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

BEYOND DEPENDENCY

QUEBEC ON CANADA

Nicole Laurin-Frenette
Daniel Latouche

OVERCOMING DEPENDENCY

Marcel Rioux/Susan Crean

THE CRISIS OF CANADIAN POLITICAL ECONOMY

Daniel Drache

THE ORIGINS OF CANADIAN DEPENDENCY

Tom Naylor

also

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Revue canadienne de théorie politique et sociale

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We dedicate this issue to the
World Peace Movement

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THE LABYRINTH OF DEPENDENCY

Daniel Drache/Arthur Kroker

Co-editors

Processed World

. . . the economies of frontier countries are storm centres to the modern international economy.

H.A. Innis, "Political Implications of Unused Capacity"

This special issue is intended to deepen and intensify the tradition of dependency theory as a way of accounting for the vicious spiral in which Québec and English-Canada find themselves as these societies are *processed* in accordance with the functional requirements of advanced technocratic capitalism.

The theme of dependency is, of course, one of the master concepts of western thought. Its continuing relevance for contemporary critical theory suggests that power and domination, whether in work experience, consumer culture, the politics of sexuality, or the economic colonialism of whole societies, is still the dynamic locus of western experience. Certainly in the Canadian discourse there is a general fascination with the question of dependency. In music, Bruce Cockburn's most recent album, *The Trouble with Normal,* provides a searing account of dependency ("When all is said and done, trying to beat the system of world events gets you nowhere") as the dark side of modern being. In film, *Going Down the Road* is a haunting cinematic account of the forced depopulation of the Maritimes, and of the human tragedy which is the other side of the centre/margin tension in the Canadian political economy. In literature, Margaret Atwood's decidedly melancholy portrayal of "victim positions" (*Survival*) as the nucleus of Canadian identity finds its novelistic equivalents in the writings of Margaret Laurence and Alice Munro. And, of course, the dependency tradition has no more eloquent expression than in that tradition of the visual arts represented by the Western Canadian painters — Tony Tascona, Don Proch, and Esther Warkov. This is a contemporary tradition of painting which has given an entirely new expression and meaning to the intracation of technology and domination as the two sides of the Canadian experience. In political philosophy, Canada's most original contribution to North American thought has consisted of the development of a comprehensive, eloquent, and internally coherent discourse on dependency. George Grant's

reflections on justice and history in *Technology and Empire, Time as History,* and *English-Speaking Justice* are a theoretical meditation on technological dependency written by a thinker who is much like a Nietzsche of the New World. C.B. Macpherson's *The Real World of Democracy, Democratic Theory,* and *Property* represent a radical challenge to liberalism, not only as the locus of Canadian dependency, but as the justificatory ideology of the deep dependencies (from the processed world of "possessive individualism" to the political assault on the democratic populisms of Western Canada) created by the spread of market-steered accumulation as the dynamo of modern society And, finally, Dennis Lee's *Savage Fields* represents a fundamental account (Heideggerian this time) of dependent being as the persistent structure of western consciousness. The Canadian reflection on dependency even spills over into the mediated world of television. Indeed, one of the most grisly, and truthful, accounts of dependency as the horizon of the Canadian identity is to be found in the opening video graphic in the much vaunted *CBC* production, *The Journal.* This show, which is intended anyway to dispense official ideology on a nightly basis, opens with a beautiful, but terrifying, video sequence. This sequence says everything about the relationship of ideological hegemony and dependency in the Canadian context. It reveals, in fact, that Canada is a nation produced as a reflex of the commodity-form. The video sequence begins with the camera zooming in from outer space, dwelling for an instant on the geographical image of Canada, and then taking a quick global skywalk. As the eye of the camera orbits the planet, from west to east, the geography of the globe is quickly transformed. Everything is processed anew into perfect technocratic modules, geometrically shaped, and in a final touch of irony, neatly divided out by countries and then by continents. We are presented with a vivid, and exact, image of Canada and Québec in the semiurgical age of technology. Nature is exterminated: it's all deterritorialization and dehistoricization. This opening sequence to *The Journal* is both a powerful and haunting reminder of Canada's production, in its politics, economics, and culture, in the image of the commodity-form. It is also a seductive vision of our imprisonment in the carceral of the image-system.

If Canadian thinkers have reflected with such intensity and passion on the implications of dependency, then it is only because it has been the Canadian fate to be both the product of and conditional for external empires. The political economist, Harold Innis, always linked the political formation of Canada to the dynamic expansion of capitalism in the New World. In a way directly analogous to Marx's classic description of the nihilism of capitalism in "The Fetishism of Commodities and the Secret Thereof", Innis has analyzed the genealogy of Canadian hegemony as part of the dynamic expansion of the price system across North America. As Innis stated in his essay, "The Penetrative Powers of the Price System": "The price system operated at a high state of efficiency in the occupation of the vacant spaces of the earth". And while Marx presented the grisly image of "abstract labour" as the devalued outcome of (our) processing within the cycle of capitalist exchange, Innis hinted that the Canadian equivalent of "abstract labour" would be the political production of the

"abstract nation". Much like the film, *Being There,* the Canadian state which was created anyway as an instrument of administrative hegemony (Naylor's "Canada in the European Age") is a constitutional form in search of a justifying content. Latouche can claim (*"Les effets pervers de l'entre dépendence"*) that English-Canada has no "national community" just because he has stumbled onto the secret of Canada's formation as a big commodity, as, perhaps, the world's first "absent nation".[2]

Dependency Theory Old and New

But if the discourse on dependency extends like a brilliant arc across the Canadian imagination, it's an altogether different story in the Canadian social sciences, and particularly in the tradition of Canadian political economy. Here, in an ironic confirmation of Canadian intellectual dependence, just when automatic class analysis of a predictable variety has been abandoned in European theory as already obsolescent (in André Gorz's *Adieu au prolétariat,* in Jean Baudrillard's *The Mirror of Production,* in Bahro and Marcuse), it's taken flight (just like Miverva's Owl) and found a final moment of renewal in Canadian thought. It's as if political economists, abandoning the *indigenous* tradition of dependency theory as represented most formidably by the communications theory and political economy of Harold Innis in favour of a Eurocentric class analysis, are determined to examine the economic crisis of advanced capitalism through the lens of the nineteenth-century.

In any event, dependency theory has come under attack in Canada on the grounds that this perspective is no longer adequate for understanding our relations with the United States or with other countries. The reasons for believing this are particularly striking. Canadian capital has now moved abroad, with significant investments in third world countries. Foreign ownership levels in the economy have declined, both due to corporate mergers and to government takeovers in the resource field. And, at least until the "discipline" imposed on the Canadian economy by the revalorizing (for the United States) strategy of American monetarism worked its effects, it could even be argued that the Canadian state was displaying unusual autonomy in regulating foreign multinationals. All this, of course, while acid rain continued to drift north from the American industrial heartland, while a working ideological hegemony was imposed, and this deeply, on Canadian experience by the consumer culture of the United States, and while the Trudeau Government was making its first secret deals to allow the testing of nuclear weaponry in Canada.

Internationally, the changes which have occured between the advanced capitalist societies and the periphery are equally remarkable. In Europe, the Germans, French and Swedes are preoccupied by the extent of de-industrialization, by their loss of sovereignty, and by the uneven development of their economies. In *The Meaning of Life,* Monty Python, that erstwhile guide to the down-side of

popular culture, can speak of Yorkshire as the Third World, and this because in a classic case, if not of the empire strikes back then, at least, of Marx's history twice-over as burlesque, Britain now experiences the technocratic and cultural peripheralization which that society once imposed on its colonies. At the "old" periphery there has been significant industrialization, whether in Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Singapore, and even in the sweat-shops of Korea (which Friedmann liked to tout as capitalism on the go). The economic hegemony of Western finance capital has been eroded by the immense amounts of capital controlled by Arab banking interests. And, finally, in the advanced capitalist societies with thirty-five million unemployed, wages as well as manufacturing costs have fallen.

There is a danger, however, in thinking that because so much has changed during the nineteen-sixties and seventies that the dependency perspective is no longer relevant. In a recent article in *Critiques de l'économie politique,* Pascal Arnaud has argued, not unconvincingly, that the problematic posed by dependency theory is an accurate reflection of the *existent* economic crisis. Despite the impressive growth over the last twenty years for a large number of third world countries, the effect of monetarism has been to leave these societies stranded in their own rigidities. The economic crisis, imposed by the centre economies on the periphery, has reinforced the extroverted nature of their political economies. In almost every case, the export side of the economy has grown at the expense of indigenous investments in the internal market. Today, the third world is maintained in an economically subordinate position by the tactic of encouraging "export-orientation" over the development of self-managed economies. More importantly, what Arnaud's research demonstrates is that the nature of foreign ownership has changed. Third world countries are only successful in "attracting floating capital", that is commercial loans with high interest. Brazil alone now owes over $90 billion (U.S.). The systematic rise of interest rates for these commercial loans explains the current massive indebtedness of third world countries. Capitalism, American style, achieves a new stage of historical development when, through international regulatory agencies such as the *International Monetary Fund,* capital accumulation entails the systematic unification of economic indebtedness (IMF loans) and political discipline (austerity budgets and the *policing* of civil society). One lesson of the economic crisis is clear: third world societies, and some first world ones, are to be managed *from without* by the disciplinary model of finance capital.

At the centre, the picture is very different. The industrial countries have profited from the crisis and, according to a recent study of the Swiss banks, have increased their economic domination of the world economy. Throughout the '70s, the advanced industrial societies exported a larger percentage of their GNP than previously. In a decade of slower growth, their export of manufactured goods increased progressively: from 18.5% to 23% of the GNP in Germany, from 9.5% to 12.5% in Japan, from 15.9% to 22.2% in Britain, and from 12.8% to 17.8% in France.

The American performance was particularly remarkable in practically

doubling its export of manufactured goods from 4.4% to 8.4% of the GNP.

More illuminating still is the economic performance of the largest American banks. In 1981, 63% of the total revenues of Citicorp, Chase-Manhattan, and J.P. Morgan came from overseas operations. For the 14 leading American financial institutions, 53.5% of their revenues were derived externally. For the 7 principal American banks between 1970-1981 profits derived from their overseas operations grew from $167 million to $1.3 billion or, in other terms, from 22% to 55% of their total profits! Given these conditions it is not surprising that the drain of capital from the third world has accelerated and that these countries find themselves more dominated by foreign multinationals and the industrial countries than previously. In Latin America alone the GNP diminished by 1.2% in 1982. This decline corresponds to more than a 3% drop in the GNP per person. While there are signs that the industrialized societies are beginning to recover from the world crisis, economists predict no significant change for Latin America, making 1983 the third continuous year of the recession there.

As the above shows all too clearly the enduring problems associated with dependency theory have become more acute and more visible with the current economic crisis. No one should need persuading of this, least of all Canadians.

The Genealogy of the Debate

Even if there was no definite answer on what caused underdevelopment or low economic growth at the periphery, the concept of dependency was a powerful one. For some it meant the ensemble of forces of advanced capitalism blocking the economic and cultural development of marginalized societies. For others, dependency theory explained how the advanced capitalist societies, through trade, the World Bank, and direct foreign investment, were able to dominate third world societies. Still for others, dependency was viewed as emerging from the international division of labour *imposed* on former European colonies, and that the strategic policies of the advanced industrial world had the overall effect of disrupting the chances for economic development at the periphery of the international system. Still for others, this perspective was retheorised as a way of looking at the complex social and economic "class relations" between centre and periphery. In this taking, the periphery became the underclass exploited by centre capitalist economies. The latter were analysed as controlling the pace and progress of economic and cultural development, not only by the traditional means of unequal trade, foreign investment, and capital accumulation, but by manipulating "intermediaries" within these societies and by creating alliances with emergent conservative elites (from business and government) in peripheralized countries. But through all of these divergent theorisations of the dependency perspective, one theme remained constant: in the changing relations between centre/periphery, *it is not only capital but power which is at stake.* That dependency theory is not just an economistic doctrine, but an ongoing *political* reflection on the unequal exchange of power between centre and margin may explain the intellectual flexibility of this

tradition: it is able to absorb, on the one hand, analyses of the cultural domination of advanced capitalist societies (the work of, for example, the *Birmingham School of Contemporary Cultural Studies)* and *systemic* analyses of the structural origins of world economic crisis (Wallerstein). Indeed, by the end of the '70s, dependency theory had changed greatly as a method of critical inquiry. No longer narrowly focussed on economic relations between the advanced capitalist societies and the third world, it became a more sophisticated perspective: one which recognized the centrality of a plurality of factors — ethnic, social, institutional, and cultural — in defining the relationship of periphery to metropole.

This explicitly neo-Marxist school of radical social science was also to play a pivotal role in revitalizing the Marxian tradition in Europe and North America. Despite its pretensions to universality, Marxism was the product of a distinctively European discourse and was handicapped in understanding the processes of social change in non-European societies. The work associated with the study of underdevelopment was instrumental in liberating Marxism from its highly orthodox, misplaced emphasis on class as well as its entirely routinized views on social transformation. In rethinking these and other questions, dependency theory stressed the central importance of both national factors and indigenous cultural tendencies in advancing socialism in a peripheral or semi-peripheral setting.

In a post-colonial world, dependency theory and its original work on imperialism, multinationals, technology transfers, foreign aid, banking and investment flows proved highly attractive, at least when Africa and Asia were on the march politically. Indeed, many Europeans and North Americans became convinced that the peripheries would decisively weaken the command centres of the complex of advanced industrial societies.

Looking back at the debates which this expectation incited, they seem badly dated, if not widely exaggerated. In reaction against the supposed excesses of "third worldism" many Marxists abandoned dependency theory on the pretext that its focus on the national context rather than on the detritus of class relations was anti-Marxist!

Much of this disillusionment is unwarranted. Neither dependency theory nor any other theory can explain the variety of forces defining the relations between the world economy and national economies at the periphery. Anyway with monetarism and other deflationary strategies of social transformation, the third world is everywhere now. The advanced capitalist societies function by the "disappearance" of whole sectors of their population, witness the policing of the black underclass in the United States. We are in the realm now of what Jean-Paul Sartre prophecied as the coming age of general human dispossession. The contribution of dependency theory was, in fact, to preserve the thesis of centre-margin in all of its changing variations as the essential angle of vision in revealing the strategies of domination in modern society.

Silent Surrender Revisited

Kari Levitt's pioneering study, *Silent Surrender: The Multinational Corporation in Canada* was part of the intellectual tradition of dependency theory, but marginal to it for the reason that Canada was part of the system of advanced industrial societies and not a member of the third world. It was Levitt's thesis that Canada's position in the world economy was fully paradoxical. This was a country which was simultaneously rich *and* underdeveloped. What dependency theory had to explain were the social and economic forces which defined Canada's ambiguous position in the global economy, making it an "advanced dependent" society.[3]

When *Silent Surrender* appeared in 1970 it created a sensation by its scathing attack on the conventional wisdom of government policy and on the role of academic advisers. Levitt challenged directly the discourse of Canada's ruling class: the belief that "increased interdependence between Canada and the United States has proven beneficial to growth and economic integration would be still more so." She singled out Canada's economists who bestowed on the continentialist trend an aura of academic respectability. The opening paragraph is worth recalling as it sets out succintly the case she intended to present:

> This book presents a sketch of Canada's slide into a position of economic, political and cultural dependence on the United States. It seeks to explain the process whereby national entrepreneurship and political unity have been eroded to a point beyond which lies the disintegration of the nation-state. Those of my colleagues who believe that understanding is advanced primarily by the accretion of factual information will perhaps be disappointed by the absence of "original research". Those, however, who share the view that further research on the effects of direct foreign investment is unlikely to yield additional insight unless accompanied by a more relevant intellectual framework... may find the ideas developed here useful in posing new and meaningful questions.

The slide into dependence, Levitt went on to elaborate was not a natural outgrowth of sharing the world's longest undefended border with the United States. Foreign domination of the economy was but the result of American expansion into Canada in search of markets, resources, and a secure outlet for investments. Her now-familiar thesis derived from an analysis of multinationals and the social consequences of direct investment:

> The links of trade... arise from the operations of American-based corporations in Canada. They are manifestations of a new mercantilism of corporate empires which cut across

> boundaries of national economies and undermine the national sovereignty of the hinterland countries in which their subsidiaries and branch plants are located.
> The feature which the new mercantilism shares with the old lies in the way enterprises use their economic power and their political influence, and indeed, the military strength of their metropolitan governments, to protect their investments against disruptions in the market for their supplies and their sales.
> Uncertainty in the free market has been reduced and sometimes even eliminated by converting market transactions into intracompany transfers through the device of vertical integration. Further, the large corporations have used their power to obtain from metropolitan and peripheral governments a network of preferential and bilateral trading arrangements and fiscal concessions which, in some ways, resemble the exclusivist privileges of the old mercantile systems.

Levitt's study explained what Canadians had always suspected: a branch-plant economy was inefficient and foreign direct investment, while productive for American capital, was harmful to Canadian interests. Levitt's thesis on dependency was developed as follows:

- Canada was not capital poor. Over eighty percent of foreign direct investment in the sixties was derived from the retained earnings and depreciation allowances of American subsidiaries operating in Canada along with other capital loaned to the foreign sector by Canadian banks. As the economy grew so did American investment. This meant that Canadians were financing the foreign takeover of their country.
- Branchplants were inefficient possessing neither economies of scale nor an export-orientation.
- American firms operated under American law and all critical decisions regarding the operation of the branchplants were made in the United States not in Canada.
- Canada was shortchanged by this kind of development acquiring neither technology nor entrepreneurship
- Crucially, American branch-plants did not create jobs. In buying up a Canadian company the new American owners often phased out jobs in manufacturing. Frequently they used their Canadian operation as a distribution depot for goods and services produced in the United States or elsewhere.

- The Liberal Government in concert with Canadian banks had consciously pursued this 'open door' policy, one which undermined Canadian sovereignty.

Silent Surrender found a large receptive audience in non-official circles. Canadians had become sceptical of American domination of the economy and wanted to know why a branch-plant economy had consistently higher rates of inflation, higher unemployment and lower growth than south of the border. But, it was influential for two other reasons as well. Firstly, in showing English-Canadians a different way of interpreting Canadian-American relations it found immediate resonance with a younger generation of social scientists who had begun to develop a neo-Marxist tradition of Canadian political economy. Her book made a signal contribution to the re-emergence of this new school of Canadian political economy. Secondly, *Silent Surrender* was one of the few books produced by an English-Canadian academic to influence public policy and Canadian political life more generally. Along with the contributions of her fellow economists, Mel Watkins and Abe Robstein, their studies of Canadian corporate behaviour and government policy played a pivotal role in transforming English-Canadian nationalism into a potent political force after the Diefenbaker debacle. The work of these leading economists gave English-Canadian nationalism a much-needed theoretical perspective on Canadian capitalism, the role of Canadian elites and American imperialism.

Yet Levitt's most important contribution was that she provided a more relevant intellectual framework "for posing questions and doing research" on Canada. What Levitt recognized is that the study of dependency in Canada is highly complex because dependency is not only a consequence of foreign investment but has at least two other facets of equal importance: between English-Canada and Québec in which Québec is the dominated community politically, constitutionally, and economically; and between Ottawa and the provinces in which central Canada, principally Ontario, has been 'favoured' at the expense of the other regions. These profound divisions which mark Canadian society *cannot* be encompassed or explained by reference to a single theoretical approach. For this reason class relations, gender, the role of the state, language and cultural differences must not be grouped under the general rubric of dependency *tout court.* Despite this, the continuing strength of Levitt's theoretical framework is that in rejecting the narrow parochialism of much of Canadian scholarship, it stresses the critical importance of situating the study of Canadian capitalism in the larger North American context and it emphasizes particularly the central role of external forces in shaping Canadian life. This point seems so obvious that it is hardly worth making were it not for the fact that contemporary mainstream liberal social science consistently misrepresents Canada's relations with the United States, maintaining that the American domination which Levitt describes belongs to another era of capitalism. For quite different reasons left-wing scholarship has not been much better with its frequently narrow emphasis on class conflict, capital accumulation and surplus

value. The reason why dependency theory has proved so illuminating and a cut-above these more orthodox approaches is that conceptually it's much clearer about how to analyze the structures and political culture of Canadian capitalism. What this involves is explaining the actions and interests of all the dominant actors and in particular, the pivotal importance of foreign capital on state policy, the economy, and the social order more generally. In social formations which are dominated by foreign capital and have weak elites, dependency theory remains a powerful tool of analysis for understanding the contradictory and often asymmetrical conflict among class, regional, cultural and state interests. Canada is a classic case in point of this asymmetry. It is an advanced society, able to function on an industrial footing, yet less and less firmly anchored in the industrial world, and with only a minimal amount of economic and political freedom. Despite the fact that *Silent Surrender* was written almost fifteen years ago, it remains the single best book explaining the post-war impact of foreign investment on this complex situation.

However, with the enormous changes which have taken place in the economy since Levitt wrote her pioneering study it's necessary to ask is dependency theory relevant at all to Canada in the 80's? It isn't necessary to go into a great deal of detail in order to see in broad outline some of the most important developments which have transpired. Let us begin with Canada's commercial position in the international economy. There are four important developments to note.

First, predictably, Canada has become significantly more reliant on the U.S. as its principal trading partner both for imports and exports. At the same time Canada has lost important ground in the American market since the United States has diversified its external trade following the Tokyo round in tariff negotiations. Canada's exports to the U.S. have grown from 53% of all exports in 1964 to roughly 70% in 1980. As for Canada's import needs, the U.S. continues to furnish 70%, a figure which has remained steady throughout the decade.

Secondly, Canada's export trade in industrial goods to the OECD countries plummeted at a time when this trading bloc rapidly increased its commercial trade with the industrial and developing world. As can be seen in the accompanying table Canada's share of world exports of manufactured products fell by 30%!

Thirdly, in terms of trade with developing countries, Canada increased its exports more rapidly than any other industrial country (Latin America represents 40% of Canada's sales to developing countries) while sales to the Middle East grew twice as fast as those of other industrial countries combined.

Lastly, the import-penetration of the Canadian market reached record-high levels. By 1980, 36% of all manufactured goods in Canada were imported. For the United States the same figure was 10%. The North American picture is markedly different from the situation in other industrial countries where imports constitute only 16% of the goods consumed. In Third World countries import penetration remains relatively weak in the order of 2 to 3% of the market but growing at an annual rate of 8%. With these countries Canada's exporters have

Table I

Canada's Share of World Exports*, by percentage								
	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979
			(%)					
Food Products	4.3	4.2	4.1	3.8	3.8	3.4	3.1	3.2
Primary Products	*8.1*	7.4	5.5	5.3	5.3	4.9	4.7	*4.5*
Semi-manufactured Products	3.9	3.3	3.0	3.0	3.4	3.4	3.3	3.3
Manufactured Products	*4.0*	3.5	3.2	3.0	3.3	3.1	2.9	*2.8*
Total	4.9	4.4	3.9	3.7	3.9	3.7	3.4	3.4

*The product categories used here are based on UN commodity classifications.
Source: "International Trade in 1978-79," General Agremment on Tariffs and Trade. As cited in *Canada's Trade Challenge.* Report of the Special Committee on a National Trading Corporation, Supply and Services Canada, June 1981, p. 4.

established strong positions in the slow growth sectors with such products as shoes, textiles, scientific and office equipment and a relatively weak position in fast-growing high technology sectors such as vehicles, motor machinery, and machine parts.

With regard to resources, there have been dramatic changes in Canada's commanding position as a principal exporter of raw materials. Two demand mention. On the one hand, Canada has lost one-half of its traditional share of the international market for resources (see accompanying table). In nickel, asbestos, paper products to name only several sectors, Canada no longer supplies the major share of these markets in the world economy as new sources of raw materials have been brought into production in the developing countries. On the other, the resource side of the economy and, in particular, mining continues to be the fastest growing sector and prominent as ever. Yet strikingly, in mining the percentage of unprocessed resources being exported in 1980 was as high as in 1928-29 despite the fact that Canada has become more industrialized over time. Sixty percent of these exports are made by branch-plants to their parent company or to another subsidiary of the multi-national.

In addition, there has been an enormous growth in Canadian foreign investment abroad. Seventy-five percent is in the U.S. and to a much lesser degree, Europe. Foreign investment in developing countries increased sharply. As early as 1970, 24% of foreign investment was directed to developing nations with Latin America being the principal recipient and the balance invested in Asia. While Canadian banks and resource companies have continued to invest aggressively in Latin America and other third world countries throughout the decade, the share ofCanadian investment in developing countries has remained roughly constant varying between 22 and 24% of all Canadian capital invested abroad.

The public sector has also undergone radical transformation. Even before Trudeau's Canadianization programme, by 1978 state enterprises had expanded enormously with assets totalling $86.8 billion shared among 156 federal and provincial state businesses. The growth of these state enterprises has had a marked effect on Canadian economic life. In 1979, of the 25 leading enterprises, 49.2% of the assets were in the public sector, 31.7% in Canadian hands and 19.1% foreign controlled (mainly American). The picture changes radically when viewed in terms of profits. Of the leading 25 enterprises, profits were divided as follows: 25.1% public sector, 44.4% Canadian capital, 30.5% foreign controlled. The economic balance of power between the state and 'both' private sectors changes again when one examines where profits come from among the top 500 enterprises. Foreign capital accounted for 46.1%, private Canadian capital 40.5%, and state enterprises 13.4%, evidence of what Calcurra notes is the importance of increased concentration in both the private and public sector. While government enterprises have a significant presence in the economy, more important still has been the impact of the merger and takeover movement on the corporate sector as a whole. In the seventies this development has overshadowed the rapid expansion of state enterprises and has strengthened the position of the corporate sector in the economy.

As for foreign ownership, the picture is hardly encouraging. In 1979 American corporations accounted for 74% of assets, 72% of sales and 87% of profits of all foreign-controlled firms. These figures exclude American financial institutions operating in Canada. In specific sectors the percentage of foreign control of industries is as follows:

Tobacco*	100%
Transportation Equipment*	73%
Petroleum and coal*	69%
Rubber*	90%
Metal mining**	35%
Textile mills**	56%
Paper and allied industries**	39%
Machinery**	55%
Chemical and chemical products	76%
Mineral fuels	59%
Other mining	47%
Miscellaneous manufacturing	45%

* 4 leading firms account for more than 59% sales
** 4 leading firms account for between 25-49% of sales.

At the aggregate level there has been significant changes. Measured as a percentage of all corporate assets the foreign sector's share has declined from 35.5% to 28.2% between 1968 and 1978 — a drop of six points. Measured by sales the drop is negligible from 34.8% to 33.8%. Measured by profits foreign-controlled firms accounted for 44.8% of all profits in 1968 and only 38.2% in

1979, a change of close to 7 points. These 'global' figures need qualification. What Calcurra also shows is that in terms of performance, the American 'giants' continue to better their Canadian equivalents with the former growing faster, being more profitable, more liquid and with less debt. As Calurra notes, "... top foreign firms showed greater earning power than the Canadian private sector... and enjoy sufficient market power or economies of scale to realize significantly higher profit patterns." (Calurra 1979, p. 41). As would be expected, the ratio of profits to sales has widened between the Canadian and American private sectors. In 1979, there were fifty foreign controlled enterprises in the top 100, a decline of 6 from 1975. Even with these changes the foreign sector accounted for no less than 47.5% of sales, 30.5% of assets, 41% of profits and 57% of taxable income of these leading enterprises by the beginning of the eighties.

In this short review of major economic changes we have deliberately left to the end the question of foreign control in order to highlight the point that foreign ownership is only one structural feature of the Canadian economy and must be examined in the larger context. Calurra warns its readers to be cautious in interpreting the changes in foreign ownership levels. It points out that part of the decline is due to reclassification of statistical data on account of mergers, takeovers and acquisitions which it says "creates an artificial movement of financial change between industries". This can result in "obscuring real economic activity as in the case of the reclassification of Esso Resources Canada and in metal mining where operations of conglomerates are divided between different classifications."

Yet even with this qualification, what needs to be said is that it matters relatively little, the critical issue is not that foreign ownership has declined by four points or risen by two, but to situate the role of foreign ownership in the larger context of (what is happening to) the economy as a whole. Here there can be little doubt that 'dynamic' foreign capital working in concert with the leading edge of Canadian corporate power and buttressed by official state policy defines the central political reality at the present time. This, of course, is neither new nor surprising. Even the fact that the nineteen-seventies was a decade which produced short-term change in the relationship between American and Canadian capital without a significant transformation of the economy is hardly novel. What is different and has to be viewed as constituting a new era for Canada is the dramatic increase in trade dependency on the United States, the sharp decline in industrial competitiveness of the industrial sector, the magnitude of the massive outflow of Canadian savings to the United States and Latin America, the totally unforseen deterioration in Canada's position as an exporter of natural resources in the world market, and the record high levels of unemployment, exceeding over 10% and depending on the region well over 20%. In order to grasp the larger significance of these developments dependency theory needs to shift its emphasis from concentrating on "the slide into dependency" to focussing on the complex process of *forced economic restructuring and its impact on the social fabric of Canadian society.*

Three aspects are particularly alarming and have far-reaching implications:

First, Canada with its antiquated industrial structure is being de-industrialized but not re-industrialized. This contrasts with the situation in Europe and United States, where the reorganization and rationalization of the industrial sector has led to increased competitiveness, economies of scale, the introduction of new technology, and in some cases, a shorter working week. Here the process is particularly brutal with few of the benefits derived from reorganization. On the one hand, Canadian capital is unable to compete with the imports coming from the industrial zone created in Latin America and Asia. On the other, it is being squeezed out of the Canadian market by the aggressive export strategy of American multinationals. The future appears bleak.

Secondly, de-industrialization has already produced dramatic changes in the labour market affecting capital's relation with labour in a number of critical areas. Hardcore unemployment has risen spectacularly for women, youth, immigrant workers in small enterprises, nationally and regionally. The restructuring of Canada's economy directly affects the way work is organized at the plant-level, real income levels, the economic rights of all Canadians, and, particularly, working-class Canadians. In a branch-plant economy with a weak trade union movement and a highly restrictive system of industrial relations, capital has used the segmented and highly regional nature of the labour market to its own advantage in order to lower wage costs, and more generally to attack the social and economic gains won by labour over the past two decades. The return to the jungle-like system of industrial relations of the '30s poses a fundamental threat to the basic freedoms of Canada as a liberal-democratic society.

Finally, the enormous increase in the level of Canadian foreign investment takes on special meaning in the present context. Not only are Canadian investors searching for high rates of return on their investments but the persistent outflow of funds constitutes a flight of capital from Canada reflecting the sharp change in Canada's economic status. As can be deduced from the accompanying table, Canada is rapidly losing its position as a privileged periphery both as a region of North America and internationally.

Table 2

DIVISION OF WORLD REVENUE BY MAJOR REGIONS

	1975	2000
North America	31.4	20-21
Western Europe	22.5	20-21
Japan and others (OECD)	8.1	10-11
Eastern Europe	15.9	14-16
Third World	22.1	32-35
Total	100.0	100

The North American share of world revenue is expected to decline by 30% over the next two decades. It is forecast that the biggest winners will be the oil rich countries with their share of world income rising from 22.1% in 1975 to 32.5% in 2000. In the industrial world the biggest losers will be countries such as Canada, Belgium, and Britain with their weak economies unable to maintain their old status in the new international division of labour.

Dependency Theory in New Key

The contributions to this special issue are decidedly austere. Indeed, taken together, these analyses represent a great rupture in the discourse on dependency, both in Québec and English-Canada. For unlike most past accounts of dependency across the northern tier of North America, these perspectives do not assume *a priori* that Canada is a privileged alternative to the United States. Quite the contrary. Written in a context of general economic crisis and at a time when the authoritarian exercise of State power is in full abuse, the present perspectives are without illusions and without false hopes. In some ways, this is a minimalist exercise since what takes place across the writings, from Nicole Laurin-Frenette's despairing comment on the strategy of *redoublement* within which we are all imprisoned to Tom Naylor's insistence of tracing through the genealogy of Canadian dependence to its bitter beginnings in the administrative rationality of British empire, is a stripping-away of the "official" myths which are the Canadian substitute for an emergent culture. In the examples of Marcel Rioux, Susan Crean, and Daniel Latouche there is a clear intent to see *heteronomy* for what it is: the genus and horizon of Canadian experience. This special issue represents then both a revisiting of classical questions (Drache, Niosi, Naylor) and points of departure (Laurin-Frenette, Latouche, Rioux/Crean, Lind) for rewriting dependency theory in new key. This is political economy with a cultural moment; and cultural discourse with a vivid sense of economic hegemony.

In the lead-off article, Daniel Drache provides a provocative challenge to the current orthodoxies of Canadian political economy. In a reflexive consideration of the history of dependency theory in Canada, Drache is a case in point. His thought moves with a great sense of dynamic tension between a deep understanding of the Innisian tradition of political economy and his present involvement in research on regulation and accumulation as theorized by the French thinkers, Robert Boyer and Alain Lipietz. The present article shows this double influence. Written from a "left-Innisian" perspective, the essay confronts, directly and critically, the limitations in the more orthodox approach to Canadian political economy as thematized in the recent special issue of *Studies in Political Economy*, "Rethinking Canadian Political Economy". Drache's purpose is twofold: to identify the exclusions in an *ahistorical* Marxist political economy (the centrality of a resource commercial economy, the influence of export-led growth on class formation); and to provide an *historically specific* understanding of the complex political, social, and economic processes which

shaped the Canadian labour market and which influenced the "dependent" development of resource and commercial capitalism in the Canadian context. Drache's argument is a central one: it provides empirical evidence (and this specifically directed against Leo Panitch's claims concerning the historical formation of the Canadian labour process) that the capital/labour nexus was not the principal theatre of conflict in Canadian mode of development; and it outlines an alternative, historically nuanced interpretation of the sources of Canadian dependency. Drache wants a political economy that takes account of Canada's "ambivalent" position in possessing the social relations of an advanced capitalist society, but the economic structure of a classically underdeveloped society.

Marcel Rioux's and Susan Crean's article, "Overcoming Dependency: A Plea for Two Nations", is the flip side of Drache's privileging of the question of political economy in the analysis of Canadian dependency. This essay was originally published as part of *Deux pays pour vivre: Un plaidoyer.* Rioux and Crean's important theoretical statement on the recovery of an emergent cultural practice in Québec and English-Canada. As a way of deepening our understanding of dependency in advanced industrial societies, the article makes at least three essential points. First, it argues for the primacy of culture over economy, noting that in consumer culture the economic sphere has been breached by ideology, "the goals of advanced industrial society... (which)... are incorporated within its own system of production". Second, much in the tradition of Bahro and Castoriadis, the authors argue that an emancipatory vision of a "self-managed" society must combat the ideological hegemony of advanced capitalism as well as the disastrous evolution of "actually existing socialism" into authoritarian forms of "protosocialism". And third, the essay develops the strategic political thesis that "in order to win Canada's autonomy in relation to the United States and that of Québec with regard to Canada", the democratic and mutual self-determination of *each* society will be necessary. "Overcoming Dependency" is, then, a profound challenge to the bureaucratic control of the Canadian discourse by the Liberal Party: a type of ideological control which sets off Québec and English-Canada in opposition to one another with the Liberal Party as the happy mediation. What Rioux and Crean are attempting is nothing less than the forging of a new alliance between emergent and progressive political forces in Québec and English-Canada. Drache may appeal for a recovery of the "National Question" in understanding Canadian dependency, but Rioux and Crean do him one better. They have outlined a possible basis for a fundamental transformation of the politics of the Québec/Canada question.

The remarkable articles by the leading Québec writers, Daniel Latouche and Nicole Laurin-Frenette, are powerful confirmations and extensions of the critiques traced out by Drache, Rioux and Crean. In many ways, Drache's retheorisation of an *historically specific* understanding of Canadian political economy and Rioux/Crean's *cultural* interpretation of a new emancipatory strategy *(autogestionnaire)* for Canada and Québec structure the Canadian debate on dependency. These perspectives, moving between past and future, circle

back on one another and show exactly the extent to which the questions of economic dependency and the political recovery of an emergent cultural practice are entangled in the fate of Québec and Canada. Now, the significance of Latouche's article, *"Les effets pervers de l'entre-dépendence"* is this: It is a fantastic critique of the absence of a distinct and autonomous national community in English-Canada; and it is a tragic reflection on the *immobilisme* which presently typifies Québec under the double shock of the referendum result of 1980 and the constitutional betrayal of Québec in the following year. Latouche demonstrates, and this clearly and convincingly, that the dependency of Québec in relation to English-Canada and the domination of Canada by American empire are mutual and self-reinforcing tendencies. Just like Rioux and Crean, Latouche states: "Que les socialistes et socio-démocrates du Canada anglais aient été incapables de comprendre que la souveraineté du Québec constituait leur meilleur allié témoigne d'une myopie sans doute causée par leur installation confortable dans un statut de minorité permanente". The tragic sense in Latouche's perspective is heightened in Nicole Laurin-Frenette's poignant and searing reflection on the Québec referendum as a *Divertimento pour deux états.* It is a certain sign of the seriousness of the present crisis that it produces serious and highly personal reexaminations of intellectual positions. This is the case with Laurin-Frenette's meditation on the incarceration of Québec and Canada within a discourse of state power which legitimates itself and expands its sphere of control by ideological diversions, including official discourses promoting "national unity". Laurin-Frenette is a dependency theorist of the blood, for she refuses to privilege the "national question" or to be less than critical of the *redoublement* at the centre of the ideology of state power. "L'état fédéral est moins l'instrument de la centralisation des opérations financières capitalistes que l'effet, le résultat de cette centralisation". Or, again, and this with regard to Québec: "For the last twenty years or so, this central state has had to deal in Québec with a provincial state that has discovered a nation for itself. Others, more recently, have discovered oil and it still remains to be seen which of the two resources can take a state further". The thought of Laurin-Frenette is on the other side of a great divide from the romantic and naturalistic account of nationalist ideology: her analysis concentrates on the thematic of *governmentalization* as the locus of modern power.

But if Latouche and Nicole Laurin-Frenette provide a privileged insight into the Québec case against Canada (and in Laurin-Frenette's perspective against the governmentalization of Québec *and* English-Canada), then Tom Naylor undercuts the Canadian discourse *from within.* In a highly provocative essay, "Canada in the European Age", Naylor breaks forever with the "parish history" of Canadian intellectuals, and shows the roots of Canadian dependency in the adminstrative requirements of British empire. Naylor's analysis, which is intended anyway to overcome "Canadian exceptionalism" traces a great discourse on European imperialism in which the place of Canada is simply that of an administrative appendage, part of the circuit of commercial capital, by which the will to power in the European penetrated the North American

continent. Naylor's analysis is much more than a historical narrative: it resituates the main political and accumulative processes in the making of the Canadian discourse within the global context of European imperialism; and it develops the important thesis that "commercialisation of social relations was at heart a political process". Naylor's essay is at once an extension of Laurin-Frenette's claim made in *Production de l'état et formes de la nation* of the national policy as an effect, and not only an instrument, of the centralisation of the operations of finance capital as part of *les réseaux* of the bourgeois class in North America. This article is an important complement to Drache's thesis concerning the complex political processes involved in the historical formation of Canadian industrialization. Naylor's inquiry is located just at that juncture where "Canada in the European Age" passes over into its opposite, Canada in the American Age: where, in fact, Kari Levitt's *Silent Surrender* begins.

The special issue on *Beyond Dependency* concludes with two interesting accounts of some possible mediations in the dependency debate.

In his essay, "The Canadian Bourgeoisie: Towards a Synthetical Perspective", the Québec political theorist, Jorge Niosi, examines the major cleavages between "nationalists" and "internationalists" in socialist discourse, and proposes a more unitary perspective on the "internal composition, rivalries and changes within the Canadian bourgeoisie". Niosi's essay makes an important contribution to the dependency debate both by developing a position on Canadian economic development which differs from the "left-Innisian" perspective in crucial ways, and by locating the developmental strategy of the "hegemonic fraction" of the Canadian capitalist class in a "continental or rentier nationalism".

The final article, "Ethics, Economics and Canada's Catholic Bishops", is an insightful and provocative commentary on the implications of the recent policy statement by the social affairs commission of the Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops on the economic crisis. Christopher Lind notes that the most original and compelling aspect of *Ethical Reflections on the Economic Crisis* has to do with its reassertion of the *moral dimension* of political economy. It is now all the more apparent that in the struggle between the disciplinary model of neo-conservatism and the various critical tendencies of the left that there takes place a great and fundamental contest between competing public moralities. It's all *market efficiency* on the side of the capitalist class, and *economic justice* as the public ethic of the dispossessed. Indeed, Lind's analysis points out, albeit implicitly, that the present economic convulsion which sweeps across the advanced industrial societies and then into the third world is focussed on an *allocation crisis*. What's at stake in the debate between monetarists and emancipatory forces, ranging from liberation theology to critical labour movements and socialist critiques, is a decisive struggle over the standards to be applied in determining such crucial issues as income redistribution and the availability of social services. Lind's analysis points to the need to rethink the relationship of ethics and dependency, and to do so in a way that would draw the parallels between the Latin American situation and the Canadian case. It's his

thesis, and this adopted from *Ethical Reflections on the Economic Crisis*, that only a fundamental debate on ethics and economy can expose the terrible consequences which follow from the subordination of society to the "ethic of means": the public morality of advanced capitalism. While Lind's recovery of the question of "public ethics" breaks sharply with Marxist political economy (thus exposing the irrelevance of an *aethical* and *atheoretical* Marxism for understanding the nihilism of modern society), it points the way to a much broader debate. Over and beyond the deep and, indeed, scandalous immorality which is a necessary condition of the present economic crisis, there is now even a more grisly immorality at work in the Canadian discourse. While the economic crisis can be explained, in part, as the result of Canada's vulnerability to *external* transformations in the logic of advanced capitalist society, there is no such easy explanation of the injustice involved in the recent decision by the Canadian Liberal government to accede to the testing of the Cruise missile on Canadian territory. It's just this decision to become a principal partner, if only for testing purposes, in the nuclear war industry which reveals both the extremity of Canadian dependency and the extent to which the nihilism of technological reason has been absorbed into Canadian experience: into our politics, economy, and psychology. We are now active contributors to the global logic of exterminism. It's not sufficient to say that the Cruise missile decision represents the final surrender of Canadian sovereignty. It is that of course; but over and beyond the Canadian fate, that of a relatively small culture in a global society, there is the unanswered question of what are we to do now that we are implicated in what is most certainly a deliberate and cynical crime against humanity. In modern society, power comes in two disguises: sometimes under the sign of seduction, and sometimes in the form of terrible oppression. Our ambivalent status as privileged participants in the wealth of American empire and as its impotent political dependents does not make the deep moral compromise in our national existence any easier to bear. Not to struggle against economic injustice, not to consider the "Cruise" as a war crime in which *we* are the criminals is to provide an unforgivable moral assent to demonic forces at work in western industrial societies. What Lind has described as the narrow "utilitarian calculation" at the heart of Canadian society represents the limit and horizon of dependent being in North America. The driving principle of Canadian public existence is this: *injustice for the weak and economic privileges for the politically compromised.*

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Notes

1. This analysis of *The Journal* is further developed in A, Kroker, "Technological Humanism: The Processed World of Marshall McLuhan", *The Technological Experience: Innis/McLuhan/Grant* (forthcoming).
2. Greg Nielsen, "Cultural Praxis in Anglo-Canada: 1939-75", an essay presented at the Annual meetings of the *Canadian Association of Sociology and Anthropology*, Learned Societies, University of British Columbia, May, 1983.
3. The concept of Canada as an "advanced dependent" nation is developed by Raymond A. Morrow in his excellent essay, *"Deux pays pour vivre:* Critical Sociology and Canadian Political Economy", *Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory*, special issue, "Québec: Culture and Political Economy", Vol. 6, Nos. 1-2, Spring, 1982, 61-105.

Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory/Revue canadienne de théorie politique et sociale. Vol. 7, No. 3, (Fall/Automne, 1983).

THE CRISIS OF CANADIAN POLITICAL ECONOMY: DEPENDENCY THEORY VERSUS THE NEW ORTHODOXY

Daniel Drache

Canadian political economy is in danger of losing the vitality, originality and critical spirit of inquiry which was much in evidence during the seventies.[1] This is the result of two unhappy developments, leading away from heterodoxy to orthodoxy. First, an important number of political economists are no longer interested in addressing the issues and concerns identified with liberal political economy. On the left, there is a widely held belief that liberal and Marxist traditions of political economy are incompatible and that it is necessary to purify Canadian political economy of original sin, its liberal origins and the "heretical" views of Innis and the Innis tradition, on the grounds that Innis wasn't a Marxist and the questions he addressed are largely unimportant.[2] The second danger rises from a misplaced idealization of Marxism — a naive belief in Marxism as a science *à tout faire.*

Here I am going to suggest that much of the current debate in political economy is unproductive and misdirected because Marxism is treated as a dogma to be defended rather than as a methodology and a mode of inquiry in constant flux and need of restatement and refinement. In Canada, Marxism encounters particular problems and it is no exaggeration to say that the Marxist paradigm, as it has been applied by many Canadian political economists, has not proven as fruitful as in other contexts. At the very least, Marxism as a mode of analysis has to be reformulated to allow for the particular nature of the semi-peripheral social and economic formation here as well as in other cases such as Australia and New Zealand. This is the essence of my reflection. In the first part, I am going to defend not Innis but Innisian-based Marxism as it relates to the current debate on Canadian capitalist development. In second part, I am going to argue the importance of maintaining an open paradigm in political economy.

What is happening in Canadian political economy? Canadian political economy is being torn by diverging tendencies. Ray Morrow's provocative and thorough analysis warns that Canadian political economy cannot afford to ignore the important theoretical work being done elsewhere on the relationship between culture and economics.[3] But from another perspective a different danger is imminent. The Canadian political economy paradigm is in the process of closing. The current debates, which surface in the special issue of *Studies in Political Economy* entitled "Rethinking Canadian Political Economy", reveal a series of limitations which must be confronted[4]:

- the disastrously oversimplified belief in "class analysis";

Editor's note: This article is an expanded and revised version of a paper presented as part of the 1982 *CJPST* theory workshops, Learned Societies Université d'Ottawa, Canada.

- the absence of awareness of the centrality of the national question and the way it interacts and mediates class relations;
- the unwillingness to recognize Canada's colonial origins and the impact of colonialism on Canadian capitalist development, most notably on the formation of the working class and other classes.
- the failure to address the political and social side of development which holds the key to understanding the development of the Canadian state and the particularity of the party system in Canada.

This list could be extended to include other aspects of Canadian political economy.

In a more fundamental way, it is not Innis and his writings which are at the centre of this controversy. Allowing myself to oversimplify, one can identify two broad tendencies, one which draws inspiration from Innis and the other from the more abstract tradition of Marxism which lacks the crucial national dimension and a specific methodology for addressing the key problems of Canadian social and economic development. From this perspective we can see that to focus narrowly on Innis and what he wrote does not go to the heart of the problem. It should be evident that more fundamentally, what is at stake is a debate about paradigms. It is profoundly methodological in the sense of defining an approach to the study of the social forces comprising Canadian reality; it is theoretical in the way it proposes to analyze the mode of development; it is intrinsically political in the strategic sense of the term and the way it accounts for social change.

While Innis is not Marx and no one has ever claimed that Innis and the Innisian tradition are a substitute for Marxian theory (must this be said again), nonetheless, it is the case that despite all their differences, liberal and Marxian political economy share certain things in common.[5] It is totally erroneous to think that one has to choose between Marx and Schumpeter, Marx and Innis, Innis and Schumpeter, or any other "odd couple" which comes to mind. If there *is* a dividing line, a point of demarcation, it is between those who subscribe to a generalized, often ahistorical neo-Marxism (with Canadian content, *bien sûr*),[6] and those who advocate a radically contextualized historical materialism aware of the limits of Marxism and open to other schools of political economy of varying tendencies.

For too long we leftist Innisians have been reticent to say explicitly what is the case the neo-Marxist anti-Innisians on the left are saying. Among other things it includes denying or minimizing:

- the centrality of a resource commercial economy;
- the imperial/colonial structure of development;
- the institutionalization of colonialism in Canada's political structures;
- the influence of foreign ownership;
- the effect of export-led growth on class formation;
- the role of the imperial state in Canadian development;
- the importance of social, cultural, national factors in the formation of Canada.

Analytically, what separates the Left Innisians from the anti-Innisians? If it can be reduced to a single factor, it is the emphasis given to the internal/external dialectic in the Canadian social formation. The anti-Innisians deny or minimize the crucial and continuing role of external factors in the formation of Canada. This is their blindspot.

In essence, the anti-Innisians claim that Canadian development is principally autonomous, intraverted, auto-centric. Nowhere is this position more clearly articulated than in the debate on industrialization, Naylor, and the Canadian state.[7] All the points in contention cannot, of course, be reduced to a single issue, but one can discover the methodological propositions which the anti-Innisians share in common: the minimization of externality (i.e. of exogenous forces) as a principal factor in Canadian development. By contrast, for Innisians, externalities play a dominant role in shaping so-called indigenous developments.

The recent debate about "externalities"[8] is not new. One has only to recall the fundamental differences between the Innis and the Mackintosh theories of staple-led growth. The Innisian theory is based on an extraverted model of development, while for Mackintosh, development is auto-centric.[9] In minimizing externalities, Mackintosh was forced, nonetheless, to explain "the rigidities" of Canadian development. He attributed them to "bad" geography and, of course, claimed that Canada constituted an unnatural economic unit in terms of the interaction of market forces in North America.

In the present context, Panitch goes one step further: he explains the weakness of Canadian industrialization not with reference to "geography" but in terms of the capital/labour nexus. More than this, he wants to explain Canadian development principally in terms of indigenous forces. He claims that the relatively high wage levels of the Canadian working class at the end of the nineteeth century retarded the rate of capital accumulation. At first sight this hypothesis seems plausible. The success of Canadian workers in obtaining a high standard of living logically would have reduced the profitability of capital and increased the costs of production, particularly in small and medium-sized enterprises. In short, Canadian industry suffered a comparative disadvantage due to high labour costs. Panitch develops a table showing that the wage levels of Canadian workers in the 1870s were considerably higher than in Europe. For him, the implications of having a high-wage proletariat are unmistakable:

> ... the only way Canadian capitalists could have competed successfully with the financially stronger and more productive American capitalists was through a higher rate of absolute exploitation of the Canadian working class than was possible... Thus the very struggles of the Canadian class... put limits on the competitiveness of Canadian capitalists.[10]

This attempt to explain the stunted and foreign dominated nature of Canadian development within a classical Marxist framework merits attention

both for empirical and conceptual reasons. But Panitch's explanation does not open any new vistas on these all-important questions because nominal wage levels tell us relatively little about the real movement of wages and their impact on manufacturing costs and productivity.

As Logan has showed in *Labour in Canadian-American Relations"*, the best source about labour costs in Canadian-American manufacturing industries during the last quarter of the nineteeth century, American industrial wages were 60% higher than those in Canada! Not only in the nineteenth but in the twentieth century as well, there was a significant wage differential between Canadian and American workers (see Chart I). In 1870, the average industrial Canadian wage-earner received $218 and the corresponding figure for the U.S. was $302. By 1880, the figures were $231 and $347. In 1890, the gap between Canadian and American wages increased further. The average Canadian wage was $273 and the average American industrial wage was $445 (see Table 1). Logan writes:

> At the beginning of the present century, wages in manufacturing in the United States averaged approximately 50% higher than in Canada and although the divergence has frequently been narrowed since that time, the American lead has never been serious challenged.[12]

Pentland fills in the rest of the picture about labour costs and the movement of wages in Canada at this critical time. Most important is the relationship between the cost of living, particularly food costs, estimated to have consumed the major part of a worker's wage income and real wages. Pentland says that rising food costs effectively neutralized nominal wage gains made by different sections of the working class after 1900 (see Chart II). "Canadian workers failed to achieve any significant improvement in real wages before 1920 and those in the export-oriented industries appear to have been distinctly worse off after 1910 than they had been in 1900".[13] Only after 1924 did real wages rise.

In fact, between 1880 and 1930 living costs in Canada were some 20-40% higher than those in the U.S. Logan notes that the American worker had higher wages and lived at less expense.[14] Before 1914, he was 30% better off than his Canadian counterpart. Given all this, it is not surprising that Buckley discovered that Canada's rate of capital formation was higher than England's when that country industrialized.[15] Even with existing wage levels, Canada's actual rate of capital formation remained persistently high throughout this period.

But the most important piece of evidence concerns the relationship between wage levels and productivity. O.J. Firestone shows that productivity gains outstripped wage increases between 1890 and 1910. Indeed, real output grew four times faster than real wages during a time of heavy industrial mergers and the rapid increase in the domestic market for consumer and capital goods. In a long term perspective, it can be seen from Table II that for this twenty year period, wages experienced their smallest increase of any comparable period between 1870 and 1950.

CHART 1

COMPARATIVE ANNUAL WAGES FOR ALL MANUFACTURES:
CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES



SOURCE: H.A. Logan, "Labour Costs and Labour Standards", in H.A. Innis, *Labour Canadian American Relations*, 1937, p. 90.

TABLE 1

COMPARISONS OF SIGNIFICANT STATISTICS PER WAGE-EARNER FOR ALL MANUFACTURES FOR CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES, AND OF NUMBER OF WAGE-EARNERS PER ESTABLISHMENT

Year	*Number of wage-earners per establishment*		*Average yearly earnings per wage-earner (a)*		*Value added by by manufacture per wage-earner*		*Capital employed per wage-earner*	
	Can.	*U.S.*	*Can.*	*U.S.*	*Can.*	*U.S.*	*Can.*	*U.S.*
1870(69)	.....	8.15	$218	$302	$489	$679	$415	$825
1880(79)	5.12	10.76	231	347	486	722	647	1,021
1890(89)	4.87	11.98	273	445	568	990	959	1,535
1900(99)	21.4	10.36	284	437	668	1,066	1,420	1,850
		22.66		426		1,025		1,904
1905(04)	.....	25.31	.....	477	.....	1,151	.....	2,318
1910(09)	24.5	24.68	418	518	1,112	1,289	2,650	2,786
1915(14)	21.6	25.73	496	579	1,201	1,403	4,320	3,234
		38.96		590		1,408		
1919	21.5	42.06	924	1,162	2,814	2,756	6,200	4,911
1921	16.5	35.44	997	1,181	3,049	2,639	8,370	( )
1923	19.9	47.78	960	1,254	2,715	2,944	7,580	( )
1925	20.9	44.83	970	1,280	2,697	3,194	8,170	( )
1927	23.2	43.49	996	1,299	2,895	3,303	8,140	( )
1929	25.2	41.89	1,040	1,315	3,174	3,607	8,508	6,335
1931	18.7	37.27	956	1,102	3,041	3,046	10,841	( )
1933	15.8	42.65	787	869	2,629	2,412	11,741	( )

SOURCE: Adapted from H.A. Logan, op. cit., p. 86.

(a) Before 1900, Canadian wage-earners include salaried workers.

CHART II

WAGE MOVEMENTS IN CANADA 1900-1930 IN CURRENT AND CONSTANT DOLLARS

Year	*(1) General Index of Money Wages*	*(2) Price Index of Family Budget*	*(3) Real Wage Index (General Index)*
1900	100	100	100
05	117	112	104
10	135	131	103
1911	133	133	100
12	137	141	97
13	141	143	99
14	143	146	98
15	144	142	101
1916	154	151	102
17	176	186	95
18	207	211	98
19	243	227	107
20	289	265	109
1921	264	232	114
22	246	214	115
23	252	215	117
24	256	212	121
25	253	215	118
1926	255	220	116
27	260	217	120
28	264	218	121
29	268	221	121
30	270	218	124

Wages (1900 = 100)

SOURCE: Department of Labour series from M.C. Urquhart and K. Buckley, *Historical Statistics of Canada* (1965). Wage indexes for 1900 estimated on the assumption that wage movements in Canada in 1900-1901 were approximately the same as those of the United States. The Chart is found in H.C. Pentland's study prepared for the Task Force on Labour Relations, *A Study of the Changing Social, Economic Canadian System of Industrial Relation*, p. 78.

TABLE II

CHANGE IN AVERAGE WAGES PER MAN-HOUR, CONSTANT (1935-9) DOLLARS, MANUFACTURING, ANG GROSS VALUE OF MANUFACTURING PRODUCTION PER MAN-HOUR IN CONSTANT (1935-9) DOLLARS: CANADA, 1870-1950

	Percentage increase in	
Years	*Real wages man-hr.**	*Real output man-hr.**
1870-90	54	47
1890-1910	10	41
1910-30	50	72
1930-50	76	47
1870-1950	346	420

*Wage-earners only.

