AUGUSTINE AS THE FOUNDER
OF MODERN EXPERIENCE:
THE LEGACY OF CHARLES NORRIS COCHRANE

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To this conception of will, as an autonomous determination of the total self, Augustine adheres tenaciously at all stages of his career.

Charles Norris Cochrane. Christianity and Classical Culture.

Will and power are, in the will to power, not merely linked together; but rather the will, as the will to will, is itself the will to power in the sense of the empowering to power.

Martin Heidegger. "The Word of Nietzsche"

Remembering Augustine

In his critical text, To Freedom Condemned, Jean-Paul Sartre remarked that the "continuous flight which constitutes the being of a person comes to a sudden halt when the Other emerges, for the Other sees it and changes it thereby into an object, an in-itself." Now, the present meditation is in the way of a report on how my "continuous flight", an effort at thinking through at a fundamental level the sources of the radical crisis of twentieth-century experience, has been brought to a sudden halt by the "Other" of Charles Norris Cochrane.

A forgotten, and certainly unassimilated, thinker, whether in his native Canada or in more international discourse, Charles Norris Cochrane represents in his writings I am now convinced, an explosive intervention in the understanding of modern culture. Before reading Cochrane, it was possible to hold to the almost lethargic belief that the crisis of modern culture could be traced, most im-
mediately, to the "bad infinity" present at the beginning of the rationalist calculus of the Enlightenment; and that, for better or for worse, the intellectual horizon of the modern age was contained within the trajectory of Kant, Hegel, Marx and Nietzsche. After Cochrane, there remains only the impossible knowledge that the discourse of the modern century began, not in the seventeenth century, but in the fourth century after Christ; and this in remembrance of the real meaning of Augustine's *Confessions*. Cochrane was the one thinker in the modern century, with the exception of Hannah Arendt, to make Augustine dangerous again: dangerous, that is, as the metaphysician and theoretician of power who set in motion the physics (trinitarianism), the logic (the epistemology of modern psychology) and the ethics (the functionality of the *Saeculum*) of western experience. In Cochrane's reading of Augustine, one can almost hear that fateful rumbling of ground which announces that, after all, the great "founders" of the western tradition may have been, in the end, either in the case of Plato, Homer or Lucretius precursors or antagonists of the Augustinian discourse or, in the case of Kant, this most modern of thinkers, merely secularizations of a structure of western consciousness the essential movements of which were put in place by Augustine. Yes, Cochrane presents us with the challenge of rereading the Augustinian discourse, not simply within the terms of Christian metaphysics, but as a great dividing-line, perhaps the fundamental scission, between classicism and the modernist discourse.

**Three Subversions**

This essay, then, is an attempt to escape the gaze of the Other—to take up the challenge posed by Cochrane—not by evading his radical rethinking of the "tradition" of western knowledge, but rather by following through a strategy of thought which consists of three fundamental subversions. The first two subversions are intended to be *with* Cochrane: to show precisely the implications of his thought for a rethinking of, at first, the Canadian discourse and then, by way of extension, of the dominant discourse of the history of western consciousness. Consequently, I shall argue at once that Cochrane has never been integrated into Canadian thought, not really because of benign neglect (although the forgetfulness of a "radical amnesia" may have its place) but because there has been until now no obvious fit between the received interpretation of Canadian discourse and Cochrane's writings. To absorb Cochrane's thought into the tradition of Canadian inquiry would be to subvert a good part of Canadian intellectuality: to demonstrate, for example, a very different use of the "historical imagination" in the role of a critical account of the philosophy of civilization; and to show that there exists in the methodology and practice of Canadian thought a coherent, indigenous and dynamic "philosophy of culture" which, in its depth of vision, is without parallel in modern cultural theory.
Augustine and Modernism

Again, and this still with Cochrane, I will put forward as a theoretical conclusion that Cochrane's philosophy of culture is subversive of and radically discontinuous with the main interpretations of the history of western knowledge. If Cochrane is correct in his philosophical and historical reflections on the genealogy of the crisis of western culture, then there is at the heart of the western vitia (in its physics, epistemology and aesthetics) the radical impossibility of a civilization which, in the absence of a "creative principle" of integration, oscillates between the polarities of the sensate and the ideal. In responding to the "depth categories" of the crisis of western culture, Cochrane sought to think through the history of classical and modern experience outside of and against Platonic discourse. The provocative interpretation which is announced by Cochrane is the same as that which was earlier hinted at by Nietzsche: Christian metaphysics, precisely because of the radical nihilism of its will to truth, also saves us from the failure of Reason to secure a "permanent and enduring" basis for society against the constant revolt of mutable and contingent experience.

In a word, Augustine is the truth-sayer of the failure of Platonic discourse (yes, of philosophy) to secure an adequate political order against the tragic dénouement of poetic consciousness. Now, while Cochrane ultimately sought shelter in the discourse of Augustinian realism, I shall argue against this pax rationalis that while Augustine may, indeed, be the precursor of and cartographer of modernism, the discourse to which he condemns us is that of a total domination: a domination founded in the will to will and in the colonization of sensual experience. Thus, against Cochrane I would offer one final subversion: the overcoming of the fundamental principles of Augustinian discourse (the will to power, the will to truth, and the nihilism of the trinitarian solution to divided consciousness) is the beginning, again and again, of a modernism which is based on the "opening of the eye of the flesh".

To Breach the Silence

A terrible silence has surrounded the work of Charles Norris Cochrane, denying him recognition as Canada's most important philosophical historian and as a principal contributor to a more international debate on the genealogy of the crisis of western society. The exclusion of Cochrane's thought is all the more ironic given the recommendations to read Cochrane made by two of Canada's most distinguished thinkers. Thus Harold Innis said of Cochrane's magisterial study, Christianity and Classical Culture, that it represented the "first major contribution by a Canadian to the history of intellectual thought." And this was followed, from the perspective of philosophical discourse as opposed to political economy, by George Grant's saying of the same work that it was the "most important book ever written by a Canadian." In a philosophical obituary written at the time of Cochrane's death in 1945, A.S.P. Woodhouse wrote of the
ARTHUR KROKER

tragic sense of his life; of his search for a principle of "historical realism" which would resolve the radical crisis of western culture; and that, even within the community of "professed scholars", Cochrane was noteworthy, above all, for his single-minded dedication to the life of scholarship. It is unfortunate that the injunction to read Cochrane has not been followed. For, taken as a whole, his writings are the record of a thinker who has adopted, lived through and overcome most of the major positions which it is possible to hold in the twentieth-century on the question of what represents an adequate philosophy of life now that the modern age verges, once again, on stasis. To read Cochrane is to be educated anew in the now-forgotten insight that the crisis of modern society has its origins in the classical genealogy of European civilization and that, at the deepest level, the tempest of twentieth-century experience (where fascism is on the move again as the norm of political life) is yet a further outbreak of a single, crisis-moment in the metaphysics of western experience.

The rethinking of the crisis of the modern age against its classical background in the metaphysics of the "Graeco-Roman mind" is the context for all of Cochrane's writings. *Thucydides and the Science of History* (1929) is an attempt to recover the classical foundations for the politics (democratic) and epistemology (critical empiricism) of "pragmatic naturalism" against the iron cage of Platonic rationalism. *Christianity and Classical Culture* (1940), which centres on the apogee of Roman civilization in Augustus and Vergil and the dynamism of Christian metaphysics in Augustine and Theodosius, is a decisive commentary on the radical "break" in world-hypotheses (in politics, metaphysics, ethics and epistemology) which marked the threshold between the naturalism of classical discourse and the rationalism of Christian metaphysics. "The Latin Spirit in Literature" (a short, but summational, article written in 1942 for the *University of Toronto Quarterly*) complements, I would contend, Weber's analysis of the "Protestant ethic" as a profound and incisive synthesis of Roman civilization (this precursor of the imperialism of the United States) as the enduring source of the "will to live" and the "will to accumulation" so characteristic of the "empirical personality" of modern political empires. "The Mind of Edward Gibbon" (delivered as a lecture series at Yale University in 1944 and, then, republished in the *University of Toronto Quarterly*) is a fundamental, and devastating, critique of the proponents of Enlightenment "Reason" (ranging across the works of Hume, Locke and Gibbon) and an almost explosive reappropriation of the significance of Christian metaphysics as the truth-sayer of the failure of classical reason. And, finally, even Cochrane's doppelganger, *David Thompson: The Explorer*, (written in 1925 and often discounted as a major publication) is almost a philosophical autobiography of Cochrane's own trajectory as a "cartographer" of intellectual traditions and as a thinker who lived always with the sense of the tragic dimensions of human experience.

It was Cochrane's great contribution to recognize, and this parallel to Nietzsche, that Christian metaphysics, not in spite of but because of the terror of its nihilism, also contained a singular truth: it solved a problem which classical reason could not resolve within the horizon of its presuppositions. And thus
AUGUSTINE AND MODERNISM

Cochrane recognized in the thought of Augustine, in this epicentre of Christian metaphysics, the limit and the threshold of that very same phenomenology of mind, epistemology of modern psychology and "direct deliverance" of personality and history, that, for all of our protests, is still all that stands between the abyss in classical discourse and the modern century. It was Cochrane's singular insight to see the real implication of Augustine's *Confessions*; to sense that to the same extent that Augustine might rightly be described as the "first citizen of the modern world" then we, the inheritors of modern experience, cannot liberate ourselves from the "radical anxiety" of the present age until we have thought against, overturned, or at least inverted, the Augustinian discourse. Curiously, this essay returns through Cochrane to the impossible task of beginning the modern age by inverting Augustine. And, to anticipate just a bit, it is my thesis that Augustine was a peculiar type of Columbus of modern experience; he was the cartographer of "directly apprehended experience", of the direct deliverance of will, nature and consciousness, this emblematic sign of the eruption of the modern discourse from the stasis of classical reason, who has falsified the maps to the *civitas terrena*. If, finally, the embodiment of the will to power in fleshly being was the modern possibility; then it was Augustine's strategy, not so much to act in forgetfulness of being but in repression of the corporeal self, by providing a method for the incarceration of that unholy triad, imagination, desire and contingent will. In making the body a prison-house of the "soul" (embodied consciousness) Augustine was also the first, and most eloquent, of the modern structuralists.

Now, while Cochrane ultimately took refuge in the *pax rationalis* (and in the *pax corporis*) of Augustinian discourse he also once let slip that, in that brief hiatus between the dethronement of classical reason and the imposition of the Christian will to truth there were at least two philosophical song-birds who, knowing for whatever reason the Garden of Eden had finally materialized, gave voice to the freedom of embodied being. Plotinus uttered the first words of modern being when he spoke of the ecstatic illumination of the One; and Porphyry took to the practice of *ascesis* as a way of cultivating the dynamic harmony of will, imagination and flesh. Before the carceral (the *Saeculum*) of Augustine and after the rationalism (the Word) of Plato, Plotinus and Porphyry were the first explorers of the new continent of modern being. And so Cochrane went to his death with his gaze always averted from the human possibility, and the human terror which might issue from a direct encounter with unmediated being. From the beginning of his thought to its end, he preserved his sanctity, and yes sanity ("unless we are madmen living in a madhouse") by delivering up the "inner self" to the normalizing discourse (always horizontal, tedious, and unforgiving) of critical realism: to pragmatic naturalism at first (*Thucydides and the Science of History*) and then to Christian realism (*Christianity and Classic Culture*). Cochrane never deviated from Augustine's injunction, delivered in the *Confessions*, to avoid having "the shadow of the fleshly self fall between the mind and its first principle to which it should cleave." But now, after his death and in tribute to the wisdom of his profound scholarship, this
essay will allow the dark shadow of the critical imagination to fall between the texts of Cochrane's writings and its modern reception. It would be in bad faith to say that what this will permit is a simple "breaching of the silence" which has incarcerated Cochrane's thought and kept us, as North American thinkers, from an inversion of Augustinian discourse and, indeed, from a full critique of classical reason, as well as of the culture of the Old World.\textsuperscript{18} To know Cochrane's thought is to discover a series of highly original insights into the nature of classical and modern experience, but it is also to recognize the limits and possibilities of Canadian thought. For it is also our thesis that the insights of Cochrane concerning the fateful movement from classical discourse to Christian metaphysics could only have originated in a tradition of thought which has transformed a tragic understanding of human experience (and the search for a realistic solution to the divided consciousness of the twentieth-century) into a searing critique of the foundations of western civilization. If it is accurate to claim that Cochrane is a precursor of Canadian thought, with the vast expansion and intensification of the region of Canadian thought contained in that claim, then it must also be said that his limitations, his radical failure, also is part of the Canadian legacy. Simply put, the silence which is breached in recovering Cochrane is our own: it is also the Canadian mind which is wagered in this encounter with the ancient historian.\textsuperscript{19}

