In a letter to Benedetto Croce, Georges Sorel complained bitterly that the works of Proudhon were virtually unobtainable in the Paris bookshops. Seventy years later, it is now quite difficult to obtain most of Sorel’s works, and the man who is credited with being Proudhon’s intellectual successor has now shared the same fate. Of Sorel’s vast work, only two books, *Reflections on Violence* and an outlandishly priced Swiss reprint of *Le Système historique de Renan* remain in print in France.

Why Sorel has failed to become a prophet in his own country while still popular elsewhere — especially in Italy — is problematic. A partial explanation may lie in the readiness of Italian Euro-Marxists to engage in modes of self-criticism that echo Sorelian themes — themes that the French Marxists, tied to the lackluster PCF, tend to avoid. Another explanation lies possibly in Sorel’s attack on the Cartesian tradition of political discourse. Indeed the members of the French literary establishment might well treat with disdain a figure who, in his own ideological itinerary must inevitably remind them of their own fashion-consciousness and offend them as the gadfly of European ideological movements, a sort of counter-cyclical trendy.

Now Richard Vernon has published an excellent essay which, together with appended translations, goes a long way to help restore respect for Sorel’s writings, and which underscores the importance of Sorel for Marxists and for all social theorists. Vernon’s theme is inspired by a passage in Sorel’s book on Renan which distinguishes between two mutually exclusive types of historical analysis. On the one hand, according to Sorel, historians may seek to recover the experiences of actors step-by-step. In such a case, they concern themselves with the emergence of the future, explaining the origin of events by means of an exact knowledge of the men who occupied the scene at the time. On the other hand, historians may adopt a rather different technique and attempt to recover the significance of events in terms of later outcome rather than ex-
periencing them internally. In this case, the historian views the past as a consolidated mass whose general appearance can be outlined schematically.2

The first method, which Sorel calls the “psychological conception,” deals with human motivations; it “corresponds to the instincts.” The second approach Sorel calls “scientific.” It alone can make sense of the historical process at a comprehensive level by interpreting change in finalistic terms, but whose end lies in the present, never the future. It looks at history “retrospectively” as an averaging out of phenomena, regarding them in terms of their relations while ignoring their causes and origins. The task of scientific history is to reduce history to a comprehensive order.

The thesis of Professor Vernon’s seventy-page essay is that by defining historical studies in these two ways, Sorel has transformed completely the way in which the social observer can deal with Marxian categories such as false consciousness and the meaning of revolutionary practice. Vernon makes clear that the first, or psychological, mode of viewing history is likely to be that of the participant himself; only the actor can account for the forces that impel him, his motives, his images and his myths. And it is precisely these sentiments and their origins that are outside the purview of scientific knowledge. That is why Sorel criticized Renan’s positivistic debunking of Christianity which tended to explain “scientifically” the causes of Biblical miracles as accidents all the while combining these explanations with a vague sympathy for religious experience. To Sorel, “as long as history is examined from the causal perspective, it is impossible to ask what real facts could have given birth to the illusion of a miracle.”3 As Vernon says, and Sorel implies, Renan cannot concern himself as a scientist with the motive forces that bring about action because he was not a participant. The self-consciousness of the historical process is fundamentally different from the reflective knowledge of the historian who judges events ex post facto. While the scientific mode of analysis, barring some extraordinary coincidence, will assign meanings to action that differ from the meaning assigned by the actor to himself, the latter cannot possibly predict the consequences of all his actions.

Sorel has in fact replaced the Marxian concept of totality with what might be called a “social uncertainty principle.” Sorel was not content simply to separate the views of participants from those of observers, but generalized this separation into a methodology whereby certain matters are excluded from consideration when others are treated. Sorel called this method “diremption” which Vernon quite reasonably translates as “abstraction.” One set of relationships must be isolated from the totality in order for the distinctiveness of these relations to be made known. But once this abstraction has been performed, one cannot possibly reassemble the broken unity. As Vernon explains it, having ignored certain relationships in order to grasp others, one cannot reinsert the construction into the total milieu without distorting the
relationship between the two. We can understand the motives of the subject in his actions or we can understand the outcomes of events by dissolving the subjects into the totality, "but there is a logical gap between these two forms of knowledge, for one posits as real what the other discounts."4

In separating the internal and external perspectives on revolution, Sorel abandoned the Marxian attempt to comprehend systematically both at once. In Vernon’s terms, such an attempt rests on a circular argument which projects the downfall of capitalism at least in part because of the existence of the socialist alternative itself, and which in turn justifies socialism by the imminent downfall of capitalism. To assume that the proletariat (or the socialist party) is the chief instrument of revolutionary change, as theoreticians do, is to argue that the intent of the partisans is identical to their historical significance; it is, to use Sorel’s terminology, an attempt skillfully to fashion a hypothetical cause according to the effect that we must explain.5 To insist that the proletariat which makes the world shall also inherit it is to suppose that we can know what we cannot know. Such a view relies on the notion of a universal class that has not yet become universal or on the concept of a revolutionary party whose attributes are simply posited with no basis as yet in fact.