SOURCE: O.J. Firestone, *Canada's Economic Development, 1867-1953* (London, 1958), Tables 76 and 81.

There is something amiss with Panitch's claim on this fundamental point of a high-wage proletariat and a lower rate of exploitation. It does not get us very far to present the capital/labour nexus in such narrow terms. Indeed, it ill serves political economy to attempt to understand the class relations of development in such orthodox terms. *Capital and labour are always part of a larger constellation of forces comprising a mode of development with its own structures, institutions, culture and history.* This pivotal relationship between the exploited and the exploiters was, in Pentland's words, "muffled" because of regional, bi-national, and occupational interests.[16]

The mode of development is too complex and atypical in Canada to single out labour costs as the central reason for retarding industrialization. While rates of exploitation do indeed affect labour costs, they do not explain how labour is employed in the productive process; how the capitalist labour market affects wage rates; and how the mode of development in its turn shapes the emergence of the working class. The important work of Robert Boyer on *le rapport salarial* is particularly germane in shedding light on these issues. In his seminal article "Wage Formation in Historical Perspective: the French Experience", Boyer has assembled impressive empirical in formation for understanding wage formation in a larger theoretical perspective.[17] He uses a different concept to explain the factors determining the wage-salary relationship:

> This approach depends fundamentally on the notion of *regulation* over a very long period of analysis. By regulation, is meant the way in which a system as a whole functions, the conjunction of economic mechanisms associated with a given set of social relationships, of institutional forms and structures. In contrast to the neo-classical school, which postulates unvarying and identical principles in all markets, including the market of labour, the notion adopted here is that the economic mechanisms in each market derive from institutions or autonomous structures. They cannot be reduced to an overall mechanism based only on the operation of "supply and demand".[18]

Boyer shows just how complex a matter the question of money wages, costs of living and productivity really is. Wages in the nineteeth century were not "limited to the determination of the average wage for industry as a whole but... what is important is the specific rather than the overall market...". Thus the overall secular market movement in wages conceals marked divergences for different occupations, the rise in money wages from 1830-1891 varying from 60% to over 200%. "Indeed it is open to question whether, in view of the large differences in wage and labour movements between sectors, *the notion of the average wage is relevant to the 19th century* (my emphasis)". For much of the nineteenth century, wages in Europe tended to increase when the cost of living rose and remained relatively unchanged when prices fell.

It is highly significant that wage movements in Canada followed this norm. Real wages tended to fall here as elsewhere, a point the importance of which has never been fully recognized and allowed for in the study of wage rate changes in Canadian economic development. In the Canadian social space, there was not *one* labour market, as is often alleged, but several different and indeed competing ones. The labour market was far from being homegeneous. (On this key point, we should not follow Pentland in thinking that there was *a* labour market).[19] There was a market of skilled workers paid more or less the same rates as American skilled craftsmen. There was a semi-skilled industrial labour market with wages possibly anywhere from 20 to 40% lower than their American counterparts. Finally, there was a reserve army of unskilled labour working in resources, construction and agriculture whose rates rose and fell with the boom-bust cycle of export-led growth. It is important to note that wage rates were not stable, and fluctuated continuously both within and between the various segments of the labour market and between regions. Given these highly favourable conditions for capitalist accumulation and investment, where did the surplus go? If it wasn't appropriated by labour, as Pentland clearly shows, what happened to it? Could it be that much of the surplus was exported?

Significantly, little work has been done on specifying the labour process and the labour requirements of an extractive commercial economy. Our knowledge of the way, the staple and resource capitalism affected the development of the

labour market is not more advanced. Both these pivotal issues remain a virtual *terra incognita*. Yet if labour costs *per se* did not retard Canadian industrialization, we do know a lot about the "other" forces which retarded and continue to retard Canadian industrialization.

Here we come full circle. Exogeneous forces did indeed play a pivotal role in restricting the development of the internal market and the Canadian manufacturing condition. But can we be more precise? Was it the fact that as early as 1840, as Ryerson shows, American manufacturing already controlled a surprisingly large share of the Canadian market for goods of all sorts?[20] Was it due to the change in the Patent Act in the early 1980's which made Canadian industry dependent on American technology?[21] Was it due to the fact that Canadian banks channelled Canadian savings to the American money-markets and that a sizeable part of the New-York short-term money-market was Canadian in origin?[22] Was it due to the policies of the state which protected American subsidiaries operating in Canada and permitted them to import machine parts and equipment duty-free?[23] Was it the fact that as Pentland showed in his now forgotten exchange with Aitken, in the pre- as well as post-Confederation period, Canada exported an important part of its "surplus" due to the continual repatriation of profits by British and American investors?[24]

One doesn't have to choose between these different options to make the crucial point. Each has a degree of validity and contributes to our understanding of the weakness of Canadian industrialization. Taken together, these factors had the effect of reinforcing the export-led nature of Canadian development with only a marginal industrial zone emerging by the end of the nineteenth century. It does not get us very far simply to claim that the meagre economic gains of the proletariat explain the relative weakness of Canadian industrialization. Rather Canadian industrialization was directed by and towards an external dynamic at all levels, including the capital and labour markets. Seen in this context, the distinction between internal and external is purely artificial. In reality, so-called indigeneous developments and initiatives taken by the state and local bourgeoisie, e.g. the National Policy, were little more than the reverse side of what I call an externality, an awkward term designating the social and economic relations of colonialism. We may like to think that these initiatives appeared as a reflection of the needs of a maturing Canadian economy and nation. To some extent they obviously were but, viewed from a larger vantage point, it is clear that neither the state nor the capitalist class controlled or even set the pace of Canadian development. The motor forces of development clearly lay elsewhere. State and capital could react; they could influence; they could take initiatives; but they could not control in any fundamental way what happened. They were a subservient state and bourgeoisie, continually on the defensive reacting to events over which they had no real control. Even the idea of "control" was alien to their political world for the simple reason that there was no fundamental conflict between their internal needs of capital accumulation and their external allegiance.[25] Witness the reaction of the political elite to Blake's now forgotten speech at Aurora in

1872.[26] They were appalled at the prospect of being *maître chez nous*. Even the National Policy, Macintosh reminds us, was a second best choice of the emerging capitalist class, its first being reciprocity![27]

A more complete explanation of why Canadian capitalists were always on the defensive lies in the political context. Among other events, we need to re-assess the long-term significance of the failed revolutions of 1837. A successful bourgeois democratic revolution would have allowed the independentist wing of the capitalist class to wrest control from the colonial oligarchy.[28] Since this did not happen, the basic strategy of Canadian capitalism has not changed greatly over the long-haul. It has remained faithful to its origins: adjustment and accommodation to empire. Surely, this is the central conclusion of Creighton's remarkable study explaining the longevity of the second commercial empire of the St Lawrence and the point is well documented in numerous studies in the Innis tradition, tracing the evolution of Canadian capitalism for the succeeding periods.

There are, then, strong theoretical and historical reasons for stressing the prominent role of external constraints in Canadian development. But it would be an error to think that there was no autonomy. This is not the case. But what does autonomy mean in a Left Innisian perspective? Under what circumstance is it proper to speak of autonomous moments of development? These questions are part of a longer discussion but this much needs to be underlined: if it can be seen that the division of labour is imposed from without, autonomy is paradoxically and not infrequently the product of an external crisis or change in the "needs" of the metropole. When this is the case, it leads to the "freeing up" of internal forces and the possibility of auto-centric development, a change in the strategy of capital accumulation, and a realignment of class forces. On balance, these "openings" (eg., at the time of the American civil war, in the inter-war period in the 20s and 30s, post-Vietnam) have been few and far between and have not been seen as occasions by the State and elite to alter radically the economic structures of what I call a dependent resource commercial economy.

All of this is schematic and perhaps when Naylor's monumental study of Canada in the European age is published,[29] we will have a better understanding of how this externally derived form of development undergoes change and transformation. Based on Naylor's earlier work, it is already clear that transformation is also usually the result of exogeneous forces: the introduction of new technology, change in the international price of staples, change in external demand, working their way through the economy and the social structure. This cycle of dislocation/adaptation inevitably produces what Innis termed social disturbances and what Marxists identify as intense periods of class struggle. Because such a large part of the economy is "exposed" to frequent changes in price, technology, capital movements, these externalities animate and intensify social and class conflict as well as forcing the state to be a stabilizing agent in addition to all its other functions. The social dynamics of a society structured on resource capitalism cannot be explained as classical Marxism would have it, by simply positing that the principal theatre of conflict

is to between labour and capital. What always needs stressing in the case of Canada is to the same extent that our development has been subject to the vicissitudes of the external market, so also are the class relations. This is part of the reason why social movements rise and decline with such regularity and why the Canadian working class finds itself divided between those working in the 'exposed' sectors and those in the 'sheltered' side of the economy. While the possibility for autonomous change and transformation frequently exist, it is an entirely different questions of how these "openings" are utilised and for what ends.[30] The study of all these external factors should be at the heart of political economy and should be central to any discussion of class, capital formation, and the Canadian state and yet frequently this critical dimension is ignored. What is it about the specificity of our social and class relations which proves so difficult to analyse from a Marxist perspective? This question is worth looking at from a number of different angles because it raises a series of interrelated issues not only about the study of Canada but neo-Marxist theory as well.

* * *

Speaking bluntly, why has Canadian Marxism had such difficulty coming to terms with Canada as a social formation? Is the problem Marxism as such, or the mechanical application of an orthodox (i.e. metropolitan) model? While, no doubt much more could be said about the particularity of Canada as a social formation, the essential point is that the theoretical, and conceptual framework of 20th century Marxism has been developed to analyze centre societies. Hence, it is not surprising that a country like Canada should present certain difficulties. It falls between social formations, having the social relations of advanced capitalism and the economic structures of dependency. There are far too many features of Canadian society that do not lend themselves to a traditional Marxist analysis drawn from a European experience. In these circumstances, undue reliance on universal models leads to orthodoxy of one form or another with highly selective views of reality. Given our ambiguous status, what particular insights of Marxism do, then, apply in the case of Canada?

The answer to this question is not immediately evident. For instance, we have already seen how staple-led growth and colonialism profoundly affected the structures of Canadian capitalist development. Similarly, consider class formation. Canada does not lend itself to a European model of industrial class analysis. As Pentland reminds us, Canadian class formation was different because up until the second world war, Canada was largely an agrarian/resource society[31] and in these circumstances much has to be explained regarding the formation of the working class. In particular, we need to know why the Canadian working class emerged internally divided, lacking an essential unity. There is also the question of regionalism and its central importance institutionally and economically. Marxist theory has relatively little to offer on the question of regionalism in Canada or elsewhere.[32] Even the Marxist perspective on the state is problematic in the case of Canada. Which, of the many theories of the state, applies here? Do we take as a "given" that the

Canadian state is autonomous, instrumentalist, corporatist or a mixture of all three?[33] The answer is not straightforward particularly when there is no purely theoretical basis for specifying the question. There is reason to believe that it cannot be autonomous in the same way found in centre societies. For much of our history while externally autonomous, the State was largely an instrument functioning directly and indirectly at the *behest* of the dominant economic elites. Possibly, the most difficult theoretical hurdle stems from the primacy of the internal national question *chez nous* which conflicts with the traditional Marxist focus on class analysis and in particular on the central role of the working class as the principal agent of change. Does it make sense to speak of *a* working class in the singular when in fact there are two working class movements one in English-speaking Canada (with marked regional differences) and one in Quebec? The longstanding cultural and national "differences" between the two has radically altered the nature of working class politics in Canada in any useful sense of the term.

These questions only scratch the surface of the complex nature of a "white" settler colony which, in the Marxian order of things, can be considered neither fish nor fowl, and for good reason. At its origins, Canada acquired, in embryonic form, the relations of metropolitan capitalism which made it part of the advanced capitalist world *regardless of its stage of economic development*.[34] In addition, it was distinguished politically by our elites who could always negotiate the terms of its colonialism, a right and privilege extended only to the "white" dominions. In these circumstances, it is wrong to think of the national question as a purely external relationship.[35] Rather, our colonialism has been institutionalized in the structure of Confederation, particularly in the role of the state in economic development, in the relationship between the federal government and the provinces, and in Quebec's status in Confederation. Even if Canada's status vis-à-vis Britain was regularized in the '30s and Canada can be said to have been industrialized to a certain degree, these developments have not challenged the basic institutional character of Canada's colonial origins. For all the change this has brought about the colonial structures from another era continue to define the basic relations which comprise modern-day Canada.

The weight of the foregoing should put us on guard against a Marxist analysis which does not lead to a deeper understanding of our specificity. As well, it should alert us to the fact that if Canada falls between formations, Marxian political economy in Canada has to be modified in important respects in order to serve as the basic framework of analysis. This modification of fundamental Marxian categories leads to the development of a heterodox tradition of political economy greatly inspired by, but not dogmatically wedded to the Marxian tradition.

Contrary to what is often thought, Innis is not the only one who bears the mantle of heterodoxy. The principal contributions of Pentland, Ryerson and Clement are solidly in this camp, as are more obviously Naylor, Levitt and Watkins. If heterodoxy is defined as opposition to conventional wisdom of the

dominant paradigm then the principal contributors to the new political economy have done more to challenge liberal orthodoxy. Each has also taken issue with one or another aspect of Marxist conventional wisdom as well. This tradition of Marxist heterodoxy constitutes the innovative side of Canadian political economy, even if it suffers from certain tensions and ambiguities. It is worth looking at some of the ambiguities which arise in the study of Canadian capitalism because they shed light on the difficulties which Marxism encounters in theorizing the Canadian case.

In his pioneering study of the formation of the Canadian working class, Pentland adopted what may be called a classical approach to this central problematic.[36] He showed how in Ontario, the market mechanism, ensuring the regular demand as well as the sources of supply of labour, rapidly encouraged the development of the industrial working class. Yet, it can be seen that such a thesis fails to come to terms with the formation of the Canadian working class nationally. Pentland himself realized that his emphasis on the formation of an industrial proletariat was problematic in an economy dominated by resource exportation. By the time of the Woods Task Force in the mid-sixties,[37] he shifted his ground stressing not industrialism but the commercial nature of Canadian capitalism and the centrality of the resource proletariat in the formation of the working class.

Ryerson is also caught in a similar tension between the general and the specific when dealing with Canada's colonial origin.[38] Roch Denis shows that there is a profound ambiguity in Ryerson's central idea of unequal union.[39] There was not, as Ryerson alleges, a single colonialism but a double colonialism which became institutionalized in the founding of the Canadian state. Not only was Quebec accorded an ambiguous status but these same institutional arrangements should be regarded as being no less satisfactory for English Canada as well. More pointedly, there was no new political nationality, as Ryerson claims, but a continuation of the *status quo* in a new guise.

Clement's study of elites suffers from a similar ambiguity. On the one hand Clement finds the "unequal" alliance between the Canadian and American elites as the reason for the fundamentally dependent nature of Canadian corporate capitalism.[40] On the other, he argues that the Canadian corporate elite has emerged as a power in its own right with a base and considerable room to manoeuvre!!

Watkin's writings on the staple reflects yet another ambiguity. He has explained the central role of resources as constituting the motor of development, but significantly, has not extended the staple argument as it relates to Canadian industrialization.[41] Are we to believe then that the staple is only a theory of resource development or does it have an "industrial" component as well?

Levitt, in her turn, states that Canada is rich and underdeveloped. She attempts to explain this fundamental contradiction in her important study of the growth of foreign ownership and foreign investment in the '50s and '60s.[42] What is unclear is the role of the State and elites in these events and particularly

why the economy continued to experience constant economic growth. What her excellent study reveals is that, contrary to her claim, there was no silent surrender: the surrender occured with the active participation of the state and the Canadian elites who financed the American take-over of Canada's industrial and resource sectors. Perhaps more importantly in spite of massive foreign direct investment the industrial sector did expand and provide badly needed jobs.

Naylor's original study of Canadian business, technology and capital is the most vexing but also the most promising for many of the same reasons.[43] It suffers from a double ambiguity in overstating the case of commercialism and understating the degree of industrialization. Yet, it retains the great merit of explaining, indeed better than anything else to date, the principal paradox of Canadian capitalist development, the continuing importance of commercialism (modes of exchange and circulation) or, what I prefer to call, commercialism in an industrial guise.

It is striking and highly significant that all the above otherwise quite diverse works suffer from the same theoretical tension. The central question addressed in each of them is accounted for in such conflicting terms as in the end to raise serious doubts about the explanation advanced. We have yet to know why this is so. Is it due to what McNally and others say is an imperfect understanding of the principal categories of Marxist theory? Or, the nature of the case — Canada as a social formation?

The answer, I believe, is that the macro-themes class and nation in Ryerson, class and elites in Clement, capital accumulation and industrialization in Naylor, foreign ownership and the state in Levitt, industry and resources in Watkins, the formation of the industrial working class in Pentland, do not lend themselves to conventional treatment. The originality of the above works stems from their awareness that the study of Canada requires a distinct methodological approach and a belief (whether articulated or not) that Canadian capitalism is sufficiently different to require original theoretical work on the mode of development and its institutional structures. Parenthetically, it is the latter point which contemporary Leftist political economists share with Innis. It should be recalled that in the '20s and '30s when the social sciences in Canada were dominated by British academics, Innis argued strenuously for the creation of a distinctive methodology for Canadian social science. His own work on the staples, centre/margin relations and the disequilibrium model of development[44] is, of course, the most significant result of this search for new, more fruitful avenues of research.

It would be premature to draw the conclusion that heterodoxy simply can be accounted for by methodological inventiveness and a critical spirit of inquiry. There is another dimension to consider. This is the importance accorded the national question in Canadian social and economic development. In Pentland, Levitt *et al.*, it is this "other" aspect which plays such a major part in specifying class and social relations.

Methodologically, this consciousness of the importance of the "nation"

provides a key to locating class relations, analyzing the Confederation settlement, regionalism, and working class organization. If there is something unique about Canada as a social formation, it derives from the way in which the national question has affected the role of the state, the emergence of the working class, and the establishment of one-party dominance in a multi-party system.[45] Indeed, the most important, original and innovative contributions to Canadian political economy have made considerable progress exactly by explaining how national factors directly affected class relations. At the same time, to date no one has managed to provide an effective synthesis of these various themes.

It is an important commentary on the English Canadian Left and, indeed, on the Quebec Left as well, that it is not class analysis *per se*, not capitalist development more generally, nor even the conflicting interpretations on the role of the state, but the national question which constitutes the "great divide" *entre les approches marxisantes*.[46] Of course, Canadian socialism is not alone in this respect. The same phenomenon marks Canadian liberalism as well. It is worth recalling that Innis stressed the continuing importance of the national question within a North American framework, while Mackintosh held the opposite view arguing that by the mid-twenties Canadian colonialism was a thing of the past and had little bearing on Canadian social development after this time. That the national question should be of such fundamental importance is not particularly surprising. It has been no less a central issue in British, French, Italian, and German Marxism as well.[47] But what is significant and merits detailed analysis is the willingness of many neo-Marxist social scientists implicitly to accept the Lower/Mackintosh thesis that Canadian colonialism came to an unglorious and muted end due to the benevolence of the British and the success of the national policy in cutting Canada adrift from its commercial/colonial origins. For those who accept one or another variant of this view, the national question has little interest as a theoretical or analytical issue.[48]

But the question which interests me the most is neither the *parti pris* against the national question nor how many Canadian Marxists in the '80s seem to be able to make such issues as foreign ownership disappear with the wave of the hand, but what replaces these issues and concerns in their writing. If we take the important analysis on the state by Panitch, Wittaker, Wolfe and others,[49] the original theoretical work on regionalism by Pratt and Richards,[50] the new studies on Canadian capitalism by Niosi *et al.*,[51] it becomes clear that contemporary mainstream Canadian political economy has a conceptual framework which glosses over the question of externalities by arguing as if:

- the primary contradiction is between capital and labour in Canada;
- uneven development is largely the product of internal forces and changes in the economy;
- the basic characteristic of the Canadian state is its autonomy vis-à-vis the dominant power bloc or the elites;
- Canadian development, while extroverted initially is now largely autocentric;

- since the '60s, the most important new development has been the emergence of a much strengthened Canadian capitalist elite which has a powerful economic and financial base in and outside Canada;
- that Canada's working class is the principal agent of change having a high degree of consciousness and organizational strength due to a long history and identity of class struggle.

What should we make of these propositions? Do they constitute an advance over the earlier work stimulated by dependency theory? Where is, for instance, the discussion of Canada as a social formation? Where does Quebec fit into this generalized schema? Where do Canada's relations with the U.S. belong? What importance is given to federalism? How are the reformist instincts of the Canadian working class explained? How do these general propositions account for what is happening structurally to the economy? If the object is to produce an understanding of class forces surely, we are very far from this goal in terms of this perspective. Putting it bluntly, it is revealing just how weak orthodox-inspired Marxism is in addressing the real complexities of Canadian society. Yet, this critique is too predictable, too sweeping and more fundamentally misses the point of explaining the pitfall of more orthodox forms of Marxism as a mode of inquiry and discourse.

Simplifying greatly, the weakness of highly generalized Marxist theory is that it creates a narrow methodological imperative defining the principal orientation of the researcher. More than this, it runs the risk and indeed the very high risk of turning into a "closed" discourse based on a deeply rooted pre-conception of what Canadian society is. As the object of inquiry it is assumed that the social relations of Canada can be studied as a variant of the general case of advanced capitalism.[53] In this one respect conventional Marxism is similar methodologically to conventional liberalism. Both share the belief that it is possible to rely on a general model of advanced capitalism to analyze a range of profoundly different situations existing within the industrial world.[54] The common assumption is that the long-run trends of all bourgeois societies are significantly more important then their cultural, economic and institutional differences. Structurally bourgeois societies are regarded as largely homogeneous marked by convergence in social relations. It is this quality of universality, not specificity which is the important object of study. With this as a general starting point it is possible to see how the bias of universal models is to minimize national and cultural differences.

There is no shortage of examples of this approach being adopted by liberal scholarship. In the fifties, it used to be the convention to study Canada in the light of the broad categories of industrialism, ethnicity, bureaucratization with a dose of geographical determinism to explain the forces shaping Canadian society. In the seventies, other models have been employed as theoretical frameworks including functionalism, behaviouralism, systems analysis etc. . . . Liberal social science has been convinced that the issues highlighted in these different perspectives are no less central to Canada then "elsewhere", an euphemism for the United States. Much contemporary Marxism of the "back

forty" variety employs another conventional schema to account for the principal developments in the present and in the past, deriving from the real antagonism between labour and capital, state and class, region and nation, gender and culture.

In downplaying the importance of external factors such a convential approach appears to be a powerful tool of analysis by concentrating on traditional Marxist concepts of class, capitalist development and the state. In the first place, what needs to be emphasized is that mainstream neo-Marxist political economy "sounds right" conceptually. Its simplicity and accessibility stands in marked contrast to the writing on dependency and the national question which superficially does not come together with the same theoretical clarity. For instance, when Panitch conceptualizes the Canadian state as being relatively autonomous, or Pratt and Richards analyze the rise of regional elites in Alberta in terms of the oil and gas boom, or Keeley describes the emergence of *a* Canadian working class culture, their scholarship has a logic and an authentic persuasiveness. Canada with its advanced capitalist relations is indeed closer to Europe economically, politically, culturally than a third world country and in most advanced capitalist countries, externalities play less of a determining role than in Canada. A second consideration is that conventional Marxism seems to be coming to grips with the specificity of the Canadian situation as evidenced by the growing number of empirically-based studies working in this tradition. If anything it is not "conventional" Marxist analysis which appears "selective" or "partial" but the reverse. The charge is often made by more orthodox marxists that it is the dependency theorists such as Naylor, Clement, Levitt who in focusing on externalities have ignored or minimized the importance of "internal" developments!

It is remarkable that the turn towards orthodoxy should have such a strong presence in Canadian political economy at the present time. Over the last decade Marxist theory has made important new advances on a wide range of issues because European Marxists have seriously questioned and reworked many of the basic concepts of Marxism and, in the process, made great strides in theorizing late capitalism both as a general phenomenon *and* in specific national settings.[55] In France, there has been an impressive resurgence of non-orthodox Marxism. Speaking to this issue Christine Buci-Glucksmann and Goran Therborn in *Le défi social démocrate*, stress "the need to liberate Marxism and the Left from certain habits" and reflexes of excessively focusing on the relations of production or uniquely on class conflict of a classical variety. This echoes similar statements made by Bottomore in which he pointed out the central weakness of convential Marxism. "It has become increasingly evident, in the controversies that have gone on since the end of the nineteenth century, that some of the fundamental propositions of Marxist theory concerning the development of the working-class movement, its engagement in political action, and the nature of the transition from capitalist to socialist society need to be subjected to both scientific and ethical criticism".[56]

It is worth noting some of the European socialists scholars who have taken up this challenge. André Gorz in his various writings has repeatedly shown the sterility of convential Marxist theorizing concerning trade union strategy, working class militancy and political consciousness. In his latest book, *Adieu au prolétariat*, he severely criticizes the central Marxist tenet of the "inherently" revolutionary nature of the working class as philosophically indefensible while at the same time analyzing the possibilities and limitations of the working class being an agent of radical transformation in advanced capitalist societies.

On the question of the state, Robert Delorme and Christiane André have produced a remarkable study, *L'État et l'Économie* which examines the historical evolution of the French State theoretically and empirically between 1880-1980. Unlike earlier Marxist studies which paid insufficient attention to its social structures and historical evolution, Delorme and André show the high price Marxist theory has paid in the past in confusing dogma with methodology on this central issue. By contrast, by employing a more adequate methodology what they have done is systematically study and clarify the complex character of the state institutionally, socially and economically. In Marxian economics, there has been a fundamental re-assessment of received wisdom as well. In their respective historical and analytical work on wage/salary relationship over a long period, on *régulation*, and on the mode of capital accumulation. Robert Boyer and Alain Lipietz have developed new theoretical insights into how the relations between capital and labour are structured in advanced capitalist society. What these studies show empirically and theoretically is the wide variation in social structures and configurations which exist in the advanced capitalist world.[57] Indeed these differences are crucial. Marxists who aspire to understand the potential for transformation must not lose sight of them.

These developments in European neo-Marxist theory stand in sharp contrast to the Canadian situation. Here Marxist political economy *is badly in need of large quantities of fresh air* and remains surprisingly intellectually conservative. While it is axiomatic that all inquiry has need of a larger point of reference or theoretical map (as distinct from dogma), the unhealthy reliance on universal models and the rather narrow views about the nature of Marxist inquiry have played their part in preparing the groundwork for the turn towards orthodoxy.

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The recent developments in Canadian political economy are indeed cause for concern. Yet, what also needs to be remembered is that heterodoxy has a long pedigree from Innis onward, and it is the Innisian tradition that despite its liberal origins, has the potential for giving Marxism a new resonance and a relevance[58] in a Canadian setting.

The Innis tradition not only serves as a counterweight to the erroneous idea that Marxism is a science *à tout faire* but it may also be superior to Marxism in explaining the interaction or linkages between culture and the economy as such. It is an important corrective to the frequently narrowly reductionist bias of Marxism in ignoring or minimizing cultural factors. Innis' essential insight was that while

we had the institutions of liberal democracy we lacked *strong* popular and democratic traditions because of a colonial past which was not "past" and because of the peculiar way Canada was settled. Those who came here were either fleeing revolution or were exiled to Canada as the Highland Scots when their revolution failed.[59] It was the presence of a deeply entrenched counter-revolutionary tradition which fundamentally altered not only the liberal democratic character and institutions of Canada but class relations as well.

It is for these reasons that Innis and the subsequent work in the Innis tradition cannot be shunted aside by the Marxist paradigm no matter how sophisticated a class analysis may be produced sometime in the future. This preoccupation with "class analysis" cannot be allowed to hide the fact that there is more to an authentic marxism than "a correct" class analysis. At a deeper level a socialist political strategy has to be able to articulate the social and political aspirations of a people in a way that is distinct, nuanced and recognizable. While not without limitations, Innis perspective is much closer to understanding the rather deceptive and contradictory nature of Canadian capitalism, a feature many Marxists tend to minimize. Kari Levitt has said that our anomalous position in the international hierarchy stems from the fact that we are both rich and underdeveloped. It is this "mix" of uneven development, dependency and advanced capitalism which defines the fundamentally ambiguous character of Canada as a social formation.

For these reasons, the "fit" between neo-Marxist theory and Canadian political economy has rarely been easy. Indeed, many of the current debates about Canadian capitalist development are not new at all if we accept the burden of Penner's research on the origins of Canadian Marxist thought.[60] The same questions and problems were fought over with equal fervor in the twenties and thirties during the formative years of Canadian Marxism. Then as now, Canadian Marxists were divided on fundamental issues regarding Canada as a social formation and the importance of the national question in a Marxist perspective. If there is something to be learned from these polemics (frequently of dubious value) it is to distrust Marxism of the standardized garden variety. Alas, some fifty years later, we are not much closer to agreement on this seemingly simple proposition that because Canada falls between social formations. The Canadian Marxist tradition of political economy is itself going to be marked by the bias of heterodoxy . . . Once again, Canadian Marxist political economy is off on the wrong track, forgetful of what we learned as kids. You can't get to heaven on a Yonge Street car because the trolley, like Canadian Marxism, doesn't quite go that far . . .

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Notes

I would like to thank Sten Kjellberg, Robert Perrin and Ian Parker for their comments and encouragement in writing this article. Special thanks also to Ray Morrow for his editorial suggestions.

1. See my earlier article "Rediscovering Canadian Political Economy" in Wallace Clement and Daniel Drache, *A Practical Guide to Canadian Political Economy*, Toronto, 1978.

2. In particular, David McNally, "Staple Theory as Commodity Fetishism: Marx, Innis and Canadian Political Economy", in the special issue of *Studies in Political Economy*, 6, (Autumn 1981), on rethinking Canadian political economy. In his article, Panitch takes a different approach suggesting that political economists have spent too much time with Innis and not enough with other liberal political economists such a Schumpeter. More importantly, for almost ten years, Marxist political economists have been debating the relevance of Innis and his legacy and this in itself is revealing of Innis' importance to Canadian political economy.

3. See Ray Morrow's excellent critique of the perennial weakness of political economy to establish the linkages between culture and the economic relations of production, *"Deux pays pour vivre*: Critical Sociology and the New Canadian Political Economy", *CJPST*, 6: 1-2, 1982.

4. These themes are expressed in different articles in this special issue of *SPE*. However it is not one issue of *SPE* which is in question but more generally the direction in which political economy is heading. One can see similar kind of debates occurring in other learned journals such as the *Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory*, as well as at the political economy sessions of the CPSA meetings of the Learned Societies.

5. Some of these differences and similarities are found in my earlier article on political economy, op. cit. Ian Parker, "Commodity Fetishism and Vulgar Marxism" (forthcoming in *SPE*) takes a different approach in attacking fundamental misconceptions currently held about Liberal and Marxist political economy.

6. I have the impression that the Marxists "purs et durs" believe that if they search long enough they will discover the "real" Marx. Is there not a parallel between the theologians futile search for the historical Jesus and the Marxists quest for the historical Marx?

7. Ryerson's exchange with Naylor is possibly the most interesting. See his review "Who's Looking After Business," *This Magazine*, 10: 5&6, 1976 and Naylor's reply, *TM*. 11: 1, 1977.

8. Ian Parker notes that this term has a long history with the economists. However, I use it in a much more conventional sense to designate the ensemble of the social and economic relations of colonialism.

9. I have attempted to restate Innis theory of capitalist development in my article "Harold Innis and Canadian Capitalist Development" *CJPST*, 6: 1-2 (Winter/Spring, 1982).

10. Leo Panitch, op. cit., p. 19.

11. Harold Logan, "Labour Costs and Labour Standards" *Labour in Canadian — American Relations*, ed. H.A. Innis, Toronto, 1937.

12. *Ibid.*, pp. 88-89.

13. Pentland, op. cit., p. 72.

14. Logan, *Logan, op. cit., p. 179.*

15. Kenneth Buckley, *Capital Formation in Canada, 1896-1930*, Toronto: The Carleton Library, No. 77. 1977.

16. Pentland, op. cit., p. 3.

17. There is a striking similarity in Pentland's argument about real wages falling in Canada during this period and the similar case in Europe. See Robert Boyer's article, "Wage formation in historical perspective: the French Experience", *Cambridge Journal of Economics*, 3, 1979.

18. Robert Boyer, op. cit., p. 100.

19. In this formulation, I have been influenced partially by the work of Boyer, op. cit. In a paper entitled "Staples and the Formation of the Working Class", I try to explain how the different labour markets affected the formation of the working class. For historical data on wages, consult *Select Documents in Canadian Economic History, 1497-1783*, H.A. Innis and A.R.M. Lower eds., Toronto, 1929. As well see D. McCaullum, on the disparity between English Canadian and French wage rates in *Unequal Beginnings*, Toronto, 1980.

20. S. Ryerson, *Unequal Union: Confederation and the Roots of Conflict in the Canadas, 1815-1873*, Toronto, 1968.

21. R.T. Naylor, *The History of Canadian Business, 1867-1914*, Toronto, 1975.

22. *Ibid.*

23. Glen Williams, "Canadian industrialization: We ain't Growin "Nowhere," *This Magazine*, 9: 1 (March-April, 1975).

24. H.G. Aitken, "A note on the Capital Resources of Upper Canada," *CJEPS*, 18:4 (November, 1952). H.C. Pentland, "The Role of Capital in Canadian Economic Development before 1875," *CJEPS*, 16:3 (November, 1950). For additional information, consult Kari Levitt, *Silent Surrender. The Multinational Corporation in Canada*, Toronto, 1970.

25. Frank Underhill, *In Search of Canadian Liberalism*, Toronto, 1960, analyzes the evolution of Canada's colonial condition and the impact of Canada's colonial ties on the formation of the party system.

26. See Underhill's analysis of these events, *op. cit.*

27. W.A. Mackintosh, *Economic Background to Dominion Provincial Relations*, reprinted in McClelland and Stewart, Carleton Library, N° 13, 1964.

28. Ryerson, *Unequal Union: Confederation and the Roots of Conflict in the Canadas, 1815-1873.* For a powerful critique of Ryerson's analysis of 1837, consult Roch Denis, *Luttes de classes et Question Nationale au Québec, 1948-1968*, Montréal 1979, particularly Chapter I.

29. This is a work Naylor completed over two years ago. Despite its breadth and originality, it has been rejected for a publishing grant from the SSHRC. This rejection is both scandalous and unwarranted and has resulted in blocking its publication.

30. Relatively little work has been done on the transformation of ideologies in English Canada. However, this is not the case in Quebec. See for instance, Denis Monière, *Ideologies in Quebec: the Historical Development*, Toronto, 1981.

31. Pentland, op. cit. "In terms of ideology and attitudes, the broader "rural" population is perhaps more significant than the "farm" population. Over half the Canadian population was classified as "rural" up to 1921, and the proportion had only declined to *43% in 1941*. (Emphasis added D.D.), p. 21.

32. In *The Break-up of Britain*, 1973, Tom Nairn has made an outstanding contribution to "rethinking" regionalism and nationalism in a Marxist perspective. In the Canadian context, two works deserve special mention: Paul Philips, *Regional Disparities*, rev. ed., Toronto, 1982 and Garth Stevenson, *Unfulfilled Union: Canadian Federalism and National Unity*, 2nd edition, Toronto, 1982.

33. It is an interesting commentary on Canadian Marxism that there was a general consensus following the publication of Miliband's *State and Capitalist Society*, that his principal concept of autonomy would apply here. However, despite an abundance of articles, there has been little primary research on the foundation and evolution of the Canadian state which would examine the Milibandian or any other hypothesis in a Canadian setting!! Indeed, much of the theorizing on the Canadian state is based on a rather modest amount of empirical evidence. An exception is David Wolfe's thesis and articles on the evolution of state economic policy since 1945.

34. This privilege of "home rule" and "representative democracy" is one of the distinguishing features of "white" dominion colonies. Certainly after the American revolution all of the remaining colonies did in fact "negotiate" albeit within a narrow framework their colonial status. It is this aspect of imperialism which Lower idealized and celebrated in his book *From Colony to Nation.*

35. In Quebec, there is a spate of articles, books and monographs on class and the national question. Among others, see, Nicole Laurin-Frenette, *Production de l'État et Formes de la Nation*, Montréal, 1978; Gilles Bourque, et G. Dostaler, *Socialisme et Indépendance*, Montréal, 1980. In English Canada, by contrast, we have yet to scratch the surface of this central question. N. Penner, *The Canadian Left: A critical Analysis*, Toronto, 1977, analyzes the twists and turns of the Canadian CP vis-à-vis its perception of the national question. In a forthcoming article, Daniel Latouche details the vacillation and confusion of English Canadian intellectuals with regard Quebec's demands for a new political status.

36. H.C. Pentland, *Labour and The Development of Industrial Capitalism in Canada*, Toronto, 1981.

37. H.C. Pentland, op. cit. See particularly, Chaps, 1-3.

38. S. Ryerson, *Unequal Union: Confederation and the Costs of Conflict in the Canadas, 1815-1873.*

39. Roch Denis, *Luttes de classes et Question nationale au Québec*, 1948-1968.

40. Wallace Clement, *Continental Corporate Power: Economic Linkages between Canada and the United States*, Toronto, 1977.

41. For Watkin's original and classic defence of the staple theory, see "A Staple Theory of Economic Growth" reprinted in *Approaches to Canadian Economic History*, eds. W.T. Easterbrook and Mel Watkins. For this more recent view consult his "The Staple Theory Revisited", *Journal of Canadian Studies*, 12: 5, 1977 and "Innis and Political Economy", *CJPST*, 6: 1-2, 1982.

42. Kari Levitt, *Silent Surrender: the Multinational Corporation in Canada*, Toronto, 1970.

43. R.T. Naylor, *The History of Canadian Business 1867-1914*, 2 vol., Toronto, 1975.

44. In "Harold Innis and Canadian Capitalist Development", I have tried to show that the staple is not the most important aspect of Innis' theoretical framework. Rather, his theory of disequilibrium and rigidities is the most original and lasting part of the Innis legacy.

45. Normally, the national question is defined too narrowly as being principally external between Canada and the United States or by contrast, largely internal between Quebec and English-speaking Canada. But this conventional approach hardly begins to do justice to its complexity. What we need to consider is a different way of understanding the national question as consisting of three related facets: the external including how Canada's colonial relationship was reproduced internally, the bi-national, English Canada's refusal to recognize Quebec's national status in the Confederation settlement; the regional aspects, the uneven and unequal development promoted by the state and elites. Usually these three issues are thought to be unrelated and separate but what I am suggesting is that these major co-ordinates are in their origin and in their modern guise aspects of colonialism and uneven development. On this key question, we would do well to pay heed to Ryerson's "Postcript" found in the French edition of *Unequal Union*. Even he underestimated "the importance of the national factor in the historical

process". *Le Capitalisme et la Confédération*, pp. 508-509.

46. See note 35.

47. European Marxist studies of class and national formation provide the base for the more general theoretical writing on different aspects of capitalism and capitalist development. This has long been the tradition in Europe dating from Marx's own writings on class and national formation. Recent contributors include E.P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class*, London, 1968; Tom Nairn, *The Break-up of Britain*, 1977; André Gorz, *Adieu au Prolétariat*, Paris, 1981.

48. The English-Canadian Left has not placed much importance on coming to terms with this issue theoretically or politically. Evidence of this can be seen in the fact that despite an excellent series of books sponsored by (SPEC) Studies in Political Economy of Canada, there has been no initiative to develop a collection articles on this central issue.

49. A sampling of their views is found in the collection of essays edited by Lee Panitch, *Canadian State: Political Economy and Political Power*, Toronto, 1977.

50. Larry Pratt and John Richards, *Prairie Capitalism*, Toronto, 1979.

51. J. Niosi, *La Bourgeoisie Canadienne*, Montréal, 1980.

52. G. Kealey, *Toronto Workers Respond to Industrial Capitalism*, Toronto, 1980; Bryan Palmer, *A Culture in Conflict*, Montréal, 1979. Much of the new labour history appears in *Labour/Le travailleur*. For two opposing evaluations of the new labour history, see G. Kealey, "Labour and Working Class History in Canada". Prospects in the 1980s," *Labour/Le travailleur*, 7, 1981, and David Bercuson, "Through the Looking Glass of Culture," *Labour/Le travailleur*, 7, 1981.

53. The most widely used text in Canadian political science by Richard Van Loon and Michael Wittington, *The Canadian Political System*, is a case in point. However, in a revised edition, they have thought it prudent to include some of the new work in political economy on dependency, the state, uneven development, etc. . . The "grafting process" doesn't take and even with an expanded bibliography these minor concessions do not alter their theoretical framework of regarding Canada as a variant of advanced capitalism.

54. See, for instance, Ralph Miliband's classic study. *The State and Capitalist Society*, in which he basically minimizes the cultural, historical and economic differences affecting the role and function of the state in different European countries. But are these differences as insignificant as he alleges? In their exchange in the *New Left Review*, Poulantzas takes Milliband to task for his "one-worldism" and the ahistorical character of this sort of analysis. Needless to say, Marxism of the Milibandian variety, while allowing us to see important long-run similarities, nonetheless, is seriously compromised by its European ethno-centricity.

55. This question of conventional Marxism and the problem of specificity is not a new issue for European Marxists. As the growing body of literature amply shows there is no *a priori* reason why the Marxist tradition need trade in stereotypes or adopt rigid theoretical views.

56. T.B. Bottomore, *Marxist Sociology*, London: 1963, p. 56-7.

57. See, for instance, Emmanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World Economy in the Sixteenth century*, New York, 1974; Christiane André et Robert Delorme, *L'État et l'Économie*, Paris, 1982; Roger Boyer et J. Mistral *Accumulation, Inflation, Crises*, Paris, 1978; Michel Aglietta, *Régulation et Crises du Capitalisme*, Paris, 1976.

58. While the Innis tradition has, what could be called, a "competitive advantage" historically and sociologically, it is not in itself sufficient to substain and indigenous Marxist tradition. Indeed, here as elsewhere Marxists need to be open to a variety of Marxist and non-Marxist sources for research and theoretical work.

59. This theme/observation appears in a number of Innis' articles written in the thirties and forties. See his essays in *Canadian Economic History*, ed. Mary Q. Innis, Toronto, 1956.

60. *The Canadian Left. A Critical Analysis*, Toronto, 1977.

Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory/Revue canadienne de théorie politique et sociale, Vol. 7, No. 3, (Fall/Automne, 1983).

OVERCOMING DEPENDENCY: A PLEA FOR TWO NATIONS*

Marcel Rioux and Susan Crean

Having followed us up to this point, the reader will have noticed our critical standpoint not only towards the United States' economic and cultural domination of Canada and Québec, but furthermore towards the kind of society which has been practiced in the West. Moreover, we have particularly stressed the cultural aspect of this imperialism, as well as the cultural contradictions of such so-called industrially advanced societies, contradictions which decide economic crises. But before we proceed to outline the possible developments which are still at an embryonic stage and which must be elucidated and brought to light, we would like to deal with a number of ambiguous points which are inherent to our criticism. We are referring, naturally, to our particular usage of the notion of culture.

In actual fact, many have already discovered the notion of quality of life along with new values which would restore meaning to people's lives at the tail end of the twentieth century. Cultural affairs, cultural policies and cultural development are widely spoken of today. In Québec, the Parti Québécois government has established a Ministry of Cultural Development because of an awareness on the part of certain segments of the population regarding the threat posed to culture by political and economic domination, an awareness which has existed for more than two centuries. For the last two decades, every political party which has come to power has created legislation affecting language and, more generally, culture. Fearing a case of genocide, the State deemed it necessary to take action. One might believe that in order to escape this situation, the State must legislate, establish new administrative structures, and exercise a strict watch over the "francicizing" of business and other sectors of public life. However, one might not perceive that such measures for the public good reinforce the power of the State and tighten the grip of technocrats and bureaucrats on vital sectors of social life. Therein lies the hazard which confronts any who demand the intervention of the State to defend itself against the dangers presented by a condition of dependence and domination — political and economic. Thus, in

* Translated from the French by Kathy Sabo in collaboration with Greg Nielsen (Université de Montréal) for the *CJPST.* This article constitutes the final chapter of the French version of Marcel Rioux and Susan Crean's *Deux pays pour vivre: un plaidoyer.* Montréal: HMH, 1980, pp. 89-112.

Québec, those who favour the progressive creation of a self-managing society where the powers appropriated by the State would be by definition re-distributed among the regions and working and living collectives, are generally in favour of a government stronger than that of Canada. But there lies a contradiction which can only be overcome if people maintain a close surveillance of the State and constantly demand the decentralization of its powers, both old and new.

In cultural matters, it is to be feared that the State, intervening with just cause to ward off the danger of national genocide, might come to consider cultural development as a kind of extension of economic development. At the core of the matter is the application of the consumer society model, predominant in the realm of material goods (i.e. a few producers with a majority of consumers), to the realm of symbolic goods. Whether the producers are in the service of the State or private enterprise, the outcome is virtually unchanged: citizens remain passive, satisfied to consume. If culture is that which gives meaning to life, to society and to nature, why, then, is this meaning produced by specialized agencies: on the one hand, the schools, and on the other, the means of mass communication. From the beginnings of industrial society, its citizens, starting with the working class, have been stripped of their traditions, knowledge and skills to the profit of a growing number of specialists who fragment life and cultures. Thus reassuming control of one's own destiny begins with culture. It is, then, for lack of a better term, a matter of "popular culture". Francis Hearn[1] shows how, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the English working class was stripped of its age-old culture and incorporated into the dominant society by the bourgeoisie. In our case, it is not a question of proselytizing some kind of return to days gone by but rather one of enabling citizens themselves to create the representations and values which, in the end, give meaning to their lives.

The sociologist Fernand Dumont has made the following comment on the subject:

> It is perhaps possible to hope for the removal of this censure which hangs over 'popular culture' through the combined efforts of sociologies of production and bourgeois representations of high culture. But it cannot be reduced to its opposite, identifying 'people' with an abstract 'proletariat' fulfilling its historical destiny with the guidance of professors or dictators likely to understand and manipulate history. Popular cultures have retained a singular sense of the kind of life, the solidarity of neighbourhood and kinship, the bonds of practice and culture which are spoken of so abstractly in epistemologies. Therein lies the promise, not of the past or its resurrection, nor of a folkloric repetition, but rather of social change in which culture takes up the gauntlet.[2]

We are far from what has been called the "culturalist frenzy", which in France, for example, at a given time resulted in the establishment of "cultural centres": people of all regions had to be introduced to the treasures of French culture. "Never," Antonin Artaud, "have we spoken so much of civilization when life itself is fading away." Thus, if the American empire extends its cultural domination in order to better assure its economic and technological domination, each country existing in its orbit begins to wave the cultural banner to conceal exploitation and alienation. We readily speak of quality of life, of cultural democracy, implying that all citizens should have the benefit of a certain "culture" which, until only recently, was restricted to elites. In this context, the ideal of cultural democracy follows on the heels of economic democracy, just as that of cultural development traces the idea of economic development. Indeed, it is a matter of retaining the political and economic system as such, while adding to it a few more material and symbolic goods for the purpose of consumption. In our view, it is clear that the citizens' reassuming control of their destiny does not stop at culture. Far from it — rather it is aimed at the political and the economic; the self-managing society must proceed toward the control of these three social instances.

A final comment on the subject will suffice. Curiously enough, even those who side with the "people" ideologically, and who demonstrate great concern for them, nonetheless remain elitist. Bertolt Brecht, in his writings on theatre wrote:

> The history of all falsifications that have been operated with this conception of *Volkstum* (popular elements) is a long and complex story which is part of the history of the class war. We shall not embark on it but shall simply keep in mind the fact of such forgery whenever we speak of our need for popular art, meaning art *for* the broad masses of the people, for the many oppressed by the few, 'the people proper', the mass of *producers* that has so long been the object of politics and now has to become its subject.[3]

The great revolution of recent years has been the citizens' increasing dissatisfaction with simply delegating power (be it even to create a "popular" art destined for the people); they are choosing rather to assume such power themselves. All this merely demonstrates that the measures taken by the Québec government to protect and develop a national culture, while admirable, consequently reinforce the power of the State, and cannot suffice to halt American imperialism nor to produce the conditions for a re-distribution of power between Canada and Québec.

It seems, in our view, that for the reasons previously mentioned, the problems of our epoch must be considered in their entirety. We allow ourselves to adopt such a perspective, certainly not because we believe that we possess a ready-made solution, but because we hold that isolating these contradictions can only aggravate them. At this point let us return to our earlier remarks concerning John Hutchison's important work, *Dominance and Dependency*.[4] Hutchison has discussed three major contradictions in Canada, and we paraphrase: firstly, the binational and bilingual nature of Canada; secondly the regions with their provincial governments; and thirdly, the contradiction of the relations between Canada and the United States. The author examines the latter without, however, denying the equal importance of the first two. To simplify matters, one may say that the three have been dealt with from three angles: Québec-Canada — two nations, two languages — would present a cultural contradiction; the regions and the central government would pose a political problem; the contradiction created by historical relations between Canada and the United States would be of an economic nature. Without envisaging these contradictions as overlapping or, even better, as reacting upon each other, one cannot hope to overcome them, much less describe them. It is clear that if these contradictions are merely identified as if they only existed locally in a world which had simply to be patched here and there, then a fourth dimension is not taken into account, one which relates to the fundamental nature of the type of society to which Canada and Québec, among others, belong. We must underscore the fact that this fourth dimension — in short, the crisis of civilization through which the West is passing — can help us in the development of hypotheses which would suggest solutions to the problems posed by Hutchison's three contradictions. And it is perhaps because of the principal contradiction of our industrially developed societies — the separation and fragmentation of society and knowledge — that we approach our problems with the attitude of an amateur mechanic who tinkers with each part of a motor without wondering if the whole is equal to what is asked of it. In other words, treating separately the political, economic and cultural contradictions identified in Canada seems, in our view, destined to lead to unrealistic solutions. Even if one were to consider Hutchison's contradictions in a global manner, and as limited to each other, without taking into account those which are specific to industrialized societies, it would seem that here again, an important dimension, indeed perhaps the most important, would pass unnoticed. If the word "radical" were not such a hackneyed term, we would describe our approach as such. Indeed, to be radical is to go to the root of a problem to examine it. In our case, the root seems to be precisely our type of society, or, in other words, our mode of production. It remains to ask ourselves which, in the final analysis, is the principal instance: culture or economy?

If we examine the economic analyses in Québec and Canada which detail the United States' domination over these regions, we cannot help but be inclined to think that the authors of these analyses deplore the fact that here in Canada the accomplishment of the same kind of "development" is hindered. We have no

wish to generalize Walter Gordon's position regarding the ensemble of economic critics who denounce American dependence and domination, but for lack of any other project of society which they would oppose to that of this country, it seems to us that their criticisms reach a dead end. What can be said of writings which, like those of the Pépin-Robarts Commission, let the economic and cultural domination of the United States pass unmentioned, and, by dint of contortions dictated by good intentions, end up balkanizing Canada in order to assure the perpetuation of Ottawa's technocrats and bureaucrats? The Pépin-Robarts report remains the best example of insipidness of all the reports coming out of the Canadian State. It claimed to present a political approach, but at best one could say that it epitomized state control was bureaucratic and abstract. Had it not been for Mme Chaput-Rolland's tears and wringing of hands this document would have passed unnoticed in Québec as well as in Canada.

If our inclinations bear us towards the cultural dimension, it is also very clear that this approach carries with it serious risks in addition to that of reinforcing the power of the State. To deal with culture without taking into consideration politics and the economy, as if it existed as a separate element and as if cultural dependence were not the extension of economic domination, would also be highly unrealistic. If our conception of society is correct, that is to say that its parts are interrelated, we can produce hypotheses regarding any one of them with the assurance that we will encounter the others along the way. We will begin our approach, however, with a demand that seems to be present in several sections of the population and at a variety of levels: precisely the demands of autonomy which is opposed to heteronomy. For a society, to be heteronomous is to receive the laws which govern from another, or to be led by forces beyond its control. It seems to us that many protest movements have been marked by the aim and conquest of autonomy, from the anti-imperialist battles of the Third World, through the many groups and individuals who are reasserting control over their lives, up to the feminist movements. A number of years ago, one of us (Rioux) wrote the following: To the extent that the ever greater development of technical society has eroded the traditions which incorporated different aims to be achieved in a global society, such aims are now largely determined by the finality of society's cumulative processes: economic growth and technological development. The goals of advanced industrial society, its ideology, are incorporated within its own system of production. Up to the present day in such a type of society, the different agents of education have aimed at producing a *normal* man, that is to say one adapted to this kind of society, one who consumes and produces as society dictates. Not only does theoretical sociology favour adaptation, statistical normality, in taking equilibrium as its key concept, but furthermore, different applications of the social sciences base their therapeutic prescriptions on the idea that individuals must adapt to society at all costs and must not disturb the status quo. The great leap which the society of tomorrow has to accomplish is the passage from the *normal* man to the *normative* one. According to the biologist Kurt Goldstein, a simply adapted existence can be one of an unhealthy

organism, adjusted, however, to a restricted environment.

> A healthy man, he notes, is not *normal* man, but normative man, one who is able to create and accept norms. The externally-oriented man of our industrial societies must be succeeded by the autonomous man, capable of establishing his personality and behaviour on values which he will be able to create and accept.[5]

This point of view would seem to be sound, perhaps even more so today than ever.

Before we proceed any further, two remarks are necessary. First of all, it is clearly not our position to embrace a point of view akin to some modified expression of "moral revivalism", that is to say the belief that if individuals change their ways one by one, society will be changed in the end. As we do not abstractly and arbitrarily separate individual and society, and as we believe them to be dialectically linked, we do take both into consideration. In clearer terms, this means that if institutions must be altered as much as individuals, nonetheless, a given type of society will correspond, to use Reisman's expression, to a particular "social character". But which comes first — the mode of production or the social character? We think the two are inextricably linked, that they construct themselves simultaneously, albeit with one or the other lagging behind creating tensions which could result in a revolution of the right or left.

Our second remark concerns the ambiguities stemming from the usage of two notions: autonomy and autonomization. In standard dictionaries, "autonomy" bears the idea of non-dependence, non-domination and the power to decide for oneself. It is in this sense that we employ it. In contrast, the notion of autonomization carries the idea of a separation which distorts reality and which denotes an ideological position, which in this context is erroneous. This meaning may be found in a number of works belonging to the Marxist tradition, and earlier, when we warned of the danger of separating the contradictions discerned in Canada and Québec, it was autonomization that we had in mind. The context will indicate whether it is a matter of autonomy or autonomization.

Protosocialism and advanced capitalism

These remarks concluded, it would seem that in fact if we adopt the critical point of view, it can be perceived that the proceedings which we have drawn up from several scenarios not only apply in opposition to advanced capitalism and its imperialist extensions, but also against proto-socialism, "actually existing

socialism" to employ Rudolf Bahro's expression.[6] Moreover, from a normative perspective, which is the one preferred, we arrive at the notions of self-liberation, self-creation and self-management. Commenting on Bahro, Marcuse wrote:

> The inertia and weakness of the masses, their dependence, which is expressed, in capitalist countries, by the people-dominant class dichotomy, and in socialist ones by the civil servants-people dichotomy, tends almost by necessity towards an autonomization of the "top". He is of the opinion that this evolution may be thwarted by the progressive establishment of a sort of Organization of Councils (self-managed, cooperative).[7]

Clearly, if we examine the two dominant types of society — protosocialist and capitalist — from this critical perspective, then the explicit and implicit assumptions on which these two types are based must be rejected. In the first case, the idea of a concordance between theory and practice, between logic and history, becomes invalid; no longer only the proletariat but each individual, each group, becomes a historical subject. Moreover, primacy is restored to subjectivity and the conscience, a primacy which they had previously lost in favour of a mechanistic logomachy. The same results hold in capitalist countries. The idea that the right society is at the end of wild economic growth and unlimited technological development finds itself repudiated in favour of another. The latter proposes that everyone — individuals, groups and collectives — become increasingly more aware of the dead ends towards which their societies are heading, and decide to progressively free themselves, create themselves and manage themselves. Collectives in both types of society have abandoned their autonomy to the profit of segments of dominant classes which take upon themselves the concern of leading society to their greater class benefit. How, then, can we explain this voluntary or forced abdication by the largest part of their societies, and how is it to be emancipated? The notion of emancipation is central to the intellectual tradition to which Marcuse belongs. It is derived from the judicial notion which designates the end of guardianship, or the son's autonomy with regard to his father, thus the acquisition of one autonomy in relation to another. How can the fact be explained that individuals and groups throughout history have been forced into dependency, and often have accepted it? Bahro and Marcuse mention compensation. Emancipation is abandoned for security which the dominator — be it class, society or empire — promises to its subordinates. The sovereign defends the serf against other sovereigns; the bourgeoisie develops forces of production and everyone profits; through the empire, order is maintained in opposition to external barbarians. In just such a way the non-denunciation of the United State's economic domination over Canada is considered as the price to be paid for a higher standard of living.

