

HEGELIAN MARXISM AND ETHICS

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I

Did Lukács, as a representative figure of Hegelian Marxism, create an ethic based on overcoming the fact/value dichotomy? To that question we may add another. Do we want Lukács to have overcome the fact/value dichotomy? My answer to both questions is "not completely", and I hope to show that Lukács, indeed the Hegelian Marxist tradition as a whole, has created false friends and false opponents by claiming to have overcome the distance between facts and values, whereas the best work in this tradition has actually created a new way of looking at facts and values which links them more closely than traditional accounts, but still allows some autonomy for value. The result is a Marxist and socialist ethic which differentiates itself from other ethical systems through the way it lessens the gap between facts and values without completely overcoming it.

An example of such false friends and opponents: E.P. Thompson has recently criticized structuralism from the standpoint of a romantic and moral English version of Marxism which he finds exemplified by William Morris. Such a critique should be in many ways amenable to Hegelian Marxists. Yet, in search of an ethical Marxism Thompson has had to counterpose "English poetry" to the tradition of "German philosophy and sociology", in part, no doubt, because Hegelian Marxists have often seemed to simply converge with structuralists in their critique of an ethic based on autonomous values. I submit, however, that a reconceptualization of the Hegelian Marxist tradition on facts and values would show that in the long run that tradition is closer to Thompson on the issue of ethics than it is to structuralism.¹

I say this in spite of Lucien Goldmann's attempt in one of his last essays to sharply separate two lines of Hegelian Marxism on the question of facts, values and ethics: one which did not keep the fact/value dichotomy (himself and Lukács), and one which brought it back (Marcuse and Bloch). Goldmann argued that in Marcuse's philosophy a world of values was set off against a world of facts, whereas Lukács was truer to Hegel in that he overcame the distance between the two. Indeed, Goldmann argued that according to Lukács' own interpretation of left Hegelianism as an attempt to introduce the fact/value dichotomy into a philosophy (Hegel's) which had already overcome it, Marcuse would be a left Hegelian, defender of a Fichteanized Hegelianism in which values are separate from facts, a position which for both Lukács and Goldmann is a distortion of Marxism and Hegelianism.²

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The problem with Goldmann's account is that he presents the overcoming of the fact/value dichotomy as a univocal doctrine in Hegel, Marx, and Lukács and, by implication, in himself. Leaving aside the question of whether it is univocal in Hegel, Marx, and Goldmann (I do not believe that it is), I will argue that it is multivocal in Lukács and further that his most famous work, *History and Class Consciousness* presents a third ethical way between the traditional way of accepting the fact/value dichotomy and what Goldmann presents as the traditional way of overcoming it. I stress that this is a third way and neither simply acceptance of the distance between facts and values nor simply acceptance of the ability to totally overcome that distance. I want to show that Hegelian Marxism has more affinities with, say, Thompson's English moral tradition than might be imagined. But it is not identical with that tradition, and I do not accept structuralist or positivistic accounts that assert such an identity.

This means that I accept many of Lukács' criticisms of autonomous ethics. If there is anything that begins to define Marxist and socialist ethics it is that it establishes itself in part by appealing to a broad range of facts, and analyses of historical laws and structures, certainly a broader range than most other ethical systems. Yet in the end, and this is what Lukács often forgot, understanding these facts, structures and laws, must combine with modes of valuation in such a way that ethical questions are always approached both naturalistically and non-naturalistically; and this combination of naturalistic and non-naturalistic ethics arises both from a factual analysis of what is the case for those moving or potentially moving toward socialism, and a moral analysis of what should be the case for them.

The question of whether Marx himself had an ethics autonomous from his factual and sociological investigations has recently interested philosophers coming from the tradition of English philosophy. Yet I believe that, whatever their intentions, the image of Marx that emerges from those who hold that Marx did not have an autonomous ethics, Allen Wood for example, is not of a person who has overcome the dichotomy between facts and values by changing our conception of both, but of one who has given up the specifically valuational elements; hence, Wood's ultimate resemblance to Althusser. And it is the desire to keep those valuational elements that characterizes the work of Thompson and of Wood's critics, who do have a hard time of it, precisely because what autonomous valuational elements exist in Marx are certainly not presented in the language of English ethics.³

Yet there is something right about these attempts to find autonomous valuational elements in Marx. Marxism needs some autonomy for a valuational language; and this is not just a philosophical desideratum but a need arising out of the failure of the line of automatic progress and the realization, particularly coming from Eastern Europe, that a Marxism without moral choices is a Marxism that will never lead to democratic self-activity. Indeed, the first impulse of that renewed Eastern European ethical Marxism has been to criticize too heavy a Hegelian dose of overcoming facts and values. This is most true of Kolakowski, who has criticized Lukács for giving up on autonomous

ethics, but it is also true of Lukács' own students in the Budapest school. Furthermore, Eastern European doubts on the issue of ethics, facts and values are certainly bound up with changes of emphasis in Frankfurt school thought. Habermas' search for an ethical Marxism has led him to criticize both Hegel and Marx and to argue with Marcuse on the importance of finding a groundwork for ethics; and the body of ethical work produced by Habermas, giving relative autonomy to ethics as communicative action, has been utilized now by the Budapest school as part of the fundamentals of their ethics. Of course neither Habermas nor the Budapest school have gone as far as Kolakowski in accepting the fact/value dichotomy, and they have also, unlike him, remained broadly speaking within the Marxist tradition by continuing to stress historical materialism and the relations of production.⁴

The paradox that emerges from much of this recent work (Anglo-American philosophers who want to find theories of ethics in Marx, Thompson's critique of Althusser, Kolakowski's critique of Lukács, Habermas' critique of Marcuse) is that Hegelian Marxism itself can be seen as one of the obstacles to the creation of a genuinely ethical Marxism. Yet at the same time that this general charge comes into view against Hegelian Marxism, it should also become clear that actual investigation of the broad range of Hegelian Marxists — Gramsci, Horkheimer, Adorno, Goldmann, I.I. Rubin — shows that in their concrete arguments they were usually concerned with opposing some theory which concerned itself only with facts and not with values. However, what differentiates these thinkers particularly from thinkers within the English ethical tradition, is that values are always tied closely enough to facts that it is easy to misread their works and see the Hegelian Marxists as denying the realm of value altogether. In short, the valuational elements present in their work must be decoded in the light of the Hegelian enterprise of changing our ordinary concepts of facts and values. Each Hegelian Marxist is different from those who talk about values cut off from facts and from those who positivistically confine themselves only to the world of facts.

In section two of this essay I examine how one centrally important Hegelian Marxist, i.e. Georg Lukács, adopted a middle way between accepting a world of autonomous values and concentrating on the facticity of the world. Other Hegelian Marxists differ from Lukács, but I believe that often their general problematic was the same as his, i.e. like him they offered different images of human activity and will, according to whether they leaned more toward acceptance of an autonomous world of values or more toward stressing the facticity of the world. In section three I will also suggest that these different images of activity and will can be located in different tendencies in classical German philosophy as well as different tendencies in Hegelian Marxism itself. If Kant and those Hegelian Marxists who stress the superstructure tended toward the view that liberation is a pure act of will, dependent on value autonomy, and Hegel, particularly when he stressed objective spirit and *Sittlichkeit*, and those Hegelian Marxists who stress the relations of production,

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toward the view that the potential for liberation must be lodged in the depths of existing society, Lukács in *History and Class Consciousness* tends toward the view that the potential for liberation is lodged in the deep structures of society analyzed by historical materialism, but can only be brought to the surface by an active creation of the will, which cannot be accounted for in terms of the more determinate structures of historical materialism, and depends upon value autonomy.

Although this standpoint is not exactly the middle way sought by all Hegelian Marxists, I believe that many of the central figures of this tradition (including Goldmann) stressed the autonomy of values more than would be suggested by the catch all rubric "Hegelian Marxists who have overcome the fact/value dichotomy." Indeed I would reverse Goldmann's judgment, which I think is inconsistent with much of his best work, and suggest that neither Hegel nor Marx ever completely overcame the fact/value dichotomy, a task that was more properly left to the right Hegelians. We will never understand Hegel, Marx, or the complexities of the Hegelian Marxist tradition, until we understand that overcoming the fact/value dichotomy always means changing, in many different ways, our concepts of both facts and values and attempting to give a proper combination of a naturalistic ethics, based on a close connection between facts and values, and a less naturalistic one, stressing the relative autonomy of value.

