Nietzsche is fascinating and troublesome in the extreme — from the unwa- 
vering confidence, the brashness and beauty of his style, to the vanishing centre 
of his thinking. Interpreters take on a task of inordinate difficulty — aggra-
vated by a legacy of Nietzsche-abuse and Nietzsche-idolatry.

The task of interpretation is little aided by an awareness of the failures and 
excesses of others. Nietzsche's texts are notorious for their illusive and often 
contradictory straightforwardness. What emerges from each of the books here 
under consideration is a slightly reverent caution, appearing in the first pages of 
each book in the form of warnings to the reader and self-imposed rules for inter-
pretive cleanliness. Neither reader nor interpreter is immune to being swept 
away by Nietzsche-the-artist, missing the confrontation with Nietzsche-the-
philosopher. Allison takes pains to make it clear that Nietzsche's texts are not 
"things." They have no resting point, they move; they are metaphorical, 
relational, and above all do not lend themselves to reformulation within tradi-
tional metaphysical frameworks (pp. xiv-xv). Strong gives his subject the 
benefit of an open mind by assuming the coherence of Nietzsche's thought as a 
whole. One can claim that "one knows one's way about" in Nietzsche "when 
all elements one encounters make sense" (p. 5). And Dannhauser wishes to 
achieve the ideal of understanding the philosopher "as he understands 
himself, as he wishes to be understood" (p. 16). But while Allison and Strong 
see in Nietzsche's style a demonstration of his success, Dannhauser treats it 
primarily as an obstacle to be overcome.

Dannhauser's *Nietzsche's View of Socrates* takes a traditional approach to 
the text. Dannhauser is convinced that a thorough documentation of Nietz-
sche's references to Socrates, placed within the context of the work in which 
they occur, will solidify our understanding of Nietzsche. Beyond this, his inter-
pretive aim is to place Nietzsche in direct confrontation with traditional
philosophy by requiring Nietzsche to *speak* to Socrates. Indeed, Dannhauser seems to intend his book as a device through which Nietzsche can be drawn into a Platonic dialogue. He understands Socrates to be a great philosopher with whom Nietzsche "actually quarrels" over "the role, status, and limits of nature and reason" (p. 13) — a demonstration of an *agon* that spans the ages.

Using this interpretive device, Dannhauser seeks to delineate the fundamental philosophical alternatives in terms of which Nietzsche's criticism of the ancients might be discussed. He places, for example, the poetic against the theoretical, the human against the animal, the natural world against the created world, and creation against negation. Nietzsche fares poorly: although Nietzsche is a wise, eloquent and provocative opponent for Socrates on these issues, Socrates emerges unscathed. The true nature of Nietzsche's failure, Dannhauser suggests, resides in the fact that he could not successfully resolve the tension between the creative component of human reason and "objective truth" (p. 263). The traditional philosophy of Socrates and Plato, he points out, "was not faced with this problem because it took its bearing by nature, which set limits to man's power and assured the existence of challenges to which he could respond" (p. 264).

Apart from questions concerning the plausibility of neo-Platonist philosophy today, Dannhauser fails to give an adequate account of Nietzsche in two crucial respects.

First, the significance of Nietzsche's attack upon Socrates is seen to be primarily an attack upon Platonic metaphysics. Thus when Dannhauser formulates the problem in terms of Platonic alternatives, it has little bearing on Nietzsche's problem of nihilism in the Christian-moral tradition, to which Nietzsche related his thinking about Socrates. Nietzsche's understanding of nihilism ties it *inextricably* to the appearance of Platonic metaphysics. This certainly means that any attempt to interpret Nietzsche through *a priori* recourse to the standards of traditional metaphysics is sure to miss his problem of the emergence of nihilistic consciousness in the Christian-bourgeois world. Instead, Dannhauser implicitly substitutes another conception of nihilism: he seems to understand nihilism as the situation in which traditional reason does not obtain. At the extreme, Dannhauser provides us with the choice between a transcendental orientation towards rationality, or the void. Within this framework, Nietzsche loses, but without having been understood.

Second, Dannhauser's exegetical device has the effect of erasing what is most interesting about Nietzsche's view of Socrates: his historical approach. Nietzsche sought not only to use Socrates as exemplary of a manner of thinking that survives in a multiplicity of forms — one of which is nihilism — but also to explain the genesis of the historical "type," Socrates. For Nietzsche, Socrates can be understood as a sign of emergent and context-bound human needs in addition to being an articulator of philosophical propositions that can be
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criticized as things in themselves. The historical Socrates gains meaning when his speech, vision and desires are placed in dynamic confrontation with existing culture, needs and desires. Without this dimension, Nietzsche's view of Socrates is unintelligible. But Dannhauser's approach to Nietzsche's Socrates rests upon the methodical denial of the historical-explanatory dimension of Nietzsche's thinking. “In the interest of understanding Nietzsche,” Dannhauser writes, “I shall try to overlook those passages in which Nietzsche insists that thinkers can be understood only in their historical or psychological context” (p. 18). Dannhauser continues by equating historical context with psychological reduction, apparently unable to distinguish a psychological exercise like Erik Erikson's Young Man Luther from On the Genealogy of Morals, where Nietzsche sees the philosopher as positing values which gain their meaning from many levels of internal and external conditions. For Dannhauser, Nietzsche's problem of truth in history reduces to the problem of the psychologized atom — the philosophizing subject — where expression and belief no longer appear as the real power of signification in a collective context, as they do for Nietzsche. “If there is no objective truth in the sense maintained by traditional philosophy,” Dannhauser claims, “then philosophies become the subjective expressions of philosophers” (p. 207). From here, it is one short leap to the polarity of Platonic reason or mere subjectivity — “nihilism.” Dannhauser's oversight verges on arrogance when — having dismissed consideration of the “historical” Nietzsche — he concludes: “The ‘historical sense,’ which Nietzsche was so proud to possess and which he characterized as one of the proudest possessions of modernity, does not necessarily lead to an understanding of the past that does justice to it” (p. 273). Dannhauser’s claims to good faith are belied not only by his attempt to displace Nietzsche into a metaphysical frame of reference that Nietzsche saw as problematic, but also by occasional deficiencies in scholarship.

