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Japanese critiques

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Technology:
JAPANESE CRITIQUES

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EDITORIAL

Japanese Perspectives on Technology and Rationalization

Technology is *the* keyword of advanced industrial societies, and nowhere is this more the case than Japan which is variously viewed (and feared) as a technological juggernaut in its own right and in its own ideological pronouncements as a "technological state" which perfectly combines technical efficiency, labour discipline, and avante-garde management techniques. This issue shatters these stereotypes of Japanese society by providing a privileged viewpoint from inside the Japanese discourse on technology and rationalization. Taken together, the articles composing the special section on Japan (all specially commissioned and translated by Japanese theorists and writers) represent a coherent, eloquent, and theoretically powerful critique of technology in the Japanese case. Reading the section as a whole provides a moving and analytically rich study of the historical foundations of the "technological state" in Japanese experience, the *actual* strategies of labour oppression used to maintain the speeded-up processes of the techno-culture, and the vast *rationalization* of Japanese language, culture, and lifestyle which has been a necessary reflex of "Japan in the U.S. Dominion". This is one of those rare texts which, just because it is so authentic in its political critique, so comprehensive in its analysis and so leavened with wit, provides that singular experience of opening up the complexities of Japanese society to critical appreciation by outsiders. Following the East Asian practice, all names in the articles on Japan are written with the family name first.

The *Journal* thanks Professor Charles Lummis of Tsuda College for his diligent, creative and entirely paintstaking work in assembling the articles for this special issue. Special thanks are also due to Michael Dorland of *Cinema Canada* for conceiving the idea of the issue, and for making the vital intellectual connections between Professor Lummis and the editorial board. In the third next issue, we shall publish another special theme issue on technology and rationalization, this time in the Canadian case. Titled *Understanding Technology: Canadian Perspectives*, this special theme issue will explore the remarkable development in Canada of a highly original, comprehensive and evocative discourse on technology. In addition to policy analyses of technology in the Canadian context ("technological nationalism" as Canadian ideology), the issue will examine the whole arc of Canadian perspectives on technology, from the critiques of C.B. Macpherson, Harold Innis, William Leiss, Charles Taylor and George Grant to the important writings of Marcel Rioux, Northrop Frye and Margaret Atwood.

Arthur Kroker

Contributors to Technology: Japanese Critiques

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MICHEL FOUCAULT

J. W. Mohr

You too now, after Barthes and Lacan; only Derrida remains unravelling the text of tradition and history. The end of an era? Eras were what captured your imagination, what you formed as images of knowledge and power. Between Marx and Nietzsche you recaptured the oppression of mind and body. But not for you the amor fati or the overcoming of the overman, although you were one of those re-evaluating the values; not for you the revolt of the masses because you sensed that repression was not only the desire of one class but of all classes. And so, following Sartre and Camus of your own tradition you remained a moralist to the end, which came when we were waiting where you would ground the moral of the stories you told.

You wrote what Saussure no longer dared to write at the end of his time and his era. But all you could do in the time that was given to you was to undertake an archeology of knowledge, to trace the order of things which names reason and madness, disciplines and punishes, gives birth to clinic and prison to sterilize and capture the mind, body and deeds of the Pierre Rivières and the Herculine Barbins which represent us all.

But what is this order about, that time after time emerges feeding on repression of the natural order and yet representing the gloria mundi? Time always overtakes our undertakings, Synchronic constitutions dissolve and reform themselves in diachronic cycles. By the time the anomaly discloses itself as the other case, knowledge is replaced by a new power which forms its own knowledge. The translation of the will to know into a history of sexuality is a sign of our time but also grounded in Genesis. Aristotle, the prototype of the kind of knowledge/power which fascinated you, only gives us a gloss in beginning his great Metaphysics with: All men desire by nature to know. He soon concedes that knowledge cannot be derived from nature nor from necessity or desire. You knew that it was not the nature of things but their order which counted and defined us. But who establishes the order, whose will is being done? Modernity, and this was your age, can have no answer for that. It does not even raise the question. Its whole project, its reason/madness is to consign it to forgetfulness. And so you remained stretched out, as we all are, between nature and order, a rake which has not yet produced any new confessions.

You started one of your last interpretations, that of the case of Herculine Barbin with the question: Do we *truly* need a *true* sex? You may well have asked: Do we truly need truth? But then you could not have concluded that ". . . one might have imagined that all that counted was the reality of the body and the

intensity of its pleasures." You, I suspect, knew much more of the reality of the mind and the intensity of its pain. The mind (the sterilized and scientized soul) needs truth; any kind of truth, but can find it only in matter and body, its substance. But this substance without the possibility of transsubstantiation is opaque, it cannot reveal truth, not even through a glass darkly. Truth has to be etched upon it. "For centuries, it was quite simply agreed that hermaphrodites had two sexes." This simplicity, grounded in a different understanding of the body, is deceptive as you go on to show. "... at the threshold of adulthood, ..., hermaphrodites were free to decide for themselves." Condemned to choose, Sartre would have said. "The only imperative was that they should not change it again but keep the sex they had then declared until the end of their lives." This is neither simple nor does it deserve the gloss of 'only'. No imperative does.

But we are promised more on that subject to complete the corpus, the body of your work which remains incomplete for sure. All bodies are incomplete and yet complete in themselves. The end of an era? Of course. What has been cannot be repeated. Every death that touches us is the end of an era. But what of it? To look at your work and to say that it was good in all its completeness and incompleteness is affirmation enough. Some asked us to forget you while you were alive; even this call now turns into recall and memory, a memorial to membership.

Howe Island, Ontario

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INTRODUCTION

JAPANESE CRITIQUES OF TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY

Charles Douglas Lummis

Many reasons have been offered to explain how Japan was able to industrialize so rapidly after the Meiji Restoration of 1868, but surely one of the most important must have been that the country was ruled by military men. The great value of Western technology, however it may be disputed by philosophers, traditionalists, or ecologists, is perfectly clear to soldiers. However "feudal" and conservative Japan's samurai rulers may have been, they knew that what rules in the end on the battlefield is the impersonal laws of physical force. When Francis Xavier wrote in the middle of the sixteenth century that the Japanese value weapons "more than any people I have ever seen,"[1] he was describing a crucial element in the thought-system of the samurai class.

This military universalism operated powerfully when Japan was thrown into crisis by the Western demand to open the country after Admiral Perry's visit in 1853. It is a famous fact, insufficiently pondered by "modernization" theorists, that the two clans most violently opposed to opening the country, Satsuma and Choshu, were converted by devastating attacks from the sea by Western fleets, in 1863 and 1864 respectively. Displaying "an amazing ability to reorient their thinking,"[2] they built fleets and rifle units of their own with which they attacked and overthrew the Tokugawa government, seized power, and established the industrializing Meiji state structure.

Moreover, these soldiers were quick to understand that Western military technique was not simply a matter of ships and cannon. It is recorded that as early as 1841 a demonstration of Western infantry drill was given in the capital. One cannot help wondering what went on in the heads of those robed warriors on seeing such a thing for the first time. Human beings arranged in precise geometric order, their motions coordinated with the precision of a well-oiled machine, disciplined to obey instantly the commands of a single leader — military drill is a perfect allegory for demonstrating the organizational basis of Western power: would not the military mind be the first to see the beauty in it?* It is recorded that some of those who observed the demonstration condemned it as childish, but that the senior officials ordered that it be further studied.[3] When the new government was formed, one of its very first major reforms was the establishment, in 1873, of universal military service in a Western-style army.

As the Meiji government carried out the reorganization of the country into a centralized, industrialized nation state, it did so under an official ideology that

only technology would be imported from the West, while the Japanese spirit would be preserved, but we must suppose that the wisest among the leaders knew that Western technique has a spirit of its own, and that it was precisely this spirit which was needed.** For surely it was the hegemony of the spirit of Western technique — the rational organization of means — that joined the various reforms (centralization of power, centralization of sacredness in the Emperor, establishment of a unified national ethical system, compulsory education, military conscription, the civil code, the factory system, etc.) and made possible the transformation of a land of semi-autonomous farm and fishing villages into a world power.

Nevertheless the *idea* of a Japanese spirit remained, in the form of ideology. Thus in World War II when the Japanese militarist government, already at war in China, chose to take on the Western allied powers as well, it was explained that it was Japanese spirit which would be able to overcome the material and technological advantages of the new enemies. Of the many deep and lasting effects which defeat had on the Japanese people, there is one which is not often mentioned — that since the war was ideologically so defined, defeat was perceived as a victory of technology over spirit, as proof of technology's invincibility. In fact the war proved no such thing, since a major part of Japan's defeat took place in China and other Asian countries, at the hands of troops who had poorer technological and material resources, but more important things to fight for (a country, not an empire), than the Japanese. One of the reasons why the Japanese people still cling to the fixed idea that Japan was defeated by the United States, rather than by an alliance in which Asian regular and guerrilla armies all across their empire played a crucial role, is that the latter view would suggest an entirely different set of lessons from the war than the ones they have drawn. A man who is old enough to remember the end of the war once told me

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* "It was in the army, finally, that the process of mechanization was first applied on a mass scale to human beings, through the replacement of irregular feudal or citizen armies, intermittently assembled, by a standard army of hired or conscripted soldiers, under the severe discipline of daily drill, contrived to produce human beings whose spontaneous or instinctive reactions would be displaced by automatic responses to orders." "Thus the pattern of the new industrial order first appeared upon the parade ground and the battlefield before it entered, full fledged, into the factory. The regimentation and mass production of soldiers, to the end of turning out a cheap, standardized, and replaceable product, was the great contribution of the military mind to the machine process." Lewis Mumford, *The Pentagon of Power*, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1974, p. 150. Sansom notes that Western dress was first introduced into Japan in the form of the military uniform, then later for government ceremonies. "This was an important departure, for it so to speak legalized trousers and abolished flowing robes, thus symbolizing the current change from a leisurely, processional life to a busy, practical striding about the market place." Sansom (cf. note 3) p. 382.

** In his discussion of the fact that the Meiji government failed in democratization while succeeding in industrialization, Sansom comments, "machines will enter where ideas cannot penetrate." But this misses the fact that machines are congealed ideas. In particular, the machines of large-scale industrial production have built into them certain notions of social structure and behavior, in the sense that only in the context of such social structure and behavior can they be put into efficient operation. Sansom (cf. note 3), p. 355.

that he had something close to a conversion experience on the day in 1945 when he first saw some GIs riding in a Jeep. "I asked myself," he said, "how could we ever have imagined that we could defeat a country capable of developing the Jeep?" One can catch the flavor of Japan's postwar ideology by comparing this question to another which could be asked, but rarely is: "How could we ever have imagined that we could defeat so many people fighting for their liberation?"

* * * * * * * * * *

In the postwar period the Japanese people committed themselves to two political principles, peace and democracy, an astounding reversal considering that authoritarianism and expansionist war were the very basis of the Meiji system. It is a great mistake to think of these as merely ideas imposed from the outside, without domestic roots. It is true that the Japanese Peace Constitution was written and adopted under the power of the Allied Occupation, and it is also the case that the Japanese ruling class has not fully accepted its principles to this day. But the commitment of the people to those principles is rooted in their historical experience. Their revulsion against war and fascism was real, and when, with the beginning of the Cold War, U.S. authorities relented and launched a project, in alliance with Japanese reactionary leaders, to undermine Occupation reforms and to reestablish military power (a process that came to be known as the Reverse Course) they fought every step of the way. It was in this fight, more than in the original ratification procedure, that the Peace Constitution was historically legitimized in Japan.

But beneath these political ideals there lay another set of beliefs, so deeply and universally held that no one would have thought of labelling them ideological: the belief in technology and in the value of economic activity. These beliefs, present from the beginning of the Meiji Era, were if anything strengthened rather than weakened by the ideological shift from militarism to pacifism. It was a Pakistani diplomat, not a Japanese, who first labelled Japan an "economic animal," and given the form Japanese economic activity has taken in poorer Asian countries the expression has a critical tone. I think it is insufficiently appreciated, however, that the work ethic which has so powerfully driven Japanese working people since the war is not purely economic, but contains a strong political element: the belief that economic activity is the peaceful and democratic alternative to military activity, a way that one can work for the good of one's country without harming others.

The irony and the tragedy of the postwar period is that the structure within which Japanese workers carried on economic activity was objectively organized as to operate against both peace and democracy. The Japanese economy has increasingly come to depend on North-South exploitation, a relationship which in the end can only be defended by military power. At the same time, economic activity has increasingly come to be a form of struggle in the arena of international capitalist competition: rather than an alternative to war, a kind of warfare carried on by other means. In this situation, the units of struggle — the corporations — increasingly display the characteristics of military organization, both in structure

and in ideology. The military aspect of the forms of technology and social organization adopted by the Meiji leaders — the precise aspect which they found attractive — was not so easily exorcised, even by the adoption of a war-renouncing constitution.

The shape of the technological society projected by present developmental trends can be discerned in the articles that follow: As Yoshioka shows, it is ruled by a military-industrial complex; as Muto shows, it has a working class crushed under a combination of direct oppression and the most advanced form of scientific management; as Muro shows, it places the language and culture themselves under the hegemony of the logic of industrial efficiency; as Hirose shows, it is powered by nuclear energy; as Kogawa shows, it has a public befuddled by a pseudo-public life of consumerism and mass media — some people even wired in directly to the broadcast headquarters: a new display of "electronic individualism".

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The above is of course a picture of the technological society triumphant; it is not a picture of Japanese society today. It is a picture of what Japanese society would look like if the peace movement, the workers' struggle, the environmental movement, the efforts to preserve the integrity of Japanese language and culture, and the struggle for autonomous and critical democratic consciousness, should all fail. They have not, but they are in a state of retreat today.

Japan's present stage of development may be compared to that of North America, particularly the United States, in the 1950s: just when a long-dreamed-of Consumer Utopia appears to have come at last. There is a complex of factors which seems to characterize both: a political shift to the right; anti-communism (both domestic and anti-Soviet); a silent generation of youth (who have no memory of what the earlier generations had done); universalization of TV and its domination over catch-words, fads and fashion; a low point in the workers' movement; explosive growth in the leisure industry; an ultra-romantic ideology of love, marriage, and the nuclear family, coupled with male-dominated, sexual pseudo-liberation; growing violence in the schools: all held together by a euphoria of stylish media imagery and consumerism.* In both cases, there is the illusion that political and social history have come to an end, that "history" henceforth will be limited to the process of economic and technological development.** Many of the books that were inspired in various ways by the particular balance of forces that characterized the United States in the 1950s,

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* The comparison would be brought to an eerie perfection should Japan also have (as is quite possible) its War in Korea.

** An indication of the degree to which the ideology of technological progress grips the popular imagination is the fact that among the cartoon heroes which are popular today in children's comic books and television programs, human beings are overwhelmingly outnumbered by robots.

one thinks of Whyte's *The Organization Man* (1956), Packard's *The Hidden Persuaders* (1957), the last part of Arendt's *The Human Condition* (1958), Bell's *The End of Ideology* (1960), Freidan's *The Feminine Mystique* (1964), and Marcuse's *One Dimensional Man* (1964) — fit today's Japan remarkably well.

In the United States, of course, the 1950s balance of forces that looked like forever collapsed in the 1960s. Here, I believe, can be found the secret of the recent fascination in the United States with the famed Japanese Management System. It appears to American corporate directors that Japan has achieved what they thought they had in the 1950s: a society organized around the business ethic, anti-communism, and a belief in the inevitability of technological development; a society with loyal workers, uncomplaining housewives, unrebellious children; and a union movement broken at last to the will of the bosses. While this Managerial Utopia was shattered in the West, in Japan it seems that the balance may hold. The techniques of management science have advanced since the 1950s, and there are historical and social factors in Japan that appear to make those techniques easier to put into practice. This is what is meant by "Japan as Number One". If one accepts the model of capitalist development in which development is accompanied by the assimilation of more and more spheres of society under the rule of managerial technique, then Japan is not "thirty years behind" after all, but is quite probably the most "advanced" country in the world. This is the society where technology and rationalization have fused perfectly.

But still, the balance is not quite as harmonious as it appears from the outside. As the articles which follow make clear, social peace in Japan is not the result of main social contradictions having been resolved: rather, social peace is maintained by a *complex* of factors and forces — illusion, ideology, intensive scientific management, the absorption of more and more of social life by the corporations, the euphoria of a recently-acquired affluence, and finally physical coercion. As Muro states, the public has so far failed to oppose the computerization of culture not because this process lacks contradictions, but because a kind of *technological fatalism* has prevented people from seeing them. As Hirose convincingly demonstrates, opposition to nuclear energy is weak not because the people do not feel the danger, but because of the same technological fatalism, combined with the fact that most people have convinced themselves that the danger has been kept at a distance: a highly fragile settlement realistically and morally. In Kogawa's essay, manipulation through consumerism and mass media is by no means a sure thing, since it may lay the groundwork for unprecedented and unpredictable forms of democratic liberation. As both Yoshioka and Muto note, Japan's remilitarization — both the actual buildup of forces and the militarization of technological development — are taking place not because pacifism is dead, but because the government has managed to induce them to avert their eyes. Here the balance is particularly unstable and some sudden shock, such as a government decision to send troops to defend Japanese interests in, for example, the Philippines or South Korea, might bring down the whole house of cards. Finally, Muto's article makes clear that class peace in the factory is the result

neither of some peculiar, ancient "Japanese way of thinking," nor of some exceptional benevolence on the part of the managerial class, but rather of a specific and bitter history of struggle, in which workers have been steadily losing ground. Here too management victory is far from complete, and their present dominant position can always be ruptured by unpredictable factors, such as changes in the world economy, the maturation of new generations, the appearance of critical ideologies or the rediscovery of old ones.

Just as history did not, after all, come to an end in North America in the 1950s, it is also not likely to come to an end in Japan in 1984.

Notes

1. Donald F. Lach. *Japan in the Eyes of Europe: the Sixteenth Century*, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1965, p. 669.
2. Edwin O. Reischauer, *Japan, Past and Present*, Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle, 1953, p. 116.
3. G.B. Sansom, *The Western World and Japan*, New York: Knopf, 1968, pp. 251-2.

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BEYOND ELECTRONIC INDIVIDUALISM

Kogawa Tetsuo

At the level of international "common sense," Japan has been considered a society of collective conformity. Most accounts of the now-famous "Japanese management" are based on this notion. However, as Takatori Masao once pointed out, the Japanese have been far more individualistic than they are usually considered in their use of table things such as chopsticks, teacups, and rice bowls. Long before Western individualism was introduced to Japan in the 19th century, the Japanese has been careful about how to use their table things:[1] even today, for instance, *waribashi*, the throw-away chopsticks which seem to be the Japanese counterpart to plastic tableware in the fast-food shop, are not thrown away so much to save the time to wash them, as from the desire to use them as a very private thing, only one time. In the history of Japanese literature, there is a long tradition in which the writer is an isolated recluse (*inja*), a lonely wanderer (*hyohakusha*), or a dissolute loner (*gesakusha*).[2] Thus, the problem is not whether the Japanese are collectivity-oriented or individualistic, but why they have behaved "collectively" in spite of their individualist tradition.

As I have explained elsewhere,[3] the multiplicity of Japanese folk culture was destroyed, on a large scale, by the newly established Emperor System of the Meiji Period and then by the more sophisticated post-war Emperor System. The Emperor System is the "transcendental scheme" under which people are coerced or persuaded into submitting to a collective conformity. It regulates not only the form of the State but also the form of people's consciousness. The pre-war Emperor System replaced the spontaneous, regional and diverse collectivity with a highly artificial homogeneous collectivity, what I have called "*banzai* collectivity." *Banzai* is a special shout and hand gesture of a person or group who blesses the authority (the State, the Emperor, the employer). When a group shouts "banzai!" with one voice, their leader shouts it first, and the others follow. *Banzai* collectivity is not spontaneous but manipulated as a cult. This manipulated collectivity was especially organized after the middle of the *Meiji* era, around 1890, by means of total integration of the educational system, the military system and family life into the Emperor System.

Nihonjin nikansuru Junisho (*Twelve Chapters on the Japanese*)[4] convincingly criticizes the myth of "the group model of Japanese society" as propagated by Nakane Chie, Doi Takeo, Herman Kahn, Ezra Vogel, and Edwin O. Reischauer.[5] Harumi Befu, Yoshio Sugimoto, Ross Mouer and others in this book revealed that such stereotypes of the Japanese as "workoholics" or "devoting the self to the group" are not spontaneous social patterns but political phenomena which

are largely imposed from above by the authority. If the pre-war Japanese society is a good model for such stereotypes, it is so just to the extent that people were forced to submit to strongly centralized and homogenized doctrine. Careful investigations can find a distinct gap between the intention of the dominant system and the "pretended" obedience of the people. The Japanese people never surrendered to the authority but have also resisted it directly or indirectly: what looked like surrender was basically a popular cunning in managing "*honne*" (true intentions and desires) and "*tatemae*" (official stance) properly. According to Yoshio Sugimoto's provocative study, *Popular Disturbance in Postwar Japan*,[6] Japanese society is far from a "uniquely harmonious whole," but every age has witnessed its own kind of conflict. Between 1952 and 1960, there were 945 cases of popular disturbances in Japan which resulted in human injury, property damage or police intervention. By contrast, in France between 1950 and 1960 there were only 163 such cases.

