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the winter is yours, the spring will be ours.

from Gdansk

This issue is dedicated to the struggle of Solidarity.
THE CULTURAL IMAGINATION AND THE NATIONAL QUESTIONS

Arthur Kroeker

The Québec Discourse

This issue examines contemporary developments in the national projects in Québec and English-Canada, and puts the question directly of the contrasts and convergencies between the "two solitudes". The recent appearance of two important collective statements of position—the Black Rock Manifesto and the Manifeste du Mouvement pour un Québec Socialiste—are indications both of a fundamental realignment of Québec politics and of the vitality of cultural critique in Québec as part of the public discourse. The predicament of the Parti Québécois, as it struggles with constitutional defeat from without and fiscal crisis from within, indicates a coming transformation of the nationalist debate in Québec. As these documents indicate, Québec is the centre of the most imaginative political discourse in North America. In Québec the national question is articulated most eloquently and forcefully in public debates which call not only for the revamping of political institutions, but also for the cultural revitalisation of Québec society. Curiously, while the American polis oscillates between social darwinism and a flawed liberalism and English-Canada is paralysed, seemingly having lost its will to survive, Québec remains the centre of the utopian imagination. Come what may, Québec has initiated a political experiment which is, in part, outside of the grim monotony of the technological life-order of North America.

In a continent in which skepticism about democratic politics and futility in the face of overwhelming power are normal responses, the sheer dynamism and heterogeneity of Québec politics are quixotic. The historical remembrance of the conquest, passed from generation to generation; the re-creation of the Québec polis as a forum for public debate; the will to remain marginal, in language and economy, to the pragmatism of North America: these are some signs of a society which has attempted to recover an authentic public life. While North America drifts towards stasis, if it is not already caught up in the adversities of a new plague, Québec remains as a centre of active political consciousness. It is the "other" to North America, and this because the concern with language itself is a metaphor for a grand reversal of the myth of progress, for the creation of a cultural life which is potentially democratic and communitarian. Thus, while the political economy of North America is ordered by the myth of accumulation, that of Québec is conditioned, however delicately, by the preservation of community. And while, in fact, the public life of the United States and English-Canada are ordered by the technological logic of political economy, the most vital tendencies
in Québec are cultural. This is a community in which writers, artists and playwrights are the articulators of the collective unconscious, and in which civil society exists outside the domain of political economy. If Ortega was correct in noting that cultural regeneration begins when intellectuals flee the institutions, then Québec is in the beginnings of a radical, but fragile, experiment in the recovery of civil society. Not every society is as bold as to throw off, in a single generation, the clerus and to seek to limit the insistent demands of the market-place.

Of course, the political experiment that is Québec today is fraught with contradictions. The immediate future seems to point to the purging of Québec society as a whole through a classic, and convulsive, crisis of the over-burdened state. The defeat of the Parti Québécois in the referendum on sovereignty-association only now has its full price revealed. From the viewpoint of legitimation demands, the Parti Québécois is trapped in a classically over-extended position. Its range of political manoeuvrability is limited by the swift, and inexorable, appearance of the suppressed fiscal crisis of the state. At the same time, the charisma of the Parti Québécois—it is, after all, the political expression of the national project—requires that it satisfy simultaneously a high and intense level of often contradictory expectations. To resolve the fiscal predicament of the Québec state, the Parti Québécois would have to start on the "weary journey" prophetically noted by Max Weber, from charisma to routinisation. To mobilise the popular base necessary for winning the referendum, the Parti Québécois obligated itself to a wide range of social commitments and, in fact, set in motion an economic planning process which depended, for its success, on the political manoeuvrability to be gained from the popular mandate of the referendum. As long as the PQ could plan on the basis of radically altered future, it could displace objective, economic contradictions—the absence of a coherent strategy of socialised production or of control over capital accumulation—to the sphere of social economy. Deficit financing, the expansion of social services, the growth of the public sector: these were, in the end, contradictory of the actual position of the Québec government as nationalist and social democratic in its objectives, but radically dependent in its foundations on the capricious logic of advanced capitalism. Consequently, the defeat of the PQ in the referendum caught the government in a position of surplus-commitments, but with a deficit of means to satisfy these obligations. And, like a classic social democratic state, the government is now over-authorized in the social sphere, but under-powered in the political arena. The "continuously repressed crisis" to which Jurgen Habermas has alluded to as the fate of the state in advanced industrial societies is emblematic of Québec. Here, the crisis is displaced successively from the economic system to the sphere of social economy. Or, as Habermas has stated, that while the "crisis" has its origins in the economic system, "the welfare state no longer allows the crisis to explode in an immediately economic form". A second front is opened, the front of "collective consumption", and it is in this general area of state funding for social services, education, medicine, etc., that the most decisive, but nonetheless deflected,
struggles take place over the growing irrationality of Québécois political economy. The suppressed fiscal crisis of the Québec state thus erupts first in the displaced form of the “overloading” of the mechanisms of social and political economy of a social democratic state. Québec hovers today between history and routinisation, between utopia and economic necessity.

The Québec discourse is now fragile and vulnerable precisely because it is caught in the critical task of transforming the heterogeneity and plenitude of the cultural imagination into the critical realism of democratic socialism. And this task, which is really a contemporary experiment in establishing a dynamic harmony between politics and ontology, is constantly kept off balance by the application of external shocks: the problem of capital disaccumulation; the use of federal fiscal policy to destabilize the Québec government; the continuous “drag” of economic crisis. The cultural imagination, which is always utopian and progressive at one of its poles, can under the pressure of external shock oscillate as quickly to its other polarity—the tragic sense of fatalism. A politics which are informed by cultural vision are, indeed, relentless. Normalisation, the falling back into the technological life-world of North America, is resisted only at the price of living between the margins of utopia and fatalism. It is not at all clear, at this time, whether Québec society will, or can, succeed in harmonizing culture and economy. There are few examples in contemporary history of the successful integration of the fullest degree possible of cultural freedom within a democratic polity and a communitarian society. Every tendency in North America combines to draw this radical experiment in cultural freedom back to the norm, the structures of dependency, of technological society. The success or failure of the Québécois in rethinking and, moreover, relieving the dialectic of domination is surely an early-warning system for those who would also attempt to name, and then to resist, dependent being.

**Domination in English-Canada**

While the historical specificity of English-Canada makes meaningless a “parallel” national project, there is something of fundamental value to be gained from the Québec experience. For too long, the national question in English-Canada, the question of how best to comprehend and to overcome domination, has had three decisive limitations. First, resistance to dependency has been articulated within exclusively economistic terms. While in effect the industrial sociology of the nineteenth-century may indicate the material contradictions of a colonised economy, this perspective cannot account for other significant dimensions of Canadian dependency. Like Québec, but with its own historical pattern of development, English-Canada has experienced not only political coercion and economic oppression, but it has also experienced two other “deep structures” of dependency—cultural repression and social suppression. Indeed, cultural domination now successively reproduces and amplifies itself at the level
of economy. Second, critiques of Canadian dependency have often been vacantly negative in character, analysing the structures of external constraints but leaving unarticulated the precise character, the ontological possibility, of our situation within the North American discourse. Cultural identity is not a given but a social possibility. And as such, the coming to national self-consciousness requires the breaching forever of the suppressed discourse of Canadian thought, and the difficult exercise of thinking anew the relationship of English-Canada, Québec, Latin America and the United States. A positive and informing vision of an alternative society can only mean a coming home, really for the first time, to the New World. Third, the national project in English-Canada has become a static meditation at the level of politics and philosophy because the struggle against domination has radically severed means from ends. A thesis on Canadian domination which would claim to be politically vital must harmonize the critique of dependent being with the analysis of dominating institutions. The national question is vital only if the political practice which its statement encourages is intrinsically transformative. The absence of intrinsic values as the fundamental principles of the cultural, and hence political, imagination condemns perspectives on Canadian dependency to repetition and dogmatism.

The national question in English-Canada is thus, at once, a matter of three interrelated questions, each of which responds to a limitation in the traditional equation of self-determination with the critique of industrial economy. The renewal of English-Canada must begin with a theory of domination which is sufficiently comprehensive to provide an internally consistent explanation of the patterns of cultural repression, social suppression, political coercion and economic oppression. What is needed is a theory of dependency which links ideology-critique with an explanation of the class-specific distribution of power and wealth in Canadian life. In addition, the national question can only be put if we are prepared to rethink the meaning of the New World for an understanding of the Canadian experience. Our cultural identity is unique precisely because Canada has acted traditionally as an archimedean point, an intellectual mediation, between the technological dynamism of North America and the historical foundations of European consciousness. The Canadian fate is as yet unknown. It remains to have its genealogy discovered and its future disclosed within the labyrinth of the New World. And, finally, the national question involves, really for the first time, the incorporation of a theory of intrinsic public morality into the discourse on dependency. As in Québec, the struggle against domination could be made self-reflexive if the act of resistance were itself an agency for the transformation of the logic of Canadian society.

Rediscovering Regionalism

One brilliant beginning for the development of a more adequate theory of Canadian dependency has been made by the essayist George Woodcock. In an
THE CULTURAL IMAGINATION

elegant monograph (and one which deserves major public debate) The Meeting of Time and Space, Woodcock has called for a rethinking of the cultural imagination in Canada. He proposes, in effect, that the only possible basis for cultural renewal is an explicit recognition of Canada as a society conceivable only in regional terms. "We are in cultural terms, as we should be in political terms, a confederation of regions." Regionalism expresses a central and important truth about Canadian society. "The full consciousness and experience of one's region in a non-exclusive way enables one to understand better other lands and other regions." In Woodcock's view, regionalism expresses the truth felt by Spaniards, "...the most intensely regionalist people of Europe, when they used the term patriachica to describe...the geographical feeling of locality, the historical feeling of a living community, the personal sense of ties to a place where one has been born or which one has passionately adopted." To the intellectual patriot, Woodcock's thesis is haunting for it calls to mind that our entry into technological society has been made possible only at the price of historical estrangement and cultural forgetfulness. So much so in fact that the actual experience of regionalism—the memory of Northern Ontario, the Maritimes, the solitude of the prairies—becomes a regressive political category. It is not an insignificant sign of cultural repression that both liberal and orthodox leftist analysis combine to denounce the regionalist experience as somehow alien to the centralizing qualities of the Canadian discourse. Such political orthodoxy is like "forgetfulness of being" itself. It forgets that the origins of ontology are found in memory, in the immedicacy of place. It also hides from attention the obvious fact that in the age of hyper-technology all sectors of society are regionalist in derivation. The centre is now only a provisional site, subject merely to the capricious whims of a "bingo economy". Or, as Woodcock states so eloquently, there has never been a genuinely creative political or cultural initiative which has not been based on a regionalist impulse. Canadian democracy, such as it is, continues to reflect the tragic experience of prairie populism the precursors of Canadian literature are to be found in the Maritimes and the prairies; labour militancy has always been a product of the margins. Even the Great Lakes region is distinctive in its intellectual contributions: it is from Toronto that there has emerged a series of masterful studies of the crisis of civilisation, a fitting mode of reflection for a region which is brushed daily by the experience of technology. In pointing to the regionalist impulses of Canadian culture, Woodcock's intentions are to indicate that Canada is a society different from the highly centralist cultures of England and France. The recovery of the Canadian cultural imagination begins with the fact that Canada has a number of "competing cultural centres", much like Spain, Germany and Italy.

In its most concrete expression, the national question is bound up with the creation of a new "way of seeing" which reflects the reality of Canada as a confederacy of regions, an alliance of cultural centres. This act does not begin in the abstract, but on the basis of recovering the suppressed discourses of the regions. For once, the indigenous, popular cultures of the confederacy of regions must be allowed to speak for themselves, to articulate their own understanding of
the relationship between emotion, locale and expression.

It is Woodcock's thesis that regionalism contrasts with the pseudo-unities imposed by political constraints. "Provincialism and regionalism are not exactly the same, since provinces can be created by an arbitrary fiat of superior governments, for they are merely political constructs, whereas regions come into being by more organic and less formalized processes". Regional discourse begins as an expression of cultural freedom—the fusing of the imagination with the realities of a people's setting. Viewed as an alliance of "mature and autonomous regional societies" (as opposed to the "centralized and long-outdated nation-state of the type developed in eighteenth-century Europe") the Canadian reality would be rethought, or perhaps re-imagined, from its roots. It is, in the end, a common cultural tradition, distinctive but non-exclusive, which would be the basis for a new social accord among the regions of Canada. And what is to be the principle of unity? Woodcock suggests that the regionalist impulse, the rethinking of Canada as an active confederacy of heterogeneous cultures, would possess appreciation as its intrinsic value. Regionalism is not limiting, any more than true confederalism is. The full consciousness and expression of one's region in a non-exclusive way enables one to understand better other land and other regions." Woodcock argues that the political significance is clear:

I am sure that this view of confederation is different from the centralizing and Jacobinical interpretation of Canadian political structures posed by Pierre Elliot Trudeau and his ruling Liberal Party, but I am convinced it is more in accord with historical truth, more fitting to geographical factors, and closer to the cultural actualities of Canada, where literary and artistic traditions are not homogeneous, but have developed variously in various parts of our immense country and can only be seen in their full richness if we understand how they differ mutually and how they interweave into the general culture of the country.

Woodcock's thesis on regionalism as the indigenous basis of the Canadian cultural experience is an appropriate beginning-point for a renewal of the Canadian imagination. It speaks not only to the tragic consequences of cultural and economic dependency, but suggests that by coming home to the popular culture of the regions—Newfoundland, the North, the "Free City" of Montréal, Ontario, British Columbia, the Maritimes—we can begin to recover a cultural tradition which will distinguish English-Canada, like Québec, from the homogeneity of North America. The intention would be to develop cultural plenitude by "connecting again" to the most indigenous impulses of Canadian society. This is, therefore, an appeal for an end to the estrangement of a dependent society. The thesis follows that cultural regeneration begins only by seizing the particular. The appreciation of the arts, music, writing, drama,
photography and poetry of a region and of their method and pace of development is the one and certain foundation for a more vital cultural imagination. And also, it might be added, for establishing a basis of common, but critical, appreciation between the cultural sites of Québec and English-speaking Canada. In this way we would begin again to recover the legacy of Canadian thought and to create the foundations of an indigenous cultural discourse.

Department of Political Science
Concordia University

Notes

2. Ibid.
3. This image of human domination as containing four intersecting dimensions of dependency was developed by Michael A. Weinstein.
5. Ibid., p. 38.
8. This term was devised by Mel Watkins to describe the accidental relationship between social needs and economic planning in a resource-based economy.
9. Woodcock, p. 11.
10. Ibid., p. 23
Although the name of Harold Innis is not a household word in Canada, it should be. He is without doubt the most distinguished social scientist and historian, and one of the most distinguished intellectuals that Canada has ever produced. Successively he wrote pioneering works in Canadian history and in the history of civilizations, held together by the common thread of an intense, passionate concern for scholarship and for the future of his country; indeed, for Western civilization itself. As an economic historian or economist, writing on Canada, he was the central figure in creating an indigenous Canadian approach to political economy that transcended economic history and economics to embrace history, political science, sociology and anthropology. Yet the legacy of this "old political economy" has been in recent years to facilitate the emergence of a "new political economy", a new synthesis. That, at least, is what this paper will argue.

In the process it will seek to answer a number of questions: What was the nature of the old synthesis formed under Innis? How was its formation possible? Why did it fall by the wayside? Why is it now being revived? Why, in terms of creative work, is the new political economy mostly of a left — even Marxist — persuasion, though Innis was certainly not a Marxist and was very much opposed to the politics of his left-leaning colleagues?

Central to my argument, following the historian of science, Thomas Kuhn, is the power of paradigms to set the questions and to constrain the methods by which answers can be sought to a limited list of questions; that is, the powerful manner in which the disciplines discipline. The phenomenon was familiar to Innis, who opposed monopolies of knowledge and schools. The practitioners of a discipline, as monopolists, set up barriers to the entry of dissenting ideas and so generally impose their will with the consequence, at first evident to the student but soon forgotten, that university departments are as much suppressors of creative thought as they can be its supporters, places of unfreedom as much as places of freedom. In Innis' arresting use of the language of orthodox economic theory to expose the reality of its practice: "Imperfect competition between economic theories hampers the advance of freedom of thought." Intellectual modes of production are, in turn, related to real modes of production, so that the dialectic of paradigm change must be related not only to matters internal to the paradigm, following Kuhn, but also to the material reality. Concretely, we must be concerned not only with the hegemonic nature of the paradigm (in our case with the politics of economics) but also with the effect of the economy on economics, including economic history: Carl Berger's history of Canadian economic history might thus be better seen as notes toward an economic history of Canadian economic history. As Innis put it: "We need a sociology or a philosophy
of the social sciences and particularly of economics, an economic history of knowledge or an economic history of economic history". Following Innis, the recognition of the narrowness of the margin for intellectual manouevre, or for creative freedom, can help us understand the bias of a discipline, and so overcome it.

Now Innis was an economic historian which means, in the North American tradition then as now, an economist who works on matters historical. The Innis tradition in economic history can properly be said to be embodied in the so-called staples approach, both in the concrete sense of the study of the great staple trades and industries and in the methodological sense that the study of staple activity broadly conceived was a unifying theme for the general historical experience at the periphery. In a paper written on the occasion of the quarter-century since Innis' death, the economic historian Hugh Aitken reminds us of "the golden age of Canadian economic history that accompanied the statement and elaboration of the staple theme", but he is critical of its legacy:

The fact of the matter is that, in Canadian economic history, Innis still dominates the field... Elsewhere [meaning the United States], the last decade and a half in economic history has been one of the most exciting periods ever experienced in the history of the profession. Not so in Canada... [A] reconstruction of the standard interpretation of Canadian economic history is still a long way off. That standard interpretation, enshrined in monographs and textbooks, is an interpretation of the Innis model. It is no compliment to Canadian scholarship that now twenty-five years after his death, it still monopolizes the field.

Referring to "developments in Canadian economic history over the last decade and a half — or rather, the relative lack of developments", he says "The strength of the Innis tradition may be one explanation."6

Aitken's evidence for "exciting" developments in the U.S. is the emergence of the "new economic history" or cliometrics, forgetting Herbert Heaton's 1954 warning (significantly in the Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science) that:

The American cult of quantities is no mere turning tide. It is a tidal wave, on which Clio's little craft seems likely to be sunk by the swarms of vessels manned by statisticians, econometricians, and macro-economists....7
The new economic history now has a track record and not all observers are as impressed as Aitken. Paul Davenport observes that “the new” economic historians tend to take the position that if a technique is acceptable to the theorists it is acceptable for economic history.” “The new economic history,” he writes, “is sometimes described as ‘the application of economic theory to economic history’; far too often it becomes... ‘the application of history to economic history.’” And the economic theory at issue is, of course, neo-classical theory. Ian Parker observes that since World War II:

Within economics...the gap between mainstream economic theory and economic history widened, despite Innis' argument that 'Any substantial progress in economic theory must come from a closer synthesis between economic history and economic theory' and despite (and on occasion because of) recent attempts to apply simple neo-classical 'cliometric' models directly to the explanation of complex historical situations.9

The American economic historian Donald McCloskey says the theory in question is "especially the theory of price" and insists (properly) that it, and not counting, is "the defining skill of cliometricians, as of other economists." He recognizes that "the cliometric school is characteristically American" and, in a characteristically American way, writes "the frontier of cliometrics is the wide world beyond America."10

Predictably the technique has, in fact, spread to Canada, where it has been in part devoted to testing the staple theory. In a review of that literature I wrote that to the extent it poses real questions it has upheld the validity of the staples approach — though making little or no contribution to our theoretical understanding. The staple theory has survived the worst onslaughts of Americanization and for that reason alone must be as hardy and genuinely Canadian.11

Aitken is excessively critical of the lack of developments in Canadian economic history while exaggerating the strength of the Innis tradition, at least in the sense of a holistic approach.

Only three years after Aitken, a new Canadian economic history textbook appeared (Canada: an Economic History by Marr and Patterson 12) which was largely successful in blending the best, or less fanatical, of the new economic history with some of the insights of both the old and the new political economy.
A new textbook was possible precisely because, as Kenneth Norrie put it in a review: "There has been an explosion of research activity in the field over the last quarter century, from perspectives as diverse as cliometrics to the new political economy." But, as Norrie also points out, the limitations of a text reflect those of existing research. The Marr and Patterson book is "an economic history of Canada." It is not based on "a broader synthesis of economic with social and political history" because, writes Norrie, himself of the new economic history persuasion, "so few of us are ourselves involved in such broad interdisciplinary work."1

Norrie is here alluding to the nature of the paradigm, and there are deeper flaws in Aitken's argument that result from the superficiality of his analysis of economics as a paradigm and economic history as a field within that paradigm. Traditionally, economic history had been critical of economic theory and, to a considerable extent, prepared to generate its own analytical frameworks, loosely related to the prevailing body of theory. As well, under Innis, economic history was central to economics itself, and had, in turn, been the core for the broader synthesis that constituted the old political economy. Beginning in the '30s with Keynes, and greatly intensifying during the war and postwar period, economics became obsessed with the immediate and the short-run, and hence became ahistorical, falling victim to quantification and the reification of technique. In the United States, the new economics, or the so-called neo-classical synthesis, destroyed the surviving remnants of the institutionalism of Veblen and Commons; in Canada, it destroyed the Innis school as a dominant influence in economics and as the unifying theme for political economy. Innis survived within Canadian economic history because the new economics sees economic history essentially as a ghetto, and because those of the Innis tradition, particularly at Toronto under the influence of V.W. Bladen and W.T. Easterbrook, were able to resist the inroads of the new economic history. In terms of influence over the profession, the successor to Innis was to be Harry Johnson located outside Canada at the University of Chicago and the London School of Economics and, as a happy prisoner of the orthodox paradigm, wholly committed to the obliteration of borders as impediments to the free movements of goods, capital and ideas.

Berger argues that Innis foresaw his fate and, in effect in his later work deserting the paradigm of economics, contributed to it:

Innis sensed that excessive specialization in economics, its presentist tendencies, and the desire for disciplinary autonomy implied a breakup of the political-economy tradition that had underlain his economic history of Canada....The staple thesis linked the history of Creighton, the sociology of Clark, and the political economy of Innis. The common approach was weakened in the forties; there were complaints about the subordination of political science to political economy...
Changing fashions in economics also foreshadowed a very different style. Innis's speculations on communications were partly responses to the conditions that were leading to a splintering of the 'social sciences'. Ironically, they were also his contribution to the dissolution of the political-economy tradition.  

It is difficult, however, to see how he could have avoided being read out of the paradigm, for quantification and Keynesianism represented everything he was opposed to as an economist. And in practice, Keynesianism — in the sense of state activity to facilitate economic growth so as to maintain full employment — was to mean for Canada in the postwar period a continuing if not increasing commitment to the export of staple products developed by and for foreign capital, that is, economic growth at the expense of deepening dependency. Daniel Drache has argued that there are (even within the liberal paradigm) two versions of the staple theory: Innis' dependency model and W.A. Mackintosh's growth-model; 15 Keynesianism was grafted onto the latter, not the former, version of the staple theory. 16 Hence the influence of Keynes worked to erode the influence of Innis — though Innis' suspiciousness of Keynesianism, given his position within the profession with respect to academic appointments in Canada, tended to weaken Keynesianism in Canada. 

The prima causa of the fate of Innis, and hence of Canadian political economy, lies with the nature of mainstream orthodox economics from the late '30s onward, its monolithic character and the arrogance of its practitioners, and their intolerance of dissent. At the same time, however, some blame must be attached to those whom Drache calls "the launderers" of Innis. 17 It is, after all, in the nature of colonialism that at least some of the colonials are complicit; the essence of this comprador intellectual role (as we shall see below) consisted of rejecting the dependency-model of the early Innis and the anti-American imperialism of the later Innis. 

The power of the neo-classical paradigm to kill reflects, of course, less its external verities as theory and more its deadly consequences as ideology, intensifying yet more powerful realities of global Realpolitik in the era of the waxing of the American empire. As I have argued elsewhere, 

Innis was able to exploit the already established bias toward economic history at Toronto, the peculiar weakness of economics generally as a discipline in the 1920s — its sterility between Marshall and Keynes... — and the momentary freedom as Canada moved from the British to the American empire. Briefly, novelty was possible. 18
But the rise of the Toronto school was only followed by its fall as Canada inexorably shifted into the American empire. The era of the Cold War saw the Americanization of the social sciences as an aspect of the Americanization of everything, and the destruction of a unified political economy appropriate to a hinterland status. Canada became, for Canadian social scientists, a "miniature replica" of the U.S., a "peaceable kingdom," America in slow motion with less of both the good and the bad. Economics, with its pretensions to fine-tuning the economy, became relevant with a vengeance when secular prosperity was thought to have been "built-in". Canadian economics became a branch plant of U.S. economics and, increasingly, of the Friedmanite orthodoxy of the University of Chicago. The subtlety and sophistication of Innisian political economy was replaced by the simplicity and banality of the doctrines of free trade and competition, notwithstanding the evident imperfections of competition that inhered in the now-ascendant, transnational corporations. "The success of laissez-faire has been paid for by the exploited areas of which we are one" (Innis). By the nineteen-fifties Innis and those who would have seen the matter as he did were swamped by both the soft money Keynesian group and the continentalist free traders" (Neill).

The department of political economy at the University of Toronto, once chaired with such distinction by Innis, grew quantitatively but, depending on one's point of view, not necessarily qualitatively. Sociology broke away and its assertion of discipline autonomy was followed, to some extent unavoidably, by pervasive Americanization. Economics and political science held together, but in the face of rising opposition from the economists that seems certain to triumph shortly. (In any event, they already operate as if they were separate departments and political economy as such is hardly taught.) The economists devote themselves to redefining political economy, on the one hand, by reducing politics to the narrowest margins of economic self-interest (for example, politicians exchanging policies for votes; nationalism reduced to a "taste for nationalism", the better to vilify it) and, on the other hand, by equating political economy with the study of public policy. As the undergraduate Political Economy Course Union recently pointed out: "It is presently possible for a student to gain a four-year specialist degree in Economics at U. of T. without ever having read a word of Harold Innis." The university honoured Innis by naming a new college after him, but I am told that the opening line of the Innis College song is, "Who the hell was Harold Innis?"

If I have dwelt on economics particularly at the University of Toronto, it is because there is the situation I know best, not because I think that situation is unique. Nationally, the old Canadian Political Science Association combining economists and political scientists split in 1967; significantly, when a Political Economy section was created in 1976, it was not within the Canadian Economics Association (CEA) but rather the successor Canadian Political Science Association (CPSA). There is now more economic history, at least in the sense that Innis would have understood, to be found at the meetings of the CPSA than the CEA; the same is true with respect to the Canadian Historical Association and
even the Canadian Sociology and Anthropology Association relative to the CEA.

Though this is what happened, it must be insisted that there is an important sense in which it did not have to happen that way, namely, that neo-classical theory could have incorporated Innis’ staple economics. Innis, after all, was a liberal, albeit a liberal with a difference. If he has been ignored, suppressed, and laundered, it has happened more for ideological reasons than from theoretical imperatives per se. The latter point is important not only in its own right but because it is suggestive of developments that may in due course take place within the beleaguered orthodox paradigm.

It seems to me that there are some ways in which the staple thesis could have been seen as relevant to neo-classical theory. By 1963, the staple theory had been restated as a theory of economic growth, showing that Innis was respectable within the orthodox paradigm. Subsequent literature has been mostly devoted to its quantitative testing (as noted) or to theoretical elaboration narrowly focussed and taxonomic in character. How might it have been effectively ‘modernized’?

There could have been incorporated into the staple theory, as a resource-based theory of growth, the importance of economic rents, as demonstrated by Eric Kierans (and understood by Innis), and of policies directed toward further processing of staples, that is, forward linkage or the “manufacturing condition” as demonstrated by Aitken and H.V. Nelles. Thereby, the staple theory would have been further elaborated as a theory of capital formation — the latter being a central concern of Innis and Kenneth Buckley. The consideration of rents leads to a concern with the loss thereof: their outward drain through foreign ownership and the consequence, particularly at the regional level, for underdevelopment; alternatively, when the rents are retained but under foreign control the power of foreign capital is entrenched. (Such considerations led, in the real world, to the National Energy Program in 1980.) Attending to the forward linkage potential of the new staple industries would have confronted the reality of the power of the resource-based corporations to resist and subvert the policies of hinterland governments (for example, Inco as documented by Nelles) and the power of the American government with a tariff-structure favouring the import of unprocessed resources. In effect, serious attention to these matters would have confronted the economic historian with Canada’s role as a resource hinterland within the American empire, that is, with Canada’s dependency, and offered an alternative to the sterility of the new economic history. For the orthodox paradigm, however, what could not be risked was the discovery of neo-colonialism.

The rationale for extending the staple approach to allow for the institutional fact of the transnational corporation transcends the matter of resource-
processing; at issue is the larger reality of the emergent global economy and polity. The task would have been facilitated by taking advantage of the American literature on the rise of the giant corporation and its transnational spread (for example, the work of Alfred Chandler and Mira Wilkins), not to speak of the American revisionist historians. Notwithstanding the failure to do so — except by the historian Stephen Scheinberg — important work was done on foreign ownership, albeit mostly on the contemporary phenomenon (by, for example, Aitken himself, the early Stephen Hymer and Kari Levitt) and on Canadian nationalism as a reaction to it by Abraham Rotstein building on Karl Polanyi. Against this, and particularly the latter, the neo-classicists wheeled out their heaviest cannon; it all smacked of economic nationalism, dangerous nonsense by second-rate Canadian academics in bed with second-rate Canadian businessmen.

The transnational corporations of the centre and the branch plant economy of the periphery were reduced by Canadian economists to the single equation: the Canadian tariff created inefficient industry. What could have been a promising approach was emasculated in the name of the most literal neo-classical orthodoxy; nature should copy art and Canadian secondary manufacturing could sink or swim on the tide of free trade. A less ideological response could have led to the writing of genuine industrial history — something that has still not been done. From the perspective of economic history proper, it would have been the most useful way to build on Innis — by blending the fact of dependent industrialization explicitly into the staple approach — and, by providing critical building blocks that the economist is best equipped to provide, would have given a firm foundation to the work of political, social and labour historians and led thereby to a new, but still orthodox synthesis. "The surface of the economic history of modern Canada has barely been scratched, and until that task is taken up systematically it will be impossible to write a convincing new synthesis of our past" (Cook).

What was above all at risk was the discovery of dependency — a possibility that could not be tolerated, for to do so would risk legitimizing nationalism. The result was to strangle economic history of the Innis variety. This decline of economic history is evidence of the high cost of the evasion and suppression that inheres in the dominant paradigm. The staple theory was at best tolerated only within the context of the Mackintosh version where it could, by quantitative testing, provide work for economic historians deemed appropriate by economists. Nor were the historians proper guiltless; Paul Craven (who calls the Mackintosh version "the whig-staples view") writes with respect to J.B. Brebner's classic North Atlantic Triangle:

Brebner's refinement of the whig-staples approach was to make it explicitly continentalist in scope. The staples orientation of the Canadian economy was an expression of natural advantage, and the expansion of the turn of the century
reflected a continental partnership between a highly industrialized United States running short of natural resources and a newly united Canada rich in them.\textsuperscript{33}

If the early Innis was laundered, the later Innis was simply beyond the ken. Even those otherwise sympathetic to Innis (like Easterbrook) failed to see any message in Innis' later writings for Canadian economic history, and certainly not his recognition of Canada's increasingly satellitic status (contained in the now often-quoted phrase of "colony to nation to colony") nor his trenchant warnings against the newly intensified economic imperialism of the United States backed by the might of the military and the mass media. The costs of compartmentalizing Innis into the staples phase and the communications phase have been very high for Canadian economic history.

These matters cut deeply, for they tell us much about the colonial intellectual and the colonization of the mind. Writes John Watson:

> It is Innis' colonial background which provides an explanation for his intellectual tragedy. It offered him the orientation and subject matter which eventually led, at the height of the Cold War, to his incisive critique of American imperialism. And yet, the same background dictated that his thought, though lauded, would not be fully appreciated and pursued.\textsuperscript{34}

Watson calls this "colonial myopia"; not to admit Canada's colonial situation was a way for the Canadian intellectual to avoid facing his own colonial situation.

A re-stated staple theory of growth in terms of the leading role of exports \textit{and} in the context of an international economy powerfully influenced by transnational corporations was one possibility; another was (and is) the development of an Innisian theory of growth in terms of rigidities, monopolies, imbalances, radical instability, etc. Even a casual reader of Innis quickly becomes aware of his concern with constraints resulting from overhead costs, unused capacity, the burden of debt, and so on. Robin Neill was the first to systematically draw our attention to Innis' emphasis on the cyclonic nature of economic development in Canada. (The contrast with the Mackintosh conception is stark.) Drache has now generalized these themes in Innis' writings into an Innisian theory of Canadian capitalist development.\textsuperscript{35} Orthodox economics offers an equilibrium model of capitalist growth through markets, linkages, harmonies, etc. Innis offers us, Drache suggests, a disequilibrium model of rigidities; in effect, a special, or limiting, case within the general model, with the further critical feature that, unlike the neo-classical equilibrium model, it is an open-ended, or dialectical, model. In Drache's terms, "rigidities" result in "incomplete development" or dependency. Watson independently makes the
same point: "In the 'staples' period Innis was primarily concerned with 'cyclonics' or radical instability..."; "By definition, an understanding of the hinterland context revolves around a conception of imbalance, or disequilibrium." 36 Notwithstanding the sharp contrast with the neo-classical model, Drache reminds us that Innis never fully abandoned neo-classical economics. Rather, the neo-classicists abandoned him. They have ignored and suppressed the essence of Innisian theory because it was necessary to do so to avoid facing its implications of inherent tendencies toward hinterland dependency. 37 Significantly, Drache shows us how Innis can be understood within the liberal paradigm, though he himself opts for the perspective of the Marxist paradigm.

What actually happened was not the realization of any of these possibilities, but rather the destruction of Innisian economic history; the latter being central to political economy, its destruction contributed to the destruction of political economy. It is useful to imagine what might have been. A central theme for Innis and his school was the notion of "centre-margin"; in fact, I think we should say the central theme in that, following Easterbrook, it is a unifying theme for historical analysis. The terminology is Innis', from his masterful "Conclusion" to The Fur Trade in Canada, where he writes of "the discrepancy between the centre and the margin of western civilization." 38 Others have rephrased the theme in the more popular terminology of "metropolis-hinterland."

The theme is indeed pervasive in the writings of the old political economy. Donald Creighton's Laurentian school of Canadian historiography, the counterpart to Innis' staple approach, explored the interaction of economics and politics in the creation of a transcontinental national economy, the empire of the St. Lawrence born and reborn. 39 No one has shown as effectively as Creighton the power of this theme to focus on the 'separateness' of northern North America. Canada as 'hinterland' is explicit throughout. The beleaguered St. Lawrence merchants face not only the competition of New York/Albany, but the indifference of the British Colonial Office to their grand (sub-) imperial designs. On the whole, though, the metropolis-hinterland relationship within the British Empire is seen as a mutually beneficial rather than exploitative arrangement, at least in contrast to later experience within the American empire (a similar bias is evident in Innis' writing and is instructive in understanding the nature of his nationalism). The rise of the empire of the St. Lawrence in the British era is followed by its "decline and fall" in the American era 40 and the successors to Sir John A. Macdonald become little more than puppets that dance to the tune of American imperialism; to read Creighton is never to be in doubt that Canada is now an American dependency.

Where he errs 41 is in exaggerating the nationalism of the National Policy, and in blaming Mackenzie King for a branch plant economy whose origins are to be found in the years immediately after 1879 and which was already fully evident by 1913 in the leading sectors of the Second Industrial Revolution. Macdonald's National Policy politically had an aura of "home rule" 42 and "American industry in Canada" economically; the basis was fully laid for the "unequal alliance" 43 of
hinterland and metropole. Indeed, even the St. Lawrence merchants of the early Creighton limited themselves to searching for a better deal within the British Empire; when it failed in the late 1840s, not a few of them sought to move fully into the American empire; they were a most colonial-minded group.44 What follows, then, is that Canada has always been more of a hinterland or colony (subjected to, and its elites complicit in, metropolitan imperatives) than Creighton tells us — though none of this is to deny that Creighton deserves enormous credit for maintaining the focus on dependency.

In economic history based on the staple approach, the focus on the hinterland status of Canada was less firmly maintained. In part, the problem was the initial difference between Innis and Mackintosh, and their influence. Mackintosh’s study for the Rowell-Sirois Commission constituted a general economic history of the years from Confederation to the ’30s (the impressive historical overview of Book I of the Report); it shows, in conjunction with Creighton on the immediate pre-Confederation period, how a national polity and economy were created but the problem of growing American influence (beyond the re- orientation of Canadian trade patterns) is ignored. To Easterbrook, who clearly worked out of the Innis tradition, Canada is characterized by a centralized, more controlled kind of growth (“a pattern of persistence” appropriate to a “margin”), in contrast to the more vital and diversified development of the United States (“a pattern of transformation” appropriate to a “centre”). The notion of Canada as a satellite of the United States would appear inherent to such a view, but Easterbrook’s writing contains little that is explicit on Canadian dependency.45

In the centre-margin/metropolis-hinterland framework, there is not only an external dimension, but also an internal dimension of internal metropolis (or sub-metropolis)/internal hinterlands. Innis’ writings, notwithstanding his emphasis on the ‘naturalness’ of Canada in terms of geography (the St. Lawrence River and the Precambrian Shield) and the character of the great staple trades of fur and wheat, always show a firm grasp of this (from the grievances of the Western farmers against the C.P.R. in his first book to those of the Maritime Provinces against Central Canada in The Cod Fisheries, and his appendix to the 1951 Royal Commission on Transportation).46 In many ways, the most important writing in the Innis tradition has been the development of this theme: for example, S.D. Clark on the Canadian frontier, with its protest movements as controlled margins; A.R.M. Lower on the forest frontier and the ‘rip-off’ by Toronto and, beyond, New York; W.L. Morton on the West — regional history important in its own right and essential, given the interplay of economic centres and subordinate areas, to the writing of national history; George Britnell on the impact of wheat on the West; Vernon Fowke on the exploitation of the western farmer by the National Policy; C.B. Macpherson on the political protest of Alberta wheat farmers and its limitation (emphasized, in the same series on Social Credit, by J.B. Mallory’s study of federalism); A.G. Bailey on the culture of the Maritime Provinces as a marginal area.47

The centre/margin or metropolis/hinterland framework is not only
two-dimensional; what is also critical is the interrelatedness of the two. Again this was clearly understood by Innis, as is evident in the following passage first published in 1937:

The end of the period of expansion based on the St. Lawrence and trade with Great Britain coincided roughly with the achievement of dominion status which followed the Great War and which was marked by the Statute of Westminster. The end of the struggle for control over external policy has been followed by problems of internal policy; and the decline of the St. Lawrence as a factor contributing to the centralization of the Dominion has been accompanied by the increasing importance of regionalism evident in the growth of the powers of the provinces.... The extension of the American empire, the decline of its natural resources, and the emergence of metropolitan areas, supported capitalist expansion in Canada and reinforced the trend of regionalism. The pull to the north and south has tended to become stronger in contrast with the pull east and west. 48

His later writings show a persistent concern with this issue of political disintegration and balkanization in the face of Americanization. Garth Stevenson refers to this as a “thin line of intellectual tradition, which...has... drawn attention to the relatedness of the internal and external threats.” 49 Indeed, not all if Innis’ successors have been able to keep their eyes focused to see both threats and their deadly interaction. Creighton powerfully analyses the external threat, but has no sympathy for “regionalism.” “In all his works,” Berger tells us, “Creighton concentrated on the centre, not on the periphery of the country.... He viewed with sarcastic disfavour both the growth of provincial powers and scholarly efforts concentrated on regional history.” 50 Morton, on the other hand, in Berger’s elegant phraseology, maintained “the delicate balance of region and nation.”

In recent years, the Quebec question has increasingly intruded upon this matter. The issue is not central to Innis — indeed, there is little in his writings about Quebec which speaks to his limitations as an English-Canadian intellectual — but it has much exercised his successors whose responses starkly indicate the limitations, if not of Innis, then of the school. Creighton’s rejection of the nationalist aspirations of the Québécois are well known and consistent with his general stand on regionalism, but what may be more significant is the vehemence with which both Morton and Lower have taken the same position on Quebec, 51 despite their general tolerance of regionalism (and Morton’s long-standing sympathy with the rights of francophones as well as Lower’s for the aspirations of Quebeckers). I do not pretend to know where Innis might have stood on the
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matter of Quebec, but it must be insisted upon that he was consistently suspicious of centralization. He wrote of "the lack of unity which has preserved Canadian unity..." and of "the common basis of union (being) one of debt and taxes." According to Neill: "He exposed the underlying forces both of unity and diversity, for the most part emphasizing the latter", and Berger adds: "Innis may have demonstrated the case for Canadian unity, but this dimension of his accomplishment was exaggerated by those who were either oblivious of, or chose to ignore, his own hostility to centralization of power and his concern with staples that had diverse effects on the country." In the context of the recent use (that is, misuse) of national unity to put down the aspirations of the Québécois, it is essential to insist that appeal to the old political economy need not lock us into a one-Canada, anti-Quebec position.

The discussion may also cast light on the argument by William Christian that Innis was not a nationalist. It is, to say the least, an original position, the counter-position being held by such diverse people as Creighton, Brebner, Berger, Drache, Neill, Cook, etc. In terms of the above, Christian makes two elementary errors. He fails to distinguish between the nationalism of the centre and the nationalism of the periphery; that is, between agressive nationalism and defensive nationalism, the first being imperialist and the second anti-imperialist. Secondly, he shows no grasp at all of the two-dimensional character of the centre-margin dialectic and of the need, in the Canadian context, to distinguish between nationalism as "national independence" and nationalism as "national unity" (or what Drache has called, respectively, the nationalism of dependency or self-determination and the nationalism of domination. With a populist-like distrust of the Ottawa establishment, Innis did not relate well to the latter. This is not to deny the subtlety of Innis' position, particularly in his later works, nor the important point made by Watson (hinted at by Berger but which escapes Christian) that "Innis was not an anti-imperialist in the sense of having a prejudice against large-scale empires. On the contrary, he felt the balanced empire represented that which was best in human achievement." This could have been Christian's strongest argument for the view that Innis was not a nationalist, but it was the fatal flaw — for Christian's argument — that is also explains why Innis was, in his later years, a Canadian nationalist. For, to again Watson, Innis "was an anti-imperialist in the modern sense of being committed to opposing the imbalance (in the form of military expansionism) of contemporary empires." This shows the importance of relating ideas to the understanding of praxis. At the same time, it demonstrates the severe pitfalls inherent to textual criticism per se.

Another major theme for Innis and the school was that of "the state and economic life." In the nature of the case, the theme linked economics (or economic history) and political science; it also stood out as a theme for historians (particularly Creighton) and for the sociologist S.D. Clark. An argument central to Innis was that the hinterland state itself was almost a by-product of the exigencies of staple production as defined by the imperial state. Both the Act of Union and Confederation were essentially dictated by the need to create a larger

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state to provide security for foreign capital to build first the canals and then the railroads to facilitate the movement of staples; Creighton's *British North America at Confederation* brilliantly documented the latter. Within economic history proper, Fowke and Aitken showed how "the state and economic life" could be a powerful unifying theme to the long sweep of Canadian history while Alfred Dubuc, in another seminal article, spoke directly of the post-Confederation period and the material basis for the erosion of federal authority. In political science, Drache contrasts the older statist tradition of J.A. Corry (that is, the state actively engaged in the process of creating economic growth) with the new "social democratic" theorists (for example, Frank Scott and Eugene Forsey) and the role of the state as a housekeeper in an advanced capitalist economy. In the latter, dependency tends to drop away in a manner analogous to its fate in the Mackintosh approach (relative to the Innis approach). Political science, like economics, ceases to be political economy. C.B. Macpherson has described how the search for discipline autonomy, in the context of American influence, worked to sever the link between the state and economic life:

Much ingenuity has been used by American political scientists, in the last twenty or thirty years particularly, in staking out a territory distinct from any other social science. The behaviouralists and systems analysts felt that they had to establish their claims to a 'new' political science. The way to escape from the confines of studying *institutions* was to see politics as an *activity*...Not wishing to work with 'the state' as the central concept, as the older political science had done, a formulation which had at least allowed some interest in the relation between the state and economic life, the new men in effect built walls between the study of the state and the study of the economy.

A return to a central concern with the state and economy-building is now evident in general and, in particular, in important writings on the provinces. The relevant disciplines are more often political science and history than economics or economic history, and the authors are, to some extent, seen, by themselves and others, as part of the new political economy and not merely as part of the established order of their disciplines. To return to the opening theme, I have argued that, post-World War II, the dominant paradigm in economics suppressed Innis while paying him little more than lip service. But the larger realities of the world could not be indefinitely suppressed. In the world of ideas, political economy in general and Marxism in particular have revived in the United States and elsewhere, including Canada, in the past ten to fifteen years; for Canada, this should be evident from the bibliographic references presented so far in this paper. This development can be
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presumed to reflect the greater contradictions of capitalism that manifest themselves in the new era of economic crisis. The neo-classical paradigm is again in trouble. As the Keynesian consensus broke down — in the face of persistant unemployment and permanent inflation, or so-called stagflation — it was met, first and foremost, by a retreat to pre-Keynesianism called monetarism. At the same time, Marxism, dormant since the 30s, experienced a major revival in the context of the antiwar and student radicalism of the late 60s and early 70s, while Keynesianism, in the face of monetarism, transformed itself into a more institutionalist, or Galbraithian, post-Keynesianism. In Canada, because of the central importance of dependency, these developments have been animated by a powerful strand of nationalism inherent to dissent from the orthodox paradigm with its cosmopolitan, or pro-imperialist, bias toward free trade and free mobility of capital. Hence, there has been a revival of interest in Innis precisely because of his understanding of Canada’s satellitic position, his distrust of orthodox economics and, notwithstanding Christian, his nationalism when it mattered. In the context of the revival of political economy and, the right-wing bias of the dominant monetarist, or neo-conservative economics, Innis became, by default, the property of the left. This is admittedly ironic given Innis’ own unwillingness to have any truck or trade with the intellectual left, particularly as represented by the League for Social Reconstruction in the 1930s.

It is a tribute to the vitality of the new political economy in Canada — albeit more evident in political science, sociology, history and anthropology than in economics proper — that it would necessitate a separate paper to describe it with any justice. Brief comments must suffice here.

Though I myself am not in doubt as to the legacy of the old political economy of Innis and his school, two qualifications are in order. The first is that there has been increasing interest in Innis by scholars who would, I presume, not wish to be seen as tainted either by the leftish or nationalist biases of the new political economy. The leading case in point would be William Christian, arguably the most productive of Innisian scholars. One must also include under this heading an interest in Innis within orthodox writing that consists not merely in ignoring and neglecting him but in explicit attacks against him. The most important example here is William Eccles’ “belated review” of Innis’ Fur Trade: it is a tribute to the new political economy that this instantly produced an impressive defense of Innis and rebuttal of Eccles by Hugh Grant. A recurring theme of this paper is the nature of paradigms; the issue between Eccles and Innis, and Eccles and Grant, then, consists of the contrast between the political economy paradigm of Innis and Grant and the orthodox Canadian history paradigm of Eccles with its enormous distrust of explicit theorizing and its tendency to see economic analysis as inherently deterministic (though it should be borne in mind here that that other distinguished Canadian historian, Carl Berger, is mostly favourable to Innis).

The second qualification is that some within the new political economy who label themselves Marxist political economists the better to distinguish themselves from political economists in general are critical of the Innis legacy,
holding it to be counter-productive to the development of Marxist political economy. The leading instances here are David McNally’s just-published critique both of the staple theory and those of us who have written of the wedding of Innis and Marx. At the risk of trying the patience of the reader, what is at issue is the nature of paradigms and so we so we should not be surprised that some new political economists are more rigid or doctrinaire than others. It cannot be denied, however, that what all but the most sectarian would regard as “political economy” has been influenced to some degree (and in some cases — such as my own — decisively so) by Innis and his school. As well, the use of the Innisian strand of political economy has the great virtue of being a protection against the mechanical application of Marxist models of Canada generated outside Canada, what Drache has called “metropolitan Marxism.” Significantly, Innis explicitly warned against the limitations of imported theory when he himself set out to create an indigenous Canadian theory.

Let me make two final observations on the Innis tradition that seem, to me, to be relevant to our contemporary situation. The first is that the later Innis deplored the militarism and irrationality he saw gripping the United States at the time of the origins of the Cold War. Once again, in the time of Ronald Reagan and the re-creation of the Cold War, there is surely much to deplore. The second seems to me, from reading Watson, to be Innis’ most important message to Canadian intellectuals. It is that we must recognize, but refuse to accept, our lot as colonial intellectuals. This paper has been an attempt to describe the powerful constraints within Canadian scholarship. Innis’ achievement is the proof that there is more room for manoeuvre than the orthodox pretend and we are today the stronger for it.

But the last word I will give to the person who is arguably the most distinguished contemporary Canadian intellectual, Northrop Frye (although I do so because his point in this quotation is particularly congenial):

Innis’s influence, in Canada as elsewhere, will grow steadily, because with practice in reading him he becomes constantly more suggestive and rewarding. He was a curiously tentative writer, which may account for something of his rather spastic prose rhythm. He saw that every new form or technique generates both a positive impulse to exploit it and a negative impulse, especially strong in universities, to resist it, and that the former always outmanoeuvres the latter. But he had some-thing of what I call the garrison mentality in him, the university being still his garrison for all the obscurantism in it that he comments on so dryly. Perhaps it is not possible to hold a vision of that scope and range steadily in one’s mind without a more passionate commitment to society as well as to scholarship.

Department of Political Economy
University of Toronto
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Notes

1. Earlier versions of this paper have been presented to the Symposium on Harold Innis: Legacy, Context, Direction at Simon Fraser University, March 1978; to the Annual Conference of the Atlantic Provinces Political Studies Association, Charlottetown, P.E.I., 1978; to the Economic History Workshop, University of Toronto, October 1978; and to the University College Lecture Series, University of Toronto, October 1981. I have benefitted from discussions on these occasions. I am particularly indebted to Professor Liora Salter of Simon Fraser University for first suggesting the topic to me. The reader will note that I am discussing the Innis tradition only in Canadian political economy and not in communications as well; this narrowing reflects my interests and competence. For one of the very few writers who is able to discuss both Innises with insight, see A. John Watson, "Harold Innis and Classical Scholarship", Journal of Canadian Studies, 12:5 (Winter 1977), pp. 45-61 and Marginal Man: Harold Innis' Communications Works in Context, Ph.D. thesis, University of Toronto (1981).


4. Carl Berger, The Writing of Canadian History: Aspects of English-Canadian Historical Writing, 1900-1970, Toronto, 1976; while Berger's book is most useful, it is the history of history rather than the economic history of history; it describes ideas with little or no reference to material circumstances and Realpolitik.

5. Innis, Political Economy in the Modern State, p. 83.


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17. "Rediscovering Canadian Political Economy".


20. Ibid., p. 118.


24. Watson is critical of those who "use" Innis' work rather than "understanding" it, but it is valid to translate from one paradigm (Innisan) to another (neoclassical or Marxist) as a way of generating insights. As well, while every effort should be made to understand Innis on his own terms (as Watson is doing), the ultimate test of the use of anyone's work, including Innis', is putting it to use; otherwise, scholarship bogs down in textual criticism.


Innis saw the importance of rents and their tendency to manifest themselves as profits; as well as royalties, taxes and license fees as devices to capture rents, he advocated using the tariff on machinery and equipment "to skim off a substantial portion of the cream by taxing equipment, raising costs of production and thereby reducing profits which would otherwise flow off into the hands of foreign investors"; suggested labour legislation "be designed to prevent exploitation of labour"; favoured "the investment of surplus by large companies in Canadian enterprises and the holding of stock by Canadian shareholders"; supported devices for increasing the prices of raw materials; and concluded, cryptically with the note "Government ownership as a means." Innis, "Snarkov Island," Appendix to Neill, pp. 146-9.

27. "Innis himself was keenly aware of the necessity of fixed investment for industrialization. He often stressed the link between staple exports and capital accumulation after Confederation, as in his Problems of Staple Production in Canada (Davenport, op.cit. 2); Kenneth Buckley, Capital Formation in Canada, 1896-1930, Toronto, 1955.


30. This is not overwriting on my part; vide Harry Johnson's vituperative comment on "the shallow and frequently near-psychotic writings of some Canadians employed in otherwise reputable economics departments, on such subjects as American investment in Canada...": "The current and prospective state of economics in Canada" in T.N. Guinsburg and G.L. Reuber, eds., Perspectives on the Social Sciences in Canada, Toronto, 1974.


33. Paul Craven, 'An Impartial Umpire': Industrial Relations and the Canadian State, 1900-1911; Ph.D. thesis, University of Toronto, (1975), p. 32; subsequently published in revised form under the same title: Toronto, 1980. It should be noted that Craven's comments on industrial history are not subject to the critique made in note 31.

34. "Harold Innis and Classical Scholarship", p. 32

35. Daniel Drache, "Disequilibrium economics and Canadian capitalist development: The Innis paradigm" (mimeo, 1979).


37. I have chosen to focus on the implications for dependency of Innisian theory as adumbrated by Drache for the purposes of this paper, but that is to do less than full justice to either Innis or Drache. In fact, a reading of Drache's paper suggests that Innis can be read as having a theory of capitalist growth and not simply of Canadian capitalist growth, albeit drawing primarily on the Canadian experience. Certainly a "disequilibrium model of rigidities" implies a more general relevance with the rigidities varying with the case. Also, Ian Parker has pointed out to me that the neo-classical theory of growth is, at least from any Marxist perspective, itself a special case of a general theory. In principle, Innisian theory may be at least as much a general theory as neo-classical theory and, since everything depends on where one stands, as Marxist theory. Hence, Parker himself shows (see note 9) that it not only helps our understanding of Innis to know our Marx, it also helps our understanding of Marx to know our Innis.