Nietzsche requires active interpretation, but certainly not on the basis of assumptions he spent his life criticizing. Allison's The New Nietzsche is more encouraging in this respect. His collection of essays proves to be a most interesting addition to our understanding of Nietzsche, introducing the English-speaking world to styles of interpretation inspired by French structuralism, Heidegger, and even Christianity itself. Heidegger’s essay “Who is Nietzsche’s Zarathustra?” is included in the volume, together with essays by Jacques Derrida and Gilles Deleuze (two pieces). The less well-known authors — Michel Haar, Alphonso Lingus, Pierre Klossowski, Maurice Blanchot, Jean Granier (two pieces), Eric Blondel, Sarah Kofman, Henri Birault, Thomas J.J. Altizer and Paul Valadier — are likely to be received either with pleasant surprise or dismay by those imbued with the Anglo-analytic tradition. Many of the authors have previously done extensive work on Nietzsche, including Heidegger, Deleuze, Klossowski, Granier, Kofman and Valadier.
arranged these essays so they move from broader attempts to deal with the major themes in Nietzsche — language, will to power, master and slave morality, nihilism, Zarathustra, the overman and eternal return — to finer examinations of philosophical issues and less traditional ways of dividing Nietzsche's texts for purposes of discussion. The essays are often difficult, requiring a solid grounding in Nietzsche's thought. But the effort of reading them is rewarding. Allison has maintained a high level of discourse, with very few disappointments.

The philosophical unity of the essays is constructed around Heidegger's question, "what is metaphysics?" Nietzsche is not seen to embody the denial of traditional modes of rationality, but rather the profound self-consciousness of their inadequacy. Western metaphysics no longer comprehends who we are. Our language and thought no longer correspond to our life-world. The "very validity of our contemporary forms of intelligibility" is called into question, precisely because nihilism is comprehended as a loss of the relationship between thought and meaning (p. ix).

Following recent French and German philosophical trends, Allison's essays tend to find the focal point of Nietzsche's critique of metaphysics in his awareness of the ways in which the world is constructed by language and symbolization. Nietzsche's critique of transcendent reason is seen to be a critique of the false authority commanded by dogmas frozen into thought and language. These essays see language as having a transcendent dimension, but a transcendence not ultimately grounded in the formal truth of either the idea or of logic, even though language exhibits a conceptual-logical structure. Rather, the transcendence of language is social and conventional: its authority is the by-product of historically-sedimented social relations. And the language products of collective activity always mediate individual thoughts, meaning that we cannot regard language as merely the reflection of some fundamental material or historical substratum. There is no fixed order against which to judge the meaning of symbols, signs and their formal rules of coherence because the meaning of a particular sign or set of rules is both contextual and relational. What Nietzsche means when he claims that all human activity is "interpretation" is that language is an irreducible medium within the development of human history.

To claim that "man and world, word and thing both belong to the order of the signifier, the only order of things" (p. xix) however, is not to say that Nietzsche identifies the world and the signification of the world in the same sense that Hegel identified subject and object in Geist: "the word never expresses an identical meaning, much less an identical object" (p. xv). It is exactly what escapes signification in history that allows language to be creative in relation to the world. For Nietzsche, there is "a more comprehensive, stranger, richer world beyond the surface, an abysmally deep ground behind every
But the world can also escape signification in such a way that the
creative power of language is lost. In nihilism, the language of convention loses
its adequacy to our life-world and thereby loses its ability to bestow meaning.
The primary concern of the essays in Allison’s volume is to understand the
“crisis of meaning” in terms of the inadequacy of our inherited languages.

Strong’s *Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of Transfiguration* is broad and
synthetic in its approach, intending a unified and systematic interpretation.6
Strong draws heavily on the French interpretations of Nietzsche, and provides
many interesting comparisons to Wittgenstein. His main concern, however,
centers on questions one rarely asked of Nietzsche: “what is history?” and —
more precisely — what does Nietzsche mean by “the history of nihilism”? These carry Strong through the formal question of metaphysics to Nietzsche’s
question of what is signified by certain ways of thinking about the world, how
new ways of life emerge in relation to these modes of thought, and how we are
to conceive of our own discourse within this history. Thus Strong’s project is
continuously intersected by the formulations in Allison’s collection, but no
single essay attempts what Strong is attempting, with the possible exception of
Deleuze’s essay “Active and Reactive.”

To ask the right questions is a considerable advance over past Nietzsche inter-
pretation. In this sense, Strong’s project is refreshing compared to (as Allison
puts it in his preface) the “pointless series of over-simplifications, biographical
anecdotes, or convenient summaries” that has unfortunately formed a
“tradition to which the English-speaking audience has long ago become ac-
customed” (p. x).

Strong claims that Nietzsche’s foremost problem is to understand the im-
passe of western society, to make “all of human history a problem” (p. 18). For
Nietzsche, what makes history a problem is the present crisis of nihilism.
Strong seeks to understand the history of nihilism by first reconstructing
Nietzsche’s thinking about the possibility of moving beyond nihilism in
thought, and then by focussing upon the logic of the historical development of
nihilism in relation to the Christian-moral interpretation of the world. By
centering on the structural necessity exhibited within the language of morality
— that is, the historical power it commands through its pervasive and limiting
character — Strong attempts to think about the real power of language in
history without crude reductions.

To construct this history, Strong emphasizes, is not simply to discover what
has been, but to do a *genealogy* of present values and meanings: to construct a
past in such a way that we are informed about the causality of what seems most
problematic in the present. Strong treats Nietzsche’s project as a kind of high-
powered practical reason which takes account of the fact that we are the history
of negative significations, and works through present significations by
examining the necessity at work in their origins.
Our moral world, for example, is an irreducible aspect of our historical development. It is "not epiphenomenal to the perceiver, to be cast off or changed like a suit of clothing. It is rather our very flesh..." (p. 49). The transcendent signification of moral valuations constitutes our thinking; more — it constitutes our psychology. But it must now be seen as questionable because these valuations are experienced as contrary to our life-needs. Thought is driven beyond the stasis of dead and worn-out metaphors by the experience of their inadequacy which is called nihilism. And while Nietzsche's genealogy maintains its objectivity in relation to the experience of nihilism, the possibility for a truly political practice depends upon the strength of the genealogical interpretation.