The Precursor of Canadian Thought

Cochrane's thought is an important precursor of the Canadian discourse because it puts into play four tendencies which are the very fibres, the interior of typography, of the Canadian mind. Or, to be quite specific, Cochrane's intervention, represents less the totality of the Canadian imagination than one side of the Canadian mind: his unnoticed contribution was, perhaps, to provide the most intensive and eloquent expression possible of that "permanent inclination" in Canadian thought which is expressed by a tragic sense of political experience, by a continuous recovery of the historical imagination (by a search for a "creative principle" which would mediate "bicameral consciousness"), and, ultimately, by a classical accounting of the genealogy of western civilization. If it is true to claim, for example, that the tradition of political economy (which was brought to its beginning, and conclusion, by the naturalism of Harold Innis) represents an "indigenous" tendency in Canadian thought, then it must also be said that the other side of the Canadian discourse is represented by an equally native tradition of cultural studies of modern civilization.\textsuperscript{20} It is within the latter tradition that Cochrane stands; an exponent of a theory of civilization who insisted that if the fatal deficiency in western knowledge is to be overcome then we must be prepared to rethink the foundations of ancient and contemporary culture. And, of course, keeping in mind what Cochrane always liked to note about Virgil, really about the birth of naturalism in the political economy of Romanitas, that "naturalism tends to devour its own gods",\textsuperscript{21} then we cannot
keep hidden for long the incipient critique of political economy that is contained in a vision of human experience which stretches from a tragic perspective on creative politics to a radical criticism of both extremities, both polarities, of the western mind—idealism (animal faith) and naturalism (the detritus of scepticism). Thus, what Cochrane has to say in “The Latin Spirit in Literature” about the sure and certain disintegration of naturalism (the root metaphor of political economy) into bewilderment applies with as much force as ever to any attempt to monopolize knowledge around the nexus of ideology and, might it be said, power. Harold Innis, who was an intellectual friend of Cochrane’s and, I believe, with Eric Havelock, one of the few Canadian thinkers who attempted, after Cochrane’s death, to call attention to his intellectual contributions was, in the domain of a tragic understanding of political experience, a student of Cochrane’s. It was not incidental that Innis recurred to the tragic motif of Christianity and Classical Culture for a way, finally, of expressing the essence, this bitter futility, of the “marginal man”. Between Cochrane and Innis, between the ancient historian and the political economist, there was a self-reflexive understanding of the impossibility of philosophy without a commitment to “thinking in blood” and the undesirability of a political economy without a philosophical foundation. Might it be that the foundations of a new Canadian discourse will someday emerge on the basis of a critical renewal of the friendship of Cochrane and Innis: not in the flesh for the finality of death has intervened but in the passing into theoretical discourse of that tiny, but elemental, spark that once exploded between Cochrane and Innis and, for a trembling moment, began to illuminate the dark night of the Canadian imagination.

If, indeed, Cochrane’s thought stands in an ambivalent relationship to the tradition, new and old, of political economy (representing its best hope for internal regeneration and its greatest fear of “being undermined”), then it is even more apparent that the recovery of his legacy constitutes a complete and unforgiving indictment of what now passes for political philosophy in Canada. Between critical philosophy and political economy there stands a comfortable and wide region of common interest; both are perspectives, tragic and historical accounts, of the nature of “dependent being”. But between critical philosophy and dominant traditions of political philosophy in Canada, there is only the silence, or is it a suppression without words of critical philosophy, of irreconcilable difference. Cochrane, together with the other founders of the tradition of critical philosophy in Canada—and I have in mind Eric Havelock’s Preface to Plato and George Brett’s comprehensive, and little understood, History of Psychology, were unique in developing a systematic critique of rationalist discourse. For Cochrane and Havelock, the legacy of Platonic rationalism was the installation, or perhaps the more insightful term would be liberation, of a totalitarian impulse in western knowledge. If, indeed, there is a single original insight, a compelling theoretical impulse, in the legacy of Cochrane, Havelock and Brett, it is this anti-rationalist impulse: their critique of the “submersion” of philosophy in rationalism begins to take root (in psychology, communications theory, literary analysis, history and philosophy); it flowers, it spreads out, it begins to sing of a new morning; and
then it is silenced. No fissures are permitted to appear; it is as if that maddening, wonderful group of thinkers in the fateful fourth century had been strained through the "conversion experience" again.

I have lived my life, in fact, not only under the sign of radical amnesia: that is bearable; I understand the psychological dynamics of the colonised mind. But I have also lived under something else that is quite unbearable; under, that is, the imposed statement that there is no immanent tradition of Canadian theory, no indigenous tradition of Canadian critical philosophy. This is the repression which wounds, and which I cannot forgive; it implies that the highly original insights of thinkers such as Cochrane, Fackenheim, Watson, Brett, and Havelock bear no immediate relation to my existence: it means that my being is denied the possibility of being wagered on the success or failure of the philosophical project represented by the anti-Platonic tradition. I have grown up, a "man of flesh and bone", a corporeal self weighed down by circumstance; but I am condemned to be a coward, a being not just without a history but without the possibility of losing everything on the wager of the "riddle of the Sphinx" if I cannot reconnect to a native tradition of Canadian thought which always "took philosophy as an experiment". If it is possible that a critical philosophy can be founded on the gesture of going over to the side of the losers; to the side, that is, of the silenced voices in Canadian intellectual history, then I suppose that qualifies this meditation as the beginning, over and over, of a loving recovery of the risk of philosophy. What I find most unbearable is not the simple silencing of the past. It is this elemental fact. Now and for some time, the discourse of Canadian political philosophy has been dominated (as Goya might imagine, with dread, this nameless domination comes in the nature of starlings rooting en masse) by Straussianism; by that very tradition of hyper-rationalism, and thus of anti-philosophy, which was the antithesis and object of scorn of the very best of the now suppressed Canadian thinkers. Can there be a more bitter mockery of the intellectual life of Charles Cochrane, or of Canada's single, most insightful contribution to world philosophy, than this, that the incarceration of intellectual history has been accompanied by the investiture of Canadian thought with an official discourse of Canadian thought has it that we are "neo-Kantians", if not the exponents of a static rationalism; we are even told, and this not uninsightfully as a reflection on the product of the suppressed mind, that Canadian inquiry hovers within the closed horizon of "the faces of reason". The reality, of course, is the exact opposite of the "faces of reason": Canadian thought is replete with insights because it forms a sustained, and not unquixotic, assault on the primacy of reason. For better or for worse, the thought of Charles Cochrane, for example, was not a vacant defence of the sovereignty of rationality, of truth, but an effort at "vindicating human experience". It was a wild gamble with a tragic and vitalistic account of human experience: a gamble that was intended to discover, at last, the "creative principle" which would provide an internal integration, a direct mediation, of personality, history and consciousness. What we witness now—neo-Kantianism (the nameless relationalism of analytical philosophy) and neo-Platonism (a normalized Plato and thus incarceratd within the rationalist heaven
of Straussian discourse)—are not the original movements of Canadian thought. They are more akin to a kind of weary fall-out from the failure of the precursors of Canadian discourse to resolve, or perhaps even to bring the threshold of speech that "Columbus's egg" of modern experience: the body as the limit and horizon of the new world; the flesh as the unmediated centre of "continuously experienced consciousness". After the limits of transgression in Cochrane's thought had been reached in his refusal to think through and beyond the transparent centre of Christian metaphysics to its inversion in the dark region of corporeal being, after this first of the great refusals, well, Canadian metaphysics lost—and this of all things—its will. This was a generation of Canadian thinkers who went to the grave, and how else can this be said, with broken hearts.

The Black Watch

Charles Cochrane was particularly adept and, in the tradition of Stephen Pepper's World Hypotheses, even brilliant as a sometimes playful, always ironic, phenomenologist of the human mind. In accounts of seminal thinkers in the western tradition, ranging from his satirical deconstruction of Gibbon's The Rise and Fall of the Roman Empire (the chief value of which, Cochrane wrote, was not as history but as literature. "It was a splendid example of how the eighteenth-century mind looked at its past") to his profound reflections on Virgil's Aeneid (the genealogy of the "Latin spirit" in the formation of "empirical will"), Cochrane drew out the fundamental presuppositions, the "discursive assumptions", by which the members of the family of world-hypotheses gained their singularity and yet announced their limitations. In ways more deeply rooted than he may have suspected, Cochrane was a "constitutive" Canadian thinker.

Not really as a simple matter of content; after all, Canadian discourse has always moved with flexibility between the New World and the old continent, between history and technology. As a matter of direct content, the greater part of Cochrane's writings are to be inscribed within that arc-en-ciel which moves from the first whispers of classical reason to the disintegration of Christian metaphysics. But, goodness knows, the intensity of the encounter with Cochrane's oeuvre may have something to do with the elliptical character of his thought; his reflections always circle back and transform the object of meditation. Thus, as in the instantaneous transformation of perspective predicated by catastrophe theory, history shifts into dialectics, Virgil's Aeneid becomes a precursor of the founding impulses of American empire, and metaphysics runs into civilization. Even as a matter of content, it is as if the region of ancient history is but a topography in reverse image of modern
experience. And, of course, it is; for Cochrane is working out a strategy of thought which moves, and plays, and fails, at the level of metaphysics. What is at stake in his thought are a relatively few laws of motion of the theoretical movements of the western mind. He was, after all, whether as a pragmatic naturalist or, later, as a Christian realist, always a metaphysician of western civilization.

Over and beyond content Cochrane was an emblematic Canadian thinker because of the form, the "presuppositions", of his thought. The enduring impulses which mediated his discourse were shadowed, however inchoately, by the discursive premises of the Canadian ethos, or more specifically, of Canadian being.

I prefer to think of Cochrane, or to "name" him, as a member of the Black Watch of philosophical history: a member, that is, of that broader tradition of thinkers in Canada and elsewhere who developed a self-reflexive critique of modern civilization and who were haunted, all the more, by the conviction that western society contained an internal principle of *stasis*, an unresolvable contradiction, which would release again and again the barbarism always present in the western mind. As Christopher Dawson, the Irish Christian realist, put it in his essay *The Judgement of the Nations*: "...this artificial reality has collapsed like a house of cards, the demons which haunted the brains of those outcasts (a "few prophetic voices", Nietzsche and Dostoevsky), have invaded the world of man and become its master. The old landmarks of good and evil and truth and falsehood have been swept away and civilization is driving before the storm like a dismantled and helpless ship." Or, as Eric Havelock remarked in *Prometheus*: "The bitter dialectic of the Prometheus seems to pursue us still. As the intellectual powers of man realize themselves in technology ... there seems to be raised up against them the force of a reckless dominating will." To Dawson's lament over the "depersonalization of evil" and to Havelock's forebodings concerning the certain doom which was integral to the "collective consciousness of the human species", Cochrane contributed a tragic understanding of the classical foundations in western culture and metaphysics, of the turning of nemesis in the European mind. It was Cochrane's distinctive contribution to advance beyond moral lament and promethean consciousness (Cochrane was to say in *Christianity and Classical Culture* that promethean consciousness is the problem of "original sin"; the turning point, not of science and technology, but of Christian metaphysics and the embodied will) to a systematic and patient reflection on the precise historical and philosophical formations which embodied—in the Greek enlightenment, in the twilight moments of the *Pax Augusta* and in the "outbreak" of enlightenment in the eighteenth-century—the "internal principle of discord" which opened time and again the "wound" in western knowledge. That Cochrane was able to surpass the intellectual limitations of Christian realism and to deepen and intensify a convergent analysis such as that of Havelock's was due, in good part, to the "four qualities" which he put into play, and for the sake of which Canadian discourse is wagered on the success or failure of his vindication of human experience.
What is most compelling about the writings of Charles Cochrane, whether it be his studies of Thucydides, Virgil, Augustine, Gibbon (or his much discounted, but seminal, meditation on the Canadian explorer, David Thompson) is that they disclose the mind—the direct deliverance of being into words—of a thinker for whom the act of thought is a way of preparing for death. Indeed, much more than is typical in the community of historians or professional philosophers, there is no sense of estrangement in Cochrane’s writings; no silence of repressed thought between the word and the meditation. What is at work in the texts is, in fact, not an evasion of life but a troubled, restless and tragic record of a thinker who gambled his existence on philosophical history; who, as Sartre said about himself in *Words* and I would now direct this to Cochrane, wrote, in desperation and in despair, to save himself. And just as Sartre noted that writing had condemned him not to die an unknown, so too, Cochrane’s “wager” is too urgent and too demanding to allow him, even in memory, to slip away from us into the oblivion of death. For Cochrane has opened up a passageway to a radical rethinking of the western tradition—to a philosophical reflection on tragedy as the essence of human experience, to a coming struggle with and through Augustine, to a reinterpretation of the genealogy of divided consciousness. Cochrane has condemned us to be “passengers without a ticket” (Sartre again) between idealism and naturalism; to be, after his unmasking of Platonic rationalism and his abandonment of classical *scientia* (long before John Dewey, Cochrane adopted, meditated upon and abandoned an “experimental” social science with its commitment to a liberal image of “creative politics”), thinkers who have nowhere to go except, finally, through and beyond Augustine.