Few popular disturbances are perceived because the control apparatus to quickly absorb them is fully established: mass media. In Japan, mass media tend to function as an apparatus of social amnesia. The prewar Emperor System, lacking in a persuasional apparatus, had to resort to the police to threaten the people into submission. By comparison, the postwar Emperor System stresses the persuasive side of domination with the help of the mass media, and the System is incorporated into a larger reproduction system that has been re-organized on the U.S. model. The centralizing and homogenizing function of the Emperor System harmonizes operated in synch with the mass media and the economic system of mass production and mass consumption. This is the main reason the Emperor System is usually invisible today.[7]

As early as the late 1960s, the life style of Japanese had become largely Americanized. Over fifty percent of Japanese households owned a refrigerator, a vacuum cleaner, an electric washing machine, and a television set, all indispensable to the American Way of Life. Nevertheless, the work ethic and the social behavior were, in the '60s, not so different from the prewar period in their collective conformity. Japanese consumer society was introduced from outside and the "instrumental reason" of advanced capitalism did not yet come into full operation but remained within Emperorism — a variation of State capitalism. Thus, the full growth of advanced capitalism must change and go beyond the structure of the Emperor System. This has, in a way, begun in the late 1970s. If the Japanese system can develop along the lines of technological capitalism as it stands, it might defuse the Emperor System by itself. However, the dilemma of capitalism is that it has to suppress its own potentiality to develop itself: otherwise it will abolish itself. The Emperor System is the decisive factor in the contradictory development of Japanese capitalism. In this sense, today's Japan seems to be on the brink of changing either into a more democratic society or into a far more repressive society.

The Emperor System functions just as long as individualism is repressed. The development of capitalism requires a middle class which is the relatively autonomous (i.e. individualist) stratum. The middle class is the social expression

of individualism. Thus, capitalism has to "promote" the middle class to a certain degree of individualism if it does not so develop by itself. Such is the case in Japan. In the 1960s, when Japanese mass production-consumption economy had just been launched, the system still responded to collectivist needs. Workers and consumers within this system were still expected to form a collective, a (kind of) family. Workers were not so isolated (artificially "individualized") as in today's computerized factory and business office. However, the highly technological development of the production system in the 1970s (a response to the oil crisis and to wage increases) resulted in a major reorganization of the labor market. The current system has a tendency to employ a handful of full-time specialists (very skilled workers, professionals, and administrators) and as many part-time workers as are disposable at any time. This reorganization of the labor market results in an increase of unemployment among traditional workers, a cruel redistribution of labor, an abnormal acceleration of meritocracy, and an emasculation of labor unions and the workers' movement. On the other hand, a new labor market of part-time jobs presents married women with the possibility of freeing themselves from the domestic economy that would otherwise keep them totally dependent on their husbands. This helps, in a way, to raise women's social consciousness, which might burst out into a more self-conscious feminism or critical social movement in the future.[8]

For the moment though, the "independent" woman has become a new consumer. Nonetheless, the level of consumption has also come to have a dual meaning. In the 1960s, popular commodities of the day like refrigerators, furniture, and television sets were not for personal use but for the family. However by the end of the 1970s, the basic necessities of life were supplied in every household, and the system needed more segmented markets than the family or the group for the further development of consumption. A single person has become more desirable than the group. Moreover, even a unit of individual consciousness is segmented into various egos or moments of desire: for instance, various kinds of television sets are invented and sold to a consumer who uses them for different occasions and purposes! Thus market segmentation must diversify the society that had been homogenized by the Emperor System. Of course, marketing techniques cannot totally control such diversification but provide possibilities for consumers to liberate themselves from their forced conformity.

According to the 1981 *White Paper on National Life*, the consumption of quality goods increased in spite of the decrease of disposable income of the salaried classes. Various kinds of wine and cooked quality foods are displayed in the windows of shops, and they, along with other daily goods, are now changing the life style of the Japanese middle class. Even in Tokyo, a kind of "gentrification" is going on right now. Metropolitan areas house an increasing number of professional upper class people who prefer luxurious apartment living to a suburban residence.

The cultural difference between city and suburb is gradually becoming more noticeable. While single persons, childless couples, and the professional upper

class want to live in the city, average middle class people and working class people have an inevitable tendency to live in the suburb. In the city it is expensive to get space enough for a household with children. In order to get their own house, people use a long-term (at least twenty-year) consumer loan, which is more suitable for salaried people with "lifetime employment." This debt then enchains them for the rest of their lives. Consequently, suburban culture becomes more conservative. Debtors of long-term loans can neither make a failure of their lives nor take a risk.[9] This conservative culture is "individualistic" to the extent that its members are egoistic and less concerned about the world outside the family. Their main concern is to develop their family income and have their children go to a "good" school which eventually would guarantee a so-called successful job for them.

In this sense, it is doubtful that salaried people in Japan devote themselves to their companies willingly, in unique harmony with the system. It's more the case that they seem to submit unwillingly to the employer. In recent years, young employees don't like to get together over *sake* or beer with their bosses after work. Such meetings used to have an important function in unifying them as a "family" and was almost institutionalized. During the 1970s, the style of the get-together or party at the drinking establishments was gradually changed. One of the most remarkable changes is the appearance of ***karaoke***, an electronic device with tape-recorder, amplifier, effecter, speaker, and microphone, by which one can sing a song to the taped accompaniment of a professional orchestra. In a party with ***karaoke***, people sing songs one after another. Even at a conventional party people used to sing songs, so it might seem that the appearance of ***karaoke*** has not changed the form of collectivity at all. However, there is a big difference. Careful observation of the relationship between the "performer" and the "audience" reveals that they are united only through the help of electronic media. *Karaoke* performs the function of unifying people who have lost their ability to communicate with each other by their oral media (the body itself).

As far as the present Japanese collectivity is concerned, it is electronic and very temporal, rather than a conventional, continuous collectivity based on language, race, religion, region or taste. A more vivid example of electronic collectivity is the "Walkman," a tiny cassette player with a headphone. "Walkman" is already an internationally popular commodity of SONY, but it has a special meaning in Japanese society. This device is for personal use only, so that the users are isolated from each other even if they listen to the same music source. They are united in the way of marionettes. "Walkman" users form a collectivity of marionettes, maintaining some kind of individualism of the user. When there is a weak pull on the string, the marionette can, to an extent, enjoy a sense of individualism: electronic individualism. When, though, there is a strong pull, the users will be totally integrated into an electronic collectivity just like with ***karaoke***, without knowing they are being manipulated. This really happens to the extent that the music source is not diversified. In fact, most users of "Walkman" in Japan are listening to FM radio, which is awfully monotonous and is not free from the control of the government and the culture industries.

The recent mushrooming of free radio stations in Japan might overcome this electronic collectivity, and help to promote a movement towards an electronic individualism and then, hopefully, an autonomous individualism. Since 1982, hundreds of tiny FM stations, using legal, very low-power transmitters, have appeared in every city of Japan, and are broadcasting their own programs for their limited service areas. Although the area is only a circle with a .3 mile radius at best, in the dense Japanese city this may mean a potential audience of as many as 20,000 people. These tiny radio stations are now succeeding in changing the human relationships of communities in several places. Given the continuing proliferation of this type of station, this "boom" has interesting possibilities.[10]

Although Japanese society has never experienced a bourgeois revolution for individual freedom, today's technological development is paradoxically developing an electronic individualism. This individualism has a dual possibility. It might open up some conditions favorable to the development of radical democracy[11] or it might offer an opportunity for the system to control people in a very sophisticated way: a system in which everyone *felt independent* of the system. It is quite natural that the system tries to protect itself against radicalization by means of robotization in the factory, computerization in the business world and by extraordinary permeation of electronic media in the personal milieu. If people would radicalize this electronic individualism, they might work out a new form of democratic collaboration among individuals, and have an opportunity to overcome the whole form of the Emperor System.

Notes

1. Takatori Masao: *Nihonteki-shiko no Genkei* (*Original Types of Japanese Thinking*), Kodansha, Tokyo, 1975, pp. 8-39.

2. As for this theme, hundreds of books and articles have been written in Japanese. Hirosue Tamotsu: *Yugyo-Akubasho* (*Flânerie-Untouchable District*), Miraisha, Tokyo, 1975 provides a brilliant account of the notions of *inja* and *hyohakusha*.

3. Kogawa Tetsuo: "Japan as a Manipulated Society", *Telos*, no. 49, Fall 1981, pp. 138-140.

4. Yoshio Sugimoto and Ross E. Mouer (eds), Gakuyo-shobo, Tokyo, 1982. This book is a revised edition from the special issue of *Social Analysis*, no. 5-6, December 1980.

5. The following books have had a great influence on establishing such a myth: Nakane: *Tate Shakai no Ningenkankei* (*Human Relations in Vertically Structured Japanese Society*), Kodansha, Tokyo, 1968; Doi: *"Amae" no Kozo* (*The Structure of "Amae"*), Kobundo, Tokyo, 1971; Kahn: *The Emerging Japanese Superstate: Challenge and Response*, 1970; Vogel: *Japan as Number One: Lessons for America*, Cambridge, Mass., 1979; Reischauer: *The Japanese*, Cambridge, Mass., 1977.
One of the best self-criticisms and de-mystifications of American Japanology and Ruth Benedict is in Charles Douglas Lummis: *Uchinaru Gaikoku — Kiku to Katana Saiko* (*Inner Foreign Countries: A Reappraisal of «The Chrysanthemum and the Sword»*), Jiji-tsushinsha, Tokyo, 1981.

6. Yoshio Sugimoto: *Popular Disturbance in Postwar Japan*, Asian Research Service, Hong Kong, 1981.

7. "Tennnosei-Bunkasochi no Kozo" ("The Structure of the Cultural Apparatus of Emperor System"), in my book *Hihan no Kairo* (*The Circuit of Criticizing*), Sojusha, Tokyo, 1981, pp. 91-124.

8. Traditionally, Japanese companies have had a full-time contract with a great number of young women office workers every year who are, however, expected to retire in their late twenties on their marriage. Most of them have been engaged in routine work. This tricky system has been recently going not so well as ever. As the number of single women is growing, companies cannot expect their "spontaneous" retirement. Thus, more "smart" companies have a tendency to reduce such employment and to accelerate the computerization of routine work. In this sense, the women worker in general faces and realizes increasingly explicit social contradictions.

9. Kamata Satoshi provided a shocking account of workers who suffer from "my home" ideology and the tragic cost. See his "Mochiie de Jinsei o Kosokusareru Hitobito" ("People who are Disabled by their Own House"), *Economist*, April 28, 1981. Cf. *Japan in the Passing Lane: An Insider's Account of Life in a Japanese Auto Factory* by the same author, New York, 1983.

10. See my account on "Free Radio in Japan" in Douglas Kahn and Diane Neumaier (eds): *Cultures in Contention*, Seattle, 1984.

11. I use this term in the context of Charles Douglas Lummis: "The Radicalism of Democracy" in *Democracy*, Vol. 2, no. 4, Fall 1982, pp. 9-16.

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SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AT THE TURNING-POINT

FOUNDING THE TECHNOLOGICAL STATE

Yoshioka Hitoshi

Techno-Nationalism

Science and technology in Japan have reached a critical turning point in their evolution. The distinctively Japanese system of technology that developed after the Second World War, characterized by its close links to the private sector, is collapsing. In its place there now emerges a new technological order increasingly shaped by the dictates of national security and closely resembling the dominant mode of techno-scientific development in the West, with its locus in the military-industrial complex. The shift toward a new technical order finds its theoretical expression and justification in what may be termed techno-nationalism.

Technological convergence is part of a broader process of political change that has seen Japan emerge from the ruins of World War II to take its place alongside other industrial democracies as a full-fledged member of the Western world. Surpassing Western Europe in economic power, Japan's influence in the tripolar alliance that constitutes the Free World is now second only to that of the United States. Technical innovation has played an important role in this country's ascendance to economic superpower status. But today, Japan stands at a crossroads: the kind of technical progress its leaders opt to pursue from now on has far-reaching political as well as economic implications. This essay seeks to clarify the meaning and direction of technological change in postwar Japan. Examining the ideological and institutional antecedents of techno-nationalism, it focuses on the emergence in the early 1980s of the technology-oriented state and the period of transition, the recessionary 1970s, that gave rise to it.[1]

State involvement in the development of modern science and technology in Japan may be traced through three phases. During the first phase, extending from the late 1930s until 1945, the massive military build-up of the war years dictated both the rhythm and direction of technical progress. The early postwar period (1945-1955) was a time of transition during which Japan rebuilt its economy and restructured its political and social systems. The population looked to science to provide shortcuts to social progress. But despite high popular expectations, the government failed to implement a consistent and effective technical policy.

The state intervened a second time during the years of rapid economic

growth. Between 1956 and 1973 the economy experienced a major boom interrupted only briefly by the recession of 1964-65. The first burst of sustained growth (1956-1964) was led by the rapid take-off of the basic processing industries, primarily steel and petrochemicals, which was made possible by imported technology. The development of heavy industry was spurred by a sense of crisis brought on by foreign pressures to liberalize trade. The second wave of expansion (1966-1973), was sustained by extending and streamlining Japan's heavy industrial base. Western insistence that the country allow the entry of foreign capital again served as an effective prod to action. During the period of accelerated growth, the state intervened actively, placing science and technology at the service of an expanding economy. Catching up with and matching the West's industrial performance became a national goal. The centralized administrative apparatus required to support technological progress was put in place and consolidated at this time.

The 1973 oil crisis brought an end to the high growth rates and unbridled optimism of the 1950s and 1960s. As political and military tensions in the world heightened, considerations of "economic security" and national defense began to colour the thinking of government planners and business leaders with respect to technology. During the 1960s, technical innovation was promoted in order to hone the competitive edge of Japanese exports, but by the late 1970s, the government had begun to turn its attention to shaping a comprehensive techno-scientific system. The new technical order would enable the state to pursue both economic and politico-military objectives deemed in the national interest. The primacy that has been accorded to the concept of the technology-oriented society since the early 1980s suggests that Japan is now moving toward some form of military-industrial complex. This development marks a historic rupture with the postwar era and sets the country on a new and uncertain course.

In February 1958, twenty-six years ago, the fledging Science and Technology Agency, established two years earlier, issued its first White Paper. The report was subtitled, "From Foreign Dependence Toward Self-Reliant Development." The late 1950s were boom years for Japan, which had just entered its first phase of sustained economic expansion. Yet reading the White Paper, one is struck by the surprisingly small scale of scientific activity in Japan. In 1956, a mere ¥47.5 billion were earmarked for scientific research, and there were only 35,000 researchers in the country. According to the latest White Paper, released at end of 1982, ¥4.7 trillion were spent on research and development in 1980, and 317,000 scientists were engaged in research. In the past 25 years, then, R&D expenditures have expanded by a factor of 100, and the number of research personnel has grown tenfold.[2]

What concerns us here is not the spectacular expansion of scientific research over the past quarter of a century but the 1958 White Paper's emphasis on technology's contribution to economic growth and the need to choose the path of self-reliant technical development:

> The progress of Japanese technology remains dependent on

> foreign technology . . . The greatest problem facing national technology is that of freeing itself as soon as possible from foreign tutelage and following a path of self-reliant development. Research, from which technical progress flows, holds the key to attaining this goal . . . The fact that today Japan is not, as it should be, an exporter of technology is an inescapable consequence of this dependence. The greater part of human and financial resources have been allocated to research projects designed to speed the absorption of imported technology. This emphasis has discouraged technical innovation. More important, the introduction of foreign technology has robbed managers and researchers of the incentive to innovate, causing basic research to stagnate. The introduction of foreign technology has had a negative effect on national research activities whose primary objective is to foster the development of an independent technological base.[3]

Two things are striking about this passage. First, the basic outlook of those who formulate national research and development policy has changed little in the past 26 years. Today, as in 1958, government planners and policy makers are urging an independent course of technical development tailored to the needs of economic expansion. Second, instead of the sense of urgency that informs technical policy planning today, one finds in the 1958 report a bland optimism: Untroubled by outside pressures, the authors of the White Paper are not very clear about why Japan should develop an independent technical base. In the late 1950s, the Japanese economy was still ensconsed behind a thick protectionist wall, and the advanced technical infrastructure that would support later growth was just then being developed. The panic aroused by American pressures to liberalize trade was a few years off. The notion of breaking away from overseas dependence was seen as a progressive idea whose time had come, not as a matter of urgent necessity.

The first science and technology White Paper holds another surprise. Citing the link between technology and military expansion in the postwar world, Japanese planners decisively reject the use of technology for defense purposes, underlining instead its purely economic applications:

> The advance of science and technology is opening up new possibilities in every field of industry throughout the world. In recent years, North America and Western Europe have diverted a significant proportion of their national resources to technical development, budgeting massive funds for education and research. The primary motive behind this effort, however, lies in the rivalry that exists between the Free World and the Socialist Bloc. The leading foreign powers are developing science and technology for defense purposes; technical

> progress in other fields is a secondary concern. As a result, the overall development of science and technology in these countries tends to be circuitous and lacking in coordination. Instead of following their example, Japan (should) choose a road to peaceful, independent development in order to assure national prosperity and raise the living standards of its citizens. Should Japan devote its energies to achieving the technical progress required to attain this goal, the results will be well worth waiting for.[4].

Japan did not break entirely with the Western model of military-led technical innovation, but its decision to adapt technology to economic ends put it substantially behind in military technology and closely related fields, such as aerospace development. However, in other areas, Japan soon caught up with and, in the application of technology to industrial production, often surpassed the West. The prophecy of 1958 has been fulfilled.

Crisis Consciousness

In the space of 25 years, Japan has been transformed from a staunch protectionist nation into a fervent advocate of free trade. Today, its exports are aggressively invading the world market, raising cries of alarm among its major trading partners and aggravating trade frictions. Yet success has not altered the outlook of Japanese businessmen and policy-makers; they have become even firmer in their determination to protect Japanese interests by increasing exports. At the root of this expansionist élan is the crisis mentality formed in the early 60s in response to foreign pressures to liberalize trade and capital. As Japan's vested interests have grown to enormous proportions, feelings of imminent doom have intensified instead of subsiding. In the domain of science and technology, this crisis consciousness finds its clearest expression in the concept of the technology-oriented state, which emerged fully formed in the early 1980's after a long metamorphosis.

The concept of state-led technical development is not new. The 1958 White Paper cited technology as "a vital component of national prosperity." This idea was not formulated as national policy in Japan until the late 1930s, but scientists had pointed to modern technology as a key factor in economic growth early in this century, urging government to use the considerable powers at its disposal to encourage scientific discovery and technical innovation. The *Draft Proposal for the Establishment of the Physical and Chemical Research Institute*, drawn up in 1915 by prominent scientists and engineers, provides important insight into this thinking:

> Our country (is called upon) to establish at the earliest possible moment a physical and chemical research institute worthy of first-rate power in order to promote original research. This is necessary if every industrial field (in our country) is to develop

> and flourish. At the same time, Japan should develop its own research capability and power of invention in order to pay off the debts it has incurred by borrowing foreign knowledge. As we develop our capabilities, we may expect to make our own contribution to the progress of world culture and civilization... The Empire has already fought three great wars, enhancing its prestige and authority (in the world). However, if it is to maintain and multiply this power, the national budget will have to be enlarged substantially. Increasing the wealth of our nation and our ability to shoulder the burdens (of national development) is a fundamental problem of nation-building that requires prompt attention. But our country is small and its land base limited. To compensate for our lack of natural resources which limits the development of agriculture, mining, and other primary industries, national industrial policy must favour forms of production based on (specialized) knowledge. Physical and chemical research is the only source of this knowledge. The Physical and Chemical Research Institute is essential if we are to make full use of scientific research and its applications (in pursuing national development). Its establishment is an urgent requirement of the times.

Substituting science and technology for "production based on knowledge", and updating some of the language, we find set out in rather neat terms here the modern theory of the technology-oriented state.

Of special interest is the emphasis on promoting scientific development as a means of overcoming the limitations to growth imposed by Japan's lack of natural resources, its narrow land base, and its large population. For national planners the 1915 proposal is a fail-safe formula for eternal progress that justifies expansionism in any form. The only substantive difference between the ideas expressed in this document and contemporary thinking about technology is the scope given to military activity. In 1915, the term "first-rate power" reflected Japan's rise as a military nation and the creation of the Greater Japanese Empire in the wake of victories over China (1894-95) and Russia (1904-05). Today, Japan, boasting the world's second largest GNP, has substituted economic prowess for military might.

If the notion of technology-oriented national development is time-worn, its formulation, whether as state policy or ideology (ie: calls to improve the quality of scientific expertise), has always reflected specific national priorities. An early version of this concept found its way into government policy during World War I when scientists were recruited in large numbers to bolster the war effort. But this was only a temporary measure. The military potential of scientific and technical research was not fully appreciated in Japan or the West until the 1930s, when on the eve of World War II, states began to mobilize their respective scientific communities, now a vital asset, in preparation for war.

