all-embracing a vision of community as the \textit{\textquote{holy nation}} of the Old Testament, as the \textit{\textquote{totus Christus}} of the New Testament, as Luther's spiritual kingdom or Hegel's ideal Protestant state. This final vision of socialism repeats the classical and systematic process of inversion of the basic antithesis of lordship and bondage. It promises once more, perfect community without power and conflict.

III

In the short compass of this paper I have tried to deal, not with the substantive doctrines of some of the main expressions of the apocalyptic tradition, nor with its \textquote{truths}, but with its forms and the structures of its rhetoric. These have been remarkably consistent over three millennia. We have the positing of the contrasting pair of opposites, lord and servant, and subsequently, the resolution of this opposition through negation and inversion into a vision of perfect community. It is this characteristic rhetorical structure that has given to the apocalyptic tradition its intimate and arresting appeal.

But it is also on this very same structure and vocabulary that schism invariably drew. This negation of the previous vision of perfect community became, in Rosemary Reuther's language, the left hand of the new round of self-affirmation in yet another vision of perfect community.

Each such vision attempts to write \textquote{finis} to history. On the theistic side, the kingdom is \textquote{\textit{beyond history}} as decreed in Revelation; on the secular side,
history itself is suspended as in Hegel and Marx. Yet for those who wish to appraise the more limited and finite question of the unfolding of the apocalyptic tradition within history, both camps can be seen as labouring under a dramatic blind spot. By foreclosing history in their different ways, they fail to anticipate the extraordinary internal momentum yet to surge forth in the next round, already, if invisibly in a state of gestation.

In my view, the evidence is consistent. Schism is inherent in the apocalyptic tradition, a latent force virtually as powerful as that of the given doctrinal orthodoxy. It is difficult to distinguish the language that leads to perfect community from the language that leads away from it to yet another characteristic embodiment; inversion and negation in its various forms and expressions is the characteristic rhetorical mode of both. Hence we must assign a far more significant place to the role of schismatic movements within the heart of this tradition since they form a consistent and integral part of its millennial history.

The postulate of the ultimate cosmic unity of God’s and man’s intentions (in theological language), or the total harmony of the state with the intrinsic goals of the proletariat (in the communist version), contains within it, the fatal rift for those who live in history. Sooner or later must come the revelation of an abyss which can only be bridged by yet another schism, an apocalyptic trajectory (or springboard) to a new cosmic harmony. A new vision of domination and oppression is proclaimed and then perceived and “felt”.

However “dialectically” we tend to see such an unfolding, the height of utopianism is contained in the expectation that society on the one side and (dialectical) consciousness on the other, can move in tandem in compatible forms. The resultant strain between the two, building to a dramatic threshold, is the ultimate source of the new schism. In the train of the new vision, there moves forward yet another “perfect community”, the quintessential catalyst of political mobilization. The depth of present injustice awaits its inversion into yet another round of perfection.

What role does the hidden structure of human consciousness play in the formulation of this vision; what role does it play in generating the seeds of this vision’s schismatic fate? We can do little more here than attempt to establish this question on the present agenda of modernity. The acceptance of such a question does not imply either a new determinism or the assumption that consciousness alone is all that there is. Such a question attempts only to identify the mediating role that consciousness exercises in this millennial cycle.

In theological language, the only assumption that need be made here is the fallibility or imperfection inherent in the human perception and transmission of divine Revelation. To assume the opposite would indeed be presumptuous. But the question now being put is whether such fallibility or imperfection in human consciousness is necessarily a random or fortuitous affair. Is it indeed
possible that there is order and consistency in the structure, that is, in the very limitations of human consciousness?

Voegelin vents much of his wrath on those engaged, in gnostic fashion, in immanentizing the eschaton — that is in locating the divine spirit and its promise within human consciousness.90 The prior and more limited question raised here however, separates the issue of the human structure of that consciousness from the events of Revelation. The theological debate around gnosticism unites the two issues and thus obscures the shape of the finite.

In Marxist language, the same question comes up in a radically different perspective. How do we account for the extraordinary consistency of this mode of perception of “domination and oppression” and the mode of its resolution? This occurs, as we have seen, in widely different settings over three millennia, amidst very different class structures and very different relations to the ownership of the means of production. Even though, as Marx states, the ideologists of bourgeois society “inevitably put the thing upside-down” (auf den Kopf stellen)91 the similarity of the image being inverted is unmistakeable.

From the side of both theism and Marxism a common issue begins to arise in our present confrontation with modernity. One of the crucial features of modernity is the reiteration of the imperious and resonant expectations of consciousness, running towards perfection along its apocalyptic track. This recurs persistently despite the inertia of our economic and political institutions with which it is in collision. In the complex undergrowth of bureaucratic and technological systems, the demands of coordination, stability, growth and even equity generate internal momenta of their own. These are often contradictory and antithetical to the pristine harmonies and dialectics of the apocalyptic mode of thought. Both the Pauline and Marxian views of power which were cited above are only one illustration of temporal innocence.

The proliferation of left-wing and liberation movements in the last decade and a half has exhibited even more vigorous schismatic tendencies than we had seen previously. Marcuse and the radical movements of our own day are no less the unexpected (and to some, unwelcome) heirs of the apocalyptic tradition than their millennial forbears. They reincarnate the old apocalyptic legacy of “domination and oppression” and charge once more into the anonymous tyranny of our bureaucracies despite the doctrinal “birth control” of the established left and the cries of heresy and excommunication. Yet the recent outcome of these liberation movements had a more transient character than ever before. A sense of futility now haunts these apocalyptic step-children.

We cannot in my view, hope to deal with the issues they raise as long as we remain innocent of the hidden relation of the apocalyptic tradition to human consciousness. Our continuing commitment to this tradition in the largest sense, has rooted within it, the seeds of periodic eruption as we re-echo in doctrinal forms the latent structures of the mind. Hence Voeglin’s focus on the
ABRAHAM ROTSTEIN

"inner-Christian tension", the struggle with heresy in the universal church and the powerful momentum of gnosticism in Western society, can be regarded as one phase of a still larger question.

The problem that was suspended almost two millennia ago has now been forced upon us by this encounter of the apocalyptic tradition with modernity. Jesus had stated to Pilate "'My kingdom is not of this world: if my kingdom were of this world, then would my servants fight...'" (John 18:36). Two thousand years later we can no longer fail to recognize the enduring reality of the biblical legacy in history — in "'this world'".

George Grant's inspiration continues among us in myriad ways. In writing recently about Simone Weil, he charted a course which each of us may pursue in his own way:

Just because western Christianity has realized its destiny of becoming secularized, it is essential to tear oneself free of the causes of that destiny, without removing oneself from the necessities of our present or from the reality of Christ.92

The causes of that "destiny" in my view, lie in the projection of the inner structure of human consciousness. Its articulation in all its inspired, recurring brilliance, forms the history of the apocalyptic tradition in Western society. But now, in the fullness of its millennial history, the forms of this tradition have now to be reviewed — or more appropriately, aufgehoben. It was Hegel who first pointed us towards the last dark continent of the mind. That, in my view, remains the question of our time.

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THE WORLD UPSIDE DOWN

Notes

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I have drawn on much of the same research for the present paper, but addressed it to a somewhat different theme.

My debt to many friends and to my research assistants will be acknowledged in a forthcoming book that will elaborate the present argument.

3. Ibid., p. 106.
7. Karl Marx and Frederic Engels, The German Ideology, Progress Publishers, Moscow: 1964, p. 37. (This will be cited subsequently as G.Id.)
8. I have expanded at greater length on this intermediate process in my forthcoming paper "The Apocalyptic Tradition: Luther and Marx" referred to above.
ABRAHAM ROTSTEIN


24. J.J. Pelikan and H.T. Lehman, *Luther's Works; American Edition*, Muhlenberg Press, St. Louis and Philadelphia: 1955-, Vol. 31, p. 344. (This edition will be cited subsequently as *L.W.*.) The German edition of Luther's work used here is *D. Martin Luthers Werke, Kritische Gesamtausgabe*, Weimar: 1883-. (This edition will be cited as *W.A.*. Luther's spelling is retained in the original which often differs from modern German.)

25. "Debet tamen rursus se exinanire hac in libertate..." *W.A.* 7, p. 65. *Cf. also evacuatur a seipso, W.A.* 2, p. 564. Luther inverts the term for servant and slave, *Knecht*, in precisely the same way as the equivalent *eved* in the Old Testament and *doulos* in the New Testament. *Knechts* is in fact Luther's translation for both the Hebrew and Greek terms.


27. *W.A.* 18, p. 327.


34. *L.W.* 31, p. 225; *W.A.* 1, p. 613.


36. In relation to *umbkeren*, to overturn, the editors of Luther's works comment: "Sehr oft bei Luther", frequently found in Luther, *W.A.* 34, II, p. 317, Note 1.

26


41. *Duplex quidem est natura, sed persona non est divisa, W. A.* 43, p. 580.


44. The Phenomenology of Mind, trans. J.B. Baillie, Harper Torchbooks, New York: 1967, p. 801. (This edition will be cited subsequently as *Phen.*) The German edition used here is *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, Suhrkamp Verlag, 3, Frankfurt: 1970. (This will be cited subsequently as *Phän.*)


47. Cf. "The changeless kingdom of laws, the immediate ectype and copy of the world of perception", *Phen.*, p. 203; also p. 207.

48. Hegel uses the word "finite" in apposition to the word "evil": "the natural . . . the finite, evil, in fact is destroyed". Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, trans. E.B. Speirs and J.B. Sanderson, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner, London: 1895, vol. 3, p. 96. (This will be cited subsequently as *Phil. Rel.*) Cf. as well, finitude (*Endlichkeit*) used synonymously with externality or outwardness (*Ausserlichkeit*); otherness or other-being (*Anderseyn*) and imperfection (*Unvollkommenheit*), Werke 12, p. 330. The imperfection attributed to finitude consists in the fact that man "can exist in a way which is not in conformity with (his) inner substantial nature . . . his inwardness" *Phil. Rel.* 3, p. 123.

In "the language of faith", Hegel’s statement on finitude runs as follows:

Christ assumed (human) finitude, finitude (*Endlichkeit*) in all its forms, which is the final tapering point of evil (*das Böse ist . . .*). Werke 12, p. 301, my translation. Cf. *Phil. Rel.* 3, pp 92-93.

49. *W. A.* 1, p. 29.


ABRAHAM ROTSTEIN

263; Phän., p. 173; "the negative essence", (negatives Wesen) or simply "nothingness" (Nichtigkeit), Phen., p. 225; Phän., p. 143. Cf. also "absolute negativity", Phen., pp. 233, 237; "absolute negation of this existence", Phen., p. 246; "absolute negation", Phen., p. 226.


56. Werke 12, p. 303.

57. Phen., p. 237.


64. Hist. Phil. 3, p. 16.

65. G. Id., p. 274. Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels Werke, Dietz Verlag, Berlin: Bd. 3, p. 237. (This edition of Marx' work will be cited subsequently as M.E.W.)


67. E.P.M., p. 132; Frühe Schriften 1, p. 590.

68. E.P.M., p. 132.

69. O'Malley, pp. 141-142; Frühe Schriften 1, pp. 503-504.

70. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Selected Works (in two volumes), Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow: 1958, vol. I, pp. 51, 53. (This will be cited subsequently as Selected Works.) Frühe Schriften II, pp. 839, 842.

71. O'Malley, p. 140; Frühe Schriften 1, p. 501.

THE WORLD UPSIDE DOWN

73. E.P.M., p. 168.

74. E.P.M., p. 169; Frühe Schriften I, p. 635.


76. Capital I, p. 837.

77. Capital I, p. 639.

78. O'Malley, p. 141.

79. O'Malley, p. 142.


81. G.Id., p. 47; M.E.W. 3, p. 35.

82. Grundrisse, p. 674; Cf. Martin Nicolaus' "Introduction", p. 32. I do not include here the financial or accounting usage of Umschlag meaning "turnover" as used in Capital.


84. W.A. 33, p. 348.


86. G.Id., p. 86.

87. M.E.W. 4, p. 182; my translation. The full passage reads:

In the course of its development to replace the old bourgeois society, the working class will establish an association that excludes classes and their antagonism (Gegensatz), and there will be no further political power as such; since it is political power that is the official expression of class antagonism within the bourgeois society. Cf. The Poverty of Philosophy, Progress Publishers, Moscow: 1973, 151. Compare also "the communist revolution abolishes the rule (Herrschaft) of all classes with the classes themselves..." G.Id. p. 85; M.E.W. 3, p. 70.

88. Selected Works I, p. 54. A similar passage in Engels' Socialism, Utopian and Scientific reads as follows:

The proletariat seizes political power and turns the means of production into state property.

But, in doing this, it abolishes itself as proletariat, abolishes all class distinctions and class antagonisms, abolishes also the state as state... When at last it becomes the real representative of the whole of society, it renders itself unnecessary. Selected Works, II, p. 150.

89. Frühe Schriften. II, p. 843.
90. Eric Voegelin, *op. cit.*, pp. 163-166:

The immanentization of the Christian eschaton made it possible to endow society in its natural existence with a meaning which Christianity denied to it. And the totalitarianism of our time must be understood as journey's end of the Gnostic search for a civil theology (p. 163).


PSYCHOANALYSIS, EVOLUTION AND THE END OF METAPHYSICS

Stan Spyros Draenos

The end of metaphysics is the story which, in Freud's eyes, psychoanalysis brings to its conclusion. That story begins with the insights of Copernicus. But that beginning did not truly complete itself until the turn of our own century when, through psychoanalysis, science finally penetrated the sacrosanct domain of the self to provide a methodology of self-understanding for men living in a rationalized world. In what follows, I explore the movement of mind that underlies Freud's theoretical self-understanding in order to see what was at stake at the moment when the metaphysical tradition lost all relevance to the understanding of life. For seen from the perspective of our contemporary situation, psychoanalysis appears as a last effort to articulate an integrative, determinate vision of man before the understanding of life dissolved into the existential morass we live in today.

The key to Freud's vision, and to the place of his thought within Western speculation about man, can be stated simply: psychoanalysis realizes the end of metaphysics by elaborating the meaning of Darwinism for human self-understanding. By this I do not mean that Freud had such a project in mind as a formal program of thought. Rather, evolution was for Freud an indubitable reality. And psychoanalytic theory arose out of the genuine perplexities that surrounded the question of man in the light of the reality Darwin had disclosed. Still, psychoanalysis is no evolutionary anthropology, at least not in any conventional sense, for Freud does not approach the phenomenon of man from the methodological perspective of evolutionary biology. That is, he does not interrogate human evidences with a view to discovering the relative survival advantages, and thus the raison d'être, of such distinctive features of Homo sapiens as language, tool-fabrication and use, or the upright posture. Instead of the biological meaning of being human, psychoanalysis is concerned with the human meaning of being a biological entity, and with finding a way of making that meaning the basis of our self-understanding, both as individuals and as species-members. It is the question of meaning that sustains the speculative vitality of psychoanalytic theory, and forms its point of critical engagement with the metaphysical tradition.
A single, radical insight founds the psychoanalytic perspective and remains its pole of orientation throughout — remains unchanged, that is, even in the shift of the theoretical center of gravity from the unconscious to the eros instincts after 1919. That single insight may be characterized as a redefinition of the essence of man. For psychoanalysis, that essence is desire. And the decisive formulations for the determination of that essence are developed in the founding work of psychoanalysis, *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900).

*The Interpretation of Dreams* shares with Heidegger's *Being and Time* (1927) the sensibility that the overwhelming reality of everyday life closes the individual off from the realization of an authentic self. For the pursuit of that self, Freud bids us turn to our dreams with a mind to discovering its hidden meaning there. While thus elevating the dream and making it the manifestation of the mind’s authentic originality, *The Interpretation of Dreams* conversely divests of substance the mind’s emphatic expression in the lucid self-consciousness of reflecting reason and substantializes in its stead an unconscious domain of sheer impulse. For that domain, suppressed in waking life, is what gains expression (albeit a distorted one, requiring interpretation) in dreams. The onset of sleep marks the withdrawal of external reality. Dreams are what the mind produces wholly out of itself when freed from the need to attend to the distractions that intrude upon it from without.

"Man is explicitly man," Hegel informs us in the preface to *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, "only in the form of developed and cultivated reason, which has made itself to be what it is implicitly." Against this identification of the human essence with reason’s reflective self-explication must be placed Freud’s assertion that "the core of our being" consists "of unconscious wishful impulses." Between the two formulations stands Darwin’s bringing of the Copernican-Galilean revolution — which had extruded man from nature — around full circle to embrace man himself. After Darwin, the nature which natural science has in view is necessarily, as J.H. Randall has put it, a "nature with man in it." And the result is that the subordination of life to the discipline of reason, which informed reflective philosophy’s continuation of the metaphysical tradition, is inverted by psychoanalysis into the subordination of reason to the vicissitudes of life. Hegel’s metaphysics begins in the naive self-consciousness of the individual who realizes himself to be "the immediate certainty of self . . . unconditioned being." Similarly, Freud’s psychoanalysis takes "acts of consciousness" to be "immediate data" that are "without parallel" and which "defy all explanation or description." The immediate self-certainty of consciousness with which both men begin, however, also marks the point of departure for two radically different ventures. For, in contrast to Hegel’s *Phenomenology*, psychoanalytic reflection stands in the shadow of Darwin, of the knowledge ascertained by the science of external reality that human existence has an animal essence. While taking its stand in,
and never abandoning the field of phenomena first delimited by reflective philosophy, psychoanalytic theory makes recourse to natural history for the determination of that essence. And this, in the first instance, means recourse to dreams for the determination of the hidden turnings of desire in which the authentic self consists. Contrary to the contemporary reading of Freud, however, psychoanalytic theory does not thereby take its bearings from the work of interpretation. Instead, the work of interpretation is itself governed from beginning to end by Freud's insight into what the essence of man must be in the light of what Darwin had taught. And as a pre-reflective urge that arises spontaneously within consciousness, the wish is the perfect choice of designation for that essence. *The Interpretation of Dreams* intends to teach men how, by turning away from the externally-imposed positivities of waking life, they can gain access to what lies hidden at the core of their being. Then, in *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality* (1905), Freud gives the dissimulations of desire an organic ground by further resolving “wishful impulses” into somatogenically-fixed sources of libidinal energy. Together, *The Interpretation of Dreams* and the *Three Essays* fill out the metapsychological program Freud had outlined for Fleiss in 1898. For Freud, the mind is no longer the independent ontological substance it was for the founder of reflective philosophy, Descartes. Now the mind is understood to be an emanation of the body lived from within.

In neither *The Interpretation of Dreams* nor the *Three Essays* is Freud yet aware of just how radical the implications of his seminal insight are. Instead, he remains — albeit awkwardly — within the framework of the philosophical tradition. Thus, the assertion that, not reason, but unconscious wishful impulses form the core of our being does not prevent Freud from fixing the relations of “reason” and “impulse” in a hierarchy of higher and lower human faculties definitive for that tradition. In full accord with the traditional hierarchy, the aim of psychoanalysis, we are told in the dream book, is to bring heteronomous unconscious impulses “under the domination of” rational psychical processes, as he takes to be the case for normal psychical functioning. And unconscious wishful impulses cannot be the “essence of man”, as I have claimed to be the case in psychoanalysis, if some higher power controls them.

Freud’s choice of the word “domination” is telling here, and reveals the significance of this apparent contradiction. Reason becomes an instrument of psychical domination rather than the realization of a rationally-ordered harmony of the soul in Freud because it has lost its metaphysical sanction. Or, to put the matter another way, lacking metaphysical justification, reason loses all substantive content, all norm-giving force, and becomes merely a necessity-imposed regulative function of the “mental apparatus” — a means among means in the technique of living, while itself unable to determine the sense of living. Organic need is what sustains that sense for Freud.
Only after completing his resolution of mind into body does Freud discover that a deepening of his generative insight is required if the recourse to natural history were itself to find completion. In this deepening of his original insight, unconscious wishful impulses are no longer subordinated within the decaying framework of philosophical rationalism. Now, what is "highest" in man is identified, not with rational processes that dominate impulse, but with conflicts internal to impulse itself. What I am referring to is that essential feature of "late" Freud, the super-ego, which he characterizes as the id's representative to the ego. In the formulation of the super-ego, but not by that alone, psychoanalytic theory finally breaks through the framework that had contained it. Freed from the inhibitions of Freud's early rationalism, though not from inhibition itself, desire steps forth as the essence of man.

The psychoanalytic perspective as articulated by Freud entails a disavowal of metaphysics. But his disavowal is not that of a positivist oblivious to the concerns that animated metaphysical speculation. Nor is it merely an incidental consequence of the psychoanalytic outlook. Rather, psychoanalytic thought is fundamentally oriented by that disavowal, and bears within itself the mark of metaphysics by virtue of it. That mark is the essentialism which sustains the psychoanalytic vision of human reality. Essentialism, the notion that a single principle or substance underlies all the manifestations of a particular entity, thereby making it be what it is, has its provenance in the heritage of metaphysics — a heritage which, cast adrift from its moorings by the Copernican revolution, suffered shipwreck in the nineteenth century. That unconscious wishful impulses constitute the core of our being is the definitive insight around which Freud's theory of man crystallizes. In this, Freud's thought perpetuates essentialism in the aftermath of metaphysics by realizing the sense of essentialism in a radically altered setting. Evolutionism established that new setting by being the instrument through which natural science could finally make a serious claim upon the totality of the existent. Psychoanalysis allies itself with this claim and tries to make it good by reading man back into nature without prejudice to the innermost, intimate evidences of the human presence within the existent.

To articulate this matter in terms of a perpetuation of essentialism without the support of metaphysics would seem to involve a fundamental contradiction. For the fact of the matter is that the implicit ontology of natural science — perhaps best expressed in the notion of reality as process — is profoundly anti-essentialist. Darwin's completion of "the Copernican revolution in ontology", to use Hans Jonas' words, consists precisely in the dissolution of essentialism's last stronghold — viz., living nature whose organisms, both individually, and in their mutual interrelations, seem to manifest some kind of teleological order. Despite its elimination of purpose from the kingdom of life, however, Darwinism itself provided the setting for
PSYCHOANALYSIS

Freud’s reconstitution of human being in accordance with a perception of its essence. But before we can explain how this is so, we must first demonstrate what we have thus far only stated — namely, that Freud’s turn to natural history draws its strength and its rudimentary orientation from his turn away from metaphysics.

"The intellectual period . . . has now been left behind", we are told in the early pages of The Interpretation of Dreams, "when the human mind was dominated by philosophy and not by the exact natural sciences." Yet that realization did not deter him, in private correspondence, from admitting to an ulterior motive in the pursuit of his scientific studies. In letters to Fleiss just following the completion of the dream book, Freud writes, "I see that you are using the circuitous route of medicine to attain your first ideal, the physiological understanding of man, while I secretly nurse the hope of arriving by the same route at my own original objective, philosophy." And a month later, the same confession recurs in somewhat revised form. "When I was young, the only thing I longed for was philosophical knowledge, and now that I am going over from medicine to psychology, I am in the process of attaining it." What prompted this circuitous route to the realization of philosophical impulses, and what in the writing of The Interpretation of Dreams made him feel that he was attaining philosophical knowledge, Freud leaves unclear. But the attitude towards metaphysics expressed in the dream book provides, I think, some essential clues.

In The Interpretation of Dreams, Freud felt called upon to make an unambiguous disclaimer of metaphysical intent. The context is a polemical one in which Freud attacks the "prevailing trend of thought in psychiatry today" according to which "anything that might indicate that mental life is in any way independent of demonstrable organic changes or that its manifestations are in any way spontaneous" provokes alarm. "Even when investigation has shown that the primary exciting cause of a phenomenon is psychical," we are assured, "deeper research will one day trace the path further and discover an organic basis (Begründung) for the mental event." In the meantime, to grant mental impulses "means of their own" does not commit one to "the metaphysical view of the nature of the mind (dem metaphysischen Seelenwesen)".

Freud himself articulates the crucial connection between this disassociation of psychoanalytic understanding from metaphysics and his sense that The Interpretation of Dreams had carried him, via the circuitous route or natural science, to the realization of philosophical yearnings. In The Psychopathology of Everyday Life (1901), a book otherwise devoid of speculative content, we suddenly encounter a striking and incisive expression of the "spiritual" orientation of psychoanalytic thought in which Freud defines the meaning of his scientific work in terms of the inversion of metaphysics. Here metaphysics is associated, not with the philosophical tradition originating with the Greeks,
but with the religious "Platonism for the masses" that was absorbed into the conceptual framework of that tradition.

A large part of the mythological view of the world, which extends a long way into the most modern religions, is nothing but psychology projected into the external world. The obscure recognition . . . of psychical factors and relations in the unconscious is mirrored . . . in the construction of a supernatural reality, which is destined to be changed back once more by science into the psychology of the unconscious. One could venture to explain in this way the myths of paradise and the fall of man, of God, of good and evil, of immortality, and so on, and to transform metaphysics into metapsychology.\textsuperscript{16}

The transformation of metaphysics into metapsychology must not be confused with the dismissal of metaphysical concerns as meaningless, typical, for instance, of the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle.\textsuperscript{17} In this transformation, Freud does not merely jettison metaphysics as some kind of colossal linguistic blunder. On the contrary, as the reflection of psychical factors in the unconscious, metaphysics becomes the mirror in which the mind might seek the image of its own innermost reality. The psychology of the unconscious fulfils the scientifically-ordained destiny of metaphysics by transforming it into metapsychology. In the letter to Fleiss where Freud lays out the program of psychoanalytic theory, we saw how Freud used the term metapsychology to signify the organic, which he locates at a level both behind and beneath the psychological. Now, in his first published use of the term (then dropped until the \textit{Metapsychological Papers} of 1915), Freud situates metapsychology in polar opposition to metaphysics. Yet the original biological meaning of the term is still latent in this new formulation. For what ultimately sustains metaphysical illusions are the urgent somatic needs arising from the body which the wishful impulses populating the unconscious represent.

In actual fact, the transformation of metaphysics into metapsychology remains an unfulfilled programmatic statement, until \textit{Totem and Taboo}, some eleven years later, realized its substance as an anthropology. Nonetheless, it remains an important signpost on the way of Freud’s thought. \textit{Flectere si nequeo superos, Acheronta movebo} ("If I cannot bend the Higher Powers, I will stir up the underworld") was the motto Freud chose for the dream book. And, without contradicting his later explanation that this motto simply represents the course taken by repressed wishes which, rejected by con-
PSYCHOANALYSIS

sciousness, find their expression in dreams, it can also be made to stand for the course taken by Freud’s youthful philosophical passions in the recognition that the triumph natural science realized through Darwin had foreclosed access to the metaphysical realm — the realm where, traditionally, mind found in philosophical knowledge “its realization,” as Hegel tells us, “and the kingdom it sets up for itself in its own native element.” As metaphysics reflected back into its origins, metapsychology — that is, “biology” — becomes for Freud the new source of transcendent meaning. Or, rather, as a response to Darwin’s enfolding of the mind within nature, the transformation of metaphysics into metapsychology substitutes an immanent “within” for a transcendent “beyond” as the ground of self-understanding.

The foregoing considerations show that Freud’s materialism arises out of his disavowal of metaphysics — a disavowal which gives definitive form to the new vision of human reality he tries to elaborate in the aftermath of metaphysics. We must now try to gain a closer understanding of what is involved in the psychoanalytic inversion of metaphysics by considering more fully how Darwinism simultaneously forecloses access to metaphysics and opens the possibility of reconstituting a comprehensive vision of man as homo natura.

If my concern were simply to show that Freud was deeply influenced by the advent of evolutionary biology, certainly I would have done better to cite Lamarck rather than Darwin as decisive for the development of psychoanalytic thought. For Freud was a life-long adherent of Lamarck’s views concerning the nature of the evolutionary process. In particular, Freud found the Lamarckian mechanism of evolution through the inheritance of acquired characteristics hospitable to, and useful for the articulation of his theory of human psychogenesis. My fundamental thesis, however, — the thesis that psychoanalysis elaborates the meaning of Darwinism for human self-understanding — does not refer to the “influence” of evolutionism on Freud’s thought. The elucidation of a great thinker’s work in terms of a history of influences, however useful in familiarizing us with his intellectual environment can, in any case, never succeed in revealing the theoretical passion that consumes itself in the life of his thought. Whatever its appropriations and whatever its failings, Freud’s thought is original. That is, it poses and answers for itself the essential questions rather than merely adopting a ready-made viewpoint, methodology or set of assumptions. The fundamental thesis is meant to indicate the originality of psychoanalysis as a solution to the enigma evolutionism posed for self-understanding — as a convoluted, but consistent response to the question man had become for himself in the wake of Darwin. It was his concern with the “spiritual” impact of evolutionary science that led Freud to cite Darwin and not Lamarck in his famous discussion of the three blows dealt to human narcissism by the researches of science, even though he considered Lamarck’s work, which preceded that of Darwin, to be scientifically
more valid. For it was with Darwin that the natural sciences came fully to
dominate the human mind. This meant, moreover, that the consequences of
evolutionism for human self-understanding would have to be worked out in
accordance with the ontological blueprint projected by the natural sciences,
although Darwinism itself, as we shall see, introduced a new dimension into
that blueprint. What I am suggesting with the fundamental thesis is that,
when given a reading appropriate to its innermost problems, psychoanalytic
theory illuminates the new situation of understanding and helps us gain our
bearings with respect to it. More particularly, in the context of our current
discussion, Freud’s recourse from metaphysics to natural history attests to the
closure of the metaphysical horizon in which evolutionism played a decisive
role. It was into this situation that psychoanalysis stepped in order to provide
what Freud claimed to be “a decisive new orientation in the world and in
science.” In disavowing metaphysics and turning to natural history for the
determination of the human essence, Freud’s philosophical daimon showed a
rudimentary grasp of, and turned to its advantage, the dissolutive impact
which evolution had on the traditional interpretation of man.

Darwin’s Origin of Species (1859), which established the evolution of life as
a scientific fact, fundamentally altered the epistemic situation upon which the
traditional interpretation of man had rested. By bringing into view a self-
generating nature out of whose contingent, yet casually-determinate in-
teractional processes man appears as but one more product, evolution was the
instrument by which natural science finally forced the issue with metaphysics.
Consciousness, which Heidegger once called “the land of modern
metaphysics”, was denied both meta-physical paternity and its exclusive
relationship with human life. If we take evolution seriously as embracing the
phenomenon of man, which in some sense we must, then mind ceases to
represent an independent ontological substance that realizes itself in the act of
reflection, but instead must be understood to have emerged from matter as the
actualization of some potentiality inherent therein. Reason can no longer be
assigned the task of realizing the human essence by subordinating the passions
of life to standards determined by the philosopher’s perception of being. For
evolution makes reason an attribute of life rather than its master. Finally,
absolute being, insofar as it is still identified with what timelessly is, dissolves
into nothingness in the face of the temporality that evolution implants at the
very heart of everything that exists. “If there is nothing eternal,” Aristotle
notes in his Metaphysics, “then there can be no becoming; for there must be
something which undergoes the process of becoming.” Now, coming-to-be
does not arise from what eternally is. Rather, all discrete entities derive their
being from becoming. Becoming is now the superior principle — or, rather, in
the face of the primacy and universality of process and change, the whole
distinction between being and becoming loses efficacy and significance. For in
becoming, entities proceed from an origin, but towards no final state, and realize no purposes. Their ontological meaning is fully exhausted in the determination of the causes that have produced them.

Correlative with the dissolutive impact of Darwinism upon metaphysics is the ontological regime evolution institutes in its stead. Here, the reflections of Hans Jonas, which have been instrumental to this point, will again form our starting point, but this time in the context of an interpretative disagreement. Jonas teaches us that Darwin’s success in establishing a mechanical explanation for the origins and development of living beings “completed the Copernican revolution in ontology” by extending “to the realm of life that combination of natural necessity with radical contingency which the Newtonian-Laplacean cosmology resulting from that revolution had universally proclaimed.” By calling Darwinism the completion of the Copernican revolution in ontology, Jonas means to signify the claim science could make upon the totality of the existent — a totality conceived monistically as matter. For evolution treats the vital difference between the organic and the inorganic in mechanical terms as the emergence of the simplest self-replicating structures from chance encounters and transmutations within non-vital matter. Random variations in the offspring and the natural selection of those best suited for survival then account for the further course of development. The element of radical contingency essential to the ontological blueprint of nature science projects is secured in Darwin’s theory by the fact that variation is a function of the organism and natural selection a function of the environment. The two functions originate independently, or at least no conspiracy of nature co-ordinates organic and environmental changes so as to realize some pre-ordained pattern of development. On the other hand, the natural necessity Jonas cites as the second element of the Newtonian-Laplacean cosmology is operative in the non-purposive “selection” of the fittest through the elimination of those organisms relatively deficient in the equipment for survival within an externally-given environment. Necessity is at work here in the stark alternatives of life or death, being or non-being.