I

Two interrelated problems pervade these books on Nietzsche. First, did Nietzsche successfully question the tradition of western metaphysics which bases its thinking upon sets of ideal correspondences between thought and reality, word and idea, word and world? If not, Nietzsche's failure may be instructive. If so, we are faced with a task more difficult than criticism, for to understand what is novel and unique in Nietzsche is to understand how Nietzsche reconceives our existence in the world without relying upon the dogmas of metaphysics and without finishing in nihilism.

Second, if the metaphysical point of view is both definitive of nihilism and also intrinsic to us by virtue of our language, psychology and history, and yet this point of view is no longer adequate to "the world we live in and are," then what could emerge from this disjunction?

Dannhauser is certainly right in this sense to challenge Nietzsche's view of reason in traditional philosophy. But since he does not look beyond the ancient conception of "truth," he cannot comprehend the meaning of the impasse of metaphysics. If Dannhauser fails to enter Nietzsche's universe, Strong and Allison do so willingly. They understand that reason in the traditional sense becomes irrational when it loses its relation to its human context. This is not to say that traditional reason is untrue in some absolute sense. It would be much better to say that it is incomplete and it ultimately turns its incompleteness into unreason by demanding faith in itself where it encounters difficulties. Nietzsche never refutes traditional reason. Instead, he transforms it by showing its truth-value to depend upon its origins in life-activity. Nietzsche treats Platonic truth in much the same way Hegel treated "understanding" (Verstand): as one-sided and therefore relatively true. It is true only in relation to some more multi-faceted and complete apprehension of the world. Thus Nietzsche asks: "To what extent can the truth endure incorporation (Einverleibung)? That is the question; that is the experiment." Only if reason moves beyond
metaphysical explanations of things that function as self-imposed, mythical limitations to thought can it truly serve human existence. The critique, for Nietzsche, only begins with the awareness that metaphysical reason has no a priori claims to the eternal nature of the world.

The claim that Nietzsche does, in fact, retain a conception of the world that does not exclude the past advances of the intellect can be further clarified: Nietzsche rejects the notion of the world as a Platonic world, where the “truth” of the world implies both the “good” and the “eternal.” But he retains “truth” in the sense that the world exhibits objective necessities which may be conceptualized in an interest-directed manner. In accordance with this, Nietzsche’s philosophy makes positive use of a kind of Kantian “thing in itself” to guard against irrationalistic or romantic deflations of the necessary world. His criticism of metaphysics is directed not so much at the metaphysical attempt to secure the concept of objective necessity as a condition of practice, but at those aspects (including various notions of “the real world”) that over time served to obscure the world by imposing categories having the character of wish-fulfillment: “The total character of the world ... is in all eternity chaos — in the sense not of a lack of necessity but a lack of order, arrangement, form, beauty, wisdom, and whatever other names there are for our aesthetic anthropomorphisms.” Nietzsche believed that the metaphysical world-view — taken now in its broadest sense to include the Christian-moral world-view — had introduced into history a fundamental disjunction between the everyday world of experience that serves as a condition of meaning, and the way meanings are constituted at the symbolic-linguistic level. Over historical time, a way of thinking that achieves meanings at the cost of projection away from experiences (like suffering) inevitably becomes hollow, simply because this kind of symbolic-linguistic universe lacks responsiveness to changes in experience. It becomes a thought-trap, introducing into history a symbolic-linguistic necessity that is very different from all other kinds of necessity.

Nietzsche in fact considers some tension between thought and action to be definitive of the possibility for human progress. But where the tension becomes a disjunction, where a manner of thought can no longer comprehend the experiences engendered by history, a crisis of meaning arises that appears to be entirely the result of the inadequacy of the inherited symbolic-linguistic universe. Nietzsche called this disjunction “European nihilism.”

It is around the conception of symbolic-linguistic necessity that Strong’s book revolves and where he is most innovative in his understanding of Nietzsche. Strong understands the emergence of both the Christian-moral interpre-
tation of the world and modern nihilism in terms of the undermining and shifting of the linguistic predicates of social order. In his historical orientation, Strong sees in Nietzsche’s concern with the Greeks both his “laboratory” — as it were — for study of this process, and his metaphor for cultural health as an historical possibility.

In order to grasp Nietzsche’s conception of symbolic-linguistic necessity in early Greek society, Strong introduces a valuable distinction between ideas and beliefs which are merely unquestioned in a particular culture, and those which are unquestionable in terms of that culture (p. 24). The significance of Strong’s distinction amounts to this: social actions are structured by, and take their meaning from, determinate structures of ideas, beliefs, symbols and languages. Actions occur within horizons of vision, to use a more Nietzschean formulation. Unquestionable beliefs are those which form a “system of unconditioned predicates which make a thought or a form of life possible” (p. 25). The horizon of a people, a class, a culture not only is an essential aspect of the stability of a society — a stability which obtains because certain perspectives are beyond thought — but that horizon solidifies this stability by collectively providing the value or meaning of a certain kind of existence. The individual’s needs and desires are symbolically mediated by the cultural-linguistic horizon. This horizon is both internal — manifested in the ways in which individuals come to need and desire things — and external, in that the specificity of a need is known to the individual only through the “system of unconditioned predicates.”

This “system of unconditioned predicates” has shifted dramatically once in history — in the transition to the Christian-moral interpretation of the world — and is now shifting again, due to the split nature of Christian-moral language itself. Why the Christian-moral “system of unconditioned predicates” must ultimately shift is clear both in Strong’s analysis, and in Eric Blondel’s essay “Life as Metaphor” (in Allison’s collection). Blondel graphically points out that in civilization man himself becomes “metaphorical” in the sense that the internalized language of denial becomes a split between body, embodiment, and thought: “The (cultural) ‘nature’ of man is thus established as nonnatural, since it is based on distance and scission: language and thought thus appear as epidemic surfaces that like our skin, both conceal and exhibit the vicissitudes our bodies undergo” (p. 151). Language becomes a “fetish” (Strong, p. 72) in the sense that it is both agent and manifestation of the “emptying-out” of the body into detached self-understanding. The origin of Christian-moral language in this dual repression and sublimation of the body makes man “sick,” or, in other Nietzschean words, “human, all-too-human.” Blondel notes that “man” is born through the “body’s symptomatic conversion into language” (p. 152). Thus Strong may correctly claim that by “making language a problem, Nietzsche gradually leads himself back to the
position where men themselves become the problem' (p. 70). Because Nietzsche sees language as a kind of practical and dynamic perversion and inversion, it can be taken as a sign or symptom which points to certain kinds of life, to certain kinds of beings. The critique of language becomes the critique of the developed social-psychology of a people (Strong, p. 92) by passing beyond itself to affective need.¹³

The shift in the linguistic predicates of social order in the modern crisis of nihilism can be seen to be the result of a broken relationship between Christian-moral language and developed affective need, between the individual and social-universal components of meaning.¹⁴ When universal modes of understanding do not permit the expression of individual experience, a kind of "legitimation crisis" develops, growing into a potentially explosive social situation. Strong tries to understand this as a crisis both of rationality and of psychological motivation.