And, if truth be told, everything in Cochrane’s life, every word, every tormented but sometimes also boring turn of thought, is but a lengthy prelude, a preparation, for his interpretation of Augustine. All of Cochrane’s thought hovers around, and falls back from, his final meditation on Augustine: a meditation which, while it occurs within that profound text, *Christianity and Classical Culture*, really takes place, receives its *embodiment* as it were, in one single, but decisive chapter of that book—“Nostra Philosophia”.

It is, of course, towards the horizon of the outrageous, tumultuous, brilliant (and, I think, quite mistaken) formulations of that chapter; towards, that is, a radical reflection upon (and inversion) of the “trinitarian formula” (seen now, both as the epistemological structure of modern psychology and as the metaphysical structure of modern power); towards this nightmare and utopia that this meditation tends. If Cochrane had written nothing else but that single chapter (that single, emblematic and, yes, mystical, outpouring of a life of thought), with its quite impossible and quite transparent and, it must be said, so troubling account of Augustine, then his would have been a full and worthwhile philosophical life. For he would still have taken us by surprise; he still would have created a small shadow of anxiety between the mind and the fleshly self; he still would have come up to us from
behind, from the forgotten depths of Christian metaphysics, and cut away the pretensions of the modern *episteme*, touching a raw nerve-ending, a deep evasion, in western consciousness. And he would have done this by simply uttering a few words (like the undermining of a modern Tertullian), by whispering, even whimsically, that the *esse*, *noscere*, *posse*, the consciousness, will and nature, of the trinitarian formula, the philosophical and historical reasons for Augustine, had not gone away. And he might not even had to say that we were merely marking time, marked men really, until we have returned to the Christian tradition and wrestled, not with the devil this time, but with the Saint. Surely we cannot be blamed for being angry with Cochrane; for lamenting that dark day when the *absence* of his writings first demanded a reply. Cochrane has condemned us to history; and the history to which he forces a return, this happy and critical dissipation of amnesia (and which critical philosopher has not begged for a recovery of the past, for ontology), is like the break-up of a long and tedious winter. But who can appreciate the spring-time for all of the corpses coming to the surface? To read Cochrane is to be implicated in the history of western metaphysics. There is no escape now: so, as a prelude to Cochrane’s prelude it would be best to establish, quickly and with clarity, the thematics which led him, in the end, to the “will to truth” of Augustine and which, I believed, doomed his thought to circle forever within the Augustinian discourse.

1. The Quest for a “Creative Principle”

That there is no tiny space of discord between Cochrane’s meditation upon existence and his inscription of being in writing should not be surprising. Cochrane devoted his life to discovering a solution to a fundamental metaphysical problem: a problem which he did not simply think about at a distance but which he lived through, in blood, as the gamble of mortality. It was Cochrane’s contention that the central problem of western knowledge (and, successively, of ethics, history, ontology and politics) lay in the continuous failure of the European mind, and nowhere was this more evident than in classical reason, to discover, outside of the presuppositions of idealism and naturalism, an adequate accounting concerning how, *within* the domain of human experience, a principle might be discovered which would ensure *identity through change*. And it was his conviction that in the absence of a general theory of human experience which furnished a “creative principle” as a directly apprehended way of mediating order and process (the contingent and the immutable) that western knowledge, and thus its social formations, were doomed to a successive, predictable and relentless series of disintegrations. As Cochrane had it, Christian metaphysics was not imposed on classical reason, but arose in response to the internal failure, the “erosion from within”, of classical discourse. Consequently, the “truth” of Christian discourse was to be referred to the constitutive “failure” of the western mind, and originally of the “Graeco-Roman mind” to vindicate human ex-
AUGUSTINE AND MODERNISM

experience: to resolve, that is, the "tension" between will and intelligence, between virtù and fortuna. In his viewpoint, it was the absence of a creative principle for the integration of human personality and human history which, in the end, led the "Greek mind" to a tragic sense of futility in the face of a world seemingly governed by the principle of nemesis; and which condemned the Roman mind (this precursor of the "acquisitive and empirical" personality) to "bewilderment" in the presence of the "bad infinity" of naturalism; and which, in the modern age, has reappeared under the sign of instrumentalism as enlightenment critique.

This impossible demand on history for a creative principle, for a new vitalism, which would successfully integrate the process of human experience and solve, at least symbolically, the inevitability of death (Cochrane's social projection for death was the fear of stasis) represents the fundamental category, the gravitation-point, around which the whole of Cochrane's thought turns. It sometimes can be said, particularly so in the case of serious philosophies of life which "think with blood", that their conceptual structure, their modes of intellectual expressions, their often contradictory interventions and reversals, their attempts at taking up the "risk of philosophy", are radiated with a single, overriding root metaphor. If this is so, then the "root metaphor" of Cochrane's thought is the attempt to solve "the riddle of the Sphinx", to reconcile the Homeric myth of necessity and chance, to answer the "weeping of Euripides" through the creation of a vitalistic account of human experience. The search for a "creative principle" (which Cochrane ultimately finds, in the "will to truth"—"personality in God") is, thus, the presupposition which structures his earliest critique of the arché—the "physics, ethics and logic" of Platonic discourse (Thucydides and the Science of History), which grounds his most mature account of the "radical deficiencies" of enlightenment reason ("The Mind of Edward Gibbon") and which informs his summational critique of the psychology, politics, history and epistemology of the classical mind (Christianity and Classical Culture).

If Cochrane's rethinking of the western tradition from the viewpoint of its radical scission of being and becoming was a simple apologia for Christian metaphysics against the claims of classical discourse or, for that matter, akin to Christopher Dawson's profound, but static, circling back to Christian theology under the guise of the defence of civilization, then his thought would pose no challenge. If, indeed, we could be certain that this turn to vitalism, to the search for a new unifying principle which would vindicate human experience by linking the development of "personality" (the Augustinian solution to the "multiple soul") to the mysterious plenitude of existence, was all along only another way of taking up again the "weary journey from Athens to Jerusalem", then we might safely say of Cochrane what Augustine said of the Stoics: "Only their ashes remain". But it is, fortunately so, the danger of his thought that, while it never succeeded in its explicit project of developing a new vitalism which would preempt the "revolt of human experience", his discourse does stand as a "theatricum historicum" (Foucault) in which are rehearsed, and then played out, the three fundamental "movements" of western thought: poetic imagination, philo-
ARTHUR KROKER

sophy (both as Platonic reason and as positive science) and theology. It was, perhaps, Cochrane’s unique contribution to recognize in the emblematic figures of Homer (myth), Plato (scientia) and Augustine (sapientia) not only powerful syntheses of divergent, but coeval, tendencies in western consciousness, but to think through as well the **significance** of what was most apparent, that these were representative perspectives, the play of aesthetics, intellectuality and faith, the fates of which were entangled and, who knows, prophesied in the gamble of the others. It may be, of course, that Cochrane’s concern, and hope, with the possibility of the “trinitarian formula” (“Nostra Philosophia: The Discovery of Personality”) as the long-sought creative principle was but a product of a Christian faith which finally permitted him the peace of the **crede ut intellegas**. But, might it not also be, that the trinitarian formula was less a historically specific product of the Christian metaphysic than an impossible, and transparent, reconciliation of the warring discourses of Homer, Plato and Augustine. In a passage which approaches ecstatic illumination, but which also carries with it the sounds of desperation, Cochrane, thinking that he is, at last, at rest within the interiority of Augustine’s closure of human experience, writes: “Christian insight finds expression in two modes: As truth it may be described as reason irradiated by love; as morality, love irradiated by reason.” Now, while this passage is a wonderful expression of the creation of the “value-truth” which marks the threshold of power/knowledge in the disciplinary impulses of western society, still there can be heard in this passage another voice which is absent and silenced: this timid voice which can just be detected in the carceral of “value-truth” utters no words; it is not, after all, philosophy which makes the first protest. The sound which we hear deep in the “inner self” of the repressed consciousness of Augustine is, I believe, that of the weeping of Euripides: it is the return of poetic consciousness, of myth, which is, once again, the beginning of the modern, or is it ancient, age. The danger of Cochrane is that his quest for the creative principle, while always aimed at silencing myth and reason, clarifies the fundamental categories of the triadic being of western society. Cochrane thought with and against Platonic discourse (*Thucydides and the Science of History* was an intentional recovery of the classical science of fifth-century Greece against the “general hypothesis” of Herodotus and against Platonic philosophy) because of his conviction that Platonic reason was inadequate to the task, posed in mythic consciousness, of discovering a “creative and moving principle” which would reconcile human effort and *fortuna*. And Cochrane fled to theology as a second strategic line of retreat (after the débacle of classical reason) from the “ineluctability” of *nemesis* in human experience. Thus, the curiosity: an ancient historian who not only meditates upon but lives through the root metaphors, the fundamental categories of thought and the immanent limitations of the three constitutive structures of western consciousness. While Cochrane’s “radical deficiency” lay in his unwillingness to relativize Augustinian discourse; that is, to think through the significance of the “discovery” of that explosive bonding of power and nihilism in theology; nonetheless Cochrane has succeeded in recessing the historical origins of the “radical scission” to the elemental play in the
AUGUSTINE AND MODERNISM

classical mind among poetry, philosophy and theology and, moreover, in presenting a broad trajectory of the genealogy of western consciousness.