If this were the sum total of the matter, it would be difficult to understand how Freud could manage to bring human evidences into conformity with the ground-plan of nature projected by evolutionary science. But it is here that psychoanalysis directs us to an aspect of evolution’s meaning for science’s understanding of nature that Jonas overlooks. By Jonas’ account, Darwin’s achievement consisted in the explanation of the evolution of living entities within the Newtonian causal scheme signified by the combination of natural necessity with radical contingency — a causal scheme whose cosmological implications were developed by Laplace. Darwinism, however, did more than just conquer the realm of life for the Newtonian world-view. By that very act, evolution transformed the role which natural science assigned to time in the
scheme of things. The conquest of vital existence for a mechanistic natural science was thus exacted at an unexpected price. The organic beings which were now subjected to the rigors of efficient causality bore within themselves something that radicalized that scheme. Evolutionary science thereby inserted into the ground-plan of nature something that Freud could turn to his advantage in reconstituting a coherent vision of man after his fall from metaphysical grace.

In his identification of Darwinism causality with the causal scheme of classical physics, Jonas turns to Laplace’s “hypothetical ‘divine Calculator’” — and properly so. For it is this hypothesis which illustrates most vividly the significance of time for classical, Newtonian physics. And evolution is about nothing, if not the meaning of time. Laplace’s famous hypothesis runs as follows:

An intellect which at a given instant knows all the forces acting in nature and the position of all things of which the world consists — supposing said intellect were vast enough to subject these data to analysis — would embrace in the same formula the motions of the greatest bodies in the universe and those of the slightest atoms; nothing would be uncertain for it, and the future like the past would be present to its eyes.26

The vision of natural processes given here is such that, in the words of Milič Čapek, “any instantaneous configuration of an isolated system logically implies all future configurations of the system. Its future history is thus virtually contained in its present state, which, in turn is logically contained in its past states.”27 For Jonas, Laplace’s hypothesis complements Newton’s mechanical explanation of “existing structures” by extending those mechanics to the question of origins and development, thereby filling out and elevating to the level of cosmology the vision of the new natural science — a vision whose “metaphysical secret”, Jonas tells us, lies “in the radically temporal conception of being, or in its identification with action and process.”29 It is into this scheme that, for Jonas, Darwin fits the realm of life. But what he does not see is that, by capturing living beings within the explanatory net of efficient causality, Darwinism transformed the meaning time bears for natural science’s “radically temporal conception of being.” Let us see how.

In its abstention from teleology, the interaction of variation and natural selection is in complete agreement with the Newtonian-Laplacean cosmology. Indeed, Darwin’s explanation of organic development without recourse to
PSYCHOANALYSIS

teleology is perhaps the most succinct expression of the victory natural science won through him over metaphysics. For in living things, philosophy had one class of entities whose teleological nature appeared indisputable. But the eradication of teleology was accomplished by the radicalization of its opposite, contingency, and with peculiar consequences. In Newtonian science, time, like space, is an infinite, uniform and continuous dimension of reality that remains independent of the events that transpire in it. Contingency refers only to the arbitrariness of the initial set of conditions — the first configuration of the system which, once in motion, unfolds within the grid of absolute time and space with ineluctable necessity. And since all relations are isometric, this world-system can be read backwards or forwards with equal sense.

None of this holds true in Darwin's theory of evolution, where the role of contingency is expanded dramatically. In the evolution of life, contingency is at work at every significant turning point in development, without thereby abrogating the law of necessity. Indeed, the unpredictable irruption of new organic forms is exactly what constitutes those important turning points. For evolution signifies the emergence of novel and unexpected adaptations out of the interplay of random organic mutations and changed organic and inorganic conditions of life. In the theory of evolution, no future "state of the system" is given with certainty in the present configuration of the natural economy. The present generation of each species is the cumulative product of the movement of life through time, and is thereby its effect. But while the variations which the present generation throws out through its off-spring for natural selection condition future possibilities, just what those variations will be, and with what result given changed environmental conditions, cannot be determined beforehand. Or to put it another way, the life or death selection lottery held every generation for the members of each species allows us in principle to infer a rigorous causal sequence which has produced the current state of the natural economy. But the cumulative causally-determined emergence of new biological forms describes a developmental sequence that is by nature irreversible. "Time's arrow" is not reversible as it is in Newton's rational mechanics, but points in one direction only — forwards towards a future which, once realized, will be seen to have been determined by the past, but whose definitive outcome remains hidden to the eye of the present.

For the idea of time implicit in the evolutionary development of life disclosed by Darwin's causal mechanism I would reserve the term temporality. Temporality is found, not in the mathematically determinate interval which makes up the uniform, continuous and infinite time used in Newtonian science to measure bodies in motion, but is found instead in the event which forms part of the unique sequence of happenings that make up a life-history. Thus, Darwin informs us in the Origin of Species that the evolutionary biologist regards "every production of nature as one which has had a history" and that
“every complex structure and instinct” is to be understood as the “summing up” of the species-history of the organism possessing it. Or, as Francois Jacob has recently put it, “Living bodies are indissolubly bound up with time. In the living world, no structure can be detached from its history.” Thus we can say that with evolutionary science, the vision of time projected by the natural sciences ceases to be monopolized by Newtonian mechanics. Evolutionary time does not derive its fundamental characteristics from the mathematics of masses in motion. For biological reality, time is not merely a measure applied to organic entities from without. It is of their essence.

This element of temporality, which Darwinism inserted into the ground-plan of nature, is what Freudian theory exploits in order to restore the sense of essentialism in the context of natural history. But in order to see how this is so, we must explore more deeply the nature and implications of temporality in evolutionary theory. For thus far, the temporality we have spoken of pertains basically to species. The story of life on this earth is the story of a single, continuous development characterized by the increasing complexity and diversity of life-forms all of which can ultimately trace their origin to some original protoplasm. What evolve are species. But they evolve through the individual organisms in which species have their empirical reality. And as the most recent product of the immense journey of life through time, individual organisms are thus the concrete manifestations of the temporality of life. Every complex structure or instinct is the summing up of the organism’s species-history because, in the theory of evolution, the individual organism is subordinate to the history of its species. And this relationship of organism to species helps explain the seductive logic of Haeckel’s famous “biogenetic law” which, in *Totem and Taboo*, Freud adopts as the logic linking the psychical development of the individual to the development of human civilization.

Haeckel’s biogenetic law — which, put briefly, asserts that ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny — is no longer taken seriously by most biologists, even though recapitulation theory was the explanation of individual organic development favored by Darwin. The facts of ontogenesis (ontogeny being understood variously to signify embryological and/or anatomical development) simply do not conform to its logic. Nonetheless, recapitulation theory dominated the thinking of the first generation of post-Darwinism biologists since, as we shall see, it idealizes the ontological implications which the theory of evolution bears for the individual organism. And since our concern is with how psychoanalysis elaborates the meaning of Darwinism for human self-understanding, Haeckel’s idealization helps us see what possibilities for reconstituting a coherent vision of human nature evolution offered when viewed from the rudimentary perspective Darwin established.
PSYCHOANALYSIS

We begin with Haeckel's own formulation of the law of recapitulation:

Ontogeny . . . being the series of form-changes which each individual organism traverses during the whole time of its individual existence, is immediately conditioned by phylogeny, or the development of the organic stock (phylon) to which it belongs. Ontogeny is the short and rapid recapitulation of phylogeny. . . . The organic individual . . . repeats during the rapid and short course of its individual development the most important form-changes which its ancestors traversed during the long and slow course of their paleontological evolution . . . .

Now the biogenetic law pertains to a developmental process with which the Origin of Species is largely unconcerned — namely, the development of the individual organism. But why, then, was the biogenetic law so appealing to Darwinists as a way of explaining the development of the individual organism? The answer is that if the law were true, it would provide an invaluable guide to the generation of phylogenetic sequences which the incompleteness of the fossil record makes so difficult, in many cases, to reconstruct. But prior to the question of usefulness and appeal lies the question of what made the recapitulation of phylogeny by ontogeny so plausible as the proper interpretation or explanation of individual development. The answer to that question lies in evolutionary science's elimination of teleology from the kingdom of life. We noted earlier that organic phenomena offer a powerful experiential basis for the notion that the series of changes through which something passes is directed towards the realization of a final goal or purpose. For both Aristotle, the original articulator of the category of teleology, and for contemporary men in their everyday understanding of things, the purposefulness entailed in the movement from acorn to oak is obvious. Consider, then, the implications of Darwinism for the teleological understanding of what is at hand in the series of form-changes through which an organism passes. To Greek eyes, each organism's coming-to-be was represented the step-by-step unfolding of an essential nature. The process of "becoming" was intelligible by virtue of its subordination to a final state of "being". Let us remember that the original use of the term species signified just this unchanging, eternally-fixed form which each organism, in its growth, strives to realize. With evolution, however, the individual organism ceases to be the manifestation-through-a-process-of-becoming of a fixed species nature. For each species itself represents
a developmental sequence of generations through eons of the past whose future course is unknown. With relation to its species, the individual living organism represents this past history for the present, and the bearer of what the species thus is “for the present” on its path towards a contingency-filled future. Thus, even though a species exists only through the succession of organisms that make it up, the species, by the logic of evolution, nonetheless subordinates the individual living organism to its own history, and imparts to the living thing the character of a concretion of historical time. By conceiving of the sequence of form-changes through which the individual organism passes to be the step-by-step repetition of its species-history, Haeckel’s law makes evolutionary time the fated way for the organism to live out the time of its life. Instead of representing the teleological striving to embody an eternal form of being, the organism follows Goethe’s advice and realizes the historical past as its own destiny. The ontological meaning of the organism is contained, not in the form it realizes, but in the sequence of form-changes through which it passes. The temporal vicissitudes of the species constitute the “essence” of the organism.

In the absence of teleology, then, Haeckel’s law was a plausible guess at the nature of ontogeny which proved wrong. But this in itself does not speak against its significance as the idealization of the temporality which still inheres in the ground-plan of nature projected by evolutionary science. Contemporary biology, after all, still links our “fate” to the “inheritance” of genetic material drawn, so to speak, from the historically-generated gene-pool specific to our species, and thus opens us, incidently, to the perverse belief that, through genetic engineering, we can “determine” the “fate” of our progeny. In its explication of the historicality which, after Darwin, informs the life-story of every discrete organism, Haeckel’s law gives us insight into Freud’s attempt to discover the sense of being what we are — creatures who by origin and destiny belong to nature. And this insight is not to be found by attending to Freud’s explicit adoption of the biogenetic law in Totem and Taboo, but rather by comprehending his reconstitution of the human essence in accordance with that aspect of evolutionary understanding that the biogenetic law explicates — by seeing, that is, how psychoanalytic reflection realizes the temporality that evolutionary science makes part of living nature’s substance. “Impressive analogies from biology,” Freud writes in his Leonardo study of 1910, “have prepared us to find that the individual’s mental development repeatsthe course of human development in abbreviated form.” But it is only because the temporality projected by evolutionary science had been incorporated from the outset into Freud’s theory of individual psychogenesis that these analogies could open the way to the generation of a cultural anthropology out of his individual psychology.

“(T)he basic text of homo natura must again be recognized,” Nietzsche urges in Beyond Good and Evil. “To translate man back into nature” — that is
PSYCHOANALYSIS

the task of the contemporary thinker who "hardened by the discipline of science" is at last "deaf to the siren songs of the old metaphysical bird catchers who have been piping at him too long, you are more, you are higher, you are of a different origin." By tracing the evidence of consciousness back to a ground in the body lived from within, the founding works of psychoanalytic theory carry out that task. The Interpretation of Dreams inaugurates the era of psychoanalytic man, of man left with nothing but life itself and whatever sense he can make out of it. But psychoanalytic man is not yet existential man. The discovery that there is nothing beyond life is not for Freud the occasion for existential despair and the resolve to be in the face of life's absurdity. Thrown back upon life by science, psychoanalytic man is, by the same token, delivered to science for the interpretation of life. And for science, life is not an absurdity, but is instead the most remarkable achievement of matter. This achievement has no meaning in the immediate experience of life. But, whatever his doubts and anxieties, psychoanalytic man knows that the life he lives does not hang suspended in the void. For beneath life stands the rich multiplicity of nature from which life arises and to which it returns. By translating man back into nature, Freud attempts to make the nature to which science gives determinate meaning the basis for human self-understanding.

The transcendence of time is the ancient dream of metaphysics and lies at the heart of the essentialist vision of reality. In Aristotle's Metaphysics we are told that, "the principles of eternal things are necessarily most true; for they are true always and not merely sometimes; and there is nothing which explains their being what they are, for it is they that explain the being of others." In eternal things lie the essence of entities — that which persists in and through all changes which any particular entity undergoes, insofar as it remains what it is and does not become something else. In the name of science, psychoanalysis undertakes to reconstitute a vision of human reality in accordance with a perception of its essence, and to do so despite natural science's dissolution of being, of teleology, of the realm of final ends, and its subjection of everything that is to the rigors of efficient causality and the relentless motion of sheer, purposeless becoming. Let us see how.

Temporality is time that is lived forwards, but comprehended backwards. But this does not make temporality merely a subjective, psychological phenomenon. For, as evolutionary biology is fully cognizant, living things are themselves temporal — that is, conditioned by time. Having discovered the temporal nature of species and disclosed the mechanism of their progressive development and differentiation, evolutionary biology imparts a determinate meaning to discrete living entities by seeing each as the summation of a species-history, thereby freeing organic time from its metaphysical subordination to the teleological realization of a timeless species-form. As we saw, Haeckel's biogenetic law tries to render the life-time of individual organisms intelligible.
STAN SPYROS DRAENOS

by interpreting each as the concrete embodiment of species-time. In this, he only idealizes the meaning which evolution bears for the individual organism. And that meaning is that the nature of the organism is contained in the history of its species. That is to say, the past itself takes the place of a super-ordinate transcendent form which the organism strives to become. In its concern with the psychosexual roots of the personality, it is exactly this orientation towards the past through which psychoanalysis elaborates the essence of man. How this is so we can learn by turning to the Freudian work that teaches us the most about meaning which the psychoanalytic theory of man bears for the understanding of life, Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of His Childhood. That life transpires in time, and that making sense of a life requires the exercise of memory (in the case of autobiography), or the sympathetic re-enactment of a life through strict adherence to chronology (in the case of biography) is hardly a revelation. But that what a person shows in his life is to be understood in “the connection along the path of instinctual activity between a person’s external experiences and his reactions” is a claim distinctive to psychoanalysis — a claim whose possibilities and limitations Freud explores in the Leonardo study. In the process, we learn much about the view of life that issues from the reconstruction of life-experience into a natural history.

Leonardo da Vinci is clearly conceived as the application of the logic of psychosexual development worked out in the Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality to a concrete case. What Freud wants to account for is Leonardo’s overwhelming passion for research and knowledge, and the particular forms which this passion took in the course of his career, both as an artist and as an investigator of nature. But psychobiography does not just take the events of a person’s life and develop them into a coherent story such that, through the sympathetic (though not necessarily uncritical) re-experiencing of those events, the meaning of that life is somehow allowed to speak for itself. Psychobiography, instead, subjects those events to critical analysis of a special kind.

Supported by its knowledge of psychical mechanisms [psychoanalytic enquiry] endeavours to establish a dynamic basis for his nature on the strength of his reactions [to external events] and to disclose the original motive forces of his mind, as well as their later transformations and developments. If this is successful, the behaviour of a personality in the course of his life is explained in terms of the combined operation of constitution and fate, of internal forces and external powers.39
PSYCHOANALYSIS

The essence of a particular personality must be sought along the path of instinctual activity which leads back to the original motive forces of the mind. Just as in biology, where genotypical characters manifest themselves phenotypically according to the conditions under which the organism's life transpires, so these "original motive forces" are manifest as a particular psychical configuration according to the interaction of an innate disposition with external circumstances. As he puts it in the 1915 edition of the Three Essays, the relation between constitutional and accidental factors is co-operative and not mutually exclusive. "The constitutional factor must await experiences before it can make itself felt; the accidental factor must have a constitutional basis in order to come into operation."

Yet once established, this original configuration of infantile sexual impulses — impulses which are polymorphic and auto-erotic — forms the basis of all later developments. What gives a dynamic character to these developments is the wave of repression which covers over the efflorescence of sexual activity with an infantile amnesia, and the subsequent vicissitudes which the repressed instincts undergo during the period of latency. The human organism is transformed into a civilized human being during this latency period through the diversion of polymorphous sexual energies to other purposes, according to a variety of possibilities about which Freud is never quite clear or settled, but which includes sublimation and neurotic compulsiveness. Both the wave of repression that ends the period of infantile sexual activity and the subsequent forms of instinctual canalization are themselves constitutionally-determined, and comprise for Freud the virtual mark of human speciation. Thus, already in the first edition of the Three Essays, we read:

The fact that the onset of sexual development in human beings occurs in two phases, i.e., that the development is interrupted by the period of latency, seem[s] to call for particular notice. This appears to be one of the necessary conditions of the aptitude of men for developing a higher civilization, but also of their tendency to neurosis. So far as we know, nothing analogous is to be found in man's animal relatives. It would seem that the origin of this peculiarity of men must be looked for in the prehistory of the human species.

Just as in evolutionary science, where the constitutional species-character which the individual inherits is itself a product of time, so in psychoanalytic science,
Freud bids us to look to events in human prehistory to account for the capacity for acculturation with which each human being is born. "(C)onstitution," he wrote Else Voigtlander in 1911, "... is nothing but the sediment of experiences from a long line of ancestors." 42

In psychoanalysis, then, the dynamic basis of the mind of any particular person is to be found in the disclosure of its original motive forces, as well as in their later transformations and developments. And both origins and the later transformations are seen as manifestations of innate constitutional factors stirred into action by the particular circumstances of his life. This basis, however, is not determined immediately, but rather is inferred from a consideration of the leading characteristics of the adult personality. Thus, to return to the Leonardo study, we find Freud beginning, not with Leonardo's childhood memory, but, just as he would with a patient, with the manifestations of his character in later life. For according to the logic of psychosexual development, the key to an individual's character is always contained in the original fixations of infantile sexual life. That key comes into view, however, only retrospectively in the light of a given outcome. The essence of an individual character is identified, not with the telos or end against which the unfolding of the self is measured, but with origins, of which all subsequent manifestations of the self are an echo. Origins become the basis for rendering the course of a life intelligible as the persistence of desire through time. The constitutive role assigned origins enables Freud to reproduce as a vision of personal destiny the peculiar combination of necessity and contingency which generates the temporality informing evolutionary understanding. Thus in the closing passages of the Leonardo study we read:

(E)verything to do with our life is chance, from our origin out of the meeting of spermatozoon and ovum onwards . . . chance which nonetheless has a share in the law and necessity of nature, and which merely lacks any connection with our wishes and illusions. The apportioning of the determining factors of our life between the 'necessities' of our constitution and the 'chances' of our childhood may still be uncertain in detail; but in general it is no longer possible to doubt the importance of precisely the first years of our childhood. 43

What makes sense of the experience we have each been fated to live is the reflective grasp of the psychoanalytically-disciplined memory. Oriented towards the fixations of the past in his confrontation with the contingencies of
PSYCHOANALYSIS

the present, psychoanalytic man finds himself permeated with time through and through. In the critical reconstruction of one's life-story along the path of instinctual activity, the sense of essentialism is restored in the context of a natural history of the mind. Psychoanalysis thus finds a way of lending a meaning to being a biological entity, and of making that meaning the basis of self-understanding.

Now the path of instinctual activity also describes the history of those wishful impulses which, having succumbed to the great wave of repression that terminates infantile sexuality, comprise the nucleus of the unconscious. And, since the recourse to natural history takes place as the transformation of metaphysics into metapsychology, it is not surprising that, in the Metapsychological Papers of 1915, Freud finally assigns to the unconscious the leading characteristic of metaphysical reality. "The processes of the system Ucs. are timeless, i.e., they are not ordered temporally, are not altered by the passage of time; they have no reference to time at all."44 The persistence of desire through time expresses for Freud a will-to-be that transcends all discrete, time-bound manifestations of it. Significantly, the basis for this "timelessness" of the unconscious is already laid out in The Interpretation of Dreams by virtue of the constitutive role assigned the "experience of satisfaction" for psychogenesis.

An essential component of this experience of satisfaction is a particular perception . . . the mnemonic image of which remains associated thenceforward with the memory trace of the excitation produced by the need. As a result of the link that has thus been established, the next time this need arises a psychical impulse will at once emerge which will seek to re-cathect the mnemonic image of the perception and to re-evoke the perception itself, that is to say, to re-establish the situation of the original satisfaction. An impulse of this kind is what we call a wish; the re-appearance of the perception is the fulfillment of the wish. (my italics)\(^45\)

The timelessness of unconscious wishes, as opposed to the timelessness of Aristotle's "eternal things", does not denote a realm of being beyond the transience of life. Metapsychological timelessness inheres in the experience of being organic realized by the psychoanalytic memory which, in tracing the continuity of desire through time, redeems a self from the transience of life.
"Whether we are to attribute reality to unconscious wishes," Freud writes in the closing pages of the dream book, "I cannot say. It must be denied, of course, to any transitional or intermediate thoughts." Of the concern expressed in this curious passage, Freud offers a further elaboration in the 1914 edition by adding the following reflections: "If we look at unconscious wishes reduced to their most fundamental and truest shape, we shall have to conclude, no doubt, that psychological reality is a particular form of existence (Existensform) not to be confused with material reality." In these formulations, Freud clarifies the ontological meaning of his resolution of the self into embodied desire. In finding, not "intermediate or transitional thoughts", but unconscious wishes "reduced to their most fundamental and truest shape" a form of existence with separate status from material reality, Freud translates Descartes' antithesis of the knowing mind and the nature it knows into an opposition within nature. As the lived side of corporeal being, unconscious wishes represent the form of existence in which nature stands conflicted within itself. "Let us imagine ourselves," Freud suggests in "Instincts and Their Vicissitudes" in the situation of an almost entirely helpless living organism, as yet unoriented in the world, which is receiving stimuli in its nervous substance. This organism will very soon be in a position to make a first distinction and a first orientation. On the one hand, it will be aware of stimuli which can be avoided by muscular action (flight); these it ascribes to an external world. On the other, it will also be aware of stimuli against which such action is of no avail and whose character of constant pressure persists in spite of it; these stimuli are signs of an internal world, the evidence of instinctual needs. The perceptual substance of a living organism will thus have found in the efficacy of its muscular activity a basis for distinguishing between an 'outside' and an 'inside'.

And a bit later in the same essay, in an examination of the "polarities" by which "our mental life as a whole is governed", Freud draws upon this biological parable in order to ground the epistemological distinction first articulated by Descartes in the rudimentary existential polarity that informs organic existence. For "the antithesis ego & non-ego (external), i.e., subject-object, is . . . thrust upon the individual at an early stage" sheerly by the vicissitudes of its being organic. "This antithesis remains, above all, sovereign in our intellectual activity and creates for research the basic situation which no
PSYCHOANALYSIS

efforts can alter." Thus we can see that the translation of man back into nature — the resolution of mind back to its bodily ground — does not signify for Freud an alteration in the epistemological situation of understanding. Dualism remains Freud's theoretical context. What has changed with the end of metaphysics is the mind's existential situation. Dissolving the subject's transcendent ground-point and enfolding the mind within nature, Darwin threw the mind back upon life as its unsurpassable reality. As a consequence, Descartes' antithesis no longer defines epistemological categories grounded by reason in a metaphysic. For the understanding living in the wake of Darwin's naturalization of man, the positing of the subject over against the object is a fact of life as such.

Social Science
York University
The clearest expression of this outlook is found in "A Difficulty in the Path of Psychoanalysis" (1917), SE XVII, pp. 140-1, where Freud places psychoanalysis as the last of the "three blows to human narcissism" wrought by the researches of science, the first two being dealt by Copernicus and Darwin.


SE V, p. 603.


"An Outline of Psychoanalysis (1940 [1938]), SEXXIII, pp. 144 & 157 respectively. While these statements are drawn from Freud's last work, the same understanding is patent in his very earliest writings. cf. Project for a Scientific Psychology (1895), SE I, p. 307.


"It seems to be," Freud wrote on March 10, 1898, "as though the theory of wish-fulfilment has only brought the psychological solution and not the biological, or, rather, metapsychical one. (I am going to ask you seriously, by the way, whether I may use the name of meta-psychology for my psychology that leads being consciousness.) Biologically, dream life seems to me to derive entirely from the residues of the prehistoric period of life (between the ages of one and four) the same period which is the source of the unconscious and also contains the aetiology of all the psychoneuroses, the period normally characterized by an amnesia analogous to hysterical amnesia." SE I, Letter 84, p. 274.

SE V, p. 378.

Cf. The Ego and the Id (1923), ch. 3, SE XIX, pp. 28-39 passim.

"Philosophical Aspects of Darwinism", an essay in The Phenomenon of Life: Towards a Philosophical Biology, (Delta Books, New York, N.Y.: 1966), p. 47. This brilliant essay was the source of inspiration for the interpretation of psychoanalysis offered here, although Jonas does not deal with Freud in any respect.

SE IV, p. 63.

PSYCHOANALYSIS

15. SE IV, pp. 41-2. While I have rearranged the sequence of points Freud makes in this passage in order to highlight those relevant to my argument, I have not, I think, violated thereby either the spirit or letter of Freud's views as conveyed in the passage.


20. SE XVII, "A Difficulty . . . .", pp. 140-1. The public controversy surrounding the Origin of Species attests to the authority science carried by that time in addressing issues of general human concern.


22. It should be noted, however, that natural science itself has had no little difficulty in knowing what to do with the spoils of its victory. These difficulties are patent in the various "scientific" speculations on how "consciousness" evolved by a process of natural selection. What all such efforts forget is that the efficacy of a mechanistic causal scheme such as Darwin's is underwritten by an ontological imperative that eliminates from the outset consciousness (awareness, purpose, intention, volition) as irrelevant to the phenomenon to be explained.


25. Ibid., p. 40, n.


27. Ibid., p. 121. Capek understates his case by adding the proviso that the "system" be "isolated". It is clear from Laplace's formulation, however, that the universe is itself just such an isolated system.


29. Ibid., p. 40.


38. SE XI, p. 136.


43. SE XI, p. 137.

44. SE XVII, "The Unconscious", p. 187.

45. SE V, pp. 565-566.

46. SE V, p. 620.

47. SE XVII, "Instincts and Their Vicissitudes", p. 119.

A long outstanding but increasingly pressing problem of social and historical analysis is that of uneven regional development. Over the years, a surprising number of theories have been applied to this problem and have shared the fate of well-deserved disrepute. More recently, however, a more promising line of questioning about this problem has been introduced by an emergent dependency theory based on the proposition that development and underdevelopment are reciprocal conditions of one and the same process of capital accumulation. Deriving from a revised Marxist analysis of conditions that apply to countries on the periphery of an international system, and, by extension, to peripheral regions of countries at the centre, this theory boils down to two alternative theses: (1) capitalist development on the periphery is based on a hyper-exploitation of productive labour, and a massive capital drain that distorts the industrial structure of the economy, limits growth of the internal market, and generates misery, chronic unemployment, and marginality; (2) industrial-finance capital on the periphery expands the production of relative surplus value, and, if it generates unemployment in the phase of economic contraction, it absorbs labour-power in the expansive cycles, creating an effect similar to capitalism at the Centre, where unemployment and absorption, wealth and misery, coexist within the same structure.

Development of Underdevelopment or Dependent capitalist development: which thesis can be said to apply in Canada? To raise this question forces us to come to terms with a conceptual ambiguity deeply rooted in dependency theory. On the one hand, its ultimate centre of reference is a method of class analysis and a theory of capitalist development outlined by Marx. On the other hand, its conception of the capitalist system in terms of a centre (metropole) and a periphery (hinterland) has formed the framework of a regional not a class analysis of dependency and as such more often than not has proved to be its Achilles heel. To properly pose the problem of underdevelopment is to connect the class and regional conditions of dependency under capitalism, to show how the exploitative relation of wage-labour is reproduced in the regional structure of production and exchange.

The necessary groundwork for such an analysis is still being laid, and with respect to both Atlantic and Western Canada several points of principle remain
HENRY VELTMeyer

unsettled. It is the purpose of this paper to raise if not settle some of these questions of theory and method.

Point of Departure: Production or Exchange?

The major question over which dependency theorists are split can be traced back to the problematic relationship between production and exchange within the capitalist system. The major models of dependency are based on an analysis of exchange relationships, the conditions which are formed by an international market. Departing from capitalism so defined, i.e. with reference to a market, the object in each case is to analyse the workings of this system in terms of a theory of unequal exchange. Because of the way the problem of capitalist development is posed, the resulting theories provide variations on the same theme: underdevelopment on the periphery is a product of development in the centre.

This model has been criticised on the basis of a principle established by Marx, namely that the system of exchange (the structure of distribution) is, "entirely determined by the structure of production". At issue is the point of departure for a dependency analysis. By defining capitalism in terms of a market, and basing their analysis on relations of exchange rather than production, these studies are forced to conclude (they assume) that the world is capitalist through and through; that all forms of productive activity in most regions of the world have been penetrated by capitalism and subjugated to its laws of development by virtue of a link to an international market. Commerce in commodities, and its medium of money, is seen here as the force behind an unbalanced international division of labour, and consequently, its structure of production. As such, capital is attributed with the power to break down, transform, or otherwise subjugate the various traditional (pre-capitalist) forms of more community-based productive activity.

Apart from its conceptual ambiguities (market relations are not specific to capitalism) the theoretical — and ultimately political — implications of this position are momentous. For one thing, it implies that a people can free itself from the rule of capital, and thus regain control over their lives, by a mere improvement in the conditions of exchange or terms of trade. To escape the consequences of this position, and to cut through this entire debate, I will argue for a closer reading of Marx’s theory of capitalist development.

The Theory of Capitalist Development

The central problem in the analysis of regional underdevelopment under capitalism is to determine how the conditions of its class structure are
DEPENDENCY AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT

reproduced in the colonial relationship of a central metropolis to its hinterland. Clearly, this problem can only be posed in terms of the conditions required for the emergence and expanded reproduction of capital. For this reason, analysis necessarily concentrates on the process of capital accumulation formed by these conditions. What is not so clear is how to approach such an analysis which involves both relations of production and relations of exchange built on them.