II

I will begin with an analysis of various statements in Lukács' works concerning facts, values and ethics between his early writings and the writing of *The Young Hegel* in 1938. Michael Löwy has recently argued that roughly from 1910 to 1918 Lukács rejected Hegelianism; that from 1918 to 1923 he began to accept it and that in 1923 with *History and Class Consciousness* he did accept it.⁵ Although I do believe that there are three stages in Lukács' thought on these matters, they cannot simply be expressed in terms of Lukács' relation to Hegel, nor are they so easily arranged chronologically, although the logical and the chronological do roughly coincide. Logically one stage is represented by Lukács' early essay on idealism in which he rejected Hegelianism because he saw it as excluding all autonomy for ethics. Another logical stage is represented by *The Theory of the Novel* (1910) and *History and Class Consciousness*. It is obvious that by the time he had written *History and Class Consciousness* Lukács had begun to accept Hegel's critique of autonomous ethics, although I would date the beginning of this acceptance even earlier with *The Theory of the Novel*. However, I hold that the ethical system presented in both *History and Class Consciousness* and *The Theory of the Novel* is one in which autonomous and nonautonomous ethics are combined. One can see this as a blending of Kant and Hegel or as a blending of aspects of Hegel or both. I tend to see it as both, since I hold that neither Lukács nor Hegel ever got rid of non-naturalistic elements in their work except when they became most inclined toward a positivist acceptance of what is. Hegel approaches this in some sections and versions of the *Philosophy of*

Right. Lukács approaches it in the third stage, both logically and chronologically, of this thought, i.e. in his book on Hegel, *The Young Hegel*, as opposed to his book that used Hegel, *History and Class Consciousness*. Actually this third stage in Lukács' attitude toward ethics, which involves more complete rejection of the fact/value dichotomy and increased conservatism, begins between 1925 and 1926 with his review of Lasalle's letters and "Moses Hess and the Idealist Dialectic," and receives its most complete expression in *The Young Hegel*.

I will argue that in these three stages are three concepts of the will and human activity: (1) a stage when accent is put on the power of the will and activity to go beyond facts, a stage when the fact/value dichotomy is completely accepted. In this stage Lukács accepts Kantian non-naturalistic ethics against Hegel; (2) a transitional period to completely rejecting the fact/value dichotomy and accepting a more completely naturalistic ethics. Out of this period the third way on facts and values is constructed; this stage blends naturalistic and non-naturalistic ethics; (3) a stage when action and will become much more based on sociological fact, when Lukács' intention is clearly to completely overcome the fact/value dichotomy and when he comes closest to accepting a completely naturalist ethic. For me Lukács' greatest achievement is in the work of the middle period, for it is this combination of a naturalistic and non-naturalistic ethic which points most clearly to a viable contemporary Marxist and socialist ethic.

Two other points must be added before I begin my discussion of these stages. In the early half of the 19th century in Germany the debate over autonomous and nonautonomous ethics was often set by Hegel's own terminology, whereby *Moralität* was identified with autonomous ethics and *Sittlichkeit* with a nonautonomous ethics, based on existing practice. The problem with this was that *Moralität* was set up as a straw man, easy to knock down and second that *Sittlichkeit* in fact often contained elements of non-naturalism in it. A second point is that Lukács' understanding of this issue was colored, particularly in his early writings, by the neo-Kantian problematic of value, and their understanding of the fact/value dichotomy. In fact Hegel and Marx hardly ever discuss *Wert* in the sense that Lukács understood it. Thus even if one were to hold that Lukács was completely orthodox in his Hegelianism, there would still be the problem of defining orthodox Hegelianism on the issue of ethics and the further problem that Lukács approached the issue with conceptual tools that were not available to Hegel or Marx.⁶

In his 1918 essay on idealism Lukács affirmed the Kantian notion of the primacy of an ethics based on the autonomy of value. There, taking up the question of whether a Kantian and Fichtean opposition of fact to value has to be progressive or conservative, Lukács argues that it can be either. However, Hegelian philosophy does tend to be conservative because of its stress on the facts.⁷ At the same time Lukács criticizes the idea that stressing transcendental values leads away from any concern with changing the facts, by recalling revolutionary and transcendental sects such as the Anabaptists. Indeed it was Lukács' view then, apparently, that Kantianism and Hegelianism may in some

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cases complement each other. The ethical and inner concerns of the one are not completely opposed to the political and external concerns of the other. Indeed, external politics may allow the inner ethical soul to be transformed.⁸ Nevertheless, for Lukács at this time the Hegelian tendency to give autonomy to politics is inherently conservative in that it tends to preserve the institution at all costs. In contrast the idealism of Kant and Fichte is in revolt "against existence as existence."⁹ The importance of this text is not just that it so clearly demonstrates elements of anti-Hegelianism in the young Lukács' thought. It also shows that his anti-Hegelianism is inspired by a moral critique similar to that found in Thompson and, according to Goldmann, in Marcuse; indeed that it would have to be directed against some of Lukács' own later espousals of Hegelianism, but not against all of them. Again my argument is that it would be directed against the conservative interpretation of Hegel found in *The Young Hegel*, but not against the middle way between an ethic based on the autonomy of value and one based on a close intermingling of facts and values that will be delineated in *History and Class Consciousness* and is already foreshadowed in the idealism essay by the reference to the possibility of synthesizing Hegel and Kant and Fichte.

In the second logical period in Lukács' thoughts on facts and values, both a naturalistic and a non-naturalistic ethic are defended. The problem is that the two are not properly united but presented as disjunctive. Thus, in *The Theory of the Novel* the naturalistic ethic is found in Lukács' depiction of ancient archaic Greece, a world opposed to the restlessness of modern times where a realm of values is elevated over a realm of facts. In the Greek world

man does not stand alone as the sole bearer of substantiality, . . . What he should be is for him only a pedagogical question, an expression of the fact that he has not yet come home; it does not yet express his only, insurmountable relationship with the substance. Nor is there, within man himself, any compulsion to make the leap.

This compulsion to leap to self knowledge, opposed to the ability to simply find self knowledge in earlier times, is expressed by the Kantian philosophy whose "new spirit of destiny" would be

folly to the Greeks! Kant's starry firmament now shines only in the dark night of pure cognition, . . . the inner light affords evidence of security, or its illusion, only to the wanderer's next step. . . . And who can tell whether the fitness of the action to the essential nature of the subject . . . really touches upon the essence, when the subject has become a phenomenon, . . . when his innermost and most particular essential nature appears to him only as a never-ceasing demand written upon the imaginary sky of that which 'should be'; when this

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innermost nature must emerge . . . within the subject . . . art . . .
is no longer a copy.¹⁰

What could be more opposed to a Kantian ethic than this characterization of a harmonious society that transcends ethics, because it already has the harmony that ethics seeks? Yet there is another picture of life in *The Theory of the Novel*, one which evokes a Kantian ethic urging people to overcome their alienated situations. How to resolve this paradox? The Kantian ethic is, for Lukács, a necessity in modern times, something which shows the degeneracy of those times; but it is not an eternal necessity, as witness its lack in ancient times (we can leave aside the obvious question of how much Lukács has mythologized ancient Greece).¹¹

Thus, *The Theory of the Novel* (1916) is a combination of naturalistic and non-naturalistic ethics; the idealism essay (1918) is a defence of non-naturalistic ethics; and *History and Class Consciousness* (1923) is again a defense of both naturalism and non-naturalism, but combined more organically than in *The Theory of the Novel*. A point that Lukács makes in the idealism essay may further explain this path from Kant to anti-Kant back to Kant again. He counterposes the different consequences of the ethical and aesthetic or contemplative attitudes. Taking this hint, we may say that although *The Theory of the Novel* at first presents an aesthetic vision of archaic Greece in which Kant's dichotomy between fact and value may be overcome, in reality in the modern period the distance between the two may not be bridged. That is why Lukács seems to accept the dichotomy between facts and values, and an ethics based on this dichotomy when discussing the modern period in *The Theory of the Novel* and throughout the idealism essay.¹² The important point to remember is that in the modern world one must accept the fact/value dichotomy in order to act. Why in the modern world? Because there acting requires being willing to break through the present meaningless factual state of the world. In contrast, acting in archaic Greece did not require an active will but a passive will, since meaning was found in the facts of the world rather than simply being posited there by human beings.

What happens, however in *History and Class Consciousness*, to the principle that to act in the modern world one must accept some autonomy for value? A possibility is that (1) one can learn to act in another way, and (2) therefore one does not need a naturalistic ethic at all. This is how *History and Class Consciousness* is usually interpreted. (1) is certainly a correct interpretation. (2) is the disputed point. The problem is that although Lukács often asserts (2), he also often asserts points that are inconsistent with (2). I will hold that Lukács' original perception about needing distance between facts and values in order to act is present in *History and Class Consciousness*. Indeed I will argue that the blending of naturalistic and non-naturalistic ethics in *History and Class Consciousness* represents a third approach to the relation between facts and values in which the dichotomy between them is lessened but not overcome.