2. The Tragic Sense of Political Experience

Cochrane’s search for a creative principle which would provide a more adequate ground for the reconciliation of order and process was made the more urgent by his tragic sense of political life. He was a “philosopher of the deed”, one who transposed the essential impulses of the tragic imagination into a general theory of the classical sources of the tragic imagination, into a general theory of the classical sources of European culture and, moreover, into a radical rethinking of Christian metaphysics as a necessary response to the internal deficiencies of the naturalistic *vitia* of the classical world. From its genesis in *Thucydides and the Science of History* to its most mature statement in “The Mind of Edward Gibbon” (an eloquent criticism of the formalism of instrumental reason), Cochrane’s intellectual project was suffused with an existentialist sensibility: with a self-conscious and deliberate attempt at formulating in the idiom of historical scholarship the pessimistic and, indeed, fatalistic impulses of the “inner man”. Whether in his studies of Virgil, Lucretius, Thucydides, Theodosius or Augustine, the historical imagination was for Cochrane an outlet for a wealth of psychological insights into the meaning of suffering in human existence. It might be said, in fact, that he elaborated, and this in the language of historical realism, a profound psychological analysis of the always futile human effort, this vain *hubris*, struggling against the pull of the flesh towards death. This was a philosopher of life who arraigned the main currents of European cultural history as a way of illuminating the more universal, and thus intimate, plight of reconciling the brief moment of life with the coming night of death. But then, the peculiar tragedy of Cochrane’s historical sensibility is that he was broken, in the end or (if a Christian) in the beginning, by the radical impossibility of living without hope of an easy escape within the terms of the intense and inevitable vision of human suffering revealed by the poetic consciousness of the pre-Socratic Greeks. Cochrane was a philosopher of the deed because his writing responded, at its deepest threshold, to the aesthetics of poetic consciousness; but the great internal tension of his thought, and I suspect the deep evasion of his life, was that he sought to make his peace with the tragedy of finality by denouncing as a “radical error” the *hubris* of promethean consciousness (this is the arché of *Thucydides and the Science of History*) and, later, by accepting the Christian dogma of original sin (the “essential moment” of *Christianity and Classical Culture*) as a justification for Augustine’s sublimation of divided consciousness into the “will to truth”. The peace made by Cochrane with existence consisted perhaps only of the expedient of substituting guilt over the *hubris* of the Homeric hero for the unmediated and unrelieved image of nemesis offered by the Greek poets. Need it be said that, while guilt offers the promise of a final
peace through the mechanism of the "confession", or shall we say "evacuation", of the self, poetic consciousness promises only that the self is condemned to the liberty of experiencing fully the vicissitudes of contingent and mutable experience. The horizon of Cochrane's historical realism was represented by the fateful figure of Augustine; it was not accidental that Cochrane's thought, while it may have begun with and never escaped from its reflection on Herodotus, concluded with a meditation on *The Confessions of St. Augustine*. Perhaps Cochrane's major contribution may have been to instruct us now of the main avenues of evasion open—the prospects for an internal peace—which were disclosed by the European mind as it struggled to draw away from the tragic sensibility of the Greek classical historians.

Thus, in much the same way that Cochrane once said of classical historiography that it represented an attempt to "escape from the conclusions of Herodotus", Cochrane's historical inquiry might be viewed as an enduring and progressively refined effort at discovering a new *arché*, or starting-point (a "new physics, ethics and logic") which would respond finally to the fatalism, to the internal principle of *stasis*, in human experience disclosed by aesthetic consciousness. In an eloquent passage in *Christianity and Classical Culture*, Cochrane presented a vivid description of the nemesis inherent in the very play of human experience. The universe which presents itself in Herodotus is one of "motion... perpetual and incessant." Translated into a principle of human behaviour, the "psyche" is so constituted that "now and then, here and there (like fire), it succeeds in overcoming the resistance of those elements which make for depression, and, when it does, it exhibits the phenomenon of accumulation and acquisition on a more than ordinary scale." But, Cochrane notes, there is in this universe no evidence of organic growth; and this because the "principle of expansion operates at the same time as a principle of limitation." Thus, and this is fundamental for Cochrane, "the process to which mankind is subject is self-defeating; it is like the opposition of a pendulum." In this tragic dénouement, the role of the mind is that of a "passive spectator": "Self-consciousness resolves itself into a consciousness of impotence in the grip of material necessity." Or, in a succeeding passage, Cochrane meditates upon the words of Herodotus which were voiced by a Persian noble at the Theban dinner-party given on the eve of Plataea:

That which is destined to come to pass as a consequence of divine activity, it is impossible to man to avert. Many of us are aware of this truth, yet we follow because we cannot do otherwise. Of all the sorrows which afflict mankind, the bitterest is this, that one should have consciousness of much, but control over nothing.

The elemental and noble gesture of Cochrane's thought was his effort, always
AUGUSTINE AND MODERNISM

AUGUSTINE AND MODERNISM

scholarly and nuanced, to fashion a response to the "bitterness" which flows from the recognition of marginal and mutable existence. Cochrane's thought hovered around bitterness of the soul, not in the modern sense of *resentment*, but in the more classical meaning of bitterness as an acknowledgement that there was a work in the very interiority of human experience a principle of limitation, of arrest, which outside of and beyond human agency moved to drag back the most inspiring of political experiments and of philosophical projects to nemesis and *stasis*. What Vico has described as the inevitable cycle of *ricorso*, Cochrane recurred to, and this often, as the classical image of "walking the wheel".

If it is accurate to claim that the tragic imagination represents the limit and the gamble of Cochrane's thought, then we should expect to find a lingering, but pervasive, sense of arrested human possibility in each of his writings. And this is, of course, precisely what occurs; but with the important change that his tragic sensibility develops from a rude, almost innate, way of meeting existence to a complex and internally coherent philosophy of European civilization. Here was a thinker who transformed the sensibility of bitterness of the soul into an overarching, and quite original, account of the failure of creative politics, of classical reason and, in the end, perhaps even of Christian metaphysics to solve the enigma of History. Thus, in his earliest published writings, *David Thompson: The Explorer*, Cochrane presented in the most agonic of terms the "story" of Thompson, this explorer of the Canadian West, whose naturalism was typified by an "imaginative sympathy" for the landscape and its inhabitants and whose intellectual outlook was that of an historian "who had the mind of a scientist and the soul of a poet." And, of course, the story of Thompson was that of a Greek tragedy: a cartographer who could find no publisher willing to take on the risk of his work; a father who is forced after retirement to return to surveying to pay off his son's debts; a Christian who lends money to the Church and, even in the face of destitution, deeds it his property; an early patriot (whose "love of country... sprang from an immediate knowledge of the land itself") whose warnings against the expansionary land claims of the "litigious" Americans went unheeded. Cochrane's Thompson was not that dissimilar to the Homeric hero who struggles courageously against adversity, seems to attain a measure of success; and then, at the very moment when relief from the vicissitudes of human existence has been gained, the achievement is swept away by the flux of human experience driven by a "mysterious inner force" of inertia, of equivalence.

In his otherwise astute philosophical obituary, Woodhouse has dismissed Cochrane's work on Thompson as an earlier historical study of little academic interest. Perhaps within the conventional terms of classical scholarship it is; but I think that in the depiction of the tragic fate of Thompson the naturalist there are anticipated all of the major themes that will come to dominate Cochrane's study of the nemesis that awaits classical reason. The essential moments of Thompson's tragedy ("the man who looks at the stars"*) are not that different from the "yawning chasm" in human experience which awaits each of the major figures Cochrane will later study: Thucydides (the first modern political scientist*) whose empiricism could not explain the suffering of the Athenian plague or the
necessity of defending democratic ideals in the *Funeral Oration*); Lucretius (whose desire for "salvation through enlightenment" was destined to dissolve into "resigned melancholy"); Virgil (whose intention of "salvation through will" could not halt the "intellectual and moral bewilderment" of the late Roman empire); Augustine (whose "historical realism" was developed in response to the radical deficiency of the classical order's desire to attain "permanence and universality" by means of "political action"); or even Gibbon (whose defence of the "universal instrument" of reason was fated to return the modern century to the *ricorso* of classical reason). Irrespective of the subject-matter Cochrane's thought was never freed of the terrible insight that in the face of a mutable and contingent domain of human experience, the self is confronted, in the end, only with futility, despair and the certainty of the decay of the flesh. And, of course, it was futile to look to political action for salvation because the principle of decay was within, not without; awaiting only an "external shock" to release the demiurge again.

3. The Method of Historical Realism: From Naturalism to Vitalism

While Cochrane's quest for a more adequate creative principle took place within the horizon of a tragic discourse on human experience, it was expressed through his always insightful recourse to the historical imagination. In keeping with the very gamble of life which was at stake in his classical scholarship, Cochrane's deployment of the historical imagination changed radically as his analysis of the sources of the tragic deficiencies of classical culture broadened into a general critique of the metaphysics of the Graeco-Roman mind. What was constant in his thought, from the beginning in *Thucydides and the Science of History* to the ending in "The Mind of Edward Gibbon", was the use of the "sympathetic imagination" as the axial principle of historical inquiry. For Cochrane, the historical imagination in its standard of presentation should "live up to the most exacting standards of logic and artistry." And, in its standard of interpretation, the "historical and synoptic method", assisted by the "rich resources of language and literature", should seek with the aid of the sympathetic imagination, "disciplined and controlled by the comparative study of people and cultures, to enter into and recover what it can of past experience, so far as this is possible within the narrow limits of human understanding; and this experience it will seek to 'represent' in such a way as to convey something, at least, of its meaning to contemporaries." Cochrane's injunction on behalf of the "sympathetic imagination" as the basis of historical investigation, delivered as it was at the end of his life, does not differ significantly from his original use of the historical imagination to "represent" the tragic sense of Thompson's naturalism; or, for that matter, to present, with a vivid sense of concretization, the discourses of Thucydides, Plato, Theodosius, Julian, Lucretius and Virgil. As a matter of intellectual inclination, Cochrane always erred on the side of generosity to the
AUGUSTINE AND MODERNISM

perspectives of his opponents in the classical tradition; and it is no small measure of his fealty to the principle of the "sympathetic imagination" that his bitterness of the soul was interlaced with brilliant gestures of sardonic wit.

If, however, the use of the sympathetic imagination represents one continuity in Cochrane's historical method, there was also another, perhaps more essential, thematic unity. Cochrane was, above all, a historical realist: a thinker who sought to discover in the immediate data of human experience an immanent principle of integration which, more than the "anaemic intellectualism of rationalism", would provide for the dynamic unification of the sensate and ideal in human existence. It was Cochrane's lifelong conviction (one which deepened as his sense of the tragic dimensions of the triadic being of western consciousness) that the "mysterious inner force" of human experience should not be met either through "apotheosis or escape. Understanding the vitalistic dimensions of human experience as a force both for creation and disintegration, Cochrane devoted his historical scholarship to the recovery of a "realistic" principle which would redeem the civilizing process." Now, as a historical realist, Cochrane was the precursor of an important tradition in Canadian letters: a tradition which includes the "psychological realism" of George Brett, the "cultural realism" of Eric Havelock, the "existential realism" of Emil Fackenheim, and the "critical realism" of John Watson. What distinguishes Cochrane's experiment in historical realism is, however, that he adopted all of the major positions which it was possible to take in the realist tradition of the twentieth century. After all, the paradigmatic figures in Cochrane's thought are Thucydides and Augustine, both of whom were realists, but, of course, of a fundamentally different order. Thucydides was a pragmatic naturalist; and in allying himself with his naturalistic political science, Cochrane sought salvation in a political realism. The attraction of Augustine lay, I believe, in the elemental fact that he was also a realist, but (in the Pauline tradition) a Christian realist of the "inner man"; a realist who sought to constitute "from within" the psychology of individual personality, a solution to the quest for "permanence and universality" which had eluded the best efforts of "creative politics." Cochrane's historical realism thus oscillates between the polarities of Thucydides and Augustine: between the pragmatic naturalism of Thucydides and the Science of History and the vitalistic discourse (or Christian realism) of Christianity and Classical Culture. In his phase of Thucydidean realism, Cochrane was a "scientific historian": one who sought to discover in the naturalistic vita; that is, in the discourse of "utilitarian ethics", "democratic politics" and an "empirical political science" canons of interpretation and practice for the "dynamic integration" of being and becoming. In his commitment to Augustinian realism, Cochrane considered himself to be a "philosophical historian": one who wished to disclose (and successively so, at the levels of epistemology, ontology and aesthetics) the deep reasons for the "internal" collapse of classical reason. As an Augustinian realist, Cochrane shifted the basis of the search for a "creative principle" from the sensate level of human experience ("creative politics") to the "remaking" of inner experience. While the classical science of Thucydides provided a basis of critique of Platonic rationalism
ARTHUR KROKER

(Cochrane said, in fact, that Thucydides and Plato were the polarities of Greek thought) and of mythic consciousness (contra Herodotus), Christian realism was the final gamble: an attempt to still the "revolt of human experience" by making the Word flesh.