Traditionally, women have submitted to men in return for so-called protection and economic security.

Today it seems that in a growing number and variety of cases, groups and individuals of several countries are placing emancipation and autonomy at the forefront of their political demands. As these lines are being written during the Iranian and Afghan crises, we can clearly see how compensation operates at an international level. Each of the two empires feeds on the other, using the promise of their protection and "pax americana" or "sovietica". This enables them to rule over the citizens of each and over the countries defined by each of them as falling within their sphere of influence; that is to say the countries which they can use as buffers and as reserves of raw materials and/or as commercial outlets. In the name of a principle of terror, those groups of bad citizens who dare "divide" their country are exposed to public condemnation. According to the United States, Russia threatens American citizens by monitoring them with increased closeness in Iran, while the USSR claims to be threatened within close range of its borders. This becomes a marvellous opportunity for each dominant class to restore its image and to justify all kinds of "gulags". And while internal protest increases in scale within these two empires, nothing better reinforces the hegemony of the dominant classes than sending citizens off to die for the hegemony of their country in Afghanistan or Vietnam. Let the Moslems of the USSR and American dissidents hold it to be true: their Empire is keeping watch. What better reason to reaffirm internal power and to eliminate the enemies of the people than an external threat? In this way empires and dominant classes perpetuate their hold over their satellites and their people as a whole.

In our view, two things must be distinguished: on the one hand, the defense of national territory, and on the other, the maintaining and expansion of the empire. The new type of society, which we believe to be emerging, is in no way at variance with the defence of territory, in fact, quite the opposite. When each citizen has the opportunity to participate in the nation, when each group feels responsible for its actions and no longer considers itself manipulated by the power elites, then the efforts made toward territorial defence can be maximized. Moreover, the new type of society no longer justifies the domination of one class over another, nor that of one country over others; thus, armed confrontations to assure the control of citizens and countries can be avoided. In any case, over the last few years, we have observed an increase in the number of non-aligned countries, those who refuse to be taken under the wing of the superpowers, being aware of the exorbitant price of dependency; others are only waiting for the opportune moment to inform the empire that they are taking back their freedom. Within the empires themselves, individuals and groups through different means which vary in the USA and the USSR, also wish to stop being manipulated by their own dominant classes and are rebelling against exploitation, domination and alienation. Otherwise, given that the natural resources which sustain both internal and external domination are gradually becoming scarcer, humanity will become engaged in struggles which bring only death and

destruction. Thus our reflections on societies, far from ignoring the war of empires, fully take it into consideration since whatever would become intolerable within one country would become the same in the others as well. Indeed, we hold that both types of domination, internal and external, go hand in hand and are subject to the same logic. In simple terms, one could say that this logic is based on the domination and exploitation of nature. Nature is given to man for him to make use of after having discovered its laws. In accordance with this logic, a mode of production based on such an assumption regarding nature — the ever-increasing development of productive forces — would come to dominate, exploit and manipulate people. What Habermas has called instrumental activity applies not only to nature but to man as well; that which Lenin called the highest stage of capitalism, i.e. imperialism, closely follows the lines of this logic of domination and exploitation. To put it plainly, to battle imperialism is to attack values, representations and conduct which are the logical extensions of those at the heart of societies resulting from the industrial revolution, whether they are in protosocialism or in advanced capitalism. To deny the relation between the type of society and its imperialist embodiments is to conceal part of the truth. In our case, this assertion does not move us first of all to economic or political reforms, but rather to cultural ones. The state of subordination of one country to another not only passes through the "opting out of the empire" to accomplish the same thing as this empire, but, as Bahro states:

> A general abolition of the state of subordination is the only alternative which can confront the unlimited expansion of material needs (. . .) the cultural revolution, overcoming the state of subordination, represents the *necessary conditions* (author's emphasis) for breaking with the extensive economic dynamics and for reinserting man in the balance of nature.[8]

The East German authorities must take these ideas seriously since the editor, on the cover of the French translation of this work, wrote: "Bahro was arrested on the twenty-third of August, 1977 and sentenced during closed proceedings to eight years in prison." Since then, he has been freed and expelled from East Germany.

Those of our readers who could be reassured by the thought that this cultural revolution advocated by Bahro aims at the transformation of protosocialism, actually existing socialism, to institute advanced capitalism, our system, are deceiving themselves. As Marcuse so clearly observed (*Les temps modernes,* nº 394), Bahro declaims against both types of society, even though like many other dissidents, he would probably have preferred the opportunity to go to advanced capitalist countries to spread his ideas rather than go to prison. Criticizing both types of society does not mean that one cannot hold a preference for one or the other. It is the case, however, that the imperialism which threatens us is on our doorstep, and is therefore the one we must criticize.

Returning to those ideas of autonomy, non-subordination and non-dependency which seem to have marked recent protest movements, we must also

stress another extremely important break which has occured during the same time in the idea of nature. It would not be far from the truth to state that the emergence of another conception of nature can be observed each time history takes a new direction. And if more and more today we have begun to doubt that man must dominate nature, or on the other hand that he must submit to it, as is the case in other types of culture, and if we have begun to believe that he must live in harmony with nature, then are we not on the verge of an extremely important mutation? We can already detect the existence of a definite coherence between the non-subordination of individuals, groups and countries and the non-domination and non-exploitation of nature. Expressed in a positive fashion, these new representations and values lead to self-liberation, self-autonomy and self-management, and beyond that, to an increasing responsibility towards oneself, others and towards nature. This is evidently at variance with the instituted culture on which our societies base themselves.

To point out these new desires and practices is also to say that they are colliding with all the weight of the institutions of domination, with conformist mentalities and with tremendous interests acquired by the power elites. As of yet, nothing is won; the imperialisms draw back from the exterior and within their own national borders only with great resistance. Real crises and those which they will provoke serve as pretexts to suppress dissidents and to legitimize the existing order, However, the other side of the coin does not appear as gloomy. If this cultural revolution has truly begun, then it means that, as Gramsci remarked in regard to culture, the fabric of society, the representations and values which hold its elements together, has already begun to tear and disintegrate. This is as true for the USSR as it is for the USA.

Be that as it may, all those who do not wish to adapt to the present, who can no longer find guides among intellectual leaders to direct them toward some Eden, who no longer possess an Arcadia towards which they could point their compass, these individuals owe it to themselves to reassume their autonomy, and to exercise it at all levels and in all sectors of their lives. This implies that the idea of progress on which our societies have lived for more than two centuries must be radically revised. Such a change of course can be expressed by the following: the appropriation of nature by man must be subordinated to man's appropriation of his own nature, which becomes the finality around which the others are ordered. Thus politics, taken in its widest sense, must subsume the economic; we will be led to distinguish civil society, political society and the State. And in contrast to other thinkers, both liberal and socialist, we do not have in mind the ideal of a transparent society where the State, politics and law would be abolished because they would no longer be necessary. Rather we conceive of a society in which the contradictions and varied interests of life in society would be recognized, but where they would also be managed in the most realistic way possible. Since the liberal and socialist societies actually existing in this, the latter part of the twentieth century, have arrived at the limits of their possibilities, it no longer seems possible to patch them here and there. On the other hand, if one agrees with Pierre Rosanvallon in thinking that Adam Smith's

successor is Marx himself, then it will be no surprise to find that Bahro's criticism of present day socialism is akin to the criticism which Marcuse, among others, had already aimed at existing advanced capitalism. To arrive at such a relation, Smith must first be perceived not as the herald of the bourgeoisie, nor as the apostle of nascent capitalism,but as the one who, in the eighteenth century, formulated economic ideology which is not capitalist practice. According to Smith, the economic is no longer incorporated into the social but rather the latter into the former; the market, says Rosanvallon, becomes a mechanism of social organization more so than one of economic regulation. Furthermore, and of equal importance:

> Liberalism, as the ideology of the market, is asserted in this manner in the struggle to deterritorialize the economy and to construct a flexible and homogeneous space, structured only by the geography of prices.[9]

Transnationals carry this movement to an extreme by deterritorializing not only the economy but politics and culture as well. In this new organization of society,

> The State accompanies the individual's assertion as a sufficient subject, collecting the dividends of a cultural mutation which it helped accelerate, indeed create, with respect to religion, equally implying the autonomization of individual in regard to the intermediary forms of sociability.[10]

Opinion polls, so popular today, have become the means of achieving Bentham's panoptic.

> The strength of the science of wealth was to produce an international 'culture' going beyond all political divisions (. . .) the market was to become the new *patria communis* of humanity.[11]

According to Rosanvallon, Marx's close ties to Smith stem from his having confused the practice of capitalism in the nineteenth century with liberal ideology.

> It is not enough, he writes, to expose the disfunctioning of the market's economy and to proceed to a 'scientific' analysis of the logic of capitalism in order to break with the liberal utopia. Liberalism, in fact, cannot be reduced to an economic doctrine of *laissez-faire*. More profoundly, it implies a representation of politics and society paradoxically common to social theories recognized as antagonistic. It is actually the common core from which most modern representations of

> society have developed. It is in this sense that Marx is, in my opinion, Smith's successor. (. . .) The problem posed for us is in fact one of a *global transcendance of modernity*. There will be no radical transformation of society if this is not clarified by a representation of the world which expels liberalism from our minds.[12]

Rosanvallon only retains from 'liberalism' that which he calls the legal State and the extension of men's rights. In this respect, the decline of the State advocated by Marx is nothing more than the consequence of political decline. It is no longer a matter of aiming to achieve a transparent society where politics, the State, law and whatever else would be banished.

> To be freed from utopian liberalism is to conceive of political society in its double difference with the State and with civilian society; it is to autonomize (we remain sceptical in this regard) and to particularize the political domain, not to dissolve it. It is also to say that democracy can develop only with the recognition of the irreducibility of social division and conflict; furthermore, it is to understand democracy as a never-ending battle of difficulties with its object, rather than as a transitory reality. In a word, it is to return to politics. This condition being met, we may be able to cease being orphans of lost illusions, to continue struggling day after day for a present which would no longer be simply the expectation of and preparation for a great dream; *we would be certain, like the poet, that our heritage was not preceded by any testament.*[13] (our emphasis)

It goes without saying that the few general remarks which we will formulate with respect to Canada and Québec will take into account these notions of civil, political and State society. Indeed, it seems that these two entities, because of the numerous contradictions which appear in them as well as because of their pluralism, can serve as fertile matter for discussion, more so than in unitarian countries such as the USA. We will also take this opportunity to discuss the role of political parties and social movements as well as the relations which they could and should maintain. In this way it can be seen that the most important proceedings are skirted, in Canada as much as in Québec. In latter years, the Québec question has been brought to the attention of a vast public, but because the debate has tended to be monopolized by political parties — who wish to seize control of the State — the political questions have largely been discussed according to the holding of power rather than for themselves. This is even more the case in the United States where politicians are interested only in power and shamelessly let this be known.

Evidently one must examine what the evolution of capitalist as well as

socialist societies has produced from the point of view of civil society, the State and political society. Our survey will be brief concerning actually existing socialism: the State has incorporated everything; the expression and discussion of choices of society are not tolerated at any level, be it civil or political. The debate between Marx and Bakunin was resolved a long time ago: statism won hands down. Truly, anarchism represented the only other solution, and this alternative must be transcended. The question is more complex in capitalist societies and at first glance one might believe that they present a greater range of choices. The stakes of the February 18, 1980 election were described by a Canadian journalist in the following way: the object was to see if Canadians had the right to change governments. When it is realized that hardly any difference exists between the two parties likely to take power and that one believes supremacy to be God-given, then the choices of Canadians are reduced to their simplest expressions. We could reasonably say that through the increasing industrialization and urbanization of our countries, not only has political society disappeared, but civil society itself has been eroded and disintegrated by the State and the actions of its institutions. André Gorz wrote the following comment, which would seem to be fitting:

> The break between production and consumption, working life and 'leisure' results from the destruction of autonomous capacities in favour of the capitalist division of labour. It allows the sphere of market relations to be perpetuated and extended: since the worker has been deprived of any possibility of choosing the aim and nature of his paid labour, the sphere of freedom becomes that of non-labour; however, any creative or productive activity having a social impact is prohibited during his free time; his freedom is limited to choices between things to be consumed and positive amusements.[14]

Subsequently the author demonstrates that the destruction of autonomous capacities begins at school, where specialization and the division of knowledge are taught. If we take *civil society* to mean "the fabric of social relations established between individuals within groups or communities who owe their existence neither to the mediation nor the institutional acknowledgement of the State,[15] then it becomes evident that these communities are dissolved by a melting-pot effect in populations and through the ever-increasing fragmentation of populations. Thus heteronomy and hetero-regulation predominate.

Political society, where citizens debate societal choices, has been taken under the wing of the State's political parties. As a consequence, all those who participate in activities, whose sole object is to retain or attain power, only discuss the issues they believe to be electorally profitable. Publicity and propaganda prevail; in the same way seducton rules rather than the expression and discussion of important political choices. In fact, this is so much the case that when all is said and done, people have little choice, both in capitalist and

socialist countries. Some of our readers will no doubt be wondering if it is truly necessary to follow such a roundabout route and to question so many notions and practices in order to discuss relations between Canada and Québec. But if, as we maintain, it is, in the final analysis, a political question, that is to say, the collective life of the community, and if this life has become thoroughly heteronomized, then in order to win Canada's autonomy in relation to the United States and that of Québec with regard to Canada, we must debate this question at great length. Otherwise, how are people to conceive of national autonomy, people who have abandoned their own autonomy as well as that of their communities and collectives, and who expect everything from others? There, as elsewhere, can be seen the tendency to turn to specialists, to constitutionalists, such as Senator Forsey, to economists of the Conference Board, in order to determine the domination and dependence of one's country.

At this point in our observations, we must forestall any misunderstanding. Faced with the failure of existing socialism and the increasingly serious crises assailing capitalist societies, many people, ourselves included, are denouncing the State's grip on collective life and do not hesitate to actively criticize political parties. Stemming from these accusations, movements labelled as the "New Right" have appeared in a number of countries. Such groups are demanding a return to free enterprise, an end to State control, action against dissidents of all kinds, and in what appears to be their common foundation, a return to biologism and racism which were thought buried with Nazism. Although these new movements manifest the uneasy and critical state of our society which we too have observed, their solutions clearly take the opposite view from our own. Furthermore, they appear to be far too easy; unfortunately there is an age-old tendency to attempt to overcome society's contradictions through war, the revival of authority and the repression of dissidents. Worst of all, the populations who have already given up their autonomy and freedom in their lives and communities follow their new saviours. Erich Fromm labelled this as the "escape from freedom". Clearly, as we have already implied, we have been conditioned by our societies to entrust others with the responsibility of doing things for us. The generalized vicariate-like state of our societies compells us ineluctably towards the delegation of functions, authority and even enjoyment. All of the power elites are continuously occupied with stripping people of knowledge, skills, desires and dreams. We live in a universe of needs and are constantly producing new specialists to fulfill them. New needs are incessantly being created, and a pretence is made of inquiring if people experience them; it is then announced that these needs can be met, and for only a minimal extra charge. And thus the world goes on.

The question we must deal with is precisely the opposite of the one posed to the power elites: How can each individual, each community, each nation regain enough autonomy to be self-determining? How does one escape the vicious circle of needs — which give birth to those who dominate to continue to dominate — and finally reach the desires, the possibilities of another life, another society? Our response is demanding of one and all, but we believe it

possible to find a way out of this impasse only through respecting the possibility of transcendence present in each of us. If this respect for the individual and the possibility of creating another world did not exist, one might as well throw in the towel, adopt the perspective of Mr. Lougheed or Mr. Ryan or join some new kind of Pépin-Robarts Commission. For this reason, our remarks are not directed towards political men with their eyes riveted on power, but rather towards the men and women of this country who have already begun to question their own lives, the life of their communities and of their country. We would tell them that it is better to live their dreams than to spend their lives in a dream. What did Nixon dream of? — Power. What does Pierre E. Trudeau dream of? Retaining power, winning it once again. Our optimism regarding the outcome of our struggle stems from a certain knowledge: we know that north of the 49th parallel, perfectly ordinary people, poets, artists, and all the others continuously harassed by our society have not only already begun to envisage other ways to live, within their own private lives, which they are encouraged to dream about, as well as in their life with others, but have also begun to live their dreams. Those who forever have the words of the people and democracy on their lips believe in them the least; in both types of society, Russian and American, people end up, through the endless delegation of power, believing only in the party, then in the party's elite, and ultimately, in its leader. In the election of February, 1980, the Liberals gave a graphic demonstration of this. To display the leader or to conceal him? This was one of the most agonizing questions asked by senior members of both parties. Yet crocodile tears are shed over the apathy of the people, over their loss of interest in politics.

What, then, is at the core of the matter? What are we getting at? It is as simple as this: to change their lives, men and women must want the change; they must conceive of other ways of living their daily lives and their existence in society and then make this reality. It was Hegel who said that if the imaginary world is revolutionized, then reality will not be far behind. If, in fact, what must be done is no longer to be found in the works of intellectual leaders, if the unchecked economic growth and the technological developments which propel and promote transnationals only serve to transform men and women into appendages, even more uniform across continents, of those marvellous machines which regulate our lives, then it remains for us to conceive of something else. And in order to do that, we can only count on those who want to make something else of their lives, on groups and communities which have already commenced desiring and realizing another life.

Every society, every culture, by means of its ideological apparatus, instills in its members through the family, school and other instances, certain ideas and values concerning the right way to live and the right kind of society. Today, the extraordinarily developed means of mass communication daily distribute explicit or implicit messages which feed the consciousness of the people; in fact it is precisely because of this that they are called the consciousness industries. In addition to transmitting representations and values, these industries feed imaginary social reality, that is to say they establish enclosures within which

imagination and desires can move. But if imagination is a function shared by all, its content — the imaginary social — differs among peoples, classes and other groups. The imaginary social is therefore always situated and dated, as much by its content as by the time to which it gives importance; the golden age could be present, past, or future depending on the society and culture. Among other things, the imaginary social defines what is held to be desirable and undesirable, probable and improbable, realistic and unrealistic, possible and impossible. The possible is, in our view, the most important category, as well as being the most laden with meaning because it stems from a given reality which it must transcend in order to bring about another one.

If a society can be judged by the type of information to which it gives importance, it can be judged as much, if not more so, by the information it conceals. Thus our societies, believing only in what can be measured, favour cybernetics or signal-type information, i.e. economic-type information described by the economist Jacques Attali as being the poorest type:

> The signal, he states, is only valued by the response which follows. Information in such a view of society is as important as (but not more than) the traffic lights which govern the roads. From the moment we move to higher levels of observation, information becomes much more complex and cannot be evaluated.[16]

Attali identifies other types of information as semantic or discourse, semiological or symbol, unconditional or relation, which are held to be of secondary importance in our society. The American economist Kenneth Boulding has arrived at approximately the same conclusion:

> The fundamental weakness of the economic-type analysis applied to essentially non-economic social systems is precisely that it neglects those aspects of behaviour which are not economic but rather heroic, or more exactly, identity-creating.[17]

The above quotations from economists serve to demonstrate how certain information is favoured, information which does not take into account the most important aspects of society. In assessments which have been made of the seventies, and in predictions for the eighties, it has almost exclusively been a question of two cumulative processes — economy and technology. From such a perspective, those who are interested in other phenomena — political and cultural ones — are considered to be "soft" compared to those "hard" people who transmit statistics and graphs. It is not surprising that in this kind of society, the imaginary social is completely oriented towards growth and development. Those who manipulate us by producing and selling material and symbolic goods

want us to dream, to escape from ourselves, but only as isolated and fragmented individuals because they only know consumers who, on an individual basis only, belong to the market society where everything, men and objects, is transformed into merchandise.

To break this domination and alienation is to leave heteronomy, i.e. the state in which others produce our lives and even our dreams. It is also to come out of a logic of equivalency — one of economics — which transforms social actors into "inert crowds, groupings of consumers, electors, spectators, users" for whom "the world of private objects (. . .) tends to take charge of the greatest possible number of desires". Such a taking in hand constantly postpones the moment of reaching the other side, that of transition, the creation of another type of society.[18]

If we speak of autonomy and imperialism, of the need for two nations, Québec and Canada, it is because we believe that ultimately, "opting out of the empire", this autonomy and responsibility which we assume with regard to ourselves, others and nature, is the course we must follow. Furthermore, it appears increasingly evident that it is no longer a matter of patching the status quo in order for it to continue. Rather, new possibilities must be made to arise and must be progressively achieved. It is perhaps the task of smaller nations like ours, which have fewer acquired interests to defend than others, to dare to imagine another life, another society. Rather than relying on fear and security, we must turn to the creative faculties harbored by this northern sub-continent which Canada and Québec form. Moreover, in opposition to those in Ottawa who would bureaucratize Canada — *ad mari usque ad mare* — and to those politicians who fiercely defend their acquired bits of power, it seems that often, albeit accidently, the dynamic groups of these countries, youth, women, artists, and others who are oppressed — workers who earn their living only to lose it — all these groups subscribe to the idea of another life and society. But where to begin? We believe that it has already commenced and that it is rather a question of amplifying what already exists, of seeking out other possibilities and especially of getting the political — everything concerning the collective life of a nation — out of the hands of politicians to make it everyone's business: recreating, then, political society. Some would say that today, less than ever, is the time to question ourselves; at the time of the rise of dangers and ayatollahs, from Carter, through Ryan to Khomeini, we must, more so now than ever, have confidence in our highest leader. The problem is that according to the discourse of power, it is never the moment. When all goes well, when the empire is expanding, while the machines which produce and dehumanize us drone on, we are told: What are you complaining about? Things have never been better! And when the machines go awry, as they are doing today, we are told: Support your leader! Otherwise our enemy will prevail. And it is in this way that systems are maintained, private capitalism as well as State capitalism.

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LES EFFETS PERVERS DE L'ENTRE-DÉPENDANCE: LE CANADA ET SON PROBLÈME QUÉBÉCOIS

Daniel Latouche

Depuis 1960, tous les gouvernements du Québec ont d'abord souhaité et ensuite travaillé pour obtenir un cadre de négociation qui mettrait en présence l'un de l'autre, sur un pied d'égalité, le Québec et le Canada anglais. Pour quiconque a suivi les choses de près cette recherche d'un cadre égalitaire fut toujours plus importante que l'égalité elle-même. La liste des tactiques, manoeuvres, revirements utilisés pour arriver à ce résultat est longue, désespérément longue. Le référendum sur un mandat de négocier et le *Livre beige* du Parti libéral du Québec pour un fédéralisme renouvelé en furent deux exemples récents. Mais dans cette tentative, il faut bien l'avouer, l'échec a été total et le Québec a perdu sur les deux tableaux: celui de la souveraineté et celui du fédéralisme. Lors de la campagne référendaire, la réponse du Canada anglais a été unanime et lors de la conférence constitutionnelle de novembre 1981, c'est un deuxième "non" retentissant qu'on a servi aux demandes pourtant fort raisonnables du Québec.

Bien plus il ne s'est pas trouvé une seule voix parmi les quelque 700 membres des assemblées législatives du Canada anglais pour s'opposer au traitement qu'on avait fait subir au gouvernement du Québec. Pas une seule voix. Bien plus certaines assemblées législatives y sont même allées de motions de félicitations. Quant aux socialistes, néo-démocrates, marxistes et autres professionnels de la bonne entente avec le Québec, ils étaient sans doute trop préoccupés par la sauvegarde des bébés-phoques. Après avoir étalé leurs états d'âme et révélé leurs inquiétudes quant à l'isolement du Québec, ils sont retournés aux "vrais" problèmes de la dépendance économique, droits des aborigènes, égalité pour les femmes et désarmement nucléaire. Finis les distractions!

C'est toute l'approche québécoise qu'il faut donc réviser. Cela implique revoir certaines des prémisses sur lesquelles cette approche s'est toujours appuyée.

Et pour commencer, il va falloir se le dire: le Canada anglais n'existe pas, n'a jamais existé et n'existera probablement jamais. Certes, on retrouve au Canada des gens qui parlent anglais — beaucoup même — mais cette simple arithmétique ne suffit pas pour en faire une véritable communauté politique. Ce n'est pas plus vrai des Canadiens anglais que ce ne l'est des "blonds-aux-yeux-bleus". Trop longtemps les Québécois ont cru que le simple fait d'interpeler, menacer, et cajoler les Canadiens anglais suffirait à leur faire prendre conscience de leur spécificité culturelle. De toute évidence, nous n'avons convaincu que nous-mêmes, le principal intéressé refusant apparemment tous

les bienfaits de l'identité collective. Cela fait pourtant plusieurs années que des observateurs qui connaissent ce milieu beaucoup mieux que nous — après tout ils en font partie — s'acharnent à nous répéter cette vérité élémentaire: le Canada anglais n'existe pas. Nous avons toujours refusé de les croire. C'est pourtant l'un des seuls sujets sur lequel les historiens, journalistes, "social scientists", intellectuels et politiciens de l'autre Canada sont tombés d'accord. Une telle unanimité aurait dû nous forcer à ouvrir les yeux. Pourtant tous les gouvernements québécois qui se sont succédés depuis 1960 ont choisi de "faire comme si", espérant peut-être par là que la réalité finirait par se conformer à leurs rêves. Il va falloir chercher ailleurs.

Aujourd'hui, ce refus de l'existence nationale est probablement trop bien ancré pour qu'on puisse y remédier. Entre 1960 et 1980, le Canada anglais, tout comme le Québec d'ailleurs, a eu sa chance de se transformer en véritable communauté politique. L'échec de l'un fut aussi l'échec de l'autre. Alors que les Québécois préféraient garder "leurs" Montagnes Rocheuses, le reste du pays, lui, voulut à tout prix conserver le strapontin que lui offraient les États-Unis. À chacun ses béquilles!

Cet article ne prétend pas régler la question de l'existence ou de la non-existence du Canada anglais. Il tentera plutôt d'évaluer les conséquences de la non-existence politique du Canada anglais pour le Québec et pour le Canada lui-même. En refusant de négocier avec le Québec dans un cadre d'égalité politique, le Canada anglais — ou du moins ce qu'il est convenu d'appeler comme tel — croyait éviter la rupture du pays. C'est vrai que le pays légal a été sauvé. Le Canada continuera donc d'être invité au Sommet des pays occidentaux, ce grand moment du théâtre politique occidental. Mais cette existence légale ressemble de plus en plus à celle de l'Ukraine dont le siège aux Nations-Unies n'est qu'une concession à l'URSS. Le Canada est devenu le cadeau des États-Unis.

Le Canada est sauvé, le Canada anglais n'existe toujours pas et le Québec politique n'existe enfin plus. Nous sommes revenus à 1959. S'il n'y avait que ce "Canadian Graffiti" il n'y aurait pas de quoi se désoler. Ce n'est pas faire preuve de cynisme que de dire les choses telles qu'elles sont. Au Québec, nous commençons à peine à mesurer tout l'impact qu'aura le passage d'une situation d'état-national-en-construction à celle de région-administrative-en-déclin. Depuis 1960, une bonne dose de complicité unissait les deux grandes tendances du nationalisme québécois: la tendance indépendantiste et la tendance autonomiste. Dans un cas comme dans l'autre, l'objectif était le même: obtenir l'égalité politique avec le Canada anglais.

Pour les indépendantistes, cette reconnaissance de l'égalité politique ne pouvait se faire que dans la souveraineté, condition préalable à la mise en place d'une nouvelle association avec le reste du pays. Pour les autonomistes, il s'agissait de passer directement à la mise en place d'une nouvelle association politique en faisant l'économie d'une souveraineté jugée aussi illusoire qu'inutile.

Nous avons surtout retenu les péripéties de la lutte entre ces deux

tendances pour oublier tout ce qui les unissait. Si nous avions ouvert les yeux et mis en place des mécanismes permettant à l'occasion aux deux groupes d'effectuer des rapprochements tactiques et des unions symboliques, nous aurions probablement perçu avec plus de lucidité combien ces deux projets étaient en fait également inacceptables au Canada anglais.

Entendons-nous bien. Le Canada anglais n'a jamais été opposé à l'idée d'égalité politique pour le Québec. Mais cette égalité ne pouvait être qu'accordée qu'aux citoyens d'une des dix provinces, c'est-à-dire aux citoyens canadiens vivant au Québec. Il n'a jamais été question dans leur esprit d'une égalité entre deux communautés politiques, encore moins en deux états, deux nations ou deux états-nations. À la limite, il pouvait être question d'égalité entre deux cultures, mais même là le récent retour en force du multiculturalisme remet en question cette acceptation. On pourrait penser qu'à chaque fois qu'un des termes utilisés pour définir l'originalité québécoise commence à prendre une signification politique on s'empresse de le rayer du vocabulaire. C'est ainsi qu'on raye nation et culture pour les remplacer par langue et minorité. Mais même là la trêve risque d'être de courte durée.

En effet, un débat est apparu récemment quant à la réalité empirique, aux politiques et surtout quant aux dangers de ce multiculturalisme qu'on croyait pourtant si inoffensif et qui devait servir à désamorcer la bombe québécoise. Ce débat sur la validité de la politique de multiculturalisme, débat qui n'a eu que peu d'échos au Québec, est en lui-même fort révélateur de la conception que se font les intellectuels et universitaires canadiens-anglais de ce qu'est une nation, une communauté ethnique ou une société politique. Pendant fort longtemps on a cru au Québec qu'un fossé linguistique insondable nous séparait et qu'au Canada anglais on utilisait une définition différente de ces réalités. Qu'il s'en est dit des énormités sur la conception juridique vs la conception sociologique de la nation. Il est temps de rassurer tous ceux qu'inquiétait cette suggestion d'une brisure aussi fondamentale entre deux des principales traditions de la famille linguistique indo-européenne. Au Canada tout au moins, Anglais et Français ont tout à fait la même vision de ce qu'est une nation et un état, c'est précisément de cette concordance conceptuelle que vient le désaccord. Notons pour l'instant certains produits "dérivés" de ce débat et qui concernent plus directement notre propos.

1) Le principal sous-groupe social, c'est-à-dire possédant des structures et des institutions qui lui donnent une complétude[2], au Canada est le groupe ethnique. Il ne saurait être question d'y chercher et encore moins d'y trouver des nations et des nationalités sur le modèle tant méprisé de l'Empire austro-hongrois. En soi cette approche fondée sur "tous les groupes ethniques mais rien que des groupes ethniques" révèle l'incapacité de voir autre chose dans la réalité canadienne qu'une copie plus ou moins conforme de la société américaine. Pour la sociologie canadienne-anglaise, les termes du débat, les paradigmes et la problématique sociétale ne sauraient être qu'américains. Nulle part on s'interroge sur les conséquences d'une telle approche pour l'évolution de la société canadienne du moins en ce qui concerne la dualité

nationale du pays. Les critiques dirigées contre la politique fédérale ne concernent que son efficacité et sa limpidité. On en est encore majoritairement à la mythologie de la mosaïque ethnique canadienne vs le melting pot américain.

2) Avec les Indiens, Inuits et Hillerites, les francophones (ou Canadiens français) sont les plus souvent placés dans un groupe à part, groupe sans nom et sans véritable fondement conceptuel. Quant à la notion de Québécois elle est encore plus inexistante. Mais ce refus de "nommer" la réalité québécoise ne devrait pas nous leurrer. C'est essentiellement à travers le prisme de groupe ethnique qu'on considère le Québec et les Québécois. Bientôt il faut même s'attendre à ce qu'on utilise le concept de "non-immigrant ethnic group" puisque seule la date d'arrivée nous sépare encore des autres communautés ethniques canadiennes.

3) On doit éviter à tout prix de politiser l'ethnicité. Ce thème sur lequel l'unanimité la plus totale s'est faite est en passe de devenir une véritable fixation. Dans un commentaire H. Brotz écrit:

> Multiculturalism... is one small step towards the politicization of ethnicity. By this I mean bringing into being a political situation in which the rights, privileges and disabilities of individuals are legally defined on the basis of their ethnic group membership. Apartheid in South Africa (...) politicization of ethnicity would be destructive of liberal democracy. It would transform ethnicity from something that is voluntary and private into something that is compulsory and political.[3]

Ce refus du politique et son association quelque peu simpliste avec l'apartheid et une menace à l'État libéral surprend quelque peu. Pourtant il ne devrait pas. Certes lorsqu'on parle de groupes ethniques et des structures nécessaires pour maintenir les frontières ("boundaries") du groupe on fait référence à l'école, la langue, la religion et diverses associations communautaires. Mais jamais il ne viendrait à l'idée de mentionner les structures politiques comme constituant une partie du minimum institutionnel vital à tout groupe. L'ethnicité et le droit à la différence doivent demeurer des attributs de l'individu, des vertus qu'on pratique en famille, après cinq heures et toute la journée du dimanche.

Nous sommes donc en présence d'un raisonnement implacable et qui ne laisse aucune marge de manoeuvre à une communauté québécoise ou canadienne-française.

- *tout est groupe ethnique et susceptible de l'être*
- *les Canadiens français sont comme un groupe ethnique*
- *le groupe ethnique est affaire d'individus et non de politique*

Dans une large mesure la vision canadienne-anglaise de son "Quebec problem" a toujours été celle d'un groupe ethnique qui exagérait "an ethnic

group that steps out of bound", pourrait-on dire. On veut bien s'accommoder d'individus qui se définissent comme francophones, canadiens-français ou même Québécois mais à condition que cette définition demeure individuelle et sans appui politique.

Cette définition de l'ordre des choses n'est guère prête de changer. Pendant un certain temps on a cru que la canadianisation des sciences sociales telle qu'elle se pratiquait dans les universités anglaises du pays pourrait s'avérer une solution. On a donc engagé des professeurs canadiens, forcé les autres à se naturaliser, mis sur pied des programmes d'études canadiennes et redéfini les priorités des organismes fédéraux de subventions. Le résultat? On est passé d'une sociologie américaine pratiquée au Canada par des Américains et intéressée surtout par les problèmes américains à une sociologie américaine pratiquée au Canada par des Canadiens et portant sur des problèmes canadiens, i.e. sur des problèmes américains tels qu'ils se rencontrent ici. C'est la règle du "Canadian content" appliquée à la sociologie.

Cet exemple, choisi parmi tant d'autres, témoigne de l'interprétation des dépendances au Canada. La dépendance académique, surtout lorsqu'elle est canadianisée, devient l'un des appuis les plus réconfortants d'un pouvoir politique central qui ne demande pas mieux que de se voir fournir des justifications à ces actions. Dans une large mesure le multiculturalisme officiel tel qu'il se pratique à Ottawa n'est qu'un emprunt à une sociologie américaine "made in Canada". Lorsque vient le temps de freiner le dérapage politique de ce multiculturalisme c'est encore du côté de la sociologie qu'on se tourne.

Il est donc grand temps de reconsidérer cette affirmation si souvent répétée quant au manque d'insertion politique des "Social Scientists" canadiens-anglais qui, contrairement à leurs collègues du Québec, n'auraient pas les mêmes entrées auprès des appareils politiques. Un autre mythe commode et sa contrepartie québécoise qui, même si on peut la trouver sympathique, n'en demeure pas moins une reconstruction symbolique de la réalité.

Il faudra bien un jour explorer cette interpénétration des dépendances canadiennes et québécoises. En effet, il doit bien exister des ponts entre les deux, ce qui expliquerait pourquoi elles sont aussi bien installées les unes que les autres. La situation n'est pas loin de ressembler à celle du Dilemme du prisonnier où les deux protagonistes sont surtout motivés par leur obsession mutuelle de ne pas voir l'autre s'en sortir. Le refus du Québec de participer pleinement à l'expérience canadienne ne fait que favoriser la dépendance culturelle et intellectuelle du Canada anglais. Le refus de ce dernier d'appuyer les tentatives québécoises d'obtenir une reconnaissance de son statut d'égalité collective ne fait qu'accentuer la dépendance politique du Québec. C'est ainsi que les deux groupes en viennent à privilégier la dépendance de l'autre. On a les réconforts qu'on peut trouver. À défaut de s'en sortir soi-même, on veut surtout éviter que l'autre y arrive.

Il y a entre les deux dépendances une sorte de division du travail qui fait frémir: au Canada anglais la dépendance culturelle face aux États-Unis et au Québec la dépendance politique face au reste du pays. Serait-ce là la consé-

cration de cette tradition anti-révolutionnaire par excellence du Canada, le seul pays avec les Iles Tonga qui vient de réaffirmer la nature monarchique, et d'une monarchie étrangère s'il vous plaît, de ses institutions. On se souviendra que le Canada est aussi le seul pays fondé sur la rencontre de deux traditions de laissés-pour-compte: celle des Yankees qui ont refusé la révolution américaine et celle de Français qui n'ont pas connu la Révolution française.

À l'occasion, la vision de ces deux sociétés qui s'accommodent et qui même entretiennent leur dépendance mutuelle frôle l'indécence. Comme s'il n'était déjà pas assez triste de voir une majorité de Québécois refuser lors du référendum de s'engager sur la voie de l'égalité politique, il nous a fallu aussi subir les applaudissements soulagés avec lesquels ce choix a été accueilli dans l'autre dépendance canadienne. Que les Québécois aient décidé de demeurer dans la dépendance canadienne "coast-to-coast" plutôt que d'emprunter le chemin étroit et difficile pour s'en sortir ne devrait réjouir personne. Qu'ils l'aient fait parce qu'ils voulaient conserver leurs Montagnes Rocheuses ou parce qu'ils croyaient vraiment qu'on allait reformuler de fond en comble le pacte fédéral canadien ne change rien à l'affaire. Dans un cas comme dans l'autre, ils se sont mépris quant à la nature réelle de ce pays qui ne saurait leur appartenir à eux aussi puisqu'il ne s'appartient déjà plus depuis longtemps. Personnellement j'ai commencé à avoir des doutes réels quant à la possibilité de gagner le référendum quand dans une enquête en profondeur menée à l'été 1979, il était révélé qu'une majorité de Québécois disaient "préférer vivre comme minorité dans un grand pays que comme une majorité dans un pays plus petit". Le "mappisme" qu'on croyait être une exclusivité de la dépendance canadienne-anglaise a aussi fait des ravages au Québec, preuve que nos deux solitudes ne sont pas aussi compartimentées qu'on le répète.

Mais le référendum de 1980 ne devrait être que le premier acte d'une pièce qui en comportera probablement plusieurs autres. L'autre grand moment de la dépendance canadienne fut celui de la conférence constitutionnelle de 1981. Alors que le référendum avait montré que l'Empereur québécois était en fait nu comme un ver, cette conférence devait montrer que celui du Canada ne valait guère mieux. Par delà les considérations tactiques, il ne fait aucun doute que parmi les raisons qui ont permis à la Conférence de s'entendre sur une formule d'amendement et une Charte des droits, on doit accorder une place prépondérante

i) au fait que cette entente était de toute évidence inacceptable au Québec,

ii) au fait qu'elle plaçait le gouvernement péquiste dans une situation politique embarrassante,

iii) qu'elle était négociée avec un gouvernement central représenté par Jean Chrétien, un French Canadian comme on les aime,

iv) qu'elle confirmait le statut de groupe ethnique des Canadiens français au détriment de la notion plus politique, et donc plus dangereuse de communauté politique,

v) *qu'elle consacrait non seulement la prépondérance des droits individuels mais que cette consécration était de plus rendue possible par une diminution des pouvoirs de l'Assemblée nationale du Québec,*

vi) *qu'elle ne touchait en rien les équilibres politiques du pays et qu'elle les rendait même intouchables à l'avenir.*

Il ne s'agit pas ici de s'indigner quant à la duplicité que révèlent ces motivations. Elles font partie du jeu politique tel qu'il se pratique au Canada. S'il faut absolument y trouver un aspect inacceptable c'est dans la facilité avec laquelle le gouvernement du Québec s'est laissé manoeuvré qu'il faut la chercher. Il était pourtant évident dès le moment où Ottawa avait décidé de sacrifier Claude Ryan et le *Livre beige* du Parti libéral du Québec en mettant immédiatement en branle, en juin 1980, le processus de révision constitutionnelle que son intention ainsi que celle des autres acteurs canadiens était de régler une fois pour toute la question du Québec. Si ces motivations n'ont même qu'un minimum de véracité — et les débats qui ont suivi l'accord de novembre 1981 le confirment — c'est plutôt un sentiment de tristesse qui devrait nous envahir. Certes le Québec a été floué et comme pour ajouter l'insulte à l'injure il l'a été par une société pouvant se contenter de tels calculs, et au moment de l'élaboration de ce qui devrait constituer le nouveau pacte fondamental du pays en plus.

Et le jeu de la dépendance, tel une locomotive emballée se continue. Incapable de saisir les leçons de sa défaite, voici que le Québec s'enfonce encore davantage et refuse de voir les leçons de ces leçons. D'un côté, vous ne trouverez aucun partisan du fédéralisme capable d'un minimum de lucidité et avouant publiquement que son non référendaire avait été une erreur. De l'autre, vous trouverez bon nombre de souverainistes prêts à tout abandonner, à mettre le blâme sur le fait que l'idée de l'indépendance ait été défendue par un parti politique au pouvoir et même à s'impliquer sur la scène fédérale pour faire ressortir, comme si c'était nécessaire, le cynisme de la politique qui s'y pratique.

Cet affolement de la pensée et de la pratique politique québécoise en fera sourire plusieurs. Elle n'est pourtant que la face immergée d'une aliénation plus profonde, du moins pour toute une génération (dont il est évident que le présent auteur fait partie). Cette génération n'a pas vraiment connu le régime duplessiste. Elle n'a eu aucun compte à régler de ce côté. Son attitude envers le Canada a toujours été plus ambivalente voulant à la fois maintenir une "Canadian connection" et allant aussi jusqu'à nier l'existence de la super-structure politique qui coiffait le tout. On dira que ce fut une relation "love-hate" typique. Et on n'aura pas tout à fait tort. Certes l'attachement au Canada était fait à la fois de calcul (par rapport aux États-Unis surtout), de sentimentalisme et de satisfaction à l'idée de pouvoir faire "marcher" les Canadiens anglais en jouant habilement sur leurs peurs et leurs culpabilités mal assumées. Mais n'en est-il pas ainsi de toutes les relations, entre les individus et entre les communautés? La formule de la souveraineté-association, la seule

formule politique originale que le Canada ait produite depuis l'idée de dominion de J.A.. Macdonald n'était qu'une façon d'harnacher ces contradictions et de lancer les relations Québec-Canada dans une nouvelle dynamique dont personne, il est vrai, ne pouvait prévoir le déroulement et encore moins l'aboutissement. Que cette tentative ait été reçue dans l'unanimité d'un "they want to have their cake and eat it too" témoigne d'un double échec: celui d'une génération qui n'a pas su trouver les arguments et les mots pour vendre et celui d'une société qui n'avait probablement pas la capacité de le recevoir. Le rendez-vous aura donc été manqué. Que le reste du pays préfère une société québécoise confortablement installée dans le protectionnisme du cocon réglementaire canadien en dit long sur ce Canada anglais. Cette société n'est pas prête d'assumer son indépendance face aux États-Unis si elle se réjouit ainsi d'avoir pu normaliser le Québec à si peu de frais. D'avoir révélé au grand jour que le rêve québécois n'était en fait que celui d'une moitié de la population, des trois-quarts d'une génération et de la totalité d'une élite est peut-être très satisfaisant mais ce Canada anglais sera-t-il bien avancé maintenant que les Québécois sont en passe de devenir de nouveaux Acadiens.

Ou bien la prochaine génération, celle qui était à l'école secondaire lors du référendum et qui s'apprête à rentrer au CEGEP, recommencera la bataille sur de nouvelles bases, ou bien elle ne recommencera rien du tout. Reste à savoir si le Québec et le Canada qui se seront enfoncés encore un peu plus dans leur entre-dépendance peuvent se permettre d'attendre encore longtemps. Qu'ils aient été de tendance autonomiste ou souverainiste, les partis politiques qui se sont fait élire à Québec depuis 1960 n'ont jamais cessé de mettre en place les institutions, les structures et les processus qui pourraient éventuellement permettre au Québec de vivre son égalité politique avec le reste du Canada. Peu importe que l'on ait pensé que cette égalité serait obtenue à l'intérieur ou à l'extérieur du cadre fédéral, on voulait se donner les moyens de l'ancrer dans la réalité.

Bref, on a fait ce qu'il serait convenu d'appeler du "nation-state-building" alors que dans d'autres provinces, notamment en Alberta, on se contentait de faire du "state-building" et qu'à Ottawa, on découvrait les vertus du nationalisme et du "nation-building". Les principales étapes de cette entreprise québécoise sont connues mais même après vingt ans l'intensité du phénomène surprend encore. Nous avons identifié sept dimensions à ce phénomène de "nation-state-building".

L'ÉTAT-NATION QUÉBÉCOIS: 1960-1981

1. **Création de nouveaux ministères**

Éducation	Affaires sociales
Affaires culturelles	Condition féminine
Immigration	Communications
Institution financières	Énergie

Science et technologie
Affaires intergouvernementales
Commerce extérieur
Environnement

2. **Mise en place de réseaux**

Éducation
Université et recherches
Affaires sociales
Télévision
Loisirs
Main-d'oeuvre
Affaires amérindiennes

3. **Mise en place d'organismes centraux de coordination**

Office de planification et de développement économique
Secrétariat-général du Conseil exécutif
Ministère d'état
Conseil du Trésor

4. **Mise en place de grands mécanismes de concertation et de négociation**

Sommets socio-économiques
Conseil de planification et de développement
Négociations provinciales (Front Commun)

5. **Réformes sectorielles et grandes orientations de développement**

Éducation
Justice
Santé et sécurité au travail
Fonction publique
Langue
Affaires sociales
Agriculture
Vie électorale
Affaires municipales

6. **Institutions de l'État-Providence**

Assurance-récolte
Assurance-maladie
Aide aux handicapés
Assurance-automobile
Charte des droits de la personne
Assurance-justice (aide juridique)
Assurance-édition
Régime des rentes
Assurance-travail
Protection du consommateur
Sécurité du revenu

7. **Grandes interventions économiques**

Nationalisation de l'électricité
Caisse de dépôt et de placement
Société générale de financement
SOQUIP, SIDBEC, REXFOR
Ministère du commerce extérieur
Sommets sectoriels
Nationalisation de l'amiante
Société de développement industriel

"Bâtir le Québec", le rapport Tetley, etc.

Bien malin celui qui peut se rappeler si ces initiatives sont le produit d'une administration libérale, unioniste ou péquiste. Toutes allaient en effet dans le même sens et procèdent de la même logique. Évidemment, ce mouvement s'est accompagné de la mise en place d'appareils bureaucratiques fort lourds, de mécanismes de contrôle et de procédures de cooptation qui nous forcent à nous interroger sur la valeur de cette créativité politico-administrative. Ainsi André Gélinas a recensé par moins de 66 conseils consultatifs, 4 tribunaux administratifs, 10 régies, 26 sociétés et 35 offices de toutes sortes du 31 décembre 1974, dont à peine 16 furent établis avant 1960.[4] Depuis il s'en est ajouté pas moins d'une cinquantaine. C'est beaucoup!

Toute cette frénésie, quelle que soit son utilité réelle, son insertion idéologique ou son contenu de classe n'avait de sens que si elle débouchait sur la transformation du Québec en véritable état national. Si le Québec n'a d'autres responsabilités que celles du Nouveau-Brunswick et l'Ile-du-Prince-Édouard, c'est-à-dire réparer les routes et administrer les subventions spéciales d'Ottawa, il n'a pas besoin de toute cette superstructure. Chose certaine, il n'en a pas les moyens.

Aujourd'hui, il faut songer au démantèlement de cette construction. Certains, au Québec même, applaudissent à cette désarticulation ne se rendant pas compte qu'elle risque d'entraîner avec elle tout projet de transformation socio-économique du Québec. Même les représentants du "French Power" à Ottawa, pourtant ceux qui applaudissent le plus fort, ne réalisent pas que leur force de négociation risque d'en prendre un dur coup. À force de répéter aux séparatistes, péquistes et nationalistes de tout genre qu'ils n'étaient que des minables attardés, ils ont fini par convaincre l'autre pouvoir, l'"Ottawa Power" qu'ils étaient "disposable".

Il n'est pas certain qu'un Québec souverain aurait éventuellement opté pour le socialisme. Mais il est hors de question qu'un Québec provincial aille jamais plus loin qu'une social-démocratie sur le mode néo-démocrate. La même argumentation vaut pour le Canada tout entier, pour le Canada anglais ou pour toute province canadienne. Tant du côté de la gauche démocratique que de celui de l'autogestion, on s'illusionne si on pense que maintenant que les événements ont réglé son compte au "projet national" québécois, le Québec va pouvoir faire l'essai de l'expérience socialiste-autogestionnaire. La dernière fois où l'on a cru que de "grandes choses" allaient enfin débloquer puisque la question nationale avait été "réglée", c'est en 1840. Et l'on connaît la suite.

Non, malgré ce que peut en penser le *Comité des cent* et le nouveau *Mouvement socialiste du Québec*, on ne peut faire l'économie du changement politique. Que ces récentes initiatives soient louangées par la gauche canadienne-anglaise ne change rien à l'affaire non plus. *Studies in Political Economy, Our Generation, This Magazine* feraient bien d'examiner d'un peu plus près la transformation du mouvement syndical québécois qui, depuis la mise au rancart d'un projet politique québécois sombre inexorablement dans des comportements corporatistes et réactionnaires. Il ne faut pas hésiter devant les mots, certains de ces propos par l'utilisation qu'ils font du chantage, du mépris

et de la force sont carrément fascisants. Aucun changement socio-économique ne pourra être construit sur la base de cette fuite en avant d'un militantisme syndical qui confond la protection des pouvoirs bureaucratiques des establishments syndicaux avec la défense des intérêts légitimes des travailleurs. À l'hiver 1982, le triste spectacle donné par le syndicalisme québécois illustre fort bien les conséquences imprévues du double échec politique de 1980 et 1981. Ce n'est d'ailleurs pas un processus typiquement québécois. Les exemples de l'Espagne post-républicaine, de l'Allemagne post-Weimar et du Chili post-Allende devraient suffire à démontrer que les échecs politiques ne bénéficient jamais aux travailleurs. Bien souvent dans ces situations le syndicalisme sombre soit dans le nihilisme pseudo-révolutionnaire ou dans l'épuration et la cooptation. Quant aux mouvements parallèles, contre-culturels et auto-gestionnaires, en l'absence de débouchés politiques sérieux, le messianisme para-religieux devient le plus souvent leur seule porte de sortie.

Le syndicalisme québécois tel qu'il s'est mis en place depuis 1960, à travers son cortège de luttes et de victoires, n'a de sens que s'il peut engager une véritable négociation avec les représentants du pouvoir politique et du pouvoir économique. La concertation sociale-démocrate telle qu'en rêvent les ministres du Parti Québécois ou le changement de régime que souhaitent les rédacteurs de *Ne comptons que sur nos propres moyens* ne peut prendre place qu'à l'intérieur d'un état national. Les principaux intéressés en sont fort conscients mais n'ont d'autres choix que de faire semblant. En attendant, tant la pratique syndicale que gouvernementale dégénèrent dans des abus de pouvoir.

De ce côté, la responsabilité syndicale est énorme. On préfère jouer sur la crise fiscale de l'État québécois pour en tirer des avantages immédiats que de faire l'éducation des membres quant aux raisons structurelles de cette situation. Évidemment à court terme on arrive ainsi à consolider un pouvoir tout aussi en déclin que celui des décideurs politiques. Pourtant tous les Québécois vont payer le prix de leur dépendance politique. Il est impensable que les employés de l'État n'aient pas à payer eux aussi les frais d'un démantèlement de l'État québécois.

Que l'on ne se méprenne pas: la fin du rêve québécois de l'égalité politique marque aussi la fin de toutes responsabilités réelles de dépasser les appareils, organigrammes et bureaucraties déshumanisantes qui s'étaient mises en place depuis 1960. La libération par le vide étatique n'a jamais constitué un projet d'avenir susceptible de rallier autre chose que les professionnels de la politique du pire.

Il ne faudrait cependant pas croire que le Québec est l'unique perdant de la récente déconfiture politique. Évidemment, notre vieille habitude de tout voir en termes d'un antagonisme automatique entre le Canada anglais et le Québec nous porte à croire que si le Québec a effectivement perdu, c'est que le Canada anglais doit avoir gagné. À court terme, c'est probablement vrai. Mais la victoire risque d'être illusoire. Certes le Québec était celui des deux ayant le plus à perdre dans le jeu de la négociation politique. S'étant rendu fort loin sur la route de la construction d'un état-national, il ne lui manquait qu'un dernier sursaut

pour franchir le cap d'une prise en charge définitive. Aujourd'hui c'est tout l'édifice si difficilement érigé par les deux générations de la Révolution Tranquille — celle qui l'a conduit et celle qui l'a vécu — qui risque de s'écrouler.

Le Canada anglais quant à lui avait le plus à gagner. En ce sens, on pourra toujours dire qu'il n'a rien perdu. Il revient au point zéro qu'il n'avait vraiment jamais quitté et où il a maintenant la satisfaction de se retrouver en compagnie du Québec. "L'égalité dans la dépendance" pourrait bien devenir la devise commune de nos deux communautés politiques. Il n'y aura pas de socialisme canadien pas plus qu'il n'y aura de socialisme québécois. Autant se le dire tout de suite. Qu'avait donc à gagner le Canada anglais dans la reconnaissance d'une égalité politique pour le Québec et dans la traduction de cette reconnaissance dans la forme d'une association avec un Québec souverain ou d'une véritable confédération à deux états ou cinq régions.

Sur un plan strictement politique l'émergence d'un nouveau palier correspondant à l'émergence d'une communauté (ou d'une nation) canadienne-anglaise aurait mis un terme à l'accumulation des distorsions causées par un régime électoral et des institutions qui ne satisfont plus personne. Pour l'alternative socialiste, il s'agit là d'un pré-requis qui risque maintenant de ne plus jamais être rencontré. Que les socialistes et socio-démocrates du Canada anglais aient été incapables de comprendre que la souveraineté du Québec constituait leur meilleur allié témoigne d'une myopie sans doute causée par leur installation confortable dans un statut de minorité permanente. Ce n'est donc pas sans réprimer un certain sourire que bon nombre de Québécois ont appris que le premier gouvernement provincial à mordre la poussière après la déconfiture constitutionnelle de novembre 1981 ait été celui du premier ministre Blakeney et de son ministre de la justice M. Roy Romanow dont le vernis socialiste s'accommodait bien d'une bonne dose de duplicité et de mépris à l'égard du Québec. Certe, nous n'ignorons pas que ce n'est pas pour leur attitude à l'égard du Québec qu'ils ont perdu les élections. Peu importe cela fait quand même plaisir. On voit mal maintenant comment le Canada pourrait se sortir d'un fédéralisme qui est devenu une véritable parodie de lui-même. La nature monarchique du régime, les rivalités régionales entretenues artificiellement, la collusion entre le pouvoir politique et les élites économiques, la centralisation bureaucratique, l'absence de tout projet collectif autre que la péréquation sont maintenant autant de traits permanents du régime politique canadien, sans compter la vassalisation accélérée face à "l'allié" américain. Comme il n'y aura pas de "nouveau Canada" et que la réforme constitutionnelle est maintenant terminée, eh bien "what you see is what you'll get". Sur le plan économique, les retombées de la faillite politique du Québec commencent déjà à ressortir.

Pour la première fois de son histoire, le Québec représentera en 1983 moins de 20% de l'activité économique canadienne! Évidemment, cette minorisation économique en fera sourire plusieurs à Ottawa, Toronto et Calgary. Mais leur sourire sera peut-être de courte durée. Pour le Canada anglais l'impossibilité

pour le pays de se donner des mécanismes efficaces de concertation et de planification, l'absence de politique industrielle, le maintien des disparités régionales et le contrôle accru par les multinationales américaines seront le prix à payer. On comprend mal pourquoi le Canada anglais, qui n'a pas su accepter sa propre identité et se confronter à celle du Québec, trouverait maintenant le courage de prendre les décisions économiques qui s'imposent. La glissade est déjà bien amorcée et va se continuer.