On the one hand, most of the relevant studies focus their attention on relations of exchange, and consequently trace the source of capital accumulation to the monetary wealth accumulated primarily in commodity trade and concentrated in the hands of a merchant class. On the other hand, although monetary wealth is clearly a source of capital accumulation, commerce does not necessarily entail nor lead to industrial capitalism. The role of commerce in capitalist development is contingent on certain conditions and relations of production. What these necessary conditions are can be ascertained by reference to the distinction made by Marx between money as a medium of exchange and money as capital:

> It is inherent in the concept of capital . . . that it begins with *money* . . . as the *product* of circulation . . .. What enables money — wealth — to become capital is the encounter, on one side, with free workers; and on the other side, with the necessaries and materials, etc., which previously were in one way or another the property of the masses who have now become objectless and are also *free* and purchasable . . .. The *original formation* of capital does not happen, as is sometimes imagined, with capital *heaping up* necessaries of life and instruments of labour and raw materials . . . [but it is the] exchange [of] money for the *living labour* of the workers who have been set free . . . which enables money to transform itself into capital.10

In other words, the existence of *free workers*, an available supply of labourers formed by the expropriation of their means of subsistence and production, is an indispensable condition of capital accumulation, the basis not only of industrial capitalism but of commercial capitalism as well. Under this condition of dependence the capitalist relation of wage-labour is formed whereby surplus-value is extracted from the direct producer. This connection between free labour and the appropriation of surplus-value is based on the conversion of labour-power into a commodity which unlike any other commodity produces value greater than itself. This surplus-value, extracted under conditions formed
HENRY VELTMeyer

by the accumulation of free labour and commercial wealth, is the source of profit and thus the basis of capitalist development. However, in order for the capitalist class as a whole to generate an adequate rate of profit, it must realise the surplus-value embodied in the products of labour. The condition of this realization is: the formation of a market in which all commodities including labour-power, are exchanged at value (cost of production). To conclude, there are three essential (i.e. structural) conditions of capital accumulation: (1) free labour; (2) monetary wealth; and (3) a market. Since each of these conditions can be treated as factors in the emergence and expanded reproduction of industrial capitalism it is necessary to specify the principles that govern their analysis. First of all, the accumulation of capital under these conditions involve relations of production formed in the extraction of surplus-value and relations of exchange formed in its realisation. With respect to these relations, it is important to distinguish between the conditions under which surplus-value is appropriated (wage-labour) and the mechanisms through which it is transferred (unequal exchange). Strictly speaking Marx's concept of exploitation applies only to the class conditions of wage-labour. However, its extension to the inter-regional relation of unequal exchange is possible under the specified conditions of capital accumulation whereby the law of value, operating through the price mechanism, regulates social production. Under these conditions, the process of capital accumulation is based not only on the exploitation of labour but on unequal exchange between regions which can be placed at the same level as a cause of underdevelopment.

How does the law of value operate through these conditions of capital accumulation to necessarily produce an inequality of regional development? To seek an answer to this question we must refer to Marx's theory of capitalist development based on the proposition of a "law of the falling tendency of the rate of profit". According to this theory, the development of the capitalist system, the expanded reproduction of capital, is based on its capacity to produce conditions that counteract this inherent (structural) tendency. These conditions can vary, but essentially involve either the intensification of the existing rate of exploitation (depression of wages, increased productivity, longer labour hours) or its increase by discovery of new sources of cheap labour (partially reflected in the cost of raw materials) or, in times of crisis, of new markets. The production of these conditions requires mobility in both labour and capital under the necessary framework of a market, which can operate under both competitive and monopoly conditions according to the dictates of an inevitable process. By breaking down the barriers to the free circulation of merchandise, labour and capital, the market mechanism allows for their redistribution according to the law of value based on the profit imperative.
DEPENDENCY AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT

It is this mobility in the distribution of labour and capital that explains the role of regional underdevelopment in the growth and consolidation of the capitalist system. First, with respect to the labour factor, the conditions of an uneven, polarised development can be connected to what Marx termed the "General Law of Capital Accumulation". Concomitant with the fundamental tendency for capital to centralise (concentrate in industrial centres) is the equally fundamental tendency for its expanded, reproduction to create a relative surplus population, an industrial reserve army, which takes the following forms: (a) a floating surplus formed by the alternate expansion and contraction of production, alternatively throwing some workers out and drawing them into production; (b) a latent surplus formed by the conditions that contract the economic basis of subsistence or independent commodity production (peasants, artisans, etc.); (c) a stagnant surplus formed by workers in marginal, very irregular employment; and (d) a yet lower stratum of individuals unable to sell their labour at any price, the, "hospital . . . and the dead weight of the industrial reserve army."\(^{13}\)

As a pool of reserve labour, the existence of this surplus population functions as a mechanism that prevents wages from rising above value, and as such, a lever of capital accumulation, which works on the condition of an uneven development: the greater the social wealth, the mass of functioning capital at one pole, the greater the mass of exploited labour and with it the formation of a reserve army, the source of poverty and misery, at the other.\(^{16}\)

Within the context of this polarised, uneven process of capital accumulation, the fundamental role of regional underdevelopment is clear: to furnish the industrial centres with reserves of cheap labour. The conditions of this role are very complex, but they can be analysed particularly in terms of a labour-force flow from non-industrial areas to industrial centres.\(^{17}\) The general pattern of this movement has been empirically well established at both the international and the inter-regional levels. The vast movements of overseas migration of the labour-force to the United States, Canada, Brazil and Argentina in the nineteenth and the early twentieth century, has its close parallel to the migratory movement within the Maritimes and from the Atlantic region to central Canada and can be explained in the same terms: as a response to conditions of capitalist development in the centre.

However, this is but one side of the picture. The unequal development of various regions and nations under capitalism is not entirely determined by conditions of labour mobility. There are limits to this process by which labour is freed and mobilised in peripheral areas for industrial capitalism at the centre. With these limiting conditions and given the fact that capital is more mobile than labour, the traditional pattern is reversed with a tendency for capital to move to non-industrial regions.\(^{18}\) In these cases, industries go where they find concentrations of huge labour reserves, rather than drawing these reserves to

59
the traditional industrial zones. This reversal of previous patterns can sometimes be explained by geographic factors, but its basic cause is the same: the pursuit of an adequate profit rate, determined in this case by a regional inequality of wages. This pattern is also applicable to both nations and regions within them. The falling rate of profit at the centre brings about a capital flow to the periphery where the cheaper source of labour allows for a higher rate of exploitation. Although de-emphasized by most dependistas, this export of capital to the periphery tends to reproduce in these regions some of the conditions of industrial capitalism, i.e. wage labour and investment in industry.19

However, the form, scale and direction of this investment is inevitably determined by the requirements of capital accumulation at the centre. As a result, capital on the periphery tends to concentrate in the extractive sector (mining, agriculture) which promotes an unbalanced division of labour and trade on an international scale. Typically, peripheral areas are led to specialise in the production and export of raw materials necessary for industrial expansion at the centre.20 In this regard Canada has stood in the same relation first to England and then to the United States as the Atlantic region has stood in relation to the central provinces, and at a different level again, the rural areas stand in relation to urban centres.

There is another dimension to this regional structure formed by an unbalanced division of commodity production, one that is more generally stressed by dependency theorists. This is that it supports peripheral areas in the role of securing a market for the growth of capitalist industry at the centre.21 In this connection, the inequality of regional development is generally traced back to capitalist control not over the means of production but over the conditions of exchange.22 This control forms the basis of a series of unequal exchange relationships between industry and agriculture, developed and underdeveloped regions or nations, involving a transfer of surplus-value, a process of capital drain from the periphery to the centre.23 The mechanisms of this surplus transfer, for the most part hidden as in the conditions of trade, are brought to the surface by the various theories of unequal exchange produced in the dependency tradition. Within Canada, there is no comparably systematic analysis of unequal exchange at the regional level, although the same principles apply and there are numerous studies that move in this direction.24

Class and Region in Capitalism

The analysis advanced thus far is based on the thesis that an inequality of regional development is the necessary product of conditions created by capital accumulation. This thesis implies the systematic transformation, and in some sense the destruction of formerly dominant modes of production in the regions
DEPENDENCY AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT

penetrated by capitalism. Presumably, production in these regions is reorganised to satisfy the requirements of capital accumulation, and with production thus placed on a capitalist basis (land, labour, and its products, transformed into commodities) the complex of pre-capitalist relations give way to the capitalist relation of wage labour, with conditions which overdevelop some regions and underdevelop others.

To the degree that it supports this assumption of a global system that swallows or destroys all prior modes of production in the process of its expansion, the thesis in question is misleading. It is unquestionably the case that the expansion of capitalism does not necessarily involve the destruction of pre-capitalist relations. In fact, it can even be argued that the capitalist system reproduces certain pre-capitalist relations as a condition of its own expansion.23 In any case, it is certainly a fact that capitalism either co-exists with or is integrated into systems based on subsistence, domestic and independent commodity or feudal modes of production; it combines with work relations formed by other modes. This is of the utmost importance for an analysis of regional underdevelopment.

Marx himself posed this problem of the relationship of capitalism to pre-capitalist formations only in historical terms, as a question of the conditions required for the emergence of capital. However, given the simultaneous co-existence of pre-capitalist and capitalist modes of production, with the integration of the former into a structure dominated by the latter and the continued reproduction of the former within this structure, the problem is clearly a structural one as well. As such, the question of a connection between pre-capitalist and capitalist formations can be applied not only to the analysis of primitive accumulation but also to the later stages of capitalist development.

To pose this problem of a structure formed by the combination of pre-capitalist and capitalist relations, raises questions not only about the Capitalist Mode of Production (CMP), the internal dynamic of which we have partially traced out, but also about the internal structure of the various pre-capitalist modes. With respect to the Asiatic modes of production, Marx emphasised that certain pre-capitalist modes are much more resilient than others to capitalist penetration for reasons that have little to do with the psychology of the producers, but a lot to do with the internal structure of the modes in question. However, since it is not merely a question of resistance but of the continued reproduction of pre-capitalist relations within a structure dominated by capitalism, the essential problem is still one of capital accumulation. In this connection, there are two possible positions on the articulation of the CMP with pre-capitalist formations: (1) it is necessary at a certain stage of capitalist development (Lenin, 1948); (2) it is necessary at all stages of capitalist development (Luxembourg, 1951). In either case, it is assumed that a purely internal accumulation of capital is impossible. Given the assumed tendency for
a falling rate of profit at the centre, the capitalist penetration of pre-capitalist formations is required for access to the material elements necessary for expanding reproduction, namely raw materials and labour, or at times of crisis, by the need for an external market.26

If not an answer, we have at least the framework of an analysis. To pose the problem in this form, however, still begs the question of why capitalist penetration of pre-capitalist formations would lead to their continued reproduction rather than their destruction as generally assumed. To raise this unasked question suggests that the reproduction of pre-capitalist relations is actually functional for capitalist development.

To properly pose this problem requires its placement in the context created by a capitalist penetration of production in peripheral areas. On the one hand, the capitalisation of production in these areas creates conditions that contract the economic and social basis of self-subsistent, simple commodity, and other pre-capitalist modes of production. On the other hand, with the concentration of investment in the extractive sector, and the consequent specialisation in the production and export of staples, industry does not keep pace with the supply of labour thus created. This is one of the most characteristic features of dependent capitalist development, resulting in the formation of a large industrial reserve army. There are a number of problems created by this development, a major one of which is how to hold this labour in reserve for periods of capitalist expansion. Some of the surplus population is absorbed by a heterogeneous sector which forms to service capitalist production.27 Another portion of the surplus population migrates towards the industrial centres to form the basis of a working class at the centre, and to a lesser degree on the periphery. However, with industrial capital largely concentrated at the centre of the system, this surplus population on the periphery forms the basis of a semi-proletariat and a large underclass of dispossessed farmers, poor fishermen, and other lumpen elements on the fringe of the capitalist labour market that surface only as an unemployment statistic.28 Clearly a more satisfactory solution for capitalism is for as much of this surplus population as possible to stay on the land or be otherwise involved in pre-capitalist work relations, while securing the instruments of its mobilization as required.

And this is precisely what happens in underdeveloped countries and regions in which a significant sector of production has a petty commodity form, is based on subsistence (agriculture, hunting, fishing, etc.), or (and this does not apply to Canada) is still governed by feudal relations. These pre-capitalist modes of production form the basis of complex social formations that ensure the vital needs of all members — productive and non-productive — of the community. The significance of these social formations is that they do not exist in isolation but, as postulated by Luxembourg, are structurally linked to the CMP. Typically, the productive members of pre-capitalist formations exchange
DEPENDENCY AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT

their labour-power for a wage either on a seasonal or a temporary basis, or even for an extended period involving a move of the immediate family. The form and conditions of this structural tie to a wage-labour economy is quite variable, and requires careful empirical analysis, but its essential function in the expanded reproduction of capital is clear. Apart from the question of an industrial labour reserve, the reproduction of pre-capitalist relations, including those that derive from domestic production, serve to increase the rate of exploitation, and thus offset the falling rate of profit at the centre. The mechanisms of this exploitation are specific to the structures that link these pre-capitalist relations to the conditions of a dependent capitalist development.

First, both domestic labour and subsistence production, pockets of pre-capitalist relations, contribute towards the reproduction of labour-power, a precondition of capitalist development. Although the family and the self-subsistent community thus create conditions vital to the expansion of the CMP, their internal structure is pre-capitalist in form; the commodity labour-power is produced and reproduced within the framework of non-capitalist institutions. Under these conditions, capitalists dispose of a labour-force towards whose formation it has made no investment.

Second, given the conditions under which the productive members of pre-capitalist formations are forced to sell their labour-power, the capitalist extracts a labour-rent on top of surplus-value. It requires an exploitation of the complex mechanisms of migrations to and from, and setting up a double labour market. Added to the direct exploitation of productive workers is the indirect exploitation of the labour required of their wives and kin through the provision of services (domestic, social, security, etc.) which the capitalist would rather not assume, but which are necessary both for the reproduction of labour-power and for the preservation of an industrial reserve army.

Although the conditions of this super-exploitation require much empirical study, its central point is clear enough, and in conclusion can be established as a principle of analysis, a working hypothesis. The CMP creates conditions of class dependence reproduced at the social level through an inequality of regional development, and the preservation of certain pre-capitalist relations. A strategy of research on regional underdevelopment would do well to concentrate on an analysis of these conditions.

Methodological Notes on Surplus Value

As defined by Marx, the value of a commodity is determined by the "labour time socially necessary . . . for its production". (Capital, vol. 1, p. 16) The
characteristic feature of the CMP is the need for workers to sell their labour for a wage, which, on Marx's assumption that "commodities are sold at their value", (519) represents the value of labour-power. On this assumption, surplus-value represents the difference between the value created by labour and the value of labour-power paid to workers in the form of wages. "The production of surplus-value", Marx argues, "is the absolute law of [the capitalist] mode of production". (618) Its necessary condition is: "Labour-power is saleable so far as it preserves the means of production in their capacity of capital, reproduced its own value as capital, and yields in unpaid labour a source of additional capital". (618) Under this condition, "the correlation between the accumulation of capital and the rate of wages is . . . at bottom, only the relation between . . . unpaid and paid labour." (621) As such, this relation of exploitation is expressed in the formula of surplus-value: surplus-value/value of labour-power. (531-4) Since the value of labour-power, received in the form of wages, represents the amount of labour-time necessary for labour to pay for itself, this formula can also be expressed in the form: surplus-labour/necessary labour. In this form (measured in time units), the value terms of the relation can be inferred and thus calculated in terms of price as the share of total profits to wages in the industrial output or national income. Needless to say, such a measure has its problems. Even if one sidesteps the theoretical problem of transforming values into prices there is the problem raised by the distinction between productive and unproductive labour. (Yaffe, 1973: 191ff) If one accepts Yaffe's position that variable capital represents only the wages of productive labour, not that of the total labour force, then the share of wages and profits in national income is a poor measure of the rate of exploitation.

The various theories of unequal exchange to which we have referred raise several questions about the calculations of the rate of exploitation. Of particular relevance to our conception of the problem is Emmanuel's theory based on the assumption not only of an unequal productivity of labour at the centre and on the periphery, but also on the hypothetical assumption of equal wages. In brief, if labour at both poles of the system were equally valued (rewarded as a factor of production), then the export price of goods produced on the underdeveloped periphery would be considerably higher. On this basis, trade constitutes a system of unequal exchange, a hidden mechanism of surplus transfer involving a drain of capital from the periphery to the centre. Put differently, labour is paid below value on the periphery, above value at the centre. In effect, Emmanuel treats wages as an independent variable; export prices are low because wages are low. This, of course, goes against Marx's in-
DEPENDENCY AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT

istence that in relation to the rate of capital accumulation, "the rate of wages [is] the dependent, not the independent, variable". (620) The source of Emmanuel's mistake is that he forgets at this crucial point that wages, as the value of labour-power, represents the cost of producing this labour-power, and that this cost varies not only historically but also across regional and national boundaries. (559ff) The cost of the expanded reproduction of labour-power within a structure of regional divisions is quite variable, and in itself a sufficient explanation of regional inequalities of wages, without resorting to the assumption that labour is paid well below value in some instances, and above value in others. This latter assumption never fully applies, given that the price of labour-power, strictly speaking, can occasionally rise above its value but can never sink below it. (519) It is true, nevertheless, that under monopoly conditions of external control, this law of exchange need not — and often does not — apply. However, even here there are strict limits to the process of unequal exchange (buying cheap and selling expensive). It can only apply when exchange involves the import of wage goods into the industrialised centre as a condition of lowering the cost of labour-power, and their import into the underdeveloped regions as a condition of raising this cost. Thus one can explain the frequent occurrence on the periphery of dramatic long-term decreases in the exchange-value of their staple-industry products without a corresponding fall in either or both wage goods or capital stock. Such a fall in industrial output relative to the cost of labour and the mass of fixed capital when it occurs in the centre is, of course, a classic example of the declining rate of profit as Marx conceived it. However, when it occurs in the underdeveloped regions of the periphery, the question of an unequal exchange applies only to the degree that the capitalist mode of production is generalised. As suggested above, this is not typically the case. The costs of developing labour-power on the periphery are usually only partially capitalised, with a significant contribution of labour organised on a non-capitalist basis. Under these conditions the question of unequal exchange only complicates the real problem, which is to calculate the value of labour-power in each instance.

In calculating the relative value of labour-power, Marx assumes that commodities are generally sold at their value. (519) On this basis, Marx makes reference to the following factors:

(1) "The price and the extent of the prime necessaries of life as naturally and historically developed", which Marx points out, "varies with the mode of production"; (519)

(2) the cost of training the labourers;

(3)
HENRY VELTMENEY

(3) the part played by the labour of women and children;
(4) the productiveness of labour;
(5) its extensive . . . magnitude (number of work hours);
(6) its intensive magnitude (number of workers per machine).

A comparison on these factors requires, first of all, the following controls:

(1) an average day wage for the same trades and for different wage forms
    (time wage, piece wage).
(2) an average intensity of labour for the production of commodities,
    which, as Marx points out, changes from country to country — and we
    may add, from region to region.
(3) relative differences of the value of money (560-3).

With respect to the first two controls, it is a question of forming a scale of the
appropriate units of measure. (560) The third control touches on a further
problem. Here Marx points out that relative values of money will . . . be less in
the nation with a more developed CMP than in the nation . . . less developed.
(56) From this, "it follows that nominal wages, the equivalent of labour-power
expressed in money, will also be higher in the first nation than in the second".
(560) However, Marx adds, this, "does not at all prove [true] . . . for real
wages, i.e., for the means of subsistence placed at the disposal of the
labourer". (560) In this connection, Marx observes that even if we control for
relative differences in the value of money,

"frequently . . . the wage in the first nation is higher than
in the second, whilst the relative price of labour, i.e. . . .
as compared both with surplus-value and with the value of
the product stands higher in the second than in the first."
(560)

In other words, labour tends to be cheaper in rich countries than in poorer ones
in relation to capital costs within (but not between) their respective boundaries.
(560 n2)

This is in fact the problem requiring explanation: the difference in the
relative price of labour expressed in real wages. Marx himself at this point does
not essay a solution beyond various illustrations that point to the average in-
tensity of labour and dismisses the theory that wages rise and fall in proportion
to labour productivity. (561-3) Where he does move towards a solution is
earlier in chapter XVII of Capital volume one. Here Marx makes passing
reference to the first three of the above factors, each of which has an effect not
easily measured, but excludes them in an analysis based on the last three. (520-
30) In this analysis, Marx considers the many different possible combinations
according to which many of the three factors are held constant or treated as variables. With reference to these considerations, it is clear that the regional structure of this variation can easily enough explain the relative costs of labour power, which, after Johnson, can be measured via an average purchasing power index.

(4)

One point of principle is clear: acts of exchange, do not add to value or produce profit. If wages are equal to the value of labour-power, then unequal exchange via trade cannot affect them. All it can do under conditions of regional inequality is transfer surplus value from one region to another, which is merely to re-distribute profit extracted under varying conditions of social production. Under these conditions of regional inequality the market mechanism can function to reduce the value of labour-power at the centre and thus offset the tendency of a falling rate of profit. This is clear enough in principle. The problem under these conditions of regional inequality is to calculate the ratio of the value of labour-power to the value produced by labour. Clearly capitalists at the centre appropriate an added surplus value by internal migration, a double labour market, the product market, etc., through which capitalists acquire labour without having to bear the cost of its development. The question is how to measure the value of this labour power under conditions such as domestic labour or subsistence agriculture involving other modes of production in which there is no direct exchange with capital, and in effect, no market. Without a market in labour, the magnitudes of value cannot be measured. No matter how clear it is in theory that capital is accumulated through an indirect exploitation of labour organised on a non-capitalist basis, it cannot be empirically determined. This is, for the most part, a problem without solution.
HENRY VELTM MEYER

Notes

1. A selected range of these theories (staples, Development, NeoClassical, regional science), for what they are worth, are briefly outlined in Economic Council of Canada, Living Together (Ottawa: 1977), pp. 23-30. The thinking behind this book shifts loosely among these theories, none of which admittedly serves as a general explanation of the well-known facts of regional disparity.


3. This form of dependency theory (the development of underdevelopment) is most clearly represented by Andre Gunder Frank, “Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America” (New York: MR, 1967). At a certain level the assumptions on which this theory is based is shared by the theory of “Unequal Exchange” outlined by Arghiri Emmanuel, “Unequal Exchange” (London: NLB) and Samir Amin, “Accumulation on a World Scale” (New York: MR, 1974).

4. This second form of dependency theory (dependent capitalist development) is best represented in Fernando Henrique Cardoso “Dependency and development in Latin America”, NLR, vol. 74 (July-August, 1972); Dependencia y Desarrollo en America Latina (Mexico: Siglo Veintiuno, 1969).

5. As illustrated by A User’s Guide to Canadian Political Economy a considerable range of studies have addressed and are raising questions of political economy from a shared perspective. However, the guiding principles of this perspective are still being worked out. A debate on problems of theory and method in relation to historical fact is but in its early stages.

6. See Amin, op. cit.; Emmanuel, op. cit; and Frank, op. cit.

7. A good centre of reference for this concept of development and underdevelopment is the distinction made by Amin (1974) between an integrated autocentric economy wherein internal or domestic exchange is more important than external exchange (i.e., imports and exports) and an economy disarticulated because of the domination of external over internal exchange. As brought out by Williams (1976) the theory based on this conceptual distinction lays emphasis on the size of the internal market as the crucial condition of independent capitalist development. However, Williams’ analysis suggests that on the basis of Amin’s theory it is also possible to explain the relatively high development of Canada’s economic system within a framework of dependency.


9. See for example Tom Naylor, “The Rise and Fall of the Third Commercial Empire of the St. Lawrence’, in Gary Teeple, op cit. In actual fact, primitive accumulation both in Europe and
Canada derives not so much from commerce as it does from a direct or indirect exploitation of
labour, land grabs, monopoly control of the means of production, extortion of rent, piracy,
currency manipulation. In the case of Canada not much is known, even today, of the specific
origins of the first Capitalists, and Marx had nothing in the way of concrete historical material
to offer on this matter. He does indicate, however, that there are two contrasting historical
modes of progression into capitalist production. The first is where a segment of the merchant
class moves over from purely trading operations into direct production. This occurred in the
early development of capitalism in Italy, and in England in the late fifteenth/early sixteenth
centuries. However, this form of capitalist formation soon becomes “an obstacle of the CMP
and declines with the development of the latter”. (Capital, vol. III, p. 329). The second
avenue of capitalist development is, according to Marx, “the really revolutionary way”. Here
individual producers themselves accumulate capital, and move from production to expand in-
to trade. While Marx gives only a few hints of how this second mode of development occurs in
manufacture, the analysis of Naylor (1972) and Teeple (1972) points to its necessary social
conditions.


11. It is this exploitation of wage-labour by capital, the appropriation by the latter of surplus
produced by the former, that constitutes the innermost secret, the hidden basis of the entire
social structure and with it the... relation of... dependency. Accordingly, the mechanism
of surplus appropriation based on the capitalist relation of wage-labour should be taken as the

12. The importance of this distinction between the extraction and realisation of profit can be
traced back to the opening chapter of Capital, vol. one. Here Marx advances a complex argu-
ment based on the principle that an exchange of commodities cannot be understood on its
own terms, but must be placed in the context of social production. On this basis, Marx argues
that despite appearances the real source of profits is found not in acts of exchange but in rela-
tionships of production. The confusion of the realisation of profits with their real production
arises from a tendency to view the process of capitalist production from the standpoint of the
individual firm. This confusion is compounded by the existence of specialised firms that make
profits through buying and selling without engaging in production at all — wholesalers,
retailers and banks fall into this category: the cheaper they buy and the more expensively they
sell the greater their profit. However, this obvious fact has no bearing on the general proposi-
tion that profits as a whole originate in production as the surplus of the social product over the
consumption necessary for its production. The magnitude of social profit is not affected by
acts of exchange, although its distribution between different firms is subject to market condi-
tions. The forces that determine the distribution of profits should not be confused with those
that determine its magnitude. They are of strictly secondary importance. (Marx, The Grun-
the theoretical basis of Marx's analysis of capitalist development. It is also the ultimate centre
of reference for a dependency analysis of underdevelopment. Without the assumption of a
structural tendency of a falling rate of profit, the phenomenon of exploitation loses its objec-
tive basis. No longer is it a question of necessity. Marx's theory of a falling rate of profit is
based on the assumption of a tendency under capitalism for a rise in the organic composition
of capital. Since labour is the source of value, and given Marx's formula for the rate of profit
(s/c + y), a tendency for the organic composition of capital necessarily leads to a falling rate of
profit. The problem is that the organic composition of capital is calculable in principle, but,
as pointed out by Steedman (1975: 80), has never been established in fact. Moreover, the
whole theory of a falling rate of profit is in serious dispute (Hodgson, 1974; Colletti, 1974;
Rowthorn, 1974). What has to be squarely faced, however, is that without the assumption of
a falling rate of profit, an analysis of dependent capitalist development has no theoretical
basis.
13. Some of the methodological problems involved in this extension are discussed in the Appendix.

14. *Capital*, vol. 1, ch. XVII.


17. This pattern forms the basis of a well-worn thesis in many studies of modernisation based on alleged but unexplained (assumed) forces of spatial concentration and diffusion. A very representative case of this tradition is Michael Ray, *Canadian Urban Trends* (Toronto: Copp Clark Publishing, 1976).

18. This only happens in certain circumstances. The historical and structural conditions of these circumstances are not given in principle (beyond a general reference to the profit dynamic) and require a systematic analysis. Some halting steps toward such an analysis are essayed in my 'The Underdevelopment of Atlantic Canada', forthcoming publication in *Radical Review of Political Economy*.

19. One of the basic tenets of dependency theory is that dependent status tends to block the development of industrial capitalism (Frank, 1969; Naylor, 1973). This widely accepted thesis in the case of Latin America has been challenged by a careful empirical analysis (Warren, 1973) and defended on the same basis (Emmanuel, 1974). In the case of Canada, Naylor's version of the thesis has been criticised by Ryerson (1976) and others.

20. This pattern is so well established that it is taken as the key indicator of an unbalanced, dependent capitalist development. In the case of Latin America there are a great number of historical studies organised around a sequence of export enclaves, (coffee, sugar, cocoa, bananas, copper, tin, oil, etc.) developing in response to the needs of metropolitan interests (Abad, 1970; Furtado, 1970; Sunkel, 1969). These studies have their counterpart in the Canadian studies based on a staple theory (Creighton, 1959; H.A. Innis, 1956; M.Q. Innis, 1954; Watkins, 1963). Both the enclave and the staple theories take the national economy as their unit of analysis. Needless to say, the same principles can be applied to a regional analysis.


22. The mechanisms and institutional framework of this monopoly control have been analysed at length on the basis of a theory of imperialism (Dos Santos, 1970; Hayter, 1972; Magdoff, 1969; O'Connor). A study by Vaitos (1974) does not fall into this tradition but provides a close analysis of the specific mechanisms of surplus transfer used by transnational corporations at the monopoly stage of capitalist development.

23. This proposition of capital drain is shared by all dependency theories of underdevelopment, although it has been suggested that 'the so-called [Capital] drain may merely be the foreign exchange price paid for the establishment of productive facilities'. (Warren, 1973: 39).

DEPENDENCY AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT


27. The characteristic feature of urban centres on the periphery of the capitalist system, whether in Lima, Guayaquil, or Halifax, is the predominance of a heterogeneous service sector, the social basis of its new middle class defined by an indirect relation to capitalist production. The socio-economic status of this broad class grouping is extremely variable as it involves a range of services from those that fulfill the function of capital, management, banking, etc. to a series of professional and white-collar functions, all the way to a number of petty services. These economic services, as the basis for government planning, are very well understood in occupational terms, but rarely analysed in terms of class studies in the Latin American context (e.g. Anibal Quijano, *Nationalism and Capitalism in Peru*, New York: 1971) but as far as I know there are no Canadian equivalents of such a systematic class analysis.


29. This is a problem well known to exist, and partially reflected in statistics on internal migration and employment, but little studied. For preliminary indications of such an analysis see Mike Beliveau, 'Canso, Cabinda and the "Weltury" Boys: The Gulf Oil Story', *Round One* 12 (Feb. 1974).

30. Our analysis of the regional question could as easily be applied to the question of domestic production in its separation from social production under conditions of a sexual division of labour. This question recently has been subject to a serious theoretical debate (Benston, 1969; Coulson/Magas/Wainwright, 1974; Seacombe, 1974). An entire issue of *Latin American Perspectives* (vol. 4, Nos. 1-2, 1977) has been devoted to an analysis of this question in the Latin American context. The Canadian case is currently being explored with studies such as Connelly (1976).

31. Again we have here a problem too little studied, although the following papers move in the right direction: B. Bernier 'Capitalism in Quebec Agriculture', *The Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology*, 13, 4 (1976); Max Hedley, 'Independent Commodity Production', *The Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology*, 13, 4 (1976); Meillassoux, *op. cit.*


33. Marx himself suggests the concept of such an analysis in 'the appropriation of Supplementary Labour-Power by Capital: the employment of Women and Children' 1967: 394-402). However, since the principles of Marx's analysis apply only to the production of surplus-value, there is no basis in Marx for an analysis of super-exploitation under conditions that combine various modes of production. As noted in the Appendix, without a direct exchange with capital, the contribution of 'supplementary labour-power' no matter how clear in principle cannot be calculated in fact.
ARTICLES

Negative Duties, Positive Duties, and Rights .................................................. Raymond A. Belliotti
On Rights and Responsibilities Pertaining to Toxic Substances and Trade Secrecy .................................................. William T. Blackstone
On Puccetti's Two-Person View of Man .............................................................. Charles L. Y. Cheng
The Impossibility of Saying What Is Shown ............................................................ C. Z. Elgin
Quantum Theory and Atomism: A Possible Ontological Resolution of the Quantum Paradox .................................................. Henry J. Folse
A Time For Waking .......................................................................................... David A. Givner
The German Romantic Background of Kierkegaard's Psychology ..................... John D. Mullen
The Methodological Achievement of Cartesian Doubt ........................................ Walter Soffer
Pragmatic and Cognitive Meaning in William James ........................................ Ellen Kappy Suckiel
Xenophon and the Socratic Paradoxes ............................................................... Craig Walton

DISCUSSION

Regan on the Sorts of Beings That Can Have Rights ........................................ Robert Elliot

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The recent reissue of Professor V.C. Fowke’s *The National Policy and the Wheat Economy* provides a welcome opportunity to re-evaluate the contribution made by this prolific, but all too often neglected, scholar to the understanding of Canadian political economy. Perhaps the failure by Canadian social scientists to rank his work with the justly renowned staple works of Innis, Lower, Creighton and Macintosh is a consequence of Fowke’s hinterland perspective. On the other hand, acceptance of his interpretation of the national policy is so complete by our contemporary generation of academics that it is possible that his contribution is simply not recognized. In any event, it is time to review Fowke’s re-issued work (which ranks with *Canadian Agriculture Policy* as his most important, although not his last), in the context of some others of his major works which comprise a core of his life’s work.2

Fowke’s prime economic focus was established early in his academic life as he notes in the preface to *Canadian Agricultural Policy*, (a modified version of his PhD thesis). His interest was, “the interpretation of Canadian agriculture policy [and] of the place of agriculture within the framework of the economic and political life of Canada.”3 In contrast to Innis’ and Lower’s studies of fish, fur, timber and mining which concentrated on these commodities as staples,4 Fowke was interested in agriculture *per se*, as settlement frontier, not just in its periodic function as a staple industry, but also in its other historic non-staple functions. He sets out explicitly his interpretation of agriculture’s dependent function.

