Philosophy continues to haunt Marxism. If Marx abandoned philosophy, later Marxists salvaged it. Georgi Plekhanov in Russia, Antonia Labriola in Italy, Georges Sorel in France and Max Adler in Austria were leading Marxists at the end of the 19th century whose main contributions did not lie within political economy but within philosophy. In the 20th century philosophy has become the principal concern of Marxists from Georg Lukács to Jean-Paul Sartre.

The turn to philosophy was not a flight from politics. Rather politics infused the philosophical debates. Yet as Lenin himself realized, no simple relationship existed between philosophical and political positions. The historical chapter which includes Lukács' *History and Class Consciousness* (1923) and Karl Korsch's *Marxism and Philosophy* (1923) is opaque if considered apart from the political context. Neither book presented any heretical political positions; yet each was soundly and quickly denounced by the keepers of the Leninist orthodoxy. Without charting the political universe of Lukács and Korsch, one cannot understand the storm their books provoked.

While studies of Lukács multiply, Korsch has been ignored and died forgotten in the United States in 1961. Unlike Lukács he was expelled from the Communist Party and subsequently pursued a long and isolated re-evaluation of Marxism. Yet his own work and life fed into a rich vein of unorthodox Marxism. In the United States he remained in contact with partisans of workers' councils, and established contact with the "Frankfurt School" (Max Horkheimer, T.W. Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, et al). At one time he was planning to collaborate with Horkheimer on a "long book on the dialectic." In this period he wrote an excellent though neglected book on Marx. His path often intersected with unorthodox Marxists. Bertolt Brecht, for example, considered Korsch his intellectual mentor, and continually sought his advice. What may be the best book by a North American on Marx in the first decades of the century — Sidney Hook's *Towards the Understanding of Karl Marx* (1933) — owed much to Korsch.

The context and fate of *Marxism and Philosophy* present the issues sharply; it was a philosophical contribution which engaged a political universe. If the
latter was not always visible, it was never absent. In the wake of Marxism and Philosophy and History and Class Consciousness the term Western Marxism arose to designate a philosophical tradition that challenged Soviet Marxism. Like Marxism and Philosophy, which partly inspired it, the entire tradition straddled philosophy and politics. On the surface the issues were philosophical. Beneath the surface lay a mixture of political principles and tactics: the nature of a revolutionary organization, the role of the masses, the formation of class consciousness.

While Western Marxism marked a common philosophical tradition it is difficult to characterize the tradition briefly. It read Marx as attentive not only to philosophy but to the categories of subjectivity, consciousness, culture and alienation; and these terms were understood as refracted through Hegel. Marxism was not simply a "science" of revolution or a political economy, but a theory of human society and subjectivity. Soviet Marxism, as crystallized in Bukharin's Historical Materialism or Stalin's Dialectical and Historical Materialism, presented an opposite interpretation. Marxism was less a theory of society than a universal science of nature and society. Unlike Western Marxism, the line between society and nature was blurred, and subjectivity devalued. For the Soviet Marxists, Marxism was a purely objective science of developmental laws.

Marxism and Philosophy echoed the general philosophical themes of Western Marxism. Korsch defended the centrality of philosophy to Marxism. Marxism was not simply a political economy, but a critique: and a critique included a philosophical confrontation with the "intellectual (ideological) structure of society." "Vulgar" Marxists deemed philosophy obsolete, surpassed by political economy; but to Korsch this was a fundamental misinterpretation. Marxism must be as multi-dimensional as is the social reality, and this required alertness to the ideological glue that bound society together. Korsch called for "intellectual action" and drew a parallel with Marx's statements on the relationship of political to economic action. "Just as political action is not rendered unnecessary by the economic action of a revolutionary class, so intellectual action is not rendered unnecessary by either political or economic action."

Marxism and Philosophy committed the philosophical sins of Western Marxism. It attended to subjectivity, consciousness, philosophy and Hegel. These were hardly a monopoly of a western tradition, but Soviet Marxism bestowed on them a sharply different meaning. The interpretation of Hegel in each tradition is both an index and a source of the divergence. If Marx arrived at his own theory by way of Hegel, so did subsequent Marxists: their reading of Marxism was decisively colored by their reception of Hegel. Nowhere is this truer than in Western and Soviet Marxism.
Both Western and Soviet Marxism have been designated as forms of Hegelianized Marxism. This designation is accurate but incomplete. What has been little noticed is the dual Hegelian legacy that issued into two Marxisms. In the course of the 19th century Hegel was interpreted in two fundamentally distinct ways. The two most vigorous Hegelian traditions were the Italian and the Russian; yet they shared little. The Hegel of Bertrando Spaventa, Antonio Labriola, Giovanni Gentile and Benedetto Croce was distant from the Hegel of Georgi Plekhanov and the other Russians. Two Hegelian traditions emerged which can be labeled the "historist" and "scientific," and each passed almost unchanged into Western and Soviet Marxism. The conflict between Western and Soviet Marxism cannot be understood apart from its roots in the divergent Hegel traditions.

The "historist" and "scientific" traditions diverged in the texts of Hegel they valued and the categories they accepted. The "historist" Hegelians, associated with Western Marxism, looked to the Phenomenology; and they elaborated the categories of mind, consciousness and subjectivity as historical products. Efforts to found a universal science or philosophy of nature were implicitly or explicitly rejected. Conversely, the "scientific" Hegelians, associated with Soviet Marxism, looked to the Logic of Hegel. They were committed to Hegel as the founder of a universal system, including a science of nature. Objectivity was their governing principle; they considered dialectics a universal law valid in nature and history.

We are essentially concerned with the Russian Hegelianism of the 1890s where Hegel enters a Marxist framework. Yet even prior to the 1890s a regular note is sounded which anticipates and defines the Hegelian reception by the Marxists. Hegel is filtered through the Western/Slavophile debate and then the Marxist/Populist exchange. Within these contexts Hegel's philosophy was welcomed or rejected on the basis of his relationship to the individual, and the distinct qualities of Russian history and society.

With some exceptions and partial exceptions (Alexander Herzen, Nikolai Chernyshevsky), the Slavophiles and the Populists found Hegel uncongenial. Hegel was generally judged the pan-logician, the rationalist, and westernizer, whose philosophy entailed the sacrifice of any individual Russian virtues, which were the hope for the Slavophiles and Populists. The rejection of Hegel from Vissarion Belinski through Nikolai Mikhailovskiy derived from this impression of Hegel.

Conversely, the Westerners, and more emphatically the Marxists, discovered an ally in Hegel. He was read as a universalist thinker, with validity for Europe and Russia. Towards the end of the century, of course, this was the issue among Russian social thinkers: the nature of Russian development — its
distinct or universal qualities — and the validity of Marxism for Russia. Philosophical categories were scrutinized as to their receptivity to individualized Russian development or to universal and ineluctable Western evolution. Due to these pressures, Hegel, already refracted through the Western/Slavophile dialogue, assumed the role of the theorist of objective and universal development.

