The concept of ideology has recently returned to the forefront of social theory. The euphoric days of the early 1960s, when social scientists confidently proclaimed the 'end of ideology' and everywhere observed the decline of radical politics, now seem long ago; with growing divergencies in national and international politics, and with the appearance of new and intensified forms of social conflict, the everyday presence of ideology seems more real than ever. The renewal of interest in problems of ideology has been closely connected with developments in philosophy and linguistics. For it has been increasingly realised that the study of ideology is, in a fundamental respect, the study of language in the social world. This realisation has offered the possibility of linking the study of ideology to forms of philosophy which have focused on the analysis of language and meaning, on the one hand, and to forms of linguistics which have been applied to textual analysis and social interaction, on the other. The task of accounting for the phenomenon of ideology has called for, and seems to require, an integrated approach to the nature and analysis of language in the social world.

While the desiderata seem clear, the results have so far been disappointing. This is particularly true of literature in the English-speaking world. Numerous books on ideology have appeared in English during the last few years; but these books, however insightful, are flawed in many ways. While often expressing an interest in language, the theorists of ideology have done little to link the analysis of linguistic expressions to the study of ideology. In the field of linguistics, there is a rapidly expanding body of material which bears the label of 'discourse analysis'. This material, extremely varied in detail, is united by a sensitivity to social context and a concern with problems of power and control. However, these problems remain unclarified at a theoretical level and their connection with ideology—a connection occasionally alluded to—is not pursued. English-speaking philosophers, for their part, have tended to remain aloof. Wittgenstein emphasised long ago that language is essentially social, but philosophers have rested content with a curiously non-social concept of the social. They have thus failed to appreciate the extent to which power and ideology are not mere side-tracks for the distraction of sociologists, but rather phenomena which lie at the heart of their own concerns.

In view of the disarray which currently prevails in the study of ideology, the
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need for a systematic and integrated approach is more urgent than ever. The following essay was conceived as an initial contribution to such a task. My aim in this essay is two-fold. First, I examine some theoretical perspectives on ideology which have been propounded during the last decade and which have had some impact on social scientists in the English-speaking world. This critical discussion prepares the way for a second, more constructive part. In the latter, I attempt to sketch an alternative account of ideology, drawing together theoretical and methodological considerations with the aim of elaborating a unified approach.

A few preliminary remarks should be made concerning the selection of material. I do not provide a history of the concept of ideology, nor do I offer an introduction to the classical theoretical positions, such as those of Marx or Mannheim, with which the notion of ideology is commonly associated. My focus is on the contemporary debates and, within that domain, I select material which seems to represent a distinctive and relatively developed position. Thus I have considered it justifiable to put aside the work of Geertz, for example, since his oft-quoted essay was published in the early 1960s and presents a perspective which shares many features with the theories examined below. While recognizing that the materials discussed belong to research projects with differing aims, I do not consider it satisfactory simply to distinguish these projects and differentiate their aims; for the projects employ concepts and methods which overlap to some extent and which are limited in ways that can be compared and assessed as a whole. Throughout the first two parts of the essay, I restrict myself to material written in English. In imposing this restriction I do not wish to suggest that contributions which have appeared in other languages are of no interest. On the contrary, the work which is currently being done in France and Germany, for instance, is of the greatest interest and merits detailed discussion in its own right. The initial restriction to material in English will nevertheless help to narrow down the domain of inquiry and will facilitate a critical and constructive discussion on what is, for English-speaking readers, readily accessible ground.

Critical Discussion

The last decade has witnessed the formulation of several different 'theories' of ideology in the English-speaking world. One such theory, that presented by Martin Seliger, is advanced against the backdrop of the 'end of ideology' debate and is cast within the framework of orthodox political science. A second account of ideology is developed by Alvin Gouldner. Strongly influenced by Habermas, this account views ideology as an historical phenomenon which emerged with the Enlightenment and which is interlaced with the technology of communication. A third perspective stems from Althusser, whose views have been forcefully
advocated by a number of authors writing in English. Prominent among these authors is Paul Hirst; he has written extensively on Althusser's theory of ideology and has attempted to incorporate many of its features in a somewhat revised account. In this first part of the essay I wish to critically examine the three positions represented by Seliger, Gouldner and Hirst. In the course of these analyses I shall highlight a point which may be succinctly stated as follows: the concept of ideology has lost its critical edge. The three authors discussed below—and in this regard they are by no means exceptional—conceive of ideology as a system of symbols or beliefs which pertain, in some way, to social action or political practice; these authors thus dissolve the connection between the concept of ideology and the critique of domination, a connection which was certainly part (if not all) of Marx's notion of ideology and which should, I believe, be preserved. Just how such a connection could be re-established and developed is a question to which I shall return in the second part of the essay.

Ideology as belief system: Martin Seliger

In a substantial volume published in 1976, Martin Seliger develops an approach which is premised upon a distinction between two conceptions of ideology. On the one hand, there is the 'restrictive conception' which confines the term 'ideology' to specific political belief systems; on the other hand, there is the 'inclusive conception' which applies the term to all political belief systems, irrespective of whether the beliefs guide action oriented towards preserving, destroying or rebuilding the social order. Seliger aims to defend the inclusive conception of ideology and to show how this conception can be linked to processes of political debate. The first stage of his defence is to offer an 'immanent critique' of those authors who have advocated some form of the restrictive conception, from Marx and Engels to the theorists of the 'end of ideology'. In a separate study devoted to The Marxist Conception of Ideology, Seliger maintains that Marx and Engels conceived of ideology in a wholly negative and pejorative way, contrasting ideology with a 'true' or 'correct' perception of reality. Yet this conception cannot be consistently combined, according to Seliger, with the Marxist emphasis on free and purposive action; for ideology can animate such action only if itconcurs to some degree with how things actually are. With the appearance of this inconsistency it becomes necessary to admit that bourgeois ideology is not bare of factual insights or even entirely wrong about causal relationships and predictive evaluations. It is also conceded that the proletarian belief system is coloured by false consciousness. Consequently, the argument reaches the point where the original absolute juxtaposition of objective or total perception of reality and ideology, of objective and subjective class consciousness, breaks down.
ideology as class consciousness oriented towards political action, a step which Seliger interprets as a transition to the inclusive conception of ideology.