In Vernon’s understanding, Sorel’s logic leads to the view that the proletariat is simply another interest group, and that the revolution conducted in its name scarcely differs from other revolutions. Indeed Sorel denied the notion of the universal class and replaced it with local allegiances and parochial concerns: the real and actual mediating forces of historical action. "As much as any sociological formula can exist," he said, "we can see that if capitalist society was characterized by the advance toward unity, the present workers’ movement tends toward local division." In such a view, the idea of a final and unified end is replaced by a federalist socialism that is put in the present — that is, in the everyday lives of the participants: "We come to understand that social questions are not resolved by the science of certain scholars and through the able tactics of party chiefs, but they are resolved every day insofar as the morality of the workers increases. The old authoritarian formulae of state socialism are tempered because the sentiment of self-government is developed in the masses; indeed whoever says federalism also says liberalism, the limitation of authority through public opinion and the balancing of powers."6

As Vernon says, the belief systems that go to make up these sentiments of self-government and the institutions out of which they arise also account for the social myths that develop in the society. In Sorel’s view the gap between this parochialism and what Fernand Pelloutier called the "concrete unity of the working class"7 is bridged when Marxism itself is seen as a myth whose predictions can now be safely ignored. That is to say Marxism becomes intelligible when we realize that it articulates a psychological rather than a scientific approach to history. Furthermore, as long as we regard the separation
between these two outlooks as methodologically sound, many of the more controversial aspects of Sorel's theory of social myth are made reasonable. Thus, Sorel's understanding of the social myth as "secure from refutation" — that it is only "the myth as a whole that counts" — does not mean some monstrous fascist lie; it means only that any attempt to refute or debunk the myth scientifically is as misguided and futile as Renan's attempts to explain away early Christian eschatology by unmasking its origins to believers. This does not mean the consequences of that eschatology cannot be judged or that it is impossible to evaluate the results of the myth of the general strike — an evaluation Sorel specifically calls for; it means that such judgements can only be made external to and after their expressions have been made and that their origins are impossible to examine scientifically; they remain "mysterious." In other words Sorel separates the scientific theorist from the immediate political process and argues for a division of labor between theorist and actor. Thus, according to Vernon, Sorel is misrepresented when he is seen as simply a theorist of "engagement," of the superiority of acting over thinking or of "violence" for its own sake. As Vernon sees it, Sorel, in denying holistic knowledge, is arguing that it is the task of the theorist quite literally to reflect on violence as an object of knowledge. The theorist is placed roughly in the same category as the theorist of Manchester economics vis-à-vis the entrepreneur who, unconscious of the consequences of his day-to-day decisions, ignores the formal categories of economics.

Since this limitation does not mean unemployment for the theorist, merely demotion, it is rather curious for Vernon to argue that, although Sorel never attacked it, the notion of false consciousness is "necessarily ruled out" in his system. But Sorel mounted a confessedly Marxist-style unmasking of the false consciousness of the "illusions of progress." Surely the idea of false consciousness, applied retrospectively to certain concepts, does not vanish in Sorel's framework; it is simply confined to the kind of ideas that arise from the contemplative stance — bourgeois ideologies such as progress located in the rationalist tradition that are amenable to a debunking process from which the strongly held myths of acting revolutionaries are immune. Sorel explicitly salvaged (dirempted) the Marxist concept of ideological unmasking — the methodological correlate of false consciousness — from Marx's other tenets.

But this objection hardly vitiates Professor Vernon's thesis. On the contrary, as Vernon notes, the methodological reform which Sorel attempts to establish has as its intended consequence the rather effective unmasking of the false consciousness of the Marxist intellectuals themselves. Marxist ideology — especially that of the French and German social democratic parties of Sorel's time — is, among other things, an ideology justifying the rule of petit bourgeois intellectuals and déclassés; it is less an ideology of the workers than a defense for the rule of the philosopher class, the university class whose utopias slide easily into reforms bolstering the present system.
Vernon states this in a rather interesting way: in arguing as he does for a *philosophie des bras* rather than a *philosophie des têtes*, Sorel really reverses the age-old notion, adopted by philosophers and politicians from classical times, that the end is pre-established by the object at which the actor aims, and that the operations he performs figure simply as means by which the model guiding him is given material form. Inspired by Hannah Arendt’s exposition of this problem, Vernon states that in such a case, the notion of making has been substituted for that of acting. The political party or professional revolutionary sets out to make a revolution as a carpenter would construct a chair. In both cases, a certain violence to the raw materials is necessary, and this violence is effectuated by a unified human will. Insofar as Sorel realizes the inadequacy of the idea of making applied to a revolution he is a critic of violence, an enemy of the pre-Marxian cult of the will and of the “engagement” of philosophers.