My delineation of this middle ethical perspective is indebted to Michael Löwy's recent attempt to describe the political perspective of *History and Class*

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Consciousness, as located between Lukács' leftism when he first joined the Hungarian Communist Party in 1918 and Lukács' gradual acceptance, in the latter half of the 20s, of a more conservative line. However, for Löwy, *History and Class Consciousness*, is not midway between the two political positions, but remained closer to the leftist period. It is with "Moses Hess" and Lukács' attack on avant garde art at the end of the '20s that Löwy sees the real beginnings of the move to conservatism.¹³ The interesting point, however, is that often *History and Class Consciousness* is closer on the issue of the overcoming of the fact/value dichotomy to the later conservative works such as *The Young Hegel* than to the early works, including those of the leftist period. Yet, if Löwy is right, and I think he is, in political content it is closer to the leftist period than to the more conservative period. To explain this inconsistency we must either assume that the fact/value material in *History and Class Consciousness* is inconsistent with its political content or that the book contains two intermingled accounts of the relation between facts and values. I will uphold the second thesis.

I will distinguish between 6 parts of Lukács' argument. His fundamental overriding standpoint is that the *Sittlichkeit* theory is correct and that this means that the Kantian theory of autonomous ethics is wrong, as well as the Kantian theory, developed more explicit by the neo-Kantians, of the importance of separating facts and values. Along the way he makes the following 5 points: (1) that autonomous ethics should be supplanted by a teleological theory of historical progress; (2) that autonomous ethics leads to an unacceptable way of relating the subject and object. (3) that it leads to passivity; (4) that such an account is individualistic; and (5) that the Kantian theory of autonomous ethics and separation of facts from value does not allow any content for ethics.

Lukács' fundamental point (6) about the opposition between value and *Sittlichkeit* can only be dealt with after the other less encompassing points are analyzed. In section three I will suggest a way in which value and *Sittlichkeit*, autonomous and nonautonomous ethics, can be blended, and also that such a blending fits in with Lukács' standpoint in much of *History and Class Consciousness*. I will now begin with (1) Lukács' critique of value and autonomous ethics from the standpoint of teleology, and show how his argument is connected with his claims about (2) the subject/object relation and (3) passivity. I will then deal with the issues of (4) individuality and (5) lack of content, and finally turn, in section three, to the whole issue of value versus *Sittlichkeit*.

In the early version of "What is Orthodox Marxism?," as in the idealism essay, Lukács had argued that one must scorn the facts and oppose one's will to the facts, that this was the only way to avoid positivism. In the reworked version that appears in *History and Class Consciousness* Lukács argues that 'it is as impossible to impose our will on facts as to discover in the facts a moment giving direction to our will,' i.e., he opposes both the ethicist's scorn of facts and the positivist's worship of facts.¹⁴ What happened between the two versions? Lukács substituted for the concept of morality, based on the autonomy of value, the notion of a teleological tendency which can change the facts toward human desires but is not dependent on either facts or desires. With

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such a teleological tendency Lukács apparently thought that he could do without the autonomy of value, which he had often treated earlier anyway as a kind of transcendental desire to change the facts.

Thus, this is first an argument against autonomous value and then against *Moralität*, i.e. against a non-naturalistic ethic based on the autonomy of value. Even on its own terms, however, the argument only claims that teleology makes value unnecessary, not that value is inconsistent with teleology. Furthermore, value, as Rickert and the young Lukács understood, is not just a desire to change the facts. Thus Hegel's teleological critique of Kantian ethics becomes Lukács' self critique, which he uses to overcome his earlier moralism. But it is not clear that he succeeds. Lukács and Hegel both hold that properly understood the facts have within them the same potential to arrive at the goal, that the ethical would impose on the facts from without. Put another way they hold that the facts have a telos in them. Yet neither Hegel nor Lukács ever show convincingly that if one is going to accept the concept of the teleological as a guide to action, then one has to give up the idea of value as a guide to action. Indeed the structure of *History and Class Consciousness* not only leaves open the possibility that the concept of teleology can be supplemented by an ethic based on the autonomy of value, but in many ways seems to demand this. This is made clear by the way in which Lukács introduces his criticism of autonomous ethics.

When Lukács introduced his critique of the fact/value dichotomy in the section on reification in *History and Class Consciousness*, the book had come to a stop with the subject in capitalism faced with a reified world in which the objectivity of nature and society is out of tune with his subjectivity. Lukács' description of that reification does not, contrary to what some people seem to have thought, imply affirmation of teleology or denial of the autonomy of value. It does involve the ontological concept of the whole of society being out of control of the individual, but that concept does not imply teleology although it does depend on the concept of *Sittlichkeit*.¹⁵ For one could imagine a society being out of control and not tending toward a higher stage. The question of teleology enters when Lukács asks how the individual who is reified can break that reification by participating in a telos moving toward liberation. Lukács acknowledges that he is asking the same question raised by the ethical tradition, which enjoins action as a method of breaking down the reified dichotomy between subject and object and thus of attaining unity between them. "But this unity is activity."¹⁶ In other words the ethical tradition does exactly what Lukács himself has done at the end of *The Theory of the Novel*: oppose to the reified world a world of values which allows the subject to act. It is important, therefore, to remember, that Lukács has shown no evidence that the concepts of teleology and value are inconsistent. It is at this stage that Lukács introduces his second point, i.e. that the theory of value leads to a false conception of the relation of subject and object. This argument, in turn, is closely connected with Lukács' third point, i.e. that emphasis on autonomous value leads to passivity.

Lukács argues that the ethical solution is a paradox. It seems to allow one to break down the subject/object dichotomy, but then it reproduces it even more

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strongly. Why? Because the very fact that the subject must overcome the subject/object dichotomy shows that there still is a dichotomy posed even in the solution to the problem.¹⁷ At this point Lukács has not yet made the passivity argument. Indeed Lukács begins by admitting that those who stress value are interested in change and activity. The major problem with those who uphold the "ought", is not that they do not want to change reality, but that they admit that there is something to change in a meaningful existence the problem of the 'ought' would not arise." But the problem with this viewpoint is that it seems to retreat to the standpoint of *The Theory of the Novel* in that the superiority of a world where values are not opposed to facts lies in the fact that it already has abolished alienation:

For precisely in the pure classical expression it received in the philosophy of Kant it remains true that the "ought" presupposes an existing reality to which the category of "ought" remains inapplicable in principle. Whenever the refusal of the subject simply to accept the empirically given existence takes the form of an "ought," this means that the immediately given empirical reality receives affirmation and consecration at the hands of philosophy: it is philosophically immortalized.¹⁸

From that standpoint the "ought" seems a failure because it has not changed reality. This argument is bad enough. It seems to allow Lukács the position of condemning as ineffective all those who have not yet attained their goals. But Lukács' conclusion that this ineffectivity leads to passivity and worship of the facts is even less warranted.

The striking thing about this criticism is that it brings against the "ought" exactly the arguments that in his essay on idealism Lukács had brought against the overcoming of the "ought": i.e. that it winds up worshipping the present. Indeed if Lukács' Fichtean scorn for the facticity of Hegelian philosophy was strong in the idealism essay, his Hegelian scorn for the facticity of Fichtean philosophy is even stronger here. But we must be dealing with a paradox. Lukács says that stress on values admits the importance of facts because in opposing the facts it admits that they exist. But Lukács would have to be Plotinus himself not to realize that the true self, potentially present in the teleological whole, must have some opposition from the false self, a problem that idealists other than Plotinus from Plato to Augustine have always grappled with. Yet according to his arguments against ethics, such opposition would imply deification of the false self just as admission that the world has not changed would imply deification of the world. As for Lukács' critique of the dualism of the fact/value dichotomy, the same charge can certainly be made against the dualism of the opposition between true and false self which is implied by any theory of alienation or reification.¹⁹ Thus it should be noted that argument one, the teleology argument, suspect anyway, gives rise to arguments two and three, the subject/object and passivity arguments which, in addition to having the

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problems of their origins are also problematic in themselves.