43. This is the major theme of Wallace Clement, Continental Corporate Power: Economic Linkages between Canada and the United States, Toronto, 1977.

44. Tulchinsky goes so far as to argue that "the high drama of the annexation crisis, which passed so quickly, masks the fact that Montreal merchants had always been continentalists..."; see Gerald J.J. Tulchinsky, The River Barons: Montreal Business and the Growth of Industry and Transportion 1837-53, Toronto, 1977, p. 237. He also writes: "The merchants had never been nationalists and never would be — unless it was in their economic interest" (p. 236) but fails to draw the inference that for a capitalist class not to be nationalist is to be colonial-minded.
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52. Innis, *Political Economy in the Modern State*.


58. *Ibid*.

59. Christian also argues, even more improbably, that George Grant is not a Canadian
nationalist "in any commonly understood sense"; see William Christian, "George Grant and the Terrifying Darkness" in Larry Schmidt, ed., George Grant in Process: Essays and Conversations, Toronto, 1978. It is difficult not to conclude at some point that what is at issue is not the nationalism of Innis or Grant but the anti-nationalist bias of Christian who respects Innis and Grant but wants to wish away their nationalism. Because the writings of Innis and Grant are undeniably rich and complex, Christian apparently imagines that they cannot believe in anything so 'simple-minded' (to him) as nationalism. A similar kind of (impoverished) reasoning presumably underlies as well John Muggeridge's denial of Grant's nationalism; see Muggeridge, "George Grant's Anguished Conservatism", also in Schmidt, ed., George Grant in Process, pp. 40-8.


62. Drache, "Rediscovering Canadian Political Economy". As well as Corry, Drache should have recognized the contribution of Alexander Brady; see his "The State and Economic Life in Canada" (originally published in 1950) in K.J. Rea and J.T. McLeod, eds., Business and Government in Canada: Selected Readings, 2nd ed., Toronto, 1976, pp. 28-42, where he writes "The role of the state in the economic life of Canada is really the modern history of Canada" (p. 28).


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Step Forward, Two Steps Back: Innis, Eccles, and the Canadian Fur Trade”, Canadian Historical Review (September, 1981), pp. 304-322. The latter also includes “A Response to Hugh M. Grant on Innis” by Eccles, pp. 323-29 which, in the customary tradition of academic rejoinders, adds nothing but vituperation to the discussion.


70. Haold Innis, “The Teaching of Economic History in Canada” in his Essays in Canadian Economic History, Toronto, 1956; the essay was first published in 1950.

In one of the last pieces he wrote before his death, Innis used the evocative term "soft capitalism" to describe the particular type of development that had occurred in Canada. From his exhaustive studies of the staple trades, Innis had reached the conclusion that Canadian economic development never achieved its full potential and thereby would not enjoy the stability and industrial maturity that centre economies had. Innis knew that development at the periphery took a different route from that at the centre, as his studies had repeatedly demonstrated. His research, of pre-industrial as well as industrial staples, produced ample evidence that staple-led growth leads to an ever-deepening arc of dependency of the hinterland on the metropole.

It was this basic insight which, when examined institutionally and in terms of the interplay of market forces, allowed Innis to document the complexity of Canadian capitalist development with such perceptiveness and accuracy. He was the first to explain theoretically why the external economy shaped, directed, and ultimately controlled the destiny of Canada as a hinterland, preventing it from becoming a fully integrated, autonomous, centre economy. What has become known as 'the staple approach' is Innis' lasting contribution to the study of Canadian political economy.

Both friendly and hostile critics have often made the point, however, that the staple is too narrow a concept to account for the successive waves of Canadian development. Though the staple may account for much, it is at best only a partial explanation. This critique of Innis contains an important truth. The staple is part of a larger set of structures that needs greater elaboration and analysis than was provided by Innis. Developed in this manner, the concept of the staple, or as it will be termed here, the staple mode of development, continues to provide the most convincing explanation of the fate of the periphery in the international economy.

If too much emphasis has been placed on a narrow perspective of the staple, the fault for this does not lie so much with Innis as with 'Innisology' — the flourishing industry of interpreting Innis. Throughout a lifetime of research and writing, Innis pursued many other themes and issues which he regarded as no less important. He was preoccupied with the spread and consequences of industrialism in all of its many aspects. He paid a great deal of attention to the creation and establishment of monopolies. He studied the state, the infrastructure of development, technology, and transportation systems, as well as taking a special interest in the rise and decline of regional economies. Beyond these aspects of political economy, Innis was greatly concerned with the importance of cultural factors, such as nationalism and the impact of democracy.
on economic development. By the end of the thirties, Innis had developed a broad overview of Canada’s commercial and industrial origins going far beyond staples and the importance of transportation and geography. Yet twenty-five years after his death Innis continues to be read narrowly and often selectively and the richest part of the Innis tradition remains to be discovered.

The fact that he was concerned with so much more than the staple suggests that the most important aspect of the Innis legacy has yet to be seen in its theoretical complexity. His work on the staples should be considered a concrete application of his broader theory of rigidities. Innis used this framework to account both for the incomplete nature of Canada’s industrial revolution and the inability of Canada to pursue a path of integrated development and become a centre economy in its own right. It is this neglected aspect of Innis which is so valuable: his penetrating insights into the weaknesses of neo-classical equilibrium theory, and his equally impressive achievement in elaborating a disequilibrium model of economic development to explain the long-run trends at the periphery, trends which anticipate and account for many of Canada’s current difficulties (de-industrialization and economic dependence).

Seen in this perspective Innis’ pioneering examination of rigidities should be considered a natural bridge between neoclassical economic theory and Marxist theory of dependency and capital accumulation at the periphery. When Innis identified rigidities such as unused capacity, monopoly, and fixed overhead costs, he laid the groundwork for a systematic and effective explanation of Canada’s unique position as a settler colony. As such, it had the social relations of advanced capitalist but an economy which was unable to escape the original division of labour that inhered in a staple colony. These rigidities, he believed, were finally responsible for Canada’s semi-peripheral economic status.

Because Innis developed such a thorough-going and compelling critique of the neo-classical explanation of growth, the general thrust of his work remains surprisingly contemporary. As the Science Council of Canada has recently shown, the general inefficiencies of the Canadian market economy are an immediate product of the rigidities of export-led growth. As well, in reformulating Innis’ theory of rigidities in the light of contemporary reality, it becomes possible to move the discussion from his specific concern with the burden of disequilibrium to the broader issues of class relations, regionalism, and capital accumulation. Thereby, we can focus more directly on the staple mode of development of resource capitalism. The argument proceeds on two levels: the first constitutes an excavation into the past, a restatement of Innis’ general theory; the second may be developed from Innis’ insights as they affect our understanding of class relations, the state and the staple mode of development.

Disequilibrium Theory and Incomplete Development

By “soft capitalism” Innis meant those countries at the periphery whose industrial development would at best only be partial because of the long-term danger inherent in export-led growth. In the case of Britain and the U.S., the
pattern of development, though cyclical, had resulted in an integrated process in which periodic crises in the international economy were used to consolidate and integrate these national economies, allowing a move to the next stage of growth and development. At the periphery something very different occurred. Economic growth, in responding to changes in the international economy, was not able fully to use these downswings in the economy to reorganize and consolidate the unevenness of development. As a result, economic development is fragmented and consolidation only partial. Despite the fact that each period begins with a spurt of development, it ends in incomplete and uneven development.

Schematically, these marked differences between the dynamics of a periphery and a centre economy can be represented as follows:

1. At the centre: growth/development — crisis — consolidation/integration — growth/development.
2. At the periphery: growth/development — crisis — limited consolidation or regression/fragmentation — incomplete and uneven development.

The latter has been called the staple trap, or what Innis believed to be the straightjacket of soft capitalism as it moves from disequilibrium point to disequilibrium point. Innis repeatedly turned to this problem of the violence inherent in the swings in staple production. He came to the conclusion that the distortions entering into the economic process became cumulative the longer the process was dominated by metropolitan institutions and that the price system, or the market institutions of capitalism, failed to correct these imbalances.

In attributing the permanent nature of developmental crisis to the price system, Innis rejected the idea that export-led growth produced a viable developmental strategy. At the periphery the presence of structural rigidities constitutes not abnormality but the normal order of things. By rigidities Innis meant a number of things, including inelasticities in supply or demand, and diseconomies of scale in the sphere of production and distribution (particularly transportation). He also used the concept to refer to pressure points, or bottlenecks, causing temporary or permanent disruptions in the economic process. A rigidity would occur because of imbalance or breakdown in a particular phase or aspect of development. At its simplest, the term was used to denote a structural obstacle to development such as unused capacity, fixed overhead costs, monopoly, fluctuating demand and government intervention. In one of his most important conclusions, Innis claimed that these rigidities did not dissolve but persisted. They took new forms even when the periphery, as in the case of Canada, became partially industrialized, acquiring limited industrial and technological capacity, with a powerful home-controlled banking system and a large market for consumer goods, etc. Deep-seated rigidities would effectively
Innis' economic views were remarkably astute in recognizing a 'dynamics' of staple development which would provide no relief for the periphery from a cycle of incomplete development. Subsequently Mel Watkins systematized the Innis paradigm by arguing that "the staple theory becomes a theory of capital accumulation." According to neo-classical economics, says Watkins, the export of staples creates inducements to invest in other sectors of the economy. These linkages — expansion of the domestic market, railway building, the replacement of foreign goods with locally produced goods, and increased processing of raw materials — are the motor of development, the pump-priming device which in due course would allow the periphery to escape its supply role in the world economy. But, as Watkins so convincingly argues, even though the export of staple generates large capital inflows and unusually high rates of capital accumulation (higher than the rate of capital accumulation occurring in centre economies at their stage of industrialization) incremental growth leading to indigenous, innovative and sustained development does not occur. At the periphery the backward, forward and final demand linkages are weak, and minimize the spread effects necessary to transform a resource-based economy into a fully developed industrial one. As Watkins shows it is the centre that profits from these weak linkages since it not only controls demand but also the supply end of the relationship through technology transfers and foreign investment. A weak set of linkages at the periphery supports a strong economy at the centre.

**Mackintosh's Theory of the Staple**

Orthodox economists never endorsed Innis' theoretical perspective, or even the restatement by Watkins, as constituting the central problematic of Canadian development. In the main they have accepted uncritically the formulation of W.A. Mackintosh, an economist at Queen's University, and a contemporary of Innis. Incomplete development was the central premise of Innis' work; for Mackintosh it was little more than a transitional stage in the history of a settler colony, and a stage which would ultimately be transcended in Canada's favour. Mackintosh's 'staple approach' was a theory of incremental development from a staple base. He argued, in effect, that the linkages and the spread effects from staple production would become gradually stronger as capital accumulation from the sale of resources to more advanced economies was reinvested in domestic industries, and as economies of scale were achieved with the assistance of foreign investment and the import of modern technology.

Writing in the twenties, Mackintosh based his theory of the staple on what he thought was the apparent success of the National Policy. In broad outline he saw Canadian development as paralleling the American experience. The U.S. had left behind its colonial past and emerged as an industrial power in its own right.
Canada, in following the American model of economic expansion through resource export and railway-building, could expect the same results. "Nothing is more typical of colonial development", he wrote, "than the restless unceasing search for staples which would permit the pioneer community to come into close contact with the commercial world and leave behind the disabilities of a pioneer existence." Each of the successive waves of Canadian development had depended upon a commercial staple for export. With the settlement of the Canadian West the world staple would prime "the pump of Canadian industry." Hence for Mackintosh there was no reason to doubt his original central assumption that the "prime requisite of colonial prosperity is the colonial staple."

In retrospect, Mackintosh's theory seems crude and simplistic in the way it accounts for the particular mix of Canadian development. The analogy with the U.S. was largely superficial given firstly that the U.S. had had a commercial revolution that put the American economy directly in the hands of its business class and secondly, that despite American reliance on British capital the latter was largely portfolio investment (not direct investment) which left control of American industry in American hands. Nonetheless, the importance of Mackintosh's analysis should not be underestimated. Like other neo-classical economists who live in a world of imperfect market forces, Mackintosh needed to account for the phenomenon of incomplete or arrested development. The answers he gave remain very much in force today not because they are scientifically based but because they acquired the status of a paradigm seeming to account for the broad contours of economic history in the last half of the nineteenth and early twentieth century. He claimed that if Canada had been unable to tap its full industrial potential, the 'fault' must be purely internal.

In fact, Mackintosh skillfully presented the case that Canada's economic difficulties were mainly a question of geography—a large country with a difficult climate and hence a small population. Even if Canada’s resource endowment was bountiful, he argued intractable geography caused industry to be slow in emerging and introduced inefficiencies of production. For Mackintosh, the main problem of Canadian development was not staple production per se but stemmed from the conflict between 'rational' economic market forces and the 'irrationality' of geography. In the most memorable sentence he ever wrote, he claimed that "Canada is a nation created in defiance of geography..." an unnatural economic unit created in opposition to the north/south flow of economic life.

Invoking geographical determinism in this fashion may be regarded as Canada's unique contribution to neo-classical theorizing, a tradition which has been carried on notably in Harry Johnson's writings and more recently in the publications of the Economic Council of Canada. However it should be noted that the principal weakness of geographical determinism is that it blames geography—a non-market force—for the phenomenon of uneven development and the inefficient allocation of resources rather than the particular behaviour of market forces in a hinterland setting.
By twisting the importance of geography out of all proportion, Mackintosh ignored a basic fact of Canadian economic history which even he himself wrote about extensively. Geography is constantly being modified by the forces of production and geographical barriers to economic development such as distance and topography are mediated by advances in technology and transportation. The question which he never explained and which lies outside the neo-classical paradigm is: why does Canada's supply role in the world economy not change even when it has met the conditions for the industrial 'takeoff'? By contrast Innis did confront this central problematic of Canadian development. He answered it by saying, in effect, that it was the division of labour under the price system and not geography which holds the key to understanding Canada's particular form of development.

Turning his attention away from the staple and focusing on the spread of relations between an imperial economy and a white settler regime, Innis produced a theory of capitalist development to explain why the price system — his word for the market forces of capitalist production — functions differently for a periphery economy. In analyzing the process by which developmental linkages turn into permanent rigidities, Innis was able to show that even though Canada was a privileged social formation and shared common institutions and traditions of the centre, something mediated the transfer of capitalism. For Innis that something was the system of capitalism itself which reproduced these rigidities in the economic process, thus preventing Canada from becoming a self-generating autocentric economy characterized by what he called "integrated development." 18

Innis had no lack of evidence of this phenomenon in which the successful neo-classical instruments of centre economies were 'inverted' and had the opposite effect at the periphery, becoming in due course structural obstacles and a source of disequilibria. Railway building was a classic instance of economic policy designed to promote economic expansion and indigenous industrialization and had been so in both Britain and the U.S. In Canada by contrast, Innis stressed that the era of railway building had produced a weak backward linkage, greater reliance on imported manufactured goods, unmanageable fixed overhead costs, diseconomies of scale that had forced government ownership of rail lines and so had reinforced monopoly. 19 The tariff, similarly, did not have the effect of protecting infant industries but, as Innis noted, repeatedly had forced American firms to locate behind the tariff wall, thus giving foreign capitalists access to and control over the Canadian industry. 20 In terms of final demand linkages such as technology transfers, Innis discovered that Canada's easy access to British and American technology had not made Canada more self-reliant and competitive with advanced countries, nor had the acquisition of scientific knowledge lessened Canada's traditional reliance on the export of resources and the import of consumer and capital goods. 21 In analyzing this phenomenon, Innis was brought face to face with what he called the price system, which prevented the periphery from being able to alter fundamentally the terms of its participation in the international economy. His explanation of why inversion occurs and rigidities
result is a powerful one because it allowed him, without abandoning neo-classical economics completely, to explain development at the periphery in terms of a disequilibrium economics.\textsuperscript{22}

**Disequilibrium Economics**

Disequilibrium economics is based upon a complex analysis which argues, on theoretical and empirical grounds, that the price system fails as a mechanism for adjustment for the periphery. It holds that the price system is impaired because of the dominance of monopolies under resource capitalism at the periphery, and because the centre economy constantly exploits the forces of production of the periphery for its own development. This in turn leads to a rupturing of the normal economic processes of capitalist development. It is for this reason that the periphery is unable to smooth out price and structural rigidities by the same means available to centre economies. A centre economy achieves equilibrium in the sense that the price system serves not only to optimize the scarce allocation of resources but as a mechanism of adjustment, periodically revolutionizing the forces of production, changing the division of labour, and strengthening the market economy through expansion. To account for development at the centre, Innis subscribed to Adam Smith's unshakable conviction in the universal features of the market mechanism as a force for progress.\textsuperscript{23} Like the founder of liberal political economy, Innis believed that the price system was a superior mode of production evidenced by its ability to transform the "rotting timbers of feudalism" into a new system of production. Subsequent transformations demonstrated again for Innis the power of market forces to harness capital, technology and trade to overcome all obstacles in the way of commodity production. Even the severe, recurring crises of capitalism which paralyzed the normal balance of market forces responded to the laws of the price system through bankruptcies, mergers, or the elimination of unproductive or marginal units of production. In the end, this ability to retrench and reorganize production made possible new ventures and eliminated bottlenecks in supply and demand. For Innis all this pointed to the existence of market forces which found their equilibrium at the point of optimum use of land, labour and capital.

But, by the same token, Innis argued that the equilibrium model of the price system only accounted for development in the advanced economies of the international price system. When Innis says that the periphery "is the storm centre to modern economies",\textsuperscript{24} it is a statement referring to the long-term trends of international capitalist development from the perspective of the periphery. The periphery is subject to another dialectic, the dialectic of equilibrium/disequilibrium, with the stability of the centre economies resting on disequilibrium economies at the margin. Or as he explained, "...disturbances in one area were offset by advances in the other."\textsuperscript{25} The theoretical explanation of why market forces were 'inverted' in this way and caused disequilibrium in the
functioning of the price system he developed in terms of factors of production. At the periphery labour, capital and resources were exploited by the centre in a trade arrangement which constituted normal market behaviour for the imperial economy, but had the effect of depriving the periphery of capital and resources to revolutionize its own mode of production. Because trade was controlled by monopolies or the terms of trade arranged under a preferential tariff or commercial policy, the market was not free but was organized to perpetuate the existing mode of development and the original division of labour.

The classic instance of this was the system of mercantilism where, in theory and to a large extent in practice, the terms of trade were fixed by the centre which was thus in a position to determine the economic future and rate of development in each of its colonies. Industrial capitalism, abandoning protectionism for free trade, redrew the economic relations between the centre and the old commercial empires, increasing the scope for the production and export of staples. But in one key respect the basic relationship of mercantilism passed into the new order unchanged. The periphery continued to specialize in the sphere of exchange, while the centre dominated the sphere of production and other sectors. Hence, under industrial capitalism, the periphery did not have greater opportunity than under mercantilism to transcend its commercial status as a supplier of resources and a market for manufactured goods. Most importantly, it could not acquire the capability to revolutionize its own mode of production.

To explain the persistence of disequilibrium at the margin, Innis isolated two broad categories of rigidities that entered into the price system:

1. **Structural rigidities**, referring to the division of labour and unused capacities both of which played a dominant role in a resource periphery and were long-term and historical in origin.

2. **Price rigidities**, such as fixed overhead costs and debt repayments which were introduced via the business cycle and became cumulative over time.

### Structural Rigidity

Of the two Innis attached special importance to structural rigidities because they reflected the long-run trends of capitalist development, trends which in his judgment were rarely reversed. Further, Innis took the position that the division of labour imposed on the periphery by the imperial power did account in no small measure for subsequent social and economic development. To illustrate this he used the case of Canada and the United States, both of which had been a colony of Britain yet with very different results. To explain the principal differences between the two formations Innis was able to show that this was due to the type of colony each had originally been in the hierarchy of the world capitalist system, as well as the status confirmed on it by British imperialism. It is in the course of this analysis that Innis discovered the source of these historically determined
The British empire had created three types of colonies each with a different division of labour. At the top of the hierarchy was the commercial settler colony of New England which traded with other colonies and had acquired its own hinterland in the interior. Its staple agrarian economy supported a relatively large settler population. British North America belonged to the second tier. It was founded primarily as a staple exporting colony for luxury and later industrial resources. Its staples supported a small domestic market with few inhabitants initially and only acquired a commercial status late in the nineteenth century. At the bottom of the imperial pyramid were plantation/slave colonies maintained by conquest. Unlike settler colonies these had large indigenous populations which became the source of labour in single-crop economies. In the plantation/slave colonies British colonial policy erected a new economic order on the existing mode of production with the sole purpose of staples exploitation.

Settler colonies had a different status for Innis from that of colonies of conquest. The difference rested on the fact that settler colonies shared with the imperial centre the same mode of capitalist production and therefore entered into the international system on a level of equality with other market economies. As great an advantage as this was, settler colonies suffered from the disadvantage of having a commercially oriented economy at a time when "the price system had gradually but persistently eaten out the rotting timbers of European colonial structures...". Innis noted that New England was the only commercial colony of the first British empire that had successfully attacked the old order and in doing so freed itself from the "shackles of the colonial system." The effect of the American War of Independence was both long-term and revolutionary in that it created the conditions for a new division of labour and opened up the American economy to the floodgates of industrialism. Innis singled out this historical moment as being without parallel in explaining how the American economy transcended the original division of labour and acquired the means to become a centre economy in its own right.

Coming to this conclusion, Innis did not evoke the doctrine of comparative advantage or a theory of entrepreneurship à la Schumpeter to account for American industrial development. With respect to the special circumstances of New England's commercial development he stressed the far-ranging political and economic consequences of a colony successfully freeing itself from the cycle of dependency and imperial domination. He wrote: "The advantages of freedom of trade supported by the fisheries and shipping broke down the colonial system of France and in turn England. Shipping implied commercial strength, naval power, and defeat of European control." By comparison, the case of Canada had to be a different affair. Canada's commercial revolution of 1837 had ended in defeat, causing it to remain a staple colony over a much longer period, subject to the more intensive exploitation of a backward commercialism embedded in the empire of the St. Lawrence. Counterposing the old to a new system of commercialism, Innis believed that he had identified the source of Canada's comparative disadvantage. Commercialism
was antagonistic to industrialism because it retarded economic activity by imposing what Innis called "restraints on trade"33 which supported an economy based on monopoly rather than on competition and the free play of market forces. Innis came to regard both these aspects of commercialism as responsible for preventing the price system from transforming the forces of commercialism into an industrial system of production. On this point Innis never wavered: "The rise of industrialism was the reverse side of the decline of the commercial system. The emergence of free trade...reflected and enhanced the efficiency of the price system and the growth of industrialism. The ebb of commercialism was the flow of industrialism."34

Canada's structural rigidities arose out of this situation. Canada remained a backwater of commercialism after centre economies had made the transition to an industrial footing. With the passage from early to late industrial capitalism, the demands from the more advanced countries for industrial staples would increase as would their penetration and control of the domestic market of this white dominion dependency with a high per capita income. Significantly it was this fact, Innis believed, that made Canada particularly attractive in the eyes of metropolitan capital as a place to exploit. The industrial price system of centre economies operated "at a high stage of efficiency in the occupation of resource rich economies."35 But the burdens of development were nonetheless inevitable. They fell on the state in recently industrialized areas which also continued to act as both banker and protector of imperial interests. Because the colonial state continued to be dependent on and indeed 'compromised' by the imperial state, the former was unable to function as an instrument of adjustment to reduce the rigidities brought in the wake of uneven development. Possibly more than any other single factor Innis viewed with alarm the institutionalization of a commercial-based colonialism in the state apparatus and believed that this relationship was responsible for the economic disequilibrium causing so many of Canada's problems.

Regionalism par excellence was a case in point. Canada was an amalgam of regional economies at different stages of development and the commercial orientation of the Canadian state perpetuated and aggravated existing regional rivalries. The results were plainly evident in the weakness of Canada as a social formation. Ontario with a commercial agrarian economy had reached the status of New England by the late nineteenth century and via the National Policy had acquired the rest of the country as its hinterland. The West had been created as a permanent staple colony with all the attendant difficulties that that mode of development brought in its wake. Although Innis did not write much about Quebec, he considered it a staple colony by conquest, controlled by the Church and Anglo-Canadian interests. Finally, the Maritimes had achieved a pre-industrial footing but after the National Policy once again became a staple economy.36 All these competing modes of development reinforced the dominance of commercialism at the expense of strong national institutions. As a consequence "the more rigid channels of surviving commercialism"37 would perpetuate Canada's dependence on one or another metropolitan power as well
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as be a chronic source of regional conflict and internal division.

Price Rigidities, Unused Capacity, and the Business Cycle

Having analyzed the long-term disabilities which Canada suffered from, Innis turned to examine the short-term operation of market forces including the movement of prices, capital formation and the business cycle. It is this incisive and highly original account of the business cycle that enabled him to identify the source of short-term crippling price rigidities. More than any other part of Innis’ theorizing, it explains the special vulnerability of a resource-based economy to a price system with a commercial bias.

Initially, Innis identified the problem of price rigidities as they related to high transportation costs in moving bulky goods such as fur, timber and wheat over long distances in the absence of a balanced cargo. This problem, resulting from intense specialization and what Innis called the chronic misallocation of capital and resources, was evident in the failure of successive waves of Canadian development to achieve sustained growth. This was entirely different from the experience in the American commercial colonies. In these, a "relative absence of unused capacity meant low costs and contributed to rapid economic development." In Canada by contrast, "an unbalanced cargo facilitated the addition of trading goods on the outward voyage for the development of trade on the St. Lawrence...[but] added little to the cargo of the home voyage." These imbalances in the sphere of circulation (and later in the sphere of production) had occurred in all successive stages of development and accounted for the shortfalls in export-led growth. For Innis, unused capacity raised the important question of why it was so difficult for an economy to find what he termed a mechanism of adjustment to reduce the sharp fluctuations in international demand responsible for over-expansion when the economy was buoyant and a shortfall in revenues followed by the inevitable economic crisis when it began to contract. This cycle of short spurts of growth followed by a severe recession had had crippling consequences for a resource economy burdened with the escalating costs of capital formation.

Orthodox economists such as Mackintosh argued that the way to respond to unused capacity was to stimulate the economy by additional government expenditures and to attract foreign capital to make new investments particularly in the resource sector. Innis refuted this, and demonstrated that such a strategy did not alleviate the problem of unused capacity but in fact aggravated it. Here is his account describing how indebtedness and unused capacity are a direct result of a strategy of incremental growth:

Low rates of interest during a period of depression and recurring deficits stimulated renewed activity in borrowing and in encouraging further construction. Deficits increased
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during a period of depression and borrowings during a period of prosperity. Throughout the period of the National Policy government debts increase and, in turn, tariffs and capital equipment.40

The key to this dilemma lies "in the difficulties in adjusting expenditure to receipts...in a period of depression and possibly in encouraging new industry by more aggressive protection, and in meeting the interest on loans during a period of prosperity."41 In Innisian terms the business cycle sought to "reduce the weight of the burden by increasing the extent of the burden."42 It operated from disequilibrium point to disequilibrium point.

In any number of ways, the periphery is constantly subject to severe economic pressures resulting from unused capacity. Because the market has a weak mechanism of adjustment, the government is forced to intervene and stimulate the economy by new investment, particularly in the most productive and competitive sectors, such as resources, or by improving the accessibility and availability of resources by expanding the capacity of the transportation system to move bulky goods more easily and at a lower cost. Capital expenditures in support of these resource projects are long-term in nature. They create higher levels of indebtedness in the expectation that they will generate additional revenue to cover the costs of this new indebtedness as well as producing linkages in the form of additional income to labour, capital and the state. For a brief period after the investments are made, the economy can be said to be in equilibrium as government borrowing generates a spurt of economic growth. However the spread effects are short-lived as conditions in the international market change and the demand for Canada's resources softens. These downswings, Innis discovered, reflect not only disturbances in the international market dominated by a few leading staples for export, but also are a consequence of the application of neo-classical fiscal and monetary policy designed to expand a centre economy during a period of economic difficulty. Innis identified the source of the 'disturbance' as the new capital outlays. He showed that these new capital outlays—an expansionist measure—have the reverse effect on a resource-based economy and quickly become a rigidity—an obstacle to economic growth—because in a period of recession revenues begin to decline while the backflow of profits and debt payments remain constant, or increase at a faster rate than the inflow of new revenues.

The immediate consequence of this shortfall in revenues is, as many economists have noted, to slow the rate of economic growth. Innis, however, stressed that the cumulative effect is by far the more decisive for three principal reasons. First, the expansionist phase of the business cycle is constantly being prematurely curtailed. Secondly, the new injections of capital repeatedly become a source of 'disequilibrium' when capacity exceeds demand and expenditures exceed revenues. Finally, in these circumstances the new capital expenditures rarely attain their intended purpose of creating either new economies of scale or
other measures necessary to reorganize, consolidate, or expand the industrial side of the economy. Faced with this recurring problem and failing to understand its structural origins, the government is once again forced to intervene financially and undertake new investments from its own resources as well as to attract new foreign investment to stimulate demand and reduce excess capacity.\textsuperscript{43} Significantly Innis was able to show how this cycle translates into a long-term structural problem. Because the periphery recurrently faces falling prices, soft markets, and declining revenues, the business cycle fluctuates between new indebtedness undertaken in the expectation of generating new industrial growth which never materializes and the fixed capital costs of past indebtedness reflecting the excess capacity and overdevelopment of the resource sector. Hence in any given moment of the business cycle the principal rigidity of unused capacity is being reproduced in full as a structural feature of the staple mode of development.

The significance of the cycle as a 'diseconomy' of development was not lost on Innis. He emphasized repeatedly that, as a persistent problem of Canadian history, unused capacity "...had its effect in prolonging the dominance of one staple or in hastening its decline and contributed powerfully to the disturbance of equilibrium in Canada and Europe."\textsuperscript{44}

Price rigidities would play a dominant role in Canadian development at all points in time. In periods of rapid expansion requiring large capital investments rigidities would be severe. They were equally present in times of crisis when interest payments, debt charges, and other obligations had to be met. Furthermore, price rigidities were inherent in the staple trades because monopolies such as Hudson's Bay Co., the CPR and the Canadian banks occupied such a pivotal role in the exploitation, transportation and sale of Canada's resources. Under industrial capitalism, Innis believed that centre economies had profited from these price rigidities which "enabled the older centres to benefit from the industrial growth of new centres by disposing or dumping obsolescent machinery e.g., agricultural implements to countries with virgin natural resources and in this way to reduce their own costs of improved equipment."\textsuperscript{45}

There were other examples which showed how rigidities were institutionalized in Canada's political and social arrangements. The most important of these was Confederation which, from Innis' perspective, was a direct response to the continuing developmental crisis Canada faced in the nineteenth century from capital indebtedness and pricing problems. He writes:

\begin{quote}
The emergence of Canada as modern state is inevitably a part of the spread of industrialism and capitalism. Confederation became an effective credit institution with the demands for long-term securities which accompanied the rise of industrialism especially as shown in transportation. The rise of Canada was in a sense a result of the demand for adequate imperial costing accounting which arose with Gladstonian liberalism.\textsuperscript{46}
\end{quote}
In the twentieth century price rigidities were again very much in evidence in the wheat economy as well as in the disturbances accompanying the growing trade and investment with the U.S. In assessing the persistance and chronic failure on the part of Canadian authorities to deal with this problem, Innis believed that Canada's problems stemmed from its position in the international economy and the rapid exploitation of its wealth. At the centre of its difficulties were debt and interest charges paid to British, American and Canadian capitalists on equipment designed to produce and transport wheat... The effects of these rigid costs strike at the heart of Canadian economic life. Neglect in facing this vital problem may lead to consequences of serious import to the Empire. The crystallization of capital in fixed charges might be compared to the hardening of the arteries for the empire.47

In the Innisian framework it was the combination of price and structural rigidities which had prevented Canada from transcending its commercial origins. As a result, Canada had been left with a badly co-ordinated machinery to cope with the violence accompanying resource capitalism.

No country has swung backwards and forwards in response to such factors as improvement in technique or transportation, exhaustion of raw materials and the advance of industrialism with such violence as Canada. Our history presents the same baffling complexity to the historian as does the Canadian shield to the geologist.48

And as he further put it in one of his summary statements on this basic point:

The structure of Canada's economy was an extension of European and British economies, with a consequent increase in efficiency guaranteed by cheap water transport, imperial preferences, and the opening of new resources. It was handicapped by the extent of government intervention, the rigidity of government indebtedness, railway rates, and tariffs, and dependence on a commodity subject to wide fluctuations in yield and price.49
Stressing the severe limitations imposed on the periphery enabled Innis to arrive at a path-breaking theory of rigidities. As a political economist and not simply an economic historian, Innis placed particular importance in examining the evolution of capitalism as a world system. Although not as systematic in generalizing the laws of capitalist development as for instance—and more recently—Samir Amin, there is a striking similarity between Innis' theory of rigidities and Amin's theory of extroversion. Even though one must tread cautiously and avoid superficial comparisons between developed dependency and stark underdevelopment, Innis and Amin share a common perspective in their respective efforts to discover the dialectic of incomplete development and the complex means by which centre economies have been able to impose through intensive specialization a division of labour on periphery formations. In his writing on the social formation of peripheral capitalism, Amin shows how the prolonged export of resources laes to extroversion of the resource industries, while sectors slotted for industrialization for the home market suffer from low productivity, marginalization and undercapitalization. From a Marxist perspective Amin explains "how the rapid spread of simple commodity production cannot reverse the extroverted character of the economy." In language which echoes Innis’ reasoning, he explains how a country at the periphery has a narrow range of productive activities and expansion of the economy via export-led growth in primary resources means that indebtedness grows faster than income.

Amin systematizes the dynamics of peripheral capitalism as follows: the spread effects of investment benefit foreign capital more than domestic industry; the resource sector has the highest rate of profitability and therefore capital flows into the 'preferred' export sector while light industry selling to the domestic market suffers from low productivity, lower rates of return and undercapitalization; foreign investment rather than expanding the economy disarticulates the key sectors by truncating the domestic market; and the backflow of profits exceeds the inflow of investment. All varieties of dependent capitalism suffer from what he terms the double crisis: "Exports that are destined for the center cannot grow faster than demand at the center—that is, approximately at the rate of growth of the center" and "international specialization...always constitutes a mechanism of primitive accumulation to the disadvantage of the center." Because of this crisis, Amin contends, it is impossible for a country to catch up on its historical handicap "while sticking to the basis of international specialization."

Innis also examined the origins of this 'comparative disadvantage'. He discovered that it was a necessary condition of the way capitalism evolved as a world system. His analysis is surprisingly comprehensive in detailing the historical evolution of capitalism from its mercantile origins to late monopoly capitalism. Committed to liberal political economy, he naturally regarded the
early period of industrial competitive capitalism as the golden age of the market economy. Economic liberty went hand in hand with personal liberty and produced what Innis regarded as the great advances in civilization, in the arts and sciences and in government, by the destruction of the vested interests and the mercantile monopolies of the old order. The strength of the new order was in Innis’ view based upon a belief in economic and social progress dependent upon the free and full functioning of market forces. However he also saw that the system of competitive capitalism had been displaced by ‘late mature capitalism’ in which monopoly rather than competition was dominant. He was disturbed by this trend which he believed brought with it profound social and economic consequences. By the twentieth century the industrial order of Europe and the U.S. had been further transformed, as capitalism had evolved into a system of imperialism based upon “a vital relationship of militarism to capitalism and the modern state.”

To account for the rise of imperialism and the decline of competitive capitalism, Innis focused on monopoly, militarism and the modern state as forces threatening the stability of both late neo-technic capitalism and the viability of peripheral regions in the world system. In his eyes, trade wars, narrow nationalism, price fixing, financial capitalism, and international indebtedness reflected “the drive of the price system on the economic and social structure within the state” as well as “continual disturbances between the states.”

Analyzing the extent and severity of these social disturbances led Innis to study the consequences of the decline of competition and “the rise of economic warfare.”

For Canada, the anarchy of a monopoly-dominated world system had serious implications.

Canada developed at the latest stages of modern industrialism and is among the first to feel the effects of the turn. The importance of the state, reliance on production of raw materials for export, particularly wheat, and the rigidities of continental development create serious problems of internal maladjustment as shown by quotas, bonuses, unemployment relief, the breakdown of provincial-federal relations and the like.

Significantly Innis noted that the sheltered metropolitan areas “tend to impose burdens on regions exposed to world fluctuations”, whose effects would be profound and immediate. “The new internationalism is upon us. No country stands to gain or lose more than Canada.”

Under late capitalism Canada faces three immediate dangers. The first stems from its ambivalent status in the world economy. On the one hand, “it stands in danger of being burned at the stake of natural resources and on the other hand of
being boiled in the oil of unrestricted competition." The second arises out of Canada's industrial position. "For a country which rides on the crest of modern industrialism and has been concerned with the demands of an international market, industrialism has provided an abundance of goods but not the first luxury of security." The third danger results from Canada's dependence on the U.S. "We have built up in Canada in competition with the United States a delicately balanced economy which has more than once crashed through ill-designed machinery." In the new order Canada's difficulties stem from its "proximity to the U.S. [which] places a severe handicap on control of capital movements. The character of our development results in rigidities such as those governing ownership." In the circumstances, Innis had few illusions as to "the obvious significance of American economic policies to Canada." He did not hesitate "to point out the existence of an American empire" and to inquire whether American policy makers were conscious of "the responsibilities which accompany imperialism." Whether the United States agrees or not, "its monetary and tariff policies are largely the monetary policies of the North American continent, including Canada."

Innis' analysis of monopoly capitalism is surprisingly contemporary in singling out the centrality of capital movements, the problem of foreign ownership, and the phenomenon of unused capacity to explain why Canada was and would remain a periphery exploited by center formations — short of a revolution as imperial capital does not permit of any other possibility. Unlike the U.S. and Europe which have revolutionary traditions, Canada's origins were profoundly counter-revolutionary, a fact for Innis which reinforced the commercial orientation of the state and elites as well as explained the long history of imperialism in Canadian affairs. As he frequently lamented, Canadians had repeatedly failed to generate alternatives to the debilitating consequences of dependence in either political or economic life. Under late industrial capitalism Canada would fare less well than it had under competitive capitalism. "The old system had linked her to Europe by a geographic background dominated by the St. Lawrence and provided efficiency of specialization under free trade." With the decline of the St. Lawrence all of Canada's economic life would be endangered from a much more powerful American hegemony in the establishment of branch-plants in Canada, the fixing of Canadian wage levels with those in American industry, "the movement of liquid capital, ownership of government securities and the temporary migration of tourists..." Emphasizing the link between capital movements and rigidities, Innis showed how closer ties to the U.S. increased "the instability of Canada's political and economic structures." Politically, imperialism leads to "a weakening of nationalism" and "the strengthening of regionalism." Economically Canada did not have the policies to improve capital allocation, reduce capital costs or lessen the "burden of defence." The strains from this asymmetrical relationship would intensify. "[I]t may be expected with the more rapid growth in population in the United States and the continued decline of natural resources, that Canada will become increasingly dependent on the U.S. and that the problem will become more,
rather than less acute..."70

Writing against the backdrop of the Depression reaffirmed for Innis all that he had been saying about the importance of rigidities in the study of Canadian development. "An array of conflicting forces" had produced a succession of structural imbalances with the inevitable result that regional and national economies found themselves unable to develop proper adjustment mechanisms to respond to the rapid changes in economic life.71 The severity of the Great Depression made evident the very real social costs of this mode of development. As he repeatedly stressed, those who were least able to shoulder the burden had to pay the costs of these permanent rigidities. This included Canada's hinterland regions, which were most exposed to price fluctuations and suffered directly from declining incomes and unused capacity. The federal government was forced into an imperialist role vis-à-vis the regions and hence was incapable of mediating the disparities and responding creatively to the demands of regional protest movements.72 Equally affected were farmers and those working in the resource sector who through their labour and loss of income were forced to subsidize the commercial policies of foreign and domestic interests.

This aspect of Innis' work on the social consequences of rigidities notably compliments and extends his more narrowly economic concerns. Economic rigidities as he discovered also are responsible for a system of exploitation having far-reaching implications for Canada.73 They not only work their way through the economy but profoundly affect other areas of Canadian life as well. He was disturbed by the fact that a society based on resource capitalism put power in the hands of the few, relied so extensively on centralized authority, accepted rule by administrative fiat and was constantly subject to absentee control. He blamed the coercive and anti-democratic institutions of Canadian life on the dominant presence of monopolies, the practices of the commercial state, and the influence of the branch-plants which had prospered and grown in influence often at the expense of the Canadian population. His research on the origins and evolution of Canadian capitalist development ultimately led him to question the role and purpose of the modern liberal state74 and its many links with corporate interests. In his mind the power of monopolies was linked to the erosion of individual and collective rights both within Canada and without. His preoccupation with these central issues made Innis into a nationalist, a critic of incremental growth, an opponent of continentalism, and an agnostic about the viability of the liberal tradition itself.75

There can be no doubt, then, that to view Innis' principal interest as the history of the staple or even staple-led growth does a gross injustice to his grasp of political economy. What concerned him was to account for the structural design of successive waves of Canadian development economically and socially, and in shifting his attention beyond the staple he thus laid the foundation for the study of the historical dynamics of what should properly be termed resource capitalism. To this end Innis was first and foremost an economic structuralist in his approach, contending that internal and external market forces accounted for the incomplete or blocked form of resource capitalism. Many have wrongly and
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disparagingly regarded Innis as an economic determinist. However, as a structuralist, he rigorously held that even geography was neither fixed nor unchanging but, like any other structure, was modified by advances in the economy. Evidence of his geographical determinism comes from Innis' oft-quoted assertion, taken from the conclusion of *The Fur Trade in Canada*, that modern Canada in following the boundaries of the fur trade was created because of geography. Yet a few pages later he says that with the onset of industrial capitalism Canada's economic geography was being eroded by this new mode of production. His words are worth recalling: "The geography unity of Canada which resulted from the fur trade became less noticeable with the introduction of capitalism and railroads." As we have seen, his particular analysis of late capitalism showed how Canada's problems, stemming from a system of staple production, were institutionalized in such economic structures as monopolies, the state-structure and American branch-plants, each of which contributed to or reinforced the diseconomies inherent in a staple economy.

However, as unequivocal as Innis was about the long-run trends of capitalism and liberalism, his theoretical understanding went no further. He saw no class, no economic system, no ideology which, when all is said and done, was more attractive than liberalism or preferable to the price system. Had he been able to conceive of an alternative he might have shifted his ground both as a political economist and in terms of his class loyalties. Even his pioneering and innovative work on rigidities did not lead Innis finally to reject the neo-classical economic perspective. For it must be remembered that while he saw and deplored 'dis-equilibrium' at the periphery, he assumed, and approved of, 'equilibrium' for the centre. In the end, his reworking of the liberal political economy tradition had brought him far but not far enough, because the difficult question of the historical viability of the capitalist mode of production was not on his intellectual agenda.

The Staple Mode of Development

His theoretical conceptualization of rigidities constitutes the vital and lasting part of the Innis legacy. His study of monopoly and the pervasiveness of commercialism suggests that these rigidities are part of a larger process which can be called the staple mode of development. Its characteristics are as follows:

1. *The staple mode of development is defined by its commercial orientation, where commercial relations of exchange and distribution rather than industrial relations of production predominate. What we have as a pattern of development is commercial dominance in an industrial guise.*

2. *Resource development is based on monopoly and monopolized sectors, not competition and competitive units of production.*

3. *Infrastructure projects such as railways are designed to link the domestic market to the imperial centre, with the result that the external market dominates industry and other core areas of the economy.*

4. *Direct investment gives foreign capitalists perpetual control of key*
industrial and resource sectors, while the branch-plant movement results in dependent industrialization and comparative disadvantage in goods-producing industries caused by truncation and extroversion accompanying the inflow of capital.

5. The rate of capital accumulation is persistently high, a reflection of Canada's status as a semi-centre economy; nonetheless, like other periphery economies Canada suffers chronic capital shortages due both to the constant backflow of profits and dividends and to the capital intensive nature of resource capitalism, dependent upon advanced technology to exploit highly sophisticated industrial and energy staples.

6. In economic matters, the Canadian state is autonomous neither in a relative nor an absolute sense; rather, as the creation of the imperial state, it functions as the instrument of foreign capital, and by direct intervention in the economy underwrites the strategies of accumulation and legitimation. 78

7. The traditional neo-classical instruments of growth such as the tariff, resource exports, technology transfers and foreign investment become structures of dependency in a satellite economy. At the periphery, they are responsible for perpetuating commercialism long after it has declined in the more advanced economy.

8. The resource/financial/transportation bourgeoisie are the 'dynamic' and dominant ruling class formation in this mode of development. 79

9. Paradoxically, staple-led growth accentuates regional disparities and undermines balanced regional development. But, because resource capitalism is dependent on a continental market, the continued export of staples supports strong regional economies and even stronger regional loyalties.

10. In an economy organized around public and private monopolies, 80 it is the subordinate classes, not capital, which are required to sell their labour or their produce on a competitive basis; it is this condition of inequality par excellence which the state utilizes to accelerate the rate of capital accumulation.

11. Incomplete development is not a passing stage but a permanent condition of the periphery in the absence of a profound realignment of class forces. Even though the mix of incomplete development can be seen to evolve, the basic division of labour and Canada's role in the international hierarchy are not altered. More accurately, what each new stage of incomplete development reflects are changes in internal class alliances accommodating or responding to the strategy of capital accumulation initiated by foreign capital and the imperial state and/or crises in the international economy. 81

It is only when we come to this final point that the Innisian contribution ends and the Marxist tradition in Canadian political economy begins. Unlike liberal political economy, the Marxist perspective no longer focuses on rigidities per se
but on a different problematic, one which is frequently implicit in Innis' work: explaining the unique set of class relations responsible for the staple mode of development. In laying the groundwork for this, we may say of Innis what he once wrote about the Fathers of Confederation—that he "builded other than he knew" and, we should add, better than he himself realized.

Atkinson College
York University

Notes

An earlier draft of this paper was prepared for presentation to the H.A. Innis Symposium, Simon Fraser University, March 30-31 1978. Special thanks is due to Mel Watkins and Sten Kjellberg for their comments and encouragement in preparing this expanded and revised version.


4. The special issue of Studies in Political Economy, No. 6 (autumn 1981) is devoted among other things to a critical assessment of the thought and influence of Innis on the resurgence of Canadian political economy. It is evident that I don’t share the perspective of David McNally who among others calls for a 'pure' Marxist model as an alternative to the 'flawed' Innisian tradition. I will need a lot more persuading that the classical European model of development is going to serve as the basis for explaining class and class conflict in Canada.

5. Innis' explanation of the many different aspects of the price system can be found in Mary Q. Innis. ed., Essays in Canadian Economic History, Toronto 1956. For an overview of Innis' perspective on economic development, see the following: "The Penetrative Power of the Price System," "Unused Capacity as a Factor in Canadian Economic History", "Significant Factors in Canadian Economic Development"; "Transportation as a Factor in Canadian Economic Development"; and "Liquidity Preference as a Factor in Industrial Development."

6. Innis developed his own specialized vocabulary of political economy to analyze and discuss the laws and relations of development. In addition to the concept of rigidity, here are some other key words Innis employs throughout his writings and to which he often attached unorthodox meanings: elasticity, unused capacity, incidental price system, fixed overhead costs, disturbance, monopoly, factors of development, disequilibrium, business cycle, geographic unity, capital movements, cyclonics, liquidity preference, vested interests, technique of production.

7. The terms "persistence" and "transformation" pervade the writings of the economic historian W.T. Easterbrook.


13. For other neo-classical economists, Mackintosh is regarded as being 'a man of science' while Innis is often seen as the myth-maker. Hugh G.J. Aitken, *op. cit.*, is a good example of the scholarly bias directed against Innis. In point of fact it was the Mackintosh model which acquired the status of having myth-making appeal. Innis was the more 'scientific' of the two in the best sense of the term, as this paper attempts to demonstrate.


17. W.A. Mackintosh, "Economic Factors in Canadian History."

18. The term appears in his essay "Unused Capacity" (1936), in *Essays*, p. 144.

19. Though it is infrequently consulted, Innis' *Problems of Staple Production in Canada*, Toronto, 1933, now out of print, contains much useful information on railways and technology.

20. See his essay "Introduction to Canadian Economic Studies" in *Essays* for a lengthy discussion and examination of the branch-plant movement.


23. Innis made constant reference to Adam Smith in his writings and used Smith's analysis of the price system to stress its 'transforming' capability. See Innis' "Penetrative Powers of the Price System" in *Essays*.

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26. Innis' view of mercantilism and late capitalism respectively are found in "The Penetrative Power of the Price System" and "Liquidity Preference as a Factor in Industrial Development". In these essays, Innis examines the evolution of capitalism as a world system.

27. See "Unused Capacity as a Factor in Canadian Economic History" and "The Political Implications of Unused Capacity", in Essays.


29. This is an important aspect of Innis' work. His views are outlined in "Penetrative Power of the Price System" in Essays.

30. Ibid. p. 257.

31. Ibid. p. 256.

32. Innis regarded the failed revolutions of 1837 as a decisive moment in Canadian political economy and, unlike Creighton, constantly pointed out the inadequacy of the St. Lawrence commercial system as a structural determinant. See "Significant Factors in Canadian Economic Development" in Essays.


34. Ibid., p. 259.

35. Ibid., p. 260.

36. For a sampling of Innis' complex views on regionalism see "Decentralization and Democracy" in Essays, particularly pp. 367-371. He believed that regionalism had become so severe that it had rendered obsolete Canada's political machinery and necessitated "concentration on the problem of machinery by which interests can become more vocal and their demands be met more efficiently." (p. 370.)


38. For an elaboration of Innis' views on transportation, see "Transportation as a Factor in Canadian Economic History", in Essays.


40. Problems in Staple Production, p. 23.

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid., p. 115.

43. "The impact on Canada of the business cycle in the highly integrated industrial system of the U.S. varies directly with the importance of American capital and of the American market and with the
character of the industrial structure of Canada." In "Labour in Canadian Economic History", Essays, p. 198. More explicitly the American control of the business cycle means "continued migration of capital in the form of branch plants from the U.S. and further exploitation of natural resources." Problems in Staple Production, p. 121.


46. Ibid.

47. Ibid., p. 118.

48. Problems in Staple Production, op. cit., p. 73.

49. Ibid., p. 82.


52. Ibid., p. 291.

53. Ibid.

54. In Innis' The Political Economy of the Modern State, there are two lengthy essays in which he identifies the problems which stem from the decline of liberty and the rise of monopoly and imperialism. The first is "The Political Economy in the Modern State" and the second is "On the Economic Significance of Cultural Factors".

55. "Canadian Economy and the Depression", in Essays, p. 133.


57. Ibid., p. 270.


59. Ibid., p. 135.

60. Ibid., p. 130.

61. Ibid., p. 135.

62. Ibid., p. 140.

63. Ibid., p. 139.

64. "Recent Trends in Canadian-American Relations", op. cit., p. 238.
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65. Ibid., p. 239.


67. Ibid., p. 238; the text reads "important wage levels" but it seems clear import is intended.

68. Ibid., p. 238.

69. Ibid., p. 238.

70. Ibid., p. 240.

71. Two themes which dominate Innis' writing on Canada are that "Regionalization has brought complex problems for an economy developed in relation to the St. Lawrence" and that "Provincialism has paralleled the new industrialism." While he held it "imperative that serious attention should be given to the problem of revising political machinery so that democracy can work out solutions to modern problems", he was not optimistic that Canada's political system would be able to reform its political structures. The above quotations are from "Decentralization and Democracy" in Essays, p. 368 and 370.

72. See "Decentralization and Democracy", "The Penetrative Power of the Price System", "Political Implications of Unused Capacity" and "Labour in Canadian Economic History". His major thesis was "that the conflict between a price structure dominated by Great Britain and a price structure increasingly dominated by the continent has serious implications for the Canadian economy in the inequalities between groups and regions." To counter this trend he believed that "provinces will require elaborate machinery to protect themselves against the exploitation of haphazard federal policies." p. 198 and p. 371, respectively, in Essays.

73. For an overview, see "Great Britain, The United States and Canada," in Essays.

74. After 1940, Innis turned his attention to a number of philosophic concerns; the results are to be found in The Political Economy of the Modern State, op. cit. The last period of his life was devoted to the study of the modes of communications and the ownership of the means of communication.


76. The Fur Trade in Canada, p. 402.

77. In "Staple-ization: A Theory of Canadian Capitalist Development, I examined the phenomena of dependent industrialization as a particular aspect of the staple mode of development, John Saul and Craig Heron, eds., Nationalism, Imperialism and Canada, Toronto, 1977. The eleven points set out in this article require a fuller explanation than is possible in the present circumstances. Nonetheless, the present discussion would be incomplete without showing, albeit cryptically, the link between Innis' theory of rigidities and the larger structure.