The clearest and most significant uniformity regarding Canadian agriculture for more than three hundred years has been its deliberate and consistent use as a basis for economic and political empire . . . . It has served as an instrument of empire in different ways according to the

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1 Vernon C. Fowke

2 Paul Phillips

3...
requirements of place and time... first, as a means for the defense of territory and trade routes; second as a provisioner of the great staple trades; and third, as the provider of investment opportunities on the agricultural frontier.

Agriculture, in this view, has for most of its Canadian history been a policy taker rather than a policy maker, farmer power varying "in proportion to the contribution which agriculture could make at any given time, to the cause of commerce, finance, and industry". The farmer stands in sharp contrast to Creighton's merchant class, the ruling elite of the commercial empire of the St. Lawrence.

These imperial political and economic interests, which were at once so wide-spread and so deep-rooted, were represented by the successive generations of Canadian merchants; and it is largely from the point of view of the commercial group that [The Commercial Empire of the Saint Lawrence] has been written. It was the merchants, above all others, who struggled to win the territorial empire of the St. Lawrence and to establish its institutional expression, the Canadian commercial state; and though their influence was undeniably less than the pressure which they persistently applied, they may be regarded as one of the most continuously important groups in Canadian history.

Such a metropolitan elitist view is in pointed juxtaposition to Fowke's concern with the "hundreds or thousands, even hundreds of thousands, of farmers competing in the same market with the same product." This, then, is the hinterland perspective, the economic inferiority of the competitor in the price system facing the monopoly of power of the established and (relatively) powerful metropolis; a combination of the dependent nature of the hinterland and the bargaining inequality between atomistic competitor and concentrated oligopoly. It is the key to understanding the political economy of Vernon Fowke; prairie populism grounded in serious scholarship backed by solid economic reasoning and prodigious historical research. There are four distinct elements in Fowke's analytic schema. All of these are functionally inter-related in his analysis of the role of Canadian agriculture, but are worth
The Function of Agriculture

Within Canadian experience agriculture has played diverse roles but always within the framework of the price system. If, indeed, the pioneer farmer was self-sufficient as is often assumed, he would be of marginal interest to the economic historian though perhaps not to the anthropologist. \(^9\) Despite the fact that income in kind and of home manufacture represented a much larger percentage of total consumption in pioneer society than it does today, the pioneer society was never completely divorced from the exchange economy although French Canadian agriculture approached a marginal status in the period after the Conquest and during the 19th century. Even at this time, however, habitant agriculture supplied the fur, timber and New England textile industries with market supplies of labour. \(^10\)

This should not be taken to imply that agriculture consistently functioned as the \textit{basic} industry in the physiocratic sense, the ultimate source of all income. In fact, for most of (European) Canadian history, agriculture played an essential functional role, but not as a staple or even \textit{main} industry. Initially, (excluding native agriculture), and periodically in Canadian history, “agriculture has been considered essential as an instrument of defense, providing armsbearers, transport and provisions.” \(^11\) This was specifically the function of agricultural settlement in New France and was a critical, if not the determining, factor in the adoption of the feudal form of seigneurial land tenure, an agricultural system organized for military purposes.

The defense function is evident in Acadian settlement (and in the expulsion), in English settlement in the maritimes, in Loyalist settlement, “a \textit{cordon sanitaire} against the contamination of that deadly political error, American republicanism”, \(^12\) in protecting the British northwest from the American imperialism of manifest destiny, and in supplying essential war materials (food) to the allied effort in the two global conflicts of the 20th century. \(^13\) The point to be made is that the defense function is necessary to the security of the existing exchange system which, in Canadian history, was not a local subsistence economy but part of a trans-Atlantic world economy.

Agriculture’s second function before it became a staple itself, has been as provisioner of the other great staple trades; fish, fur, timber, potash, intermittently even of sugar, and of the commerce associated with these staple
trades. With economic development and industrialization, the provisioning function has broadened to service a more diversified and increasingly urbanized population — in contemporary terminology, to meet the agricultural products component of the final demand linkage. The integration of provisioning agriculture into the exchange economy is obvious and should need no explanation, despite its neglect by some economic historians.

By mid-19th century, agriculture in Upper Canada evolved to a well established staple export "of profitable proportions". But if staple export agriculture provides market-linked opportunities for the employment of labour and commercial, financial and industrial capital in the production and marketing of the product, these opportunities in a developed but static economy are much less dramatic, much less a stimulation to the economy, than the economic opportunities associated with the developmental process, the outward movement of the settlement frontier. This process, because of the immigration and settlement of very large numbers of people (proportionately at least), creates the opportunity for profitable investment of quite unusual size. This is compounded if the process of immigration and settlement also requires massive investments in infrastructure, specifically transportation systems and the network of commercial urban centres. This stimulation to the economy does not depend on agriculture achieving the status of staple, but merely that the agricultural frontier be expanding at a rate significantly large relative to the size of the existing domestic economy. The commercial interest is in agricultural expansion.

The agricultural immigrant to Upper Canada contributed to the creation of profitable investment opportunities as he was being outfitted at home before his departure, as he purchased ocean passage, as he moved inland from Quebec and bought transportation, accommodation, and provisions on the way, and, finally, as he purchased additional equipment and provisions to take with him to his back lot farm. But the original settlement was only the starting point, and similarly the original outfit of tools, personal effects, and provisions was but the starting-point in the settler's demands for capital equipment and consumers' goods and services. The frontier settler did not attain self sufficiency upon arrival at his farm, or, indeed, at any time thereafter. Contemporary evidence makes it clear that his demands on the commercial system for capital equipment and consumers' goods persisted and became increasingly diverse in proportion as he became more and more settled.
VERNON C. FOWKE

It was this development role of the settlement frontier and the profits that expansion made possible that was, for Fowke, the dynamic that most influenced the course of Canadian policy and the nature of the Canadian state in the 19th century up to 1930 with the establishment of the western wheat economy. It has placed its indelible stamp on the nation, its structure, its politics and its destiny.

The Frontier of Investment

The previous discussion of the dynamic role of agricultural settlement is a specific example of a general dynamic that Fowke identifies as the propelling force in Canadian economic development, the investment frontier; an integration of Turner’s frontier thesis with the Keynesian model. Turner, the American historian, advanced the proposition that the political dynamism of American society — the American way of life — was the result of the interaction of the geographical frontier, the western limit of free land, with inherited European institutions. Fowke, the Canadian economist, recognized that there was no continuously westward moving frontier in Canada due to the intervening geographical barrier of the Canadian Shield, but that the economic dynamism of the Canadian economy was the result of the interaction of investment opportunities created by frontier resources with the established commercial economy. As he says:

The ‘frontier role’ of agriculture now becomes obvious. Whatever may be the essential features of the agricultural frontier for the historian, the sociologist, or the political scientist, for the economist the frontier’s essential features are its investment opportunities. In fact, for the economist such questions as whether or not the frontier is exclusively an agricultural concept, or whether or not it must be looked for ‘on the hither edge of free land’ are quite beside the point. The frontier at any point in time is whatever place and whatever economic activity gives rise to investment opportunities on a substantial scale.18

There is, in Fowkes’ conception, the obvious influence of Keynes, whose theory must have been sweeping the economists’ world when the young Fowke was preparing his first major work.19 Keynes was primarily concerned with the cyclical implications of investment opportunities but Fowke, possibly under the influence of Hansen, was more concerned with the long run or growth im-
PAUL PHILLIPS

applications, foreshadowing the Keynesian type growth models of Harrod and Domar. A precondition of an expanding capitalism, Fowke argues, is an upward shift in opportunities for profitable investment. The economic frontier occurs where opportunities exist for profitable investment independent of whether these occur at a definable geographic location or, alternatively, in a specific industry or group or related industries. He quotes Hansen in support: "... the economic frontier of any country must always be conceived of not in terms of its own boundaries, but in terms of the possibility of capital investment throughout the entire world." Or in Fowke's words, "an investment frontier may be geographically diffused but it nevertheless has tangible, concrete expression in the process of real-capital formation."

What we have here is a forerunner of modern linkage theory. The critical element, in terms of the impact of an investment frontier and in particular of agriculture, is that the investment dynamism is the establishment phase. This establishment phase is that of immigration and settlement and it is characterized by widespread fixation of necessary capital investment. In short, "there is a great difference between a continuing commerce and an expanding one." In a staple economy, the cyclical growth and prosperity swings reflect the accelerator effect of the investment frontier. As Fowke notes, the critical factor for induced prosperity is the rate of agricultural expansion since, ceteris paribus, investment opportunities depend on the rate of growth.

Nevertheless, the total volume of investment opportunities depends both on the growth rate and the size of the investment frontier. This is suggested by Fowke's comparison of timber and agricultural lands. "Acre for acre, the servicing of the prairie frontier offered less prospect for profitable enterprise than did timber lands, for clearing was unnecessary, and each acre would absorb less in the way of capital and business resources; but there were so many more acres." (The opposite may be said for the precambrian staples that developed after the turn of the century).

Competition and Monopoly in the Price System

The essential problems of growth in an economic society may not be only those of the rates of accumulation and innovation but also the problem of balance between different sectors of the economy. That is, the real question may be, not the average (short-run or long-run) degree of competitiveness in the system but rather the differing degrees of price competition in different parts of the system. The enlargement of such differences may lead to increasing inequities in the distribution of income and in the acquisition of property rights."
In Fowke's analysis of the role of agriculture in the creation of an investment frontier, he was vitally concerned with the question of the distribution of economic power, its influence on the distribution of income and wealth, and, in particular, its relation to the competitive inferiority of the agricultural hinterland. Indeed, if one were to summarize (somewhat simplistically in one sentence) the essential concern of *The National Policy and the Wheat Economy*, it would be the struggle of the competitive hinterland for equity against the state fostered monopoly power exercised from the metropolis, central Canada.

The economic origins of monopoly were simple and straightforward. The immense capital requirements of the commercial and transportation infrastructure provided the basis, indeed necessity, for expenditure by one, or at most a few, large enterprises. Given the prevailing *free enterprise* ideology, these large capital agglomerations, even when the capital came largely from, or with the assistance of, the public purse or tariffs (or both), were alienated to provide ownership and control (except, of course, where there remained no expectation of potential operational profits even after subsidy as with the canal system or the Intercolonial Railway). Nor was there any real opposition to the freedom of industrial or commercial capitals to merge or combine to prevent competition, for the ideology meant "freedom to compete and, except for exceptional cases, freedom to combine; it has meant freedom to grow large and economically powerful or to remain small and weak." The story of the agricultural hinterland's response to eastern monopoly power is the story of the farmer campaigns for government action to repair the competitive inferiority of agriculture, an inferiority dictated by the large numbers of small producers and the uncontrolled and unstable world market of export agriculture; and, failing government action, a resort to co-operative organization and the pools to bring balance between the different parts of the system. Any governmental support for the farmers' campaign was forthcoming only when their interest "clearly coincided with those of some other [dominant] group . . . ." centered in the metropolis. Two major examples which Fowke examined in detail can be cited, agricultural royal commissions between 1900 and 1930, and the farmer campaign for compulsory government pooling and marketing of wheat. In the first case, the early royal commissions on grain handling were staffed with farmers because the government accepted that, on the issues involved:

monopoly would stifle rather than promote western expansion, and thus imperil the national policy . . . So sure was the Dominion government of what it wanted to be forced to do, and so certain was it that on this point the
views of western agrarian leaders were fully in accord with its own, that it manned its early commissions either exclusively or predominantly with farmers.32

After 1920, however, when the farm organizations challenged the very symbol of the free market, the grain exchange, the royal commissions were staffed with lawyers, railway officials and economists, representatives of the monopoly part of the system. "There was no longer any possibility of harmony of interest."33

On the second case, it need merely be noted that compulsory pooling and marketing of grain was legislated twice, not to repair the competitive inferiority of agriculture and maintain remunerative price levels, but to prevent grain prices from rising during both the first and second world wars when the exigencies of the conflicts provided agriculture with competitive superiority.34

To alter the balance of economic power in favour of the hinterland would reduce the profit opportunities offered by the investment frontier and hence undermine the role of agriculture as it was perceived in the national policy. Without an understanding of the national policy, therefore, it is impossible to comprehend fully the political economy of the Canadian federation and the nature of the economic growth in Canada over the last century.

The National Policy

If there is one common thread that runs continuously through Professor Fowke's works it is his concern with the formation and impact of policy, a concern readily apparent not only from the titles of his major works but also from the fact that so many of his writings took the form of reports of, or submissions to, royal commissions on various aspects of economic policy. It is within the framework of policy that the other parts of his theoretical system are integrated. It is also for his elaboration of the economic consistency of the national policy that Professor Fowke is recognized as a significant figure in Canadian economic history.

Generically, national policy can be defined as those specific policy measures, "integrated functionally toward the furtherence of fundamental and persistent government aims."35 In the 19th century Canadian context this includes, "that group of policies and instruments which were designed to transform the British North American territories of the mid-nineteenth century into a political and economic unit."36 While the term National Policy was applied specifically to the tariff system in the election of 1878 and introduced by the Macdonald Conservatives in 1879, it is, in itself, only one element in the national policy as
VERNON C. FOWKE

defined above, a policy with origins that pre-date Confederation and, indeed, required Confederation as the political instrument of its implementation.37

The national policy was, in reality, a policy of desperation, dictated by the disappearance of the favoured alternatives, imperial or continental economic integration. It was the consequence of actions taken by the two imperial systems, Britain and the United States, either to cut loose from Britain or bar access to the United States of the dependent Canadian economy.38

The three policy initiatives associated with the national policy are generally accepted as the transcontinental railway, the system of tariff protection, and immigration and western (agricultural) land settlement. To be completely accurate, Confederation should also be considered a fourth pillar of the national policy because without the BNA Act and the distribution of powers contained in it, the national policy had no instrument of implementation or of functional integration.39

The evolution of the four main elements of the national policy point to the growing awareness of the geographical realities of the northern half of North America. The Canadian Shield interrupted the western movement of the settlement frontier unlike the movement of the frontier in the United States as, indeed, did the western mountains when the time came to integrate the mining frontier of British Columbia into the Canadian economy. The recognition of the necessity of transportation and communication facilities linking the component regions in an economic unit came early but because of the necessary complement of capacity with traffic, the creation of a transnational link must occur simultaneously with western commercial settlement that would generate two-way traffic necessary to make economical the massive investment required. In the conceptual framework of modern development economics, such a development plan required a degree of balanced growth, inter-regional and inter-sectoral.

Immigration and settlement policy, including purchase of Rupertsland from the Hudson's Bay Company, reservation of crown lands in the Northwest for federal purposes, assisted passages, colony settlement, the homestead acts, and all the other sundry measures to promote immigration and agricultural research, comprise one element in the required complement. The protective tariff comprises another since only with such a tariff could westward traffic over the unprofitable barren lands north of the Great Lakes be guaranteed against the American competitive advantage of cheaper access. In short, the protective element in the tariffs should be considered primarily as protection for the railway, and only, incidently, protection for manufacturing development. This, not unnaturally, suggests why little concern was expressed in the boom periods of western expansion (1900-1913), at least among policy makers, at the considerable penetration of American branch plant capital into Canada, a penetration which has since only intensified.
PAUL PHILLIPS

The enactment and elaboration of such an integrated development strategy required an institutional agent with the appropriate powers. The BNA Act provided such an instrument, the component parts of the national policy being within the jurisdiction of the new federal authority. The end of the first national policy period in 1930 has been accompanied by increasing obsolescence in the Canadian constitution made tolerable only by amendment (family allowances, unemployment insurance), by federal-provincial agreement and shared-cost programs and, in a few cases, by judicial re-interpretation. It is obvious, therefore, that contemporary Canadian political-economy was shaped, cast and confined in the institutions of the past and may only be understood with an appreciation of the national policy and its economic ingredients.

View from the Hinterland: The Nature of the Canadian State

If Creighton can be said to be the champion of the St. Lawrence merchant class, Fowke can be seen as his hinterland counterpart, chronicler of the vision of the great mass of farmers on the land. Fowke is unambiguous. Canadian agriculture, historically, has been molded and manipulated to serve the interests of the ruling class; up to the mid-19th century, the trans-Atlantic mercantile interests and, with the abrogation of the imperial system after the 1840's, the St. Lawrence mercantile elite.

Again in contrast to Creighton, Fowke's opinion of the merchant class' Canadian vision is somewhat jaundiced. In reference to the mid-19th century, Fowke has noted, "Canadian merchants never paid much attention to the international boundary. If the Canadian capitalists had been able to cash in on the [U.S.] frontier development, there probably would have been no Canadian nation." By implication, therefore, the Canadian nation was the vehicle for guaranteeing the economic vested interests of the merchant class; or as he puts it himself, the Canadian nation was, "designed by commercial interests with the intention of making use of agriculture for commercial purposes."

Romantic myths of visionary fathers of Confederation serve only to mystify reality, to glorify a self-seeking economic elite and to justify what was, and was intended to be, an exploitative relationship. It is perhaps desirable to demonstrate in some detail how and why Fowke reaches his conclusions. First, he goes to great lengths to exorcise the myth of the self-sufficient hardy pioneer wresting his every need from a grudging nature.

It is held to be demonstrable rather than merely arguable that the Canadian pioneer was at no time self-sufficient, that he was from the beginnings of his
migration and throughout his pioneer days inseparably tied in with the price system and the urban economy on a national and international basis. . . . It is one of the contentions of [The National Policy and the Wheat Economy] that the exchange activities of the Canadian frontier settler in eastern Canada were far from negligible and that his integration into the price system did not await or depend upon his production of a staple agricultural export.43

Even before 19th century settlement in the Ontario region, agriculture had played important complementary roles in the mercantile system, first for "defense of territory and trade routes", and second, "as a provisioner of the great staple trades".44 Agriculture was clearly subservient to the interests of mercantilism. "The clearest and most significant uniformity regarding Canadian agriculture for more than three hundred years has been its deliberate and consistent use as a basis for economic and political empire."45 The evolution of Ontario agriculture by mid-19th century to the stature of a staple export did nothing to alter its subservient status as "auxiliary to commerce".46 Nor did the opening of the last-best west, the Canadian prairie. In the imperial dominance of commerce, "the period 1850-1930 forms a unit."47

As a staple, either in 19th century Ontario or the 20th century prairies, agriculture was not supported for itself but rather for the investment frontier that the staple created on both the input and output sides, indeed in the development process itself. By the 1850's the coincidence of immigration and settlement with buoyant economic conditions in the first half of the century came to the awareness of the merchants of the St. Lawrence.48 Then, "... Canadian governmental policy came to be squarely based on a full realization of the significance of immigration and agriculture settlement for the well-being of the entire economy."49

The problem for the empire of the St. Lawrence was that by mid-century the Ontario agricultural frontier tributary to the St. Lawrence was approaching the limits of extensive cultivation. Canadian policy involved two prongs, the further promotion of immigration and settlement into the unsuitable and inhospitable fringes of the Canadian Shield, and a renewed, costly and ultimately unsuccessful attempt "to bring the Canadian commercial economy into effective contact with the American agricultural frontier."50 In short, the publicly supported Grand Trunk Railway was initiated in the attempt to make the American western frontier at least partly tributary to the St. Lawrence, the same dream of Creighton's first commercial empire which collapsed with Britain's abandonment of the imperial mercantile system.51 But Fowke quite
PAUL PHILLIPS

explicitly rejects Creighton’s assertion that “with this repudiation of its past and this denial of its ancient principles, [the 1849 annexation manifesto] the history of the Canadian commercial state comes to a close.”52 Fowke considered the Grand Trunk Railway the last attempt to capture the linkages of the American frontier for the merchants, but not the last attempt to create a tributary hinterland.

By 1860 it was apparent that the St. Lawrence commercial system had no chance of sharing in the agricultural trade of the American frontier. If the St. Lawrence merchant group were to look to an expanding agricultural frontier for profitable employment, it would of necessity be one of their own creation.53

Thus, the necessity of the national policy, was made doubly urgent by the American expansionism that threatened to pre-empt the last potential hinterland of the St. Lawrence. Agricultural settlement, therefore, plays the dual role of investment frontier and defender of the territorial integrity of British North America.54 It should be noted that the two functions are inextricably linked, not only in Fowke’s hindsight, but in the minds of many of those parliamentarians now characterized as Fathers of Confederation.55

The economic purposes of the national policy were essentially commercial, and, to that extent, involved merely a continuation of the type of activities characteristic of the fur trade and the timber trades. But the commerce contemplated in the new policy was not only tolerant of but primarily dependent upon immigration and agricultural settlement.56

Thus, the national policy, far from being a break with the commercial empire of the St. Lawrence was, in fact, its latest and ultimately most successful manifestation. Fowke’s characterization of the national policy and its function for agriculture as consistently commercial would seem also to place him on the merchant capitalism side of the contemporary debate on capitalism and the national question. In some ways there is a strong similiarity between Fowke and Tom Naylor, the most articulate exponent of the commercial view, when Naylor says, “Canadian Confederation and the subsequent national policy are an unambiguous example of British mercantilism in action.”57
This would appear to be very similar to Fowke's statement already quoted that "the Canadian nation was designed by commercial interests with the intention of making use of agriculture for commercial purposes." While the similarity is, in many ways, striking, Naylor goes on to say that the national policy was the work of descendants of the mercantile class who aligned themselves in 1837 with the Colonial Office "to crush the indigenous petite bourgeoisie and nascent industrialists." Thus the national policy was in basic conflict with industrialism. Naylor argues: "Preventing competition is what industrial protectionism is all about and this is not what Macdonald's tariff was intended to do." Quite the contrary, according to Professor Fowke. That is precisely what the national policy's intention was: to prevent the competition from the American commercial system. This also implied preventing competition from the American industrial system. Indeed, there was a harmony of interests which is integral to Fowke's analysis.

The key to this harmony lies in the recognition of the importance of an ongoing investment frontier for general economic prosperity. Throughout the expansive periods of the 19th century, the agricultural frontier provided both an extensive and intensive frontier for investment opportunities within the commercial system "on both sides of the Atlantic as well as in the North Atlantic shipping services." But Fowke uses the term commercial in a rather broad way, as a synonym for business, including the specific capitalist functions of commercial, financial and industrial capital. This is made clear in many places, explicitly in the following passages. "Immigration and settlement in the upper St. Lawrence region were commercial as well as agricultural processes. They enormously expanded the field of investment opportunities for commercial, transportation, and manufacturing capital within and beyond the new territories." The diversity of the investment frontier is a function of the degree of settlement and of urban development.

The underlying, but not necessarily recognized, complement of mercantile and industrial interests implied the exclusion of American located business from the profits of the lucrative development process of the Canadian west. Exclusion could be achieved through the agency of a national policy which integrated transportation, tariffs and agricultural settlement. Fowke is worth quoting at some length on this point.

It is clear that Canadian rail lines linking central Canada with the Maritimes and the West provided only the physical facilities for the movement of goods: they did not in themselves make it certain that manufacturing facilities would develop in the central provinces to supply the outlaying regions. Without protective measures of some
sort, manufacturers in central Canada could secure and hold the markets of the outlying regions only if they could deliver goods in competition with the highly efficient mass-production industries of the eastern and middle-western United States. This they have consistently alleged they could not do.\textsuperscript{66}

If the provincial tariff of 1859 was designed primarily for revenue [for transportation infrastructure], and incidentally for protection, the Dominion tariffs enacted in 1879 and subsequent years were designed primarily for protectionism, and incidentally for revenue. This change in emphasis was essential to the national purposes. Construction of a Pacific railway would make possible the economic development of the West. Protective tariffs would foster interprovincial trade in place of international trade. Canadian manufacturing would be assured as fully as possible of exclusive rights to the total Canadian market. Together, railways and tariffs would integrate the expanding area of economic activity. Tariffs would ease the burden of improvements in transportation by providing railway traffic and a more diversified economy as a source of tax revenues.\textsuperscript{67}

The aim of the national policy, therefore, was to monopolize for Canadian capital the profits of western development.\textsuperscript{68} While its original impetus may have been primarily mercantile, there was, by the mid-19th century, no major conflict between the interests of industrial and mercantile capital. Nowhere in Fowke’s work is this more clearly and brilliantly outlined than in his Submission for the Province of Saskatchewan to the 1960 Royal Commission on Transportation.\textsuperscript{69} The imperialistic character of the national policy is well documented in the wrestling of the south eastern British Columbia mining frontier from integration with the American economy into a hinterland area of Canadian capitalism,\textsuperscript{70} in large part at the expense of the Canadian public.

What then can we conclude about Fowke’s conception of the Canadian state in the century or so before 1930? First, it was imperialist in its designs on the western hinterland. While it was truly a counter imperialism to American imperialist designs on western British North America, it was imperialist nevertheless.\textsuperscript{71} The western development process was to provide the profits for central Canadian capital. The national policy was the policy framework through which this was to be ensured. Second, the Canadian state in the form of the BNA Act and its institutions, specifically the federal government, “was the
creature of the national policy and its most prominent instrument... The federal government was created an agent within the framework of the first national policy and continued to act as agent until, with the attainment of the objectives of the national policy it had exhausted its usefulness to its original principles, the commercial, financial and manufacturing interests of the central provinces.

Imperialism is rarely, and then normally only incidentally, designed to benefit the colonial regions. What, then, can be said of the distributive equity of the national policy and its instruments? Deliberate inequity was built into the inferior constitutional status of Manitoba and the Northwest territories (Saskatchewan and Alberta after 1905) by the reservation of crown lands for Dominion purposes. Homestead grants, admittedly, returned a considerable amount of the equity to settlers which ultimately was capitalized in property values. Pre-emption rights no doubt also contributed to settler equity although how much was expropriated by speculators is a matter of conjecture. The dual and conflicting role for land, enticing settlers (free or cheap land) and financing the railway (expensive land) also limited the ability and desire of the CPR to appropriate the maximum economic rents. In fact, the CPR favoured cheaper land as traffic was more profitable than capital gains in land. Nevertheless, there is no doubt but that the CPR is a monument to public enterprise for private gain. The return of what little remained of potentially productive Crown land to the prairie provinces in 1930 occurred only after western agriculture had served its original purposes in the national economy [when] the great period of capital creation on the prairies was at an end, and [when] in future the frontier dynamics would have to be sought elsewhere, in the mineral and forest staples of the Precambrian Shield. 1930, therefore, marks the end of the period during which western natural resources were expropriated by Central Canada for its imperial purposes. Land was not the only wealth transfer to the commercial empire. Massive public subsidies to the railways and indirectly to the railway contractors were effected through the tax system in which tariffs constituted a major, if not dominant role.

Much has been made of the role of tariffs in income distribution in Canada reflecting economists' preoccupation with the static theory of trade. Fowke, concerned more with the dynamic aspects of development, is less inclined to stress the distributive equities as contrasted with the structural and monopolizing effects. As he points out, the prairie developed within the already established tariff structure, so that the introduction of protective tariffs did not confiscate existing equities. Nonetheless, regional differentiation of incidence existed, primarily expressed in the value of property restricting the increase in values in the western agricultural areas and enhancing the property values in the central provinces. At the same time, industrialization of central Canada pre-empted the development of manufacturing in the west by acquired comparative advantage.
PAUL PHILLIPS

The prime impact, however, lies in the role of the tariff to make the Canadian railway system economically viable, a necessary precondition of making the Canadian agricultural frontier tributary to central Canadian capital and preventing American railway penetration. As he notes, "As far as the western provinces are concerned, therefore, Canadian railways are expensive alternatives to American railways rather than to no railways at all." 80

It should be noted, at least in passing, that Fowke did not dismiss inter-class re-distribution as non-existent or inconsequential. "Wage earners as such have suffered rather than gained because of the tariff, but property owners in central Canada have achieved permanent and substantial gains." 81 To some extent, eastern farmers producing for the domestic market may also have gained by the enlargement of the domestic market at the expense of western farmers producing for the export market.

In the final analysis, however, Fowke stresses the role of monopoly or market power, however created and maintained, by tariffs, royal commissions, legislation, control of resources and capital, judicial acquiescence, or purposeful inaction, in affecting the terms of trade to the disadvantage of the numerically superior agriculturist and in favour of commercial and industrial capital. To a significant extent this is the central theme of The National Policy and the Wheat Economy if not most of Fowke's work, and is summed up succinctly in the conclusions to two of his major studies:

One of the most significant features of the national policy has been a persistent disregard of the competitive inferiority of agriculture within the price system. The major era of the national policy which ended in 1936 witnessed no serious attempt on the part of government to ameliorate or even to assess that inferiority. 82

[Indeed,] Canadian farmers have been a factor of any significance in directing government policy only when their interests have clearly coincided with those of some other group in the community, whether merchant, carrier, or manufacturer. 83

These conclusions say much about the nature of the Canadian state but perhaps not as much as Fowke's analysis of the philosophical foundations of the free enterprise ideology that underlay the national policy. Philosophy, however, never was allowed to interfere with "government enterprise and assistance of a development nature" which contributed to the accumulation of private wealth.
VERNON C. FOWKE

If monopolistic elements persisted in appearing they might nevertheless be disregarded as peripheral and accidental phenomena . . . for business men were men of good will with a high regard for their own good names. There was no place in this basic philosophy for trust-busting or even any serious measure of muck-raaking. The possibility of instituting public enterprise as a curb and counterpoise to private monopoly was unacceptable. The philosophy was consistent in that it justified equality of freedom to competitive and monopolistic entrepreneurs alike."84

Likewise, both rich and poor were forbidden from sleeping on a park bench.

Canadian federalism, at least until 1930, represents no distinct break in the traditions of monopoly-capital exploitation of the competitive hinterland that was the hallmark of the original penetration of the Canadian interior through the monopolistic fur companies. The question is, does the end of the investment frontier associated with the first national policy mark an end to this phase of mercantilism, neo or otherwise? In perhaps his best known, and somewhat controversial, article, Fowke suggests that such may be the case although he is by no means confident in his suggestion.

Fowke argues that, since 1930, the federal government has evolved a second national policy involving "the broad field of public welfare; agricultural policy; and possibly money management."85 The clearest evidence of the concern for public welfare he finds in Bennett's "new deal" legislation of 1935 which, being largely defeated in the courts on grounds of constitutionality, led to the appointment of the Rowell-Sirois Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations; and subsequently the Unemployment Insurance Act of 1941 and Family Allowances after 1944. He finds evidence of concern with monetary management in the creation of a Keynesian influenced Bank of Canada in 1935.86 Agricultural policy, in this context, is far removed from the agricultural policy of the first national policy, replacing a concern with expansion with that of stabilization. As Fowke notes, "price supports and crop failure legislation had no part in the first national policy but may be regarded as an integral part of the second."87

His second national policy has a degree of symmetry with the first in that he identifies three constituent parts — the expansion of public welfare, agricultural stabilization policy, and monetary management. One should note that all three may be collectively described as Keynesian type stabilization measures rather than economic development policies.88 Nor should one be surprised that such measures should evolve, for the most part, during and after the most disastrous depression in modern economic history.

89
PAUL PHILLIPS

There are numerous qualifications in the article to suggest that the idea of the second national policy was tentative and qualified. The qualifications appear to be even stronger in his later work, particularly in the National Policy. For instance he states, "one may well doubt that Dominion agricultural policy is inspired by a conviction of the competitive inadequacy of agriculture," and, "the persistence of doubt concerning degree of permanence in Dominion agricultural policy arises mainly from its lack of theoretical or conceptual content."

Our must also seriously ask whether the adoption of a monetarist position by the current Bank of Canada does not signify the abrogation of monetary policy, rather than the adoption of it. If Fowke were alive today one can only speculate that he would agree. However, perhaps the most telling criticism of contemporary national policy, or lack thereof, is his observation that, "the preservation of the east-west axis of trade and transportation is as urgent a requirement today as at any time in the past." This would suggest that contemporary federal policies can be considered as defining national policy only to the extent that they are policies of the national government.