The two major figures in this conflict were Mikhailovsky and Plekhanov. Mikhailovsky, a populist and critic of Marxism, ardently defended the individual, and individual ethical and moral choices; in this respect he also resisted fatalism and determinism in social theory. It is not fortuitous that he dubbed his contribution “subjective” sociology, for he found extremely inadequate a purely objective approach.17 As he stated in his famous “What is Progress?”: “The exclusive use of the objective method in sociology ... would be tantamount to measuring weight with a yardstick ... supreme control must be vested in the subjective method.”18 Hegel, consequently, is viewed as the foe of the individual. “There is no system of philosophy which treats the individual with such withering contempt and cold cruelty as the system of Hegel.”19

The most important rejoinder to Mikhailovsky was by Plekhanov, and the substance of his reply was adopted and repeated by the Legal Marxists and Lenin. Plekhanov celebrated Hegel and wrote a commemorative piece for the German Social-Democratic journal Die Neue Zeit.20 His full answer to Mikhailovsky, The Development of the Monist View of History, “reared,” according to Lenin, “a whole generation of Russian Marxists.”21 Contra Mikhailovsky, Plekhanov accentuated the objective, deterministic, and universal qualities of Hegel and Marx. With Hegel “the accident of human arbitrariness and human prudence give place to conformity to law, i.e. consequently to necessity.”22 Or as he stated in his polemic: “The ‘subjective method’ in sociology is the greatest nonsense.”23

Most accounts agree that in the Populist/Marxist conflict, the Marxists were able to gain the upper hand. They were able to pin on Mikhailovsky the charges of confusion, idealism, vacillation, while they themselves claimed science, objectivity and determinism. It did not matter how one wanted or desired Russia to develop, it was in fact objectively developing towards capitalism: so would argue many of the first Russian Marxists, including Lenin. Inasmuch as this was already a chapter in the longer exchange between the Westernizers and Slavophiles, the Marxists were more than ready to stress the objective, scientific, and universal qualities of the categories of Hegel and Marx.24 The very term “subjective” for the Russian Marxists was irrevocably tainted by its association with the populists and their argument for a non-western and non-Marxist option for Russia.
HISTORY OF WESTERN MARXISM

The Soviet version of Marxism as a scientific and unified theory of society and nature was already prefigured in the response to Mikhailovsky. For Mikhailovsky, in accord with his concern for the individual, separated society from nature.23 His complaint against the positivists was rooted here: they devalued the individual by employing methods appropriate for biology and chemistry. The rejoinder by Russian Marxists defended the continuum of nature and society; they considered this the test of the rigor and objectivity of a science. This political crucible cast a reading of Hegel, science, nature, and objectivity, which was the mirror image of that formed in Western Marxism.

The European reception of Hegel which issued into Marxism toward the end of the century differed in kind. By the last quarter of the century the Hegelian tradition had almost disappeared, especially in Germany.26 It is to be recalled that when Marx averred that he was a "pupil of that mighty thinker" in 1873, it was because Hegel was currently being treated as a "dead dog."27 Nearly everywhere forms of positivism and social darwinism, had supplanted Hegel. Italy could claim the richest Hegelian tradition outside of Russia. The most significant and original of the Italian Hegelians was Bertrando Spaventa. Studies of Spaventa have increased in recent years not simply because of his own contribution but because his pupil was Antonio Labriola, the "first" Italian Marxist. Moreover there is practically an unbroken line running from Spaventa through Labriola, Croce and Gramsci — and Gramsci, like Rosa Luxemburg, is one of the major figures of Western Marxism. Gentile, also, was a "second generation" student of Spaventa.28 He published many of Spaventa's works, and since he became later a "philosopher" of Italian fascism, the interpretation of Italian Hegelianism is politically charged.29

While national and political motives were Spaventa's impetus he was drawn to the active and subjective dimensions of Hegel.30 Man's "world, his knowledge, and his happiness — all which he is as a man — is by his own efforts. In general that is the significance of the great concept of work and history, which in essence are the same thing."31 The Phenomenology was the key to the Logic, and not the other way around.32 In Spaventa the subjective elements predominate. Exactly on the point of the dialectic of nature in Hegel, Spaventa differed from the orthodox wing of Italian Hegelians (Augusto Vera, et al).33 The orthodox sought to defend the whole of Hegel including the "systematical unity of nature," and transformation from quantity to quality. Spaventa, and his circle, recognized here the inadequacy of Hegel.34

Labriola, a student of Spaventa, defended Hegel against the call for the "return to Kant" in his very first work.35 And here it was not the Hegel of the system and universal science à la Plekhanov, but the Hegel of the theory of knowledge, and the subjective and objective moments of the dialectic. The Marxism of Labriola and for a brief moment Gentile, would bear these traces: a focus on subjectivity, self-activity, philosophy and praxis; and a very deter-
mined effort to set Marxism off from its positivist deformations. It was with regard to Plekhanov, in fact, that Labriola regretted that some people turn to Marxism for "universal knowledge." The Marxism that Labriola came to was a philosophy as well as a political economy; the evolutionary or Darwinian interpretation of Marxism was especially foreign to Labriola. He retrieved the subjective and human core of Marxism.

Labriola's most important contributions "In Memory of the Communist Manifesto" (1895), "Historical Materialism" (1896), Socialism and Philosophy (1897), were followed shortly by Gentile's Philosophy of Marx (1899) and Croce's Historical Materialism and Marxist Economics (1899). Both of these were elaborations, as well as partial rebuttals, of Labriola; both emphatically displayed Hegelian roots. Croce, while contesting that Marxism was a "philosophy of history," sharply criticized Achille Loria's positivist misreading of Marx. Gentile translated the neglected Marx's "Theses on Feuerbach," and centered his study on the subject/object relation and the concept of praxis. The term that he applied to Marxism, "philosophy of praxis," would later be employed by Gramsci.

In contrast to the Hegel and Marx of Russia, the Italian interpretation pursued the subjective dimension. Obviously the context was a fundamental determining force; the Russians were contesting a populism devoted to the uniqueness of Russian development; and they reached for the Hegel of objective and universal categories. The Italians were confronted with widespread positivist and evolutionary thought. Consequently, they were less interested in the Hegel of nature and science than the Hegel of spirit, consciousness and activity.

In France, the weakness and slow development of a Hegelian tradition confirm a close relationship between the "historicist" Hegel and Western Marxism. A good translation of the Phenomenology only dates from 1939. The reasons for this lateness are many, including an old and deep anti-German sentiment; but it seems clear that only after this Hegel tradition was established could a Western Marxist tradition root and grow. Hence a Western Marxism kindred to Labriola/Gramsci in Italy and to Lukács/Korsch in Germany only developed after World War II in France.

Of course this is somewhat overstated. Nineteenth-century France could boast a feeble "eclectic" Hegelian, Victor Cousin, whose inadequacies were compounded by his insufficient German. The orthodox Italian Hegelian, Vera, completed some French translations and introductions to Hegel — which have been universally denigrated. More interesting, however, are some figures at the end of the century — Georges Sorel, Charles Andler, Lucien Heer — who reveal the same preoccupations as the Italians: attention to Hegel and the subjective dimension of Marxism, and repudiation of positivist "scientific" Marxism.
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Sorel was closely tied to Labriola and Croce. Sorel wrote the preface to the French edition of one of Labriola’s books; and another of Labriola’s books, *Socialism and Philosophy*, is composed of letters to Sorel. While Labriola eventually broke with him, Croce considered Sorel a kindred spirit, and was his regular correspondent. Sorel’s position on Hegel was not consistent; on some occasions he attacked, on others he defended Hegel. He was, however, a forceful exponent of praxis and subjectivity in Marx, and, consequently, a vigorous critic of the positivist and scientist pretensions of Marxism. He repeatedly denounced the notion that Marxism was a “science” like the natural sciences. Herr wrote one of the few articles on Hegel, and planned to write a three-volume study — volumes which he never completed. Very few of the French, it could be noted, who were attracted to Hegel, demonstrated interest in Hegel’s philosophy of nature.