78. Leo Panitch and others in The Political Economy of the Canadian State (Toronto, 1978) err badly in a) discussing the Canadian state without reference to the imperial state and b) adopting the metropolitan Marxist theory of the state as the theoretical backdrop to their analysis. The contributors dismiss out of hand an instrumentalist view of the state and yet on conceptual and empirical grounds the policies, structure and behaviour of the Canadian state for reasons given in
points 3, 5, 7, 10, 11, demonstrate the relevance of the instrumentalist approach. Nor do they reconcile a Millibandian view of the state with Canadian statist tradition.


80. The monopoly aspect of development has important ramifications for the study of working class history in a double sense: firstly, the resource proletariat, being forced to carry the burden of the rigidities, became the most class conscious element of the working class movement. Many labour historians erroneously continue to regard the urban industrial proletariat as its leading element. Secondly, under resource capitalism, the indigenous tradition of Canadian unionism has been a unionism of struggle arising out of the objective conditions that confronted the resource, transportation, and construction proletariat. The entry of American unions into Canada established their hegemonic control over much of organized labour, destroying this older radical tradition of unionism and replacing it with a corporate ideology of business unionism. The destruction of the radical Mine Mill Union by the Steelworkers is a telling case in point. Much of the Canadian Left has been compromised on this issue because both the social democratic and Marxist political parties have relied on these American ‘internationals’ for political and financial support.

81. In the twentieth century two types of class alliances reflect Canadian development at the national level: a) 1890 to 1930 was the period of a national development strategy under the direction of the commercial/financial elite, the state, and British capital; b) 1945 to the present has been a period of renewed dependency under the same elite, orchestrated by the state in alliance with American capital. At the regional level only south-central Ontario has reached the lofty heights of the national development plateau. Significantly, Alberta and Quebec have attempted to acquire a new status in Confederation but by very different means. Quebecers have opted for a national popular government possibly leading to independence while Albertans believe that a national development strategy based on alliance with American capital offers salvation from the ‘exploitative’ policies of Ottawa.
DEUX PAYS POUR VIVRE: CRITICAL SOCI OCY AND THE NEW CANADIAN POLITICAL ECONOMY

"L'imagination est la reine du vrai, et le possible est une des provinces du vrai."
Charles Baudelaire, Curiosités esthétiques

"Most forward-looking people have their heads turned sideways."
H.A. Innis, The Idea File of Harold Adams Innis

Ray Morrow

On the basis of mass-mediated news and commentary it is tempting to believe that these past couple of years have been among the most momentous of modern Canadian history: the defeat of the Quebec referendum on sovereignty-association, the repatriation of a constitution from Britain and the addition of a bill of rights, a national energy policy oriented toward domestic control of the oil industry, hints of a strengthening of a previously toothless investment review agency, the creation of a royal commission on the newspaper industry and the setting up of a major cultural policy review committee. But are these signs of a fundamental turning point in Canada's development, a creatively adaptive response to the increasingly evident crisis of an advanced, yet peripheral and dependent state? Or are they symptoms of a malaise and thus in principle unable to cope with the increasing pressures for fundamental change?

As the celebration of a constitutional agreement recedes into the immediate past and a semblance of normalcy returns to public discussion, some of the more disturbing features of federal policies may become more evident. For example, despite some signs of discontent within the business community, especially south of the border, the measures which could be linked to a new economic self-assertion are—with the partial exception of the energy policy—extremely timid, scarcely threatening the overall structure of economic power. At all levels of government debts continue to accumulate and the resulting dependence on American and European financial markets increasingly constrains domestic economic policy. Similarly, federal budgets reveal a sense of complete helplessness before the effects of Reagan's economic policies. And now Quebec has been isolated by constitutional negotiations which, even if they had been accompanied by short-term compromises between Trudeau and Lévesque, would not include a sufficient acknowledgement of the special status of Quebec to defuse the discontent articulated by the Parti Québécois. Let us also recall that most of the indices of the structural decline of the Canadian economy and its
skewed development continue to worsen and the overall structure of cultural
dependence remains intact, despite statistically insignificant signs of vitality
reported by nationalistic journalists and official publicists. Along with Greece
and Italy, Canada still stands at the bottom of the O.E.C.D. list in terms of the
level of research and development in relation to GNP.

This discrepancy between the apparent federal mastery of events and the
disturbing reality of continued drift are largely masked by the mass media's
inability to exert any real autonomy in carrying out its responsibility to critically
inform, as well as to entertain, to lead as well as to follow, to create new forms of
awareness rather than to merely reflect the inertia of events. What is largely
missing in the public, mass-mediated expressions of these symptoms of national
crisis is any sense of its longer history, its need to be explicated within the
framework of the most advanced forms of modern political and social theory, and
its more fundamental implications for a strategy for responding to the future.
Even where such matters are discussed it is usually under the influence of the
gurus of popular American futurology.

For the forms of interrogation which are attempting to grapple with the most
fundamental issues of the crisis in Canada one must look elsewhere, bypassing
the mass media and the official responses: to the margins of the academy, to the
non-sectarian groups which attempt to articulate the needs and frustrations of
marginalized and under-represented populations, to artists and writers, and to
the handful of magazines and journals which reach only select audiences. Only
here and there is it possible to find the foundations for an alternative discourse
on the crisis of Canada and its relation to the crisis of advanced capitalist and
industrial societies. But the question remains for those who have glimpsed the
symptoms yet have been largely excluded from these underground debates: where to begin?

The Discourse of the Other Canadas

The most obvious place to turn would be the volume edited by Wallace
Clement and Daniel Drache under the heading *A Practical Guide to Canadian
Political Economy*. Within its covers the reader is provided with a comprehen-
sive, thematically organized bibliography, a short list of some "Thirty Basic
Readings in Political Economy," and a long, informative introduction on
"Rediscovering Political Economy" by Drache. However, a closer examination of
Drache's perceptive and wide-ranging introduction reveals some disconcerting
conclusions: "Yet despite this enormous intellectual output in the last five years,
the new political economy has not been able to produce a clearer synthesis of the
development crisis." Pursuing this question further, he acknowledges that this
continuing difficulty is closely related to a "lack of a cultural self" or a
"deculturation" which "has also left its imprint on the resurgence of political
economy, both in general and in specific ways." Many of these problems seem to
THE PLEA FOR TWO NATIONS

reflect the fragmentation which results from the lack of a unifying theoretical and political framework and is manifest in the one-sidedness that comes from emphasizing any single analytical argument at the expense of others. More fundamentally, however, he concludes that it reflects an ambivalent relation to Quebec, a swing between economism in good times and nationalism in bad, an uncritical reliance upon metropolitan Marxist models, and a tendency to pursue economic interpretations for their own sake.

For these and other reasons which will become apparent in the course of this essay, there may be a more instructive and provocative place to begin rethinking of the nature of public life in Canada: a slender volume by Quebec sociologist Marcel Rioux and writer/social critic Susan Crean, *Deux pays pour vivre: un plaidoyer*, which is scheduled to appear in a greatly expanded English version in the spring of 1982. Had it appeared a couple of years earlier, *Deux pays pour vivre* would surely have found a place on Clement and Drache's short list were it to have included any French-language titles. Yet this inclusion would have been misleading to the extent this were taken to imply that its argument could be easily assimilated into the broader tradition of Canadian political economy without raising some fundamental questions about its limits and political implications. Without intending to do so, *Deux pays pour vivre* provides important responses to the very weaknesses identified by Drache in his own assessment. With this in mind, the following essay seeks to undertake a critical reading and analysis of *Deux pays pour vivre* from the perspective of its significance for rethinking both Canadian political economy and the crisis of Canadian development.

It is likely that the English version of *Deux pays pour vivre* will eventually stand in the company of George Grant's *Lament for a Nation* as a milestone in the discussion of the cultural crisis of Canada. Yet, like Grant's study, the reception of *Deux pays pour vivre* will be uneven, confused, and plagued by misunderstandings. This is related not only to the difficulty of serious theoretical discussions to penetrate beyond a small, largely academic public fragmented along regional, disciplinary, and sectarian lines, but is inherent in any text, however introductory and popular in intent, that presupposes theoretical traditions which cannot be fully presented and yet are not generally part of the common knowledge of the intended reader. In its English version, therefore, *Deux pays pour vivre* will suffer from its contradictory objective to provide a popularization of the issues of cultural dependence and at the same time to situate these within the framework of a critical theory of Canadian society. Yet this very weakness as a medium of popularization is simultaneously a manifestation of its movement toward originality: *Deux pays pour vivre* is one of the first major efforts to apply European critical theory to the issues of Canadian and Quebec cultural development.

In the pages that follow Rioux and Crean's study will be explored as a document expressing and articulating the foundations for a new stage in research and discussion on the national and cultural questions in Canada and Quebec. It would be beyond the scope of this essay, in part because of the differences in the
expanded English version, to attempt any premature assessment of this approach as a whole or to situate it more closely in relation to Rioux's version of critical sociology or the specific traditions from which it draws inspiration. The more immediate task is to facilitate an adequate comprehension of the approach represented by the text and to encourage debate with respect to its implications for the tradition of Canadian political economy. A book such as this does not purport to provide final answers, but seeks rather to cultivate awareness of new concepts and categories of discourse: in the context of social theory mastering the medium (language) reveals the message. To this end, it is necessary to first situate the resulting critical sociology in relation to the more recent history of the nationalist debate, examine some of the implications of the collaboration between Rioux and Crean, and finally turn to a reconstruction of their argument and a tentative exploration of some of its internal tensions and implications for rethinking Canadian political economy.

Committing Collaboration

An unusual feature of *Deux pays pour vivre* is that it is a rare example of cooperation between the advocates of the anglophone Canadian and francophone movements for national autonomy. Whereas this would seem to be a natural form of alliance, one of the characteristics of Canadian politics and culture over the past decade has been the mutual isolation and ignorance of these two movements, a fact which has been costly for both. As Abraham Rotstein affirmed prophetically a decade ago in response to the October Crisis:

Quebec nationalists, of whatever persuasion, must now recognize they cannot achieve their objectives at any reasonable cost without active support from English Canadians. Nationalists in the rest of the country must realize that the continued repression of Quebec will only create a society which is not worth inhabiting.

Our mutual interests must be recognized. The old empathy and passive moral support are no longer sufficient. We must now travel in tandem to create in English Canada active legal, political and institutional channels that support and foster Quebec's legitimate aspirations. It is our only hope of mitigating the impact of the collision which looms ahead.

The failure to have done so is in part responsible for the current situation in which Quebec has been isolated from a constitutional agreement and frustrations within the Parti Québécois threaten an internal split. Reciprocally, few non-francophone Canadians can relate the experience of Quebec to their own
situation in the larger context of the development of Canada. More generally, of course, this outcome reflects the deliberate strategy of the federal government and Quebec Liberals to isolate the Parti Québecois, cutting it off from outside allies and at the same time hoping to push it toward internal conflict and extremist responses.

The collaboration between Rioux and Crean thus represents a deliberate rejection of the form of political discourse generated by the federal isolation of the Quebec independence movement. Significantly, this subtly taboo form of theoretical “sovereignty-association” took place between representatives of the two different generations which mark, respectively, the cultural watersheds of Quebec and anglophone Canadian politics. What may appear to be an accidental alliance thus turns out on closer examination to have an underlying cross-generational logic. First, there is Marcel Rioux: friend of Trudeau and other Liberals of the Cité Libre generation in the 1940’s and 1950’s, eventually associated with the New Democratic Party and then various socialist groups after making the transition from apolitical anthropologist to radical sociologist by the early 1960’s, and finally supporter of the Parti Québecois from its early days. Then Susan Crean: typical female product of upper-middle class Toronto, then member of that generation of Ontario students initially drawn in the late 1960’s to Trudeau’s vision of Canada, and finally passionate advocate of Canadian cultural independence.8

With Rioux, Crean has found the theoretical dimension lacking or only hinted at in her pathbreaking Who’s Afraid of Canadian Culture?9 Though especially strong in its description of the many different mechanisms of the American domination of the different spheres of Canadian culture, this study lacked a fully developed critical sociology of culture and thus tended to view national identity in isolation from the broader issues of social justice and the transformation of Canadian society. If there is a cultural and political sense in which Quebec is ahead of the rest of Canada, it is natural that Crean should find theoretical inspiration in Rioux, a man with no theoretical peer among anglophone Canadian sociologists of his generation, let alone the experience of participation in a remarkable cultural movement. In collaboration with Rioux, therefore, there is also a symbolic acknowledgement of the comparative impoverishment of this generation of senior anglophone scholars and intellectuals, depleted by earlier emigration southward and robbed of a creative context for theoretical synthesis by maturation under the debilitating canopy of American hegemony.

What Rioux seems to have gained from Crean is an interlocutor for coming to terms with his ambivalent relation to anglophone Canada and an ally for bringing to both the francophone and anglophone publics an awareness of the divide-and-rule strategy which has served a form of authoritarian federal power and distracted attention from the more fundamental question of American domination. Yet this approach remains a lonely one in Quebec where Deux pays pour vivre has fallen on deaf ears. On the one hand, the theme of cultural dependence is already old hat, having received more in-depth treatment elsewhere. On the other hand, to couple this theme with reference to a parallel
analysis of English Canada is generally greeted with indifference or skepticism, if not downright ridicule. This stems primarily from a pervasive rejection of the assumption that anglo-Canadian culture has any potential at all. And in the present conjuncture, the reality of public debate in francophone circles is the dominating presence of an antagonistic system of federal power, the humiliating experience of constitutional negotiations, and the less than convincing gestures of concern and reconciliation on the part of the Conservative and New Democratic parties. In such an atmosphere, the more popular response is to denounce Quebec Liberals as "traitors" and dallying with the progressive elements of the enemy as an ill-advised waste of time. Yet this unwittingly contributes to the federal strategy of divide-and-rule, both within Quebec and in relation to potential allies elsewhere.

Stages of Nationalist Discourse

In entering the debate about the national questions in Canada and Quebec, Rioux and Crean write within a tradition of discussion sharply divided along the line of the two official languages. An important difference between these two worlds of discourse is that the francophone version stretches back for more than two centuries, is symbolically defined by a heroic tradition of conquest and revolt, and has fundamentally shaped the development of the human sciences and culture in Quebec. By contrast, the anglophone version has a short and anemic history, is defined by an ambivalent response to the transition from being an English to an American "colony", and marked by a sense of futility and despair expressed only on the margins of the academy or literary culture. Yet even in anglophone Canada over the past decade or so the criticism of the "Americanization" of Canada has at last become a major topic of public debate, through rarely of action.

A striking feature of this anglophone recovery of an understanding of the strategic importance of cultural and economic, as well as political, autonomy in the life of a nation-state is that it bears only a faint resemblance to the conception of Canadian national identity evoked by the advertisements and public relations releases of the federal government. Those who have contributed the most profound meditations on the crisis of Canadian nationhood have consistently defended the privileged status of Quebec within confederation, accepted its right to whatever form of independence it democratically chooses, and acknowledged its inspirational role as a model for the rest of Canada. This contemporary discourse on nationalism in anglophone Canada might be said to have moved through three different stages of development with Rioux and Crean's *Deux pays pour vivre* signalling the third. The first can be precisely dated with the appearance of George Grant's *Lament for a Nation* in 1965, a book which began the process of awakening Canadians from the slumbers of cultural dependence.
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Listen to Grant's pessimistic and conservative diagnosis as formulated nearly two decades ago:

The keystone of a Canadian nation is the French fact; the slightest knowledge of history makes this platitudinous. English-speaking Canadians who desire the survival of their nation have to co-operate with those who seek the continuance of Franco-American civilization.12

Or again:

The Liberals have failed in English-speaking Canada. If the nation were to survive, it had to be anchored in both English-speaking and French-speaking Canada, and a modus vivendi had to be established between the two. The Liberals failed to recognize that the real danger to nationalism lay in the incipient continentalism of English-speaking society, rather than in any separatism. Their economic policies homogenized the culture of Ontario with that of Michigan and New York.13

A second stage of discussion was brought about by the crisis on the left produced by the recognition of the disastrous consequences of an unreflective internationalism which had failed to take into account the specific circumstances of Canada and the inevitable link between any socialist project and a new form of nationalism. This was most clearly expressed in the dissident NDP "Waffle" platform which, in hearkening back to the 1933 Regina Manifesto's call for large-scale nationalization, acknowledged the relation of this strategy to a formation of national purpose which had been eroded by continental integration. Though this economic programme was challenged by those, such as Rotstein, who questioned the capacity of the state to effectively organize a modern industrial system, there was general agreement that overcoming cultural dependence was a necessary condition for any steps toward regaining economic autonomy. Furthermore, it followed from these positions that Quebec had a comparable right to self-determination which should be acknowledged within the federal system.14

In what ways does Rioux's and Crean's study mark a third stage in the history of contemporary discussions of the national questions in Canada? To anticipate the subsequent analysis of their position, at least four aspects of their book mark important new steps. First, more than lip-service is given to cooperation between the representatives of the two different national projects through the act of committing collaboration. Secondly, the justification of this position is linked to the central issues of contemporary European social theory, rather than elaborated primarily at the level of a political economic analysis. Though this theoretical dimension was implicit in the theory of modern civilization at the heart of Grant's work, it remained repressed in the nationalist debate unleashed
under the guidance of political economists and largely carried out in mass-media polemics. Though the categories of political economy greatly facilitated forms of research which demonstrated many of the mechanisms of economic and cultural dependence, they could not—with the partial exception of those who followed Innis—adequately formulate all the bases of a critical sociology of culture. Consequently the resulting debates often oscillated between uncritical pro-Canadianism or dogmatic anti-Americanism, on the one hand, and tendencies toward unmediated reductionism on the other. Accordingly, a third advance signalled by Rioux and Crean's book is the linking up of a form of "cultural Marxism" to the analysis of national self-determination. Finally, the resulting political programme departs sharply from the strategy of bureaucratically-organized nationalization as advocated by classic socialist parties. This is explicit in the concept of "autogestion" which underlies their vision of a new form of society.

To summarize, it might be said that Rioux and Crean's arguments culminate in a threefold cultural, economic, and political radicalization of the anglophone nationalist debate by claiming: (1) the priority of the cultural question in any process of qualitative change which seeks to transcend the limits of industrial societies; (2) the necessity of a fundamental transformation of the organization of the industrial economy, not simply the abolition of its capitalist form; and (3) the self-contradictory character of any political strategy based on the simple expansion of state power or the illusory assumption of its eventual withering away with the abolition of bourgeois class relations. Though these themes have dominated discussions of European critical theory for some time, they have not been systematically respecified in relation to the contemporary crisis of Canada. And though, as we shall see, such a programme might be charged with utopianism, it has the merit of an internal consistency and a libertarian spirit which sets it aside from previous radical diagnoses of the crisis of the two Canadas. In short, it does not suffer from the pessimism of a conservative nationalism trapped in an anti-modernist flight from history, an orthodox socialism waiting patiently for economic contradictions to bring forth the Godot of proletarian consciousness, or a form of social democracy always just an election ahead of its time. Whatever its immediate limitations as a concrete political strategy, in other words, Deux pays pour vivre challenges artists, writers, and scholars to what Rioux refers to elsewhere as a categorical "résémantisation" of the world and with that, a rethinking of the possibilities of Canada and Quebec.

Domination and National Autonomy

Not altogether escaping the pitfalls of eclecticism, Rioux's critical sociology weaves together categories drawn from German critical theory (especially Habermas and Marcuse), the French tradition of existential and humanistic
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Marxism (Sartre, Lefebvre, Castoriadis, etc.) and related sociological approaches, and selected aspects of American cultural anthropology and the youth countercultural movements of the late 1960's. If the European tradition is the basis of the centrality of alienation and domination and hence of the critique of advanced capitalism, ethnography and youth countercultures are the original source of concern for the role of communities and nations in the reconstruction of industrial societies. Whereas the European theorists have tended to take a rather dim view of nationalism, given its abuse as a weapon against working-class movements and a pretext for imperial wars, the situation has been fundamentally different in colonized regions. Although this has long been recognized in the case of the colonies of the Third World, a similar process of domination—requiring a very different analysis—can also be observed within and between advanced societies. For Rioux, therefore, the elaboration of a critical sociology of Canadian society requires a fundamental reinterpretation of the national question which can take into account its potentially progressive features as part of a strategy of the critique and transformation of advanced capitalism.

The goal of linking the theory of domination with that of national communities is announced in the introductory chapter of Deux pays pour vivre. Following the tradition of German critical theory, the vision of general human emancipation is taken as the normative foundation of inquiry in the human sciences. From this perspective biographical self-reflection becomes a strategic point of departure and, as previously alluded to, the authors provide a brief sketch of the personal trajectories which resulted in the book in question. But what is of interest here is the outcome of these two struggles for self-understanding: the shared interest of Canada and Quebec is recognizing cultural and economic dependence as the most fundamental obstacle to qualitative social change.

As Rioux and Crean indicate, such an approach is based on a number of assumptions which must be acknowledged, even if for the most part they are not discussed or defended in detail in the text. These include (1) the relative unimportance of political constitutions as a means of resolving fundamental questions; (2) the failure of the strategy of assimilating Quebec and the need to recognize its autonomy; (3) the importance of more general demands for changing the relations between central federal power and that of regions; (4) the emergence in English Canada of an economic nationalism increasingly accompanied by a cultural equivalent in certain areas of the arts and popular culture; (5) a general awakening of consciousness in Canada and Quebec of American imperialism and its effects on their respective economies and cultures; (6) that all of these conflicts take place at a moment when industrial societies have put into question their vision of the world and conception of development.

At the outset, therefore, the authors set the stage for developing the central critical theme of their approach: the rejection of any strategy of analysis which privileges the economic or political at the expense of the cultural dimension of social reality. As they emphasize, any approach which limits discussion to questions of economic benefits and distribution is not only doomed to failure, but
inevitably culminates in the dangerous complaint that economic dependence has prevented Canada from becoming as "advanced" as the United States, thus implicitly taking for granted a specific model of development as necessary and desirable. For Rioux and Crean, on the other hand, if Canada and Quebec desire autonomy, "ce n'est pas pour continuer la société commerciale mais pour faire autre chose, pour bâtir une autre type de société." 17 From this point of view, moreover, what often appears to be "backwardness" may often conceal hidden advantages, if one desires a different type of society.

Furthermore, Rioux and Crean reject any political strategy which fails to privilege national autonomy as the creative nexus around which the struggle against all other forms of domination must be organized. In viewing history as a process of revolt and creative reconstruction acted out at both the individual and collective levels, they consider the question of the relationship between the many forms of domination (between nations, classes, sexes, age and ethnic groups, etc.), concluding that they can be simultaneously reduced only with movement toward a "société autogestionnaire" which extends to both the private and public worlds. And in societies such as Canada and Quebec, this is inevitably linked to gaining the national autonomy which is the condition of all other forms of emancipation. Furthermore, the process of realizing national liberation may serve as a source of apprenticeship for recognizing and coming to terms with all of the others.

Let there be no misunderstanding: this notion of national liberation makes no attempt to draw directly upon the example or rhetoric of Third World liberation movements. The strategy is rather to link the issues of national autonomy in Canada and Quebec to the more general crisis of advanced capitalism and industrial societies generally. Thus, while they follow John Hutchinson in viewing Canada as divided by three major types of conflict (bilingualism, provincial and regional relations, and Canadian/American relations), they also try to situate these within the horizon of the crisis of advanced societies without any simplistic analogies based on liberation movements in underdeveloped countries.

Moreover, as the introductory chapter makes clear, this conception of the nationalist debate in Canada and Quebec has little to do with the classic 19th century romantic veneration of tradition or the subsequent use of nationalism as part of a strategy of imperial aggrandizement. This difference is especially difficult for the American left to grasp in relation to Canada, given the pernicious consequences of nationalism at home and in dominant and aggressive societies elsewhere. But in small and peripheral societies such as Canada and Quebec, with neither militaristic traditions nor a capacity for deep-set xenophobia, the meaning of national self-assertion is fundamentally transformed; it becomes the context of symbolic transfiguration within which a repressed past is recovered, the collective will for the mastery of the contemporary crisis can be mobilized, and the self-construction — rather than importation — of a vision of the future can be initiated. 18 In other words, what is in question here is a form of nationalism whose cultural renaissance takes to heart Walter Benjamin's thesis
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- eloquently expressed in modern Quebec literature — that “there has never been a document of culture which was not at one and the same time a document of barbarism.”\textsuperscript{19}

The central chapters of \textit{Deux pays pour vivre} are concerned with developing a complex argument sustaining the specific sense in which the cultural must be privileged theoretically and practically if a new form of society is to be realized. This entails a series of discussions, not always adequately elaborated given the constraints of space in the French version, which can perhaps be more readily grasped when reconstructed in terms of three levels of argumentation: (1) a metatheoretical thesis regarding the problems of conceptualizing the relationship between the economic, political, and cultural aspects of a theory of society in general; (2) a substantive, theoretical thesis regarding the historically-specific status of culture in advanced capitalism, i.e. the notion of cultural domination as the highest stage of imperialism; and (3) a series of strategic arguments, directed at the cases of Canada and Quebec, concerning the potential contribution of certain forms of “culture populaire” as media through which various social groups and communities may take steps toward gaining control of their political and economic existence. Since these three levels of argumentation are not outlined explicitly, and the text tends to meander around them, it is instructive to briefly review the resulting approach from this schematic perspective.

The Constitutive Primacy of Culture

The first and most abstract level of analysis — a stance with respect to the relationship between the economic, political, and cultural dimensions of society — is the least explicitly developed. To a great extent the authors fall back upon the metatheoretical assumptions of the tradition of critical sociology in which they are working. Accordingly, it is not their task to take up issues such as whether or not the economic is determinant “in the last instance”, as Althusser and others would have it. Yet in their discussion of the problems of defining culture, it is clear that the cultural has a kind of analytical priority as the basis of the moment of historical specification which is the ultimate objective of inquiry. Moreover, it is within the domain of the cultural that the symbolic and categorical foundation of new possibilities are elaborated. This position is linked to both Rioux’s early training in American cultural anthropology, his own fieldwork experiences in Quebec, and similar arguments about the cultural matrix of social formations found in the tradition of historicist Marxism.\textsuperscript{20} The strategic importance of this metatheoretical position is that it opens the way for a more positive assessment of the community, as opposed to any absolutization of class, as the political locus for emancipatory movements. Consequently, culture is not something epiphenomenal, frivolous or secondary, something reducible to a mere weapon.
within class struggle, but a constitutive dimension of the political and economic, hence a presupposition of their qualitative transformation.21 This valorization of the cultural has nothing to do, of course, with any traditional idealistic conception of the pure autonomy of cultural activity or of its capacity to wish away its embeddedness in the economic, technological, or political conditions of society. For this reason, for example, the authors reject the thesis of the neutrality of technology because of the constraints it may impose upon the possible forms of social organization and culture open to a society. Accordingly, Rioux and Crean argue that it may be desirable to select forms of technology on the basis of other criteria than market-mediated assessments of efficiency in order to preserve or construct preferred social and cultural forms of life. More specifically, the authors concur with those who argue that the energy and ecology crises are expressions of a form of industrial society which must dominate nature, as well as create hierarchical forms of social organization and systematically erode cultural differences. Indeed, one of the consequences of this type of society is that it downplays the importance of the cultural because its cultural presuppositions privilege the political and economic as more real, thus undermining the capacity to envision cultural options. This position culminates in a kind of negative definition of culture as rooted in the differences which alone can produce concrete paths toward the universality of emancipatory praxis. Hence, a culture ceases to exist when those who are its bearers become submerged by the mental and affective structures of others and thus no longer able to "réinterpréter les emprunts qu'ils font selon leur code propre et ne peuvent plus créer de solutions originales dans la conduite de leur vie collective."22 The outcome of this epistemological position is, therefore, the rejection of any hypostatization of the imperial nation, the privileged class, or the abstract individual as the locus of emancipation.

Cultural Domination as the Highest Stage of Imperialism

Much more explicit attention is given to the question of specifying the status of cultural phenomena in the form of society under examination: the advanced but dependent capitalist society. In this context, of course, Canada and Quebec are cited as the primary illustrative examples. Accordingly, chapter two of Deux pays pour vivre is concerned with a brief survey of the history of economic and cultural imperialism defined by the triangular relation of dependencies which interlock Canada, Quebec, and the United States.23 On the one hand, this analysis is critical of the frequent tendency in Quebec to identify its dependence primarily in relation to Ottawa and the rest of Canada, thus glossing over the larger context of American hegemony. This discussion also dispels any suspicion that the authors' emphasis on the priority of the cultural question is linked to a simplistic understanding of the possiblity of separating cultural, political, and economic
issues. As the analysis of the political economy of culture concludes, it is ultimately impossible to separate the maladies of cultural and economic dependence: "La logique de la production des biens symboliques se moule donc sur celle de la production des automobiles." Failure to grasp this point, it is argued, has been at the root of the continuing failure of Canadian governments to effectively deal with the crisis of the economy or culture.

The examples of Canada and Quebec thus lead Rioux and Crean to a more general formulation of the processes of cultural domination analysed. This is expressed in the thesis of cultural hegemony as the highest stage of imperialism. Whereas past forms of imperialism emphasized political and economic power, its contemporary form is crowded by ever more subtle cultural processes:

La domination culturelle n’est possible que si existent les hégémonies politique, économique et technologique. L’hégémonie culturelle que la puissance impériale américaine vise viendrait la forme suprême de l’impérialisme puisque les représentations et les valeurs des sociétés dominées s’érodent et sont remplacées par celles de la puissance dominante. Les dominés enviennent à vouloir et à désirer pour eux ce que charroient les industries culturelles de la métropole et ce que qu’elles privilégient comme souhaitable et désirable. C’est la forme la plus insidieuse d’impérialisme puisqu’il n’y a pas d’occupation militaire ni de brimades économiques et politiques mais des images, des sons, des mots, des formes qui représentent une société d’abondance et de rêves.

Unlike political and economic domination, which are more visible and closely linked to the potential use of force, the processes of cultural domination are veiled behind ideological interpretations of the neutrality of technique, the free movement of information, and the objectivity and rationality of professionalized communicators. In these circumstances, subjects voluntarily comply with relations of domination and even come to actively identify with the perspective of the metropolitan centre, as has been well-documented in the case of Canada. Here, of course, the authors follow the several approaches to cultural reproduction in advanced capitalism, referring somewhat eclectically to such diverse analysts as Habermas, Mattelart, Schiller, Baudrillard, and Bourdieu. An interesting implication of Rioux and Crean’s discussion, which they do not sufficiently stress, is the unique context of Canada and Quebec as examples of some of the most subtle and complex forms of inter-cultural domination.
But having outlined the grimly deterministic spectre of cultural reproduction, Rioux and Crean then proceed to couple it — unlike most authors in this area — with an attempt to formulate a strategy of escape from the symbolic chains of the consciousness industry and total administration. Somewhat apologetically, to be sure, they conclude that domination can be fought primarily — at least initially — by cultural means; moreover, most efforts proceeding directly from economic to political issues are doomed to repeat the errors of the existing form of industrial society:

Nous croyons, à tort ou à raison, que pour faire autre chose du point de vue économique, il faut d’abord que change le système de valeurs et de représentations qui, lui seul, peut donner naissance à d’autres projets de bonne vie et de bonne société, ce qui, à notre sens, est éminemment culturel.26

At first glance, this position might appear to be consistent with an essentially Gramscian conception of a counter-hegemonic strategy of cultural mobilization. Though there is indeed considerable continuity between aspects of Gramsci’s conception of historicist Marxism and Rioux’s critical sociology, the latter implicitly re-invokes the historicist principle of specification and is forced to reach rather different strategic conclusions about the form of crisis in advanced capitalist societies such as Canada. The decisive differences here are the recognition of the obsolescence of the classic conception of revolutionary struggle (still entertained in a modified form by Gramsci in a fascist Italy) in the context of an affluent liberal democratic society, and a rejection of any exclusively proletarian or narrowly working-class basis for the development of cultural alternatives. Accordingly, the position of Rioux and Crean diverges sharply from many of those who, following the Birmingham School’s reading of Althusser and Gramsci, are tempted to revive a rather orthodox version of Marxism in the avant-garde guise of a variant of cultural Marxism.27

What then is this alternative strategy? At the risk of the distortions inherent in any schema, Rioux and Crean’s positon could be characterized as (1) counter-hegemonic but also countercultural; (2) reflexively nationalist and counter-evolutionary; and (3) populist as opposed to proletarian or elitist. Each of these obviously requires clarification.

The argument of Deux pays pour vivre is "countercultural" in the sense and to the degree that its counter-hegemonic plea presupposes a theory of cultural crisis. From this point of view the concept of crisis should not be restricted to its manifestations in the contexts of energy, ecology, economics, or politics. To do so is to run the risk of formulating the problem of opposition to the dominant order
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in terms of concepts and categories which are grounded in its vision of the world. In contrast — and this is the counter-cultural thrust of their argument — industrial civilization is in the midst of a process of cultural mutation which has called into question the conception of economic development running from Adam Smith through Marx and their contemporary representatives. Whether expressed in Habermas' notion of "legitimation crisis" or Bell's reference to the "cultural contradictions of capitalism," it is clear — the authors conclude — that "la crise qui atteint nos sociétés est avant tout une crise de la civilisation et non pas celle des débouchés commerciaux."28

Secondly, the resulting strategy is "reflexively nationalist" in relation to peripheral and dependent societies because national aspirations are not an exclusive goal, but are linked with a critique of all other forms of domination. It is also "counter-evolutionary" in the sense that the demystification of any unilinear logic of industrial development, whether in the form of any "convergence theory" or conception of "lead society", paves the way for the recognition of the possibility of divergent strategies of development in advanced societies.29 If neither the Soviet Union nor the United States represents some hidden logic of history or rationality, then their satellites are no longer bound inexorably to imitation and inferiority. On the contrary, they have an implicit responsibility for innovation, for pointing the way to possibilities not open to imperial centres paralyzed by the inertia of power. In this respect, the situations in Poland and Quebec are essentially parallel.

Finally, the conception of transition proposed is "populist" rather than proletarian or elitist in the sense that it assumes that the ultimate locus of the creative imagination required for an epochal breakthrough is preserved and rekindled in groups and communities whose everyday life experience has not been fully incorporated into the ethos of the dominant civilization.30 On this account, any abstract identification of the proletariat or state with "progressive" tendencies falls prey to the limits of innovation within the logic of the existing order. An important example of the latter problem can be seen in the paradoxical role of the state in promoting cultural autonomy in a dependent society. As the practices of cultural development in Ottawa and Quebec City demonstrate, there is an inherent tendency to treat cultural development as a simple extension of the logic of economic development; consequently, the citizen is again transformed into a passive consumer by specialized agents of cultural production. These processes are evident in all forms of elitist — official or academic — cultural production and distribution.

Similarly, the working-class does not offer an unproblematic point of departure for cultural resistance and innovation because of its long and largely successful incorporation through the activities of the state and mass cultural industries. Indeed, it was precisely through the process of cultural integration that the proletariat failed to preserve its autonomy and lost its privileged historical position and mission; at the same time, however, "la prise en main de sa destinée commence donc par celle de sa culture."31 But in the contemporary situation of Canada and Quebec this cannot be readily identified with any specific
group—such as the working-class or specific unions—because of the extent to which these have been incorporated into "mass culture."

The strategic possibilities for emancipatory practices are located instead in what the authors refer to as "culture populaire", a term which translates somewhat misleadingly into "popular culture", at least to the extent this is associated with "mass" cultural activities in general. Consequently, it is much closer to the use of the notion of popular culture by those concerned with early modern European history and hence with essentially pre-mass-mediated and pre- incorporated forms of working-class leisure and private life. So for Rioux and Crean the concept of "culture populaire" retains a strong positive and normative connotation (given its association with potential for cultural innovation) and a restrictive empirical as a means to indicate those forms of cultural activity and expression which retain local and regional roots, hence considerable autonomy as the repository for the imaginative recovery of the collective will of groups and communities. This "culture populaire", however, is simultaneously menaced from the elite culture above (official and academic) and the mass culture proceeding from distant centres:

La thèse que nous voudrions défendre c'est que l'apport de la culture populaire est toujours allé en s'amenuisant au détriment de la culture dite d'élite et de la culture de masse, toutes deux aux mains de groupes dominants au sein de chaque pays et à l'échelon international.32

Obviously this populist theme and the related typology of forms of culture poses some problems which are not adequately resolved in the next of Deux pays pour vivre. It should be noted, however, that these questions are being explored in more detail by Rioux and others in Quebec under the auspices of a major research project.33

From Theory to Political Practice: The Eternal Triangle

This simultaneous refusal of the liberal-pragmatic, pessimistic-conservative, and neo-Marxist strategic options, thus opens up the more specific issue of the implications of Rioux and Crean's conception of critical sociology for contemporary Canadian politics. It would lead far beyond the bounds of this essay, however, to do more than iterate the general strategy of the "plea for two nations" and to note a couple of omissions in their analysis which could lead to unnecessary misunderstandings.
As previously mentioned, priority is given to a preliminary re-negotiation of the relationship between Canada and Quebec as a necessary prerequisite for freeing both to construct policies oriented toward greater self-determination. The underlying assumption here tends to converge with that of left-nationalism generally: that the political process of attempting to gain greater control of a society's economy and culture is the most powerful means available for creating awareness of the range of forms of domination. From this follows the support (not uncritical) of the Parti Québécois, despite its practice of a rather conventional form of bureaucratic social democracy. This support, however, is based on the assumption that this movement is the carrier of authentic utopian aspirations which transcend both the specific class background of participants and the specific policies forced upon a party in power by the federal government, the general economic crisis, the potential blackmail of capital, and a precarious alliance with unions torn between irresponsibility masked as class militancy and co-operation in a long-term strategy of economic re-organization.

Rioux's response to this situation follows from the general position of his critical sociology in that an ironically Weberian distinction is preserved between the ethics of responsibility for the social democratic politics of the economically possible and the extra-parliamentary ethics of commitment to anticipatory cultural movements. This allows the degree of reconciliation between theory and practice possible under difficult conditions. From this perspective, the practical failure of the Parti Québécois would not refute the justification of support because there is no convincing basis for the assumption that there was a dramatically different alternative. A multidimensional conception of change implies that the process of transition operates at many different levels requiring different time cycles for their realization. Electoral politics is only one of these domains, as are class and other forms of mobilization, cultural movements or one's personal life. None of these is absolutely privileged and setbacks in one may be compensated for by advances in others. Such a flexible reconciliation of theory and practice allows avoidance of both Adorno's metaphysical pessimism and the naive optimism of a political economy waiting for the revolutionary millenium.

A first neglected point in Rioux and Crean's analysis which could lead to misunderstanding is a failure to draw out the consequences of the asymmetry of the actual and potential role of the national questions in the province of Quebec as opposed to elsewhere in Canada. It is questionable whether there are comparable bases for the forms of "culture populaire" which have played such an important part in defining the cultural autonomy of Quebec and its relation to a mass movement. There are thus reasons to believe that any cultural developments in anglophone Canada will be accompanied by a sharp split between indigenous cultural creation appealing to a largely elite audience and the mass audience of imported American culture. To this extent, there is little basis for any short-term reconciliation between cultural anticipation and social democracy of the type now found, even if on a fragile basis, in the Parti Québécois.

Another potentially misleading omission is the absence of a "plea" for a third
"pays pour vivre," i.e. a process of development in the United States which would complement the aspirations of Canada and Quebec. Equally as pressing as the need for mutual understanding within Canada is the imperative of communicating to sympathetic Americans what is or might be happening north of the 49th parallel. On the one hand, there are voices in America which increasingly articulate a conception of the crisis of advanced capitalism close to that of the critical sociology of Rioux and Crean. Some of these have even drawn similar conclusions in calling for the development of regional "nations" to counter the excessive scale and centralization of American society. As William Appleton Williams has recently pointed out, one of the congenital flaws of the American left has been a blindness, originating in a shared indebtedness to the heritage of Napoleon, Lincoln, and Marx, to the problem of the scale of political communities:

In a fundamental sense, therefore, twentieth-century radicals followed Marx in becoming victims of his fascinating combination of capitalist assumptions and socialist utopianism... (which) led him to believe that a change of class at the center of the metropolis would change the inherent nature of the system.

Unhappily, it was wrong and wrong again. For if capitalism leads to increasing demographic imbalance, the super-centralization of power, and the destruction of community, then surely a rigorous radicalism is defined by regionalism in the international arena...It is easy, and convenient, to dismiss such alternatives as nostalgic nonsense. But they are in truth the guts of a very tough late twentieth-century radicalism. American radicals must face and answer the naughty question: Do they want to manage an essentially unchanged corporate capitalist political economy as little more than especially sensitive and responsible administrators, or do they want to change the world? If the latter, then I suggest that changing the world hinges on breaking the existing system into human-sized components of space, time, place and scale.35

Moreover, by omitting the question of internal American developments, it is implied that the "American empire" is a monolithic entity and that Canada and Quebec could successfully negotiate their fate in relation to it. Yet it is obvious that any effort to renegotiate such relations presupposes sympathetic and informed groups which are now — outside of a few cases of cooperation on ecological issues — clearly absent. Even in progressive, cosmopolitan circles there is an abysmal ignorance in America of the Canadian question, a fact which does not bode well for the future. To an extent, Quebec has already committed a
similar mistake by ignoring the rest of Canada (Rioux is an exception here), leaving the population at the mercy of the mass media and politicians. Does not a dependent culture have a responsibility to bring its message to those groups in the dominant culture which are the potential agents of change? Is not this ambivalence and temerity itself a manifestation of a colonialized culture? In this context the export of creative indigenous cultural productions which are rooted in Canadian experience and not Hollywood imitations becomes (again) more than a question of dollars and cents, for it is the only means to create the respect and understanding necessary for negotiating a new relationship.

II

Political Economy and Critical Theory

The preceding sympathetic reconstruction of Rioux and Crean's critical sociology of culture has set aside many of the more detailed issues which might be of concern in a more comprehensive analysis and critique. The objective has been, rather, to present a "stylized" version of their approach which highlights its implications for Canadian political economy. To make these more explicit, it is instructive to outline an agenda of questions (and challenges) which such a confrontation implies. To be sure, the resulting discussion is selective because limited to problems which arise directly from the formulation of critical sociology utilized; but the advantage is that it narrows an otherwise vast topic, directs attention to a number of fundamental issues, and allows a focus on an example of critical sociology formulated specifically as a response to the crisis of Canada and Quebec.

The more general context of debate here is the future of the human and social sciences in Canada. For some time now there has been extensive discussion within universities of the relations between the development of a "national" tradition of scholarship, the preservation of certain "universal" standards associated with the ideal of a scientific community, and the process of borrowing from other societies, most typically Anglo-American or European. In the case at hand, however, this question is narrowed to those forms of inquiry which, unlike the dominant paradigms of empirical social science, address directly issues concerning the national components of research traditions and their capacity for informing or guiding fundamental — perhaps even radical — social change. With respect to the internal differences which divide those who propose what are in some sense "radical" and "critical" alternatives, the crucial point of contention has been the strategy for appropriating the Marxian tradition, both as a programme of research and as a guide to political change. The resolution of this question defines, in turn, a specific relationship with traditional social scientific theories, methods, and modes of application.

As argued at the onset, Rioux and Crean's critical sociology cannot be readily
classified within the typology proposed by Drache for understanding the
development of the political economy tradition in Canada, the primary discursive
framework within which the Marxian tradition has come to influence
interpretations of society and history. Aspects of their approach would allow, to
be sure, its classification under the heading of the "new political economy"
especially those strands with roots in the traditions of the "hinterlanders" and
the "post-Innisians." But as the preceding reconstruction has made clear, there
are aspects of their critical sociology which call into question its identification,
without further ado, with any grouping including people such as Ryerson, Nelles,
Watkins, Clement, Drache, and Panitch. Though building upon the work of such
authors indirectly, Rioux and Crean's project is animated by different cognitive
interests and arrives at some divergent political and strategic conclusions. The
simplest solution to this anomaly, therefore, would be to add an eighth phase of
development under the heading of "critical sociology and critical theory." \(^{37}\)

Yet this new category adds as many problems as it solves; it does not follow
immanently from the new political economy and cannot be compared to it
without addressing some important theoretical and methodological assump-
tions. \(^{38}\) Especially important here is the relative heterogeneity of the approaches
contrasted and the degree to which they may lie on different theoretical levels
because guided by different cognitive interests. If the former presents the
potential problem of overgeneralization, the latter creates the risk of
constructing a pseudo-debate.

To avoid overgeneralization, the following discussion focuses on the "new"
political economy as designated by Drache. This will be taken idealtypically to
refer to an approach to the reinterpretation of Canadian economic history guided
by a theory of development derived in part from an indigenously constructed
dependency model (staples theory) coupled with, in diverse fashions, some more
or less conventional neo-Marxian conception of class conflict. Internal debates
turn precisely on the question of the relationship between the dependency and
internal class relation models, creating a latent tension between the older
tradition of economic history and the introduction of contemporary models of
neo-Marxist political economy based primarily on the European experience. \(^{39}\)
These explanatory debates do not stand in isolation as manifestations of some
kind of value-free science, however, because they are integrally associated with a
set of ideological and strategic assumptions rooted in the analysis of the class
nature of political conflicts. Again, there are important differences surrounding
such questions as the exact status and potential of nationalism in the struggle
against inequality, the potential of the state to respond to parliamentary
oppositional movements, the class character of farmers and petty commodity
producers, etc. Yet there is also a significant degree of consensus about the
strategic role of the working class as the objective basis for overcoming the
existing system of domination. The result is an approach within which a form of
specialized inquiry (political economy) is coupled more or less uncritically with
an ideological framework (conception of science, culture, politics, history) to
which it has a taken-for-granted relationship.
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Defining the approach of critical theory and sociology is simplified, largely because of its underdevelopment with respect to Canadian issues. And by giving Rioux and Crean’s analysis pride of place, the stage has already been set for outlining an agenda of implicit questions for political economy. Suffice it to note that the crucial point of difference is the metatheoretical and sociological framework within which the data of political economic and other forms of social scientific research are reinterpreted. The resulting strategy of inquiry is thus marked by a different knowledge-guiding interest than that which informs the research practices of those concerned with the theory of Canadian economic development. In this respect Rioux and Crean implicitly follow the model of "critical" theory in their concern with the conditions of possibility of qualitative change, as opposed to the priority of an empirical-analytical analysis of the determinants of the existing form of society. This disjuncture is based on the assumption that the analysis of economic relations no longer (if it ever did) provides an adequate account of how a new form of society might be constructed. The consequence is that the meaning and significance of political economic findings are transformed by their incorporation into a more general theory of society and cultural critique.

To avoid a pseudo-debate, it is important to stress that the relationship between political economy and critical theory is best referred to as a dialogue rather than as a question of theory competition in the strict sense in which one must be false if the other be true. But this also presupposes differentiating between political economy as a specialized discipline and its loosely associated aspiration to be the basis for a general theory of politics, culture, and the human sciences. At the empirical level, political economy and critical sociology are in principle complementary, even if the latter draws upon aspects of more traditional historical, sociological, and social psychological research to qualify, challenge, or reinterpret many of the analytical explanations of political economy. For critical sociology the exact significance of economic phenomena (itself a problematic manner of slicing social reality) is an empirical question which can only be determined from within the framework of a given sociocultural totality.

Political economy and critical theory are, on the other hand, largely competing and antagonistic at the metatheoretical and strategic level because of divergent conceptions of the relation between theory, practice, and radical change in advanced capitalist societies. This stance is closely linked to critical theory’s claim, expressed in various ways, that the world-historical mission of the proletariat, as originally envisioned by Marx, has failed and that invoking its spectre increasingly distracts from conceptualizing the new historical possibilities. (The Third World obviously requires a rather different analysis.) Moreover, this position emerged from within the tradition of Marxism itself. Whether it be the Frankfurt School or its inheritors, or the ex-Trotskyites who are so numerous among the critical sociologists of France, or the theoretical offspring of the Anglo-American New Left, this response has proceeded by way of an immanent critique of Marxism.
One of the earliest and most poignant expressions of this was Karl Korsch's 1931 essay on the "Crisis of Marxism" which begins with the acknowledgement that "Marxism as a movement and as a theory is in a state of crisis. This is no longer a crisis within Marxism, but a crisis of Marxism itself." Those who followed to the bitter end the underlying principles of historical specificity and the unity of theory and praxis were forced to recognize a fundamental transformation of the place of the economic process within advanced capitalism and the enhanced significance of the state and the new forms of cultural reproduction. In the Canadian context the initial failure of traditional Marxist analysis was therefore not only that it was "metropolitan"; it was also dogmatic, hence unable to revitalize its own theoretical categories. Not surprisingly, there has often been much more to learn from Marxism's best critics: "bourgeois" theorists animated by a desire to come to terms with the crisis of modern civilization. For this reason, the major original contributions to Canadian political economy were those of Innis and his followers who elaborated a theory of economic development on the basis of an empiricist concern with historical specificity. This would have been impossible within the Marxism of the day and Innis' strategy was in many respects comparable to that of Max Weber in Wilhelmian Germany a generation before: they both used economic history against Marxism, provoking awareness of the need for its renewal. In the process, of course, they were forced to become much more than economic historians by acknowledging the need for a complementary theory of society and culture. And as a consequence, there is a sense in which the students of Innis (as those of Weber) were forced to return to Marx as part of the process of going beyond both.

In the course of this return to Marx, however, the indigenous tradition of Canadian political economy has experienced difficulties related to a tendency toward excessive empiricism, an absence of metatheoretical reflection, working within an impoverished and dependent cultural tradition, and a suspicious attitude toward European social theory. One of the greatest sources of appeal of a more systematic neo-Marxist form of political economy is that it offers, in its revitalized and highly sophisticated manifestations, an almost ready-made resolution of these past difficulties. In the process the peculiarites of Canada can be acknowledged in a manner previously impossible for Marxist theorists and many of the pretensions of staples theory can be demolished (whether validly or not) because of its lack of a more comprehensive theoretical programme. And it is precisely for not moving far enough in this direction that Panitch has recently chided the new political economy:

A more precise source of the weakness of the new political economy than nationalism, however, may be said to be its insufficiently dialectical approach to social phenomena. The failure to take this approach, which stems from a failure to take Marxism seriously enough, rather than from any.
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necessary 'contamination' which results from incorporating certain expressions of nationalism (or insights of Innis) into a Marxian framework, may be said to lie at the core of the new political economy's weaknesses.

Even if this be accepted in general terms, paths begin to part over the question of precisely what it means to be "sufficiently dialectical" and to "take Marxism seriously enough." This is the most fundamental issue, not the danger of importing "metropolitan Marxism" as Drache warns. For this reason Panitch is again on solid ground when he suggests that nationalism has been a source of weakness not for political reasons, but because of "a certain insularity of focus that tends to discourage (and not count as part of Canadian political economy) contributions to general theoretical debates or to comparative research." Though this very insularity was a primary source of its capacity to theoretically articulate the unique features of Canadian economic development, beyond a certain point it must re-examine its assumptions in relation to these larger debates if it is to enter a new stage of creative research, especially in relation to the contemporary crisis. The real question is which debates and which forms of comparative research are to be taken to inspire reflections on the reinterpretation of Canadian social, political, and economic theory.

So-called "metropolitan Marxism" is itself a highly heterogenous phenomenon with a long history and divergent tributaries of development. For this reason it is important to stress the strategic difference between the sophisticated form of neo-Marxist political economy advocated by Panitch and the critical sociology of culture proposed by Rioux and Crean. These represent two fundamentally different strategies for drawing upon European discussions as a basis for rethinking the problematic of Canadian dependence and development. Whereas the first appeals to a restoration of Marx's programme via a theory of monopoly capitalism, the latter draws inspiration from a counter-response based on the assumption of the failure of that original project. At the same time this post-Marxist discourse claims to have neither abandoned the search for a critical theory of society nor for a strategy of political and cultural renewal.

An Agenda of Questions for the New Political Economy

The following agenda of questions alludes to the larger European context of division, even as it directs attention to its specific manifestations within Canada. Partly because of the previous monopoly of discussion by the new political economy, the exposition is weighted toward a series of challenges posed by critical theory which have been rarely voiced, even in muted form. These
questions are not, however, directed at the strictly empirical issues which divide political economists, might become the basis for forms of empirical critical sociology, and can only be resolved within the parameters of a cumulative research tradition. The points of contention touch rather upon problems of generalizing those findings, relating them to those of other disciplines, and translating them into political and cultural strategies. Since the indigenous variant of Canadian political economy is silent on many of these types of issues, discussion is also weighted toward the temptation of following the rejuvenated models of neo-Marxist political economy as the strategy for moving from economic history to a theory of society and politics. How these and related types of questions are resolved will determine, for better or worse, the future of critical social science in Canada. Defined thematically, these should include: (1) metatheoretical assumptions about the nature of social inquiry; (2) conceptions of cultural analysis and critique; (3) social psychological presuppositions about the agents of change; (4) political strategies of change; and (5) the form of utopian imagination underlying the project of cultural transformation. The significance of the differences within each of these can be grasped by a brief review of the contrasting tendencies expressed in the new political economy and Rioux and Crean's critical sociology.