The transfer of the remaining natural resources of the prairie region to the provinces was symbolic of the end of the agricultural investment frontier and equally symbolic of the end of national development policy, in consequence of the growth of provincial power and the geographic dispersion of the investment frontier. "The constitutional diffusion of the economic frontier in Canada after 1920 was as pronounced as was its geographic diffusion." In short, we have no national policy and with the rise to dominance of multinational business in Canada, Creighton's lamented commercial elite has finally gained access to the American imperial frontier, as civil servants of American based multinationals. Having achieved this goal, there is no longer any need for a national policy.

Economics
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1. I am indebted to a number of my colleagues for their comments on this paper; in particular Irene Spry, Gerry Friesen, Rhys Phillips, Claire Pentland, Ken Hughes and the editors of the Journal Arthur Kroeker and Allen Mills. Of course, the final interpretation and judgements, for better or worse, remain mine.

2. A selected list of Fowke's writings appears in the attached bibliography.


4. It can be argued that Innis' focus was transportation and communication and that his concentration on staples reflected his interest in the technological relationships between the development of the staple and of transportation and communication.

5. Fowke, op. cit. pp. 3-4.

6. Ibid., p. 9. See also p. 270.

7. Donald Creighton, The (Commercial) Empire of the St. Lawrence. Toronto: Macmillan, 1956 (first published 1937). p. v. In the reissue of Creighton's book, the title was changed from The Commercial Empire of the St. Lawrence to The Empire of the St. Lawrence. Why is not clear, but the original title would appear to be a more accurate representation of the thesis of the book.


9. "Canadian economic historians have not given adequate attention to migration and the agricultural settlement of the St. Lawrence Valley in the Pre-Confederation period. The reason is simple. The traditional assumption is that agricultural pioneers were self-sufficient. If this assumption were correct it would follow that the pioneer farmer had no economic significance to anybody but himself. If he neither bought nor sold, it is clear that he could have no part in the exchange economy, he would be neither borrower or lender. He would have no economic contact with trade or industry, or, indeed, with urban life in any of its economic aspects." Ibid. p. 12.

10. Fowke, Canadian Agricultural Policy, p. 5.

11. Ibid., p. 273.


13. See Ibid.


15. Fowke, Canadian Agricultural Policy, p. 275.

16. Ibid., p. 110.


23. It is not known to what extent Fowke's investment frontier concept influenced Professor K.A.H. Buckley in his early research but Buckley's *Capital Formation in Canada, 1896-1930* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1955), constitutes in effect, a quantification of the concept.


26. *Ibid.*, p. 141 emphasis added. Also, of course, investment in transportation was much greater.


28. Given the prevailing public morality exhibited by political figures of the day it may be suggested that public ownership was not a viable alternative to private. However, a review of the evidence provided by Naylor (History of Canadian Business, Toronto: Lorimer, 1975) would suggest that private business morality was no better, if not worse, than the public. Since many of the individuals were one and the same, it is perhaps not surprising.


30. This constitutes the body of *The National Policy and the Wheat Economy*, chs. 6 to 14. "The western wheat farmer reasoned that there was serious inadequacy in national policies which assured the subsidization of transportation interests by land and money grants and security guarantees, provided for the protection of industry by tariff walls, permitted to economic interests generally the greatest possible freedom in their efforts to avoid the hazards of competition by combination and agreement, and, at the same time, left the agricultural producer exposed to the full rigours of competition both nationally and internationally”, (p. 192).


34. Ibid., p. 276.
35. Ibid., p. 4.
36. Ibid., p. 8.
38. Ibid., p. 240.

40. For the sake of brevity and, I hope, clarity, I have not attempted to summarize Fowke's discussion of the role of the Maritime provinces in Confederation. These were the obvious public finance requisites of union to create such size as to absorb the costs of development and to diversify the economic base. But Fowke notes that the Confederation debate speakers "including several of the outstanding leaders of the day, saw the union of the eastern provinces simply as the starting-point in the creation of a political and economic union which would stretch from the Atlantic to the Pacific . . ." Fowke, The National Policy and the Wheat Economy, p. 24.

41. Fowke, Lecture Notes, p. 76.
42. Ibid., p. 75.
44. Fowke, Canadian Agricultural Policy, p. 4. "Agriculture has served as an instrument of empire in different ways according to the requirements of place and time. Simplest and most obvious has been its use as a defence device, where settlement has been encouraged for the protection of territory and trade routes. Equally widespread has been its use as the provisions of the great staple trades, whether of fish, fur, sugar or timber, or of carrying trade itself. Provisioning, of course, has been partly a defence function, since in the economic conflict of competitive empires, notably the English and the French, survival necessitated a degree of commercial vitality possible only on a strong agricultural base." (pp. 3-4).
45. Ibid., p. 3.
46. Ibid., p. 7.
47. Loc. cit.
50. Ibid., p. 23.
51. "Merchants on the St. Lawrence, at Montreal, regarded the St. Lawrence as the natural trade route to the inland frontier, wherever that frontier might lie." Ibid., p. 25.
52. Creighton, op. cit., p. 382.
PAUL PHILLIPS


56. Ibid., p. 57.


58. Fowke, Lecture Notes, p. 75.

59. Naylor, op. cit., p. 16.

60. Ibid., p. 20.

61. "The near cessation of immigration and the exhaustion of the Canadian agriculture frontier in the late 1850's coincided with economic recession. The obvious inference was that failure of agricultural expansion was largely responsible for the general economic distress". Fowke, The National Policy and the Wheat Economy, p. 243.

62. Ibid., p. 16.


64. Ibid., pp. 17, 19.

65. Ibid., pp. 20-21.


67. Ibid., p. 64.

68. "Their aim was to draw the whole western Canadian region into their commercial and general economic orbit." Vernon C. Fowke, (with G.E. Britnell) "An Historical Analysis of the Crow's Nest Pass Agreement and Grain Rates: A Study of National Transportation Policy". Submission of the Province of Saskatchewan to the Royal Commission on Transportation. Regina: Queen's Printer, 1961, p. 17. See also Fowke, The National Policy and the Wheat Economy, p. 69.

69. Fowke, "An Historical Analysis of the Crow's Nest Pass Agreement and Grain Rates."

70. For a summary of the goals see Ibid., p. 30: For the integrative effects see Ibid., p. 32.

71. Ibid., p. 15.


77. In recent years there has been a resurgence of interest among academic economists in assessing the "Costs of Confederation" to the hinterland regions of Canada (See, for example, W. Blackman, "A Western Canadian Perspective on the Economics of Confederation"*, Canadian Public Policy, Autumn 1977; and K.H. Norrie, "Some Comments on Prairie Economic Alienation", *Canadian Public Policy*, Spring, 1976). In fact, these costs are, more accurately, associated with the elements of the national policy, more specifically, with tariffs and transportation policy. Norrie makes the point (pp. 212-214) that many of the prairie grievances arise from the operation of a market economy in respect to a hinterland or peripheral region. It is likely that Fowke would, by and large, have agreed with this assessment. It is precisely the fact that the national policy was designed to create a western hinterland tributary to central Canada that leads to the differences in economic power, and thus to the grievances.


79. Ibid., p. 68.

80. Ibid., p. 69.

81. Ibid., p. 68.

82. Ibid., p. 290.


86. Ibid., p. 253.

87. Ibid., p. 258.

88. Ibid., p. 257.


90. Ibid., p. 296.

91. Ibid., p. 297.

92. Ibid., p. 83.
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NIHILISM AND MODERNITY

Barry Cooper


The term *nihilism* is a neologism coined by Jacobi to describe the efforts of Fichte to ground the world in the ego. Jean Paul took over the term from Jacobi to describe the romantic movement as "poetic nihilism" and the word gained a general currency in Germany among Christians such as von Baader as a synonym for atheism. The Hegelian notion of negation re-imported the notion of *nothing* into philosophy whence it passed into the hands of the epigones, including Marx who in 1843 spoke of the *Nichtigkeit* of the ancient regime. Negation as a principle of political action became famous with the anarchism of Bakunin and the conspiratorial revolutionary terrorists in the reign of Alexander II (1855-81) in Russia, and is with us still. But the activist nihilism of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is a late development: according to Rosen, nihilism is a perennial human potential, even while taking a particular form in each historical manifestation. Both books under review, in characteristically distinct ways, are concerned with the topic. Paraphrasing Nietzsche, they both raise the question: is everything permitted? If so, what does this mean? If not, why not?

To talk of nihilism or, to use a more popular idiom, to express one's concern about "the crisis of our times" is in no way out of order. The details are presented with each morning paper — the reading of which, Hegel said, was the daily benediction of the modern realist. What we read informs us not just of fresh external disasters but of an internal loss of meaning. The crisis is a crisis in what we are, as well as what we do, and most clearly may be seen in how we understand ourselves, what words we conventionally and sometimes deliberately employ to describe significance. Rosen and Grant are agreed on the centrality of the term "history" for our self-understanding, whether this be in the area of philosophical discourse, Rosen's subject, or everyday speech, Grant's.
BARRY COOPER

Rosen considered specifically the two most fashionable philosophical movements of the day, language analysis and existentialism and centred his discussion on the question of reason and goodness. He did not, of course, deny that language analysis and existentialism were full of useful insights. Rather, he insisted that, notwithstanding whatever truthful accounts of human things these philosophical movements happened to possess, they were and are unable to account for the merit and significance of those insights because of a common and central feature, the separation of reasonableness and goodness. To employ reason nowadays means to undertake mathematical or quasi-mathematical analyses and to suppress or exalt the pre-rational (or irrational) "poetic sense of life". The significance of the first is suggested by Rosen's account of Wittgenstein and of the second by his account of Heidegger.

The early Wittgenstein, Wittgenstein I, accepted the view that reason was equivalent to logical calculation and scientific verification of "what is the case". He grew dissatisfied with this formulation for the obvious consequence was that there was nothing inherently reasonable in the ends towards which a contingent and instrumental reason was directed. The apprehension of truth seems to lie in the silence of vision (noēsis) utterly cut off from explicatory discursive thought (dianoia). The later Wittgenstein, Wittgenstein II, apparently repudiated this and emphasized dianoia. It did not, however, lead to noēsis but to the quasi-noēsis of the language-game, which is to say, convention. To raise the question of goodness was now possible, but the answer was: The good is the ordinary, the conventional, etc. Then if we asked: What good is what is ordinary? The answer was: The good is the ordinary because that is what we mean. And if one should object to this, one would be unreasonable because to be reasonable means to speak in the ordinary way and so on ad infinitum. One is reminded here of the opinion of Humpty Dumpty:

"When I use a word," Humpty said in a rather scornful tone, "it means just what I choose it to mean — neither more nor less."
"The question is," said Alice, "Whether you can make words mean so many different things."
"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "Which is to be master — that's all."

The moral and ethical implications of Humpty Dumpty's opinion are well-known; Rosen's point is that nihilism is only secondarily a matter of morality because morality is derived from our conception of reason: If morality is non-rational, reason is non-moral and the consequence is the willful and arbitrary
NIHILISM AND MODERNITY

attribution of sense to nonsense. Perhaps it is enforced, perhaps not. In either case, conventions are hostages to history: new times, new conventions, new truths. And this, he said, is nihilism.

If such a reason were impotent in matters of goodness, perhaps the answer was romanticism: The heart has its reasons, which reason does not know. The vulgar may be seduced by the promise of more fun; the learned by the astringent teaching of Heidegger. In his dialectic of ontic speech and ontological silence we find an equivalent to Humpty Dumpty: If the object of our care and concern is Being and we can speak only of beings, and if Being is hidden by beings, then speech and reason only serve to hide Being even more. Being must reveal itself and we, like the Beatles, must "let it be". The medium through which Being is revealed is human history, which is also the medium through which it is concealed. Whether revealed or concealed, Being depends upon fatal (in both senses) contingencies about which meaningful debate is impossible. Hence it is impossible to distinguish between good and evil or speak rationally about the goodness of reason. This essential feature of existential nihilism has the direct political implication that the individual cannot be held responsible for his actions because what happens is the gift of Being, the self-revelation of Being coming-to-be. Responsibility, perhaps even of Ministers of the Crown, can be eclipsed by the unfolding of the universe. Accordingly, it makes no difference whether we understand our acts as resolution in the face of death or submissiveness before the revelation of Being; nor are we given the means to distinguish resoluteness from stubbornness or submissiveness from cowardice.

Wittgenstein and Heidegger are joined, Rosen argued, by their common commitment to history as the repository of all meaning. It provides the actual contents of the language game; it is the revelation of Being. It is true that sometimes we distinguish history from nature, but at least since the popularization of Darwin's theories, to say nothing of neuro-pharmacology or the contemporary practice of recombinant DNA-technologies, nature and history have been blended in our understanding of ourselves to such a degree that it now makes sense for ever larger numbers of people to say that man, the historical one, can change and even conquer nature even while he sees that conquest as the perfection of his "natural" (meaning willful or historical) inclinations. It is here that Grant has put his readers in his debt by trying to think out what this signified. What does it mean to conceive of the world as a historical process, to conceive time as history, to conceive man as an historical being — all of which expressions are equivalent?

Time as history, Grant said, is the animator of our existence, our everyday existence: subways, supermarkets, the CN Tower, Revenue Canada Revenu, all that constitutes life in technical society. To conceive time as history is to be oriented towards the future, to be "progressive", to make tomorrow as we will.

99
BARRY COOPER

It is, therefore, to emphasize that part of our being that makes things happen. The "historic" men of the age are precisely those who made the biggest things happen. And while it is true that historic individuals may be found in China or Africa, the historic collectivity is European and latterly North American. Historic activity necessarily exalts will and correspondingly de-emphasizes the useless and invisible mental activities of reflecting, deliberating, feeling, thinking, and judging.

Put crudely, the ancient philosophers taught that a natural bond united reason and goodness: the good was reasonable and reason was good. Modern man, who has no conception of nature in the old sense, asserts that goodness is created amid the indifference of an animate and inanimate nature-at-hand by an act of will. History is the pragmatic wake left by man’s actualization of a meaningful world. Reason, our quasi-mathematical calculative faculty, is therefore bent to the purposes of will. In modern technical societies one can observe few purposes beyond innovation, novelty and change. Our cup of resoluteness in the pursuit of change increases as less and less of the presently existing seems admirable or lovable. But if what is unlovable about the present stems from our exaltation of will, it can hardly be comforting to hope that improvement will result from more of the same.

These commonsensical observations deal with the outside and the visible aspects of modernity, and are familiar enough. In turning to Nietzsche’s thought, Grant encountered one who brought to light the hidden, internal, and dark meaning of what it is to be a member of Western society. He makes explicit what earlier was implicit — in Marx, for example — and makes clear to us, who have come after, just what the conjunction of nihilism and modernity is. Nietzsche affirmed the separation of reason and goodness even while he declared them to be creatures of the will, "values", as he was the first to call them, whose acceptance depended upon a prior commitment to certain conventions or "horizons". Once we know that our horizons are man-made they can no longer sustain us as truth independent of our will. But this presupposes that men are creatures in need of being sustained, which Nietzsche denounced as weakness. The hard truth, according to Nietzsche, is that we cannot know what we are fit for — or rather, there is nothing we are fit for and nothing we are not fit for. We can make it up as we go along, because our purposes are a matter of will, and they always have been, even though it was up to modern man to find this out.

Let us see further what this means. We no longer believe our purposes in life are ingrained in the nature of things, in the structure of reality. Because we no longer experience the limitedness of creatures we can see ourselves as masters over all. And this sense of mastery (even if it turns out, centuries hence, to be temporary) comes, precisely, from recognizing that all horizons are so-called limits — including God, the horizon of horizons, who is dead. But if all this is
so, why bother? If all is conventional, why will anything, since one just as well, just as reasonably, etc. might not? It used to be thought that the purpose of unlimited mastery was the realization of the slogan of the French Revolutionaries, liberté, égalité, fraternité, with variations according to local custom and sensibility: liberal democracy, democratic liberalism, democratic socialism, social democracy, republican democracy, people’s democracy, guided democracy, and so forth. All that used to be the end of history, the point of all progress. But progress, Nietzsche showed, was a secular Christianity; before God all human souls were equal, but God has died and man has forgotten about, or perhaps mislaid, his soul.

Men who are no longer Christians and who no longer see the natural goodness of reason but who are still of the species homo sapiens, Nietzsche called last men and nihilists. The former seek happiness bereft of nobility and purpose; the latter seek only to be resolute in their willfulness. Both are moved by a spirit of revenge, a spirit of resentment that arises when our wills are thwarted. The last men want revenge against nobility, and it takes the form of trivializing everything; nihilists want revenge against their own joylessness, and theirs takes the form of violence against the present.

Even deeper is their common desire for revenge against the past, which has made the present what it is and against which they (or is it we?) seek revenge. To overcome the spirit of revenge fully is to have desired and willed what has happened. It is the amor fati, the endurance of the eternal recurrence of the identical, from which, Nietzsche said, emerges a joyful willing of novelty. This conception of time as history is therapeutic nihilism because it accepts gracefully the dominance of time, which is to say, since human existence is temporal, that man extends grace to himself.

So now there arises a new urgency: Are there men who can supplant the last men and the nihilists, who know, as moderns, that they are the authors of their own horizons, that they create their own values, but who do so joyfully not vengefully, and so deserve their mastery?

Before seeing why or why not such a question can be answered, let us look more closely at the condition for its being raised, namely the death of God. While one can find equivalent symbolisms in Hellas — Prometheus’ hatred of the Olympian gods, for example — the death of God, or rather his murder, seems intimately tied to Biblical religions. Gershom Scholem reported a golem-legend from the twelfth century in his On the Kabbalah and Its Symbolism that is helpful in seeing the significance of Nietzsche’s murder of God.

In the story, two adepts made a man through magical operations with the Hebrew alphabet and placed the word emeth, truth, on their creature’s brow as God had done with man to show that man was the perfection of his creation. But the golem rubbed out the initial aleph, transforming emeth into meth, dead, so as to indicate that the truth was God’s alone and that if man tried to
BARRY COOPER

copy God's creation he would surely die. In another version, the words Yabuweh Elohim Emeth, God is truth, appeared on the golem's brow. Again he rubbed out the aleph and his creator, horrified, asked what this meant. The golem informed his creator that his success in creating an homunculus would lead him to revolt against God in an attempt to become a second God. With even greater horror, the adept asked the golem how to avoid such a thing, and received the magic formula to destroy his creature, which he then employed. He concluded with the observation that one ought to study magic and kabbalah only to learn of the omnipotence of God and not to create a golem.

In aphorism 125 of The Gay [or Joyful] Science, Nietzsche told a similar tale, entitled "The Madman". A Diogenes-like character ran into the marketplace crying "I seek God!". He found not God but men who did not believe in God but made jokes about his having emigrated or gotten lost. The madman replied that he had not gone away but had been killed "by you and I". God was dead and, unlike the golem story, "God will stay dead!". God, having bled to death under human knives, enabled man to create a golem in his place. At first man was afraid and sought consolation. But this proved impossible: God would stay dead, the murder could not be reversed, and man must raise himself, by that bloody murder "to a higher history than all previous history!". As in the second golem story, the murderer of God became a second God. But the madman's audience was silent and uncomprehending; he hurled his lantern down and declared that he had come too soon — even though the deed had been done.

Eric Voegelin's comments on this passage (in Science, Politics and Gnosticism, pp. 63ff.) are particularly instructive for our purposes. The madman, he said, unlike the original Diogenes, was not searching for man but for the new man, the super-man who lived on a higher historical plane than all previous history, and who emerged from the murder of God. The madman's stupid audience knows not what they have done. Doubtless in an effort to inform them, the madman, Nietzsche told us, entered several churches to sing his requiem aeternam deo. This activist element, which is often forgotten, suggests the non-philosophic singificance of the madman's search. As in the golem stories, we are dealing with a magical operation and as Voegelin remarked, "the interpreter of a magic opus need not, to put it bluntly, be taken in by the magic."

Grant's resistance to Nietzsche's sorcery began by questioning his notion of the amor fati. How, he asked, could anyone love fate, including the absurdities, injustices, alienations and exploitations of time without the occasional intimation that our fate may be perfected? How ever could we be freed of a spirit of revenge in the absence of that intimation? Is Nietzsche's therapy, therefore, not just a deeper, because self-conscious, nihilism? Such questions re-introduce the rabbinic understanding of the golem legends. The magical
murder of God can only express man's self-willed alienation from reality — in theological language, his rebellion against God.

If this is true, one is not condemned to the fatal acceptance of the self-interpretation of the age. Indeed, one's duty may lie in resisting it. But, as Grant has often insisted, the task of reappropriating what an intimation of perfection, eternity, God, might mean for a modern man is an enormous difficulty whose dimensions we can only suggest with the observation that the language we use is so infected with modernist connotations — our chatter about "values," for example — that its very structure denies a proper place for such terms. Rosen has attempted in the concluding two chapters of his book to suggest what it means to speak of the goodness of reason, and his argument in large measure is an exegesis of pre-modern thought. To moderns, it is strange stuff, as anyone who tries to explain his argument to a group of intelligent undergraduates (or even to one's colleagues) will discover for himself or herself quickly enough.

Perhaps the opacity of modern minds can be pierced only, to use a phrase from Grant's *Technology and Empire*, by intimations of deprival. These at least cause suffering that in no way can be ignored. Not that suffering is to be desired of itself, but, in the words of Anaximander (D-K, B 1): "It is necessary for things to perish into that from which they were generated, for they pay the penalty to one another for their injustices, according to the ordinances of time." Or, as other ancient authors, both pagan (Aeschylus) and Biblical (Deutero-Isaiah), said, suffering may be transfigured into the beginnings of wisdom. This hard teaching, which may be extracted from both Rosen and Grant, is difficult for the last man in all of us to accept. The quite viable and seemingly more comfortable alternative may well consist in an external tyranny run by Nietzsche's managerial nihilists whose internal expression is continuous self-laceration.

Political Science
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103

Norman Penner's *The Canadian Left* is an attempt to make sense at one sitting of the historical experience of Canadian socialism. Some of its material is new, particularly that from the pre-1914 period, and some of it covers ground that has already been gone over in greater detail by such historians as Young, Rodney and Avakumovic, but only with Penner are the respective parts of Canadian socialism brought together in some kind of coherent unity and juxtaposition. The book's style is adequate, its grasp of historical material extensive and its tone is equitable and broad-minded, although devotees of the Communist Party of Canada will quarrel with this latter judgement. Penner's suggestive insights will not only absorb the more academically minded students of socialism in this country, but they will as well be read, and profitably so, by socialists de la rue, so to speak. *The Canadian Left* is what a work on socialism should be — intellectual without being abstruse, theoretical without being impractical.

Much of the historiography of Canadian socialism has been concerned with the founding and development of the C.C.F./N.D.P. What existed before that is therefore prologue, the details of which can be safely overlooked. Only recently has attention been given to English-Canadian socialism before 1914. Penner's work continues this recent emphasis and provides an intriguing interpretation of the pre-1914 period. Contrary to the views of the 'cultural' school of Canadian socialist historians, Horowitz, Robin and McNaught among others, who generally argue that socialism in this country will usually be found to be non-Marxist, Fabian, empiricist and constitutionalist, Penner argues that the predominant emphasis before 1920 was in fact Marxist and, if not always revolutionary in practice, at least revolutionary in its attitude towards capitalism. It was the Socialist Party of Canada and the Social Democratic Party that carried the torch of early socialism in this country, and they were by no means temperate British gradualists.

1917 was the great watershed in Canadian socialism, says Penner. The Bolshevik Revolution established the primacy of Leninism in the world Marxist
community and convinced many socialists of the efficacy of both revolutionary methods and the dictatorship of the proletariat. Canadian Marxists from the S.P.C., the S.D.P. and the Socialist Party of North America founded the Communist Party of Canada in 1921 and it quickly became affiliated with the Third International. Those Canadian socialists who were more reformist and gradualist in outlook and who looked to the example of the British Labour Party were destined to wander in the wilderness along with the radical remnant of the farmers' movement until they found each other in 1932/3 at Calgary and Regina with the founding of the C.C.F. Penner seems of two minds over the significance of this division in the ranks of Canadian socialism. Looking at the matter negatively the spirit of sectarianism that has bedevilled the Left owed its beginnings to this split. On the other hand he seems to feel that the emergence of social democracy as a separate political force was probably inevitable, given the likely ability of Canadian society to make reforms to its economic system. In this case the founding of the C.P.C. as a separate revolutionary movement could not have been surprising. As it was, says Penner, we have gotten the worst of all worlds. Not only was the Left diametrically split in two, but soon after its founding the C.P.C. came under the hierarchical and dogmatic influence of Stalin and the Communist International. The rule of Moscow forced Canadian Communists to acquiesce to haphazard and arbitrary policies that rejected principle and made an absolute of pragmatism and opportunism. Penner's elaboration of the circumambulations and contradictions of Canadian Communist policy is the most engrossing and illuminating part of his book and provides him with his most sobering conclusion, that an unconcern for principle must lead to political disaster, the eventual fate of the C.P.C. While the C.P.C.'s abject submission was assuredly perverse, it was at least sometimes humorous. The very same party that could so consistently castigate the C.C.F. as a perpetrator of social fascism on three distinct occasions considered Mackenzie King a suitable political ally, and once, in 1954 in a fit of nationalist excitement, laid a wreath at Sir John A. Macdonald's monument in Queen's Park! The dialectic moves in mysterious ways its wonders to perform.

Yet, says Penner, the Communist Party's record has in other respects been noble and exemplary. In the 1930's especially, it helped organize the unorganized, conducted numerous extra-parliamentary campaigns, played a major role in the founding of industrial unions, and kept alive the spirit of Marxist enquiry, when particularly after 1945, to do so condemned its members to social and intellectual ostracism.

In spite of this Penner is more critical of the C.P.C. than he is of the C.C.F.-N.D.P. The latter, he claims, embodied, and still does, a social democratic tradition of reformism that was the inheritance of the influence of the farmers' movement. Its precedence over other left-wing groups and parties in this country, he feels, lies in the simple fact that it embodies whatever nascent class
ALLEN MILLS

consciousness the Canadian working class has attained. The C.C.F.-N.D.P. has not been without skeletons in its own closet and has at times for example shown an insensitivity, like the Communists, to the national aspirations of French-Canadians, but altogether, Penner seems to say it has behaved more in accordance with its admitted more limited lights than the C.P.C.

All in all, Penner concludes that socialism in Canada could have done with more help from the intellectuals. Particularly early on, socialism was the ideology of self-taught men and thus tended to be dogmatic and sectarian. Canadian socialism has also shown the paradoxical qualities of being at once insular and not sufficiently concerned with the application of abstract socialist principle to Canadian circumstances. But if there is a final lesson that Penner is most intent on imparting to his readers it has to do with the paramount need for the primacy of moral and intellectual principle in the ongoing experience of the Canadian Left. The Communist Party especially but also the C.C.F.-N.D.P. became ineffective and irrelevant when their feet strayed into the ways of pragmatism. Commitment to principle gives strength to the Left as the life of Woodsworth so completely attested.

My main quarrel with the argument of this book has to do with the author’s ambiguous use of the term “Marxism”. Nowhere does he specify what he understands by this word, and this is unfortunate in a work that is intent on advancing an unusual interpretation of the position of Marxism in the canon of Canadian socialism. We are told that Marxism ‘predominated’ on the Canadian Left before 1921 and that since then it has been a source of strength to the Left and has done much to complement the efforts of the C.C.F.-N.D.P. Penner informs us that Marxism actuated not just the S.P.C. and the S.D.P. and later the C.P.C., but also was present in the thinking of James Simpson, Frank Underhill, the League for Social Reconstruction and that it always played some role in the C.C.F. What is this Marxism that has, relatively speaking, been so ubiquitous?

Penner is clear that it is not Leninism simper, because Lenin, and Stalin for that matter, are in his opinion not infallible interpreters of Marx. At times he seems to suggest that Marxism is equivalent to the recognition of the growth of monopolies; on other occasions Marxism equals the economic interpretation of history or the advocacy of revolution or simple criticism of capitalism. Marxism, I recognise, has come to mean some or all of these things in the minds of many, but they are characteristics that either singly or together are not peculiar to Marxist socialism. Also the features of Marxism that I believe most distinguish it from other socialisms, the labour theory of exploitation and the account of the collapse of capitalism, are in fact largely if not completely overlooked by Penner in his discussion of Canadian Marxism. Clearly any conception of the prevalence of Marxism in this country depends on what we understand by that term in the first place. Penner defines it broadly and
THE CANADIAN LEFT
discerns its presence in all sorts of places. If it is defined more narrowly, and I
think correctly, its role is greatly diminished.

Also, we must distinguish between two senses of Marxism, one which can be
applied to the pre-1914 period, and the other to the years after the First World
War. What finally defined Marxism as a separate, distinctive and some would
say superior version of socialism was the Bolshevik Revolution. Socialists, like
everyone else I suppose, find it difficult to quarrel with success, and there could
be no doubting the success of Lenin and his Bolsheviks. This easily led to the
belief not only in Marxism’s superiority over other socialisms but also to the
feeling among some that Marxism was the only valid socialism, an attitude that
was certainly present in the C.P.C.’s view of the C.C.F. However, before the
First World War, while “Marxism” was in some sense predominant, I think it
was perceived as something unexceptional, as one of several socialist traditions
each of which had some sterling validity of its own. To be sure there were
elements in the S.P.C. before 1917 who thought that Marx’s theory of ex-
ploration and class struggle were next to revealed truths and that other
dissenting ‘socialists’ were not in fact socialist, but there is a sense in which
socialism in English Canada at this time was more varied, pluralistic and in-
determinate than Penner suggests. Robert Blatchford, who probably had a
large impact on the English-Canadian working class before the First World
War, recommended at the end of Merrie England that his readers not only read
Marx’s Wage, Labour and Capital and works by the Social Democratic
Federation and its leader H.M. Hyndman, but also the writings of Carlyle,
Ruskin, Whitman, Dickens and the Fabian Society. And as Penner points out,
Canadian socialists at this time were as likely to read Henry George and Edward
Bellamy as Karl Marx.

On one other small part of the history of the Canadian Left I would disagree
with Penner. As with much else in this country, the centre has only with some
difficulty been able to impose its will on the peripheries. Woodsworth in
Ottawa from 1921 to 1942 was certainly important, if not crucial, in the
establishment of the C.C.F., but was he as important as Penner makes out?
Confining ourselves to Manitoba as an example we find that not only was
Woodsworth late for the beginning of the Winnipeg General Strike, he was
also absent at the founding of the Independent Labor Party of Manitoba, and
while he was in Ottawa he participated little in the day-to-day affairs of the
I.L.P. Certainly he was most important in the founding of Canada’s national
democratic socialist party, but without the often equally brilliant work of
regional leaders like F.J. Dixon, S.J. Farmer and John Queen there would not
have been in existence in the provinces the wherewithal to constitute a national
party, and it is time that historians began to acknowledge this fact.

In general Penner seems to be optimistic about the future of Canadian
socialism. There will always be socialism, he seems to say, as long as there is
ALLEN MILLS

capitalism. He is particularly encouraged by the increased interest in Marxist speculation among left-wing groups and in the universities. Never in our history have so many Canadian intellectuals considered themselves Marxist. And yet if one confronts the condition of Canada today from another perspective, one without implicit assumptions about the rationality and progress of history, a different picture emerges. The C.P.C. is moribund, and many of the splinter groups on the Left seem to be irrelevant to any serious sort of socialist politics. There is a resurgence of neo-Marxist and critical speculation in the universities, but much of it is abstruse and without a clear point of contact with the organised political expression of the Left in the N.D.P. and the trade unions. The N.D.P. itself presently seems mainly concerned to batten down the hatches and ride out the storm of right-wing revanchism. And colouring everything is an uncertainty over the very future of Canada. Moreover, new issues crowd in, ones that socialists, with their 19th century confidence, were perhaps oblivious to: environmental collapse, the proliferation of nuclear waste and technology, the possibility of resource depletion. The future of Canadian socialism as of so much else would seem to be highly problematic. Norman Penner should write another book, The Canadian Left; the Way Ahead.