The implicit adoption of the inclusive conception can also be discerned in the writings of those who espoused the 'end of ideology' thesis. There is, Seliger observes, a peculiarly close connection between Marx's concept of ideology and the modern, non-Marxist notion presupposed by the theorists of the end of ideology. For the latter also use 'ideology' in a restricted and pejorative sense, but apply it, unlike Marx, to political belief systems which call for radical social change, and hence to Marxism itself. The thesis that ideology has come to an end was very much a product of the Western liberal democracies in the late 1950s and early 1960s, when politics was a matter of pragmatism and even radicals had seemingly reconciled themselves to moderation. But Seliger shows that the main proponents of the end of ideology thesis—Aron, Shils, Lipset, Bell and others—were not entirely consistent in their use of the term 'ideology', occasionally lapsing into the inclusive conception. He argues, moreover, that the thesis cannot be sustained insofar as it assumes that 'attitude towards change' will suffice as a criterion of ideology. It will not suffice because one cannot establish an unequivocal link between the content of a political belief system and its character as conservative, moderate or radical. Whether a belief system is conservative, moderate or radical obviously depends upon the prevailing political culture and upon the attitude adopted towards it—Marxism may be as radical in the West as it is conservative in the East. From this argument Seliger draws a conclusion which anticipates his version of the inclusive conception: 'As that which guides and defends political action, ideology must therefore be defined so as to refer to political belief systems, whether they are revolutionary, reformist or conservative (traditionalist) in outlook.'

Ideologies, according to Seliger, are action-oriented sets of beliefs which are organized into coherent systems. These systems are composed of a number of elements which may be formally distinguished and represented as follows:

- **D** = description
- **A** = analysis
- **P_m** = moral prescriptions
- **P_t** = technical prescriptions
- **I** = implements
- **R** = rejections

![Diagram of Ideology System](image-url)
As this diagram makes clear, all ideologies mix together factual description and the analysis of situations with moral prescriptions about what is right and good and technical considerations of prudence and efficiency. It is this peculiar mixture of factual content and moral commitment that gives ideology its appeal and enables it to guide political action. The action-giving role of ideology is further reinforced by what Seliger calls ‘implements’, that is, rules which provide ways and means of implementing commitments and adapting them to circumstantial requirements. The final element of ideologies, described as ‘rejections’, concerns the fact that ideologies are always defined in opposition to others and thus incorporate the denial or rejection of certain principles and beliefs; the separation of powers in constitutional democracy, for example, is premised upon the rejection of the divine right of kings. On the basis of this formal analysis of the elements of ideologies, Seliger offers a full definition of his inclusive conception:

An ideology is a group of beliefs and disbeliefs (rejections) expressed in value sentences, appeal sentences and explanatory statements... [It is] designed to serve on a relatively permanent basis a group of people to justify in reliance on moral norms and a modicum of factual evidence and self-consciously rational coherence the legitimacy of the implements and technical prescriptions which are to ensure concerted action for the preservation, reform, destruction or reconstruction of a given order.\(^\text{10}\)

From this definition it follows that politics and ideology are inseparable. All political action is ultimately oriented towards the preservation, reform, destruction or reconstruction of the social order, and hence all political action is necessarily guided by an ideological system of beliefs.

The actual implementation of ideology in concerted action has an effect on the formal structure of the belief system. In fulfilling its practical role, ideology is relied upon to devise and justify specific policies and to pronounce on issues of everyday politics. This endangers the purity and centrality of prescriptions which are essentially moral and leads to the ‘bifurcation’ of political argumentation into two dimensions: ‘that of fundamental principles, which determine the final goals and the grand vistas on which they will be realized, and which are set above the second dimension, that of the principles which actually underlie policies and are invoked to justify them’\(^\text{11}\). Seliger calls this second dimension ‘operative ideology’, to distinguish it from the ‘fundamental ideology’ of the first. All the elements of ideology are realised in both dimensions, but with a different emphasis in each case. In justifying policies in the operative dimension, more consideration is given to norms of prudence and efficiency; whereas moral prescriptions are central in fundamental ideology, it is technical prescriptions which have priority in the operative dimension. Thus the elements of ideology are more accurately represented as follows:
The bifurcation of ideology generates a constant process of internal change. Tension and conflict arise between the principles of the operative ideology and those of the fundamental ideology, as well as between principles in the same dimension. So in order to maintain a minimum of coherence, ideologies must constantly adapt their elements and dimensions to one another, either realigning the operative principles to the original specifications of the fundamental ideology or modifying these specifications in accordance with what is actually being done or what is possible.

Ideological change is also generated by conflicts between the principles of different fundamental ideologies. In this regard, Seliger observes a growing consensus concerning overall objectives within and between the various political systems. He interprets this not as an indication of the end of ideology, but as a sign of 'the diminishing appeal and suitability of diametrically opposed social values and goals, following success in the battle for raising the standard of living among large sections of the working classes and the spread of social security'.

Moral absolutes have lost much of their appeal in the party politics of the West. In order to secure votes, however, parties must not dilute fundamentals beyond recognition, for there must be sufficient distinction between the parties in order for voters to choose. A conflict is produced between the rationality of maximising votes and winning elections, on the one hand, and the rational defence of fundamental principles, on the other. Fundamental principles are generally protected from the changes in orientation to which policies attest; parties defend their fundamental principles in order to conceal a convergence in the operative dimension. The dynamics of party politics thus lead to a growing disparity between the two dimensions of each ideology and provide a constant source of ideological change.