(1) **Metatheoretical Assumptions: What Kind of Critical Social Science?**

Why is it that the Canadian political economy tradition is characterized by an almost complete avoidance of the metatheoretical debates which have transformed our understanding of the human sciences over the past decade or so? After all, Toronto has been the site of the publication of one of the most important journals in the philosophy of the social sciences and a centre for the study of European and Anglo-American social theory for nearly a decade. Yet one looks in vain for either any reference to these discussions by political economists or any interventions which seek to contribute to them. (Reciprocally, those interested in the theory of the human sciences have also largely ignored Canadian political economy.) At best, those who identify more strongly with a general neo-Marxist form of political economy can passively fall back upon the rich Anglo-American and European literature which has rehabilitated this approach within the academy. But again, one finds few sustained, metatheoretically sophisticated debates concerning the problems of translation implied by a historically specific Canadian political economy. All in all, therefore, the Canadian political economy tradition has completely failed to specify and secure its scientific status or relation to other disciplines, irrespective of its immense contributions to a theory of Canadian economic development. What this failure seems to betray is a lack of reflexivity linked to sub-disciplinary isolation, a lack of philosophical sophistication, and embeddedness in pre-existing ideological formations which have only occasionally been called into question. Even where there are the beginnings of such an interrogation, as in the case of Innis' fragmentary observations on the crisis of civilization and the role of value in
social science, they have not been systematically followed up or linked with contemporary debates.45

In contrast, Rioux and Crean ride on the wake of the elaborate and wide-ranging discussions in the philosophy of social sciences associated with Jurgen Habermas and others in West Germany, Goldmann, Lefebvre, Sartre, Castoriadis, Morin, Bourdieu, etc. in France, and Anglo-American contributions influenced by these. Of particular importance is that these European discussions originated as internal and immanent critiques of classical Marxism confronted with the twin challenge of the crisis of advanced capitalism and empirical social science. Whereas these tendencies have influenced much research in Quebec, they have been largely ignored by the tradition of anglophone political economy, even if there have been a number of interpretive commentaries by other Canadian scholars.

A practical consequence of the approach of Rioux and Crean is that they can operate with an implicit conception of the complementarity of their use of political economy and their own critical sociology.46 For instance, they rely upon the results of political economy for understanding the context of economic and cultural domination which structures the relations between Quebec, anglophone Canada, and the United States. Yet this conception of complementarity is coupled with grave reservations about the capacity of political economic research can it react to this challenge? Other than through vague references to "idealism" or "anarchism", the absence of a well-defined metatheoretical discourse renders Canadian political economy almost helpless to respond to a critical sociology of culture, even where this may be called for. And without the development of such a metatheoretical competence a fruitful and constructive, hence mutually beneficial, dialogue will not be possible.

(2) Forms of Cultural Analysis: Cultural Reproduction or Cultural Anticipation?

With reference to Canadian political economy, it could be argued that there is already a relatively rich tradition of research in the areas of culture, nationalism, and ideology. But this claim can be sustained only by overlooking at least three problematic characteristics of this work: an inordinate emphasis on classical forms of political ideology at the expense of cultural phenomena generally, especially as expressed in everyday life; a lack of theoretical and methodological sophistication in analyzing ideological and cultural phenomena beyond the sheer description of contents or their reduction to economic variables; and a chronic inability to appropriate some of the most innovative and suggestive contributions to cultural analysis within the Canadian tradition, i.e. McLuhan, Frye, and Innis.47 In these circumstances, is Canadian political economy in a strong position to remedy these difficulties by importing some variety of European cultural Marxism to fill the gap without running the risk of a superficial and inadequately mediated application of "metropolitan" Marxism?

This situation suggests a couple of important questions: why this general neglect and impoverishment of cultural studies in the first place, and what is the most appropriate way to overcome this deficiency in the long run? As for the first
point, the most obvious response is to refer to the process of repressing Canadian identity linked to the "Americanization" of the economy, culture, and human sciences. Without denying the strategic significance of these factors, it is also plausible to add that political economy, to the extent that it necessarily privileges an economic interpretation of cultural reality, is inherently limited in its capacity to account for such phenomena. For this reason, of course, the tradition of the critical sociology of culture has relied upon a multiplicity of disciplinary resources: varieties of cultural Marxism, interpretive sociology and cultural history, ethnography, and the methods of the humanities generally. This implies, in relation to the second question, that the weakness of cultural studies in Canada cannot be remedied primarily from within the existing tradition of political economy. Though there are and will continue to be important forms of the political economy of culture and communications which draw more or less directly upon economic concepts, it is also clear that these forms of research can scarcely exhaust the issues of cultural analysis. Most importantly, both the limits and full significance of this research can be realized only within the framework of a more comprehensive cultural theory. Otherwise the political economy of culture risks enclosure within a specific specialist mode of inquiry, i.e. an economic interpretation of cultural reality, which is a necessary, but not sufficient foundation for a sociology of culture, the identification of possible emancipatory practices, and a strategy for encouraging anticipatory cultural movements.48

Rioux and Crean's critical sociology is exemplary of what this might and should entail and reflects a series of specific decisions about the most appropriate strategy for using "cultural Marxism" as a resource for cultural research in Canada. The result is intimately linked to both their metatheoretical point of departure concerning the nature of a critical social science and to Rioux's reflections upon the experience of cultural movements in Quebec. Such considerations have led them away from a concern with static models of cultural production of the type most closely associated with Althusserian Marxism or the formal models of causal determination characteristic of vulgar Marxism or conventional empirical sociology. As a consequence, their approach has many affinities with that of English cultural Marxists such as Raymond Williams and E.P. Thompson. But this should not obscure important differences deriving from a perception of the very different class formations, a context of dependent development, and very different historical traditions.

This is not to say that the development of a critical cultural sociology in Canada has developed beyond an elementary stage, or even that Rioux and Crean have set out a systematic programme for this purpose. What can be argued, however, is that unlike the tradition of Canadian political economy, they have pointed the way to a strategy for appropriating European models consistent with the autonomous Canadian tradition of research. Many specific issues remain open (i.e. how to engage in a critical appropriation of the work of the Birmingham School) and it would require a separate essay to consider the limits and absences characteristic of Rioux's approach to the sociology of culture generally.
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(3) Social Psychological Presuppositions: Mediating Objects or Potential Subjects?

Canadian political economy has not been concerned with social psychological issues at such. Yet it must be asked: what is its underlying conception of the historical subjects, the agents of change? Is this neglect a product of disciplinary specialization or does it reflect the assumption that such matters are essentially secondary, epiphenomenal and thus not a priority of research? In any case, since such issues cannot be completely ignored, political economy has tended to work with a notion of human motivation based on a relatively simple conception of economic interest which is taken to be most naturally expressed in class-based collective action. Converted into a procedure for historical research, however, this assumption has proved fruitful to the extent that it has served to unveil the class bases and dependent context of Canadian development masked by previous generations of historiographers and social scientists. On the other hand, the limitations of such a crude materialist social psychology become immediately apparent in any effort to theoretically conceptualize the range of ways in which people live and act: the origins of dynamics of social movements, various aspects of religious and cultural phenomena, and the prospects for any fundamental transformation of the capitalist mode of production - to name only a few issues. If this is so, how can political economy propose to move from its findings about Canadian economic development to a theory and strategy of change directed toward the future?

The neglect and superficial treatment of social psychological issues closely parallels the problems of cultural analysis within the tradition of political economy generally. Both pertain to the strategic question of the movement between objective structures and the actions of subjects. Though the early Marx provided some brilliant insights into these issues, they came to be methodologically severed from the specialized form of economic analysis which was the concern of his attempt to isolate the laws of motion of an autonomous process of production. The reincorporation of cultural and social psychological questions into a conception of society for which the logic of capital is all-determining, however, necessarily requires a focus on how symbolic and individual realities are functionally adapted to the imperatives of cultural and social reproduction. The more recent move away from a mechanistic, reductionistic account of this process toward a structural model granting a degree of autonomy to superstructural phenomena does not change the essential objectives of such forms of inquiry. And though these types of research have an obvious social scientific legitimacy, it is important to note that the sociological contributions have been much richer, historically and ethnographically differentiated, and methodologically rigorous than those stemming more directly from neo-Marxist models. Yet outside the area of family and feminist research, such social psychological issues have been of peripheral interest to the new Canadian political economy. The reason may be, in part, that the further a form of analysis is from influencing actual processes of change, the less concerned it is with the introduction of the mediating categories useful for, and
demanded by, the subjects transforming their lived experience.

Again, however, the critical sociology of Rioux and Crean provides some important suggestions regarding social psychological questions, though this remains an inadequately developed aspect of their exposition. The central concept here is a conception of alienation and domination against which individual subjects have struggled historically as part of a general process of emancipation. But unlike most neo-Marxists, they refuse to reduce alienation to an economic category and limit social psychological research to problems of structural determination. By viewing alienation in relation to a more general theory of domination, it is possible for a critical sociology to develop a critique of industrial society generally, not exclusively its capitalist forms. And by situating the problematic of social psychology in relation to the development of emancipatory practices, rather than limiting it to explaining the determination of individual behaviour by macro-structures, it seeks to escape the conservative implications of any static model of social reproduction, whether of Althusserian or Parsonian inspiration, which seeks to reduce social psychological inquiry to the perfunctory status of describing the transmission belts from macro- to micro-, from structure to subject. Marx, of course, countered such static implications with a conception of the revolutionary reversal of alienation which abstractly evoked the possibility of transformation through the action of a creative, collective subject. With the decline of the revolutionary mythos in this century, however, Marxian social psychology reverted to a formal determinism and increasingly lost interest in the question of the sources of the cultural innovation which are to bring forth a new world and a new human subject. Not surprisingly, such questions were left primarily to "bourgeois" cultural movements inspired by the aesthetics of surrealism or existentialist philosophy and personalist theology. More recently, similar concerns have been expressed by various countercultural critiques of contemporary social character and efforts to reconceptualize the problem of human needs. Practically, however, the task of conceptualizing the political basis of incremental revolutionary change has fallen to the inheritors of the anarchist and council communist traditions, the theorists of "autogestion."

(4) Strategies of Change: Working-Class Mobilization or "Autogestion" Movements?

Strategies for initiating and guiding change follow directly from social psychological presuppositions, i.e. an understanding of the conditions under which individuals come to form or reform groups to transform the institutional and cultural foundations of their existence. Again, this is not a question which Canadian political economy has addressed directly, though it has been touched upon by some of the writings on social movements. Yet the disturbing question cannot be avoided: is there a danger that an analysis of economic development has been linked with a strategy of radical change without having adequately examined the relationship between the two? May it be that the new political economy has been characterized by a split between theory and practice because
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the questions posed by historical research have only an oblique relation to the range of answers needed to construct a theory of advanced capitalism in Canada and linking it to an emancipatory politics?54

Though Drache has charged that one of the chronic features of the Canadian political economy tradition has been a tendency to make economic interpretation an end in itself, it is evident that more recently this latent positivism and academicism has not been carried over into the public political stance of those associated with this form of research. The new political economy has been generally linked with a leftist politics which ranges from the left-wing of the NDP, the more radical socialist-nationalist stance once associated with the Waffle group within the NDP, to the various radical socialist positions which converge at a certain point with the more or less “revolutionary” sectarian groups. Despite all of these overt political differences, however, the continuity between these approaches is derived from a shared reliance on political economy as a research method and a linked tendency to hypostatize the concepts of “class” and “labour” inherited from historical materialism. This is manifest in the assumption that the most fundamental category of political change is the response of the working-class to its exploitation and an objective deprivation of needs which can only be fulfilled through economic growth and gaining control of the state apparatus as a means of socializing the mode of production. In practice, however, a significant split is evident between the political strategy of those who lean increasingly toward a production-centred model of capital-logic and those who have been concerned with demonstrating the strategic importance of dependency theory.

The most internally consistent position is held by those who have attempted to subordinate dependency theory within the more general framework of the contradictory development of the production process and class conflict on inter-regional and international levels. Though this position can be reconciled with a tactical support for left-nationalist politics, the question of national or regional autonomy is interpreted in essentially instrumental terms. By definition, the logic of capitalism requires that the possibility of fundamental transformation is grounded in the process of working-class mobilization and is thus irreconcilable with the various reformist, populist and popular movements expressing largely middle-class or petit bourgeois forms of dissent. As a consequence, there is a certain formal reconciliation of research and practice because the former is concerned with analyzing the changes in the production process from the point of view of isolating the objective bases of contradiction and the strategic points for initiating support of progressive political activities.

The political strategies linked to forms of dependency theory, on the other hand, are characterized by a number of unresolved internal tensions. This is expressed in the anomaly that the new political economy has been most informative about the political consequences of the contemporary crisis in such deviant areas as urban politics, ecology movements, women’s issues, Quebec and Canadian nationalism—none of which can be adequately treated exclusively within the theoretical framework of class conflict and economic infrastructures.
Paradoxically, there is a large and theoretically unexplained discrepancy between the model of the political economy of change which informs historical research and what are in fact identified in advanced capitalism as the actual sources of innovation and contestation. In much of the Quebec socialist-independentist literature this anomaly is reflected in the curious reference to "les classes ouvrières et populaires" or even "le mouvement ouvrier et populaire." However useful this reconciliation may be for tactical purposes, it is difficult to comprehend the nature of the theory of social class which underlies such an approach. It is difficult to escape the impression that this may involve a form of theoretical wishful-thinking whereby political economy tries to remain open to these new sources of change by grafting them onto the classic model of the "interest" of the working-class. Most of this type of analysis in Quebec represents a rather uncritical effort to transpose a Gramscian conception of counter-hegemonic mobilization to the contemporary Canadian situation. Drache has proposed a similar analysis, but has made no attempt to conceal the fundamental difficulties:

A nationalist struggle implies the need for alliances and such alliances are the essence of any political struggle. It is irresponsible for the Left to cherish the illusion that there is a 'pure' manifestation of class conflict between the workers and the bourgeoisie. No class, it must be remembered, is a monolithic bloc without contradictory and opposing factions. Much more useful is Gramsci's notion of the 'process of popular mobilization' that is 'characterized inevitably by the foundation of "blocs"'. If Gramsci is right, the Left must begin to rethink its traditional ideas about what a working class politics means in the Canadian context. As a beginning it needs to develop a new approach which enables it to analyse nationalist issues in relationship to the specific class interests of both the working class in and outside the NDP and other embattled elements at this time in Canada's history.

Though these suggestions are well taken as guidelines for certain types of empirical research and as a rejoinder to any proletarian puritanism, they still remain rooted in political economic categories and cannot formulate any objective reasons why such a left-nationalist popular coalition could or should develop. Whereas it was plausible for Gramsci to speak of "the working class" as an active, organized agent of change, what does that mean today? The precarious links within organized labour? And if labour itself is not unified, how is it to be linked to non-working class demands? What about all the latent "class" interests which find no active expression at all because the affected individuals have no basis for organizational self-defense? And if the activities of all these groups are
to be reduced to their diverse class interests (presumably excluding those groups which do not seem capable of acting upon them), how are these cleavages within the "working class" to be reconciled with those of "other embattled elements"?

This, apparently, would be one of the important functions of a movement against dependency, but is this possibility really linked to economic conditions directly? The desire for national autonomy, like that for workers' control, cannot be understood as a demand that follows from any materialistic social psychology of interest: those in greatest need tend to be least aware. In other words, such aspirations imply a fundamental cultural transformation, a utopian dimension of group activity, and a process of collective learning whose "necessity" cannot be derived from the facts of economic development. If the evolutionary logic of capitalist development is abandoned — and here neo-Marxist political economy is perfectly consistent—the "revisionist" consequences cannot be halted halfway through the process of rethinking working class politics.

One of the most provocative consequences of Rioux and Crean's "autogestion" strategy is that it breaks decisively with the assumption that the crisis of advanced capitalism can be resolved exclusively within the framework of economic categories. From this perspective, the more fundamental contexts of domination are the forms of culture, production, and consumption generated by enslavement to an industrial process guided by its internal priorities rather than those of the members of society. Accordingly, any socialist strategy grounded in the appeal of simple enrichment is inherently incapable of significant movement toward the transcendence of alienation and inequality, even assuming that it can compete with the productivity of capitalism in the first place. An "autogestion" approach, in contrast, is not in the first instance justified by any claim to greater productive efficiency; instead, it is legitimated as a means for allowing cultures and communities to redefine the priorities of human association in relation to other values than those imposed by the demands of the productive apparatus itself. This implies a recognition of the multiple sources of alienation and domination and consequently a pluralization of the potential forms of collective organization which might become vehicles for emancipatory practices and a basis for the spontaneous articulation of previously repressed human needs and concerns.

There is, of course, an obvious objection to the advocacy of a proliferation of emancipatory demands and projects: how are these to become cumulative, how can they be politically aggregated in a way that guarantees a rational determination of societal priorities, inhibits co-optation and fragmentation, and guides a strategy oriented toward the transformation of the mode of production? The logical persuasiveness of the classic conception of the mission of the counter-hegemonic proletariat and its vanguard leadership was that all of these problems were "objectively" resolved. And the persistence of adherence to this solution, despite a century of well-documented failure, attests to both its intrinsic coherency and the absence of any conceptually tidy alternative, aside from abandoning the project of qualitative transformation altogether. The response of the theory of "autogestion," however, does suggest a new point of departure:
abandonment of the myths of abundance and transparency, a generalization of politics in an experimental society, and a subordination of economic relations to social ones.

(5) Economic Necessity or the "Imaginaire Sociale"?

Finally, it might be asked, what is the vision of cultural transformation which inspires the new Canadian political economy? In moments of romantic anticipation, which aspects of contemporary culture are taken to be expressive of such possibilities? Are its categories inherently linked to the unfolding of the logic of industrialization, or does it contain any conceptual basis for distinguishing between growth and happiness, affluence and the good society? Or are such questions largely irrelevant given the essential realism of political economy which implies that the outcome of history will be a simple product of objective forces, rendering our scribblings null and void?

If it rejects or ignores such questions, political economy is forced to join with some uncomfortable company. From the perspective of liberal pragmatism, for instance, which takes for granted a given form of capitalism as "reality", any effort to defy the reality principles which underlie the immutable logic of rationalization is doomed to Darwinian elimination. More sympathetically, a conservativism such as that of George Grant seeks to preserve cultural differences against the onslaught of technology, but sees no escape from the iron cage of rationalization given the functional imperatives of any movement seeking national autonomy. Finally, from the position of a neo-Marxist conception of social reproduction widely accepted by Canadian political economists, it could be argued that the possibility for any fundamental change must be located in the evolution of the structural conditions of the economy which are, in the last instance, the determinants of possible transformations.

How might Rioux and Crean respond to each of these types of criticism? In order to comprehend the logic underlying their position, it is instructive to try to draw out the form of response which might follow from an understanding of the utopian dimension of their conception of critical sociology. First, their defense against liberal pragmatism would be the most straightforward. From the perspective of a dynamic conception of social reality, the actual can only be comprehend in relation to implicitly possible future conditions of society. On this point they could even cite students of contemporary modal logic who acknowledge that "possible worlds are a hidden and implicit aspect of all model-building and all theorizing. A theory that covers the actual world and only the actual world, is not a theory but a description." This is admitted by macro-sociological theories of development and evolution, but for the most part these remain within the framework of a linear conception of rationalization and progress. As previously suggested, the position of Rioux and Crean is counter-evolutionary in that it argues for the possibility — at this stage of historical development — of smaller nations choosing novel strategies of development.

To the second type of objection, that of Grant's conception of the
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incompatibility of technology and community, Rioux and Crean could reply that the possibility of cultural mutation (especially for a new conception of nature), including the development of a "société autogestionnaire," provides the potential conditions for transcending technological domination. This argument overlaps, of course, with that directed against liberal pragmatism and its similar hypostatization of technological determination.

The response to the third position, that of a neo-Marxist political economy, serves to summarize the previous agenda of questions. By hypostatizing a particular method, political economy runs the risk of a formalistic conception of practice because the identitarian logic underlying its conception of society denies the multidimensional and open-ended structure of social reality. On the one hand, this can even reach back into the realm of the economic, resulting in the conclusion that there is a single model which can adequately encompass the economic process.

On the other hand, and more pertinent to the questions under examination, it cannot adequately pose the problem of the formation of a new form of politics and culture, except by reducing them to the logic of the economic process. In culture this culminates in the temptation to see the system of cultural reproduction as essentially imaginary, precluding engagement with the latent truth contents of bourgeois traditions. In the case of politics it implies the reduction of differences of interest to the domination of capital, thus obfuscating the enduring political dimensions of any possible political order.

With respect to the issue of socialist politics, Rioux and Crean cite Pierre Rosanvallon's charge that Marx was ultimately a continuator of Adam Smith and thus remained a prisoner of liberal ideology and its abstract utopia of transparent, atomized individuals. The result was a confusion of the disappearance of the bourgeois state with that of politics as such, and a failure to grasp the importance of preserving the autonomy of civil society and its political dimensions as opposed to the state. Only by recognizing these dilemmas does "autogestion" become a priority and with it the potential transcendence of the polarization between Marx and Bakunin.

On the other hand, with respect to the cultural question Rioux and Crean are unrepentantly utopian and ally themselves more strongly with the creators than with the analysts of culture: "il faut mieux vivre vos rêves que de rêver votre vie." This follows from the thesis that the potential for qualitative change must be already rooted in existing institutions and culture, rather than something which can be assumed to arise automatically in the course of the "revolution" or be "scientifically" constructed and imposed after the destruction of bourgeois institutions.

Another way to illustrate the implications of this utopian dimension of transition is to cite a similar formulation by Zygmunt Bauman. As he argues, the futile search for an analysis which demonstrates the "necessity" of socialism not only distracts from understanding the nature of change, but expresses and reproduces the very alienation to be overcome by superficially linking happiness, economic gain, and revolt. The rationale for this search to "prove" the
"inevitability" of socialism, hence its latent positivism, stems from the assumption that this is a requirement for motivating participation in the "daring adventure of emancipation":

But can it really? It seems unlikely that the kind of emancipation and freedom the modern socialist thinkers dream of can be won with arms forged in the smith of alienation. It is, on the contrary, the relinquishment of the power internalized urge to employ such arms which is the preliminary and paramount condition for this emancipation. If the advent of socialism involves the creation of a new culture, the cultural image under which the transition takes place is not an irrelevant issue; in fact, it may well be the decisive factor... The proponents of the socialism of 'inevitability' will smile contemptuously at the memory of hopes that 'the strengthening of the state will bring nearer its demise', or that rampant terror will enhance human liberties; but they fail to see the ominous logical affinity between such hopes and their own. The idea that people will free themselves while acting as convinced agents of inevitability can only deepen and reinforce the mental grip of unfreedom... If socialism is to be seen, as it claims, as a further inquiry into yet unexplored regions of human freedom, it can be brought about only in a free and unconstrained dialogue between all the actors of the historical process.66

The Mutual Challenge

In drawing upon the critical sociology of culture sketched in Rioux and Crean's *Deux pays pour vivre* as a resource for challenging aspects of the new Canadian political economy, the objective has not been to distract from its major contributions to Canadian scholarship and its ongoing importance for understanding Canadian society. But this strategy has served to point to increasing signs of the limits of this tradition: its internal divisions, its unarticulated assumptions, and its need for new directions. Undoubtedly, many of the questions posed have slighted existing responses and demanded a clarification of problems which lie, strictly speaking, outside the bounds of political economy as such. To the extent that this has been the case, political economy can only benefit from setting the record straight and establishing more clearly its own relation to other traditions and disciplines. On the other hand, many of the weaknesses, limitations, and ambiguities of critical sociology and critical theory have been glossed over, along with the divergent formulations
within that tradition. Above all, no attempt has been made to consider why such forms of inquiry have largely failed to concern themselves with Canada at all and what their implications for various types of empirical research might be. But again, critical sociology can only gain from further interrogation from within and without. What is regrettable (and symptomatic of the depth of the cultural crisis in Canada) is how seldom the question of the complementarity and tension between these two traditions has been raised; both have been impoverished as a consequence.

Theoretical division, the decline of the university as a source of cultural innovation, and all the other difficulties of constructing an alternative tradition of critical discourse take on a new urgency in a strategic context completely unforeseen by 19th-century revolutionary theorists: the rise of electronically and mass-mediated culture as the primary mode of communication. Writing in the twilight of what was believed to be a revolutionary mass waiting for the spark of mobilization, Walter Benjamin could still express one of the last hopes of the revolutionary tradition: that the electronic media and the mechanical reproduction of culture offered a break-through for agitational propaganda. But as McLuhan has showed us against his intentions, the advent of a wired civilization has largely served to secure the veil of cultural domination even tighter. In attempting to respond to this situation more than three decades ago, Harold Innis and Theodor Adorno ended up as strange bedfellows in invoking, unbeknownst to one another, the priority of preserving the philosophical imagination. For this reason Innis charged that the conservatism of education institutions resides primarily in their tendency to "avoid the major philosophical problems of Western civilization." Moreover, the electronic media, rather than ushering in a new age of public awareness and the popularization of knowledge, have exacerbated the loss of theoretical capacity grounded ultimately in the interaction between oral and written discourse:

The tendency toward conservatism has been accentuated by the mechanization of communication in print, radio, and film. They have tended to emphasize the factual and the concrete. Abstract ideas are less susceptible to treatment by mechanical devices...Large ideas can only be conceived after intensive study over a long period and through the direct and powerful device of the spoken word in small groups.67

Because the traditions of scholarship are also a product of the specific conditions of North American civilization, even radical research has not been exempt from the process of formal rationalization against which it has so valiantly protested.68 However much the cultural industry may engender awareness of unmet needs, desires and aspirations, these cannot be channeled directly into a process of collective transformation by the austere empirical

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findings of an angry economic science or the anachronistic folklore of a revolutionary proletariat. Those who would and could transform the world under the conditions of advanced capitalism come from too many different walks of life, have suffered from too many different forms of domination, and have too great an awareness of the contradictory features of any project of qualitative change to be subsumable within a totalizing movement. Whereas a decade ago it could still be proclaimed that "if you are not part of the solution, you are part of the problem," that has now been implicitly transformed into its opposite: "if you think you are part of the solution, you are probably a part of the problem." If one side of this response is cynicism and retreat, the other is an insatiable hunger for concepts which can articulate the new framework of questions within which talk of solutions might once again seem something more than sectarian chatter. In this context, therefore, nothing could be more radical than to plead for the cultivation of a new form of critical thinking not only as the basis for a new vision of the future, but as a source of resistance to the temptations of power, the rewards of accommodative thinking, and the seductions of repressive de-sublimation. In this long winter of cultural hibernation in Canada and Quebec, hope for survival requires a quiet confidence which can be nurtured only through the passions aroused by abstract ideas, written texts, and the spoken word in small groups. So Rioux and Crean conclude not with "le grand refus" of Marcuse, but with "un grand défi":

Yet this vindication of theoretical imagination should not be taken to imply that political practice and empirical research have simply lagged behind theory, as if they could have kept pace or that theory is somehow better off as a consequence. Such an interpretation would be false not only because it sees political failure as the work of individuals, or glosses over the difficulties of building up an empirical research tradition, or forgets the realities of isolation, fragmentation and dependence in Canadian scholarship; it also ignores the potential of theoretical reflection for irresponsibility and poetic promiscuity, beholden only to a narcissistic conception of wisdom. The divorce and mutual distrust between critical theory and political economy should be taken, therefore, as mirroring the objective breach between theory and practice, hence a sign of domination and a call for mutual learning. Otherwise both run the risk of falling prey to the tyranny of epistemological divide and rule, by allowing talismatic labels of "materialism" and "idealism" to magically name the source of all our conceptual ills and thereby deprive us of the critical imagination required for recovery. To the extent there is hope for theoretical reconciliation or qualitative
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change, "the task is to subsume the descriptive into the critical, making the turn to the concrete the dominant moment of social theory."10

Montréal

Notes


2. Ibid., p. 43.

3. Ibid., p. 45.


5. The concept of "critical theory" is employed as a contrast term to neo-Marxism or Marxist political economy; with respect to substantive issues it will also be used synonymously with the term critical sociology. For a representative example of the contemporary applications of critical theory in this generic sense, cf. Norman Birnbaum, ed. Beyond the Crisis New York: Oxford, 1977. Sometimes the notion of "critical sociology" has been employed rather indiscriminately, blurring the important differences between critical theory and neo-Marxist approaches as, for example, in J.W. Freiburg, ed. Critical Sociology, New York: Irvington, 1979.

6. A largely anecdotal and biographical recounting of Rioux's intellectual development can be found in Jules Duchastel, Marcel Rioux: Entre l'utopie et la raison, Montréal: Nouvelle Optique, 1981. Among Rioux's writings his Essai de sociologie critique, Montréal: Hurtubise HMH, 1978, is most pertinent as a general account of his conception of critical sociology.


8. For a fascinating historical reconstruction of the Canadian version of the late 1960's generation, see Myrna Kostash, Long Way from Home, Toronto: Lorimer, 1980.


10. A general survey of this tradition is given by Denis Moniè in Le Développement des idéologies au Québec, Montréal: Québec/Amérique, 1977; for insightful theoretical discussions focusing specifically on the national question, Nicole Laurin-Frenette's Production de l'état et formes de la nation, Montréal: Nouvelle Optique, 1978, should be consulted along with Robert Vandycke, "La question national: où en est la pensée marxiste?" Recherches sociographiques, vol. 21, no. 1-2, 1980, pp. 97-129.

11. There is not as yet any comparable theoretical treatment of the more recent developments of the national question in Canada, but Clement and Drache provide a helpful listing of pertinent materials in A Practical Guide, pp. 146-52.

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13. Ibid., p. 40.


15. See Rioux, Essai de sociologie critique and Duchastel, Marcel Rioux.


17. Ibid., p. 17.

18. As evidence of this it should be noted that survey analysis has revealed that "Quebecers who support independence are not more bigoted or authoritarian. On the contrary, they tend to be more approving of minority language rights than English Canadians, and they tend to be more libertarian in their attitudes toward civil rights than other Quebecers," Michael D. Ornstein, et al. "Public Opinion and the Canadian Political Crisis," The Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology, vol. 15, no. 2, 1978, p. 203.


20. In this connection Rioux cites approvingly the work of Zygmunt Bauman, Jacques Attali and Marshall Sahlins.

21. For an elaborate defense of the view on the Quebec left which Rioux is opposing here, see Gilles Bourque, L'Etat capitaliste et la question nationale, Montréal: Les Presses de l'Université de Montréal, 1977.

22. Rioux and Crean, p. 58.

23. In the French version the discussion of the political economy of culture and communications is perfunctory and has largely an illustrative function. For more recent detailed discussions of these issues with reference to Canada, see Thomas L. McPhail, Electronic Colonialism, Beverly Hills: Sage, 1981, and Dallas W. Smythe, Dependency Road, Norwood, N.J.: Ablex, 1981. Smythe's study marks a new stage in the development of the political economy of Canadian communications and poses a number of theoretical issues which would require separate treatment to do justice.

24. Rioux and Crean, p. 43.

25. Ibid., p. 67.

26. Ibid., p. 75.

27. For an often penetrating critique of the influence of Althusser on British cultural theory—which does not, however, provide an altogether suitable alternative—see Simon Clarke, et al. One Dimensional Marxism, London: Allison and Busby, 1980.

28. Rioux and Crean, p. 87. For this reason modern countercultural movements are viewed as expressing in part authentic utopian aspirations. This theme is developed in greater detail by a former student and a colleague of Rioux: Diane Moukhtar and Luc Racine, "Nouvelle culture, utopie et non-pourvoir," in N. Assimpoulos, et al. eds. La Transformation du pouvoir au Québec, Montréal: Ed. coopératives Albert Saint-Martin, 1980.
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29. In part this refers to the right of survival of a number of internally colonialized peoples as celebrated, for instance, in Michèle Lalonde and Denis Monière in their recent Cause Commune: manifeste pour une internationale des petites cultures, Montréal: L'Hexagone, 1981. More generally, however, this plea converges with a rich tradition of decentralist social theory long cultivated by people such as George Woodcock, Ivan Illich, Paul Goodman, Murray Bookchin, and Jane Jacobs. In fact, Jacobs has recently provided a sober and independent defense of the Quebec autonomy movement: The Question of Separatism, New York: Vintage, 1981.

30. Though Rioux's use of the concept of "culture populaire" has affinities with the notion of "populism" used in reference to Western agrarian social movements, the two should not be confused. His concept retains reference to the process of marginalization, but generalizes the potential sources. To a great extent he follows Marcuse here.


32. Ibid., p. 63.

33. This research is being conducted under the auspices of the "Institut Québécois de recherche sur la culture" headed by Fernand Dumont. In addition to the various related monograph series, mention should also be made of an associated new journal, Questions de culture (1981-).

34. More recently, Rioux has joined the fray against Trudeau in a satirical political tract titled Pour rendre publiquement congé de quelques salauds, Montréal: l'Hexagone, 1981. The specific political and cultural implications of Rioux's position is evident in his role as one of the founders of the "autogestion"-oriented journal Possibles (1976-).

35. William Appleman Williams, "Radicals and Regionalism," Democracy, vol. 1, no. 4, October 1981, pp. 90-2. Or as Frederic Jameson has recently admitted, following here the example of Tom Nairn on Britain rather than the case closer to home which he has often visited, the nationalist question stands as "Marxism's great historical failure": "it is increasingly clear in today's world (if it had ever been in doubt) that a Left which cannot grasp the immense Utopian appeal of nationalism (any more than it can grasp that of religion or fascism) can scarcely hope to 'reappropriate' such collective energies and must effectively doom itself to political impotence." The Political Unconscious, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981, p. 298.


37. Representatives of critical theory and sociology have been discussed in Canadian journals, most notably in the Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory, and to a lesser extent in Philosophy of the Social Sciences. The overall isolation of Canadian critical sociology is one of the reasons why Rioux and Crean's book deserves particular attention. The consequence of this situation has become especially evident in the textbook literature oriented toward "Marxist" approaches and "political economy." Such terms are used indiscriminately and little effort is made to introduce the important differentiations necessary for a selective and critical introduction. This problem relates, of course, to the difficulties in the technical literature. Symptomatically, none of these texts draw upon critical theory and sociology, a fact which points to the remarkable isolation of Canadian neo-Marxist sociology in particular. The only exception is directed by necessity to the American marker: Ben Agger, Western Marxism, Santa Monica, Ca.: Goodyear,
The theme of the relationship between political economy and critical theory has been articulated most explicitly within the Frankfurt School tradition. For a detailed account of the emergence of this problem in the early Frankfurt School, see Giocomo Marramao, "Political Economy and Critical Theory," 

The principle underlying all the models of new-Marxist political economy is to explain the continuing failure of revolutionary transformation. Different regulative concepts are taken to be decisive. As Stanley Aronowitz has suggested, three basic theories have been used to account for the apparent failure of capitalism to collapse: the realization crisis emphasized in Lenin's theory of imperialism, dependency theory which explains the integration of the Third World into the world capitalist system, and the model of capital-logic:

The third position, capital-logic, tries to overcome the apparent failure of the third world revolution in a different way. A theory of late capitalism as a specific historical stage, it incorporates the theory of imperialism into an entirely new paradigm: it is the logic of accumulation itself, literally at its origins in the labor process, that the whole development of capitalism, including the problem of the proletariat as historical agency or subject, may be understood. Unlike Lenin and dependency theory, which subsume the labor process into the process of circulation of capital, capital-logic remains oriented to production relations, both with respect to its value from and its technical character. "The End of Political Economy," Social Text, no. 2, Summer, 1979, p. 8.

The central issue in the more recent Canadian discussions has been how to combine the indigenous version of dependency theory with variants of the production-centred capital-logic approach which goes far beyond cruder notions of class conflict. For one of the few occasions where this debate has become more explicit, see Ray Schmidt, "Canadian Political Economy: A Critique," Studies in Political Economy, no. 6, Autumn 1981, pp. 65-92.


Ibid.

Among the important contributors to the debate on the foundations of the human sciences one would have to include Jürgen Habermas, Gerard Radnitzky, Richard Bernstein, Anthony Giddens, Roy Bhaskar, Joachim Israel, Jon Elster, and Johann Galtung, to name only a few. See also the magistral survey by Paul Ricoeur, Main Trends in Philosophy, New York and London: Holmes & Meier, 1979.

A potential exception here is the question of the relationship between the theorizing of Innis and Marx. Ian Parker's efforts at reconciliation have been heatedly attacked by David McNally in "Staple Theory as Commodity Fetishism: Marx, Innis and Canadian Political Economy," Studies
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In Political Economy, no. 6, Autumn 1981, pp. 35-63. It is clear this debate should be continued as it goes to the heart of the relationship between staples theory and other forms of analysis, especially neo-Marxist capital-logic. At this point the staples version of dependency theory is on the defensive and highly vulnerable because it has not elaborated its metatheoretical assumptions and has failed to develop a comprehensive critique of neo-Marxist theory. Also, important issues of political strategy are at stake here.

45. Some of these themes have been touched upon in Robin Neill, *A New Theory of Value: The Canadian Economics of H.A. Innis*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972. Those who have begun to pose such questions are largely outside of or on the margins of political economy as is evident in a recent Innis symposium: William H. Melody, *et al.*, eds. *Culture, Communication and Dependency*, Norwood, N.J.: Ablex, 1981.

46. As Rioux has described this relationship:

Les divergences entre les marxistes économistes et les marxistes culturels—pour employer une expression commode—semblent à la fois moindres, à certains égards, et plus graves à d'autres points de vue...c'est au sujet du passage d'un type de société à l'autre que les deux groupes peuvent s'opposer mais il semble que leurs points de vue et leurs démarches peuvent être complémentaires et devraient l'être. *Essai de sociologie critique*, p. 164.

Aronowitz expresses this in a somewhat less conciliatory manner:

...the counter-logic of the erotic, play, and the constituting subject may not be reduced either to the mode of production of material life or the mode of social reproduction (family, school, or religion in their capacity as ideological apparatuses of the state). Political economy ends when theory seeks to specify the conditions of transcendence. Marxism as critique consists in showing the *science* of political economy is descriptive of the commodity fetish. The apogee of critical science resides in specifying the non-subsumable. "The End of Political Economy," p. 51.

47. The limitations of the existing tradition of cultural analysis are evident in the items cited by Clement and Drache (pp. 146-52) on culture and nationalism. There is no sign of the range of theoretical issues of the type surveyed, for example, by Jorge Larrain, *The Concept of Ideology*, London: Hutchinson, 1979. An important exception here is John Fekete's *The Critical Twilight: Explorations in the Ideology of Anglo-American Literary Theory from Eliot to McLuhan*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977. That such a transformation is underway, however, is evident in recent work on the history of working class culture, the Concordia radio drama project, and some research underway at Trent University, the communications departments at Simon Fraser and McGill, and the sociology and social and political thought programmes at York. See also, Liora Salter, ed. *Communication Studies in Canada/Études Canadiennes en Communication*, Toronto: Butterworths, 1981.

48. Aronowitz expresses this crucial point as follows:

Even if capital-logic is an adequate explanation of the *origin* of the ubiquity of cultural domination in general and mass culture in particular, it cannot account for their autonomy. For having been produced as the aspect of capital's new conditions of reproduction, mass culture reproduces itself on the basis of its own logic, whose economic dimension, while not insignificant, cannot encapsulate its influence, which exceeds its intended
function. Mass culture, as the penultimate substitute for community, conceals that fundamental social impulse, but its spurious gratifications reveal it as well... If the counter-logic is not theorized as utopia, the proletarian public sphere, popular culture that is rooted in everyday resistance, and the possibilities for transcending capital itself are theoretically foreclosed. "End of Political Economy," p. 50

49. A social psychologist, Peter Archibald, in Social Psychology as Political Economy, Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1978, has made a useful contribution to drawing out this dimension of political economy. His account suffers, however, from a superficial rejection of the possibilities of social phenomenology and symbolic interactionism to contribute to these matters. The most serious consequence of this social psychological blind spot is in the area of the theory of social movements. Though the re-introduction of class analysis has corrected important deficiencies of much conventional historical research, it has not led to any serious reconsideration of the deficiencies of classic Marxist analysis and culminates in the most superficial of generalities as, for example, in Gary B. Rush, "Political Economy and Social Movements: Notes Towards Theory and Analysis," in John Allan Fry, ed. Economy, Class and Social Reality, Scarborough: Butterworth, 1979, pp. 435-59. This is also evident in R. J. Brym and R. J. Sacouman, eds. Underdevelopment and Social Movements in Atlantic Canada, Toronto: Hogtown Press, 1979, though the historical richness of the materials compensates in part. The tendency for many political economists to simply denounce populist and nationalistic movements as petit bourgeois and reformist betrays a dogmatic tendency which blinds analysis to the dynamic elements of contemporary politics. For a characteristic example of this kind of reductionism, see James Overton, "Towards a Critical Analysis of Neo-Nationalism in Newfoundland," in Brym and Sacouman, pp. 219-49. And no one on the left in Canada or elsewhere has dared to provide an adequate rejoinder to Mancur Olson Jr. in his Logic of Collective Action, New York: Schocken, 1965. His analysis of the discrepancy between the individual and collective rationality and how it undermines the utopian thrust of social movements remains an indispensable point of departure for any strategy of radical change. The theory of "autogestion" seems to provide an implicit response derived from the failure of traditional forms of party organization and mobilization.


51. For a valuable complementary study which draws upon Gregory Bateson's communication theory for a social psychology of domination and dependency, see Tony Wilden, The Imaginary Canadian, Vancouver: Pulp Press, 1980. Though the militancy of his use of the language of colonialism may make many readers wince, Wilden's often startling revelations about Canadian identity and history point to a form of cultural suppression of possibilities which is difficult to deny. A more nuanced vocabulary for expressing this form of "advanced" cultural domination remains to be elaborated.

52. It is not possible here to consider in more detail Rioux's use of the concept of alienation, but see his Essai de sociologie critique, pp. 85-95. What is called for, of course, is a broader critical social psychology whose outlines are now emerging. For earlier analyses of the crisis of academic social
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54. A good example of this, because theoretically well-informed, is James Sacouman's assumption that a Maritimes-rooted political economy has a greater chance of developing an effective political strategy because of the previous weakness of "third road" populist and social democratic efforts. What is hard to follow is why a region previously resistant to protest should as a consequence be ripe for working-class mobilization in response to "concrete, theoretically informed research that is effectively communicated and organized," "The 'Peripheral' Maritimes and Canada-Wide Marxist Political Economy," Studies in Political Economy, no. 6, Autumn 1981, p. 146. Signs of historical working-class resistance and state coercion should not be mistaken for an emergent counter-hegemonic movement; nor is it clear why the pattern will not follow the populist and social democratic path found elsewhere in Canada. This is not meant to discourage such political economic research, but to sober its political "pretentions" and call for other forms of inquiry as well.

55. This type of "wishy-washy" class analysis is characteristic of both the "Comité des Cent" and the "Regroupement pour le socialisme" as defined by Marc Ferland and Yves Vaillancourt, Socialisme et indépendance au Québec: pistes sur le mouvement ouvrier et populaire, Montréal: Ed. Socialisme et Indépendance/Ed. coopérative Albert St-Martin, 1981. Such "class analysis" is then coupled with an astounding naiveté (if not deceit) about the elementary constraints of economic scarcity and the existing system of power and production. In the name of such "un vaste mouvement populaire pluri-classiste" all of the public and para-public unions are told by their "maître penseurs" that they have an obligation to maintain their already excessive wage gains (relative to the private sector), even if it (as seems possible) bankrupts the province, worsens the situation for the impotent groups, makes the envisioned coalition impossible, destroys the PQ, and restores with even greater power the rule of the Quebec Liberal Party. See, for example, the reasoning of Jean-Marc Piotte and Thierry Hentsch, "Le malaise du syndicalisme québécoise," Le Devoir, 18 janvier 1982, p. 11. Where criticism of the PQ is most just, however, is in pointing out that it has attempted to adjust to the fiscal crisis by following the lines of least resistance (budget cuts in the areas where there is the least capacity for a defensive response), rather than spreading the burden equitably throughout society. Remarkably, the PQ's leftist critics seem unable to grasp that a new strategy of industrial development requires capital which must come either from internal savings and investment or more borrowing. Given the fiscal crisis, therefore, the PQ is powerless to carry out its programme and part of the socialist left has tried to make the absurd claim that it has an alternative other than a "Cuban-style" revolution that would last about as long as it takes to shut off an oil line. For a sober assessment of the crisis of public finances and a call for a freeze on public sector wages, see Pierre Fortin, "Les finances publiques: un coup de barre radical s'impose," Le Devoir, 14 janvier 1982, p. 19.

Grant's formulation bears repeating:

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58. This is one of the most fundamental contradictions of the recent Manifesto of the "Comité des Cent" in Quebec. Though its call for de-centralization, worker's participation, and a fully democratic form of party organization echoes the influence of "autogestion" discussions in the francophone milieu, it is coupled with a classic appeal based on the supposed economic benefits of independence and socialism. By not fully acknowledging the tensions between industrialization and alternative forms of work organization, this document promises too much and provides no guidelines for resolving the dilemma. Moreover, its call for opting out of the North American economy betrays the complete poverty of its conception of transition. Great silence surrounds the question of where the capital for development is to come from and how to persuade the 'working and popular classes' to accept an interim decline in their standard of living through voluntary savings.

59. Such questions have not, for the most part, been posed by the new political economy, even if there are expressions on the periphery, as in Abraham Rotstein, ed. *Beyond Industrial Growth*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1976. In lamenting the consequences of a staples economy, dependency theorists have tended to fall back on a celebration of industrialization without adequately posing the question of alternative forms of economic development. Neo-Marxist capital-logic approaches propose an alternative form of industrialization, but do not really examine its fundamental assumptions which are, to be sure, still rooted in the logic of a growth-oriented society. There is, however, a more sociologically-oriented form of political economy which can be reconciled with a critique industrialization as, for example, in Patricia Marchak, *In Whose Interests*, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1979.

60. Grant's formulation bears repeating:

...indigenous cultures are dying everywhere in the modern world. French-Canadian nationalism is a last-ditch stand. The French on this continent will at least disappear from history with more than the smiles and whimpers of their English-speaking compatriots—with their flags flying and, indeed, with some of their guns blazing. The reality of their cultures, and their desire not to be swamped, cannot save them from the inexorable facts in the continental case. Solutions vary to the problem of how an autonomous culture can be maintained in Quebec. But all the answers face the same dilemma: Those who want to maintain separateness also want the advantages of the age of progress. These two ends are not compatible, for the pursuit of one negates the pursuit of the other. Nationalism can only be asserted successfully by an identification with technological advance; but technological advance entails the disappearance of those indigenous differences that give substance to nationalism. *Lament for a Nation*, p. 76.


62. Such a view of change challenges both certain tendencies toward an unfolding, linear model of development in Marx and the even more evolutionistic conceptions characteristic of most sociological theories. As Anthony Giddens has recently argued, here supplementing Rioux and Crean's general position, a more adequate approach to contemporary social change would have to give more prominence to:

(1) Relations of autonomy and dependence among societies or regions of
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social systems...(2) The uneven development of different sectors or regions of social systems...(3) Critical phases of radical social change, in which the existing alignment of major institutions in a society becomes transformed, whether or not this involves processes of political revolution...and (4) A 'leapfrog' idea of change, according to which the 'advanced' in one set of circumstances may inhibit further change at a later date; while on the other hand that which is 'retarded' at one point in time may later become a propitious basis for rapid advancement. Central Problems in Social Theory Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1979, pp. 225-9.

Canada and Quebec provide interesting illustrations of each of these processes and Rioux and Crean's plea falls directly within the purview of the final point: "For leapfrog processes of change involve the awareness that some events in the past need not be repeated in the future; that avoidable possible worlds are the other face of future states of society to be striven for." Ibid., p. 230.

63. This holds primarily for neo-Marxist, especially Althusserian, versions of political economy. Non-structuralist versions tend toward a more Gramscian conception without, however, the autonomous, counterhegemonic proletarian culture which he could take for granted. Staples and dependency theory has not really worked out a coherent alternative aside from a pragmatic recognition of the need to rehabilitate nationalism as a mobilizing force in a dependent economy.


65. Ibid., p. 108.


68. In this respect the situation in Europe is only moderately better. As Habermas has noted in an interview, he considers himself as one of the "last of the Mohicans" in having had the opportunity to combine philosophy and social science. Symbolically enough, the chair in philosophy and sociology created for Horkheimer was abolished in 1971 with Habermas' departure from Frankfurt. When pressed to cite a concrete example of philosophers still able to combine social scientific standards and a "public, politically effective," role, he names Charles Taylor as a type found even in the Anglo-Saxon domain, "even Oxford." What Habermas fails to mention, however, is that Taylor is in intellectual and political exile, having failed to gain significant appreciation or influence at home in Canada. See Jürgen Habermas, Kleine Politische Schriften (I-IV), Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1981, p. 487.


70. Aronowitz, p. 52.
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As a form of political and cultural expression, the manifesto has long been supplanted by the memos, reports, working papers, application forms, and news releases of administered politics. But the intersection of political crisis and a tradition within which artists and intellectuals continue to aspire to be more than functionaries or marketing experts may now and again call back this archaic, early democratic genre of communication. The manifesto thus becomes once again an expressive, emotive vehicle of mobilization and resistance which seeks to articulate the desperations and hopes of a group, a movement in the process of gestation. Here we see the constitution of subjectivity in process, mocking with rage the objective constraints of existing structures, anticipating possibilities while denouncing that which is. Here we see the primordial force of ideology critique and utopian restoration congealed in a particular place and time, a handful of individuals speaking for those who would otherwise not speak or be heard.

The documents at hand manifest two very different moods, two contrasting modes of expression. In the one, the Black Rock Manifesto, art speaks over politics, but speaks for life through politics. It evokes the forgotten ghettos of anglophone and allophone poverty and cultural degradation as a world more real and more human than the wealth and cultural pretensions of Westmount; it speaks for those who would stay in Québec, accepting the responsibility and the challenge of creating and transforming their world, rather than succumb to the temptation to flee westward or retreat inwardly to the south; it voices the creative potential and frustrations of non-francophones whose needs and aspirations have been suppressed by isolation on the cultural islands of Montreal, subdued within francophone and American hegemony and clinging desperately to the shreds of a political claim to be Canadian.

In the second document, we see a political manifesto in the classic mould. The work of a committee, it lacks the stylistic verve and steady dramatic rhythms of the masterpieces of the genre. Content dominates over rhetoric and form in an attempt to hammer out a consensual basis around which to organize a new movement for socialism and independence for all Quebecers. The primary political significance of this document is that it seeks to gather together a movement from two directions, filling an emerging gap on the left. On its left, it signifies an appeal to those who have been previously drawn to sectarian groupuscules, to those who remained suspicious of independence and a national project, those who remained ambivalent about "popular" movements as opposed to working-class organizations. On its right, the timing of its publication is linked to the long-anticipated split between the socialist left and the troubled
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social democracy of the Parti Québécois. So the primary thrust of the manifesto is to lure away those disillusioned with the "étapisme" of sovereignty-association and the seeming abandonment of the social project with budget cuts, efforts to prop up the indigenous bourgeoisie, and circumspection toward Canadian and international capital. This appeal is reflected above all in the reiteration of the promise of true independence, democratic forms of organization built from the base upwards, non-bureaucratic forms of planning, independence from unions, new forms of work organization, and a multi-class front which respects civil rights, minorities, native Indians, and women.

As a somber reminder of the underbody of economic woe carried by the large minority which bears the brunt of economic adjustments in advanced capitalism, and as a formal declaration of a series of values to be privileged and goals to be realized, this document deserves respect and attention. It gives testimony to an important maturation of certain types of radical socialist thinking, a conscientious response to some painfully learned lessons, and an honest commitment to the formation of a movement which seeks to break the deadlock within which a form of nationalist social democracy is being crushed between the imperatives of accumulation and legitimation.

But the silences remain disturbing. As a document of compromise, reconciling those in flight from the disappointments of social democracy and the tyranny of authoritarian militancy, it suppresses its internal contradictions. Its lamentation of poverty and injustice forgets that the majority of the population, despite increasing securities and anxieties, lives more than adequately and is more concerned about protecting those gains than radical change. Moreover, its productivist vision of progress would have us believe that economic growth, abolition of the capitalist mode of production, and independence would cure all the evils of politics, work, and life. There is more than a hint here of a rhetorical something for everyone, a latter-day call for "land, peace and bread."

Even more important, its conception of transition remains ambiguous. Though there are echoes of Mitterand-style socialism, there is no direct acknowledgment of the very different situation in France where the state effectively controls an economy dominated by indigenous entrepreneurs and financial markets, and the planning apparatus is already one of the most developed in the capitalist world. This difference is implicit, however, in the call for economic autarky, withdrawal from the North American economy, come what may. But how is this credible? How can this strategy be reconciled with all the other demands and promises of the manifesto: respect for democracy, minorities, civil rights, and most decisively, making good the economic promises on which everything else depends?

These silences also suggest why the Parti Québécois has been the most threatening force in contemporary Canadian politics: it became a credible alternative. Despite its compromises and gradualist strategy, the PQ developed a programme which could realistically propose a re-organization of the federal system, a redirection of economic development, a preservation of a cultural heritage, and an encouragement of parallel movements more radical than itself.
in preparation for longer term initiatives. To break the federal monopoly of innovation could have turned the tide of modern Canadian politics, not only because of Quebec autonomy but as a consequence of breaking the hold of the Liberal Party and providing an inspirational model for the rest of Canada.

The hidden agenda of this manifesto is that it fails to acknowledge the fragility of its point of departure: the assumption that the failure of the PQ would eventually rebound to create a quasi-revolutionary crisis by unveiling the flaws of gradualism and pushing the working and popular classes toward a truly socialist independence movement. But is this plausible? No, the lessons of the past are clear: the result would be the fragmentation of interest groups, the disintegration of the national movement, and a surge for the return of economic stability and security with the division of spoils even more than before a function of the respective power of the groups in conflict.