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BLINDSPOTS ABOUT WESTERN MARXISM:  
A REPLY TO DALLAS SMYTHE

Graham Murdock

Dallas Smythe's recent article, "Communications: Blindspot of Western Marxism" deserves serious attention from anyone interested in the possibilities for a viable materialist theory of mass communications. According to Smythe, not only do we not have such a theory at present — we do not even have a firm basis for its development. And this, he argues, is principally because western Marxism suffers from a fatal blindspot on the subject. It is not only that communications has been a relatively underdeveloped area of work with Marxism; it is also that the attempts at analysis made so far have been fundamentally misconceived. They have treated the mass media primarily as part of the ideological superstructure and ignored or underplayed their integration into the economic base. Smythe argues that we need to reverse this emphasis and return economics to the centre of Marxist cultural analysis. For him, "The first question that historical materialists should ask about mass communications systems is what economic function for capital do they serve, attempting to understand their role in the reproduction of capitalist relations of production" (p1 italics in the original). It is a bold polemic, delivered with panache, and embracing almost all of the currently fashionable variants of European Marxism. His list of the "blind" includes, Adorno and Horkheimer, Gramsci, together with leading contemporary writers such as Louis Althusser, Hans Enzensberger and Raymond Williams.

Smythe is undoubtedly right about the underdevelopment of economic analysis in western Marxist work culture and communications. However, he is by no means alone in this perception. A number of European Marxists would wish to go a good deal of the way with him. Raymond Williams' recent writings, for example, are peppered with attacks on versions of Marxism which over-emphasise the ideological role of communications. As he put it in a recent article then, "the main error" is that they substitute the analysis of ideology "with its operative functions in segments, codes and texts" for the materialist analysis of the social relations of production and consumption.1

In his latest book, Marxism and Literature, he insists that "the insertion of economic determinations into cultural studies is the special contribution of Marxism, and there are times when its simple insertion is an evident advance."2 Moreover, questions of economic determination have recently provided the
focus for several Marxist and Marxian analyses of the British mass media. However, these studies part company with Smythe on the question of the value and relevance of the western Marxist tradition. Whereas for him it is an obstacle to be cleared away, for Williams, for myself and for many others in Britain and Europe it is a resource to be drawn upon. Certainly it needs to be rigorously reworked and the dross jettisoned, but I want to argue that a critical engagement with western Marxism is still indispensable to the development of a comprehensive and convincing Marxist analysis of mass communications. Not least, this is because the central topics of western Marxism are precisely those which were left underdeveloped in the work of Marx and of classical Marxism: the nature of the modern capitalist state; the role of ideology in reproducing class relations; the problematic position of intellectuals; and the formation of consciousness in conditions of mass consumption. Smythe acknowledges the continuing importance and centrality of these issues and itemises them as areas requiring further development at the very end of his essay. Yet paradoxically he turns his back on the rich sources of insight and conceptualisation offered by European Marxism. This wholesale rejection seems to me to be rooted in an over-simplified view both of the tradition itself and of the historical experience to which it speaks. This is Smythe's own blindspot. Before I elaborate on this point however, it is necessary to outline his argument a little more fully.

As noted above, Smythe is not alone in insisting that contemporary mass communications systems must be analysed as an integral part of the economic base as well as of the superstructure. At its simplest this is so because communications are now big business with mass media companies featuring among the largest corporations in the major western economies. Indeed, some commentators have argued that recent developments, particularly the general shift from manufacturing to service industries and the investment switch from armaments to communications, have made the information industries "one of the economic leading edges of developing multi-national capitalism." Smythe's primary interest though, is not so much in the emerging structure of contemporary capitalism as in its underlying dynamics. For him the crucial question concerns the role of mass communications in reproducing capitalist relations of production. His answer centres on the part they play "in the last stage of infrastructural production where demand is produced and satisfied by purchases of consumer goods" (p3). In particular he focuses on their articulations with advertising and on the way that the mass media create "audiences with predictable specifications who will pay attention in predictable numbers and at particular times to particular means of communications" (p4). In order to generate these stable consumer blocs he argues, media entrepreneurs offer their audiences inducements in form of news and entertainment material designed to keep their attention and induce a favourable response towards the products being advertised. Hence, while he recognises
that mass media content plays an important role relaying and reproducing
dominant ideologies, for Smythe this is less important than their prime task of
creating audiences-as-commodities for sale to monopoly capitalist advertisers.
Through their exposure to mass media audience members learn to buy the
particular goods advertised and acquire a general disposition to consume,
thereby completing the circuit of production. Moreover, while they are doing
this they are simultaneously reproducing their labour power through the
relaxation and energy replacement entailed in consumption.

Despite the reservations which I will come to presently, Smythe deserves
credit on at least two counts. Firstly, in contrast to most Marxist discussions of
communications which start from Marx’s more obvious statements about
ideology, notably The German Ideology and the 1859 Preface, his analysis is
firmly grounded in the central economic works; Capital and the Grundrisse.
This redirection of attention enables him to highlight a number of for-
mulations which have been passed over previously and which deserve the at-
tention of Marxists interested in communications. Secondly, Smythe’s own
attempt to apply these insights to the contemporary situation succeeds well in
demonstrating their importance for a full understanding of the role of the mass
media in capitalist societies. Unfortunately though, his argument suffers
somewhat from overselling.

In part the problem stems from his treatment of the North American
situation as paradigmatic. “Europeans reading this essay”, he argues, “should
try to perceive it as reflecting the North American scene today, and perhaps
theirs soon” (p2). Today New York, L.A. and Vancouver, tomorrow London,
Paris and the world. Of course there is a measure of truth in this assertion.
North America does occupy a pivotal place in the world media system; as a
source of ownership and investment, as an exporter of products, technologies
and organisational styles, and as a key market for English language material.
Certainly no analysis of the media systems of Britain and continental Europe
would be complete without an analysis of their various links with the systems of
North America. At the same time though, the European situation displays
important differences which are reflected in the emphases and preoccupations
of Marxist theorising. Smythe’s failure to acknowledge and come to terms with
these departures has produced his own blindspots about western Marxism.
There are three particularly important omissions in his presentation.

1. He drastically underestimates the importance and centrality of the state in
contemporary capitalism. True he refers in passing to the recent work of Nicos
Poulantzas and Claus Offe, but only on his last page and then very much as an
afterthought. Certainly the implications of their work are not explored in the
body of the essay.

The continuing crisis of profitability has produced two contradictory
movements within European capitalism. Firstly, a number of industries in-
cluding mass communications have witnessed a marked concentration of ownership as the large firms have absorbed smaller concerns in a variety of sectors. In an effort to maintain profit rates these emerging multi-media conglomerates have sought out new markets, thereby further extending their reach and influence. Examples include: the institution of aggressive export policies, the opening up of new outlets such as commercial radio in Britain and so-called "free" television in Italy, and the incursion of competition and market criteria into hitherto public communications sectors such as French television. At the same time however, as the crisis has deepened, so the state has assumed a larger and larger role in formulating and directing economic activity and policy in order to guarantee the necessary conditions of existence for continued accumulation. The result is an indissoluble but contradictory relationship between the centralised capitalist state on the one hand and concentrated monopoly capital on the other. Consequently, as Bob Jessop has recently noted, "the analysis of the state ... is an absolute precondition of adequate economic theorising today". Indeed, the very notion of a materialist political economy presupposes the centrality of state-economy relations. How exactly these relations are best analysed remains the subject of pointed debate among European Marxists, but it is a debate which is missing from Smythe's presentation. Nor are the questions to be settled solely economic. The problematic relations between capital and the capitalist state have important social and cultural repercussions. They are mapped onto the ideological conflict between criteria of profit as against need and onto the political struggles between public and private ownership and control. In Britain at the moment, for example, protracted struggles are being waged around the allocation of resources for the fourth television channel, and for local community radio and cable TV. And to varying degrees this pattern is repeated in the rest of continental Europe.

But more is at stake than a better account of the contemporary situation in Europe. If Marxism is to go beyond the critical analysis of capitalism to develop a genuinely comparative analysis of social formations it urgently needs an adequate framework for conceptualising the complex and shifting relations between modes of production and forms of the state. There are signs that this difficult but necessary enterprise is now gathering momentum within Marxism, with the revival of investigations into European Fascism, the spate of post-mortems on the fate of Chile, and the growing interest in the nature of socialist states and the problems of transition. This last is particularly crucial, for as Tom Bottomore has emphasised, an adequate "Marxist sociology at the present time would have to be capable of providing not only a 'real' analysis of capitalist society, but also a 'real' analysis of those forms of society which have emerged from revolutions inspired by Marxism itself, but which display many features that are problematic from the standpoint of Marxist theory." On this problem
Smythe is entirely silent. His analysis applies only to advanced capitalist economies.

2. Smythe’s preoccupation with the relations between communications and advertising leads him to underplay the independent role of media content in reproducing dominant ideologies. This is particularly clear in the case of those sectors with minimal dependence on advertising revenue — the cinema, the popular music industry, comic books, and popular fiction. True, they are still articulated to the marketing system through equipment sales (you need a record player to play records), through the use of film and pop stars to endorse consumer products, and through the manufacture of commodities based around film and comic book characters — Star Wars T-shirts, Mickey Mouse soap and so on. But selling audiences to advertisers is not the primary raison d’être of these media. Rather, they are in the business of selling explanations of social order and structured inequality and packaging hope and aspiration into legitimate bundles. In short, they work with and through ideology — selling the system.

These non-advertising based media are almost entirely passed over in Smythe’s presentation in favour of the press and commercial television which are the exemplars par excellence of his thesis. Although secondary, the sectors he neglects are not exactly marginal. Certainly an adequate analysis would need to incorporate them, and here again western Marxism has much to offer. Pertinent work includes: Adorno’s writing on the music industry; Gramsci’s analyses of popular literature; Dieter Prokop’s investigations of contemporary cinema; and Armand Mattelart’s dissection of the ideology of Disney comics. Alongside these analyses of content and production others have worried away at the problem of understanding how ideologies become internalised and fixed in the consciousness of audiences. The various efforts to explore the relationships between Marxism and the ideas of Freud are probably the best-known. These range from the early work of Wilhelm Reich and of the Frankfurt School to the recent appropriations of Jacques Lacan. While these attempts have not always been particularly successful or convincing, they have at least grappled with the crucial problems of mediation and reception, and tried to explain how exactly the ideas of the ruling class come to constitute the ruling ideas of the epoch. In his eagerness to purge every last trace of idealism from his analysis, Smythe has abolished the problem of ideological reproduction entirely.

This is a serious oversight. Materialist analysis needs to begin by recognising that although integrated into the economic base, mass communications systems are also part of the superstructure, and therefore they play a double role in reproducing capitalist relations of production. They complete the economic circuit on which these relations rest and they relay the ideologies which legitimate them. This second function is not reducible to the first. Indeed, as several recent commentators have emphasised, the successful reproduction of
ideology is one of the key conditions for the continued existence of prevailing productive relations. Therefore it is not a question of choosing between theories of ideology and theories of political economy, but of finding ways of integrating the two into a more adequate and complete account. To quote Tom Bottomore again: "This phenomenon, the maintenance of capitalist society through the reproduction of bourgeois culture" still "needs to be investigated in detail." 

3. Smythe tends to present the operations of mass communications systems as relatively smooth and unproblematic. Not only is this somewhat surprising theoretically, given Marxism's stress on contradiction and struggle; it does not fit the facts of the present situation. As mentioned earlier, the British media system is currently the site of protracted struggles over questions of use and control. There are demands for the extension of nationalisation and municipal ownership, for greater decentralisation and regionalisation, for various forms of worker control, and for greater public participation in planning and production. Similar demands are also being made across the rest of western Europe. Moreover, these struggles are mapped onto the broader patterns of class conflict: between different factions of capital, between owners and production personnel, between intellectual and technical workers within media organisations, and between producers and consumers. Smythe acknowledges the problem of class struggle as an important area requiring examination, but he gives no indication of how it might be accommodated within his framework. Once again however, some of the most fruitful pointers have come from western Marxism, particularly from the work of Gramsci.

Given that these issues of state economy relations, of ideological reproduction and of class struggle, appear to be central to an adequate materialist theory of mass communications, why does Smythe give them such short shrift. The obvious reason is lack of space. Clearly it is unreasonable to expect a single article to offer a fully comprehensive framework. However, it is reasonable to expect a degree of balance between the important elements. Unfortunately Smythe's presentation is clearly unbalanced. In his eagerness to jettison western Marxism he reverses its priorities and treats its preoccupations as peripheral. Partly this is polemics, but I think it is also symptomatic of a real failure on Smythe's part to come to grips with the tradition. He doesn't settle accounts, he simply refuses to pay. What then is western Marxism and what does it have to offer?

At its broadest, the term "Western Marxism" covers all the variants of Marxism which developed in western Europe after 1918. Hence it stands in contrast to the other great current — Soviet Marxism. Although servicable, this distinction has a tendency to blur around the edges. For example, one of the most influential western Marxist, Georg Lukács, spent long periods in the Soviet Union, an experience which is reflected in his writings. Conversely,
BLINDSPOTS ABOUT WESTERN MARXISM

Trotsky is often co-opted as a sort of honourary western Marxist. But even if we leave these ambiguous cases to one side, western Marxism still presents a remarkably complex and varigated intellectual tradition.

While it is broadly true that western Marxists have tended to concentrate their attentions on ideology and culture (for reasons we shall come to presently) there has always been a vigorous though subsidiary current of work on economics. Indeed, we are only just now beginning to explore this legacy; to come to terms with Austro-Marxism and particularly Hilferding, to work through the implications of Pierre Sraffa’s writings, and to recognise the important contributions of neglected figures such as Sohn-Rethel. Smythe is however correct in suggesting that the insights generated by Marxist economists have never been systematically applied to the analysis of mass communications. Among those mainly interested in culture and ideology however, other important divisions are evident, most notably the split between those who involved themselves in political activity and those who remained disengaged. Where the first group found their main base and audience within the left parties and the workers’ movement, the latter found theirs primarily within the universities and the literary establishment. Hence the break was roughly between the activists and the academics. The first group includes Gramsci, Brecht and a number of lesser figures like the Trotskyist Franz Jakubowski, while the second includes Adorno, Goldmann, Althusser, and Raymond Williams (in his later phase). From the list Smythe offers (p22) it is clear that it is this academic group that he has most in mind as representatives of western Marxism. Once again however, this distinction is not as firm as it first appears. Louis Althusser for example, is usually counted among the more theoreticist of contemporary western Marxists, yet he is also an influential member of the French Communist Party whose works are permeated albeit surreptitiously, by party polemics. Nevertheless, Smythe’s assertion that “professorial Marxists” have been preoccupied with questions of philosophy, ideology and culture is broadly correct. He poses the question of why this should be so, and expresses the hope that others will try to suggest an answer. An even half-way adequate reply would take at least a book, but for the moment some sketchy suggestions will have to serve.

To understand the blindspots and idées fixes of western Marxism we need to place its development in the context of the history which formed it. As a beginning it is useful to distinguish three broad phases: the interwar years, the period from 1945 to the end of the 1960’s and the years since. Although certain themes are common to all three, each has inflected them in a distinctive way.

The central problematic of the interwar years was formed by the failure of the revolutionary initiatives in the advanced western economies. One after another, promising advances were turned back and crushed. Later, with capitalism facing an unprecedented crisis, instead of a resurgence of socialism, Fascism
GRAHAM MURDOCK

took root and flowered in the very places where revolution had seemed most possible: in Germany, in Austria and in Italy. Not surprisingly, explaining this spectacular reversal became a major priority among western Marxists. Since economic crisis had clearly failed to fuel the revolution, attention turned to the forces maintaining cohesion and domination. Some, like Trotsky, Franz Neumann and Sohn-Rethel, focused on the new fascist forms of the capitalist state and their coercive apparatuses. Others, notably Gramsci, Adorno and Horkheimer highlighted the part played by communications and culture in engineering the consent of the governed. This second line of inquiry was given added impetus by the massive expansion of the communications industries. These were the years that saw the rise of radio as a mass medium, the introduction of talking "pictures", the sophisticated deployment of photo journalism, and their wholesale co-option into the ideological apparatuses of the fascist states. Against this background of escalating propaganda management, censorship and repression the question of the mass media's economic and commercial role seemed relatively unimportant.

Once ideology was viewed as a key weapon in the arsenal of class domination, critical intellectual work on culture could be regarded as a crucial contribution to the general struggle against fascism and the capitalist system which supported it. For Horkheimer and Adorno this meant preserving the gap between the actual and the possible; for Gramsci it meant constant educational work to build a radical counter culture among the dominated. This emphasis on the importance of critical intellectual work and cultural practice provided a convenient occupational rationale for Marxist intellectuals. For, as Pierre Bourdieu has wryly pointed out, nobody believes more fervently in the transforming power of ideas than the professional intelligentsia who owe their class position to their intellectual skills. In a number of cases this occupational ideology was further reinforced by biographical experience. Adorno for example, came from a milieu where cultural activity and accomplishment was a central value. He had dabbled at composing and music criticism. Similarly it was not particularly surprising that Gramsci should value educational activity, given that it had provided his own escape route from poverty and his entry ticket into the radical intelligentsia.

After the initial period of post-war reconstruction, the advanced capitalist economies of western Europe entered a cycle of boom which generated a rapid expansion in the consumption of leisure and entertainment goods. Many of these developments were dominated by American style products and organisations, and were firmly articulated to the advertising and marketing system which Smythe describes. Why then did western Marxists generally pay less attention to these aspects than to the problems of cultural form and ideological transmission?
BLINDSPOTS ABOUT WESTERN MARXISM

Part of the answer has to do with the classification of Soviet Marxism. The concentration on culture among western Marxists at this time can be seen as an over-reaction to the economism of the official Soviet line and to the Stalinist political practice that stemmed from it. Against the Soviet tendency to reduce cultural forms to reflections of class position and class interest, western Marxists stressed the relative autonomy of ideological production and the complexity of its internal dynamics. Raymond Williams, for example, left the British Communist Party in the late 1940's to begin a long interrogation of the British socialist tradition in an effort to find non-reductionist ways of conceptualising culture-society relations. Elsewhere, others were independently engaged on the same task. In France, for example, Sartre was struggling to marry his existentialism with his growing commitment to Marxism; Lucien Goldmann was exploring to the possibilities offered by Lukács' work, and Roland Barthes was trying to integrate Sassurian linguistics with a Marxist account of domination and to apply the resulting framework to the analysis of French popular culture. Once again, this general intellectual project was underpinned by occupational and biographical considerations. It is certainly no accident, for example, that a number of prominent European Marxists of the post-war period began either as professional philosophers (Goldmann and Althusser), or as writers and literary critics (Sartre and Williams).

Another part of the explanation however, lies in the changing texture of social conflict. The expansion of consumerism was accompanied by a dampening down of industrial conflict and class struggle. The contradiction between Capital and Labour receded from the centre of attention and its place was taken by conflicts grounded in age, in gender, in nationality, in race, and above all in the yawning gap between the developed and underdeveloped worlds, between the colonisers and the colonised. Moreover, these conflicts appeared primarily as political and cultural struggles for self determination, political liberation and cultural autonomy. To many observers on the left it seemed that culture was not just one important site of struggle among others, but perhaps the most important. This misreading of history reached its height during 1967-1968, when for a brief moment it seemed that the construction of a radical counter culture coupled with the control of key institutions of transmission would bring about a bloodless transformation of capitalism.

The seventies have provided a sharp corrective to this utopianism, and as the economic crisis has deepened so the intellectual pendulum has begun to swing back, and questions of economic dynamics and determinations have re-emerged at the centre of Marxist debate. The reappropriation of Marx's mature economic works, the renewed attention to the core problems of crisis and the falling rate of profit, and the revival of interest in figures such as Sraffa, all indicate a resurgence of Marxist political economy. This development in turn has opened up new issues in the other key areas of contemporary debate; the
structure and role of the state in contemporary capitalism, the dynamics of class
structuration and class struggle, and the nature of legitimation processes. At
the present time then, Marxism in Europe is at a point of transition. It is
simultaneously assimilating the culturalist legacy of western Marxism and
confronting the implications of the emerging political economy. Certainly a
choice has to be made, but it is not as Smythe would have it, a choice between a
theory of economic processes on the one hand and a theory of ideology on the
other. Rather it is a choice between different ways of conceptualising the
complex relations between the economic, ideological and political dimensions
of modern capitalism.

Western Marxism still has an indispensable role to play in this enterprise.
Firstly, it speaks to real theoretical silences within classical Marxism, silences
which cannot be adequately filled by Smythe's schema. Secondly, because it is
grounded in historical processes which are still unfolding themselves it provides
points of entry into the analysis of contemporary experience. The problem of
understanding the resurgence of neo-Fascism within Europe is one obvious
element of its continuing relevance.

To react to western Marxism's over-emphasis on culture and ideology as
Smythe does by jettisoning it completely and calling for a new improved "non-
Eurocentred Marxsm" (p21) seems to me to be an over-reaction which sub-
stitutes one set of biases and blindspots for another. Rather than rejecting the
European tradition tout court, we need to critically rework it, to confront the
theoretical problems and possibilities that it opens up, to sort out the concepts
and insights that remain viable, and to consign the rest to the history of ideas.
There is no doubt at all that Marxism needs to be overhauled if it is to produce
convincing analyses of contemporary mass communications systems. As part of
this task we shall certainly need to develop the fertile line of analysis sketched
by Gramsci, but we shall also need to assimilate and build on the contributions
of Gramsci, Althusser, Williams and others. For without them, the Marxism of
the 1980's will be very much the poorer.

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BLINDSPOTS ABOUT WESTERN MARXISM

Notes


12. A work by Sohn-Rethel on one of his major preoccupations ("Intellectual and Manual Labour") is due for publication by Macmillan later this year.

13. Jakubowski's major work, Ideology and Superstructure in Historical Materialism, was published in English in 1976 by Alison and Busby.

14. This argument is also central to Perry Anderson's recent analysis and critique of the western Marxist tradition, Considerations on Western Marxism, London: New Left Books, 1976.

15. Franz Neumann's Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism has been available in English since the early 1940's. Trotsky's writings on the fascist state were only published in English in 1971 under the title: The Struggle Against Fascism in Germany. Sohn-Rethel's major work, Okonomie und Klassenstruktur des Deutschen Faschismus, remains as yet unavailable in translation.

REJOINDER TO GRAHAM MURDOCK

Dallas W. Smythe

The assertion is made that I propose a choice between a theory of economic process and a theory of ideology; that by a "serious oversight" I have "abolished the problem of ideological reproduction entirely"; that I failed "to come to grips with the European/ Marxist tradition"; that I don't "settle accounts" with that tradition, but "simply refuse to pay". If these assertions were well-founded, then indeed my paper would have been misconceived and mischievous. I refute these charges but I welcome the opportunity to clarify and to some degree extend my thesis.

Murdock's criticisms reflect the very Eurocentered, class-biased, reductionist tendencies which warranted my paper in the first place. He has a curious inclination to reduce the real and the theoretical frame of paper which hinges on the meaning of "Western Marxism" in its title. I had elaborated this frame as "a blindspot in Marxist theory in the European and Atlantic basin cultures", and "This lag in considering the product of the mass media is more understandable in European (including Eastern European) countries than in North America". By implication; the antithesis of "Western Marxism" in this context is Eastern Marxism, specifically Chinese. Neither praise nor blame for Chinese Marxism is implied by my exclusion of it from the object of my attack. Chinese Marxists have not had to deal with the full impact on their population of the Consciousness Industry, powered by that advertising vehicle of Western Capitalism, the commercial mass media of communication. But to expand on this rationale in my article would have been to extend its scope unduly. Chinese communications theory deserves its own analysis. Is it not reductionist and Eurocentered to restrict the grounds for evaluating my paper's argument, as Murdock does, to Europe and within Europe to that part which lies between the Berlin Wall and the Azores? Marxist writings from the Americas are totally ignored, those from the Soviet bloc dealt with separately in Murdock's reply and the implications for the world capitalist order of my frame of reference are denied.

Do I propose a choice between a theory of the economic process and a theory of ideology and opt for the former? Do I reduce the function of the mass media in "relaying" the ideologies which legitimate capitalist relations of production
to their function in “completing the economic circuit on which these relations rest” as Murdoch charges? If this is how the argument of the blindspot paper is perceived, I failed to express myself clearly enough in writing it. The part which advertising, political candidates, institutions and ideological points of view in the guise of the free lunch and advertising messages play in the work set for the audience commodities to do is recognized. It is provisionally concluded that the work which audience members do for advertisers takes place in a household context where familial, individual and other associative needs must be dealt with. I explained how the twin of the household matrix was that at the job where the ideological lessons are built into the job descriptions, promotions possibilities, and incentive wage arrangements. What I was trying to say regarding the production of ideology boils down to these propositions; that commodities as well as ideas carry ideological meaning, that at the job matrix there is ideological instruction and at the household matrix where income-spending decisions are made, the commercial messages or mass media output are to be considered in relation to the role of the audience as a do-it-yourself marketing agent and reproducer of labour power. In the interaction within and between these matrices, consciousness is produced and ideology cultivated — just how we do not yet know. These propositions are intended as a beginning toward understanding how ideology and consciousness are produced, not as disembodied abstract processes in the realm of psychology divorced from the nitty-gritty of daily life, but as part of the latter. We North Americans have had half a century to observe how the monopoly capitalist corporations through demand management via advertising and mass communications dominate culture and produce mind slavery (a tendency toward ideological tunnel vision). It would indeed be useful now to see some studies bearing on whether or not the writers in the Western Marxist tradition have dealt with this aspect of monopoly capitalism and, if so, how. The proximate reality imposes this burden of proof on them, not on me alone. When a mythical little boy shouted that the king wore no clothes, it was time for his elders to verify the proposition, and they did.

Is the North American situation a genuine paradigm for monopoly in relation to culture, or is it, as Murdock seems to suggest, that Western Europe is a special case, somehow fixated in nineteenth century production relations and isolated from the effects of monopoly capitalist transnational corporations, advertising and mass-marketing, mass-communications processes? Murdock concedes a “measure of truth" in my assertion that the North American situation is paradigmatic, but says that I “oversell" it. His argument is curiously like that of Jeremy Tunstall’s The Media are American. North American media do hold a pivotal place in the world media system, as source of ownership and investment, as exporter of products, technologies and organizational styles, and as exporters of English-language media material. He
then argues that "the European situation displays important differences which are reflected in the emphases and preoccupations of Marxist theorising" and that my "failure to acknowledge and come to terms with these departures has produced (my) own blindspots about western Marxism." He does not indicate what these important differences are, but cites "three particularly important omissions" on my part; but first my answer to the immediate question.

I had not considered it necessary to demonstrate that transnational corporations, linked oligopolistically with major domestic monopoly corporations in capitalist countries, form a web of production and merchandising activity for consumer goods and services which spans the capitalist countries and even penetrates the "socialist" economies of Eastern Europe. Their rapid penetration of markets previously less rationalized is the result of strategies involving advertising, advertising agencies, takeovers, influence, aggressive merchandising of consumer goods and services and skillful propaganda for the "free flow of information". This has been analytically described by Schiller, Nordenstreng, Mattelart, and others and it did not occur to me that Marxist readers of my blindspot article would need to be reminded of these facts. Murdock toward the end of his reply confirms what he had tried to deny in charging me with "overselling" my central thesis. "The expansion of consumerism was accompanied by a dampening down of industrial conflict and class struggle..." Welcome to the club. The ignominious defeat of the Henry A. Wallace Progressive Party in the 1948 election carried a similar message for North American Marxists who paid attention. Western Europe is not a special case, even if the implicit bourgeois assumptions of its Marxists seem to make it one.

The first of my alleged omissions is that I "drastically underestimate the importance and centrality of the state in contemporary capitalism." Of course I am aware of the lively interests by Marxists in Europe and North America in recent work on the theory of the state. This debate may indeed be central to the elaboration of an overarching theory of the superstructure. But theories of the state are at a level of abstraction remote from the nitty-gritty level where daily the institutions of monopoly capitalism use commodity marketing and the mass media to push capitalist ideology, to absorb the energies of the population in such a way that the old-style class struggle withers away, and conflict takes on the "demographic" character that Murdock uses to describe it (which happens curiously enough to be the specifications advertisers use to identify the audiences which they buy from the media). Is it necessary to regard work on the theory of the state and work on the theory of the audience commodity as mutually exclusive? I had thought each could benefit by work on the other.

True, I was silent as to how my theoretical analysis applied to the peripheral or third world economies. This silence was due, not to my analysis applying
only to advanced capitalist economies, as Murdock would have it, but again because I thought the connection to be obvious. Wherever the transnational corporations and their allied advertising agencies, mass media programme and technique peddlers go in the third world or into socialist countries, there the practice of producing audiences as commodities designed to market goods and ideas to themselves goes also. Chile is a good example, and I'm glad Murdock raised it. Schiller and I published an article which pointedly drew the contradiction between the uninterrupted activity of consciousness industry in the interest of capitalist transnational corporations in the daily lives of Chileans and the unrealistic assumption on the part of the Allende government that once basic industry had been nationalized, popular support would carry the Unidad Popular over into the transitional stage to socialism — and we did it before the putsch, not post-mortem. I see the world capitalist system as having systemic integrity, albeit of a kind full of contradictions; I do not see it as a series of discrete structures and problems, as Murdock's reply seems to do.

In dealing with the issue of the state, Murdock raises a very important issue, that of class struggle. He says I gave no indication of how it might be accommodated within my framework. He is correct, I did not. The reason was that I didn't know how to do so, not that I considered it irrelevant. So I left the class struggle at the point of the reproduction of labour power — a very unsatisfactory position in which to leave it. Murdock observed, as noted, that the "dampening down of industrial conflict and class struggle" "accompanied the expansion of consumerism" and this had a lot to do with misperception by the left of the counter culture's potential for revolution. In North America since 1945 there has been an abundance of strikes and lockouts, and a dearth of class struggle. Coincidentally the ideology of workers and their unions has been predominantly economistic — the conflict is over sharing capitalism's goodies. To discern class struggle in North America one must look at minority ethnic groups (Blacks, Chicanos, Puerto Ricans, Native People) in class terms, and in that limited context it has been visible at times. Now that in the post-1968 period, European Marxists must face the same phenomenon, let us pursue the analysis of how ideology is produced in the daily round of life of workers, prominent in which is their experience as unpaid "workers" for advertisers. Perhaps through such analysis the dampened class struggle may be reactivated.

His second charge of "omission" is that I portray the mass media under monopoly capitalism as a smooth and unproblematic process. Of course, if you examine the media and advertising at close range, a dog-eat-dog competition for power and profit is evident. Monopoly corporations continuously struggle to create "new" services (cable TV originated in western United States in the late 1940's), and the struggles between terrestrial common carriers, cable companies and aerospace giant corporations pushing satellites displayed a tug-of-war for favour from the state to give just one example. In the area of soft-ware,
a daily and weekly struggle characterizes the actual audience production scene. I have analyzed and written about these struggles for 30 years. More recently others (William Melody, Herbert Schiller, Manley Irwin, et al) have joined in this work. But my blindspot article was intended to focus on theory, not industry structure and policy; and the systemic characteristics were what I emphasized, at a sacrifice of detailed authenticity which would have blown the paper to the dimensions of a book. I contend that the enterprise "trees" do constitute a smoothly functioning monopoly capitalist "forest" because of and despite their intra-mural conflicts.

Have I underplayed the "independent role" of content in reproducing dominant ideologies? Is it to underplay the secondary role of the mass media to emphasize the primary role, neglected in the literature of the past century? Nevertheless I was and am dissatisfied with my treatment of the dialectical relation of media "content" to "advertising". I use quotes around the words to emphasize that they have no existence separate from each other. Humphrey McQueen, quite independently, came to the same conclusion:

To make sense of Australia's media monopolies, it is essential to get the relationship between the media and advertising the right way round: commercial mass media are not news and features backed up by advertising; on the contrary, the commercial mass media are advertisements which carry news, features and entertainment in order to capture audiences for the advertisers... It is a complete mistake to analyse the relationship between media and advertising by supposing that the media's prime function is to sell advertised products to audiences. On the contrary, the media's job is to sell audiences to advertisers.4

Within a given programme or newspaper or magazine, there is an integration of style and content between the ostensibly "advertising" and "non-advertising" content. Both must meet the advertisers' standards of what is entertaining, informative, and provocative. Murdock emphasizes that I ignored cinema, popular music, comic books and popular fiction. Superficially, as Murdock says, it seems that selling audiences to advertisers is not the primary raison d'être of these media. But, as he must know, their "content" is cross-marketed between themselves and between themselves and the mass media: stories, stars, songs, and films are passed from one to another medium and there cross-blended with the dictates of advertisers. For an axiom of the trade is that if it will sell as a paperback or song it will work as lure for the commercial
REJOINER TO MURDOCK

mass media. So their apparent independence is illusory within the monopoly capitalist system.