The difficulty, however, as Vernon realizes, is that Sorel does not always dispense with the model of making because such a model inspires Sorel in his own limited version of the unity of theory and practice. This leads to the most problematic aspect of Vernon’s thesis. Vernon claims that not only did Sorel separate theory from practice, and hence reject Marx’s notion that the act of understanding is identical with the act of overturning, but that Sorel had “come to the conclusion that Marx had quite wrongly treated consciousness as an epiphenomenon.” For Vernon, Sorel was “not familiar with the doctrine of the ‘unity of theory and practice’ in its Marxist sense, or even with those of Marx’s writings from which the notion can be derived.”

But what is the “Marxist sense” of the unity of theory and practice? At this point it is necessary to distinguish between Sorel’s interpretation of Marx and his acceptance or rejection of various positions taken by Marx. I think it fair to say that Sorel did not view Marx as regarding consciousness as a mere epiphenomenon — or at least that he did not consistently interpret Marx in this way. Since he does adopt the position ascribed to him by Professor Vernon, Sorel must argue, as he does, that Marx’s “Hegelian biases” led him to look forward to the day when social transformations “will result henceforth from ideological causes.” In a paper presented to the *Société française de philosophie* in 1902, Sorel clashed with some of the luminaries of French intellectual life on just this point. Sorel asserted that Marxism sought a “tight solidarity between theory and practice,” and cited the editor of the French edition of the *Communist Manifesto*, Charles Andler, to the effect that there is truth “only in the synthesis of theory and practice.” Indeed, Elie Halévy, espousing the more old-fashioned interpretation of historical materialism in which thought is part of a superstructure, accused Sorel of “a kind of treason” to Marxist thought for implying a reciprocity of action between the elements in question which Marx thought irreconcilable.
The problem for Sorel and for Vernon is that Marx was not consistent in his views on the function of theory in revolutions. Vernon quotes Marx to the effect that "philosophy finds its material weapons in the proletariat, and the latter its intellectual weapons in philosophy." But Sorel was acutely aware of the ambiguity of Marx's positions in this respect. Thus at one point he can assimilate Marx to Plato's philosopher king, while on the other hand he repeatedly expressed his awareness that Marx, in his constant opposition to utopianism, was also sensitive to the hazards of predicting the future. Thus Sorel quotes Marx as saying that the method of exposition differs from the method of action.

In fact in our day other problems are encountered with regard to this question. In the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* socialism is given the form of a "crude communism" in which proletarians are conscious of themselves only as members of a certain class and not as emancipated individuals — and whose consciousness cannot be said to be as unified and as "total" as that of the philosopher, Marx. Even contemporary Marxists are far from agreement as to what constitutes this unity; Vernon finds a rough parallel between Sorel's debate with the orthodox Marxists and that of the structuralists with the phenomenologists of our day.¹³

The question remains as to how Sorel integrated his understanding of Marx with his own understanding of the unity of theory and practice. Vernon is aware that, like Marx, Sorel imbues his own theories with a doctrine based on "making." He notes that Sorel adopted a form of praxis when he adopted the "Vicoian" notion that man knows what he makes. As Vernon states it, "manual work" for Sorel "represented what was concretely rational in human society — the extension of the made at the expense of the given, and the progressive construction of an artificial and hence intelligible milieu."¹⁴ Sorel regarded this notion as the epistemological basis of the unity of theory and practice and it is here that one finds a crucial link with Marxism. Sorel expressed the relationship between theory and practice in his colloquy with Halévy, saying that he "understood such a union in the sense that is given to it in the so-called applied sciences; that is to say that theory and practice are applied to a single group of phenomena. The historical interpretation of Marx and Engels should serve to clarify the workers' movement which without it would develop in a purely haphazard, empirical way. They have tried to justify the movement in proving that it can end and that the proletariat can accomplish this revolutionary mission which was, in their view, the basis of all proletarian action. It is a matter of clarifying a social activity, just as a physical theory clarifies an industrial practice."¹⁵ Indeed, Sorel sees similarities in the kinds of theory that are required of both the industrial practitioner and the Marxist-syndicalist. Just as science is unable to predict how a steam engine will develop a hundred years from now (to use Sorel's example), for Marxists, "research applies no longer to what society will be, but to what the proletariat can ac-
In both social science and technology, as Sorel says to Halévy apropos of Marxism, "a theory founded in practice is essentially a rule of prudence which provides man the means of knowing the dangers encountered in his path." Sorel thinks that Marx wants to make a revolution in which "the end is narrowly determined by practical concerns," and in this Sorel is in substantial agreement.