On the epistemological level, the internal logic of the (moral) desire for truth works itself out as a "gradual undermining of that which might serve as a basis for truth" (p. 76, de-emphasized). Identity theory reveals to itself its formal inconsistency. For example, the traditional identity postulate "'God' is unmasked as a fiction by the drive to truth implied in this postulate.

On the psychological level, there is a disjunction between the individual's experience and the cultural account of this experience. It is manifest in the excessive weight of guilt and bad conscience resulting from the increasing internalization of the collective "'system of rewards and punishments'" established through Christian morality (p. 106).

Thus the individual's vision loses its groundings — its horizon — and language as the collective repository of meaning loses its relation to what individual social actors require for the self-understanding of action. That collective language metaphors are "'worn-out'" — and show themselves to be worn-out by their static, reified quality — appears in the experience of nihilism. Importantly, Strong has grasped that Nietzsche attempted nothing less than the construction of history in terms of a dialectic of existence and the meaningful structuring of this existence in and through the social horizons of speech and language. This places Nietzsche squarely within discussions which today are increasingly interested in the relations between language and social change.¹⁵

But why moral language should become worn-out, why reification of moral teachings should inevitably appear, indeed, why the inverted language of the Christian-moral interpretation should appear at all in history remains a difficulty for Strong's analysis and unfortunately prevents his project from fulfilling its promise.

Strong devotes a chapter to analyzing the problem of the origins of Christian-moral language in terms of the historical actors, Socrates and Christ. Socrates and Christ were both great "'immoralists'"; they taught against con-
vention and custom, exploding pre-existing social horizons and becoming extraordinary social actors in the movements from mythology to rationality, and from the collective morality of custom (die Sittlichkeit der Sitte) to individual morality (Moralität). For Strong, Nietzsche’s Socrates and Christ are figures who speak, who teach, who name things differently. But they are individuals in history who name or teach wrongly because their personalities were “flawed” (p. 109). Their lack of self-understanding was exhibited in incorrect teaching and the resulting idolization and reification of teaching into stagnant doctrine. Strong relates these errors to a “genealogy” of the great individual’s psychology in the attempt to understand the material “soil” from which the errors grew.

But the “soil” from which human valuations spring is not, for Nietzsche, merely individual depth psychology, as the logic of Strong’s interpretation seems to suggest. Nietzsche does not explain the fatal dynamic of nihilism simply in terms of the cultural projections of powerful, but flawed personalities. Strong’s interpretation seems to have moved the idealistic locus of historical explanation from individual consciousness of nature to the collective and individual unconscious in the structuralist sense, without really showing why Nietzsche thought nihilism would necessarily emerge in the modern world. Christ might have made a mistake, but this is not sufficient to explain the real power of the Christian-moral interpretation of the world.

Allow me to elaborate this criticism. I believe Strong has successfully identified that aspect of historical necessity that results from the failure of signification to maintain its relations to its human origins. Strong’s position is that something about the content of a particular language masks the fact that this language is only a created transcendence, and not an ontological limitation. Human actors needlessly operate within paradigms that constrict consciousness of themselves as actors. So far, so good. But because Strong does not develop Nietzsche’s way about thinking of a necessary world which is not language, because he traces all historical necessity to the human act of interpretation, we could be left with the very un-Nietzschean conclusion that if we could simply recognize our significations and languages as creations, we could achieve perfect freedom by simply creating new ones with positive content. Nietzsche’s insights do not end with the criticism of language as a prison-house. History results in the naming of things, but the naming of things does not in itself account for history. Strong has not adequately dealt with Nietzsche’s fundamental problem of why particular ways of naming things endure in history to the exclusion of other possibilities.16

III

Strong’s difficulty is that he does not fully develop the relationship between language and human need in Nietzsche’s work. Language, although it consti-
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tutes the self-consciousness of need and is therefore creative of the particular way in which a need is formed, understood and acted upon, is not the sole constituent of need. Nietzsche does not locate the genesis of a historical crisis solely within the right or wrong of a collective self-understanding, but attempts to relate language to the conditions escaping signification. Thus Nietzsche retains the ideas of instinct and social coercion — two crucial embodiments of will to power — as the "other" of language, which enter into the constitution of history as a dialectic of power and the subsumption of the experiences of power under categories of meaning. I believe a more thorough examination of the role of the concept of will to power in these aspects is required not only for the plausibility of Nietzsche's philosophy as a whole, but to see the ways in which Nietzsche is interesting for social theory.

Dannhauser's book provides no useful material in this regard. It merely dismisses the will to power as a metaphysics that denies metaphysics. Strong thinks more seriously about the will to power as pathos, as history, and as a principle of interpretation. But the consideration Strong gives to the topic occurs only in the second-to-last chapter, and is far from adequate. If Strong had considered the will to power earlier, in conjunction with thoughts on language, his project might have reached further than it does.