At any rate, Lukács continues his claims about subject/object relations by noting that for pure Kantian ethics there comes to be an absolute dichotomy between the world and the self so that the problem of human freedom becomes almost incapable of resolution.²⁰ When freedom is inner and divorced too much from the world, then it may be true that freedom can never realize itself. But to posit a self totally bound up with the world does not resolve the problem either. I am not saying that Lukács in *History and Class Consciousness* does bind the self totally to the world. Rather, I think that he achieves a synthesis between cutting the self and its values off from the world and indentifying the self with the world. Yet his critique of Kant sounds as though he is simply negating the theory of distance between self and the world and positing immediate identity between self and world; indeed, in "Moses Hess" and even more in *The Young Hegel* Lukács actually does what he only suggests here that he wants to do, namely to totally deny transcendent values and to identify the self with society.

Lukács' criticism that Kant's moral theory simply reproduces the concept of external and internal within the human subject is different from the criticisms we have been considering. It is not simply in need of relativization, but seems incompatible with *History and Class Consciousness* as a whole. For though this criticism may be consistent with the idea that the self actually exists in a state of harmony (the idealized archaic Greece of *The Theory of the Novel*), it is not consistent with the idea that the self is not actually in such harmony but only teleologically oriented in that direction. However, the whole structure of *History and Class Consciousness* depends on the idea that there is a dichotomy between the actual and the potential. Indeed Lukács' theory of alienation and reification depends on the possibility of such a dichotomy. Now even if for argument's sake we grant Lukács that the dichotomy between the actual and the possible does not have to be at least partially described in moral language (a highly doubtful proposition), still it certainly must be describable in terms of opposition between parts of the self.

Lukács' bad arguments do suggest some general problems with the self realization theory. In the self realization theory the dichotomy is no longer between a value out there, and a fact which is the self or in the self. Instead the dichotomy is between the potential and the actual self. However, the potential, it could be argued, is itself a value. The other way of arguing is that the potential self is simply located in history. Now it is obvious that the notion of finding the true self does have to involve a phylogenetic and ontogenetic recapturing of history. However, it is just not clear that is all there is to it. But if it is said that it is more than history, then the true self must be a value or identified partially by values, and we are half way back to Kantianism again. The problem with Lukács' argument here is that he does not understand this. Thus his arguments about subject/object fail as do his arguments about passivity.

It must be stated, though, that Lukács does seem implicitly aware of some of these problems in his characteriations of passivity. Thus, in the course of stressing that the "ought" ultimately involves the will caving in to the facts,

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Lukács notes, nevertheless, that there is a sense in which the "ought" affirms the will in that "to aspire to Utopia is to affirm the will in what is philosophically the more objective and clearer form of the 'ought'." ²¹ This observation is important for its recognition that there is no absolute dichotomy between the stress on action provided by the teleological whole and that provided by the concept of values. Of course, Lukács is not explicitly admitting much here — only to the idea that the ethicist may have the same aim as the one who wants to insert the human being into a teleological process. He is not at all admitting that ethicism can achieve that aim, nor that the inserting of the human being into the teleological whole can itself be accomplished partly by ethical means. It is this latter point which he seems to be admitting when, returning to the theme of how to end reification, which had originally led to his ambiguous attack on ethics, Lukács says that the end of reification can be accomplished only by "constant and constantly renewed efforts to disrupt the reified structure of existence by concretely relating to . . . the total development", i.e. the teleological whole. Unlike that aspect of the thought of Hegel or Marx which stresses that such disruptions can only occur when the facts are right, Lukács then emphasizes that these disruptions can only occur when the proletariat is conscious of the larger issues. Such stress on consciousness seems inconsistent with a strict teleological theory. Consciousness here seems to play the role that value played for the neo-Kantians. Certainly Lukács is not just stressing consciousness of the facts, nor can he be stressing only consciousness of a teleological process. For neither facts nor teleological processes depend on consciousness, but he is talking about actions that do so depend. Lukács' stress on consciousness here thus implies that action is based on something more than facts or teleology: value. When Lukács adds that "what is crucial is that there should be an intention toward totality,"²² he seems to be explicitly admitting, as he once did, that the path to the harmony of ancient Greece, the path to the proletariat becoming the identical subject/object of history, is an intention based not just on integrating facts and values, but also on autonomous values.

Let us sum up. I began by talking about Lukács' three arguments, (1) the teleology argument, (2) the subject/object argument, and (3) the passivity argument. We have seen how intertwined they are, and we have seen the internal problems with the subject/object argument and the passivity argument. There are not as many internal problems in the teleology argument, but the major problem is that Lukács never shows that he has better claims for there being such a teleology than the Kantians have for their being a realm of autonomous value; second, he never really shows inconsistency between the two realms, and indeed asserts points, such as his theory of consciousness, which seem to entail a concept of autonomous value. All these points work together, as I will now show, to raise devastating problems for his teleological critique of ethics.

Again I must stress that although Lukács' solution to the problem of reification in here is different than in his earlier work, the structure of the argument in *History and Class Consciousness* is not new. *The Theory of the Novel* also assumed that there was a golden age when there was no ethics, and another age,

the modern, where autonomous ethics became necessary.²³ Here, as there, doesn't Lukács say that in order to end alienation we must act, the difference being that now we can act not because of value, but because of our participation in a teleological process? It is not enough, however, for Lukács to simply say that now he has overcome ethics through teleology: "the working class has no ideals to realize."²⁴ He must show it and this is rather hard for him to do given that his whole account of consciousness suggests that the objective teleological process of history must be accompanied by conscious acceptance of this teleological process; and the easiest way to analyse this conscious acceptance is as a value acceptance. Thus even if we accept Lukács' teleological assumptions his critique of value is suspect; without them it is of course even more suspect.

Of course a will to act based on the autonomy of value is not necessary for action if one is already in the state of harmony described in the first part of *The Theory of the Novel*. From that standpoint one can critique a non-naturalistic ethic based on the autonomy of value or on the elevation of the will. But the reified modern society described in *History and Class Consciousness* is not harmonious ancient Greece. Lukács wants that modern society to be struggled against. Lukács' admission that only action can give the unity which has been taken away by reification suggests that there is an elevation of the will in *History and Class Consciousness* and I suggest that, try as hard as he can, Lukács cannot avoid the ethical connotations of this elevation of the will.

Lukács himself, as we have seen, connects the issue of facts and values to the question of activity or passivity of the will when he attacks the passivity engendered by the moral attitude.²⁵ Yet this criticism is very strange since he also has given as a distinguishing feature of the philosophy of Kant and Fichte the fact that it is more activist than Hegel's. In his polemic against Kant and Fichte in "Moses Hess" and in *The Young Hegel*, he argued that their elevation of the "ought" leads to too much opposition to reality, too much action, too little passivity. In the idealism essay he had made the same point but from an opposite perspective. Kant and Fichte were praised for not accepting passivity.²⁶ In short, Lukács contradicts himself on the question of whether it is accepting the fact/value dichotomy or rejecting it that leads to activism. He clings to his program in *History and Class Consciousness*, i.e., that he wants action without stressing values, but he cannot even answer his own earlier and later critiques of such a position.

In truth *History and Class Consciousness* is the meeting ground for seemingly opposed tendencies, on facts, values and ethics. Lukács is explicitly arguing that he has overcome Kantian moralism, but in fact there are elements of actionism and moralism in his own account. Thus, Lukács is trying to blend Kant on the one hand and Hegel on the other in a way that he himself does not make totally explicit. This blending emerges more clearly as he works out the details of his opposition of value and teleology. As we saw, one element of opposition is that what is posited as a value outside the fact in ethical philosophies becomes a possibility within the fact when the fact is placed within a teleological process. This allows one to look at facts not just

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immediately but to see them as mediated by the tendencies of the teleological process. It must be recalled, however, that the way in which the teleological whole mediates particulars is different from the way that the reified whole, in which the individual is enveloped at the beginning of *History of Class Consciousness*, mediates particulars. Both mediations involve a distinction between what is immediately perceived and what is mediately true. Yet in the case of the reified whole both the mediate and the immediate are present, whereas in the case of the teleological whole, the immediate is present, but the mediate is only present as a possibility.

It is of the mediating ability of the teleological whole that Lukács is talking when he says that

the category of mediation is a lever with which to overcome the mere immediacy of the empirical world and as such it is not something (subjective) foisted on to the objects from outside. It is no value judgment or 'ought' opposed to the 'is.' It is *rather the manifestation of their authentic objective structure.*²⁷

Although Lukács asserts that the mediating process of the teleological whole is totally different from the "ought", there is some reason to doubt this. The doubt centers on the concept of possibility. The notion of possibilities creates a dilemma for a philosophy of the present. For if one wants to limit the concept of possibility to what is only very close to the immediate present, then one moves closer to positivism, a move which Lukács seems to have come close to making in *The Young Hegel*, and which he was concerned about both in his early writings and in his more radical days of the late '60s. However, if one stretches the concept of the possibilities of the present then there is the danger that one will wind up with utopias of the type that Lukács criticized in "Moses Hess".²⁸ Thus, if possibility is defined narrowly it becomes closer to the facts, if more broadly closer to values. Since possibilities are perceived broadly in *History of Class Consciousness* this suggests that they are closer to values. This fits in with the stress of consciousness which also implies values. Furthermore the logical connection between the two is that it is heightened consciousness which sees revolutionary possibilities more clearly or posits them more strikingly.