One final issue should be mentioned here since it involves the French as well as the Italians and Russians. One index for the separation of Western from Soviet Marxism was the interpretation of Engels. After Marx’s death, Engels became the official spokesman for Marxism, and several of his pamphlets proved more popular than anything Marx wrote. While to some Marx and Engels were intellectually inseparable, others suggested that on some critical issues Engels deviated from Marx.

In fact this was one of the “heresies” of Lukács’ *History and Class Consciousness*. Lukács commented — and he was not alone here — that Engels “following Hegel’s mistaken lead” extended the dialectic to nature, and lost the distinction between history and nature. Consequently the dimension of subjectivity — unique to history — was eclipsed.

The evaluation of Engels highlighted not only two Marxist, but two Hegelian traditions. It is no accident that those most critical of Engels were closest to a “historicist” Hegel. While it has recently been argued that Lukács was the first to criticize Engels, initial re-evaluation is more properly attributed to the Hegelians of Italy and France in the 1890s. Soviet Marxism, however, considered the sundering of nature and society a betrayal of science. Consistent with their image of a “scientific” Hegel, they defended Engels and his philosophy of nature. Hence Soviet Marxism has been characterized by its dependence on Engels more than on Marx.

Both the French and Italians recognized that Engels gave a scientific and positivist cast to Marxism. Gentile claimed that Engels “never penetrated profoundly the philosophical part” of his friend’s theory; and that he had transformed the Hegelian notion of “immanence” into the “Platonic idea of transcendental nature.” These Italian criticisms, which included those of Croce, culminated in Rodolfo Mondolfo’s major analysis of Engels from 1912. Mondolfo stated, among other things, that Engels was less interested in the critique of consciousness than Marx; and that Engels transformed the subject/object dialectic into a causal relation.
Sorel, for his part, had a very dim view of Engels. He charged that Engels had no philosophical training, and was confused about Hegel; and moreover that Engels passed off evolutionary theory as historical materialism. He thought that Engels’ term “scientific socialism” was misleading, bearing more the imprint of Spencer than Marx.64 Andler sought to separate Marx’ and Engels’ respective influence in the text of the Communist Manifesto;65 and he judged Engels one of the prime agents of what he called the decomposition of Marxism. The “decomposition of Marxism” was a course that Andler gave in the mid 1890s,66 and the subject of a book he never completed.67 Sorel borrowed the title for his Decomposition of Marxism (1908).68

The point of this, is to illuminate the nexus of philosophical and political categories. The line of conflict between Western and Russian Marxism was simultaneously philosophical and political. A bifurcated Hegelian legacy fired the political disputes. That the translation of philosophy into political categories contained many ambiguities and misunderstandings need not be belabored. However, the “historical” Hegel translated into politics suggested a different logic of revolution from that derived from the “scientific” Hegel.

In the “historical” Hegel, the categories of subjectivity and consciousness are transcribed into a notion of the self-formation of a class: the class attains (self) consciousness through its own activity. To cite Lukács, the most emphatic representative of this politicized “historical” Hegel: with Marxism “the very meaning of social development, emerged from its previously unconscious state ... the laws of social development ... awoke to self-awareness, to consciousness ... . This consciousness — in Hegelian terms, the development towards self-consciousness of society, the self-discovery of the Spirit seeking itself in the course of history ... is alone cut out to become the intellectual leader of society.”69 The embodiment of this consciousness is the proletariat, and not its representative in a party. A party itself, in fact, is evidence that the proletariat has not yet attained class consciousness. The workers’ councils, conversely express “the ability to act and the power of the proletariat.”70

Here in the early Lukács the Hegelian concepts began to inch towards political formulations; and the direction this took conflicted with the predominant Soviet formulations. The premium placed on consciousness, self-activity, and subjectivity, eliminated or drastically redefined the Leninist idea of the vanguard party. This challenge to Leninism, rooted in a different philosophical tradition, would be posed by a series of “left” splits in the first years of the Communist Parties.

Korsch indicated in 1930 that the philosophical conflict provoked by Lukács and his books in 1923 was only a “weak echo” of the “political and tactical disputes” of “some years before.” This was accurate; by the end of 1923 the period of the political offensive, the revolutionary upsurge, had long subsided. Unlike the first post-World War I years, politics lost an immediacy. This was
not only hindsight; it was a regular pronouncement by Lenin, Trotsky, and others, that the revolution was off the agenda for the moment, that there was a "slowing down of the revolutionary tempo." The task was to dig in and prepare.

Yet the distance between the "Red Years" and 1923 was not very great; and the years mirrored the distance between the political and philosophical dimensions. Not only were the revolutionary upsurges in Germany, Italy and Hungary still vivid memories, so were the existence and threats of "left" oppositional movements. Here "left" signifies what Lenin bestowed on it: a "left" split in and from the new Communist Parties who were members of the Third Communist International. The quotation marks around "left" suggested the Leninist position: the "left" was left in name, not fact. In these years the "left" or "ultra-left" was the plague of the Communist Party.

When Korsch was denounced in 1924 as an ultra-leftist there was no ambiguity over the political meaning of the term, and there was little doubt about Korsch's links to it. The evidence up through 1924, however, on Korsch's credentials as an ultra-leftist is not without uncertainty. This is to be expected. First, Korsch was extremely active in several roles, as Communist Party Reichstag representative, editor of a theoretical journal, and regular contributor to the daily communist press. It is obvious that Korsch would not air heretical views in all the forums. Secondly, the situation was objectively unclear. The post October 1923 period brought a "left" turn in the German Communist Party (KPD) as will be discussed below. At the time it was difficult to foresee the outcome of this change in direction.

The political heresy of "left" communism is inextricably linked to Western Marxism. Yet if the philosophical component shaded off into the mysteries of Hegelianism, the political lacked another kind of coherence; it was always sharper in its critique of Soviet Marxism than in posing a compelling alternative. This need not be overstated; there were political issues and alternatives. These were presented and, less frequently, an attempt was made to realize them. The ambiguity that surrounds the political dimension is illustrated by one of the sources of Western Marxism, Rosa Luxemburg.

Luxemburg is claimed by both Leninists and non- or anti-Leninists; and this suggests the duality of contribution. Yet in the long run the Leninist tradition assimilated Luxemburg only with difficulty. Increasingly in the 1920s the Communist International (Comintern) attacked the sin of "Luxemburgism." Luxemburg's critique of Lenin from 1904 and the Russian Revolution from 1918 proved to be unpalatable. The repudiation of Luxemburgism was facilitated by the fact that her successor, Paul Levi, was expelled from the Comintern; and Levi published her essay in 1922 on the Russian Revolution. It showed, he stated, "the deep antagonism between Luxemburg and Bolshevism."
On a series of issues Luxemburg assumed positions that were unacceptable to Soviet Marxism — issues which included *imperialism*, *nationalism*, and *organization*. While all these are linked, the last is the most important to our discussion. The organizational question includes the relationship of the party (and leadership) to the masses, and of theory to praxis. Consistently she charged that Lenin (and also Kautsky) over-valued leadership and fetishized organization.