The scientific establishment was enlisted in support of Japanese colonial policy after 1932, but the scale of colonial research remained small. The full-scale mobilization of science behind the war effort did not get under way until after 1939, following a major military setback. Between May and September of that year, a Soviet armored division defeated Japanese ground troops at Nomonhan in Outer Mongolia. Until then, scientific detachment had been regarded as somehow subversive and unpatriotic, reflecting the nationalistic temper of the times. This attitude changed overnight as the state itself stepped in to update and expand scientific research and explore its practical applications. Rapid technical progress became an important national goal and was codified in slogans such as "Consolidate a New Scientific and Technical Order! Build a National Security State!" The technological state became a clearly articulated national policy.[5]

The problem of recovery obliged science and technology to take a back seat in the immediate postwar years, and further systematization of technical policy was suspended as the wartime scientific establishment was dismantled. By the mid-1950s, however, the United States and most other industrial powers had set up the bureaucratic machinery for framing scientific and technical policy. Japan was not far behind. In May 1956, the Science and Technology Agency was inaugurated as part of the Prime Minister's Office, and in 1959, the Scientific and Technical Administration Commission, the nation's highest advisory body on scientific policy, was established.

Once again, the state took a direct hand in guiding the course of techno-scientific development.[6] In October 1960, the Scientific and Technical Administration Commission published the first programmatic statement on national science policy since the war, the *Comprehensive Basic Policy for the Promotion of Science and Technology in the Coming Decade.* Coinciding with then Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato's "income-doubling plan", the report stressed that technical planning should be geared to specific economic policies. The income-doubling scheme called for the laying down of an advanced industrial infra-structure and the rapid expansion of trade in a bid to double Japan's national income in the decade between 1961 and 1970. To achieve these results, it was proposed that two percent of the national income be allotted to research and development over the 10-year period. The plan deemed that Japan's 170,000 scientists and engineers were insufficient to meet its goals and recommended that the number of students enrolled in engineering and technical courses be expanded. The Scientific and Technical Administrative Commission's report, plainly drafted with the Ikeda plan in mind, made virtually the same recommendations.

Technical Policy and Economic Planning

The close relationship that developed between technical policy making and economic planning in postwar Japan is conspicuously absent in North America and Western Europe. This is not surprising in view of the development of technology for military purposes by Western governments. In the postwar years,

the greater part of R&D expenditures have been paid for out of national coffers, and well over half of these funds have gone for military-related research, an accepted fact of life. In other words, assuming the above estimate to have some basis in reality, at least one quarter of the money budgeted for scientific and technical research in these countries has been channeled into military R&D.[7]

Some readers will object that the very approximate figure of 25 percent is exaggerated, others will say it is too conservative, but both arguments beg the question. The essential point is that military research is the compelling force that has brought science and technology in general to a high level of sophistication. The impact of defense-related research on the evolution of postwar technology has been far greater than the actual budgetary outlays for military R&D would lead one to expect. Without it, today's state-of-the-art technology would not exist, and the mode and thrust of techno-scientific development would be different.

Front-line technology in Japan is nearly identical in structure and function to the military-centered technology produced in the West: in this sense, it, too, bears the imprint of postwar military expansion. Technical know-how developed first in North America or Western Europe for defense purposes has been transferred routinely to Japan as the private sector has discovered industrial applications for it. Nevertheless, on balance, compared with the industrial West, Japanese technology has developed more in response to the demands of private industry and market forces than to defense requirements.

Western countries, though, have not been indifferent to the contribution of technology to economic growth. Focusing on Europe, French political scientist Jean-Jacques Salomon has identified two stages in the evolution of scientific and technical policy in the industrial states.[8] During the formative phase, ie: from 1945 to the mid-1950s, most Western nations created the administrative structures necessary for promoting and sustaining rapid technical advance. The second stage, which Salomon dubs the pragmatic phase, is described as lasting from the mid-1950s to 1967. In the first half of the latter period, strategic concerns determined the pace and direction of technical progress, but during the second half, attention turned to the role of technology in boosting economic performance. As science came to be regarded as a crucial asset in enhancing the competitive power of domestic products internationally, pragmatic economic planners began to insist that national R&D expenditures be raised to three percent of GNP. The new appreciation of technology was stirred by the unprecedented expansion of the world economy in the mid-1960s, and toward the end of this period, priorities shifted. State investment in arms development was curtailed significantly, and more funds were diverted to R&D projects having practical applications for high-growth industries in the private sector.

Japan did not turn its back on the rest of the world during the 1960s. Technical development in the West continued to be tied to military strategy, but these countries were just as determined as Japan to tailor technology to the requirements of a high-growth economy. The era of accelerated expansion saw the emergence of comprehensive technical policies aimed at insuring progress

in both military and industrial spheres. Japan alone, however, innovated exclusively to raise industrial productivity and corner a larger share of the world market for its finished goods.

Many Japanese look back on the era of economic prosperity as a time when the nation calmly set its sights on catching up with the West, rolled up its sleeves, and proceeded to do so. The idea is alluring especially to those of us who grew up in the years following the first oil crisis, *but it is a myth.* A sense of impending crisis generated by outside pressures compelled Japan to chose the path of industrial expansion. Throughout the 1960s, Japanese were captive to two nightmarish fears: the liberalization of trade and the opening of the domestic market to foreign investment.

Japan's mid-1950s policy of heavy industrial development based on imported technology succeeded spectacularly. But, as growth indices soared, foreign pressures mounted on Japan to remove protectionist barriers and free the economy from irrational, "feudal" restraints. Calls for trade liberalization reached fever pitch in the early 1960s, causing government and business circles to react with extreme alarm. The looming spectre of free trade was compared to the forcible opening of Japanese ports by the West in 1853. It was widely feared at the time that Japan, which had just laid the groundwork for heavy industry, would be quickly submerged by a torrent of cheaper Western products and driven out of business: the country would remain forever a producer of light industrial goods. The emphasis placed on developing an independent technical base in the 1961 income-doubling plan reflects the acuteness of this perception. But by 1963, trade liberalization had run its course: Japan's heavy industry remained intact.

By the middle of the decade, however, the West was pushing hard to open the Japanese market to foreign investment. Commodore Perry's black ships were once again sighted on the horizon. Big business warned that if the West got its way, domestic industry would come under the control of foreign capital. Capital was liberalized in five stages between 1967 and 1973. By the end of this period, the basic requisites for Japan's transition to a free-trade economy had been met.[9]

As Japan prepared to grant foreign capital entry to the domestic market, government and business leaders began to call in earnest for self-reliant technological development. The 1958 science and technology White Paper had sounded a similar note, but this time the slogan was being raised with genuine urgency. Ultimately, it was not technical self-reliance that enabled the economy to weather the crisis of capital decontrol but two unrelated factors: corporate mergers engineered by big business in its search for scale economies; and the thorough streamlining of production in the heavy industrial sector.

From the middle to the late 1960s, the clamour for a self-directed approach to technical innovation was accompanied by the implementation of a number of concrete measures designed to bring this about. A series of giant, futuristic R&D projects were started at this time. Nuclear power development was initiated after 1966, leading to rapid progress in applying basic research and readying nuclear

energy for commercial use. In 1967, the Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation was set up as a semi-private company under the Science and Technology Agency. Nuclear power development became a national priority. The aerospace industry also was developed at this time. The Space Development Commission was formed in 1968, followed in 1969 by the National Space Development Agency (NASDA). Until then, the University of Tokyo had directed aerospace research in Japan, but most of the work done there was limited to scientific experimentation and observation. Thereafter, the Science and Technology Agency assumed the lead in this field, taking a more practical approach to space technology.[10]

Large-scale pioneer technology, then, was developed rapidly after the late 1960s, largely in response to foreign insistance that Japan throw open its market. This period also witnessed the first unmistakable signs of a general disillusionment with science and technology. Curiously, however, the huge national projects were not singled out by the public for criticism. Instead, people took aim at industrial pollution and other forms of environmental disruption, technology-based ills that affected them in their daily lives. Technologies not associated with expanding scale economies in the basic processing industries escaped critical scrutiny: the end products of technical progress were attacked, not big technology itself. Under state tutelage, new large-scale projects made rapid strides.[11]

Developing high technology involves two complementary processes. The first is the adaptation of tested innovations to production in order to achieve economies of scale and slash basic production costs. The second is the discovery of new practical uses for frontier technologies. As this often means looking for ways of increasing scale and making such innovations commercially viable, a sharp distinction cannot be drawn between the two aspects of development.

MITI

Throughout the years of industrial expansion, Japan's economic performance did not depend on a series of technical breakthroughs but on the constant improvement of existing technology borrowed from the West. The realization of scale economies remained the primary objective of innovation in the 1960s, but toward the end of the decade, Japan began to explore, in earnest, new scientific frontiers. In 1966, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) set up inside its Agency of Industrial Science and Technology a program to plan and coordinate the development of large-scale industrial technology. The projects involved both the public and private sectors. In a 1971 report, the MITI broke new ground by calling for the priority development of knowledge-intensive industries. The document, *A Policies Vision of International Trade and Industrial in the 1970s*, marked a radical departure from previous policy, committed to promoting scale economies in the basic processing sector. It identified four types of knowledge-intensive industries and proposed the consolidation around this core of a "knowledge-intensive industrial base." These were: R&D-intensive

industries (computers, aeronautics, nuclear power, robotics, integrated circuitry); modern assembly industries using advanced technology (communications machinery, office automation equipment, numerical-control machine tools); fashion industries (haute-couture, high-quality furniture); and knowledge industries (data processing, information services, consulting, computer software, systems engineering).

By the early 1970s the emergence of new front-line technologies developed after the late 1960s had produced a gradual shift away from large-scale heavy industry toward knowledge-intensive high technology. Although the oil embargo of 1973 put an end to the technical boom of the previous decade, the funds allocated to research and development continued to grow for some time afterwards, hastening the transition. The oil crisis also wrought a qualitative change in the very concept of technical innovation. During the 1960s, technical advance was spurred by the need to maintain the competitiveness of Japanese industry in the face of strong Western pressures to liberalize. Rapid economic growth was a national policy goal, and this challenge could be met best by allowing economic necessity to direct innovation. But after 1973, a new concern surfaced, one that continued industrial expansion could not dissipate: national security. The structure of postwar Japanese science and technology, closely attuned to the requirements of the economy and the private sector, began to change, moving closer to the military-industrial model of technical development prevalent in the West.

The Technology-Oriented State

The expression "technology-oriented state" first appears in a policy paper issued by the Scientific and Technical Administration Commission in May 1977 entitled, *Guidelines for a Comprehensive Scientific and Technical Policy in an Era of Resource Scarcity*. The term was not given a precise meaning, however, until the government of Prime Minister Ohira Masayoshi (1978-1980) mapped out its comprehensive national security strategy. Once into the 1980s, the concept gathered public momentum. The expression now appears regularly in official publications, public relations literature, and even in popular magazines and newspapers. Just as an earlier generation of academics attempted to link their work conceptually to the Pacific war, regardless of their legitimate research interests, so scholars today feel constrained to pay lip service if not hommage to the idea. "Building a technology-oriented society" contains an emotional appeal that defies precise definition. It is easily the most effective, far-reaching technical-policy slogan of the postwar period. The 1980 White Paper on science and technology defines the technological state in these terms:

> Our country lacks natural resources, such as oil, and its narrow land base is home to a large number of citizens. It is not an exaggeration to say that (if Japan is) to overcome the severe restrictions (that inhibit its growth) and maintain an average

> real growth rate of 5.5 percent per annum, technical innovations based on scientific and technical progress must be assigned a major role (in economic development) . . . In our efforts to achieve technical breakthroughs independently, technology must be strengthened by promoting basic science and creative human resources must be nurtured carefully. What is demanded of us in the 1980s is the creative development of an independent technology suited to the special features of Japan, a technology capable of generating economic growth and assuring international cooperation. At the same time, a "technology-oriented society" should be built to increase Japan's international bargaining power.[12]

The figure 5.5 percent, obviously unrealistic today, is derived from the *New Economic and Social Seven-Year Plan*, which was released by the Ohira government in 1979. Just as a decade ago, the basic premise remains that technical policy should reflect the objectives of economic planning. But an important new nuance has crept into economic thinking itself: whereas the overriding consideration of policy makers in the 1960s was how to maintain Japan's competitive position internationally, today the key word is "economic security".

Economic security is an ambiguous term, but it seems to be used in two senses: maintaining security through economic growth and insuring the security of economic activity in general. Obviously, the size of GNP is not a sufficient guarantee of national security; economic growth must be accompanied by strong political and military policies. A 1982 report, *The Economic Security of Japan*, issued by MITI's Industrial Structure Council, is helpful here because it supplies us with concrete examples. The paper identifies three national priorities related to economic security: insuring a stable supply of crude oil and other critical raw materials; preserving and strengthening world-system functions; and creating a technology-oriented economy compatible with international obligations. All three objectives are eminently political, and each can be understood to imply some degree of military commitment. Although never defined explicitly, economic security may be thought of as identical with Ohira's concept of comprehensive security: the two-track pursuit of economic and strategic goals.

The 1982 MITI paper introduces another political concept: bargaining power, which is described as an attribute of the technology-oriented state. Like economic security, the term is employed loosely, but it appears to mean two things: bargaining power with respect to the industrial West, and bargaining power *over* countries of the third world.

In the postwar world, technology became a commodity that was bought and sold like any other merchandise. The 1958 White Paper referred frequently to the "commercialization" of technology, an important factor in Japan's formula for economic growth. Japan was able to overtake the economies of the industrial West by acquiring innovations sold openly on the world market. But today we

have entered the age of technological security. State-of-the-art high tech is no longer sold over the counter to any bidder. It can only be obtained in exchange for equally sophisticated hardware or software. To Japan, whose commercial success rests on copying and improving Western know-how, this is a sobering thought. It explains why government and big business are pulling out all the stops to develop an independent technical capability, displaying a determination that was absent in the late 1960s. Simply put, "bargaining power" means the ability to destroy the technological-security shield the West has raised to Japan by capturing the lead in high technology. At the same time, MITI seems to be suggesting that technical advances linked to the modernization of mining, agriculture, and manufacturing be used to strengthen Japan's position with respect to the third world.

The idea of technology as a bargaining tool appeared shortly after the oil crisis as government thinking turned to ways of protecting Japan's access to raw materials. Until the late 1970s, however, when this concept re-emerged alongside that of the technology-oriented state, it was expected that technical progress would solve the energy crisis and lessen Japan's dependence on foreign natural resources. The years between 1973 and the end of the decade define a period of transition. During this time, debate over Japan's technical policy, which centered around nuclear power and alternative energy sources, seemed strangely devoid of substance. The media entertained the idea that technical innovation was dead and speculated that no revolutionary breakthrough was coming. They had a point: the pioneer technologies of the late 1960s had not yet matured: innovation did indeed appear to be at a standstill.

However, in the early 1980s, the technical impasse was broken. Almost simultaneously, the theory of the technology-oriented state emerged, with its implicit emphasis on the potential contributions of technology to national security. In retrospect, the late 1970s, ostensibly a technical void, appears as a critical gestation period during which the ideological foundations of techno-nationalism were laid. Without this rupture in continuity the transition from the high-growth economy of the late 1960s to the high-tech economy of the 1980s would most likely have proceeded unnoticed perhaps robbing the theory of the "technological society" of it rhetorical force.

A Military Technology Gap?

In late 1982, Nakasone Yasuhiro replaced Suzuki Zenko as prime minister. Soon after taking office, the new government announced a major change in national policy on technology. Japan, Nakasone said, stood ready to provide the United States with the full panopoly of Japanese military technology in times of war or peace. Although the new policy made no provision for exporting weapons, now prohibited by administrative policy, it left open the possibility of arms exports at some future time. But supposing Japan chooses this path: is it realistic to imagine that the country can someday rival the United States in armaments production?

Some business leaders boast that with adequate funding, Japan is now capable of developing and producing any weapon available in the arsenals of the West. Specialists, regardless of their political convictions, also tend to agree that Japan has the potential to become a major producer of advanced military technology. The right-wing critic Miyazaki Masahiro, in his book *The War of the Military Robots*[13] claims that in the near future, Japan will have the capability to produce strategic weapons, including aircraft carriers, inter-continental ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, theatre nuclear weapons, nuclear submarines, strategic bombers, neutron bombs, space cruisers, and spy satellites. "Japan's front-line industrial technology", Miyazaki writes, "can be converted into equally advanced military technology at any time . . . As long as the (political) will exists to turn advanced private-sector technology to military use, Japan can become a great military power in very short order, just as the West is insisting that it do. Moreover, this transition could be managed smoothly and very cheaply."

When individual weaponry (eg. missiles) is considered, the technical performance of Japanese armaments and military equipment compares favourably with those produced anywhere.[14] Japan is already one of a handful of countries manufacturing high-quality conventional arms. Much is made of the overwhelming advantage the United States enjoys in the field of military technology (and aerospace development). However, less than 25 years ago, it was being seriously argued that Japan was doomed to remain a light industrial economy. Almost overnight, it caught up in most fields and is now outpacing its Western trade partners in basic commodity production. But while the technology gap should not be exaggerated, producing superior weaponry is not the same as producing better automobiles or computers.

Commercial viability is the premise on which automobile and computer technology has been developed. Since R&D expenditures are normally recovered through profits government support is not required and the private sector can be counted on to provide adequate funding for innovation. The state limits public intervention to selective protectionist measures and special incentive or subsidy programs. A very different set of factors govern the growth and financing of defense industries. No internal dynamic, such as bottom-line considerations of profit and loss, directs the course of technical progress in this case. The government must assume full financial responsibility for insuring the growth and reproduction on an expanded scale of defense-related technology. That is why a military-industrial complex is indispensable for the rapid development of military technology.

Japanese technical progress in defense-related fields is still dependent on U.S. technology; only a political decision can free it from this tutelage. But one can already observe in Japan a convergence between civilian and military technical development, particularly in fields such as electronics where significant advances in both defense and industrial technology are just a matter of time. Today it is not uncommon for private industrial technology to be diverted to arms production and other military fields upon reaching maturity. The fact that the ability of Japanese engineers to design and produce any weapon given

sufficient funding no longer depends completely on U.S. arms technology reflects the increasing overlap between military and non-military technology. Japan will not overtake the United States in advanced military technology with the same ease it has conquered the automobile and computer industries, but it would be a mistake to underestimate the latent military potential of sophisticated private-sector technology.

Some statistics will give us a better idea how far Japan has come along the road to militarization, and how far it still has to go. In 1982, Japanese spending on military R&D accounted for 1.4 percent of defense allocations and 2.5 percent of the total R&D. U.S. military expenditures for the same year came to just under 10 percent of the defense budget and more than 50 percent of the R&D funds were budgeted for military-related activities.[16]

The United States spends more of its national budget on military research than any of the Western countries. But a comparison of defense-linked research funds reveals a particularly large gap in spending between most Western nations, on the one hand, and West Germany and Japan, with the smallest military budgets of all, on the other. In 1961, the United States spent 71 percent of its R&D outlays on military projects, the United Kingdom 65 percent, France 44 percent, West Germany 22 percent, and Japan a mere 4 percent.

The low level of spending on military research in West Germany and Japan reflects the special historical conditions that obtained in these countries from 1945 until the late 1970s. During this period, the victors of World War II assumed the task of defending the defeated powers. As a result, a strong NATO force outfitted with nuclear weapons remains stationed in West Germany today, and Japan is still host to a large number of U.S. military bases under the Japan-U.S. Mutual Security Treaty. Enjoying a position of unquestioned superiority, the U.S. armed forces have shouldered the greatest part of this burden, and their presence has limited the expansion of independent military power and retarded the development of military technology in both Japan and West Germany.

The current round of U.S.-Japanese summitry and statements by the leaders of both countries indicate that the historical specificity of Japan's postwar science and technology is eroding rapidly. The Reagan administration has elevated Japan to the same status as America's West European military allies, even suggesting that its war-renouncing constitution be revised. But more important than outside pressures is the fact that the Nakasone Cabinet itself intends to bring down the curtain on the postwar era. Some critics accuse Nakasone of being a pawn of the United States. Be that as it may, if Nakasone makes good on his promise to transform the postwar system of science and technology, his administration will leave its mark on history.

In 1945, as a 35-year-old Diet member from the Progressive Party, Nakasone earned a reputation for himself when he unexpectedly introduced a bill in parliament to appropriate funds for the construction of nuclear reactors. His maverick intervention launched Japan on the path of nuclear-power development. Again in 1959, as director of the Science and Technology Agency, his first cabinet post, Nakasone set up within the Agency's planning bureau a preparatory

committee to promote the development of space technology. This was the first in a series of moves that eventually resulted in the transfer of leadership of the aerospace program from Tokyo University to the Science and Technology Agency. On these and many other occasions, Nakasone has proved himself an energetic innovator in the formulation of technical policy. He is entirely capable of doing the unexpected and announcing a slate of radical changes designed to overhaul and expand Japan's defense technology program.

The Nakasone Cabinet has been consistently hawkish on defense issues, but compared to other world leaders, the Japanese prime minister is something less than an archmilitarist. However, his government intends to assume its "fair share" of military responsibilities as a member of the Free World alongside North America and Western Europe. Unless it abandons this line, military expansion is inevitable. Military growth, absorbing technical development, may be expected to proceed at high pitch, bringing Japan up to a level of defense readiness considered reasonable by other industrial nations.

But what is "reasonable"? Acquiring a defense establishment commensurate with its economic power would make Japan a military superpower second only to the United States and the Soviet Union. This is exactly what Japan's technocrats have in mind when they speak of ending the era of postwar science and technology. In the four decades since the end of World War II, Japan alone has been able to avoid militarizing its technology. This privileged position is the product of a specific historical situation, and it is not realistic to imagine that it can be defended indefinitely. In fact, there is a very real danger that Japan will someday rival the standards of military technology attained in the West: in which case, it is also likely to internalize the dynamic of military-industrial expansion that propels the economies of the other industrial countries.