In *History of Class Consciousness* Lukács does not achieve an ethics based on the denial of the autonomy of value. It is only with *The Young Hegel* that autonomous values become not so much overcome as rejected. In *The Young Hegel* there is first, less and less stress on consciousness and even on the teleological process both of which, according to *History of Class Consciousness*, were the primary antidotes to the reified world of capitalism. Second there is fuller development of those criticisms of Kant that are indeed crucial for constructing a Marxist ethic, for example critique of the scholasticism and legalism that pervades too much of the Kantian system. Third, combined with *History of Class Consciousness*, Lukács' criticisms of (4) individuality, (5) lack of content, and finally (6) the excessively inner nature of ethics based on autonomous

value as opposed to an ethic based on outer *Sittlichkeit*, are all stated more fully. I will now concentrate on these latter arguments both as they appear in *History of Class Consciousness* and *The Young Hegel*.

As early as *The Theory of the Novel* Lukács had seen ethics as implying excessive individualism. Yet he had not accepted the essential individualism of ethics in the essay on idealism; and in *The Young Hegel* he has to admit an inconsistent critique, namely that Kantian ethics does not stress the individual enough. Even in *The Theory of the Novel* he seems to suggest the possibility of a non individualistic ethics.²⁹ In *The Young Hegel* Lukács continues the argument that the moral attitude is individualistic. However, more and more this point is made contradictory: e.g. when Lukács admits that at Berne Hegel was both a moralist and concerned with collectivity.³⁰ Of course this charge of individualism had always been one of Lukács' weakest points against morality anyway. Indeed we find Lukács simultaneously criticizing Kantian ethics for excessive individualism and for not being individualistic enough, as for example when he accuses Kant and Fichte for erecting an absolutistic morality, which he sees as part of a "desensualization process".³¹

However, the main problem with Lukács' account of individualism is that it simply mirrors the errors and confusions in Hegel's own account. Roughly, the problem is that. The deep problem that Hegel was dealing with in his writing on Kant concerned the relation between an ethics based on existing practice and one that is not. However, since Hegel found, in many formulations of autonomous ethics (a) ontological emphasis on the individual subject and (b) stress on interpretations of right, duty, justice, etc., which entailed elements of economic and political individualism, he therefore assumed for the most part that there was a necessary and not a contingent connection between an ethic not based on existing practices and individualism. This however ignores the possibility of a collective noninstitutional ethic. Furthermore, neither Hegel nor Lukács ever constructed an adequate argument for the essential individualism of autonomous ethics. However, a partial argument can be constructed for both (a) and (b). The closest thing to the former is found in the work of Lucien Goldmann and the closest thing to the latter in the debate over socialist ethics within and without Hegelian Marxism.³²

Lukács' critique of the lack of content of Kantian ethics is also only partially convincing. The problem, however, is that Kant himself sometimes did give his ethics a content and indeed different contents.³³ This, of course, does not get Kant off the hook. One may say, with Hegel, that there is a problem with such an abstract notion of duty which can be interpreted so differently. In opposition to such abstraction, which has to utilize a content anyway, one might like to propose a philosophy like Hegel's which consciously thematizes the problem of content. The problem is that Lukács' and Hegel's principles of social reality, which they use to give a content to the abstract forms of duty, are themselves extremely variable. Thus, for Lukács, one year they center on the mass strike, another year on the Leninist Party, another year on the Popular Front. If Kant's ethical theories are too abstract and need a content, perhaps Hegel's and

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Lukács' theories need some more abstraction in order to prevent them from just taking any moral content they want. Lukács' criticism, then, may be justified, but perhaps may be answered by anchoring Kant's moral philosophy somewhat more to the social world without thereby completely breaking down the dichotomy between facts and values.

Of all Lukács' criticisms, however, I do think that the lack of content argument has the most validity, next to the criticism of the excessively inner nature of Kant's ethics, and I will take up both in section three. For now I would just note that certainly in *History of Class Consciousness* Lukács does not attempt to resolve the question by taking the content of ethics simply from what is the case, but rather from what he thinks will, from a teleological perspective, be the case. Thus, the issue is displaced to the first one of teleology versus value. In contrast, in *The Young Hegel* he takes the content more from what is. This difference conforms to my basic logical reconstruction of Lukács' thought, whereby the first period presents a non-naturalistic ethic, *History of Class Consciousness* and the second period represent a non-naturalistic combined with a naturalistic ethic, and the third period, particularly *The Young Hegel*, opts for a more completely naturalistic ethic. The first is more conventionally left Hegelian, the second neither right nor left and the third tending toward a right Hegelianism in which the autonomy of value is gone.

This leads me to one of my central claims, which is that there is no easy answer to the issue of right, versus center, versus left Hegelianism as the basis of a Marxist ethic. It is not just a question of which is the best interpretation of Hegel, but rather that each option represents a tendency toward emphasizing an ethic based on the autonomy of value, or one based on a close intermingling of facts and values. There is no easy answer as to which is right, except that it seems obvious that it is almost impossible to simply adopt one or the other. They are two extremes of a spectrum, one of which tends to make ethics dependent on facts about human nature and human society, the other of which tends to make ethics more autonomous. In the Hegelian system the tension is represented by the directions of *Moralität* and *Sittlichkeit*. One problem, as we will see, is that Hegel often characterizes these two in such a way that it sounds like *Sittlichkeit* must be the solution, particularly by giving a narrowing reading to the concept of *Moralität*. However, I will argue against this narrow reading. Although *Moralität*, for example, often involves individuality, the moral does not; or at least he has not shown it to, and I will go on to hold that in fact it does not. Nor is the moral particularly tied to a narrow individualistic reading of duty. The moral and the *sittlich* can be seen as two modes of collective self development. I will also contend that the problem with many existing interpretations, including Lukács', is that they give no real decision procedure for choosing the right place between logically reconstructed notions of *Sittlichkeit* and *Moralität*, i.e., that none of the decision procedures work and, more strongly, that there are a number of reasons for why they cannot work unless a naturalistic and a non-naturalistic ethics are combined. The contrast between the practical results of *History of Class Consciousness* and *The Young Hegel* reveal this clearly.

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All the new material on ethics in *The Young Hegel* basically leads Lukács to praise Hegel more and more for his political moderation, his middle political path. Much of the spirit of the book is encapsulated in Lukács' comment that

The outstanding feature of Hegel's position was that even though he rejected the extreme left wing of the French Revolution right from the beginning, he nevertheless retained his faith in its *historical necessity* and to the very end of his life he regarded it as the very foundation of modern civil society.³⁴

Of course Lukács is aware that Hegel's stress on necessity as opposed to Utopia can lead to reaction. Yet he seems unaware that the way in which he formulates Hegel's problem would of necessity lead to a conflict between stress on necessity and a progressive attitude.³⁵ Lukács sees Hegel's developing critique of the moral attitude, from 1799 to 1807 as leading to what he calls Hegel's philosophy of renunciation.

For the later Hegel 'reconciliation' is a category expressing the idea that the objective course of history is independent of the moral aspirations and evaluations of the men active within it. The various philosophies, ideologies, religions, etc., appear correspondingly as intellectual syntheses of a particular historical era. For this reason, Hegel rejects all purely moral evaluations of them. This is not to say that he abstains from any point of view. But his chief criterion is the progressive or reactionary nature of a particular period and not, as earlier on, its relation to an eternal, supra-historical morality. To this extent 'reconciliation' is an index of the great development in Hegel's historical sense.