The perspective of Rosa Luxemburg valued spontaneity. This meant that she paid attention to the subjective state of the masses; it seemed to her that the obedience that Lenin demanded was a problem, not a solution. The working class was already too subservient and obedient; a tendency implanted by the factory, and military and state bureaucracy. She suggested that "self-discipline" was the goal to be achieved "not as a result of the discipline imposed" by a Central Committee or a capitalist state, but "by extirpating, to the last root, [the working class's] old habits of obedience and servility."

More concretely, Luxemburg questioned parliamentary tactics and trade unionism. To achieve revolution by electoral politics or by minimal economic reforms bypassed the authentically revolutionary drives of the masses. Trade unions lacked the power to suppress exploitation, and electoral politics could only attain formal democracy. Both these positions constituted important elements of Western Marxism.

Luxemburg herself suffered from some fundamental ambivalences. Nevertheless she is justifiably associated with a series of propositions which formed a sharp critique of prevailing Leninism, and which projected a partial alternative. The distrust of a parliamentary route, of trade union politics, and of revolution "from above" formed part of her legacy. She prized "self" activity of the masses, and little incensed her more than restricting Marxist theory to the elite of the party. If philosophically, the interpretation of Engels was an index for the Soviet/Western Marxism split, politically the index was the interpretation of Luxemburg.

The murder of Rosa Luxemburg confused the issue of her political legacy; and she was plundered by all political groups. It is necessary to dig more deeply into the political history of the KPD to find where the political and philosophical dimensions of Western Marxism intersect. Elements of this intersection can be found in the formation of "left" communism and the Communist Worker's Party of Germany (KAPD).

The story of the KPD, the most important party outside the Soviet, was marked by splits, expulsions and unifications. The primary issues were tactical and political: the degree of centralization in the party and the Third In-
INTERNATIONAL, and the utilization of trade unions and parliaments for revolutionary ends. The result of the first major split in the KPD was the KAPD, at its founding congress (1920), KAPD counted close to half of the KPD membership.80

The KAPD is important here because it represents a convergence of neo-Hegelianism and leftist politics.81 Obviously the paramount issues were tactical; and behind the tactical issues of trade unions and electoral politics stood the question of leadership. The first statement from the opposition delegates who would form the KAPD declared that "revolutionary action must not be commanded from above by a secret leadership, but must emerge out of the will of the masses."82

The analysis of leadership depended on an essentially theoretical position: the revolutionary process relied upon the subject (the proletariat) attaining (self) consciousness. Frequently this was presented in neo-Hegelian terms. The accent was placed on the immanent development of the subjective dimension, including the psychological. The inaugural program of the KAPD stated: "The psychology of the German proletariat in its present constitution bears only too clearly the marks of centuries of militaristic enslavement .... The subjective moment plays a decisive role in the German revolution. The problem of the German revolution is the problem of the self-conscious development [Selbstbewussteinwicklung] of the German proletariat.83 The Hegelian language betrays here its politics, or conversely, the politics betrays its Hegelian philosophical sources. The problem was not the formation of a disciplined party to lead the revolution, but the self-consciousness and self-activity of the masses.

Much of the theoretical inspiration for the KAPD was derived from Anton Pannekoek in particular, and the "Dutch School," including Hermann Gorter, in general.84 A long history of opposition to the majority social democrats marked Pannekoek and the Dutch School. Their analysis hinged on the role of consciousness and self-activity in the revolutionary process. The obstacles to revolution were modes of activity that suppressed self-activity and consciousness in the proletariat; and these included both bourgeois culture and ideology and the tightly organized party that sought to command revolution.

For Pannekoek it was exactly here that Kautsky first, and later the Bolsheviks, missed the point. Surmounting capitalism was not simply or primarily a tactical problem as to how and when to seize power. The force of capitalism lay primarily in the cultural and subjective dimension; its power consisted in the "domination of bourgeois culture" which "infiltrated" the entire society and formed a "cultural organisation and discipline."85 From this perspective, the Communist Party "underestimates" the task to be accomplished; for liberation from this cultural domination must accompany, if not precede, any specific tactics, and indeed is the index of successful tactics — success being the ability to release the proletariat from bourgeois culture.
These were persistent motifs in Pannekoek, who in fact was much inspired by his interpretation of Joseph Dietzgen. Pannekoek's "World Revolution and Communist Tactics" (1920), a fundamental "left" text, was published in Kommunismus. This Vienna based journal, a regular outlet for left communists, including Lukács, was dissolved, after several years, by the Comintern.

According to Pannekoek, capitalism was constituted out of intellectual and material elements. While the material dimension, or more concretely, the economic collapse, was requisite for revolution, it did not suffice. Germany in the recent past had experienced an economic and political collapse of the bourgeoisie, but not a successful revolution. The reason was the "secret power," of the bourgeoisie, its "spiritual power over the proletariat." The proletariat was subjectively and culturally mesmerized. For this reason the decisive battle of the future would be fought in the arena of culture and Geist.

The KAPD, Pannekoek, Gorter and other groups and individuals constituted what would be labelled and denounced as "left" communism. While "left" communism was defined primarily on the tactical level, Pannekoek argued the theoretical and tactical were inseparable. "The problem of tactics ... is how to root out of the proletarian masses the traditional bourgeois modes of thought that paralyze its power." Trade unions, parliaments, as well as vanguard parties smacked of traditional bourgeois culture and organization. Conversely, workers councils, that is, activity derived from the proletariat itself, and spontaneous actions struck bourgeois culture at its source.

Two final points: "left" communism was the significant heresy in the first years of the Third International. The terminology received official confirmation in Lenin's pamphlet Left-Wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder (1920). As a fact and label "left" communism (later also called ultra-leftism) retained a reality in the Comintern. Precisely the same charges of "leftism" would be levelled against Korsch and Lukács.

Secondly, "left" communism became indistinguishable — for the most part — from Western Marxism. Many of the "leftists," especially the Dutch, justified their politics by the specific conditions of Western Europe. The depth and vigor of bourgeois culture, Pannekoek and Gorter believed, were unique to Western Europe; this was the fundamental difference between Western Europe and the Soviet Union, where bourgeois culture was relatively weak. The weakness of bourgeois culture in the east dictated different tactics; there Geist and ideology were not the supreme questions. The most trenchant reply to Lenin's Left-Wing pamphlet, Gorter's "Open Letter to Comrade Lenin" (1920) pursued this very distinction.

Gorter argued that Lenin's tactics were wrong in generalizing from the Russian experience. In doing so he obscured the basic social differences be-
tween societies. In Russia an alliance decisive for victory was struck between the proletariat and the peasantry. In Western Europe, however, the proletariat lacks the possibility of peasant allies; moreover the European proletariat is immeasurably older and larger than the Russian. In brief, the class and general structure of bourgeois society in Western Europe fundamentally diverged from the Russian reality.