It was almost inevitable that Cochrane's deployment of historical realism would shift from a naturalistic to a vitalistic basis. The striking feature of his study of Thucydides, aside from its brilliant linking of Hippocrates' *Ancient Medicine* with Thucydides' invention of a method of empirical political science modelled on the medical strategy of "semiology, prognosis and therapeutics" ⁵² (the historian as a "physician" to a sick society), was that it was a decisive failure. Cochrane may have begun *Thucydides* as a "scientific historian", but he ended with the complete abandonment of "creative politics" as a way of warding off the "external shocks" which threatened at every moment to release the stasis within the body politic. While Cochrane managed to complete *Thucydides* with a diminishing but dogged loyalty to the canons of a naturalistic political science (even in the last paragraph he insists that the problem of suffering is a matter of "philosophy not empirical political science"), the central thrust of the study is to shatter the best hopes of "political action" as a means of "saving the civilizing process." It is not a little ironic that Thucydides' declensions in favour of democratic politics are presented in the form of the famous *Funeral Oration*, nor that the background to Cochrane's paean to democratic politics is the seeming madness released by the Athenian plague.

The study of Thucydides had the effect of destroying the foundation of pragmatic naturalism: after Thucydides, Cochrane never sought solace again in the "scientific spirit" (indeed, he was to resituate classical science and Platonic reason as two sides of the philosophical impulse) nor did he seek to exclude (on the basis of the exclusionary canons of interpretation of narrow empiricism) the problem of human suffering from his thought. Cochrane turned to philosophical history to find an answer to the radical failure of classical science to respond adequately to the impossibility of a "stable and enduring" form of political action; more, to that original sense of suffering ahead: the weeping of Euripides as the sure and certain sign of the coming revolt of human experience against all incarcerations. And, might I say, Cochrane's desire for the recovery of Christian metaphysics was confirmed by his historical observation that Augustine was the objective necessity, the inevitable product, as it were, of that fateful breakdown of the classical mind.

4. *The Refusal of Classical Reason*

The whole of Cochrane's thought gravitated towards an elegant and comprehensive critique of the divided consciousness which he took to be the metaphysical centre of the secular mind. It was his insight, at first historical and then metaphysically expressed, that the modern century has not escaped the cata-
AUGUSTINE AND MODERNISM

Cochrane was, in the end, an opponent of all rationalism, not simply on the grounds of providing a defence of Christian metaphysics, but really because the radical severance of reason from experience (the "disembodied logos") was fated to terminate in "static and immobile" conceptions of social reality. And, of course, in the face of a contingent and mutable process of human experience (a social reality which exploded from within, subverting all attempts at the final closure of experience), rationalism could only be maintained through the imposition of a totalitarian politics. Cochrane may not have been the first to realize the totalitarian impulse which is implicit within Western reason, but he was the philosopher who carried through to its limit the historical thesis that reason, "instrumental" reason, could only persevere if the heterogeneity of human experience was finally silenced, incarcerated within the "iron cage" of rationalism. For Cochrane, as long as western metaphysics was thought within the terms of Platonic discourse, it was condemned to oscillate between materialism and idealism, between the naturalization of the will and the transcendentalism of disembodied knowledge. This, at least, was the thesis of his remarkable essay, "The Latin Spirit in Literature", just as surely as it was the coping-stone of Christianity and Classical Culture. It is important that Cochrane never forgot that Augustine, before he was a Christian, was a confirmed Platonist; and that Christian metaphysics (the "embodied logos") was also the reverse image of Platonic ideas. Under the rubric "the word was made flesh", Platonic Reason migrated into the body and blood of a corporeal being that was about to be "delivered up" to incarceration within the metaphysics of a Christian, but really modern power. In a word, Augustine "embodied" rationalism; and he thus provided a solution to the instability of "creative politics" which had eluded the classical mind. The "iron cage" of rationalism expressed, after all, a more general commitment by the classical mind to seek a political solution to the quest for "permanence and universality". Political action was presented as the "creative principle" (whether in Athens or in Rome) which would integrate the "warring tendencies" of the sensate and the ideal, making "the world safe for the civilizing process." Now, just as Cochrane had earlier in his study of Thucydides concluded that the canons of a positive polity could not arrest, let alone explain, the "uninterrupted" revolt of human experience, so too his study of the politics of the Roman empire led him to the insight that the secular mind possessed no "creative principle" to prevent the disintegration of organized society into the extreme of naturalism (the "empirical will") or of idealism ("salvation through enlightenment"). The catastrophe that awaited classical culture (this emblematic foundation of secular civilization) may have been precipitated by "unanticipated external shocks" but its origins were to be traced to a "fundamental failure of the Graeco-Roman mind." It was Cochrane's intention in "The Latin Spirit in Literature" and in Christianity and Classical Culture to explore the deep sources of the radical deficiency in the politics and reason of classical culture. What, he inquired, caused the "Latin spirit" to a restless oscillation between the "resigned melancholy" of Virgil and the "melancholy resignation" of Lucretius: the exemplars of the tragic and
instrumentalist tendencies in the classical discourse? What, that is, destined the Roman mind, this genus of the empirical will to fall short of the political ideal of “permanence and universality”; to fall into a “moral and intellectual bewilderment” from which there was to be no hope of recovery except for a “radical remaking” of personality and the “practical conduct of life”? And what, in the end, arrested the Greek imagination within a vision of a universe dominated by *stasis*, for which the only recourse was futility and despair? It was Cochrane’s historical thesis that the referents of the “Graeco-Roman mind” (reason and will) stand as “permanent inclinations” in modern culture; and that, therefore, the “sure and certain doom which awaited classical culture” is also a sign of the coming disaster in the modern age.

The work of Virgil, like that of Lucretius, is in a large sense, didactic; otherwise, the difference between them is as wide as the difference between Greece and Rome. The one preaches a gospel of salvation through knowledge; the other of salvation through will. The one holds up an ideal of repose and refined sensual enjoyment; the other one of restless effort and activity. Lucretius urges upon men a recognition of the fact that they are limited as the dust; that the pursuit of their aspirations is as vain and futile as are the impulses of religion, pride, and ambition which ceaselessly urge them on. The purpose of Virgil is to vindicate those obscure forces within the self by which mankind is impelled to material achievement and inhibited from destroying the work of his own hands. . . . It is this difference which makes the distinction between the melancholic resignation of Lucretius and the resigned melancholy of Virgil; the one the creed of a man who accepts the intellectual assurance of futility; the other of one who, despite all obstacles, labours to discover and formulate reasonable grounds for his hope. It is this difference that makes the distinction between the epic of civilized materialism and that of material civilization.55

Just as Cochrane had discovered in the inexplicable suffering of the Athenian plague (*Thucydides and the Science of History*) the limits of Greek politics and, moreover, of classical reason; so too, he finds in Virgil’s description of the “empirical personality” as the foundation of Roman empire the threshold of instrumental activity as a basis of “material civilization”. As Cochrane noted, the strength and weakness of Rome as the “foundation of western civilization” depended on the “psychology of rugged individualism—the spirit of individual and collective self-assertion” which destined the Romans to represent, if not “the origin, at least . . . the essence of the acquisitive and conservative spirit in
AUGUSTINE AND MODERNISM

modern civilization." For Cochrane, the peculiar strength of the Latin spirit (this emblematic expression of naturalism) was that the Romans, viewing themselves "as custodians rather than creators" allowed nothing to stand in the way of the development of the "empirical personality" with its basis in will. Consequently, the Roman identity, rooted in natura naturans, oscillated only between the polarities of amor sui (individual self-assertion which found expression in dominium) and collective egoism ("public authority and the discipline of the city"). Thus, while to the Greeks:

life was an art, for the Romans it was a business. While, therefore, the rich Hellenic genius exhausted itself in the effort of speculation, and in the cultivation of the various forms of artistic expression, the Romans ... devoted themselves to the acquisition and conservation of material power, and this aim they pursued with narrow concentration and undeviating consistency for as long as they deserved their name. The Greeks shrank in terror from excess; the Romans found nothing excessive which was possible, and their measure of the possible was based on a 'will to live', cherished by them to a degree almost unique among the peoples of antiquity.

Or, stated otherwise, long before the Protestant Reformation and that fateful linking of the will to salvation and the capitalist ethic, another bridging of the pragmatic will and private property had taken place. The "Latin spirit" parallels the major themes of Weber's "The Protestant Ethic", with, however, the major exception that empirical personality of the Roman imperium put into practice a discourse which linked together a theory of family right (patria potestas), an understanding of personality as property (dominium), a "civic bond" founded on the urge to practical activity, and the will to exclude everything which did not contribute to the "will to work, the will to fight, boldness of innovation and ... disciplined obedience."

It was Cochrane's great insight to "diagnose" the Latin spirit correctly, taking Virgil as the principle spokesman of that which was most faithful to the naturalism of the Roman mind. In "The Latin Spirit in Literature", Cochrane said of the empirical personality that its adoption made of the Romans a "type of a practical people whose objectives are realizable because they are clear, and clear because they are limited to what the eye may see and the hand may grasp. It is no accident that the spear was for them the symbol of ownership..." Yet, for all of this devotion to the expansion of the pragmatic will, it remained "the fate of naturalism to devour its own gods." And while naturalism devours its own gods, "it never succeeds in replacing them with others more impregnable to the assaults of time and circumstance." The Latin spirit, the coping-stone of the empirical personality, gave way to "spiritual bewilderment"; that is, to a search
for an answer to the question: "what is to be the intellectual content of life, now that we have built the city, and it is no longer necessary to extend the frontiers?" Or, as Hegel would say later, what could possibly be the content of a civilization founded on "bad infinity"? For Cochrane, it was the peculiar fate of Virgil to be a "splendid failure", understood only by the Christians who "recoiled from him in terror, for the very simple reason that they regarded him as a man who had something to say." It was Virgil's fate to provide a warning, but only after stasis had begun, that "the state and empire of Rome depended fundamentally on will; virtue is not knowledge, it is character; and its fruits are seen in activity rather than in repose or contemplation." As Cochrane remarks, Virgil "gives authentic expression not merely to the Latin temperament, but in considerable degree to that of western civilization as a whole. It him alone you see them all." It was Cochrane's radical insight that Christian metaphysics represents an active synthesis of the Latin experience. The Latin fathers put the "coping-stone" to the developing theory of personality; Augustine's transcendental will was the reverse image of the empirical will of Virgil and Sallust; and the "doctrines of sin, grace, and redemption... achieved that philosophy of progress for which the classical world had waited in vain for two thousand years; and which, even through its perversions, has been one of the chief sources of inspiration to the mind of modern man." Virgil is envisaged as bringing to a conclusion the futile quest in classical culture for a creative principle which would have its basis in naturalism or idealism. The modern age does not begin with Plato or with Virgil, but with Augustine's radical reformulation of the philosophy of progress. It was the distinctive contribution of Augustine to rethink the void between naturalism and transcendentalism (between the empirical will and the tragic sensibility); and in the reformulation of the "trinitarian principle" to develop a new principle of integration of human action which would shift the discourse of progress to a "radical remaking of character." As Cochrane says, "Latin Christianity culminated in Augustine, who may justly be described as, at once, the last of all the Romans and the first citizen of the world." As a philosopher of the modern public situation, Cochrane devoted himself to the exploration of the fundamental categories of western metaphysics: that is, to the investigation of the "inner logic" in western consciousness of the relationship among being, will and truth. Thus, for Cochrane, the phenomenology of the Latin spirit or, for that matter, the historical wager of Thucydides were not episodic or discontinuous historical "events", locked up within a certain phase of historicity, but, rather, gained their significance as reflections of the way in which the dynamics of western metaphysics worked itself out, and this so vividly and
concretely in historical experience. The bicameral consciousness, or we might say
the radical division between will and knowledge (philosophy and history), which
was at the root of the Latin spirit is the very same reflection of warring being
which has coloured the history of western metaphysics (Nietzsche’s truth and
will, Heidegger’s world and earth, Grant’s technology and sapientia, Lee’s “savage
fields”). To say this is to link Cochrane’s exploration of the Graeco-Roman mind
(the “permanent inclinations” towards transcendence and submersion) to its
actual extension as a fundamental reflection on the genealogy of the radical crisis,
the catastrophe, of twentieth-century human experience. Within the discourse of
philosophical history, Cochrane stands in that tradition of metaphysical reflection
which has sought to understand the inner workings of the nihilism in the
western mind. Cochrane was, first and last, a metaphysician for whom the
medium of philosophical history was a way of presenting the concrete expressions
in western history of the fundamental categories of being.