Pour ce qui est de la culture, le même diagnostic prévaut. Peut-on vraiment penser qu'à l'heure des satellites de télécommunications et de la télévision payante, la culture canadienne-anglaise pourra se maintenir sans un projet politique et un espace économique bien à elle? La démarche du "contenu canadien" risque de ne plus être d'aucune utilité devant ces nouvelles technologies. Le Comité d'étude de la politique culturelle fédérale aura beau exhorter le gouvernement fédéral à faire passer la culture avant tout et ne pas laisser les exigences économiques et les impératifs politiques dominer sa politique culturelle, cet appel risque de tomber à froid faute de choses à se dire entre Canadiens anglais. Évidemment, certains diront que le statut de dépendance politique, économique et culturelle dans lequel le Canada anglais va se trouver confirmé ne pourra que favoriser les artistes, ces êtres un peu bizarres qui ne fonctionnent vraiment bien que lorsqu'ils sont minoritaires et marginaux. Peut-être!

Le point de vue que cherche à défendre cet article est donc très simple: pour le Canada anglais le "problème" du Québec n'est que le reflet de sa propre problématique en tant que communauté nationale distincte et autonome. On ne peut régler l'un sans l'autre. Certes ce point de vue ne sera guère partagé par les Canadiens anglais. Pour la majorité d'entre eux, la question québécoise est maintenant réglée et ne saurait plus intervenir dans la problématique canadienne. D'ailleurs c'est à se demander si pour cette majorité il existe une problématique canadienne. Le pays existe, la nationalité aussi. La Chambre des Communes fonctionne. CBC, la Coupe Grey, le drapeau sont fort visibles. Et de plus le pays possède maintenant sa Constitution, sa Charte des droits, sa formule d'amendement et Pétro-Canada!

D'autres Canadiens anglais, une minorité cette fois, acceptent à l'occasion un diagnostic d'échec pour le socialisme et le nationalisme "made in English Canada". Mais jamais ce diagnostic n'inclut l'incapacité de ce nationalisme d'accepter la nécessité de la libération politique du Québec comme symptôme de ses propres déboires. Ainsi Daniel Drache, que l'on ne peut guère soupçonner de ne pas comprendre le fait québécois, écrit à propos de l'impasse du socialisme canadien:

> In Canada today, the Left is at an impasse because of its continuing inability to relate to working class nationalism, because of its romance with populism and because of a cast of mind shaped by a metropolitan Marxist intellectual tradition that fails to speak to specifically Canadian concerns.[5]

Il ne s'agit pas de critiquer ici un texte qui demeure l'une des analyses les plus lucides du nationalisme canadien-anglais et qui, fait inusité, ne remet pas en question l'existence d'un tel sentiment national, mais de constater que même une telle analyse, si elle identifie trois causes, ne fait aucune place au Québec.

Car voilà bien le drame. À droite comme à gauche, le Québec n'est perçu au Canada anglais ni comme une cause, ni comme un effet de l'échec canadien. Ce n'est d'ailleurs pas ce qu'on demande au Québec et après vingt ans cette interrogation de la manière bien canadienne de s'organiser une petite dépendance bien tranquille a fini par exaspérer bon nombre de Canadiens anglais. On les comprend.

Pour l'instant, le Québec et le Canada n'ont d'autres avenues que de se regarder l'un l'autre en se rappelant ce qui aurait pu être. Heureusement que nous aurons bientôt la "télévision géante".

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Notes

1. L'un des véhicules les plus utilisés pour ce débat est la revue *Canadian Public Policy*, voir entre autres H. Brotz, *"Multiculturalism in Canada: A Muddle"*, *Canadian Public Policy*, 6, 1(1980), pp. 41-46; L.W. Roberts and R.A. Clifton, "Exploring the Ideology of Canadian Multiculturalism", *Canadian Public Policy*, 8, 1(1981), pp. 88-94; D. Dawson, "The Structural Realities of Canadian Multiculturalism: A Response to Roberts and Clifton", *Canadian Public Policy*, 8, 4(1982), pp. 608-611; R.A. Clifton and L.W. Roberts, "Misreading the Nature of Canadian Multiculturalism", *Canadian Public Policy*, 8, 4(1982), pp. 611-612.
2. À ce sujet, l'article de R. Breton paru en 1964 semble avoir eu une influence déterminante sur cette vision du groupe ethnique: "Institutional Completeness of Ethnic Communities and Personal Relations of Immigrants", *American Journal of Sociology*, 70, 1(1964), pp. 193-205.
3. H. Brotz, "Comment", *Canadian Public Policy*, 8, 4(1982), p. 613.
4. André Gélinas, *Organismes autonomes et centraux*. Québec. Presses de l'Université du Québec, 1975.
5. Daniel Drache, *Canadian Socialism and the Transformation of Popular Ideologies: An Analysis of Political Myopia*, York University, mimeo.

Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory/Revue canadienne de théorie politique et sociale, Vol. 7, No. 3, (Fall/Automne, 1983).

DIVERTIMENTO POUR DEUX ÉTATS
DIVERTIMENTO FOR TWO STATES

Nicole Laurin-Frenette

À Halifax, elle est venue participer à la plénière de l'Association canadienne de sociologie. Sa collègue de McMaster a organisé la table ronde de cette plénière sur le thème, Québec après le référendum. Elle n'a pas eu le coeur de refuser l'invitation bien qu'elle craignît de s'ennuyer aux sociétés savantes et d'affronter un public d'intellectuels canadiens en anglais. Il l'a appelée au téléphone lorsqu'il a su qu'il était invité aussi, parlant du plaisir d'un voyage à Halifax ensemble. Il a corrigé le texte qu'elle a rédigé pour la plénière. Elle corrige quelquefois ce qu'il écrit en français. Il lui a donné le titre:

I have entitled my paper Divertimento For Two States because I believe the May 1980 referendum was an original political and ideological composition of the Québec state, performed with the enthusiastic assistance of the Canadian state for the benefit and pleasure, as indeed it should have been, of the Québec and even larger Canadian audience. A few critics, including myself, have maintained that the work itself was of disputable taste and that the performance had been poor. But perhaps we may simply seem ungrateful. After all, the concert was free and it seldom happens nowadays that we get to be directly entertained by our governments without even having to ask for the privilege and without even having to decide whether we want to be entertained at all. Our governments, too busy managing and solving our countless social problems, usually leave the entertainment functions to private agencies which cater for profit.

Elle a pris des notes pour se rappeler Halifax, cette ville qui n'est aucune ville en particulier, devient Halifax en toute ville qu'elle permet de retraverser: simple ailleurs, décor pour des amants. Afin de se rappeler Halifax, elle évoque Amsterdam, les maisons rouges, la brique et l'eau grise, le reflet des maisons dans l'eau tranquille; elle voyageait seule, parlant avec lui dans un cahier que personne ne lirait, d'un consentement inadmissible par l'esprit. Elle évoque Naples aussi, la baie illuminée au bord du soir, chansons traînantes, repas qui dure l'éternité au fil de l'eau; le matin, les ambulances de la Croix Rouge recueillaient du sang aux carrefours. San Francisco estompée par la brume, l'ennui poignant car le coeur veut tant et plus, jamais assez. Le golfe à Rimouski est la première figure de la fuite, détient l'irrésistible attrait de ce qu'on va quitter. Toutes ces villes dans la baie de Halifax et Vancouver. Il lui parlera de Vancouver, bleue avec des maisons de bois comme celles qu'ils voient à Halifax; dans ses yeux, l'eau du Pacifique à Vancouver. De Melbourne écrit Aurélia Steiner, sa soeur inconnue: le premier matin, dans la fenêtre de l'hôtel qui surplombe le port de Halifax, elle lui racontera l'histoire d'Aurélia,

née dans le rectangle blanc de la cour d'un camp allemand.[1] À cause de Halifax, elle penserait plus tard à Boston — l'eau de l'Atlantique est la plus salée du monde — la théorie pourrait dévorer la raison et ce qui resterait du coeur.

Ils ont quitté Montréal un matin de mai aux feuilles nouvelles. Elle est passée le prendre en taxi; sa femme était au lit, les enfants partaient pour l'école. Il a demandé quel temps il fait, pris un gilet. Toutes ces semaines, elle rêve au dernier numéro de *La Nuit*: les fantasmes machistes de leur camarade Miguel, la voix de son amant répétant je t'aime, tu m'aimes, nous courons au désastre et le texte de sa femme, une plainte, un reproche, I'm tired of being lumped together with my children.[2] Ce jour-là, ils auraient la mer, n'auraient plus honte de voir.

Il porte un t-shirt imprimé I'm a natural wonder et la préposée au comptoir de CP-Air a ri: so you're a natural wonder. Dans la salle d'embarquement, il lui a présenté un couple de sa connaissance, professeurs à Dawson College; elle n'a pas retenu leur nom. La femme a expliqué qu'elle devait assister à d'interminables réunions des comités de l'Association mais qu'ils allaient faire de la voile après le congrès avec des amis de Halifax; leurs enfants viendraient les rejoindre ou ils étaient déjà là-bas, elle n'a pas compris. On leur a donné des magazines avant le décollage, une publicité du Time leur demandant d'imaginer How would your life be without your bank? Il a réclamé La Presse pour connaître les détails du projet annoncé la veille par Parizeau d'un ticket modérateur pour décongestionner l'accès aux services de l'État. À dix heures, on a servi le champagne dans des verres de plastique comme on le fait au cours des vols vers la Floride.

Elle lui a écrit deux fois de la Floride. La première fois, elle s'excusait d'avoir manqué une soirée à laquelle il l'avait invitée; elle faisait allusion au vide après la rupture. La seconde lettre racontait comment à l'aube, les nuages forment des animaux mauves dans le ciel; de leurs rapports, elle notait, nous nous frôlons à peine. Il avait aimé le verbe frôler sans équivalent dans sa langue. Elle parlera de ce temps à la plénière, du printemps de l'année référendaire.

I know that we are supposed to be speaking of Québec after the referendum but one has to understand first what the party was like to be able to make sense of the morning-after syndrome. I have been wondering whether it could deepen your sociological understanding of the referendum if I told you that I, a political sociologist, bought a color-tv for the occasion in somewhat the same way my neighbour, a sport fan, bought his colour-tv a few years ago for the Olympic games. Or, if I told you that I, an anarchist and internationalist for years, also for years a violent critic of the right wing, center and left wing nationalist ideology in Québec, I became a fervent nationalist on the eve of the referendum, went to the poll to vote yes, looked with hatred on the way back at the people on the bus whom I knew from their looks had voted no or were going to vote no and, on the evening of the next day, could hardly master enough physical energy and moral courage to attend a five-o'clock reception at one of my English-speaking friends to which I had been invited long before the fatal date. This confession is probably sufficient to

convince you that although the referendum as a divertimento for the states involved, may have been in bad taste and poorly performed, it created nonetheless a deep and violent impression on at least the more impressionable section of its captive audience.

Qu'on perde ou qu'on gagne, on se soûle au gin les jours d'élection de génération en génération. Le gin noie les idéologies, dissout les contradictions. Séparés de leur gauche, coupés de leur base, courtisant leur droite, ils offraient l'étapisme à l'une, l'étatisme à l'autre. Cette défaite référendaire à la face du monde et du pays, comblait la mesure de l'absurdité péquiste. On savait déjà la veille qu'on ne s'en remettrait pas — l'avaient-ils assez dit, it's now or never, now it would be never — le soir, on pleurait devant l'écran de télévision.[3] Elle avait eu honte de se montrer chez lui, craint le regard de ses amis anglophones et anarchistes, ils seraient au-dessus de la confusion. Il l'avait embrassée pour la première fois. À son retour de Floride, il était venu chez elle. "Les mots ne manquaient, je croyais disposer d'un vocabulaire de quatre cents mots à peine." Il parlait alors de Jean-François et de sa femme il disait, je vois toutes les cicatrices du mal que je lui ai fait, des années durant. Elle lui avait dit en le quittant, nous vivons contre la mort, nous sommes vivants.

Depuis qu'ils ont quitté Montréal, il s'amuse. La route de l'aéroport à la ville de Halifax traverse un paysage des Laurentides où ils ont marché l'hiver dans le bois; ils s'endormaient au coin du feu leurs mains soudées. Il dit que le Canada se ressemble d'un bout à l'autre, elle connaît le Québec seulement et Toronto. Une femme descend du bus devant le Holiday Inn en échangeant des plaisanteries avec le chauffeur, alors il fait l'hypothèse que les congrès servent des amours clandestines renouées chaque année dans une autre ville. La chambre réservée pour eux à l'hôtel Barrington n'est pas prête; ils s'enlacent dans le lobby de cette institution modèle du voyage à frais remboursés.

Le soleil danse sur le trottoir. Ils marchent dans le quartier du centre de Halifax. On voit la baie au bout des rues en pente vers le port. Sous les pierres noires de l'ancien cimetière de Halifax, les tombes font face à la mer comme à Boston et à Plymouth mais les gratte-ciel bouchent la vue sur la baie. Au son des cloches on les menait au cimetière, le corbillard tiré par des chevaux: ordre des deuils et des naissances, larmes de la résignation. Who departed from this life: les épitaphes, dit-il, sont au moins réconfortantes; dans l'épitaphe des femmes de Nouvelle-Angleterre, elle se rappelle qu'on mentionnait goodwife of so and so. Il s'émeut de constater combien ces gens mouraient jeunes. "Se trouve conservée ici la plus vieille église du continent, of British origin." Oui. Ils sont accourus des champs au tocsin, l'église de Grand' Pré brûlait. Ils se retrouvèrent au bout de l'exil, ayant fait l'économie de la vie, entrèrent dans l'éternité avec une passion intacte.[4] Groupées autour du piano dans la salle du couvent, elles chantaient en canon: "Évangéline, Évangéline, tout chante ici ton noble nom, dans le vallon, sur la colline, l'écho répète et nous répond, Évangéline, Évangéline." La politique de la mémoire ignorée des sciences humaines. Le texte de sa communication va tenter d'expliquer comment l'État gère dans ce champ, l'orgueil et l'humiliation tout autant que l'emploi et le revenu dans le champ de l'économie.

DIVERTIMENTO POUR DEUX ÉTATS

In order to sound a bit more sociological, I should add that this is what nationalism is all about. It is based on the real feelings of real people, feelings such as one's attachment to the corner of the earth one has been living on, one's elementary solidarity with the people with whom one shares a minimal understanding based on past experiences and a common linguistic universe... Unfortunately for the Marxists these feelings, in and of themselves, do cross class-barriers. It is also based on the real problems of the same real people and it should be underlined that these are mostly class-based. Problems such as the competition over resources and markets for the commercial classes, the possibility of meaningful and influential careers for the intellectuals and other middle-class groups, job security and the size of the transfer payments for the workers and the people on welfare, without mentioning other non economic problems affecting the same groups. As such, nationalism is a political and ideological creation of the state, which transforms and uses these feelings and problems to articulate and legitimate its claim to power, over a particular population, on a given territory. Things and people are nationalized as they come under the state's control, symbolized by the state's flag. Of course, when you have two states fighting for the control of the same things and people, you get nationalist squabbles between the two states and sometimes between the two peoples and even among the same people, since people tend to identify with the state and even with the states where there are two or more. Otherwise there would be no state control at all, over anybody whatsoever.[5]

Ils sont rentrés à l'hôtel faire l'amour. De la rue monte le bruit des marteaux pneumatiques jusqu'à quatre heures, après le temps s'arrête. Avec lui, le temps de l'amour est fuite, arraché à la force d'on ne sait quel système. Les poissons nageaient dans l'aquarium au Café Timenes, avenue du Parc dans le quartier grec de Montréal, des instants que la brièveté de leur tête-à-tête rendaient sonores tombaient comme des pièces de monnaie dans l'assiette de l'après-midi. Brel disparu récemment chantait à la radio: "ils parlent de la mort comme s'ils parlaient d'un fruit." Que serions-nous si nous avions le temps, pensait-elle, nous ne l'aurons pas. L'hôtel offre tous les leurres de la dépersonnalisation, programme de conditionnement physique en plus, piscine, bain tourbillon, services indispensables à la forme parfaite des cadres de la contre-révolution. Ils marchent le long des quais de Halifax dans la fin de l'après-midi, fument un joint, le temps ralentit encore, se fige. Dos tourné à la mer, elle lui parle de la côte Amalfitaine et de Capri. I am blissed out, dit-il, le soleil dans les yeux à la terrasse du restaurant.

La salle à manger est sombre, des photos de voiliers au mur, un portrait de la reine Victoria. La table met entre eux une distance qui semble infranchissable, les objets tanguent sur cette table. Elle a appris la théorie des systèmes dans une université américaine; elle en offrira à l'auditoire de la plénière une caricature légère.

Most political scientists will agree with the elementary proposition that in the two-state situation either one wins and the other loses or they both win; or sometimes, both lose but that, on the whole, most people do not either gain much or lose much in any case. What most people get though is a lot of entertainment, that is, a chance to get excited. We

can hardly imagine how boring life must be for most people in a one nation-state that never gets the chance to be defied or menaced as such, from within or from without. Fortunately, this does not happen too frequently, since the relationships among states and those of states within states, are in a condition of what political scientists call moving equilibrium, that is no equilibrium at all but constant struggle and negociation.

Le menu est anglais: du hareng et des pommes, du poisson sauce à la crème dite hollandaise. En Hollande, on nappe tous les plats d'une sauce brune qui n'a pas de nom. Elle aurait aimé voir des patineurs sur les canaux d'Amsterdam mais en février, l'eau n'avait pas gelé. Elle l'avait baptisé cuirassé Potemkine, il était blond. Tout l'hiver, éblouie par cette lumière du corps radieux: à l'origine, un point agrandi par l'insomnie. Le dessert est anglais aussi, pommes cuites dans la pâte. "Quand nous étions petits, nous insistions pour manger au restaurant avec nos parents. Quelle épreuve pour eux!" — "La bataille, les cris?" — "Elle désirait l'aîné seulement, pas les suivants." — "Tu me l'as dit." — "Il est question d'enfants dans mes poèmes toujours. Les enfants sont importants pour moi." Rideau sur la scène du théâtre familial; ce qui se passe dans les coulisses demeure caché aux spectateurs. Le restaurant s'est rempli de gens qui ressemblent à des professeurs en congrès, des hommes surtout par groupes de trois ou quatre. Elle ne sait pas que sa montre s'est détraquée quand elle l'a mise à l'heure de Halifax; ils croient qu'il est dix heures et sortent émerveillés car il fait clair. Au soleil de minuit, des garçons pêchent sur les quais.

Ils sont montés vers la forteresse qui domine la ville et le port de Halifax. De là-haut, le contour de la baie se découpe étincelant sur la nuit. L'horloge de l'ancienne tour municipale donne l'heure juste, normale; la fatigue les envahit. Sur le trottoir devant un bar, un vieil homme demande vingt-cinq cents avec l'accent des corsaires dans les films britanniques: "Don't be too hard on an old sailor; and may God bless you." Une bénédiction... Au milieu de la nuit, quand ils dorment dans le lit aux draps jaunes de l'hôtel Barrington, le navire des pirates lève l'ancre sans bruit, laisse le flux de la marée l'emporter vers la mer. Au vent du matin larguant les voiles, il fuit les rives de la Confédération.

Lorsque s'établissent les institutions politiques canadiennes à la fin du 19e siècle, l'État fédéral est moins l'instrument de la centralisation des opérations financières capitalistes que l'effet, le résultat de cette centralisation. Il est moins le moyen, plus ou moins efficace, par lequel la bourgeoisie canadienne tente de s'instaurer comme classe, que le résultat de sa "mise en place" dans les réseaux de l'ensemble bourgeois nord-américain; le lieu où s'organise le discours sur la place spécifique qu'elle occupe dans cet ensemble. L'opération est si manifestement arbitraire et, en fait, si peu fonctionnelle, qu'elle aura du mal à réussir: la nation canadienne, dès l'origine, est peu convaincante et cela n'a rien à voir avec son caractère bi-ethnique. C'est une faiblesse congénitale du sens, du discours, qui vient et viendra toujours trop tôt ou trop tard tenter de donner un caractère canadien à des procès (économiques, sociaux, culturels ou autres) dont le champ de reproduction est plus restreint ou plus vaste que celui qui leur est ainsi

arbitrairement assigné. Ce qui va produire et reproduire, non pas des crises politiques car les réseaux d'appareils de contrôle fonctionnent aussi bien qu'ailleurs, mais surtout des crises idéologiques, dans l'État, à propos de la nation dont il est censé manifester l'existence et assurer la cohésion. Le mode d'articulation des divers éléments ou fractions du sous-ensemble de la classe dominante lié à la place de l'État, est inscrit dans la structure politique formelle, confédérale et parlementaire. Elle organise à la fois leur coordination et leur contradiction (ou leur entente et leur rivalité) comme éléments constitués dans ce sous-ensemble. On peut ainsi comprendre la profonde ambivalence dont le nationalisme sera forcément affecté. L'État canadien et les États provinciaux qui en font partie, s'appuient sur un discours nationaliste canadien, comme condition de production et de reproduction de la nation canadienne et de la place des groupes politiques associés à ces États dans les réseaux de la classe dominante. Mais chacun de ces États exige aussi d'être investi d'un sens particulier, organisant son pouvoir propre et assurant également, sur cette base, la reproduction des groupes politiques qui lui sont associés. Une dose minimale d'idéologie régionaliste ou de nationalisme provincial est nécessaire et elle ne manquera jamais. À cet égard, le Québec ne représente pas vraiment une exception mais plutôt une exagération de cette tendance, inscrite dans la logique politique de la confédération canadienne.[6]

Le soleil s'est levé très rouge sur la baie de Halifax déserte; elle a écarté les rideaux pour le voir puis elle est restée éveillée. Il dormait — la solitude est sans fin, c'est le prix du désordre — il était triste en s'éveillant. Les marteaux pneumatiques s'étaient remis au travail. Ils ont pris le petit déjeuner en regardant le port de la fenêtre de la chambre, les bateaux noirs ancrés de l'autre côté de la baie. À Portsmouth mouille la flotte de guerre canadienne. Elle lui a raconté le film de Duras sur Aurélia Steiner: la caméra suit le long d'un quai des rangées sans fin de caisses numérotées et la douceur des peupliers au bord de la Loire se superpose au texte sur l'horreur des camps. Elle n'a pas vu le film, on lui en a fait ce récit. Il dit que le monde est une coupe débordant de souffrance. Dans un texte récent, il montrait l'impossibilité de dissocier le désespoir et l'utopie, l'illusion et la réalité, la reproduction et la révolution mais il n'en est plus certain.

C'est l'été dehors. Ils entrent dans une librairie coopérative, n'y voient rien de nouveau; dans la section consacrée aux Indiens et Esquimaux, un livre sur les Acadiens qui ressemble à un manuel québécois des années cinquante. La librairie voisine vend des comics et des romans de science-fiction. Il lui offre le dernier tome de la série Riverworld attendu depuis un an.[7] Ce quartier de Halifax ressemble à tout et à rien, l'Amérique standardisée du best surprise is no surprise. À l'heure du midi, les gens achètent des frites d'une cantine ambulante; elle remarque qu'on mange les frites avec du ketchup. Un oasis mousseux de verdure et de fleurs se cache derrière de hautes grilles: ruisseau en cascade, bassin de poissons rouges, des cygnes. Les canards sur l'étang de Hyde Park leur semblaient résumer l'Angleterre; il se mettait en colère parce qu'elle disait je t'aime. Ils se sont dit je t'aime bien des fois, pas à Halifax cependant. Ils sont assis tranquilles sur un banc du parc et soudain, dans le tintamarre,

les deux faces du monde se télescopent. Il chancelle, équilibriste sur le fil du sens. Elle essaie de lui expliquer que le sens se venge de nous parce que la création se suffit à elle-même, il n'y a qu'à penser aux reptiles, aux rapaces, aux dinosaures. Elle lui raconte comment le wizard of earthsea encore apprenti, déchira le tissu de l'univers, de cette déchirure s'échappa la forme invisible du mal, la peur, qui le poursuivit jusqu'au bout de la mer où les vagues tombent dans le vide.[8] Elle ne lui est d'aucun secours.

Le quartier de l'Université Dalhousie ressemble à Cambridge, autour de Harvard les maisons en bois et les petites églises protestantes. Une fois de plus à Boston, elle était revenue par amour, la seule langue qu'elle eut apprise à souffrir. La foire des sociétés savantes bat son plein. Au Students Union Building, chaque société a son kiosque, le hall bourdonne d'activité, dossiers et brochures éparpillés. On leur remet leur kit de congressiste, l'étiquette portant leur nom et celui de leur institution qu'ils enfouissent dans leur poche. Quelques collègues tels des fantômes leur apparaissent dans le demi-jour de la cafétéria. Pour lui permettre de voir le médecin préposé aux malaises des intellectuels dalhousiens, le Health Center lui demande sa carte québécoise d'assurance-maladie: de loin l'État du Québec veille sur elle. Mais le silence de la salle d'attente l'angoisse alors il tient sa main, à voix basse lui parle d'un mal mystérieux dont les médecins n'ont pu le guérir pendant des mois en Israël, du désert aussi, une panne de voiture dans le désert: des années irréparables dans l'attente de ce qui n'a pas de nom, années qui ne s'achèvent jamais, il le sait. Le soir dans leur chambre, elle va lui dire en riant, j'irais jusqu'au bout du monde ta main dans la mienne, elle va prononcer une phrase pareille. Folle, Adèle H. poursuivait son amant à Halifax dans la tempête, on entend les cloches des bouées vers les écueils, le mugissement des vagues.[9]

Parmi les livres que les sociétés savantes exposent dans le gymnase de l'Université, il a trouvé le sien mais ceux qu'elle a publiés sont absents. Au centre du campus, dans un carré de gazon entouré d'immeubles victoriens: l'arbre de la science du bien et du mal. Ils s'allongent sous cet arbre, parlent sans se regarder. "Dirais-tu que tu es heureuse ou est-ce que ce terme n'a plus de sens?" Lui, cherche toujours le point où s'effacerait la contradiction entre le réel et l'imaginaire — "être présent ou absent serait indifférent" — mais le piège de l'aveu s'est refermé sur lui. Après Jean-François, après ce qui est arrivé avec Jean-François, dit-il, le monde n'est plus sûr et dire je t'aime n'est ni vrai, ni faux, c'est à côté de la question. Il lui demande si on perd l'amour comme on perd la foi. Elle répond, je rêve à la mer et au temps ouvert sur l'année sabbatique du désir; comme Julia,[10] écrire et aimer une fois à la même heure, au même endroit. Une maison sur la plage: il écrivait, elle et moi regardions l'enfant jouer dans le sable, l'enfant grandissait; à quatre heures, on fait une partie de tennis, on achète des crevettes fraîches mais elle avait peur de la mer, après ses nuits d'insomnie ils trouvaient parfois fermés les stores et les rideaux, verrouillées les fenêtres et les portes. "Qu'est-ce qui a pu vous arriver?" — "Le mal en nous, à travers nous." Ensuite, elle ne dit plus rien.

DIVERTIMENTO POUR DEUX ÉTATS

À l'heure de l'apéritif dans le bar voisin du Barrington — the happy hour dit-on en anglais — ils font une incursion dans l'univers complémentaire de la famille nucléaire. Il se demande pourquoi les bars sont sombres; parce que les living-rooms de la banlieue sont ensoleillés, pense-t-elle. Les techno-bureaucrates rentrent en retard, ils flirtent après le bureau avec les serveuses décolletées qui apportent aux tables des drinks et des hors-d'oeuvre. Il boit un bloody-mary, elle un gin-gimlet; l'alcool a le goût du mariage au début du divorce, le goût des années soixante-dix quand les choses ont tourné au désastre, la question nationale en premier. Classes et nation, dit-elle, c'était notre jeunesse, cela devint notre profession et pour finir, "el monumento de una vida ajena y no vivida, apenas nuestra."[11]

Le projet indépendantiste est né, pour l'essentiel, dans les cercles, revues et groupuscules de gauche du début des années soixante. Nourri de sociologie tiers-mondiste puis de théorie marxiste, l'indépendantisme s'est formulé dans les termes d'un projet de libération nationale. L'émancipation du peuple québécois devait s'accomplir par le socialisme et, dans ce contexte, l'indépendance du Québec apparaissait tout à la fois comme le moyen, la condition et le résultat de la révolution sociale. Plus tard, les partisans de la libération nationale se fondront dans le Rassemblement pour l'Indépendance Nationale qui ralliait également les courants de droite et de centre du nationalisme et se fixait de objectifs électoraux. La gauche forma l'aile radicale de ce parti. Elle mit de l'avant une conception de l'indépendance et des stratégies de lutte nationale d'inspiration socialiste et populiste. Cette perspective engendra toutefois une division irréparable au sein du parti qui provoqua le départ de la faction de gauche vers la fin des années soixante. Le R.I.N. sera démantelé peu après; ses militants formeront, avec les éléments nationalistes du Parti Libéral et d'autres formations politiques, le Mouvement Souveraineté-Association qui deviendra plus tard le Parti Québécois. Ainsi s'est creusé le fossé qu'il ne sera plus jamais possible de combler, entre le projet de libération nationale et ce qu'on nommera l'option souverainiste, modérément réformiste et définie par la stratégie étapiste. Pendant quelques années encore, la gauche parviendra à intégrer les thèmes du nationalisme révolutionnaire dans la lutte anti-impérialiste et socialiste. Dans le courant des années soixante-dix cette problématique sera graduellement abandonnée. La gauche se partagera selon l'une ou l'autre voie d'une alternative politique qui dissocie l'indépendance et le socialisme, sinon dans le discours, du moins dans la pratique. Une partie de la gauche se consacrera soit aux luttes pratiques et immédiates des organisations syndicales et populaires, y compris celles du féminisme et de la contre-culture, soit aux tâches plus théoriques de l'élaboration et de la diffusion du marxisme. L'autre partie des forces de gauche se ralliera explicitement ou implicitement au Parti Québécois, se justifiant par les principes de l'étapisme ou de la ligne de masse. Ces réalignements politiques s'inscrivent dans un contexte qui place les groupes de gauche sur la défensive. La crise d'octobre et le démantèlement du F.R.A.P. en 1970, suivis par la déroute du Front Commun de la fonction publique, en 1972, auxquels s'ajoute la remontée des idéologies et des mouvements sociaux conservateurs. La gauche se trouvera

désormais à la remorque du Parti Québécois sur le front de la lutte nationale. Piégée par la stratégie étapiste du parti au pouvoir et compromise avec l'appareil étatique, d'une part. D'autre part, isolée par des visions sans prise sur la conjoncture ou enfermée dans des combats ponctuels.[12]

Geoffrey est arrivé un peu en avance, ils finissaient de se rhabiller après le sauna et la piscine. C'est un jeune avocat de gauche, le luxe et le désordre de la chambre le scandalisent. Avec lui, ils ont repris le périple de la veille dans le centre de la ville en écoutant son compte rendu de la lutte des habitants de Halifax contre la démolition des vieux édifices et la construction de tours en béton. Ensuite, il les a amenés à un restaurant ennuyeux, insistant pendant tout le repas pour discuter de syndicalisme. Par politesse, ils ont cherché à se souvenir des grèves qu'ils ont vécues: la grève de la fonction publique en 72 a failli mener à l'insurrection — Geoffrey est impressionné — et celle de 76 à l'Université du Québec à Montréal, leur grève pour une fois cette génération de théoriciens gauchistes, leur dernière folie.[13] Quatre mois, avant et après la victoire du Parti Québécois, ils sont restés dehors, ils ont gagné. De retour au travail ils étaient tristes: perdue la chaleur de janvier, leur rire sur les lignes de piquetage.[14] Le délire s'enclanche dans ce récit, Geoffrey resté en plan veut rentrer. Ils l'ont laissé partir seul.

À une autre table, il a découvert un vieil ami, un ami du Manitoba en compagnie de trois professeurs ontariens. Il est en train de lui reprocher ce qu'il appelle sa trahison de l'année précédente; venu à Montréal pour le congrès des sociétés savantes, il ne lui a pas donné signe de vie. Devant tes collègues, dit-il, tu as rougi de mes opinions anarchistes. Elle revoit le chemin qu'ils ont suivi depuis la date de ce congrès, un an exactement, sûrs tous les deux que la peine protège de la peine mais leur blessure s'est refermée. Elle a peur. Personne ne lui adresse la parole. Ils s'engagent dans une discussion de la position socialiste sur le rapatriement de la Constitution que le politicologue de York interrompt par trois fois pour demander ce qu'ils ont mangé précédemment avec Geoffrey. Entre le coup de circuit et la fausse balle, le baseball comme métaphore de la relation des révolutionnaires avec l'ordre établi, ne leur arrache que des sacarsmes.[15] Quand on lui demande enfin son avis, elle ne peut plus parler. Elle est prise de panique. Elle devra s'adresser le lendemain à des gens comme eux, pas une parole ne va passer. Les mots anglais sont partis en fumée, les mots de cette langue sont impossibles à prononcer. Évangéline, prie pour nous. Pardonne-nous d'avoir franchi les frontières de la réserve. Hors du pays, point de salut: les bateaux ennemis, l'exil! Pourtant, dans sa communication à la plénière, elle traitera la question avec humour.

Now, Canada has come a long way since the said fathers of Confederation managed to get the railroads running from coast to coast by negociating, among other things, a satisfactory division of powers and jurisdictions between the French-Canadian Church and the English-speaking so-called federal state. For the last twenty years or so, this central state has had to deal in Québec with a provincial state that has discovered a

nation for itself. Others, more recently, have discovered oil and it still remains to be seen which of the two resources can take a state further. The details of the squabbles and negotiations are not really interesting, be it Québec's divertimento referendum or Ottawa's concerto for the patriation of the Constitution, but they are entertaining. From an historical point of view, the interesting thing is that they will go on forever or at least, as long as the states involved will retain the material and ideological bases and conditions of their respective power. The federal state seems to have enough of such political resources to back its own claim to power despite a few episodic shortcomings. In the last recourse, the interests of the Province of Ontario would suffice to keep it strong and healthy. As for the Québec state, it has a nation as I said before, and it can be depended on, whatever the party in control, to keep it from dilution or absorption, or from whatever disease a nation can catch that may render its state impotent. Besides, the state of Québec has even endowed itself with a bourgeoisie as my more orthodox Marxist colleagues will have it. True, it is a modest one, but its economic power is firmly rooted in the state-owned natural resources and the state-privileged cooperative sectors of the economy, though it also has its tentacles in the state-supported local private investment sector. All these conditions would be sufficient to insure that, all things remaining unchanged, we or our successors in the Canadian Universities' Schools of Sociology, could be here twenty or fifty years from now, discussing the question of what does Québec want.

Ils ont cru en voir la fin. Trois semaines après le référendum, aux sociétés savantes de Montréal, ils avaient la condescendance agacée de gens importants qu'on aurait dérangés inutilement. Désormais, ils peuvent re-situer dans leur contexte et à leur niveau, la critique de la crise, du capitalisme et de l'impérialisme, de la bourgeoisie et de l'État. Ils peuvent renouer le fil de leur rêve du socialisme canadien. Entre temps, sur l'échiquier de ce pouvoir dont l'enjeu est toujours le maintien de l'ordre, les pions auront repris leur place: enfants, femmes, Noirs, Juifs, sous-développés, prolétaires, Acadiens, Franco-Ontariens, Québécois... En sortant du restaurant, ils se serrent l'un contre l'autre pour se protéger du vent froid de la mer, la nuit. Il a dit à son ami de l'Ouest qu'il lui avait pardonné mais ne pourrait oublier; d'un coup il tremble, elle ne sait quelle perte l'a saisi. Accroché au corps du délit: le silence, le rejet, la rage, il s'excuse pour cet ami, pour eux tous comme si c'était sa faute. Ils rentrent par le labyrinthe souterrain de couloirs aux vitrines somptueuses qui débouche sur le hall de l'hôtel, s'arrêtant pour regarder des objets inutiles, abstraits comme Halifax et les villes de la mémoire.

Elle s'est levée avant lui le jeudi, jour du spectacle dont ils doivent payer Halifax. Elle meurt de se réveiller ce matin-là. Au chaud dans le bain tourbillon, elle cause avec un historien de Victoria et un latiniste américain. Le latin, déclare l'historien, revient à la mode, c'est bien. La femme du latiniste explique que les enfants sont chez leurs grands-parents; elle lit au bord de la piscine pendant que son mari prend un sauna. Il fait sa gymnastique sur la terrasse et elle attend. (Se glisser dans un bonheur comme il faut, prolonger son souffle, baisser la flamme.) "Tu as lavé tes cheveux?" Elle se coiffe dans le miroir de la

salle de bain étincelante, il reste au lit. Le ciel et la baie dans la fenêtre sont gris, Halifax les abandonne. Ils s'inquiètent de la table ronde de la soirée. Ils travaillent, polissent le texte qu'elle a rédigé, prennent des notes. Il cherche des idées pour sa communication mais l'inspiration le fuit. Elle lui jette des matériaux pêle-mêle, évoque pour lui le temps fou: les communes chinoises de la Matapédia, les lettres que Vallières écrivait de prison, la R.C.M.P., les perquisitions. Alors il se souvient d'avoir un jour tutoyé Paul Gérin-Lajoie, ministre de l'Éducation, de ses années soixante au *McGill Daily.* Ils marchent dans Montréal chacun vers le pôle opposé aux repères de l'enfance: l'asphalte, les escaliers de l'est, les parterres des quartiers de l'ouest. A-t-il connu Stan Gray qui avait organisé à l'époque la manifestation pour un McGill français? Elle lui montre en passant la signification érotique des relations entre Québec et Ottawa depuis 1960: l'homosexualité implicite de la gauche et de la droite, leur passion sado-masochiste. Ainsi la grande trouille d'octobre 70... Il sourit, il va mieux; elle ignore ce qu'il va faire de cela.

Elle l'a traîné à Dalhousie dans l'après-midi pour assister à quelques sessions du congrès de l'Association. Ils ont croisé Jorge Niosi sortant d'un débat entre lui et Leo Panitch sur la bourgeoisie canadienne. Ils se sont excusés d'avoir manqué ce débat et il s'est excusé à son tour de ne pouvoir assister à la plénière du soir parce qu'il reprenait l'avion. Ils se sont rendus à la séance intitulée Recent Developments in Sociological Theory. Trois chercheurs exposaient les résultats d'une étude de plusieurs années sur les enfants, subventionnée par le C.C.R.S.H. Why was the cookie crying? demande l'expérimentateur. Because the mother had been a wafer too long, répond l'enfant. Ce wafer, explique le professeur, représente le phallus de la mère au début du stade oedipien. Leur collègue de McMaster est entrée à ce moment, elle sourit. Ils sortent discrètement mais regrettent d'abandonner leur collègue, entrouvrent la porte et lui font signe de les rejoindre.

Ils retournent ensemble au quartier du port car le beau temps revient. Ils boivent du vin blanc à une terrasse, font des commérages d'universitaires. Elle jouit des mots anglais, leurs sonorités se réchauffent au soleil et au vin — touristes victoriens sur la promenade à Nice — la baie retrouve sa couleur méditerranéenne. Il leur parle de l'héroïne d'un roman sud-africain qui subordonne l'oppression des Noirs à celle des femmes. D'un regard, chacune a pressenti la solitude de l'autre. Il leur parle aussi de ses poèmes, beau comme au théâtre, très beau. Elle met du temps à reconnaître André, surgi soudain d'un passé trop lointain pour être vrai, à Halifax; son assistant en 68 au plus fort de la contestation à l'Université, il avait rompu ses fiançailles bourgeoises sur un coup de foudre pour Michelle, sa camarade de combat. Travaille à Radio-Canada, un bébé de quelques mois, dit-il, une fille. "De Michelle?" Il a répondu non. Cela fait mal sans raison comme une dent morte, une ancienne fracture les jours humides, une habitude: délivrez-nous du mal pas de l'amour, que l'amour se dissolve dans la vie, la bataille finie. Où sont-ils tous les quatre maintenant dans l'espace du temps et ce que la chaleur fait perler au bord du verre, cette rosée du vin, est-ce l'espoir ou le souvenir seulement? Dans un autre

vocabulaire, elle va poser ces questions à l'auditoire de la plénière.

What I am trying to say, in short, is that the maintenance of the unstable equilibrium of the system involving the two states, is precisely what will keep things from changing at all though they may well be kept moving a lot. And in this process, people's hopes and desires for change, from which the moving equilibrium takes its impetus, will go on being deceived and frustrated as they have been for the last twenty years at least in Québec, and also, I suppose, in the other parts of Canada. I have recalled the social movement that gave rise, in the sixties, to the not so quiet Québec revolution and from which the now institutionalized nationalist movement derived the energy that it progressively reinvested in the party, in the state apparatus and in the general control system. Surely, the movement died from exhaustion and recuperation, but it should also be recalled that the central state, assisted by the local state, had no hesitation using violent means against its militants and supporters, such as invoking the War Measures Act, sending in the army, putting many people in prison and creating a lasting impression of fear among the population in general. It shows, among other things, that the moving institutional equilibrium may feed on people's desires for change only if these people do not, on their own, try to put their desires into practice.

Dans la baignoire, elle relit à haute voix le texte de sa communication. Elle portera son tailleur le plus élégant. Elle se demande si sa montre est à l'heure, s'ils ont pris le bon autobus, s'ils pourront descendre à l'arrêt le plus proche du pavillon où ils doivent se rendre sur le campus mais il a vérifié chaque détail, tout planifié avec précision. Les autres participants sont arrivés: Louis Maheu, Pierre Fournier, Stephen Schecter, John Jackson accompagné de sa femme et Peta Sheriff qui préside la séance. On cause joyeusement. Deux étudiants au doctorat anglophones de son département se joignent au cercle, la soirée prend un air de famille. Il passe sept heures et demie mais on a prévu ce léger retard parce que l'Association invitait ses membres à un cocktail, à cinq heures.

Ils ne viendront pas. Après une heure d'attente dans l'amphithéâtre, ils sont cinquante. Post-referendum Québec: ils s'en fichent. Elle pense tant mieux, que la paix descende sur eux, qu'ils habitent ce pays de leur ennui, avec les Rocheuses, la beauté des sentiers de montagne, cette paix reflétée dans les lacs immobiles dont tu m'as parlé, là où tu as rencontré ton ange gardien. Qu'ils ignorent, oublient nos histoires de coeur, de tête, nous serons seuls à savoir. Tu leur dis pourtant: two years ago, I was standing at the corner of Ste-Catherine and St-Alexander in Montréal, wondering if I'd ever be able to make love in French, then I did, 1979-1980 was a year in which a lot of people fell in love and out of love.[16] Ne pas pleurer sur cette estrade, ce soir, devant ces gens. Ils rient de ce dont nous avons tant pleuré, tant parlé ensemble, ton histoire, la mienne et ri aussi jusqu'à se lier par cette folie. De 1979 et 1980, on vous aurait tout raconté. Louis Maheu analyse les enjeux du nationalisme pour les classes moyennes et certaines catégories d'intellectuels: ce qui déborde, dit-il, le jeu du marché politique.[17] Retraçant l'évolution des luttes politiques et sociales de la

décennie précédente, Stephen Schecter souligne que désormais la gauche québécoise n'est pas plus révolutionnaire que celle du Canada anglais, un mythe qui a pourtant la vie dure. Dans un anglais impeccable, Pierre Fournier propose de se tourner vers la réalité d'aujourd'hui plutôt que celle des vingt dernières années, d'analyser davantage la stratégie fédérale et les nouvelles alliances à l'intérieur du Canada. John Jackson, décrivant la réaction idéologique de la minorité anglophone du Québec, ses nouveaux porte-parole, son organisation, en conclut que cet autre nationalisme est illusion et allusion. Elle se rappelle de lire en prononçant bien les mots, sans forcer la voix, ignorer l'écho du microphone qui porte à ralentir le débit sinon sa communication va prendre toute la nuit. Ils rient du divertissement qu'elle leur offre et cette accusation: vous êtes dupes du pouvoir comme nous mais vous vous pensez plus fins, plus forts que nous. L'armée est venue, la peur est restée. Ils ne sauront jamais combien nous avons ri et pleuré. Nous venions à Halifax parler de l'amour, de la liberté qui nous fuient, vous n'êtes pas venus. Peta Sheriff a fait les présentations, dirige la période des questions; l'absence des membres de l'Association la contrarie, cependant elle sourit.

Le quartier de l'Université Dalhousie est désert à dix heures du soir; ils marchent par petits groupes, hélant des taxis qui foncent aveuglément dans les rues. Un des étudiants au doctorat s'accroche à ses pas, il déplore ce qui lui semble une absence de concepts dans le texte de sa communication. Maintenant l'essentiel est que ce soit fini, qu'ils puissent regagner leur lit dès que les dernières obligations seront remplies. Dix à table — une maison ancienne de Halifax transformée en restaurant — des éventails tournent silencieusement au plafond: Humphrey Bogart dans la scène d'adieu de Casablanca — "Don't worry, leave it to me, I'm taking charge of everything." — et le corps d'Anne-Marie Stretter allongée sur le plancher du salon de l'ambassade de France à Calcutta.[18] À Halifax où sont-ils vraiment? Les retrouvailles de deux collègues se sont transformées en partie de squash: "Combien d'enfants maintenant?" — "Deux." — "De ton ex-femme?" — "Non, un autre d'elle, deux de ma femme actuelle." — "Quel âge?" — "Deux ans et un an." — "C'est raide." — "C'est l'Europe. On ne peut pas avoir d'avortement. Toujours avec la tienne?" — "Oui." — "Alors, tes déclarations contre la famille nucléaire, c'est pour le fun?" — "Non." — "Combien d'enfants avec ça?" — "Deux." Ils sont à Halifax, dans un restaurant qui ferme d'habitude à dix heures. En Écosse, à l'Université de Glasgow pendant un congé sabbatique — fantômes dans les brumes violettes — dans une ferme du pays de Galles où la sage-femme du village vient mettre au monde un enfant. À Bath, l'un d'entre eux a évoqué Bath, leur plus mauvais souvenir Bath, un mot de passe, un code. Il va répéter mot pour mot ce qu'il lui a dit un soir en décembre: pendant la semaine sainte à Bath, j'ai entendu la Passion selon Saint Matthieu de Bach, j'ai vu du sang partout dans l'église, la lumière des vitraux sanglante. Elle lui avait dit après l'amour, si on pouvait entrer dans la tête de l'autre pour voir le monde avec ses yeux, quelque chose d'aussi banal. Cela n'a plus d'importance. Ils ont laissé les autres reprendre un taxi, ils sont rentrés à pied; elle s'est endormie en regardant

un film d'horreur à la télévision.

Il lui a raconté la suite du film le lendemain. À neuf heures, il avait demandé le petit déjeuner, confirmé l'heure du vol pour Montréal, les places. Leur restait à peine une flaque de temps à marée basse. Ils essayaient de ne pas traîner. Il fallait ordonner ce temps. Une dernière fois nager dans la piscine. Les valises bouclées, tiroirs ouverts, la corbeille débordait des papiers qu'ils ne voulaient pas rapporter. Entre le miroir et la porte du placard ouverte, ils allaient se caresser, s'étreindre, la suite était prévisible mais lorsqu'elle a crié — ton cri, dira-t-il, m'a bouleversé — le rire s'est emparé de lui, l'emportant jusqu'à l'épuisement. En vain, il essaiera de trouver une explication à ce rire.

Halifax les quitte des rives de la baie qui s'élargit jusqu'à la mer au loin. Le taxi file entre les sapins, les bouleaux de leur enfance avant le drapeau canadien, avant l'État laurentien. Ils se tiennent par la main. Le temps se ferme. Ils parlent de Paris où il part en vacances le surlendemain. "Entre Roissy et l'Étoile, le car met presqu'une heure. Il faudrait prévenir Hélène de l'heure de votre arrivée, déposer vos bagages chez elle, dormir un peu." Hélène avait appelé de Paris le soir du référendum, dix ans au Québec, pleurait au téléphone. La veille, cette conclusion de son intervention à la plénière de l'Association...

The referendum only told the same old lesson to the same people, already well warned from past events that they should not be hoping for much in the way of a real transformation of the conditions of work and life in general. Nobody did hope for much. But just in case they would, all the established powers, and the powers to be, and even the powers that have been — capital, religion, techno-bureaucracy and even phallocracy — rose to warn them of all the ills they would be bestowing upon themselves by voting Yes in the referendum. This is why I became a fervent nationalist on the eve of the referendum: because it had nothing to do with the nation. And this is why, like others in Québec, I am still suffering from the morning-after syndrome, which is characterized less by nationalistic frustration than by the sad realization of how well all of us are guarded against freedom by the system of which we are part.

À la dernière minute dans l'aéroport de Halifax, panique au comptoir de CP-Air: valises ouvertes par terre, le billet de l'un retrouvé au fond du sac de l'autre, course vers la salle d'embarquement. Chaleur humide de Montréal où la feuillaison est plus avancée qu'à Halifax. Quelques semaines et la lumière dans sa course atteindrait ce sommet d'où elle basculerait dans l'autre versant de l'été. En novembre, la télévision retransmettrait les négociations d'Ottawa sur le rapatriement de la Constitution, la charte des droits et libertés. Il lui dirait, je sais que tout a commencé à Halifax et elle aurait peur ce que fût la fin.

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Notes

1. Marguerite Duras, *Aurélia Steiner.* Paris: Mercure de France, 1979, roman; France, 1979, film.
2. *La Nuit,* Montréal, vol. VI, 1, 1er mai 1981, périodique anarchiste.
3. Voir "Par delà l'écran référendaire" dans *L'impasse: enjeux et perspectives de l'après-référendum,* sous la direction de Nicole Laurin-Frenette et Jean-François Léonard, Montréal: Nouvelle Optique, 1980.
4. Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, *Évangéline, A Tale of Acadie,* Boston: Osgood, 1871.
5. Cette problématique de la relation entre la nationalisme et l'État est explicitée dans Nicole Laurin-Frenette, *Production de l'État et formes de la nation,* Montréal: Nouvelle Optique, 1979.
6. Repris après adaptation de *Production de l'État et formes de la nation,* ibid., p. 79-81.
7. Philip Jose Farmer, *The Magic Labyrinth*, Berkeley Science Fiction, 1981.
8. Ursula LeGuin, *Wizard of Earthsea,* Parnassus Press, 1968.
9. François Truffaut, *L'histoire d'Adèle H.,* France, 1975, film sur la vie d'Adèle, fille de Victor Hugo.
10. Fred Zinnemann, *Julia,* États-Unis, 1977, film.
11. "Le monument d'une vie étrangère, non vécue, à peine nôtre." Octavio Paz, "Piedra de Sol", dans *Versant Est et autres poèmes,* Paris: Gallimard, 1970.
12. Laurin-Frenette et Léonard, p. 16-18.
13. Sur la grève générale de la fonction publique: Jean-Marc Piotte, Diane Éthier et Jean Reynolds, *Les travailleurs contre l'État bourgois,* Montréal: Les Éditions de l'Aurore, 1975; sur la grève de l'U.Q.U.A.M.: les articles de J.-M Piotte, R. Laperrière et A. Vidricaire, dans *Le syndicalisme universitaire et l'État,* Montréal: Hurtubise HMH, 1977.
14. Michel Van Schendel, *Veiller ne plus veiller: suite pour une grève,* Montréal: Les Éditions du Noroît, 1978.
15. "Play Ball! Ou pourquoi un anarchiste assiste-t-il aux Expos", dans *La Nuit,* ibid.
16. Extrait de la communication de Stephen Schecter attribué dans ce texte à un participant imaginaire.
17. Cette analyse de Louis Maheu est reprise de son article: "La conjoncture des luttes nationales au Québec: mode d'intervention étatique des classes moyennes et enjeux d'un mouvement social de rupture", dans *Sociologie et Sociétés,* XI, 2, 1979.
18. Michael Curtiz, *Casablanca,* États-Unis, 1942, film. Marguerite Duras, *India Song,* France, 1975, film.

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CANADA IN THE EUROPEAN AGE

R. T. Naylor

From the fall of Constantinople to the Ottomans in 1453 until the maelstrom of 1914-1919, the European imperial powers penetrated, dominated, exploited and transformed the globe. By the end of the European Age of world domination, the frontiers of "discovery" and settlement had been pushed to their virtual limits. One continent after another had fallen before the joint forces of European military power and commercial enterprise; and the "native" peoples and societies variously subjugated, absorbed, or, on occasion, obliterated.

While the above generalizations apply to the history of European expansionism in general, they also apply to the history of Canadian economic and social development in particular. In theory that notion should call forth no surprise; in reality it is often met with strong resistance, so deep-rooted is the idea of Canadian exceptionalism in its national mythology. But, historical mythmakers to the contrary, Canadian history is far from being the parish history it is usually presented to be, albeit the corollary proposition that Canadian historians are parish historians remains all too often true.

Although Canada, Newfoundland excepted, has usually had a rather marginal role to play in the evolution of imperial systems over the course of the European Age, the reverse is not true — the ebb and flow of imperial history played the determining role in Canada's pattern of socio-economic evolution. Its exploration, exploitation, and development has been profoundly affected by major events occuring at the four corners of the globe. Thus Canadian history in general is part of the story of the conquest of America by European imperialism; and the fate of the Beothuk, Huron, Blackfoot, and Kwakiutl peoples is in no way qualitatively different from that of the Aztec, the Maya, the Inca or the Arawak. Newfoundland's history is inextricably bound up with that of the West Indies, the cornerstone of European mercantilism. British Columbia's history belongs to that of a Pacific economy called into being by the same set of forces that fired the opening shots in the Opium Wars in China. The decision of a British cabinet in the middle of the nineteenth century to block Russian imperial expansion at the mouth of the Black Sea was more important for the course of Canadian economic development in the 1850's, and perhaps well beyond, than the sum total of all decisions taken by Canadian entrepreneurs in that decade, since the former largely determined the shape of the latter. The building of the Canadian Pacific Railway, long touted as a romantic tale of autonomous nation building, was in fact an imperial event linked inexorably to the progress and protection of British imperialism in India and China — a compelling vision of the 1880's was for a railway, built by Canadian public money, to haul Indian grain to British markets through Canada's empty prairies.

The examples are beyond number. Nor indeed are they merely of historical interest. For the recent sharp deterioration of the Canadian position in the international economic pecking order, measured in terms of per capita income and general economic performance, reflects a social and structural deterioration that bears an uncomfortable resemblance to a process to which Argentina succumbed half a century ago. The debate in Canada over the effects, political and economic, of the proliferation of American-controlled corporations in the 1960s and 1970s, was part and parcel of a world wide process of response to the march of the transnational corporation, a march whose pace flagged sharply with the dethronement of the U.S. dollar in a series of monetary crises of the early 1970s. And the current struggles of the Dene Nation to maintain a minimal control over the pattern and pace of economic "development" in their historic territories in the face of a growing industrial appetite for raw materials is different in degree, but not in kind, from the battle now being waged by the aboriginal population of the Amazon Valley. Nor, niceties of technique aside, is the outcome likely to be much different.

The Structure of Dependent Relations

However what is involved cannot be reduced to a simple narrative of comparative events, great and small, tragic and comic, well-known and obscure, that make up the framework of five centuries of the history of European colonial expansion. There is a logic and an order to the sequence. History is the unfolding of "economic" systems over time and their accompanying social transformations, albeit such a judgement must be tempered by two further considerations. One is that the economic "motor" of history must be defined in the broadest possible sense, involving the accumulation of the material prerequisites of *social* existence, including the array of intangibles normally and artificially shunted aside into the subcategory of "culture". The second is that if "progress' is defined in modern, western Eurocentric terms, the motor of history must be accepted as being capable of, not just stalling for substantial periods of time, but of actually going into reverse.

It is only since the advent of the European Age that the movement of history even in the long run appears even remotely predictable, and when the propensity to economic integration and commercial homogenization over large social and geographic distances seems the rule rather than the highly aberrant exception. Thus the history of European expansionism in particular is a symptom of a process by which social relations became increasingly commercialized, by which the "market mechanism" flowed across geographic space at the same time that it percolated through social space. The resulting history of contact between societies is one in which the strong exploit and all too often obliterate the weak. Therefore the history of European penetration into "new" parts of the globe can only be seen as an amalgam of destructive and constructive forces, the two sets of forces being inextricably interrelated.