As for the rest of Canada, such a scenario would be greeted with a sigh of relief. The failure of the PQ could be celebrated as a sign of the victory of federalism and the restoration of Canadian unity. The residues of militancy, confrontations, strikes, agitation, and individual acts of degradation, violence and terrorism associated with the rump of a socialist-independentist left could be taken as final proof that Trudeau was right after all, and that behind the veneer of the PQ was the FLQ lurking, waiting for its day of reckoning. And if all this were to come to pass, it would prove that a man had single-handedly, along with the help of a few francophone allies changed the direction of Canadian federalism and Canadian history. This defeat of the PQ would be comparable to "la Conquête" relived, non-violently, in slow-motion, on T.V. To be sure, the French fact would remain and literary culture flourish, but the resulting anger, bitterness, cynicism and loss of self-respect would make a joke of Canadian unity and check new possibilities in midstream. It would, in short, preserve that two-century long compact between the anglophone and francophone elites which first stabilized Canada in the interest of the Commonwealth Empire and now does so for the American.

Ray Morrow
Montréal
pour un
QUÉBEC
SOCIALISTE

Manifeste du Mouvement
pour un Québec socialiste,
indépendant, démocratique
et pour l'égalité entre
les hommes et les femmes.

LE COMITÉ DES CENT

QUÉBEC TODAY

In this beginning of the 1980's, the great majority of the men and women who live and work in Québec cannot help but ask themselves about their conditions of existence, and those of other peoples, in a world in crisis where everything seems to be going awry.

Anxiety increases everywhere. The arms race menaces more than ever our collective survival. Harshly exploited for centuries, a growing number of Third World peoples are reduced to misery and angrily watch their children die of hunger by the millions. The right of peoples to control their own fate, their natural resources, and their economic and political development is denied. Human rights lose ground before the rise of dictatorships most everywhere in
the world. Waste and the deterioration of the environment grow. The inequalities between peoples and between classes expand. The future appears bleak.

Yet hope persists. Enslaved by capitalism, millions of men and women resist, gather together, mobilize, awaken popular consciousness, combat privilege and struggle for peace, justice, equality and solidarity. Millions of men and women are also working for a true socialist democracy in societies of the Soviet-type. African peoples continue liberation struggles against racism, colonialism and imperialism. The native peoples of North America demand their rights. The peoples of Central and Latin America shake the yoke of the multinationals and the oligarchies. In France the struggle for socialism assumes new dimensions. Great transformations are underway: Nicaragua, Salvador, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Poland...

In this tormented world, what is happening to Québec? In this troubled epoch, where are the Québec people going?

The immense hopes raised by the “Quiet Revolution”, by the modernization of our society and its opening up to the world, have been silenced, abandoned and betrayed by the movements and parties that pretended to embody them. Nothing has been resolved. Our survival as a people continues to be in danger. We have achieved neither equality nor independence. We are not masters of our own household. On the contrary, our economic, political and cultural dependence is being perpetuated. Social inequalities not only remain, but consolidate themselves. Exploiters proliferate. Profiters increase their profits. The conditions of existence of the population deteriorate. To the extent that the just society has fallen into oblivion, favorable attitudes toward workers erode... How could it have been otherwise? Have not these parties and movements always refused to call into question the true causes of the dependence, exploitation and domination to which we are subjected? When all is said and done, have they not served the interests of the minority rather than those of the majority? Today as before the Québec people finds itself disillusioned.

Nevertheless a collective awareness of the necessity of a radical change (rupture) and of the urgency of a new political path is in the process of emerging within the working and popular classes of Québec.

The men and women who work in the exploitation of resources, in the mines, forests, agriculture, fisheries, construction, manufacturing industries, transport, commerce, finance, research, cultural affairs, communications, medical and social services, education and all other services; all these men and women deprived of all collective control over their working and their living environments, reduced by the system to unemployment, social welfare, or retirement full of insecurity, all these, allied to housewives, small independent producers, male and female
Students, together form the social basis for a new political force to be constructed for the profound transformation of Québécois society.

It is to these men and women of the working and popular classes of Québec that this manifesto addresses itself. For it is with these men and women that lies all hope. No will to act, no real change can come from anywhere else.

Living in Québec Today

We live in an industrialized country that is potentially very rich. Astride the mouth of one of the principal maritime communication systems in the world, pivot between the continents of North America and Europe, Québec benefits from an interesting geographical position.

With its fertile agricultural lands, immense forests, a sub-soil abounding in asbestos, iron, zinc, titanium, copper and all sorts of minerals, its rivers dispensing hydro-electric energy, Québec possesses considerable natural resources.

With its communication networks, its industries, its institutions and its service infrastructures built by men and women workers, Québec possesses undeniable material resources.

Still more important, the dynamism and creativity of its people could allow it true development.

And yet...

In this land, said to be rich and free, in this society purportedly modern and just, the working and popular classes that make up the great majority of the population live daily in concrete conditions of domination, exploitation, and oppression.

Men and women workers bear the toll of rising unemployment and no job security. Factory shut-downs, lay-offs, and job cut-backs in the public service multiply. 300,000 people are unemployed. 9% of the working population in Montréal, Québec, and Sherbrooke! 12% on the North Shore and in Saguenay-Lac-St-Jean! 13% in the Outaouais! 14% in Abitibi-Témiscamingue! More than 16% in the Lower St. Lawrence and the Gaspé!

Jobs are not only harder to find, but work is more and more precarious: Occasional work, part-time work, free-lance work, work on call, work at home, work that places men and women workers at the mercy of their bosses. In 1981, 50% of the jobs created in Québec are part-time!
POUR UN QUÉBEC SOCIALISTE

Less interesting and lower-income jobs for francophones, immigrants or native peoples; while anglophones, representing 14% of the population occupy 31% of administrative positions and scarcely 10% of jobs in production!

Jobs that are more and more controlled and supervised. One foreman for three or four employees in many enterprises and services, uniforms and ID cards are obligatory, control systems are an integral part of the machinery! Even in the medical services there are arbitrary productivity norms!

Jobs that endanger our health and our life. Nearly 300,000 work accidents a year! Every year one out of three workers in the forestry and metal-products manufacturing sectors! In 1977, one death and 40 cases of permanent disability out of 1,000 workers in the mining sector!

Working conditions that do not improve except at the price of lengthy and difficult strikes. Salaries that for a long time now can no longer keep up with the dizzying rise in the cost of living. Non-stop work, evening work, night work. Breaks that are too short, vacations that are inadequate. Work areas that are cramped, noisy machinery, cold, over-heated, dangerous products, depletion and premature aging...

Unskilled jobs increasingly fragmented, dehumanising and monotonous. An automatization of production is taking place on our backs. A division between the conception and execution of work condemns us to boredom. Not only do our bosses tell us what to do but how to do it, in the minutest details!

This constant deterioration in working conditions spills over in a global manner onto the quality of life in general, in such a way that the vast majority of Québécois waste their lives in order to make a living.

These are the conditions that are given to men and women workers in Québec today.

In this land that is, so they tell us, privileged, in this society purportedly better than all others, the women, the children, the young and the old people of the working and popular classes confront conditions of existence that are often painful, at times degrading, always difficult.

Women...in their daily lives, victims of the sexual division of labor, of sexism, of sexual harassment, dominated by a medical apparatus that tends to dispossess them of their bodies, deprived of their right to freely-chosen maternity, confined to traditional roles of wife and mother, assuming daily and without pay the education of children, familial tasks, housework, all of which lead them too often into theanguishing paths of solitude and dependence. Of the 135,000 Québec women living alone with their children, two-thirds dwell in poverty. More and
more women enter the job market only to find themselves faced with discrimination and job-ghettos, confronted by inequalities in access to work, in working conditions, in salaries. 66% of women's work is in offices, in commerce and in services! Secretaries, waitresses, sales-women, hostesses, nurses, teachers, garment workers. The average income of women on the job market is equivalent to 58% of the average income for men!

And it is expected that they be silent?

Children... victims of housing conditions, of health, nutrition, environment, education so unequal that 50 times more whooping-cough, three times more pneumonia and tonsilitis, seven times more ear infections are found in popular neighbourhoods than in privileged neighbourhoods! The infant mortality rate in east Montréal is three times higher than in the west end. Children are deprived of daycare... barely a few thousand openings are available when the demand is 10 times greater; centres badly equipped, begrudgingly subsidized, strangled by exorbitant rents. Our children are too numerous in discovering life through the eyes of Goldorak, too numerous in discovering the world in schools often organized like prisons!

And it is expected that they be happy?

Youth... entangled at a very young age in a selective school system in which inequality of opportunity is still loaded against francophones, the poor regions, the working and popular classes: making up the majority of elementary school students, the children of these classes comprise only one third of the manpower at the university level. Furthermore, a great number of them end up in the vocational sector, the first step towards a labour market and the unemployment that strikes the young before all other social categories! Faced with an illusory possibility of access to higher positions and incomes through the barely open doors of the universities and the certitude of becoming a cog in industry through the predetermined path of vocational training courses, how many of the young "choose" to drop out of school in order too often to loose themselves in delinquency? There are, for instance, almost 5,000 minors, young men and women prostituting themselves in Montréal! Competition, individualism, submission is what they are taught. To make as much money as possible and accumulate material possessions, these are the goals that are offered them! Every man for himself is the proposition held up to them!

And they are not supposed to be disillusioned?

The aged... excluded from work and so condemned to poverty and solitude, impoverished, rejected from social life, deprived of the services and care that is their due from a society to which they have devoted a lifetime's work. Of the 500,000 senior citizens of Québec, 63% live below the poverty line! In Montréal,
where three-fifths of Québec's aged are to be found, 25% live in neglected housing or in cramped rooms often without stoves, fridges, baths, private toilets, hot water or telephones!

And these are supposed to be "the golden years"?

In this land that is said to be open to the world, in this society that is ostensibly welcoming and tolerant, are not handicapped people the victims of enormous discrimination in work, in transportation, in social life?

Male and female immigrants... are they not confined to employment ghettos (textiles and garments, hotels and restaurants, home maintenance, domestic work, work at home) where working conditions are particularly bad and where the right to free unionization is either denied or made impossible? Are they not confronted with linguistic problems, discrimination and increasing racism, and the ignorance of their social rights, governed by laws and rulings like the Federal Immigration Law C-24 that limits the exercise of their democratic rights? Are these men and women workers not faced with living and working conditions that are increasingly precarious?

Native peoples... have they not been decimated in the reserves? Have not their rights to an immense territory been extinguished? Must they not put up with an education that does not respect their values and needs, discrimination in employment, an unemployment rate that is four times higher than ours, an average income that is 20% lower, an infant mortality rate that is 2½ times higher, dependence on social welfare that affects over half their population? And what is to be said about their housing conditions? Barely one-third of their homes are equipped with running water, inside toilets and bathtubs! Almost 20% still do not have electricity!

Just because our children are not dying of hunger, and we are not the victims of terrifying droughts, catastrophic floods, disastrous earthquakes, must we close our eyes and not see the deterioration in housing and environmental conditions, the decrease of services especially in medical and social services, the decay of urban life, the growth of insecurity, the increase in indebtedness, the impoverishment of cultural life that result in an actual decline in the quality of life for a growing part of the working and popular classes?

Just because we enjoy a relative, but real, prosperity if compared to the dramatic conditions of existence of Third World peoples, must we close our ears and not hear the rumbling of poverty that is establishing itself in our society? Over 300,000 people are "officially" unemployed, 500,000 others subjected to the social welfare regime! In all, one million poor people in Québec, out of which 600,000 can barely satisfy their basic needs!
The heart of exploitation in capitalism is found in the private appropriation of the value created by work. It is in this appropriation that capital grounds its domination. Through the grands bourgeois that own and control the means of production and exchange, the administrators and executives of the industrial and financial monopolies, the high officialdom of the State, the capitalist system determines the conditions of existence of the working and popular classes.

Our society is dominated by these few thousand individuals, millionaires or billionaires, Québécois, Canadian, American or other, anglophone or francophone, the Rockefellers, the Bronfmans, the Desmarais. Business being business, they do not always see eye-to-eye, and sometimes endeavour to snatch from one another control over an enterprise or lay hands on a market, but at the slightest threat to their interests and common privileges, they swiftly reunite in ties that are multiple and solid.

Issuing for the most part from a limited number of great families, educated at the same private schools, members of the same select clubs that admit only their allies in their company, these lawyers, judges, top civil servants and politicians share the same contempt of the needs of the people, a common thirst for power, and they are all important cogs of capitalist accumulation. They most loudly proclaim their faith in private property, free enterprise, and the virtues of competition, but all the while, they never cease to seek to stifle their smaller competitors, to consolidate their monopolies and fix market prices. They demand that men and women workers respect the laws under all circumstances but never hesitate themselves to transgress, distort and flout the laws.

Administrators of the banks and of financial institutions, they control the money, credit, interest rates, using the savings and riches of the community in order to increase centralization and the accumulation of capital.

Big stock-holders and directors of multinationals, they hold in their hands the lives and destinies of entire populations. They provoke crises in the supply of energy or raw materials from which they obviously derive great benefits. They speculate on the exchange rate of monies and the values of stocks. They put themselves above nations and laws. Within the framework of the international division of labour they transfer capital and businesses at the expense of the evolution of salaries, the costs of energy and raw materials, and the social and political situation...

Owners and managers of companies regrouped in multiple associations, chambers of commerce, industrial and other types of councils, they never cease to intervene to impose their point of view on society as a whole. They own the largest part of the information media, and of the means of production and diffusion of culture. Through advertising, companies encourage over-consumption and waste, individualism and consumerism. They are principally responsible for the
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pollution of the air and waters and for the depletion of the earth and resources. Through the mechanism of the State, they maintain an organization of manpower, work, health, education, culture and knowledge, subjected to the imperatives of production. Capitalism provokes and sustains division at the very heart of the working and popular classes, alternately playing one group against another: workers against the unemployed, men against women, manual labourers against intellectuals, francophones against ethnic minorities, the men and women workers of the private sector against those of the public sector, the regions against Montréal...divide and rule!

And the capitalist class rules! It decides the quality, the quantity, the diversity, the cost of the entire range of products available to the population. One goal drives it: making profits, the most profits in the shortest time. All of production and all of economic life are organized round this one and only goal: profit. Can it be surprising then that existing relations, not only between countries and between regions, but also between groups and individuals, are relations of competition, inequality, and exploitation? Nor can one be surprised either by the absurdity of a society in which everything including men and women becomes a commodity, and which demands of children, adults, families, increasingly uniform and standardized behaviour?

Our entire social life is conditioned by relations of exploitation, oppression, and domination, imposed upon the millions of men and women of the working and popular classes by the capitalist class, the minority that has been in power since the industrial revolution, when it learned to appropriate the collective wealth and the means of production, diverting them for its own profit and making them the bastion of its privileges.

The State, far from being neutral, maintains, neutralizes and reproduces these relations, constituting simultaneously the political framework of society, the instrument of domination of the capitalist class; as well as a field of interaction and struggle between classes.

Yet the working and popular classes refuse to allow the State to be a mere "administrative council" of capitalism. They continually exercise pressures and often succeed in extracting concessions that improve their social condition.

Be it against the State or against industry, the men and women workers must struggle tirelessly to have their rights respected. This struggle between social classes had profoundly marked all of Québec's history for 150 years. From the 1833 carpenters' and joiners' strike for a reduction of the working day, right up to the foresters' strike against contract work in 1981, through the 1937 Sorel strikes, the asbestos strike in '49, that of Murdochville in '57, of the teachers in '67, and the Common Front in '72, how many great corvées, how many boycotts, how many United Aircraft occupations, how many picket-lines and demonstra-
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Innumerable struggles, not only in the workplace but also in other areas, in neighborhoods, villages, cities and regions, ... against national oppression, for the liberation of women, against expropriations, for the right to unemployment insurance and social welfare, for the respect and growth of democratic liberties and rights... for free medical services, for public education, for adequate housing at reasonable prices...

Long and difficult struggles punctuated by violence on the part of the bosses and the police, injunctions, intimidation, expulsions, firings, fines, imprisonment, humiliations... struggles that had to be renewed generation after generation because nothing is ever truly secured by those who have nothing but their solidarity with which to defend themselves and to improve their lot.

We Live in a Dependent Society

To live in Québec today means living within a part of the Canadian whole with everything that this represents in terms of inequalities in development and integration in the American imperialist system.

To live in Québec also means submitting to national oppression that the Canadian grande bourgeoisie, through the federal State, exercises over the people of Québec. By imposing its language, its culture and its policies of development, the Canadian bourgeoisie exercises a range of discrimination that affects the Québécois on an economic level as much as on a cultural and political one. Unemployment, poverty, inequalities are so many forms of national oppression that afflict the working and popular classes in their daily lives.

To live in Québec means finally to submit collectively to a situation of dependence that is considerable and multifaceted: economic, commercial, financial, technological, military, political, cultural and ideological. To such a degree that the most important positions of power and the principal levers of command are to be found outside Québec.

Certainly there exists a group of Québécois capitalists that rely on the provincial State to grab a piece of the cake. And they have been relatively successful as is shown by the development of such financial institutions and businesses as Trust Général, Provigo, Québecor, Normick Perron and Bombardier... But in spite of the fact that the majority of the medium and large Québécois businesses have benefited from the support of the Québécois State for their development, all of which only accelerated under the PQ which has placed public capital at their
Pour un Québec Socialiste

Service and reinforced them through State firms such as the Caisse de dépôt et placement, the SGF, and Hydro-Québec. Québécois capitalists remain confined to activities left to them by Canadian and foreign capitalists in sectors that are minimally productive and markets that are local and regional. Our economy and our commerce remain dominated by Canadian and foreign capitalists. Sixty percent of Québec’s international exports are controlled by 20-odd large American and European multinational corporations!

Even more than the Québécois capitalists, the true masters of Québec are the Canadian capitalists and big firms of the Canadian State such as Noranda Mines, Petro Canada, Northern Telecom, Consolidated Bathurst, Dominion Textile, Canada Packers, Abitibi-Price, John Labatt, Stelco, Bell Canada, Canadian Pacific, Canadian National, Sun Life, the Royal Bank, Bank of Montreal... but also the foreign capitalists, in particular the Americans, who control Alcan, General Motors, Imperial Oil, Kraft Foods, Celanese, IBM, ITT, Pratt & Whitney, Reynolds, Iron Ore, Wabush Mines, Johns-Manville and how many others!

For Québec the consequences of the dependence are tragic: an unbalanced economy, a slow-down in manufacturing, specialized international commerce, underdeveloped technology, and stagnant regional development... Québec is more than ever a vast reservoir of manpower and natural resources at the disposal of, firstly, the American capitalist class, secondly, the Canadian one, and, thirdly, the Québécois if anything remains. So it is no wonder that Québec capitalism, unable to develop short of further integration into the Canadian and American economies, should be opposed to true Québec independence.

The American imperialist system conditions the policies of the central Canadian State and of the Québécois State. No government has ever truly questioned this multifaceted dependence: neither the federal Liberal government that keeps Canada in military, political and economic alliances that serve American imperialism, nor the Parti Québécois one of whose first political gestures, it should be recalled, was to go to New York’s Economic Club to reassure Uncle Sam!

Since the very first hours of Confederation, the history of the Canadian State has been characterized by subservience to the interests of American capital even if under the cover of policies that have been called ‘national’.

The history of the Canadian State, over and above the national oppression to which it subjects the Québécois people, is that of the oppression of the native peoples and ethnic discrimination against all men and women immigrant workers.

And these relations of oppression and dependence, that have developed in the
 framework of the Canadian federal State and North-American capitalist society, show no signs of disappearing, on the contrary...

The Micmacs of Restigouche know it, invaded and bludgeoned by Sûreté du Québec squads in the name of salmon protection. And the Haitian taxi-drivers of Montréal know it too in seeing, more and more, manifestations of racism spread around them!

The people of Matapédia and of eastern Québec know it as they continuously rebel against the under-development and stagnation to which their regions have been reduced! And the people of the Outaouais, anxiously succumbing to an economic and cultural invasion that threatens their identity, know it too!

The men and women workers of the North Shore know it as they powerlessly watch the American multinational corporations shut down: ITT subsidized by tens of millions of dollars, and Iron Ore that has nevertheless made fabulous profits! And the miners of Thetford and those of Abitibi know it too as witnesses to today's as well as yesterday's scandalous rape of our natural wealth, transported to the US only to be transformed into the finished products that will then be sold back to us at high prices.

And the Montréal dockers have suffered the consequences of the displacement of harbor facilities towards the Great Lakes since the construction of the St. Lawrence Seaway; men and women workers of General Motors saw the Canada-US auto pact give industrial superiority to Ontario and have had to strike for the right to work in French; women textile workers whose jobs are sacrificed to the new international division of labor; men and women workers in the film industry, in music and publishing who are still protesting the PQ government's inaction in the face of the growing invasion of foreign cultural products in our market; do not all these men and women workers know that the effects of national oppression are still being felt in Québec today?

It is no accident that the struggles of the working and popular classes have always been linked to struggles against national oppression such that they mutually re-enforce one another. It is first these classes that were subjected to the effects of national oppression and it is particularly through their resistance that the Québec nation has been constituted.

But, in the absence of a political direction through which our national liberation could have progressed by relying on a social project fitted to working class and popular aspirations, this resistance has always been used to advance the ends of the political classes that have dominated the Québec State throughout all its history.

Faced, as we are today, with a federal State which renews its attacks and which
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increasingly menaces our self-determination and collective future, and with the Parti Québécois that presents no other perspective but that of administering the economic and political crisis, it becomes ever more imperative for the living forces of the nation, the working and popular classes, to take the fight for national liberation into their own hands, and bring it to its conclusion.

We Live in a Pseudo-Democratic Society (Une Société Faussement Démocratique)

Living in Québec today means living in a society that is increasingly authoritarian and where power is concentrated in the hands of a minority.

To be sure, we have the right to elect members of the National Assembly, mayors, municipal councillors, and directors of school commissions. This is an important aspect of democracy historically the end-result of the people’s long battle against despotism. Nevertheless this democracy is limited because it does not permit us to have real control over every dimension of our collective life.

Who decides about the needs of the population, the distribution of resources among economic sectors and regions, priorities in development, energy policies, production goals, the distribution of goods and revenues, imports and exports; the way in which work, education, health, housing, transport, and cultural activities are organized? Who decides about the price and the quality of food, clothing, housing, automobiles, and all other consumer products? Who has the power to open or close the mines, factories, commercial enterprises, hospitals, schools, and recreation centers?

Each day millions of decisions are taken that will concretely affect the way in which the Québécois people live, work, eat, dress, educate or amuse themselves and this people has but little control over all these decisions that nonetheless determine its conditions of existence and its future. Outside of popular and union organizations—whose autonomy is continually threatened and attacked by the media and the State in their efforts to create disunity—where can the working and popular classes exercise their democratic powers? What does democracy mean for those on unemployment and social welfare, for the native peoples and the ethnic minorities, the men and women students, the housewives and the aged? What control have we got over our lives, our environment, our neighborhoods, our villages and our cities?

Certainly by gathering together and waging struggles, by making use of pressure and by exercising relations of force (un rapport de force) in our places of work and habitation, we can influence the authorities and sometimes even get them to act in favour of our collective interests, but we do not control the decision-making power. We have acquired rights and liberties that are enviable to other peoples, but are not these liberties and rights continually threatened,
questioned, scoffed at and restricted? What happened to our rights and liberties when the Canadian army trooped in for a "visit" in October 1970? What can be the meaning of the right to work for the hundreds of thousands of people out of work? What can be the meaning of the right to circulate freely for the thousands of aged people who lack the means to keep up with the rising costs of public transport? What can be the meaning of the right to education for young people from poor neighborhoods? What does the right of association mean when unions must fight for years to obtain recognition? What does the right to limited strikes mean when they are banned by injunctions and constantly mocked by anti-union legislation? What does freedom of expression mean when the means of communication are not available to us? What does the right to health mean for a worker who does not have the right to stop working if he considers his life or his well-being endangered?

We live in a society that is dominated by a minority—the capitalist class, which by owning the means of production and exchange and dominating the state apparatus and the political parties, exercises real control over our economic, political and social life.

Leaning on politicians, high officials, lawyers, judges, who share the same interests, the capitalist class uses instruments of "persuasion" of the information media and instruments of repression like the police corps and the coercive apparatus of "justice" in order to exercise its authority and power. Let us simply remember the rain of injunctions, fines and prison terms that fell upon the MUCTC and Common Front strikers while, in contrast, the goon who fired at point-blank range at the Robin Hood millers was scandalously acquitted! Let us remember, too, the $10 million in fines plus interest imposed on the Reynolds union in Baie Comeau, though the seven oil companies responsible for extortion to the tune of $12 billion, according to an inquiry by the auditor-general's office, have not even been taken to court!

Whether it be in the State, whose presence is growing in our lives, in the public services as they become more and more bureaucratized, or in companies where the authoritarianism of the bosses reigns almost without limit, a complex hierarchy of power has been established: from the foreman to the manager, from the departmental assistant-director to the deputy minister, a multitude of small bosses agitate, fight for privileges and daily rest the weight of their authority upon our lives.

But the real center of power is situated way beyond this pyramid, and far beyond the parliaments in which "our" representatives figure: within the limited circle of the administrative councils of the multinationals, the large financial institutions, in the upper spheres of the State and the Council of Ministers, they are but a few hundred who determine our present and mortgage our future!
We live in a society in crisis

Living in Québec today means living in a society that is plunging into a profound economic, social and political crisis.

Daily we hear speak of the devaluation of the money, the rise in prices and interest rates, the decline of investment and production, the increase in the cost of energy and raw materials, the stagnation of productivity, the saturation of markets, the exacerbation of commercial and technological competition between capitalist powers, the persistent and simultaneous growth of inflation and unemployment, the reduction of buying power and real salaries, the deterioration of public services and the quality of life, the increase in bankruptcies and factory closings... so many aspects and signs of a crisis that does not let up and only deepens.

What is hidden beneath it all and what our governments are careful to keep from explaining to us, is that we are being subjected to the impact not of a temporary recession, or a foul-up in the economy, but of capitalism itself which can only survive by means of crises. Not a single generation of Québec men and women workers has not lived through one!

Imprisoned by an absurd logic which imposes upon it, for its maintenance and development, the genesis of a constant growth in profits, the capitalist system as we know it has been in a profound state of crisis for 10 years now. As a way out it now attempts to proceed toward a global re-organization of the international economic order, the modes of production and exchange, the markets and monetary system, the organization and division of labor, the role of States....

And Québec, fragile and dependent, is also affected by the crisis of world capitalism. All the more so because the crisis has developed here in the context of a political crisis, the questioning of national oppression and of the centralizing authoritarianism of the federal State, which seems at present stalemated. By itself, the extraordinary rise in poverty that victimizes one out of six people in our society is an indication of the extent to which the working and popular classes are threatened in their conditions of existence by this crisis. And what can be said about the economic death of the North Shore that only yesterday was being presented as the symbol of our collective prosperity?

Faced with the crisis that does not cease to deepen, the government of the PartiQuébécois, like the federal government and all other capitalist governments, only initiates economic and social measures that intensify exploitation. The PQ "solution", the one that emerges from "Bâtir le Québec" and Parizeau's budgets, puts the entire weight of the crisis upon the working and popular classes: the reduction of real salaries, job cuts, the important decreases in medical and social
services, rises in electricity costs and in public transport... and this, at the same
time as it substantially reduces taxes imposed on business profits and subsidizes
them as never before.

In this way one is witness to the redirection of an important part of the collective
wealth, allocated to the profits of private interests at the expense of public
services.

Inspired by the multinationals, elaborated at economic summits and by major
international organisms such as the World Bank, the OECD and the
International Monetary Fund, the capitalist response to the crisis here, as
elsewhere, goes directly against the interests of the working and popular
classes.
And here, as elsewhere, these classes still have only and always no other
recourse but to resist and fight, be it only in order to limit the more nefarious
consequences of this crisis in attempting to preserve their rights and the
improvements in living and working conditions dearly acquired. In addition, a
social crisis, linked to the political and economic crisis, is slowly developing that
tomorrow could well reach a point of no return.

Relations between the classes are more and more tense. Aggravated by the crisis,
the entirety of social problems resulting from relations of exploitation,
oppression and domination, explode in the face of the capitalist class that sees
itself increasingly confronted with the combativeness and solidarity of the
working and popular classes.

This is testified in the demands and struggles of the trade-unions for the right to
work, against the closing of factories and job-cuts in the public service, for health
and safety at work, the dequalification of labor and the negative effects of
automation, precarious employment, unemployment...; the demands and
struggles of the people in the areas of housing, health, urban planning, the
environment, public transport, social rights...the demands and struggles, of the
regions, in Saint-Scholastique, in the Gaspé, in the Matapédia valley...the
demands and struggles of the aged, of immigrant men and women workers, and
of the native people.

Equally testifying to it are the extraordinary struggles and demands of women for
equality in access to employment and in working conditions, for the recognition
of the social value of housework, for the establishment of a network of popular
daycare centres, against sexism and sexual violence, for the right to free and
costless abortion...the struggles and demands in the cultural field, in music, in the
new theatre, in film, in community media...the struggles and demands of the
ecological movement...the movement in support of peoples struggling against
exploitation and domination.

To be sure, these demands and struggles more often than not remain confined to
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the defence of the immediate interests of the men and women workers, and do not manage to extend toward and articulate a project for a radically different society. And despite certain initiatives at the municipal level or, for example, occasional debates on the national question, the working and popular classes do not have the means for autonomous political expression, and remain dependent on capitalist political parties that continually corrupt and distort their collective aspirations for a better life.

But the fact remains that these demands and struggles constitute the foundations of a real resistance to national oppression and are the expression of a will to break away (volonté de rupture) from capitalist society.

Through their demands and struggles, the men and women of the working and popular classes are slowly outlining the elements of a project for a radically new society and are more and more asserting the necessity for an in-depth transformation of Québec society in the direction of their interests and their collective aspirations.

Borne by this growing consciousness, change is under way. And to the extent that the working and popular classes will provide themselves with their own social project (projet de société) and the political instrument for its realization, nothing shall be able to stop it.

II

A SOCIETY IN NEED OF PROFOUND CHANGE

Where are our collective aspirations taking us if not to the establishment of a radically different society, in which our life would be better, more creative, freer, more worthy of being lived?

Where are our demands and our struggles leading us if not to build a society in which production and work as well as social, cultural and political life would no longer be organized around the profits and interests of a minority class, but around the needs and aspirations of the whole of the population instead?

Where do we want to end up if not at a new society in which relations of exploitation, oppression and domination would be replaced by relations of equality, liberty and solidarity?

In order to achieve these goals the working and popular classes must begin work on an in-depth transformation of contemporary Québec by undertaking a collective appropriation of control over their work, their lives, and over the whole of society.
To this end we must collectively appropriate the means of production and of exchange of goods and services, by democratizing property, its organization and operation. It is necessary to radically transform the State not only by achieving independence but by inventing new means of control for the working and popular classes over the parliamentary system, the bureaucracy and the legal system. We must destroy the sexual division of capitalist labor and establish authentic egalitarian and solidary relations between men and women. We must proceed toward a major decentralization of the economic and political power, promote popular autonomous organizations, animate a true democracy at the grass roots.

The in-depth transformation of Québec in the light of the aspirations and interests of the working and popular classes involves the construction of a popular power (pouvoir populaire) that can only be achieved on the inseparable foundations of socialism, independence, democracy and equality between men and women.

This represents, as we should be aware, a difficult undertaking since it implies putting into question national and international capitalist powers that have no interest in change and that do not hesitate to intervene in the lives of peoples in order to maintain their domination.

This represents a large-scale undertaking which simultaneously presupposes economic, social, cultural and political mutations whose difficulties and depth must not be underestimated.

This represents a complex and long-term political project that calls to be specified, clarified, elaborated and transcribed into a program of struggles and stages to follow in accord with the conjuncture and evolution of the social forces that will bear it. This political project does not belong and would never belong either to an avant-garde or to a group of experts. The construction of popular power can only be the work of the people themselves.

For a socialist Québec

A society such as we want—egalitarian, free and solidary—cannot emerge short of the Québécois people’s radical break with capitalism and thus the exploitation and dependence it engenders.

Only such a break can permit the creation of conditions favorable to the freeing of the working and popular classes.

We must overturn the capitalist class’ economic dictatorship and political domination by proceeding toward socialization of the means of production and exchange in such a way as to eliminate the private power of decision that
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permits this minority to exercise despotic "rights of management", to set the prices of consumer goods, to direct the organization of the economy and of work, to impose unemployment...all to maximize their profits.

We must put an end to dependence by proceeding toward a collective appropriation of the foreign companies that have established themselves in Québec—at a pace and modalities to be collectively determined—and by henceforth disallowing all foreign control over our resources and our means of production and exchange.

The Québécois people will not be the first to want to sweep away the structures of exploitation and dependence and to want to overthrow the capitalist system. In undertaking this difficult combat, it owes to itself to take stock of the experience gained elsewhere and to learn from the successes as well as the errors.

While the socialization of resources and of the means of production and exchange is an essential condition for the realization of the popular power, it still does not guarantee it. There is no recipe, there is no fatherland of socialism, no guiding country nor model society. We must seek our own way of liberation through the conditions that are our own.

By placing the accent on the construction of a real popular power out of the collective appropriation of the means of production and exchange, our socialist project refuses to consider the State the only agent for the transformation of society.

And if we place the objective of socialization rather than that of state control (étatisation) to the fore, it is to forcefully underline that for a socialist society it is necessary to bring together the conditions allowing that all economic decisions be the object of public debates and democratic choices. For it is neither a minority of capitalists hiding behind the market's pseudo-laws nor a minority of technocrats and ministers hiding behind the mysterious veils of their expertise, but the whole of the working people that, through the collective elaboration of democratic mechanisms, must decide the needs to be satisfied, the goals of production, imports and exports, the allocation of resources among sectors and regions, the distribution of production between consumer goods and services, the quantity and quality of these goods and services, the distribution of wealth, the choices in the domains of energy, the orientations of development—in short, the whole of those decisions that above all others determine living and working conditions.

In arriving at the elaboration of a plan for overall development, this democratization of economic power must be exercised on the national as well as the local and regional levels and must leave ample room for the autonomy of the various collectivities.
Economic power must be collective not only on the level of major orientations, but also in the very direction of enterprises and services. Their administration must be simultaneously placed in the hands of the men and women workers, of the representatives of the democratic institutions of society, and of the representatives of the collectivities concerned, as determined by the nature and function of the enterprises and services in question.

In addition, the socialization of the economy cannot be achieved by planning alone, no matter how democratic. It must be concretized in a radical transformation of the organization and division of labour. The men and women workers must have actual control over their work and the manner in which it is organized; among other things, this implies a reduction of the size of enterprises, control over technological changes and the integration of the conception and execution of work such that men and women workers not only can provide themselves with clean and safe working conditions but also transform the content of their work as well.

For, ultimately, we must put an end to this real dispossession of the world to which men and women workers are subjected through the impoverishment and growing subordination of their activities. We must strive to abolish the division between manual and intellectual labor, as well as all the discriminations and privileges that derive therefrom.

On the other hand, the abolition of unemployment and the recognition of the right to work are made possible only through the actual socialization of the economy and the planning of development.

By putting an end to the private appropriation of the wealth that work produces and by establishing a mode of remuneration based on participation in social labour, we are giving ourselves the means to eliminate poverty, to considerably reduce inequalities, and to guarantee to everyone a decent income that satisfies socially defined needs.

No longer seized by a privileged minority, the social surplus becomes available for the improvement of our collective equipment and services and thus our living conditions.

In addition, the building of a true popular power demands an in-depth socialization of public services, at all levels, in all sectors, and for all groups.

We must transform social services in such a way that they are no longer subject to the demands of industrial production, but rather directly anchored in the aspirations and the needs of the collectivities through the extensive autonomy of popular groups and organizations. We must undertake to democratize and re-organize services in such a way that the population can appropriate them and
orient them to their real needs.

Thus in health care, as well as in education, the autonomy of individuals and collectives must be promoted through the increased diffusion of knowledge. In addition to offering the best curative care, the health system must be based on the promotion of health and prevention, and must strive to check illnesses of social origin. Education, in the framework of a public, secular, and francophone system, respectful of the right to difference of the minorities, greatly decentralized and subject to popular control, must be oriented toward the permanent education of the population. It must in particular serve everyone, in accordance with their choice and the needs of the society, providing vocational and balanced (polyvalente) training that can give the men and women workers real control and a true capacity for intervention in the conceptualization and organization of their work and social life as a whole.

What we must seek through the socialization and the democratization of the economy and services, as well as through the planning of development and the transformation of the organization of labor, is not a new way to structure and administer the same old production-oriented (productiviste) society that sees in individuals nothing but their “labour power” and their capacity to produce “profits”, but on the contrary a transformation of this capitalist vision of the world and a real change in the modes of living and working.

Building a socialist Québec means to reunite the conditions that make for a different and better life: for children and young people at last recognized as persons in themselves with needs for supervision, education and leisure that the society must strive to meet; with the right to speak, to organize themselves, and to act so as to transform society in the light of their aspirations...for men and women, finally liberated from the sexual division of labor and henceforth able to establish authentically egalitarian and solidary relations...for the aged, finally re-integrated in social life, liberated from officialized impoverishment, and henceforth disposing of a real capability to add to the collectivity with their knowledge and expertise.

For an Independent Québec

Our project, because it is that of the working and popular classes, affirms the indivisible relationship between socialism and independence. One could not fight for a socialist democracy without taking up the national question in all its historic significance, without assuming the project of national liberation.

The creation of a new and fully independent Québécois State is an indispensable condition for not only overthrowing the domination of the capitalist classes and achieving a true sovereignty of the people, but also for
putting an end to national oppression.

We must put an end to the present situation: to the provincial State, toothless cog of the central Canadian State and defender of "local" capitalist interests; to the federal State that embodies the class power of the bourgeoisie as a whole, reproduces the national oppression of the Québécois people and the native peoples, and that serves as the transmission belt of American imperialism.

We must radically reconsider the whole of the political, economic and military alliances to which we are integrated, and which not only maintain Québec in a state of profound dependence but make it an accomplice in American imperialism's enslavement of numerous peoples.

We must acquire the independence that allows the working and popular classes to collectively and democratically appropriate economic as well as political power. In this respect our project is clearly distinct from the Péquiste perspective of "sovereignty-association". The PQ does not question either the capitalist system, or the exploitation and dependence it engenders. Wishing to protect the American and Canadian capitalists' interests and develop Québécois capitalism, it ends up, under the pretext of modernism, becoming the promoter of the safe-keeping of the principal federal institutions in the framework of a "new" association and the maintenance of all the political, economic and military alliances that bind us to the American imperialist system. Moreover, it recommends integration of the Québécois economy with the North-American economy, and submission to the present international division of labor. But political and economic independence cannot be separated this way, and it is certain that the construction of a popular sovereignty (pouvoir populaire) cannot follow such a dead-end street.

On the other hand, we must elaborate and collectively put into effect a strategy of development based on the satisfaction of our real needs and the realization of our democratic aspirations. This presupposes both a restructuring of our economy with the objective of reliance at first on ourselves alone, and a restructuring of our international exchanges which should henceforth evolve from our development objectives.

This means not only maintaining but developing economic, financial, commercial, technological and cultural relations with other peoples, and in a radically different way: in due respect of the independence of peoples, mutual avoidance of the creation of relations of dependence, in the adherence to a policy of international co-operation at the service of development in equality and solidarity.

In addition, we must put an end to all political, economic and military alliances and treaties that involve us in complicity with American imperialism. By
contrast, our project demands that we establish relations of friendship and solidarity with peoples struggling against all types of exploitation, oppression and domination; we must as well fight the thermonuclear menace and make ourselves active emissaries of peace among peoples.

Moreover, in the same spirit of independence and internationalism, we must cast off our dependence on the dominant cultural industries both by supporting the production and diffusion of the culture of the people of Québec and by permitting true access to the culture of other peoples, of minorities, and of the native peoples.

Building an independent Québec, from our point of view, also means to undertake the establishment of new relations with the ethnic minorities: eliminating all forms of discrimination and racism perpetrated against them; recognizing both their right to difference and their right to integration by favoring the study, knowledge, use and expression of their own languages and cultures within the framework of a policy in keeping with the principle that French is the language of use in Québec; according to men and women immigrants the same rights as to Québec men and women workers; favouring in our immigration policies the re-unification of families and welcome to political refugees.

Equally this means putting an end to the oppression of the native peoples, and recognizing their national rights to self-determination and independence; all the while inviting them to join as equal members in our social project and negotiating with them on the basis of their demands: the delimitations of their territory, the preservation of their culture and way of life, the autonomy of their social, economic and political organizations.

Independence as we conceive it stands for a good deal more than a new juridical form of the State. It is the watchword for a whole people; not only for putting an end to dependence and national oppression, but also for collectively and democratically appropriating control over that people's conditions of existence and its future.

For a Democratic Québec

Through the realization of socialism and independence is raised the necessity of democratizing all the powers in society. Only a socialist and independent society can achieve true socialization and authentic popular sovereignty. These three terms are irrevocably linked.

To construct popular power, we must put an end to the private appropriation of decisional powers in politics just as much as in the economy, and eliminate authoritarianism and relations of domination in society.
POUR UN QUÉBEC SOCIALISTE

We must bring together the conditions that will allow the majority—the working and popular classes—to exercise effective power in the elaboration of collective decisions as well as upon their application in working places, neighborhoods, villages and cities, in the regions and on the national level.

On the level of its organization and its operation, the Québécois State must be radically transformed through the democratization of the legislative, executive, administrative, judicial and police apparatus, so as to guarantee the effective realization of the wishes (volontés) of the people.

The power of the State must be decentralized, debureaucratized, and dehierarchized so as to interdict the appropriation of power by a minority. Far from being based on a monopoly by a single party, or on the fusion of the State with a party, the organization of political power must express a new dynamic based simultaneously on the recognition of the freedom of political organization, on the recognition of the role and autonomy of popular and worker organizations, on the development of fundamental solidarities and the decentralization of power towards the local and regional collectivities, as well as on the birth of multiple locations of political expression and intervention appropriate for working and popular classes.

Certainly political power, be it on the local, regional or national level, must dispose of a true capacity to co-ordinate and effect collective decisions. It must also possess sufficient force to resist internal or external pressures in opposition to democratic decisions. And this power must exercise itself within a dynamic of participation, exchange and interaction in such a way as to prevent dominating and repressive bureaucratic apparatuses from being able to take root.

Our democratic project recognizes that the rights and liberties of the individual are inalienable and guarantees their permanent respect through specific and independent institutional mechanisms.

Our democratic project equally recognizes the rights and liberties of the collectivities and that these must be fully recognized: the rights and liberties of association, union, expression, demonstration, the right to negotiation and the continuous right to strike. It recognizes the rights of individuals and groups with common interests and objectives to form autonomous organizations and to establish relations of force (rapport de force) in defence of their rights. It recognizes the fundamental right of individuals and collectivities to be real agents of political power; that is, to democratically direct all aspects of their work and lives.

Instead of opposing individual to collective rights, and thus seek to eliminate one in the name of the other, our project on the contrary favors their reciprocal
expansion and reinforcement.

Building a democratic Québec is to provide the means to establish new relations between individuals and collectivities.

Certainly tensions and conflicts of interest will continue to exist between the individual and the collective, between the national, regional and local collectives as well as between different groups. The elimination of dependence, the abolition of social classes, the disappearance of inequalities between men and women, the socialization of the economy, the democratization of powers will not be achieved overnight, and even once achieved they will not eliminate all contradictions.

Nevertheless, all these transformations will create a new dynamic in social relations that will allow tensions and conflicts to be recognized and to be democratically resolved in the framework of the organisms that society will have created in accordance with the interests and aspirations of the working and popular majority, and in a common spirit of solidarity.

For Equality Between Men and Women

Just as fundamentally as socialism, independence, and democracy, the establishment of egalitarian relations between men and women on the social as well as economic, cultural, political, and juridical levels is an essential basis for the construction of a veritable popular power in Québec. This represents one of the objectives that is at the very heart of our political project.

We must put an end to the sexual division of labor and sexual discrimination be it in culture, advertising, information media, the school, the family or work, and to establish special measures to systematically check the historical and structural discrimination of which women are the victims.

We must eliminate all forms of the domination of women, the constraints, harassments, humiliations, and the violence that the present society exercises against them.

This presupposes in particular the recognition of parental responsibilities and familial tasks as being social responsibilities, such as to establish conditions to allow these responsibilities and tasks to be shared between men and women in an egalitarian fashion as well as a greater socialization of the tasks of reconstitution and reproduction, notably by means of a network of daycare services that is universal, free of charge, and controlled by the users and men and women workers. Equally this supposes that the costs brought about by the fact of having children be shared by the collectivity as a whole.
Moreover, this supposes that maternity, the function specific to women, be finally socially recognized, that all maternities can be freely consented to, and that consequently all women have the possibilities and means either to interrupt a pregnancy or bring it to an end without harm to either their health or other rights.

Finally this supposes a radical transformation of the organization of work which eliminates all discrimination both in working conditions and in pay between men and women, favors the development of egalitarianism for women as well as for men in all sectors of employment, the taking into account of pregnancy, birth and nursing as much through the flexibility of schedules and the granting of leaves as in the nature of the work, and moreover an egalitarian sharing of familial responsibilities and tasks.

To build equality between men and women is to put together the conditions such that socialism, independence, and democracy are realized not halfway, but fully and for all men and women.

Towards popular power

By collectively appropriating the means of production and exchange, socializing enterprises and services, transforming the organization of work, democratizing economic and political power, achieving independence, and transforming relations between men and women, the working and popular classes will build a new society that will answer to their needs and their collective aspirations.

How will these transformations be expressed with respect to one another? At what pace will we proceed with the required socialization? What stages will we have to go through in the realization of independence? What democratic mechanisms will we have to establish? What kind of relations will there be between the State and the political organizations, the social movements, the rank-and-file collectives? How will the political power be expressed with respect to economic power?

So many questions to debate, so many problems to resolve, so many political choices to effectuate, for us to undertake today to raise in the very heart of the working and popular classes.

In order to conduct this collective reflection, to elaborate their project of society, construct their power, the working and popular classes must undertake to forge an instrument for themselves.

It is for this end that we must now get down to work.
POUR UN QUÉBEC SOCIALISTE

III

A MOVEMENT TO CONSTRUCT

Undertaking to transform in-depth Québécois society in accordance with their interests and their collective hopes, the working and popular classes must henceforth count only on their own power (force).

The time has come to put an end to our class dependence in the face of those political parties—Liberal, Péquistes, or other—who have largely demonstrated, in varying degrees, that they are the political expressions and the servants of the interests of the capitalist minority that exploits and dominates us.

The time has come to stop being in tow to these political administrators of capitalism, and to no longer leave the defense of our interests to those parties, that, from election to election, if not from generation to generation, do not cease betraying our collective aspirations.

These parties will never tackle the real causes of exploitation and domination. They will never really question the inequalities between men and women, nor dependence, nor unemployment, nor poverty. Only the working and popular classes have the interest and the political will to do so, because they experience the necessity in their lives and in their work.

The construction of a radically new society necessitates the establishment of an autonomous political movement of the working and popular classes. This represents an essential condition and an indispensable step.

Already with our trade-union and popular organizations we have given ourselves the collective instruments that have permitted us to appropriate for ourselves through autonomous measures, the defence and the transformation of our living and working conditions. We must today appropriate for ourselves "politics" ("la politique") by giving ourselves our own instrument of political struggle.

Our political project supposes such radical changes in social relations, and meets head-on such powerful interests, that we cannot hope to realize it without disposing of a collective instrument with which to confront the considerable resistances that we will encounter. It is easy to imagine that the capitalist class, having access to political, economic and military power, will not witness the questioning of its privileges and the explosion of its domination without reacting.

How are we to achieve victory without having a political lever that will carry our project and that will gain such support from the people that the capitalist domination can be broken?
Let Us Construct Our Movement

The Socialist Movement that we today undertake to construct, as well its strategy of implantation and development, are determined by the political project that we put forth.

Our project implies radical transformations in the political, economic, social and cultural organizations of Québec society. It affirms the necessity for the working and popular classes to conquer not only the State power, but all sites of power, and to appropriate, transform and democratize them in such a way that socialism is one that is lived by the men and women workers in their daily lives, and the sovereignty acquired be that of the collectivities—autonomous and solidary—over their development and their future.

This represents a profound change that cannot be realized by the simple election of deputies. Certainly, given the present political void and the urgency of change, the temptation to constitute a party to hurl ourselves in the conquest of State power could be great and legitimate...but this is a temptation to be wary of, one that in the present situation could at best lead to ephemeral and fragile successes. It is not sufficient to simply decree that Québec is henceforth socialist, independent and democratic, for it to become so!

The changes to which we aspire will not take place overnight. We must first bring together a constellation of political conditions: transcend divisions and realize the political unity of the working and popular classes; deeply implant our project in all the regions and spheres of life and work; arouse and develop a will to struggle and change, construct a relationship of strength, develop international solidarities; in short, put into operation a social dynamic capable of carrying out our political project.

We must bring about a true political and unitary mutation in the midst of the working and popular classes. It is through the construction, as of today, in our working and living environments, of a large movement for socialism, independence, democracy and equality between men and women, that we will get there.

And if it is reasonable to believe that in its development this movement will in its time undertake the conquest of State power, we must today start at the beginning and act in such a way as to make this seizure of power not only possible but significant with respect to our fundamental objectives.
POUR UN QUÉBEC SOCIALISTE

To the power of capital, the working and popular classes oppose their unity and their solidarity. The coming into being of a movement that will realize in its internal operation the main orientation of our political project will be the expression of it.

A site for regroupment not centralization

The Socialist Movement will be a site of regroupment, not of centralization.

It will aim at regrouping, as broadly as possible, all those men and women who adhere to its orientations as expressed by this manifesto, and who want to take concrete action in the areas of work and life, in order to establish at the base the foundations for a socialist, independent, democratic Québec where there will exist equality between men and women.

To become a member, it is necessary to subscribe to the manifesto, to engage oneself in the organizational tasks that evolve from it, to accept the statutes and rules, and pay the dues that have been established. Those belonging to another political organization will not be able to join.

In its procedures of implantation, our movement will seek to be as representative as possible in its male/female, geographic and social distribution.

It will be of a national character, rooted in all the regions of Québec, and all sectors of activity. In a first step, it will be formed around provisional regional committees that will be set up soon after the publication of this manifesto.

It will be constructed on the basis of a democratic and decentralized structure, allowing simultaneously its members' control over the orientations, the actions, the leadership decisions, and the democratic expressions of the different regions and various fields of struggle.

Until the convocation of a first congress at the latest one year after the publication of the manifesto, the Movement will function under provisional statutes and will be co-ordinated by a committee of eleven persons elected from the project's initiating group, and by a provisional national council composed of a co-ordinating committee and of delegates from regional committees.

A site of egalitarian relations between men and women

The Socialist Movement will be a site of egalitarian relations between men and women.

Not only will it leave a clear field to the expression and development of the specific struggles of women, and support them through the creation of a
permanent committee concerned with the living and working conditions of women, but it will grant constant priority to the establishing of egalitarian relations at all levels of organization and at every stage of its implantation as much in its recruitment efforts as in its decision-making and concrete activities.

Taking into particular account the parental and familial responsibilities of its men and women militants, the Socialist Movement will aim at establishing concrete conditions that permit full, entire and egalitarian participation of men and women.

A site of convergence not domination

The Socialist Movement will be a site of convergence of solidarities and struggles, not a site of domination. It will be fully autonomous with respect to trade-union and popular organizations, and will only accept individual memberships. It will be respectful of the very nature and specific autonomy of trade-union and popular organizations, rejecting absolutely political conceptions that aim at subordinating social movements, the notion of "transmission belt", attempts at monopolizing the political field. By contrast it will clearly affirm that an essential condition for the in-depth transformation of Québec society is precisely the existence and development of trade-union and popular organizations that are autonomous and dynamic.

Seeking the political unity of the working and popular classes, the Socialist Movement will certainly strive to attract the adhesion of members of union and popular organizations, though in the strict respect of democratic mandates and outside all strategies of manipulation.

Autonomous and respectful of autonomies, the Socialist Movement will be a site of convergence so that the demands and struggles of the working and popular classes open onto a larger political framework.

A site of debate not dogmatism

The Socialist Movement will be a site of democratic discussion and debate, not of dogmatism.

It will pursue a collective reflection so as to elaborate, in the light of its development and its struggles, a project of society, a program of struggle and a program of transition to socialism that will give rise to the adhesion of the working and popular classes of Québec because these will be the expression of their interests and their aspirations. It will give itself the appropriate means to become a true site for political education (formation politique).

An instrument of struggle and intervention
But even more the Socialist Movement will be an instrument of struggle and political intervention.

Through it the working and popular classes will be able to provide themselves with all the necessary means to denounce all forms of exploitation, oppression and domination. It will be their instrument for making known their point of view, and for defending their collective interests in all major debates. It will be their tool for getting down to work, as of today, on the egalitarian, free and solidary Québec of tomorrow.

As female and male activists for a socialist, independent, democratic Québec in which there will be equality between men and women, we are today making an appeal through this manifesto to all those men and women of the working and popular classes who share our aspirations and will for change: let us together construct the Socialist Movement!

Conscious of the amplitude and the difficulties of the political combat that we are undertaking, it is with confidence and determination that we launch this call. For we are profoundly convinced that this combat will tomorrow be that of the Québec people as a whole.

Québec
October, 1981
BLACK ROCK MANIFESTO

The Black Rock memorial stone in the traditionally Anglo working class district of Pointe Saint-Charles in Montréal, honoring the 6,000 immigrants that died of typhoid fever in 1847.

Not a Bleeding Heart of Christ or the head of holy fool John the Baptist but a huge black rock like a bad tooth pulled out of the river and placed on the common grave by the working men that built the Victoria Bridge.