To say this is to note only that which was most original and, in fact, radical
about his thought. Cochrane approached the domain of Christian metaphysics as
a constitutive response to the failure of the secular mind, at least in its Virgilian
and Platonic representations, to solve the riddle of being-in-the-world: to pro-
vide, that is, an internal and directly experienced principle of integration
between “order and motion”, or, more accurately, between contemplation and
instrumental activity. It was Cochrane’s thesis that Christian metaphysics was
not an aberration in the western tradition; not a long, grey twilight which
separates the celebration of reason in Latin classical culture from its re-
emergence in the Enlightenment, but a necessary, and vital, response in western
thought to the flight of being from the vicissitudes of existence. For Cochrane,
Christian metaphysics was the truth-sayer of the vide at the centre of western
consciousness; and the theological discourse of the early Catholic thinkers,
(Athanasius, but, most of all, Augustine) the first intimations of the birth of
modernism. As Cochrane remarked of Augustine: “Not satisfied like the Hebrew
to weep by the waters of Babylon, nor yet, like the Greek, merely to envisage
the pattern of a city laid up in heaven, but true to the native genius of the children of
Romulus, he traced the outlines of an ecclesiastical polity which . . . had its
foundations solidly embedded in the living rock of empirical fact. Leaving it to
others to pursue millenialist dreams of a New Jerusalem, he erected the last but
not the least impressive or significant monument to the spirit of Ancient
Rome.”68 In the face of the failure of political action to achieve “permanence and
universal” in the “civilizing process”, Augustine developed a synthesis of “the
whole vision of antiquity (Hebrew, Greek and Latin)” which was delivered up in
terms of a theory of the radical remaking of the “human personality” and of the
creation of “historical experience” (the Saeculum). Augustine was a crucial
mediator of the “inner logic” of western metaphysics to the extent that his
writings install a new metaphysics of power (what Nietzsche describes as the
“will to will”), an epistemology of modern psychology (the “closing of the eye of
the flesh”), and the creation of the “will to truth” (the linkage between power
and knowledge of which now only Heidegger, Nietzsche and Foucault have taken

103
as the nucleus of the modern regime of power). The Augustinian discourse was, in its essentials, a reflection of a permanent desire in the western mind to silence the struggle of being and becoming (which first found expression in the tragic sensibility of mythic consciousness) through the strategy of embodying the Concept (what Cochrane refers to as the values of “truth, beauty and goodness”) in the living fact of the flesh, in the normalization of psychological experience.

The high-point of Cochrane’s intellectual achievements was represented, and this most certainly, by the publication of Christianity and Classical Culture. It was in this work that he explored, in rich historical detail and with genuine philosophical insight, precisely how the Augustinian discourse constituted both a “solution” to the catastrophe which awaited classical culture (the Pax Augusta was finally capable only of “renovation” and “regeneration” of western civilization). In analyzing the historicity of the troubled relationship between the discourse of classical reason and politics (Virgil and Augustus) and Christian metaphysics (Theodosius and Augustine), Cochrane brought to a new threshold of understanding the way in which the western tradition, both as metaphysics and as political action, has deployed itself. Before Cochrane, the genealogy of western culture has to do with the history of Reason: a Reason which is sometimes transcendent, at other times submerged in the naturalism of empirical will. After Cochrane, the archeology of European, and now North American, culture cannot avoid the truth contained in the fact that Augustine, this founder of Christian metaphysics, was not ultimately the bitter opponent of classical reason, but its redeemer. It was the fate of Augustine to represent a “synthesis of the whole vision of antiquity” precisely because he understood the nihilism which is at the heart of western consciousness. That there is only a reversal of terms between Plato and Augustine, and not a radical d iremption, might only mean that Augustine was the first of the modern rationalists: the thinker who understood that Reason could be maintained only as a member of the holy trinity of nature, will and knowledge; as a term within that triadic structure of modern consciousness. That Augustine followed Latin Christianity in widening and deepening “the spiritual foundations of a material life which it refused either to repudiate or deny” also meant he was the first of the modern metaphysicians, or, perhaps more accurately, sociologists, of power: the first thinker, that is, to transform the empirical will into the transcendental will and, consequently, to establish the possibility of the will to power. As a synthesis ultimately of Plato and Virgil, Augustine was the culmination of the classical mind’s futile search for a new principle of fusion, a “will to truth” which would finally overcome the radical division of the sensate and the ideal. Now, to accomplish this philosophical equivalent of nuclear fission (in which Christian metaphysics preserved the nihilistic moment in the western mind), Augustine made of the body, its deep psychology and its sensual appearance, a radical experiment in a “totalizing” political philosophy. It is often thought that in his famous words “look into yourself” or in his equally celebrated invention of modern psychology in the creation of a “continuous and cumulative experience” that Augustine was somehow freeing the region of the body, and most certainly of the unconscious, for the
development of a modern experience which would no longer be incarcerated within the monotonous terrain of a transcendental reason. It is not as often thought that in his search for the "inner man", Augustine was presenting only a chilling sentence on the human possibility: an intimation of a fascist power which would work its wonders through the explosive combination of guilt and the will to truth. Was not the "confession" of Augustine ultimately of the will to itself; that is, the assent of the fleshly will to abandon its claim to radical autonomy in favour of the peace which would come with that new "union of hearts"—the development of the "will to will"? Nietzsche might have been thinking of Augustine when he remarked that the will to power is "the innermost essence of Being"; and further, when he notes (with Heidegger) that psychology is not the essence of the "will to will", but is "the morphology and doctrine of the will to power". This is simply to say, of course, that the whole of European culture, the metaphysics of modern experience, was decisively transformed by the Augustine's synthesis. And who can say, with any certainty, that Augustine's formulation of a nameless power based on the will to will or, moreover, his colonization of the "inner man" through the incarnation of a metaphysical "truth" have somehow disappeared, now that the profile of religious discourse has receded from view?

In the writing of Christianity and Classical Culture, Cochrane presented the exact terms of Augustine's revision of Christian metaphysics with the easy assurance of a thinker who was confident that modernism had not escaped the Augustinian legacy. And, of course, while it may have been Cochrane's weakness that he took refuge in the carceral of the "trinitarian formula" (and this as a way of evading, not philosophy, but the tragic aesthetics of poetic consciousness), nonetheless his description of Augustinian metaphysics, delivered up as the "loving" act of a thinker who had finally come home, offers us an invaluable insight into the phenomenology of the modern mind. The overriding importance of Christianity and Classical Culture may be that it makes visible the metaphysics of modernism which, taking place in the fourth century in that decisive threshold between the opening of the wound in western consciousness (the radical antagonism of the "Graeco-Roman mind") and the coming millennium of a Christian peace, was forced to declare openly its strategies, its "inner logic". In Augustine, the inner logic of western metaphysics, the specific strategies by which the corporeal self would be invested by the "will to truth", was forced finally to the surface. For a brief moment, the dominations and powers of western experience were forced, in fact, to confess themselves; to declare their justifications and to say, quite honestly, how they intended finally to silence the weeping of Euripides by turning the corporeal self against itself. Curiously the act of rereading Augustine is nothing less than an exploration of modernism before it goes underground. And what makes Cochrane such a brilliant guide is that his thought, always tragic and ever in flight from existence, cleaves to Augustine as its "first principle". Cochrane tells us what exactly constitutes, at a theoretical level, the decisive intervention by Augustine into western metaphysics.
It was Cochrane's claim, as elaborated in the third and decisive section ("Regeneration") of Christianity and Classical Culture, that Augustine's originality consisted of assembling into a single discourse three important innovations in Christian metaphysics. Augustine's break with discursive reason (with the whole dualistic logique of dialectics) imposed a new beginning-point on human experience. While the Augustinian discourse had the immediate effect of transforming the corporeal self into a vehicle (the body as a prison-house of the flesh or as a "temple of God") for the inscription of truth, it also established the foundations (in epistemology, aesthetics and ethics) of a modernist conception of personality and history. Augustine was, indeed, the first of the modern structuralists because he broke completely with the classical conception of reason and with the classical economy of power. Before Augustine, reason and power were rooted in the representationalism of nature. After Augustine, the representationalism of classical reason and power had disappeared; it was replaced by a thoroughly relational theory of personality and history. It was, perhaps, the sheer radicalness of the break in western experience which was contained in the thought of Augustine that lends Christianity and Classical Culture such elegance and persuasiveness. Cochrane realized that whether in The Confessions or in the City of God (or, indeed, in his numerous doctrinal challenges to heresy) Augustine articulated the main impulses of the vita of the Catholic world. In a word, Augustine was the first theoretician to explore the physics, the logic and the ethics of modern experience. Long before Foucault and Baudrillard alerted us to the character of modern power as a "dead power", a "nameless" power which no one owns (but which operates as an "eternal inner simulacrum") that is, long before Foucault broke forever with a representational discourse which was founded on the originary of "nature"; long before this, Cochrane, looking for shelter from the storm, had stumbled upon an earlier expression of a dead power, of a power which is purely mediational and, thus, relational in its symbolic effects. The significance of Cochrane's recovery of Augustine against classical reason is that, almost innocently, he provides an intimate account of that fundamental break between the modern and classical epistemés which was precipitated by Augustine and from which we are only now beginning to awaken.

1. Physics: The Discourse of the Trinitarian Formula

Augustine's first intervention into the closed and comforting discourse of western metaphysics consisted of a radical refusal of the classical conception of a dialectical reason. As Cochrane said, it was "... the function of fourth-century Christianity ... to heal the wounds inflicted by man on himself in classical
AUGUSTINE AND MODERNISM

times."  

Classical discourse, beginning as it did with the arché of nature, constituted itself within the horizon of a closed logos which oscillated backwards and forwards between the antinomies of the naturalistic table of discourse. With all of the flourish of bad burlesque, the classical economy of reason found itself trapped between the polarities of scepticism (Platonic logos) and dogmatism (empirical will). The problem for classical reason, faced with the alternatives of transcendence and submersion, was to discover an adequate "myth" (Homer) or "hypothesis" (Plato) which would serve as a "fuse" to complete the "circuit of intelligibility" across the void at the centre of discursive reason. Much like the modern effort of Enlightenment (Cochrane claimed in "The Mind of Edward Gibbon" that its attempted rehabilitation of discursive reason was nothing but an imitation of the "radical deficiency" of the table of classical discourse), classicism began by "envisaging the subject as in some sense 'opposed' to the 'object' world" and, then, seeking a reconciliation of the two by presenting, mythically or hypothetically, some intelligible relationship between the two. Two escapes were possible: "upwards by way of transcendence or downwards into positivism." At stake were the reconciliation of the "classical logos of power" (which opposed its subjective character, "art and industry" to an objective side (fate and fortune); and the fusion of the classical logos of reason (which opposed an ultimate principle of being—"water (Thales), air (Anaximenes), fire (Heraclitus) or some element undefined (Anaximander) or as the limit or form (Pythagoras)—to a differentiated principle of becoming (Heraclitus' dialectical materialism, the "idealism" of the Pythagorean school. As Cochrane notes, the result of the closed table of classical discourse was to condemn thought to the "assertion of the claims of the positive sciences" (Hippocrates' Ancient Medicine) or to an endless drift into "subjectivism and sophistry" (Plotinus and Porphyry). And, of course, from Augustine's standpoint, the radical error of Plato was his discovery and then displacement of the third arché (Order) into the Form of the Good, the One, which was to supervene over the atomism of sensate experience. The "blunder" of Plato was to overlook "the possibility that if the conclusions thus reached were so disheartening, the reason for this might not lie in some radical misapprehension of the problem as originally proposed." In not providing a means by which logos might be made immanent, Platonic discourse, viewing matter as the "all-but-nothing" immobilized reality, "reducing it purely to terms of structure, so that time was represented as a 'moving image of eternity' and process, as such, was identified with 'irrationality' and 'evil.'" The result was the picture of the 'multiple soul', a composite of discrete elements confronting one another in a struggle to be concluded only by the final release of mind from its prison-house in matter and by its return to its source of being, the 'life' of pure form. The fuse between the One and the Many (the Universal Soul as the "hypostatized" connective, or fuse, between the sensate and the intellectual) would be by way of dialectic: the instrument by which the radical dualisms at the heart of discursive reason would be resolved in favour of the overcoming of the "illusory world of sense." Now, long before Kant's renunciation of the possibility of knowledge of the
Ding-an-sich (and his subsequent turn to a regulatory theory concerning the analytical presuppositions of the categories of thought) Augustine broke with the Platonic logos, with rationalism, by opposing to the nature of discursive reason the supersensible principle of triadic being. Classical discourse had sought the principle for the unification of human experience in an external mediation: in idealism (transcendentalism) or in materialism (submersion in the finite). Augustinian metaphysics took as its realm of action the field of human experience itself; with, of course, the important exception that it invented “personality” (what Cochrane describes as the “triune character of selfhood”) as the embodiment of the Word. Augustine’s subversion of classical discourse consisted, above all, of fusing epistemology and psychology in the special sense that he put the body itself into play as a living theatricum for the struggle of the finite and the indeterminate. It surely was an early sign of the beginning of the specious cruelty (the “guilt” over fleshly being) of the modern century when Augustine, in his declarations on the “direct deliverance” of consciousness, said, in effect, that now corporeal being would be the new epicentre for a metaphysics of ordered process. For what, after all, was sin but mortality? And, as Cochrane liked to be reminded by Augustine, the Christian analogue of promethean consciousness was that first transgression of “original sin.”