Such a perspective is not intended to suggest that Canada, in its historical

relations with the great powers, was in any way a defenseless and exploited colony whose population struggled in common with other oppressed peoples for national liberation. "Dependency" in its obvious Canadian manifestations is not a moral condition, but rather a basic structural constraint on autonomous evolution. A country can qualify as "dependent" in a number of ways. It can have the development of its forces of production and exchange derivative from, or even incidental to, the development of the forces of production and exchange in the major metropoles of world capitalism. Its governments may lack, by virtue of the power of exogenous structures and transnational economic institutions, the normal levers of control over the course of a country's economic evolution, thus having its economy become to all intents and purposes a regional adjoint of that of the metropole. It would, however, differ from other regions in having an autonomous *administrative,* as distinct from a genuine policy-making, apparatus. It can qualify as a "dependent" economy in these and other ways, for that reason not being any less a net beneficiary of the development of capitalist relations of production and exchange on a world scale. This, in turn, requires jettisoning the naive and misleading notion that the development of capitalism divides the world neatly into "exploiting" imperial powers and "exploited" colonies in a scenario that owes more to a rejected John Wayne movie script than it does to the critical spirit of classical Marxism.

Empirically and analytically within the various empires that have successively marched across the parade ground of world social history, there are usually an array of politically defined components existing in symbiotic relationship with each other and, more importantly, with the imperial centre. In these cases, the degree of domination of and dependence of each upon the metropole is likely to be highly variable in degree and radically different in form. The notion of an empire of economically interdependent components knit together by an asymmetric distribution of political-military power is most clearly applicable in the pre-industrial period when empires were ordered by legislative fiat as much as, or more than by the market mechanism. Thus in the British mercantile system, Britain, the political metropolis, manufacturing centre and main entrepot for European and Oriental trade, controlled in varying degrees the economic life of West Indian and American plantation economies, West African slave trade posts, Newfoundland fisheries, ports of trade on the coast of India, and white settler communities in New England-New York. All of these areas had complementary economic roles within the empire as a whole. All of them too found their economic development structured in some fundamental way by their links of commercial dependency upon Britain. Yet they exhibited an enormous diversity of institutional forms, and each evolved qualitatively distinct sets of socio-economic relations in which the degree of metropolitan domination and "exploitation" differed drastically depending upon a complex interplay between their primary economic function in the empire, the institutional form of their link to the metropole, and their pre-existing socio-economic structure. Each of these areas was a dependency in some basic way;

yet each developed (and hastened the development of their own hinterlands) along diametrically different principles, both in terms of social formations and the political imperatives that these social formations engendered. Talking merely about an imperium or metropole on the one hand and a set of colonies or satellites on the other and deducing political strategy from little more than a casual reference to a specious dichotomy is thus an abdication of investigative responsibility.

Similarly in the empires of the late nineteenth century there exists a plethora of institutional forms of relations of dependency and an equally wide variety of socio-economic consequences of this diversity. In the British empire, India was by far the most important dependency, and was organized politically as a separate empire in its own right. Along with it came a multiplicity of Crown colonies, self governing dominions, spheres of influence and so forth, each with a different economic and/or strategic role within the imperial whole and each complementing and supplementing other areas. The ensuing social formations, be they in West or East Africa, India, the Middle East, the Pacific or in the white settler states, differed so widely as to once again make the simplistic dichotomy of metropoles and colonies so vague as to be less than useless. These formation must be seen in historically specific settings, and as the outcome of particular temporal-spatial conjunctures in the long term evolution of the European Age.

Imperialism and the Social Classes

Central to the story is the process euphemistically described as the "accumulation of capital" both in its societal and in its individual manifestations. It is therefore a story of the assault by "entrepreneurs" on the physical environment, on the existing social fabrics, both their own and those of others, and on their competitors, domestic and foreign. It is a story too of power, its accumulation and use for personal and political ends. For, contrary to the mythology of liberal societies, the "market mechanism" which *in theory* (though rarely in fact, and even in those rare instances, only temporarily) diffuses and depersonalizes power is, in its most advanced form, a very recent and still very imperfect instrument for the mobilization of resources for economic pursuits. The alternative to the market and diffused, depersonalized power, is personalized socio-economic relationships — in effect, political power to be exercised over, and often at the expense of others. That too is a central part of the story as it unfolds in both the world context and the narrower Canadian one.

These themes are, of course, inextricably interrelated. As the socio-economic influence of the European imperial powers penetrated new areas of the globe, the accumulation of wealth by European adventurers abroad went hand in hand with the spread of commercial, market-oriented activity into societies and social strata where it had been previously rare or completely non-existent. And as the market system of organizing economic activity spread, it did so not by virtue of the laws of nature, but very much by the laws of man.

Commercialisation of social relations was at heart a political process reflecting the exigencies of power and the need to increase it through access to economic resources. So too was the accumulation of wealth by the emigré European entrepreneurs and enterprises in the colonies who functioned as part of, and under the protection of, an expanding system of political power.

Thus, particularly in the early stages of European overseas expansion, but continuing in substantial, if diminished importance up to the bitter end, the "value" of the resources, wealth, and profit acquired in the process cannot be assessed in solely economistic terms. Wealth was often, perhaps normally, in the form of an intangible stream of social and political privileges that flowed from the control of economic assets, assets which themselves often took a relatively intangible form. Decisions with respect to "investment", including the disposition of armed forces and diplomatic duplicity, were made in order to maximize advantages of every kind, in the economic sphere and certainly in the social and political one, as well, particularly with respect to prestige and social status. Not until the end of the European Age do wealth in the simple, material sense and social status, not to speak of political power, come to be largely synonomous; and even then the process of assimilation was far from complete.

The mechanisms by which the metropoles in the colonial process, or at least certain privileged groups in them, reaped the benefits of imperial expansion, were put into operation through the activities of emigré entrepreneurs or enterprises. The colonies were ripe fields for the exercise of their talents, for the colonial societies were typified by a rather pronounced lack of inhibition in the range of economic behaviour they would tolerate. Though codes of social conduct were scarcely edifying in the European societies that sponsored colonization, in the colonies they were much looser, due to an absence of accumulated social institutions of an inhibitory nature in the early stages of European colonization. This in turn reflected the relative fluidity of the colonial social order, as compared to that in the European metropole.

Within a European state, upward movements in social status were rendered difficult by the rigidity of the social hierarchy and the existence of a set of social mores that rationalized and protected the socio-economic status quo. For the aspirant to a higher position on the metropolitan social ladder, the existence of a frontier of European penetration overseas provided the means by which he could circumvent the barriers to upward social mobility at home by accumulating wealth and social position abroad. When a transfer of wealth and social status occurred within the metropole, it was perceived as benefitting one party at the expense of another. But wealth and class privileges accumulated abroad represented a net addition to the total available to an expanding social system and hence could be assimilated without serious disruption to the socio-economic order. While a metropolitan based nouveau riche class could be a threat to the established order, and its emergence often had revolutionary consequences, a colonial nouveau riche class was, at least in its formative era, not such a threat. Indeed the diversion of footloose elements of aspiring social classes to the colonies to do their best for themselves and their worst for the

aboriginal societies paid a double dividend to the metropole exporting them. For their predatory instincts yielded the metropole a direct return in the form of expanded political influence abroad, and an indirect one in the form of improved prospects for social stability at home. Hence the diversion abroad of the activities of aspirants to higher status at home. From Columbus to Frontenac, from Clive of India to Strathcona of Fort Garry, the impetus to action was fundamentally the same. So too all too often were the consequences to the aboriginal societies in the areas in which the action took place.

As social conditions stabilised and rigidified in the older colonies, as the initial European acquisitions generated their own social and economic elite, the field of action of the emigré adventurers from the metropoles simply moved elsewhere. For throughout the entire European Age, the general story was one of steady expansion of the frontier of European influence across the globe.

For the European imperial powers as a whole, as distinct from a particular group of entrepreneurs and adventurers who spearheaded the conquest and colonization process, the role of colonies in their socio-economic development was diverse, and tended to vary over time and space. Colonies variously produced certain strategic materials, be they luxuries, essential foodstuffs, or industrial raw materials. They functioned as markets for metropolitan output, as fields for the investment of metropolitan capital, as dumping grounds for surplus population. They were a source of private profit and public gain, swelling the capital stock available to private business and the bullion supplies and tax receipts of the metropolitan government. They, therefore, linked up at different times to different strata of the metropolitan social structure, providing precious metals for the public treasuries, commercial profits to the overseas trading companies, raw materials for metropolitan industrial capitalists and, in a later period, cheaper food for the proletariat and rentier income for the overseas investors. Some colonial possessions were acquired not as economic assets per se, but as stategic ones to help defend the trade routes of others. However, direct or indirect, an economic motivation for colonization, both individual and societal, was always present and generally dominant in one form or another, albeit that its precise manifestation varied with the degree and direction of economic development in the metropole, and with the relative amount of political power certain interested business groups in the metropole could wield.

A public presence was invariably much in evidence in the colonization process. Metropolitan entrepreneurs went to work behind the protective shield of military and diplomatic power. Indeed these same entrepreneurs often *were* that military and diplomatic power: for they generally comprised the backbone of the colonial administration; political and military power was directed to the task of enhancing their private interests; and the plunder of the public purse was frequently the first step to personal wealth. But above all else the link to the state was essential because the state was the instrument by which commercial relations could be extended into new territory, and by which the profits from these commercial relations could be tapped.

Most of the historical time, and social and geographic space, embraced by the European Age involved the evolution of societies that were "non-industrial" (something quite distinct from "pre-industrial" with its historically erroneous implication of the *inevitability* of universal "progress" towards modern capitalist society). Indeed many of the societies that were caught up in the process were non-commercial as well, in which exchange relations were societally determined and reflected, indeed reinforced, the existing political and social hierarchy. Hence the dialectics of relations between groups of actors, and between economic classes, were for the most part quite distinct from the conflict of labour and capital that dominated the more modern scene. Thus the central element determining economic, and, therefore, political power was *not* the "ownership of the means of production". Indeed the very concept of "private property", with its implicit carte blanche for utilisation according to the whims and fancies of the owner, as regards natural resources, labour power, and financial capital, was a long time in coming. For many of the metropolitan societies for much of the historical time covered by the European Age, the concept was only in its infancy or at best its adolescence. For many of the non-European societies it was not even conceived. In fact the slow and uneven process by which private property relations spread throughout an ever broader range of human relations is precisely what much of the story of the European Age is all about.

For most of the historical time covered in the European Age, the closest approximation to "free market" activity lay not in the allocation of the elements essential for the production of commodities, but only the process of exchange of the commodities themselves. And in this limited sphere the "market" was long hemmed in by an array of public restrictions imposed on behalf of and at the behest of certain privileged groups that would be threatened by the socio-economic fluidity the market system portended. Hence, once beyond the stage of simple plunder and the imposition of forced tribute payments, essential to the process of accumulation of wealth was the ability to control the *flow* of commodities and of the credit that accompanied those commodity movements. The key to wealth and power, therefore, lay not in the ownership of the means of production, so much as in control over the means of circulation — of commodities and financial capital.

Spatial considerations were a necessary adjoint of the process of securing control of commodity flows. To that avail European factors and merchants planted themselves at the geographic points necessary to control the flow of trade between the aboriginal productive apparatus and that of the metropoles they represented, notably at the junctions of major waterway systems and at well-established coastal ports-of-trade. Even after the phase of aboriginal-European exchange relations gave way, as it sometimes did, to one of white settlement, the pattern of settlement, and the commerical infrastructure that accompanied it, followed trade routes already created and operating in the era of pre-contact or early contact trade.

Contact between European and aboriginal economic systems intermediated

by the European traders did not *automatically and inevitably* involve the aboriginal system succumbing to the corrosive force of market exchange relations. Indeed in the early phases the aboriginal socio-economic system was deliberately maintained intact albeit its substructure eroded by a profound shift in the motivation and direction of societal economic activity. Thus, in North America, furs, originally produced incidentally to the hunt for food, became an object pursued for their commodity value in exchange for European goods, albeit with the institutions of exchange remaining intact and the terms of trade, once established, maintaining a stable relationship for long periods of time. Similarly in West Africa, slaves, originally generated incidentally to the pursuit of prestige in war, became instead an explicit objective of war once their commodity value was established. Again the establishment of relations of exchange between two social systems did not involve the smothering of the weaker by the stronger in the first instance, but rather the establishment of a symbiosis between the two in which the terms of trade were set by diplomacy and custom on a societal level, rather than by individual acts of market exchange. The revolutionary consequences of administrative commoditification of production took some time to fully manifest themselves, and ended up by sweeping aside both aboriginal and European constitutions.

While the political institutional framework within which the aboriginal economies met the European ones is clearly of central importance, so too was the political-institutional framework within which the European traders operated. And the instruments for control of commerce and credit were fundamentally political. The state, both in its metropolitan and its colonial guises, in its military as well as its civil manifestations, was responsible for creating and extending the field of commercial activity. The state was capable of moulding the flow of commodities in desired directions. The state was a key instrument in the mobilization of capital which could then be put to work at the behest of the entrepreneurial class, financing the operation and expansion of the frontier of commercial activity. And the state had the ultimate authority over the financial system on which trade credit, and, therefore, trade itself, ultimately rested.

Given the central importance for imperial-colonial economic relations of the commercial infrastructure, of the transportation system, and of the monetary apparatus, the vital necessity for the entrepreneurial class to have at least partial control of, or, at a minimum, a fair amount of influence on the use of the state apparatus followed. For access to the state apparatus conveyed control over the commercial and financial aspects of economic life, and thus the capacity to manipulate them for private gain. In a full-fledged, freely functioning, liberal industrial economy (or a reasonable approximation thereto) the commercial and financial sectors of the economy exist as dependent subsets of the dominating industrial core. In the non-industrial world, and particularly during a historical age market by the continuous creation of new fields of commercial activity, the cornerstone of economic power lies in controlling the movement of goods and trade credit. But even after the

metropolitan economies completed the transition to modern industrialism, in their colonial appendages, where non-industrial conditions continued to prevail, the central role of the commercial and financial sectors, with their interrelations with the state, remained a central structural feature throughout all of the European Age.

Prelude to a European Age

The process by which Western European states in the mid-fifteenth century began to carve our their trans-oceanic, global empires had its roots in the dynamics of conflict and competition between East and West that followed the disintegration of the Roman Empire and the Mediterranean unity it had created.

After the fall of Rome, the eastern part of the empire, Byzantium, inherited the commercial and cultural crown of the Christian world. But its control of the wealth of the eastern Mediterranean was soon challenged by newcomers from the arid pasture lands of the Arabian peninsula, who shortly carved out an empire that stretched from the Pyrenees to deep into Central Asia. The rise of Arab commercial and military power, the shift of the centre of economic gravity of the Christian world to Byzantium, and the barbarian assaults from east and north combined to assure the continued decline of western European commerce, industry, and cultural attainment alike. The indigenous wealth of the eastern empires, their control of the luxury trades from India, China and beyond, and their monopoly control over the sources of gold and silver, plus their scientific, commercial, and cultural achievements stood in stark contrast to the stagnation of Western Europe. Thus, the military and economic conquest of the East soon became — and long remained — the dominant strategic objective of aspiring western European powers.

There had been two major exceptions to the rule of stagnation of European commerce in the Middle Ages. On the northern periphery, the non-feudal Scandinavian tribes mixed brigandage and extortion with trade and settlement. Apart from their short-lived ventures in the Canaries and Sicily, they managed to conquer and settle Normandy and from there conquered England. They also ventured across the Atlantic to Iceland, Greenland, and northern North America. Iceland, which constituted Western Europe's first bona fide overseas colony of settlement, was soon dotted with farms. Greenland attracted the Vikings to its fur and marine mammal resources. But an attempt at colonization in North America proved abortive.

In the southern periphery the exception was provided by certain Italian cities in which commerce and finance thrived free from the feudal restrictions on usury and trade that the Catholic Church imposed elsewhere in Europe. The Italian cities were the principal intermediaries in the flow of trade between Europe and the Levant, and had close commercial ties to Byzantine and Arab merchants. Venice had links to Egypt and its trade from the Far East flowed along the Red Sea — trans-Egyptian route. Genoa, its principal commercial

rival, traded mainly via Constantinople and the Black Sea. The Italian links to Levantine trade were a major instrument in fostering the rebirth of commerce within Europe itself in the eleventh century and beyond.

On the crest of the revival of commercial activity came efforts by western Europe to launch overseas wars of conquest, pillage, and colonization. The purpose of the Crusades was to reopen the East by rolling back the limits of Arab power, starting in southern Europe and spreading to Arab Spain and the Middle East. Particularly attractive was the Palestine-Syria area with its fertile lands for settlement, its control of the major trade routes, and its rich cities ripe for plunder. And the alliance of Norman knights with Italian cities, blessed materially and spiritually by the Church of Rome, set off in pursuit of these goals.

The Crusades wrote a vital chapter in European commercial history. By whetting the appetities of Western Europe's aristocracy for eastern luxuries, they assured a new urgency to east-west commercial intercourse. Some of the commodities in question were known and coveted before — luxury fabrics and spices for instance. What was different in these cases was the scale and continuity of demand. Other products were new to European tastes, particularly sugar, which singlehandedly revolutionized the European diet and left a trail of bloodshed and human anguish that few commodities before or since, with the possible exceptions of gold and silver, could rival.

A second vital commodity, though far from a novelty to European tastes, whose seeming abundance in the Arab world excited Western Europe, was gold. Gold from sub-Sahara Africa provided much of the commercial lifeblood of the Arab West and from the thirteenth century began moving in greater abundance to Europe to grace its noble tables, decorate its cathedrals, fructify its public treasures, and quicken its commerce. Fables of the great gold resources of the Arab West spread through Europe and kept the fires of expansionism alive even after the main body of Crusades in the Arab East had been defeated, and the East largely closed to the West by the rise of power of the Ottomans.

For the hundred year period from 1350 to 1450 European commercial expansion by and large came to an end. The impetus from the Crusades had run its course. The Norman forces had been expelled from the Levant. Civil War and great plagues ravaged Europe, while the Ottomans continued to press the European powers beyond the Levant and into Southern Europe itself. Economic collapse inside Europe was accompanied by a drastic deterioration of the living standards of the poor. The income gap between social classes was exacerbated by the increasing exactions on the peasantry imposed by a nobility whose extravagant tastes could no longer be satiated by plunder from the East; and it manifested itself in a series of peasant uprisings. Agricultural prices fell; harvests failed; political authority desintegrated; brigandage was rife; while the principal trans-European trade routes declined as the trade of the principal actors, the great Italian cities, with their Oriental suppliers was disrupted.

The 100 years of depression also coincided roughly with the 100 Years War in which the political links between France and England, forged by the

conquests of the Duke of Normandy 200 years before, were broken. The period that began with the Crusades saw the rising power of central authority in several of the chief political divisions of Europe. Modern warfare required more sophisticated equipment and mercenary armies rather than the periodic calling up of the peasantry and knights loyal to the King. Centralization of power too required more revenue for civil administration, and the Crowns reached out to take control of the commerce that flowed through their jurisdictions to extract tax and tribute from its participants.

In 1453 Constantinople, seat of Byzantium, fell to the Turks and cut off European commerce almost completely from the major Levantine trade routes, a development accentuated shortly thereafter by the Turkish conquest of Egypt and closure of the Red Sea-Suez route as well. To acquire eastern luxuries Europe now had to find new trade routes free of Turkish control. The year 1453 also marked the end of the 100 Years War, and left England and France politically and commercially divorced, but each equipped with central monarchies seeking wealth through overseas expansion to maintain and expand their power. From both the Mediterranean and the North Atlantic, European states were soon poised for overseas commercial conquest.

The Age of Bullionism

Reacting to the Turkish closure of the Mediterranean trade routes to the Orient, Italian capital joined the absolute monarchies of Spain and Portugal, two countries created by the Reconquista, in an effort to circumvent the Turkish and Arab hold on the principal commercial arteries of the day. The Iberian phase of European overseas expansion followed directly from the Crusades and the Islamic resurgence under the Ottoman Empire. The sealing of the Mediterranean destroyed the spice trade of several major European commercial centres and blocked further effort by Europe's landless nobility to seize estates in the East. The Crusades simply shifted from a series of commercial wars in the Mediterranean — where western European nobility allied with Italian merchant capital to further their joint economic interest — to a worldwide movement to encircle Islam and seize control of its sources of wealth.

Portugal initiated the process by sailing south along the West African coast, rounding the African cape, and eventually penetrating into the Indian Ocean and beyond, in quest of gold and slaves from West Africa, spices from the East Indies, and the luxury products of India and China. Commercial aggressivity coupled with advanced military and naval technology sufficed to consolidate the Portuguese hold on the far eastern trade to western Europe, but only briefly.

Spain, also prompted by Italian capital and expertise, reacted to the Turkish closure of the Mediterranean routes, and the Portuguese control of the African one, by focussing its commercial aspirations to the southwest. Financial links were forged with Italian cities long active in Levantine trade to give an added impetus to Spanish external expansion. Genoa and Florence in particular were centres that grew rich in the Crusades and whose commerce was severely

damaged when the Turks captured Constantinople and broke up the eastern spice trade of all the major Italian cities except Venice. For Genoa an added danger to its financial stability came from Portugal's interference with the trans-Sahara gold trade, a trade for which Genoa had managed to preserve some commercial links with the Moors. Robbed of its spice-trade by the Turks and with its gold sources threatened by the Portuguese, Genoa linked its commercial destiny to Spain, and helped finance Spanish overseas expansion, investing in early Spanish sugar plantations, slaving expeditions, and voyages of "discovery". Once more reflecting the vital link between the Crusades and the voyages of "discovery", the route to the east by sailing west had been worked out by a Florentine scholar name Paolo Toscanelli who gave his map to a Genoese adventurer named Christopher Columbus. The Toscanelli family had been among Florence's leading spice merchants, but were ruined when the Turks captured Constantinople and destroyed their trade. Columbus called on the Spanish Crown for aid at an opportune moment. Isabella and Ferdinand had just united the thrones of Aragon and Castile, and were jointly entangled in a campaign to destroy Grenada, the last Moorish emirate on the Iberian peninsula. The public purse was exhausted by the cost of the war. Commerce and overseas plunder held out hopes for replenishment of the royal treasury, or so Columbus and his associates insisted. Columbus himself, in his zeal to broaden mankind's intellectual horizons and carry the light of Christian civilization to the unfortunate races of the world, asked for very little in return — merely the rank of Admiral of the Ocean Sea; a vice-royalty for life making him, after the monarchs, the second most important figure of the realm; ten percent of all the gold, jewels, and spices obtained by any means whatsoever from the lands he conquered, all tax free; plus the right to invest up to one-eighth of the total capital in any ship subsequently venturing to the areas he chanced upon; and a lien on all of these titles and privileges for his heirs and successors forever. The contract was agreed upon; two-thirds of the required capital was invested by the Crown; one-third came from rich merchants. And off Columbus sailed carrying with him interpreters fluent in Arabic and other tongues equally useful for conversing with the native peoples of the Americas.

Heading southwest in part, no doubt, because of the then current theory that gold was engendered in hot climates while silver was engendered in cold, Colombus "discovered" the island of Espanola — undoubtedly somewhat to the surprise of the million and a quarter people already living there. He quickly fell into reveries about gold and spices, and rushed about the island misnaming trees and plants in the conviction that they were bearers of oriental spices. As to the native population, Columbus directly conceived plans for their exploitation and enslavement, particularly in the gold mines. For as he so aptly put it in his letter from Jamaica in 1502, "Gold is a wonderous thing. He who possesses it is lord of all he wants. By means of gold one can even get souls into Paradise."

Spain's subsequent fortuitous "discovery" of the great pre-Columbian civilizations of mainland America, and more particularly, their enormous resources of gold and silver, inaugurated the Age of Bullionism.

Gold, and especially silver, were vital to the socio-economic fabric of early modern Europe, and to its process of transformation. The closed social structures of classical feudalism were dissolving rapidly. No longer could private and public demands be met by flows of tribute in kind — in goods or services, including military services — up the social scale. Luxury goods demanded by the noble or rich bourgeois required precious metals for their acquisition; for the luxury goods came from the East, and the West had nothing of comparable value in eastern eyes with which to trade. The Crown too demanded precious metals for reasons of public finance, since an expanding state structure required the wherewithal to finance its growing obligations. Centralization of political power in the hands of the Crown at the expense of the old feudal baronry led, in early modern times, to the fundamental link typifying the Age of Bullionism, that of public finance to the expansion of overseas commerce. Since there were no domestic sources of precious metals of any great significance, the Crown backed the merchants politically and militarily in their overseas ventures while, in turn, the merchants provided a return flow of precious metals that the state could use to finance its expenditure obligations. Political power and the extension of the frontier of commerce overseas went hand in hand.

The Spanish conquest of Mexico and Peru precipitated a flood of silver into Europe, and it was on the foundation of silver that Spain's European as well as its world power was based. Since Spanish political, diplomatic, and military power rested on financial foundations, challenges to Spanish supremacy depended likewise for their success on the economic and fiscal resources of the challenger. The Dutch were the first to successfully weaken the Iberian hegemony. The Dutch ousted the Portuguese from the East Indian spice trade, weakened their hold on India, challenged their supremacy of the Atlantic slave trade, and seized their sugar producing colony of Brazil. The Dutch assumed control of the European money market, as a result of their privileged access to Spanish silver which in turn derived from their success in capturing a rising share of the Spanish imperial trade. Not least of Dutch accomplishments was to secure a prominent, indeed initially dominant, position in intermediating the flow of North American furs to Imperial Russian markets. But in the long run the principal consequence of the Dutch challenge was to weaken the Iberian powers sufficiently for other western European states to profit from their decline.

For England the reaction to the Iberian "discoveries" took the form of a Crown sponsored and supported search for the North West Passage to the Orient and for gold and silver mines en route, the most concrete early results of which were the hesitant beginnings of English territorial claims in the Caribbean and the effective ousting of Spain and Portugal from Newfoundland. The subsequent development of the great cod fisheries again combined politico-military with commercial objectives: the fisheries sustained a reserve of trained sailors and armed ships in times of peace that could be called upon in times of war, while the cod that were produced were an effective trading

instrument for tapping Iberian and Italian supplies of silver and gold. A side effect of the development of the Newfoundland fishery was that the indigenous Beothuk people slowly but inexorably followed the Arawaks and the Caribs of the West Indian islands into extinction.

For France similar motivations were at work, although it was slower to break with its long standing policy of according primacy to the Mediterranean commercial tie. Its search for precious metals and the North West Passage also led it to Newfoundland and to the Caribbean islands. But, in addition, France staked a stronger claim to territorial empire on the North American mainland than England did in the early years. And France's rapid prosecution of the fur trade with the aboriginal population not only consolidated its territorial and diplomatic hold with a system of military alliances, but it also provided it with a luxury product that could be reexported to European markets in exchange for precious metals. The French presence in North America, while initiated by private enterprise, was simultaneously military and commercial, representing in its own way the same type of mix of political, military, and economic objectives as did the early English presence on Newfoundland. Incidentally it produced similar side effects as first the Mohicans, then the Hurons succumbed to the fate of the Caribbean, South American, and Newfoundland aboriginal populations.

The steady stream of silver tribute flowing into Europe from the Americas via Spain primed the pump of European commercial expansion during the Age of Bullionism. Hence the sudden drop in the rate at which it was supplied in the early seventeenth century coincided with the advent of a general economic crisis. It coincided as well with a major international conflagration that aggravated the economic crisis and also broke the back of Spanish imperial power.

In medieval times economic crises tended to be characterized by a regression of economic activity in the direction of self sufficiency. The crisis of the seventeenth century was quite different. Although the frontier of overseas expansion and thus the *range* of Eurocentric commercial relations tended to shrink somewhat during the course of the crisis, nonetheless within the European societies and their overseas appendages, market relations tended to grow in terms of *depth*. The concomitant commercialisation of economic relations percolated through layers of society previously largely immune to the process. The crisis was also associated with the rise of the bourgeoisie to a much more prominent position of political power, whether completely dominant, as in the Netherlands, or only enhanced in influence, as in France.

Together, these trends — the decline of Spain, the deepening of market relations, and the rise of the bourgeoisie — signaled the emergence of the Age of Mercantilism and the shift in the centre of European economic gravity away from the old Mediterrenean based powers and towards those bordering the North Atlantic: France, England, and the Netherlands. Bullionism had been an economic system premised on Mediterranean strategic and commercial assumptions, and the extension of the Mediterranean economies across the

Atlantic and around the African cape in search of alternative means of pursuing the same commercial ends. Mercantilism was an economic system emerging from and appropriate to the rise of an Atlantic economy.

The Age of Mercantilism

Apart from the commercial geography it represented, mercantilism had several other characteristics that sharply differentiated it from its predecessor. The state acted not only on behalf of the business groups interested in overseas commerce, but as an agent of domestic economic development as well. Whereas bullionism had focussed on the overseas luxury trades whose successful intermediation by national merchants could yield a flow of specie to the royal purse, mercantilism linked overseas trade to domestic production in an effort to extend the range and depth of commercial relations at home and thus to expand the local tax base. Public finance therefore became tied to the fortunes of a national economy, its growth and development, rather than the profits of a privileged set of traders in commodities whose production might well have owed nothing at all to domestic productive resources. While overseas expansion was fundamental to the mercantilist plan of action, it involved devising a colonial and foreign trading system that complemented domestic productive activities. Moreover under bullionism the measure of success in overseas commerce (or piracy, the two being conducted indifferently often by the same sets of entrepreneurs) was the gross volume of specie it could bring into the country, specie which was then subject to legislative constraint to prevent it from leaving again. Under mercantilism the measure was more sophisticated, reflecting the advance of market relations and therefore of market criteria: the measure was the net balance of specie flows. Specie exports were increasingly permitted, albeit at the discretion of the public authorities, if their use in overseas trade would yield a return flow of an even greater sum.

These broad precepts were embedded in the structure of the imperial systems that France and England evolved over the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. At the top of the political and economic chains of authority were the metropoles, the manufacturing centres of the empires and the entrepôts through which colonial staples had to pass en route to foreign markets. At the base were the West Indian plantation colonies producing sugar, first and foremost, and also tobacco, cotton, coffee, and other tropical staples. Their output was supplemented, in the case of the English mercantile system, by the tobacco, rice, and indigo production of the American mainland colonies. Since the principle relation of production in the imperial core was plantation slavery, other parts of the empire had their roles more or less automatically defined. Slave trading posts along the West African coast provided manpower. The fisheries of the North Atlantic provided cheap protein to feed the slaves. And since the colonial system demanded the specialization of production in the plantation colonies on exportable staples, temperate colonies in North America

were necessary to provide grain, timber, horses (for working plantation machinery) and similar products.

While the objective was the maximum possible degree of imperial self-sufficiency, the system was not an entirely closed one. Both France and England were dependent on overseas sources for the supply of precious metals that their internal financial systems and trade relations with the Orient required. Therefore certain Caribbean colonies functioned as trade emporia for tapping the vast commerce of Spanish America, exporting imperial products and deriving silver in return. Metropolitan manufactured goods, colonial staples processed in the metropoles, and high quality fish from the North Atlantic found their way to the markets of other European powers in return for essential imports and yet more silver. And in the Far East, trading companies from France and England, along with those from the Netherlands and Portugal, carried cargos of Spanish silver for the purchase of silk, tea, spices, and all manner of oriental luxuries to satisfy home demand or to assure a supply of luxury reexport goods.

Relationships with the economic systems of the aboriginal societies in most of the areas European commerce tapped were largely those of reciprocity rather than market exchange. The aboriginal productive system was left essentially intact and simply adopted to the requirements of Eurocentric commerce. Thus, the European presence in West Africa and India was largely restricted to the port-of-trade, established at the main centres of previously existing commercial systems, and relying on diplomatic relations with and the military protection of the native political authority for success. In most of continental North America where the fur trade produced the principal staple, again the aboriginal economic system was simply adapted to European standards with the active participation of both sides to the bargain. Only in Newfoundland, the Caribbean plantation colonies, and parts of the English colonies on the North American mainland was there a record of intensive European settlement and exploitation. In Newfoundland bank fishing was clearly alien to the aboriginal economic system, and it had neither the population base nor the technological prerequisites for participation under European direction. The same held true of the aboriginal populations of the Caribbean islands who were, after the initial plundering stage, an obstacle to the progress of plantation agriculture with its alien techniques and products.

Given the continuation of aboriginal economic structures in many of the areas of contact during the Age of Mercantilism, and indeed the relative novelty of market relations in much of the economic organization of European societies, trade occurred not so much between different individuals, as between different societies. It therefore remained very much a political event, preceded by diplomacy, and cemented by military alliances between the European adventurers, speaking frequently in the name of their states of origin, and the political authorities of Indian states, West African empires, and Amerindian nations. Given the heavy commitment of capital to the time-consuming and costly business of establishing and maintaining trade relations with foreign

powers, and given the political nature of these relations, the Age of Mercantilism was typified by the rise of great chartered companies acting as subordinate parts of the parent state, and charged with all manner of diplomatic, juridicial, and colonisation functions in addition to their commercial ones. They also played a vital military role as well vis-à-vis both their trading partners and their European competitors.

Throughout the seventeenth century the three great mercantilist powers of the age, France, England, and the Netherlands faced off at different times and in different combinations, and battled for control of fish, fur, sugar, tobacco, slaves, spices, and the Spanish American imperial trade. By the end of the century the Dutch had been marginalized; Spain was reduced to the status of a commercial vassal of France and Portugal similarly of England; and France and England faced each other directly in the protracted conflict for the supremacy of their respective mercantile systems.

Despite their apparent similarity in structure, the mercantile empires of the two superpowers had begun to evolve in strikingly different directions, the key to which lay in the lack of balance between their North American and Caribbean colonies. The French West Indies were both newer and intrinsically more fertile than the English islands, and French sugar steadily squeezed the English product out of its foreign markets. Yet the relative strength of the French plantations was not matched elsewhere in the empire, particularly not on the North American mainland. New England, New York, and the Middle Mainland colonies had developed into flourishing temperate economies, capable of satisfying the demands of English Caribbean for grain, timber, fish, horses, and other essential materials. In fact, in conjunction with New England commercial entrepreneurship, they were more than capable of meeting the demands of the laggard English islands. New France, on the other hand, was a failure from that point of view, for its economic activity continued to turn almost exclusively on one luxury staple more appropriate to the economic conditions of the Age of Bullionism. Hence the economic prosperity and growth of the French West Indies translated itself into the economic prosperity and growth of New England whose contraband trade flourished — to the anger of English imperial authorities, English West India planters, and French imperial authorities alike.

The failure of New France to fulfill what was in theory its rightful place in the French empire resulted from a number of factors, not least of which was the incapacity of its export staple to generate an on-going process of economic development. Equally important were the long term effects of the shift in the balance of military power in the eastern part of the North American continent resulting from the destruction of the French-allied Huron by the Dutch- and English-allied Iroquois. After the fall of Huronia, the fur trade spread the French presence deep into the continental interior, with a long series of fortified trading posts bolstered by a web of Indian commercial and military alliances. The drain on the capital resources of the small colony that the far flung trading system imposed — a heavy commitment of fixed capital by the military-governmental authorities compounded by the long period for which

commercial capital was tied up in the actual conduct of the trade — largely precluded any sustained effort towards broadening and deepening, as distinct from lengthening, the range of French commercial activities on the continent. So too did the failure of the staple itself to generate any strong linkage effects, the more so given the explicit disapproval of the metropolitan authorities of such developments.

By contrast New York and New England did greatly diversify their economic activities. Fur was also the staple of New York; but the Iroquois, who simultaneously protected and hemmed in the colony militarily, conducted the long range trade and hence precluded the need for New York's capital resources to be so heavily committed either to defense or to a single branch of commerce. New York entrepreneurs therefore ploughed the returns of the fur trade into developing export trades in rum, timber, farm products, and other commodities. New England went even further. Since it lacked any export staple of its own, it tied its economic fortunes to that of another set of colonies, and it therefore shared in the great prosperity of the French West Indies, exploiting the opportunities for trade that eluded New France.

Thus, contradictory forces were at work in determining the strategic balance in North America. The English colonies were economically strong, but were, at least in the north, dependent militarily on the Iroquois and were geographically constrained to an area close to the seaboard. The French colony had an extremely narrow, and vulnerable economic base, for its commercial-military fortunes were tied exclusively to the fur trade. But its territorial presence was bolstered by its system of commercial-military alliances with the various Indian nations; and the fortified trading posts that resulted, surrounded the English colonies. A short war would go in favour of France in America; a long one would be inclined to favour England. And for the 50 years after 1713 war was more common than peace, with the seemingly inevitable result.

The final triumph of English mercantilism in the Seven Years War was followed closely by its collapse in the American Revolution. England had emerged victorious in India, in most of the West Indies, in West Africa, in the North Atlantic fisheries, and on the North American continent. It followed up its success by attempting to tighten control on the expanded imperial system. France was ceded back some of its sugar producing capacity, and the islands returned were then beyond the legal range of New England's commercial ambitions. Canada however was not only retained for the empire, but was given control of the vast Ohio country which thus confirmed Montreal as the fur trade centre of the continent — to the anger of New York fur traders and Virginia land speculators. And all the colonies were increasingly constrained to cease trading with France, to settle their heavy debts to the metropole in cash, and to pay their share for imperial defense and thus pay part of the cost of their own subjugation. The ensuing American Revolution destroyed one of the central elements in the British mercantile system and, along with other revolutionary developments, led quickly to its complete dismemberment.

The Age of Industry

In fact three revolutions coincided to inaugurate the Age of Industry. The fracturing of the mercantile system by the American Revolution forced the more astute business leaders in Britain to look forward to a process of imperial reconstruction on drastically different principles. The Industrial Revolution gave Britain the economic means, and indeed the economic necessity, to put those principles into practice. At the same time the French Revolution sparked off a new round of Anglo-French wars during the course of which Britain's overseas markets and sources of supply were dramatically altered in ways that complemented the transformation of its national industrial base.

At the heart of the Industrial Revolution was the generalization of the factory system as the dominant mode of organizing production, beginning in the cotton industry and later spreading throughout other major industrial sectors. Accompanying the industrial transformation were developments in agriculture, finance, and overseas economic relations including the colonial system. In the agricultural sector the effects of the war with France were to hasten the final triumph of the large capitalist farm over the small holder. Great tracts of land were enclosed, and their populations uprooted, a process ably assisted by government policy that both encouraged eviction and protected investments in large-scale capitalist agriculture. The consequences for the livelihood of the population at large were made worse by the fact that the years of industrial change and war were also years of rapid population increase. The redundant rural population then drifted off to swell the ranks of the parish poor relief recipients, the urban proletariat, the urban pauper class, or the army.

In finance, the war and immediate post-war period saw as its most dramatic innovation the final dethronement of the Spanish silver dollar, long the very quintessence of international commerce and finance. Over the course of the eighteenth century England's alliance with Portugal had gradually pumped increasing quantities of Brazilian gold into its circulatory system. So too had the plunder of India; while at the same time bank-issued paper money grew in acceptability. During the wars with France at the turn of the century England had stopped specie exports except by government fiat, and had also stopped payment of bank paper in gold and silver at home. After the war convertibility was restored, but it was convertibility of paper money into gold, with silver playing only a secondary role. It was a major step in the direction of a freely functioning, automatic gold standard system whose generalization over the next 100 years would assure Britain the position of world financial metropolis.

In the field of overseas commerce, the changes characteristic of the period were equally far reaching. Foreign trade had played a major role in mercantilism in several different ways. Tapping the trade and markets of Spanish America had long been a cardinal objective of British policy. So too was the business of selling English manufactures, oriental luxuries, such as tea, spices, and silks, colonial staples like sugar and tobacco, along with fur from continental North America and fish from Newfoundland to Europe in exchange for precious

metals or essential commodities, preferably the former. During the Age of Industry commercial relations with all of these areas changed drastically.

The Napoleonic Wars cut Britain off from many of its markets and sources of supply of raw materials such as timber and grain, and did so just at a time when British industry stood ready to pour vast amounts of cheap cotton textiles onto export markets. The problem of foreign markets was partially alleviated during the war by the British commercial takeover of the Spanish and Portuguese colonies in America. After the war the colonies of the Spanish American mainland were formally "liberated" politically, thus to remain under British economic domination. But the Spanish and Portuguese colonies provided only a partial solution.

The real salvation for Britain's industry came in the wholesale transformation of India's role in the imperial system, from a source of luxury products including fine cotton fabrics to a dumping ground for cheap industrial products from Britain. The resulting destruction of Indian artisanal industry and the reversal of its traditional balance of payments surplus with Europe heralded the tremendous increase in the economic value of India to the British empire that was typical of the age, and beyond. The centre of imperial gravity was quickly shifting from the moribund British West Indies, and the economy of sugar, slaves, and Spanish silver, to the British East Indies and the economy of cotton, wage workers, and the paper pound as the Age of Mercantilism gave way to the Age of Industry.

Other, complementary changes in Britain's overseas commercial relations occurred during, and just after, the war. Given the voracious appetite of British mills for raw cotton, the capacity of the traditional producers such as the British Caribbean was inadequate to meet the demand. The response was therefore for great cotton plantations to spread across the American South. The decline of mercantilism had destroyed the sugar economy based on slave plantations in the Caribbean; but the rise of industrialism had sparked the growth of a cotton economy based on slave plantations in the U.S. Thus, as the American Revolution had shattered British mercantilism and heralded the end of the Age of Mercantilism, it had simultaneously heralded the advent of the Age of Industry. For the defeat of mercantilist Britain by the colonies opened up the continental interior to them, and hence laid the foundation for the spread of the cotton economy on which Britain's industrial machine depended. Thus during the Age of Industry Britain's most important overseas commercial relations were tied to cotton at both ends of the productive chain: raw cotton moved, predominantly from America, to British mills; while finished cotton goods went to market first and foremost in India.

Economic relations with those parts of North America that remained in British hands were also drastically revised during the Age of Industry. Newfoundland's decline in terms of its strategic and commercial role in the British empire paralleled that of the West Indies, and it was aggravated by the development of professionalism in the British navy which rendered the old "nursery of seamen" function of the fishery largely redundant. The wars with

France broke up the annual migratory fishing fleet from the West Country, and led to a transfer of fishing operations to the sedentary fishery operating off Newfoundland itself. It also prompted a migration of West Country merchant houses to the island. Newfoundland ceased to be merely an annual port of call of a transitory English fishing fleet, and finally became a normal colony of white settlement — its settler population producing a staple for export and struggling over the terms of trade in a declining industry with a local merchant class that controlled not only the international and wholesale trades, but also the political apparatus and the judiciary.

Similarly Nova Scotia, which had, under the aegis of emigré Yankee merchants, briefly aspired to replace New England as the American vertex of the mercantilist trade triangle that ran between Britain and the Caribbean, found that it had pinned its economic expectations to a rapidly expiring imperial system. The situation was hidden during the Napoleonic Wars, then starkly revealed in the post-war period when the general loosening of imperial trade regulations and Anglo-American diplomatic rapprochement delivered the bulk of the trade of the dying Caribbean colonies to the U.S. As in Newfoundland, economic power was complemented by political power and both rested in the hands of the commercial interests tied to the declining imperial order.

The prospects of the other major North American colonies on the surface seemed somewhat more favourable. When Napoleon's Continental System cut Britain off from its traditional supplies of Baltic timber and grain, it had to seek alternative sources. And the laws passed during the war to favour the development of a colonial grain and timber trade were continued for some time after the war as well. As a result, the newly created colony of New Brunswick, under the political control of a Loyalist clique of land speculators and timber barons, who acted on behalf of British commercial houses in the timber importing business, became Britain's leading source of timber. At the same time a small, but increasing part of British grain imports were derived from Canada and Canadian ports.

Canada was in many ways an ideal colony for the Age of Industry. Its fur trade had been under attack by the competition of the Hudson's Bay Company and had been wound up completely by 1821, leaving Montreal's merchant elite in search of alternative staple trades. The Iroquois Indians who had commanded the fate of much of eastern North America for over a hundred years had been reduced to the status of refugees living on sufferance in a tiny part of the territories whose military and commercial fortunes they had long controlled. At the same time that the aboriginal economy and its extension into the fur trade was being marginalized, the Industrial Revolution was creating a surplus of population in Britain that could be dumped overseas to man lumber camps, construction sites, and farms, while the wars and post-war legislation created a demand for timber and grain from the former fur trading colony. Canada would, or at least could, form a growing market of white settlers whose capacity to absorb British manufactured goods would increase along with its ability to sell raw materials and foodstuffs inside Britain. Furthermore

continuing British control of Canada and therefore of the St. Lawrence river held out the promise that Britain could retain control of the trade of the American interior via Montreal.

The Age of Industry represented a period of transition between the close control over commerce typical of mercantilism and a subsequent age of multilateral free trade. In the commercial economy of mercantilism, the state set out to extend the range and depth of commercial transactions, and the returns came in the form of commercial monopoly profits from an administratively fixed terms of trade. The nature of the state guaranteed monopoly varied from country to country. In England after 1688 monopoly was guaranteed largely at the national level, but in France it frequently involved the enterprise level as well. And in both countries at least part of the political mechanisms necessary to assure the monopoly were in the hands of an elite of merchants and planters involved in the colonial trade. By contrast, the Age of Industry witnessed an assault on the notion that commerce controlled by and in the interests of the elite of merchants and planters was simultaneously in the national interest, as the industrial entrepreneurs aspired to a higher position on the socio-economic ladder.

However for most of the period, a compromise, at once economic and political, was at work; and it was reflected in the nature of the colonial system. The colonies were held as economic and political dependencies of the metropole, albeit that their role was altered to make it compatible with changed metropolitan objectives vis-à-vis the colonies. The imperial authorities retained ultimate control over tariffs and trade, and over the governmental apparatus in the colonies. The local level of political authority was run by "loyalist" cliques of planters, land speculators, or merchants who were tied into imperial trade structures, and whose hold over the colonial governmental structures was assured by the political and military support of the metropole. Hence despite the movement away from outright political determination of the terms and patterns of colonial-imperial trade, despite the tendency to substitute preference for prohibition, the economic relationship between various parts of the empire continued to be determined in good measure by administrative rather than market criteria. And within the framework of imperial tariffs and trade preferences, the colonial staples moved to metropolitan markets along a commercial chain whose continuation was assured jointly by the economic power of the metropolitan commercial houses and their colonial associates, and by the accumulated network of debt or creditor relations than ran from the colonial farmer, timberman, or fisherman all the way to the London houses that extended credit and controlled the commodity flows.

As the century progressed the politico-commercial structures typical of the Age of Industry came under attack both in Britain and in the colonies. Manufacturers demanded liberalisation of trade regulations and the elimination of tariffs on raw materials and food, and therefore the elimination of colonial preferences. These demands manifested themselves at least partially in similar reforms in the colonial government apparatus. But the full

fruition of the trends towards economic and political liberalisation in which colonial preferences and most of the constraints on the colonies' own fiscal freedom were eliminated did not occur until mid-century with the advent of the Age of Steam and Steel.

The Age of Steam and Steel

Early industrialization in Britain had been centred on the cotton industry, on the manufacture of light consumers' goods using human, animal, or water power. The new wave of industrialization typical of the Age of Steam and Steel was centred on the producers' goods sector, and involved the application of steam power to an expanding range of heavy industry. This new phase of industrialization was associated with a drastic hardening of class lines as heavy, large-scale industry obliterated much of the remaining craft style organization and therefore largely eliminated the possibilities of master craftsmen rising to the status of industrial capitalists. In its stead there emerged clearly differentiated and *economically* antagonistic classes of industrial capitalists on the one hand, and wage workers on the other.

That the mass industrialization and its social concomitants did not generate social revolution in Britain, as had been widely predicted by political activists and analysts on the left at the time, reflected two principal and interrelated factors — one indigenous and the other colonial in dimension. Within Britain the antagonism of proletariat and industrial capitalist however sharp in economic terms, was partially ameliorated in its political dimension by the fact that the old elite, of a landed and commercial gentry, maintained a degree of political power well out of proportion to its continued importance in business affairs. And within the colonial sphere emigration to the colonies of white settlement — the American West, Australia, Canada — meant that at least a part of the labour displaced from the farms and skilled crafts in Britain could be redistributed to the colonies. The elite of that migration, the most potentially troublesome group in political terms, was transformed into a class of independent commodity producers, principally farmers, in the rapidly developing continental interiors. Thus the reduction of *social* class tension within Britain that emigration permitted, in turn built up precisely that class in the colonies that was most committed to the reinforcement of capitalist standards of property rights there.

Associated with the industrial changes within Britain were complementary ones in a number of fields. In transportation and communication, the railway, the steamship, and the telegraph spread rapidly across Britain and then beyond, and had revolutionary consequences. Between them these three kindred innovations created for the first time a genuine "world market" for major commodities by enabling information about prices and the availability of stocks to be rapidly transferred, and then for the commodities themselves to quickly follow. They also called into being the beginnings of a world capital market. The

scale of enterprise associated with the progress of the Age of Steam and Steel, especially with the railway, demanded the mobilisation of capital on a hitherto unprecedented scale. Until the railway age, the British capital market was largely restricted to trading in government securities — domestic, foreign, and occasionally colonial; and its participants were a few major merchant banks and an array of rich merchants, planters, and other "gentlemen". But during the railway building era, capital had to be mobilised from the "lower" social strata, from the middle class, and the capital market had to be regeared to dealing in the securities of incorporated enterprises like railway and utility companies.

Once the financial infrastructure had been put in place domestically, it was a straightforward matter to extend its operations abroad. As increasing numbers of countries adopted a freely functioning, automatic gold standard, guaranteeing a free flow of service payments of debt, the attractiveness of overseas investments grew. At the same time British entrepreneurs took the lead in promoting railways and similar quasi-public works abroad. And these enterprises in turn created markets for the products of the British iron and steel industry, the core of the new wave of industrialization.

The effects of the economic trends of the Age of Steam and Steel on Britain's overseas commercial relations were appropriately far reaching. Overall it was an era typified by noticeable progress towards multilateral free trade. It was also an era in which the future of colonialism of the old coercive, protective, or preferential sort seemed increasingly in doubt as new areas were opened to British penetration and the comparative value of much of the old colonial system declined rapidly.

The one big exception to the trend in commercial relations away from the old empire was, of course, India. The period was therefore characterized by a strengthening of the British hold on its existing subcontinental possessions and their rapid territorial expansion. India was still Britain's greatest market for cotton goods. It also became an important recipient of British funds for railway building, and therefore a major market for British exports of iron and steel products.

Cotton cloth, iron and steel products, and financial capital for railways and public works were also Britain's principal exports to the U.S. And during the Age of Steam and Steel Anglo-American commercial relations actually became more intimate. The American South still provided the bulk of Britain's raw cotton requirements. Furthermore the rapidly growing American West held out the prospects of a lucrative and steadily increasing market for British manufactures at the same time it quickly became Britain's leading overseas source of foodstuffs. All of this was observed with less than rapturous enthusiasm by a rapidly industrializing American North that resented the British commercial presence in the South and West, and resented further Britain's diplomatic intrigues along with those regions to keep American tariffs low.

In addition to strengthening its existing trade relations with the U.S. and India, Britain penetrated a potentially enormous new market during the middle decades of the nineteenth century. It was the fur trade that first pointed out to

European business the potential of the Chinese market. But furs could be sold to only a limited population of rich Chinese. They were also relatively expensive to acquire both because of the early depletion of the prize fur-bearing marine mammals (especially sea otters) of the American Pacific coast and because of the sharp commercial instincts of the Amerindians of the Pacific North West who produced the furs.

Much more lucrative, and important in the long run for the commercial subjegation of China, was the opium trade. Opium tapped a mass market; the demand for it was certain, and not subject to whim and fancy; and it could be produced as a perfectly renewable cash crop by the virtual slave population of British Bengal. It was the opium trade that opened China to European commercial penetration. It simultaneously heralded the beginnings of an integrated, flourishing Pacific economy whose vast mix of lands, peoples and resources most of them previously absorbed into the expanding world market system, permitted the profitable proliferation of everything from temperate colonies of white agricultural settlement to tropical plantations manned by the slave labour of either the South Sea islanders or kidnapped Chinese coolies.

Given the tremendous acceleration of Anglo-American trade, the excitement over the rise of the Pacific economy, and the expansion and defense of its Indian empire, it seemed as if many of the older colonies of the British empire would be all but forgotten. In the short run the impact of decolonisation was certainly detrimental and sometimes catastrophic for the business interests of the old colonial elite, as preferences on sugar, wheat, and timber were abandoned. There was too an important political dimension to the process of loosening the imperial fiscal grip on colonial commercial activity. "Decolonisation" was in part a manifestation of a post-Napoleonic War, middle class tax revolt in Britain that helped confer political power on that middle class and enable it to cut British government expenditure liabilities abroad. These liabilities included subsidies and supports to the colonial establishment. However, as progress was made towards having the colonies of white settlement assume more of the burden of their own expenditure responsibilities, culminating in the grant of full fiscal autonomy, appropriate changes in the colonial class structure had to accompany it. The metropolitan government therefore cooperated where necessary with the colonial middle classes to dump the old "loyalist" planter, merchant and squirearchy class from power. In sharp contrast to the pattern of political evolution of the old American colonies during the transition from mercantilism to early industrialism, when the time came to shift the structures of imperial-colonial relations to a form commensurate with the demand of free trade imperialism, the colonies were dragged against the will of their hitherto dominant class into the modern age.

There was one rather significant exception towards the British policy of granting greater autonomy to its colonies of white settlement. If the colonies were granted full fiscal freedom and "responsible" government — translating into full responsibility to pay their own debts — nonetheless in the financial sphere metropolitan interference continued. The objective was to assure that

colonies moved steadily in the direction of the fully automatic gold standard system that served to assure world financial and commercial primacy to Britain.

For British North America the age manifested itself in contradictory trends, positive and negative, with crisis succeeded by prosperity to be followed by crisis again.

The Nova Scotian economy was uniquely situated in terms of economic geography, resource base, and accumulated entrepreneurial capacity to participate fully in the expansionist impulses of the age. It had built up great fleets of windships, and of merchants and ships masters with long experience in the trade of diverse parts of the world. Hence, during the great trade expansion at mid-century Nova Scotia ships could be found in all manner of activities — from plying the coolie kidnapping trade to carrying Peruvian guano to British markets to running the northern blockade to American southern ports during the Civil War. At the same time its resources of iron and coal pointed in another direction — steamships called for fuel while British capital and contractors plunged into the task of building a provincial railway system. Moreover, the generalisation of the gold standard, and the rising price of gold, led to gold fever spilling over into Nova Scotia. It was a fortunate and fortuitious combination of circumstances; for Nova Scotian prosperity of the period was based on a short run coexistence between the old economy of wind and water, which pointed to transAtlantic trade and a British imperial connection, and the new economy of steam and steel, pointing to railways and continental integration.

Canada also felt contradictory forces shaping its pattern of economic development. Recovery from the crises associated with repeal of the colonial preferential system was rapid, and from the time of the granting of responsible government until the crisis of 1857, the province's rate of economic expansion was unprecedented, albeit largely confined to the south-west penninsula. The impetus from a heavy program of British financed railway building, expanded trade with the U.S., and a boom in wheat sales to Britain manifested itself in a rapid rate of both urbanization and land settlement. But the crash of 1857 left the province in a desperate economic condition — and provincial business leaders reacted to the crisis by lobbying for a federal union of all of British North America. In effect Canada would become the centre of a British North American empire whose rise and development would roughly parallel that of the British Raj in India; and the two developments would be linked by British North America providing the site for an "all-red-route" of railways, joined at the two ends to steamships and connecting Britain to its imperial and commercial possessions in the Orient.

Aptly symbolizing the imperial objectives of the era was British North America's Governor-General, Lord Elgin, whose father had set suitable standards of sibling deportment by stealing the choicest marbles from the Parthenon in Athens. Lord Elgin operated in Canada more or less openly as the agent of the great British merchant banks and construction companies promoting railway ventures in the underdeveloped parts of the commercial

world. His greatest monument was the engineering of the Grand Trunk Railway job; projected to be the largest railway system under single management in the world. In this project Canadian parliamentarians ran amok looting the public purse, and bequeathing the country with a debt burden that finally forced a fiscal union of British North America to assure its service. Lord Elgin himself retired to Scotland before that event, allegedly carrying with him L50,000 worth of the railway company's securities. He subsequently became Vice-Roy of British India after the bloody suppression of the Sepoy Mutiny; but before he could take up his charge, he found himself diverted to China, leading the British offensive in the final Opium War, ordering the looting and burning of the fabled Winter Palace in Peking, along with much of its surrounding area, and imposing on the Chinese emperor a "treaty" forcing the opening of all of China to British drug pedlars and slave traders — whose fruits subsequently served to abet the opening of the British North American Pacific North-West.

