CIVILIZATION AND ITS CONTENTS

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The concept of civilization orginated in eighteenth-century France. It epitomized the confident self-understanding of an age that saw itself as having, once and for all, left behind the primitive life world of subsistence, superstition and barbarity. By its very nature, it was a self-image that entailed a concept of social and psychological evolution that represents probably the earliest secular variant of a world-historical perspective. The empirical indices of civilization were several: economic development beyond the narrow agrarian framework of feudal relations of production; progress in the natural sciences; religious toleration and freedom of thought and expression; enlightened political authority;...and finally a high degree of refinement of manners.

The inclusion of, and emphasis on, manners as an aspect of civilization became the object of criticism as early as the 1750’s, with the publication of Rousseau’s first two *Discourses*, Diderot’s *Supplement* and a few other writings. How can “manners”, this superficial and ritualized curtsying of the human being, claim a place alongside the state of science and technology when propriety of conduct is so patently unimportant and so clearly aristocratic in origin? Dissident intellectuals such as Rousseau were quick to pose such rhetorical questions merely to dismiss them. The same happened in Germany, except on a much larger scale. The German Enlightenment, the generation of Kant and Goethe, almost to a man counterposed to “manners” what it thought was a more authentic idea of civilization, namely *Kultur*, which was a specific formation of the inner man rather than a disciplining of the body. This trend continued throughout the nineteenth century, and it held sway over the whole spectrum of philosophical world views and persuasions. To the idealist, manners were too external, too corporeal, too material to have any relevance; whereas to the materialist they were the weakest link in a harmonistic ideology.
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that tried to make people believe there were no real antagonisms between
them, for they were saying, were they not, “Good day, sir” to one another.

In short, to reflective thought (as distinct from general opinion or from what
people think) the meaningfulness of a phenomenon such as manners declined
markedly during the nineteenth century. Were manners a telling indicator of
social evolution? The very idea made intellectuals laugh. What proponents it
still had were all and sundry second-rate apologists of the Restoration or
outright imperialists. Beware of manners! Beware lest you take manners for
what they are not! Be sure always to unmask the inhumanity that lies beneath
them! Such was the drift of the sceptical consensus concerning the notion of
manners.

The almost complete rejection of deportmental civilization as a major aspect
of progress had to be reviewed in a more psychologically oriented age than the
nineteenth century, namely our own. Strangely enough, despite the strong
tendencies since the turn of the century toward psychologism in theory and
introspection in everyday life, and despite the tremendous advances of in-
dividual and social psychology as scientific disciplines, there have been few
serious attempts to redeem the much-discredited notion of deportmental
civilization and to put manners on the agenda of modern thinking again.
Norbert Elias' *The Civilizing Process*, published 40 years ago in German, was a
first step in this direction, a step that initially made few waves. There may be
some secondary ripples now that the first volume of this important two-volume
work has finally been translated into English.¹

The fate of the book and its author is perhaps worth telling. In the early
1930's Elias collaborated with Karl Mannheim in Frankfurt, in the hope of
“habilitating” himself at a German university. Racist repression in Germany
forced him and Mannheim into exile in London, where Elias completed the
manuscript of *The Civilizing Process* in the mid 1930's. It took him another
three or four years to arrange publication by a small publishing firm in Swit-
zerland. The eventual publication coincided almost to the day with the
German invasion of Poland in the fall of 1939 — hardly an auspicious moment
for launching a fat treatise on anything, let alone on the historical pacification
of the human beast. The apparent naivé of its main thesis continued to
militate against a serious appropriation of *The Civilizing Process* in post-war
Germany for well over two decades. The appearance in 1968 of a second
German edition that included a lengthy new introduction marked something
of a turning point. Shortly thereafter, Elias was discovered in France and his
major work translated into French. With that publication, by Suhrkamp
Verlag, of a cheap paperback edition in 1976, Elias at last succeeded in reaching
a wider audience in his native Germany. All this is to say that the English
translation, appearing as it does more than 40 years after the book was written,
is not the fruit of an idiosyncratically archeological orientation on the part of the American publisher. On the contrary, interest in Elias is currently running high in continental Europe; making his work available to English-speaking readers is not an eccentric feat of excavation, but part of a trendy revival.