From these preliminaries a series of political consequences followed. Deprived of peasant allies in the west, the proletariat was forced back on itself. In concurrence with themes in Lukács, Luxemburg, and (some of) Gramsci, the proletariat itself — or its own intellectual dependency — blocked the revolution. The categories of culture and consciousness again moved to the fore. The economic crisis had come and gone; and the paralysis of the proletariat stemmed from extra-economic causes, its intellectual enslavement. The defeat of the revolution rested on "the Geist of the masses."90 To Gorter, the intellectual liberation of the proletariat was the task — a task specific to Western Europe which could not be assumed by a party.

III

We turn now to Korsch's own place in this dense net of Hegelianism and "left" communism. Korsch was condemned, along with Lukács, at the Fifth Congress of the Communist International (summer, 1924). His major theoretical contribution to date was *Marxism and Philosophy*. Was this grounds alone to identify Korsch as a "left" communist? If not, Korsch provided enough additional political clues; but these can only be understood within the context of the KPD, the Comintern, and in particular, the immediately preceding event, the "German October" (October 1923). The Soviet leaders, especially Trotsky and Zinoviev, had invested their hopes for a successful German Revolution in the "German October", and more or less promoted it. Not only was the "German October" the final offensive for the German party, it was a profound defeat.91

The defeat of the German October led to a shake-up in the German party — which became part of the emerging conflict between Zinoviev and Trotsky. Even to the participants the relationship between these two factional fights proved mysterious. The problem for the Soviet leadership was to saddle someone with the German disaster. Heinrich Brandler and August Thalheimer, the leadership and the so-called right of the KPD, did not exempt the Comintern in their post-mortem of the defeat. They concluded that the Comintern misjudged the objective conditions, minimizing the disjuncture between Germany and the Soviet Union.92 This position was unacceptable to Zinoviev for it cast a dark shadow on his role.
Trotsky's *New Course*, with its criticism of the Soviet party, had just appeared as a booklet (January 1924). By some logic Zinoviev managed to link Trotsky and Brandler as responsible for the setback.\(^9\) The vehicle for this link was Karl Radek, who had been associated with each.\(^9\) Hence it was possible for Zinoviev to evade responsibility for the defeat. That Brandler and Trotsky drew opposite conclusions from October 1923 seems not to have mattered.\(^9\) Attacking the leadership of Brandler and Thaleimer, Zinoviev counseled and commanded: "We must have a change of leadership."\(^9\) He then threw his support to a new and left leadership of Ruth Fisher and Arkady Maslow. They agreed on at least one crucial point: that there was no misappraisal of the objective conditions by the Comintern, but inadequate leadership by Brandler and Thalheimer of the German Party.

However — and this defines the entire subsequent period — the alliance between the "left" of Fisher and Maslow and the Comintern was unstable. The "left" attained power as the reliable agent of the Comintern; yet the left tended to be "left" in the sense of Lenin's *Left-Wing Communism*.\(^9\) This meant that from the perspective of Soviet Marxism it was guilty of the same sins as the KAPD. Fundamentally the "left" challenged the Soviet model of hegemony of the European revolutions. Maslow himself was easily identified as a "leftist." In the immediate past he had contact with the Worker's Opposition, a left Soviet group. This was serious enough to attract Lenin's attention.\(^9\) A committee of the Comintern, in fact, was charged with investigating Maslow's record.\(^9\)

The instability, then, was defined by a Comintern/left KPD alliance which was grounded on a fundamental antagonism. None of this was absolutely clear in 1923 and early 1924, but neither was it totally obscure. If anything Zinoviev perceived more accurately than the left, the dangers of the alliance. From the very beginnings of the alliance, and the victory of the "left" in KPD, Zinoviev warned of the dangers of leftism and ultra-leftism, distinguishing repeatedly between the responsible proletarian elements and irresponsible intellectuals of the left. This motif was persistently reiterated by Zinoviev until September 1925 when the left was removed; and it was removed for precisely the sins of leftism and ultra-leftism. The element of truth was that the left did contain a high percentage of the intellectuals. It is here where Korsch gets early targeted as one of the intellectuals who are guilty of ultra-leftism.

The Ninth Party Congress of the KPD (April 1924) sealed the victory of the left in the post-October months. Zinoviev's letter to the Congress (March 26, 1924) already distinguished the responsible leftists from the irresponsible. Moreover, Zinoviev noted that one leftist (Samosch) had advanced resolutions that would effectively dissolve the Comintern.\(^10\) At least to some of the delegates the letter was a surprise. The alliance between Zinoviev and the left had been against the right of Brandler and Thalheimer; now Zinoviev was also attacking the left.\(^10\)
This was no isolated intervention by Zinoviev, nor a real shift; he had been cutting away at the left even while helping it to victory. In addition to the letter to the Ninth Congress, Zinoviev fired off a series of messages warning of the dangers of left intellectuals. At the end of March, Zinoviev (and Bukharin) wrote to Ernst Thälmann and Paul Schlecht warning that tendencies were surfacing in the party which were irreconcilable with Bolshevism: there were pressures to exit from the trade unions, to renounce the united front, and to "retreat to the perspective of Rosa Luxemburg in the organizational question" — all "left" tendencies. More damaging, some elements in the party had spoken of a "crisis in the Comintern." On the same day, Zinoviev wrote to Fisher and Maslow: "Do not imagine that the ultra-left does not represent a serious force." The banner of Rosa Luxemburg is raised, and the united front is attacked in the Comintern.

The new leadership of Fisher and Maslow sought to parry the attack. Fisher claimed that stray pronouncements defending Rosa Luxemburg "misled the Executive of the Comintern that the formation of an ultra-left wing was a real danger." Actually, the danger was on the right. The Politburo of the KPD replied to Zinoviev's letter to the Ninth Congress declaring that intellectuals could be found in both wings of the Party. Moreover it noted that "under the appearance of a struggle against the 'ultra-left', there is in reality a struggle against the party leadership."

In this atmosphere, clouded by charges of ultra-leftism against the left KPD leadership, Lukács' History and Class Consciousness and Korsch's Marxism and Philosophy appeared. Lukács, though he was fast covering his tracks, was easily identified as part of an ultra-left: he had been denounced by Lenin for it, and had participated in the journal Kommunismus, which had been closed by the Comintern for its left orientation.

Korsch in an "Afterwards instead of a Forward," which appeared in the edition of Marxism and Philosophy published in the Grünberg Archiv, expressed his solidarity with Lukács. "History and Class Consciousness touches at many points on the questions raised here; as I presently see the matter I am pleased to state my fundamental agreement with [Lukács]."

On the eve of the Fifth World Congress (June 1924), an issue of Internationale (edited by Korsch) appeared containing Korsch's "Lenin and the Comintern" back-to-back with an article by Boris (Roninger) on the program of the Comintern. Both of these would be considered ultra-left provocations. In addition the issue contained a review by Korsch of several books, including Lukács' History and Class Consciousness and Bukharin's Historical Materialism. Here Korsch criticized Béla Kun, identified with Zinoviev, for crassly attacking Lukács' book. Moreover he suggested that Bukharin was defending "a specifically bourgeois method of science."
The article by Boris was a provocation if only because of its attack on Bukharin; moreover Boris was identified as an ultra-leftist, and had once advocated that the KPD break ties with the Comintern — an ultra-left position. His article was a full-scale defense of Rosa Luxemburg, and a critique of Bukharin, which did not even exempt Lenin from criticism. For Korsch to publish this, along with his own criticism, on the eve of the Fifth World Congress was rightly interpreted as a direct assault on Comintern policies.