Augustinian metaphysics saw the fleshly self both as a danger and a possibility: a danger because the “raw touch of experience” was only a sign on the way to death; and a possibility because the radical remaking of corporeal being promised, and this finally, the inner silence of the “unmoved mover”. Augustine opened up the continent of human experience only to, and this so promptly, incarcerate the corporeal self within the “triune character of selfhood”. Yes, Cochrane is correct in noting that Augustine invented the modern conception of “personality”; but the “personality” which was created, viewed always as a sociological manifestation of the “unmoved mover” (an early structure of “dead power” of modern times) was also a prison-house of the actual data of human experience.

We are confronted with a contradiction in Augustine. This was the thinker who simultaneously broke with the static dualisms of classical discourse by recovering human experience as its own ground and, yet, who spoke to being, will and consciousness only to silence them under the sign of a relational will to truth. Augustine’s physics involved a fourfold strategy for the colonization of human experience. First, Augustine transformed the, previously supersensible principle of triadic being (Father, Son and Holy Ghost) into the axial principles of a new theory of personality. The Holy Trinity was embodied under the sign of a new trinitarian formula of human personality: being/will/consciousness. At a fundamental metaphysical level, the fleshly self was transformed into a mirror image, or perhaps better described as a colonization in parallel form, of trinitarian Christianity. Augustine said that the “problem of life was one of consciousness” and by this he meant that the closed table of naturalistic discourse could only be subverted by means of a new “phenomenology of human experience”: one which generated no hiatus between the sensate and the ideal. The embodiment of logos (the “Word made flesh”) meant that consciousness was to be
transformed into a matter of "direct deliverance" and that the sensate and the ideal would be unified by will. An "intima scientia" would be created which would take being, will and intelligence as directly experienced aspects of human experience. "From this point of view we may see ourselves as possessing the inseparabilis distinctio and distinctio cuniuncto of a quasi-trinity: being, nature and consciousness."

More fundamentally, the trinity of nature, will and intelligence (itself a mirror image of the original trinity) parallels that other way of taking the trinitarian formula; corpus (the body), anima (the vision) and voluntas (intentio animi). It is, in the end, desire (amor, libido) which unites the body and intelligence. For Augustine, the body was not an epiphenomenon nor a real principle of existence. It is but a "ticket of recognition." For, after all, the "flesh is the nag on which we make the journey to Jerusalem." Now, however, in the struggle among the body, desire, and consciousness, Augustine argues that everything is to be referred for adjudication (and unification) to an "internal principle of being". The three-in-oneness of the modern personality is founded on an original absence, a void: "the soul is that by which I vivify my flesh."

The presentation of a triadic structure of human experience (of which one manifestation was the theatricum of personality) depends on two other strategic interventions: the desubstantialisation of nature and the final affirmation of the self as a substantial and transcendental unity. Augustinian physics undertook the ultimate gamble of delivering up the "inner man" to the surveillance of an "intima scientia". It was Augustine's claim that he was finally able to break with classical discourse when he realized that spirituality was substantial and that nature was experienced only as a lack, an absence. Long before Kant, Augustine undertook that fateful movement of thought in which the gravitational-point shifts from the contents of human experience to the analytical presuppositions which regulate the play of the various elements of social existence. The embodiment of the "unmoved mover" as the internal mediation of human experience (a "meditation" which is always known as an absence) meant that the Augustinian discourse would move to decentre the empirical will (contingent and mutable being), concentrating instead on the conceptual norms which regulate, and incarcerate, the different dimensions of human experience. Thus, a great reversal in the order of thought appears: the Ding-an-sich of human experience (the ontological domain of the thing-in-itself) is desubstantialized and what remains as immanent are the normative relations ("truth, beauty and goodness") which signify the internal pacification of human experience. All of this is to indicate, of course, that the Augustinian discourse is nihilistic: it substantializes an absence (the creative principle of the "unmoved mover") and it condemns as nothingness the whole region of corporeal being. Augustinian metaphysics can seek to "close the eye of the flesh" under the comforting ideology that empirical experience is a void, a dark absence. And it is not even with bad conscience, but with the consciousness of a mind which has committed itself to the metaphysics of nihilism, that Augustine can speak of the need for a "hatred of the corporeal self" and of a "love of the self which clings to..."
Thus, as a matter of physics there are two great ruptures of thought in Augustine: the embodiment of trinitarianism as the coeur of the modern personality; and the substitution of the substantialization of the Concept for the nothingness of human experience. In Augustine's discourse, a complete metaphysics founded on the principles of a new epistemology of modern power is imposed on human experience. Before Augustine, there may have been a "warring subject" which oscillated between the ideal and the sensate; but, after Augustine, there is only the silence of a corporeal self which, having been evacuated of its claims to be the centering-point of contingent and mutable experience, now falls into silence. For all of the speech in Augustine concerning the nature of sin, the turbulence of the body, the iniquity of desire, what is most peculiar (and this is apparent in Augustine's adoption of an increasingly militant form of analysis) is that the actual body falls into silence. We are confronted not only with the splitting of reason and imagination but also with the severance of empirical and transcendental will and with the radical disjunction of nature and analytics.

2. Logic: Crede ut Intellegas

Augustine's second intervention into western metaphysics was represented by the creation of a discourse which, in overcoming that real space in the classical domain between will and truth, brought together, and this for the first time, authority and reason. Cochrane reminds us that in reconceiving "substance as spiritual", Augustine was able to perceive that "so far from being ultimate, 'form' and 'matter' alike were merely figments of the human mind." Now, Augustine's revolt against reason was fundamental (not because, as for Tertullian, it implied a radical severance of faith and reason, a faith by 'instinct', under the sign of the credo quia absurdum) in two senses. First, the Augustinian discourse represented a sharp denial of "science as architectonic" in human existence, and thus of the correlative belief that while reason is capable of transcending to the objective domain, faith remains a matter of "private intuition." The essence of trinitarianism, both as a theory of "dynamic personality" and as an epistemological discourse, was to assert memory, intelligence and will (corpus/anima/voluntas) as relative and directly experienced aspects of the single process of human experience. Against the radical scepticism of, for example, Pyrrho, Augustine claimed that "reason itself presents the credentials by virtue of which it presumes to operate." In his "phenomenology of the human mind", Augustine asks: "What must I accept as the fundamental elements of consciousness, the recognition of which is imposed upon me as an inescapable necessity of my existence as a rational animal"? And to this, he replies that to "the awareness of selfhood as a triad of being, intelligence and purpose" there is to be ascribed
"infallible knowledge; because it is the knowledge by the experient of himself."96 It is the "direct deliverance of consciousness, independent of all mediation through sense and imagination" which brings reason into a direct and substantial mediation (Cochrane describes this as the "substantial unity" of the triune character of selfhood) with memory ("the sense of being or personal identity") and will ("the uncoerced motion of the self"). As Augustine said in that famous expression: "If I am mistaken, this very fact proves that I am."97 This vitalistic theory of knowledge (vitalism in the sense of the "direct deliverance" of consciousness) is the precise point of division between the epistemological rupture at the heart of classical reason and the reconciliation of consciousness, life and will initiated by Augustine. The categories of triadic being represent a resolution to the classical scission of the material and the ideal; the trinitarian principle represents the preconditions "which are imposed upon the intelligence" as the starting-point of its operations. Thus, for Augustine, faith and reason are not antithetical principles, but "complementary." From the rejection of the claim "that discursive reason can authenticate the presumptions which determine the nature and scope of its activity otherwise than in terms of their 'working and power',"98 everything follows. As Augustine noted: the crede ut intellegas ("believe in order to understand") was, above all, a response to the incapacity of the classical mind to resolve the radical divisions at the heart of naturalism. The lesson of Cassiciacum was, in the end, that "if faith precedes understanding, understanding in turn becomes the gift of faith."99 Between philosophy and theology, that is, there is a silent assent: reason never escapes from faith, and faith as the ultimate acknowledgement of science to verify the presumptions by which "it presumes to operate" remains always as the truth-sayer of consciousness.

It is then only a very short passage from Augustine's deflation of reason into its ground in faith to his second, and this very political, conclusion that reason and authority were to be coeval principles. It was a momentous, and terrible, development in modern metaphysics when, in his meditation upon the trinitarian principle, Augustine discovered the necessary connection between the will and reason: the fateful connection which produced the will to truth."Such is the constitution of human nature that, when we undertake to learn anything, authority must precede reason. But the authority is accepted only as a means to understanding. 'Believe ... in order that you may understand.'"100 The crede ut intellegas, this invention of the will to truth, is surely the beginning-point for a full politicization of western consciousness; for, that is, a working of power within the interstices of will and consciousness. Augustine had already claimed that memory was the centre of personal identity (thus the Saeculum will substitute for fleshly being), and now memory will be made to correspond to the regulae sapientiae ("the true service of which is purely as an instrument for correct thinking")101. Thus, the Augustinian episteme fully penetrates the private sphere of "inner consciousness." A substitution of the order of knowledge occurs: "the knowledge in question ... is that of the spiritual man. The man who sees the universe, not through the 'eye of the flesh' but in light of a principle whereby he is enabled to judge everything without himself being judged by any
man. Curiously, Augustine brings us to the very edge of a modern and critical theory of experience (memory, will and intelligence as directly experienced aspects of human action) but then he reverses the process of discovery, playing the modern constitution of experience back upon itself as a way of responding to the "error" of classical discourse, but also of prohibiting the direct encounter with mortality which is the essence of the human condition. Augustine's politicization of truth provides, I believe, the exact grammatical rules of usage by which reason is to be permanently severed from the imagination. Under the sign of the crede ut intellegas, consciousness is universalized; and this in the precise sense that rules of correspondence (whether functional norms of truth, beauty and goodness or relations of similitude, likeness, etc.) are established between the will (this "uncoerced motion" of the mind) and the authority of the regulae sapientiae. The trinitarian principle allows the will to invest knowledge; and, inversely, it necessitates that the regulae sapientiae will be internalized as permanent defences against the appearance of egotism (empirical will) and, why not say it, against the ultimate freedom of the corporeal self to accept its human fate as an ironic gesture of life against death. It was against the human condition of the empirical will, against death, that Augustine erected that first social contract represented by the triadic principle of being.