Why this belated popularity? *The Civilizing Process* has a two-fold appeal. First, it contains an important analysis of the formation of the modern state. This is a topic that has in the last ten years begun to interest Marxists who are rightly concerned about the lack of an adequate theory of the state in orthodox Marxism. Elias’ inquiry into the process of monopolization of power, written in the form of a case study of absolutist France, is probably economic enough in appearance to attract some attention among Marxists, regardless of the author’s philosophical orientation, which is not Marxist by any stretch of terminology. I do not intend to comment on Elias’ monopolization-of-power theorem which is set out in great detail in the still untranslated second volume of *The Civilizing Process*.

There is another major reason why this renaissance of interest in Elias is timely — the one-sided way social evolution has come to be viewed in the century since Marx. Let us look, from a Marxist perspective, at the great historical movement from an agrarian/feudal to an industrial/capitalist society. More specifically, what did the aristocracy do to bring about the new world of the bourgeoisie? The standard Marxist answer is a kind of undialectical “nothing”. At most the aristocracy is credited with having plugged its economic demand for exotic goods into the bourgeois circuit of commercial relations; it is credited with an increasingly friendly attitude toward cash-crop farming and money revenues in place of the old personal servitudes; it is credited with bringing about that increase in the efficient exploitation of the land that ultimately made possible the existence of growing secondary and tertiary sectors; and so on. Hyperbolically put, the feudal nobility for Marx and the Marxists was a group of rationally calculating businessmen whose chief handicap was their being tied to a primitive mode of production. Marxist theory says nothing about the progress from a cruel warrior mentality to the mannered ways of courtly society, which was a clear historical trend between the ninth and seventeenth centuries. As a result Marxism has a much too urbane perspective on the Middle Ages. Far from exaggerating the inhumanity of feudal society, Marxists tend actually to belittle its violence and the aggressive disposition of the warrior nobility.

It is here that we can see Elias furnishing a corrective. By tracing the outlines of a psychogenetic history of the French aristocracy he intends to revamp our false perception of feudalism as a period in which the only socio-historically important phenomena were economic, technological and demographic ones. The taming of “affect”, as he calls it, along with purely economic trans-
formations, is one of the prerequisites for the rise of modern societies. In other words, if it is true that the nobility of the late Middle Ages were the first to impose "affect control" on themselves as a group or class, then we must revise our estimate of the bequest it made to the bourgeois world, assuming it is correct that the middle class did in fact largely inherit the pattern of impulse control from their aristocratic adversaries rather than generating it on their own. (That impulse control is an indispensable trait of bourgeois patterns of behaviour, can hardly be doubted.)

The chief psychological presupposition of The Civilizing Process is that modes of behaviour of the kind we generally subsume under the heading of manners are not at all external to the development of the individual and that their phylogenesis, i.e. their historical rise to prominence as a modal pattern or structure marks a distinct stage in the progress of mankind. Norms of etiquette, Elias argues, are as firmly lodged in the superego as moral norms, and have the same kind of suasion as the latter. Were it not for this internalization of rules of etiquette, we could not explain a phenomenon such as the shame that attends their breach. Nor could we explain why people dream of situations in which they make fools of themselves in the eyes of others when perpetrating acts regarded as gauche. These are empirical phenomena which while directly pertaining to deportment and manners seem to point to an integration of soma and psyche at a deeper level of human life. They are behavioural manifestations of a depth structure to which is attached the capacity to experience fear of embarrassment, for example, by fantasizing about one’s own gaucheness in situations of social intercourse.

All of this had been grasped by Freud. It was he who first saw the depth-psychological repercussions and reinforcement mechanisms of what, to the untrained eye, looked like "mere" conformity to "external" rules of behaviour. If fear of breaking taboos of etiquette can haunt the individual’s dreaming and waking hours, we can infer that there is a greater degree of mediation and interdependence between what an earlier view had mechanically separated into external and authentic aspects of being. Concerned as he was with other things, namely the development of a universal theory of mental functioning, Freud did not pay systematic attention to the question of the historical origins of what Elias calls "affect control". In fact, Elias is the first to bring out the implications of the new psychology for the old discredited concept of deportmental civilization, which is an historical concept. In this regard, his two major theses are that the development of manners can be interpreted as a change in the structure of affects and that this change in the affect structure is closely bound up with institutional change: in France, with change during the period of nation-building and absolutism. It is in this way that Elias proceeds to correct the facile critique of the Enlightenment's
equation of progress with refinement of manners, on the one hand, and to historicise psychoanalysis in the spirit of *Totem and Taboo* and *Civilization and Its Discontents*.