Finally, Boris participated in the 1923 Summer Academy. The Summer Academy gathered a number of Marxists, including Korsch and Lukács, in order to discuss their respective books. It also included Friedrich Pollock and Felix Weil, who would be instrumental in founding the Institute for Social Research ("The Frankfurt School"). It represented a moment of independent Marxism. It is not fortuitous that most of the participants played a role in the formation of Western Marxism.

The Fifth Congress opened in June with a leading address by Zinoviev. With regard to the KPD, his pronouncements were entirely consistent with his earlier letters. He attacked the ultra-left, naming Lukács and Korsch, and denounced them as intellectuals, or, this time, as professors. "If we get a few more of these professors spinning out their theories, we shall be lost." He relegated to Bukharin the full response to Boris. Again Fisher sought to parry the blow, this time by disassociating Korsch from Boris. "... When Korsch and Boris are named in the same breath ... when Comrade Korsch is thrown into the same pot as Boris ... this the German Party will not allow.

What is surprising is not the identification of Korsch as an ultra-leftist, but the recent claim that it was all based on a misunderstanding; and that at this date Korsch was not an oppositional figure. According to Douglas Kellner, the notion that Korsch resisted Comintern leadership prior to September 1925 is a "myth." In particular Kellner argues that Korsch's "Lenin and the Comintern" has been misread as a critique of Comintern leadership, when in fact it is an endorsement.

Several points should be made. Even apart from this article, Korsch was identified and denounced as an oppositional leftist. His publication of Boris's article, his own critique of Bukharin and Béla Kun, his solidarity with Lukács, his Marxism and Philosophy, and even his status as an intellectual — all these unmistakably revealed a "left" orientation. It is true that "Lenin and the Comintern" hardly telegraphed Korsch's heresy, but this was not necessary; it is a subtle, perhaps opaque, defense of Lenin against deviations. Yet it contained a qualified apology for the Luxemburgian interpretation of Marxism, and the Hegelian dimension of Marxism; moreover it criticized the codification of Leninism. It concluded: "For a positive fixation of the essence of Leninism as a method, the present moment in the development of the Comintern is just as
little appropriate as the fixation of a final Communist *program*, valid for an entire epoch of Communist politics."^{116}

In addition Zinoviev, with no ambiguity, took Korsch to task for the article, and his "defence" of Lenin, at the Fifth World Congress. "The editor of the magazine, Comrade Korsch, 'defends' Comrade Lenin from many deviations from Leninism. I believe that we should give Comrade Korsch the friendly advice to above all study Marxism and Leninism.... I believe that it is not too much to demand of the German Party, when I ask that the magazine *Internationale* be placed in the hands of Marxists."^{117} Korsch would later complain of the attacks on this article. In a review of Stalin's *Lenin and Leninism*, some months after the Congress, he mentioned in passing that his "'Lenin and the Comintern' was 'unjustly and without foundation attacked at the Fifth Congress as a critique of Leninism...."^{118}

For Korsch it was only the beginning. The next months saw the left leadership of Fisher and Maslow succumb to — or embrace — the Comintern position; they became eager Bolshevizers, sniffing out Luxemburgism and ultra-leftism. Maslow himself replied to Boris's article^{119} and the Central Committee of the Party formally condemned it.^{120}

The rest of the story can be told briefly. Korsch increasingly moved toward the left opposition, and Fisher and Maslow increasingly conformed to Comintern policy; this meant they were on the alert, as was Zinoviev, for left deviations and the West European Marxist heresy, or what Fisher called "'the West European theoretical school,'" meaning Korsch and Lukács.^{121} In this period, Korsch is more than once identified as part of the radical opposition.^{122}

The story ended happily for no one. The maneuvers culminate in the Tenth Party Congress of the KPD in July 1925. While this nominally reaffirmed the victory that Fisher and Maslow had obtained at the previous Congress, in reality it was their demise.^{123} Only a few weeks after the Tenth Party Congress, Zinoviev turned decisively against the leadership of Fisher and Maslow. This shift appears as one more obscure change of direction in the Comintern only if the nature of the alliance from the beginning is not perceived. It was always unstable, and this was clearer to Zinoviev than to Fisher and Maslow. Despite their conversion to enthusiastic Bolshevizers, they remained suspect as intellectuals and tainted by their relations with the left opposition. They were convenient allies only when the right discredited itself in October 1923.

The German Party was discussed by the Executive Committee of the Comintern in the middle of August 1925, some weeks after the Tenth Party Congress. What Zinoviev stated then is partly true; he originally supported Fisher/Maslow "'reluctantly,'" as the best opponents to Brandler; moreover he always distinguished between the "'good proletarian elements'" and the intellectuals in the left.^{124} These discussions, which included members of the German party, signalled a transition. Word of the change did not reach the
party at large until Zinoviev’s “open letter” was published in the main party newspaper, _Die Rote Fahne_ on September 1, 1925. The “open letter” called for the cashiering of Fisher and Maslow — and was the most direct intervention of the Comintern into the KPD to date.

Essentially, Fisher and Maslow were accused of failing to fight vigorously against the ultra-left. Maslow was even more violently attacked since by his past and writings he stood closer to the ultra-left than Fisher. “Comrade Maslow sought to oppose a ‘pure’ ‘left’ specifically ‘West European’ Communism to the ‘opportunism’ of Leninism.”

The “open letter” of Zinoviev “caused sensation and panic” in the Party. Few anticipated that the left leadership of Fisher-Maslow, that had been put in power with Zinoviev’s blessings, would be so unceremoniously discharged. It did not take long for the Party to vote them out. Within days of the “open letter,” District Meetings of the Party were called. It was then that Korsch spoke out openly. At the District Meeting in Frankfurt on September 9, Korsch denounced the “red imperialism” of the Comintern.

The rest of Korsch’s development need not be recounted here — not merely for lack of space, but because it was consistent in its loyalty to an independent Marxism. For this he paid the price of isolation which was the fate of many Western Marxists. He went on to form a left faction within the Communist Party. Expelled from the Party, he proceeded to develop a critique of Leninism and the Soviet Union. In the future was his critical evaluation of Kautsky, his reappraisal of _Marxism and Philosophy_, and his book _Karl Marx_. In the United States his closest contacts were with advocates of workers’ councils, — the living legacy of the KAPD and the “Dutch School.” Throughout his life, Korsch stitched together the politics and philosophy of Western Marxism. In the US “desert,” as he called it, this was sometimes difficult. One of his last letters stated that after the damage of the Stalin episode he was still holding on to “another dream: to theoretically restore the ‘ideas of Marx.’”

Department of History
University of California, Irvine
HISTORY OF WESTERN MARXISM

Notes

1. The argument of Perry Anderson in Considerations on Western Marxism, London 1976, that Western Marxism's attention to philosophy breaks with "classical" Marxism, is not exact — as he half admits in his "Afterword."