3. Ethics: Theatricum Saeculum

In the Augustinian discourse, the will to truth is grounded in the principle that the realm of sensuous experience is mediated by the "value-truth" of the ordo conditionis nostrae: the fundamental categories of epistemology and normative evaluation which are, ultimately, a matter of direct deliverance. While, at one of its polarities, the ordo conditionis nostrae generates the radically new conception of a human "personality" ("the primitive and original values of selfhood"), at the other polarity, it produces a second, great discursive unity, that of "history" (the Saeculum). It was, indeed, an awesome and definite line of division between the discourse of classical naturalism and modern experience when Augustine, refusing to "close the wheel" of a mythologically informed history, invented human history as the actual site in which there would take place the "subduing of the flesh" and the regeneration of personality. In the pursuit of a pax rationalis (the synthetic unity of knowledge and activity), the function of the Augustinian discourse was to link the ontological (or, more accurately, theological) unity of human personality, conceived as a "centering" of the trinitarian principles of being/will/intelligence, with the "ethical" unity of historical action, rethought as a discursive manifestation of the divine economy. With the integration of personality and history, a new social unity was created: one which was capable of serving simultaneously as the apparatus of society and as a regulator of individual conscience. As Cochrane stated: "History in terms of the embodied
logos means history in terms of personality. As such, it makes possible a fulfillment of the great desideratum of classicism, viz. an adequate philosophic basis for humanism. For Augustine, the radical error of classicism was that in the absence of a "substantial" principle of unity, its image of an adequate basis for social unity oscillated between the extremes of "thinking with blood" (barbarism) or of civilization (classical ataraxia, apatheia). Christian metaphysics addressed the defect of the classical economy of power (this restless movement between barbarism and civilization) by delivering up a substantial ground for human experience. Cochrane argued: "Properly speaking, (Christian) history is the record of a struggle, not for the realization of material or ideal values but for the materialization, embodiment, the registration in consciousness of real values, the values of truth, beauty and goodness which are . . . thrust upon it as the very condition of its life and being."

Now, without doubt, Cochrane intended his remarkable analysis of the phenomenology of the Augustinian discourse to serve as a last, eloquent apologia for Christian metaphysics. And it might even be said that what drew Cochrane to Augustine was precisely Augustine's creation and thematic unification of the discursive ensembles of the "dynamic personality" and the Saeculum. After all, Cochrane claimed that the criticism of classical truth was also a "criticism of classical ethics." And there are, in fact, few more ecstatic passages in Cochrane's writings than his description of the almost vitalistic origins of substantiality in Augustinian ethics. Of Augustine's defence of "value-truth" as the essence of "creative personality" and of "creative history", Cochrane says: "It is substantial rather than formal truth, and it is substantial rather than formal ethics." And why? Because in Christian metaphysics, "truth may be described as reason irradiated by love; as morality, love irradiated by reason." In sum, the Augustinian discourse makes the linking of personality and history (consciousness and will) dependent on the incarnation of the word; and to this extent it closes together the problem of historical necessity (the "divine economy") and the maintenance of an adequate personality (the "redemption of the flesh"). Cochrane was ultimately seduced by the Augustinian vision that in the "discipline" which was provided by "the subjugation of the flesh", there was to be found an actual working-out (in conscience and in history) of a substantial synthesis of human experience. Or, as Cochrane would claim, the regulative values of "truth, beauty and goodness" are "essentially substantial . . . and inherent in the very constitution of the universe." Thus, to the degree that the values which are "metaphysically and physically real" are at the same time "historically real", to that same extent the logos (the intima scientia) is embodied in the consciousness of the flesh.

It is, perhaps, the simple fact that Cochrane, himself in search of an adequate philosophy of life, took the trouble to read Augustine seriously and to rethink the implications of the Saeculum which makes his recovery of Augustine of such fundamental consequence. For, outside of Cochrane's apologia for Christian metaphysics, there is present in his analysis of Augustinian ethics a theoretical account of the actual birth of personality and history as the main discursive sites.
of western politics and metaphysics. Long before Sartre’s declaration of the "age of ideology", Augustine described the genealogy of the total ideology which was imposed by Christian metaphysics on western experience and, in addition, justified the thematic unity which would be struck between personality (an "identity" which comes after, and not before, the "subduing of the flesh") and history (the first economy of ideology). And it is essential to the understanding of the nihilism which is at the heart of western experience that Augustinian ethics, based as it is on a complete severance of the *civitas terrena* and the *civitas dei*, justifies itself, not through a litany of prohibitions, but through the discourse of love. It is "love irradiated by reason" and "reason irradiated by love" which are the ethical principles guiding the struggle against the corporeal self. Cochrane found, and this finally, a real serenity in the ethic of love/reason; he might have noted, though, that the curious feature of the modernist discourse released in the vision of Augustine was that it would justify the "subjugation of the flesh" in the name of the "defence of life" and that it demanded "hatred for the self" in favour of the ethic of love. Augustinian ethics, which surely as Cochrane claims, finds its fullest expression in the concept of the *Saeculum*, truly embodies in the flesh the metaphysics of the trinitarian principle and the epistemology of modern psychology contained in the notion of the will to truth. With Augustine's "registration in consciousness" of the *analyticus* of being/will/intelligence and with his ethical defence of the "will to truth" as a historical and moral necessity, the modern age is suddenly upon us; and all this in the fourth century after Christ.

Yes, it is in Augustine's discourse on the will that there is the beginning of the arc of a dead power which will be illuminated in the nineteenth century by Nietzsche's nightmarish vision of the "will to will" and in the present century by Michel Foucault's image of a "relational" will: the transparent, meditational and contentless will at the centre of the disciplinary society.

Notes

2. It was Augustine's project to close "the eye of the flesh" and thus to substitute an "inner power" for the workings of sensuous experience.
AUGUSTINE AND MODERNISM


13. This, at least, was Cochrane's position in *Christianity and Classical Culture*.

14. Cochrane described Plotinus and Porphyry as mediational moments in philosophical discourse; a trembling mid-point between the birth of Christian metaphysics and the death of the disembodied logos of Plato. Plotinus followed a programme of *ascesis* (the 'evacuation' of the soul of all elements of complexity) and Porphyry had recourse to *theurgy*, (an early example of psychoanalysis.) *Christianity and Classical Culture*, pp. 429-430.

15. And, of course, all of Cochrane's thought stands as a response to precisely this possibility.

16. Cochrane never suspected though that in Augustinian realism there is, above all, the first stirrings of the birth of nihilism. Augustine stands on the dark side of Nietzsche as much as Foucault is the future of Nietzsche's 'will to will.'


18. It is my thesis, after Heidegger, that Augustine's discourse on the "flame of the will" installed a transparent, contentless and mediational 'power' - a dead power - at the epicentre of western experience. I have discussed twentieth-century manifestations of this relational theory of power in "Modern Power in Reverse Image: Michel Foucault and Talcott Parsons;" forthcoming.

19. After Thucydides, Cochrane said that the study of "radical eviscer" was also a way of "taking possession forever" of another world—hypothesis.

20. Cultural studies in English Canada centre on an examination of the form (the deep structures) of modern society. See, for example, the analysis of cultural forms in Northrop Frye, Marshall McLuhan, E. Carpenter, etc.


23. Thus, Leslie Armour has titled his recent, excellent study of Canadian philosophy, *The Faces of Reason*. The gamble of Canadian thought is, however, an interrogation of the privileged position of reason (Emil Fackenheim, George Brett, George Grant, etc.)


30. Ibid., pp. 399-455.

31. Cochrane's search for a solution to the problem of identity through change is the common feature which grounds his historical realism and his turn to Augustinian vitalism.

32. And why? Because dialectics oscillates between pragmatic naturalism and hyper-rationalism, neither of which exhausts the heterogeneity of human experience.

33. See specifically Cochrane's critique of Lockean epistemology in "The Mind of Edward Gibbon."

34. Cochrane understood, in fact, that Augustine's doctrine of the Trinity (a doctrine which located in the mirror of the Trinity an indeterminate recession towards that which never was, but which could only be known in its absence,) was also a significant act of metaphysical closure. In the mirror of the Trinity a reversal of the order of experience occurs: a reversal in which the region of non-being nihilates facticity. It was the arc of a dead power represented by the movement of the will to will between two signs that were reverse images of one another. This leads directly to the writings of Nietzsche, de Sade and Camus.

35. Cochrane's tragic sensibility paralleled the cultural pessimism of Herodotus; the third term which he always sought escape was mythic consciousness.


37. The search for a mode of scientific history which in establishing the foundation of creative politics rendered possible an escape from the poetic consciousness of Herodotus was a theme of Thucydides and the Science of History.

38. Cochrane, Christianity and Classical Culture, p. 468.

39. Ibid.

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid.


46. Ibid., p. 169.

47. For an account of how Thucydides applied the principles and methods of Hippocratic medicine to the interpretation of political history, see Thucydides and the Science of History, pp. 14-34.


49. Cochrane, "The Mind of Edward Gibbon," p. 166. This article represents Cochrane's most mature account of the historical imagination and, indeed, is the moment at which his thought is its most metaphysical.
AUGUSTINE AND MODERNISM

50. For a full account of the early Christian attitude to the 'apotheosis' of promethean consciousness, see Christianity and Classical Culture, pp. 359-398.

51. Thucydides and the Science of History represents a synthesis of an empirically informed history (Thucydides) and a theory of creative politics based on the model of the Athenian polis.

52. Ibid., pp. 26-34.

53. It was Cochrane's thesis, of course, that the genealogy of this failure of the Graeco-Roman mind begins and ends with the metaphysical impossibility of naturalism, with, that is, the impossibility of maintaining a creative politics on the basis of a rationally divided experience. Augustine's contribution was to repudiate a dialectical conception of power in favour of a relational one!

54. For a brilliant account of the psychological differences which established the Greeks and Romans as mirror images of one another see "The Latin Spirit in Literature."


56. Ibid., pp. 321-322.

57. Ibid., p. 322.

58. "It was not John Locke but Cicero who (in a little-noticed passage) first asserted that the state exists to protect property." Cochrane, "The Latin Spirit in Literature," p. 323.

59. Ibid., p. 322.

60. Ibid., p. 331.

61. Ibid., p. 325.

62. Ibid., p. 334.

63. Ibid., p. 337.

64. Ibid., p. 333.

65. Ibid., p. 335.

66. Ibid., pp. 337-338.

67. Ibid., p. 338.

68. Ibid.

69. After Jean Baudrillard's description of power as dead "in-itself" moving between signifier and signified as symbolic effects of one another, I take Augustine to be the first theoretician who radicalized the infinite possibilities which would be opened to the disciplinary method if the void of the 'flame of the will' were to overcome the facticity of the flesh. I understand Nietzsche's will to power, Heidegger's critical account of the will which moves restlessly to impose value, and Foucault's nightmarish vision of the 'eye of power' as the first awakening of thought to the transparent and mediational quality of modern power. See, in particular, F. Nietzsche, The Will To Power, New York: Random House, 1968, M. Heidegger, The End of Philosophy, New York: Harper and Row, 1973: and Michel Foucault, Folie et déraison, Histoire de la Folie à l'âge classique, translated as Madness and Civilisation, New York: Pantheon Books, 1965.


72. Cochrane, Christianity and Classical Culture, "Nostra Philosophia: The Discovery of
90. The "desubstantialisation of nature" is accomplished by transforming the world of factual experience (yes, sensuous experience,) into a "privation," an "absence," a "lack." Augustine's revolutionary conception of the will as the vital force of the modern personality was shadowed by that other sign: "to nil." Thus, what is instituted by Augustine is simultaneously the sovereignty of the void as the centre of western experience and an order of transgressions. The theory of human action which is revealed by trinitarianism is nothing less than what we later witness as "institutionalization" (Talcott Parsons) or "normalization" (Michel Foucault).

91. But the God to which the self is referred is in Augustine's terms immutable, indivisible, omnipotent and sexless: yes, at the beginning and always a dead God.
AUGUSTINE AND MODERNISM

101. Ibid., p. 414.
102. Ibid., p. 415.
103. Ibid., pp. 471-516.
104. Or, as Cochrane says: "History in terms of embodied logos means history in terms of personality."
    Christianity and Classical Culture, p. 480.
105. Ibid
106. Ibid., p. 513.
107. Ibid., p. 506.
108. Ibid., p. 506.
109. Ibid., p. 513.

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119