It is generally next to the impossible to get a clearly defined understanding of "manners". The concept of manners we know is not coextensive with affect control. Western languages differentiate between manners, morality, law, parental repression, etc., all of them supposedly constituting different modes of affect control while often overlapping in terms of the area of behaviour they regulate. However, even as different modes of affect control, these phenomena cannot be clearly distinguished. Notably, manners and morality form a kind of ambiguous tangle which is difficult to sort out. Elias, thank God, takes the easy way out. For him, "manners" are those principles of conduct that are laid down in a literary genre called books of etiquette. Substantively these principles govern behaviour related to the ingestive and emissive functions of the body, sleep and sexuality. We can see that while "manners" are the sole judge of the way in which a person ought to blow his nose, they are not unchallenged in their authority over sex, since sexual morality has a separate existence alongside sexual manners. Where do sexual manners end and where does sexual morality begin? This remains, as I have mentioned, an open question for Elias.

Rather than worry about neat distinctions, Elias proceeds to adduce a wealth of evidence, quoting — at times fascinating — excerpts from books on manners written between 1500 and 1800. What is it exactly that is being proved? Answer: The intensification of affect control. What is affect control and especially what is affect, a concept that, unlike "instinct", "unconscious", etc., has no well-defined status in analytical psychology? Looking at the civilization of table manners, what meaning can I attach to the statement that eating with one's hands is "affective" whereas eating with a fork is affect-controlled? Does this mean that eating with one's hand is an act from which the individual derives greater emotional satisfaction? We can with some justification assert this to be the case for the child at a certain stage of immaturity. This however rivets the analysis to the level of ontogenesis which Elias does not address in his book. *The Civilizing Process* is about the historical evolution of modes of behaviour. In this area, if we take a psychological orientation of any kind, all we can say about the ill-mannered squire of the Dark Age is that his not using the fork appears natural to him and to his contemporaries. It is neither instinctually nor affectively more gratifying for him to use his hands than it is for his courtly successors — and finally ourselves as successors of the successors — to use a fork. By the same token, the contemporary gourmet does not feel that the eating implements are getting in the way of his enjoyment. On the contrary, he insists that they be available, clean.
and in a good state of repair. In other words, if affect is what a person really likes to do in the absence of deportment constraints, then civilization is not necessarily a mechanism of affect-inhibition and control. Rather, civilization then becomes an integral part of the individual’s cathexes of certain acts and performances.

In sum, I think there is a certain facility about the way in which we tend to chalk up deportmental civilization on the side of discipline, denial of gratification, and so on. While this connection may hold for the processes at work in the ontogenetic development of the human being, it does not necessarily and universally hold true for the evolution of stages of civilization, compared longitudinally over many centuries. Granted, Elias does not subscribe to the simple-minded view I have imputed to him. However, some of his formulations are vague enough to invite such a rendering as I have given here.

Putting the most plausible interpretation on the text, I think the phylogenetic thesis about affect control through manners makes the best sense when we view civilization as a process of increasing distances between human bodies. From this vantage point, dipping your hand into a common dish of food is not the same as retrieving some morsels from the same dish by means of a fork, and this in turn is not the same as piling some food from a common dish onto your own plate and eating it with your fork. In this three-stage sequence, the original aspect of a somatic oneness of a dinner community wanes, giving rise to what we might call spatial individuation of bodies. The same phenomenon can be observed in comparing medieval and early-modern sleeping patterns with contemporary ones in terms of the variable of space: Here, too, we see a tendency away from common family sleeping quarters to segregated bedrooms. Elias argues that this kind of somatic distancing, as evidenced by the privatization of sleeping quarters and the introduction of eating implements, reflects the growing sense of delicacy. Conversely, the ability to put space between oneself and one’s next of kin is the pre-condition for psychological civilization.