2. Lenin's major philosophical work, Materialism and Empirio-criticism (1909), was a sharp critique of the followers of Ernst Mach and Richard Avenarius. Lenin in this philosophical conflict was vulnerable on a critical score: many of the followers of Mach were Bolsheviks, especially a key supporter of Lenin, A. A. Bogdanov. Moreover, the Marxist philosopher Lenin prized the most, Plekhanov, was at the time a political opponent. Lenin alluded to this embarrassing fact once in the book by noting there were also Machian Mensheviks — that is, in addition to Mach's Bolshevik supporters. "Plekhanov in his criticism of Machism was less concerned with refuting Mach than with dealing a factional blow at Bolshevism. For this petty and miserable exploitation of fundamental theoretical differences, he has already been deservedly punished — with two books by Machian Mensheviks." V. I. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-criticism Peking, 1972, p. 431. In the introduction Lenin declared that his opposition was united philosophically "despite the sharp divergence of their political views." (p. 5). For several years, in fact, Lenin worked energetically to separate philosophical from political disputes. As he explained to Gorky, "In the Summer and Autumn of 1904 Bogdanov and I reached a complete agreement, as Bolsheviks, and formed the tacit block, with tacitly ruled out philosophy as a neutral field." Lenin sought to preserve this agreement. While despising Machism (or what he understood by it), he wrote to Gorky "Proletary must remain absolutely neutral towards all our divergences in philosophy and not give the reader the slightest grounds for associating the Bolsheviks, as a trend ... with empirio-criticism or empirio-monism." See Lenin and Gorky: Letters, Reminiscences, Articles, Moscow, 1973, pp. 32-33. It was in this period that Lenin protested to Die Neue Zeit when it mentioned that the philosophical disputes in the Russian party were political ones. "This philosophical controversy is not a factional one.... Both factions contain adherents of two philosophical trends ("Statement of the Editors of Proletary," in Lenin, Collected Works, vol. 13, Moscow, 1962, p 447). The point here is only that where politics and philosophy seem to present no problem — in Lenin — there is a tangled relationship. One of the best accounts of these events is in David Joravsky, Soviet Marxism and Natural Science, London, 1961, pp. 24ff. Cf. Manuel Sacristán, "'Lenin e la filosofia,'" Critica marxista, IX(1971), pp. 87-118. On Bogdanov see Dietrich Grille, Leninim Rivaie. Bogdanov und seine Philosophie, Köln, 1966, and for a partial rebuttal of Grille, see George Katkov, "Lenin as Philosopher," in Lenin: The Man, the Theorist, the Leader, ed. Leonard Schapiro and Peter Reddaway, New York, 1967.

3. For a bibliography of Lukács literature see István Mészáros, Lukács' Concept of Dialectic, London, 1972, pp. 188ff. The best recent accounts relevent to this study are Jorg Kammler, Politische Theorie von Georg Lukács, Darmstadt, 1974 and Laura Boella Il giovane Lukács, Bari, 1977.


13. Chernyshevskii is a partial exception insofar as he was ‘half’ a populist. William F. Woehrlin argues in Chernyshevskii, Cambridge, Mass., 1971 that Chernyshevskii on many issues deviated from the populists (pp. 226 ff.) See Chernyshevskii’s discussion of Hegel in “Essays on the Gogol Period of Russian Literature” in his Selected Philosophical Essays, Moscow, 1953. Herzen distanced himself from Hegel to the degree that he was disillusioned with the West. See Martin Malia, Alexander Herzen and the Birth of Russian Socialism, New York, 1965, pp. 278-9.


15. As Belinski stated, “I will stick to my view: the fate of a subject, an individual, a personality is more important than the fate of the world and the zeal of the Chinese emperor (viz., the Hegelian Allgemeinheit),” letter to V.P. Botkin, March 1, 1841 in Vissarrion G. Belinsky, Selected Philosophical Works, Moscow, 1956, p. 160. See Edward J. Brown, Stankevich and his Moscow Circle, Stanford, 1966, pp. 83ff.
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17. The populist social thinkers accentuated the subjective and distinct qualities of Russia which separated it from the West. See Alexander Vucinich, *Social Thought in Tsarist Russia*, Chicago, 1976, pp. 185ff.


28. More precisely, he was a student of Donato Jaja.


38. He explained to Engels that he arrived at Marxism because of his Hegelian education; see Antonio Labriola, Lettere a Engels, Roma, 1949, letter March 14, 1894, p. 142.


40. For a summery of Gentile’s analysis of Marx, see H.S. Harris, op. cit., pp. 45 ff.; and for a critique of Gentile’s reading of Marx, see Alberto Signorini, Il giovane Gentile e Marx, Milano, 1966.


44. See the study by Alfred Cornelius, Die Geschichtslehre Victor Cousins under besonderer Berücksichtigung des hegelischen Einflusses, Genève, 1958.


47. See “Author’s Postscript to the French Edition” and “Author’s Preface to the French Edition,” both in Socialism and Philosophy, Chicago, 1918.


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52. According to Andler, Herr planned to write a Hegel book as early as 1887. Andler reproduces a sketch of the preface to the three projected volumes, C. Andler, Vie de Lucien Herr, Paris, 1932, pp. 41 and 58 ff.

53. Herr judged it the least satisfactory part of the system; Koyré thought it arid, Kojève judged it absurd. See Salvadori, Hegel in Francia, p. 73. Representative in this regard is Georges Noël, La logique de Hegel, Paris, 1967, p. 160. First edition: 1897.


57. Comments depreciating Engels in comparison with Marx were not uncommon in the 1890s; one example: Ernst Seilètte, Littérature et morale dans le parti socialiste allemand, Paris, 1898, p. 310.

58. "Marx and Engels are in the same manner 'guilty' of applying the dialectic to nature.... Not Engels, but Lukács has transformed the teachings of Marx," A. Deborin, "Lukács und seine Kritik des Marxismus," Arbeiterliteratur, 10 (1924), p. 619.


60. Gentile, La filosofia di Marx, pp. 125-127.

61. Croce, What is Living and What is Dead of the Philosophy of Hegel, p. 206-7.


63. Ibid., pp. 9ff.; 237. Mondolfo was less critical than Gentile of Engels. See the comments in Nobetto Bobbio, "Introduzione," Mondolfo, Umanismo di Marx, Torino, 1968, pp. xxiv-xxv. Labriola, who had been a friend of Engels, was unconvinced; he wrote to Croce: "I am such a cretin that I do not see the differences (between Marx and Engels)," Labriola, Lettere a Benedetto Croce 1885-1904, Napoli, 1975, letter, December 31, 1898, pp. 323-4.

64. See "Is there a Utopia in Marxism?" (1899) in From Georges Sorel, p. 130. He wrote to Croce: "...it seems to me that Engels only had a general scientific education.... He did not have very clear ideas, notably on Hegelianism. He has contributed a great deal in leading historical materialism down the path of evolutionism and making it into an absolute dogmatism," "Lettere," La Critica, XXV (1927), p. 51, letter, December 27, 1897.