The version of techno-nationalism being pushed today obscures these points. Instead, it emphasizes "economic growth", "bargaining power", and — although rarely defined clearly — "crisis management" (one of the legacies of the oil crisis). Yet the concept of comprehensive security has obvious military implications. The total exclusion of this dimension from public discussion of the technology-oriented society, itself one of the corner-stones of the government's comprehensive security scheme, is bizarre: One of the basic tenets of greater state involvement in technical development is left unexamined. Military R&D is an accepted fact of life to Japanese industrialists, but in the universities and intellectual circles, open discussion of this fact is taboo. This prescription is also deeply rooted in the public consciousness. Only in this context can the silence that surrounds the issues of substance raised by techno-nationalism be understood.[17]

Structural Recession/Militarizing Technology

The changes that have occured in technical policy since the era of rapid economic growth seem to point in one direction. Japan is moving from a society in which the primary motif was purely economic to one increasingly dominated

by the national security interests of the state. At the same time, Japan's "unreasonable" stance on defense is being abandoned in favour of policies more in line with the shared assumptions of other advanced nations. Today, as the sun sets on the age of Pax Americana, Japan's position in the U.S.-Japan military alliance is being reinforced amid emerging new international power relations. Given the shift in Japan's defense posture, the subordination of technology to national security requirements cannot, unfortunately, be dismissed as idle speculation. It is true that appropriations for military research remain modest, and Japan still has a long way to go before the military technology gap separating it from the Western powers is eliminated. However, when that gap is closed, or when Japan marshalls its resources and moves to close it, we will have entered a new era, one in which the strategic interests of the state direct the evolution of technical development.

Military expansion is said to impede economic growth. Stepping up defense spending may boost economic activity in the short run, the theory goes, but over a longer period of time, military production siphons off limited resources that would normally be allocated to meet private sector demand. This stifles productive investment and induces recesion. Although some empirical evidence exists to support this contention, attemps to demonstrate a causal relationship between world recession and militarization are not convincing. The frenzied expansion of arms production after the Second World War, for instance, occured amid an unprecedented worldwide economic boom. military expansion must be seen as just one of many factors influencing the pace of industrial growth.

Nonetheless, arguments opposing militarization in favour of arms reduction as a way of boosting economic growth continue to find a willing audience in Japan where this idea couched in sober academic language is advanced to explain Japan's postwar economic success. However, it was not the remarkable expansion of the economy that restrained military expansion, although there was indeed a trade-off between industrial growth and militarization. Japan owes its impressive growth rate to U.S. political pressure and the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, which imposed strict limits on the size of the military establishment and kept defense spending to a minimum. This special relationship prevented Japanese corporations from investing substantially in weapons development and production. At the same time, however, it is difficult to imagine the business world uniting under the banner of disarmament. Today military production is viewed as providing a way out of structural recession most industrialists will not hesitate to jump on the bandwagon.

The argument that sustained industrial growth is incompatible with armaments production is flawed on another point: the uncritical assumption that economic progress is desirable in itself. It overlooks the fact that Japan's bloated economy now produces 10 percent of the world's goods and services, as measured by GNP; that in its rise as a economic superpower, Japan has acquired huge vested interests; that the strategy of comprehensive security with its implied use of military force has become an indispensable requisite for further

industrial expansion. Given the ballooning of interests that need protecting and the restructuring of the political and military framework within which postwar economic growth has taken place, it is entirely unrealistic to suppose that Japan can continue to rely on its ability to maintain a competitive position in the world market by economic means alone. Unless Japan sheds its "economic animal" mentality and disabuses itself of the illusion that industrial growth is inherently good, it will not be possible to refute the technology-oriented state.

Superstate Japan

Driven by a sense of crisis, the Japanese have displayed amazing single-mindedness and sense of purpose in devising solutions to the complex economic problems of the postwar period. But, paradoxically, successfully clearing one hurdle after another — the liberalization of trade and capital, the oil embargo, and overcoming protectionism in trade and technology — has imprisoned them in a crisis mentality. This mind-set provides the energy that fuels industrial expansionism. When Japan was a relatively backward country trying to catch up with the West, the world could turn a blind eye to expansionism. When the world economy was still in full swing, Japan could be forgiven for taking a slightly larger piece of the pie. But this best of all possible worlds came to an abrupt end with the 1973 crisis. Capitalizing on its rapid recovery from the oil "shock", Japan has improved the competitiveness of its industrial products, outperforming North America and Western Europe. The subsequent export drive got underway just as the world economy receded deeply into stagnation. In recessionary times such behaviour is seen by other countries as overbearing and aggressive and led to threats of retaliation.

Pleading resource poverty, a small national territory, and a large population does not justify naked expansionism. A case can be made for Japan's overseas advance and its flooding of world markets with cheap industrial goods on the grounds of economic survival, but only as long as Japan's standard of living is comparable with other industrial countries. Today, Japan has far surpassed that level. In an age of worldwide poverty and hunger, nothing can excuse its monopolization of world resources. The glaring injustice of a country that has only 2.5 percent of the world's population yet produces 10 percent of its GNP is evident to all. Even if it reduced its economic activities by half, Japan would still occupy a privileged position internationally. But the expansionism of the strong knows no limits. That this thrust really hides a deep-seated fear of economic collapse only makes matters worse. It is this kind of thinking that produced the comprehensive security strategy and that now motivates calls for the building of a technology-oriented society. Given the influence Japan already wields in the world, techno-nationalism not only betrays the arrogance of power; it is dangerous. In exposing and refuting the logic of the technology-oriented state, it will not be enough to point to the probable consequences of this project. While the public must be alerted to the dangers of militarizing technology, so long as

the expansionist ideology of the powerful, fed by the fear of economic ruin, is not debunked and abandoned, the state will move to protect its vested interests, sweeping all criticism aside. What is required is a basic rethinking of the premises of Superstate Japan as it nears the end of its postwar adolescence. This essay has attempted to situate the rise of the technology-oriented state in the context of the postwar development of Japanese science and technology. As the outlines of the new technical order become clearer, a deeper understanding of what state-led, technology-oriented national development means for Japan, its Asian neighbours, and the world will become absolutely essential. This is a collective task that will require the efforts of many minds.

Notes

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1. "Turning-point" is a convenient phrase whose imprecision encourages abuse. At worst it is an empty rhetorical devise used to dignify the titles of scholarly works by giving them a vaguely progressive allure. Even researchers who employ the term with care are apt to give it a subjective twist, intending some nuance of social progress. Few writers who really believed society was entering a period of decadence would characterise the present period as a turning point. The uncritical use of this concept robs it of explanatory power, obscures the dynamics of social change, and makes it difficult to identify historical turning points when they actually appear, particularly where the transition is in a direction judged socially undesirable.

2. In current terms, the ¥47.4 billion spent on research and development in 1956 is a mere drop in the bucket. In 1982, ¥52.3 billion were budgeted for nuclear fusion research alone.

3. *White Paper on Science and Technology in Japan — From Foreign Dependence Toward Self-Reliant Development* (in Japanese), FY1958, pp. 32-33.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 46.

5. In discussing the role to be played by the new scientific and technical order, the accent was invariably placed on its military importance, and this was as true in the West as in Japan. See HIROSHIGE Tetsu, *A Social History of Science (Kagaku no shakai-shi)*, Chuo Koron-Sha, 1973.

6. Hiroshige has referred to this as the "capture of science by the Establishment" (*kagaku no taiseika*), *ibid.*

7. In other words, one out of every four researchers is involved in military-related work. If all scientists who have engaged in such research at least once in their career are considered, then the overwhelming majority have contributed in some way to military expansion. No other profession is so closely tied to the military establishment.

8. Jean-Jacques Salomon, "Science Policy Studies and the Development of Science Policy", in I. Spiegel-Rösing and D. de S. Price (eds.), *Science, Technology and Society: A Cross-Disciplinary Perspective*, Sage Publications, 1977, pp. 43-70.

9. In just 10 years, Japan changed from a staunch protectionist into an advocate of free trade, a switch that has embroiled it in heated controversies with its major trade partners. The Japanese case is a paradigm of just how extreme what Marxists refer to as capitalism's uneven development can become.

10. See the author's "National Space Technology: The First 30 Years" (*Kokosan supeisutekunorojii — sabjyussai no sugao*), in *Diamond Popular Science*, April, 1983.

11. An exception is nuclear energy, which, like the heavy and chemical industries, seeks economies of scale. Since the mid-1970's, nuclear-power development has become a major social problem. It remains one of the most crucial challenges facing modern science and technology.

12. *White Paper on Science and Technology in Japan — International Comparisons and Future Tasks* (in Japanese), FY1980, p. 116.

13. Miyazaki, Masahiro, *The War of the Military Robots (Gunji robotto senso)*, Daiyamondo-sha, 1982, pp. 6-7.

14. There is of course a difference between developing a weapon that works and developing one that meets the highest world standards of performance.

15. The usual procedure in acquiring rocketry and other aerospace technology is purchase, followed by production under license, and, finally, independent development. But in Japan, production under license and domestic production are still throught of as equivalent, attesting to the low technical standards of Japanese space technology.

16. Defense expenditures for 1982 were ¥1,398 billion, and military R&D expenditures came to ¥35.6 billion. The U.S. defense budget was $214 billion, its R&D budget $37 billion, and the military R&D budget $20 billion.

17. However, the Nakasone administration may go out of its way to challenge this taboo. Its self-proclaimed role is to break away from and bring an end to the postwar era of science and technology, an objective that has been promoted in installments by preceding administrations.

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JAPAN IN THE U.S. DOMINION: STATE, POLITICS, AND LABOR IN THE 1980s

Muto Ichiyo

Introduction

This report was originally prepared in April 1982 for the *Fernand Braudel Center for the Study of Economies, Historical Systems, and Civilization* based at the State University of New York at Binghamton.

After this was written, in November 1982, Nakasone Yasuhiro, well-known as a rightwing leader of the Liberal Democratic Party, assumed premiership with the pledge to "remake the 33-year history of the postwar state." I feel this development has not made this essay outmoded since Nakasone is attempting to overcome precisely the inertia of the postwar years as described here. The "integrated security program," an attempt to politicize this economistic inertia and the public attachment to the status quo, has developed its immanent contradictions to the point of rupture at the military dimension. Washington considered the program the maincurrent Japanese ruling groups' subterfuge to slow down the Pentagon-desired pace of military buildup. It is this failure of the integrated security program in its relations with the United States that brought the downfall of former Prime Minister Suziki Zenko and put Nakasone in power. Nakasone therefore had to start with an extreme pronouncement of loyalty to Washington, especially in defense matters. His sudden visit to Seoul in January, 1983 with a promise to accord Chung Doo Hwan $4 billion mainly in security aid was followed by his statement in February in Washington that Japan was an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" on the forefront of the U.S. defense line. He also declared, after an "intimate talk" with President Reagan, that Japan and the U.S. shared the "same destiny" (using the Nazi concept of "schicksalsgemeinschaft" introduced to Japan in the '30s).

The Japan-centered rhetoric of the integrated security program thus had to be disavowed before President Reagan, and Nakasone had to exaggerate this disavowal precisely because he was considered in the U.S. ruling quarters to be a "dangerous nationalist" who might openly advocate Japan's own nuclear armament. Though the U.S. is pressuring Japan to rearm quickly, it is hardly inclined to tolerate Japan as an independent nuclear power.

But Nakasone has not succeeded in overcoming the deep-rooted contradiction between the project of remaking of the postwar state directly on the basis of the requirements of the U.S. global strategy and the economistic, status quo-oriented domestic political formation. His belligerant statements early this year

turned the public off, and so he had to start an apparent retreat in March, speaking dovishly to the public.

There is more to it. Visiting ASEAN countries in May prior to the Williamsburg summit, Nakasone pursued two goals — getting the governments of the ASEAN countries to accept Japan's re-armament and obtaining the latter's mandate to make him their spokesperson at the summit. He failed in both despite the generous economic aid he offered. After all, at his last stopover in Kuala Lumpur, Nakasone had to declare, betraying all his previous political career, that he would abide by the peace provisions of the Japanese constitution.

And then he swung again in the other direction. During the subsequent summit, he behaved as an extreme hawk, insisting that theater nuclear missiles should by all means be deployed to Europe by December.

Nakasone's pendulum locus reveals the secret of present Japanese society, which is the theme of this present essay.

In the meantime, the labor reorganization scheme proceeded on schedule. In December 1982, big rightwing unions of the private sector organized their national council (Zenminrokyo) with 4.5 million members under it. In the same month, radical and genuine unions and worker activist groups founded an embryonical national formation called Zenkoku Rosoren.

I

The Japanese bourgeoisie has, thus far, handled the potential national crisis fairly well, and it will continue to do so unless and until its major programs, political, and ideological as well as economic, crumble on two fronts — military-cum-diplomatic and labor.

The Siamese twin coexistence, or back-to-back connectedness of the two parallel systems of post-World War II Japan, the "Peace Constitution" system internally and the military alliance system with the United States which functioned mainly externally, worked magnificently during most of the postwar period. This parallelism, originating in the occupation period, is based on an arrangement between ruling political groups and the bourgeoisies of the two countries. This felicitous arrangement provided for complementary functions by the two countries. After the shattering defeat in their hopeless adventure to wrest the Asian Pacific region from Western powers for Japan's "co-prosperity" sphere, the battered Japanese bourgeoisie could not hope to repeat the same thing again. They sought to turn to account the fact of U.S. military, political, and economic domination of capitalist Asia (and the Third World in general upon which Japan had to rely for resources) as a new framework within which they could pursue their own goals. This meant for the Japanese ruling class the partial relegation to the United States of its own imperialist superstructural functions, mainly military but also some diplomatic and political functions. In exchange they were to devote themselves to rebuilding and expanding their economic base. In this remarkable case of working through a borrowed imperialist superstructure, the military alliance with the U.S. became a built-in feature of Japanese capitalism.

This deal was beneficial to the United States, too. The United States established its right to use Japan, Asia's leading industrial power, as its military outpost and the single most important logistical base for military operations in Asia (a "right" fully exercised during the Korean and Vietnam wars). The U.S. simultaneously enjoyed the benefit of a dynamic capitalist economy buying vast quantities of U.S. grains, machinery and technology and serving as a showcase of capitalist development in a shaky, revolution-fraught Asia. Most importantly, this *quid pro quo* barred Japan from again venturing to build its own exclusive empire as a threat to the United States.

This division of labour between the United States and Japan, is essential to understanding postwar Japanese development, for it has had a pervasive effect upon the formation of society, polity, and ideology. It was not just relatively lower military expenditures that contributed to the unprecedented growth and prosperity of Japanese capitalism. More importantly, the whole setup made possible by the complementarity helped shape a polity as well as a social, economic, and ideological environment for postwar Japan which facilitated maximization of economic pursuit. Thanks to this division of labor between military and economic, the Japanese ruling class had little need to mobilize politically and ideologically the masses to fight a war, and this circumstance accordingly could seal off internal Japanese politics from external turbulence. This separation imparted peculiar parochial characteristics to internal development. Rule was the rule of economics, and the Liberal Democratic Party, which has monopolized power ever since the occupation period (except for a brief intermission of socialist coalition government in 1947-48), embodied this rule. Given this ideal circumstance of germination, corporate power quickly took root, proliferated, and expanded. The state with its efficient bureaucracy worked to coordinate conflicting business interests in order to maximize corporate interests. In the whole period of what is often called "Postwar Democracy", the social integrative power of big business corporations came to overwhelm the political integrative power of the state as such.

Problems were already lurking. Those who designed this course of development as a stop-gap or a transitional process, enroute to the reestablishment of Japan as a full-fledged imperialist power experienced this paradise of economism as a bit of an aberration. Thus, Fukuda Takeo, later Prime Minister, deploring the individualistic tendencies prevalent among youth, railed against the theme of a popular love song of the 1960s, which says, "The whole world is for us two." "You should remember," he said, "that you two are for the whole world, not the other way around." Though nobody took seriously this old Meiji boy's admonition, the LDP's official ideological program, and among others the Education Ministry's sustained, tenacious battle against the Japan Teacher's Union and its "Democratic Education" program, precisely followed the same line as Fukuda's — less individualism, less assertion of the rights of individuals, more collectivism and self-sacrifice, more respect of elders, duty before rights, more love for the nation and state, and ultimately more concern about national defense. The right traditionalists in the LDP, bureaucracy and education circles, pushed this line, praising, whenever they felt they could be frank, the moral values of the Meiji

Imperial Rescript on Education (loyalty and sacrifice to the nation, filial piety, and the respect for the Emperor).

But these admonitions were self-defeating as the Japanese bourgeoisie and LDP had long based themselves precisely upon a socio-political formation that inevitably secreted and spread crass economism, competition, and hence individualism. This was the chronic dilemma *and* scourge the postwar Japanese ruling class which opted for integration with the American empire.

Political Repression of Labor

In spite of officially approved cartels, "administrative guidance" by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), and all other official measures to coordinate conflicting business interests, competition was of course never eliminated. Competition was indeed sharp among "corporate groups" each comprising an entire business complex — a bank, a giant trading firm (*sogo shosha*), heavy industrial, light industrial, chemical and petrochemical, and marketing companies, subordinating in their train numerous subcontract and affiliate firms. Competition was also ruthless among giant firms in the same business area. Thus, Mitsui & Co. and Mitsubishi Corp. (both *sogo shoshas* representing their respective corporate groups) were engaged in cut-throat competition over market shares and overseas projects, and the two auto firms, Nissan and Toyota fought a never-ending giants' contest.

The secret of Japanese capitalism is its success in translating this severe inter-firm and inter-corporate group struggle into competition among invidivual workers. Contrary to the widespread myth in the West about "traditional collectivism and the allegiance of the Japanese working class to management," it is this highly individualistic competition that has so far succeeded in creating labor's seeming collectivism and allegiance to management. Kamata Satoshi, a labor journalist, who himself worked at a Toyota auto plant, reports how management and the union constantly reminded the workers of rival Nissan's output and sales, and urged them to emulate and surpass it.[1] The intra-firm system was so organized as to set one worker against another in increasing productivity so the company could compete effectively with its rival firms. The well-publicized QC (quality control), TQC (total quality control), and ZD (zero-defect) campaigns at major plants are the culmination of this inter-firm and inter-individual worker competition. In order to be evaluated as passable and therefore to be secure in his job, each worker has to say something in the form of a proposal to boost efficiency. The point here is not so much the contents of these thousands of proposals as the effects of these campaigns on the thinking of workers. In the corporate setting arranged for workers, each worker is compelled to think on behalf of management and this is inescapable as competition among individual workers is organized on this plane. An auto worker at a Nissan plant reports that "having no fresh idea, my colleague at last proposed a 10% conveyor speed-up!" Of course, the poor proposer knows he is choking his own neck, but something had to be said somehow if he did not want to be a dropout and eliminated. The "collectivism" or "loyalty to management"

are products of this coercive system which essentially capitalizes on the disintegration of the Japanese working class into isolated *homo economicus*.

The giant oligopolies organized in this manner themselves control thousands of subcontract firms. Some of them send their employees to work side-by-side with the employees of the parent firm, where they are paid less, have lower status, and remain devoid of job security. Dirty or fringe work — maintenance, repairs, and services — are contracted out to small subcontractors who hire workers on a parallel labor market functioning for jobs of this kind. True, on this second labor market where day laborers, casual workers, and small enterprise workers are recruited, it is impossible to translate inter-firm rivalry into inter-worker rivalry because mobility of labor is too high. But the whole hierarchical formation is characterized from top to bottom by competition, either among the regular employees at big factories or among subcontract firms trying to remain on the contractor list. These are competitions hardly hampered by any extra-economic regulations, and in these competitions the working class is cut up into small segments, ultimately individuals, and then compulsorily brought together and pressed into the mold of corporate power. If an independent union is established at a subcontract firm, the parent company simply terminates the contract with that firm (as occurred with Nippon Steel whose sub-contract bus company came to have an independent union). Or else, as is often the case with Nissan Motor, the parent company union intervenes to annex the new union after changing its leadership to loyal boys.

As capitalism required primitive accumulation before it could stand on its own feet, corporate omnipotence has as its pre-history extra-legal and extra-economic steps of stamping out factory militants and suppressing the potentially revolutionary labor upsurge of the immediate postwar years. That was accomplished by the Supreme Commander of Allied Powers (SCAP), Douglas MacArthur, in the form of the "red purge" carried out prior to and following the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950.

But that was not enough. After the collapse by repression of the militant Sambetsu (the Confederation of Industrial Unions), Socialist-led Sohyo (the General Council of Trade Unions) was created with the help of SCAP, and through this major new labor federation the U.S. sought to forge an effective anti-communist labor fortress behind the United States. Sohyo soon disappointed its designer by maintaining a militant trade union line under the leadership of leftwing socialist Takano Minoru and by beginning to resist the U.S. Cold War strategy. The workers under Sohyo leadership continued to maintain their power on the workshop floor in the coal, steel, shipbuilding, metal working, and auto industries as well as in the public sector where Sohyo was the unchallengeable power.