Seliger's contribution to the theory of ideology provides a convenient point of departure for developing a critical discussion—'convenient' not only because his views may be widely shared (if not widely known) among social scientists, but also because I wish to adopt a position which contrasts sharply with that which
he defends. I wish to adopt, that is, a conception of ideology which Seliger would call ‘restrictive’ and which owes something to the work of Marx. It is therefore appropriate to begin my critical comments on Seliger’s contribution by returning to his critique of the ‘Marxist conception of ideology’. According to Seliger, the conception of ideology advanced by Marx and Engels is essentially a ‘truth-excluding’ notion: ideology is a distorted representation of reality, a ‘false consciousness’ in Engel’s terms. At the same time, Marx and Engels tended to attribute ideology to the bourgeoisie alone, which seems inconsistent both with the realisation that bourgeois ideas must have some factual content if they are to be efficacious, and with the recognition that the proletarian outlook is by no means free from distortion. These apparent inconsistencies lead Seliger to the conclusion that Marx’s and Engel’s restrictive, truth-excluding conception of ideology cannot be sustained. There is, however, a serious flaw in Seliger’s argument. For he is mistaken to assume that ideology is conceived by Marx and Engels exclusively, or even primarily, in opposition to ‘truth’. What is equally or even more important in the work of Marx and Engels is the link between ideology and class domination. The truth or falsity of statements about the natural or social world is one matter; the ways in which such statements may serve to sustain class domination is another. I do not wish to suggest that Marx and Engels always draw a sharp distinction between these two sets of concerns, nor do I want to imply that their texts provide satisfactory answers to the key questions about ideology. I wish only to emphasise that Seliger’s critique of Marx and Engels, insofar as it underplays the link between ideology and class domination, fails to demonstrate the untenability of a restrictive conception of ideology.

Seliger has, however, another argument against a restrictive conception. In criticising the end of ideology theorists, he submits that the apparent demise of radical political doctrines does not indicate the end of ideology: radicality cannot suffice as a criterion of ideology, for whether a doctrine is radical or not is a contingent matter which depends upon the prevailing political culture. It may now be asked whether such an argument could be used against a restrictive conception which established a link between ideology and class domination—or, more generally, between ideology and domination. Could it be argued that to conceive of ideology as ideas or utterances which serve to sustain a system of domination is unacceptable, because whether certain ideas or utterances serve to undermine or sustain a particular system will depend upon what that system is and the attitude adopted towards it? Such an argument would not show that this restrictive conception of ideology is unsound, but only that this conception does not provide a criterion for identifying certain ideas or utterances as ideological as such, independently of the particular conditions under which they are promulgated. Seliger’s argument, in other words, does not show that a restrictive conception is unsound, but only that what counts as ‘ideological’ cannot be ascertained independently of the surrounding circumstances. For the advocate of a restrictive conception, it is harmless to acknowledge that a specific doctrine may be ideological in one context and non-ideological in another.

So far I have been concerned to cast doubt on Seliger’s view that a restrictive
conception of ideology is untenable. I now want to call attention to some features of Seliger’s inclusive conception which seem to me misleading or mistaken. My first and most fundamental reservation stems directly from the preceding discussion: Seliger’s inclusive conception is so general and indiscriminate that it breaks every connection between ideology and the critique of domination. For Seliger, the concept of ideology can be applied to any political belief system, whether revolutionary, reformist or reactionary; and thus the concept is stripped of the critical edge, the negative force, which it had in the writings of Marx. Having broken the connection between ideology and the critique of domination, it is no surprise to see that Seliger’s conception of ideology is related in only the most diffuse way to the institutional and structural features of society and to the analysis of power. My second reservation pertains to the characterisation of ideology as a belief system. In regarding ideology as a relatively coherent belief system which can be formally analysed into its constituent parts, Seliger exaggerates the unity and discreteness of ideologies. If one wishes to study ideologies one is invited to examine the articulated doctrines of organised political parties; one no longer sees that the most effective ground of ideology is not the domain officially defined as ‘politics’, but rather the domain of everyday life—the home, the workplace, the school, the media. Restricting the study of ideology to an examination of official politics is like confining a study of British culture to an excursion through the Tate. The third and final reservation which I want to express concerns the conceptualisation of ideology as a system of beliefs. To conceptualise ideology in terms of beliefs is to divert attention away from the complex and crucial problem of the relation between ideology and language. Seliger speaks very loosely of ideology as a ‘system of beliefs’, a ‘system of thought’, a ‘system of thought and speech’; he describes the ideological composite as comprising ‘principles’ and ‘commitments’, ‘judgements of value and statements of fact’, ‘tested and testable empirical claims’ and ‘claims that are neither’; nowhere does he explore what might be involved in the connection, acknowledged partially and erratically in his work, between ideology and the language in which relevant ‘beliefs’, ‘judgements’ or ‘commitments’ are expressed. A greater sensitivity to the dimension of language is one of the features which characterises the contribution of Alvin Gouldner.

Ideology as rational project: Alvin Gouldner
In The Dialectic of Ideology and Technology, Alvin Gouldner elaborates a richly historical perspective on the concept of ideology. If Seliger examines the history of ideology in order to uncover the seeds of a conception which can no longer be sustained, Gouldner turns to history in order to recover a specificity which the concept of ideology is today in danger of losing. If Seliger regards ideology as a system of beliefs which can be studied by the methods of social science, Gouldner views ideology not merely as a potential object of social science but as its alleged boundary, a boundary which stems from the simultaneous birth of ideology and social science in the Enlightenment. The rise of the social sciences and the new ideologies of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were both shaped by the
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growth of modern science and the decline of older traditions. When the notion of ideology is taken up by Marx, however, it is turned against its historical twin: Marx uses this notion to criticise the scientific pretensions of the new social science, to attack beliefs about society that make scientific claims which he holds to be unjustified. The modern interest in "ideology" thus emerges as a Marxist category whose underlying, latent paradigm is: a belief system that makes pretentious and unjustified claims to scientificity."¹⁴ This intrinsic, antagonistic relation between ideology and social science has, in Gouldner's view, fundamental implications for the way in which ideology can be studied. Ideology cannot be treated as a mere 'thing-out-there' to be observed and investigated empirically, for it necessarily points back to the problematic of self-understanding and calls for the sort of reflexive social theory which Gouldner is concerned to defend.