They built the bridge, they didn't name it or the city they worked in, living on streets like Duke, Prince, King, Queen, streets that are now parking lots in what was once called Griffintown after John Griffin, Montréal's first slum landlord and like all immigrants they were scared and hoped and prayed that God or luck or the boss would give them a break but like all immigrants they learnt that the only thing to do right or wrong was to kick shit and keep on kicking it until something broke.

And they fought the landlords, the bosses, the politicians, the rich millionaire gangsters posing as gentry on the mountain and then too, the French habitants, starved off their land and moving into Anglo Montreal neighborhoods, taking away Anglo jobs, lowering the wages and level of misery forcing the Anglo workers into a fatal unspoken agreement with the Westmount ruling class that in exchange for acting as sort of unofficial garrison troops, the Anglos would receive preferential treatment in the British-owned companies just like the protestant Orangemen in Northern Ireland.

Yeah keep those peppers down on the farm and Rule Brittainnia with Griffintown following Westmount into wars that had nothing to do with them, dying for the fuckin British Empire in defence of the divine rights of British Petroleum and then getting hot at the French cause they had enough sense to stay out of that very bad joke called World War One, which started in 1914 and has not stopped since with the good guys becoming the bad guys and the bad guys getting worse.

And Premier Duplessis, the nigger king in smiling photos with the big fat landlord and the big fat cop waving hello to the big fat priest passing by in his long black Lincoln while the blokes and pepper fought in the back alleys of Pointe Saint-Charles, drowning each other below the poverty line with Westmount having its own trouble keeping pushy Jewish parvenus out of their private clubs while an all American boomtime was transforming the whole continent into one big supermarket in accordance with the laws and morals of Mickey Mouse and Joe McCarthy.
BLACK ROCK MANIFESTO

The good life in Fat City with the academics talking about death of ideology and father does know best after all as long as you can keep the Bomb out of your nightmares and meanwhile down home on Rockefeller's Plantation the peppers are watching The Sixty Four Thousand Dollar Question on channel 2 with Duplessis dead as a statue and Rocket Richard retired to Vitalis haircream and the Church like an old movie that everyone has seen too many times and the question being, when do we get our share, calice? And fuck the queen anyhow and the kings, bishops, knights and rooks and anybody else that stands in the way of our right to a trailer and a ski-doo.

Boom Boom Boom, FLQ and ski-doo with the Union Jacks disappearing from the city flagpoles as the French workers began placing their full weight behind their new militant unions with the French intellectuals deciding that Oui, maybe it was o.k. to talk joual, tabarnac, and the rich Anglos shitting in their tweeds as new nigger king Jean Lesage emerged with the new bilingual policy of the Quiet Revolution which quietly left the working class Anglos behind in their unilingual ghettos to ponder the past glories of the British Empire that was now leaving them to a stiff upper-lip fate in a strange new Québec that was fighting against its third class status as a colony within a colony.

And then the growth of Uncle René and the Parti Québécois in the Seventies triggering off a mass exodus down the 401 of McGill students who didn't need much of an excuse to head out west to where the money is turning green and leaving behind the old, the middle aged middle incomers with tenure and the unemployable poor that have no choice but to stay in the Montréal of the Eighties in a Québec that doesn't officially recognize that there ever was an Anglo working class in this city.

And that's all history and who gives a fuck cause the chances are the Bomb will blow us all to bits anyway, winner, loser, left and right and toute la patante but anyhow, the Black Rock is still there kind of pushed to the side and stuck in the middle of a narrow traffic islet dividing a two-lane highway leading onto the Victoria Bridge, sitting there like an obscure traffic marker, useless and forgotten by a community that stems from the 6,000 people buried under it, a community that is trapped and feels they have nothing to do but die.

...OR CHANGE...

Anyone walking down Wellington Street on a Friday night can see that there are energies and talents in the Anglo community that haven't been tapped, energy that results in a mutant hero like Buzz Beurling rather than a Norman Bethune because there are no proper outlets just a long series of short circuits that result in the energy eating itself up with the greatest of our poets dying young and proud
in jails or drinking themselves to death in the uptown bars around Atwater Park.

And dying is easier but some of us shitdisturbers born down there in the Pointe Saint-Charles-Verdun ghetto have decided to form something called the Black Rock Group, basing ourselves on the last hope that what’s left of the Anglo community can be salvaged and made useful to itself despite itself and hoping we can help place more weight behind the progressive forces trying to form a Québec that is a colony to no one and belonging to nobody but the people themselves, of themselves and by themselves.

A QUEBEC THAT LETS US LOVE
A QUEBEC THAT WON’T TURN US SOUR
A QUEBEC THAT DOESN’T KILL ITS POETS

And at least, if nothing else, we’d like to announce that the war is over ... and nobody won.

When I begin to write something that is perhaps what one might loosely deem to be a manifesto—an intention of purpose—a collection of thoughts and things that reflect my class, I have the inclination to surround it with credible ways of thinking—those ways which I have inherited from my middle class education. But I am not Eliot’s Prufrock; I have never been or shall I say, we have never been “ragged claws scuttling across the floors of silent seas”. We are not your “Hollow Men”—we have been on the front line pissing in our handkerchiefs, holding the Germans back. We have bathed Dieppe in our blood and have come home without jobs. This is not really a complaint. We have learned not to complain. At least, our fathers complained very little. As soon as I completed grade eleven, I was already further ahead than anyone in our family. I was the way out—the Dauphin.

Verdun is simple. We volunteer for everything. Its main arteries that pumped blood into two World Wars are still there. The blood goes now into early pregnancies and the welfare office. We are the Brooklyn of Montréal. We are that place which crawled from the slime of the Black Rock like some crazy Darwinian beast towards the “Northern”, towards the C.P.R. We have filled the factories. The Sun Life would have moved a long time ago without us. We are the result of the baby boom which simply means that our fathers were not boomed away in the last War. They had the good fortune of having large fins on their cars and young sons who had to go to University.

My father had four teeth knocked out when he was a kid hopping an oil truck in the winter down near Delormier Street. He had both knees broken in the War and was captured because somebody forgot to tell him that there were fourteen thousand Germans in the town. He has trouble sleeping at night. Nothing changes. Verdun is the same. The English don’t punch out the zoot-suiters on
the boardwalk anymore, but still it's the same.

Rosemont's the same. Working class neighbourhoods are supposed to produce hockey players, not poets or playwrights. Even if there is not a war, we are supposed to high-stick someone anyway. My mother with her coveted Bingo chips and minimum wage. Nothing is supposed to come from us. Certainly not art. We must know what "Moby Dick" means. We must sit in faculty clubs or else flirt with the French culture. At first, it was my intention to talk to you as a friend—as my father might talk to you over a beer, but it occurs to me that you will not understand. It occurs to me that you will classify, categorize, look for a footnote. I give up. This is no longer a statement—this is a threat. Our class shall no longer be your convenience. We, the sons and daughters of those who died on strange beaches so Redpath Crescent would survive, will have our say. I am sorry it is not only the French who threaten you. We shall reverse the disease. We will create in these troubled times. Our class has taught us to tell the truth or we would get a punch in the mouth. Something you would not understand. My grandfather remembered and I remember. He didn't get a double hernia trying to throw a French cop off the Victoria Bridge for nothing. The Black Rock is not the myth of Sisyphus. We have pushed it up the hill and into your factories. It is washed with blood and now it shall be washed with the creative energies of a new generation.

We shall walk backwards and applaud no longer. We shall celebrate ourselves. We will create a forum for our thoughts. We will have it out with you.

Perhaps I can explain it to you a little clearer. Remember in the Sixties when Stan Mikita was in the Forum giving the "high sign" to the entire crowd—well that "high sign" is our sign. We have our colour T.V.'s and sometimes we are quiet. We are "les autres" and don't know why. But we shall create. We shall sing the song of our class and when we tell you to "fuck off", at least it will not be footnoted. It will not be interpreted. It is not lower class language. It is that thing we have learned to say to those in power—to those who refuse to understand. The referee has made a bad call. Stan knows it and we know it.
PIERRE TRUDEAU ON
THE LANGUAGE OF VALUES AND
THE VALUE OF LANGUAGES

Edward Andrew

No one dies for mere values.
M. Heidegger

We must be free or die, who speak the tongue
That Shakespeare spake; the faith and morals hold
Which Milton held.
W. Wordsworth

Wordsworth's equation of freedom with individual and national identity defined in terms of language and religion, appears both foreign to our understanding of freedom and yet hauntingly familiar. English-speaking Canadians outside Québec tend to take language for granted. But to take language for granted is to place Canada in jeopardy, for it is to assume that English is to be the dominant language of North America.

As a French Canadian, Pierre Trudeau is concerned with the conservation of the French language within a country and a continent where its status is insecure. As a liberal, his political commitment is predicated on a conception of liberty and he has publicly stated that conception of freedom with force and clarity. His Catholicism is not part of Trudeau's public life. His faith and morals are reserved for his personal life. The faith in morals of a "civil society" with no commonly recognized public purpose, become values, or objects of personal estimation. And an intellectually educated in the contemporary social sciences, Trudeau articulates the relationship between freedom and language in terms of "values".

It shall be argued in this paper that to employ the category of values to language pre-judges and circumscribes certain aspects of linguistic concerns in Canada. To put it baldly, to call language a 'value' is to categorize it as a luxury, rather than a necessity. Yet to call it "la nourriture culturelle", as René Lévesque does, is to consider it to be indispensable to the existence of a people, a defining characteristic rather than an instrument of human beings. In this light the eating of food, as something essential to our being, is not usually considered a value. To be sure, Trudeau sometimes recognizes language to be a necessity rather than a luxury, but in the sense of a necessary vehicle or an essential instrument to convey or express "values" (or the luxury goods in the world market of moral and cultural options). And, for Trudeau it is precisely these values, rather than the language bearing them, which define human beings.

Values and Human Freedom: The Valued and the Evaluators

In Trudeau's articles and speeches, before and after he entered political life,
one continually encounters the word *valeurs* or 'values'. This much-used word appears familiar, but familiarity does not breed thoughtful reflection about its derivation and usage. Thus, prior to analyzing Trudeau's political philosophy, his understanding of human nature and its relation to language, it is necessary to unfold what is enclosed in the use of the word 'values'.

The currency of the word 'values' derives from Max Weber's assumption, based on the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche, that there are no moral facts. 'Values' are to be distinguished from facts, or the domain of scientific reason. Since reason is impotent to prescribe or guide human conduct, moral and political goals are autonomous or self-legislated. 'Values' are the product of will rather than reason; they are willed into being. 'Values' have no independent being disclosed by reason. What is emphasized in the usage of 'values' is our choosing rather than what is chosen: that the values be ours, freely adopted by us, rather than that they be rational. Reason cannot prescribe values which one is compelled to adopt by virtue of one's nature or through conformity to some natural or God-given standard. Our values are what we will or freely choose, not what we are commanded, obliged or called upon to do. Our nature is our history; we are not creatures but creators, creators of our moral as well as our technical world. Our freedom consists in the voluntary adoption or rejection of existing values and their continual re-creation in repetitive, selective and transformative actions. The place of reason is to serve freedom, to avoid inconsistency and impossibility, and to find the appropriate means to secure the end willed, or the value chosen. Values, then, are the principles, sentiments, habits, interests and aspirations that are manifested and defined by moral choices or practical commitments which constitute our character or personality structure.

Yet our values, it might be said, are not of our own choosing. They are imparted to us by a particular religious tradition, class background and cultural inheritance. But adherence to inherited values, (which include the heresies, revisions, and creations within the preservation of our heritage), are not reducible to that which has been given us. We are forced to choose, whether or not we want responsibility or autonomy. But to hold blindly to our prejudices or pre-judgments is to choose, however it seems to violate our essence as judges, choosers or evaluators. Yet no commitment is so binding, no alternative is so appealing, no action is so compelling that we can evade our freedom. So it is in the recognition of personality as free that we can appropriately speak of values. Thus values are the creation of the free subject who projects a world of meaning and significance into a course of actions that are not inherently or demonstrably choiceworthy. In this sense, values are subjective, not grounded. They rest in freedom, on nothing.

To speak of religion as a value is not to assert that God is present in the world and that His will commands our assent. Rather is it to assert that we exist as the measure of all value and some conception of God is useful to the living of a vital and moral life. Similarly, to speak of nationalism or culture as values is not to assert that the nation has given birth to what we are (the word nation has the same root as nature, natal and nativity) or that a cult has sustained that birth and
TRUDEAU AND THE LANGUAGE QUESTION

encouraged growth (as in a bacterial culture). As values, they depend upon us for their status. They do not have an independent reality—as do facts. Thus to assign nationalism and culture the status of values is to assert that we do not depend upon the nation or the cult for our birth and growth but rather that we freely dispose of them and honour them as instruments of our freedom. We stand in a relation to the so-called higher values as beings with the power and authority to estimate their worth to us. We implicitly exalt the position of the valuer above the valued. To call something a higher value is to deprecate it, to lower it in status by subjecting it to our appraisal. As a value, culture is not the measure of man but man, whether or not exposed to, and nurtured by, the cult, assigns a quality to culture. Only for men and women who have cast themselves as the measure of all things, as the sovereign subject, do values achieve a position higher than Man.

But, if man is the measure of all things, what is the standard to measure human conduct? If all lengths are to be gauged by 'the standard metre in Paris', what is the length of this standard of measurement? To answer a metre is meaningless, as it assumes some standard beyond what is accepted to be the standard of measurement. We stipulate standards of measurement—freely. Values are free, arbitrary or willed stipulations to gauge conduct? The substance (what is standing under) of these stipulations is man as subject (what is cast under), as the ground of values.

The Free Subject as Natural Individualist:
Language and Community as Instruments

Trudeau writes:

Je crains qu'à trop se préoccuper de l'avenir de la langue, un certain courant de pensée n'ait oublié celui de l'homme qui la parle. Si les travailleurs tiennent à leur valeurs culturelles et à leur langue, ils tiennent fortement à vivre convenablement...4

Who then is the man lurking beneath the tongue but somehow connected to it? A preliminary answer seems to be given — the worker, or to be more precise, the worker as consumer. Yet how is human nature, thus understood, clearly related to language?

In Les cheminements de la politique, Trudeau presents an account of human nature by examining the basis of political authority. He rejects the idea of a social contract, although that doctrine correctly emphasizes the will or consent of the governed as the source of legitimate government. Trudeau insists that a contractual basis of society is inadequate because men are born into a particular society independently of their will and consent. Men are naturally social beings and subject to some form of political authority, although "les hommes restent toujours libres de décider quelle forme d'autorité ils se donneront, et qui
l'exercera."—In short, Trudeau advocates the doctrine of the liberal contractarians within the framework of the Catholic natural law tradition.

Aristotle presents the basis of Trudeau's political theory: "Le principal but de la société est que ses membres puissent, tant collectivement que chacun en particulier, vivre une vie pleine." However, in elaborating Aristotle's view of the innate sociality of men, Trudeau substantially revises Aristotle, particularly with reference to the enjoyment of collective life. "Or nous vivons en société précisément afin de pouvoir attaquer collectivement les problèmes que nous ne pouvons pas résoudre individuellement." That is, participation in collective life is an external necessity rather than a positive aspiration; unfortunately, individual enterprise cannot provide the transportation systems, safety and health measures that individuals demand. Collective life is thus seen by Trudeau as technically necessary for the achievement of individual ends or individualist values.

Trudeau presents a Rousseauian individualism in Aristotelian clothing, although his Rousseauianism involves a more favourable assessment of the benefits of technique and collective labour than can be found in Jean-Jacques' Discours sur les Sciences et les Arts. For Aristotle did not think that social life goes against the grain of men's nature. Nor did he think that human sociality was merely a means to an end, namely necessary to the achievement of private, consumer interests. Aristotle states, in the sentences prior to that cited and then paraphrased by Trudeau:

...man is an animal impelled by his nature to live in a polis. A natural impulse is thus one reason why men desire to live a social life even when they stand in no need of mutual succour, but they are also drawn together by a common interest, in proportion as each attains a share in good life.

What is striking in Trudeau's representation of Aristotle's understanding of men's social and political nature is what is conspicuously absent, namely, an
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account of language. In Aristotle’s well-known argument, the basis of his contention that human destiny consists in participating in a political community is that man is unique amongst the animals in being gifted with language. Man alone is a political animal because he is able to reveal his nature, and the nature of other things, in speech. He is able to convey his interests and his ideas of justice and to resolve conflicting interests and opinions through persuasive speech. Language is not merely useful in conveying information, serving vital wants and obviating pressing fears, but is also a form of display or playful revelation and a form of communion, establishing and preserving a sense of kinship essential to the political community. Contrary to liberal theorists, Aristotle insists that a political society cannot be merely a network of instrumental relationships, of mutual exchanges and pacts for common security. The gift of *logos* is what makes possible a political community, and the exercise of that gift is the purpose of human life.

For Trudeau, it is not language that distinguishes man from other social animals. Following Rousseau, Trudeau asserts that it is free choice. Rousseau is clear that language is not natural to man; it is the product of some historical accident, such as an earthquake which created an island from the mainland and forces natural individualists into contact with one another. This bizarre account illustrates Rousseau’s view that human nature is fundamentally pre-social and pre-linguistic. Language merely utters pre-verbal and personal experiences; it expresses the impressions of things upon the senses and the passionate response to them. Participation in a political community is neither for Rousseau nor Trudeau an outgrowth of what is unique to man, of the natural faculty of speech, but a means to the achievement of personal (and fundamentally pre-social and pre-linguistic) goals.

The Shift from *Logos* to *Ratio*

Trudeau seems to adhere to the Latinization of the Aristotelian understanding of man as the being endowed with speech into man as the rational animal. The basis for this shift appears to be two-fold: first, that man’s rational nature cannot be encompassed within a specific linguistic community and secondly, that reason is preeminently to serve human “animality”, creature comforts, the material or economic requirements of man the consumer.

As to the universality of man, the rational animal, Trudeau approvingly cites Renan:

L’homme n’ appartient ni à sa langue, ni à sa race; il n’appartient qu’à lui-même, car c’est un être libre, c’est-à-dire un être moral.

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Furthermore, he asserts:

L’ère des frontières linguistiques est finie, au moins en ce qui concerne la science et la culture...

In the realm of science, language merely denotes certain objective or universally intersubjective processes (and the languages of mathematics and symbolic logic are universally comprehensible means of organizing scientific experience). But the realm of culture is more problematic since there is no universally recognized language which surpasses the frontiers of linguistic communities. Writes Trudeau:

...il importe maintenant d’examiner le cas plus difficile des valeurs culturelles qui se rattachent directement à la notion d’ethnie; ou plus précisément, des valeurs qui, au Canada et au Québec, sont véhiculées par la langue française.

There would seem to be some inconsistency in asserting that culture transcends language barriers and also that cultural values are somehow bound up with ethnicity and language. However the inconsistency is less striking when we consider that language is merely a vehicle or means of conveying meanings or 'values'. Although 'values' must be conveyed or communicated, they are not conditioned by the means or vehicle of communication. The medium is not the message. Language is an instrument, albeit a most important one, for conveying values which are not limited or conditioned by the instrument. A tool is external to, or not an integral part of, its user. Thus, if 'values' are as universal as the objects of scientific investigation, the many languages of the world can convey or express these 'values' without altering them in the means of communication or expression. If the era of linguistic frontiers has gone, then the 'meanings', 'ideas' or 'values' represented in language, or to which language refers, are as external to language as scientific objects are to mathematical concepts.

What I wish to emphasize in this shift from logos to ratio is that language has become external to man, as an instrument, a means of conveying information or meanings rather than informing the meaning conveyed, a means of expressing personal experience rather than impressing itself upon experience. In loosening the bonds between the speaker and speech, the shift from logos to ratio also loosens the ties between speech and what is spoken of. The ideal or real objects (meanings or things) represented in language are detached from the linguistic community using and being used by the language. The meaning of concepts (like the material qualities of things) are assumed to be independent of common, poetic or philosophic usage. Ideas reside outside rather than inside speech until a
universal language or 'logic' is created to represent adequately the objects of reason to reason as subject. Language is a displaceable mediation (medium of communication and means of thinking), a stop-gap until reason embraces itself in the cybernetic automation of *logos* servicing the pre-linguistic purposes of 'man'. The crucial point in the shift from *logos* to *ratio* is that it presupposes that speech refers beyond itself to speakers as reasonable subjects and to what is spoken of as objects of reason and that neither subject nor object is informed by language.

Linguistic frontiers have doubtless eroded for man, the rational and tool-making animal. If Marx and Engels were wrong to assert that industrial workers have no country, their error was based on the correct estimate that the world of science and technique, in which workers are professionally engaged, is increasingly universal and free of the heterogeneity of pre-industrial modes of production (which depend on differential soil fertility, climate, irrigation facilities, natural resources, trading and communication opportunities). Today one would expose oneself to ridicule if one were to refer to a national science (in the way one speaks of a national culture). Even to speak of a specific manner of harnessing the power of natural or international science as a national technology or ethnic technique would be considered parochial.

Trudeau has few peers in his warm disposition to the cosmopolitan mission of modern science, in his appraisal of the richer and more fruitful lives provided by industrial technology to increasing numbers of people, and in his hopes for enhanced freedom or mastery in the cybernetic revolution. Yet the universality of modern technology, the best-loved child of science and commerce, threatens to homogenize man's estate and to depersonalize man within that estate. As Trudeau put it:

> La technologie qui crée l'abondance et le bonheur matériel présuppose une masse indifférenciée de consommateurs, et tend ainsi à minimiser les valeurs par lesquelles la personne humaine acquiert et retient son identité propre, valeurs que je groupe ici sous la vague vocable "culturel". L'ordre politique établi par l'État doit lutter contre cette dépersonnalisation en poursuivant des objectifs culturels.20

Cultural 'values' thus enter into a dialectic, or a fruitful tension of attraction and repulsion, with technological 'values'. It is not just a question of French and English Canadians being drawn, moaning with pleasure and with pain, into the orbit of multinational corporations. Rather it is more a question of how Canadians can remain Canadian, and Québécois, Québécois, when subject to international capital, particularly when the instrument of communication in North American is the English language.21 Is international technique to be an instrument of Canadians or are Canadians to be instruments of international
technology? For one to conceive of technique being used by, rather than using, man, one must conceive of certain ends, or purposes which are not the means to, or the products of, economic or technological objectives. Trudeau calls these ends or purposes 'cultural values'; they constitute the identity of the free subject who uses language and technique as instruments of identifiable purposes. The identity of the free tool-user does not derive from the tool used, although there is the permanent possibility of a surrender of freedom in the identification of the user with the tool, or in the submergence of personality under the impact of dominant technological forces.

It is within the context of these considerations that Trudeau can consistently maintain that language serves to preserve cultural values while asserting that linguistic barriers to a cosmopolitan culture are, and should be, disappearing. The world of 'material' and 'spiritual' goods are only appropriated in freedom, or are only appropriate to a free subject, when they can be used by a person for his own (i.e. cultural) ends. To lack a culture of one's own is to lack an identity that can take a stand in relation to the dissolving agents of global technique. An uprooted individual is not able to choose freely in the world market of science and culture.

Language as an Instrument of National Culture or Languages as Nations

In a speech to an Ukrainian-Canadian congress in 1971, Trudeau provided an account of the place of language in human affairs.

Languages have two functions. They act both as a vehicle of communication, and as a preservation of culture. Governments can support languages in either or both of these roles, but it is only in the communication role that the term 'official' is employed. Trudeau explained that his government's Official Languages Act designates English and French as the languages to be used in communication with government but does not necessarily sponsor English or French above other languages in promoting Canada's cultural mosaic. He distinguished a technical, administrative function of language as a means or vehicle of communication and its cultural function as the caretaker or guardian of values.

The other use of language, as an ingredient of cultural preservation, as the vehicle for the dissemination and inheritance of literary and artistic treasures, requires no official recognition. Language in this sense is contributor of those values which guarantee to Canada its diversity, its richness, its
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Language so described becomes synonymous with culture. Though language for that purpose need not be official, it nevertheless deserves the support of government.\(^{23}\)

In this quotation, we see the affirmation of an essential relationship between language and culture, but the nature of the relationship is presented unclearly. Language is "an ingredient of cultural preservation", (the apples, the flour or the salt in an apple pie?), "a contributor" to cultural values (as a catalyst accelerating but external to the chemicals interacting or as one of the elements in the compound?), and itself "synonymous with culture". Clearly if language is identical in meaning with culture, it cannot merely be either a vehicle, an ingredient, a contributor or a means of preserving culture. Consistency requires that we consider Trudeau's statement of the identity of language and culture to be rhetorical emphasis and that he wishes to emphasize that language is an important ingredient of cultural preservation or a central contributor to cultural values.

Common sense also speaks against the equation of language and culture. The Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism sensibly points out that various groups of Canadians enjoy an identifiable culture different from other groups who share a common language. For example, most Canadian Jews born in this country do not speak Yiddish but have maintained a cultural identity despite having to find a home in another tongue.\(^{24}\) Speaking a common language is thus not only not a sufficient condition of cultural distinctiveness but also is not even a necessary condition of preserving a cultural identity. However, the point here is that for Trudeau, cultural identity, like economic power, is prior to language use; language is not a precondition, but merely an expression or an instrument of, a culture (which appears as a-linguistic as money).

You don't protect a language essentially by laws or even by a constitution. You can prop it up artificially that way but if you want to have a language preserved and have it flourish, it will be by making that language, in a sense, the expression of a dynamic, lively, important, cultured, wealthy, powerful group. I don't think you do this by laws. You can't legislate a language into importance. You can, once again, make sure that the people who speak a language become a very important contribution to the society in which they live and therefore that language will take prominence.\(^{25}\)

If language is not identical with culture and is not a necessary condition for the preservation of cultural values, could we say that language is one of the many 'values' that comprise culture or a way of life? Trudeau appears to speak of
To be sure, when Trudeau refers to language as a 'value', he does not mean it to be understood as an 'ultimate value'. Its 'value' is conditional upon other 'values' expressed by the speakers of the language. But if our earlier discussion of the meaning of 'values' is correct, all 'values' (and not just the value of language) are conditional upon the disposition of the free subject. That is, 'values' are instruments in the progress of human freedom and are conditional to the extent of their contribution to this end. In designating certain things or relationships as 'values', we honour the human subject who realizes his or her freedom, through these things or relationships. What is notable in Trudeau's formulation is not that language, as a value, is conditional upon ulterior purposes (freedom, progress) but that the human subject who freely disposes of its 'values' is a collectivity, or a people, and not an individual.

It may seem strange to portray a people or a nation as a collective subject since collectivities do not think, feel, judge and act as do individuals, and since Trudeau understands collectivities to be individuals jointly engaged in the common pursuit of individual interests. However, what is crucial to our analysis is to see that the collective subject, like the individual subject, maintains an external relationship to the object valued. The language which is valued by the people speaking it is not intrinsically or definitionally related to the people or nation as a collective subject. The collectivity, like the individual, is not defined in terms of language. Trudeau usually defines a nation or a people in terms of ethnicity, rightly observing that such a conception of a national collectivity is theoretically unsound and practically intolerant. But if Quebec nationalists were to hold by a racial or ethnic definition of a nation, they would object to all immigration into Quebec rather than to the tendency of immigrants into Quebec to adopt the English rather than the French language. Trudeau's conception of the nation is not just a straw-horse to be knocked down but inheres in the notion of a pure subject (individual or collective) prior to all particularisms, who then clothes himself or itself with concrete characteristics called 'values'. Indeed, Trudeau does not always seem to take a negative view of the nation.

La nation est porteuse de valeurs certaines: un héritage culturel, des traditions communes, une conscience communautaire, une continuité historique, une ensemble des moeurs, toutes choses qui contribuent—au stage présent de l'évolution de l'humanité—au développement de la personnalité.
Here we see Trudeau reaffirm that the collectivity exists for the purpose of individual development and that the nation is not understood in terms of language but in terms of cultural 'values'. The nation seems to be endowed with personality or subjectivity; it is the porter or caretaker who conveys or preserves goods or values. But porters or caretakers do not enjoy a lofty status; they deal with goods belonging to others, and serve the individuals entitled to their services. The collective subject is a servant of individuals.

Yet if we understand nationality in linguistic terms, we can see why the nation might be considered to be a subject rather than a predicate of individuals. For, as Marx and Wittgenstein emphasized, there are no private languages. Thus, to the extent that thinking requires language, our personal experiences are brought to self-awareness by means of what is common to a linguistic community. Language not only serves to express or convey one's experiences to others but also, and more fundamentally, to impress itself on, and order, experience. A child learns about the world by seeing the way words are used. The meaning of words is not unique to himself unless the child remains autistic and incapable of registering his thoughts in a regulated framework and of communicating them to others. Thus our thoughts are never simply our own; they are a product of social or linguistic interaction.

It is truer to say that thinking individuals are the product of a linguistic community than it is to say that a nation is the product of the thoughts or 'values' of natural individualists or 'unsocialized' individuals. As Aristotle said, the community is prior to the individual. This does not mean that the end of human life is to subordinate individuals to the collectivity but that the pre-condition of a 'human' life for individuals—the exercise of logos in practical and theoretical matters—is participation in a linguistic community. As indicated above, Trudeau cites Aristotle's dictum that individual fulfillment is the end or purpose of collective life. He parts from Aristotle in failing to recognize language as inseparable from man, as the very element within which one can question or doubt who or what man is. Language is no more a value, or a vehicle to convey values, than is man. For language itself is man. As such, man is not a pure subject but is subjected to, or conditioned by, the language with which he is at home.

Language, Languages and Meaning

The purpose of this paper has been to clarify the dimensions of Pierre Trudeau's approach to language. His approach is grounded in a rejection of an Aristotelian understanding of human nature, of the innate sociability of men and of language as that power which unifies and orders a political community. This rejection is the precondition of the thoughtful application of the vocabulary of values to linguistic questions. Consistent with the grammar of values in the analysis of moral and political questions, Trudeau identifies individuals and
collectivities not in terms of language but in terms of the values adopted by the free subject, who somehow subsists under the particularisms or accidents of class, culture and nationality. Language is understood as an instrument or vehicle of human freedom, not as the very being of humanity. As a 'value' or a vehicle to convey 'values', language is external to the definition of a man or of a specific group of men: the nation is conceived in terms independent of a linguistic community.

It is for this reason that the vocabulary of values may be inappropriate to linguistic concerns in Canada. For a fundamental conflict in Canada is between French-Canadians and English-Canadians, not between individuals who happen to speak French and those who happen to speak English. It is not a question of the values of those who speak the tongue that Shakespeare or Racine spake: it is a question of the very being of French and English Canadians.

If one understands language merely as a vehicle to convey values, one would be at a loss to account for the public misperception that the Official Languages Act forces Canadians to speak both French and English. The error that the Act is a threat to freedom and personal identity is suggestive of the truth that individuals see their identity and their freedom to consist in the security of their mother tongue. What English-speaking Canadians should come to realize is that French-Canadians experience a similar sentiment. They do not want to bear what many consider to be the burdens of bilingualism; they do not want to feel compelled to speak English in order to get on in the public and private corporations. Those who have been inappropriately called "the white niggers of America" do not simply want more of an anglophone pie, for the language one speaks is not as external to one's civic status as is one's blackness or whiteness.

The Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism stated: "As a means of communication, language is the natural vehicle for a host of other elements of culture." An even stronger link between language and culture is suggested in the statement that language is "an essential expression of culture." However, as a means of communication or of expression, language is secondary to what is prior in importance or closer to man, the culture which is conveyed or expressed. Such a view, which is similar to that of the prime minister, might be called a liberal or anti-nationalist understanding of language.

The Royal Commission cites, but does not espouse, the following opinion of R.L. Watts:

It is through language that man not only communicates but achieves communion with others. It is language which, by its structure, shapes the very way in which men order their thoughts coherently. It is language which makes possible social organization.
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This view, which might be called a nationalist or communitarian understanding of language, is that which has been implicitly advanced throughout this paper as an alternative to Trudeau’s instrumentalist conception. The Royal Commission advances a third alternative, which might be called a moderate or liberal nationalist view; namely, that it is language which unites a culture, but it is culture or “a way of being, thinking or feeling” which defines a man.33

If, as the nationalist view of language claims, it is the structure of a language that shapes the way men think, one might infer that it is impossible to translate one language into another. If so, the position is absurd, particularly for one who attempts to analyse the ideas of a bilingual, such as Trudeau. (However, the structure of French and English grammar or usage is not so different that one encounters the problems of translating between two languages of independent origins and differing grammatical structures. And doubtless, with the techniques of modern linguistics and sufficient sensitivity to understand the nuances of the languages involved, any sentence of any language can be translated into another.) However the question is not so much whether one can translate the ideas formulated in one language into another but whether the ideas formulated in one language are shaped or conditioned by the language in use.

Can one assert that all words have a strict denotation, that is, something external to speech to which one can point? Or do a good many words also have, or only have, a variety of connotations, or meanings internal to speech, meanings determinable only through relation to the usage of other words? Les mots can be denotative nouns (noms, names) or less denotative verbs (verbes, words). Hobbesian nominalism, with its instrumentalist view of language, may do less justice to the activity or potency of words (verbes). What a word means (veut dire) may be what one wants to say, but what is meant by a word wanting to say something?

Perhaps one might say that words refer beyond themselves, not simply to things, as Hobbes had it, but to universal ideas or meanings, as Plato thought. That is, the abode of Platonic forms is not in the tongue but in some intelligible realm to which all reasonable beings have access, regardless of the specific tongue expressing what these universal forms or meanings impress upon it. However much Trudeau’s cosmopolitanism or anti-nationalism, together with his view of language as a vehicle of communication and means of expression, suggests a Platonic view of the relation between words and ideas, Platonism is fundamentally incompatible with the doctrine of ‘values’. For Plato, man is not the free sovereign subject, the creator of the moral world, the measure of all things.

We have indicated how Trudeau’s shift from logos to ratio, from the speaking to the rational animal, involves a positioning of meanings outside speech. The rational animal refers beyond linguistic representations or signs to the things and meanings signified in speech. Thus what is represented in language is detached from the usage of specific linguistic communities. But what constitutes the rupture with Platonism is the new function of reason which serves the animality of the rational animal in a human—that is, free and creative—manner.
Reason, like language, becomes an instrument of human freedom or value creation.

To insist that language is part of the being of man, and is not just a 'value' or a vehicle to convey values, is not necessarily to submerge individuality under nationality. For Aristotle, upon whose understanding of human nature this analysis has been based, asserted, as Trudeau pointed out, that the purpose of political life is to foster individual development. However, in the Aristotelian understanding, individuality is to be conceived more fruitfully as a product of society than can society be understood as the product of unsocialized individuals. We have pointed out that Trudeau presents a one-sided interpretation of Aristotle, because Aristotle thought the nurture of community and language were ends in themselves as well as means to individual fulfillment. But to maintain that attention to, and care of, language is an end in itself does not entail that language is not also a means to individual purposes.

If a linguistic community is, as Premier Lévesque has it, the spiritual food of humankind, one must insist that man is not only what he eats, but what he makes of his spiritual nourishment; eating is both an end in itself and a means to further ends. Thus we conclude that language is both an instrument of our freedom and our being, and our very being and freedom; it is a means individuals use to convey information or to express personal experience and, at the same time, language orders individuals' experience, bringing it to consciousnes, or common awareness. Language is the con-ning of scientia, or so nationalist con-men would have it. Care for language is care for what is common.

Whatever the effect of Trudeau's political career, whether the federal state can be re-constituted to meet the interests, aspirations and sentiments of the two nations, or whether Quebec becomes politically independent of the rest of Canada, French and English Canadians can be indebted to the prime minister for making intelligence respectable in public life and for drawing attention to linguistic concerns as a central feature of political conflict. If this analysis has attempted to indicate the inadequacy of Trudeau's account of language, it has also attempted to show the force and coherence of that account. Indeed, any thoughtful review of the merits of federal institutions and the liberal philosophy informing them must take the ideas of Pierre Trudeau into account. Because he has articulated his liberalism with intelligence and because he has provoked thoughtful opposition to his political position, Trudeau has added dignity to Canadian politics by opening us up to fundamental questioning of our political commitments and personal identity. For to question, in and out of whatever language, is a high and uncommon road, a destiny without a destination.

Department of Political Economy
University of Toronto
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Notes


3. What follows is an elaboration of certain aspects of Trudeau's thought which was ably examined over a decade ago by A. Carrier, "L'idéologie politique de la revue Cité Libre", Canadian Journal of Political Science, 1 (1968) 416. Since no reference is made to Trudeau in this section clarifying the usage of 'values', readers wishing to ascertain the compatibility of the liberal grammar of values with Trudeau's personalist Catholicism would do well to consult this fine article by Carrier.


6. ibid., p. 51.

7. W. Mathie has contrasted the thought of Trudeau and Aristotle in 'Political Community and the Canadian Experience: Reflections on Nationalism, Federalism and Unity', Canadian Journal of Political Science, 12 (1979) 15-19. However the differences between Aristotle and Trudeau on the place of speech in human society is not analyzed by Mathie.

8. op. cit., p. 54.

9. ibid., p. 55.


11. ibid., 1253a.

12. The Politics of Aristotle, 1280a-b.


15. Rousseau, in Émile (Bk 4 and 5), portrays the motive for civic responsibility as erotic; only when Émile desires Sophie does he search for a homeland to raise a family and establish roots. His commitment to the principles of The Social Contract is conditional upon his desire to sow his seed in fertile ground.

16. See P.E. Trudeau, Conversations with Canadians, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1972, p. 27; and 'La nouvelle trahison des clercs' and 'Fédéralisme, nationalisme et raison' in Le fédéralisme et la société canadienne-française. To be sure, the shift from 'logos' to 'ratio' is not as abrupt as the words 'language' to 'reason' would suggest. The Greek word 'logos' was used in various ways, apparently without even Wittgenstein's family resemblances amongst the usages;
'logos' meant thought or reason, as well as speech, language, word, proportion or ratio, estimation, collection, computation or account, explanation, grounds of a theory or course of action, the matter spoken of, etc.


18. ibid, p. 184.

19. ibid, p. 36. The English translation renders "se rattachent" by "related" which does not capture the essential belonging together of language and cultural values. Federalism and the French Canadians, Toronto, MacMillan, 1968, p. 29.

20. Le fédéralisme, p. 36.

21. I am told that English is the language of the boardrooms and of senior management of the Chase Manhattan Bank in Paris. However widespread the use of English in multinational corporations in Europe, it is clear that English is for the most part the language of capital in Quebec. The "working language" is not the language of most workers. Thus linguistic and economic concerns, the "national question" and the "social question", are intertwined; linguistic conflict is to a greater or lesser extent class struggle. With the increasing concentration and socialization of production, language, as an instrument of communication, becomes ever more "a productive force." Access to this productive force is an element of class struggle, particularly when the "traditional petit-bourgeoisie" or independent proprietors have been incorporated in large organizations.

22. Conversations with Canadians, p. 33.

23. ibid., p. 36.

24. One might say that religion more than language accounts for the cultural identity of Jews, Mennonites, Doukabours, etc. But it would be inappropriate to consider a religion a 'value', or as a vehicle of cultural 'values' since religious observants do not consider religion exhaustively or primarily in terms of the secular functions of maintaining an identity and enlarging one's freedom. The vocabulary of values adopts a point of view foreign to those believing themselves called by God to realize His will. Similarly, the vocabulary of 'values' is inappropriate to language. Language, like religion, is not merely an instrument or a vehicle; it is not the product of human will and artifice; it is not conditional upon the disposition, choice or evaluation of the free subject. We are used by language in our use of it.


27. ibid., p.186.

28. D. Cameron's Nationalism, Self-Determination and the Quebec Question, Toronto, MacMillan, 1974, is a thoughtful analysis of Quebec nationalism is spite of the fact that he employs the language of values without subjecting it to the careful historical scrutiny which he bestows on other central words in our political vocabulary.

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30. The Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, Ottawa, Queen’s Printer, 1967, Bk 1, xxxiv.

31. ibid.

32. ibid., xxix.

33. ibid., xxxi.

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Among the many perverse features of human action, one of the most remarkable is its sublime self-confidence in manipulating things unseen. Vast material wealth moves and fluctuates without being touched in the daily routines of stock exchange and banking transactions. Modern science applauds the progressive refinement of the physicists’ instruments that reveal the existence of particles with infinitesimally small mass and lifespan. Experts in the affairs of souls, gods and devils manage fantastic property holdings and in places operate gallows and firing squads around the clock. Others await their turn to reorganize social relations according to the dictates of the “not-yet-present” and the “what could be.” And all of them regard themselves quite correctly as eminently practical men and women.

Modern society has realized the synthesis that eluded all earlier times, the union of rationalism and faith. It is a potent brew.

Marxian socialism turned out to be one of the most influential variations of this union. Its message was grounded in a proposition of stunning simplicity and elegance, namely, that what must be (the unavoidable outcome of historical laws) and what should be (the most desirable and appropriate framework for human relations) are identical: the triumph of socialism and communism as the universal social form. The proposition is the core of Marx’s thinking, the unifying ingredient that provides an overall coherence for Marxism as a “system” of thought. It is one of the great strengths of Leszek Kolakowski’s Main Currents of Marxism to see it as the focal point for a study of Marxism: “The present conspectus of the history of Marxism will be focused on the question which appears at all times to have occupied a central place in Marx’s independent thinking: viz. how is it possible to avoid the dilemma of utopianism versus historical fatalism?” (I, 6)

The idea of a thoroughgoing unity between what is necessary and what is good is a cornerstone of religious thought. Modern philosophers (notably Kant) dissolved this unity, and struggled with the resultant dualism of a world fractured into the realms of natural necessity and ethical freedom. As a secular philosophy of history Marxism re-asserted their unity on the level of collective social action. The commonplace that Marxism is a secular version of religious faith, however, usually does not distinguish with sufficient precision between two quite different
aspects of Marxism considered as soteriology. One is the (false) unity between
the necessary and the good in Marx’s own thought. The other is the essential
difference between Marx’s philosophy of history, considered as a product of
rational inquiry (and thus subject to requirements of adequate reasoning and
evidence), and Marxism as a dogma in the service of social movements and state
power.

The false unity between the necessary and the good in Marx’s thought results
from his attempt to overlay a rationalist historical sociology onto a philosophical
scheme, rooted in Hegelian dialectics, that aims at the dissolution of the split
between essence and existence. As the notorious passage from the 1844
Manuscripts says, communism as “completed naturalism” overcomes the
estrangement of mankind, not only from its own nature (its species-being), but
from nature itself. What is presented here is essentially a conceptual issue of
some considerable complexity, requiring sustained philosophical reflection—
namely, what is this estrangement, and can it be cured? Furthermore, is it
something that we can even conceive of “curing” through rearrangements in the
structure of social relations?

Marx does not stop to examine such issues, but instead proceeds to announce
that there is an agent of social change (the proletariat) to accomplish the
overcoming of estrangement. What the 1843-44 writings develop, of course, is
the concept of the proletariat, as it (the concept) “emerges” from the dialectic of
private property. To this point Marx remains faithful to the tradition of
rationalist social theory (for example, Plato and Rousseau), where hypothetical
social conditions are arrived at deductively from speculative premises. The next
step marks his break with the tradition. In Kolakowski’s words: “Having arrived
at his theory of the proletariat’s historic mission on the basis of philosophical
deduction, he later sought empirical evidence for it.” (I, 373) The subsequent
historical sociology, based on the theory of classes, was to provide the grounds for
asserting that the good (the overcoming of estrangement) was also, by a happy
coincidence, the outcome of the historically necessary evolution of social forms.
What linked the two was the proletariat itself.

In fact this was sheer fantasy, and subsequently the link was ruptured. The
philosophical scheme nurtured a commitment, still a vital part of contemporary
social critique, to the reduction (if not the elimination) of estrangement and
reification as a goal of social change; the more prominent this theme was in any
particular case, however, the less successful was any connection to a detailed
sociological analysis (for example, Marcuse’s works). On the other hand, modern
historical sociology is deeply indebted to Marx’s thought; yet the more detailed is
the understanding of class structures, the more tenuous becomes the link to any
coherent account of class consciousness.

It is only with respect to a desire to uphold this false unity of the necessary and
the good, and not with respect to the philosophical or sociological themes taken
independently, that Marx’s thought itself represents a secular faith.

The philosophically grounded conception of “true human production” in the
early Marx, for example, leads us to believe that a market society such as ours
systematically blocks the development of creative human powers; distorts the expression of fundamental needs; deprives persons of any control over their own labour activity and its products; and encourages an "instrumentalist" attitude in relations between persons that undermines the social (non-economic) bonds of family and community life. These are all propositions that are subject to rational analysis, discussion and proselytizing. In other words, they form (potentially) a coherent position on which one can base a set of rational goals for social change. (It must be said again that this position remains remarkably underdeveloped both in general and in details; but it is capable of further development.) The associated contention—that modern society's evolution produces of itself a group that is the overwhelming majority whose being is the concrete embodiment of this position—has never been accorded the dignity of a consistent argument.

In fact the assertion of an internal contradiction in Marx's thought between historical materialism and proletarian revolutionary consciousness is an old one. It was stated forcefully, for example, by the Russian Marxist Peter Struve in an 1899 essay, "Marx's Theory of Social Development." In Struve's view "it could not be expected that a class condemned to increasing degradation of mind and body would be able to bring about the greatest revolution in history, including not only economic changes but the efflorescence of art and civilization." Historical materialism, on the contrary, reveals the continuous interaction of socio-economic change with changes in legal, moral, aesthetic, and other forms. As capitalism developed, so did the resistance to its injustice and degradation; this resistance became embodied in the institutional structures—unions, social welfare policies, public education, and so forth—that represent a growing "socialist" element within the evolution of capitalism (Kolakowski, II, 366-7).

On the other hand, the historical sociology stemming from Marx's work represents a powerful tool of rational social inquiry when separated from the eschatological vision of proletarian revolution. The study of social class formation shattered traditional paradigms of, for example, political history; helped to destroy the "naturalistic" illusions inherent in the economic ideologies of market society; and offered—in its best expressions—a sophisticated view of the differential impact of large-scale historical changes on particular social groups and their self-understanding. Divorced from the eschatological revolutionary vision, it also helps us comprehend the new constellations of social interests, relations between privileged elites and other groups, and the functional interplay of economic and political power that characterize the so-called "socialist" societies. What it emphatically does not do, however, is lend credence to the eschatological vision.

Marxist thought itself, then, represents a secular variant of religious faith insofar as it insists on the unity of the necessary and the good. Insofar as it does so, it reproduces, in the contradiction between historical determinism and proletarian consciousness, the eternal conundrum represented best in Christianity's "freedom of the will."

There is a quite different sense in which Marxism fell victim to a kind of
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historical determinism that makes plausible an analogy with religion. This occurred to some extent as soon as Marxism became an "official" ideology of social movements and solidified when it became the official dogma of a political regime. For in this setting its rational content is inevitably subordinated to its instrumental function in the service of political power. For example:

Zhdanov in his address to the philosophers in 1947 inveighed against the disciples of Einstein who declared that the universe was finite... In general, since Einstein made temporal relations and movement dependent on the 'observer,' i.e. on the human subject, he must be a subjectivist and thus an idealist. The philosophers who took part in these debates... did not confine their criticism to Einstein but attacked the whole of 'bourgeois science,' their favourite targets being Eddington, Jeans, Heisenberg, Schrödinger, and all known methodologists of the physical sciences. (III, 132)

The historical legacy on which this way of treating ideas is based is not hard to discern: "The Second Council of Constantinople in 553 recognized the key issue in the christological controversy when it anathematized anyone 'who says that God the Logos who performed the miracles is one, and that the Christ who suffered is another.'"

In this regard the historical analogy is illuminating. Both Christianity and Marxism infiltrated shaky empires, steeling the resolve of oppositional groups in their struggles against decadent ruling classes. Both ideologies ultimately were founded on an antagonism, not only towards particular regimes, but also towards political power per se. Thus the groups motivated by these ideologies were unprepared for the exercise of political power, with the result that they were ruined by their own successes. Lacking any conception of legitimate authority of their own, both were forced to pretend that they could make do "temporarily" (i.e., until political authority itself was abolished, which was to be done post-haste) with the institutional structures conveniently left at their disposal in the old regimes' collapse. These structures wreaked their revenge on the conquering ideologies by converting thought into dogma, ideas, into instruments of repression.

The outstanding virtue of Leszek Kolakowski's Main Currents of Marxism is to impose an ineluctable duty on all serious participants in discussions of its subject-matter: the duty to confront the intellectual content of Marxism in terms of both its deepest originating impulses and its historical fate.

The first of these two tasks is undertaken in volume one, where what is at stake is identifying the key presuppositions in one of the great nineteenth-century "systems" of thought, and then subjecting them to rigorous criticism. Volumes two and three are occupied with the second task, which properly falls under the
rubric of the "history of dogma"; here typically the system's subsequent permutations can be understood only by relating them to definite historical circumstances to which they have become subordinated.

Kolakowski's principal interpretive framework in volume one is straightforward. Its first feature is the idea of the unity and consistency of Marx's thought. This obliges us to seek to understand Marx's thought in its entirety as being governed by a conceptual unity, and not by the historical circumstances of his day. Its second feature is to locate the foundations of that conceptual unity. For Kolakowski the foundation is Hegelian dialectics, which itself is heir to the long Western tradition of neo-Platonism and religious mysticism; volume one opens with a fascinating chapter on this theme. Kolakowski is both a historian of ideas and a philosopher, and the merits of this volume lie in the detailed, combined application of both approaches. It culminates in a close examination of the key concepts and methodological principles, especially the concept of value (325 ff.) and historical materialism (363 ff.).

Of course both the interpretive framework and the critical commentary are subject to debate. What is especially important about them, however, in addition to their own contribution to the ongoing debate on Marx's work, is their strong challenge to a fundamental impulse in the Marxist tradition: namely, the desire for an intellectual synthesis that harmonizes a "scientific" theory of social development with an utopian vision of a single, perfected future state of social relations.

The first phase of Marxism after Marx and Engels is called by Kolakowski its "golden age," encompassing the period from the end of the nineteenth century to the beginnings of Stalinism. During this time Marxism "was not the religion of an isolated sect, but the ideology of a powerful political movement; on the other hand, it had no means of silencing its opponents, and the facts of political life obliged it to defend its position in the realm of theory. In consequence, Marxism appeared in the intellectual arena as a serious doctrine which even its adversaries respected" (II, 2). There were a number of interesting new developments, such as the attempted synthesis of Kantian and Marxian thought, and many variations on the original themes, such as the meaning of materialism. Perhaps most importantly, it began to be recognized and assimilated into the broader intellectual currents of the time by outstanding thinkers in philosophy, economic history, and sociology (Croce, Sombart, Simmel). At the same time, however, sectarian quarrels began to take shape in which the doctrine's intellectual content was interpreted from the standpoint of the "practical situation" of the moment.

Kolakowski dates the next phase, "breakdown," from the beginnings of Stalinism, and under that rubric includes both Soviet Marxism and all the varieties of "Western Marxism." Clearly it is the Bolsheviks' success in seizing state power, and in converting a sectarian ideology into a police-state dogma, that is the watershed; but Kolakowski's own scheme breaks down here. Since, as he argues, Stalinism is so firmly rooted in Leninism, why does "the breakdown" begin with the former? More serious are the presumptions implicit in the
lumping together of Soviet and Western Marxism. There is not transition at all here; the third volume moves without interruption from Stalin and Trotsky to Gramsci, Lukács, Korsch and other "Western Marxists."

Ironically the historical situation here enters Kolakowski's own work and in fact dominates it; philosophical reflection on Marxism's historical fate itself falls victim to an interpretive framework that is conditioned by historical circumstances. The author attempts to be disarmingly candid in this preface to volume three, warning his readers that he is "not able to treat the subject with the desirable detachment." This is something of an understatement. The entire tone of the discussion changes drastically in the passage from the first two volumes to the third, from patient exposition and severe but temperate criticism to curt dismissal and harsh — sometimes shrill — condemnation. I hasten to add that there is much in this period that merits condemnation; but the evenhanded treatment of the first two volumes ill prepares us for the lack of restraint and discriminating judgment in the third.

For example, the specific criticisms levelled at Adorno are well formulated and to the point. However, the discussion is framed by the following remarks: "There can be few works of philosophy that give such an overpowering impression of sterility as Negative Dialectics. ... The pretentious obscurity of style and the contempt that it shows for the reader might be endurable if the book were not also totally devoid of literary form" (III, 366, 357). Similarly, there is much in Marcuse's work — especially his disdain of reasoned defense for radical perspectives and his theoretical affirmation of vague revolutionary slogans — that merits severe and even harsh criticism. Kolakowski is not content to rest his case with his detailed and pointed critique, however; and he wishes us to believe that "Marcuse's demands go much further than Soviet totalitarian communism has ever done, either in theory or in practice" (III, 419). It is possible to interpret what Marcuse wrote in this way; but a critic who fastens onto the least charitable interpretation of his sources will fail to earn his own readers' sympathy.

Kolakowski's understanding of twentieth-century Western Marxism is clearly shaped by his lived experience of Marxism as dogma in the service of repressive political power. How could it not be? It may be impossible for one with this experience to understand it either in its own terms, as a response to the imperialism, economic crisis, and rise of fascism earlier in this century, which was the lived experience of those theorists — or in terms of its impact on intellectual developments in North America and Western Europe in the 1960s.