Looked at in this way, the concept of affect control is finally released from its confinement to individual psychology, thus enabling it to play the role of a building-block for a theory of interaction. Manners are fences between interacting individuals, guaranteeing to each a private space of his own that must not be invaded. When of two civilized actors one momentarily disregards a prescription of etiquette, the other will show discomfort, simultaneously a physical and a psychical reaction. More important, the violator of the rule will be ashamed and embarrassed, which is also a psychosomatic reaction. Discomfort and shame are constitutive of internal civilization or affect control only in the presence of others. On the objective side, manners are social definitions of what constitutes appropriate distances and what constitutes
excessive proximity between human bodies, whereas on the subjective side repugnance and embarrassment are telltale signs that manners have become truly internalized controls similar, for example, to the precepts of moral theology.

It may not be such an outrageous conjecture to think that if The Civilizing Process is going to have any specific impact at all, it will be, especially in North America, in the area of interactionist sociology rather than on general theories of social evolution such as historical materialism. In this connection it should be noted that E. Goffman made occasional references to Elias in the 1960's at a time when American sociology had never heard of him. I take this to be suggestive of a subterranean affinity which is probably going to become more explicit now that the translation is available. What The Civilizing Process can contribute to the study of behaviour in small groups is more than anything else, a much-needed historical perspective.

Any analysis of manners exposes itself to one of two perils: it tends to be either too functionalist or too formalistic. Elias does not err on the side of functionalism. He knows that the tortuous kowtows and curtsies of seventeenth-century courts cannot be related to specific purposes of society. Society does not require any particular set of deportmental norms governing the interaction of bodies. Unlike the incest taboo and the prohibition of murder, manners do not discipline people in a determinate functional way so that we can correlate even the most minute rule of etiquette with such and such a particular purpose of society. In other words, there does not exist any society whose inviolable foundation is the fact that people blow their noses into handkerchiefs or spit only into spittoons. All these highly specific regulations of conduct enjoined by codes of etiquette are fungible, that is to say not at all sacrosanct or foundational. It seems that nothing matters so much as the specific content of manners. The social purpose, if that is what it is, of manners — i.e. the maintenance of distance between bodies — can be achieved in a thousand different ways. Thus it is only in a completely empty and formalistic sense that we can maintain anything like a functionalist explanation of manners. Manners there must be, if society is to progress.

In the last instance then, while freeing the subject from the obtrusive physical presence of other bodies, manners merely reaffirm the "primacy of the object", i.e. the primacy of a society that shapes and disciplines its members. In civilization, the object is no longer the somatic unity of an interacting group eating food out of common bowl but becomes instead an abstract and formal principle of order bringing about the individuation of bodies by means of deportmental rules that seem to have no rhyme or reason. That is why quotes from Erasmus Colloquies and Francois de Callieres' Du bon et du mauvais usage, even when we read them at a distance of several centuries, are not sheer
fun. Today the most reflective individuals, including those who are least conformist in their thinking, take manners as they come, one set apparently being as good as another. There is a kind of crushing consensus to the effect that since manners are unimportant, the individual's deviation from them does not even have the meaning of a symbolic rebellion any more. It is this attitude of indifference that highlights the lack of freedom in the individual who is both the product and the victim of the civilizing process. Inter-disciplinary in the best tradition of German sociology, Elias' approach lacks sensitivity to the coercive objectivity of the process of rationalization, of which the psychological civilization of the human being is one important aspect.

The apologetic posture Elias takes in relation to manners can be partly explained by the broad scope of the notion of manners itself. If manners cover every type of interaction from common meals to cohabitation, then they are more than just censors of body crudity: at the end of the spectrum that is indicated by sexuality, they become censors of instinct. As censors of instincts manners lose the odium of being both risible and blatantly repressive. In accordance with his general view that manners are not a laughing matter, Elias ends the first volume of his book with an analysis of historical "Changes in Aggressiveness" (Ch. X) which I will briefly comment on in conclusion.