There, in the far west the British presence had long been restricted to the posts of the Hudson's Bay Company from whence the Pacific fur trade to China was conducted. Then, as in California just before it, the discovery of gold transformed the economy, and the strategic value of the area — and in so doing assured the destruction of the aboriginal socio-economic system in the process. Pacific trade and gold were two of the most compelling economic urges of the age; and both of them made evident the need for a reconsideration of imperial policy towards the Pacific North-West, the more so since its natural harbours were endowed by abundant, nearby coal resources at a time when it was evident the future of world commerce lay in the steamship.

Thus the demands of Canadian business interests pushing for territorial expansion to rekindle earlier boom conditions coincided with the demands of British investors in Canadian railways anxious to create a transcontinental trade route for British imperial commercial objectives. And both pushed for a federal union of the colonies of British North America into a politically autonomous, British Kingdom on the North American continent, a project conceived in the Age of Steam and Steel but only brought to full fruition in the historical era that followed.

The Age of Imperialism

The Age of Imperialism began with a crash — in 1873. Out of the ensuing depression and deflation came a renewal of formal imperialism by a number of European powers, and with it a renewal of the challenge to British global power. The economic trends of the period were markedly different from those of its predecessor. It witnessed a general retreat towards protectionism, with an accompanying impulse to territorial annexation to safeguard markets and raw material sources. It witnessed competition among the powers for concessions — industrial and financial — in the unpartitioned parts of the world, and a scramble to build railways and other instruments of commercial and military

hegemony. And it witnessed a general rearmament program that was symptomatic of the rising temperature of international economic relations.

The British position in the Age of Imperialism was in many respects unique, for it was against Britain that much of the economic aggressivity and antagonism of other states was implicitly or explicitly directed. Britain began the era with a far flung empire, and its policy choices involved defence of the existing frontiers as well as expansion of its territories in the face of Russian, French, German and American ambitions. Britain began as the industrial giant of the century, but it found itself increasingly threatened, particularly by the U.S. and Germany, and facing the actual or potential loss of many of the export markets it had long taken for granted. But Britain did not share the general reversion to protectionism; for it still aspired to be a global, rather than just an imperial commercial and financial metropolis. Despite the challenge of newer powers, it was from Britain that the largest single part of the great international capital movements of the period originated. It was with reference to the London commodity market that speculators in many primary products made their calculations. It was in British ships that much of the world's trade, even that not destined to touch British territory at any point in its travels, moved to market. And it was in British currency that most of the world's commodity and capital movements were denominated, and by movements of that currency that imbalances were cleared.

The centre of gravity of the British empire remained India, and defending the approaches to it was still the cardinal objective of British imperial policy. India was still England's greatest market, and it had the advantage of absorbing old-fashioned industrial products, thus freeing Britain of the need to meet the competition of the U.S. and Germany by modernizing its industrial base. India absorbed huge amounts of British investment funds, and yielded a large share of the enormous return flow of tribute payments British investors were reaping from around the world. And India's balance of trade deficit with Britain yielded nearly half of the foreign exchange that Britain required to finance its own deficit with the industrially advanced nations of the world.

Thus, while impelled by the usual array of imperialist motives for grabbing territories abroad — the search for secure sources of raw materials, new markets, coaling and naval bases to defend its principal trade routes, and the consolidation of its overseas investments — for Britain an additional, and vitally important motive to its global strategy was controlling the approaches to India. The objective of securing the Suez Canal brought Britain into Egypt; and Egypt in turn could only be controlled by securing the Nile Valley, which took the British into the Sudan and Uganda in the face of contrary French ambitions. To control the Red Sea required the further consolidation of the British hold on the Gulf of Aden and parts of East Africa, which brought potential conflict with Germany and inclined Britain to support the projected carve-up of the Turkish empire. Assuring the British hold on the South African route in the face of German intrigues with the Boer was one factor propelling Britain to war in 1898. And not least of the methods of assuring the safety of Britain's oriental trade was

the bolstering of the Canadian Confederation and its transcontinental railway line.

Once more an imperial figure captured the spirit of the age. In 1870 Colonel Garnet Wolseley led the British forces in crushing the Métis resistance against forcible incorporation into the new British North American Kingdom, opening the Manitoba area to land speculators and railway promoters. Shortly after Sir Garnet Wolseley took charge of suppressing the Ashanti resistance against British seizure of the coastal trade and the gold of the interior of Ghana. In 1882, on behalf of the British merchant banking firm of Baring Brothers & Co., he crushed the Egyptian revolt against new taxes to service the Egyptian debt to Britain. And when the Sudan rebelled against like treatment, it was Wolseley who led the Gordon Relief Mission in which Canadian volunteer forces participated. And as an aging field Marshall Wolseley participated in the process of bringing British liberty and democracy to South Africa by taking part in the smashing of Boer resistance to Britain's greed for the lands and mineral resources they occupied. In this campaign Lord Strathcona who had personally begun his rapid ascent to fortune as a virtual camp follower of Wolseley's Manitoba expedition, personally financed for imperial service the equipping of a Canadian cavalry unit drawn from the same North West Mounted Police forces that the Canadian government created to replace Wolseley's contingent policing railway building and land settlement in Manitoba and the North West territories.

Canada was the oldest and largest of the colonies of white settlement that played a role of increasing importance in the economic and strategic balance of the pre-World War One Period. Canada's much touted "national policy" — a combination of transcontinental railway development, colonization and settlement, encouragement of financial capital inflows, and attempted hot-house industrialization by invitation — by accident more than by design, imposed an *institutional and legislative framework* on the economic development process in Canada that made it accord very well with the dominant economic impulses of the age.

Across the globe those states that had achieved the essential prerequisites, began to mark out their own commercial hinterlands abroad through the promotion of railway, steamship, telegraph lines and similar infrastructure to control them. Bouyed up by enormous subsidies from the public purse, railways and related infrastructure formed both a prize of and a tool in furthering the imperial ambitions of the age. So too in Canada, Canadian railways, financed by heavy infusions of British capital, crossed a continent in competition with American railways to tap the trade of the Orient and to open the continental interior to exploitation and settlement. Creating a Canadian transcontinental route assured Britain an emergency lifeline should its trade with the Orient be threatened at Suez and at the African cape. Creating a new frontier of staple production within British territory provided an assured supply of strategic materials — gold and other minerals, grain, timber and the like — for the British empire. And creating commercial arteries into the Canadian West helped divert

part of the transAtlantic flow of immigrants away from the U.S., where they would bolster the economic power of one of Britain's major rivals, towards Canada whose imperial fidelity was assured.

Colonization and immigration also satisfied imperial objectives — the creation of a new market of white settlers within British territory at the same time providing a labour force for construction camps, farms, and industries. As the world frontier of white settlement expanded, so too did the Canadian one. The period of the last great phase of European penetration of the globe was thus also the final state of the white man's conquest of British North America. Paralleling the drive of Imperial Russia into the Turkic and Persian areas of central Asia, and that of imperial American into its continental hinterland, came that of British North America, whose aboriginal society and economy, apart from isolated pockets of resistance which succumbed one by one in the decades to follow, was extinguished, as the market mechanism completed its task of achieving global commercial integration.

Into the newly opened territories poured the settlers — Russian into central Asia, American and Western European into the American West, and British into Canada's new hinterland. Efforts to promote French settlement into Canada's West were a failure. Faced with a choice between Algerian lands cleared of Arab and Berber farmers by the French Foreign Legion and American aboriginal lands cleared of Cree and Blackfoot hunters by the North West (Royal Canadian) Mounted Police, French emigrés chose the first, much to the relief of the British ersatz aristocracy then ruling in Canada. With the largely successful sealing of the Pacific Coast against the Yellow Peril, Canada was assured the post of senior white daughter in a British empire reaching its zenith.

Behind the successful winning of the Canadian North West by the miners, timberman, farmer and speculator, behind colonization and the railways, stood the power of British financial capital. The phenomenal prosperity and frenetic pace of developmental activity Canada experienced in the very late nineteenth and early twentieth century was directly attributable to its favoured access to the London capital market. The Canadian monetary, fiscal and financial system had been moulded in such a way as to reassure British and foreign investors of the safety, security and free convertibility into gold and sterling of their assets inside Canada, with the payoff manifesting itself in the form of a flood of British investment capital. Only the U.S. and India surpassed Canada in total borrowings; and if the rate of capital inflow had continued for a few years beyond 1914, Canada would have surpassed even India in its total absorption of British investments.

Yet while all of these forces and events were serving to consolidate the position of Canada as a pivotal element in the British imperial economy, a set of economic interrelations of quite a different sort were also taking shape, a set of interrelations grounded first and foremost in the industrial system. In an age of competitive industrialization, when the more advanced economies reacted to a deflationary crisis and their long standing vulnerability to British competitors, by active, state-fostered policies to encourage their own industrial base —

through tariffs, subsidies, and patent law manipulations — Canada did likewise. Canada however saw itself as Britain in America; and Canadian policy makers reacted to the consolidation of the giant American national enterprise of the era by what they assumed to be a minor modification of policy priorities. Instead of Canada continuing its traditional role as the backdoor through which Britain could infiltrate its imperial wares into American markets, Canada was to be the venue where Britain captured the benefits of American industrial power. Thus while British investments poured into Canadian railways, utilities, land companies, and government debt instruments, American industrialists extended their influence northward in forms that ranged from the establishment of price fixing and market sharing agreements with Canadian enterprises, to licensing of their techniques, to direct investments in branch plants and subsidiaries. The one thing all of the forms of American encroachment had in common was their tendency to focus their attention on the more modern industrial sectors, on chemicals, electrical products, automobiles and the like, sectors where neither Britain's old and backward industrial system nor Canada's very young and primitive one could challenge them. And the result was to create an American continental axis of economic integration between Canada and the U.S. at the same time the flows of staple exports and British portfolio investments were creating an imperial one.

Canada's economic prospects were thus tied to two metropoles simultaneously, one representing a European Age rapidly approaching the point of its demise, the other representing an American Age at the point of its birth. As the pundits say, the rest is History.

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Notes

The previous text is adapted from the theoretical and historical-summary chapters of the author's CANADA IN THE EUROPEAN AGE, a two-volume study that had been scheduled for publication by James Lorimer & Co. in 1979, but which was prevented from appearing in print by decisions taken by the Social Sciences Federation of Canada. Intervention by the Academic Freedom and Tenure Committee of the C.A.U.T. and protests by several colleagues, angered at what they perceived to be a politically motivated process, failed to induce the SSFC to alter its decision. Since to date only one chapter of that study has appeared in print ("The Canadian State, the Accumulation of Capital, and the Great War", JOURNAL OF CANADIAN STUDIES, Vol. 16, no. 3-4, 1981), it seemed desirable at this time to make the main results and the theoretical "model" available for free academic discussion and debate.

Thanks are due to the editors of the special issue of CJPST for making such an opportunity available.

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THE CANADIAN BOURGEOISIE: TOWARDS A SYNTHETICAL APPROACH

Jorge Niosi

Socialist scholars disagree with one another on the principal characteristics of the Canadian capitalist class. This disagreement is based on a broader one namely on the nature of the Canadian economy and its place in the international division of labour.

The most important cleavage among Canadian socialists is the one between Nationalists and Internationalists. The Nationalist perspective took shape fifteen years ago, after the publication of the Watkins' *Report of the Task Force on the Structure of Canadian Industries.* In succeeding years socialist scholars developed, and adopted almost unanimously, a particular perspective on Canadian economy and society. Theoretically left wing Nationalism was nourished by Latin American dependency perspectives either reformist (of the R. Prebisch and C. Furtado variety) or Marxist (in the P. Baran, P. Sweezy or A.G. Frank tradition). Politically these theories were influenced by the more respectable Nationalism of the Walter Gordon type, which emerged in Ottawa in the period between 1963-68. Left Nationalists emphasized the dependent character of the Canadian economy — its technological underdevelopment, its heavy commercial links to the U.S. economy as a raw materials exporter and a capital goods importer, and the predominant role of foreign (mainly American) capital in the manufacturing and mining industries. Canadian Nationalists concluded that the Canadian bourgeoisie was mainly a comprador one, and that the indigenous capitalist class was either too small, narrow and powerless or a purely financial-commercial one, not interested in industry and fairly accommodating to its dependent status.[1]

During the seventies, while a majority of Canadian socialist scholars adopted Nationalism, a small but increasing minority distanced themselves from this current of thought. I will call them the Internationalists. This group is more firmly entrenched in Marxism, espousing a theoretical approach close to some Left Nationalists. Internationalists see the world capitalist economy thoroughly divided into an industrialized core and a dependent periphery, but they include Canada among advanced countries instead of dependent societies. They maintain that Canada is a very important foreign investor, with huge Canadian-owned multinationals, not only in banking and finance, but also in manufacturing and mining. They add that foreign control has been steadily falling since 1970, and that the analysis of the Canadian State (i.e. Canadian economic policy, Canadian Crown Corporations and regulatory agencies) show the major and increasing influence of the Canadian indigenous bourgeoisie.[2] The

deindustrialization debate is a major element in the Nationalist/Internationalist cleavage. Most Nationalists underline the small and declining percentage of the country's labour force involved in manufacturing, the increasing trade deficit in high technology products, little innovation due to branch plant manufacturing and a general decline of Canadian industry following rising American protectionism and the end of U.S. world industrial domination. Internationalists respond that manufacturing is falling as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product in every industrial country and that Canadian industrial production is growing at a regular pace, comparable to the other advanced nations.

The finance capital contention is another important issue in this cleavage. Most Nationalists assert the dominance of a strong financial fraction over a weak industrial bourgeoisie, while most Internationalists argue that the Canadian capitalist class is a well-balanced financial-industrial group.[3]

During the seventies the Nationalist approach came under attack through a second front. This second cleavage concerns the interpretation of provincialism and regionalism. Most Nationalists argue that regionalism and provincialism are the political effects of foreign capital on Canadian society. They see the provinces scrambling among themselves to attract international investors and fighting against the Canadian State, which represents national unity. Conversely several major studies in the late seventies interpreted provincialism as the cradle of regional bourgeoisies. Provincial governments, through their taxing and provincially oriented buying policies, were viewed as nurturing the development of regional groups in the Canadian bourgeoisie. The Alberta and Quebec and perhaps soon Nova Scotia and Newfoundland situations were considered to be representative of this trend. [4]

A third line of cleavage among Canadian Socialists concerns the ethnic composition of the Canadian capitalist class. Once again this cleavage only partially overlaps with the first one. Most Nationalists, mainly in Quebec but also in English Canada, see the country's capitalist class (either comprador or indigenous) as predominantly Anglo-Saxon. In Quebec this is the prevailing view, not only among the Parti Québécois left-wingers, but also in the emerging Socialist Movement. More simply I could say that most Nationalists view Quebeckers as an ethnic class of proletarians. On the opposite side, new studies agree on the emergence not only of a French-speaking bourgeoisie, but also of other ethnic groups in the formerly homogeneous Anglo-Saxon establishment.[5] A further cleavage within Quebec scholars divides those who interpret the rising francophone bourgeoisie as the driving force in the P.Q. government and those who see it as simply the francophone counterpart of the Canadian bourgeoisie, almost an ethnic group among others.[6]

In this presentation I would like to go beyond these cleavages and propose a unifying, coherent approach combining the stronger dimensions of each contending thesis. I will argue that most of the opposing perspectives just sketched overemphasize some real element in the Canadian social structure or some particular characteristic of the country's capitalist class. I will also

maintain that several approaches simply overlook some major changes in the Canadian economy and society which are taking place since the late sixties. In short, I will propose that each polar position is part of, or presents, an incomplete, fragmentary perspective of the Canadian bourgeoisie and the underlying social and economic structure. My position tries to eliminate some quick extrapolations to build a unitary descriptive and explanatory scheme of the internal composition, rivalries and changes within the Canadian bourgeoisie.

Underlying my synthetical perspective is a critique of the core-periphery dichotomy. Since Confederation, Canada has occupied an intermediary position in the world system, exhibiting some traits both of advanced and dependent societies. But during the last fifteen years Canada has been moving towards an increasingly independent position, pushed both by internal and international forces. I will first analyse these changes before turning to a more detailed discussion of the cleavage just outlined.

I

The International Economy of the 1960's and 1970's

Since the mid-sixties several major changes took place in the international economy which heavily affected Canada. The most important of them was the decline of the American leadership in the capitalist world. Europe and Japan imported, applied and modified American technologies in the 1950's and 1960's, bringing their economies closer to the United States position. Productivity growth was far higher in Western Europe and Japan than in the U.S. and the American multinational corporations began to face fierce competition from European and Japanese giants both in foreign countries and in their domestic market. From textiles to television sets, from steel to automobiles, U.S. competitiveness was losing ground and the American Government had to intervene to prevent massive layoffs and plant closings.[7] Many U.S. corporations established in Canada started to sell their Canadian subsidiaries to reinforce their domestic operations facing tough foreign competition.

The second major change in the international economy was the relative strengthening of mineral and oil producing countries. With OPEC, CIPEC and several other cartels the prices of energy and, though less dramatically, mineral resources increased very rapidly during the seventies. As a large producer of most kinds of energy and mineral products, Canadian international position was improved. Economic rent rised sharply and several provincial governments, together with the federal government, engineered different economic policies in order to capture these rents or to keep them in Canadian hands. Also, American corporations were willing to sell some of their foreign subsidiaries, and Canadian companies were able to buy them. These basic

trends contribute to explain the relative decline of American investment in Canada.

A third important development in the world economy was the decline of tariff protectionism between industrialized countries following the GATT rounds. Canadian tariffs were significantly lowered since the sixties and some American corporations preferred to serve their Canadian customers from their home operations. Some of the decline of the American control of Canadian manufacturing industry was simply due to the closing of unprofitable branch plants. Tables I and II show the decline in foreign control of the Canadian economy since the 1970 all-times peak.

Since 1970, under this favourable environment, Canadian nationalism, which had known a slow start in the early sixties, grew at a rapid pace. The Foreign Investment Review Agency, the Canada Development Corporation, Petro-Canada and the National Energy Program were the cornerstones of the new nationalism. Energy and mineral prices seemed to skyrocket. Canada's megaprojects — Alberta's tar sands, the Arctic region, the eastern Coast and Quebec hydro-electricity — were supposed to be the locomotives of the country's growth till the end of the century.

And then came the crisis, the stabilisation and decline in world oil and gas prices, and the dramatic fall in mineral prices. Following the 1981 economic stagnation, Canada experienced a 5% decline in its GDP in 1982. The provincial governments, which had imitated the federal nationalist policies in the seventies (taking over half of the potash industry in Saskatchewan, most of the coal industry in British Columbia, 40% of the asbestos industry in Quebec, and several oil and gas facilities in Alberta and Ontario) returned to their more traditional attitude of appealing to foreign investors to foster their development. But in the eighties, Canadian resources are less indispensable, because of the diffusion of technologies saving both energy and raw materials, because of the American economic decline, and because of the world crisis. After fifteen years of nationalism and increasing economic independence, Canada's ailing economy is once again at the crossroads: either it furthers its autonomy through a national industrial policy or it comes back to a more dependent status vis-à-vis the declining American economy.

The Nationalist approach of the left appeared thus at the 1970 peak of the foreign control on the Canadian economy. Contending theses were born in the seventies, while the economic prospects seemed brilliant to Canada and while the state seemed to be able to easily repatriate control from foreign hands.

II

A comprador or a national bourgeoisie?

The "exclusively dependent" perspective of Canada goes along with the thesis of an "exclusively comprador" bourgeoisie. More sophisticated

presentations of the Nationalist thesis argue that the Canadian capitalist class is not merely comprador, but also includes some fragments of an indigenous bourgeoisie. This position as I see it, is based on the overwhelming evidence on the technological, financial and commercial dependence of the Canadian economy on the U.S.. A first major problem with this approach is that it overlooks the study of the 70% of the economy which is not foreign controlled. I have elsewhere tried to focus the analysis on this 70% of Canadian-owned and controlled capitalism, in order to demonstrate the existence of a very vigorous Canadian bourgeoisie, running large autochtonous corporations. Not only are large Canadian-owned firms numerous; they can compete with foreign firms in many industries. The Canadian bourgeoisie now has flesh and bones and is no longer considered as a residual category.[8]

But what about Canadian dependency and the crushing presence of foreign multinationals in Canada? The Science Council of Canada has published many impressive monographs on Canadian technological underdevelopment, based on solid data about the lack of domestic innovation, the high percentage of patents obtained by non-residents and our massive trade deficit in capital goods. However, international discussions concerning technological transfers and dependence focus increasingly on the problems of *mastering* technology and less on the *origins* of technology. The emphasis is less on what innovations a country produces than on what technology it is able to use. Of course the Japanese experience of rapid growth based on copying technology, buying foreign licenses, and adding minor modifications to existing products, and the NIC's adoption of the Japanese model, are key elements in these new approaches concerning technological dependence. On-going research on Canadian technical policy and innovation, and my own research on Canadian multinationals show that many domestic companies are able to buy foreign technology, master and modify it, and eventually re-export it to other countries with or without foreign direct investment. The Bombardier example is a good case in point. Bombardier, the largest Canadian-owned and controlled transportation equipment producer, manufactures subway cars in the United States using a modified French license, and will soon produce additional cars using a Japanese design. Bombardier also manufactures military trucks in Ireland under an American license, and street tramways in Austria under a German license. This is not the traditional behaviour of an independent capitalist class, but it is a rational and indeed increasingly common way of making profits in a very imperfect technological market. This pattern is essential to the understanding of many Canadian multinationals and of the so-called high performers among domestic enterprises.[9]

As to foreign direct investment in Canada, let me add that while, of course, it is massive, its relative weight is rapidly declining. From 1970 to 1981 foreign control has declined from 36% to 26%, measured by total capital employed in all-non-financial industries, according to very recent estimates by Statistics Canada. Equally important is the change in the Canadian balance of international investment. In 1970 there were 4.6 dollars of foreign direct

investment (FDI) in Canada for each dollar of Canadian direct investment abroad. In 1975 this ratio was only 3.6 to 1, and in 1979, based on the latest figures published by Statistics Canada it was only 2.7 to 1. The U.S. link, measured by F.D.I. data is also much looser that it was fifteen years ago. In 1970 there were 6.6 dollars of U.S. F.D.I. in Canada for each dollar of Canadian F.D.I. in the United States. By 1979 the ratio was only 3.5 to 1.[10]

But, the Nationalists argue that two-thirds of Canada's foreign trade is still with the U.S. Consequently, the level of economic activity in this country is dependent on the ups and downs of the American economy. Furthermore, the composition of our foreign trade has not been altered by the decline of the American control over the Canadian economy. Even worse Canadian manufacturers as a whole are losing their share of the domestic market as tariff barriers are lowered between the U.S. and Canada. What kind of Canadian bourgeoisie is it that accepts this dependent and even self-destructive commercial pattern? To this question some Nationalists have responded that the Canadian bourgeoisie is so weak that it is unable to chart an independent course for our economy. Let me suggest another response. The dominant strata of the Canadian capitalist class are so strong (not only in finance, commerce and transportation, but also in several manufacturing industries such as paper, agricultural machinery, distilleries, telecommunications equipment, metal refining, petrochemicals, etc.) that it cannot only challenge foreign competition in Canada, but also export to or invest in the U.S. in order to capture a large portion of the American market. The dominant strata of the Canadian bourgeoisie are not afraid of a continental economy. They have carved narrow but secure niches for themselves in many financial and non-financial industries and are quite able to compete in the North American market. This is not to say that the Canadian capitalist class is dissolving itself within a Continental bourgeoisie. In fact, some level of dependency and Continental integration is a profitable strategy for the dominant strata in Canada, even if it sacrifices many small and medium-sized local manufacturing firms.

The Internationalist case is weaker. They argue first that Canada has large multinational banks and industrial firms. This is true, but let us not forget that many semi-industrial countries (such as Argentina) or newly industrialized countries (such as South Korea) also have MNC of their own, even if they are generally less known. Besides Canadian multinationals present instances of foreign expansion via licensing, or technological absorption through acquisitions. They are the multinationals of an industrial dependent country. More often than not they have their R & D headquarters abroad, they buy foreign firms in order to absorb their know how (as in the Massey-Harris acquisition of Ferguson and Perkins in the 50's) or their trademarks (as Seagram and Hiram Walker have done for fifty years). Canadian MNC are alive and well but their technological pattern is rather unique. This is an aspect that Internationlists have omitted from their analysis.

Another major argument of the Internationalists is the steady decline in foreign control in Canada since 1970. This is a key point, but one should not

conclude (as Resnick has recently written in *Our Generation)* that Canada is becoming much more industrialized or independent. Dependency is a multi-dimensional phenomenon. Foreign control is only one, albeit an important, aspect of dependency.

I would like to point out another important dimension of the decline of foreign control. If foreign control is declining, who exactly is "Canadianizing" the economy? Statistics Canada data show that nine-tenths of new Canadian assets are in the Canadian private sector, not in Crown corporations. In other words, the Canadian capitalists class is growing faster than the State (see Table IV).

To summarize my analysis, I argue that the Nationalists are correct in emphasizing different aspects of the country's dependence, but they incorrectly conclude that the Canadian bourgeoisie is weak or non-existent. They erroneously equate technological dependence and technological incompetence. They only see foreign multinationals in Canada and not Canadian multinationals abroad. Some Internationalists rightly observe that Canadian transnationals are strong and growing, but they ignore their technological dependence and their narrow range of products. They correctly point to the decline in foreign control but unjustifiably deduce that Canada has already become an independent industrial country.

My point of view is that most of the decline in foreign control has been in extractive and mineral processing activities in sectors such as oil and gas, metals, potash, coal and asbestos. The Canadian bourgeoisie is consolidating its hold on the Canadian economy, but without changing its semi-industrial character. It is destroying only one dimension of dependence. This domestic bourgeoisie is reaping all the benefits of Canadian nationalism. In his very important book, *What does the Ruling Class do when it Rules?,* Goran Therborn asks the question of how one may recognize a ruling class. He says that a ruling class is one that is able to ensure the enlarged reproduction of its economic base. That is exactly what the Canadian national bourgeoisie is doing: socially reproducing its domination on an extended scale by taking over foreign subsidiaries in Canada.

The deindustrialization cleavage in Canada is a sort of nonexistent debate in which both parties seemed tied. Those arguing deindustrialization maintain that Canada has the smallest percentage of its labour force in industry, the highest proportion of foreign control in manufacturing, increasing trade deficits in high technology industries, and little innovation due to branch plants. They add that the American economic decline and non-tarif protectionism will accelerate Canadian deindustrialization. Tables V and VI support some of these contentions. Opponents to the deindustrialization thesis respond that manufacturing is declining as a proportion of GDP of every industrial country, that employment and industrial production is growing in Canada at a quicker pace than in other advanced countries, and that the Canadian manpower employed in manufacturing is small because of high productivity and modern technology.[11] Again Tables V and VI support some of these points. As a matter of

fact from 1973 to 1981 Canadian manufacturing production rose by 14%, as against 26% in Japan, 21% in Italy, 15% in the U.S., 5% in West Germany, and 4% in France; in Great Britain it declined by 18% during the same period.[12] Canada is not deindustrializing in absolute terms, but its manufacturing base is much narrower than that of any advanced country. Also, manufacturing is declining as a proportion of Canadian economic activity.

Another debate among Canadian Socialist scholars takes place between those arguing, as Clement puts it "the dominance of a financial economic elite and the underdevelopment of an indigenous group of industrial and resource entrepreneurs" and those proposing the thesis of a well-integrated indigenous capitalist class.[13]

Supporters of the first thesis have proved the weakness of Canadian manufacturing (accounting for only 20% of the Canadian GDP as against 36% in Germany), the highest level of foreign control in this particular industry (nearly 50% of total assets) and the concentration of multinational foreign companies in large, modern industries. Supporters of the second thesis have focused on the high density of interlocking directorships between financial and industrial corporations (mainly with Canadian-owned ones). They have also criticized the classification of transportation and utilities as outside the industrial sector (Canadian-owned corporations are much stronger in those latter activities), and a general underestimation of Canadian industrial capital.

Once again my position lies somewhere between the two divergent perspectives. On the one hand, the weakness of the country's *manufacturing* industry is evident compared not only with the Canadian financial system, but also with the manufacturing sector of any industrial country. At the end of 1981 for example the aggregate assets of the six largest chartered banks of Canada were $333 billion.[14] At the same time the six largest manufacturing companies had total assets of $32.7 billion, ten times smaller.[15] Even including public utilities, railways, resource companies and manufacturing as industrials, the total assets of the six largest were $85 billion; merely 25% of the six largest banks.[16] Or compare FDI of all non-banking Canadian companies in 1980 ($23 billion) with foreign assets of Canadian chartered banks ($109 billion).[17] The relative weakness of Canadian manufacturing compared to the banks are patently evident. Turning now to international comparisons, the OECD publishes comparative data on industrial employment, where industry includes manufacturing, mining, construction and public utilities. Canada has the smallest percentage of its civilian labour force in industry among the eleven largest partners of the OECD. Germany heads the list with 45% and Canada finishes last with 28.5% (see tables V and VI).

In addition, I am not convinced by the studies of interlocking directorships to prove control or even "fusion" or "interpenetration" of banking and industry. Hilferding meant nothing less than increasing *control,* and *ownership* in industrial firms by banks; Lenin's version is weaker but implies also some level of intercorporate ownership. Nothing of this sort has been demonstrated in Canada where both types of institutions are independent from one another.

On the other hand, some Canadian manufacturing and mining firms are large by world standards, and they are among the dominant multinational oligopolies in the global markets. Corporations like Seagram, Hiram Walker, Alcan, Inco, Northern Telecom, Massey-Ferguson, Polysar or Cominco, are as important in their specific world industries as the Canadian banks are in world banking. In short, all measures of size show a very strong financial sector towering over a smaller and unequally developed industrial one. Ownership and control data show that both sectors are independent, but a solid Canadian bourgeoisie is active in both, with some big capitalists simultaneously controlling industrial and financial institutions.

III

Province-building, provincialism and the regional bourgeoisies

The opposite explanations of "province-building" and "provincialism" have also to be confronted and qualified. Both key concepts, describing the activities of the provincial states have previously to be defined. Authors do not agree on the time limits, the geographical extension or the type of activities they include.

On the time limits the original proponents of the province-building concept saw it as a secular phenomenon.

> "Since 1867 Canadians have been engaged in more than the construction of a new state; they have been building provinces".[18]

More recent analysts of province-building in Alberta and Saskatchewan, on the contrary, understand it as "the entrepreneurial development strategies of the seventies".[19]

On the geographical extension, Left Nationalists such as Stevenson and Levitt see province-building as a general phenomenon, which we could see in every province, while their opponents tend to restrict it to several provinces only.

Finally, what activities should be included in province-building? In a devastating critique of the concept, R. Young, Ph. Faucher and A. Blais have shown that provinces have experienced a secular and smooth growth of revenues and expenditures since confederation, that their main expense fields have always been, by far, in their traditional activities (education, health care, social security), and that the growth of provincial bureaucracies has been a long term process starting from 1867.[20] They have also shown that federal-provincial conflicts are less frequent than Left Nationalists have asserted, because many Provinces, specially the financially dependent Maritimes, have seldom discussed federal jurisdictions, and also because in many fields cooperation or straight acceptance of Ottawa's guidelines have been the rule (including, for example, the Canada Pension Plan, rejected only by Quebec in the early sixties

in order to build the huge Caisse de dépôt et placement to finance regional development).

On the basis of this confusing semantic situation I propose a restrictive definition of province-building, and a broad one for provincialism. Close to the Richards and Pratt notion, I understand "province-building" to be a recent phenomenon, started in the 1960s and 1970s, by which provincial governments try to influence their *economic development* by means of *direct intervention* (by planning, nationalization or straight regulation of key industries). This concept excludes simpler, traditional functions of provincial jurisdiction; it also excludes the long term growth of provincial bureaucracies and budgets devoted to those traditional activities such as education, health care, social security or infrastructure. Province-building is a particular variety of provincialism, the entrepreneurial variety. Conversely, provincialism is a normal and permanent activity of provincial governments trying to favour economic development through indirect means and traditional activities (education, transportation facilities, electricity, etc.). Provincialism implies some degree of quarrelling with the federal government on taxation, expenditures and other jurisdictions. But before 1960, provincialism left entrepreneurial decisions to private (often foreign) entreprise. What was new after 1960 was the direct engagement of provincial governments in industrial activites.

A simple indicator of the radical start of province-building in the sixties and seventies is the rapid growth of the provincial crown corporation in those two decades. Table VII shows the assets of provincial and federal crown corporations in 1959 and 1979. While federal state enterprises had annual increase rate of 9.1% during that period, provincial crown corporations grew 13.5% per year. Most interestingly, Ontario had the lowest increase rate (10.1%) while Newfoundland, Quebec and Alberta show the highest growth rates. Table IX shows that provinces are moving out from utilities and into manufacturing, mining and finance. Measured by province, Quebec has shown a remarkable growth, controlling 37% of all assets in 1979, up from 18% in 1959. Alberta and B.C. equally show impressive records, while the Maritimes growth is still concentrated in electricity and other public utilities. All 76% of existing provincial crown corporations were created after 1960.

Once presented a clear definition let us go back to the opposing theories. While not all theories try to explain the same phenomena, some of them find the roots of province-building in the patterns of accumulation and class structure of Canadian regions. Garth Stevenson[21] sees the province as being Canada-wide, comprising all provinces and the whole post-war period. The most outstanding Left-Nationalist writing on this field, he sees province-building as the political expression of the comprador bourgeoisie: foreign resource capital in the West and the East, and foreign manufacturing capital in Central Canada. Kari Levitt has also argued that Balkanization would be the political outcome of Canadian surrender to foreign multinationals.

The problem with these interpretations are many. Since 1970, not only does

foreign control of the Canadian economy decline, but province-building increases. Even during their rising years, in the 1945-70 period, American multinationals were active in *several* provinces at the same time, while foreign resource capital (in pulp and paper, oil and gas, non-ferrous metals, etc.) vertically integrated with manufacturing. Already by 1975, in Saskatchewan, Alberta, Newfoundland and P.E.I. primary industry (measured by value added) outpaced manufacturing.[22] Resource taxation is a minor component of province revenues everywhere except in Alberta, with the average being only 10.1%.[23] And it would be awkward to classify as resource-oriented and pro-American the Quebec Quiet Revolution, with its motto "Maîtres chez nous" and its huge nationalizations, Peter Lougheed's Conservative province-building or the Saskatchewan NDP administration of the 70s. Furthermore the Left-Nationalist approach precludes the analysis of present day federal-provincial scramble over future oil rents in Nova Scotia and Newfoundland, as well as the multiplication of provincially-financed industrial development corporations, industrial research centers and manufacturing ventures in several provinces. Instead of letting its population migrate towards industrial Ontario, most provinces prefer to promote industrial activities in their own territory.

It is no accident that the strongest opposition to the Left Nationalist perspective of province-building came from Alberta, British Columbia and Quebec. Richards and Pratt define themselves as:

> "tangentially engaged in intellectual debate with the "left nationalist" perspective on Canadian economic and political development. / ... / "The Left nationalist" version of dependency theory... could not account for the emergence in the 1970's of an ambitions arriviste bourgeoisie in a province such as Alberta. It... generally underestimated the autonomy of the state in Canada, notably in relationship to foreign capital. In Marxist terms it committed the fallacy of reductionism, analysing all events as the intended out come of some dominant class, in this case American capitalists"[24]

While Pratt and Richard's argument against the Left Nationalist seems well-taken, one cannot understand all *provincialism* as the political effect of growing regional bourgeoisies. First of all, Duplessis' Quebec, Manning's Alberta and Bennett's British Columbia correspond more to the type of provincialism described by Stevenson and Levitt; this variety of provincialism favours foreign capital and thus the comprador bourgeoisie.

In my opinion, each contending perspective is argued on the basis of a different period of Canadian capitalism. The Left Nationalist perspective applies relatively well to the 1900-1960 period, during which many provincial governments tried to foster the development of their provinces by inviting foreign capital. Regional parties such as the Union Nationale in Quebec and the

Social Credit in the West were instrumental in this policy. Only Ontario has diverged at the time, through the creation of the Ontario-Hydro and the development of the pulp and paper, steel and non-ferrous metals industries.[25] But, starting in the sixties, the decline of the American economy has rendered the invitation strategy increasingly obsolete. Several provincial government turned to province-building, that is, to promote development through their own entrepreneurial activities. For example, while sending its iron to the U.S. and to Ontario, Quebec tried to build its own steel industry under the Liberal's Quiet Revolution; while fueling Ontario's petrochemical industry, Alberta built its own processing facilities under Peter Lougheed.

The social content of provincialism is changing, but provincialism as such remains. This points out to the common deficiency of both extreme approaches, namely class reductionism. Both try to reduce political phenomena to the activity of an economic class. On this point I agree with Theda Skocpol in thinking that "no existing Neo-marxist approach affords sufficient weight to state and party organisations as independent determinants of political conflicts and outcomes".[26] Provincialism is first of all a *political* fact, the policy of state provincial apparatus against the centralfederal state. Provincialism is written in the Canadian constitution, in terms of federal/provincial jurisdiction over taxation and expenditures. All provincial governments want to broaden their tax base. For more than half a century they have tried to achieve this goal by inviting foreign capital to exploit local resources. This strategy generated high economic rents in the postwar period, and the growth of regional capital and provincial bureaucracies eager (and more and more capable) of capturing these rents. Thus we have Quebec's Quiet Revolution and Alberta and Saskatchewan province-building of the 70's. This policy now seems less effective because of the present crisis, the American economic decline, and stiffer competition from less developed countries which offer cheaper resources. With economic rents falling, many provinces (including the nationalist Quebec government) prefer to return to the traditional policy of inviting foreign investors to foster development.

In short, provincialism is a constant element in Canadian politics, but its class contents varies: not all provincialism is province-building, neither is it always a political reflection of foreign investment. Only detailed political, economic and social analysis can say which groups are benefiting in the federal/provincial struggles for economic rents and manufacturing development. As to the near future, I personally feel much less optimistic about the chances of success of province-building strategies than I was four years ago when I wrote *Canadian Capitalism.* But I am also less optimistic about the invitation strategy. Both development policies are based on a strong reliance on resource exportation, and Canada is losing markets and competitiveness in many extractive industries. With the eventual exception of Alberta, Canada's regional bourgoisies will probably weaken in a near future.

IV

The Ethnic Composition of the Canadian Bourgeoisie

Let me analyze now the debates concerning the ethnic and national character of the Canadian bourgeoisie. I believe that the approach arguing the Anglo-saxon ethnic unity of the Canadian capitalist class is simply outdated.[27] The French-Canadian, Jewish and Eastern European elements are not only well represented, but able to take over some of the major traditional Anglo-Canadian corporations, such as Power Corp, Brascan, Abitibi Price or Imperial Life. There is a steady rise of non-Anglo groups in the Canadian capitalist class during the postwar period. Let me compare some figures. In his well known book *The Vertical Mosaic*, Porter asserted that in 1951 only 6.7% of the members of the economic elite were French Canadians and only .78% were Jewish (as opposed to respectively 33% and 1.4% in the general population).[28] For 1972 Wallace Clement found 8.4% of French Canadians and 4.1% of Jewish in this economic elite.[29] With 1975 data, I found that 10% of the larger Canadian companies are owned and controlled by French-Canadians, and another 10% by Jewish.[30] Even if the definitions and the samples are not the same, the trend is clear.

The francophone bourgeoisie is also the object of a particular debate in Quebec. Some authors believe that this French-speaking bourgeoisie is the driving force behind the P.Q. government.[31] The problem with this point of view is that the Francophone capitalists of Quebec were conspicuously financing and backing the Liberal Party and federalist forces during the referendum campaign. In addition, they are increasingly investing in English Canada and even in the United States and beyond: Provigo, La Laurentienne, Bombardier, the National Bank of Canada, the Power conglomerate and other firms are becoming pan-Canadian and even multinational corporations.[32] Against these arguments Bourque, Fournier and Légaré maintain that a class has not necessarily a political consciousness of its real interests and that only the capitalist state is the bearer of the long term projects of the ruling class. The argument is in the Poulantzas tradition: a ruling class does not rule, a position ably criticized by, among others, G.W. Domhoff in the United States.[39] At least important groups within the ruling class are politically conscious, and are able to create or join profitable political alliances. But this is not the case in Quebec, where the francophone bourgeoisie remains as Liberal as before. If the P.Q. government has tried to attract its main political enemy, it does not seem to have succeeded.

The opposite approach sees the French-speaking bourgeoisie as a new federalist fraction.[34] As Garth Stevenson has correctly stated "the no longer negligible francophone bourgeoisie... is in many ways more dependent on a strong federal State than its counterpart in the West or even in Ontario". But we have wrongly predicted that the P.Q. government would act according to the class origins of its membership, and its financial and electoral supporters. The P.Q. is mainly composed of white collar employees, civil servants, teachers, etc.

It is financed and voted for by the same groups. In fact the Quebec government has followed a middle-of-the road strategy in order to attract the French-speaking capitalists toward a separatist coalition. This strategy was defeated during the referendum, and the economic crisis is widening the gap between the government and its electoral and financial supporters.

Conclusion

The Canadian economy has undergone major changes in the post-war period, partially as an adaptive response to corresponding changes in the world economy. The two decades following World War II were those of American hegemony, both in Canada and in the capitalist world. The Canadian state (at the federal and provincial levels) moved back to a passive strategy of growth by invitation, leaving all entrepreneurial initiatives to foreign multinationals. The Left Nationalist perspective was born in this context.

In the seventies, however, the American economic decline became evident to the most acute observers of the international economy, including in Canada, Stephen Hymer.[35] American multinationals were losing ground to European and Japanese competitors, while oil and mineral producing countries successfully raised the prices of resources. As several U.S. giants were interested in selling foreign subsidiaries, Canada's position improved. The federal and provincial governments tried to capture the economic rents windfalling to Canada, and nationalism gained momentum. As the foreign control of the Canadian economy declined, the Left-Nationalist perspective came under fire from several different positions. The Canadian state, both federal and provincial, became more entrepreneurial, trying to substitute for retreating American entreprise. Canadian-owned multinational corporations in mining, oil and gas, and manufacturing became more conspicious and difficult to understand in the Left-Nationalist scheme.

From a theoretical point of view, the core-periphery dichotomy which pervades the Socialist debate, mainly in the Nationalist approach, is in my view an overly simplistic scheme for classifying societies in the present world system. With the dissolution of colonial empires and zones of influence in the post-war period and the rise of the New Industrialized countries in the last twenty years, more and more countries find themselves in some intermediary category between the two poles. Owing to Canada's narrow manufacturing base, the huge development of its resource industries, finance and transportation, high foreign control, lack of spheres of influence, existence of large Canadian MNC mainly in low technology industries, I would personally prefer the semi-industrial label as the most adequate to describe the Canadian role in the international division of labour.[36] In any case what seems to me indisputable is Canada's intermediate position in the modern world system.

My contention is that, as a consequence of this intermediate position the Canadian bourgeoisie is a fragmented class. First of all there are two major fractions, one linked to foreign capital (the comprador bourgeoisie) the other to

domestic capital (the national or autochtonous bourgeoisie). I believe the second is and has always been the dominant element in the power bloc in Canada. During the seventies the domestic capitalist class has been solidly strengthening its hold on the Canadian economy. This domestic bourgeoisie is mainly (but not solely) interested in finance, commerce, resource extraction, transportation and services. Its secondary interest is in manufacturing, where it controls some major industries.

Another line of fragmentation in the Canadian capitalist class is the ethnic one. The traditional bourgeoisie is Anglo-saxon, but new ethnic groups have emerged in the postwar period, mainly French-Canadian and Jewish. This cleavage partially overlaps the first one: foreign subsidiaries hire almost exclusively Anglo-saxon managers. Thus the ethnic bourgeoisie is mostly national, and Anglo-Saxons are fairly divided into a comprador and a domestic fraction.

On the political level these two cleavages have important effects: the Liberal Party of Canada (representing French-Canadian and Jewish capital plus several nationalistically-minded WASP mavericks) is much more nationally oriented than the purely Anglo-Saxon Conservative Party, in which comprador bourgeoisie is very well represented.

The debate around provincialism and the regional bourgeoisies would be much clearer if we agreed on the fact that provincialism is a political phenomenon with solid roots in the Canadian constitution. Provincialism can be conservative when oriented to or by the comprador bourgeoisie and foreign capital, but it can also be of the "province-building" type when directed to the development of regional indigenous capital. My guess is that this second type has replaced the first as the most common variety, as foreign control declined in the 70's.

Once we accept the complex structure of the Canadian capitalist class one can see that the opposing points of view have made important contributions, but have over-emphasized one particular dimension. A better understanding of this country's ruling class can be derived from an acknowledgement of the existence of a fragmented bourgeoisie with a solid autochtonous fraction as the hegemonic partner. I call the development strategy of this hegemonic fraction "continental or rentier nationalism". This type of nationalism is concerned more with changing the ownership and control pattern of the Canadian economy than on altering its industrial structure. Present-day nationalism is only buying back foreign subsidiaries in the resource and resource-related industries without destroying dependency.

My approach is thus a synthesis of contending positions, a synthesis that tries to eliminate some contradictory statements and fill some gaps. Most of the elements necessary for an understanding of the puzzle of the Canadian bourgeoisie are now in hand. The task remains to put these pieces of the puzzle together into a general historical perspective.

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TABLE I

Foreign Assets in Canada

% of total assets by industrial sector
1970 and 1980

	1970	1980	Difference
Agriculture	13%	4%	— 9%
Mines	69%	45%	— 24%
Manufacturing	58%	48%	— 10%
Construction	16%	10%	— 6%
Public Utilities	8%	5%	— 3%
Wholesale Trade	27%	24%	— 3%
Retail Trade	22%	13%	— 9%
Services	22%	15%	— 7%
Total, non financial industries	36%	27%	— 9%

Source: Statistics Canada, Cat. 61-210, CALURA Reports for 1970 and 1980, Ottawa, 1973 and 1982.

TABLE II

Foreign Manufacturing Assets in Canada

% of total assets, by industry group
1970 and 1980

	1970	1980	Difference
Petroleum and Coal Products	100%	70%	— 30%
Primary Metals	43%	13%	— 30%
Machinery	75%	52%	— 23%
Transportation Equipment	85%	71%	— 14%
Wood Products	33%	20%	— 13%
Metal Fabricating	47%	34%	— 13%
Electrical Products	65%	54%	— 11%
Furniture	21%	12%	— 9%
Food	37%	29%	— 8%
Miscellaneous Manufacturing	51%	43%	— 8%
Leather Products	30%	23%	— 7%
Paper and Allied Industries	42%	35%	— 7%

TABLE II (continued)

	1970	1980	Difference
Knitting Mills	21%	15%	— 6%
Chemical Products	81%	77%	— 4%
Printing, Publishing	15%	12%	— 3%
Rubber Products	93%	91%	— 2%
Clothing Industries	13%	14%	+ 1%
Textile Mills	52%	54%	+ 2%
Non Metallic Mineral Products	63%	70%	+ 7%
Beverages	20%	32%	+ 12%
Tobacco Products	84%	100%	+ 16%

Source: Statistics Canada, Cat. 61-210, CALURA Reports for 1970 and 1980, Ottawa 1973 and 1982.

TABLE III

Foreign Assets in Canada

% of total assets, 1970 and 1980

U.S. Assets in Canada

	1970	1980	Difference
Mining	58%	36%	— 22%
Manufacturing	45%	35%	— 10%
Total, non financial industries	28%	20%	— 8%

Non-U.S. Assets in Canada

	1970	1980	Difference
Mining	10%	10%	— —
Manufacturing	14%	13%	— 1%
Total, non financial industries	8%	7%	— 1%

Source: Statistics Canada, Cat. 61-210, CALURA Reports for 1970 and 1980, Ottawa, 1973 and 1982.

TABLE IV

Canadian Assets, Private and Government Enterprise

% of total assets, 1970 and 1980

	Canadian Private Enterprise			Canadian Govt. Enterprise		
	1970	1980	Difference	1970	1980	Difference
Agriculture	54%	83%	+ 39%	— —	— —	— —
Mining	30%	51%	+ 21%	1%	4%	+ 3%
Manufacturing	38%	46%	+ 8%	1%	6%	+ 5%
Construction	67%	79%	+ 12%	— —	— —	— —
Public Utilities	33%	37%	+ 4%	58%	58%	— —
Wholesale Trade	54%	67%	+ 13%	10%	6%	— 4%
Retail Trade	56%	74%	+ 18%	2%	2%	— —
Services	52%	68%	+ 16%	?	11%	?
Total, non financial industries	40%	52%	+ 12%	18%	17%	— 1%

Source: Statistics Canada, Cat. 61-210, CALURA Reports for 1970 and 1980, Ottawa, 1973 and 1982.

TABLE V

Industrial Employment in Major OCED Countries

(% of Civilian Labour Force, 1970/1980) (*)

Country	1970	1980
West Germany	50,3%	44,8%
Switzerland	51,4%	39,5%
United Kingdom	46,6%	38,0%
Italy	43,7%	37,8%
France	38,8%	35,9%
Japan	35,7%	35,3%
United States	32,3%	30,6%
Canada	31,4%	28,5%

(*) Industry includes mining, manufacturing, construction and public utilities

Source: OCED: United States, Economic Studies, 1972 and 1982.

TABLE VI

Gross Domestic Product in Manufacturing Industries

Selected countries, 1970/1980, % of GDP

Country	1970	1980
West Germany	42,7%	36,4%
United Kingdom	28,3%	21,4%
Italy	31,7%	35,2%
France	35,5%	26,2%
Japan	36,4%	30,3%
United States	26,0%	24,2%
South Korea	21,7%	30,0%
Canada	20,6%	19,5%

Source: United Nations: *Monthly Bulletin of Statistics*

TABLE VII

Canadian Foreign Trade with the United States

1970-82, % of totals

Year	Imports	Exports
1970	71,1%	64,8%
1971	70,1%	67,5%
1972	69,0%	69,3%
1973	70,7%	67,4%
1974	67,4%	66,0%
1975	68,1%	65,1%
1976	68,8%	67,3%
1977	70,4%	69,8%
1978	70,6%	70,4%
1979	72,5%	67,8%
1980	70,2%	63,3%
1981	68,7%	66,2%

Source: Statistics Canada, Cat. 65-202 and 65-203

TABLE VIII

Provincial Crown Corporations Assets by province, 1959/1979 ($ Millions, %)

	1959 $ (%)	1979 $ (%)	Annual growth rate
Newfoundland	39 (%)	2031 (%)	21.9%
Nova Scotia	77 (2%)	1471 (2%)	15.9%
New Brunswick	108 (2%)	2566 (4%)	17.2%
Quebec	908 (18%)	26321 (37%)	18.3%
Ontario	2515 (49%)	17152 (24%)	10.1%
Manitoba	353 (7%)	4139 (6%)	13.1%
Saskatchewan	376 (7%)	3598 (5%)	12.0%
Alberta	261 (5%)	5561 (8%)	16.5%
British Columbia	486 (9%)	8989 (13%)	15.7%
P.E.I., NWT, Yukon	2 — —	66 — —	
	$5717 (100%)		
Federal crown	$71894 (100%)		
Corporations	$7394	$41988	9.1%

Sources: Stat. Canada, Cat. 61-203 and 61-204, Ottawa, 1960 and 1982

TABLE IX

Provincial Crown Corporation Assets by industry, 1959/1979 ($ Millions and %)

	1959 $ (%)	1979 $ (%)	Annual growth rate
Electricity	46553 (65%)	4653 (65%)	12.5%
Finance	318 (6%)	15065 (21%)	21.3%
Communications	356 (6%)	2918 (4%)	11.1%
Transportation	479 (8%)	2268 (3%)	8.1%
Manufacturing	3 —	2078 (3%)	38.7%
Services	— —	1236 (2%)	—
Mining, oil, gas	2 —	1234 (2%)	37.9%
Commerce	89 (2%)	611 (1%)	10.1%
Other	30 —	47 —	—
	$5717 (100%)	$72011 (100%)	13.5%

Sources: Stat. Canada, Cat. 61-203 and 61-204, Ottawa, 1960 and 1982

Notes

1. T. Naylor, *The History of Canadian Business,* Toronto: Lorimer, 1975. K. Levitt: *Silent Surrender,* Toronto, Macmillan, 1970; J. Hutcheson: *Dominance and Dependence,* Toronto, McClelland and Stewart, 1978; R.M. Laxer (ed): *Canada Ltd — The Political Economy of Dependency,* Toronto, McClelland and Stewart, 1973.

2. Cf S. Moore and D. Wells, *Imperialism and the National Question in Canada,* Toronto, 1975; P. Resnick: "The Maturing of Canadian Capitalism", in *Our Generation,* vol. 15, no. 3, Fall 1982; M. Ormstein, et al.: "The Network of Directory Interlocks among the Canadian Largest Firms" in *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology* 1982, vol. 19. no. 1.

3. For the deindustrialization debate see J. Laxer: "Canadian Manufacturing and U.S. Trade Policy" in R.M. Laxer (ed), *Canada Ltd.* op. cit.; and S. Moore and D. Wells, *Imperialism and the National Question in Canada,* op. cit.
In the finance capital debate W. Carroll ("The Canadian Capitalist Class: Financiers of Finance Capitalists" in *Studies in Political Economy,* Ottawa, No. 8), F. and L. Park (*Anatomy of Big Business,* Toronto: Lorimer, 1973) represent the financial-industrial approach, while T. Naylor (*The History of Canadian Business,* op. cit.), K. Levitt (*Silent Surrender,* op. cit.) or W. Clement (*The Canadian Corporate Elite,* Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1975) defend the opposite.

4. See the Nationalist case in T. Naylor, op. cit., K. Levitt op. cit.; the province-building interpretation is in J. Richards and L. Pratt, *Prairie Capitalism,* Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1979; P. Fournier (ed), *Le capitalisme au Québec,* Montréal: A. St -Martin, 1979.

5. J. Porter. *The Vertical Mosaic,* The University of Toronto Press, 1965: W. Clement, *The Canadian Corporate Elite,* op. cit.; H. and S. Milner: *The Decolonization of Quebec,* Toronto, McLelland and Stewart, 1973. The opposite point of view is represented by P. Fournier, op. cit.; G. Bourque and A. Légaré, *Québec, la question nationale,* Paris: Maspéro, 1978; J. Niosi, "The New French Canadian Bourgeoisie", *Studies in Political Economy,* No. 1, 1979.

6. This debate opposes Fournier and Bourque on the one hand and A. Sales *(La bourgeoisie industrielle au Québec,* Presses de l'Université de Montréal, 1979) and myself on the other.

7. L. Francko, "The End of US Dominance", *Harvard Business Review,* Nov-Dec. 1978; B. Bluestone and B. Harrison, *The Deindustrialization of America,* New York: Basic Books, 1982; I.C. Magaziner and R. Reich, *Minding America's Business,* New York: Vintage, 1982; N. Rosenberg, *Inside the Black Box — Technology and Economics,* Cambridge University Press, 1982, Chap. 12.

8. J. Niosi, *The Economy of Canada,* Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1979 and 1982. J. Niosi, *Canadian Capitalism,* Toronto: Lorimer, 1981.

9. J. Niosi, *Les multinationales canadiennes,* Montréal, Boréal-Express, 1983; G. Boismenu and G. Ducatenzeiler: "Le Canada dans la circulation internationale de technologie". Paper presented to the Conference on the International Division of Labour, Ottawa, 1983.

10. Statistics Canada, Cat. 11-001 (Jan. 26, 1983; Feb. 1, 1983 and Nov. 18, 1982).

11. J. Laxer, op. cit.; S. Moore and D. Wells, op. cit.; S. Langdom, "Thoughts on Canadian Dependency", *This Magazine,* Nov./Dec. 1975.

12. Calculated from United Nations: *Monthly Bulletin of Statistics,* 1982 (several issues).

13. W. Clement, *Continental Corporate Power,* Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977, p. 8; see also K. Levitt, op. cit., T. Naylor, op. cit. For the opposite point of view see W. Carroll, op. cit., F. and L. Park, op, cit. and M. Ornstein et al., op. cit.