70. Ibid., p. 61.


78. To avoid oversimplifying a Lenin/Luxemburg antagonism see Luxemburg's "Blanquism und Sozialdemokratie" (in Internationalismus und Klassenkampf — Neuwied, 1971); this contains a partial defence of Lenin.


80. See the figures in Hermann Weber, Die Wandlung des deutsche Kommunismus, Band 1, Frankfurt, 1969, pp. 39 and 362. For the KPD the Weber volumes are indispensable.


85. "Der neue Blanquismus," (1920), in *Organisation und Taktik*, p. 120.

86. Dietzgen was an odd bird, and it is difficult to assess his thought or influence. Pannekoek himself noted that Dietzgen's philosophy "did not seem to have, until now, exerted any perceptible influence on the socialist movement." (Pannekoek, "The Position and Significance of Joseph Dietzgen's Philosophical Works" (1902), in Dietzgen, *The Positive Outcome of Philosophy*, Chicago, 1906, p. 35. However all the key figures of the Dutch School were attracted to Dietzgen. Pannekoek wrote frequent essays, and Henriette Roland-Holst a book, about him. Gorter was one of his translators. See Hans Bock, "Anton Pannekoek in der Vorkriegs Sozialdemokratie," *Jahrbuch Arbeiterbewegung*, Band 3 (1975), hrsg. Claudio Pozzoli, pp. 107 ff. In any case, what Pannekoek took from Dietzgen, or found in him, was an account of the role of ideas in the historical process.

87. Pannekoek's "Weltrevolution und kommunistische Taktik," was published in *Kommunismus* and later, with an addition, as a brochure. An editorial note in *Kommunismus* commented that it was a "very important contribution," although it "might stand in certain antagonism to the line of the Moscow Executive Committee, *Kommunismus* I (1920), p. 976. *Kommunismus* was the journal of the Vienna Bureau of the Communist International. Many Hungarians, including Lukács, were part of its staff; several of Lukács' essays which later would make up *History and Class Consciousness* appeared first there. Like many projects with which Pannekoek was associated, *Kommunismus* was accused of 'leftism', and after a short period was closed. See Branko Lazitch, Milorad Drachkovitch, *Lenin and the Comintern*, vol. 1, Stanford, 1972, p. 200.


96. "Rede des Genossen Sinowjew über die Lage der KPD" (in der Sitzung der Exekutive der Komintern January 1924), Die Internationale VII (1924), p. 44. For Zinoviev’s position prior to the shake-up see his Probleme der deutschen Revolution, Hamburg, 1923.


99. Carr notes with regard to this investigation, "few references to this episode exist in party literature," The Interregnum, p. 217. Cf. Fischer, Stalin and German Communism, pp. 361-2.


101. Delegate is designated only as from Berlin (Opposition), Ibid., p. 289.


113. Douglas Kellner, "Korsch's Revolutionary Marxism," in Karl Korsch: Revolutionary Theory, ed. D. Kellner, Austin, 1977, p. 45. In many respects Kellner is drawing upon Michael Buckmiller's work. See his "Marxismus als Realität. Zur Rekonstruktion der theoretischen und politischen Entwicklung Karl Korsch.", Jahrbuch Arbeiterbewegung, Band I, pp. 15-106. Apart from the facts and context, Kellner's argument that the condemnation of Korsch was based on a misunderstanding is based on a misunderstanding. "There was supposed to be some kind of profound connection between 'idealistic deviations' and ultra-leftism. Hegel would have smiled." "Korsch's Revolutionary Marxism," p. 46. If Hegel would have smiled, it might have been a knowing smile; at least most recent scholarship has put to rest the equation of Hegel's idealism and reactionary politics. See, for example, Joachim Ritter, Hegel and die französische Revolution, Frankfurt, 1965, Shlomo Avineri, Hegel's Theory of the Modern State, Cambridge, 1974, Walter Kaufmann, Hegel: A Reinterpretation, Garden City, N.Y., 1966.


117. Zinoviev, Fünfter Kongress, p. 54.


124. "Die erste Rede des Genossen Sinowjew. Aus den Verhandlungen des EKKI über die deutsche Frage," *Rote Fahne*, September 26, 1925. This speech was delivered August 13 but was published on September 26 and the following day.


127. R. Levine-Meyer, Inside German Communism, p. 86.

128. On the report that Korsch cried out 'red imperialism,' Kellner states: "I have yet to discover any evidence for this story and suspect it is part of the Korsch legend." Kellner, "Korsch's Revolutionary Marxism," p. 69. Yet Korsch's remarks were widely noted at the time. An anonymous article in *Die Rote Fahne* at the end of September entitled "Down with Petty Bourgeois Anti-Bolshevik Spirit" made the conventional distinction between decent proletarians and irresponsible intellectuals on the left. As an example of the latter it cited Korsch's remarks from the Frankfurt District meeting. It quoted Korsch as saying "that through an alliance of the Soviet Union with capitalist states, the revolutionary principles of the Comintern could be placed in danger." It further stated that "Korsch characterized the campaign for international trade-union unity, as a 'product of Russian foreign policy' and spoke of 'red imperialism,' and a 'possible 1914 of the Comintern.'" — brief Ernst Meyer in a letter cataloging the responses to Zinoviev's "open letter" also cited Korsch's comments. "Comrade Korsch followed so closely the style of the anti-Bolshevik tendency that he spoke of a 'red imperialism' (of the Soviet Government)...." — brief Ernst Meyers in Weber, *Die Wandlung*, Band 1, pp. 413-14 (October 3, 1925). Heinz Neumann, who later organized the Canton Commune and was for some years a favorite of Stalin, attacked Korsch's remarks at length. Korsch "wishes to show, that in case of a war, the alliance of the Soviet Union with capitalist states could place in danger the revolutionary fundamentals of the Comintern." Heinz Neumann, "Der neue Kurs des KPD," *Die Internationale*, VIII (1925), pp. 528-29. (For his efforts Neumann was later arrested and disappeared in Stalin's jails. His companion, Margaret Buber-Neumann, was one of the communists delivered to the Gestapo during the Soviet-Nazi pact: see her *Als Gefangene bei Stalin und Hitler*, Stuttgart, 1968. Her sister, Babette Gross, was no more fortunate in the choice of a companion. He also disappeared. See her *Willi Münzenberg*, n.p.; Michigan State U.P., 1974. Neither Neumann nor Münzenberg could swallow the Comintern position on fascism.) The flurry of activity over Korsch's remarks caused him to publish a brief "explanation" in several party newspapers; this tried to put to rest three allegations about "Korschism." See "Eine Erklärung des Gen. Korsch," *Neue Zeitung*, September 24, 1925. These allegations were that Korsch had made an "anti-bolshevik and anti-Soviet speech" at Frankfurt; that there was a "group" that included Korsch, Boris, Rolf and Dr. Weill; and that he was forming a left faction. Korsch asserted that he always supported the Russian Revolution and no such group existed. The "explanation" also appeared in *Die Rote Fahne*; an editorial note which followed it correctly observed that the explanation was lame. "The above explanation provides no clarification on the dispute. Comrade Korsch does not give the text of what he has said, nor does he concretely dispute what the Frankfurt party newspaper reported he said," *Rote Fahne*, September 27, 1925.