I am accused of abolishing the problem of ideological reproduction entirely. In reality what I have abolished is the simplistic model of direct manipulation by the state or the government propaganda ministry. This I have done in the pursuit of a more realistic if more complex and presently obscure process by which consciousness industry produces ideology. In this connection, further consideration of the characteristics of the audience as commodity produces a provocative and possibly fruitful question, which I will put in the form of a conundrum: What mode of work is it which has the following characteristics: One is born into it and stays in it from infancy to the old folks' home; one is not consulted as to the precise work to be done tomorrow; work tasks are presented and done; and lastly, one is unpaid? Answer? Slavery? Yes, and the audience too? Is it not correct, as a matter of political economy, to refer to a category of work (not to all individual audience members any more than to all slaves) as "mind slaves"? Even before television, bourgeois sociologists Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Robert Merton concluded that the mass media audiences were systemically subject to "dysfunctional narcotization."

In support of the charge that I have underplayed the independent role of the content in reproducing relations of production, Murdock says that I have committed a serious oversight. "Materialist analysis needs to begin by recognizing that although integrated into the economic base mass communications are also part of the superstructure, and that they therefore play a double role in reproducing capitalist relations of production." I refer him to my paper:

"If this analytical sketch is valid, serious problems for Marxist theory emerge. Among them is the apparent fact that while the superstructure is not ordinarily thought of as being itself engaged in infrastructural productive activity, the mass media of communications are simultaneously in the superstructure and engaged indispensably in the last stage of infrastructural production where demand is produced and satisfied by purchases of consumer goods." (emphasis in orginal).

And I later refer to "... the implications of this 'principal and decisive' integration of superstructure and base which reality presents."

It was beyond the scope of my paper to try to explain why there has been a Western Marxist blindspot, to which question Murdock devotes the last five
pages of his reply. No doubt this question should be raised and answered. But the purpose of my paper was to establish a prima facie case that such a blind-spot does exist. Readers of his reply and my rejoinder, and possibly other replies and further rejoinders will determine whether I have succeeded or not. Because Murdock has raised the why question, I will close this rejoinder by volunteering what might be some clues to the answer. Doubtless the factors which he mentions played a part in producing the blindspot — superstructural domination via propaganda management by the fascist states; and the "ossification" of Soviet Marxism. But I suggest that the persistence of usually implicit bourgeois class conceptions of "Culture", "Science", "Technology", and hierarchical bureaucratic organizational structures are to be found endemic amongst Western Marxists, and that these preconceptions have produced the blindspot regarding consciousness industry and ideology. Hence the need to challenge and re-examine the European tradition through a perspective which owes much to the Chinese experience. My view is that Marxism at bottom arises from historical dialectical materialism and class struggle through political economy. It is what Murdock calls the "culturalist" legacy of Western Marxism which stands suspect of being deficient in regard to such terms. I suggest that the way to a Marxist theory of how ideology is produced by monopoly capitalism is to use an historical, materialist, dialectical method always seeking the reality of class struggle, and the terms will reflect political, economic and psychological aspects of the process. Finally, I do not believe the first obligation of Western Marxism to be to speak "... to the real theoretical silences within classical Marxism." It smacks of static abstractions. I believe the first obligation of Marxist theorists is to use the obvious and trusted tools to analyze and predict the development of modern monopoly capitalism.
Notes


A NOTE ON ROD PREECE AND RED TORIES

William Christian

Although I am naturally delighted to see my name linked so closely with those of George Grant and Gad Horowitz, both modesty and honesty (not to mention prudence) require me to request that my case be tried separately. Perhaps it might be better to hang together rather than hang separately, but since it was central to the argument in Political Parties and Ideologies in Canada that Colin Campbell and I had departed significantly from the Horowitz thesis, I find it strange and embarrassing to have Gad Horowitz's brilliant insights attributed to me.

What novelty there is in Professor Preece's article, lies in the rediscovery of old misunderstandings and old methods. Ten years ago, few would have even considered it a striking observation that there were no ideological differences between Liberals and Progressive Conservatives. This was an article of faith, and the brokerage theory reigned supreme. Nor indeed, would anyone find it controversial, either a decade ago or indeed even today, to be told, as Professor Preece tells us at such length in his paper, that all leading English political figures of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries accepted the achievements of the Glorious Revolution and the Revolution Settlement. England had by universal account in the eighteenth century the finest system of government in the world, and Locke was the acknowledged theorist of the regime. I suspect that it is only certain Americans who would be surprised to discover that Edmund Burke had been associated throughout most of his career with the Marquess of Rockingham and the Duke of Portland in the Whig interest, although the meaning that can be given to these shifting coalitions of parliamentary groups is far from clear.

Now I am far from suggesting that simply because Professor Preece has reaffirmed an older conventional wisdom we should not take his arguments seriously. Novelty, as Aristotle counsels us, is more likely a sign of error than truth in political matters; and on a number of important issues Professor Preece's argument is very close indeed to the one which we advanced, although his enthusiasm for lumping us together with Grant and Horowitz and attacking us as a group appears to prevent him from seeing these similarities.
ON ROD PREECE AND RED TORIES

Perhaps Colin Campbell and I should have indicated more explicitly that we had broken from Horowitz’s argument in several important ways, although our consciousness of the great debt we owed him would have remained none the less. Horowitz had taken a great step in the understanding of the Canadian political community when he modified the Hartz-McRae thesis. McRae had argued that Canada was a liberal fragment, in essence similar to the United States, but with minor (and regrettable) imperfections. Horowitz saw that McRae’s imperfections were instead the manifestations of a significant, but minor, tory strain that was to prove of considerable importance in explaining subsequent Canadian ideological development. George Grant had noted the same phenomenon, and he commented with some pride that there had been Canadians whose memories extended to a remembrance of a past before the age of progress.

What kind of people, then, were these tories? Were they romantic Jacobites, toasting the king over the water? Or could there instead have been a covert sub-culture of Filmerian patriarchalists who had kept alive in the oral culture the view that the king ruled over his subjects because God had given an absolute dominion over Adam? Not a bit of it! We summarized and agreed with Horowitz as follows: "Horowitz’s point is that although the people in these groups [i.e. United Empire Loyalists and later nineteenth century British immigrants] were by no means unalloyed Tories, they were sufficiently unliberal to produce a different political culture." (p. 23) Can we be at all sure that the Yorkshire Methodists who emigrated to my area of New Brunswick brought Locke and Blackstone with them as cornerstones of a decent farmer’s library? No one I know, except Professor Preece, has ever suggested that the Whig triumph was total, even in the United Kingdom. Were Swift, Blake or Coleridge Whigs? Was David Hume tarred with being a Whig historian? But the poets and historians become political romantics for Professor Preece; Burke was the conservative and Burke was a Whig.

This argument, if at all clear, would confound only those who believed Burke to be the authentic source of modern philosophical conservatism, as do some of the American writers whom Professor Preece cites. For those of us whose interest lies in the development of Canadian Conservatism, it is completely beside the point. What fascinated us was that there was an apparently significant difference between Canadian and American Conservatism (and British, for that matter) and we wanted to understand how it could have arisen. Since it is in principle impossible to do retroactive attitudinal surveys in the eighteenth and nineteenth century, we are left with the proposition that must necessarily stand at the level of a supposition, that immigrants to British North America carried with them an ideological mix different from those who settled in the American Colonies.
It is an inference of the Hartzian thesis about fragment societies that Horowitz picked up, following McRae’s lead, that fragments were by definition not miniature replicas of the original society. Consequently different fragment societies could manifest the elements of the original society in different ways. It was Hartz’s own curious and unnecessary assumption that fragment societies tended to be, or needed to be, pure. Horowitz, however, went on to accept the fragment theory notion of congealment, that is the assumption that fragment societies reach a point at which they become relatively stable and then act to assimilate new immigrants to the dominant ideology.

We explicitly rejected the necessity of congealment. (20) In contrast we presented throughout our work a picture of Canadian ideological development which was analogous to the dynamic model Hartz himself had sketched with reference to Europe. In addition we further modified the Hartzian analysis by taking seriously George Grant’s argument that liberalism had, throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth century, become increasingly ascendant. Although we credited Horowitz with a major insight, we thought that he had been too much influenced by the fragment model. The Canada we saw had manifested a European pattern of development, although with a different mix of toryism and liberalism, the former being weaker and the latter stronger than in Europe.

The antithesis between these two ideologies ought, on the Hartzian analysis, to have been able in its own right to generate an indigenous socialism; and we believe that it was capable of doing so. The British immigrants in the late nineteenth century, who had come from a society in which the pace of ideological development had moved more quickly, found that socialist ideals were not totally alien in the new land, especially those that did not rely too heavily upon a Marxist inspiration. This interaction and development, which we called the ideological conversation, never stopped, although liberalism frequently hogged the stage and spoke rather more loudly and more often than politeness might have allowed.

If Professor Preece still finds the coherence of this argument lacking, I would like to suggest that there was another important source of tory-feudal ideals which he (and Horowitz) surprisingly overlook, namely the ideological character of the French Canadian inheritance. French Canada spun off at a time when feudal ideas were relatively stronger in Europe than they were in the eighteenth century, and it would have been strange if the immigrants’ stock of feudal notions were not more deeply rooted. The military success of English arms in eighteenth century Canada injected an increasingly potent liberal virus into the French Canadian body politic, which subsequent Anglo-Scottish traders reinforced. Confederation slowed the speed of the penetration, but it also decreased the possibility that French Canada would
survive as an isolated feudal fragment. The social democratic orientation of the Parti Québécois is a further manifestation of the ideological outcome which the Hartzian thesis of dynamic development would lead us to anticipate.

The Liberal-Conservative Party which Macdonald and Cartier created had its roots in both English and French Canada, and probably drew its original tory-feudal inspiration more from the bleus than from Canada West. As we noted with reference to Durham's Report: . . . there has long been in Canada an indigenous conservative tradition with strong local roots, more pervasive in French Canada than English Canada, although at the time Durham wrote it was still dominant in English Canada through the political control of the Family Compact. (79) We also drew attention to the fact that the very name of the party indicated that even in its origins it was a coalition rather than a synthesis of ideologies. (eg. 83-84)

None of this amounts to an argument that the Canadian Conservative Party was ever, even in its origins, a purely tory party. It was not; and I doubt that any serious scholar, or politician, ever asserted that it was. Macdonald himself explicitly repudiated the idea (80) and it would be an audacious historian of Canadian Conservatism who would take issue with such an authority. What we did suggest, and the balance of evidence still strongly favours this position, is that there were in the original elements out of which Canadian Conservatism was created sufficiently important tory-feudal elements to generate indigenous and continuing ideological development in antithesis to the predominating liberalism both without and within the Conservative Party.

Having misunderstood our argument so far, Professor Preece thinks that he can drive home the victory with a devastating reductio ad absurdum:

If early Conservative philosophy was in some measure and manner "corporate-organic-collectivist" then we are forced to the conclusion that modern Conservatives deny their own heritage; they must be seen to be repudiating their own history . . . If Christian and Campbell's view is correct we are constrained to accept the improbable thesis not only that both parties have renounced their own past but that each has taken as its own the position formerly held by the other. (Preece 15-16)

Had we been looking for one enduring essentialist description of Canadian Conservatism, of the kind that Professor Preece seems to seek, we
might indeed have been embarrassed by this apparent absurdity. Fortunately for us, we treated the historical past as the record of how thinking men had responded to their concrete circumstances. Had Professor Preece read our treatment of Canadian Conservativism with any reasonable care, he could not have failed to notice that we noted explicitly the alteration he finds so ludicrous. “Under Drew, the party continued on in the new paths charted by Bracken, repudiating many of the historic principles which had comprised Canadian Conservatism before that time.” (99) Professor Preece might regret the force of the spell worked on Canadian Conservatives by the little grey wizard of the age, Mackenzie King, but it happened; and I think that we fairly chronicle its progress.

As an argument against our analysis we see Arthur Meighen cited as a Conservative leader who expressed a strong individualist bent. Were we then unaware of this aspect of Meighen’s political thought? Clearly not. Instead we cite Meighen as an important figure in effecting this change, and, incidentally, the reasons we give mark a further modification of Horowitz’s argument:

On the whole Horowitz treats the social and ideological composition of Canada as if it were relatively uniform. Clearly this is not the case. In the Maritimes, the liberal fragments were much weaker, and a more tory attitude was implanted by the predominately loyalist settlement. The settlement in the West was much later and of a much more strongly liberal bent . . . Meighen reflected this disposition. (89)

Although we cite Davie Fulton, John Diefenbaker and Robert Stanfield as leading Conservatives who found much to admire in their party’s tory heritage, we were and are in pains to emphasize that Canadian Conservatism has always consisted of a usually inharmonious mix of ideologies. We summed up Robert Stanfield’s predicament along with these lines:

Stanfield is in the quandry that all Conservative leaders since Macdonald have faced. Pure toryism commands neither majority support in the country, nor even within the party as Fulton’s unsuccessful attempts at the leadership have shown . . . Yet to transform the Conservative Party into a liberal one is to make it redundant in a
political setting which already has a party which espouses
a relatively pure form of liberalism. (111)

"Red tory" was, in Horowitz's original exposition, a useful description
because its paradoxical character was initially striking. It was always an im-
plausible and misleading term. When we sketched the lineaments of
ideologies we suggested that toryism's central values were "collectivism, and
hierarchy or privilege" and that socialism shared collectivism with toryism
but sought "to replace privilege by equality". (26) A red tory, therefore,
would have to believe in collectivism, and simultaneously, or in quick suc-
cession, in privilege and equality. I do not believe that this intellectual con-
juring trick was attempted by many. Most Canadian Conservatives found
that business liberalism coincided comfortably enough with a defence of
privilege, and their collectivism could take the satisfactorily modest form of
a faith in the coherence of the social order.

It is, however, clear that Horowitz took the red tory concept more serious-
ly than I ever could; and we had occasion to take substantial exception to
part of Horowitz's analysis. In a discussion of Canadian Conservatism in the
1930's we wrote: "It is impossible in the light of this analysis to agree with
Horowitz that Bennett was a 'red tory', a man who might prefer the CCF-
NDP to the Liberals. In no way can we accept the argument that the Ben-
nett New Deal was, as Horowitz claims, a manifestation of 'leftism' derived
from tory democracy." (94)

I have not belaboured these points to establish a priority of discovery,
though I do find it annoying to see my position systematically confused with
that of Horowitz, and to find myself attacked for not making points which I
did in fact make unambiguously and at some length. Had Professor Preece
merely wanted to impugn the limited usefulness of the term 'red tory', I
would have no objection, although I still would have thought it curious to
see myself held up as a proponent of the term.

But Professor Preece wants to go further. He wants to deny that there was
ever any significant tory element in Canadian Conservatism, that there "are
just Lockes, Hobbes, and Burkes and the occasional Charles James Fox."
(Preece, 23) Would perhaps that there were, for these were all great men,
although none was exactly a model of political success. It is perhaps
refreshing, if not very helpful, to see Canadian Conservatism described as
other than a choice between Senators Goldwater, Percy and Javits. However
too much is ignored and too many questions are left unanswered if we turn
our backs on our own past, and seek enlightenment in the history of other
political traditions. I had hoped that if our book were to have any effect it
would turn attention away from the attempt to find the answers to Cana-
WILLIAM CHRISTIAN

dian questions elsewhere than in Canada. It had been the regrettable tendency in the past for writers on Canadian ideologies to turn first to European or American ideologies with similar names, and then assume that the Canadian counterparts were copies which the lack of imagination of Canadian politicians, combined with their notorious penchant for compromise, had corrupted.

In Political Parties and Ideologies in Canada we treated Canadian ideologies as ideas which had European origins, but which became securely rooted in the British North American political tradition. As a consequence they had acquired a history which could be written and an identity which could be explored through their history. We were not very interested in affinities, which are relatively uninteresting phenomena in the history of ideas. On the other hand, we were interested, where relevant, in influences, such as how Roosevelt's New Deal had been mediated to Bennett through Herridge. As historians and philosophers, these were our legitimate concerns.

We also thought it unprofitable to set ourselves up as judges of doctrinal purity and we were content to accept the opinion of the Liberal-Conservative Party, or the Union Government or the Progressive Conservative Party that its leaders and senior party spokesmen represented something called Canadian Conservatism upon which they, by their position, were singularly qualified to pronounce. Canadian Conservatism is as Canadian Conservatism says. Indeed, in Canada, the Whig is a myth, and a not very persuasive one at that.

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Notes

1. Page references are to W. Christian and C. Campbell, Political Parties and Ideologies in Canada, (Scarborough: 1974). Those to Preece's original article [Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Spring, Summer 1977).] are indicated Preece.
I was somewhat surprised to discover that Professor Christian had interpreted the thesis of my piece on ‘The Myth of the Red Tory’ as the proposition that there are “no substantial differences between Liberals and Progressive Conservatives”. In order to allay any further misunderstanding, given the gratifying interest the article has aroused, it would appear appropriate for me to state my conception in a rather more complete and perhaps more enlightening form.

Both Conservatives and Liberals are, in my view, born of the liberal tradition but whereas Conservatives remain legitimate heirs to a critical version of that tradition, Liberals have entirely suborned that tradition. That is, the classical liberal tradition of limited government and economic individualism, restricted by law (in the liberal version) and also by order, by prudence, by a critical approach to rationalism and by duties (in the conservative version), remains alive in the Progressive Conservative Party but was buried before the turn of the century by increasingly collectivist Liberals who followed the new welfare liberalism advocated by T.H. Green, John Stuart Mill and L.T. Hobhouse. It is classical liberalism, not welfare liberalism, with which conservatism has much philosophically in common, although the centripetal forces of electioneering and brokerage politics do much to persuade Conservatives in practice to adopt a welfarist liberal stance which, in its present extreme form, militates against their traditions.

In classical liberal philosophy man was freed from the tutelage of the state, but as liberals were increasingly imbued with the idea of progress they came to recognize the state as an indispensable agent of that progress; and they now regard the state as the means whereby the individual frees himself from the economic fetters of the marketplace. The conservative, on the other hand, while rejecting feudalism almost as vehemently as the liberal, has been far more skeptical than the liberal about man’s propensity for successful change. He saw that man was not born an isolated individual but as a member of a family and a nation in which he found a measure of his identity and to which he owed a measure of his duty (feudalism, we must remember, had little sense of nation),
that increased use of the state involved the danger of diminishing man's responsibilities (hence the constant conservative appeal to self-help), and that an extensive welfare state would deprive man of his dignity (although welfare measures designed to enhance individual responsibility were never inimical to conservative doctrine). In short, the conservative recognized the merit in the liberal's claims but rejected their extreme versions as utopian panaceas, he attempted to restrict those claims by the need for societal equilibrium, and today he worries about the simplistic belief in the virtues of democracy rampant because he ignores the necessity of restricting all power — in whomsoever's hands — if we are not to suffer dictatorship. For Halifax, Bolingbroke and Burke the danger foreseen and rebuked was monarchical dictatorship. For the modern conservative the dictatorship of the democratic proletariat is the current danger.

Having made my perceptions more explicit, let me return to the claims of Professor Christian. He asserts that in 'The Myth of the Red Tory' I misrepresented his views. If that is so, I apologize. In order to ensure that the charge cannot be levelled again, I shall be careful to deal with Professor Christian's arguments entirely in his own terms.

Professor Christian informs us that "the antithesis between toryism and liberalism ought, on the Hartzian analysis, to have been able in its own right to generate an indigenous socialism; and we believe it was capable of so doing . . . This interaction and development, which we call the ideological conversation, never stopped . . ."

Socialism, then, we are expected to believe, is the synthesis of the contradiction between tory and liberal values. Christian goes on to quote from his book with Colin Campbell (Political Parties and Ideologies in Canada) that "'in the Maritimes the liberal fragments were much weaker, and a more tory attitude was implanted by the predominantly loyalist settlement. The settlement in the West was much later and of a much more strongly liberal bent.'"

Now it follows from Christian's statements that where liberalism and toryism are present the propensity to socialism is present and where either toryism or liberalism is absent the propensity to socialism is absent. Thus if there is any validity in the Hartzian thesis, as adopted by Christian and Campbell, then the Maritimes should be the Canadian breeding ground of socialism. It had, according to Christian, the necessary toryism, and we are further informed by Christian, following George Grant, that "'liberalism had throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth century, become increasingly ascendant'" in Canada as a whole. The Maritimes, therefore, had the necessary liberalism. Yet, as we all know, socialism failed to develop in the Maritimes. The lesson for the Hartzian model could not be clearer.

On the other hand, in the West, where, according to Christian, there was a "much more strongly liberal bent" — a point used by Christian to explain the
RESPONSE TO CHRISTIAN

individualism of Meighen — and hence the appropriate dialectical relationship was absent, socialism developed with greater strength than elsewhere in Canada. In other words, the facts are precisely the opposite of what they would have to be to support the Hartzian thesis!

Professor Christian goes on to tell us of “another important source of feudal-tory ideals”, namely French Canada. These ideals, he tells us, were more deeply rooted in French Canada than in English Canada, although “The military success of English arms in eighteenth century Canada injected an increasingly potent liberal virus into the French Canadian body politic, which subsequent Anglo-Scottish traders re-inforced”. One is bound to wonder why, if the warriors and the Anglo-Scottish traders had a partial but significant tory ideology themselves (which, to be consistent, Professor Christian must believe), the injected virus, on Christian’s own confession, was a liberal one. But that is only a minor point. The major point is that, if the Hartzian model is an appropriate one, French Canada must have been the province ripe for socialism par excellence. Yet socialism remained ineffective there (and waxed where the preconditions were absent!) until it arrived very late and in very dubious form with the Parti Québécois — whose success is to be attributed more to nationalist than socialist feeling, whatever the ideology of the party activists.

I find no difficulty in accepting the view that feudalism played a stronger role in Quebec than elsewhere in Canada, although I find the philosophe influence of the Marquis de la Galissonnière and his ilk is usually underestimated. But, however feudalist Quebec may be supposed to have been, if the Hartzian thesis were an adequate one — or even just a stimulating and instructive one — we would be entitled to expect socialism to have arisen earlier, more steadfastly and more purely in the “tory” Maritimes and “tory” Quebec (where liberalism is also present) than in the predominantly “liberal” West (where there is no toryism). The fact that the reverse is the case indicates that the Christian adaptation of the Hartzian model has absolutely nothing to recommend it.

What is, I think, even more significant to Professor Christian’s failure to understand the nature of Canadian Conservatism is his claim that “The Liberal-Conservative Party which Macdonald and Cartier created had its roots in both English and French Canada, and probably drew its original tory-feudal inspiration more from the bleus than from Canada West.” I am not persuaded of the influence of Cartier on the philosophy of the Liberal-Conservative creation. Moreover, I sometimes wonder whether the attempt of Canadian historiographers to discover a highly influential role for French Canadians in the history of our last two centuries reflects more a political state of mind than a concern with the realities of the past. More importantly, I am unable to discover adequate ground for considering the philosophy of Cartier (or of other important French-speaking Liberal-Conservatives) to reflect a “tory-feudal
inspiration", While Cartier acknowledged that French Canadians were "issu de l'ancienne France. Nous sommes Francais d'origine, mais Francais du vieux régime", he nonetheless made it clear that the contrast between Quebec and France was like that between Britain and the United States. He did not resurrect any feudal images but eulogized the new industrialized, capitalist Britain — "le seul gouvernement au monde ... qui, tout en utilisant l'élément démocratique, a su le tenir dans les limites raisonnables. L'élément démocratique a une heureuse action dans la sphère politique lorsqu'il est équilibré par une autre force. Nous avons cet avantage sur nos voisins les Américains qui ont la démocratie extrême."

Along with the democratic element within constitutional monarchy Cartier espoused "le système de responsabilité pratiqué en Angleterre ... Le président des Etats-Unis est un despote comparé à la reine d'Angleterre". He denounced reciprocity because he wanted Canada to become a modern industrialized nation. It was thus necessary to prevent that "la grande industrie manufacturière se concentrerait dans les principales cités des Etats-Unis." While the population of French Canada were "Englishmen speaking French" who shared the strength and equanimity of British power, by contrast "de l'autre côté de la frontière le pouvoir dominant c'est la volonté de la foule, de la populace enfin."

Cartier was, as has oft been said before, no philosopher, but there can be little doubt that his espousal of responsible government, the democratic element within constitutional monarchy, moderation, and an industrialized Canada, all indicate that his influence on the Liberal-Conservative Party was anything but of a "tory-feudal inspiration."

As to Macdonald himself, his attitude to Quebec's feudalist heritage was resonant and unmistakable. He described seigneurial tenure as "the system of the dark ages" and as "ruinous to the interests of Lower Canada." Abolition of seigneurial tenure was "for the purpose of wiping out the obstruction to enterprise and advancement which the feudal tenure presented." It was "for the purpose of opening up one of the most beautiful countries under the sun to British enterprise and British skill". I have quoted Macdonald on this before but it bears repeating: "I have always been a Conservative Liberal", he proclaimed, "I could never have been called a Tory". Nothing could be clearer about the original Liberal-Conservative attitude to what Professor Christian mistakenly calls "its original tory-feudal inspiration". If Professor Christian is content, as he claims, "to accept the opinion of the Liberal-Conservative Party, or the Union Government or the Progressive Conservative Party that its leaders and senior party spokesmen represented something called Canadian Conservatism upon which they, by their position, were singularly qualified to pronounce", then Christian has no alternative but to confess his error.
RESPONSE TO CHRISTIAN

Let me take one short passage from Christian and Campbell’s book in order to demonstrate how their analysis leads them astray. In discussing Bracken’s renunciation of protection, Christian and Campbell assert that, “This was a tremendous step, because, as we have argued, time and again, Canadian Conservatism had affirmed the importance of state intervention and control over economic forces in the interests of the nation.” (This is viewed by Christian and Campbell as an aspect of Conservative collectivism). “But now, Bracken was repudiating this position. A corollary of this new emphasis was the diminished importance of state initiatives. Previously, Conservatives had sought to harness the state’s power in the national interest; Bracken, on the other hand, believed that ‘government must be decentralized.’”

The passage is of importance because in it a number of the common misconceptions of the nature of Canadian Conservatism come together, and it also demonstrates the authors’ failures to come to grips with both historical detail and political reality. First, in its inception, the National Policy (i.e. Conservative protectionism) was political and economic expediency, not Conservative principle. At the 1877 London-Norfolk Picnic Macdonald declared, “I am in favour of reciprocal free trade if it can be obtained, but so long as the policy of the United States closes the markets to our products we should have a policy of our own as well, and consult only our own interests.”

Second, if the National Policy were seen as an aspect of Conservative collectivist principle and injurious to rural interests — as many politicians of the day suspected it in fact was — then Conservative collectivism would have to represent a view of the nation as a separate entity from the individuals who comprise it, whereas Conservative ‘collectivism’ in fact can only be understood with reference to the good of the individuals who comprise the nation. The difference between the strictly organic view of the state, as expressed by Plato, for example, and the view of the state as a unit of solidarity and identity, as expressed by Aquinas and Burke, is a significant one. Third, at the time of Bracken, state initiative received increased not decreased approval by the Conservatives — witness, for example, the Port Hope conference — and the party was roundly condemned therefor by Meighen and others. Indeed, state initiative is precisely what was needed to secure the removal of barriers to trade. Fourth, Bracken’s belief that government must be decentralized was neither novel — Borden, at least, had espoused explicitly a similar principle — nor did it require any diminution of state initiative. The federation may use more of the powers it retains — which was precisely what Bracken proposed to do. It is, of course, impossible to provide the detailed historical evidence for these assertions in the space at my disposal. They are, nonetheless, provided in full in Rod Preece and Wolfgang Koerner, The Conservative Tradition in Canada, Carleton Library Series, forthcoming.
ROD PREECE

It is unfortunate that much of what Professor Christian writes contains misleading innuendo. There is the assertion, for example, that Preece's "argument, if at all clear, would confound only those who believed Burke to be the authentic source of modern philosophical conservatism, as do some of the American writers whom Professor Preece cites." The implication from the words, and even more from the context, is that it is at least a little unusual for non-Americans to consider Burke the authentic source of modern philosophical conservatism. But in fact Burke is treated far more commonly than any other as that source. De Maistre (France), von Gentz (Austria) and Adam Müller (Germany) paid — in my view inappropriately — homage to Burke, and the historians Pinson, Reinhardt, Weiss and Artz accept Burke — quite mistakenly in my view — as the source of European Conservatism. I find it more convincing to treat Burke solely as the source of English-speaking conservatism. And I am unable to discover a single modern work on conservatism in the United Kingdom which does not accord Burke that prominence.

A sound case may be made that David Hume rather than Edmund Burke is the appropriate pater familias of mid to late twentieth century conservatism — though Christian does not, of course, attempt to make it — and it is refreshing that Ian Gilmour in his recent book Inside Right has found Hume a place alongside Burke in the conservative lexicon. (I tried something similar in The Conservative Tradition in Canada). But it should be clear to anyone acquainted with the works of Hume and Burke that the former is even less of a corporatist, an organicist and a collectivist than the latter. Be that as it may, William Christian's implication that regard for Burke as the fount of conservatism is slightly unusual or is reserved for certain American conservatives is, to put it in its best light, inaccurate.

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Notes


T.H. GREEN AND THE BRITISH LIBERAL TRADITION

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Whatever else T.H. Green might be, he is an anomalous figure. A hybrid of the Utilitarian and Idealist schools, it can be said of him what Marx said of Bentham: he "could only have been manufactured in England." He is, consequently, a solitary figure. His Idealist disciples, principally Bradley and Bosanquet, moved off into realms rather more ethereal than the one he had trodden while liberals such as Hobhouse shifted toward the 'mundane'. Everyone (including a Prime Minister, Lord Asquith) paid tribute to him but no one really followed him; hence, his legacy is both diverse and elusive. It is, therefore, not the easiest of tasks to define just how, or why, Green is important to the British liberal tradition, although it is generally assumed that he is. Toward such definition, Phillip Hansen's article, 'T.H. Green and the Moralization of the Market' makes a useful contribution. However, I cannot totally agree with Hansen's assessment of Green. I think he miscalculates the nature of the man's importance and, in doing so, implies a view of nineteenth century British liberalism which is unrealistic. In this paper I should like to suggest an alternative assessment of Green's significance, and of the tradition of which he is a part.

My disagreement with Hansen really concerns his 'rating' of Green as a liberal theorist. "Certainly", he writes (p. 91), "Green understood the dynamics of capitalism much better than did other liberal theorists, particularly the Utilitarians." In my opinion, the degree of certainty displayed in this judgment is matched only by the extent to which it is debatable. In opposition to it, I would contend that, especially compared to the Utilitarians, Green had a very meagre comprehension of the dynamics of capitalism. His defence of it, and of liberal democracy, is not so much "sophisticated" (p. 92) as blind. It is this reversal of judgment which leads to an assessment of Green's significance which differs, at least in emphasis, from Hansen's.

I

At the outset, a brief comment on the term 'Utilitarian' is necessary. My concern is not with what it implies but to whom it is applied. Hansen, for

All parenthetical page references pertain to Vol. 1, No. 1.
example, appends it to Hume (p. 95), which is stretching the case. John Stuart Mill had most to do with appropriating the term for a particular school of thought and it is unlikely that he intended the designation to extend back beyond Bentham.\(^1\) The limitation is reasonable since it was Bentham who broke conclusively with natural law theory and established a wholly materialist system based on the principle of utility. Pain and pleasure were the constant 'sovereign masters' which guided his development from a Tory legal reformer to a radical democrat, via a decade and a half's immersion in political economy. In this way, he was distinct from earlier British 'Utilitarians', Hume among them, who were partially located in a natural law universe. Hence, I shall restrict my comments on Utilitarianism to Bentham and his somewhat heretical 'successor', John Stuart Mill.