14. Royal Bank, Bank of Montreal, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, Toronto-Dominion Bank, Bank of Nova Scotia and National Bank of Canada.

15. Alcan, Seagram, C.D.C., Hiram-Walker, Massey-Ferguson and Stelco.

16. CP Ltd, Hydro-Québec, Ontario-Hydro, Bell Canada, Dome Petroleum and Alcan.

17. Statistics Canada and Review of Bank of Canada figures.

18. E.R. Black and A.C. Cairns, "A different perspective on Canadian federalism", in *Canadian Public Administration,* Vol. 9, 1966, p. 27.

19. J. Richards and L. Pratt, *Prairie Capitalism,* op. cit., p. 11.

20. R. Young et al., "The Concept of Province-Building: A Critique", Paper presented to the Annual conference, Canadian Political Science Association, Vancouver, June 1983.

21. G. Stevenson, *Unfulfilled Union,* Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1979.

22. M. Jenkin, "The Prospects for a New National Policy", in *Journal of Canadian Studies,* Vol. 14, no. 3, Fall 1979, p. 131.

23. R. Young, et al., "The concept of province-building", op. cit., p. 29.

24. J. Richards and L. Pratt, op. cit., p. VIII.

25. H.V. Nelles, *The Politics of Development,* Toronto, Macmillan, 1974.

26. T. Skocpol, "Political Response to Capitalist Crises", University of Toronto, Dept. of Sociology, Working Paper Series no. 8, July 1979, p. 1.

27. S. and H. Milner, op. cit., chap. 2.

28. M. Porter, *The Vertical Mosaic,* University of Toronto Press, 1965, p. 286.

29. W. Clement, *The Canadian Corporate Elite,* op. cit., pp. 235 and 237.

30. J. Niosi, *The Economy of Canada,* op. cit.

31. See Bourque and Légaré, op. cit., and Fournier, op. cit.

32. J. Niosi, "La multinationalisation des firmes canadiennes-françaises" in *Recherches Sociographiques,* Quebec, Vol. XXIV, No. 1, 1983.

33. G.W. Domhoff, *The Powers that Be,* New York: Random House, 1979.

34. S. Ryerson, "After the Quebec Referendum: A Comment", in *Studies in Political Economy,* no. 4, Autumn 1980.

35. S. Hymer and R. Rowthorn, "Multinational Corporations and International Oligopoly: The non-American Challenge", in C.P. Kindleberger: *The International Corporation,* Cambridge: MIT Press, 1970.

36. My position is close to P. Ehrensaft and W. Armstrong, "Le Capitalisme des Dominions", in *Cahiers du socialisme,* no 3, (printemps) 1979, Montréal.

* This is the revised version of a paper presented to the "Marxism — The Next two Decades" Symposium held in Winnipeg, March 1983. I am grateful to Daniel Drache for his careful comments in its preparation.

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ETHICS, ECONOMICS AND CANADA'S CATHOLIC BISHOPS

Christopher Lind

In January of 1983, the Episcopal Commission for Social Affairs of the Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops released a statement on the Canadian and international economies entitled, "Ethical Reflections on the Economic Crisis."[1] In that statement the Bishops criticized the "industrial vision and economic model that governs our society." "In developing strategies for economic recovery," they argued, "first priority must be given to the real victims of the current recession namely — the unemployed, the welfare poor, the working poor — pensioners, native peoples, women, young people — and small farmers, fishermen, some factory workers and some small business men and women." "This option," they continued, "calls for economic policies which realize that the needs of the poor have priority over the wants of the rich; that the rights of workers are more important than the maximization of profits; that the participation of marginalized groups has precedence over the preservation of a system which excludes them."

The Bishops analysed the present recession as "symptomatic of a much larger structural crisis in the international system of capitalism." "Through these structural changes," they said, " 'capital' is re-asserted as the dominant organizing principle of economic life." Interestingly, given the technical level of their analysis, their critique is not economic, primarily, but ethical. The dominance of capital as the organizing principle, they argued, "directly contradicts the ethical principle that labour, not capital, must be given priority in the development of an economy based on justice." From the point of view of the Bishops, "the present economic crisis . . . reveals a deepening moral disorder in the values and priorities of our society." It is the ethical foundation for the Bishops' remarks and the implications of their participation in an economic debate with which this paper will be principally concerned. The Bishops' statement has achieved a certain notoriety, though, and there are two aspects of its reception by Canadians that merit brief comment.

The first is that it has received perhaps more public attention than any other Canadian Church document in recent memory. As of this writing (some five months after its release) it is still a matter of considerable public debate and interest. The second aspect that merits attention is that the business community and the federal Liberal Government have been either unwilling or unable to critique it with the force one might have expected. In part this is because of a tendency to dismiss the statement itself. The Bishops have been described as "poorly informed," "out of touch with reality," "beyond their depth," and "a bunch of dreamers."[2] In another way, the critics have been unable to understand the basis on which the Bishops have entered the debate and they

have been unwilling to wrestle seriously with the resources and theoretical foundations relied on by the Church. The inability to understand the statement is demonstrated by the remark attributed to Bill Hamilton, a member of the Macdonald Commission on the Economy, who said: "It sounds to me as if we are dealing with people whose morality and economics are from the sixteenth century."[3] Nothing could be farther from the truth.

There are three major points that I would like to make in the course of this paper. The first is that the Catholic Bishops have relied squarely on their own area of expertise by entering the debate with an ethical critique of Canada's economic condition. This has confused those unfamiliar with disciplined ethical discourse; it has confused others because the Bishops have used economic terms with an ethical content. As will become clear, the use of ethical content in an economic debate is problematic for economic discourse in both the mainstream and on the margins of the discipline. This is especially true of the concepts of development, underdevelopment and dependency.

The second point is that apart from their experience of the Canadian reality, the Bishops have been influenced by movements originating in nineteenth century European philosophy and by the experiences of the Catholic Church in the Third World, most especially in Latin America. Furthermore, these influences have been felt by most of the other Canadian Churches as well.

The third point is that while the Catholic Bishops, in their statement, have relied on the analysis of political economy as over against economics, what has gone unnoticed is that their statement also represents a critique of political economy as that term is currently understood. The statement represents a critique because it has re-asserted an element in the established tradition of political economy which is frequently ignored by the political economists formed in the Marxist mold who now dominate the discipline. That element is the ethical dimension of political economy. The Bishops are demanding an ethic of means as well as an ethic of ends.

Catholics and Underdevelopment

Contrary to the comments of a minority of critics, the Bishops have not assumed a cloak of expertise that is not their own. Rather, they have entered the debate precisely on the grounds where their expertise is most widely acknowledged — morality. For the Catholic Church, the problem with the Liberal Government's decision to attack inflation before unemployment is not only its limited effectiveness as an instrument but rather that it inverts the proper hierarchy of values by valuing things (capital) more highly than people. The Church is concerned with people and specifically with their development.

In 1967 Pope Paul VI issued an encyclical letter, On the Development of Peoples (Populorum Progressio). In that document he attempted to define a Christian vision of development. What is important to note is that the concept is not primarily an economic one. Rather it has its roots in a personal concept

which is extended to the social level. It describes the development of peoples, not economies, and in that sense owes a debt to modern psychological theory. What is new for the document is that for the first time in Catholic social teaching it includes a discussion of trade relations as a part of development.

> Development cannot be limited to mere economic growth. In order to be authentic, it must be complete: integral, that is, it has to promote the good of every man and of the whole man. As an eminent specialist has very rightly and emphatically declared: "We do not believe in separating the economic from the human, nor development from the civilization in which it exists. What we hold important is man, each man and each group of men, and we even include the whole of humanity."[4]

In another section the document continues,

> As a result of technical progress the value of manufactured goods is rapidly increasing and they can always find an adequate market. On the other hand, raw materials produced by underdeveloped countries are subject to wide and sudden fluctuations in price, a state of affairs far removed from the progressively increasing value of industrial products. As a result, nations whose industrialization is limited are faced with serious difficulties when they have to rely on their exports to balance their economy and to carry out their plans for development. The poor nations remain ever poor while the rich nations become still richer.
>
> In other words, the rule of free trade, taken by itself, is no longer able to govern international relations.[5]

This document is, in many ways, a continuation of the modern trends in theology and Church life initiated by the Second Vatican Council. It has provided, in turn, a major basis for the engagement of the Church in the development debate in both the First and Third Worlds.

One of the major new ingredients in the Second Vatican Council was the large representation from the Third World. The Catholic Church in particular has been profoundly affected by the colonial and post-colonial movements that followed the end of the Second World War. This influence is apparent in the 1975 Labour Day Message given by the Canadian Catholic Bishops under the title, "Northern Development: At What Cost?". During the course of that statement the Bishops made the following remarks:

> We are especially concerned that the future of the North not be determined by colonial patterns of development, wherein a powerful few end up controlling both the people and the

> resources.
> . . . what we see emerging in the Canadian North are forms of exploitation which we often assume happen only in Third World countries: a serious abuse of both the Native Peoples and the energy resources of the North. Herein lies the Northern dilemma. What has been described as the "last frontier" in the building of this nation may become our own "Third World".[6]

In this passage we see for the first time links being made between the Canadian experience, patterns of development typical of Third World countries, and the image of colonialism. These are links which get progressively stronger and more explicit in the following eight years. The year of this Labour Day Message (1975) was also the year in which the Canadian Catholic Bishops joined with the Anglican Church of Canada and the United Church of Canada to form the inter-Church "Project North." It subsequently became the major vehicle through which Church concerns for Native people were given voice.

Up until this point, underdevelopment had been used in Church statements to refer to a state of limited industrialization. It appeared to refer to a state of economic growth somewhere between fully-developed and undeveloped. In 1977, however, we see another shift beginning to take place. In December of that year, Canada's Catholic Bishops issued a pastoral message entitled, "A Society to be Transformed." In that document, they began to draw parallels between Canadian experiences and patterns of life thought to be normal in the underdeveloped Third World.

> Although our country is called developed, it has many of the marks of underdevelopment.[7]

Among the characteristics they identified were large numbers of people living below the poverty line, foreign controlled companies exercising increasing power, persistent economic and social disparities between regions, threats to cultural sovereignty, and workers being excluded from the decision-making process. With the identification of Canada as a contradictory case where the characteristics of development and underdevelopment co-exist, the Bishops began the process of identifying underdevelopment as a relational concept. They did so because they saw that the characteristics of underdevelopment are the characteristics of unequal relationships. From the Bishops' point of view, love of God requires that we "establish the truest possible justice in all our relationships."[8]

In 1979, another inter-Church project in which the Catholics participate, GATT-fly, criticized the Alaska Highway Pipeline proposal by arguing that it would "lock Canada's energy, finance and industrial development even more deeply into a pattern of dependence on exports of non-renewable resources, into foreign indebtedness, and into underdevelopment of our manufacturing

sector."[9] The following year Project North clarified the connection between their experience of the Third World and colonialism and their analysis of underdevelopment.

> The positions of the Churches re chronic under-development of people in Third World countries are based on an analysis that, when the colonial powers withdrew and gave up political control, they did not relinquish economic power. And when political power was turned over, it was usually given to elitists, those already made in the image of the colonial masters, hence frustrating true self-determination.[10]

The Churches also argued that racism would be "perpetuated because of a domination — dependence relationship."[11] But for the Churches, development does not mean, simply, economic growth. In the same paper they defined development as "the process by which persons and societies come to realize the full potential of human life in a context of social justice, with an emphasis on self-reliance."[12] Conversely, underdevelopment becomes a relationship of inequality and it then becomes possible for the Churches to sensibly describe underdevelopment in an industrialized economy. The Churches do not maintain that an increase in G.N.P. will necessarily result in development.

The analysis of the Catholic Church in Canada with regard to development and underdevelopment, which has emerged in conjunction with the analysis of other Canadian Churches over the last fifteen years, should by now be clear. It should come as no surprise then, to see in the 1983 "Ethical Reflections on the Economic Crisis" a critique of the dominant Canadian economic model as "capital-intensive . . . energy-intensive . . . foreign controlled . . . and export-oriented."[13] In other words, they described it as capitalist, materialist, and dependent. What may surprise some is that this represents a mere reiteration of the same critique made in their statement of January, 1980, "Unemployment: The Human Costs". The analysis of the Churches has not only been developing over more than fifteen years, but the analysis of 1983 is essentially the same as (though more detailed than) the analysis of 1980.

Influences on the Churches

As I have indicated already, the Catholic Church in Canada has not been alone in developing this analysis of the Canadian economy in relation to underdevelopment. In Canada, the last fifteen years have seen the development of unprecedented cooperation among Christian denominations on justice issues. There are now over one hundred such organizations across the country but attention is most often focussed on the most prominent national coalitions such as GATT-fly (working on issues related to trade, aid and development), the Inter-Church Committee on Human Rights in Latin America (I.C.C.H.R.L.A.),

Project North (working with Canada's Native peoples), and the Task Force on the Churches and Corporate Responsibility (T.C.C.R.). Through these organizations, the Churches have assembled the resources for research and advocacy that were simply unavailable before. These groups have also been the vehicle through which common positions have been fashioned among the Churches. For this reason, the voices of support in 1983 offered to the Bishops by the leaders of Canada's other large denominations ought not to be interpreted as quick and ill-considered responses. Such responses rest on the history of cooperation between the Churches and in that sense, the statement by the Catholic Bishops can be seen as representative of a basic thrust in the mainline Churches as a group. Even prior to the development of specific coalitions, some Canadian Churches were making independent moves in the direction of an analysis of the connections between development, underdevelopment and dependency. The Anglican Church of Canada is a case in point.

In 1969, Prof. Charles Hendry of the School of Social Work at the University of Toronto submitted a report which had been commissioned by the Anglican Church of Canada. Published under the title, *Beyond Traplines*, it dealt with the situation of Canada's Native peoples. It was a response to the call made two years earlier for "forgiveness regarding Anglican participation in the perpetuation of injustices to Indians."[14] It signalled a major shift in that Church's response to Native claims for justice. In that report Prof. Hendry made the following remark:

> A community becomes truly developed only when it can itself decide and charter its own course of action with only secondary reliance on experts, money and other resources from outside.[15]

In that passage the link is made, in a separate denominational tradition, between development and self-determination. It is still, primarily, a personal or social concept and an economic one only by extension. Like the Papal Enclyclical, it shows a debt to movements originating in nineteenth century philosophy — to modernism and to existentialism and phenomenology. There we see for the first time the concept of humanity seeking its true end by seeking its own fulfillment. We see personal development emerging as the proper goal of human life.

In the Catholic tradition, the roots of this position have been traced back from the Second Vatican Council, through Joseph Marechal and transcendental Thomism to the French philosopher of action, Maurice Blondel. Gregory Baum has referred to this "shift to the subject" as the "Blondelian shift."[16] In the 1983 Catholic Bishops' statement on the economy, this tradition is most clearly expressed in the Bishops' reliance on the "Priority of Labour" principle. It is a specific reference to John Paul II's recent Encyclical "On Human Labour" (Laborem Exercens) but more generally it refers to the modern philosophical concept whereby labour is the activity and the arena in which humanity achieves self-realization (for a detailed commentary on the Encyclical and its roots in John Paul II's personal story, see Gregory Baum's *The Priority of Labour*[17]).

The concept of development, like the Canadian Bishops' economic statement, has at least two roots outside of the Canadian experience. One is the European philosophical tradition just mentioned, and the second is the Third World. In the latter case we need to be reminded that the Church, and especially the Catholic Church, is not solely a national institution affected by national trends, but rather an international one. The 1983 statement acknowledges a clear debt not only to the Third World but specifically to Latin America. This is manifested by its reliance, as a first fundamental Gospel principle, on the "preferential option for the poor". According to this principle, the Church is obligated to differentiate between the experience of the strong, rich and powerful, and the experience of the weak, poor and dispossessed. In the Canadian case it means analysing the economic crisis from the perspective of the victims of that crisis — the unemployed.

The phrase "preferential option for the poor" originated in Latin America. It is associated with the movement known as "Liberation Theology" which identifies the liberation of the people of Israel from their Egyptian bondage as the most appropriate metaphor to describe the most hoped-for reality in Latin America today. Christians associated with this movement are using what they describe as a "praxis" approach which enables them to discern the social nature of sin in their communities and which equips them with the developing insight necessary to mount an appropriate and effective response. Praxis refers to a new epistemological and hermeneutical approach which seeks to re-unite theological reflection with the concrete experiences of people in their historical contexts. The concept of the preferential option for the poor was employed in the documents of the Second General Conference of Latin American Bishops at Medellin, Columbia in 1968 and received official sanction at the Third General Conference at Puebla de los Angeles, Mexico in 1979. The preferential option for the poor summarizes the notion that the Christian is obligated to relate to the world in the way Jesus would have done in that specific historical situation.

> *Praxis* is defined by the fact that Jesus 'emptied himself to take the form of a servant' (Philippians 2:7) . . .
> Taking the part of the dominated in a system of slavery, being the poor, the servant, is the starting-point for Christian praxis, for Christian ethics.[18]

The notable influence of Latin American Christianity on North American Churches and the increasing use of phrases like "Liberation Theology" and words like "praxis" (despite its distinguished and ancient pre-marxist lineage) have caused some people to cast aspersions on the fidelity of contemporary Christians to their own theistic tradition.[18a] It is important to underline the misguided nature of that critique. It is not that these people have abandonned their Christianity for Marxism but rather that they are tilling common ground. As the Geneva-based theologian Ans Van der Bent has written,

> Christians cannot avoid the risks of involvement in an arena where others, marxists included, have made competing claims to offer authentic and workable solutions.[19]

The experience of the Third World Church has not influenced the Canadian Churches simply by direct transfer through personnel exchange, though there has been some of that. Rather, there have been other experiences that have served to join the two situations. As an example, we should note how the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry and the struggles of the Dene for self-determination have served as major avenues of mediation between Third World analysis and the Churches' Canadian experience. Through the efforts of the Churches to assist the Native people, issues related to underdevelopment and dependency have been faced with a great deal more discipline than would otherwise have been the case. In the same vein, through the Berger Inquiry, the Dene were able to secure the funds necessary to hire southern academics who helped them prepare submissions to the Inquiry. Because the Dene hired academics like the political economist Mel Watkins (who has been influenced himself by Third World economic debates), there has existed for the Churches yet another indirect source of analysis regarding underdevelopment and dependency.

Ethics and Dependency

The Canadian Catholic Bishops have criticized the Canadian Government's economic model and industrial vision on the basis of its inversion of the right order of values. They have also criticized the dominant approach to economics on the same basis. By this action they have put themselves in the company of others who are critical of the mainstream positions in economics, and who feel that values have a place in the debate — namely, the political economists.

The distinction between political economy and economics (in spite of the efforts of this and other journals) still strikes the ears of some as a curious and unhelpful anachronism. In his 1974 review of the term "political economy," Paresh Chattopadhyay traced the origin of the phrase to the early seventeenth century, noting that the modern tendency to use the word "economics" can be traced to the late nineteenth century work of Alfred Marshall. Chattopadhyay goes on further to say that while the phrase, political economy, can have several different meanings, "it is being set up mostly as a standard of revolt against 'orthodox' economics."[20]

Let me suggest that since, in Canada, the term political economy is used overwhelmingly (but not exclusively) by theorists of the left, it is an attempt by those people to distinguish themselves from an economics that claims for itself the status of a positive, value-free science. Scientists of the latter tradition, the economists, would see themselves as obligated to embrace with dispassion a

politically neutral position with regard to their research. They would think of value commitments as liable to cloud the judgement of the researcher. Left-wing political economists however, seek to clarify the ideological dimension inherent in those positions. As such, the work of political economy is an attempt to reclaim the fullness of the economic debate. One consequence of this is an attempt to provide an economic home for the ethical dimension of means/ends debates.

The Catholic Bishops have entered Canada's political debate on the economy through the door marked "political economy" because they share with others a distrust of the values inherent in the dominant economic model and industrial vision. This distrust allows the Bishops to critique the framework of values (the ideological dimension) upon which the arguments of the dominant forces rest. It also allows them to describe the current crisis as a crisis in the international system of capitalism, since these same problems and these same values seem prominent elsewhere. Since the Bishops appear as critics of capitalism, some would conclude that they have identified themselves with the Marxist alternative. This impression is further complicated by the reliance of the Bishops on the work of Marxist dependency theorists like Samir Amin and André Gunder Frank. The Bishops, though, are not Marxists. In the same way that they have entered the economic debate on the basis of their ethics and not their economics, so they have appropriated the analysis of André Gunder Frank on the basis of his ethics, not his Marxism. Let us consider the nature of Frank's analysis.

Frank is an American trained, German born Marxist political economist who made his reputation with studies of the relationship between capitalism and development in Latin America. In particular, Frank described the Latin American experience of underdevelopment as an integral part of the Latin American experience with capitalism. Frank reached back into the correspondence of early Spanish Governors to demonstrate his thesis that from the earliest period the colonial capitalist system sucked funds away from Latin America and these missing funds accounted for the inability of the people there to reach the state of "development". He also described how the demands of the Spanish system completely changed the economic relationships that previously existed in the countries of Latin America. Frank used the phrase metropolis — satellite to describe the economic relationship between and within nations. *Between* nations, the phrase is used to describe a relationship typical of mercantile capitalism where the metropolis trades manufactured goods for the raw materials or staples of the satellite. *Within* nations, Frank used the phrase to describe a typically colonial relationship whereby the strongest cities or regions arrogate to themselves political and economic power at the expense of the weakest and most distant regions.

Frank's major contribution though, is his description of development and underdevelopment as two faces of the same process. For him, underdevelopment is not merely a median stage between no development and full development. It is a necessary consequence of capitalist development.

> . . . underdevelopment, as distinct from undevelopment, did not pre-date economic development; nor did it spring up of itself; nor did it spring up all of a sudden. It developed right along with economic development — and it is still doing so. It is an integral part of the *single* developmental process on the planet during the past five centuries or more.[21]

Frank argues that staples exports provide more stimulus to the economies at the centre than they do to economies at the margin where staples are produced, and further, that this is a necessary consequence of an international system based on the expropriation of surplus value. For Frank, surplus value is the basic building block of developmental life. When surplus value is expropriated through staples export, the centre or metropolis can develop beyond its normal capacity and the margin or satellite is permanently restricted to the underdeveloped role allowed for it in that relationship.

An important dimension to Frank's research is his insistence that underdevelopment is not just a relative and quantifiable state. He insists that underdeveloped does not mean just less rich than fully developed, or less developed than fully developed. Rather, he insists that underdevelopment is a *relational* and qualitative term.[22] Underdevelopment is a state of dependency which is brought about in the satellitic country precisely because of the nature of its relationship with the metropolitan country. It is a system of relationships reproduced throughout the economic chain.

This view of development as a relational process is an important one because it challenges not only the dominant assumption that development is a quantitative state but also because it insists that real development cannot take place without confronting the economic relationships which have produced the underdevelopment. I have noted previously that the Canadian Churches' active support for the Dene during the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline debate was a crucible for their understanding of the development process. Into the mix went concerns for racism, colonial relationships, economic growth, self-determination and a present day experience of the Third World. One of the resources they were able to draw on was the experience of Catholic missionaries with the indigenous peoples of Latin America. André Gunder Frank was an obvious ally in that regard. Pursuing the phenomenon of the repeating satellitic structure, Frank was able to show how the Native people of Latin America, rather than having had development pass them by, have suffered the butt-end of capitalist development. They have been marginalized not because they occupy remote areas of the country but because they occupy the final hinterland of the last metropolis and they therefore bear the weight of all the other satellites upon their heads.[23]

In this context, the concepts of dependency and underdevelopment are closely linked. According to the Frank analysis, the same relationship which would be described as dependent would be the relationship that causes underdevelopment.

The Catholic Bishops are attracted to this analysis in part because of the parallels they see between the Latin American situation and the Canadian situation. Although the Bishops do not use the term "dependency," it is, in fact, part of their critique. In their "Ethical Reflections on the Economic Crisis," they criticize Canada's present model of economic development for being primarily " . . . foreign controlled (orienting development priorities to external interests); and export oriented (providing resources or products for markets elsewhere rather than serving basic needs of people in this country)."[24] This is as clear a critique of dependency as any Frank could provide. When the Bishops call for capital to be re-distributed to underdeveloped regions and for "self-reliant models of economic development,"[25] they are also relying on an analysis of dependency. Dependency is closely linked to underdevelopment because it too is a *relational* concept. It describes a relationship of power and who exercises it. Of course, that also makes it a profoundly ethical concept and so it should come as no surprise to find the Bishops describing an alternative economic vision that "could place priority on . . . an equitable distribution of wealth and power among people and regions."[26]

André Gunder Frank represents only one attempt to explain the relationship between underdevelopment and dependency and not necessarily the best one. Indeed, his work has become quite controversial. It is significant though, that the controversial character of his analysis is essentially irrelevant to the concerns of the Catholic Bishops. Whether or not his argument succeeds in developing a *formal* theory of dependency, whether or not the internal characteristics of underdevelopment can be causally linked to external factors, and whether or not he and his followers have successfully demonstrated the integration of colonial economies into a sixteenth century capitalist economic order, these questions are tangential to the concerns of the Canadian Churches. From the point of view of the Bishops, the aspects of his work that are most likely to be criticized by other political economists, are the aspects of his work to which they are most attracted.

For example, Frank's establishment of the terms dependency and underdevelopment in a tautological sequence so that a dependent relationship, by definition, results in underdevelopment, is an approach with which Church leaders would have little difficulty. It is important to remember in that regard that the Churches typically concern themselves with *the development of peoples, not economies*. They are concerned with economic growth only when growth stands to be a potentially positive development for people. In the language of the Bishops, dependency is by definition not full autonomy, and lacks the crucial ingredient of self-determination. It is therefore not full development and hence, people are under-developed. For this reason, the apparent contradiction of relying on the Marxist analysis of André Gunder Frank at the same time as one is relying on the capitalist analysis of E.F. Schumacher (as the Bishops do in their 1980 statement "Unemployment: The Human Costs" — see notes 21 & 33) is dissolved. For Schumacher, as for the Bishops, economic growth is an instrumental good rather than a final good and so may or may not be an

adequate way of overcoming underdevelopment. Similarly, while it would be difficult to imagine Frank arguing that underdevelopment could be overcome by anything other than growth per se, it is a necessary but not a sufficient condition. Therefore, the argument is about whether certain kinds of growth could really solve the problems at hand. This ethical dimension to Frank's conception of underdevelopment and dependency is what attracts the attention of the Catholic Bishops. Conversely, it is this same ethical dimension that causes him to be criticized by other political economists in the Marxist tradition. Gabriel Palma is a case in point.

In his 1978 review of the dependency debate, Palma identifies the ethical content of the debate but leaves it unexplored since for him it is a weakness rather than a strength. In describing that school of dependency theorists of which Frank is such a prominent member, Palma makes the following observations:

> Perhaps the other distinctive aspect of this line of Latin American thought was that it made a basically *ethical* distinction between 'economic growth' and 'economic development'. According to this, development did not take place when growth was accompanied by:
> (i) increased inequality in the distribution of its benefits;
> (ii) a failure to increase social welfare, in so far as expenditure went to unproductive areas — or even worse to military spending — or the production of unnecessarily refined luxury consumer durables;
> (iii) the failure to create employment opportunities at the rate of growth in population, let alone in urbanization; and
> (iv) a growing loss of national control over economic, political, social, and cultural life.
> By making the distinction in these terms, their research developed along two different lines, one concerned with the obstacles to *growth* (and in particular to industrial growth), the other concerned with the perverse character taken by *development*. The fragility of such a formulation consists in its confusing a socialist critique of capitalism with the analysis of the obstacles of capitalism in Latin America.[27]

It may well be that there is a legitimate problem in so far as the theorists in question have 'done what they ought not to have done and not done what they ought to have done.' That is to say, Frank may be making an ethical distinction that he does not claim to make nor care to make. But the quotation is used to illustrate the point that what is for Palma a "fragile formulation," is to the Bishops solid ethical ground. Morover, the ethical distinction is not just problematic for Frank and his followers but rather, for Marxist political economy

as a whole.

It is a curious phenomenon that economists of the left and the right should be equally suspicious of the concern for values, though for different reasons. For economists in the mainstream of capitalist society, values are impediments to rational judgement. For political economists in the Marxist tradition, values are necessary ideological commitments. For the latter group, a politically neutral standpoint is not only undesirable but impossible and therefore fraudulent when claimed. However, the ideological dimension looms so large for this group that all value claims are thought to focus on the question of ideological choice. Therefore, when an ethical distinction is made in the dependency debate it is thought to be an unnecessary diversion into the debate about the moral superiority of socialism. Within their own ideological framework, Marxist political economists are just as unwilling to grant space to an ethical debate. Like their capitalist colleagues, Marxist political economists have a tendency to assume the legitimacy of their ends in such a way that all discussion about means is reduced to a discussion of technique.

Aside from the bias of contemporary First World economists to statistical analysis, the reason for this suppression of the ethical dimension by political economists of the left lies in a contradiction fundamental to Marxism. Marx's own work can be characterized as a variant of the natural law tradition in ethics whereby we ought to become who we really are. Eugene Kamenka summarized Marx's position as follows:

> The presupposition and the true end of ethics, of philosophy, of all human activities, is the free, truly human man. Man is potentially the only *subject* in a world of objects, and anything that turns him into an object, subordinates him to powers outside himself, is inhuman.[28]

On the other hand, Engels can be found arguing insistently, the relativity of all morals. Specifically, he argued that moral ideals are social products dependent on the practical relations generated by class position.[29] Rather than spurring on a creative debate which would include some novel reflections on the sociology of morals, this has remained a theoretically unresolved contradiction. Its practical effect in political economy has been to suppress the ethical debate at the level of means since the only place where ethics has a clear use is at the ideological divide where one might debate the moral superiority of socialism. But this really amounts to a collapse of ethical concern into an ideological joust which is decided, in any event, not by argument but by conversion. Within the Marxist tradition of political economy, an ethical approach to issues of economic development is still ruled out of court.

The Catholic Bishops have joined with political economy in order to provide a critique of the values inherent in the economic model being promoted by the present Government. Ethics is their key to the door of this debate. Ethics is also the content that attracts them to the research and work of André Gunder Frank.

Since Frank's ethical content is precisely that aspect of his work that is least valued by other political economists in the marxist tradition, we can see that the ethical reflections of the Catholic Bishops represent not only an overt critique of mainstream economic theory but also an implicit critique of marxist political economy. In both cases the means of development are evaluated by strictly 'economic' standards. The best means of achieving ends assumed to be appropriate are judged by their practical efficiency. From the Bishops' perspective, the ethic of means has become a straight calculation of utility. At its narrowest, the ethical dimension of instrumentality has been denied. The Bishops have unlocked the debate about means in the same manner in which they have renewed the debate about ends. In seeking to move beyond the distorting comfort of instrumental reason, they have produced a critique which can act like a two-edged sword with implications for both economics and political economy.

This is particularly interesting given the universal welcome the ethical reflections of the Bishops were given by critics on the left. To their surprise though, it may turn out that they have grasped a rose which comes with thorns attached. As the Catholic Bishops continue to deepen their analysis, and other Churches seek to respond to those specific initiatives, we can expect them to rely less on the resources of Third World theorists and more so on the work of Canadian theorists. The group that would seem most amenable to such an appropriation would be that group known by the phrase, the "New Political Economy."[30] This particular group is likely to be attractive to the Churches because through people like Mel Watkins, the ethical content of Frank has been married to the nationalist and non-marxist scholarship of Harold Innis. In the course of that marriage the "staples thesis" of Harold Innis has been transformed from a theory of economic growth into a theory of subordination and dependency. That transformation will provide a firm foundation for an ethical debate about the merits of staples exports as a vehicle for Canadian development. The criticism of the mega-projects by the Bishops[31] (as providing for economic growth but not development) already represents that position in essence. That is especially so if one recalls the importance for the Churches of the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline debate, and the parallel argument advanced by Watkins at that time on behalf of the Dene.

On the other hand, the Churches will be relying on people like Watkins on the basis of the ethical content to their scholarship and in spite of their marxism. This is likely to provoke attacks from those to the left of Watkins who are concerned to distinguish "true" (orthodox) marxism from "false" (heretical) marxism (for an example of this kind of reasoning, see David McNally's critique of Watkins et al. in *Studies in Political Economy: A Socialist Review*, Autumn, 1981). Of course, given the tenor of Ian Parker's critique of MacNally[32], it is difficult to know to whom the thorns on the rose will do more damage. Still, it would be one of history's more ironic moments if in the final decades of the twentieth century, it is the Canadian Churches who are helping to unite disparate forces in the struggle to realize a right order of social relations, and it is the marxist left which

is condemned to the toil of Sisyphus, struggling with the rock of dogmatic belief.

The irony would stem, in part, from the bleak history of the Churches in acting as agents of social transformation. Marxists, moreover, have provided some of the most trenchant critiques of ecclesiastical collusion with elites. But the history is not universally dark. There are many patterns of relation between Church and society which have had different results regarding social change.[33] The pattern in the twentieth century is as varied as the difference between the reaction of the Catholic Church in China to the revolution of Mao Zedong (active resistance) and the reaction of the Catholic Church in Nicaragua to the revolution of the Sandinistas (active support). What role might be both available and proper to the Canadian Churches (Catholic and Protestant) is not clear and merits debate. The history merely indicates that it cannot be pre-determined.

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Notes

1. The Episcopal Commission for Social Affairs, "Ethical Reflections on the Economic Crisis", Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops, Ottawa, 1983.
2. Quoted by Peter Rickwood and William Bragg in "Carter rejects bishops' blast on economy", *Toronto Star*, January 1, 1983, p. A4.
3. Ibid.
4. Pope Paul VI, "Populorum Progressio", Mar. 26, 1967. Reprinted in David J. O'Brien and Thomas A. Shannon (eds.) *Renewing the Earth*, Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1977, p. 317.
5. Ibid., p. 333.
6. Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops, "Northern Development: At What Cost?", Labour Day Message, 1975, Ottawa. paragraph 12.
7. Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops, "A Society to be Transformed", Pastoral Message, December 1, 1977, paragraph 3.
8. Ibid., para. 10.
9. GATT-fly, "Where is the Alaska Highway Pipeline Taking Us?", Toronto, March 20, 1979.
10. Project North, "Native People and Economic Resource Development in Northern Parts of Canada — A Basis for Action", Toronto: Mimeo, 1980, p. 9.
11. Ibid., p. 2.
12. Ibid., p. 6.
13. Episcopal Commission for Social Affairs, "Ethical Reflections . . ."
14. Quoted in H. & K. McCullum, *This Land is Not For Sale*, Anglican Book Centre, Toronto, 1975, p. 180.
15. Anglican Church of Canada, *Beyond Traplines*, Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1969, p. 11.

16. G. Baum, *Man Becoming*, New York: The Seabury Press, 1970, p. 23.

17. G. Baum, *The Priority of Labour*, Ramsey, N.J.: Paulist Press, 1982.

18. Enrique Dussel, "Analysis of the Final Document of Puebla: The Relationship between Economics and Christian Ethics", in Dietmar Mieth and Jacques Pohier (eds.) *Christian Ethics and Economics: The North-South Conflict*, Concilium, Dec. 1980, p. 102.

18a. The single most important book representing this shift in emphasis for theology is Gustavo Gutierrez's *A Theology of Liberation*, Orbis Books, Maryknoll, N.Y., 1970. The closest thing to a Protestant equivalent also coming out of Latin America is Jose Miguez Bonino's *Doing Theology in a Revolutionary Situation*, Fortress Press, Philadelphia, 1975. The Ecumenical Association of Third World Theologians has sponsored a series of international conferences. The papers from many of these have been published in a series by Orbis Books in Maryknoll, N.Y., and edited by Virginia Fabella and Sergio Torres. A good one volume introduction to the range of Third World theologies is *Mission Trends No. 3: Third World Theologies*, Paulist Press, Ramsey, N.J. and Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., Grand Rapids, Mich., 1976. It is edited by G.H. Anderson and T. F. Stransky, C.S.P. .

It would be a mistake to think, though, that all Latin American Christians are on the left. In fact there is a fierce battle raging at various levels of the Catholic Church in Latin America. One must keep in mind that some Catholic Bishops are blessing the tanks of the dictators at the same time as priests are joining guerrilla armies. This battle is also being waged denominationally. On a continent overwhelmingly Roman Catholic, some Central American governments have taken to encouraging American Protestant and Evangelical missionary groups. They are then used to counter the influence of Catholic aid organisations, like Caritas, which are seen as being too radical and too sympathetic to insurgents. Significantly, the previous President of Guatemala, Rios Mont, is a "born-again Christian".

In the United States, the most important centre for conservative reaction to these trends in the Churches is Ernest Lefever's American Enterprise Institute. It has close connections to the Reagan administration and publishes the work of people like Michael Novak, author of *Toward a Theology of the Corporation*, American Enterprise Institute, Washington, 1981. On the other side of the spectrum, theological reflection using the liberation motif is being used by many American groups but most notably by feminists and blacks. For a good example of each see Rosemary Ruether's *Liberation Theology*, Paulist Press, N.Y., 1972 and James Cone's *God of the Oppressed*, The Seabury Press, N.Y., 1975. For a one volume introduction to American and European efforts in this direction see Anderson and Stransky (eds.) *Mission Trends No. 4: Liberation Theologies*, Paulist Press, N.Y. and Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., Grand Rapids, Mich., 1979.

In Canada, the tension between left and right in the Church has been most obviously demonstrated by the negative reaction of Cardinal Carter to the January statement on the economy issued by his colleagues. His resistance extended to his establishing a public hearing on the statement in an unsuccessful attempt to generate a more widespread negative reaction. The general influence of Third World Christianity on Canadian Churches has been to focus attention on the Canadian context for theological reflection. Examples of this kind of reflection can be found in the volume edited by Ben Smillie *Political Theology in the Canadian Context*, Wilfrid Laurier University Press, Waterloo, Ont., 1982, as well as in Doug Hall's *The Canada Crisis — A Christian Perspective*, Anglican Book Centre, Toronto, 1980, and in the essays edited by Graham Scott, *More Than Survival: Viewpoints Toward a Theology of Nation*, Canec Publishing and Supply House, Don Mills, Ont., 1980.

19. Ans J. Van der Bent, *Christians and Communists*, World Council of Churches, Geneva, 1980, p. 49.

20. Paresh Chattopadhyay, "Political Economy: What's In a Name?", *Monthly Review*, April 1974, p. 23.

21. André Gunder Frank, *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America*, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1967, p. 242.

22. Ibid., p. 9.

23. Ibid., p. VIII.

24. C.C.C.B., "Ethical Reflections . . ."

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

27. Gabriel Palma, "Dependency: A Formal Theory of Underdevelopment or a Methodology for the Analysis of Concrete Situations of Underdevelopment?", *World Development*, Vol. 6, 1978, p. 908.

28. E. Kamenka, *Marxism and Ethics*, London: Macmillan, 1969, p. 11.

29. Engels wrote:

    But when we see that the three classes of modern society, the feudal aristocracy, the bourgeoisie, and the proletariat, each have their special morality, we can only draw the conclusion that men, consciously or unconsciously, derive their moral ideas in the last resort from the practical relations on which their class position is based — from the economic relations in which they carry on production and exchange.

    Quoted in Howard Selsam and Harry Martel (eds.), *Reader in Marxist Philosophy*, New York: International Publishers, 1963, p. 251.

30. See Daniel Drache, "Rediscovering Canadian Political Economy", in Wallace Clement and Daniel Drache (eds.), *A Practical Guide to Canadian Political Economy*, Toronto, 1978; and Mel Watkins, "The Innis Tradition in Canadian Political Economy", *Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory*, Vol. 6, Nos. 1-2 (1982).

31. C.C.C.B., "Ethical Reflections . . ."

32. Ian Parker, " 'Commodity Fetishism' and 'Vulgar Marxism': On 'Rethinking Canadian Political Economy' ", *Studies in Political Economy: A Socialist Review*, Number 10, Winter 1983.

33. One of the most well known typologies can be found in H. Richard Niebuhr's *Christ and Culture*, New York: Harper and Row, 1951.

Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory/Revue canadienne de théorie politique et sociale, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Fall/Automne, 1983).

ONTOLOGY AND VALUE: THE ECOLOGY OF FREEDOM

John Fekete

Murray Bookchin, *The Ecology of Freedom: The Emergence and Dissolution of Hierarchy*. Palo Alto, Ca: Cheshire Books, 1982. 385 pp.

Introduction

Nature metaphors have performed an abiding, variable, and powerful role — for good and evil — in the history of human self-understanding, from pre-literate organicism and mythology through Oriental metaphysics and the nature philosophy of classical antiquity to social Darwinism, the Nazi 'blood and soil' cult, and the 'dialectics of nature' endorsed by Soviet Marxist orthodoxy. A broadly benign modern variant has been taking many faceted intellectual form under the master concept of 'ecology', and, through articulations ranging from a host of 'environmentally' concerned texts to works like Gregory Bateson's *Ecology of Mind* and Murray Bookchin's own *Toward an Ecological Society*, contributing strategic new social, political, and cultural dimensions to traditional discussions in ontology and epistemology. *The Ecology of Freedom* is Bookchin's most comprehensive and ambitious effort to discover in the ecological concept cluster the means for illuminating an epic evolutionary scenario within which emancipatory possibilities for the advancement of life may find natural support (although no guarantees) against the destructive and dangerous continuum of the domination of human by human and hence of nature by society.

Bookchin, now in his early 60s and living in New Jersey, is an impressive figure with enduring integrity at the utopian pole of North American radical thought. In the course of an actively political public life, which has taken him through a variety of oppositional formations in the roles of militant activist, anarchist theorist, or radical educator, he has become known as a brilliant orator, a formidable polemist, and a reliably compelling essayist whose contribution is distinctive, credible, and increasingly highly regarded. With respect to ecological politics, he has been a leading opponent since the 1950s of the growing use of pesticides and food additives, radioactive pollution, and the construction of nuclear reactors. He has been involved in anti-nuke alliances such as Clamshell and Shad, as well as their predecessor, Ecology Action East, whose manifesto, "The Power to Destroy, the Power to Create," he wrote in 1969. Indeed, Bookchin has served as an influential pioneer of the social ecology movement since well before the 1960s and 1970s were market by Carson's *Silent Spring* and Schumacher's *Small is Beautiful*, Alinsky's urban activism, the engineering and design proposals of such figures as Fuller, Heronemus, Meinel, Glaser, O'Neil, Soleri, or the environmental politics of the Seabrook occupation, MUSE, Greenpeace, or Commoner's Citizen's Party.

As a historian of radical social movements and of urbanization, and as an ecological philosopher, over a generation of writing in the tradition of Aristotle, Fourier, Kropotkin, Mumford, and Goodman, in periodical publications such as *Liberation, Telos,* the more recent *Comment,* and the new *Harbinger,* and in his earlier books, including *Our Synthetic Environment, The Spanish Anarchists, The Limits of the City,* and the classic *Post-Scarcity Anarchism,* Bookchin has staked out with admirable consistency a crucial minority position within radical discourse and ecological discussions in particular. His emphasis has always fallen on the toxic social institutions and values that underpin the ecological crisis on the planet — broadly speaking, the crisis of life. He has repeatedly advanced the thesis that ecology must mean *social* ecology, his stance resting on "the conviction that the very concept of dominating nature stems from the domination of human by human, indeed, of women by men, of the young by their elders, of one ethnic group by another, of society by the state, of the individual by bureaucracy, as well as of one economic class by another or a colonized people by a colonizing power." In consequence, he has again and again pointed to the compelling imperative to renew humanity, and thus the relation between humanity and nature, through strategies for global social change governed by a consciously non-domineering sensibility. In *The Ecology of Freedom,* Bookchin goes further, to argue that such an emancipatory social momentum can find its ultimate grounding in nature. Here, he undertakes to present his long range project of sketching the dialectical reunification of social history and natural history. His propositions culminate, as I will summarize, in a teleological ontology which turns, without theological nuances, to nature as the basis for ethics. That Bookchin's image of nature is credible, attractive, and helpful is demonstrated persuasively by his text. That 'nature' allows of such a construction is not in doubt. What may be the final epistemological status of these reflections and how provisional the objectivity they postulate, is closely tied to ongoing debates about representation to which, also, this text has something to contribute.

All of Bookchin's well-known themes are recast and reinforced within a systematic framework in a text organized around a conceptual narrative of human history form the earliest organic consociations to the most recent social forms hollowed by bureaucracy. The thread that he tugs at unwaveringly to unravel the tapestry of human life is the thread of *hierarchy,* announced in the book's speculatively optimistic subtitle: "The Emergence and Dissolution of Hierarchy." In following this thread, Bookchin is able to formulate propositions that aim for universal reference and call for some response equal to the challenge. He aims to encompass far more than mere environmental engineering (e.g. 'limits to growth', 'alternative' power sources), merely quantitative futuristic extrapolation (e.g. Toffler, Kahn, Erlich, Fuller), as well as other radical critiques of social life that are less thoroughgoing than his (e.g. Marxism, psychoanalysis). His intellectual strategy is also oriented self-consciously on a different path from the ones taken by libertarian skeptical currents or contemporary endeavours to reconstruct the human project on

strictly subjectivist foundations. In taking account of the accelerating tempo of destruction that is engulfing physical, social, and psychic life, Bookchin is unashamed about highlighting the utopian imperative of a radical ecological reconstruction — down to the level of the molecular relationships in society — on the principles of natural ecology: diversity, complementarity, spontaneity.

He argues that this will involve the restoration of human scale, the renewal of community and a self-governing civil self, and the persistent striving for face-to-face democracy, liberatory technologies, and non-hierarchical values and institutions. It is the worthy intention of the text to stimulate the imaginative development and interchange of utopian views in public dialogue in order to evoke the details of reconstruction. In his own words: "utopian thinking today requires no apologies. Rarely has it been so crucial to stir the imagination into creating radically new alternatives to every aspect of daily life. . . . Utopian *dialogue* in all its existentiality must infuse the abstractions of social theory.

The Order of Domination

Even Bookchin's earlier work barely prepares the reader for the rich and lucid exploration of the conspicuous features in the development of our world that *The Ecology of Freedom* offers. In brief, the book anatomizes the "curse of domination" that, since its inception long before the rise of economic classes, has profoundly infused virtually every human achievement in rationality, institution, technique, science, ideology, and art. Bookchin refuses the mystifying explanations that place the blame on 'reason', 'technology', or the pressures of a 'stingy' nature, analysing, instead, the sinister institution of subjugation consequent on the emergence of elites, and the correlative psychological self-abnegation that comes with the social conflict and repression that accompany the rise of hierarchy.

The text analyses the imposition of rule, acquisitive impulses, property rights, contracts, and the rule of equivalence on a recalcitrant archaic world. It reviews the stupendous mobilization of materials, wealth, human intellect, and human labour over the centuries for the goal of domination, with the result that in our own time domination has spread over the social landscape to a point where it seems out of control and where it has penetrated our basic socialization processes and our most intimate experiences. Freedom is betrayed "by our treatment of children and women, by our physical stance and most personal relationships, by our private thoughts and daily lives, by our unconscious ways of ordering our experiences of reality. The betrayal occurs not only in our political and economic institutions but in our bedrooms, kitchens, schools, recreation areas, and centers of moral education such as our churches and psychotherapeutic 'conventicles'. Hierarchy and domination preside over our self-appointed movements for human emancipation..."

The Legacy of Freedom

What most sharply distinguishes Bookchin's work, however, from that of prophetic dystopian critics of human life — for example, Jerome Deshusses in his impressive *The Eighth Night of Creation* — is his commitment to rescuing "the legacy of freedom that the legacy of domination has sought to extirpate from the memory of humanity." What relieves the grim account of the rise of hierarchy is the account of the enduring features of a subterranean libertarian realm. Ranging from the earliest archaic customs, through the Gnostic heresies and radical moments in Christian intellectual history, to the modern secular traditions of resistance and freedom, Bookchin's text takes note of the technics, forms of association, religious beliefs, conventicles, and institutions of this realm of freedom. He finds "residual areas of freedom in communities where the word simply does not exist, in loyalties that are freely given without expectations of recompense, in systems of distribution that know no rules of exchange, and in interpersonal relations that are completely devoid of domination."

In effect, Bookchin articulates this 'legacy of freedom' at five levels. First, the history of ideas and ideals. Thus from the early 'Land of Cockayne' story of a bountiful nature through medieval chiliasm to the hedonism of Rabelais and Fourier, Bookchin embraces the libertarian utopian imagination and endorses its fundamental commitment to fecundity, sensuousness, and the principle of pleasure. He writes, for example: "The greatness of the Dadaist tradition, from its ancient roots in the gnostic Ophites to its modern expression in Surrealism — a celebration of the right to indiscipline, imagination, play, fancy, innovation, iconoclasm, pleasure, and a creativity of the unconscious — is that it criticizes this 'hidden' realm of hierarchy..." Correspondingly, at a second level, he embraces the social instances of libertarian resistance and struggle, for example, popular movements in the medieval world like the Crusade of the Shepherds (13th C.), the Taborites of Bohemia (15th C.), the Diggers (17th C.), the sweeping popular revolutionary movements from the time of the Reformation to the Paris Communards (19th C.), and the counter-cultural radicals of the 1960s.

The question remains of how to account for the persistence of these empirical instances of the striving for freedom and whether there are grounds to believe that they resurface again and again not only as ad hoc responses to the pressures of domination but that their reproduction and endurance is nourished from deep roots. Bookchin's answer is to offer interpretations of three deeper layers in the legacy of freedom: the historical heritage of freedom with its basic social programme embedded in the customary relations of the earliest pre-literate organic societies; early socialization through mother-love; and finally, as the grand source of the freedom strivings of human subjectivity, the dynamic evolutionary subjectivity of nature *per se*.

Bookchin's analysis endeavours to move through "the layered membranes of freedom," from its outward surface manifested in struggles for justice (what

Bookchin calls "the inequality of equals", a mutilated form of quantitative balancing belonging to hierarchical societies, built around the quasi-radical and quasi-mystifying principle of equal treatment of people with unequal situations), through various economic layers of equivalence, finally to "its core as a caring personal sensibility, a supportive domestic life, and its own rule of the equality of unequals" (this last, a form of qualitative sharing, being Bookchin's term for a reconciliatory, compensatory social logic, still echoed in Marx's "to each according to his need", which offers to equalize by compensation for inescapable inequalities in attributes, skills, powers, etc.).

The Outlook of Organic Societies — Updated

In criticizing modern societies built on property and bureaucratic power, it is not surprising that Bookchin's strategic sense would be to stress the links between freedom and community, and that his attention would turn to the other great model of human association, the model of the family. Indeed, he finds in the outlook of pre-hierarchical organic societies, of the primal communities based on blood-ties, fundamental principles of human life that he urges us to recover. His review of anthropological data concerning the habits and values of early hunting and foraging groups and of communities like the Hopi, Wintu, Ihalmiut and others — which "might well be called *organic societies* because of their intense solidarity internally and with the natural world" — uncovers as their most prominent operative features the practice of usufruct, the guarantee of an irreducible minimum, and complementarity.

'Complementarity' works as the fundamental social articulation in the absence of coercive and domineering values: people, things, and relations are not hierarchized into 'superior' and 'inferior' groupings but appreciated for their dissimilarities, variety and differences being valued as priceless ingredients of communal unity, entailing equality and respect for all individuals (irrespective of age, sex, or attributes) as a byproduct of the democratic structure of the culture itself and not as a calculating principle to be applied. Sharing follows as a matter of group solidarity and offers inalienable access to the 'irreducible minimum' of food, shelter, and clothing to every individual in the community, simply by virtue of belonging to the community, irrespective of the amount of work contributed by the individual to the acquisition of the means of life.

Finally, the practice of 'usufruct' comprises the freedom of individuals in a community to appropriate resources merely by virtue of the fact that they are using them, thus placing unconscious emphasis on use and need that are "free of psychological entanglements with proprietorship, work, and even reciprocity". Thus, Bookchin argues, usufruct differs qualitatively from the subsequently arising quid pro quo of reciprocity, exchange, mutual aid, and the world of contracts, all of which, with their 'just' ratios and 'honest' balance sheets, taint consociation by the rationality of arithmetic and degrade the human spirit to a quantitative world of 'fair dealings' between calculating egos

whose ideology of interest barely conceals a mean-spirited proclivity for acquisition.

Bookchin's argument is that there was a period in humanity's early development marked by the disinterested willingness to pool needed things and needed services and by an unthinking sense of responsibility and cooperation that both prized individual uniqueness and fostered the unity of consociation. His point is that "we should not disdain these almost utopian glimpses of humanity's potentialities, with their unsullied qualities for giving and collectivity... Rarely is history notable for its capacity to select and preserve the most virtuous traits of humanity. But there is still no reason why hope, reinforced by consciousness and redolent with ancestral memories, may not linger within us of what humanity has been in the past and what it can become in the future."

Bookchin makes two further arguments on this score. First, that these features in the heritage of freedom have never entirely died out but faded and mutated within the subterranean libertarian realm that remains active, if always under threat, within the order of domination. And secondly, that the appropriate response to the dangers arising from the insane irrationalities of our world is to recover not only the best features of organic societies, but to recover those features as mediated by the benefits of the intervening era of civilization/domination. This is not the same as saying that civilization/domination was a necessary evil for a greater future good (Marxism), but rather that the passage beyond the parochial boundaries of blood kinship offers creative opportunities in spite of the dark side of history. An ecological society would not only be based on usufruct, complementarity, and the irreducible minimum, but would also recognize the existence of a universal humanity and the claims of individuality. It would embrace the 'stranger' and exogenous cultures, and, beyond tribal society's respect for the person and for uniqueness of behaviour and character structure within a group context, would embrace the individual's autonomy to act in accordance with his or her sovereign judgment of 'freedom of will', that is, to select or formulate personal needs, to choose or create the constituents of choice, to function as a competent, hence rational, self-determined, self-active, self-governing being.

Indeed, irreversibly, civilization has rendered customary and unconsciously practised ancient values ideational and conceptual, with particularly enormous potentialities latent in the formation of ethical standards for a shared *humanitas,* a human community, and in the placement of emphasis on volition as a formative element in social life and culture, especially to the extent that the will has been identified with personal freedom. "A free-flowing realm of ethics, as distinguished from a world of hardened customs (however admirable these may be), is a *creative* realm in which the growth of mind and spirit is possible on a scale that has no precedent in the world of traditional mores. Ethics, values, and with them, social relationships, technics, and self-cultivation can now become self-forming, guided by intellect, sympathy, and love."

If civilization has usually betrayed its promise of ideational and personal

self-creativity, if both collective ethics and individual volition have found expression in domination, if both community and individual autonomy are declining through a fetishization and bureaucratization of needs that reduces freedom to the level of normalized custom, nevertheless the reality of these potentialities and the many achievements in which they were actualized is not altered. Bookchin looks to the tradition of artistic creativity as a permanent model of the right to imagine life as an art rather than as a conflict. He writes: "In contrast to the parochial world of the kin group and its fixity in custom, 'civilization' has given us the wider world of the social group and its flexibility in ratiocination. Today, the real issue posed by this historic transcendence is no longer a question of reason, power, and *techné* as such, but the function of imagination in giving us direction, hope, and a sense of place in nature and society."

"Second Nature" and 'Third Nature"

But again, what can support the imagination of freedom against the massive power of domination? Bookchin turns for a ray of hope to the mother-infant relationship, to the *initial* step in the socialization process, and to its monumental (if now declining or altering) role in shaping human thought processes and sensibilities. In an analysis which (like his analysis of organic societies) some will see as one-sided and marked by elements of sentimentalism — even though his purpose is to urge that hopeful features abstracted from the concrete history of human life need to be self-consciously nurtured to pre-eminence for the growth and enhancement of future life — Bookchin represents the early mother-infant relationship, the point at which biology and socialization are conjoined, as the cradle in which the need for consociation is created and the most fundamental canons of reason are formed.

A human 'second nature' is structured around nurture, support, concern, love, and a deobjectified world of experience within the maternal, domestic universe, rather than a world guided by domination, self-interest, and exploitation. Indeed, to accommodate humanity to war and obedience involves the undoing not only of human 'first nature' as an animal but also of this human 'second nature' as an infant. Thus it is possible and necessary to lament that "the story of reason in the history of 'civilization' is not an account of the sophistication of this germinal rationality along libertarian lines; it is a vast political and psychological enterprise to brutally extirpate this rationality in the interest of domination, to supplant it by the 'third nature' of authority and rule."