While ideology and social science have developed in opposition to one another, they nevertheless emerged together from the collapse of the 'old regimes' and their established system of authority. Ideology, like social science, is a modern symbol system premissed upon the 'detraditionalisation' of society and communication. Traditional society allowed only relatively fixed and limited claims to be made, and these claims were already known and established: the legitimate was the Old, the 'What-Has-Been'. Moreover, the way in which the claims could be justified was also limited, for speech was typically authorised by the authority or social position of the speaker. The emergence of ideology, according to Gouldner, both reflected and promoted the radical transformation of traditional society. New kinds of claims and legitimations became possible; traditional structures were called into question by new interpretations of social life and new projects of social change. Whereas religion focuses on the immediacies of everyday life and strives for transcendental reconciliation, ideologies are concerned with the organisation of social life and advocate public, 'rationally grounded' projects of social reconstruction. Ideology is a call to action and a claim to justify that call by recourse to 'evidence' and 'reason'. 'Ideology thus entailed,' writes Gouldner,

the emergence of a new mode of political discourse; discourse that sought action but did not merely seek it by invoking authority or tradition, or by emotive rhetoric alone. It was discourse predicated on the idea of grounding political action in secular and rational theory. . . . Ideology separated itself from the mythical and religious consciousness; it justified the course of action it proposed, by the logic and evidence it summoned on behalf of its views of the social world, rather than by invoking faith, tradition, revelation or the authority of the speaker.¹⁵

In breaking with authority and tradition, ideology submits to what Gouldner calls the 'grammar of modern rationality'. This is not a timelessly valid mode of cognition but an historically emergent set of rules for discourse which stipulate
that claims should be justified by evoking the voluntary consent of those addressed on the basis of arguments alone. Although ideology is a 'rational' mode of discourse, it does not understand itself as such. Ideology claims to be autonomous from the social conditions on which it rests and the language in which it is expressed; the rationality of ideology is 'limited' by the pretension to be supra-historical and by the hubris of the disembodied word.

The hubris of the disembodied word: ideology does not float in some ethereal realm of ideas but is tied very closely to the medium of linguistic communication. Ideology pertains to that part of consciousness which can be said; it has a public objectivity which enables the projects it promotes to be discussed among strangers. While grounded in ordinary language, ideology restructures it and constructs itself 'as a sociolect of an "elaborated" sociolinguistic variant'. Gouldner thus conceives of ideology as a 'language variant' which deviates from the common linguistic codes of everyday life. Incorporating a distinctive mode of justifying assertions, ideology is similar to what Bernstein calls 'elaborated codes', that is, codes which are relatively self-reflexive and independent of context. The public and decontextualised character of ideology is reflected in the fact that writing was and still is its principal medium. 'A Socratic preference for the spoken word,' remarks Gouldner, 'is inherently nonideological.' Yet ideology allows only certain things to be communicated and discussed. It not only 'expresses' but also 'represses', excluding certain issues from discussion and creating a 'public unconsciousness'. Ideology is, as it were, the linguistic legislation which defines what is available for public discussion and what is not.

There is a profound historical connection between the emergence of ideologies and the revolution in communication associated with the development of printing. In unfolding this connection Gouldner leans heavily on Habermas's early study of the formation of the 'public sphere'. The development of the mass media and the formation of a 'public' are, Gouldner explains, mutually supportive processes. A public is formed when the links between culture and social interaction are attenuated, so that people can share something without being in constant interaction. The development of the mass media facilitates this process by greatly increasing the exchange of information at a distance. But the proliferation of information created a need for interpretation, for the provision of publicly shareable meaning. It was in the cleared space of the 'public sphere' that the rational discourse of ideologies thus appeared, offering their interpretations 'openly' and without fear of sanctions. Ideologies serve to mobilise social movements through the mediation of newspapers and related media. Ideologies pertain to a news-reading public, and hence they may be further defined as symbol systems generated by, and intelligible to, persons whose relationship to everyday life is mediated by their reading—of newspapers, journals, or books—and by the developing general concept of 'news', as well as by the specific and concrete 'bits' of news now increasingly transmitted by the growing media, and is grounded in the experiencing of life as
Ideologies are not rooted directly in the experiential flux of everyday life but are mediated by the news and the interpretation of news. Ideologies are second-order accounts, 'palimpsestic texts on texts', which interpret and integrate the information provided by the news-producing system. The modern period thus offers its own means of countering the special sense of groundlessness which accompanied its birth.

The emergence of ideologies is connected not only with the revolution in communication, but also with the industrial revolution and the rise of capitalism. As the ruling class in capitalist society becomes increasingly engaged in economic affairs, it is obliged to place the ultimate protection of its class position in the hands of others. The development of a relatively autonomous state thus accompanies economic growth and provides a basis for the expansion of administrative and political strata. The key political problem for the bourgeoisie is raised: how can it exercise influence over other sectors and ensure their loyalty? In response to this problem the bourgeoisie avails itself of ideology, which 'thus assumes a new historical role in the maintenance of social solidarities and class control'.