Thus, after the ground was roughly bulldozed by the U.S. occupation, the Japanese bourgeoisie still had to fight its way to wipe out the stubborn power of workers. Where necessary, violent suppression was used, and the rightwing Domei (Confederation of Labor) unions attempted to split the still militant Sohyo unions. But the single most important factor that undermined the workers' power on the shopfloor of the key industries was technological innovation

wedded to new labor control systems. "Scientific" labor control systems were originally imported from the U.S. through the Japan Productivity Center set up in 1955. From the beginning these labor control systems were organically and consciously combined with the restructuring of the production processes.

Matsushita Konosuke, the founder of the Matsushita group (Matsushita Electric Co. as the core "National" brand), already in the early 1960s boasted that he would make of a simple young fellow a skilled worker in one month. Companies failing to produce skilled workers quickly enough, he said, would be disqualified as viable business firms. Now in the auto industry, any person of average physique, whether a farmer or a school dropout, can be, and is forced to be, a "skilled worker" in a single week. This is so for most of the assembling industries where production processes are highly automated and standardized.

The steel industry is where the Japanese bourgeoisie has earned worldwide reputation. It is in fact the first industrial branch that set out to carry out comprehensive technological-cum-managerial innovation in the latter half of the 1950s. The brand new Tobata mill of then Yawata Iron and Steel Co. (now part of Nippon Steel), with the most advanced computer-controlled blast furnaces and strip mills, was organized on an entirely new labor system based on the separation of "line" from "staff": "line" meaning workers who had no say, and no role to play in controlling the production process as such. The production process was centrally controlled by computers, and most of the work was standardized. What once had been hard and complex work requiring years of experience and subtle coordination of all workers in the workshop under the guidance of a respected, experienced foreman, was reduced to simple, monotonous labor. The newly appointed "foreman" had nothing in common with what had been called by the same name before. He was now simply the lowest echelon representative of management whose duty was to control the workers posted under him for the sake of the company. The whole stratum of skilled workers, who used to be the core of worker collectivism, was wiped out in due time.

The situation differs industry by industry, but the technological revolution — a permanent revolution for that matter — had more or less the same effect of, or rather targeted, the disintegration of workers' collectivism on the workshop floor through the elimination of traditional skilled labor and the reduction of qualitative and hard-to-measure worker expertise in favor of quantitatively measurable standard works. This same process abolished or minimized the need for cooperative work among workers of the same team, which also led to dissolution of the basis of the traditional worker collectivism. In the chemical industry, for example, workers are terribly isolated, watching meters all day long, and having little chance to meet fellow workers.

The "Company World"

A vulgar version has it that Japanese workers are happy because they are protected by the "life-time employment"[2] and "high seniority wages" systems (under which the salary goes up in accordance with duration of employment),

and they enjoy such intra-firm benefits as company houses, company housing loans, company gymnasia and swimming pools.

Aside from the fact that these benefits are "enjoyed" by only one-third of the Japanese working class, or the regular employees of big corporations, it is important to see that these systems, together with other more ideological and starkly coercive devices, are the bricks of what may be called a "company wall" without which the bourgeoisie can hardly transplant inter-company competition into the ranks of workers and turn it into inter-worker competition.

Obviously, inter-company competition should be clearly distinguished from inter-worker competition. The latter sharpens or relaxes depending on the conditions of the labor market. Inter-firm competition also sharpens or relaxes (but generally sharpens) but it is determined primarily by the commodity market situation and is not linked directly with the labor market situation. To link the two kinds of competition, the Japanese bourgeoisie devised an apparatus by which they could tie the fate of individual workers to the fate of the company. The said systems are useful as long as they serve this purpose. In other words, these systems herd workers into a pen, the "company world", sealed off from the general relationship of class forces, as the arena of inter-worker competition. The "company world" might better be called a "company country", for this partition resembles the division of the working people — classes — into separate nation-states, which enables the state to channel even the discontent of local working people into an outburst of national chauvinism in the context of nation-to-nation competition.

As a veteran left worker leader put it, the "company housing loan incapacitated the Japanese working class." An employee of a big company can borrow money from the company to buy a tiny house on the condition that he repay it with his severence pay at the age of 55 when he has to retire. This alone ties him to the company. If he should resign prematurely, his severence pay would be much less than his debt to the company. Pointing to this, the leader said that for a worker being hired by a big company is like mortgaging his whole life. Usually the company housing loan is not enough for a worker to buy a house, and so he borrows from other sources counting on the severence pay. If the company should go bankrupt, he also goes bankrupt as he cannot repay his debt to the private housing company. This means that his house will be confiscated. A series of family suicides occurred precisely for this reason following the bankruptcy of many medium-size firms during the recent recession. The "seniority wage system" works similarly. If a worker is in continuous service with the same company for 20 years, his salary goes up, and his life style and social status improve accordingly. But once his company fails and he loses his job, he can hardly get a new job with a comparable salary allowing him to maintain the same living standards. Besides, his skill has been shaped in accordance with the particularized systems of his company and often has little universal value. (Formerly mechanics were mechanics wherever they went.) Even if his skill has a universal value, his social value does not. His social value is determined by his status in the company (foreman of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, for instance). Since he has reached this status through severe intra-firm competition only to

satisfy the company requirements, he finds that the value does not emanate from himself at all. It has been imparted to him by the company. So, the value goes as soon as he ceases to be a company man.

Sophisticated intra-firm systems have been developed in order to mold workers as "company men". The "seniority wage" system is one of these systems. This system is characterized by complex, often mysterious, job-rating, promotion, and work/attitude evaluation schemes.[3] The present tendency is that the portion of the wage subject to evaluation is expanding at the sacrifice of age (employment duration) consideration. And since the 1974-1976 recession, the whole systems of "seniority wage" and "life-time" employment are being gradually phased out in favor of increased capacity-loyalty evaluation.

The average wage level and intra-firm benefit level, of course, are influenced by the labor market. When labor was scarce (especially the young work force) in high growth periods, companies had to engage in competition among themselves to obtain "golden eggs" (as middle school graduates were called). In this competition, companies had to offer higher pay, better intra-firm benefits, better dormitories, etc., which resulted in the raise of benefit levels. Within this framework, Sohyo's annual wage-hike campaigns (Spring Campaigns) could exploit the labor market situation.

But what should be noted is that the absolute level of benefits, which is a function both of labor supply and demand as well as workers' struggles, are not essential to the corporate mechanism. The heart of this mechanism is the corporate microcosm where workers are told to work, compete, and live throughout their service time. Essential to this mechanism is the particularization of business undertakings into these "company worlds". To build the wall of the "company world", the builder does not choose bricks as far as they are useful. A new gymnasium can be such a brick to lure "golden eggs" during an economic boom, and the "life-time employment" system apparently served the purpose for many years, but if it becomes cumbersome, it can be phased out and the gap may be filled by more coersive ideological drives. The bricks are changeable but the wall stays the same.

The "company world" is the key to understanding postwar Japanese capitalism. It is in fact the citadel of the Japanese bourgeoisie. Pushed into the "company world", a large segment of the Japanese working class has taken up inter-company competition as their challenge — if not fully believing.

The Complimentarity Deal

The Shangri-la of pure capitalism, however, was not totally consistent and complete in itself, for it had as its premise the above-mentioned complementarity deal. If this domestic rule, resting heavily on the integrating capacity of corporate power is likened to a circle, another larger circle partially overlapped it. The larger circle is the circle of U.S. strategy with its military prerogatives and drawn in accordance with the requirements of the U.S. empire. While the popular assumption in Japan was to regard the smaller circle as more or less complete, this understanding was more self-deception than perception. The larger circle

was the real determinant factor, not just an extension of the smaller circle.

Japanese ruling groups knew better than the ruled that the smaller circle was but a subordinate function of the larger. Knowing this, they never compromised with the people when it came to the matter of military alliance with the U.S. Thus, in 1960, Premier Kishi Nobusuke rode roughshod over millions of protesters to ram through the revised Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. Premier Sato Eisaku, Kishi's brother, in 1969 flew to Washington, defying militant mass protests by radical workers, students, and citizens, to reiterate Japan's support for the U.S. in the Vietnam War, and in his joint communiqué with President Richard Nixon assumed the role of "peace keeping" in South Korea.

These steps gradually expanded the area of the small circle covered by the large circle, and the point of equilibrium between the two parallel systems accordingly moved visibly to the right. Even so, the division of labor remained basically the same: military functions for the U.S. and economic pursuit for Japan. And as long as this pattern was alive, the parallelism of domestic rule could also survive.

The parallelism generated, and at the same time concealed, an insoluble dilemma of identity for Japanese imperialism. This dilemma became more and more visible with the growth of Japan as an economic power with expanding foreign investments and control of the resources and manpower of other countries. The dilemma concerns, more than anything else, the military forces.

What is the nature of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF)? Palpably unconstitutional in light of Article 9 of the constitution, they have nonetheless existed already for more than three decades, ever expanding and ever better equipped. The fundamental question was whether it was the Japanese armed force or part of American armed force. The SDF was decreed by General MacArthur as a rear force of the U.S. army fighting in Korea, and in this light it was nothing more than a mercenary army. Has it ceased to be a mercenary force? If so, when? Can it cease to be mercenary while remaining an integral part of the U.S. forces deployed worldwide and thus deprived of the right to independent action or non-action? On the other hand, the SDF is proclaimed to be the force to defend Japan from invasion. Japanese people should be more defense conscious (so we are told) and support and love the SDF.

Where the small circle and large circle overlap is the twilight zone in which the SDF is located. Depending on how one looks at it, the SDF can be seen belonging to the smaller circle, or it can be seen as part of the larger circle.

To the "genuine" rightists, Emperor Hirohito himself is an ambiguous entity. He is the one who told Japanese youth to go to the battlefield and die for the glory of the nation, but at once it was he who was saved from the gallows by yesterday's enemy, and who now says he hates war. Again he is the one who attends ceremonies to pay tribute to the war-dead and he is the "symbol of the unity of nation", the constitution proclaims. What "unity" does he symbolize? The image is totally confusing.

The armed forces being an essential factor for any imperialism (because absolute loyalty is involved), the ambiguity of the nature of the SDF symbolically

reflects the ambiguity of identity of the postwar Japanese state. For Japanese rightists and the ruling classes in general, this duality of state identity was and is a haunting torment. Mishima Yukio's theatrical putsch attempt followed by suicide reflected precisely the irritation of rightwingers with the embedded dualism of "statehood" and the impossibility of "purifying" Japan of this ambiguity. But this crucial issue could be left more or less dormant as long as the parallel systems based on the complementarity deal worked.

II

In the 1970s, the premises of complementarity collapsed. Two factors contributed to this: (1) the erosion of U.S. global hegemony and (2) the end of the long cycle of prosperity of world capitalism of which Japanese prosperity was a part. On the Japanese side, Japanese economic power has outgrown the capacity of the complementarity deal.[4]

With its economic hegemony eroded and new tensions created with the Soviet Union, the U.S. has categorically told Japan that a division of labor should now exist not between military and economics, but in the military field itself. The U.S. has also made clear that in the economic field Japan had become America's rival. These issues have been linked up — if Japan wants to continue to export, it should share more equally the U.S. global military burden.

The demise of the old complementarity logically calls for the termination of the parallelism of government and, for that matter, the remaking and reorganization of the postwar state and its underlying assumptions: for it means the crumbling of the wall that shielded internal development from the rough external situation under the old division of labor. This new situation confronts the Japanese ruling groups with very serious difficulties.

If they continue to go with the United States in the new setting, they have to share the empire's global military burden. The SDF, nurtured in the atmosphere of economism, has to be made ready to fight a real war under U.S. Command, and the Japanese people have to be mobilized politically and ideologically to make self-sacrifice for the cause of the "free world".

A call for the "defense of the free world" can hardly appeal to the people, first because the "free world" understood as the U.S. Empire is too abstract, and second because it can easily prove, as the military plans prescribed for Japan show, fatal to the *status quo* whose maintenance is the major concern of an economistic people. It should be recalled that Japan's military buildup has been rationalized for many years by an "entertainment cost" theory. This theory, peculiar to the postwar Japanese politics, says that defense spending is so much entertainment cost Japan should be prepared to meet in order to "please and satisfy Americans". Its artless cynicism aside, this "theory" could be maintained as long as Japan's role in counter-revolutionary wars in Asia was confined to verbal and logistical support for the U.S. without committing its own troops in combat.Now a different role has been meted out for Japan. Under ther 1978 U.S.-Japan Guidelines for Joint Defense, Japan is required to fight a real war in and around Japan. On what ground, then, can this type of real military involvement

be rationalized? Certainly the government cannot tell young SDF soldiers to go to war and kill "to please and satisfy Americans".

Stirring up nationalism and chauvinism would be a classical solution. But when the SDF is obviously part and parcel of the U.S. global strategy and practically under U.S. command, mobilization of nationalism would not be easy at all.

Whatever the case, the ruling groups must now deal with the enormous inertia of the pervasive economism which has served their interests well in earlier decades. More than anything else, the Liberal Democratic Party and its style of rule are a product of this postwar economism. Can the LDP be a body qualified to carry out the "great task" of transformation?

III

Toward the end of the 1970s, business think tanks (Mitsubishi and Nomura Institutes) and rightwing elitist intellectuals (some of them from the Defense Agency Institute) were working together to improvise a new program to meet the new situation. The late Prime Minister Ohira seized upon it and made it the central state strategy as he came to power. Before he died during the 1980 election campaign, Ohira was haunted by the worsening prospects of the capitalist world economy. Although he was publicly optimistic about Japanese politics (proclaiming in a speech to business leaders that all political parties in Japan had the same heavy stake in capitalism), he remained preoccupied with how Japan could avoid political turmoil when the world economy went into a downspin. He found the answer in a new program.

The program is called the integrated security program, and what is new in it is precisely the concept of "integrated security".[5] Ohira emphasized that security could not be considered purely military security, but should be interpreted to encompass national security in the broadest sense. Integrated in this concept are military security, energy security, raw materials security, business security, public peace, and family life security. Japan is an insular, resource-poor country, depending upon distant countries for the supply of materials, and accordingly, just trying to defend its raw materials and energy security by military force will not work. Hence, the need for "all dimensional diplomacy" with an emphasis on aid to resource-rich countries as a "sort of insurance" (Foreign Ministry's expression). Nuclear power generation is essential to keeping the Japanese economy going, and so, the anti-nuke movement must be regarded as a national security threat as rebellion in the army and therefore should be "crushed" (1981 LDP Policy Statement). For a society to live securely in an era of turmoil, public peace is essential: consequently there is a need to strengthen the riot police and intelligence service and regulate labor disputes. With Japanese society aging, the family tradition should be revived with more filial piety in order to ensure security for the aged with less reliance on the state. Last but not least, the buildup of the SDF and the alliance with America should be a high priority as it is the ultimate recourse to defend the nation from invaders.

It is clear enough that the whole program rotates around the key word "defense". People are urged to defend: the *family* by protecting the old; the *company* by working hard and preserving industrial peace; *energy* supply by silently accepting nuclear plants; the *national economy* by accepting oil storage projects; *law and order* by supporting the police; and the *nation* by supporting the SDF buildup (and collaborating with the U.S.).

This program brought the LDP a near landslide victory in the 1980 general elections, during which campaign Ohira died, and Suzuki Zenko, picked for prime minister from among second-liners in the interest of intra-party peace, inherited it as his strategic guideline.

Japanese Anxiety

In fact, the integrated security program is a well-formulated program precisely because it addresses the widespread anxiety of the Japanese people about the future. Devoid of bright prospects, they anticipate, if only vaguely, something worse happening in the future. The program, with its call for the maintenance of the *status quo*, deftly capitalizes on this sentiment and "elevates" it step-by-step to the buildup of an authoritarian state, ultimately, to an accelerated military program.

What is actually happening under this program is a move to the right (*ukeika*) in all areas of state and society. The drive for the revision of the constitution (not just for the deletion of Article 9 but curtailment of human rights and labor rights and a change in the Emperor's status) is gaining momentum. "State of emergency" systems enabling wartime mobilization of human and material resources are in the making and the Education Ministry has strengthened its censorship to eliminate or tone down textbook references to the evils of prewar Japanese militarism, to the horrors inflicted at Hiroshima and Nagasaki and to pollution issues.

The Justice Ministry has drafted a revised Penal Code which would legalize preemptive detention of the "mentally sick" who are considered potential subversives and criminals. The courts are handing down starkly anti-labor rulings in eight out of ten disputed cases. Ideologically important are the recent demonstrative visits of Cabinet ministers to the Yasukuni Shrine where the war dead of the Second World War are enshrined, an obvious gesture to rationalize Japanese motivations in the last war. The program at a glance would look complete and consistent in itself as a strategy reflecting genuinely the Japanese national interests (or the Japanese imperial interests).

But a closer look at the program will show that it is heterogenious. Though the program's formulations are extremely Japan-centered, the strategy lacks the lynchpin — Japan's military autonomy. The whole program is predicated on the continued and strengthened military alliance with the U.S. The people are told that they should be prepared to "defend the nation" if they want to safeguard their *status quo*.

However, the U.S. never conceals its intentions. The strategic roles doled out to Japan under the Reagan strategy are: strengthen the Japanese navy to improve

the Seventh Fleet's anti-submarine operational functions; prepare Japan to assume responsibility for the blockade of the three strategic straits of Soya, Tsugaru and Tsushima (to contain the Vladivostock-based Soviet fleet in the Japan sea); take responsibility for safeguarding sea lanes over 1,000 nautical miles south of Japan; and strengthen the Japanese navy and air force to participate effectively in joint operations with the U.S. in case an "emergency situation" arises in the Far East (particularly South Korea). By securing the participation of Japan in the global U.S. strategy, the United States (it is stated) can safely fight a war in the Middle East or Europe. The present buildup of the SDF is to play this strategic role.

The advocates of the proposed program argue that all this is for Japan's defense.

But it is clear that the strategy which Japan is urged to join (and has joined) is the Reagan-Weinberger strategy designed exclusively to preserve U.S. interests. Where is the guarantee that it is also a strategy appropriate to the interests of Japan as an imperialist power? There is none. On the contrary, this strategy presupposes the sacrifice of Japan on the frontline of a future war with Soviet Union.

The blockade of the three strategic straits, for instance, would be highly provocative, and if it were done, Japan would have to be prepared against an all-out attack from the Soviet Union. As all strategists agree, Japan cannot hold out for many days should the Russians attempt to destroy Japan's war capabilities. The commitment to this strategy obviously has nothing to do with the defense of Japanese imperialism, let alone defense of Japan as such.

Absurdity comes to a head when strategists argue that by collaborating with the U.S., Japan's energy security will be safeguarded. Could Japan expect the U.S. fleet to convoy tankers all the way from Persian Gulf when Japan's supply line is threatened? The program promoters carefully conceal from the public the established lesson of the 1973 oil crunch when the U.S. exploited the situation to weaken its Japanese and West European rivals.

All told, this program is intended as a moratorium, an effort by the Japanese bourgeoisie to buy time by artificially extending the practically dead system of complementarity by telling half-truths to the people. In this sense, it adheres to the assumption of parallelism when the basis for "parallelism" has already been abandoned. Its success is therefore limited to the domestic sphere. It assists in mobilizing the security concerns of the Japanese people while leaving intact their economism. If this is still a way of politicization, it is *politicized economism*: one based on a half-truth at that. The discrepancy between false assumptions and reality will inevitably widen, and though this gap is now barely bridged by the rhetoric of integrated security, the Japanese ruling class, and the people, as far as they follow this rhetoric, will be forced to settle the account in hard currency in the future.

IV

The unions have been selected by the Japanese bourgeoisie as the basis for

the authoritarian state.[6] Whatever the future political choice may be, the bourgeoisie reasons, Japanese capitalism would be secure if the state is sufficiently authoritarian and labor-management relations are under control. Sakurada Takeshi, the leader of the Employers' Association of Japan (Nikkeiren), declared in a public statement widely acclaimed by the entire bourgeoisie that Japan will not be shaken (regardless of what happens at the highest levels of political leadership) provided the bureaucracy, the courts, and the police are sound and the labor-management relationship remains a "zone of stability" in society. He made this statement in 1975 when Japanese politics was shaken by the Lockheed bribery scandal which led to the arrest of former Prime Minister Tanaka.

The " unification of labor fronts" promoted energetically at the initiative of rightwing labor leaders is precisely an effort at strengthening and solidifying this "zone of stability" as the optimum social base for the integrated security program. The scheme concerns not just labor, but the entire structure of Japanese society in the 1980s.

"Body Slimming"

But before looking into the present phase, it may be necessary to see (if briefly) what happened to labor in 1974-78, the years of recession that hit Japan as well as other countries.

No major confrontation erupted between labor and capital when the Japanese bourgeoisie initiated what it called a "body-slimming" rationalization to survive the slump. Body-slimming included dismissals, layoffs, scrapping entire factories, transfer of parent firm workers to subcontractors, annexation of bankrupt small firms by big ones, fictitious bankruptcies of small firms where unions were strong, purging activists, violence against dissidents, and innumerable other corporate "rationalization" stratagems. Workers tried to resist, and they fought back wherever there was strong union leadership. Saeki Shipbuilding workers, for instance, put up mass resistance, mobilizing the whole township against the parent company Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries, and metal workers in South Osaka countered bankruptcies and shop closures with the occupation of factories and self-management. But the big unions in the strategic industries not only did nothing on behalf of their workers, but on the contrary, volunteered for the dirty work of kicking workers out of jobs for the "defense of the company". Hypocritically, dismissal was called "voluntary retirement". It happens like this: one day, an elderly worker is tapped on the shoulder and told by his foreman/union officer that he had better retire. If he resists, harassment starts and continues until he resigns. Thus, from 1973 through 1979, the number of Japanese industrial workers decreased by one million. In the shipbuilding industry, a cartel was formed by all the major companies under the guidance of the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MITI), under which Japanese shipbuilding capacity was reduced by 40%. Accordingly, the shipbuilding work force in the four years from 1974 dropped from 274,000 to 179,000. The government designated 12 industrial branches (including ship-

building, aluminum refining, textiles, and fertilizer) as "recession-vulnerable" and poured in state funds to accelerate rationalization. With this help and with the annexation of smaller firms, most of the "vulnerable" sectors came out with "slimmer", healthy bodies from the recession. Or else, overseas relocation of plants was carried out as in the case of the aluminum industry. In the years of recession, the increase of Japanese companies' employees overseas about matched the decrease in their employees in Japan.