But the development is highly contradictory. For his use of the category also points to a reconciliation with the most retrograde tendencies of the past and present. In particular, it tacitly accepts the reactionary institutions of contemporary Germany and this leads to the abandonment of all conflict, and of all real criticism, especially with regard to Christianity. Hence, the historical and scientific advance on the moral indignation of his Berne Period exacts a great price in terms of his progressive outlook.³⁶

Thus, Lukács is aware of the problem that reconciliation can be reactionary and not just moderate. But he seems to be unaware that by emptying the concept of reconciliation with social reality of all ethical content, he makes it very difficult for Hegel or anyone else to clearly demarcate the line between simple reconciliation and actual reaction. Certainly, Lukács did have a political

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demarcation in mind between the two but the very connection of that political demarcation with his own situation in Moscow raises with renewed vigor the need for a moral as well as a pragmatic political demarcation between the tendency to reconciliation and the move to reaction. This seems doubly imperative in light of the fact that in *The Young Hegel* the political demarcation is often placed so far to the right. Hegel, for example, is praised for accepting Thermidor, Fichte condemned for opposing it and accused of being naive because he wanted to redistribute property. Although Lukács admits that Hegel may have been more conservative on this issue of property, still, for Lukács at this time, Hegel's very conservatism shows his superiority to Fichte. Fichte is even criticized because, unlike Hegel, he upheld the right of human beings to rebel.³⁷

What happened? What is the relation between this version of Hegel and the version found in *History and Class Consciousness* and the relation of both to Lukács' earlier critique of Hegel's criticism of Kantian ethics. The usual flip way of treating this is just to say that Marx was a left Hegelian. However, Lukács and Goldmann have argued effectively against this standpoint. I would say that they have also shown that Marxism to be viable should not simply be left Hegelian, since this position leaves human activity in a vacuum and not adequately tied to historical reality. I would add that from an ethical perspective left Hegelianism defined in this way would lead to an extreme non-naturalism in ethics. However, in exposing this problem Lukács and Goldmann opened another which they were not adequately aware of, namely that if autonomous ethics is taken to be characteristic of left Hegelianism and if center Hegelianism completely rejects this position, then center Hegelianism of necessity becomes right Hegelianism. This can be taken as a dilemma or as a suggestion that Marxism must combine naturalistic and non-naturalistic ethics. Only the second approach allows us to understand the strengths and limits of Lukács' sixth and final critique of autonomous ethics, that it is too inward oriented. In section three I turn to this issue.

III

It must be kept in mind, that *History and Class Consciousness* and *The Young Hegel*, not only represent different interpretations of Hegelian Marxism, but also different interpretations of cultural history, particularly German history, and I believe that the issue of uniting a non-natural and a natural ethics through uniting collective values and collective praxis, can benefit from both these elements of Lukács' thought. Seen from a cultural standpoint and particularly in the light of Lukács' role in the popular front as a defender of progressive aspects of German culture, *The Young Hegel* defends the enlightenment and those themes which see Marxism and Hegelianism as part of the enlightenment. It resolutely critiques romanticism and interpretations of Hegel and Marx that place them there. Although *History and Class Consciousness* is not a work of cultural history in the same sense, nevertheless in many ways it reflects Lukács' earlier attitude

to literature and culture, which, many scholars now agree, whether they defend this or not, placed Marxism within romanticism and utilized romantic themes. This opposition becomes more interesting if we add that the primary Hegelian and Marxist enlightenment theme that is picked out in *The Young Hegel* is philosophy of history and historical materialism. Indeed in his connection of Marx, Hegel, Smith and the earlier economists, Lukács develops an account of the historical continuity of historical materialism which, when added to his innovative work on the historical novel, produced around the same time as *The Young Hegel*, allow Lukács to be seen as one of the best delineators of the relation between the enlightenment as a whole and the tradition of materialist history, both economic and cultural. But there are striking anomalies in both of Lukács' accounts and in the relation between the accounts. First, his treatment of Kant is very strange. It does, however, speak to the issue of combining a collective value orientation with a collective praxis orientation.

Second, although the reversal from defense of a romantic Marxism to defense of an enlightenment Marxism might suggest that Lukács only provides grounds for continuing to separate Marxism, along the lines of Gouldner, into romantic and scientific Marxism, the fact that both versions of Marx are defended through the same Hegelian categories, albeit with different results in *History and Class Consciousness* and *The Young Hegel*, might suggest that there is some synthesis possible between the Marxism of materialist history, enlightenment themes, and the Marx of romanticism, consciousness and radical potentialities.³⁸ This perhaps lets the cat out of the bag for my ultimate aim. I believe that these two can be combined if the non-natural and the natural ethics of Marxism can be combined and that they must be combined for Marxist ethics to be viable. And combining them would mean combining the theory of base and superstructure, which leads in many of its formulations to a naturalistic ethic, with the theories of radical possibilities and the significance of consciousness for revolutionary change, which lead to a non-naturalistic ethic. The point is that they both lead to an ethic, whereas in most of the debates between the two camps the ethical dimension is not expressed. That is why, going back to my opening comments, E.P. Thompson can connect structuralism with Hegelian Marxism. In this connection there is nothing more important than the reassimilation of Kant and his concerns for collective social values and aspirations back into Hegel and Marx. Yet in both *History and Class Consciousness* and *The Young Hegel*, Kant is treated both inconsistently and shallowly: inconsistently because whereas in *History and Class Consciousness* he is seen as an enlightenment thinker who did not understand the revolution brought in by Hegelian philosophy with its stress on consciousness, in *The Young Hegel* the author of *What is Enlightenment* is treated either as a scholastic fogey or as a precursor to existentialism.³⁹

The shallowness of Lukács' interpretation of Kant is shown by his basic presupposition that the inner in Kant is always individualistic. However, there is another way of talking about inner moral experience and I believe that Kant can also be approached in this way: namely that inner moral experience defines collective value aspirations which have not been manifested in the actually

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existing structure of society, against collective values which have been. On this point Lucien Goldmann's discussion of Kant in *Immanuel Kant* and *the Hidden God* is immeasurably superior to Lukács (although Goldmann often falls back on Lukácsian formulation). For on Goldmann's account tragic thinkers like Kant are usually characterized precisely as moralists who are not individualists, but who uphold a collective value which has less chance of being manifested in the world than in the Marxian or Hegelian system where collective values are seen to be directly manifested in practice.⁴⁰ But it does seem that the reasons I have given for why there is room in *History and Class Consciousness* for an autonomous ethics apply with equal force here. For it is precisely in those sections of *History and Class Consciousness*, i.e. in Lukács' defense of revolutionary consciousness and radical possibilities, in which Lukács seems to need a philosophy of the autonomy of value (even as he denies it) that he also needs a philosophy of collective inner value orientation to be conjoined with a collective praxis based on actuality. There the possibility is raised of combining a romantic and an enlightenment ethic.

In contrast to the view espoused in *The Young Hegel*, for the early, romantic Lukács, the philosopher of revolt, the primacy of ethics, as found in Fichte or Kant, was part of the tradition of revolt, i.e. according to one interpretation, part of the tradition of romanticism.⁴¹ For it seems as though the romantics, like the young Hegelians, try to create a self based on autonomy from facts and this is a revolt against existence as existence, but that then, romantics begin to worry about whether the self can develop in such a way or whether it has to be anchored to facts and tradition, a debate over what I have called the creation of the self versus the discovery of the self.⁴² This debate is carried on in many aspects of romanticism ranging from English poetry to French painting to German philosophy. In English poetry, for example, many of the romantics wound up by submerging revolt in some sense of tradition. There is a similar dialectic in French painting from David to Delacroix. Moving to German literature one also finds this theme in Schiller's concerns over whether the self should be more bound or more structured. It is Charles Taylor's thesis that a concern to find a median point between expressiveness and autonomy, i.e. what I would call naturalism and non-naturalism, is found in Hegel and Marx.⁴³ I would like to suggest that the third ethical way offered by *History and Class Consciousness* combines expressiveness and autonomy by giving a new account of will and activity based on both value and *Sittlichkeit*. This synthesis was all the easier to make in that Hegel's nonvaluational theory of will and activity was originally an overreaction to Kant's overly valuational theory. On this account, both Kant's and Hegel's interpretation of will, activity, and ethics may be seen as part of the romantic debate over tradition and revolt. But obviously looked at this way enlightenment and romantic ethics combine, just as I would like to combine naturalism and non-naturalism, historical materialism and the theory of the self, collective social practice and collective social values. Lukács' attitude toward Kant is a key.

As we have seen, for the early Lukács Hegel was associated with

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conservatism. The reason was that Kant and Fichte were seen to elevate the will, whereas Hegel had attempted on Lukács' view to reconcile the will with the facts, i.e. overcome the fact/value dichotomy. The young Lukács' analysis of Hegelianism and anti-Hegelianism is actually consolidated in *The Young Hegel* except that there Lukács' judgments of the two positions are reversed. Hegel is now praised for his antiromantic spirit of realism whereas Fichte is condemned for his romantic utopianism. In contrast *History and Class Consciousness* represents a third way between acceptance of a world of value absolutely set off against a world of facts and the total assimilation of facts and values.