For his part, Bentham displayed a remarkably precise understanding of early-nineteenth century capitalism. From the 1790's, one of his principal concerns was to indicate how an efficient market could be established, that is how the economy could be perfected, and the political barriers which prevented it be removed. Of Bentham's economic writings, virtually nothing can be said here; he wrote too widely on the subject to allow of any brief summary. All that can be noted is that his works stemmed from a vision of a society haunted by chronic scarcity, most concretely and starkly in the form of overpopulation. Consequently, the main social priority was the expansion of production; the feudal fetters to the accumulation and employment of capital had to be broken. This he set out to do, opposing what restricted the flow of capital (laws against usury, primogeniture) and supporting what stimulated it (laws of escheat). Generally, Bentham favoured a policy of laissez-faire which he thought would allow the countless individual calculations of pain and pleasure to give rise to a more productive (and therefore happier) society. Politically, this led Bentham along the road to democracy, for which his Plan of Parliamentary Reform is perhaps the seminal document — far more so than James Mill's more famous Essay On Government which pulls up short of Bentham's work on a number of points.\(^2\) His contention was that government had to be placed under the scrutiny of the whole of the adult population\(^3\) as a guarantee against rule by 'sinister interests'. Specifically, the argument was directed against the control of the non-productive, aristocracy/landholder class.\(^4\) In short, Bentham argued that democracy involved transferring political power to the productive part of the community, to the capitalists and wage-earners.

In other words, Bentham found that liberal democracy was necessary to the further development of capitalism. In fact, democratic capitalism seemed to represent the epitome of social stability: he had little understanding of the problems to which it would give rise. There are, however, good historical reasons for this. In the first place, Bentham's primary political opponent was a feudal remnant, the aristocracy/landholder class mentioned above. For him
the bourgeoisie and the as yet ill-formed working class were part of a 'productive alliance' against its parasitical life-style. Given this anti-feudal context, one can scarcely expect Bentham to have seen very clearly the fundamental nature of the antagonism between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, especially since the latter was still hardly discernible as a class. So far as he was concerned, both capitalist and wage-earner stood to gain by removing control of the government from unproductive hands. If their relationship involved a contradiction, it was secondary to their shared interest. This is underscored by the fact that, in Bentham's day, the forces of production were still relatively undeveloped. He had, for example, little idea of the impact machinery would soon have on the process of production. This too obscured the extent of the opposition between capital and labour; it simply had not developed to the point where a Marx could meticulously analyze it. This is not to say that Bentham was totally unaware of the 'transfer of power' involved in the relations of production; only that he thought it to everyone's advantage to accept it. In his terms, such a transfer was part of a market which created a surplus of pleasure over pain. What this represents is not a failure to understand the dynamics of capitalism, but an understanding of them within certain historical limits. However one judges Bentham, that much credit should be accorded him.

I would therefore argue that Bentham had a very good comprehension of the capitalism of his day, of the way in which wealth was amassed under it, how it was distributed and the kind of political machinery it required. Most of what he did not see he cannot reasonably have been expected to see. His is a very complete theory of early-nineteenth century capitalism, one which supported Ricardo and, in a different way, Marx.

The degree to which Mill backtracked on Bentham is still insufficiently recognized. Indeed, commentators on Mill tend to praise his retreats from Benthamite principles as necessary correctives to the master's rather vulgar approach to life. But the vulgarity was often no more than a refusal to moralize about topics not susceptible to such treatment. Bentham summed up the matter in one of his earlier writings on political economy:

I beg a truce here of our man of sentiment and feeling while from necessity, and it is only from necessity, I speak and prompt mankind to speak a mercenary language. The Thermometer is the instrument for measuring the heat of the weather; the Barometer the instrument for measuring the pressure of the Air. Those who are not satisfied with the accuracy of those instruments must find out others that shall be more accurate, or bid adieu to Natural
Philosophy. Money is the instrument for measuring the quantity of pain and pleasure. Those who are not satisfied with the accuracy of this instrument must find out some other that shall be more accurate, or bid adieu to politics and morals.}

The passage could well have served as a warning to Mill (and more so, to Green) who tended to reject Bentham's moral standard but to retain the market structure from which it had sprung and to which it was so well suited. Given this adherence to the market, it is doubtful whether he ever provided a more accurate moral and political thermometer than Bentham.

The problem is central to Mill's work. On the whole, he remained faithful to the political economy he had learned in his father's study, which means, among other things, that he never overcame the troublesome relations of production encased in wages and profits. At the same time, in the spheres of politics and morals, he moved quite far from his original Utilitarian positions, ruminating about the 'higher' pleasures and the sense of public interest which he hoped would eventually supplant the Benthamite insistence on self-interest as the basis of social life. This movement can be related to the fact that, since Bentham's day, relations between the bourgeoisie and the now fully formed working class had become antagonistic. Mill was well aware of this fact, almost painfully so, but as I have noted, he was unable to theorize its resolution at the level of political economy. Hence he was forced to find his antidote elsewhere, to envisage a political-moral world, which when properly developed, would overcome the opposition of economic life. But Mill was never sure of his vision and his uncertainty was reflected in the cautious nature of his support for democracy. That caution — the enthusiasm for such devices as weighted votes and an established clergy — was indicative of the resilience of the opposition between labour and capital. Try as he might, Mill could not make it go away, and as a result there was a tension in his political works, a fear of mass politics which sometimes drove him to the kind of moralizing about working class depravity so typical of the bourgeoisie of his day (although he was too intelligent a theorist to sink to the depths of many writers). In the end, Mill's work suffers from the same double vision as Green's, envisaging a competitive and class-divided economy coexisting with a non-competitive and unified political-moral world. The two realms are ultimately irreducible; the best Mill can do in the Principles of Political Economy is to suggest that the cooperative movement will foment a 'moral revolution' in which class conflict will be transformed into a 'friendly rivalry' between capital and labour. The opposition of economic life is complemented with the friendship of political and moral life.
Mill’s work is difficult to assess. I would contend that it is less consistent than Bentham’s, and in many ways less valid. But I would also contend that one cannot thereby infer that Mill’s grasp of capitalism was weak. On the contrary, the inconsistencies and the vacillations in his theory may well be attributed to his sharp awareness of the contradictions of capitalist society, of his keen insight into the reasons for the hostility with which “buyers and sellers of labour” eyed each other. Why he did not produce a systematic answer to the problems he saw is a question which stretches far beyond the limits of this paper. All that can be said, and only argumentatively, is that while Bentham was up to the task of theorizing early-nineteenth century capitalism the same cannot be said (at least not so emphatically) for Mill in mid-century. Again, this is not to say that he did not understand his subject in terms of seeing many of its problems, but he was uncertain of how to deal with them. The “stationary” state of the Principles of Political Economy is perhaps symbolic of Mill’s plight. Based on an insight into the tendency of the rate of profit to decline, and of capitalism to stagnate, it freezes rather than corrects the problem. The stationary state is a vision of a world suspended in a capitalist limbo. Ricardo had also seen that vision but, in an earlier period, he could ignore it. Mill could neither ignore it nor surpass it. His claims for it to the contrary, the stationary state is very much the product of historical befuddlement. Given his remarkable intellectual capacity, he reminds one here of a theorist’s version of a person whose party has been cancelled: all dressed up with no place to go.

In this sense, Green was quite faithful to Mill’s legacy. He went nowhere with a flourish, appending to Utilitarianism an elaborate metaphysical structure which, when all was said and done, served basically to justify the tired old system of laissez-faire. There is a certain simplicity to Green’s approach; he simply ignored many of the touchier problems of political economy which had constantly commanded Mill’s attention. Far from understanding capitalism better than Mill, he scarcely understood it at all, except perhaps intuitively. After all, what is the evidence of his comprehension — that he saw that the proletariat had to be better treated? Long before Green, feudal Tories like Shaftesbury had realised as much. And a quarter of a century before Green’s principal writings, Mill was well aware that a badly fed working class was likely to be revolutionary material.17 (cf. Hansen, p. 112) Compared to Mill, Green offered an opaque view of class conflict; his references to it were mainly testaments to obscurity. Generally, his concern for the working class took the form of demands for more education and better working conditions (not to mention restriction of the sale of alcohol),18 demands which many Tories could
T.H. GREEN AND BRITISH LIBERALISM

support. As Hansen notes (p. 110), Green suggested no fundamental change in the class structure itself; it is doubtful he understood it well enough to do so. The players were to be better provided for but the game was to go on as it always had.

Not only did Green have a shaky grasp of class conflict, he had almost no comprehension of basic political economy, something to which his chapter on property in Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation gives testament. There, after laying the blame for the miserable condition of the proletariat like a wreath on feudalism’s grave, he proceeds to a discussion of that class’ expectations under capitalism. Green concludes that despite the desperate circumstances of many workers, they can reasonably hope to obtain sufficient property to live moral lives. In fact, as Hansen observes, (p. 107), he believes that they can themselves become capitalists, adding that in the better paid industries this is already the case inasmuch as workers there often own homes and furniture and belong to co-operative societies.¹⁹ Now the problem here is not so much as Hansen puts it (p. 101), that Green could not see that “the vast majority of men are prevented from ever becoming capitalists,” but that he obviously did not understand what constitutes a capitalist in the first place. The essential point is the utter naivety of his view of property. Hansen comments (p. 107), somewhat peripherally that Green “appears to say that wages are a form of wealth similar to profits”, but he fails to follow the remark to its conclusion — which is that Green (unlike Bentham and Mill) did not understand, or at least make the distinction between property which is utilized as capital and that which is simply consumed. In short, he did not understand a basic concept of capitalism. To him property was all of one type and capitalism simply signified private ownership of any kind.

Green’s dictum that workers can become capitalists thus boils down to the contention that they can be adequately paid. In making it, he actually abolishes capital, collapsing it into an undifferentiated mass of possessions. Thus Green provided no particular justification for capitalism at the level of political economy. Theoretically, any mode of production which provides people with enough property to live moral lives, on his account an amount far less than the fortune of the average entrepreneur, should be acceptable. Of course, as Hansen points out (p. 105), Green’s justification of capitalism stems not primarily from the wealth it produces but from the way in which it is produced. Capitalism is necessary because it involves the private appropriation which allows the individual to “realize his will”. However, this makes Hansen’s criticism (p. 108), that Green did not see the systematic transfer of power which capitalism entails, curiously beside the point. Had he seen it, he probably would have eulogized it in the same way Mill eulogized competition, as a stimulant to private initiative.²⁰ The position of the worker relative to that of the capitalist, his dependence on him for access to the means of labour, was
irrelevant for Green as long as his wages were not so low as to preclude moral life. Green's overt concern for capitalism extended no further than was necessary to his metaphysics; he justified it by turning it into a by-product of the will's search for "self-realization". In his concern to point out the lacuna in Green's theory which hurts his case for capitalism — essentially the transfer of wealth and power from worker to capitalist — Hansen slides by the one which helps his case, or at least allows him to make it. That is his utter disregard of even the basic concepts of political economy.

Hansen's neglect of this point leads him into a rather speculative and debatable interpretation of Green's defence of capitalism. He interprets (pp. 110-11) Green's assertion that in his "realization of the [moral] idea" the individual is limited to the "duties of his station" as implying that the capitalist performs a higher moral function than the worker. I would suggest that by lumping together all types of private property Green precluded the possibility of such a distinction. The capitalist is not entitled to property because he has, in Hansen's words, (p. 111), "a greater capacity for fulfilling the moral end than does the man without any capital." He can, in fact, lay claim to no special justification for the extent (and for Green it is 'extent' not 'type') of his ownership. The capitalist's property, just like the worker's, is the result of the teleological requirement that individuals seek self-realization through private appropriation. Now there may be a puritanical suggestion here that he who appropriates most is most moral, but that does not seem to me to be the thrust of Green's writings. For him, differences in property indicate differences in talent, but they are not the ground of moral distinctions. Property is a basis — a first stage — of morality, not a test of it; the test is one's contribution to the common good. The whole point of Green's defence of capitalism is that worker and capitalist are equally free to contribute. At the level of morality, his view of the class structure was not so much that it was necessary but that it was, or should be, irrelevant. The argument is virtually an inverted Utilitarian one; since classes are an unavoidable by-product of the private appropriation so essential to moral growth, it is to the net advantage of society to accept their existence. In terms of morality, they are neither necessarily helpful nor hurtful. Beyond this, Green did not go: he was too rooted in a laissez-faire world to develop either the incisive class analysis of Hegel or the corporatist leanings of Bosanquet and Bradley.

The peculiar mix of Green's theory is important. He overlaid Utilitarianism with a strong dose of German metaphysics filtered through the prism of British Nonconformism. This 'layering' and 'filtering' is the essence of his defence of capitalism. His metaphysics and his religion isolate him from a realm (the one in which Utilitarianism was rooted) essential to an understanding of capitalism, that of political economy. If, "within his premises, he argues his position quite persuasively . . .," (pp. 112-13) it is largely because within his premises
T.H. GREEN AND BRITISH LIBERALISM

Teleology suffocates science. Capitalism is justified a priori and subsequent independent criticism at the level of political economy is ruled out. That would seem to be the source of Green's great confidence in the chapter on property in Political Obligation. On the basis of his metaphysics, he knows what the answers to his questions about the political economy of capitalism must be. The queries are purely rhetorical. In comparison, Mill's uncertainty is much more enlightening, and enlightened.

III

Having said this, I must warn against the conclusion that Green is entirely to be ignored or denigrated. I agree with Hansen that an understanding of his work is important to a critique of capitalist democracy. However, such a critique should not depend upon presenting Green as anything like a clear-eyed marshal of capitalism's defences. His success in that role has rather more to do with his vagueness about what capitalism is and how it unfolds. Vagueness and obscurity are a large part of Green's legacy to liberal theory. A brief look at the fate of his concept of positive freedom may help to explain this point. As Hansen notes (p. 105), the concept is an important one in Green's writings; it contains his vision of social improvement, linking the private appropriation of negative freedom to a communal ideal in an attempt to promote social unity. Yet, when one looks for it in the work of younger Idealists like Bradley and Bosanquet it is virtually unrecognizable. There, positive freedom has been turned into what Green termed "moral freedom", which is basically an individual state of grace, the absolute communion of reason and will. The social intention of Green's concept is by-passed and the result, in both cases, is an archly conservative doctrine which ignores his concern for reform.23 The spirit of the concept was given continued life in the work of men such as Hobhouse, A.D. Lindsay and even Harold Laski but its fate has not really been a happy one. By the end of the Second World War, it has largely disappeared as an explicit concept in British liberalism. In Sir Isaiah Berlin's 'Two Concepts of Liberty', for example, it serves as a whipping boy for all that is wrong with the tradition and in the end is rejected as anti-liberal.24

One could perhaps argue that positive freedom has been rejected mainly because even its indirect insight into the contradictions of capitalism and liberal democracy — the lack of 'social unity' it points to — is too much for liberalism to bear.25 There is, however, another point which should not be missed. Green — and the debate about negative versus positive liberty is an example of this — has provided liberal theory with 'safe' ground for discussion. By artificially covering the realm of political economy with a metaphysical layer, he has made it possible to carry on a debate about the shadow rather than
ANDREW LAWLESS

the substance of social issues. The problem of class conflict, for example, is imbedded in the concept of positive freedom but it is not easy to find it there. It is, as it were, kept out of sight. Thus, writers can discuss the concept of liberty without risking a direct confrontation with one of the very things which gives meaning to such discourses, the very real class antagonisms of our society. In fact in many cases, they can discuss liberty instead of class conflict. In this manner, we can arrive at one critic’s opinion that there is only a “mere historical connection” between the development of the concept of positive freedom and the circumstances of late-nineteenth century British liberalism. Perhaps Plato’s analogy of the cave serves as the best description of the theoretical space which Green created for succeeding generations of liberal theorists.

Attributing Green’s importance more to his misunderstanding than to his understanding of capitalism necessarily involves a view of British liberalism which differs from Hansen’s. To note the obvious, it removes Green from the mountain top. And, when that is done, it is possible to indicate for the nineteenth century a pattern of decline. Of the three thinkers I have considered, each of whom stands out in his own day, Bentham’s understanding of his own period was the greatest, Green’s the smallest. To borrow the terminology of psychoanalysis, Bentham’s theory is relatively healthy, in touch with the demands of the day; Mill’s is somewhat neurotic, trying desperately to mediate between the demands of the ethos of laissez-faire and those of an increasingly socialized, interdependent world; Green’s is psychotic, reality has succumbed to fantasy and can only be glimpsed through its obscuring haze. It is precisely this ‘psychotic’ haze which has enveloped much of liberal theory for the past century, producing reified debates about concepts that are divorced from the social reality which could, and once did, give them meaning. That I think, is Green’s real political legacy.

To conclude, I must stress that my disagreement with Hansen is partly a matter of emphasis. I do agree with him that Green was a “possessive individualist” (of sorts), that one purpose of his work was to provide a defence for capitalism and liberal democracy, and that it was based on a theoretical position which precluded thorough criticism of either. But I would contend that Green’s defence depended very much on the obscurity of his analysis of capitalism, on the fact that he ignored issues Bentham and Mill refused to ignore. I have further contended that that was the secret of the appeal he had for his fellow liberals. In this context, it is instructive to note how soon after their deaths Bentham and Ricardo became embarrassments to the bourgeoisie, how much energy was expended in refuting them. Perhaps Keynes explained why this was so when he referred to “the final reductio ad absurdum of Benthamism known as Marxism.” The point is that Bentham, along with Ricardo, did provide much of the foundation for *Capital*. This perspective may

150
help us to extract new meaning from Hansen’s observation (p. 92) that, for Green, ‘strictly Utilitarian-Benthamite assumptions . . . could not form in themselves an adequate justificatory base for the market.’ Within their historical limits, I think they could and did. They constituted a very reasonable analysis of early-nineteenth century British society, providing a base not only for Marx but also for the working class political economy of men like Thompson, Hodgskin, Gray and even Owen (for whom Bentham provided financial backing). I suspect that Green’s problem had rather more to do with the fact that they did not, after about 1830, easily admit of development in a manner acceptable to the bourgeoisie. It is in his role as a representative of that class that Green rejects them. Yet Utilitarian-Benthamite assumptions could not be safely done away with without also doing away with the market. Consequently, Green did all he could do; he covered them over, obscuring their influence and their meaning.

Keynes’ comment, and Marx’s own implicit assumption that he was the real heir of the Utilitarians and the Classical Political Economists as well as of Hegel, should be taken seriously. From different perspectives, both carry a warning against accepting too uncritically the interpretation liberals generally put on their tradition. For to do so is to risk castigating theorists for being unscientific, or ‘incorrect’, when what they are really guilty of is outliving their usefulness to the bourgeoisie. If the sons are not to be blamed for the sins of the fathers, neither should the fathers always be blamed for those of the sons.

Postscript

In this paper, I have considered Green in his role as a defender of capitalism. I should now like to soften the harshness of my judgement by noting its narrowness, which I think stems from my adopting the standard ‘political’ perspective on Green. While he is best known for his political writings, they in fact constitute a very small part of his work. Essentially, there are just two. One, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation, is a posthumous compilation of his university lectures; the other, ‘Liberal Legislation and Freedom of Contract’, is the text of a public lecture. When Green actually sat down to write a book, it was Prolegomena to Ethics which, in its concern with epistemology and psychology, is very representative of the bulk of his life’s work. However, since the turn of the century, and especially since Russell and Moore,30 his contributions in these fields have generally been debunked, so much that his reputation as a political theorist is virtually all that remains to him. As a result, the rest of Green’s work is now usually interpreted in the light of his political writings, as the groundwork for them. I have done that and so, I think, has Hansen.
Without rejecting this perspective, I should like to hint at another which would place Green in a better light. If we, however artificially, isolate Green's metaphysics from his politics we can perhaps indicate a positive contribution which he made to British thought. In a word, he brought to it what is essentially a theory of ego-development. He traced the process through which the individual takes his original self-image from the community, then personalizes it (in Green's case, through appropriation) in order to become a self-conscious social being. This essentially Hegelian psychology offered Britain a fuller portrait of the individual than the one the associationist psychology of the Utilitarians could provide. But when Green proceeded to a political application of his insight, he did so in the context of capitalism. Thus his "self-distinguishing consciousness"\textsuperscript{31} manifested itself by appropriating property, hardly a surprising method in a society which worshipped property to the extent Victorian Britain did. The important question is thus whether such unlimited\textsuperscript{32} appropriation is necessary to his theory of ego-development, for that is where his political theory (and his defence of capitalism) begins. It is unlikely; Freud's child, for example, does with language what Green's adult does with property. In any event, we are approaching from a different direction the point I stressed above; that Green's knowledge of capitalism extended no further than his argument about the necessity of private appropriation. The whole mode of production is condensed into that act making it the shaky bridge between his 'philosophy' and his 'politics'. If it crumbles, it takes with it the latter but not necessarily the former. I think it is possible to question Green's political writings, to question the incisiveness of his analysis of capitalism, without denying the existence of a real insight in his philosophy. I can say it only tentatively but it may be that most of us have highlighted the least valuable part of Green's work.

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152
T.H. GREEN AND BRITISH LIBERALISM

Notes


2. Mill favoured a relatively high age qualification for the franchise and seemed to find the argument for majority, as opposed to universal, suffrage convincing. (An Essay On Government, New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1955, pp. 74-77.) Bentham supported universal suffrage (see, e.g., Works, John Bowring Ed., Edinburgh: William Tait, 1843, vol. 3, p. 452.) and saw no reason for a high age qualification (see e.g., University College London Mss., Box 34, fo. X, 302-03.).

3. Privately, Bentham favoured the inclusion of women in the franchise; publicly, he excluded them because he thought the prejudice against their inclusion to be "at present too strong". (Works, vol. 9, pp. 108-09.)


5. E.P. Thompson (The Making of the English Working Class, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1970.) argues, for example, that it was not until the second decade of the nineteenth century that wage-earners and craftsmen began to locate their protests in the context of capitalism, ceased in effect to look back to a lost age. Moreover, it was not until the third or fourth decade that one could think in terms of a 'working class'.

6. E.J. Hobsbawm notes that, before the 1830's, "there was probably no enterprise except perhaps the occasional gasworks or chemical plant which a modern production engineer would regard as having anything but archaeological interest." (Industry and Empire, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1970, p. 68.)

7. Thirty years later, it was Marx's appreciation of the role of machinery in production which had much to do with his ability to surpass the political economy of Bentham and Ricardo.

8. Bentham did not see these relations, and the inequality they entailed, as good in themselves; quite the opposite in fact: "In proportion as equality [of fortune] is departed from, inequality has place: and in proportion as inequality has place, evil has place . . ." (Works, vol. 2, p. 271.)


10. Samuel Hollander argues that "the only full-fledged system in Mill's Principles is that of Ricardo." ('Ricardianism, J.S. Mill and the Neo-classical Challenge', in James and John Stuart Mill/Papers of the Centenary Conference, Robson & Laine eds., Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1976, p. 84.)

11. Here, Mill employs language which brings him very close to Green. For example, he contends that the education which would instil in people awareness of the qualitative differences between pleasures would also "give to each individual a stronger personal interest in practically consulting the welfare of others: it also leads him to identify his feelings more and more with their good . . . He comes, as though instinctively, to be conscious of himself as a being who, of course, pays regard to others. The good of others becomes to him a thing necessarily to be attended to, like any of the physical conditions of our existence." (Collected Works, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969, vol. X, pp. 251-32.)

12. Bentham wrote that: "In spite of everything which is said, the general predominance of self-regard over every other sort of regard, is demonstrated by everything that is done. . . . in the ordinary tenor of life, in the breasts of human beings of every mould, self is everything, to
which all other persons, added to all other things put together, are as nothing." (Works, vol. 9, p. 61.)

13. John Foster, in his study of three industrial towns (Class Struggle and the Industrial Revolution, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1974.), documents the aggressiveness the working class displayed toward the bourgeoisie in the 1830's (to the extent that in some towns the bourgeoisie demanded permanent militia detachments) and the latter's counterattack in the 1840's and '50's. Asa Briggs ('The Language of Class in Early Nineteenth Century England', in Essays in Labour History, Briggs & Saville eds., London: Macmillan, 1967.) has shown the degree to which class terminology became prominent in the Chartist years after the crisis of 1837.


15. Certainly, there are moments of frustration in Mill's work. "Few," he wrote, "have considered how anyone who could instil into these people [i.e., the working class] the commonest worldly wisdom... would improve their conduct in every relation of life and clear the soil for the growth of right feelings and worthy propensities." (Collected Works, vol. IV (1967), p. 377.) Green's close friend, Arnold Toynbee, was more direct, and perhaps more typical, when he warned his proletarian audience to "remember that the material change you want can only be got by the development of higher moral qualities." (Progress and Poverty, London: Kegan Paul, Trench, 1883, p. 54.)


17. In the Principles of Political Economy, Mill wrote that: "The working classes have taken their interests into their own hands, and are perpetually showing that they think the interests of their employers not identical with their own, but opposite to them. Some among the higher classes flatter themselves that these tendencies can be counteracted by moral and religious education: but they have let the time go by for giving an education which can serve their purpose." (Ibid, vol. III, p. 762.) Toward the end of his life, Mill posed the problem even more directly: "A portion of society which cannot otherwise obtain just consideration from the rest, may be warranted in doing a mischief to society in order to extort what it considers its dues. But, when thus acting, that portion of society is in a state of war with the rest..." (Ibid, vol. V, pp. 665-66.)


20. Hansen notes (p. 110) that "Green justified class inequalities as essential incentives to production." There is no reason to suppose that recognizing the transfer of power involved in this situation would have changed his mind. On his account, the limited power of the reasonably well-paid worker was sufficient for moral life.

21. This is the interpretation I would place on P.O., par. 223, which Hansen quotes on page 109 of his article.


23. With respect to the 'Greenites' concern for the living conditions of the working class, Bosanquet wrote: 'I am jealous — I frankly admit it — of any movement which appears to
T.H. GREEN AND BRITISH LIBERALISM

disparage by comparison the life of the citizen who lives at home and works among his
neighbours. This and not the other, appears to me to be the ideal.'" ('The Duties of


25. See e.g., C.B. Macpherson, 'Berlin's Division of Liberty', in Democratic Theory, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973. Macpherson argues that there is a sense of positive freedom — the sense in which Green used it — which entails criticism of the impediments to self-direction created by the class structure. He further argues that Berlin does his best to bury this sense of the concept beneath a more authoritarian one.

26. These class antagonisms do surface, but in a way which estranges them from liberty. For example, Maurice Cranston (Freedom: A New Analysis, 3rd ed., London: Longmans, Green, 1967.) argues, on linguistic grounds, that negative liberty is the true variant, while positive liberty is an authoritarian imposter. Only then does he admit (p. 53) that English liberalism and negative liberty have been to the advantage of 'big employers'. Nonetheless, since their validity has already been demonstrated linguistically, Cranston implies that to redress the balance may involve a sacrifice of liberty along with liberalism. Similarly, Berlin argues that 'it is a confusion of values to say that although my 'liberal' freedom may go by the board, some other kind of freedom — 'social' or 'economic' — is increased.' ('Two Concepts', p. 126.) Class revolutions involve the 'conquest of power and authority,' (Ibid, p. 162.) not the conquest of freedom. Thus, both Cranston and Berlin assume the incompatibility of discussions of class and freedom.


28. In his own way, Mill was in the forefront of the refutation of Bentham, and he was followed by Green and many others. For the rejection of Ricardo, see Ronald Meek, 'The Decline of Ricardian Economics in England', in Economics and Ideology and Other Essays, London: Chapman & Hall, 1967, esp. pp. 66-72.


32. It is important to note that Green favoured unlimited appropriation, not just appropriation to the point where one could live a moral life. The reason for this is to be found in metaphysics, not political economy. See, e.g., P.O., par. 219.
T.H. GREEN AND THE LIMITS OF LIBERALISM: A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR LAWLESS

Phillip Hansen

Professor Lawless has provided an interesting and intelligent critique of my article on T.H. Green's political thought. Among the several virtues of his paper are a generally cogent analysis of the Utilitarian tradition of political economy against which Green directed most of major political and philosophic arguments; and a shrewd assessment of the problems that the concept of positive liberty — Green's chosen vehicle for ameliorating the class conflict engendered by and through market social relations — has posed for modern liberal theory. Taken together, these two features of Lawless' critique define what I think is his understanding of the key strengths and ultimate limitations of British liberalism: both are rooted in political economy. On the basis of his position, Lawless argues that I have to a large extent misconstrued Green's defense of capitalism and hence overestimated his importance for the British liberal tradition. While claiming that in many ways his views accord with mine, and that some of our differences are merely matters of emphasis, Lawless also implies that we disagree in more substantive ways about the purpose and character of Green's work. It is because of those disagreements, based for Lawless on our seemingly different positions on the role of political economy in Green's writings, that in his eyes we offer radically different assessments of Green's significance.

But I wonder if perhaps Professor Lawless himself overstates our allegedly "real" differences, and hence misses those points on which we actually do differ more substantially? More specifically, I wonder if both he and I do not share a similar perspective on the nature and importance of Green's explicitly philosophical writings, whatever our supposed differences in interpreting his political work? I suggest we do in fact share such a perspective, but that while Lawless sees Green's philosophy as distinct from and in a sense superior to his politics, I find the two to be so inextricably intertwined that it is impossible to consider either separately without, in the context of Green's work, distorting both. It seems to me that this difference, and not so much our respective evaluations of Green's understanding of political economy, accounts for our divergent interpretations of Green's role as a thinker.

And there is more to the matter than simply the question of Green's status. At issue here is the problem of how the vulnerabilities and limitations of
THE LIMITS OF LIBERALISM

liberalism may best be understood. For Lawless, liberalism must be unmasked at the level of political economy because it is only in the realm of political economy that the real character of market society's relations of domination can become clear. For my part, while the critique of political economy is a necessary component of any attack on bourgeois hegemony, it must share the load with a philosophical critique: an examination of how advanced capitalist society is reproduced by and through the administration of the relations of everyday life beyond the work-place. Such administration is almost total: the very sense perceptions of society's members are moulded and shaped so that its class relations are seen as "natural". That this totalization is not, however, without problems for the maintenance of social control suggests that liberal society, and liberalism itself, are peculiarly vulnerable not only at the level of political economy, but also, and perhaps more importantly, at the level of culture, i.e. morality. It was because he sensed the increasing moral inadequacy of what was, even in Green's time, a rapidly changing market economy that I think Green occupies an important niche in liberal thought. I titled my article, "T.H. Green and the Moralization of the Market", and gave much attention to Green's philosophical critique of Utilitarianism, for that very reason.

Putting it another way, Lawless and I view the problem of what constitutes a sound liberal defence of liberalism from different vantage points. It seems to me that as liberal society changes, so too must its legitimating ideology change. Stated simply, the main problem now confronting liberalism is the adequacy of the bourgeois account of human nature. Green saw this and his defence of bourgeois values (and bourgeois society) must be seen in that light. As Lawless himself argues, Green's "essentially Hegelian psychology offered Britain a fuller portrait of the individual than the one the associationist psychology of the Utilitarians could provide." Surely this psychological issue has significant political implications. Lawless wants to reproach me for supposedly implying that Green somehow successfully defended liberalism while ignoring (and displaying ignorance of) the essential features of political economy — a "blind" defence at best. But this is precisely what liberalism has had to do. Green did not so much ignore political economy as assume the universal permanence of the market relations it subtends. His aim, rather, was to make explicit at the level of self-consciousness the moral (teleological) content of economic behaviour. In order to do that successfully, Green saw the need for liberalism to transcend Utilitarianism. That such a project is doomed from the outset was the main point I tried to make in my article, but the importance of that attempt cannot be overlooked.

In a certain sense, history has been much kinder to Green than philosophers have been. As the work of thinkers such as Marcuse and Lefebvre suggests, capital has succeeded where Green failed. Among other things, the triumph of the consumer ethic has flattened the distinction between property in capital
and property in goods for consumption, with important consequences for class consciousness. A kind of "positivist liberty" has emerged and with it the moralization of the working class in Western liberal democracies — one of the main purposes of Green's work. The process of capitalist development has made Green a success. What liberal thinker could wish a better epitaph?

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Books Received/Livres reçus

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