The bourgeoisie becomes more dependent than ruling classes in previous forms of society on a belief system which aims to win over other groups and define its dominance as legitimate. Gouldner argues, however, that this dependence is an increasingly fragile one, both because the bourgeoisie is separated from the cultural elite which produces ideologies, and because the hold of ideologies is being progressively undermined by the transformations in the communication media. The privileged link between ideology and the written word means that, with the growth of radio, cinema and television, ideology loses ground among the masses. A split appears between the 'cultural apparatus', centred on universities, which produces and consumes ideologies, and the 'consciousness industry' which takes over an ever-greater role in shaping the opinions of the population. With this split between the cultural apparatus and the consciousness industry 'ideology continues to ground an elite politics but loses effective influence over the masses'; a growing part of the population is placed beyond the reach of ideological discourse. But there will be no 'end of ideology' so long as government by oligarchic elites is bolstered up by a rational discourse which claims to represent the interests of all.

Gouldner's writings on ideology represent, in my opinion, one of the most interesting contributions in English which has appeared in recent years. No doubt this interest is due, in a very substantial part, to the debt which Gouldner owes to Habermas—a debt which is not always made explicit in the text itself. But Gouldner has given a distinctive twist to certain Habermasian themes and has connected them up to other, more original ideas. One consequence of Gouldner's somewhat eclectic style is that the conception of ideology which he offers is not clear-cut and precise; several definitions of ideology are offered, from 'a belief system that makes pretentious and unjustified claims to scientificity' to 'speech that seeks to reduce the dissonance between mutual dependence.
and differential allocation', and it is not easy to see how these various definitions can be reconciled. Nevertheless, there are certain elements which emerge consistently from Gouldner's historical approach to ideology. Without wishing to dispute the value of such an approach, I want to argue that these elements form a concept of ideology which is unsatisfactory, for it is both too general and too specific. Too general: in conceiving of ideology in terms of public projects advocated by rational discourse, Gouldner dissolves the connection between ideology and domination. It makes no difference on Gouldner's account whether the public projects animated by ideology are directed towards reaction, reform or revolution; what is important, it seems, is that these projects are justified by evidence and reason, rather than by appeal to authority and tradition. This general use of 'ideology' demands the same riposte which I made to Seliger's inclusive conception: the concept is stripped of the critical edge, the negative force, which it had in the writings of Marx. Gouldner's discussion of Marx, like Seliger's, tends to accentuate the opposition between science and ideology, suggesting that Marx thought of ideology as essentially failed science. Gouldner is not unaware that Marx's concept of ideology is also linked to the problem of maintaining a system of class domination. This link is even drawn on by Gouldner himself, who observes at one point that ideologies 'help perpetuate the specific system within which the privileges and powers of the hegemonic class and its allied classes exist'. But the link between ideology and domination seems, on Gouldner's account, to be no more than a contingent one, subsumed to the overall idea of ideology as rational discourse which mobilises public projects.

If Gouldner's concept of ideology is too general, it is also too specific. The concept derives its specificity from two oppositions which Gouldner traces back to the Enlightenment and which define ideology as an essentially modern phenomenon. The first opposition is that between ideology and social science: ideologies are would-be social sciences, pretenders to a throne of relatively recent date. Whatever the historical accuracy of this observation, it seems to me mistaken to build such an opposition to the definition of ideology. For a symbol system to be ideological, it need not be dressed up in the guise of social science, as is attested to by Gouldner's own allusions to liberalism and nationalism as ideologies. Moreover, to oppose ideology and social science is to preclude the possibility that, under certain circumstances, the social sciences as well as the natural sciences may become ideological. This is a point which is forcefully made by Habermas and which is in no way vitiated by Gouldner's unconvincing critique. The second opposition which gives specificity to Gouldner's concept is that between ideology and tradition. Like social sciences, ideologies are 'rational belief-systems' which seek to justify their claims by referring to the world rather than by appealing to faith, authority or tradition. Ideology and social science thus fall on the same side of an historical fence that separates them from the pre-Enlightenment fields in which myth and religion flourished: ideology is a feature of the modern era. Once again, I do not wish to dispute this view as an account of the origins of the concept of ideology, an account which has been developed in a systematic way by other authors. What I do want to question,
however, is the advisability of employing this account for the purposes of *defining* ideology, which would imply that one could not even *speak* about ideology in societies which preceded the European Enlightenment or which have not been overturned by its effects. Why should the history of the *concept* of ideology—a history which has, after all, given rise to no single *conception* of ideology—be regarded as defining the parameters of *ideology as such*? How many thinkers would seriously maintain that one could not even *speak* about socialisation processes or relations of domination and exploitation in societies which did not have a *concept* of socialisation, domination or exploitation? When the curious assumption that underlies such a view is made explicit, the restriction of ideology to the modern era can be seen to rest on unsteady ground.

One of the commendable aspects of Gouldner’s analysis is, as previously mentioned, his concern with the connection between ideology and language. Ideologies, he maintains, are ‘symbol systems’, ‘language variants’, ‘elaborated codes’; they can carry out their task of mobilising public projects only by being expressed in a language, primarily a written language, which is critical, rational and empirically plausible. It seems to me that Gouldner is right to emphasise the linguistic dimension of ideology, for language is the principle medium by which *meaning* is produced and transmitted in the social world. However, I believe that it is mistaken to maintain that the language of ideology is a discrete ‘sociolect’, a sort of meta-language which draws upon but remains distinct from the language of everyday life. I think that one must leave open the possibility that the language of everyday life is the very *locus* of ideology and the very *site* of the meaning which sustains relations of domination. Leaving open this possibility would prepare the way for an approach to ideology which is much more radical than that advanced by Gouldner and which avoids the paradoxical conclusion that he is obliged to draw. Having conceived of ideology as a discrete sociolect which is realised above all in writing, Gouldner is compelled to conclude that the growth of mass media such as radio and television marks a decline in the role of ideology, which is thereby displaced from society as a whole and increasingly confined to the university. Little do intellectuals know the power of their words! By an act of definition, Gouldner has excluded a vast arena of language and meaning—the arena *par excellence* in which attitudes and opinions are formed—from the object domain of ideological analysis. It is to the credit of Althusser and his followers, among others, to have redefined the terms of ideology in a way which brings such everyday phenomena as the family and the media, together with their subject-constituting effects, into focus.