Now it is certainly true that Kant radically separated fact from value and that Hegel attempted to bring them back together again. However, Hegel's attempt to overcome the fact/value dichotomy is partially a result of Kant's extreme overevaluation of it. Before Kant separated them so much who would have seen the urgency of getting them back together? The fact/value dichotomy would not be perceived as needing radical overcoming if someone had not given a sharp theoretical separation of facts and values in the first place.

What was unique in Kant's separation of fact from value? Here we must sharply separate what a neo-Kantian like Ernst Cassirer gets out of Kant and what a utopian Hegelian Marxist such as Ernst Bloch gets out of Kant.⁴⁴ We must differentiate between the Kant who comes out of the enlightenment and the Kant who comes out of romanticism. What do I mean by this distinction? For those who see Kant as an enlightenment thinker there must be stress on his idea of universalization or duty. For those who see him as a romantic the stress must be more on self-creation, i.e. the spirit of revolt. On my view these two interpretations are not necessarily opposed, although particularly if one emphasizes duty rather than universalization, it is easy to overemphasize the rigid, legalistic, individualistic side of Kant's thought. On the enlightenment interpretation Kant is great because he stresses the moral law. On the romantic interpretation Kant is great because he stresses the self-creation of the moral law. According to this romantic reading Kant is the thinker who attempts to radically impose significance on a universe that is otherwise devoid of meaning; and he accomplishes this by elevating not simply the autonomy of the moral law, but also the power of the will, the power of human beings to achieve self-creation through moral norms. On this reading Kant is part of a whole tradition of thinkers who claim that values are no longer simply given, who insist that human beings must create new values through the will. This is the standpoint of Rousseau, of Nietzsche, of Sorel and of Gramsci. It is also the tradition of the Young Lukács.⁴⁵

The comparison of Rousseau, Nietzsche, Kant may sound strange to some, but once it is seen how both Rousseau and Nietzsche are asking for a new human being rather than simply for a new morality, then we can see how Kant's creation of a new realm of value plays structurally the same role as Rousseau's call for the creation of a new social, "general" will; or Nietzsche's call for the creation of a new individual will. This leads to an analysis of Lukács' opposition between inner ethics and outer practice.

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The creation of a new universal will in Kant involves extending the concept of the individual will to include its relation with other wills. This new general will of reason is social but not necessarily observable in existing societies. Furthermore, Hegel's attempt to overcome the fact/value dichotomy, which usually involves placing human beings within actual existing society, also involves extending the individual will and person to include their relations with others. This interpretation reconstructs the argument between *Sittlichkeit* and *Moralität*. On the one hand, there is the historical method of extending the human will beyond the individual by emphasizing collective praxis. On the other hand there is the moral method of extending the human will beyond the individual so that a collective general will or will of reason is created which is not objectified in existing society. Put another way there is opposition between Kant who usually extends the individual will in an inner but collective direction, and Hegel who usually extends it in an outer and collective direction.

I would suggest, however, that already in Hegel the concept of extending the individual will through practice, although it is different from the Kantian concept of extending the individual will through value, nevertheless, unless it is to fall into a positivistic identification with actually existing society, must keep some aspect of the concept of extending the will through value too. On this account the fact/value dichotomy is not entirely overcome: this is the third way represented by *History and Class Consciousness*. Furthermore, one way of seeing the continuity in the thought of Kant, Hegel and Lukács is to realize that for none of them, at least at their best, is it ever a question of extending the individual will simply through such collective notions as duty or historical praxis, both of which are primarily enlightenment concepts. For all of them the extension of the individual will has an element of romanticism and non-naturalism in it, i.e. an element of revolt and self creation. The extended human will, the new human nature is not only discovered in history, as the enlightenment and enlightenment Marxists emphasize, but also created as romanticism and romantic Marxism stress. This new human will thus allows the combination of enlightenment, naturalistic and romantic non-naturalistic ethics.

Kant may have been one of the first to suggest, along with Rousseau, that one can will to have a human nature. It contrast it seems to have been the view of Leo Strauss, the arch antiromantic, that such a thing is impossible: either one has a human nature or else one wills individuality.⁴⁶ The young Lukács followed Kant. In *History and Class Consciousness* in contrast, Lukács seemed to follow Hegel in arguing that one does not simply will that one has a human nature, but rather that one appropriates a human nature created through existing social processes. For Lukács, willing to have a human nature was to accept the fact/value dichotomy, whereas appropriating a societally-created human nature was to overcome the distance between facts and values. One appropriates a human nature that has been externalized in society. According to this notion the foundation for growth of the self is already laid by the direction pointed to by reified human nature in society. What becomes important is to break that reification either by action or contemplation. But the telos toward change is

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already present in the reification. And this puts limits on how far one can expand the inner collective will. For expansion of that will is limited by how much the inner collective will has already been objectified in existing society. However, it is precisely (a) in the theory of change and (b) in the question of how to come to consciousness of the relation between internal and external that Hegel fails or becomes ambiguous and where the Lukács of *History and Class Consciousness* has to add something which he later described in many ways, but basically was an actionistic element of a type not clearly found in Hegel. I hold that the process of change can only be illuminated by adding Kantian stress on the power of the inner collective will to the stress on the will's objectification in existing society, i.e. adding collective values to collective praxis.

According to the univocal expression of overcoming the fact/value dichotomy, liberation is simply the historical extension of the changing patterns of modern society at whatever pace these changes happen to take. To go beyond or to fall behind that pace is to fail to be in harmony with history, and thus, ultimately, with oneself. The problem with this account is that it is sometimes difficult to separate it from straightforward right-wing Hegelianism. In contrast, according to the commonly accepted dichotomy between facts and values, liberation is a moral demand located outside of society. This is the account of liberation that Goldmann attributes to Marcuse and the left Hegelians. The problem with this interpretation is that it is sometimes difficult to separate it from the straightforward utopianism, advocated by E.P. Thompson or, sometimes, by Ernst Bloch. Finally, according to the third way delineated in *History and Class Consciousness*, liberation is lodged in the depths of society, but can only be brought to the surface as the result of an active creation by the will.⁴⁷

Naturalism and non-naturalism, enlightenment and romanticism, all these themes found their way into Marxism, particularly Hegelian Marxism, and indeed seem jumbled when they are not approached ethically. But it was this combination of elements that allowed 20th century Hegelian Marxists to usually in practice opt for a synthesis of naturalistic and non-naturalistic ethics, even though to later interpreters and indeed to Hegelian Marxists themselves it might seem that the autonomy of value was being completely denied. Labels often remain, however, long after concepts have expanded or been broken down. The idea of a Marxism without values has attained mythical status, but the myth of the severance of Hegelian Marxism from the world of values has been particularly unfortunate because it has tended to create a dichotomy between Hegelian Marxists and their most natural allies.

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Notes

1. See E.P. Thompson, "Romanticism, Utopianism and Moralism", *The New Left Review* 99 (September-October, 1976). For Thompson's extended critique of Althusser from the same standpoint see *The Poverty of Theory* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1978).
2. See Lucien Goldmann, "Réflexions sur la pensée de Herbert Marcuse", *Marxisme et sciences humaines* (Paris: Gallimard, 1970); *Lukács et Heidegger* (Paris: Éditions Denöel, 1973). A clear statement of Marcuse's position is in Herbert Marcuse's *Reason and Revolution* (Boston: Beacon, 1960), p. 8. For an example of Bloch's position see Ernst Bloch, *A Philosophy of the Future* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1970).
3. For an equation of Hegelianism with utopianism see, for example, Gareth Stedman Jones, "The Marxism of the Early Lukács", *New Left Review* 70 (November-December, 1971). For the discussion in English of Marxist ethics see Allen Wood, "The Marxian critique of justice", Ziyad Humsami, "Marx on Distributive Justice", and Allen Wood, "Marx on Right and Justice, A Reply to Husami", all in *Marx, Justice, and History*, ed. Marshall Cohen, Thomas Nagel, and Thomas Scanlon (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980); *Marx and Morality*, ed. Kai, Nielson and Stephen Patten (special supplementary issue of Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 1982).
4. Leszek Kolakowski's critique of Lukács is in *Main Current of Marxism*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978). The discussion between Habermas and Marcuse is in *Telos* 38 (Winter, 1978). For an example of the intertwining of Budapest school ethics and Habermas' work see György Markus, "Die Welt Menschlicher Objecte. Zum Problem der Konstitution in Marxismus", in *Arbeit, Handlung, Normativität*, ed. Axel Honneth and Urs Jaeggi (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1980).
5. Michael Löwy, *Pour une sociologie des Intellectuels révolutionnaires: L'évolution politique de Lukács, 1909-1929* (Paris: P.U.F., 1976), has called attention to the further complication that the essays in *HCC* (Cambridge: M.I.T., 1971) themselves do not reflect a single viewpoint (pp. 202-203).
6. For Lukács and Neo-Kantianism see Hartmut Rosshoff, *Emil Lask als Lehrer von Georg Lukács* (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1975); For a recent discussion of facts and values in Hegel see Jonathan Robinson, *Duty and Hypocrisy in Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), reviewed by Robert Perkins in *Owl of Minerva*, vol. 10 1 (September, 1978); also see *Hegel's Philosophie des Rechts*, ed. Dieter Henrich and Rolf Petch Horstmann (Klett Cotta: Stuttgart, 1982).
7. Georg Lukács, "Idéalisme conservateur et idéalisme progressiste" in Löwy, *Pour une sociologie*, p. 302.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 304. This sharp contrast between inner and outer is denied both in *HCC* and in the more complete overcoming of fact/value found after 1926. Nevertheless, the claim that stress on the inner and on the outer can be brought together seems to anticipate the doctrine of *HCC*.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 316. A comparison between this passage and the Gramsci of "The Revolution against Capital" is unavoidable. It also should be noted that Lukács refutes here the charge that Kantian ethics is formal by noting that its content is the free will (p. 306).
10. Georg Lukács, *The Theory of the Novel* (Cambridge: M.I.T., 1971), pp. 33, 36. In this work the Kantian philosophy is associated with the "productivity of the spirit", (p. 33) i.e. with stress on creating the self. For a further discussion of the concept of the productivity of the spirit in Lukács see Alberto Asor Rosa, "Der Junge Lukács — Theoretiker der Bürgerlichen Kunst", in *Lehrstück Lukács*, ed. Jutta Matzner (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1974).