To begin with, a reorientation to different types of data is necessary for understanding the alleged pacification of aggression. The manuals on etiquette cease to be serviceable at this important juncture, for as a rule they do not define what constitutes propriety in the area of violent and destructive behaviour. Accordingly Elias gathers his data from a wider array of source materials. Thus he tries to document the civilizing of aggression, for instance, by comparing the cruel subjectivity of the early-medieval Chansons de geste with the mannered tenderness of the later troubadour poetry. Similarly, he drags out the old stand-by of the rationalist historian, knightly tournaments, to show how violent conduct was transformed into mock warfare and a sense of sportsmanship. All this we know from Huizinga and other medievalists. What Elias does, in addition to reciting these facts, is to argue in the light of Freudian theory, or of his peculiar appropriation of it, that these phenomena, seen in their historical sequence, allow us to plot "a distinct curve of moderation" (203) of aggression as part of the general trend toward affect control.

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Much has been written since 1939 on the possibility of sublimating or
pacifying aggression. In the wake of World War II and the genocide of the
1930's and 1940's, it is little consolation indeed to know that medieval knights
developed the idea of the sporting match and that the sensitivity of sixteenth-
century Parisians had been refined to the point where they no longer executed
heretics at the stake but were publicly burning cats in an atmosphere that was a
smelly mix of circus and Staatsaktion. We need only extrapolate this ascending
line of development into the present where cruelty to animals and even
violence in sports tend to mobilize the public prosecutor, and we have a
seemingly airtight case for Elias' rationalistic evolutionism. The evidence is all
there, neatly arranged and apparently compelling, but what does it prove?

Several years ago Le Nouvel Observateur published an interview with Elias in
which he was asked whether his view of the pacification of aggression was not
altogether too optimistic in view of recent historical events. Here is his reply,
quoted at some length:

As far as violence today is concerned, I do not think it has
much importance, save for those who become its victims.
In comparison with our ancestors we are veritable lambs. I
am referring here to violence between individuals, to
violence within societies, rather than to violence between
states.... We no longer have any idea what a violent society
really is. Take ancient Rome, for example, or...medieval
society where violence was part of the social fabric itself.
The ruling-class was a warrior class. Life was a combination
of pillage, warfare and the hunting of men and animals.
The historical records draw a picture of incredible rapine
where people would constantly be seeking gratification in
extreme types of behaviour: ferocity, murder, torture,
destruction and sadism.... We ourselves live in relatively
pacified societies, although there is present in them a
contradictory element, namely the constant preparation
Thus three decades after *The Civilizing Process* had been branded naive and untimely, its author fully re-affirmed the thesis on the historical civilization of aggression. The sceptic is to be disarmed by facts that speak for themselves. However do they speak for anything but themselves?

It is all too easy to be overly empirical about aggression. Compiling data about changes in aggressive behaviour does not warrant the conclusion that aggression, an instinctual force, has been tempered. For one thing, too much ambiguity surrounds the status of aggression in Freudian theory for such a concept to be simply adopted without clarification. For another, supposing we knew what aggression is and furthermore we had historical proof that aggression takes on increasingly more "civilized" forms, such a theory would be psychologistic in the worst sense of the word. Whether or not the domestication-of-aggression thesis can be proved, the fact remains that aggression has also been subject to an historical logic of increasing socialization. What was once a trait of irrational individuals unable to control their impulses has become a facet or latent capacity of societies. Psychological sublimation of aggression and socialization of (unsublimated) aggression are two sides of the same coin. The social totality has become the repository and agency of violence to the extent to which the individual has learned to play chivalrous games. Writing on the eve of unprecedented mass murder, Elias gives an underexposed portrayal of the dark side of this coin, stressing instead the emergence of a personality type content with make-believe aggression.

How can society be aggressive in the absence of the personality trait called psychic aggression? Social science today is beginning to understand the mediations between the civilized, nonaggressive personality type and the aggressive society in which he lives. It becomes more and more evident that in trying to enlist people for acts of violence, society does not so much re-activate an aggressive potential in civilized individual psyches as operate through psychological and ideological mechanisms that insure compliance with authority. Society, of course, cannot act violently, or in any determinate manner whatever, except through its individual members. In other words, it must be able to elicit individual behaviour of a patterned, predictable kind. From the point of view of violent society, it is quite beside the point whether or not its *Schreibtischmörder* and pushers of lethal buttons are all and sundry...
gentle lambs at heart, provided they do their job. Critical social theory has to come to terms with this modern configuration of man and society, where the individual’s capacity to act in a determinate way is uncoupled from the psyche, as it were, so as to be put directly at the disposal of society. Seeing the problem, Elias capitulates before its complexity as though he were facing an insoluble antinomy of modern life, leaving us with the impression that everything could be well if only the social whole were as civilized as the individual is today — which is at best a defeatist kind of truism.