Indeed, in some Sorelian writings there appears to be a resemblance not only to the Marxian theory of practice but to the attempt to transcend alienation, of which the division of labor between philosopher and practitioner is an example. As Sorel says, "the old dualism of mind and body, head and hand, on which the old economy was based, is tending to disappear .... The idea is born of action and returns to action under pain of failure for the actor. All that would remain in the domain of pure speculation and which is not translated into any practical result seemed to ... result in the intellectual amputation of man. Subject to the harsh law of work, man is incapable of freeing himself to live as a pure spirit."

What is not in common with Marx however, and the point at which Sorel appears to us as both anachronistic and strikingly original, is Sorel's acceptance of this "harsh law of work" and its dissociation from a historical telos. By accepting the present industrial system, Sorel denies that the kind of alienation that Marx described as having existed in his day had survived until his own time. But in so doing, Sorel did not argue that it was possible to attain the transcendence of alienation envisioned by Marx. In Sorel's writings, the alienated industrial relations of early capitalism have been replaced by an industrial system that has already created new dimensions in human creativity. The old automatism is now a thing of the past. But this system is the result of a convergence of many scientific endeavors whose plurality cannot be transcended through the Marxian formula that "in the long run there will be only one science" — the kind of prediction that Sorel repeatedly insists is impossible to make.

Sorel realized that even among the natural sciences the plurality of methods was such that a unified science was impossible to foresee. Until about 1894, Sorel took the view that machines are like geometric verifications of change wrought upon matter. After 1895, he realized that such an analogy was vitiated by a fundamental error, that of assuming that science is applied perfectly to nature. He realized that the world cannot be turned into an immense laboratory precisely because his uncertainty principle which limits investigations in social matters operates, albeit in a general and very different way, in the physical world. The construction of laboratory models, a means which links making and knowing, also effects an isolation of the experiment from the world.
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The Feuerbachian unity of nature that had for Marx been alienated under the capitalist system Sorel regarded as fragmented both by the scientific procedures themselves and by the manufacturing processes that proceeded from them. If this had not been the case, Sorel would have followed Engels in foreseeing the replacement of the all-encompassing world of Laplacian physics with an equally all-encompassing socialist laboratory-workshop. But instead Sorel ended by separating "artificial" and "natural" nature; that is, he made a distinction between nature wrought by men and nature which is left untouched. In this artificial milieu of the laboratory and workshop, matter cannot avoid being alienated from the rest of nature by *homo-faber* or by the laboratory scientist in the creation of his measurements and controls; furthermore, the investigation of phenomena of artificial nature clouds the investigations of other kinds of phenomena.18

Artificial nature resembles a kind of diremption which cannot be assimilated back into the main body of nature. Indeed, as Vernon notes, Sorel depicts the invention of new devices as a sort of warfare between the two realms: "the more scientific that production becomes, the better we understand that our destiny is to labor without a truce and thus to annihilate the dreams of paradisiacal happiness that the old socialists had taken as legitimate anticipations."19 With this pessimistic view in mind, it is surprising to find Vernon saying that for Sorel "the history of technology, hitherto a sacred thread in an otherwise profane history, would become the whole of history."20 Surely by arguing that "we will never be able completely to subject phenomena to mathematical laws," Sorel is only affirming what Vernon has said of him elsewhere, that it is impossible to reduce all of history to a made thing; that the process of making itself is a diremption for whose ruination natural nature "never ceases working with a crafty slowness."21 Indeed, Sorel's overwhelming dread of almost inevitable decadence, the triumph of our own natural nature, the inclination to passivity and sloth, would preclude any such technological totality.