The auto industry fully utilized this opportunity for rationalization in all fields. The subcontract prices for parts were cut by an average of 10%, seasonal workers dismissed, and conveyer speed increased. The auto manufacturers thus increased exports by an average of 20% annually from 1975 through 1978, chalking up record profits of 14 billion yen in 1977.

Regular employees in factories with 30 or more employees all over the country diminished 5.9% from 1975 through 1979, and labor days declined 6.4% but their output grew 33.1%, a labor productivity growth of 42.8% (taking 1970 as 100, the labor productivity index in Japan's manufacturing industry in 1980 stood at 159.2 compared with 127.3 for the United States and 139.8 for West Germany).[7]

Industrial accidents also increased year after year. The victims of industrial accidents claiming the lives of workers or requiring absence for four days or more climbed from 318,000 in 1975 to 334,000 in 1976, to 346,700 in 1977, and 348,826 in 1978, the overwhelming majority of the victims being subcontract workers.

"Body-slimming" was characteristically carried out at the expense of the "life-time employment" system. In order to economize on wage costs, managemement preferentially fired relatively highly paid older workers. Already they were feeling that these workers were cumbersome as production processes were computerized and work simplified and standardized. Economic activities were reinvigorated from 1979, but the old system did not return as management preferred hiring part-time workers, many of them women, to do the same jobs that regular full-time workers had done before.

Labor Rationalization

Inside big factories, labor rationalization was carried out through stepped up QC drives. Scenes of QC drives are often crazy and horrifying. Take the Kimizu steel mill of Nippon Steel where workers gather in a "self-management" rally to listen to their colleagues' proposals for higher productivity. The speaker on the stage first flashes a V-sign, and shouts, "Are you alright? Are you doing what you should?" The whole crowd must shout back in unison, "Yes, we are alright. We are doing it." This is called workers' participation in the work process, hence self-management. A bad joke? In the course of "body-slimming", workers who remained at major corporations were fully integrated in the "company world" through *compulsion* to *voluntarily* participate. As happened in 1981 at Nissan's Kawaguchi auto plant, dissidents are met ultimately with physical violence such as beatings wielded (in this case) every day over weeks. It is as though the

"company world" were immune from the law of the state. And it is natural that in this "company world", workers, petrified with horror, their free thinking frozen, keep their mouths shut. Fear of freedom, in Paulo Freire's words, is deeply embedded in the workers. If they were earlier lured by benefits to internalize inter-company competition, they are now compelled (morally, physically, and institutionally), to make their own the fear on the part of capital which faces worldwide crisis.

For this type of labor control to become pervasive in key industries, thorough "brainwashing" of a segment of workers is required. The brainwashers are so-called "informal groups" (company-organized groups) including professional union busters. The brainwashing takes a variety of forms — para-military training at a training school coupled with moral teachings, sado-masochistic criticism/self-criticism sessions outside the company, and pseudo-psychological conditioning. Soul-searching type moral teachings are combined with inculcation of anti-communist ideology to produce the ideological foundations for the company's private army. These people are then posted to major workshops and most become union officers with the backing and recommendation of management.

Politically, this labor control system is connected with the Democratic Socialist Party. Tempered in the day-to-day class struggle against workers as front-line officers of management, the Democratic Socialist Party has come to occupy the extreme right position in the Japanese political spectrum. Die-hards in fighting "communism", loyal to management, and abhorrent of the very concept of class struggle, the party even criticizes the LDP for being "too liberal" as it did, for instance, in connection with the "illegal" strike waged by workers of the National Railways to regain their deprived right to strike. The Liberal Democratic Party includes diverse tendencies from ultra-right to liberal, and it must collect votes from broad constituencies who are more interested in the protection of their economic interests than in the anti-Communist cause itself. Not so for the Democratic Socialists who are anti-communist crusaders.

Can this intra-firm totalitarian rule now consolidated in key industries be extended to form a universal polity for all Japan? If so, Japan will emerge once again as a totalitarian state, this time on the basis of a corporate constituency rather than the poor peasant constituency on whom fascist young Turks of prewar Japan relied. Though this possibility cannot be categorically denied, a large gap remains between the current intra-corporate totalitarianism and totalitarianism as a universal polity. The Democratic Socialists are strong in as much as they are protected by the watertight fabric of the labor management system which cannot easily extend beyond interests of individual corporations (though it should be noted that big corporations are now trying to extend their influence over the whole community and have succeeded in some industrial cities, most typically Toyota and Hitachi and the nuclear park in Fukushima). More importantly, the support which the SDP does receive is not always full and spontaneous. As the general constituency is politically passive and supports the LDP program only out of fear of the future, so the same is true of workers in big companies despite the seeming enthusiasm they must manifest during

campaigns of company chauvinism.

Corporate power is a product of the era of parallelism and still bears its imprint. Chauvinism for the company, institutionalized so as to maximize corporate profits, cannot be shifted immediately to a *national* chauvinism. To become the social basis for a totalitarian political regime, corporate power will have to make a death leap, the same leap which confronts the ruling political elites in the context of the new reality.

V

But for the immediate program of integrated security, which is a transitional program, corporate power is in sufficient to provide an adequate social base. So the big unions, as part of the corporate power structure, spring to the fore as a new social force asserting itself in the name of labor. It is not fortuitous that the initiators and promoters of the "unification" scheme are big unions integrated into the corporate world, most of them in strategic export multinationalized industries. They are the 600,000 member Confederation of Auto Workers' Unions (Jidosha Soren), 540,000 member Federation of Electrical Workers' Unions (Denki Roren), 230,000 member Federation of Iron and Steel Workers' Unions (Tekko Roren), and the 170,000 member Confederation of Shipbuilding & Engineering Workers' Unions (Zosenjuki).

The above mentioned unions are all members of what is called IMF-JC (International Metal Workers' Federation-Japan Committee, under the ICFTU). This committee was set up in 1964 as the channel introducing ICFTU influence into the Japanese labor movement. There is a background to it. Inspired by an unusual personal message addressed by President John F. Kennedy to the 1961 annual convention of Denki Roren, a move began to unite all metal-related industrial workers, regardless of their affiliations, on a neutral and non-political platform. Traditional bitter antagonisms existed between Sohyo and rightwing Domei as Domei constantly attacked Sohyo unions to rip off their weak units. Though Domei was often successful, it could not match Sohyo in size (2,000,000 members), and the antagonism became sharper and sharper. The IMF-JC proposed to overcome this conflict, inviting members from Domei, Sohyo, and Churitsu Roren (Federation of Independent Unions) as well as non-affiliates. This was a shrewd tactic to unite all corporation-integrated unions on a broader basis than Domei itself. The scheme worked. As the workplace power of workers was wiped out at one company after another, the IMF-JC succeeded in recruiting new members, from Domei, Sohyo, and Churitsu Roren, as well as from among non-affiliated unions. Sohyo was plagued by a trojan horse in its organization, Tekko Roren, which openly defied the "political" and "too class-struggle oriented" policy of Sohyo while Sohyo was too weak to expel the union.

Though both are rightwing, there is a marked difference between the traditional Domei maincurrent and the IMF-JC maincurrent. (IMF-JC includes Domei unions, too, but the leadership is in the hands of non-Domei or non-maincurrent Domei unions.) The maincurrent Domei consists of traditional rightwing unions with anti-communist labor bosses who bargain on behalf of

the workers if only to compromise. In this sense, it is a union movement in its own right. But IMF-JC maincurrenters are indistinguishable from the management of the big corporations they work in. Their organization, at the company level, merges with and fuses into the labor management system itself. It is this wing of the union movement that is dictating the terms of unification.

In June 1981, a six-man working committee appointed by Sohyo, Domei, Churitsu Roren, and non-affiliates, produced a guideline for unification which proudly claimed that the Japanese economy had succeeded in overcoming the two oil crises and was able to continue stable growth "thanks mainly to the quantitatively abundant and qualitatively superior labor force in this country," (thus echoing the voice of business). Nakamura Takuhiko, Chairman of Tekko Roren, bluntly set out the goals of unification: (1) eliminating Marxist influence and the concept of class struggle from the Japan Socialist Party and turning the party into the Japanese counterpart of the West German Social Democratic Party; (2) promotion of nuclear power to save the nation from the energy crisis; (3) abandonment of the struggle against industrial rationalization and "industrial structure transformation" program (government efforts to relocate processing and assembling industries abroad to allow Japan to concentrate on technology-intensive ones); (4) revamping the National Railways and other unprofitable public corporations through administrative reforms. The program is taking effect. Zosenjuki (shipbuilders) is already promoting a campaign to pressure the government to increase domestic production of weapons, specifically warships and aircraft. The Federation of Electrical Workers Unions recently adopted a more explicit program calling for strengthened military alliance with the U.S., faster buildup of Japanese military forces, promotion of nuclear power, and closer collaboration with South Korea's dictatorial regime.

The unification plan is being carried out in accordance with the predetermined schedule. On December 14, 1981 the Domei and IMF-JC unions and several Sohyo unions set up a preparatory committee. This is scheduled to grow in the following year into a liaison council comprising private sector unions. Later, all unions, including public service workers' are to join, closing the big circle of "company-union world" — a design as grand as the Ohira-Suzuki integrated security program. Sohyo is either to disappear or be pared down to a second-rate national labor federation.

VI

Can these grand designs of Japanese capital work? In the suffocating atmosphere of the rightward swing, beginning & continuing resistance is not easy. However, certain points relevant to the question emerge from the above analysis.

(1) The self-serving formulation of the integrated security program and its fallacy vis-à-vis the contemporary world reality can be exposed in ways which could call forth a popular movement comparable to the anti-nuclear movement witnessed in western Europe in 1981. This could arise either as a result of a shock to the unprepared Japanese public in an emergency situation which forces the

realization that the U.S. has no interest in the "defense of Japan" as such, or as a result of normal educational and campaign efforts to expose the gap between assumptions and reality.

(2) Division among ruling groups over the question of the U.S. link may shatter the consensus on the integrated security program and cause political reorganization, creating in the process space for popular resistance.

(3) Stepped up U.S. economic pressure may occur including pressure to curb Japan's exports or to reinvigorate U.S. capital in specific markets, followed by a serious trade war directed against Japan.

(4) The effects of one or more of the above on labor should be closely watched. In the event of a political military crisis [as in case (1)], the labor force, even if it has been "unified" under the hegemony of the right, may be shaken, creating and expanding space for pacifist and radical tendencies to gain grassroots support. If U.S. capital's counter-offensive succeeds in specific areas (particularly in the auto industry), the weakest links of corporate totalitarianism may be broken creating greater possibilities of intervention by the left.

Currently, the front unification drive itself is a major battlefield of class struggle in Japan destroying the decades-long stalemate and compelling unionists to rethink the situation. The unification move started at the top and in camera. Neither the rank and file nor even middle echelon union officials were consulted. In the fall of 1981 many middle-echelon officiers suddenly realized the danger of the great conspiracy and began to rally to block this scheme.

Three different labor forces, sometimes collaborating but also developing sharp differences, presently resist the unification scheme.

1. Those socialist union leaders and the unions and groups under their influence who, sensing that what is under way is the total negation of the Sohyo-Socialist tradition of labor militancy (especially the tradition of the Sohyo sponsored Spring Wage Campaign), oppose the scheme and advocate that all efforts concentrate on strengthening Sohyo.
2. Communist Party-influenced national and local unions and chapters, in accord with party policy, denounce the unification as the negation of class struggle and of the democratic labor movement. They have declared that they will set up their own national federation in the event that unification is carried out. (These unions have already formed their own liaison council, which claims a membership of 1,100,000.)
3. The radical labor trend attracts a growing number of rank and file members of Sohyo unions as part of it, or as its allies, and maintains close ties with workers' groups in the IMF-JC and Domei unions. The core of this group came from the radical workers' movement rallied around the Anti-War Youth Committee, which in the late 1960's and early 1970's mobilized tens of thousands of workers from all sectors of industry and engaged in street fights over the Vietnam War issue. Though the committee as such disintegrated, its members, joined by student radicals who chose to work among the working class, have struck roots across the country and industry.

A wing of this trend allied with the former Takano faction of the Sohyo movement, Rodo Joho organized the first national workers' assembly in Osaka in

1976 that drew 1,000 representatives of militant unions and workers' groups. It has since sponsored annual national assemblies of workers. The 1982 assembly, attended by 1,500 representatives and addressed by two former Sohyo chairmen and former secretary general, adopted a new policy line envisioning the total reorganization of the Japanese labor movement into a new front cutting across corporate barriers and based on the participation of alienated masses of workers. As a transitional step toward the formation of such a front, the radical wing will help form a coalition of "genuine unions" (including the militant wing of the National Metal Workers' Union and the dockworkers union as well as of public workers' unions which are resisting the "unification" line). This is a new strategy based on a critical assessment of the weaknesses of Sohyo's Spring Campaigns (which after all could not break the corporate walls). Also, this radical wing's anti-imperialist stance makes possible solidarity with workers' movements in the Third World (especially in Asia) where Japanese multi-national corporations are directly exploiting local labor. The radical wing of labor is also active in the anti-nuke and Korea solidarity movements and has close working relationships with community-based movements and struggles including the Narita farmers' 17-year struggle against land confiscation.

Whether a rebirth of the popular movement on two fronts — military buildup and labor — can be achieved hitting at the weakest joints of the whole structure is still to be seen.

As of now, the whole situation is yet to unravel.

Notes

1. Kamata Satoshi, "Japan in the Passing Lane," Pantheon, New York, 1982.

2. "Life-time employment" is a misnomer for workers are not employed life-time. They have to retire at the age of 55 (or 60) receiving severence pay, whose amount is supposed to be proportionate to the duration of employment. This system implies no post-retirement employment guarantee.

3. The mystery of the "seniority wage" system can be illustrated with the case of Nissan Motor. The "regular wage" (which excludes incentive bonus, special work allowance, and overtime) has the following components: basic wage (13.5%), special allowance (72.9%), qualification allowance (2.4%), and family allowance (4.5%), which altogether account for 93.3% of the "regular wage". Note the exhorbitant weight of the "special allowance". This part of the wage is largely subject to evaluation, based on job rating and capacity rating. (The figures are for 1978.)

4. This essay does not detail the overseas expansion of Japanese capital and increasingly visible imperialistic activities of the Japanese state. It should be noted that the private industrial branches with the rightwing unions mentioned in this essay are also most aggressive in overseas expansion. Shipbuilder Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries (a citadel of IMF-JC) is operating shipyards in Brazil and Singapore, and 32% of the firm's total employees are workers in those two countries. Electrical firms were operating 407 factories overseas in 1978, which employed 180,000 workers. Tokyo Shibaura Electric (Toshiba) had 40.1% of its workforce overseas. The comparable rates were 20.6% for Mitsubishi Electric, and 11.1% for Hitachi Electric. The MITI, in its "Trade and Industrial Policy Vision for the '80s" is encouraging relocation of traditional industrial branches overseas so as to allow Japan to concentrate on aircraft, space, nuclear, electronic, and other technology intensive businesses yielding high value added. Japanese overseas investments in 1980 exceeded $30 billion (placing fourth in the world following the U.S., U.K., and West Germany).

5. The integrated security program is connected with the Ohira-proposed "Pacific Community" program, a proposal for a Pacific-Asia economic zone connecting Australian and Canadian resources, Japanese capital and technology, and labor force in Southeast and East Asia. But this program is still vague, and it is still difficult for the Japanese government to obtain the consent of the countries involved.

6. This essay does not refer to one of the most important aspects of the "labor unification" scheme — the Administrative Reform. The reform is aimed not only at slashing the state budget in the face of serious fiscal crisis (due to deficit budgeting over the years) but also, and mainly, at totally revamping the labor situation of public corporations. The central idea is that the public corporations, some of which suffer from deficits (National Railways in the main), should be rationalized and organized on the same competitive principle as private companies. Uneconomical corporations are to be transferred to the private sector in whole or in part. In our context, it is important to note that workers' power is still strong in these corporations because the mechanism of translating inter-firm competition into inter-worker competition has not been developed there. The public sector thus remains Sohyo's (and the Socialists') main constituency. By introducing the principle of competition, the government is attempting to demolish this remaining "workers' world."

7. These figures are taken from *Kyodai Kojo to Rodosha Kaikyu*, (Big factories and working class), Mukai Ryoichi, *et al.*, ed., Tokyo: Shinnihon Shuppan, 1980.

8. *Rodo Joho* has already started an active international exchange program under which Philippine activists were invited to Japan in 1979, Detroit auto workers in 1981, and a Malaysian worker in 1982. In 1981, it inaugurated the English version of *Rodo Joho* (monthly). (Available from 5-13-12 Shimbashi, Minatoku, Tokyo, Japan., Bi-monthly, $10 per year.)

Reference

In a serialized essay entitled "Class Struggle in Japan — Its Past, Present, and Future," *AMPO: Japan-Asia Quarterly Review* (published by the Pacific-Asia Resources Center, P.O. Box 5250, Tokyo Int.), I deal in much more detail with the same subject as this essay. (The first three installments have been published in *AMPO*. Vol. 13, No. 4, Vol. 14, No. 1, and Vol. 14, No. 3.) This English quarterly systematically carries analysis of Japanese imperialist activities and labor, community, anti-nuke, and other people's movements as well as of the Korean and Southeast Asian situations.

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NUKES NEXT DOOR

Hirose Takashi

In 1962, the Con Edison Company made a decision to build a nuclear power plant in downtown Queens, only three miles from the center of New York City. The plan was supported by New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller, who argued that it would be helpful in reducing atmospheric pollution. The proposal triggered a furious dispute on the safety of nuclear power generation, and the number of anti-nuclear demonstrators increased steadily. By the following year, the plan was abandoned.

. . . . . .

Almost twenty years later, in 1981, a book was published in Japan called *Nuclear Plants in Tokyo!* The cover showed the giant cooling towers of the Three Mile Island nuclear plant, black against a red sky. The book was subtitled, *At the End of Desire.*

The book argued as follows.

> Although the slightly more than half of the Japanese who live in urban areas consume most of the electric power and favor the building of more nuclear power plants, not one of those plants has been built in a big city. Tokyo should have several nuclear power plants for the following five reasons. First, of the thermal energy produced in nuclear power plants through the complicated fission process, only twenty to thirty percent is actually being used today, while the rest is being uselessly dissipated into the atmosphere and the sea. If this wasted energy were channeled throughout the city in the form of steam through a network of pipes, the result would be far greater efficiency in terms of energy utilization, which, after all, is the whole purpose of Atoms for Peace. To this end, nuclear power plants should be built in the most densely populated areas of the country, for example in Shinjuku Central Park in downtown Tokyo. Mothers would be able to bathe their babies in hot water directly supplied by the plants.
>
> Second, these urban plants would require no long conventional power cables, which not only cost a great deal but also destroy beautiful sights in the rural areas. Third, the plants would be safer with quality urban labor . . . Fourth, disputes over nuclear power would automatically end, since the plants

> would be built by supporters next to their own houses. Fifth, the plants would fit well into the lifestyle of big cities, since both are restless machines . . .
>
> Needless to say, the spent fuel should also be reprocessed in Tokyo and the radioactive waste should be buried in Tokyo. Let's build more and more nuclear plants, as many as we desire, but for our conscience let's build them in Tokyo.
>
> We citizens have never chosen nuclear power nor believed in its safety. However, if it is necessary for us in our present situation, it is useless to dispute about whether it is dangerous or safe. The only conclusions we can draw are either to call a complete halt to the operation of all nuclear plants and nuclear development in the interest of our continuing survival, or else to construct urban nuclear plants and indulge our desires as fully as possible before the downfall. Theoretically, there are no other choices.

The book offered a realistic plan, including a cost estimate that demonstrated the huge savings in income that Tokyo could expect from the expected four- to five-fold increase in energy-use efficiency, and drawings of seven small reactors located in proposed sites in the crowded areas of the city.

"Now we will be able to enjoy them because we will be relieved from the pricks of conscience," the book argued. "If these reacters are 100% safe, there is no problem. If they are 100% dangerous then in these narrow islands the risk is inescapable, when you consider what would be the result of a major accident whether it occurred in a remote rural area or at a nearby site in Tokyo. Instead of going on with the endless conventional disputes about their safety, of which we are all sorely tired, the effective thing to do is to build them on sites where we, the main consumers of electricity, can see for ourselves whether or not they are dangerous."