I wish to contrast Kolakowski's experience with my own, which was a part of the "second phase" of Western Marxism in the 1960s. Anyone associated with universities in the 1950s will remember the unofficial ban on Marxist thought then in force (I do not claim that this was in any way equivalent to police-state repression), which in practice inhibited even non-Marxist forms of social critique. I recall an episode at graduate school in the early 1960s: Having written a careful analysis of some seventeenth-century English pamphlet literature for a graduate course, I incautiously mentioned a few general observations at the end, including an offhand use of the phrase "capitalist society." My professor, a
well-meaning soul concerned for my prospective academic career, who as a young man had tasted the spicier ideological fare of the late 1930s, remarked: "We don't write that way anymore."

He was wrong. In the ensuing period many of the existing constraints on intellectual discourse were eroded, and the legacy of Western Marxism (together with its major surviving expositors) played an important part in the process. There were the usual rhetorical excesses, to be sure, but these have largely disappeared. What remains today is a much richer dialogue, in which those who have been influenced by Marxism have a recognized place in both academic and more general public forums. My teacher would, I trust, no longer be surprised to see casual references to "capitalist society" in writings by those considered to be in the "mainstream" of social commentary.

Events have ruptured — permanently, I suspect — the unity of historical sociology and utopian vision that provided the basic impetus for Marx's thought. That historical sociology, shorn of all but the most tenuous associations with the eschatological vision of proletarian revolution, has found a permanent home in the intellectual culture of the semi-capitalist societies, whose future evolution, so far as we can now see, will bear little resemblance to Marx's crudely-sketched scheme. That scheme, however, lives on in the cruel masquerade conducted by the official ideologies of the "socialist" and "communist" states. In becoming the public language of authoritarian regimes, it has surrendered whatever moral authority it once possessed as a guiding image in the struggle for a better society.

Department of Communication
Simon Fraser University

Notes


2. In discussing Ernst Bloch, Kolakowski remarks that "Bloch helped in one way to throw light on Marxism by revealing its neo-Platonic roots,... He emphasized the soteriological strain which was blurred in Marx and could therefore be neglected and overlooked, but which set the whole Marxian idea in motion: namely, the belief in the future identification of man's authentic essence with empirical existence,..." (III, 448). My formulation in the text above suggests that there are a set of propositions critical of market society which can be stated in secular terms and be the subject of rational discourse—even though the underlying "inspiration" for them may be located in the tradition of neo-Platonism and religious mysticism. I hasten to add that, more than a century after their formation, as secular propositions they remain seriously underdeveloped.


4. "At public meetings, and even in private conversations, citizens were obliged to repeat in ritual fashion grotesque falsehoods about themselves, the world, and the Soviet Union, and at the same time to keep silent about things they knew very well, not only because they were terrorized but
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because the incessant repetition of falsehoods which they knew to be such made them accomplices in the campaign of lies inculcated by the party and state. It was not the regime's intention that people should literally believe the absurdities that were put about: if any were so naive as to do so and forget reality completely, they would be in a state of innocence vis-à-vis their own consciences and would be prone to accept Communist ideology as valid in its own right. Perfect obedience required, however, that they should realize that the current ideology meant nothing in itself: any aspect of it could be altered or annulled by the supreme leader at any moment as he might see fit, and it would be everyone's duty to pretend that nothing had changed and that the ideology had been the same from everlasting" (III, 96).
The Political Unconscious is Jameson's most comprehensive and insightful work to date—yet it has many of the negative traits of his earlier books. Though it is a masterful treatment of dialectical criticism in both its theoretical and practical dimensions, it is also tortuously excessive and eclectic. In theoretical terms it tries to come to grips with the leading schools in modern literary criticism in order to transform and totalize them according to Jameson's own Marxist framework: Structuralism becomes hermeneutics and hermeneutics the unmasking of ideology with the differences between schools sometimes vanishing altogether. Ranging in Jameson's practice of criticism from the analysis of myth to the interpretation of romanticism, realism and modernism, the purpose of the book is to show how the repressed "political unconscious" lying behind such works of narrative can be recovered. The task of interpretation is to rewrite the text in terms of class struggle, the fundamental Marxist code, so that it becomes socially meaningful. Yet this code itself is open. This is the paradoxical core of Jameson's work: the fundamental story is incomplete and unfinished; the totality is "infinitely totalizable" (p. 53); the recovery of latent meaning is forever an alienated project. And this is the nature of history, the ever-present absence in history, in the light of which the ultimate task of the critic is to show how a literary text either hides or reveals this absence.

The vast scope of The Political Unconscious invites many different readings and entries into the text. One could concentrate on what Jameson has to say about interpretive practice, or one could simply focus on his extended discussions of writers like Balzac, Gissing and Conrad. Jameson's use of structuralism certainly challenges one to think out the latter's implications and limits, while his Marxist language opens the vast problem of Marxism and culture, particularly the problem of finding a non-reductive Marxist literary criticism. Such important but singular dimensions, however, cannot measure up to Jameson's total project. The "imperative to totalize" (p. 53), Jameson's implicit Pascalian wager, challenges the reader to appropriate his notion of historical narrative.¹

I will take up this challenge by focussing on the distinction between the wish-fulfilling "illusions" of romance—Jameson goes so far as to call romance "degraded narrative" (p. 255)—and the "truth" of historical narrative.² Jameson's "metacode" is a historical rewriting of the romantic search for a "lost Eden" (p. 110), rendering it in terms of the history of man's social and political
relationship to the world in the fullness of its ambiguity. So too, it turns out, are the objects of his study, the works of Balzac, Gissing, and most important of all, Conrad.

Bearing this in mind, we can bracket the historical dimension in order to uncover the essential latent meaning behind romance. To borrow Ricoeur's expression, we can begin with a Marxist hermeneutic of demystification. It is at this level that Jameson's debt both to Marxism and to structuralism is most evident. He distinguishes three overlapping and intertwining horizons of Marxist interpretation which are necessary for the understanding of a literary text: The text must be rewritten in terms of a Marxist metacode consisting of political history, social relations and the sequence of modes of production. Jameson uses Levi-Strauss in order to introduce his analysis of a given text as a politically significant symbolic act. According to Levi-Strauss, the structure of myth must be grasped in terms of a wish-fulfillment, or in Jameson's words, "an imaginary resolution of a real contradiction" (p. 77). This is the cornerstone on which Jameson builds his whole theory of what, following Lacan, he calls the Imaginary: the aesthetic act invents imaginary solutions to unresolvable but real social and political contradictions. Such solutions are more than mere reflections for they are acts whose purpose it is to symbolically transcend contradiction. This utopian dimension is ideological, however, because it is bound by these social contradictions, unable to realize their transformation.

Like myth, the romance narrative offers a salvational vision, the structure of which Jameson unveils as ideological closure using Greimas' semiotic rectangle. The rectangle consists of (1) a relation of contradictories: a simple term (white) and its binary opposition (non-white); (2) a relation of contraries: the simple term (white) and a contrary term (black); (3) the other terms generated by these two relations: a contradictory (black - non-black) and a subcontrary (non-black - non-white); (4) relations of implication: if white, then non-black; if black, then non-white. Out of this rectangle, Greimas generates four more categories: the complex term (white + black) and the neutral term (non-black + non-white) which are in a relation of contradiction; two other terms (white + non-black, and black + non-white) which are contraries. This can be sketched as follows:

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complex term (meaning)

white  \  \  black (contraries)
(contradictories)

(implication) non-black  \  \  non-white

neutral term (non-meaning)
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The complex term represents the meaning which brings together the human world in a significant whole (as white and black). It is the mythical unity which orders chaos.

While for Greimas the semiotic rectangle is the basic structure of all meaning, Jameson makes it the basic structure of all closed meaning, of ideology. It is a model of closure that maps out the limits of a historically specific social and political consciousness. By using it the critic is able to determine the basic terms of the particular political fantasy embedded in a literary text. The relation of contraries becomes for Jameson a basic social contradiction, while the complex term is the political fantasy resolving it. In Balzac's *La Vielle Fille*, there is, argues Jameson, a contradiction between Balzac's leanings towards the ancien régime and his recognition of the powerlessness of this tradition in the face of the rising bourgeoisie. The narrative must resolve the social contradiction between the powerless ancien régime and the powerful bourgeoisie. The first step in the resolution is reached when Napoleonic prowess is separated from bourgeois commercial activity. The ancien régime could save itself from the bourgeoisie if it were to recover for itself a form of Napoleonic energy. Thus the solution to the contradiction would be the unity of the two contraries, ancien régime and Napoleonic energy. This ideal or complex term, argues Jameson, is symbolically achieved with the appearance of the aristocratic and powerful officer, Comte de Troisville. His arrival at Mademoiselle Cormon's house is all the more indicative of the utopian solution because the town-house itself is the synthesis of the old (the courtyards and domestic household economy) and the new (the commercial and urban context in which it is set).

This political analysis directs us to the second horizon of Marxist interpretation. Embedded in the text is a discussion of class relations: feudal lordship versus the bourgeoisie. Shifting the analysis from Balzac to Gissing Jameson discusses the wider system of class discourse itself, this time examining relations between bourgeoisie and proletariat. At this level, the symbolic text is grasped as a particular strategic move in a broad ideological confrontation. What is important is not just the ideology of a particular text, but its relation to a class discourse made of "ideologemes." Jameson defines the ideologeme as "the smallest intelligible unit in the essentially antagonistic discourses of social classes" (p. 76). Like an individual text, the ideologeme is an imaginative narrative unity, a symbolical act resolving the social contradictions in a concrete historical situation. However, it is a collective praxis transcending any given individual text. Jameson uses as an example of an ideologeme the theory of ressentiment. Loosely distinguishing between the middle and the lower class, he presents nineteenth-century ressentiment as the anti-mob, bourgeois sentiment "Stay in your place!" The class contradiction is resolved in fantasy narratives upholding the naturalness or justice of social distinction. Gissing's *Demos* portrays the impossibility of the proletariat, irredeemable body as it is, controlling the means of production.

Marxist comprehension requires that one further horizon be brought into play in the interpretation of the individual text. The literary work and its ideologemes...
must be placed in the context of the sequence of modes of production. The transition from the feudal to the capitalist mode of production is a fundamental tension in Balzac's text. In Gissing, social relations are grounded in the capitalist mode of production, and implicitly, its possible replacement by a communist mode.

As in the political and social horizons, Jameson uses the model of contradiction and its imaginary resolution to discuss the structure of culture at this level. Greimas' essential contradiction is recast in terms of contradictory modes of production. (Jameson follows Poulantzas in using the idea of overlapping modes of production in order to avoid a reductive stage theory of culture.) The contradiction between modes of production is resolved in terms of the form of cultural production. This is because form (e.g., the romance genre) itself transmits an ideological message. The critic must analyse the text until he reveals the conflicting modes of production underlying it, and the way in which they are embedded in the form of the text. The romance work, for example, carries within itself the tension between two coexisting modes of production (usually found in the transition to capitalism). It resolves this in terms of a closed form projecting a utopian social resolution of contradiction.

While both Balzac and Gissing have been treated so far in terms of romance, it is Conrad whom Jameson uses to most clearly bring out the link between romance and mode of production. The second half of *Lord Jim*, argues Jameson, is a romance in which the fundamental contradiction is that between the religious passivity of precapitalist society and the frenetic activity of capitalism. *Lord Jim* is the romantic hero, the fantasy that unites the contraries of value and activity.

The problem not only with *Lord Jim* but also with many of the works of Balzac and Gissing is that they cannot as a whole be reduced to the romance genre. There is another Jim in Conrad's book who, far from being the "lord" uniting the contraries of value and activity in a utopian manner, is an existential hero condemned to freedom: Jim's "act itself suddenly yawns and discloses at its heart a void which is at one with the temporary extinction of the subject" (p. 260). Jim is the modernist who experiences in anguish his transcendence of space and time and simultaneously the necessity of ordering the discontinuity of time and absurdity of nature. But the truth of the narrative goes further, argues Jameson, beyond the individual experience of historicity towards the totality of history. Jim's discovery of Sartrean freedom has a demoralizing effect on the ideological myths allowing "the heroic bureaucracy of imperial capitalism" to assert its unity and legitimacy (p. 265). Thus the importance of *Lord Jim* does not rest in the ideological unity of value and activity, but in the critique of ideology. Jim's experience of history is a communication of man's freedom to endlessly transcend real contradictions rather than to simply try to romantically resolve them.

According to Jameson, Balzac and Gissing also confront romance with history, each in their own way. In Gissing's later works, the ethic of bourgeois **resentment** is unmasked as a mere ideologue. Bourgeois desire is presented as petty, worthless, commodity desire, something that the reader begins to dislike.
in himself. This *ressentiment* directed at oneself, however, dialectically transforms *ressentiment* as bad faith (flight from self) into authenticity (confrontation with one's relationship to history). Gissing's narratives generate "an omnipresent class consciousness in which it is intolerable for the bourgeois reader to dwell any length of time" (p. 205). In Balzac, a different movement leads to a similar position. The Comte de Troisville never does manage to fulfil Balzac's ideal resolution of aristocratic legitimacy and Napoleonic energy. Mademoiselle Cormon does not find her ideal man: he is married. The ideal resolution in Balzac is carefully contrasted with the lived reality that renders the romance impossible.

In order for criticism to be adequate to its object, it must come to grips with this historical repudiation of fantasy. Jameson sees Lacan's distinction between the Imaginary and the Symbolic as one step in this direction. The Imaginary, the realm of infantile wish-fulfilment in which desire is ignorant of reality, finds its completion in historical narrative. The story of the Comte de Troisville is an Imaginary text rewritten to fit the demands of the reality principle and the censorship of the superego. In order to satisfy itself, Desire must systematically confront the objections of the Real. When it recognizes "the unanswerable resistance of the real" (p. 183), it has reached the level of the symbolic text. Balzac's "incorrigible fantasy demands ultimately raise History itself over against him, as absent cause, as that on which desire must come to grief" (p. 183).

Everything in Jameson's work hinges on his use of this Althusserian notion of history as "absent cause." For Jameson, the movement from the Imaginary to the Symbolic or historical level can be formulated in terms of what happens when "plot falls into history" (p. 130) i.e., when romance structure or deep text is transformed through time into manifest text. According to Greimas, one can look at the way in which different semiotic structures formally combine using a static model called the *combinatoire*. Appropriating this term, Jameson applies it to the analysis of the dynamic relation between deep structure, manifest text and history. The deviation of the individual text from the deeper narrative structure directs us to the historical situation in which the imaginary wish is repressed and transformed. Deep plot is rewritten across the three horizons of politics (ideology), class struggle (ideologeme) and mode of production (ideology of form). The levels of the text are transformed, including its genre, as content becomes form. Rather than ignore the diachronic dimension as Greimas does, the critic must locate plot in terms of history to render the transformation meaningful.

Jameson uses the term "homology" to apply to the reductive rewriting of a surface text (including its diachronic transformations) in terms of a deeper level or code. Greimas' model of the semiotic rectangle is homological in this sense, but so too would be any closed code such as is found in certain forms of Marxism (Jameson uses the example of Goldmann). If the three historical horizons are merely taken to be three dimensions of a fundamental Marxist metacode which can be applied to all superstructural activity, then Marxism is no more than homological reduction. Such a code would only be relevant to the realm of
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ideological closure. However, it would itself be trapped in this realm since its own code (or metacode) would be a closed narrative structure, a romantic story with a utopian vision of historical transcendence. The three historical horizons must therefore be seen precisely as horizons, as openings on to history, rather than as finite determinations of history.

In contrast to homological interpretation, a mythical approach to the movement of plot in history would concentrate not on determinate changes, but on identity over time. It presupposes an unbroken continuity in social relations and narrative forms from primitive to modern times. Frye’s “positive hermeneutic” filters out historical difference to trace the continuity of an original myth through the levels of romance, tragedy, comedy, realism and other genres. His metacode, therefore, essentially reads all texts in terms of myth or its narrative transformation in romance. Whereas the Marxist metacode focussed on difference in order to arrive at the essential plot of history, Frye’s method, however, focusses on identity, but arrives at perpetual change. Frye analyses each new remythicization of an original myth in what Jameson calls “figural” terms. The community celebrates its unity in terms of religious figures symbolizing the ultimate utopian classless society. These figures are constantly refigured in time as man experiences the impossibility of one utopia and seeks a new mythical possibility.

Jameson’s critique of Frye lacks the precision of his critique of reductive Marxism, no doubt precisely because of his desire to avoid any type of closed structure such as the latter. He does, however, argue that Frye (and likewise Ricoeur) fails to deal with the ideological dimensions of utopia, that is, with what might be called false consciousness. He also points out that Frye incorrectly projects the categories of religion (the actor) on to those of myth. According to Jameson, characters in romances are merely passive “mortal spectators” who reap “the rewards of cosmic victory without ever having quite been aware of what was at stake in the first place” (p. 113). The implications of this critique are that myth must be demystified and man restored to his capacity to change history.

The historical approach must resolve the antinomy between myth and homology without collapsing into one or the other. The task of a properly Marxist hermeneutic is to reveal the condition of man in history, and the problems of ideological mystification—without creating a new myth. Pulling together such unlikely company as Lukács, Althusser and Sartre, Jameson attempts to come to grips with the foundations of such an approach.

Althusser distinguishes between what he calls “expressive causality” such as found in Hegelian Marxism, and his own “structural causality.” Expressive causality interprets one phenomenon or text in terms of a mastercode i.e., in homological terms. Lukács’ reduction of realism to material conditions is one example. In contrast, structural causality relies on a non-reductive notion of mode of production that includes the semi-autonomous spheres of culture, ideology, the juridical, the political and the economic. The cause of any phenomenon cannot be reduced to any other phenomenon (or level) but rather is
the result of the entire structure of relationships. This structure is an "absent cause" since it is nowhere present as an element.

Jameson recognizes both the limits of this formulation, and its possibilities. He notes that Sartre criticizes Althusser for privileging the atemporal synchronic moment of the concept thus restoring a form of presence over absence. However, one can go beyond what Althusser is apparently saying to establish a continuity between him and Hegel. The notion of "semi-autonomy," by its implication of identity and difference, is compatible with Hegel's dialectic. Both Hegel and Althusser are in fact criticizing identity theory. "The true is the whole" is not a positive closed truth for Hegel, but a method for unmasking the false (i.e. the ideological). Likewise, Lukács' notion of totality should not be read as a vision of the end of history, but as a methodological standard, a critical or negative ideal, on the basis of which ideological closure can be revealed. The negative status of this ideal ensures that it cannot be closed: the totality is infinitely totalizable. However, as in the Kantian ideal, the negative implies a positive, practical dimension, an imperative to totalize infinitely. At once affirmed and denied, the notion of totality rejoins Althusser's History and Lacan's Real as absent cause.

Totality is another name for narrative unity. History is only accessible in narrative form, but because it is infinitely totalizable it cannot be reduced to any given narrative. Narrative must present history as absent cause, not as absence, not as presence. Any symbolic act entertains an active relationship with the Real. The content of the Real is structured into form as it transforms form. However, it is only the historical text which has a form and content equal to this idea, for the romance text hides the process in the closure of ideology. Any narrator, be he writer, critic or historian, is bound by this imperative to totalize infinitely.

It is to Conrad's *Nostromo* that Jameson turns for his ultimate vision of history. "By a wondrous dialectical transfer," a history which cannot be narrated is inscribed in the form of the text itself (p.280). By a wondrous dialectical transfer, the semiotic rectangle opens onto history itself. The ideal act, (the complex term) which will found an "ideal" capitalist society out of "fallen" Latin American history (two contradictory modes of production) is not a utopian resolution: *Nostromo* will "insist to the end on everything problematic about the act that makes for genuine historical change" (p. 277). Yet out of the non-narratable collective process in which the individual acts of Decoud and Nostromo (the capitalist and the populist) are alienated and appropriated, capitalism arrives:

So this great historical novel finally achieves its end by unraveling its own means of expression, "rendering" History by its thoroughgoing demonstration of the impossibility of narrating this unthinkable dimension of collective reality, systematically undermining the individual categories of storytelling in order to project, beyond the stories it must continue to tell, the concept of a process beyond storytelling (p. 279).
Historical criticism finds its completion in the historical act in Conrad. But is Jameson's form adequate to this content? His integration of theory with literary interpretation, as well as the dialectical turns, oppositions, resolutions and transformations of meaning in his text all point to the fundamental "openness" of his narrative. We must question, however, his sometimes excessive use of apparently closed structural and conceptual formulations. Is the identification and inventorying of ideologemes (p. 88) any more than pseudo-science? His focus on "collective" History makes one suspect a lingering, unresolved resentment against the bourgeois subject. Jameson constantly returns to Nietzsche only to reject "the constitutional ethical habit of the individual subject—the Eternal Recurrence" (pp. 234, 115). But is the Eternal Recurrence anything if not man transcending the individual finite subject, yet simultaneously bound by space and time? Is it not Nietzsche's allegory of infinite totalization?

Social and Political Thought
York University

Notes

1. According to Jameson, "the Pascalian wager of Marxism" lies in the bet that in a genuine community "the fundamental revelation of the nothingness of existence" will have lost its sting, though not its ontological truth. This ambivalent transposition of eternal life onto finite social relations hides Jameson's real affinity with Pascal (and, as we shall see, Sartre and Conrad). "Life is meaningless," says Jameson, but "History is meaningful" (p. 261). This is the movement from original sin to grace.

2. Jameson has been influenced by Sartre's literary criticism which revolves around a similar distinction. See, for example, Jameson's discussion of the difference between the "récit" and the "genuine novel," or the art form at one with its public and that which challenges society, in "Three Methods in Sartre's Literary Criticism," Modern French Criticism: From Proust and Valéry to Structuralism, ed. John K. Simon, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1972, p. 200 and pp. 222-223.


6. According to Althusser, "the whole dialectic of transition [from the Imaginary to the Symbolic Order] in all its essential details is stamped by the seal of Human Order, of the Symbolic, for which linguistics provides us with the formal laws, i.e., the formal concept." As lack, Desire is nevertheless "determined" by this knowable scientific Order. In "Freud and Lacan," New Left Review, No. 55 (1969), pp. 61-62.
IT IS NOW-ALWAYS 1984

Michael Dorland


The implacable criticism of everything that exists would, Marx vowed, produce for the world a consciousness that was missing from its ownership of the dream of a thing that has already long been. In this light, Marxism is less the science of history, the method of historical materialism, the technique of revolution or any other of its signifiers than it is a science of bitching. Like all sciences, bitching opens onto a continent of knowledge. Like all continents, this one possesses not only a topography but also its explorers and discoverers. Like all continents, it is multiple and temporal, with its old worlds and its new. And as Hegel predicted, the new world would see the reign of the extreme unleashing of fabulations of all kinds. Has critical criticism, never implacable enough, thus succumbed to delirium in the face of everything that exists?

As a delirium whose supposed object is historical, Marxism has been accordingly tongue-tied by its inability to properly address the history of itself (assuming that there is such a thing as Marxism unless it be the Marxian dream that never gets realized). This handicap has been a considerable limitation in discounting suspicions that Marxism may itself be an ideology, and one should distinguish between suspicions inherent to Marxism (ontic phenomena that produce a universe best characterized as "concentrationnaire") and those extrinsic to it (mainly the suspicion of being what I have elsewhere called a power system). For the purposes of this review, one can focus on some of these suspicions inherent to Marxism. Outside the charmed circle of militancy, it was M. Merleau-Ponty who first touched upon the dialectic of Marxism and terror, though the times were still terroristic enough to force him to entitle this relationship, with all the innocent irony of the ideological, "humanism" and terror. Not for nothing, then, does terror (as the critique of terrorism) deeply inform Paul-André Dagon's Contribution à la critique de l'idéologie américaine. Terror is of the world; as part of "everything that exists" terror is the world and speaks the language (and logic) of that world. Terrorism (or the science of bitching, critical criticism raised to the power of criticism by the weapon) thus becomes a discourse that is interchangeable with the world as it articulates itself. Terrorism is a discourse that is eminently recuperable by the world since it speaks the same language. Terrorism, finally, speaks the worldly language of
recuperation (through interlocutors like the police etc. on the one hand, "revolutionaries" on the other) since its object is the reproduction of the terror of this world; ie, power over others in the dialectic of "L'Etat c'est les autres."

In opposition to this, Dagon (as the interpreter of the text of the revolution as the end of pre-history) articulates the new world: "la tendance la plus radicale du 'mouvement réel', celle qui ne veut pas 'le pouvoir' mais 'le monde' " (p. 36). The movement of the real that destroys the existing order, no longer on the basis of the old marxo-lenino-stalino- etc. order, but on the basis of the new world. The new is thus new in being both i) as old as the world (p. 40) and ii) the dream of a thing that has already long been. The new world is the New World; it is and its name is echt America.

And so it becomes directly pertinent that Dagon is Québécois, writing from within the context that is the continuity of Quebec (New France) in the new-old/old-new world and interrogating a so-called revolutionary ideology that has been part of the Quebec spectacle since 1970, or more exactly that arose in the wake of the 1968 moment of the new world revolution.

And just as May '68 "happened" in France, and was later hailed by Marxist theoreticians as an event of epochal revolutionary significance, 7 so too Quebec—weak link in the imperialist chain of "fortress America" (p. 31)—"experienced" its Oktyabr in the FLQ crisis of autumn 1970. Something akin to a "revolutionary" seizure of power — at least a "provisional" government—flashed across the TV screens, and was happening/happened/might have happened/never happened in time and place here within the pasteurized hinterlands of capitalist domination. History, offering a fragmentary glimpse of its Significance, flashed the diamond ring on its little finger, and the skies were torn asunder by the dawn of revelation. 8

(The importance of this, especially in a society of the spectacle, that is, one from which History has been eliminated electronically, and therefore upon the consciousness of Quebecers [or Canadians who are even more ideologically dominated] saturated with the image of the American contemplation of its own self-consciousness, is immense. In a psychological framework as mythologically-over-determined as Marxism which believes itself to be a reading of history, such an impact could have staggering consequences. The American left could keep "its" Watts or Weathermen, terrorist operations easily contained by the traffic police: in Quebec, whiteniggerdom but with a memory of its own imperialism, History is on the march!)

Some years have passed, from the "spectacular" act of 1970, to René Lévesque's arrival to power, to the present "general crisis". It is now-always 1984, says Dagon, the writer of text, arriving post- or ante-festum on the scene, and surveysing the nature of things with the biliousness that comes from a surplus of History. So a decade of practice (in its local, groupuscular, syndicalist and secret police forms 10) is there to be copiously crapped upon. Critical criticism is loosed: there is an unleashing of fabulations of all kinds. But, as Marx said with cheerful resignation when he abandoned The German Ideology to the mice, at least the main objective of some clarification has been achieved. Writes Dagon:
MICHAEL DORLAND

Au lieu de courir après toutes les modes révolutionnantes... Marx et Engels se sont attachés à lutter de toutes leurs forces contre le "communisme vulgaire"; de même, il faut aujourd'hui se battre contre le marxisme et l'égalitarisme vulgaires. Tout comme le marxisme vulgaire (qui n'est rien d'autre qu'une survivance du communisme vulgaire via l'école kautskyst-léninisaie) a été la planche du salut du capitalisme, l'égalitarisme vulgaire s'apprête à prendre la relève du "friendly fascism" pour assurer la continuité du régime de la séparation où le désespoir de chacun est la clé de l'oppression de tous.11

Why—one must ask since Dagon only dances in the shadow of the question—is there such a preoccupation in Marxism with vulgarity? What is this suspicion of lowly origin that predominates in so much Marxist theory? Could it not be the terror of a theory that is afraid to reflect (think) itself for fear of seeing there something frightening? Or has the time still not yet come for Marxism to bear the burden of its own failures, beginning with its inability to read History (or Lenin or Capital)? At least Dagon (p. 34) comes close to being able to admit that 'objectively' and historically old-world Marxism is terrorism.

And once that terrible step 'beyond good and evil' is taken, Dagon has the courage to make the attempt to carry on:

"La force motrice de l'histoire moderne, c'est la révolte du prolétariat", c'est ainsi que Raya Dunayevskaya entendait "résumer" Marx....on voit facilement le clin d'œil de la vérité, à savoir que le force motrice de l'histoire bourgeoisie, c'est le prolétariat et sa révolte. La bourgeoisie n'est pas seulement "la classe révolutionnaire par excellence" qui "ne peut exister sans révolutionner constamment les instruments de production", mais bien plutôt la seule classe révolutionnaire, c'est-à-dire la seule classe qui peut prendre le pouvoir à l'occasion d'une révolution ET LE GARDER, l'exercer en tant que classe (l'ambition de la bourgeoisie est d'ailleurs d'être "la seule classe"...la survie de son pouvoir est toujours plus essentielle liée à sa capacité de se représenter comme classe unique, "planétaire", solidaire...).12

Faced with the "planetary" domination of this one self-conscious class

Le lot des travailleurs révolutionnaires n'est pas tant de n'avoir
“ni dieu ni maître”, que de n'avoir aucun recours, aucun abri, aucun refuge; ni “leur classe” (qui, vouée au rôle de “force motrice”, ne saurait se “constituer en classe”) ni—encore moins—l’éventuel exercice d’un éventuel “pouvoir de classe du prolétariat”...ni rien d’autre, sauf “la critique impitoyable de tout ce qui existe”. En même temps qu’“avec le capitalisme s’achève la préhistoire de la société humaine”, notre époque, à défaut d’autre chose, aura au moins vu s’achever le temps de la préhistoire de la révolution...faite par des révolutionnaires....

Yet in the utter darkness of the old world, the illumination cast by the new is incandescent, not only in shining light into the shadows but more so because of the nature of its own reflection. Thus

le prolétariat d’Amérique du Nord, du fait même qu’il est employé, c’est-à-dire exploité, aux points les plus cruciaux de l’accumulation du capital, de la marchandise et du spectacle, est la clé de voute de la libération mondiale...parce que...son programme révolutionnaire ne peut que porter sur la totalité de la vie.

Located in the new world, the North-American proletariat (or as Dagon says more directly “the salaried slaves”) is the New World and the new world-revolution, poised on the edge of the dream that has already long been and is about to become Historical Truth. In other words, a logos of recuperation (anti-terror, anti-world) whereby the new world articulates the annihilation of the old:

...une nouvelle Internationale de la révolte se dresse qui, achevant de balbutier dans le langage qui lui avait été confisqué par le vieux monde, écrit maintenant sa propre théorie et sa propre histoire...qui sera...“le coup du monde”.

Thus, from 1970-’1984’, the ellipse from Revelation to Affirmation. For Dagon’s contribution is affirmative; the myth is reaffirmed and it is Year Zero. The historio-theology of critical criticism triumphs over the delirium of everything that exists. History is, and all is well.

Yet in a science of bitching, there is no affirmation, only critique, the sacrifice, as Nietzsche noted, of everything to and/or including “future blessedness and justice.” But in the presence of the nothing is preserved a relic of Marxism’s philosophical genealogy: the eternal dawn of speculation.
shimmering with questions.

Despite its taint of affirmation, Dagon's pamphlet is one of a growing breed. It is no more than it claims to be: a contribution to the critique of American ideology; that is, both the dominant ideology in its death pains, and the ideology of a North-American Marxism in its birth pangs. But the latter, odd-looking bastard though it may be, is at least alive, or says it is.

What if this were so then, and the imperial bastions were at last on the verge of crumbling even if only in the realm of theory? What if the dream of a thing that has already long been is nigh, here in the New World, in the uncertainty between sleep and wakefulness of what Nietzsche called dreamy times? Would it be the echt American Dream or the extreme unleashing of fabulations of all kinds?

Would one then be able to say "Hic Rhodus, hic salta", or would one prefer the more vulgar Ramones' (new) version of that (old) tune: "Do you do you do you wanna dance?"

Montréal

Notes


4. In Discourse of the Old Mole, unpublished MSS., Ch. X.


6. Dagon, p. 15: "La dénonciation et la critique du terrorisme, ainsi que la lutte contre sa "logique" constituent une élément essentiel de l'offensive que les travailleurs révolutionnaires de notre époque doivent mener...."

7. Perry Anderson, Considerations on Western Marxism, London, 1979, p. 95: "For the first time in nearly 50 years, a massive revolutionary upsurge occurred within advanced capitalism...."

8. Cf. two remarks made by Hegel that seem to the point here: his celebrated "Never since the sun had stood in the firmament..." contrasted to his own, far drier "By the little which can thus satisfy the needs of the human spirit we can measure the extent of its loss", in Preface to The Phenomenology of Mind, New York, 1967, p. 73.


10. Dagon who appears to have studied, not terribly well, at the Raoul Vaneigem school of name-calling, expends tremendous energy in the main body of his text (pp. 1-92) hurling insults at individuals and organizations. The insults are generally of an ad hominem or scatological kind.
Fortunately, in the notes (pp. 95-120), this lets up enough for Dagon to demonstrate that he has indeed thought a bit about some of the points he is attempting to make; to such a degree, in fact, that something resembling beauty even emerges, as in his aesthetic of suicide, pp. 95-96. One of the reasons for this dichotomy can be laid at the feet of the intensely provincial character of Quebec society as a whole.


12. ibid., pp. 90-91, Dagon's emphasis.

13. ibid., p. 91.

14. ibid., p. 69, emphasis added.

15. ibid., pp. 78-79.

16. On some of the origins of the terror of affirmation, see Martin Jay, The Dialectical Imagination, Boston, 1973, p. 56. Almost everything remains to be said on the rich topic of being and time in Marxism, and Walter Benjamin said most of it in his description of Messianic time as "the straight gate through which the Messiah might enter." In "Theses on the Philosophy of History", XVIII B, Illuminations, New York, 1969, p. 264.

17. Beyond Good and Evil, Chicago, 1955, p. 61, emphasis added.

18. See, for purposes of invidious comparison, the manifesto, "Pour un Québec socialiste", Montreal, in this issue of CJPST.
DE SADE AND THE DEAD-END
OF RATIONALISM

Andrew Wernick

O thou my friend! The prosperity of Crime is like unto the
lightning, whose traitorous brilliancies embellish the
atmosphere but for an instant, in order to hurl into death's very
depths the luckless one they have dazzled.

Marquis de Sade, Preface to Justine

Re-evaluating de Sade

In an extraordinary reversal, de Sade, whose writings have been excoriated for
two centuries as "dirty, dangerous, violent", has been gradually disinterred by
radical intellectuals and made the subject of increasingly sympathetic
re-evaluation. Indeed, since the lifting of the ban on his work in the '50s and '60s,
the Divine Marquess has not only become established as a polite topic of
intellectual conversation, but he has been virtually rehabilitated as an ideological
figure.\(^1\) The climate of discussion has changed so much in the past twenty years
that David Cook is moved to suggest in his recent essay that the old problem of
how to justify publication (must we burn Sade?) has been superceded by a new
one of how to resist trendiness (must we read him?).\(^2\) The question is more than
rhetorical, for it is impossible to reflect critically on the intrinsic meaning and
value of de Sade's work and thought without simultaneously, and first, reflecting
on the changed meaning it has begun to acquire in the contemporary cultural
context.

Rather than confront the problem head on, Cook offers a corrective strategy
which aims to clear the ground for critical appropriation by detaching de Sade
from contemporary myth (he was not proto-Freud) so that he can be properly
grounded in the ideological world whence he sprang. Despite the care with which
this is done, however, Cook's re-interpretation works within the general
framework of rehabilitation, and to this extent merely exemplifies the trendiness
problem he has raised. Since Sade wrote to rationalize (in every sense) the
instinctual vicissitude to which he gave his name, what is signified by the current
intellectual interest and sympathy for this project? What are we to make of the
paradoxical process whereby the author of such ostensibly inhuman books as
Justine and Philosophy in the Bedroom has been semi-recuperated by some of
the finest modern minds into the tradition of emancipatory thought?

In part, it must be said, the current revival is a transitory event: the product of a
search for literary arguments to justify the lifting of a puritanical censorship of
DEAD END OF RATIONALISM

his works. But although this was certainly the immediate context for the flurry of de Sade scholarship in the '50s and '60s—particularly in France—it does not explain the persistence of interest into the present, nor does it take into account the underlying process of valorization also at work.

Within radical humanist circles (leaving aside the ideologically ambiguous case of Nietzsche) the modern receptivity towards de Sade can be traced to two distinct moments of reinterpretation. The first, expressly undertaken in the excursus on Juliette in Dialectic of Enlightenment, retained but pivoted on the traditional grounds of anti-Sade critique. Like those who banned his books, Horkheimer and Adorno had no doubt that de Sade was a moral monster. However, they moderated the critique by rejecting the ascetic and liberal-humanist values that have always subtended conventional expressions of outrage. Thus, they insist that the objection to de Sade's cruel and mechanized eroticism not be confused with the rejection of sexual freedom and enjoyment as such; and, further, that the anti-human dimension of his thought should be read not as the antithesis but as the very fulfillment of Enlightened ethics. In the eyes of Critical Theory, de Sade disclosed the erotic telos of dominated reason: Belsen in the bedroom. At this pedagogical level, and despite himself, de Sade has positive value as an honest and illuminating spokesman for Enlightenment rationality: closer in truth-value if not in piety to the liberal-rationalist tradition that hypocritically silenced him and whose authentic representative he nevertheless really was. It should be noted that the Frankfurt School's ironic employment of de Sade as an ally in their civilizational critique belongs to a more general fascination evinced by radical thinkers for the black tradition of bourgeois thought. Blunt voices of repressive realism like Machiavelli, Hobbes and Ricardo have certainly been accorded greater respect by many socialists and anarchists than more humane—and mystified—ideologues like Locke, Kant and Mill: presumably because the former speak the truths of a social order founded on domination and scarcity which the latter, hoping for an easy passage to a better world, play down as real obstacles to progress.

The Frankfurtian interpretation paved the way for a positive appropriation of de Sade by dialecticizing the critique without actually crossing that line. For actual absorption into the emancipatory tradition to be possible, a more directly sympathetic line of interpretation had to be established. This was the work of a second current, originating in the late 19th-century avant-garde and extending into both existentialist and structuralist corners of the modern French intelligentsia which read de Sade as a tragic, romantic figure: the parable of an insurgent imagination incarcerated by a repressive social rationality. From such a perspective, what is noteworthy about de Sade is less the deformed character of his fantasy life than the fact that he insisted on the right to fantasize in the first place. Indeed, the human value of his fantasies becomes a purely secondary issue in so far as it is precisely fantasy (and not necessarily its enactment) that is at stake. De Sade, whose writings champion murder for thrills, was himself no murderer. Conversely, the symbolic play of his unconscious was no respecter of persons. Abstract libertarianism, always more sensitive than censors to the
difference between language and reality, opens here onto a genuine insight. However, revolutionary modernists from Baudelaire to Barthes go much further insisting, as a practical goal and not only as a matter of epistemological principle, that the disassociation between sign and referent be regarded as absolute—the better to shatter the actual relation and transform them both. Such a project evidently requires an anarchist poetic to break the thrall of words and codes and open up a space for free symbolization. From this perspective, it has been possible to assimilate de Sade not merely as real-life victim of cultural repression but as a fully-fledged revolutionary artist. For surrealism, in particular, the will-to-power of Sade's imagination automatically converted him into a progressive. In effect, a second line in the valorization process was thereby crossed: psychosis transvalued as iconoclasm.

Cook, in commendably ecumenicist spirit, pitches his own evaluation and interpretation of de Sade somewhere between the Frankfurtian moment of critique and the symbolist moment of appropriation. Thus, while he accepts the vision of de Sade as imagination locked up by reason in the tower of Liberté, he denies Sade's pedigree as a neo-Freudian libertarian and insists that he be "returned to the Enlightenment". Only by locating him in that tradition, argues Cook, can we derive a clear understanding of the ideological deformations to which his "dominated imagination" was necessarily subject. De Sade exhibited, without transcending them, all the cultural limitations of his times. His libertines' fantasies unfold within the strict limits of a Hobbesian universe, and his anti-Christian metaphysic of human emptiness (desire as lack, the other as empty receptacle) merely secularize the ontological tenets of the Christian adversary. Overall, de Sade is to be read as a kind of satirist, pushing the contemporary ideological universe, in all its contradictoriness, to a logical and absurd conclusion—in part as self-justification, but also as a deliberate assault on the hypocrisies of Church and State in the degenerate, pre-revolutionary France of Louis XV and XVI.

It is hard to disagree with these theses, and Cook's paper offers both an interesting extension of the Frankfurtian critique and a valuable corrective against any reduction of de Sade's thought to mere literature. Barthes may be correct to see in de Sade's writings a quasi-reflexive meta-discourse on the formal relation of desire to language, but Cook is surely also right to object that such treatment bowdlerizes their meaning. To grasp the real ideological substance of the Sadian message we must indeed "render the text dangerous". But I do not think that Cook has rendered the Sadian text dangerous enough. If Sade is to be critically appropriated by the emancipatory tradition at all, it is not sufficient to emphasize his external points of reference. We must also come to terms with the meaning and content of his inner imaginings in all their brutality and violence. In fact, the disturbing question is why that violence has not proved an insurmountable obstacle to his reception into an ostensibly humanist tradition—a process that Critical Theorists in the '30s and '40s, obsessed as they were with the onset of terroristic total administration, could only have understood on the literal plane as dominated reason gone mad.
DEAD END OF RATIONALISM

The Sadian Eros

For all his insistence on disengaging the referential substance of the text, Cook tends like Barthes to metamorphosize Sade into (political) metaphor. But why avoid the obvious? On the most direct level, as act and expression, Sade's writings were sexual. Their main aim was to describe, justify and celebrate a way of sexual life Sade terms libertinage. The explicit contestation of sexual and moral taboos that even the representation of such a programme entailed demands and deserves a response.

This is no easy matter since de Sade's libertinage, like the renunciatory ethics to which it is angrily counter-posed, conceals the difference between liberated and non-liberated forms of sexual freedom. Contemporary critique must preserve the full force of the distinction, however, and not, as is the current temptation, lapse into the liberal relativism of anything goes (particularly on paper). Cook's argument that Sade's criticism was restrained by his "dominated" imagination underestates the problem which verged on the fascistic. The mere, if important, fact that de Sade affirmed the worth of human sexuality does not make his actual sexual programme any less antithetical to the vision of a liberated eros.

To mention only the most obvious points: First, Sadian sexuality is autistic; there is no sexual interaction or intersubjectivity of any kind, orgasm is a solitary experience, and the physical dimension of sex is reduced to fluid exchanges between orifices. Secondly, the Sadian sexual drive aims to dominate what it desires. This has nothing to do with formal passivity or aggression in the sexual act: the sexual objects vanquished by the libertine may be required to flagellate or penetrate from a theatrical position of power, but the actors are still slaves. Thirdly, not possession of the object but its violation and destruction provide the pinnacle of ecstasy. If willing objects provide the highest pleasure it is because domination is the more profound in their case: compliance affords no protection against torture, since pain and misery in the victim per se provide pleasure to the libertine. Fourthly, the master/slave asymmetry is mapped not only by convention but also as the expression of a special animus in the distinction between male and female. De Sade was profoundly and pathologically mysogenist. Philosophy in the Bedroom culminates in the orgiasts congratulating themselves on the just vengeance they have just wreaked on the initiate's moralistic and interfering mother: with her husband's compliance, the woman is raped, after a frenzy of indignities, by a syphilitic dragged in off the streets, and then stitched together to prevent the disease's escape. The only good women are those like Juliette, smart enough to make it in the male libertine's world as sexual entrepreneurs or as partners in patriarchal crime. Sade's libertines also prefer anal to vaginal intercourse. While this reflects, in some measure, the low contemporary level of birth-control technology, and thus a rational shift in sexual aim, it also reflects a revulsion against the female organ as such. Moreover, as Barthes observes, the consistent choice of this mode where the sexual object is
female also affirms and extends the (male) power of the libertine. Anal entry doubles the cultural possibilities and effectively neuters femininity by reducing women to the functional equivalent of males.

While we can appreciate, in retrospect, that the dialectic according to which the anti-puritanical irruption of Desire in an unreconstructed hierarchical and instrumentalist world was bound to be distorted and one-sided, and in these qualified terms endorse the positive dimension of its protest against "Sunday wife" morality, there is no reason to flinch from criticizing Sade's infantilism, cruelty and heterophobia. Indeed, in his extreme authenticity, in his will to reveal the sexual fantasies that lay under the mendacious surfaces of the ancien régime, he revealed, unself-consciously, the contemporary psychological connections between patriarchy, egotism, power, instrumental reason and destructive fury: his ratification of this complex as "natural" (in the Hobbesian not Rousseauian sense) merely ontologized a cultural moment that emancipatory reason longs to surpass.

It must be emphasized, finally, that Sade's espousal of "crime" was no mere effect of libido overflowing the bounds of established order: rule-breaking in and of itself provided erotic stimulus. Such extreme antinomianism renders insoluble the conflict between the reality principle of social order and the anarchy of pleasure. As an abstract negation of all socially instituted impulse controls, de Sade leaves the Western morality debate suspended in its stupid oscillation between "freedom" and "order". De Sade was driven by reason and instinct to transgress: the emancipatory project seeks to transcend.

The Black Tradition

On one level, as I have suggested, modern receptivity toward de Sade, inaugurated by Horkheimer and Adorno's somewhat mischievous conjugation of Kantian moralism with Juliette, flows from critical reason's ambiguous respect for the black, anti-liberal counter-tradition on the fringes of classical bourgeois thought. Whether forced back on itself in civilizational despair or driven in the context of actual political struggle to be tough-minded and "practical", critical reason has always tended to posit illusion rather than bad intentions as its principal ideological antagonist. However, the "dark side" from Machiavelli to Mandeville and beyond evidently exerts an appeal in its own right, and there is more than a fine line to be drawn between respect for candour and an identification with the "evil" that a perverse candour may contestatively embrace.

Where the temptation to cross the threshold has proved particularly irresistible, especially for anarchists, has been in the case of hard polemics against Christianity and its secular residues. Prime examples are provided by the radical revival of Nietzsche—and "behind" him, de Sade. Marxism itself, born as a
humanist critique of its own Judaeo-Christian roots, has always retained a certain ambivalence towards religion. The most violent and thoroughgoing anti-Christian positions (from de Sade to Breton) have in fact arisen and taken root outside the predominantly collectivist and communitarian ethos of the Left, in the Bohemian, anarcho-individualist world on its artistic periphery. It is just here that “left” and “right” critiques of bourgeois society have tended to merge and become confused.

For both Sade and Nietzsche (and indeed for Hobbes also) the absolute, counterposed to the God of Christianity and the Man/Society/Community etc. of religious humanism, is Nature—red in tooth and claw. This nature (unlike that of Aristotle, Rousseau and Hegel) is far from benign. It is almost deliberately cast in the Christian image of sin. But whereas Christianity (and transformism in general) envisages the possibility of redeeming nature (particularly, fallen human nature), anti-Christian naturalists (like Sade and Nietzsche) ontologize it in all its arbitrariness and imperfection as the starting-point for a demystification of conventional morality.

Emancipation also demands this unmasking, and on the purely critical level is attracted even to those whose programme (with which it disagrees) is to return the species, disabused of pious illusions, to a primordial Hobbesian condition. There is evidently, however, a problem: The Nietzschean locomotive moves relentlessly towards “rank values” and eugenics, and the Sadian towards masturbatory fantasies of victims tortured exquisitely to death. Where do we get off? What are we getting off on?

The questions are linked since the nature that grounds the logic is the same as the nature which emotionally drives it along: for Sade and Nietzsche, the nature that matters is the force of human instinct. A dialectical counter-critique of Sade and Nietzsche begins, then, with a critique of their writings’ deformed instinctual character. This requires more than an examination of the way in which their imaginations were totally trapped in the dichotomies of master/slave and male/female. The fixation on little-boy infantilism is undeniable, but there is also a sustained fury and hatred which is instinctually irreducible to it. Sade, faithful to his own impulses, named this additional aim “crime”—an ever-escalating will to annihilation which Beauvoir ascribes to his autism and Klossowski to his Hobbesian vision of “nature as destructive principle”. Nietzsche, with greater historical reflexivity, situated his own mission of aggression (philosophize with a hammer) in the contradictory space between Dionysus whose spirit he wished to revive, and modern nihilism, which had (as asceticism and ressentiment) undermined the vital strength of the species and had now to be assisted in the necessary process of its own self-destruction. For de Sade, as for Nietzsche, the rage to destroy was sublimated into an ideological project: the cultural liquidation of Christian morality and all its metaphysical idols. But de Sade’s imagery in the service of this project was the more direct as his actual urge to destroy was the less under control: with him, what Nietzsche called nihilism was represented literally as dismemberment. Herein, I believe, lies the disagreeable secret of Sade’s current
intellectual appeal. The road that has led, with the post-structuralists, from anarchism and semiology to the rediscovery of Nietzsche, proceeds to a friendly encounter with the less-nuanced deconstruction of the Divine Marquess.

The Current Appeal of de Sade

Of course, the intellectual resonance of de Sade is not (consciously) at a level of the first order. Whatever the vicissitudes of their instincts, post-structuralists are not turned on by torture. Sade's appeal to writers like Barthes lies rather at a second-order level where the Sadian narrative figures as a plane of expression for a more abstract message: the message constituted by the structure of the text. The modern discovery that realism is a literary code and not an authentic duplication of reality theoretically sanctions this well-nigh universal de-emphasis of the referent. For Barthes, it is not just that Sade's writings as writings are to be carefully disengaged from their immediate authorial context, but even their historical significance as a cultural event flows less from the sexual values they directly express than from the new relation between imagination, desire and language the structure of the writing exhibits and installs.4

The shift in focus brought about by the semiological mutation of critical analysis is startling. Whereas Frankfurt thinkers, engaged in ideology-critique, were struck by Sade's mechanistic rationalism (hypothesized in Juliette's notorious sex machine), Barthes is fascinated by Sade's baroque formalism (orgies as rangements and tableaux, passions classified and sub-classified, meals as ceremonies punctiliously prescribed etc). Barthes' dissection of the form and substance of the cultural code which mediates enunciation of the Sadian sexual sign is quite brilliant—and yet his formalism (like Sade's) ultimately inhibits attention to the explicit ideological meaning that sign bears. The inhibition can be considered symptomatic, especially when placed alongside Barthes' equally symptomatic occlusion of any consideration of the teleological dynamic that powers Sade's stories simultaneously towards destruction, dissolution and orgasm. Justine, at the climax of degradation, is struck by lightning; the final days at Silling culminate in mass mutilation and massacre of the playmates. The linguistic transcription which depicts Sade's work as a destruction/reconstruction of sexual coding limits the reflexivity with which the perverse appeal of his role as transgressor can be grasped. Le crime is not merely (for us) a figure for the shattering of language; in any case the cultural significance of linguistic deconstruction itself needs to be decoded (and not merely as the otherness of liberation).

Rather than papering over this problem by seeking out the positive, reconstructive moment in de Sade, we should perhaps reverse the operation in order to uncover the sadistic dimension of the rationalism with which his

ANDREW WERNICK

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DEAD END OF RATIONALISM

writings seem to resonate. Post-structuralism, as expressed variously in the thought of Derrida, Barthes, Baudrillard and Foucault, represents the moment in which critical reason, having despaired of discovering logic in history, intentionality in praxis and apodicticity in language (objectivity's final refuge) moves at last to reject the ratio of signification itself. The outcome, as a mode of criticism, displays a wild parallel: just as post-structuralism deconstructs the idea of selfhood and disarticulates texts, so too de Sade, in fantasy, destroyed actual selves and dismembeed real bodies. In the mirror of Nietzsche, whose revival prepared the ground for that of de Sade, reason become criticism of reason could enjoy the image of the destructive rage that gives that nihilism its critical momentum. As reconstituted in the current intellectual imaginaire, the figure of de Sade functions as an unrecognized simulacrum of what reason, without cognitive ground or satisfaction, has finally become. In search of knowledge and finding only an unstable and referable prison-house of language, the moment of illumination at which mind aims has been displaced by an urge to destroy categories and in that anti-Cartesian and anti-anthropological emptiness achieves (with de Sade) a painful and never actually consumated moment of black pleasure.

Must we then read de Sade? Perhaps so, if we seek a little intellectual self-knowledge. But if we seek heroes from the sexual demi-monde of bourgeois literature surely Genet and Wilde would be healthier candidates. The instinctual basis of de Sade's intellectual project, like that of the modernist criticism that currently finds him congenial, is a complete, if understandable, dead-end. Emancipatory reason, the crushed flower of enlightenment, seeks its own instinctual basis in a quite different eros: one that is fully liberated, self-affirmative and strong enough to be suffused, intellectually speaking, with an ecumenicist pathos that can even learn from de Sade.

Department of Sociology
Trent University

Notes

Let us begin with Mr. Wernick's admirable division of the Marquis into parts. The first division is Horkheimer and Adorno's reading of Juliette as the "erotic telos of dominated reason." The second, attributable to post-war French existentialism and structuralism, views Sade as "a tragic romantic figure: the parable of an insurgent imagination incarcerated by a repressive social rationality." I am placed somewhere in the middle and am granted agreement in linking Sade to the tradition from Hobbes. Otherwise I share with the others the crime of "rehabilitation" explicitly in my case of metamorphosing Sade into a "(political) metaphor".

Mr. Wernick, on the other hand, in I am sure commendable catholic spirit, pitches his Sade "in his will to reveal the sexual fantasies that lay under the mendacious surface of the ancien regime, he revealed, unself-consciously, the contemporary psychological connections between patriarchy, egotism, powers, instrumental reason and destructive fury: his ratification of this complex as 'rational' (in the Hobbesian not Rousseauian sense) merely ontologised a cultural moment that emancipatory reason longs to surpass." The Marquis has been made whole again. Yet setting aside this Marquis who dons many masks there is in Wernick's analyses the claim that the true Marquis de Sade is found in what's before one's eyes, in sadism itself. It is the "instinctual character" of Sade's life and writings which links him in Wernick's analysis to Nietzsche, and what's worst, the contemporary dead end of post-structuralist thought which suffers from the "vicissitudes of their instincts". In this rejection of post-structuralism we are agreed but, of course for different reasons. In part Wernick's rush to put all of us in the second order has overlooked the profound difference within the order of the existentialist writers from the contemporary attractions in France who themselves are far from agreed. Courting the risk of again politicizing Sade I think we should return to Maurice Blanchot's claim that "Sade discerned clearly that, at the time he was writing, power was a social category, that it was part and
parcel of the organization of society such as it existed both before and after the Revolution.\textsuperscript{2} Wernick's own deconstruction of Sadean critiques to the instinctual level, despite its interest, must lead him away from the question of power to a depoliticized Sade: a return despite protestations to psychologism.