Since this perpetual antagonism between artificial and natural nature requires agonal striving against natural nature, including our own sloth, through an ever more ardent self-overcoming, the poetic spirit, as Vernon notes, and not Marx's rational one, becomes the solvent of praxis; this is why social poetry including the social poetry of the general strike looms so large in Sorel's vision. It is poetry that is oriented towards projects for the future and as such represents a realm of freedom; while rational thought, whether in science or philosophy, represents a closed and determined system. Since pure science in Sorel's view is deterministic, to rely on it is to invite stagnation in science as well as in society. To exclude the poetic spirit altogether from scientific undertakings would be to lapse into the passive terrain of natural nature. Being "purely intellectual, scientific knowledge presents itself to us as something alien to our person .... We attribute to it a determinant force on our will and we submit weakly to its tyranny."22
Paradoxically for Sorel, this determinism is an adversary of science for it always ends in affirming the powerlessness of our creative forces. Sorel was aware of Marx's distinction between man and the social animals wherein man alone possesses a preconceived plan prior to building something. The Bergsonian departure from Marx lies in Sorel's view that such a plan itself does not break the circle of determinism. This is the reason that Sorel sharply distinguishes between engineers who follow scientific routines and inventors who do not. Sorel argues that the invention of devices precedes rather than follows the development of scientific theory. Future creations of science are the purview of practical men such as inventors or artists who see in theories only instruments destined to establish certain qualitative determinations that have already been constructed through empirical investigations. Such men never reason by applying scientific theories: "The architect combines all his pieces before verifying their stability; this verification is very useful; but it comes at the end as a contributory means of science."

Hence there is a bit more to Sorel's view of industry than the demand that workers maintain order with vigor as Vernon puts it. For in order to create something in science or in society, one must break the chain of determinism by an action informed by poetic sentiments. As Sorel says "poetic fictions are stronger than scientific ones." They represent "the ability to substitute an imaginary world for scientific truths which we populate with plastic creations and which we perceive with much greater clarity than the material world. It is these ideals that penetrate our will and are the sisters of our soul." The same poetic vision that inspires the syndicalist believer in the inevitability of the general strike, or assures the Marxist that his cause is certain to triumph, produces in the heart of the inventor the moral certitude of the rightness of his task. "If man loses something of his confidence in scientific certitude, he loses much of his moral certitude at the same time." This certitude is more poetic than rational.

Under such a system, "the rules of prudence" that Sorel mentions become the rational side of praxis, and as Vernon notes Marx sees rational theory as going far beyond such rules. Indeed in his departure from rationalism and his insertion of the poetic spirit in the scientific process itself, Sorel is among other things arguing for what William James called a preliminary faith in science. In fact there are, as Sorel himself later came to realize, considerable affinities between Sorel's view of the poetic spirit and William James's pragmatic view of religion. It is unfortunate that Vernon does not mention pragmatism because much of his understanding of Sorel is similar to William James's distinction between "religious propensities" and their "philosophical significance." What James calls the "existential judgement" of religion as opposed to our "spiritual judgement" of its value are close to Sorel's separation of mythical from retrospective knowledge.
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Sorel argued that the social myth is "an expression of the will." Similarly, for James "beliefs are rules of action .... If there were any part of thought that made no difference in thought's practical consequences, then that part would be no proper element of the thought's significance. To develop a thought's meaning we need therefore only determine what conduct it is fitted to produce." 26

For James the truth is what is advantageous in our order of thought, and the success of a doctrine is more important than its inner coherence. For Sorel whether beliefs are based on bad theology "is much less important than the fact that they possess the poetical power of myths." 27 For James there is a heterogeneity between the ends realized and the means given. For Sorel "even if the only result of the myth were to render the socialist idea more heroic, it would on that account alone be looked upon as having incalculable value." 28

Years ago Bertrand Russell argued that Marx's view of the unity of theory and practice was essentially pragmatic in nature. The merit of Vernon's essay is to show how Sorel's own pluralistic understanding of knowledge, an understanding that is close to James's, differs from Marx's idea of a unified science. For this reason alone, — even apart from its many suggestive insights too numerous to mention here — I would recommend Vernon's exposition of Sorel's theory to all serious scholars of modern social thought. In his essay, Vernon has hit upon what is perhaps Sorel's most enduring contribution to modern social science. The fifty pages of excerpts from Sorel's writings are all excellently translated and include a complete translation of the important preface to Pelloutier's Histoire as well as large excerpts from prefaces to Merlino's Formes et essences du socialisme and to his own 1905 edition of L'Avenir socialiste des syndicats.

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SOREL AND THE SOCIAL UNCERTAINTY PRINCIPLE

Notes


2. *Le Système historique de Renan*, pp. 5-6.

3. Ibid., p. 37.


9. Sorel, *The Illusions of Progress*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969. See p. 152, where Sorel states that "one of the tasks of contemporary socialism is to demolish this superstructure of conventional lies and to destroy the prestige still accorded to the 'metaphysics' of the men who vulgarize the vulgarization of the eighteenth century. This is what I try to do whenever possible in this work."


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