**Ideology as social relations: Paul Hirst**

During the 1960s, Althusser published several essays on ideology which have received widespread attention in the English-speaking world. While writing from a Marxist perspective, Althusser's approach to ideology differs considerably from that adopted by Gouldner. For Althusser and his followers, ideology is not a specific creation of European culture but is a necessary feature of any society, insofar as any society must provide the means to form its members and
JOHN B. THOMPSON

transform them to their conditions of existence. 'Human societies secrete ideology as the very element and atmosphere indispensable to their historical respiration and life.' It is customary to view ideology as a form of consciousness or a realm of ideas; but this, Althusser argues, is a mistake. Ideology is not a distorted representation of real relations but rather a real relation itself, namely the relation through which human beings live the relation to their world. Ideological relations make up a specific instance of the social totality which, in a provocative essay, Althusser analysed under the label of 'ideological state apparatuses'. This essay forms the focal point of a recent study in which Paul Hirst offers a critical and constructive commentary on Althusser's work. Hirst has been one of the major proponents of Althusser's views in the English-speaking world and, while he is not alone in seeking to elaborate Althusser's account of ideology, his writings provide a suitable basis for an analysis of this orientation.

Althusser's account of ideology falls, according to Hirst, into two parts. The first part concerns the general notion of ideological state apparatuses. This notion is introduced by Althusser as a response to the question with which he begins, namely the question of reproduction. Inasmuch as production in any society necessarily depends upon the reproduction of the conditions of production, one must ask what is involved in this reproduction process. Such reproduction involves reproducing both the forces of production, like buildings and machines, and the labour-power employed in production. To reproduce labour-power requires, among other things, that individuals are provided with a certain know-how and trained to perform certain jobs; it also requires that individuals are trained to submit to the rules of the established order. Althusser's view is that the reproduction of relations of production is secured essentially by the exercise of state power in the specific 'apparatuses' (or institutions) that make up the state. Two types of state apparatuses are distinguished by Althusser: the repressive state apparatus, comprising the government, army, police, courts, prisons and so on; and the ideological state apparatuses, which include the Church, schools, family, legal system, political parties, trade unions and communications network. Althusser then begins a more detailed discussion of ideology by observing that, whereas the repressive state apparatus functions primarily 'by violence', the ideological state apparatuses function primarily 'by ideology'. This way of setting up the problem of ideology is, however, very questionable in the eyes of Hirst. While Althusser's conception of society as a 'complex structured whole articulated in dominance' helped to counter the reductionist tendencies of Marxism, nevertheless his approach to the problem of ideology betrays, according to Hirst, a latent economism.

Althusser's question—how is it that the relations of production are reproduced?—accepts the primacy of the 'economy'. The 'point of view of reproduction' amounts to asking the question, what is necessary for existing class relations to be maintained?...Class society is unaffected by the forms in which its conditions of existence are provided. ISAs [ideologi-
Moreover, the very notion of ideological state apparatuses gives a false unity to the ideological field. 'Ideological social relations' do not fit into a single form. One must, Hirst stresses, attend to the complexity and heterogeneity of such relations, just as, in political practice, one must be concerned with struggles which cannot be aligned in terms of capitalism and anti-capitalism.

Hirst is similarly critical of the second part of Althusser's account. This is the part in which Althusser explores the nature and *modus operandi* of ideology. Three theses are put forward in Althusser's text. The first thesis asserts that ideology does not represent reality but rather human beings' lived relation to their conditions of existence. This relation is 'imaginary' in the sense that it is the form in which the subject 'lives' its relation to the world and to itself, living 'as if' it constituted itself as a subject. The second thesis maintains that ideology has a material existence: the representations which make up ideology are inscribed in social practices and expressed in objective forms. If an individual 'believes' in God, for example, then he or she goes to church regularly, prays, confesses and so on; 'beliefs' are realised in specific practices which are governed, in turn, by rituals relating to an ideological apparatus. Althusser's third thesis is expressed in the oft-quoted slogan, 'ideology interpellates individuals as subjects'. Like in the case of the police officer hailing an individual who recognises that the call was really addressed to him or her, so too in ideology the individual is constituted as a subject by a process of interpellation in which the subject recognises itself as a subject, although the subject does not recognise that its subjectivity is thereby produced. It is with regard to this third thesis concerning the ideological constitution of subjectivity that Hirst expresses a serious reservation. For Althusser's account seems to assume that subjects and individuals correspond, that the subject is the unitary 'identity' of the individual. But 'it is possible', writes Hirst, 'to conceive the human individual not as the unitary terminal of an "imaginary" subject, but as the support of a decentred complex of practices and statuses which have distinct conditions of existence'. Hirst points out that there are two ways in which the lack of correspondence between individuals and subjects can be shown. First, at a psychic level, it can be seen that the individual is the effect of multiple processes and cannot be equated with a subject conceived of in terms of 'conscious' functioning. Second, when we consider subjects as 'supports' of processes, we see that the subjects which perform this role may include non-human entities like joint-stock companies (or even animals in certain legal cases). Such subjects are not 'consciousnesses' and cannot be analysed in terms of an 'imaginary relation'.