What happened after the publication of *Nuclear Plants in Tokyo!?*

Curiously, it was the nuclear advocates, and not the anti-nuclear activists, who became confused. The popular Asahi Shimbun and other newspapers dealt with it sensationally at first. Then more than a hundred articles concerning it appeared in newspapers, journals, and magazines. In these articles nuclear power, which had up to then been treated by most editors as a technological question and written about mainly by technical writers, was redefined as a social question and written about by political writers and social critics. For example, it was the subject of the cover story for the sixth anniversary special edition of the Japanese version of *Playboy*. The article was entitled "Tokyo Syndrome," and the cover picture (which was used on an advertising poster that was displayed all over the country) was a realistically executed photo-montage which placed the five cooling towers of the Three Mile Island No. 2 reactor in the middle of the cluster of high-rise buildings near Shinjuku Central Park. One of the five towers was glowing red.

A reader asked why it was made red.

"A new form of major accident is occuring," answered the man who prepared the photo-montage.

Professional nuclear advocates tried to suppress the plan for Tokyo Nuclear Plants, as it was arousing the attention of people who up to then had been largely unconscious of the risks of nuclear energy. In order to discredit it, scientists were obliged to point out the shortcomings of the plan. However, the more they criticized it, the more they were obliged to disclose the shortcomings of the already existing nuclear plants, the drawings of which had been used as the basis for the proposed Tokyo plants.

Three weeks after publication, in an interpellation session in the Diet, a member of the House of Councilors showed the book to the responsible Government energy official and asked, "What do you think of this?"

"That is difficult to answer," the official answered. "Frankly, I'm sick and tired of hearing about it. But anyway, if its safety can be thoroughly confirmed, and if the citizens agree, it might be feasible."

Nuclear advocates tried to divert attention from the problem of danger by putting emphasis on the impossibility of getting the agreement of the residents of Tokyo, as well as on the existing laws which restrict construction of nuclear plants to sparsely populated areas. But this escape route was easily cut off in a simple, often repeated dialogue.

"Please tell me the *reason* the residents will not agree. Please tell me the *reason* the laws restrict plant sites to sparsely populated areas."

". . . . . "

"Is it because the plants are dangerous?"

"No, absolutely no, but . . . "

"Then what?"

". . . . . "

The nuclear advocates shifted their tactics, and began arguing that the ground under Tokyo is too soft for the construction of nuclear reactors. It would be necessary, they argued, to dig down more than a hundred meters to find a solid rock bed. In fact, one of the reactors presently under construction in Japan required excavation down to forty meters for the same reason, and technology now exists for boring down to over a hundred meters for the construction of other types of buildings. Moreover, if they are to seriously perform risk analysis of the ground, then the operation of all existing reactors would have to be stopped immediately, since they are standing either on soft ground or on active faults. The old legend that the Japanese Islands rest on the back of a giant catfish buried in the mud, which occasionally wiggles into a new position, indicates a well-known truth. Japan is a land of earthquakes and volcanoes, and there is no sufficiently solid ground anywhere.

Because of this, scientists and engineers have had to use a novel method in preparing safety reports on the solidity of the ground beneath areas that have already been chosen as nuclear plant sites. Solidity is calculated by averaging the value of the strongest samples with that of the weakest, which is rather like calculating the breaking point of a chain by averaging the strength of the links. In still more blatant cases, data has been collected from ground other than the

actual site.

"When I was sampling the soil, I was told to set aside samples that showed high strength," testified a worker to the Diet. "They used these samples as substitutes when weak samples were taken. Yes, so we called this the 'savings deposit' system."

"We took our samples from fresh layers," an engineer for an electric company recently admitted. His words mean that old and weak layers were neglected. Two dozen nuclear reactors are in full operation on this kind of ground. Japan has a total capacity of generating approximately seventeen million kilowatts of electricity by nuclear power, which places it third in the world at present. This means that our country produces radioactive waste equal to seventeen thousand Hiroshima bombs each year. In particular, the Tokyo Electric Power Company, the biggest enterprise in Japan, achieved the greatest capacity of nuclear power generation of any company in the world last year. Moreover, ten reactors are under construction, and another ten are planned for the near future. In all, there will be forty-four reactors within the next ten years. Forty-four reactors in this narrow country! Do they want to commit suicide? This situation may seem a sort of living-body experiment through which other countries can come to know how nuclear disaster will happen. Then why not go ahead and build the plants in the cities, as the book proposes, and indulge the advocates' desires to the full before the end comes? Since all of these forty-four plants are located in rural areas too remote from the cities to be seen, the urban public believes that even if there is a major accident it will not pose a serious danger to the cities.

On the other hand, how did rural people respond to the plan? Initially many were confused, both supporters who were looking forward to the big indemnities and the highways, public halls and other facilities that would come with the construction of nuclear plants in their areas, and opponents who feared that the proposal represented a real government intention to build nuclear plants throughout the country.

Six months after publication of the book, the author and his compatriots began a drive to collect signatures on a petition supporting the plan. They asked passers-by to endorse either nuclear plants for Tokyo, or a complete halt to nuclear development.

The interest aroused by this campaign reflected a growing uncertainty about nuclear power. Several months earlier an accident at a nuclear station in western Japan had resulted in radioactive contamination of the nearby sea. Authorities insisted that the accident was an "isolated incident," but the memory of Hiroshima and Nagasaki has left a deep and abiding suspicion of the atom. The petition campaign revealed the complex and contradictory throughts of urban people about nuclear development.

Most of the passers-by stopped by the petitioners took an attitude of disinterest in the campaign. This was expected. The petitioner would smile and say, "This has nothing to do with you, has it? You're too busy to now to consider our plan, but what is it that you are so busy with? Your busy business must require a lot of electricity . . . "

One passer-by got angry at these tenacious questions.

"Tokyo Nuclear Power Plant? What a thing to say!"

"Absurd?"

"Of course!" The man was wearing a stylish suit. "You listen to me. We Japanese all know nuclear plants are dangerous."

"How dangerous?"

"Accidents, you know!"

"Could those accidents kill us?"

"If there is an accident . . . so . . . somebody has to die. To kill one is better than to kill five. Tokyo is crowded. It would be crazy to build nuclear power plants in such a densely populated area."

"You say that you can accept killing one, but not killing five. But I think five consists of five ones. The truth is that you want to survive as a member of the "five" group, killing the people in the "one" group. But if you were living in some rural area, could you say the same thing?"

" . . . . . "

Another passer-by asserted, "Rural life is supported by urban industries, while urban life is supported by rural industries. Each supports the other. Each has its own territory. We can't raise rice here in Tokyo, and in the same way we can't build nuclear plants in Tokyo."

"You know that before building a nuclear power plant they always hold a hearing. Why is a hearing necessary?"

"To avoid danger!"

Is there danger in nuclear plants?"

"Everybody knows that."

"Is any hearing held before raising rice?"

" . . . . . "

At the beginning of the campaign, people regarded it as a mere parody. A folk singer appeared on the street to espouse the plan, singing, "Build nuclear plants in Tokyo / Build, build, build in Tokyo."

Soon, however, the group forced the mass media to take its idea seriously, contacting members of the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly by sending them a questionnaire. The Questionnaire asked,

1) Do you support or oppose the idea of Tokyo Nuclear Power Plants?
2) Do you support or oppose nuclear power plants in areas other than Tokyo?
3) Do you have a plan to solve the energy problem?

The questionnaire was sent out just before the election, and the majority of the nuclear advocates among the Assembly members decided that the most politic thing to do was not to return it. The Liberal Democratic Party apparently directed its members not to answer. The Communist Party members, on the other hand, answered, but their answers were all identical, evidently having been dictated by Party headquarters. Other answers were mainly restatements of the member's position on nuclear energy which attempted to discredit the plan for Tokyo Nuclear Power Plants but failed in that attempt when an editor of the *Mainichi Shumbun* pointed out that their real intention was to avoid construction of nuclear plants in big cities. Careful analysis of the returns showed that not one

Assembly member was able to say, "Nuclear power plants are safe." Clearly, the politicians had the same way of thinking as that of the passers-by described above, but could not state it publicly in their role as politicians. On the contrary, since not one of them supported the construction of nuclear power plants in Tokyo, despite the obvious advantages in efficiency and expense, the questionnaire demonstrated that all of them recognized that such plants are highly dangerous.

The campaign to build nuclear plants in Tokyo was made the subject of a special television program. In it, the director visited farmers and fishermen in rural areas where nuclear plants have been built, and asked them, "Most people in Tokyo, including the members of the Metropolitan Assembly, consider these plants to be very dangerous, and say that they should be built in rural areas: What do you think of that attitude?"

"A dangerous thing should be sent away to our area — did they really say that?" a farmer asked back. "We don't have enough people here now. That's because of what the government did. And now the government gives us nuclear plants because there aren't many people here. What are we? To kill one is better than to kill five — did they really say that? Aren't we human beings? What are we working for in the fields? What are these city people eating?"

* * * * * * * * * * *

Hypocrisy about nuclear power is not limited to Tokyoites. A survey made in the United States in 1981 showed that only nine percent of the people would agree to the construction of a nuclear power plant if it is to be located less than one mile from their homes, while sixty percent would agree if it is more than a hundred miles away. Similar results were obtained in Japan by an NHK survey in the same year.

But now it is time for the author to introduce himself. I am the one who wrote *Nuclear Plants in Tokyo!* I am a member of an environmental group which is opposed to nuclear power. By rights, we should be exhorting the Japanese to fight against the construction of nuclear plants no matter what the location. In fact, this is what we had once been doing. But then we began petitioning and campaigning to have them built right in Tokyo itself, where we live. I want to describe briefly how we came to this change of position.

In the years when we first started to think about nuclear power, we read everything that was available on the subject, we studied and discussed it for hours and days, and finally we concluded that all reactors should be stopped at once. We made our appeals to the public in the full confidence that our position was the right one. These efforts were effective in many rural areas where nuclear plants were and still are planned. One of our efforts was to publish a book at our own expense entitled, *What Is Nuclear Power? — An Easy-To-Understand Explanation.* This book sold best in those rural areas. For example, it was used as a textbook in an area where a town manager who was a nuclear advocate was facing a recall election.

The townspeople, who were resisting the construction of a nuclear plant there, used the book to study the various aspects of the problem, and were able

to successfully recall the town manager, though the fight over the plant is still going on. In another planned site, a fishermen's union bought one thousand copies to distribute to the local residents and so far have continued to resist construction effectively.

The time came, however, when we found ourselves isolated and ignored by the urban public, which has been the very source of nuclear advocates in our country. After some reflection, we found that we shared a weakness of many Japanese reform movements, and perhaps of reform movements in general: That is, a tendency to preach, to demand that the public adopt the opinions that we are certain are the correct ones. There may have been areas where this is effective, because the problem is urgent for the inhabitants, but in urban areas it is not. What is the reason? Most Japanese, including myself, are relatively satisfied with their lives, and at the same time are tired of ideological dispute. In spite of this, anti-nuclear activists, who are mostly ideologists, have tried to defeat nuclear advocates with ideological reasoning. Therefore, their efforts could be appreciated only by people who were already anti-nuclear. This means that those who most need knowledge about the danger have been able to ignore it. No proliferation of people who know the facts; no improvement in the situation. Our group's activities were also one of the links in this chain, in the sense that we were having no success in shifting the general tendency to support nuclear power, even though we could have some effect on local situations. This meant we had to permanently continue our hard task. We tried to seek another way which would change this general tendency from the bottom. Finally, we found a philosophy.

What we need now is not authoritative opinions, but a way of coming into contact with the facts through our own sensibility. To achieve this we need to refrain from offering conclusions which seek to coerce people by admitting of no alternatives. If no conclusions are given, people will have to conclude for themselves. At that time, if we have prepared more than one answer it helps people to understand the problem.

Apart from the campaign described above, our group regularly presents a movie show at which both a pro- and an anti-nuclear film are shown. If we are right, we believe the audience will support us. If we are wrong, that is, if nuclear power is actually safe, we will be criticized, but that is all right if there really are no accidents. The title of these shows is, "Which is the Liar?" If we are to believe in the public, it should not be necessary for us to explain to them why we think the position of the nuclear advocates ought to be criticized. As we expected, many people have come to see these films.

Now we do not fight. There is no enemy in front of us. Many movement people want to show the "V" sign, but why is it necessary? The goal of our activities is not to gain a victory, but simply to live in peace. Beginning from this point, we can find hope in the present situation, over which other nuclear activists sigh. The danger of nuclear power is not an ideological or moral position, it is a fact. Nuclear power endangers our lives. People who do not oppose nuclear power have not grasped that fact. When they do, they will be able to resist.

HIROSE TAKASHI

Anti-nuclear demonstrations are not particularly effective in helping people to grasp the danger of nuclear power. To the supporters of nuclear power, the demonstrators seem to be enemies. What the demonstrations demonstrate is the existence of anti-nuclear activists. But what the unaware public needs to know is whether or not nuclear power is actually dangerous, not whether or not anti-nuclear activists exist.

In Japan there is a game called *shogi*. It is similar to chess, but there is an important difference. In chess, the pieces which have been taken are abandoned, while in *shogi* the player who takes them can re-use them by placing them arbitrarily on any square on the board. In the game between the supporters and opponents of nuclear power, the rule of *shogi* is appropriate, since the object is not to defeat the other side, but to live together peacefully. In accordance with that rule, when a nuclear advocate is "taken" by an anti-nuclear group, he or she becomes a fresh anti-nuclear activist. But the reverse is not true, since supporters of nuclear power are so by virtue of their failure to have grasped the fact of its danger.

The debate over nuclear power has become a conventionalized dialogue between the experts representing government and industry on one side, and those representing the anti-nuclear movement on the other. In this sense, a true public hearing on the subject has never been held. In our petition campaign we ignored the government and the experts, and appealed directly to the public. The petition campaign gave us an opportunity to inform people about the facts, but more importantly, the structure of the petition — offering a choice between either nuclear plants for Tokyo or a complete halt to nuclear development — put people in a position in which they could not help but see that those facts mattered. This petition campaign may have been the first real hearing on nuclear power between citizen and citizen.

How do people, who have not been doing so, begin *thinking*? Usually not by being told that it is their duty. Before people can begin to inform themselves about the facts concerning nuclear power, they must have a feeling that those facts are important to them. The Tokyo Nuclear Plants campaign provided people with such a feeling. The feeling was fear.

During our campaign, many people asked us if what we were doing was not a parody. Others — mainly anti-nuclear activists — criticized what we were doing, saying that its overall result would be to lend support to further development of nuclear power. Standing in the crowd in the din and bustle of downtown Tokyo, I was one day seized with fear. "What will I be," I asked myself, "and what shall I do, if . . . " At the very moment I felt this fear, I could believe that our campaign was right. Nuclear plants frighten me. This must be true for the passers-by as well. When the real construction of nuclear plants begins, then their real resistance will appear. Therefore, with the ultimate goal of a non-nuclear world, we campaigned for the real construction of nuclear plants in Tokyo. It was by no means a parody.

Unfortunately it was in the egoism of my countrymen, rather than in their ethics, that I could believe.

PLAYBOY Japanese Version – July, 1981

The fruit of *Nuclear Plants in Tokyo!* is not directly visible today, three years after its publication. However there is evidence that the seeds of doubt which it planted will continue to put up shoots in many areas. For example, I find many more persons in the mass media who have begun to think afresh about the problems of nuclear development after having passed through a "gate." "The gate was that book," they tell us. "It was a brand-new concept in spite of the fact that anyone could have seen it." Many of these people, who had been unconscious previously, are now speaking of their own fears in their own words to the public. The words seem to have been born not from the pricks of conscience originating from responsibility or duty. But I believe that these words will become a real power against nuclear development, as egoism is stronger than ethics in many people. Curiously, I believe at the same time that they have passed through a gate of ethics when they have noticed their egoism, because they must have noticed the egoism of the surrounding people simultaneously. The key to ethics exists in the recognition of the common substance of human beings, including egoism. Only after recognizing that common base of egoism can ethics seek a way to overcome it.

We recently began discussing the problems of nuclear power with the employees working in the Tokyo Electrical Power Company, who themselves initiated contact with us. This February we — the workers and our group — held a joint hearing. This may have been an epoch-making starting point, in that two formerly antagonistic groups are now in a position to carry out common actions, just as in the example of the *shogi* game.

Perhaps the book *Nuclear Power Plants in Tokyo!* at least partly contributed to change our situation from the bottom. We expect that the change at the bottom will in turn bring about changes on the surface as well.

My final goal is to force the government to hold a national election in which the people will have to vote for or against nuclear power, after they have come to understand the facts well enough to know what the choice implies.

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THE COMPUTER AND JAPANESE LANGUAGE

Muro Kenji

I

Casting Their Dreams at the Computer

The purpose of this essay is to describe how the computerization of Japanese society is operating to change the Japanese written language.

This description provides a concrete example of the manner in which culture changes *and* is changed in response to the computer, both to the machine itself and to the mode of thinking which it engenders.

It also shows how the way of thinking of the postwar period of economic development in Japan has penetrated language itself. I shall call this the industrialization of the Japanese language.

Today, Japan is in a fever of enthusiasm over the computer and the new technology associated with it. The country is engrossed in their development, production and sale, and in the prospect of how much the businesses (offices and factories) which use them will be able to increase their productivity.

At any of the big computer shows which are held several times each year in Tokyo, there is a collective enthusiasm as though on the stage of a kind of mass theater. Middle-aged managers, young office workers (male and female), engineers from the companies represented and from smaller companies, small-business entrepreneurs and store owners, students from colleges, high-schools and junior high schools, and, finally, journalists: all walk about in rapt enthusiasm. There they face the computer, and at it they cast their dreams, at least for the moment, they are possessed by the idea that it is the computer, the machine and its philosophy, which will fulfil their wishes.

So, what is wrong with industrializing the Japanese language:

A language with a long tradition and rich cultural heritage, and also a language which was such an important weapon in Japan's modernization? But at the same time, from the standpoint of the business of today, a language of low productivity. If, through the computer, Japanese can be made easy to use — what's wrong with that?

The industrialization of Japanese has only just begun. But it contains the possibility of proceeding very rapidly. And what is significant (or frightening) is that no one raises any objections. In fact, most people are unaware that the process is happening at all.

While people cast childish dreams at the computer, at the same time they

don't know enough about what it is, and about what is actually happening in that field (or even imagine what is happening there).

Before entering the discussion of the Japanese language and the computer, there is another matter which must be discussed first.

For English speaking readers of this paper who don't know Japanese it will be necessary to give a simple explanation of what kind of language Japanese actually is.

II

The Written Language: Genealogy and Problems

Japanese is a member of the Ural-Attaic language group. It is written with imported Chinese characters, called *kanji*, plus two sets of phonetic symbols which were derived by the Japanese from *kanji*, called *hiragana* and *katakana*.

It is difficult to determine how many *kanji* the average Japanese "knows". The large newspapers which are read by the majority of the people limit the number of characters which they use, but even then the number is around 3000. So we can say that the bulk of the people are able in one way or another to read this many. ("To read" here includes cases in which the reader understands the meaning of the character without knowing how to pronounce it. This is quite common in reading *kanji*).

On the other hand, the number of characters taught in the nine years of compulsory education is just under 2000. These characters one is supposed to be able not only to read, but also to write. So perhaps we can say that this is the number of characters that the bulk of the people can "use".

Hiragana and *katakana* each comprise 46 phonetic symbols (representing the same 46 sounds) and resemble each other in shape and function. *Katakana* is primarily used for words of foreign origin. Writing with a combination of Chinese characters (*kanji*) and the two phonetic systems (collectively called *kana*) is called "*kanji-kana* compound writing," and written Japanese has been the historical development of this form. Today the language can be written either horizontally or vertically, but formerly it was written only vertically.

Originally the Japanese language had no written form. But in the 5th and 6th centuries the introduction of Chinese characters flourished. This was not only a matter of writing but a process which entailed the introduction of the culture of China and Korea.

Chinese characters are based on a different principle from phonetic letters such as the Roman alphabet. Most Japanese characters are made up of a combination of symbols. For example the character for "letter" (字) is simple, but is made up of one element which represents "house" (宀) and another which represents "child" (子). The element "child" is a character which can be used independently, while the element "house" is not. If the element "child" is replaced by the character for "woman," the new character (安) means "ease" or "peace." If it is replaced by the character for "cow," (牛) the new character (牢) means "prison."

In this way, most Chinese characters are made up of combinations of a certain number of basic elements, each of which has its own meaning and pronunciation. Complicated characters are composites which comprise several of these basic elements within a single character.

Chinese characters are not phonetic symbols, but represent with their form both a sound and a meaning, and used in a variety of methods of combination can carry a meaning that transcends both time and space. In the vast territory of China there are many dialects, but though the pronunciation and syntax of the spoken languages may differ so greatly as to be mutually unintelligible, meaning can be transmitted through the characters of the written language. Moreover, using the same characters as employed in daily life one can transcend time and enter directly into the world of the classics.

Through these characters, China has been able to maintain its identity over time and space.

Again, through using these characters the countries surrounding China were brought within the sphere of Chinese culture. Even when they are used in a different language system, with different grammer and different pronunciation, Chinese culture (meaning) is still contained within the form of the characters themselves.

When the Japanese were importing Chinese characters, at first they used them to write in Chinese, but gradually they developed a way of using them to set down Japanese, a language of entirely different grammatical construction. This system was gradually refined. At first the method was to use the characters as phonetic symbols for writing Japanese sentences. Later, those few characters which had been selected for use as phonetic symbols were abbreviated into the two phonetic systems that are in use today, *katakana* and *hiragana*.