Nietzsche's thinking in fact requires the idea of will to power in order to conceive the all-pervasive nature of language without exorcizing the necessary element of difference between word and world, between human need and the conceptualization of need. What needs to be understood is how Nietzsche thought he could speak of that which is signified, that which language responds to, without falling back into either naive realism or idealistic metaphysics. Could Nietzsche's conception of "will to power" find a kind of provisional objectivity of a different nature? Can will to power be seen as an example of the non-codifiable metaphors to which Deleuze refers in his excellent article "Nomad Thought," wherein Nietzsche's metaphors are seen to require a moment of objectivity in the movement toward the exterior parameters of their meanings? Does Nietzsche's style intend to move language metaphors momentarily into the world in order to escape the realm of merely self-identical concepts? Many of the essays in Allison's volume ask questions such as these. They suggest that the novelty of Nietzsche's approach has yet to be appreciated in its full significance. If the will to power is the kind of extended metaphor that pushes thought toward distinction and difference, opening language out towards the world and away from mask, then Nietzsche may indeed have taken a step beyond metaphysics. Haar, Lingus, Deleuze, Blondel and Kofman all imply that Nietzsche provides something new in this respect. But if the will to power is simply a new kind of essence, if it requires the metaphysician's faith as the ground for criticism of all past truths, then Nietzsche has not provided a way of adequately thinking about the constitutive aspects of language in history, nor about nihilism itself.  

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Sarah Kofman’s incisive essay, “Metaphor, Symbol, Metamorphosis,” deals directly with Nietzsche’s attempts to conceptualize the “thing in itself” signified by metaphors of different orders. Kofman pays close attention to the transitions that occurred in the course of Nietzsche’s thoughts about the problem of metaphysics. Nietzsche originally held to Schopenhauer’s metaphysics of the will, Kofman points out, wherein the metaphor or sign was conceived as a more or less impoverished representation of a signified, or “natural” realm of the will.¹⁰ This construction, Kofman continues, leaves the alternatives of either generalizing the “good natural”—as Nietzsche does in The Birth of Tragedy—or generalizing the idea that all is metaphor—as Nietzsche tended to do at other times in his early work, e.g., in the fragment “On Truth and Lie in the Extra-Moral Sense.” But, Kofman writes, the “two opposing terms belong to the same system and if we deconstruct one only by generalizing the other, the deconstruction remains bounded by the field it originally sought to escape” (p. 208). Only in his later works, Kofman correctly notes, does Nietzsche abandon the notion of the metaphor as a basic philosophical concept due to this difficulty, substituting the different notions of will to power and interpretation.¹⁹

Before we consider what this implies it should be noted that both Dannhauser and Strong fail to grasp the significance of this transition in Nietzsche’s development, although both attempt to periodize his works. Strong relies too heavily on Nietzsche’s early philological writings in attempting to understand Nietzsche’s thoughts about the breakdown and recreation of cultural horizons. In these writings Nietzsche’s ideas were still in flux.²⁰ Dannhauser’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s Socrates relies heavily on an exegesis of The Birth of Tragedy, allowing him to extrapolate the sometimes static polarities that occur in that work— the polarity of rationality and aesthetics, for example—through the whole of Nietzsche’s works.

Gilles Deleuze, in his essay “Active and Reactive,” deals more successfully with the overall meaning of the will to power, despite the excessively neat constructions which belie a structuralist upbringing. Deleuze’s approach captures the intention of Nietzsche’s concept by showing how it refers to the irreducible other of language, an other which renders language dependent, but also creative of meanings; limited, but also having the power of extension. The two irreducible moments of the will to power are the experiences of internality, or desire and drive, and externality or resistance and fulfillment. Will to power names the “affect” or interest which is the flow of meaning through the non-identity of internality and externality. This affectability or interest is constituted as meaning for consciousness within the medium of metaphor and symbol. (Blondel’s essay also contains a good discussion of Nietzsche’s constructions in this respect.) Meaning is dependent upon energy, intensity, flowing “to” and “from.” And energy is inconceivable without the non-identity of internality and externality. The will to power is the metaphor which
names meaning as (directed) energy, the ontological limit for the affectability which meaning requires. Thus the will to power contains within itself difference, non-identity, and the "pathos of distance."

It is precisely this movement of force and energy that is "other" than language, whose nature it is to freeze this movement into conceptual stasis. Against this stasis, Nietzsche provides the metaphor of will to power. By constructing the "hypothesis" of will to power, Nietzsche is performing a language "experiment" in an attempt to incorporate the idea of energy in time into language. It is the element of energy in time that the metaphor of will to power tries to name as essential to the world, and that could re-establish a relationship between the concept and its contextual meaning. In Deleuze's interpretation, the will to power embodies the idea of force and diversity, allowing thought to see stasis, desire for completeness, death and nihilistic judgement in its past conceptions.

This interpretation of the will to power permits Deleuze to interpret Nietzsche's ideas about historical development such that he might ask the heuristic question: "How does the human constitution of meanings interact with all other existing forces?" Deleuze believes that Nietzsche sees history as an interplay of "active" and "reactive" forces. Deleuze calls the self-understanding which negates ideas of force "reactive" and that which affirms and increases force "active." "Active" force is sensibility and affectability, while "reactive" force is mask, dullness of sense, and negation of the world. History consists in the appearance of "reactive" forces in response to "active" forces: specifically, the slave reacts to the action of the master.

Deleuze structures Nietzsche's history of nihilism as a history of "reactive" forces fragmenting "active" forces by imposing negative meanings, by denying force with categories of "being" and eternity. Consciousness and language arise as "reactive" forces in history; the imposition of meaning has heretofore been essentially reactive in nature. Our present thoughts are laden with the sedimented history of domination/negation.

IV

Should one try to reapply Deleuze's notion of will to power in history to the example of Socrates, I believe a different image of Socrates would result than that of either Dannhauser or Strong. I will merely attempt to be suggestive at this juncture. For Nietzsche, to explain the peculiar necessity of Socrates, together with his brilliance and his lasting historical effect, would be to capture the dynamic elements of the context within which Socrates' speech becomes effective. Socrates, as an historical actor, cannot be conceptualized merely as a philosopher who espouses ideas (Dannhauser), nor as a personality whose naming of the world results in a misunderstanding (Strong). At some level,
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Nietzsche wants to see Socrates as a focal point in Greek culture who embodies the contradiction of master and slave, who holds this contradiction within himself, and who transvalues immediate master-slave violence into a cultural code which resolves this contradiction at the level of a new, negative self-understanding. Nietzsche’s search for the genesis of the power of language in history leads him to examine the kinds of social relations that do not admit of immediate linguistic meanings. Socrates’ language — or, at least that part of it that becomes Christian — attains its endurance by providing a provisional orientation to the slave’s will to power. The new way of speaking and thinking gives meaning to experiences that cannot immediately be altered in their nature — due to the real power disadvantage of the slave — but may be misunderstood in such a way that they do not threaten chaos.