As always, Bookchin's analysis here is also a call to action. He notes that 'modernity' may well "demarcate an era in which the cradle of reason has finally been demolished." But also that: "As barbarous as its most warlike, cruel, exploitive, and authoritarian periods have been, humanity has soared to radiant heights in its great periods of social reconstruction, thought, and art — despite the burdens of domination and egotism. Once these burdens are removed, we have every reason to hope for a degree of personal and social enlightenment for

which there are no historical precedents. Through the mother-infant relationship, we regularly plant the seeds of a human nature that can be oriented toward selfless endearment, interdependence, and care. These are not trite words to describe the womb of human renewal, generation after generation, and the love each child receives in virtually every society. They become cliches only when we ignore the possibility that separation can yield an aggressive egotism and sense of rivalry, when material insecurity produces fear toward nature and humanity, and when we 'mature' by following the pathways of hierarchical and class societies."

Nature and Society: Evolution and History

We must, urges the author, try to create a new culture, not merely another movement that attempts to remove the symptoms of our crises without affecting the sources. We must create a new culture around the most hopeful and free aspects of our total history. But our total history involves natural history, indeed, conversely, natural history as evolution includes social history — or, put differently, the dialectical and hermeneutical circle of the story of life must be made comprehensive by rejoining nature and society. It is in this prospect that Bookchin now finds the deepest elemental motivation for the project of freedom and for the self-conscious direction and integrative meaning of an ecological society. Considering our experience with the power exercised by reactionary and oppressive traditions of theologically tainted naturalism, it is here that his deliberate departures from the conventional wisdoms and strategic directions of radical social criticism are likely to prove most risky and controversial; but it is also here that they appear most daring, most ambitious, and perhaps most fruitful.

1. *Commonality.* In short, Bookchin starts with the proposition that "the concept of an ecological society must begin from a sense of assurance that society and nature are not inherently antithetical." We need to see the commonality of society with nature, as a 'niche' in a given bioregion and ecosystem. We do not need to extol the very failings of civilization, the domineering and exploitive relationships to nature and human beings, which are falsely represented as intrinsic social attributes, as evidence of the disembeddedness of society from nature (e.g. Marx).

Humanity is a manifestation of nature, however unique and destructive, and it is not the case that human 'interference' in the natural world need necessarily be seen in a pejorative light, as 'unnatural'. When human society cultivates food, pastures animals, removes trees and plants, that is, 'tampers' with an ecosystem, these seeming acts of 'defilement' may enhance nature's fecundity rather than diminish it. "To render nature more fecund, varied, whole, and integrated may well constitute the hidden desiderata of natural evolution. That human beings become rational agents in this all-expansive natural trend... is no more an intrinsic defilement of nature than the fact that deer limit forest growth and preserve grasslands by feeding on the bark of saplings."

In other words, humanity's well being, even survival, may depend on consciously abetting the thrust of natural evolution toward a more diversified, varied, and fecund biosphere. It is clear in the context that this is not meant to justify the reduction of nature to a mere object of human manipulation as a 'something' that merely exists 'for us'. In fact, Bookchin suggests, it may be the task of ecological ethics to discriminate which of our actions serve and which hinder the thrust of natural evolution whenever humanity, a unique product of that evolution, "brings its powers of reasoning, its creative fingers, its high degree of conscious consociation — all qualitative developments of natural history — to nature.

2. *From Biology to Culture.* Secondly, Bookchin stresses that natural evolution phases into social evolution in that we are heirs to a strong natural thrust toward association. Owing to our prolonged dependency as children and the plasticity of mind that this long period of growth provides, we are destined to live together as a species, to care for our own kind, to collaborate, whether in village or town, *polis* or city, commune or megalopolis. Indeed, the kinship tie or blood oath is a more strictly biological basis for association than any form we know. Yet the *strictly* biological, parochial and restrictive as it is, may not be more 'natural' than the human social attributes produced by natural evolution. "Our very concept of nature may be more fully expressed by the way in which biological facts are *integrated structurally* to give rise to more complex and subtle forms of natural reality."

On this account, if human nature is part of nature, the associations that rest on universal human loyalties, nourished by our modern commitment to a universal *humanitas* beyond the blood tie, "may well be expressions of a richer, more variegated nature than we hitherto have been prepared to acknowledge." In other words, conscious cultural affinity on the basis of tastes, cultivated similarities, emotional compatibilities, sexual preferences, and intellectual interests, can be regarded as a more creative and no less natural basis for association than the unthinking demands of kin loyalties and tribal forms, with the result that "it is not 'retribalization' that an ecological society is likely to seek but rather recommunalization with its wealth of creative libertarian traits." Society might take the form of a Commune composed of many small communes, containing the best features of the Greek *polis* without its fatal ethnic parochialism and political exclusivity, networked confederally through ecosystems and bioregions, artistically tailored to their surroundings, and aspiring "to live with, nourish, and feed upon the life-forms that indigenously belong to the ecosystems in which they are integrated."

3. *The Natural Ground of Libertarian Ethics.* Thirdly, in order to find general coordinates by which to take our social bearings, Bookchin offers to illuminate the human enterprise by way of the distinction between 'libertarian' and 'authoritarian', the latter referring to all the social and psychic forms of hierarchy and domination, the former guided by his description of the ecosystem: "the image of unity in

diversity, spontaneity, and complementary relationships, free of all hierarchy and domination." What he considers decisive for a new rationality, for shaping a new approach to subjectivity, is to raise "a biotically variegated ethical standard based on the fecundity of life, on the virtue of complementarity, on the logical image of an ever-richer mosaic of experience..." And he proposes that a libertarian ethics can be grounded objectively — beyond the vagaries of opinion, taste, or instrumental effectiveness, and also apart from 'inexorable dialectical laws' — on an "intentionality latent in nature, a graded development of self-organization that yields subjectivity and, finally, self-reflexivity in its highly developed human form." The argument opens out to a full philosophy of nature with emphasis on the purposive structure and behaviour of organism and the inwardness of substance. Life can be known only by life, and as a result of life; that is, life "can never, by its very nature, be dissociated from its potentiality for knowingness...".

Bookchin's arguments need to be read in their complete form, then debated and expanded. But the net effect is to dissociate from Bertrand Russell's image of life and consciousness as the meaningless product of mere accident, and to place the properties of inorganic matter and of organic life into some kind of unified context. Based on a variety of scientific and philosophical reflections touching on molecular self-organization and mutation toward complexity, Bookchin here makes every effort to consolidate his understanding of nature as active rather than passive. He writes: "The prospect that life and all its attributes are *latent* in substance as such, that biological evolution is rooted deeply in symbiosis or mutualism, indicates how important it is to reconceptualize our notion of 'matter' as *active* substance."

Indeed, on this account, the self-organization of substance into ever-more complex forms, its ever-striving, creative *development,* provides a picture of unceasing growth and evolution as the epic drama of the universe, an evolution that is entropy-reducing and charges the universe with meaning, even ethical meaning. Moreover, there is no suggestion here whatever of a supernatural deity to be invoked *ex machina* to introduce design exogenously into the universe. Bookchin writes:

> Hence our study of nature — all archaic philosophies and epistemological biases aside — exhibits a self-evolving patterning, a 'grain,' so to speak, that is implicitly ethical. Mutualism, freedom, and subjectivity are not strictly human values or concerns. They appear, however germinally, in larger cosmic and organic processes that require no Aristotelian God to motivate them, no Hegelian Spirit to vitalize them. If social ecology provides little more than a coherent focus to the unity of mutualism, freedom, and subjectivity as aspects of a cooperative society that is free of domination and guided by reflection and reason, it will remove the taints that blemished a naturalistic ethics from its inception; it will provide both

humanity and nature with a common ethical voice. No longer would we have need of a Cartesian — and more recently, a neo-Kantian — dualism that leaves nature mute and mind isolated from the larger world of phenomena around it. To vitiate community, to arrest the spontaneity that lies at the core of a self-organizing reality toward ever-greater complexity and rationality, to abridge freedom — these actions would cut across the grain of nature, deny our heritage in its evolutionary processes, and dissolve our legitimacy and function in the world of life. No less than this ethically rooted legitimation would be at stake — all its grim ecological consequences aside — if we fail to achieve an ecological society and articulate an ecological ethics.

Mutualism, self-organization, freedom, and subjectivity, cohered by social ecology's principles of unity in diversity, spontaneity, and non-hierarchical relationships, are thus ends in themselves. Aside from the ecological responsibilities they confer on our species as the self-reflexive voice of nature, they literally define us. Nature does not 'exist' for us to use; it simply legitimates us and our uniqueness ecologically. Like the concept of 'being', these principles of social ecology require no explanation, merely verification. They are the elements of an ethical *ontology*.

Conclusion: Ontology and Value

Hans Jonas noted in the Epilogue to *The Phenomenology of Life* that ontology as the ground of ethics was the original tenet of philosphy, before the 'objective' and 'subjective' realms were divorced. If their reunion was to be effected, it had to be from the 'objective' end, through a revision of the idea of nature. This is the project that animates Bookchin's reflections, to found an ethics, no longer foundable on divine authority, on a principle discoverable in the nature of things, in the immanent direction of natural evolution, and thus to avoid the relativism that plagues the modern temper. At the same time, he argues for a loose conception of teleology, and open-ended relationship between potentiality and actualization, as the frame for representing human subjectivity in continuity with nature but free to play a role as the creative, self-governing heir of evolution's thrust toward mind.

On this speculative account — whose scope of parameters, polemical edge, and totalizing reach for coherence will not be readily embraced universally but whose sense of urgency communicates to set in sharp relief the issues and values at stake — our options are to continue on a moribund, counter-evolutionary path, destroy life on the planet, and leave our Earth "a dead witness to cosmic failure." Or else, to recover nature in history and restore

history to evolution, create a new world and sensibility based on self-reflexivity and an ecological ethics, and thus "reclaim our legitimacy as the fullness of mind in the natural world — as the rationality that abets natural diversity and integrates the workings of nature with an effectiveness, certainty and directedness that is essentially incomplete in nonhuman nature."

There remain, inevitably, many problem clusters open to discussion and dispute, among others: the evaluation of past, present, and future forms of reason and sensibility, forms of association and politics, forms of communication, science, technics, ethics, and aesthetics as to their 'libertarian' and 'authoritarian' dimensions; the composite features of the earliest forms of human consociation; ontogenesis and early socialization; the relationship between morality and politics; the emergence of will as a dimension of subjectivity, and its articulations and representations; the relationship between ethical and aesthetic value, the assignment of a quasi-hegemonic role to ethics, the question of value abundance and value hierarchy generally, and the scope of imagination; the representation of natural value as displaying the warm current of an ethical tropism; the nature, place, and implications of teleology; and the epistemological mediations of ontological propositions.

Most broadly, the haunting problem is that the questions of value and interpretation at the level of human history — at a more complex, subtle, *ambivalent*, and *problematical* level than non-human nature — are not likely to be resolved by either ontologizing or ethicizing the *structural integration* of non-human nature. More specifically, there remain questions as to how the prominent features of nature and their social analogues — symbiosis *and* predation, cooperation *and* conflict — are to be highlighted and interpreted, for ontology and for ethics. One line of inquiry would lead us to ask whether nature might not lend itself more readily to a Manichean ontology or some other variant of Gnostic dualism than to a mutualist ecological monism? On what authority are we entitled to believe that the dark side of the force is intrinsically dissolvable (even allowing for the occasional empirical "cosmic failure") into some Hegelianized or naturalized version of Augustine's *Omnia cooperant in bonum, etiam peccata* ('All things, even sin, work together for good')? Or Why would the fact that life is in principle entropy-reducing guarantee suspension of the second law of thermodynamics which proposes entropy for the universe, the eventual loss of universal coherence? Again, put differently, why would the seemingly perpetual opposition between entropic and counter-entropic forces, in human society as in nature, not provide greater support for a dualist metaphysics than for Bookchin's monistic preferences? What guarantees that the pre-eminence of Good is inscribed in the nature of things?

To pursue this ontological speculation further might be to review the ethical closure of ontology that is implied at one level of Bookchin's argumentation. It would seem, recasting somewhat his own account of the thrust of natural evolution, that the action of the counter-entropic force of life in regions of the universe can be read as the creation of value in the course of the self-organization of evolutionary substance. The dynamic principles of complexity,

diversity, spontaneity, and complementarity add up to an operative guidance system for the generation of value abundance. Such value creation proceeds into human history, but the strategic question would seem to concern what we are to make of the realm of *ambivalence* (indeed, polyvalence) that appears to arise in natural evolution with the emergence of self-conscious human life? And closely linked, the consequent question: when and in what ways (under what conditions) does ambivalence — the imprint of alternativity and human choosing (in short, freedom) on natural ontology — become *problematical* (entropic) and tendentially destructive of value (hypothetically, by homogenization, dispersion, inhibition, extermination, or some other mode of reduction and dissolution)?

Interpretive problems of course abound. Is human predation an ambivalent social analogue of ecological predation among animals or the problematical, entropic distortion of cooperative possibilities? Is the strongly matricentric bias of Bookchin's warm hermeneutic, undoubtedly important corrective as it is, on its own an ecologically sound basis for human life? Are the ambivalent dimensions of individuation characteristic features of a new stage of complexity or problematical, entropic offshoots of aberrant hierarchy? In general, how can we best apprehend the ontological topology of the relations between the ambivalent (polyvalent) and the problematical (entropic)? Finally, if "harmony" is a helpful teleological aspiration, how can it be theorized and fleshed out to be of counter-entropic use in attacking the problematical destruction of value without entropically undermining the ambivalent creation of value?

In brief, precisely because value, in an evolutionary frame, is expansionary and not only regulative, the ethical question does not exhaust the value question at the ontological levels. The emergence of value in the human sphere comprehends the broad range of existential and structural dimensions that make up human history, including all its rich buzz and sparkle. It seems desirable to incorporate an ecumenical dimension into our social-ontological speculation to support an attraction that many of us will feed for a somewhat more positive evaluation of civilization than Bookchin is inclined to offer. I suspect that a more ecumenical embrace of the structural-institutional-technological-existential evolution of complexity that human civilization comprises goes, in any case, with the grain of the *evolutionary/ontological* arguments, and can be understood to do so while providing us with cognitive, affective, volitional, and practical grounds for all the more relentlessly confronting the problematical, value-destructive, *ethical* atrocities that curse and haunt human history with the spectre of entropy.

I do not wish to suggest, by raising some abiding analytical and speculative problems of ontology-construction and value theory, that Bookchin is mistaken either in articulating an ontology *per se,* or in proposing that an ethics is derivable therefrom, or even in claiming that such an ethics can validly be articulated as a libertarian, life-enhancing, counter-entropic ethics. On the contrary, the ontological scope of his concerns, and his particular ethical principles, can take us a long way toward placing our world on a better footing.

Indeed, to say, as he does, that the natural thrust of the evolution of life is counter-entropic, is in the end to offer a valid account of the emergence of the human and of human subjectivity in our region of the universe. To urge that this unique level of natural subjectivity, the human, be self-optimizing and reflectively oriented to enhancing the counter-entropic forces in this region is to urge a cosmic evolutionary ethic (by way of the social-historical-cultural) that is right and sane, responsible to the universe, favourable to the survival and life interests of the human race, and authentically grounded in the potentialities and actualizations of nature. If we are compelled to note, nevertheless, that the concrete questions of valuation, symbolization, and objectivation are not thereby resolved, we are merely taking note of the ambivalent constituents in the self-organization of a gradient of life evolved to a point of relative indeterminacy in programming where the daily drama of life is not decisively informed by non-human natural analogues, and where the ambivalent and the problematical need to be recognized and distinguished.

Ultimately, and here lies both the classicism and the contemporary strategic merit of Bookchin's approach, he is looking for a self-definition of mankind in order to (re)orient the human project. Definition, on his method, emerges only from the total history (both natural and social). Hence he turns, especially under the pressure of society's war on nature and nature's incipient revenge, to the big picture that situates our predicament within a broad evolutionary frame. And since this history is neither completely known nor completed — indeed, seems to be at a decisive cusp, a point of choosing — he develops a processual form of definition that can span a broad continuum of life and frame a processual ontology that is not instrinsically bound to any essentialism of origins, manifestations, or ends. In value terms, the stress falls on abundance, difference, complexity. And the growth of life. It needs to be said that for a potential community of embodied minds who have been denied a dynamic communal and personalizing transformational logic by both the reductiveness of the Marxist labour theory of value and the strict culturalism and ultra-Kantianism of the structuralist and post-structuralist allegories, Bookchin offers pathways to renewed self-awareness and renewed praxis.

Even to have raised an agenda as complex and significant as the abbreviated list above of issues outstanding suggests, and, much more, to have offered carefully supported and clearly argued perspectives within such a broad range of strategic parameters, testifies to the courage, dedication, and intelligence of the author. Bookchin's text provides so many insights and practical challenges that, in addition to its educational role in a broadly conceived and indeterminate public realm, it can properly prove to be directly relevant to the concerns of a large sector in the oppositional community, including many engaged in ecological, feminist, peace, cultural, anarchist, or socialist politics, and especially the incipient Green politics currently taking organizational and philosophical shape in Germany, Canada, and elsewhere. *The Ecology of Freedom* can serve as an extraordinary stimulus to imaginative social dialogue and it deserves a reception which ungrudgingly accords it that function.

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A QUÉBEC DOCTOR: ANALYSIS, ETHNOGRAPHY AND PATHOS

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The text we employ is a fragment, a piece—perhaps a piece of life. A writer's life? A life of writing? Our treatment remembers that sketches are not drawn in one stroke—nor are signatures. It remembers that the figure of a man may be anticipated in that of a child, but that the relation of child and man is more one of uncanny resemblance than identity. It is a beginning that is of interest here, a man's childhood as recalled from a distance of time and development—the development of the figure of a man. And it will be remembered that a figure is not the whole of life, but that it is perhaps the memorable part of a life for which one cares. The text of initial interest to our work is a first person account of the background or inheritance of a country doctor who has practiced for many years in a rural community of the Eastern Townships of Quebec. We hope to glimpse the beginning of the part of life called writing in this image of the part of life called healing. It is an account of the man's origin and his relation to his origin. The account is deceptive because it seems to be two accounts—the account is divided into two tales—one concerning family background and the other concerning the iteration of an image—so perhaps together the account(s) render(s) the facts and figures of a life.

The first tale reads as follows:

"My great-grandfather came out in 1833 and he settled beyond Inverness and that's where my grandfather and grandmother, a neighbour's daughter, were brought up. And when they got married they came out here and homesteaded three miles from Englishville, in the Law Forest area. It was on that farm that I was brought up.

"My father was a farmer. When he got old enough to get married he moved to his own farm It was a terrible time: my parents were just getting established on their farm when my father's brother died of Spanish flu—and without anyone to take care of my father's parents, my

It would be difficult to witness a life without being moved by it. We take it, therefore, that the characteristic problem of the ethnographic genre (and of the particular geneological trace to which it is bound) is that of pathos. Initially, then, our work will be that of formulating the character of this problem as the problem of a character whose particular logic and passion become available through analysis of a distinctive style. It is in pathos' stylistic particularity that we may glimpse the irony of the doubled life wherein the pathologic figure is embodied—both in the practices of a physician and in those of the ethno-

father was obligated to return and take care of them.

"They moved back to the ancestral farm where his father had cut and cleared the first cultivated lands. They went back to an old lady with TB and an old man with arterial sclerosis . . . The neighbours below looked after their parents—and our other neighbours just finished looking after their parents. So it was the family trait in this area for children to look after their parents."

"Did you in turn look after your parents?"

"Well, no . . . not to that extent. I could not do very much, I could not get by my epileptic brother and I could not get by my father. In a sense my father left me to settle the will but . . . I . . . I could never contribute the way I thought I should. I could not break through my father and brother; they had the feeling that things ought to be hard to be good and that any decent thing in the house was an insult. My mother waited on them hand and foot as she always did until she died. Then my sister looked after my father . . . I was always frightened of him, I remember my mother saying 'Don't beat the child, it's not going to make him better'. It took a lot of guts to stand up to him."

"Did you have friends?"

"No, we did not go out much, because . . . my father did not like that . . . he became annoyed when I played with my neighbour's kids, so I rarely did. And they did not come to visit us because my grandmother had TB and everybody knew that my mother had all that she could do . . . you did not play with things around the house because my father did not like anyone to play."

"Did local people come by to give a hand?"

grapher who seeks to illuminate the details of a doctor's life.

The doctor's problem is how to achieve an enjoyable relation to his inheritance, how to achieve a desirable difference between his origin and his fate—between the figure of his predecessors and that of his own life. The problem of pathos (of the pathetic figure) seems to be its weakness, the weakness of its unavoidable inscription within a particular style of figuration: literally—as the account/gesture that paces and punctuates a spatio-temporal alternation of the presence/absence of the object of its desire. The pathetic figure can only conceive a strong relationship as his identity, either with what he desires, or with the conditions of his life. If the pathetic figure is undesirable, it is perhaps because its literal style of figuration grants no strong place in its life to its own desire. So the problem of which pathos is an example is the problem of one's relation to his desire.

We might be tempted to think that the pathetic figure's problem is that his imagination is weak or constrained—that he cannot imagine himself committing an act of violence, that he must conceal from himself the great violence that identity (e.g., his identity as pathetic) does to (his) desire. The pathetic figure could move us to feeling sentimental, if we were to repeat his strategy: he treats his desire as if it were emotion—he does not see his emotion (his unhappiness) as an image

"No, we all kept to ourselves. I was never close to people. At school I had poor contact with the teachers—which kept me more isolated. They were not very bright. They kept me after school to write out words without telling me what was wrong. This was not a very good way to learn."

"Did you not have any friends?"

"Well . . . I did have friends in my brothers and sisters. We were a close-knit family . . . I guess you wonder why, if I was so unhappy at home, I came back here to practice medicine?"

We are initially tempted to call this talk geneographic, i.e., organized by reference to a literal treatment of an image of the line—the family line. The aim of family life is to preserve the line unbroken through its several generations—to insure that each generation is like the previous one, such that there is no generation, only iteration. Truly, this is hard work! It is the difficulty of indefinitely suspending the development of one's own particularity and of seeing this deed as doing and being good—the difficulty of a life of obligation and necessity as a family trait—of being obliged to have no influence, to become unable to make a contribution when it is clear that one is needed. It is being stuck and unable to break through. It is living in fear of one's predecessor and yet having no one else to live with.

The family's child thus tries to keep to his own, but confuses his own with what owns him, i.e., fear, isolation, rigidity, helplessness, severity and frustration—a life unlikely to of his version of the life of desire. If the pathetic figure masks his own violence, it is this mask that permits him to repeat his act of self-mutilation. What is masked is the election to not differentiate one's origin, circumstance and fate. What is masked is the limited appropriateness of this deception—perhaps to the particular circumstance of the child in an environment of indifference. But the very notion of the child references an alternate circumstance: that the child could mature. This is to remind us that the problem of imagination is not adequately treated in terms of its abstract strength or weakness, but rather in terms of its specific limitation as an expression of the development of character.

We could think of ethnography as a response to the pathetic problem of imagining (treating) oneself as unable to make a desirable difference between oneself and one's origin or environment (unable to make a contribution). Ethnography treats making a difference as a problem of rule, i.e., ethnography might think of the pathetic child as needing a rule of difference—it might think that a contribution is produced by the application of a rule to an environment (of events or materials). Ethnography thinks that rule makes (and we think that it masks) the difference that is wanted, i.e., that the difference between itself (as the actor who is happy with his account—his contribution) and the unhappy child (whose only account is his tears) is its ruleful discipline. It might suggest that the child's problem is that of its submersion in the endlessly multifarious particulars of its life. The rule of eth-

generate care for its history because, for it, history is only chronology and care is obligation. To care for himself one would have to leave this line, for this family line truly does not know how to care for itself—for its own need to care. And yet—it produces this child!

Why, he wonders, would he (would anyone?) return to such a domicile (such a community) and care for its diseased members? Why would a sensitive spirit desire to cleave to that kind of hard life? If we cannot imagine the continuation of the practice of necessity without its desirability, perhaps visiting the doctor in his maturity would enlighten us. But recall that we have already heard the mature man speaking of his childhood—yet the speech disguises (and knows that it disguises) the decisive difference between adult and child, between the doctor and his inheritance.

The doctor's office is a part of his domicile—its entrance appears as the front door of the house. Inside, as you enter, you make yourself acoustically visible by buzzing a bell the resonance of which nears completion when you're already in the outer office. As a rule, the announcement does not yield immediate recognition; neither nurse nor receptionist provide formal acknowledgement, instead one waits for the doctor.

Functionally, the outer office seems not unlike other waiting rooms with their usual assortment of chairs and reading materials. However, what seems unique to this place may inography (of science) subjects the plurality of those particulars to its own singularity. Its solution, therefore, is one of simple reversal—if pathos submerges itself (its desire) in its particulars, science submerges its paticulars in its rule. If pathos' excess is passivity, science enacts methodic aggression. Neither is violent, neither is desirable and neither can supply an adequate image of what is best.

In contrast, our interest is in the question of the interest served by both pathos and ethnography. By this is meant that we seek to recover the use and attractiveness of these figures in our work. We conceive of our work, then, as a reflexive inquiry into our own practices.

At their best both pathos and ethnography seem strategies of delay and disguise that aim to preserve desire in times of extremity. This is how they could be taken as themselves extreme, for they are forms of conduct that mimic the conditions of their enactment. While pathos seems a simple failure to exercise self-regard, ethnography is a more elaborate and artful trope in the hands of an authoritative writer, who uses this ruse to lead the reader to a denouement of the authority, aim and beginning of his work. Its descriptive rule is a deception to charm and seduce the reader, whom we suppose always to wish to be charmed. But we know that charm alone, without irony, is shallow and aimless. That deception must serve life—must be *for* something, must bear upon some matter—is inescapable for us. For us, the material at hand is both a certain image of relationship embodied in

itially be grasped as a decorative preference for wood; all the furniture as well as the walls are made of clear pine, giving the office a darker shade —a setting more appropriate to the intimacy of a living room than a medical office. The resemblance to home is not accidental to the medical practice at hand but essential to it.

Concretely, the office is part of the doctor's family house and the inseparability of these distinct spheres of life is made audible to waiting patients, be it in the form of a piano being tuned or the excitable sounds of children playing outside; in any event, the plethora of family sounds permeates and is held as a stable fixture of this place. When the doctor does appear in the outer office neither apology nor any other sign referring to the propriety of these sounds is heard. They are accepted as the ongoing background to the medical work in question. Features of familial life do not end with these sounds; the doctor himself repeats the familial which the sounds first disclose. His attire, for example, is stripped of any designation that would draw attention to his professional status. Dressed in the same manner as his patients, that is, without the white medical uniform, it is difficult for a stranger to distinguish the doctor from his patients: they tend to look alike. Moreover, they talk in the same way and about the same things, so the patient/doctor relation—in the outer office at least—is covered over by the membrane of an alternate mode of sociation: that of neighbour and kin.

the figure of the doctor and named as pathos and the ethnographic treatment thereof.

The ruse of ethnography is its claim to ground itself in a rule (e.g., of the adequacy of description as an image of good writing) and its deflection of any interest in the desire of either its decisive author (whose commitment to the rule is the ground of its authority), or its decisive subject (who becomes thereby a cypher). The ethnographer thus appears to speak methodically rather than passionately—at least long enough to suggest an image of why he would do so, i.e., why his passion serves itself in this style and how this writing befriends and best serves the good of the desire that animates it.

We find both pathos and ethnography depressing. By this is meant that they depress or flatten the essential problem of writing into the technical problem of the depiction of materials. Neither shows its interest in a decisive way—neither is desirable because neither permits itself to enjoy the free play of its desire. Neither is desirable because neither shows that it desires itself—neither shows that it chooses its particular life and that such a decision (and the experience of what is chosen) is one's own, i.e., offers a home in which desire can dwell and ease its restlessness: neither exemplifies desirability. The kindest thing one could say of them is that they are modest, but to be honest one would see their asceticism; their desire to generate a world without desire, a world without pain and pleasure (and hence without the need to moderate them),

If the natural social intercourse within the outer office effectively conceals the medical practice, there does exist a sign that makes explicit the function served by this place. Facing the entrance, there hangs on the wall a diploma identifying the resident of the house as a licensed medical doctor. And, as if to predicate the formal announcement of medical competence, there hangs an additional document—a photogaph of an elegantly dressed man. Ordinarily the photograph evokes no conversation; given the urgency of the sickness that brings patients to the outer office, concern with the photograph is necessarily deflected. However, when asked as to who might this man be, the doctor responded that the photograph is of his predecessor. But why should a photograph of his predecessor be on public display, when conventional medical establishments are known to cultivate a scene wherein the concern for "the here and now" makes certain that any and all artifacts belonging to "the there and then" are strategically displaced? The doctor's (second) tale is indispensible:

> "He . . . was very good to members of my family whether it was the oldest one who had epilepsy and he took him to see Dr. Penfield at the Royal Vic in Montreal, or when my older sister had spinal meningitis and it looked like a hopeless case, he attended her even though he had to come up with a horse and buggy to see her. And, when my younger sister had pneumonia very badly at the age of four he attended her, so our family relationship with him was good.

a world of duty rather than enjoyment, of conventional deprivation rather than essential luxury—their participation, in short, in the city of pigs.

But how can this be seen as other than a mistake or blunder—what can we learn from the city of pigs? Perhaps something of the danger of passion and of the potential of desire to consume a soul. Perhaps pathos and ethnography know of these extremes as possible fates, yet neither truly encounters them and is tempered (educated) in the course of meeting their resistance. Neither risks its education, i.e., the adulteration of its purity of spirit with the wisdom that spirit alone cannot provide for a life. This would develop literality's desire to preserve what is good in the encounter with the truth that the best cannot be described, but only suggested. This could be glossed by saying that both ethnography and pathos are deeply abstract, despite their seeming emersion in life's particular details. Their abstraction is their lack of their own particularity, their nonparticipation in the practice of making the difference they embody. They do not enjoy the exercise of their particularity.

Perhaps, then, the city of pigs is populated by those who seek to improve themselves rather than develop. This suggests that development is an arresting of desire's abstractly infinite plasticity at those points of crystallization befitting the particular needs of a particular life. Improvement, in contrast, is distinguished by its mimicry of a foreign form—the mistrust and betrayal of what is best in oneself. That the best

"When I came here to practice so many people came in and asked 'Have you got Dr. Goodfellow's photograph?' Then, what happened was that a friend of his said that she would get me a photograph. She wrote to Dr. Goodfellow's wife and this is the photograph that was sent. And when I put it up, I found a great many who were here thirty years ago, are very happy to come in and look at this photograph."

Although the photograph is enigmatic to many of his present-day patients, we are invited to treat their ignorance as an index of their relative newness to this area; after all, those who have been here thirty years would recognize the photograph. Even though the photograph in its present context fails to disclose the sensible figure represented therein, it does touch these patients in ways which, while they are as yet invisible, will be shown.

The account, specifically in the manner and figure that it unfolds, is (structurally speaking) exceptional for its powers of disclosure. Not only is the photograph employed by the medical practitioner as a discriminatory device intended in its usage to articulate an existing division between new and old patients; but having achieved drawing our attention to a difference that does not lend itself to direct observation, we are then re-introduced to the same difference through the documentation of the responses which "the old" have towards the photograph. Initially "the old" are identified as those who, in knowing Dr. Goodfellow, may at first speak in a small voice (perhaps akin to that of a child) is mistaken by improvement for the weakness and irrelevance of the call of the best. Improvement is thus charmed by what seems good (and, abstractly, may even be good—e.g., for another) but is in truth another's affair. Improvement does not know how to cultivate and care for its own good which is the work, life and enjoyment of development.

Perhaps the distinction of the interests of development and improvement could be illustrated in the contrast between the doctor's image of life as embedded in the line of a geneological trace, and the image of a line of development presented in Plato's *Republic*. The doctor recites a litany of generations gathered and collected with one another in a relation of continuity. What is continuous is the treatment of predecessors as an inhibition of successors' development. What is repeated is the unsuccessful attempt of a son to be free of the need to stand in relation to concrete versions of life's source (father) or conditions (nature, the land, illness, accident, congenital defect). Each generation is a pathetic regeneration of its predecessor's impotence (and consequent need to be compelled by duty and convention) to care for its inheritance. At no point is this care desired, at no point is the line marked by anything but a moving cypher. Even at the end of the geneological line the question suggested is that of why the son *came* back, not why he (or anyone) would *want* to come back; for there is no suggestion of a life one could desire, a life to which one could be related by

form a select group apart from the new and the ignorant. They are, accordingly, privileged in having had the opportunity to experience Dr. Goodfellow's particular commitment to their care. However, insofar as Dr. Goodfellow is recalled for his special attendance to the well-being of family members, the recollection of "the good doctor" has the structural effect of shifting the speaker out of one frame of reference and necessarily into another. For example, in bearing witness to the relative state of health of his brothers and sisters, the status of our speaker is displaced from that of doctor to that of family member. The displacement or shift is not without significance; sociologically, it serves to locate our speaker in the limited capacity of family member, i.e., contained within a particular geneology. At the very moment that membership within the family is proclaimed, a structural shift takes place again which returns to our speaker his professional status. "I found," he says, "that a great many who were here thirty years ago, are happy to come in and look at this photograph." As one "who was here thirty years ago," he looks at the photograph and speaks his recollections *qua* family member. He recognizes, however, that although the recollections triggered by the photograph are his, the photograph evokes a similar impact on others. The recognition of the shared effect which the photograph has on others, is in fact the acknowledgment of its usefulness as a therapeutic tool, specificaly since it attends well to the afflictions of "the old."

The therapeutic of the photograph passionate enjoyment. So the therapeutic/geneological interest in improvement of the conditions of life raises for us the question of what such a life is for—a life of systematic disregard of its interest, a life that seems unbearable because it remains unaware of and disinterested in what it bears upon? What such a life bears upon is the question of the desirability of the life of necessity. The strongest interest of such a life is to improve its capacity to satisfy its obligations. The missing interest is in the development of that life—its maturation—its releasing of itself into its rightful heritage, its gift to itself of the recognition that a heritage, a gift, is for something. To use a gift in such a way as to recognize both what it is, and who oneself is, is to enjoy it.

The geneological interest is analogous to the interest of the familiar lives its account recounts—the account doubles the line it traces. The ethnographic account, similarily, doubles the kindness it describes. Kindness is a loyal practice, loyal to the rule of necessity within which familiarity is inscribed. Its rule is that interest be limited by need rather than desire and be oriented to satisfaction and compliance rather than enjoyment. Its aim is sleep rather than play—it works in order to keep its place, rather than plays in the enjoyment of its development. Its work is hard bcause it is the work of avoidance and concealment of its own (best) interest. It works to secure a place of rest, but cannot thereby make a place where one could want to be—it excludes decency as a respect for and interest in feelings.

The practice of medicine could

is not, according to our speaker, to be found in the stylistic or aesthetic composition of the photographic texture, but in the reading which "the old" and the knowledgeable apply to it. A reading, moreover, not dissimilar from the account itself; a reading which begins with the remembrance of a family life prior to his present occupation, only to terminate with the acknowledgment of its communal property. The reading therefore is loyal to and respectful of the mediating function served by the figure of Dr. Goodfellow. The geneology of family life is recalled, but *always* in relation to the services rendered by "the good doctor." The repetitious invocation of the authoritative figure represented by the doctor makes of the reading a litany. Hence, those others "who are happy to come in and look at this photograph" are happy because through the auspices of this photograph they are able to retrieve a life that is no longer. Their happiness stems not from the recollection of past events—for in itself the recall of these events is achievable under radically diverse conditions—rather it is from the recognition of the valuable nature of this photograph, for unlike others this photograph links "the old" into a community—one that shares a common figure. The photograph, therefore, is not merely a photograph, but more of an icon through which a particular community sustains a life. That that icon is located in the outer office of the medical establishment (and that the figure represented therein is a country doctor) bears directly upon seem a version of decency, for the physician's concern is to eliminate disease and pain. Yet this is a negative interest, not the cultivation of well-being, but the elimination of particular instances or episodes of feeling poorly. Medicine's concern is to respond to the appearance of a complaint in such a way as to remove its specific cause. Medicine's negativity is its compliance with the life of expectation, its satisfaction with normalcy as an adequate version of its end, i.e., an adequate version of its patient's interest. Medicine's other is truly expected to be patient: to defer any possible present interest in well-being. Medicine's negativity is its loyalty to a normative order of the scrutiny of bodies for the discernment of atypicality, where the type is grounded in a rule of balance and symmetry among particulars (organs, functions, practices etc.) Medicine's negativity is its conception of what is first in terms of conditions. It seems thereby to be only concretely different from geneology's negativity, the conception of what is first in terms of origin.

We suggest that what is first could better be conceived as the committed actor who knows that he is more than either his origin or the particular conditions which his life encounters, whose commitment is to the exercise and development of his particularity (his style and character) in the enjoyment of what he loves. Profoundly, he loves neither his origin nor the conditions of his life (though he recognizes their needful character). Deeply he loves the influence of the play of his desire upon his beloved (upon what is best in himself). He

the particular vocation of the country doctor.

What seems unique to the figure of the country doctor, specifically in view of its iconographic representation, is not necessarily the concrete care for the sick (although that is indispensible), but that, stemming from the medical care, there issues forth a supplementary gain in the economy of family life. Family members, under the auspices of the icon, are offered the opportunity to reappropriate their collective history in a way other than familial, that is, in a peculiarly communal way. While the reappropriated histories retain their distinct familial background they share a common property, that being the inclusion of the doctor's involvement in the on-going life of the family. In this strict sense, the doctor's deed is inscribed in the familial history of each of his patients—and *qua* inscription bonds families into a community of shared interest.

However, although the "inscription", i.e., the doctor's practice, links dispersed families into a community, the "inscription" itself is presented as void of family. While the doctor makes possible the doubling of his patients' families by giving them a second membrane, a communal skin so to speak, the very practice which adds to the affluence of each patient's family simultaneously requires that the patient figuratively forego familial membership in the name of the community thus instituted. Put differently, the icon's possibility as that which secures community, is grounded in the necessity of recognizing it loves the best of himself. His relation to his origin and circumstance is thus one of using them in order to imagine what his best could be. He knows that he is not yet wholly what is best—that what he can know of himself is always mixed with circumstance such that what he can expect of himself is less than what he wishes for. But to enjoy one's life is to be able to see this inescapable circumstance as the place of one's passionate happiness. This is the site of surprise—of self-recognition—the source of the generation of practices. This enclosing gap is the womb of the soul, its crypt and its milieu.

The deepest happiness of the soul is to stir and be stirred by its best part—to arouse and draw its best into giving a suggestion of itself—a suggestion of the soul's own future, of its fate as other than the mimicry of its condition(s). If the soul's best part is the standard of its development—what it as a whole is organized by and for—then the joy of any part of the mix that the whole is, is to influence the standard. Through its influence on the best the part can see how the best needs it, yearns for it and responds to it. Thus even the remotest part can see its necessity and desirability to the whole in its ability to animate the best. So we can see that to enjoy life is to open oneself to being influenced by one's own future and that this is not a matter of passive waiting for the future as a chronological (geneological) consequence; rather, it is a resolution that the future is the realization of the best of one's particular present in the whole of one's life.

So it is this (or something like it)

as different from that which communal members solicit through it. If, by doctoring in the country way, the medical practitioner gives nourishment to the family, the gift given to the family (i.e., health and symbolic prosperity) is necessarily different from the gift that animates doctoring as a course of conduct; a difference which the account radicalizes as the difference between vocational and familial life.

Vocational and family life—at once together and separate, two hands, two looks, two sorts of seeing: their relation has the effect of documenting the family twice, from two sides as it were. The family is profiled as in need of external intervention, strictly in the form of medical assistance; without which it runs the risk of losing some of its members and perhaps of placing itself in jeopardy. At the same time that the account represents the family in its needful capacity, we are introduced to the country doctor who attends to these needs in ways not dissimilar from familial expectations. He goes out of his way in his care; he takes one child to Montreal in order that he may be examined by a specialist; in another instance he comes by horse and buggy to attend to his patient. The kindness exercised by "the good doctor" sustains the family—the source of sustenance, however, is other than the family. That is to say that kindness, in the way that it is inscribed within the account, can only be described as the effacing of the family itself. Kindness comes to be by its deconstruction of the family's capacity to preserve an autonomous sphere of influence.

that we take to be the import for our work of the conception of development suggested in the Platonic version of the line. The peculiar feature of this conception is its formulation of the highest (best) part of the soul as that unknown but effective (desired) part which serves as the standard in terms of which the multitude of other parts (impulses, features, mistakes, conditions) are collected. What is still undeveloped (immature) in our discussion is the particular manner in which the best is both moved and placed (given rest) by the parts that are other than the best. How, in other words, can the best be influenced by what is not the best in a way that is other than decadence, degradation, humiliation, indecency and vulgarity? Put differently, how can the best be understood to desire multiplicity in a way that is other than sheer promiscuity?

The best enjoys the play of *multus* as the display of its own self. The best is that part of the soul that remembers (re-collects) itself as the interest in terms of which the several parts were generated as a response of the best to a particular set of conditions. As a mix of the best and its incidental milieu, every practice or part is a kind of image of the figure or form of the best in a certain stage of its development. So the mix of practices is a kind of family album, perusal of which could perhaps suggest the specific resemblance in terms of which each image belongs in the collection.

So the particular parts answer to the best's desire to know the form in which to understand itself. Here we acknowledge again that the best is

In the hands of "the good doctor", kindness protects the family, yet the conception of family which it serves is other to the "natural" family—the family that claims as its jurisdiction an autonomous sphere of influence. Kindness, in fact, protects the family from its "natural" counterpart by doing violence to the rule of kinship. That is to say that the problem of the family, i.e., that which warrants attention and treatment, is its "naturalness"—the literal implementation of which serves to contain and thereby suffocate its members.

not the whole and that the best yearns for the whole. The best desires to ground itself absolutely in the whole, i.e., the multifarious forms of its developmental course together with the course and practice of development. These forms are beyond number, i.e., incalculable in their diversity, yet they are finite and severely limited by the organization and generative inspiration of the best. This is as much true of those forms which at any point of development are unrealized as it is of actual practices of long standing.

Pathos and ethnography are two possible forms of a soul's self-development, and we intend our treatment of them as particular instances or examples of our conception of development. Our aim, then, is to develop our notion of good writing through developing our relation to the interests which pathos and ethnography embody. This means that our interest is only incidentally arrested by pathos, ethnography, geneology, medicine or any of the other notions we employ. More than *by* them we are stirred by what they *represent*; namely, embodiments of what is best. So we are not interested in abstract bodies but in embodiment. This, however, is not to say that we are disrespectful of the body, for it is the site and sight of our soul's development. The notions we employ are essentially inessential reminders of the interest of the soul and the development of its own particularity. Reason's difficulty with our treatment of each notion is reason's difficulty in knowing (and hence directing itself usefully and enjoyably toward) what is best (and hence most useful and enjoyable) for the soul. We note here that reason's practice and interest, like that of the pathetic physician, is not to serve itself but rather to serve what is best in the soul. This is to serve the most particular, the own-most, feature of one's life. It is to identify and cultivate the unique self, understanding that as a kind of imitation of the best in the sense that the whole that is organized, collected and gathered in reference to the best will bear the mark of the best in each of its parts. Reason's problem could thus be understood as that of recognizing this mark rather than identifying the best concretely (literally) with some part. Reason yearns for (and is dissatisfied with what is other to) the best, so it follows the trace of the mark of the best like a hunter follows the trace of his prey. But a distinctive difference separates the hunter of prey from reason: the trace/mark that interests reason is internal to the self that reason serves. In the best sense we can say that the work of development is that of hunting for oneself in the strange terrain of one's own life—the strange body of another—a hunt that constitutes the very life it seeks. The terrain of a life is its traces, its works, creations, progeny. These, considered

as a particular collectivity, constitute a life's embodied trace. The portion of the trace that is closest to hand is the body. The body is the most intimate tracery of the relation of the best to the conditions of its existence. Thus we do not treat the body primarily as a condition, rather, as a medium and milieu—as a text of the life of the soul.

The good doctor would thus be one who read the body's tracery in order to find there the signs of its well-being. He would be guided by the account that the body naturally renders of its good, and he would not mistrust the language of the body (feelings, postures, gestures and the like) or the accounts rendered therein (particularly symptoms). He would know that if language and signs are dissociated from their own ground, i.e., the life of their own corpus, they become free signifiers—capable of infinite self-reference—they truly signify only the fact of being off the trace, they become a labyrinth of darkness. He would also know that in truth no signifier can be free inasmuch as it is read. So one may read others but only for the purpose of reading the reading (my reading of the other is a sign of the best of me) so to be of use to me I must read my reading—read myself reading other. The proper (self-serving) use of work is to create a corpus in which I may read myself. It seems a little like going out of myself in order to come into myself. The condition of my entry is that I already have left and now return. The "entry" is thus in truth a re-entry—which has the form of self-recognition. What difference does self-recognition make? What does self-recognition recognize in its shock or surprise? Perhaps a different relation between itself and what is other than itself, e.g., its heritage, its environment, its practices, its fate, its temptations and the accidents that befall it. The difference is between what merely is and what is influential, compelling and inspiring. The recognition is of the authoritative relationship of the self and the best—the best acts authoritatively in its relation to the rest of the self, which is to say that what the rest is is due to the influence of the best. The way the best exercises its authority is not the way the rest does; the rest seeks to force the whole to accede to its requirements by invoking fear, necessity and obligation. The best is authoritatively influential by evoking a decisive commitment. The best does not insist; it suggests, and its suggestion stirs the self's desire to move itself. Such action is the self's risk of itself, i.e., its offering of its own desire as the ground upon which it moves toward the best as its place of rest. To move in this way is to give oneself pleasure—to enjoy experiencing oneself in the play of one's desire. This play is the gift of the best, it is the gift the best gives to the rest—the gift of luxury—the gift of desire—the exorbitant excess that is never necessary but is what every necessity is recognized to be for. This is the surprise one gives oneself in the shock of self-recognition—the decisive knowledge of what one is for.

So now we can see that the problem of pathos—what makes the pathetic character what he is—is what he is not. He is not for anything—he has no aim—he has no name of his own (no name that calls to him—to which he decisively responds—at best he reacts to his needs—he cannot give himself to another because he cannot give himself to himself)—he is not for himself. As well, we can now see that the problem of the life of rule (geneology, ethno-

graphy, science, etc.) is its impatience—its acceptance of a rule as a surrogate for the best that could call (to) one out of his own immature character. He accepts the appearance of a gift instead of the gift itself. We could say he lacks discrimination (has bad taste, does not know the taste of the best), but that would perhaps itself be premature. We would rather say (it would be better to say) he lacks a sense of timing—of the time it takes to develop a character—the time it takes to find what is best in and for oneself. He settles for what seems good enough for practical purposes, but finds (but we find) that he cannot truly settle himself with (collect himself in relation to) what he settles for. He remains restless—he cannot collect all of the rest because only the best is good enough for that. The life of rule *is* good enough for practical purposes, i.e., it can collect all practices because it is itself a practice—it can collect what is like it. It cannot, however, collect what is not like it, i.e., it cannot collect the desire that animates it and its practices of collecting. It tries to collect all practices because it is not itself limited (centered) in its own particular character. The best is particular in its collection because it can only collect what truly belongs to it by giving itself to what it truly longs for. It gives itself decisively to what it recognizes it belongs to. It truly keeps itself to (for) itself. It is not promiscuous because it only gives its particularity (only can give its particularity) to its *own* other. Desire, unlike rule, can give itself to the rest—but only to the rest of itself. The rest of itself is not everything, but it is what is best for itself—it is what desire is for.

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FROM *SURVIVANCE* TO *RATTRAPAGE*

Greg M. Nielsen

Denis Monière *Ideologies in Quebec: The historical development*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981 (Translated by Richard Howard).

This translation of *Le développement des idéologies au Québec: des origines à nos jours* (1977) by Denis Monière, a political scientist from L'Université de Montréal, will undoubtedly prove to be a useful contribution to the literature on Quebec society available in English. Monière's approach joins an emerging body of work in Quebec which may be situated between a Marxist political economy and a general critical theory. Nicole Laurin-Frenette includes the works of Michel Freitag, Jean-Jacques Simard, Monière and her own as representative of this tendency.[1] Monière's book is an attempt to outline the development of ideologies in Quebec in both their synchronic and diachronic dimensions, that is, a consideration of historical as well as social and economic elements.

Although the original version of the book has enjoyed a remarkable commercial success (more than 20,000 copies sold in Quebec alone), its reception by the academic community has been ambivalent. Controversy has evolved around three issues. In defying an almost twenty year tradition of refusing to accept federal prizes for artistic and scholarly work as a symbol of solidarity, Monière's acceptance of the 1977 Governor General's award for non-fiction in French tends to stand out. A second detail which haunts *Ideologies in Quebec*, is the well documented accusation by the Laval sociologist Nicole Gagnon, of plagiarism. Finally, a more fundamental criticism again raised by Gagnon, has to do with the question of whether or not a work can be considered as a significant scholarly contribution if it makes no claim to original research.[2] Monière's text is such a work. His aim is ambitious, indeed nothing short of a comprehensive review and synthesis of the major works on ideology produced in Quebec. Yet, as he states: "I make no claim to exhaustiveness or originality".[3]

The problem is that the data from which Monière constructs his history of ideologies are entirely secondary. Hence, there is little attempt at reconstructing the methodological assumptions of the researchers who constructed the data in the first place. Without knowing exactly why and how the data was constructed, one can make little if any claim to their validity. At the same time, however, the absence of methodological reconstruction does not negate the provisionary hypotheses and questions which may be generated from the synthesis that he offers, nor its value as a guide to existing debates. This is of particular value to an English-speaking audience in that it brings to life a tradition of Québécois

thinkers, movements and activists which otherwise would remain unknown. This alone constitutes a significant contribution. Still to situate the work and to determine its larger political and social implications we must summarize the structure of his argument.

In his opening chapter Monière outlines a theoretical model for the study of ideology in a dependent society. The discussions of dependency, modes of production, class structure and ideology are presented in the tradition of Marx and Engels. Ideology is understood in terms of universal world views which are ahistorical, yet serve as rationalizing principles for the legitimization or falsification of action. Quebec, as a dependent peripheral society, in relation to capitalist centers, displays particular ideological expressions which may only be explained in terms of the historical specificity of their relations to both internal and external hegemonic processes. For Monière, such an explanation requires a consideration of the development of ideology in relation to modes of production as they emerge, assume dominant positions, decline and are replaced.

Here we must remind ourselves that it is a textbook we are reading and not an in depth look at problems in either marxist theories of capitalist development or general theories of ideology. Monière chooses to avoid the more contemporary controversies in each of these domains while at the same time he poses an alternative to traditional historiography and political science. As a result his approach is somewhat eclectic, citing Samir Amin to explain the colonial and dependent status of Quebec, Poulantzas' theory of social classes and the relative autonomy of the state to explain the transition from feudalism to capitalism,. and Lucien Goldmann's concept of the *subject trans-individuel* to explain the periods of ideological solidarity within Quebec. Unfortunately the theoretical discussion is not systematically integrated into the rest of the text. Monière follows the existing literature, stopping here and there to comment, raise objections or underline certain problems. Even though he does seek out data on progressive social movements, in hopes of avoiding a study exclusively concerned with the history of dominant ideology, he has no explicit theory of emancipation. Consequently, emphasis is placed more on the absorption and domination of emergent cultural practices by the dominant ideology. This tendency is expressed in the selection of the themes which are chosen for consideration, as we see below.

The history of ideologies in Quebec begins in the 17th century wherein feudal modes of production are being replaced or dominated by mercantile capitalist modes. Monière proposes a review of the class formation and ideological expressions of New France using the concept of the petty producer mode of production. Rejecting both the Montreal and Laval schools of history (the latter seeing New France as essentially feudal and the former seeing it as essentially capitalist), he suggests that the petty producers mode within which the majority of the French Canadians participate is neither essentially feudal nor capitalist but that it contains elements of both. It is a mode of production which is dominated first by the French aristocracy and a small French merchant

class and then latter by the British colonizers, the allied local clergy and an emerging middle class replacing the French merchants. Following Rioux and Dofny, along with a long line of others, he argues that the British conquest establishes a double class structure in Quebec. On the one hand, the habitants (petty producers) are subject to the hegemony of the British aristocracy and its middle class control over the macro-economy, while on the other hand it is also subject to the ideological manipulations of the church and an emerging middle class itself in alliance with the British in order to preserve their own immediate interests. With confederation the British aristocracy is replaced by a national anglophone bourgeoisie (the latter representing American capital) which in turn is allied with elements of the new middle class in Quebec who take control of the provincial state. Thus the double class structure is continued.

The transition from the colonizer-colonized to the dominator-dominated antagonisms forced the ideological expression of the Quebec class structure into a long century of *survivance,* a kind of inner retreat lead by Catholic corporatism. Monière traces examples, again following standard arguments, of the dominant gallicist ideology of the French regime, along with the unruly and non-Catholic behavior of the habitants, to the ultramontanist ideological expressions of the local clergy, its control over cultural institutions and alliance with the emerging middle class. The description of ideological world views is prefaced by a discussion of the structural considerations of the transformations of the mercantile, industrial and monopoly modes of production. In each transitional period new formulations of the nationalist world vision of survival emerge. The era of the Duplessis regime marks the last traditional alliance between the rural petty bourgeoisie and the church. The ultramontanist conservatism of the regime could no longer cope with the penetration of the monopoly phase of world capitalism spearheaded by American investments. The result is a an increasingly organized and secular industrial proletariat and a disenchanted liberal intelligentsia who together form a provisionary alliance against the regime. This opposition is expressed in the ideology of *rattrapage* or 'catching up' with the industrial status of other western nations. The *rattrapage* ideology ends with the "quiet revolution" wherein one faction, headed by Trudeau representing another wave of "French Power" in Ottawa, and another representing the independentist aspirations and social democratic tendencies is headed by Lévesque. The ideological formulations of the national question shift from *survivance* and autonomy to *rattrapage* and finally independence.

Whereas the conclusion to the 1977 edition is highly skeptical of the actual intentions of the P.Q. and indeed calls for the formation of an authentic socialist party, there is also a kind of "wait and see" attitude. The postface to the 1980 English edition offers a different conclusion arguing that the federal state structure and the overall double class structure have placed the Québécois in a deep contradiction. On the one hand, their minority status has forced them into a nationalist ideology with autonomous if not independentist aspirations, while on the other hand, federally they are the historical captives of the Liberal party. The only solution to the dilemma is the development of a nationalist philosophy

"which begins by exposing the patterns of domination", according to Monière.[5]

Monière's conclusion contributes very little directly in terms of 'what is to be done' in the future to attain Quebec sovereignty. Indeed he conveniently expresses a plea for a nationalist strategy without designing it.[6] In part this conclusion is not surprising in terms of the marginality of his theoretical approach to the history of ideology in Quebec. The approach is marginal because it is situated between a political economy which emphasizes themes of repression, domination and reproduction and a general critical theory which seeks to elucidate historical specificity, spontaneity and patterns of emancipation. As a consequence the full dynamic of social change in Quebec over the last four centuries remains hidden, largely because the overall tendency of the book is towards the former of these two problematics.

Sociologie
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Notes

1. See Nicole Laurin-Frenette's discussion in "La sociologie des classes au Québec de Léon Gerin à nos jours", Communication présentée lors du colloque *Continuité et rupture dans les sciences humaines au Québec* en octobre 1981, Non-published manuscript.
2. See Nicole Gagnon's review of Monière's book in *Recherches*

2.

2. See Nicole Gagnon's review of Monière's book in *Recherches Sociographiques* XXI, 1-2, 1980, 193-98 and Monière's response in *Recherches Sociographiques* XXII, 1, 1981, 145-46.
3. *Ideologies in Quebec*, p. IX.
4. See Jacques Dofny and Marcel Rioux "Social Classes in French Canada" in Marcel Rioux and Yves Martin *French Canadian Society* Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1964, 307-319.
5. *Ideologies in Quebec*, 312.
6. He does enter the debate in his more recent work. See for example his work with the new political science review *Politique: Revue de la Société québécoises de science politique* 1982 — and his recent book *Pour la suite de l'histoire: essai sur la conjoncture politique au Québec* Montréal: Québec/Amérique, 1982.

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