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11. See Löwy, *Pour une sociologie*, p. 201. *The Theory of the Novel*, pp. 144-153.
12. Löwy, *Pour une sociologie*, p. 167, sees the break between Lukács' November, 1918 article against Bolshevism and his January, 1918 article for Bolshevism as showing his rapid move against Kantianism. However, he also indicates that that very move to Bolshevism was ethical.
13. Löwy, *Pour une sociologie*, p. 228, sees the political shift beginning in 1926, whereas an antileninist might have located it in 1924 with Lenin or even in the final, party essays of *HCC*. Lukács talks of his recognition, after 1924, of political stabilization. See his preface to *HCC*, p. xxviii. Löwy's evidence for the leftism of *HCC* is partially indirect. He notes that it comes out more clearly in an article on literature, "Nathan und Tasso", written at the same time as *HCC* which contrasts Goethe's reconciliation with Lessing's opposition to empirical reality. Löwy contrasts this defense of Lessing against Goethe with Lukács' Moscow literary criticism when Goethe is defended for the very same thing for which he was condemned earlier (Löwy, p. 201-202). The ethics and the politics may have not have kept pace here. It may be that the third ethical way of *HCC* is more consistent with what Feher calls the ethical democracy of the 30's, than it is with the Syndicalism or Leninism of 1920-24. See Ferenc Feher, "Lukács in Weimar", *Telos* 39 (Spring, 1978).
14. *HCC*, pp. 5-10. See Löwy's discussion in *Pour une sociologie*, pp. 203-204 and James Schmidt, "Lukács' Concept of Proletarian Bildung", *Telos* 24 (Summer, 1975).
15. Against Althusser we can say that not all of Lukács' holistic method is teleological; in part his holistic method delineates the power of society over the individual independent of the question of goals.
16. Lukács, *HCC*, p. 123.
17. *Ibid.*, pp. 123-124.
18. *Ibid.*, pp. 160, 161.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 161.
20. Lukács, *The Young Hegel* (London: Merlin, 1975), p. 124.
21. *HCC*, p. 160.
22. *Ibid.*, pp. 197, 198.
23. See Note 11.
24. *HCC*, p. 177.
25. *HCC*, pp. 160, 191, 185-186.
26. Lukács, "Idealisme", pp. 13-14; Lukács, *The Young Hegel*, pp. 244-245.
27. *HCC*, p. 162. We should add that the definition of attributed consciousness in terms of the reified whole deduces what the class feels without using empirical methods such as questionnaires, whereas the definition of attributed consciousness in terms of the teleological whole involves deducing what the class could feel if it could realize its potential.
28. Lukács, "Moses Hess and the Problems of Idealist Dialectics", in *Tactics and Ethics* (New York: Harper and Row, 1975), p. 188.

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29. *The Theory of the Novel*, pp. 66, 48; *The Young Hegel*, p. 151.
30. *The Young Hegel*, p. 7.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 286. Lukács also notes that it was not at Berne that Hegel criticized stress on inner experience. For there Hegel simply started with stress on the collective. It was only in Frankfurt with the *Spirit of Christianity*, that Hegel began to examine the inner moral experience more fully and in the process to criticize Kant's overemphasis on it (pp. 6, 7, 147).
32. Lucien Goldmann, *The Hidden God* (New York: Humanities Press, 1964).
33. On this point see my "The Concept of Community in Kant's Architectonic", *Man and World*, Vol. 2, No. 314 (Summer-Fall, 1978), pp. 372-391.
34. *The Young Hegel*, p. 11. One is reminded here of Lukács' analysis of the middle way followed by the heroes of Scott's novels in *The Historical Novel* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969), p. 36.
35. For a study of the relation between Burke and Hegel which indirectly sheds light on this conflict see J.F. Suter, "Burke, Hegel, and the French Revolution", in *Hegel's Political Philosophy*, ed. A.Z. Pelczynski (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971).
36. *The Young Hegel*, p. 71.
37. *Ibid.*, pp. 285-294.
38. Alvin Gouldner, *The Two Marxisms* (New York: Seabury, 1980).
39. *The Young Hegel*, pp. xviii, 286.
40. Lucien Goldmann, *The Hidden God*.
41. The idea of romanticism as revolt is of course only one possible characterization of romanticism and is inevitably one-sided. Thus if, following Lukács in *The Young Hegel*, romanticism were characterized as individualism, and conservatism (p. 163 and throughout the book), then one is not likely to include Marxism within romanticism, at least not on the basis that both are traditions of revolt. Here the extreme conservatives are likely to help us. Did Irving Babbitt denounce romanticism because of its individualism and conservatism? Did Demaistre and Debonald? Rather they denounced it because it stressed that values were created rather than discovered, a position which can but does not have to lead away from conservatism. Leo Strauss' work is anti-romantic because he opposed the attempt to collectively recreate norms which, for him with the growth of Machiavellism and Hobbism, could only be captured in an individualistic way. See Leo Strauss, *The Political Philosophy of Hobbes* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963).
42. See the Introduction to my *Economy and Self, Philosophy and Economics from the Mercantilists to Marx* (Westport and London: Greenwood Press, 1979).
43. See Charles Taylor, *Hegel* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975). For a discussion of Lukács' relation to romanticism see Paul Breines, "Marxism, Romanticism and the Case of Georg Lukács", *Studies in Romanticism*, vol. 16, 4 (Fall, 1977). Breines has also suggested a connection between recent work on Lukács and English historians such as E. P. Thompson. Michael Ferber has discussed the issue of Marxism and romanticism recently in a review of books by Terry Eagleton and Raymond Williams in *Socialist Review* 46 (July-August, 1979). For relevant accounts of English and French romanticism, respectively, in poetry and painting, see Walter Jackson Bate, *From Classic to Romantic* (New York: Harper and Row, 1961) and Frederick

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- Antal, "Reflections on Classicism and Romanticism", in *Classicism and Romanticism* (New York: Harper and Row, 1973).
44. See Ernst Cassirer, *Rousseau, Kant and Goethe* (Princeton: Princeton, 1970); and Ernst Bloch, *A Philosophy of the Future*, (New York: Seabury), p. 29. To see where stress on Kant's theory of duty can lead see Ferenc Feher, "The Last Phase of Romantic Anti-Capitalism", *New German Critique*, No. 10, Winter, 1977, p. 145.
 45. Antonio Gramsci, *History, Philosophy and Culture in the Young Gramsci* (St. Louis: Telos Press, 1975), pp. 16, 19, 21, Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Genealogy of Morals* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1956), pp. 189-190, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract* (New York: Hafner, 1947), p. 19.
 46. Leo Strauss, *The Political Philosophy of Hobbes*, p. viii.
 47. I believe that today a new such third way is being developed in, for example, Habermas' attempt to link ethics and historical materialism and Gyorgy Markus' linking of ethics and political economy. See Jürgen Habermas, *Communication and the Evolution of Society* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1979); Gyorgy Márkus, "Die Welt Menschlicher Objecte. Zum Problem der Konstitution in Marxismus".