The final major objection which Hirst makes against Althusser's account pertains to the concept of representation. While Althusser rejects the traditional view of ideology as a distorted representation of real relations, he nevertheless retains the concept of representation, for he proposes that ideology represents human beings' lived relation to their conditions of existence. This
residual element of representation indicates, according to Hirst, that Althusser has not fully broken with the basic assumptions of 'empiricism'. The concept of representation presupposes the subject/object structure of knowledge: the represented (object) is the source or measure of representations (subject). The latent empiricism of Althusser's approach is closely connected to his well-known distinction between science and ideology.\textsuperscript{33} Althusser renounced the claim to be able to differentiate between forms of consciousness as true or false representations of reality, but he did so by transforming Marxism into a science autonomous from the social formation and capable of producing knowledge which could be fed back into political practice. Althusser thus provided a philosophical underpinning for a traditional Marxist-Leninist conception of politics, a conception which has consigned Marxism to virtual irrelevance in the present conditions of political struggle. Hirst suggests that these theoretical and political weaknesses of Althusser's approach can be overcome by conceiving of Marxism, not as a science opposed to ideology, but as a political theory which provides a means of calculating effects in concrete political struggles.

Socialism is nothing if it is not a political theory: a discourse which directs politics toward the construction of definite forms of social relations and in definite ways, a discourse which can construct and evaluate political situations (relative to definite objectives)... Political practice cannot dispense without \textit{sic} calculation, and calculation, beyond the politics of preservation of established and opportunist cliques, demands criteria of appropriateness: in a word, 'ideology'.\textsuperscript{34}

It is Hirst's expectation that, by placing the issue of ideology in the context of political calculation, a new set of theoretical questions will be generated and Marxist theory will be rendered more attentive to the many forms and changing circumstances of political struggle.

In offering some critical remarks on the views of Hirst, I do not wish, by some curious alignment of theoretical forces, to defend Althusser from attack. It does seem to me that there are certain aspects of Althusser's work which are more plausible, and many aspects which are more intelligible, than the alternative formulations offered by critical commentators such as Hirst. Nonetheless, the approach adopted by Althusser and his followers is not one that I want to endorse. In recent years the prominence of this approach, especially in the English-speaking world, has faded considerably and it now seems to have begun a process of self-destruction. Nowhere is this process more evident than in the appropriation of Althusser's work on ideology. While Hirst expresses his desire 'to take up and extend certain of Althusser's innovations in relation to Marxist theory' and praises Althusser's 'significant advances in trying to deal with the problem of what is called "ideology"',\textsuperscript{35} nevertheless Hirst ends up with a concept of ideology which—so far as it is discernible—bears little resemblance to the view of Althusser. One of the merits of Althusser's account is that it situates
the problem of ideology within an institutional and structural context: the problem of ideology is inseparably linked to the issue of how societal arrangements are sustained. It is my opinion that Althusser seriously misconstrues this link by presenting it in functionalist terms and by neglecting the problem of domination, so that ideology appears as a functional prerequisite of any society. But Hirst, so far from seeking to remedy these faults, destroys the link between ideology and social reproduction. Precisely how Hirst conceives of ideology in the wake of his critique is not altogether clear. At one point he seems to regard ideology as 'a system of political ideas' which can be employed in 'political calculation'; at another point he offers this definition: 'We use the word "ideological" to refer to a non-unitary complex of social practices and systems of representations which have political significances and consequences.' These loose and tentative definitions appear to promise a notion of ideology which is strikingly similar to Seliger's inclusive conception; Hirst may sketch a more heterogeneous and conflictual picture than Seliger, but the overall framework seems to be the same. What is lost by Hirst, no less than by Seliger and Gouldner, is the connection between ideology and domination. This is a connection which can only be explored through an investigation of the institutional and structural realisation of asymmetrical relations of power and the ways in which these arrangements are sustained. I find no reason to believe that the theoretical questions generated by Hirst's proposals—questions which are self-confessedly 'cryptic in the extreme'—would provide an avenue for approaching these issues.

Althusser and authors influenced by him have rightly emphasised the importance of the relation between ideology and the subject. The concept of ideology directs our attention towards processes whereby consciousness is constituted, both at an individual level and at the level of groups and classes. There can be little doubt that Althusser's analysis of these processes is oversimplified and excessively deterministic; his view that 'ideology interpellates individuals as subjects' leaves no room for the autonomous action of subjects who may decide to contravene the imperatives of reproduction. At first sight, Hirst appears to offer an alternative formulation which avoids the excessive determinism of Althusser's account. In discussing subjects as 'supports' of processes, Hirst distinguishes between two conceptions of the subject. On the one hand, the 'juridical conception' refers to the legal or political designation of entities which function as supports of processes; legal subjects, for example, are entities (of whatever kind) which are capable of initiating suits, appeals and so on. On the other hand, the 'operational conception' refers to agencies that have an 'effectivity' on the processes in which they are involved and where that effectivity is partially determined by the 'calculation' which the agencies undertake. By explicitly referring to agencies and their 'effectivity' and 'calculation', Hirst seems to break free from the deterministic framework of Althusser; but on closer inspection, this break is more apparent than real. To re-raise the question of the subject in the way that Hirst does is to assume from the outset that subjects can only 'support processes' which already exist in advance. The passively supportive role
of subjects is in no way mitigated by Hirst’s frequent appeal to ‘calculation’—a notion which seems to have become a conceptual hold-all for the remains of Althusserianism. In the rare passages where Hirst attempts to clarify this concept, he suggests that calculation should be regarded as a practice depending on a body of technique which has its own history and conditions of existence. ‘Calculations, account books, etc., are not the mere material auxiliaries of a perception; they designate the presence of a practice which cannot be reduced to experience and intuition.’ What Hirst calls ‘calculation’ seems to be nothing more than a process dictated by rules, methods and techniques which the agent is trained to employ. That rules, methods and techniques must always be negotiated by agents, that such negotiation is an inherently problematic process in which rules and methods are transformed in their very application, that agents can (and frequently do) act contrary to the rules and methods which allegedly guide their behaviour, that for many actions there simply are no relevant rules, methods or techniques—these are considerations that Hirst, in his vague appeal to the concept of calculation, appears to have overlooked.