To see the mode of necessity at work here, picture the condition of the slave. The will to power of the master is experienced by the slave as greater than his own real power. From the point of view of sensuousness, this is painful. From the point of view of vision, it is chaotic. The condition reveals no immediate human meaning. There is but one way out: to impose meaning mediate through an alteration of the consciousness of the painful power. And it is Socrates who steps into this immediate contradiction of social forces and performs the master-stroke which transvalued and spiritualized these forces. Socrates’ language, among other things, provides universal and enduring meaning through a double dynamic of repression-masking and sublimation that increases the feeling of power of the oppressed. And in this way, Socratic conceptions become real and powerful things in history by defusing, sublimating and solidifying explosive configurations of will to power.

The point to be grasped here is that Socrates is one who names “wrongly” — because of the denial of life in his new “truth” — but necessarily, in the sense that only a certain range of ideas could have spoken to existing needs so they would become a utility of meaning for a certain kind of life — slave life — in their Christianized form. Socrates creates the kind of horizon that makes the slave’s life possible, but the condition of this new horizon is the pre-existence of a socially-created reservoir of “reactive” force.22

This “genealogy” of the origins of our present-day ways of thinking allows Nietzsche to suggest that our language is nihilistic because it retains an “inverted image” (Deleuze’s term) of primordial social violence. An image of violence is contained in the particular way in which Socratic language masks the world, and this becomes a structural attribute of western language as formal sets of rules, propositions and correspondences.23

V

The most political questions of self-definition emerge against this understanding of our metaphysical language in terms of its social genesis. At the
same time that the criticism of metaphysics shows that the "self" is not a "thing," but rather a locus of forces, the genealogy shows that the metaphysical self was carved out of social violence. As an idea, Nietzsche thought the "self" to have rather shabby roots. The metaphysics of "self" wishes the self to be more, but does not provide the conceptual apparatus for it to be more.

Several essays in Allison's collection seriously consider the problem of the self as a locus of creative activity. They see that the philosopher's problem of identity and metaphysics contains the existential question of the integrity of the self in the non-transcendental world. Conceivably, the dissolution of metaphysics could undermine any notion of "self." In spite of its roots, Nietzsche did in fact hold the metaphysical notion of "self" to be one of the positive — although inadequate and deformed — aspects of the Christian-moral interpretation of the world. If the dialectic of individuation is not to finish in nihilism, Nietzsche's goal of higher individuation requires that it be possible to imagine new ways of conceiving the self and the world which are not metaphysical, but which proceed from within metaphysical language — our only language.

Is this possible? Michel Haar's essay, "Nietzsche and Metaphysical Language," represents one kind of answer, concluding that Nietzsche's destruction of metaphysical language can "be looked at as an experiment pushed so far as to destroy the destroyerqua speaker" (p. 35). "The language the self uses," Haar writes, "to provide itself with a fictitious center, the language of fixed and arbitrary identities, appears to be so much bound up with this system of contradistinctions that denying this system casts one back into the dissociated and inexpressible clutches of Chaos" (p. 35).

Nietzsche poses for himself the problem of truth or life, truth or nothingness/chaos; a seemingly irresolvable confrontation. But Nietzsche finally asks — like Heidegger later — "what is the meaning of such a confrontation?" Nietzsche resolves the confrontation into a problem of the "will to truth": metaphysical language has "spilled out" into psychology, but it does so only after having passed through a dilemma that implied nihilism. Metaphysical language, Nietzsche tried to show, like every other metaphor, can reveal what is signified ("life") by looking truthfully at its own contradictions. Metaphysical language contains within itself, as a symptom of its embeddedness in life, the possibility of overcoming itself by again turning out of itself. The will to truth discovers itself as a will to power, turning thought out of self-identity and again toward the world.

The essays by Maurice Blanchot, Pierre Klossowski and Jacques Derrida attempt to push through metaphysical language where Haar, Granier and many others leave off. Blanchot, for example, in "The Limits of Experience: Nihilism," attempts to demonstrate that the thought of nihilism, manifest in
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the first confrontation with eternal return, moves through negation as a moment. When nihilism is truly thought, it “tells us of the final and rather grim truth: it tells of the impossibility of nihilism” (p. 126). Why? Nihilism is not tied to the nothingness of the world as such, but only to the nothingness of past ideals: it leads back to the affirmation of this world of movement and appearance. At the limit of nihilism is the discovery of the root of the old language in the will to power; hence, the discovery of the possibility of new meanings.

This passage of thought can best be interpreted in its existential meaning by reference to Nietzsche’s enigma of eternal recurrence. I agree with Strong that the eternal return is “not a theory of the cosmos” — the will to power is rather the cosmological postulate — but a “state of being” (p. 265). Eternal return is no mere dissolution of all opposites into a desperate embrace of fate — although metaphysical thought might first experience the eternal return with desperation — but more profoundly, the eternal return is a “vision,” an aspect of imagination that makes plausible the postulate of will to power as the experience of a horizon. Eternal return, I suggest, is Nietzsche’s attempt to retain as a plausible existential horizon the possibility of the self as the locus of creative action, without making the self into a fictitious metaphysical substance.

This is what Klossowski demonstrates in his essay, “Nietzsche’s Experience of the Eternal Return.” Drawing on Heidegger, he tries to show that it is possible to re-account for the self as a constellation of forces just when the self loses its one-sided reflection in traditional values. Klossowski investigates the possibility of reconstituting the self (which depended upon its belief in its self-identical status) as a multi-fold self. The self — if I might be permitted a rough translation of Klossowski’s difficult construction — requires both the identification of itself in signifiers which are “outside” the self (the self locates itself in terms of a coherent, pre-existing symbolic universe) and the forgetting-overcoming of this schizophrenic set of identities in order that the self return to itself as the (now concrete) consciousness of itself as a locus of forces. The eternal return, Klossowski believes, is the thought out of which the self can generate itself as a higher belief within the “closure” of the circle of signs from which the self takes its bearings. As an example, it could be added that Freud accomplished this transition of thought for the self-understanding of psychotherapy.