Wernick's analyses rest on the fundamental moment of interpretation in the description of crime. Crime represents both the negation of law in its natural and social contract forms, but also the progressive end-point of the Sadian plots. Each of Sade's major works follows the path of escalating crime set against the constant of sexual orgasm. Wernick in contrast returns crime to Sade's "own impulses", his own autism (which is undeniable in the sense of Sade's own life in prison though not of his thought), thereby seeing crime as an "additional aim". Crime is thus made superfluous as it is returned into the individual in a Freudian sublimation of the sexual impulse. We are then back to Freud and the literal Sade.

However much one wished to emphasize the sexual dimension in Sade there is a constant disappearing act going on. Wernick himself points out that the sexual act is merely an exchange which adds nothing to the actors, but serves as a prelude to crime. Crime here is precisely the vehicle that reaches outside, transcends negatively if you will, the negative shells that engage in fluid mechanics. To rejoin Blanchot, crime is a social act which I have claimed evidences, not the autonomy of denying social reality, but rather its confrontation in challenging the political and social ideologies. It is inextricable from the reality of the Enlightenment.

As a consequence the interpretation of the final crimes of \textit{Juliette} and the atrocities at Silling should not be passed over en route to papering over the post-structuralists. The Président de Curval, one of the libertines inhabiting Silling in \textit{The 120 Days of Sodom}, sets the dimension of crime, the Sadian 'metamorphises', in this frequently quoted passage from the eighth day:

\begin{quote}
Ah, how many times, by God, have I not longed to be able to assail the sun, snatch it out of the universe, make a general darkness, or use that star to burn the world! Oh, that would be a crime, oh yes, and not a little misdemeanor such as are all the ones we perform who are limited in a whole year's time to metamorphosing a dozen creatures into lumps of clay.\textsuperscript{3}
\end{quote}

We are reaching with Curval the limits of Sade's thought in what I referred to earlier as the dark side of the enlightenment; here presented in the absurd image of the binary choice of a black hole or of a super nova begat as Goya suggests by an 'impossible monster'. The imagination 'deserted by reason' exorcizes the Christian and bourgeois myths through their realizations. In either case 'nothing' is left.

A similar progression is found in the storm scene which ends \textit{Juliette}. The striking of the virtuous Justine is not, as Foucault comments, "Nature become criminal subjectivity"\textsuperscript{4} but rather man became God, the most impossible criminal of all the monsters. Again the systematic outcome of the extension of crime from
the castle to the city in the penultimate scene and finally to the heavens. It represents Clairwill's desire to "set the planet ablaze" which is fulfilled in commanding, through the exercise of the libertines' will the death of Justine and ultimately their own mutual destruction. Again the perverse logic of the claim of the Enlightenment philosopher-king ending in the violence of the libertine-God.

The last section of Michel Foucault's *Madness and Civilization*, which I have referred to above, draws the conclusion that this violence holds out "the possibility of transcending (the Western world's) reason ..., and of recovering tragic experience beyond the promises of dialectic." This conclusion flows from the comparison he draws between Sade and Goya and in particular the last scene of *Juliette* referred to above, and the Caprichos. With Sade, as I have argued, there is no exit through violence. The forceable negation of the subjects which are already empty ends in a reciprocal nothingness. In the case of Goya, Foucault's ultimate abandonment of Capricho no.43 to "that triple night into which Orestes sank " neglects the fact that with Aeschylus the violence of the Furies finally recedes. Although both Sade and Goya were consumed by the problems of power and violence their work directs us to the union of reason and the imagination. Goya claimed that Capricho no.43 was the first 'universal idiom' that was to lead to the 'source of all wonders.' These wonders were to be denied to them both. It takes little imagination to see in the Capricho the awakening of reason —Minerva's owl—pen ready to be instructed by Hegel once again in the subjection of the imagination.

Department of Political Economy
Erindale College
University of Toronto

Notes

1. Unattributed references are to Andrew Wernick's "De Sade and the Dead End of Modern Reason" appearing at the same time as this response. Wernick's article is itself in response to "The Dark Side of Enlightenment" CJPS Vol. V:3, pp. 3-14.


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I will begin by repeating a relatively minor observation from Eli Mandel’s paper: "...the most cogent means of describing Canadian culture through its literary expression has been... the so-called thematic criticism of Frye." We note that this statement does not say that Frye’s is the most powerful means of describing Canada’s literature. We also note here an assumption that there could be ways other than thematic criticism to describe a culture through its literary expression. Even more, we may notice questions hidden in the text: Is culture best described through its literary expression? Is the description of culture a proper function of literary criticism? Is not the description of culture through its literary expression one of the possible definitions of thematic criticism? Would not any criticism which attempted the description of culture through its literature be, of necessity, a thematic criticism?

"Strange Loops" is a provocative paper, which raises numerous issues about the nature of writing, the nature of criticism, the cultural divisions (if any) in Canada, the role of geography (if any) in literary theory or cultural division, and, fifthly, the strange leap that occurs between Frye’s universal theory of literature and the limited perspective of literary nationalism. It would be much simpler to respond to a piece of thematic criticism than to a paper such as this. For, in raising these issues, Mandel repeatedly offers puzzles rather than answers, and while one may affirm or deny answers one necessarily puzzles over puzzles.

I recently attended a York University conference on writing by women, and between sessions was asked two questions by both anglophone and francophone Quebec writers. The first was why did nearly all the English-Canadian critics at the conference address themselves only to themes and images, in contrast to the Quebecois critics who addressed themselves mainly to language and form; the second was why are the works of English-Canadian feminists by and large so uninteresting as structures of language. The two questions were clearly related and pointed to conflicts of vision. Does one write in the service of ideas or language? Is language of less significance than the ideologies it may carry? Is it, like the text of a dream, of less intrinsic interest than are the extra-linguistic matters it may reveal? Or should it be, as one critic at the conference described the work of Nicole Brossard, neither a receptacle of ideas nor an expression of emotional condition, but simply a text brought into being to evoke a reading, a response.

One value of a paper like "Strange Loops" is that it reveals its puzzles where we may have thought we had been given answers. A recurrent problem for writers and teachers is that too many people have read books like Margaret
Atwood's *Survival* or John Moss's *Patterns of Isolation* and believed them to be about writing. How salutary it would be to have cultural criticism clearly distinguished from the literary, so that sociology or cultural psychoanalysis could not be confused with literary understanding (or be confused by the writer with linguistic creation)!

Writing of Daphne Marlatt, a poet only briefly mentioned here, John Bentley Mays termed hers a "poetics of dwelling ... a pacing off of the bounds of our habitation." We are told of Maggie's wish in Jack Hodgins' *The Invention of the World* "to be at home in the world," of the Rudy Wiebe narrator who declares himself " 'an element in what is happening at this very moment,' "3 of the prairie town of Kroetsch's *Seed Catalogue* that "grows of nothing." We are told also that the past may be deconstructed, and the present or home invented. The contrast between these approaches and the Canada-besieged vision of Atwood, or the Canada as a "conservative town" which Mandel attributes to Frye, is, I suggest, not merely one between the particular and the general, the active and the passive, the temporal and the atemporal, but between sharply affirmative and defensive attitudes to life. It is the contrast between what Paul Bové terms the "quest to escape nature and time" and the celebration of nature and time.

I cannot see this opposition as one between British and American elements in Canadian culture — an opposition Mandel correctly attributes to John Sutherland and which he himself also appears to believe in. I see the use of such terms as British and American here as simplistic and, in less scrupulous hands, potentially mischievous. These terms have long been coloured in Canada by irrational associations; worse, they disguise broad philosophical issues as narrow political ones. The actual argument is a very old one between humanism and anti-humanism, between realism and nominalism. As such, it pre-dates the discovery of the Americas, and divides the U.S. as much as Canada. In that country Sutherland's dichotomy is expressed as Philip Rahv's palefaces vs. redskins, Roy Harvey Pearce's nay-sayers vs. yea-sayers. The question Canada has faced is not that of choosing an imperial influence; it is a fundamental question with which Aquinas, Abelard and Bacon have contended: should mankind view its civilization as the fruit of its own heroic struggle against a hostile nature — Birney's "spark beleaguered by darkness" — or as a miracle of cosmic process, of a fertile planet, a life-affirming universe?

These matters lead directly to what I find most surprising about Mandel's paper: the central role it assigns to Frye. In my own commentaries on thematic criticism, I had concluded that its pessimistic or defensive posture was part of the humanistic despair of postwar Western Europe and North America articulated most clearly by Sartre; while the affirmative counter-current, the immediate source of the linguistic regionalism of which Mandel speaks here, I had believed to have stemmed from Jaspers and Heidegger. Perhaps I am now betraying my British Columbia perspective. Mandel suggests that I, among others, in assessing "Frye's method" have overlooked certain "major peculiarities," but it may be only the case that, as a non-Ontarian, I overlooked Frye. It has always seemed to me that the abuses of thematic criticism have been committed by others, and that the neglect, until recently, of alternative critical approaches could only be the responsibility of those who committed it. Frye himself has not written a
ON ELI MANDEL

book-length study of Canadian literature; what shape such a book might take we
can do no more than guess.

During a panel discussion at the Simon Fraser University conference last July,
"The Coast is Only a Line" (note the structuralist displacement of geography
here), Eli Mandel declared what he calls in this paper Northrop Frye's
"interpretation of Canada as ... a Laurentian Empire" to be a mistaken equation
of Ontario with the rest of Canada. Certainly as a British Columbian I can agree
with this. In this context we see that, of the four writers he proposes today as
regionalists of language, particularism, and discontinuous form, three are from
western Canada and the fourth is itinerant. The four major works of cultural
criticism which he cites are Frye, Jones, Atwood, and Moss, all of whom write out
of central Canada. A geographical distinction appears to lurk within his analysis.
Yet, in his discussion of regionalism as a linguistic rather than geographic
concept, he clearly offers the possibility that geography can be removed from
literary description, with not only the imposition of Ontario on Canada being
thereby denied but also that of "Western" on such writers as Kroetsch, Hodgins,
or Wiebe. I can add that his definition of regionalism would admit Ontario
writers like Michael Ondaatje and bpNichol. I also suggest that there can be local
variants of thematic criticism, as Laurence Ricou's Vertical Man / Horizontal
World, or W.H. New's Articulating West, which, without projecting an Ontario
vision on Canada, still demonstrate a preference for ideas over writing. Geographical sections of Canada can, it seems, be accommodated separately on the
couch of cultural Freudianism. Does Mandel himself go so far in denying
geography? His is an enigmatic paper, itself a "strange loop," which describes
two extreme critical positions without overtly choosing, a paper which is notably
Frygian in avoiding obvious value-judgment. Which way does Eli Mandel lean?
The most telling clue, it seems to me (despite his declared "strong personal
attraction to Bloom's theory of influence") is the Clark Blaise quotation on
which he ends. Perhaps we should ask him to begin again.

York University

Notes

1. Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory, V:3 (Fall 1981), 34.
2. "Ariadne: Prolegomenon to the Poetry of Daphne Marlatt," Open Letter, Third Series, no. 3 (Fall
   1975), 33.
5. Mandel, 35.
8. Mandel, 34.
9. Mandel, 35.
10. Mandel, 36.
Eli Mandel rightly notes the powerful, and I would add, pernicious influence of environmentalism on literary criticism. The question this raises is why is the land as physical space and the landscape as metaphor portrayed in the Canadian imagination as a source of terror and alienation, unyielding to man’s efforts to live with nature? When treated thus environmentalism is nothing less than an uncritical endorsement (and, for many, a celebration) of geographical determinism—man’s submission to the unchanging and unchangeable structures of geography. That many of our critics remain fixated and enthralled by the narrow strictures of territory is a strange loop indeed, and something that deserves comment.

I begin with some questions that need answers. Why do our writers and critics continue to drown in the metaphysics of space? Why do they accept geographic determinism as a mode of critical thought and analysis? More fundamentally, why do they adopt this ideological mask which can never explain the profound social and economic inequalities of Canadian life? Why do they continue to believe that geographic isolation rather than the mode of production is responsible for regional identities? Finally, why are they so concerned with geography and not with history which, after all, is about memory and voice, what happened and why?

As a category of thought geographic determinism tells us a lot about ourselves and our capacity for self-deception. Atwood in Survival discusses the four basic victim positions. In the first, the victim denies being a victim. In the next, the victim acknowledges victimization but justifies or rationalizes this condition by appeals to authority, nature, external circumstances, etc. Much of what passes for environmentalism is, I submit, an interpretation of the world according to the victim mentality of position two.

Eli among others would no doubt object to this line of attack with the counter-argument citing the positive, creative, non-victim use of geography as found in the regional novel. But my point is somewhat different. Our fixation with land, space, territory, geography arises in the absence of a popular, accessible, critical discourse capable of explaining Canada as a social and cultural entity. In my perspective, environmentalism is really not about geography but about ‘totems’, ‘myths’, ‘superstitions’ which explain nothing and offer false answers to complex issues. That is why cultural theories which rely on the primacy of geography to explain the development of Canada or to account for our regional character are an ideological mask. A mask, as we know, functions as a repressive structure and blocks the emergence of an authentic discourse, one which is capable of liberating the imagination or providing answers where
previously none were thought to exist.

Finally, I have purposively refrained from discussing a non-literary loop—the explanatory power of appeals to 'good' or 'bad' geography. Would anyone dare analyze Third World literature in terms of geographical handicap, climate, nature? But the obvious point for a political economist to make is that this perspective on Canadian culture tells us more about the bias of intellectuals and their preference for simple answers than it does about the fundamental issues of memory, voice, class, and nation at this time in our history.
“Do you understand Dionysus or Christ?” With these words Professor Kroker ends the discussion of my article, *Nihilism, Politics and Technology*. But surely from what Professor Shell has said about the article there is little doubt as to who she thinks I understand. Shell thinks I speak as a Christian of the Voegelinian perspective. Kroker thinks that there is at least a half chance that I speak as an atheist nihilist. Although I appreciate their comments, I disagree with much they have to say and find these conclusions amusingly odd, especially when considered together. Before we look at them together, let’s look at them separately.

While Professor Shell does not seem to take much issue with my overall interpretation, she does raise objections. I will speak to the objections and then return to her interpretation.

Shell says that I do not appreciate the benefits of individual satisfaction afforded by technology. The benefits of technology, at least on the level of individual satisfaction, I consider too obvious to state. I am not writing about technology as would a liberal who wishes to praise it nor as a luddite who would bury it. My level of discourse is elsewhere. It should be evident that individual satisfaction, because it is the end product of the dialectic of recognition, is presupposed in the system. After all, part of the system is the civil society. It is that part which sees to individual needs. Pertaining to the quote from the *Phenomenology* that she says I “quoted somewhat out of context,” here too it should be understood that the individual is preserved, not swallowed up by the system. Hegel say that subject equals substance and I argue that we have this in the form of a homeostasis of desire and need.

The last objection is the most interesting and important. She claims that the position I am left with at the end of the article calls either for a leap of faith or an exercise of the will to power. A leap of faith to where? Into the arms of Christ, I presume. If I advocated such I would not have ended the article with the quote from *Zarathustra* but with the Nicene creed. But maybe I am advocating the human shaping of human nature through an exercise of the will to power. If this were the case, I would not have talked of human nature in terms of the metaxy. Why do I talk of this doctrine that places man half-way between the beast and the gods? I talk of it because this is what Hegel historizes on the level of both epistemology and philosophical anthropology. It is Plato who discovered the metaxy not Voegelin. Perhaps her reply should be re-titled “Confessions of

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Plato." Hegel claims that this in-betweeness can be surpassed. This is what he means on page 71 of the Baillie translation of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* when he talks about the new goal being not a love for wisdom but the possession of it. Perhaps we should call her reply "Confessions of Hegel." But yes, it is Voegelin who calls Hegel a sorcerer who has attempted to perform magic. I differ with Voegelin in this respect: Hegel is a man like the rest of us, who, in a curious way, does perform magic. Voegelin has not looked at the man Hegel, neither has he looked at what it means for men to perform magic, nor has he looked at the relationship of magic to technique. I do agree with Shell that to interpret human nature in terms of the *metaxy* requires faith. At least today, such an interpretation would. But if there is an acknowledgement here on my part, and after all, acknowledgement is what confession requires, then it has to do with the question of what happens to human nature when it is not thought of in these terms. What happens is somewhat like our jumping over man in the manner of Nietzsche's dwarf. I clearly state what I am acknowledging in the article: "a need to take seriously both technology and nihilism." In other words I am not talking of a need or even possibility of returning to recycled dead values, but of a beginning by addressing ourselves to these two concerns. Even in our post-modern age I am advocating philosophy as a possibility. But for a possibility is all that we can hope; again, as with Nietzsche's dwarf, after our leap there is no guarantee that we will again descend once more upon the tight-rope bisecting the abyss below us and the sky above us.

This leads to Professor Kroker's commentary. He begins by quoting Foucault's comments on Hyppolite's Hegel and claims that I, unlike the latter, did not make an experiment of Hegel and did not let Philosophy take the ultimate risk. By this I take him to mean that, despite what I have to say about Hegel's philosophy, I remain an adherent of the philosophy of the Concept; that Hegel, in effect, is standing there motionless when I am done. Let's look at the whole quote from the *Archaeology of Knowledge*.

> For Hyppolite, the relationship with Hegel was the scene of an experiment, of a confrontation in which it was never certain that philosophy would come out on top. He never saw the Hegelian system as a reassuring universe, he saw it in the field in which philosophy took the ultimate risk.

> From this stem, I believe, the alterations he worked, not within Hegelian philosophy, but upon it, and upon philosophy as Hegel conceived it; from this also, a complete inversion of themes. Instead of concerning philosophy as a totality ultimately capable of dispersing and regrouping itself in the movement of the concept, Jean Hyppolite transformed it into an endless task, against the background of an endless horizon. (p. 236)
On the whole I do not disagree with what Foucault claims for Hyppolite, but since the discussion is about what I was doing and not about what he was doing, I suggest as a way of elucidating my own project we look at this in light of what Hyppolite was doing in relation to Kojève.

If I had to pick a study of Hegel that is faithful to the letter of the text of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, it would be Hyppolite's. If I had to pick one that is faithful to the spirit, yet goes beyond it, it would be Kojève's. Hyppolite stops short where Kojève goes on. In *Genesis and Structure*, Hyppolite leaves us with the query: "Is Feuerbach's interpretation—which absorbs God into man instead of absorbing man into God—the consequences of Hegel's philosophy of religion?" (p. 541) The subject of Hegel's mysticism Hyppolite will take only so far. At best he is ambiguous. (p. 594) As is well known, Kojève does not exhibit this kind of reserve. There is no ambiguity in Kojève. While philosophy for Hyppolite took "the ultimate risk," Kojève took a greater risk and took a risk that did not turn out well for philosophy. It is Kojève's Hegel who allows us to see perhaps more clearly the result of conceiving time as history and this is the concern of my article. But did I take the ultimate risk despite the possibility of a bad outcome for philosophy? Although the proof is in the examination of what I have written, I will again point the reader to my concluding quote from Nietzsche. The quote, has to do with the changing of human nature and the will to power and immediately follows my statements about the *metaxy*. I am saying that if this is the case, if the nature of humanness has been transformed, then we are left with will to power and not with philosophy. The outcome has not been so good for philosophy, but even in spite of this, I never deny the possibility of it. In fact, as I have already said in conjunction with Shell's comments above, I acknowledge its possibility.

Now I will turn to a few small matters in Kroker's comments, matters that merely need clearing up, and then return to my final point which is connected with the above.

Professor Kroker says that my interpretation leads toward androgyny. Although I am not exactly sure what he means by this, but since I do not talk about it here but somewhere else, I can only assume he refers to what I have said elsewhere. I do talk specifically about androgyny but I do so in my forthcoming book, *The Feast: Meditations of Politics and Time*. There I argue that androgyny is but one of a cluster of symbols that resolve the tension of various dialectical polarities, one being sex. On a mundane level this has to do with a variation of the master/slave dialectic and on another level with the presence of two dialectics in Hegel, one anthropocentric, the other theocentric.

Kroker argues that there are two major omissions: that I should have talked about work and that I should have talked more about nihilism. Responding to the first, I would say that the dialectic from which work is an exudate is the dialectic of desire. From this we not only get the dialectic of work but the dialectic of recognition. Marxists tend to forget this. I would argue that by talking about desire we thereby presuppose the dialectic of work and recognition and, although I could have gone to Marx to illustrate it, we do not need him to explain it.
DARBY REPLIES

Regarding his second point, I would say that a discussion of nihilism beyond what is to be found in section III of the article, is to go beyond Hegel and therefore beyond the subject matter. The title of the paper originally included the sub-title: "An Excursus into our Hegelian Legacy." A further investigation of nihilism is now being undertaken in my current project, *The Feast: Meditations on Nihilism and Technology*. Here a more 'mature' nihilism tumbles out of our previous subject matter, but cannot be discussed further in this context. We have to go beyond Hegel to Nietzsche for that.

The phrase the "non-time between the crucifixion and resurrection" is mine, not Kojève's. It was inspired by some things Hegel had to say in *Die System der Sittlichkeit*.

Now I will conclude with a brief response to the upshot of their commentaries taken together. If we take "understanding" in the broadest sense to mean "to stand under or among," then I would say that I, together with all of us, understand both Christ and Dionysus. They are the shadows that loom both behind and before us, the former is our past and latter is our future. Thus perhaps it is best in our "New World" to say that "understanding," as it pertains here, is to stand between them. It is from the position of this tension that we must interpret our world. It is a tension wrought of remembering the words in *Hebrews* that "faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen" while hearing clearly Hegel's and Nietzsche's word that God has died. It is to stand between the Passion and the willing will of the Dynamo.

Department of Political Science  
Carleton University
The "blindspot" debate, conducted between Dallas Smythe, Bill Livant and Graham Murdock in the pages of this journal, raised some vital issues concerning the Marxist analysis of the communications industry. In this comment I wish to address three central issues of the discussion: the audience as a commodity; the labour of the audience; and the audience commodity as the key to the internal unity of the media. I will argue that Smythe's suggestion of the audience as a commodity can only be defended by a further theoretical elaboration of the key themes, that the notion of audience labour in marketing and consumption cannot be substantiated within a Marxist framework, and that Livant's claim for the internal unity of the media is not consistent with a study that places the analysis of commodity relations at its centre.

Smythe, aware that his central claim that the chief product of mass media are audiences produced as commodities will prove contentious, poses and answers a series of questions which he claims "an historical materialist approach would seem to indicate." Unfortunately, he asks the wrong questions and does not provide himself with an opportunity to theoretically specify the basis of his claims. All he comes up with are a number of observations that support his general contention. A set of different questions would have allowed the opportunity to substantiate and specifically probe the blindspot he has perceptively located. These questions are: (1) Does the audience commodity have a use-value, (2) does it have an objective existence, (3) does it have an exchange-value, (4) is it produced by value-adding labour, and (5) is it owned by specific capitalists? These are, I believe, the main parameters of the Marxist definition of a commodity and it is only if all these are satisfied that we can include the term in the wider Marxist analysis of media.

(1) Does the audience commodity have a use-value? Use-value is a relative term. Different consumers will have different use-values for the same commodity. For advertisers of consumer products the use-value of the audience commodity is the movement of commodities-in-general. Also, different audiences will "move" a divergent set of commodities. For advertisers such as the army, use-value is connected to recruitment. For corporate (image-based) advertising, use-value is connected to ideological factors concerning legitimacy.

(2) & (3) Does the audience commodity have an objective existence and does it have an exchange-value? Livant, arguing to put the audience commodity on an objective footing, writes that if Smythe's point of switching analysis from ideological content to objective function is to be taken, there is a need to break with the message-based definition of the audience. The definition should rest on objective criteria. The distinction thus becomes one between the audience for
"Happy Days" and the demographic and psychographic specifics of that audience. This distinction is based on an historical process in which the audience (not necessarily as a commodity) is the factor through which the commodity form is articulated (see below). Thus, in the earlier days of television, the commodity form of mass media was the technology. As Raymond Williams notes, the "major investment was in the means of distribution, and was devoted to production only so far as to make the distribution technically possible and then attractive." A commodity was sold to an audience once the technology had been widely distributed the commodity form of mass media changed to the production of audiences. The development of the modern systems of market research (numbers, demographics, psychographics) has greatly facilitated this process in recent years. Furthermore, as soon as any material "emerges as a commodity, it changes into a thing which transcends sensuousness. It not only stands with its feet on the ground but in relation to all other commodities" (Marx). Hence some audience commodities exchange for more than others. For instance, in the late 1960's, CBS decided to cancel a number of popular prime-time programmes, such as "Andy Griffith" and "Ed Sullivan" because these programmes attracted proportionately more elderly, lower-income, rural audiences. The new programmes, instead, had to try and capture the profitable markets of the young, affluent, urban audiences who would be willing to try new products. This new audience could be sold at a higher price to advertisers. Today, the most valuable TV audience is the sports audience, which, because of its demographic specificity, is sold at approximately twice the price of the prime-time audience. It is important to note here that advertising rates are not based on time but on the objective characteristics of the particular audience. The cost is calculated in terms of cost per thousand viewers reached. As Pete Rozelle of the National Football League says, "our demographics are such that an advertiser paying $7 per thousand for football really has a better buy than if he paid $4 per thousand for another programme." The sports audience is more costly because the people reached are mostly men with a decisive role in the decision-making process in the purchase of high-cost consumer items, and because the characteristics of this audience are more precise and specific than the more amorphous, prime-time audience.

(4) Is the audience commodity produced by value-adding labour? Smythe claims that the prime function of advertising-dominated media is to produce audiences as commodities for sale to advertisers. Undoubtedly network executives think that this is what they are doing. However, for us to substantiate this objectively, we would have to show that television undertakes specific actions not merely to draw existing aggregates together (although, strictly speaking, that would be enough) but to create new ones that will sell on the market for more than the original aggregates (raw materials). To illustrate this, an illuminating example can be chosen from the relationship between sports and TV. In 1979, when Pete Rose signed for the Philadelphia Phillies, the latter were able to guarantee his salary from television ($800,000 a year), after it was found that having Rose with the team would significantly raise viewing figures. Rose
signed for the Phillies because he could be used to create a new audience commodity. As in the creation of all commodities for exchange, value is added through the conscious activity of producers. The media work to change sports to produce a new audience commodity. Although the message is central to the creation of this new commodity, it is not defined by the message. It is defined by the objective characteristics of the audience commodity.

(5) Is the audience commodity owned by specific capitalists? This is the most vital issue concerning the audience as commodity and is, in a sense, the most ambiguous and problematic. Orthodox Marxists balk at the acceptance of the audience as commodity on this point. The claim is put instead that, although network executives and advertisers talk about buying and selling audiences, objectively what is being sold is simply time. In this view the audience does not exist as a commodity because it cannot be owned by anyone. Fortunately, a number of situations along the Canada/US border have provided us with the material to at least attempt a defence of the notion of audience commodity ownership.

The Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) proposed in 1971 to give cable companies permission to remove commercials from American station broadcasts and to substitute Canadian commercials instead. In August 1973, Rogers Cable of Toronto began to randomly delete commercials from Buffalo station broadcasts. Three Buffalo stations immediately threatened legal action, arguing that the Canadian action was both immoral and illegal. While this legal action was ultimately unsuccessful, the policy of random deletion has been stopped and, in the process, a number of interesting relationships have been highlighted. The intriguing question is — what exactly was being "stolen" to prompt this legal threat? The Buffalo stations were threatened with the loss of their Canadian audience, meaning that this audience could not be sold to advertisers, thus resulting in a loss of advertising revenue. While the programmes of the American stations would be used to produce the audience commodity, the selling would be done by Canadian cable operators. As one broadcasting consultant put it: "substitution is plain stealing." The present border policy is one of overlapping programme substitution. If the same programme is being shown on both Canadian and American stations at the same time, the cable company blocks out the American signal, thus assuring the Canadian stations an unfractioned audience that can be sold to advertisers at a higher cost than if the audience was split between different stations. While the American/Canadian situation certainly highlights the issues, the question of audience commodity ownership is not only an international affair. Within the US and Canada, the FCC and the CRTC have fairly stringent rules protecting markets within a certain geographic range of each other; i.e. if Toronto were in the USA the Buffalo stations would be prevented by FCC regulations from doing any selling in that market.

Smythe starts his analysis with the question of the objective definition of the commodity produced by advertising-based media, but unfortunately he addresses the key issues only tangentially and thus fails to establish sufficient theoretical
support for his argument. The questions posed here are the ones that address the central issues, and while more problematic, I believe that, in the long run, their working through will provide stronger support for Smythe's assertions regarding the audience commodity.

Smythe's second major contention is that the audience commodity labours productively for capital in marketing goods to itself, and by reproducing workers' labour power through consumption. Now clearly the term "labour" has some very specific meanings within a Marxist perspective, most importantly that labour is used to create value in the production of commodities. For Smythe it seems that as labour power is a commodity, that which produces it is labour. Because workers can reproduce their labour power only through consumption in the monopoly capitalist marketplace, all time becomes work time. Livant clearly agrees with Smythe on the general point although his position as regards the productivity of labour is unclear. The whole discussion of audience labour revolves, however, around the issue of productivity. What is actually meant by productive? For Smythe and Livant the answer would seem to be: "if it is essential for the maintenance of the system of monopoly capitalism it is productive." Clearly this is not a very Marxist position, which would stress that labour creates value which is reflected in the exchange-value of the product.

What then happens to Smythe's suggestion that marketing and consumption are part of productive labour when viewed from the perspective of the Marxist definition of labour? It seems that for Smythe the marketing function is a purely subjective act. It is a learning of cues when making up a "mental shopping list" (p. 14). Audience members sit in front of a TV and learn certain actions. Surely there can be no claim that there is anything productive in this activity by itself. For the claim to have any basis it must take place with some form of real (objective) activity — spending income in consumption. It must be in this activity of consumption (subsuming self-marketing) that Smythe locates productive activity. For consumption to be productive it would have to be shown that the consumption involved in creating the commodity labour power is adding value to labour power. But if the value of labour power is defined as the value of the means of subsistence of the worker and his family (the Marxist definition), then labour power would have to exchange at this value plus the value added by consumption. Thus labour power would have to exchange at above its value. Smythe's claim about the productivity of marketing and consumption cannot remain consistent within a Marxist framework. It only makes sense outside of it, although the alternative framework is not stated and is not plainly obvious. By viewing monopoly capitalism in a holistic manner, Smythe (and Livant, it seems) label the functionally distinct parts with the essence of the most vital (production). They mistake an integration into monopoly capitalism for the installation of monopoly capitalist relations of production. This is not to deny Smythe's claim that advertising by capitalists can be productive, but is to specify that productive activity takes place within production (in the age of monopoly capitalism including marketing and distribution), and not in response to this activity, in consumption, which is
outside production. Within production, activity is concerned with the production of commodities-in-general. In consumption, activity is geared towards creating something else (labour power). The only formulation of audience labour that might remain consistent and fruitful is one which sees that labour is not being performed for advertisers but for the mass media. Audience labour is part of the production process of the audience commodity. Their "wages" are the programmes, without which they would not watch TV. The networks get more from advertisers than it costs to produce the audience commodity, so value (or at least surplus) is being created.

Livant, in an extension of Smythe's position, asserts that the notion of audience commodity applies even to non-advertising-based media. Whereas for Smythe it is the content that is cross-marketed, for Livant it is the audience itself that is cross-marketed. The audience is the commodity form through which the media are internally articulated. "In some of the media, some of the time, commodities-in-general are being sold; but in all sectors, all of the time, the audience commodity is being made. In all sectors it is being traded, in all sectors it is being measured." Just as audience labour was generalized from a specific section to the whole, so now Livant has overextended the useful concept of audience commodity. I think it is indisputable that the audience is the key to the internal unity of the media and that Smythe is correct when he says that the content is cross-marketed. It is quite another thing to say that the audience as a commodity fulfills this function. Within advertising-dominated media, accumulation is based on the sale of the audience commodity. In other media, accumulation is based on the sale of a commodity (book, movie, record) to an audience. All mass media create audiences but it is only advertising-based media that produce audiences for sale. Thus "Star Wars" was a commodity sold to an audience (or rather a cinema seat was sold for a particular period of time). When "Star Wars" is shown on TV, it is being used as a producer's good to produce an audience for sale to advertisers. When "Star Wars" books are produced they are commodities for sale to an audience. When "Star Wars" music is played on AM radio, it is the audience commodity that is being produced. While the audience and the audience commodity may be comprised of the same aggregates, the specific context of their relations with various media define them in different ways. It is through the audience that the commodity form of mass media is articulated. The audience commodity is not the commodity form through which the media is internally articulated. The term "commodity" is a description of relations. It is not a description of static characteristics.

To conclude, the argument of the audience as a commodity is a vital one for Marxist analysis and should greatly increase a critical comprehension of the workings of mass communication. The claims put forward about audience labour and the internal unity of the media cannot be included within the same analysis in their present formulations, although there may be room for a more limited notion of audience labour and of the audience as the key to the internal unity of the media.
PROBING THE BLIND SPOT

Notes

The present comment is a shortened version of a paper presented at the 1981 Canadian Communications Association meetings in Halifax, "Probing the Blindspot: Issues Concerning the Audience Commodity", mimeo, Communication Studies, Simon Fraser University, 1981.


2. Smythe's questions are, 'What do advertisers buy?'; 'What institutions produce the audience?'; 'How do advertisers know they are getting what they paid for?'; 'What does this audience do for advertisers?'. These questions already pre-suppose the acceptance of the audience as a commodity.

3. Raymond Williams, Television: Technology and Cultural Form, London: Fontana, 1974, p. 25. Williams goes on to write, "Unlike all previous communications technologies, radio and television were systems primarily devised for transmission and reception as abstract processes, with little or no definition of preceding content."


7. A more spectacular example is that of the American Football League, which was given a huge increase in its television contract by NBC, so that the AFL could compete for the top college players and so break the football audience monopoly for the National Football League and CBS. When they were successful, the two leagues realigned (merged) to assure the networks their valued monopoly.

8. Further to this productive activity by the networks we can also see how the State acts to create the conditions for the most profitable production of the audience commodity. Murdock in his reply criticises Smythe for underplaying the role of the State, and in his rejoinder the latter writes that he did not deal with theories of the State because they are "at a level of abstraction remote from the nitty-gritty level where daily the institutions of monopoly capitalism use commodity-marketing and the mass media to push capitalist ideology" (p.122). However, he correctly states that theories of the State and theories of audience commodity should not be mutually exclusive of each other. Indeed they should not, for the production and exchange of the audience commodity takes place under conditions explicitly moulded by State activity. For instance, it is the audience as commodity that stands at the centre of the articulation between professional sports, television and the State. The State not only allows a professional sports league to operate as a monopoly within a particular sport but it also allows a sports league to bargain as a league, rather than as individual teams when negotiating the sale of television broadcast rights. The effect of the latter is to guarantee that the sports audience will not be fragmented between different stations but can be sold as a lump monopolistic sum of demographic and psychographic variables to the networks.
This is profitable to both the sports leagues which can get a higher price from the networks and the networks themselves which command higher prices from advertisers because they can guarantee an unfractioned audience. It is also profitable to advertisers who get full value for their advertising dollar. The State has explicitly created the conditions for the most profitable production of the audience commodity.

9. I would like to thank Charles Tolman for originally raising the issue of ownership and Rohan Samarajiwa for suggesting where an answer to it might be found.


11. Smythe writes, "The work of audience members which advertisers find productive for them is one of learning clues which are used when the audience member makes up his/her mental shopping list and spends his/her income." (p.14).

12. Ian Gough has written that productive labour under capitalism is a historically specific relationship in which "only labour which is directly transformed into (productive) capital is productive. When wage labour is exchanged for the variable part of capital, it reproduces the value of its own labour power and in addition surplus value for the capitalist." See "Marx's Theory of Productive and Unproductive Labour", New Left Review No.76, 1972, p 50.

13. One is reminded here of the debates concerning the productivity of housework. For a useful summary of this, see "Relations of Production, Relations of Re-Production" in Working Papers in Cultural Studies, No.9, Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, Birmingham, 1976. In fact the role of the housewife is vital in the reproduction of labour power in that she fulfills the basic consumption activities to this end. If anyone is working to reproduce the labour power of the worker it is the housewife and yet she is strangely absent from Smythe's analysis.

14. One is reminded here of another debate within a Marxist framework concerning the articulation between modes of production, i.e. the Frank/Laclau debate. In fact, Laclau makes this very criticism of Frank. See E. Laclau, "Feudalism and Capitalism in Latin America", New Left Review, No. 67, 1971.

15. In a footnote to his paper (p.105) Livant argues that Murdock splits apart production and consumption and assigns an analytic symmetry between them and thus "blocks investigation into the nature of the object which is being produced which includes both 'production' and 'consumption' in the more restricted sense." Production here seems to include consumption, just as consumption includes production ("when the listener buys his player, he participates in its production") (p.96). I believe an intermediate and more balanced view would see consumption as completing production, but being analytically distinct from it. One can give production dominance without subsuming everything under it.

16. During the course of a private correspondence, both Bill Livant and myself independently reached this position. I am much more tenative with it than is Livant.
I am grateful to Sut Jhally for his critique, both in the preceding article and in our informal exchanges (see his footnote 16). I have gone back to the drawing board; back to the beginning of the debate on the audience commodity. In my contribution to that debate in this Journal, I was concerned to support Dallas Smythe against a peculiar kind of criticism of his views on the audience commodity. I called it criticism of the form "yes, yes, of course... but what about X?"; or criticism in which the concept of the audience commodity "seems self-evidently true, but not terribly interesting. Its theoretical meaning is obvious, and already exhausted. There is much that is new outside it, but nothing new within it".

I think that there is something quite new within it, but I am no longer sure that Smythe would agree with me about what it is. His very important point (expanded in his recent book, Dependency Road, 1981) is that mass media sell audiences to advertisers, and that these audiences perform value-adding labour in the marketing of commodities. But from the very beginning of this debate I felt that watching, listening itself was the new thing within the media that needed attention. And this is what I attend to below. Just what is it that we have heretofore called "an audience commodity"?

The "audience commodity" is the talk of the TV trade. In his article Smythe cites the talk of traders, and his book cites more. Jhally notes that "network executives and advertisers talk about buying and selling audiences". Now, the talk of traders is valuable data as to what they believe to be true. But that doesn't mean it is true. The nature of what they buy and sell may be invisible to them, or only partly visible, in distorted form. Things go on behind their backs.

I will stick with advertising-based media here because this is the case that demands clear understanding. If we are wrong or unclear about the nature of the "audience commodity" in this classic case, we are sure to be wrong on the others. Indeed, in this case, the "obvious" case, the "audience commodity" turns out to be different from what it first appears.

There is one empirical fact about watching TV that a theory of the "audience
commodity" must address. People watch so much. And yet they are not obliged to watch; they are formally free not to watch at all.

We need not review in great detail how much. In North America, an average of about 30 hours a week. By the time the average person reaches working retirement at 65, he or she will have put in nine years watching TV. Nine years, 365 days a year, 24 hours a day. TV watching compares very closely with the total hours spent by a fully employed worker working for a wage over a whole working lifetime. For TV there is no child labor law, and no retirement age. And to top it off, the new narrowcasting technologies promise more watching, not less.

No theory can ignore this immense amount of time spent watching. Not buying; watching. It is because so much time is spent here that it becomes reasonable to ask questions about economic value, surplus value, accumulation within this time itself, and not simply as an adjunct to something else. If people watched only 30 hours a year; if we expected this time to decrease in periods of economic depression as is the case with home-buying, then a theory which puts watching time at the center would have little plausibility. But this is not the case. A theory of the "audience commodity" must explain this immense watching time. Watching time, and no other, is its primary material.

What goes on in this time? To whom does it have value, and how does that value arise? Jhally's fascinating example of the U.S.-Canadian cable conflict is relevant here. Jhally turns to it to help solve "the most vital issue", but also "the most ambiguous and problematic one" concerning the audience commodity. Why is it most vital for Jhally? Because to sell a thing you have to own it. And why most ambiguous and problematic? Because it is unclear what the commodity is. Is it "audiences"? Is it "time"?

As mentioned earlier, people in the media talk of buying and selling "audiences, like herds of cattle". But they also talk of "time": "The basic economics of television are quite simple. They involve a commodity that's traded by both the networks and the creators of programs: time. The networks sell it, and the producers fill it." These citations are typical. If the audience is the commodity, just what is it about the audience that is bought and sold? If time is the commodity, whose time? It is not only some "Marxists who balk"; something is not yet in focus.

In Jhally's example, the American stations may declare that "substitution is plain stealing". But note that it is not any old substitution. If, for example, Rogers cable had deleted some American programs but kept the American spot commercials, there would be no theft at all. It would be a gift, a gift Rogers cable is not about to give.

What is it that marks the difference between theft and gift? The theft is substitution in time that Rogers can sell to sponsors. The gift is substitution in
time Rogers can't sell to sponsors. For not all the time can be sold, only some of it. The time that can't be sold to a sponsor is, as Jhally says, "program" time. This is time necessary to "produce the audience". Why can't this time be sold to a sponsor? Because this time, this part of watching-time, must be sold to the audience.

This time has economic value. It was produced by value-adding labour. Its cost to the media is the cost of its production, the socially necessary labour time to produce the programs, to produce the news, the entertainments, to produce what Smythe has called "the free lunch".

And what does the media buy from the audience in return for the time it sells to them? It buys from the audience extra time; it buys extra watching time by the audience. This extra time is the time the media can sell to the sponsors. If the audience did not watch extra, the media would have nothing to sell.

It is in the form of extra watching time that surplus value appears. This extra watching time I will call surplus time. This is the commodity that the media do own, that they have indeed paid for, and that they can sell to sponsors. The media do not own "audiences". They do not own abstract "time". They own the extra watching time, the surplus time. The loose talk of the trade is that "programs" are sold to audiences, and "audiences" are sold to sponsors. In fact time is bought and sold in both cases. But the important difference is between necessary and surplus watching time. The distinction between necessary and surplus time has become more visible with the evolution of commercial television. Sponsors no longer own programs. As Erik Barnouw points out: "By the 1970's network-sponsor economic relations focussed entirely on the buying and selling of spots—mainly in 30-second and 60-second units."3

Why did TV evolve in this direction rather than the opposite way? Because spot-selling works to raise the fraction of surplus/necessary watching time. The struggle to increase surplus time and decrease necessary time animates the mass media. On this proportion the rate of surplus value produced in the media depends. The trade literature is full of studies which strive, one and all, to convert necessary time into surplus time. For example, a fascinating recent example is time compression whereby a 36-second message is squeezed into a 30-second spot without pitch distortion. This subdivides time in such a way that now there are six spots for sale where before there were only five. And according to the Wall Street Journal, "fast talkers are more believable."4

More surplus time. And this process will be intensified by satellite/cable technologies. Bergreen notes that: "While they cannot expand time either, they can divide it, a process which amounts to a form of expansion."5 In this process of determining the ratio of surplus/necessary time, the audience fully participates. Jerry Mander's young son Kai told him: "I don't want to watch television as much as I do but I can't help it. It makes me watch it."6 Kai Mander shows us that it is not only wage-workers in the media but audiences that participate in the production of surplus time; that is, add value to it.

This is the path by which I come to agreement with Jhally when he formulates audience labour as working "not for the advertisers but for the mass media".
BILL LIVANT

Audience labour is part of the production process of what he calls (and what I formerly called) the “audience commodity”. Only this commodity is not “an audience”. It is an audience’s extra time, its surplus watching time. This is its media-relevant commodity, no other.

Jhally writes that it is important to note that “advertisers rates are not based on time but on the objective characteristics of the particular audience. The cost is calculated in terms of cost per thousand viewers reached.” But this begs the question of how much time the network owns and therefore can sell. They cannot sell necessary time to sponsors; they do not own it. They own only surplus time.

This is why Jhally’s last sentence, just cited, lacks a real subject. “The cost” of what? The cost of those spots, of those 30-seconds or 60-seconds, the cost of that watching-time.

The fact that only surplus watching time is the commodity in no way denies the importance of audience demographics. Quite the contrary; it shows how they are important. Jhally approves of my break with message-based definitions of audiences in favor of objective ones. But when we focus on necessary and surplus time, we see that a minute of TV time is filled in two ways. It is filled with messages which embody the labour time of their production. And it is filled with watching by specific kinds of people. Surplus time is their time which they have sold. It will then be put to work by the buyer.

IV

Once we see that, appearances and trade-talk to the contrary, “audiences” are not commodities, we can take a fresh look at the last of Jhally’s three points: the unity of the mass media. Since an audience commodity is the surplus watching time of an audience, I do not agree with Jhally that “... the audience and the audience commodity may be comprised of the same aggregates.” Because we were not able to describe clearly the nature of the audience’s commodity, we fell into the attitude which I earlier called “Yes, yes, of course...”. That there was an “audience commodity” in advertising-based media seemed obviously true. That there was an “audience commodity” in non-advertising based media seemed obviously false.

From our present point of view, both of these “obvious” points are false. Despite the talk on the 16th floor, “an audience” is not sold in advertising-based media. And again, in non-advertising-based media, surplus watching time is being produced, although it may be sold in another medium at another time. If we fail to distinguish an audience from its surplus time we are forced into an incorrect opposition between situations in which it appears, on the one hand, that “an audience” is being sold to an advertiser; and on the other, in which some other commodity (a book, a record) is being sold to an audience. Where we see the second, we think the first does not exist. But on television, both are true simultaneously. They mark the boundary at a given time between necessary and
surplus watching time itself.

Once we properly distinguish the audience from its *media-relevant* commodity, we can see the proper place of other kinds of commodities-in-general (communications equipment, consumption goods, etc.) and I never claimed that they have no role in accumulation.

I do agree with Jhally that "it is through the audience that the commodity form of the mass media is articulated", and I am grateful to him for stressing this point. But I do believe that the distinction between necessary and surplus audience time is precisely the commodity form through which capitalist media are internally articulated. In all sectors, all of the time, this commodity is being made and measured. The struggle over surplus and necessary watching time is the central struggle over accumulation in the mass media. As Harry Cleaver put it:

"Capital tries to convince us that time is universal and just a physical entity. But we know it is not. One hour of work time is not equal to one hour of free time by any means.... Any time spent by the working class that is not work—exactly the time workers fight to increase—is dead time for capital."

Is it accidental that socially necessary labour time, which appears in *latent* form in the values of all commodities-in-general, appears *manifest* in the mass media as the terrain of struggle?

Department of Psychology
University of Regina

Notes


I am grateful to the department of sociology, Brooklyn College, CUNY for their hospitality and the use of research facilities, 1981-1982.

1. Dallas W. Smythe, Dependency Road: Communications, Capitalism, Consciousness and Canada, Ablex, 1981, see especially ch. 2, "On the Audience commodity and its work".


4. John Andrew, "Need to Convey More Data? Squeeze 36-second Message into 30-seconds", Wall Street Journal Journal, 14 May, 1981. A limit on the speedup of producing the spot is mentioned in the last paragraph of the article: "Common sense might say that advertisers and others could save money by simply getting their actors to talk faster. Not so...People tend to slur their words when they talk fast. Time-compressed voices don't sound slurred. Another problem: People can only talk as fast as they can think."


On March 15, 1978, Professor Bertell Ollman was offered the position of Chairman of the Department of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland (College Park) by the Provost with the full approval of the Chancellor. Ollman, a professor at New York University and author of the book *Alienation: Marx's Conception of Man in Capitalist Society*, was selected over 100 or so other candidates chosen by a faculty search committee.

More than a dozen Maryland state legislators, including the chairmen of the committees which deal with the university's budget, protested the appointment. Acting Governor Blair Lee dubbed it "unwise", saying "it may kick up quite a backlash". Several conservative newspaper columnists condemned the appointment, and at least three members of the university's Board of Regents made their objections public.

Outgoing president of the University of Maryland, Wilson Elkins, stalled any final decision. On July 19, 1978, incoming president John Toll rejected the appointment. Denying that Professor Ollman's Marxist views played any part in the decision, President Toll claimed that he acted solely on academic grounds, but refused to state what these were. Professor Ollman then filed a suit against the university for violating his constitutional rights by denying him a job on political grounds.
ACADEMIC FREEDOM ON TRIAL

The case came to trial in Baltimore on May 18, 1981. During the month-long trial, considerable evidence was produced indicating political pressure on presidents Elkins and Toll not to appoint Ollman. In his testimony, President Toll cited "academic grounds" as the basis for his negative decision. The main reason being, he said, that Ollman has "poor administrative judgement"; as evidence of which, he cited anti-Vietnam War political activities that Ollman is alleged to have taken part in.

Judge Alexander Harvey III, a member of one of Maryland’s leading banking families, found for the defendants, claiming that President Toll acted "honestly and conscientiously". Praising the great achievements of presidents Elkins and Toll as educators, Judge Harvey said he simply did not believe that they would lie about their actions.

The decision is being appealed.

Judge Harvey made a number of possibly serious judicial errors. For example, he ruled out as irrelevant all evidence pertaining to the standards President Toll used in appointing department chairmen in his 16 years as university president. This deprived Ollman of a base from which to show that he was being treated in a unique manner and judged from a standard that did not apply in other similar appointments.

The rejection of Ollman’s appointment has contributed further to the chilling atmosphere for academic freedom in America’s universities. This is even more true in light of the widespread publicity that this case has received. Whatever the final judgement on Ollman, this ruling cannot be allowed to stand.

Ollman’s lawyers are working pro bono, but he is responsible for various “incidental” expenses, the most pressing of which is $15,000 to $20,000 (which he does not have) for typing out the trial transcript in order to begin the process of appeal. If progressives and others concerned with issues of academic freedom cannot help out in cases of such flagrant abuse, the time will come when no one will want or be financially able to seek legal redress for any discriminatory practice. What will reactionary administrators unleash then? Solidarity and enlightened self-interest both require that Ollman be supported.

Please give generously:
Make cheques out to Ollman Academic Freedom Fund and send to Prof. Michael Brown, 210 Spring St., New York, N.Y., U.S.A. 10012.

Supporters of this appeal include: Sheldon Wolin (Princeton); Frances Fox Piven (Boston); Harry Magdoff (Monthly Review); Immanuel Wallerstein (SUNY-Binghamton); Sam Bowles (U. Mass.); Ted Lowi (Cornell); Bert Gross (CUNY-Hunter); Peter Bachrach (Temple); Christian Bay and C.B. Macpherson (Toronto); Bill Livant (Regina); James O’Connor (U. Calif.); Ben Barber (Rutgers).
BOOKS RECEIVED


The Origin of Formalism in Social Science, Jeffrey T. Bergner, University of Chicago Press, $16.00 (cloth), 162 pp.

The Politics of Work and Occupations, Geoff Esland and Graeme Salaman (eds.), University of Toronto Press, $11.00 (paper), 408 pp.

Paths to Political Reform, William J. Crotty, Lexington Books, $29.95 (cloth), 366 pp.

Science and Ethical Responsibility, Sanford A. Lakoff (ed.), Addison-Wesley, 331 pp.


Toward an Ecological Society, Murray Bookchin, Black Rose Books, $8.95 (paper), 331 pp.

Coping with Proposition 13, Roger L. Kemp, Lexington Books, $24.95 (cloth), 222 pp.

Estrangement: Marx's Conception of Human Nature and the Division of Labor, Isidor Walliman, Greenwood Press, $29.95 (cloth), 195 pp.


Canada Since 1945: Power, politics and provincialism, Robert Bothwell, Ian Drummond and John English, University of Toronto Press, $19.95 (cloth), 489 pp.

BOOKS RECEIVED


Political Parties in Europe, Theo Stammen, Meckler Books, $42.50 (cloth), 321 pp.


Making Canadian Indian Policy: The Hidden Agenda 1968-1970, Sally M. Weaver, University of Toronto Press, $25.00 (cloth), 236 pp.


Main Currents of Marxism, Leszek Kolakowski,
I - The Founders, 434 pp.
II - The Golden Age, 542 pp.
III - The Breakdown, 548 pp.
Oxford University Press, $9.95 (paper)


Thomas Hill Green and the Development of Liberal-Democratic Thought, I.M. Greengarten, University of Toronto Press, $20.00 (cloth), 151 pp.

Energy and the Quality of Life: Understanding Energy Policy, C.A. Hooker et al., University of Toronto Press, $25.00 (cloth), 283 pp.


Dependency Road: Communications, Capitalism, Consciousness and Canada, Dallas W. Smythe, Temple University Press, $29.50 (cloth), 347 pp.


BOOKS RECEIVED


*Assessing the Elderly: A Practical Guide to Measurement*, Rosalie A. Kane and Robert L. Kane, $23.75, 301 pp. (cloth)

*Ideologies in Quebec: The Historical Development*, University of Toronto Press, Denis Monière, $30.00 (cloth), $10.95 (paper), 328 pp.


*Eastern and Western Perspectives*, David Jay Bercuson and Phillip A. Buckner (eds.), University of Toronto Press, $25.00 (cloth), $10.00 (paper), 227 pp.

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