Hirst’s critique of Althusser’s account of ideology is part of a more general attack on the possibility of ‘epistemology’. As is evidenced by his retention of the notion of representation and his conception of Marxism as a science, Althusser is an ‘epistemologist’ who implicitly accepts the subject/object structure of knowledge. Althusser, in Hirst’s eyes, has not remained true to his words; he has backtracked on his own radicalism and left Marxism open to the twin dangers of rationalism and empiricism. The cure for this unfortunate relapse is to dispense with epistemology once and for all. Marxism must be regarded as a ‘political theory’ which facilitates the calculation of effects; and as Hindess and Hirst insist in a study dedicated to defending this view, ‘there can be no “knowledge” in political practice.’ Every epistemology, according to Hindess and Hirst, conceives of knowledge in terms of a relation between a realm of discourse and a realm of objects, where this relation is construed, in one way or another, in terms of ‘correspondence’ or ‘representation’. Every epistemology must assume that there is a privileged level and form of discourse which provides a yardstick against which all claims to knowledge can be assessed; thus empiricist epistemology, for example, posits basic statements which purportedly reproduce what is given in experience. But the assumption of a privileged level and form of discourse merely betrays, in the view of Hindess and Hirst, that every epistemology is arbitrary and dogmatic, ‘since there can be no demonstration that such-and-such forms of discourse are indeed privileged except by means of forms of discourse that are themselves held to be privileged.’ From such observations the authors infer that epistemology must be discarded and, along with it, the idea of knowledge as a representation, more or less adequate, of some independently existing reality. What we are offered instead is a vision of multiple ‘theoretical discourses’, in each of which numerous ‘objects of discourse’ are specified; neither within nor between these theoretical discourses is there any privileged level of discourse, so that the only way in which a theoretical discourse can be assessed is in terms of its own internal consistency.

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There is nothing particularly novel about this relativistic conclusion, although it is rare to find authors who embrace it so wholeheartedly. It is my opinion, however, that this conclusion is untenable and that it is in no way established by the arguments of Hindess and Hirst. For their arguments are premised, it should be noted, upon very narrow and oversimplified conceptions of 'epistemology' and 'knowledge', conceptions which are difficult to pin on anyone other than the early logical positivists. When Hindess and Hirst maintain that every epistemology is dogmatic because it is incapable of providing a non-arbitrary justification of its privileged form of discourse, they overlook the possibility that epistemology may be, not so much a purported defence of a particular version of 'knowledge qua representation', but rather an attempt to elucidate what is presupposed by claims to know. And indeed Hindess and Hirst, despite their presumptuous dismissal of 'epistemology', proffer no shortage of claims to know. Thus Hirst, in discussing the nature of corporate enterprises today, argues that shares are increasingly held by financial institutions and other companies and adds evidence from a Royal Commission: 'In 1973 financial institutions, companies and public bodies held over 52 per cent of quoted ordinary shares (5 per cent being held by overseas investors and 42 per cent by persons, executors and trustees), the total held by financial institutions was 38.3 per cent'; and these compare with considerably lower figures in previous years. Why does Hirst offer us this information, if he does not assume that it is evidence which supports his claim to know that shares are increasingly held by financial institutions and other companies? And does he seriously believe that the only way of assessing this 'discourse' is to examine its internal consistency, as opposed, for example, to pointing out that the quoted percentages are inaccurate, misleading or out of date? Authors who, like Hindess and Hirst, work themselves into a theoretical cul-de-sac would do well to attend more carefully to the processes of argumentation by which claims to know are defeated or sustained. They would then see that some form of 'epistemology', so far from being redundant, is vital for social theory in general and for the analysis of ideology in particular.

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Notes

1. I wish to thank Anthony Giddens and David Held for their helpful comments on an earlier draft.


4. For example, a general discussion of recent work in English on discourse analysis may be found in Malcolm Coulthard, An Introduction to Discourse Analysis (Harlow, 1977).

5. I have made some preliminary contributions to such a discussion in two essays: 'Ideology and the


22. *Ibid.*, pp. 9, 277; cp. also pp. 54-5, 81, 105, 206 and 276.


26. See, for example, the contribution by Lefort (in this issue) and Jürgen Habermas, 'Technology and science as "ideology"'.


30. For other studies influenced by Althusser, see Rosalind Coward and John Ellis, *Language and Materialism: Developments in Semiology and the Theory of the Subject* (London, 1977); Ernesto Laclau, *Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory: Capitalism, Fascism, Populism* (Lon-


32. Ibid., p. 59-60; cf. 'Ideology, Culture and Personality', in this issue.

33. For Althusser's original statement of this distinction, see For Marx, especially pp. 167 ff. The distinction was subsequently criticized and modified by Althusser himself in Essays in Self-Criticism, trans. Grahame-Lock (London, 1976), pp. 119-25.


35. Ibid., pp. 1, 22.

36. Ibid., pp. 7, 54.

37. Ibid., p. 73.

38. Ibid., p. 88. See also the recent book by Paul Hirst and Penny Woolley, Social Relations and Human Attributes (London, 1982), in which it is argued that 'human attributes' are the constructs of definite and historically variable social relations, so that the "person" is an effect and support of the repertoires of conduct employed in the definite sets of social relations (p. 43).


40. Barry Hindess and Paul Hirst, Mode of Production and Social Formation, pp. 13-14.

41. For further reflections on this theme, see Paul Hirst and Penny Woolley, Social Relations and Human Attributes, where Winch's views on 'the inescapable relativity of distinct theoretical schemes and belief systems' (p. 269) are endorsed in opposition to Evans-Pritchard and to critics such as MacIntyre. This relativistic position is combined in a somewhat paradoxical way with a critique of 'sociological relativism' for its refusal 'to situate itself in definite social relations, ... to take questions of policy, reform, and genuinely available alternatives seriously' (p. 97).