Derrida’s “The Question of Style” approaches the same problem of the decentered metaphysical self through an analysis of Nietzsche’s metaphor of “truth” as being a “woman.” Derrida pushes beyond the face-value of Nietzsche’s metaphor — by itself infamous for its anti-feminist connotations — by relating Nietzsche’s idea of feminine style to the structure of Nietzsche’s aphorisms. Derrida discovers in Nietzsche’s word-praxis that the dual notions of “style” and “distance” step into the void of decentered metaphysics.
“Woman” becomes a synonym for style and distance. The “truth” of one’s relation to a “woman,” Nietzsche had held, was precisely in its distance. This truth is “relational”— it requires this distance in order that the appearance might constitute itself with the integrity of a “thing.” Desire—or, will to power—spans the distance, constituting the appearance as satisfaction. The will to truth, on the contrary, violates the appearance, committing the “indecency” of wishing to see the thing itself, of wishing to close the void between perceiver and perceived. Nietzsche wanted to show that the will to truth—in its metaphysical form as the wish for identification—really neuters the truth. “Woman,” on the contrary, suspends questions of “truth” in the void, but also “in eroticis,” substituting play and intensity as the substance of the self.

Both Derrida and Deleuze see in Nietzsche’s style the praxis of the idea of the non-identical. Nietzsche’s text constantly pushes beyond itself, into its “other”—the intensity of will to power—by forcing the reader to supply meaning and life from outside the text.

VI

In the last analysis, however, these possibilities of the rational imagination are realized or not realized depending upon forces of historical necessity; not in the sense of linguistic necessity or entrapment—many of these barriers can be transformed slowly by the rational imagination—but rather in the sense that configurations of will to power do have historical specificity not reducible to language. The focus on Nietzsche’s idea that history is constituted within constellations of will to power does give his idea of the “overcoming” of man a non-mystical meaning, however. The constellation of historical forces constituting the “self” of modern man is contradictory. It is from the awareness of this contradiction that the overman can arise. In Nietzsche’s language, the overman could emerge from the “breeding” (Züchtung) of previous history. For example, truth and morality are overcome, but retain themselves as “instinctual” grounds, bred into the psychology of modern man.

Significantly, Nietzsche uses the term Selbstaufhebung as well as Selbstüberwindung to speak of the emergence of a new thing out of an old thing, implying a Hegelian understanding of the transition. If Strong fails to articulate Nietzsche’s ideas about present change and transition, it may be because he seems overly interested in differentiating between Hegel and Nietzsche, often ignoring the crucial and illuminating similarities. When Strong claims that Nietzsche’s philosophy intends a remolding of the “very stuff of humanity” (p. 16), he is certainly correct. But he consistently fails to point to the ambiguous status of this “very stuff.” For Nietzsche, the overman contains nothing that is not implied in man, even if the overman as such is not recognizable to man.

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Alphonso Lingus comes closer to Nietzsche's intentions in his essay, "The Will to Power," by paying attention to Nietzsche's "types" who embody active will to power. Lingus names three: the "artist," the "noble individual" and the "sovereign individual" (pp. 56-58). These three "types" occur within Nietzsche's writings as metaphors for the conditions within man that are the conditions for overcoming. The artist signifies the will to power as the creative externalization of horizons, the noble individual represents the will to power as a present-oriented psychology (that is, non-neurotic; not frozen into past obsessions), and the sovereign individual is the one whose psychology can contain the historically developed knowledge of natural necessity, the (scientific) condition for controlling events in the future.

Any overcoming of man presupposes the existence of these "progressive" tendencies: Nietzsche never condemns dogmatically man as such. Humans are "sick," but their "sickness" is pregnancy (Blondel, p. 153). Nietzsche's task is not to condemn history, but to recover it by moving the pregnancy into a birth. Thus a great deal of Nietzsche's critical efforts are expended in attempting to assess the degree to which the strong types (artist, noble individual, sovereign individual) exist within the present, either as actual individuals, or latently within an existing psychology — in nihilism, for example.

To miss this side of Nietzsche would be to miss him in his most political aspect, overlooking the crucial relation Nietzsche draws between affirmation and critique, between "rank order of value" and "yes-saying and no-saying," between critical history and new valuation.\(^\text{28}\)

The failure to note that Nietzsche's ideas about transcendence within history rest upon the psychological possibilities cultivated (stächete) by history, and that these possibilities are illuminated only by selective affirmation and negation, is the most crucial objection I have toward the three essays that occur at the end of Allison's collection under the ambitious section heading: "Transfiguration." Allison himself uncritically locates the mystification in interpreting Nietzsche as an existential visionary: "What would appear to be the joyous new light (sun, dawn, day) is certainly not any 'divine' illumination.... For Nietzsche, this was the effulgent light, the efflorescent vision, of a newly transformed self — and its source was the clairvoyance of a transfigured attitude" (p. 217). But contrary to Allison's claim, these last essays are theological in the sense that they reduce the changes in ways of living which Nietzsche clearly envisaged (Strong addresses himself to the politics of this in his seventh chapter) to a change of attitude, allowing the self to become once more a fictive actor. These essays represent the worst tendency of Allison's collection: the avoidance of any consideration of the conditions of transvaluation, the problem that consumed so much of Nietzsche's attention. Thus the eternal return at the hands of the theologians seems to become a glorious vision of apocalypse, eternal affirmation, and the incarnation of the Christian promise of eternal
bliss. Nietzsche drops out, and Nietzsche-the-visionary, whose "madness" ascends to an "unfathomable reality" remains (Valadier, p. 252). If this were indeed Nietzsche, the self he wished to realize would also become merely a vision, an ideology. Nietzsche would be a brilliant, mad prophet — but of little interest for social theory.

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Notes

1. In Canada the popular image of Nietzsche has been influenced to a large extent by George Grant's C.B.C. radio lecture Time as History, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, Toronto, 1969. Grant is more eloquent than Dannhauser and less inclined to misinterpret. But, like Dannhauser, Grant concludes that without a Platonic notion of the eternal, man is doomed to the meaningless passage of time. As I mean to show in this essay, this construction does not exhaust the alternatives envisaged by Nietzsche. For Nietzsche, these are the alternatives of theology and nihilism; and, theology has become in many respects an impossible alternative. Dannhauser and Grant both seem to ask their readers to accept on faith the Platonic notion of the eternal, through fear of the alternatives; rationalism — as Nietzsche knew — moves back to its origins in theology with this conclusion. Grant can impose these alternatives on Nietzsche only by misunderstanding the crucial role of the doctrine of eternal return and the complementary notion of amor fati within Nietzsche's philosophy. See pp. 41-51.