Truisms have a tendency to be forgotten. That is why people like Elias are needed. It is good to be reminded of the obvious, especially when such reminding takes the form of an expertly guided tour of historical records few scholars have ever bothered to bring to light. In the last analysis it is quite unlikely that The Civilizing Process will revamp the thinking of entire schools of thought. For that to happen he would have to be a more powerful theorist than he is. There is a deliberate air of dilettantism about his handling of key concepts of historical materialism and psychoanalysis. Lodging his approach squarely in the tradition of historical sociology, Elias would be the first to deny that his investigations support anything approaching an inclusive theoretical structure. It is he who eclectically raids the theorists’ conceptual edifices. All he gives them in return is food for thought. However, this he does liberally and with gusto, although many specialists and satraps of academic fiefs will probably think he is merely throwing sand into their well-oiled disciplines. Wolf Lepenies captured the essence of this intellect well when he spoke of Elias as an “outsider who is full of unfettered, naive insights”.10 He is indeed an outsider, and an intrepid one at that.

Notes

1. The second volume will be published soon, also by Urizen Books.

2. The English edition is identical with the German one of 1968, except that the new “Introduction” of 1968 is put at the end (Appendix I). In addition, the excerpts from pre-modern sources, translated in the main text, are cited again in the original in the appendix section (Appendix II).

4. "Über den Prozess der Zivilisation," Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1976, volume 2, pp. 123-311. There is some doubt in my mind as to the unifying theme of both volumes together. The analysis of civilization in the first volume and that of the monopolization of political power in the second volume are ostensibly disparate kinds of concerns. In the "Outline of a Theory of Civilization" at the end of volume 2, Elias finds a formula for integrating his materials. It reads as follows:

The peculiar stability of the psychic apparatus of self-control which is an outstanding characteristic in the behavior of every "civilized" person is closely related to the formation of institutions monopolizing physical force and to the growing stability of central political agencies of society. It is only in connection with the rise of such stable monopolistic institutions that a formative social apparatus emerges which is able to instil a continuous, carefully regulated self-restraint in the individual beginning with childhood; it is only in connection with the former that the individual develops within himself a fairly stable, automatically operating agency of self-control. (Ibid., II, p. 320)

Out of necessity — the necessity of having to forge a link between the two parts of his work — Elias proposes a general theory of evolution that seems to go far beyond what the facts (his facts) support. This generalization may fall flat on its face, depending on what the anthropologists, for example, have to say about the existence of psychic self-restraint in societies with diffuse, undifferentiated structures of authority. The simultaneous emergence of civility and the centralized state may well be a Western oddity. Quite intrepidly, Elias generalizes from his study of a single case, by summing it up in a grand formula of interdependent development which is highly Parsonian, the author's disclaimers in the "Introduction to the 1968 Edition" notwithstanding.

5. Since even psychologists, let alone ordinary-language speakers, often fail to use the term "affect" systematically and with any consistency, it may be in order to give a definition of the concept. Affect is "a feeling state of particular intensity. Sometimes an affect is characterized as a state brought about by actions almost wholly devoid of intentional control in accordance with moral and objective viewpoints". Encyclopedia of Psychology, Freiburg: Herder Verlag, v.1, p. 28. In other words, affect is not synonymous with emotion but with impulsiveness. The German ordinary-language speaker has the advantage of being familiar with the expression "im Affekt handeln" ("acting on impulse"), which does reflect adequately the technical connotation of the term affect.


8. I was not surprised to read that Elias was a student of R. Hönigswald, the neo-Kantian at Breslau University. There is indeed a sense in which the idea of manners in The Civilizing Process is modelled on Kant's notion of duty, a connection which I can only hint at here.