2. Nietzsche outlines his project in On the Genealogy of Morals as follows: "Under what conditions did man devise these value judgements good and evil? and what value do they themselves possess? Have they hitherto hindered or furthered human prosperity? Are they a sign of distress, of impoverishment, of the degeneration of life? Or is there revealed in them, on the contrary, the plenitude, force, and will of life, its courage, certainty, future?" Preface, 3 (Werke, Karl Schletta, hrsg., Frankfurt a.M.: Verlag Ullstein, 1972, vol. II, p. 765). Where available, I have used translations from Walter Kaufmann's editions of Nietzsche's works. Other translations are mine.

3. These deficiencies would not be serious in themselves except that they have the effect of systematically serving Dannhauser's interpretation of Nietzsche. For example, Dannhauser contrasts the Aristotelian equation of happiness and reason with Nietzsche's view of happiness by alluding to Nietzsche's early essay, The Use and Disadvantage of History for Life: "Nietzsche speaks explicitly of the happiness of children and animals" (p. 150). Dannhauser is apparently suggesting that Nietzsche has here defined happiness in this manner. In fact, Nietzsche merely uses these examples to suggest that a common element of all happiness is the capacity to feel "unhistorically" (Werke, I, 212). But Dannhauser seems to need this falsification to support his constant suggestions that Nietzsche sides with irrationalism against reason. In another place Dannhauser writes: "Nietzsche criticizes drama for portraying effects without sufficient causes" (p. 173). Dannhauser makes this statement to support his dubious contention that Nietzsche turned to Western positivism during his middle period (p. 19). But in the passage Dannhauser is paraphrasing, Nietzsche actually criticizes only modern European drama (Werke, II, 96-97). In a third instance, Dannhauser overlooks a crucial adjective when he paraphrases Nietzsche as saying that the "perennial optimism of Alexandrian culture has led it to deny the undeniable dependence of any [sic] culture on a slave class..." (p. 69). Nietzsche actually writes: "die alexandrinische Kultur braucht einen Sklavenstand, um auf die Dauer existieren zu können..." (Werke, I, 100). This mistranslation has the effect of supporting Dannhauser's emphasis upon the Nietzsche who glorified war, slavery and political irresponsibility (p. 31).


6. Nietzsche is anti-systematic not in the sense that his philosophy is ultimately self-contradictory, but rather in the sense that it opposes the systems of German idealism. Nietzsche occasionally interjects reminders to his readers: "Do you think it is piece-work because it is (and must be) offered to you in pieces?" *Human, All-Too-Human*, II, i, 128 (*Werke*, I, 787).


10. To hypothesize that "there is no truth, that there is no absolute nature of things nor a 'thing in itself'," Nietzsche wrote in an 1887 note, "is merely nihilism — even the most extreme nihilism." *The Will to Power*, 13 (*Werke*, II, 817). Nietzsche's use of the term "nihilism" is disparaging in this context.


13. See the very important aphorism on method and interpretation in *On the Genealogy of Morals*, II, 12 (*Werke*, II, 817).

14. "What is dawning is the opposition of the world we revere and the world we live and are. So we can abolish either our reverence or ourselves." *Op. cit.*, *Werke* (*Grossoktavausgabe*).


17. I will avoid considering Heidegger's claim that Nietzsche was the last metaphysician, a claim made in his essay "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" and elsewhere. In addition to the difficulties caused by the special status Nietzsche occupies in Heidegger's thought as a whole, such consideration depends heavily upon Heidegger's view of history as the history of Being, and takes its significance from this context. Suffice it to say that in many respects Heidegger does not think through Nietzsche's thoughts on history. On this issue see especially Bernd Magnus, *Heidegger's Metahistory of Philosophy: Amor Fati, Being and Truth*, The Hague.

18. See e.g., *The Birth of Tragedy*, 16 (Werke, I, 87-93).


20. *On Genealogy of Morals* could not have been written at this time, for example. The intelligibility of this work no longer requires the genetic-Hegelian approach of *The Birth of Tragedy* nor does the metaphysics of the will appear as in earlier works.

21. Jacques Derrida has coined a word for the idea of energy in time: he calls it *differance*. Nietzsche's approach to metaphysics seems to have been crucial to Derrida's innovative formulations. See *Speech and Phenomena*, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973, pp. 129-160.

22. It is possible to arrive at this interpretation of the significance of Socrates by reading the section "The Problem of Socrates" in *Twilight of the Idols* with *On the Genealogy of Morals* in mind. That this reading is warranted is clearly suggested by sections 5-9 of "The Problem of Socrates."

23. "Could it be," Nietzsche asks with respect to Socrates, "that wisdom appears on earth as a raven, inspired by a little whiff of carrion?" *Twilight of the Idols*, "The Problem of Socrates," 1 (Werke, II, 951). "And might one not add," Nietzsche writes with respect to later moral concepts, "that, fundamentally, this world has never since lost a certain odor of blood and torture? (Not even in good old Kant: the categorical imperative smells of cruelty)." *On the Genealogy of Morals*, II, 6 (Werke, II, 806). "Nothing has been more dearly purchased than the minute portion of human reason and feeling of freedom which now constitutes pride." *The Dawn*, 18 (Werke, I, 1027). Ironically, Dannhauser believes Nietzsche's praise of the sense of smell, which Nietzsche thought of in terms of the "sniffing out" of violence in sterilized language categories, indicates that he values subhuman ways of assessing things over human ways! (p. 224)


26. Nietzsche writes the following in the *The Gay Science*: "'Is it true that God is everywhere?' a girl asked her mother; 'I think that's indecent' — a hint for philosophers!" Preface, 4 (Werke, II, 15).

27. Strong seems to have picked up a case of Hegel-phobia from Deleuze, to whom Strong is indebted in many respects. For Deleuze, as for many of the contributors to Allison's collection, Hegel is merely the paradigm case of identity theory. Nietzsche certainly did not regard Hegel in this one-sided manner. See, e.g., *The Dawn*, Preface, 3 (Werke, I, 1014); *The Gay Science*, 357 (Werke, II, 226).