1. Kanji/Kana

The history of the Japanese language can be seen as the history of the tension between the characters brought from China and the phonetic *kana* which were derived out of them.

Until the Meiji Restoration (1868) Japan was overwhelmingly under the influence of the *kanji* culture of China and Korea. "Culture" itself came to Japan via Chinese characters.

At first, as I mentioned above, these characters could only be used for writing the Chinese language. Later, the ruling class and intelligentsia succeeded in developing a special method for reading and translating Chinese. They devised a set of symbols which when written into the original Chinese text allowed one to change the order of words and read it directly as Japanese. This Chinese-classic-translation-style came to be not only a method of translation, but also one important way of writing Japanese. The very peculiar mode of expression which had been developed for writing translated Chinese, using many *kanji* words (that is, Chinese words), became the style of the ruling class and intelligentsia — particularly among men.

On the other hand, another style was developed in which the phonetic *hiragana* were employed to write, this time using Japanese rather than Chinese

words. The great example of this style is the *Tale of Genji*, which was written by a woman. But even here the influence of *kanji* is present.

Given the structure of Japanese, *kanji* were not a difficult tool to use. If they had not happened to fit the structure of the language, they probably would have been discarded after the phonetic *kana* had been developed.

Both the Japanese and Korean languages are constructed out of word stems and suffixes. By using *kanji* for the stems and phonetic *kana* for the suffixes, a linguistic order could be established out of a combination of both writing systems. It was out of the tension between two different writing systems, *kanji* and *kana*, which also means the tension between Chinese and Japanese words, that the present method of writing Japanese, "*kanji-kana* compound writing," developed.

2. Kanji/Modernization

The modernization of Japan began some 120 years ago with the Meiji Restoration, which overthrew the Tokugawa Shogunate and put an end to the feudal system. The Meiji government established the emperor system, and began importing ideas concerning politics, economics, military science and strategy, education, science and technology, from the West. In this modernization process, *kanji* are accredited with having played an important role.

Kanji are extremely well suited for coining new words. As I described above, each *kanji* is constructed of several smaller symbols, has several pronunciations and can indicate several meanings. it is easy to connect two or more *kanji* together to form new words with new meanings. In this way the Japanese of that period were able to coin new *kanji* words with which to express the basic words and concepts then being brought in from the West. Through this *kanji* substitution, Japan was able to make the concepts of Western social structure, scholarship and technology its own. Many of these new words coined in Japan for the purpose of modernization were later adopted in the other countries in the sphere of *kanji* culture: Korea and China.

This opinion, that the role of *kanji* in Japan's modernization is of first-rank importance, has become increasingly current in recent writings on the language. It is argued that it was through the possession of a language with the ideal combination of elements — *kanji* with their capacity for coining new words plus the phonetic *kana* — that Japan was able to modernize, and, indeed, that the failure of other Asian counties to modernize can be attributed to the fact that they do not possess such a language.

This trend is one reflection of the self-confident great-powerism that has characterized Japan after its period of rapid economic growth. It entirely screens out the question of the ill effects of *kanji* and includes no historical and cultural sense of the strength of native Japanese words.

3. Power/Language

The *kanji-kana* composite writing form is not without its problems.

The first is that one needs to learn many *kanji*. At least, if you do not you cannot read or write. In order to have the people learn those *kanji*, a powerful

educational system is necessary. The Meiji government built an educational system in which state power was strong, and which penetrated every corner of the country, and it was within this system that *kanji* were taught to the children. However in the period before the end of World War II, when the number of people who received higher education was few, one can say that the ability to write in this form making full use of *kanji* belonged to only one part of the population.

There is also a problem in the capacity of *kanji* for coining new words. Using *kanji*, one can easily take words and concepts from daily life and, without thinking in rational concepts, form abstract words. And once such an abstract *kanji* word is made, it can be used on the strength of its form alone without thinking each time about its meaning. Or rather, *kanji* contain within them something which operates to defy analysis of their meaning. The capacity of *kanji* for coining words and for expressing meaning is not analytical but rather depends on their symbolic function, and in an authoritarian, dominating society this ability becomes the ability to do violence.

In prewar Japanese society, which was centered on the Emperor and which had a powerful bureaucracy, military and police, authoritarian, dominating *kanji* words were forced upon the people. Words without concrete referents, whose meaning content was vague, were vigorously manufactured and used for the purpose of political rule. Before and during the war, the military administration, buried irrational sentiments inside *kanji*, and used them like a kind of magic, along with violent power, to maintain the legitimacy of the military and the emperor system. If it is possible to make the extreme argument that *kanji* were a necessary condition for Japan's modernization, it is also possible to claim that they were a necessary condition for Japan's emperor-system fascism.

Another disadvantage of *kanji* is that there are many homonyms. This is especially true because in Japan there was a great difference between the written and the spoken languages, and the use of *kanji* developed primarily in the context of the former. It often happens that when one uses a *kanji* word in conversation, the meaning is not communicated, and the listener does not understand until told what *kanji* one is using. *Kanji* are used in such a way that you often cannot understand their meaning until you see them. The inconveniences of this characteristic of *kanji* increase as the spoken and written languages are brought closer together.

In addition, in *kanji-kana* composite writing there is no orthography. Since a given word can be written in either *kanji* or *kana*, the lack of a clear orthography (which would reduce these choices to a set of rules) can generate large mistakes in meaning. Moreover, when a word is composed of stem and suffix, it is often difficult to say how much of it should be written in *kanji* and how much in *kana*. In short, a standard orthography is hard to produce. Even in the schools, the students are not taught orthographic rules but rather are given only standards of writing considered to be desirable.

However, while lack of an orthography is a weakness, it can also be a way of expression. All significant Japanese writers develop their own orthographic practices, which become an aspect of their style.

Reform of these weaknesses in the writing system began immediately after World War II. As was true for all reforms of that period, it was instigated by pressure from the General Headquarters (GHQ) of the Allied Occupation. These groups responded to this call for reforms: the Roman Alphabetists (who argued that Japanese should be written entirely in ABCs), the *Kana* Phoneticists (who argued that it should be written in *katakana*), and the *Kanji* Limitationists (who argued that a limit should be set to the number of *kanji* which could be used). GHQ took sides with the Alphabetists, who wished to eliminate *kanji* altogether. A U.S. investigation team which studied Japanese education also leaned in its report toward the Alphabetists and the phoneticists.

In this fashion, the reform of the written language moved in the direction of limiting *kanji*, and of emphasizing phoneticization. Thirty years later, the reforms made under the Occupation receive severe criticism. Nonetheless, it was a reasonable reform. The number of *kanji* taught in the compulsory education system was limited. Steps were taken so that the number of *kanji* in general use should not be unreasonably expanded. *Kanji* of complex shapes were simplified. *Hiragana* was further phoneticized to correspond to pronunciation in actual use. In teaching language in the schools, a writing style close to the spoken language was emphasized.

In a sense, all of these reforms were perfectly natural. In fact, they were welcomed by many people who sought liberation from the authoritarian and dominating pressure of the language and of *kanji* that had characterized the pre-war and wartime period.

However these reforms did not move very far in the direction of phoneticization. And why? Perhaps because there is something in the language which resists phoneticization.

III

Now we can return to the question of contemporary Japanese and the computer.

I wrote at the beginning that Japan is now in a period in which all the people are casting their dreams at the computer. What, then, is their expectation concerning the relation between the computer and the language? What is the dream here?

It is of an efficient Japanese language.

Kanji-kana composite writing is, in comparison with languages written in the Roman or other phonetic alphabets, clearly inferior from the standpoint of efficiency in the modern sense. It is impossible to write Japanese, with its thousands of characters, on a typewriter. There did exist a mechanical Japanese "type-writer" with a keyboard of some 2000 letters, but this was something that could be operated only by a typist who had received special training, and actually was a "clear copy machine", in a category quite different from the Roman-letter typewriter. Without exception, all writing was done first by hand. Then in those cases where it was absolutely necessary, as with a contract for example, it would be sent to a typist who would make a clear copy.

The fact that there did not exist a typewriter with which Japanese could be typed rapidly and easily meant that Japanese business offices were less efficient that those of countries that did possess such typewriters (or at least, so the Japanese believed). With regard to writing in the worlds of business, academia, and journalism, there was in Japan an aspect entirely different from the West. Because of the lack of a typewriter, it took longer to translate things into written form, which meant that fewer things were so set down. To make a detailed written record, and then to discuss those details, was an infrequent practice.

That which is written by hand and that which is written by machine (the typewriter) give an entirely different impression both to the writer and to the reader. That which is written by hand is inseparable from the writer as an individual, whereas that which is written by machine has less connection with the writer and can more easily be held in common with others. For Japanese (as well as for Chinese and Koreans) the activity of writing *kanji*, while it may be a business activity, is at the same time in some sense an artistic activity. (The writing [in one's own style] of classic Chinese poems on a single sheet of white paper with brush and India ink is no longer as common as it once was in the ordinary household, but within the sphere of *kanji* culture it used to be a perfectly natural form of art).

For these reasons, the standardization of writing had not been given much thought. Writing was done by hand, vertically, horizontally, in different forms, on different sizes of paper, with a different style for each individual and for each company. The question of what form of writing would be most easily read by others was given little consideration.

Moreover, since it was not the practice to use typewriters and make carbon copies, the art of systematically filing and preserving documents did not develop. With the appearance of the Xerox machine, on which handwritten documents can be copied, this has changed rapidly.

Thus in all businesses which made use of written Japanese (and doing business without writing is virtually impossible) inefficiency has long been a problem. However since the problem was built into the nature of the written language, it was generally considered insoluble.

One important argument of those who advocated Romanization or *kana* phoneticization was that this would make possible the use of the typewriter, and thus the language would become more convenient. One leading prewar advocates of *kana* phoneticization, Yamashita Yoshitaro, a director of Sumitomo, had Sumitomo use a newly developed *kana* typewriter in an experiment to improve efficiency. However it is hard to say that the experiment was a great success.

In recent years the expression "OA" has come to be used constantly, almost as a kind of magical incantation, both by the mass media and in ordinary conversation. What is meant by "OA" (office automation) in Japan is the use of the computer to improve the efficiency of written Japanese. The problems of speed, quality, and quantity of writing, the process of circulation, management, and universalization of writing, and procedures for printing can all be solved (they say) by the computer, and efficiency thus achieved. Through the computer, a true Japanese language typewriter is made possible for the first time. Through

the computer what had been a handicap in the Japanese language will now disappear.

On the underside of this passion for increasing the efficiency of the Japanese written language there is also the pull of a complex toward the efficiency of the phonetically written English and other European languages: or perhaps a complex toward these languages themselves.

4. The Rationalization of Japanese Language

To increase the efficiency of Japanese business writing is a good thing, and to improve the performance and generalize the use of the Japanese language word processer is also a good thing. At least so everyone believes.

What, then, are the problems?

I will begin with the simplest and most easily understood. This is the problem of how many *kanji* should be put into the computer, and how they should be chosen. In order to put *kanji* into the computer, it is necessary to have a set of standards.

This set of standards has, of course, already been established. It is called Code of the Japanese Graphic Character Set for Information Interchange JIS C 6226-1978. It carries the status of a Japan Industrial Standard (JIS), Japan's most authoritative industrial standard, which is fixed by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry in collaboration with the makers in question.

The Code comprises a Number One Character Group of 2965 basic characters, and a Number Two Character Group of 3384 additional characters, for a total of 6349. Each character is given two byte codes. This list was compiled in 1978 for the purpose of facilitating exchange of information among computers by unifying the various *kanji* codes. For this purpose the roughly 3000 most commonly used *kanji*, and another 3400 less commonly used *kanji*, were selected, and a code ascribed to each.

By what standard were these *kanji* selected? How was the difference established between the two groups? Why 3000 and 3400? Are those *kanji* not included not to be used?

How to make a list of *kanji* for the purpose of establishing a standard has always been a problem. Such lists have always been born of argument and have always stirred up argument. Why questions of *kanji* lists, their number, their form, and their use, should provoke controversy is understandable, taking into consideration the history of *kanji-kana* composite writing. *Kanji*, unlike phonetic symbols, are units each of which contains within its form meaning and thought. To make a decision that this *kanji* should be used and that one not, or that a part of a similar *kanji* should be used instead, or that a complicated *kanji* should be simplified, raises serious questions.

One who fully accepts the function of *kanji* will see any limitation of their number or interference with their use as a violation of freedom of thought and expression, and also as an injury to the thousands of years of tradition of *kanji* culture. Seen from this point of view, limitation of *kanji* is not a limitation on the use of letters but a limitation on the free use of words.

On the other hand, one who has doubts about the use of *kanji* will, precisely

because each character contains within its form both meaning and thought, wish to limit their number and lighten the burden of thousands of years of tradition of *kanji* writing. They would place value not so much on the tradition of the written language as on the tradition of the spoken language. Chou En-Lai once said that while the Japanese people must feel regret for the Japanese military's invasion of China during the last war, the Chinese people also have reason to feel regret towards the Japanese, namely for having forced the use of *kanji* on them a thousand years ago. The Chinese Revolution was also confronted with the weight of history, meaning, and thought contained within *kanji*.

However for the purpose of communication without misunderstanding, it is necessary to make standards that are in some degree binding. So *kanji* lists are made and debate is triggered. Pro-*kanji* and anti-*kanji* groups debate during the process of making such lists, and after the lists are made they continue to debate.

However the JIS *kanji* list has triggered no such debate. Why is it that while everyone talks enthusiastically about how the computer society of the future will dramatically increase the use efficiency of Japanese, no one understands that in that case the *kanji* list will be far more restrictive than any other list that has hitherto been made?

The JIS *kanji* list was compiled by a group with various computer makers and MITI at the center (and with some participation from universities, broadcasting companies, and newspaper publishing companies).

Traditionally, the question of the national language had always been under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education. Now, however, it was transferred to the Ministry of International Trade and Industry. The issue which up to then had been the subject of debate among educators, writers, linguists, publishers, and newspapers was now under the jurisdiction of computer manufacturers and settled from the standpoint of technocracy. And no one complained. Surely this means that there are no problems with the JIS list. Or is it ignorance? Has Computer Fever made the people unable to see?

One reason for the apparent satisfaction of *kanji* supporters is that the total number of characters included, some 6400, is extremely large. The number is not so large, however, when one considers that real aim of the list is in the direction of doing all writing with the No. 1 list of 3000. Or perhaps they are satisfied because the list contains not only new characters which have been abbreviated, but also old, complex characters and even non-standard characters (those which vary only slightly in shape from another of the same meaning).

However this list was not constructed from the standpoint of the "culture" which the *kanji* supporters had previously held to be so important. The representatives of MITI and the computer industry who assembled it did so without regard to culture, but entirely through the manipulation of statistics (with only the slightest alterations added to the result). From the standpoint of their supporters, are *kanji* — for the purpose of thought and expression, the most valuable inheritance from traditional culture — something that can be handed over to MITI and the industrialists, and to the logic of technology and business efficiency?

And what about the *kanji* opponents? Are they not opposed to this list that was made simply by throwing in everything and anything with regard to neither educational nor cultural considerations? Perhaps they have been rendered speechless by the fact that the increase in efficiency of the language, which they had argued would be achieved only through phoneticization (making possible the use of the typewriter), is now apparently being realized by the computer, using *kanji-kana* composite writing.

Until now, all *kanji* lists which have sought to impose limits on their use have been the product of the debate and the power relation between the pro- and anti-*kanji* forces. But this time, it is entirely different. The power of this list, backed by as it is by the power of the computer, will surely become immense, great enough to alter the language or perhaps eventually to create a new language. Despite this, both sides have so far remained virtually silent.

5. Technology against Culture

When using Japanese language in the computer, *output* is not the real problem. Output is just a matter of technology. However the problems which arise when Japanese is the *input* strike to the center of the language itself: these are not merely technological problems, but fundamental problems of culture.

When Japanese language is used as input, punching out on the keyboard the two byte codes assigned to each character presents no particular problem, technologically or linguistically. However looked at realistically, a system which would require the operator to punch a number code — 2-16, or 10-6, or 16-4 — for each letter is out of the question. The whole point, after all, is efficiency.

Then how about a keyboard with thousands of keys? But we already have a typewriter of this construction. There is no way to operate it rapidly.

In the end, the method adopted was to punch in Japanese a keyboard either in *kana* or in the Roman alphabet, after which the computer leaves the *kana* parts in *kana* and converts the *kanji* parts into *kanji*. This is called "*kana-kanji* conversion" and "alphabet-*kanji* conversion." Since both *kana* and Roman letters are phonetic, in transforming them into *kanji* the principle is the same.

The problem here is a problem contained in *kanji-kana* composite writing, and returns us the difficulty of phoneticizing this form of writing. That is, putting the Japanese into the computer in the form of phonetic symbols and having the computer convert this into *kanji-kana* composite writing gives birth to just the same sort of problems as would the complete phoneticization of that writing form. In effect, *kanji-kana* composite writing is translated into a phonetic writing form to be put into the computer, and then the computer retranslates this phonetic Japanese back into *kanji-kana* composite writing.

I mentioned above that since the Japanese language developed with *kanji*, whose meaning is transmitted to the eye rather than to the ear, it contains many homonyms, and that in daily conversation it often happens that when a *kanji* word is used its meaning cannot be understood until the speaker explains what *kanji* he or she is using.

And I also mentioned that there is no fixed orthography for Japanese. A given sentence may be written using many *kanji* and few *kana*, or vice-versa, without

changing the pronounciation or meaning. (However, depending on whether there are many *kanji* or many *kana*, the sentence presents a very different impression to the reader. It is only a slight exaggeration to say that whether a particular *kanji* word is written in *kanji* or in *kana* is the free choice of the writer).

Moreover, in Japanese, unlike English, there is no concept of independent words each occupying its own space. Japanese is a language constructed of word stems and suffixes, where in many cases the stems are written in *kanji* and the suffixes in *kana*. The problem is that is the case of a given word, it has not been fixed how much should be written in *kanji* and how much in *kana*. It cannot be fixed. Standards of usage exist, but they are full of contradictions and have little binding authority.

When writing a word of a certain pronunciation, what a writer will do is first decide whether to write it in *kanji* or in *kana*. If in *kanji*, the writer will then select from among the many *kanji* of that pronunciation the one which correctly fits the meaning intended. If there are several which fit the meaning, the writer will select one from among these, basing the choice on nuances of meaning and personal style. Finally, if it is a word with a stem, the writer will decide how far to write it in *kanji* and from where to begin the *kana*. Consequently, when a writer is punching out Japanese on aphonetic keyboard which the computer is to convert into *kanji-kana* composite writing, the computer must not only determine the meaning of the writing from the phonetic symbols, but must also determine the writing method and taste of the author.

This is clearly not an easy job for a computer.

To be concrete, I will give the example of the word processer on which I am presently writing this manuscript. Let us say that I have punched a certain word on the *kana* keyboard and then punched the key which tells the computer to transform it into *kanji-kana* composite writing. The computer will begin its search from the last sound in the word, and will display the possible *kanji* on the screen. If it is a word with a suffix, only those *kanji* for which that suffix is grammatically possible will be shown. It is very rare that only one *kanji* comes up on the monitor. When there are more than one, the computer first displays the one with the greatest use frequency, and then all other possible words. There will be several, and grammatically there may be hundreds, but the better the word processer, the fewer will be listed, and the more likely the desired word will be among those displayed.

In short, from the phonetic input the computer selects all grammatically possible combinations, and from among these the human being selects one, from the standpoint of meaning. Then the process is repeated, over and over.

To one who is accustomed to an English or European language typewriter or word processer, this may seem like a bewildering description. However once one learns to operate the keyboard, it is a great step in the direction of efficiency.

These techniques have been developed through the researches of the various makers. All have been researching the problem of how to put Japanese into the computer efficiently, some from as long as ten years ago, some from more recently. Those doing this research are neither grammarians nor educators,

nor are they writers, journalists or other specialists in the written word. They are computer engineers and programmers. In no sense experts on the language (but in accordance with a decision of industry), they began studying it — from the standpoint of the computer. What they quickly discovered is that from the standpoint of the computer Japanese grammer is entirely useless. And so from the standpoint of the computer they themselves have begun to create a Japanese grammer that would not be useless. This is how the interference of the computer into the language began.

It may be hard for someone who doesn't know Japanese to understand the difficulty of punching in *kana* and getting out *kanji*. But in order to convert a short phrase into *kanji-kana* writing, the computer must first (since there are no spaces between words in Japanese) separate it into grammatically possible units (and it is rare that there will be only one possible way to do this) and then begin to search its dictionary for each possibility. Then it will choose the most likely form for the kana it was given and show it on the monitor. If it is wrong, the operator will push the key for the next candidate. To enable the computer to do this grammatical work, each makers' computer engineers have had to produce a new grammer and a new dictionary. (And it happens very often that they produce forms absolutely impossible in Japanese).

But hardly any of this research has been made public. It is an industrial secret. Several years have passed since the various companies began marketing Japanese language word processers, but the method each company arrived at for conversion into *kanji-kana* writing is slightly different, and each is of course an industrial secret.

Everyone admits that this is a transition period. It is so in two senses.

From the standpoint of technology, progress can probably be made but up to a certain point. The operating speed of the computer can be increased, the capacity and speed of the external memory equipment can be improved, the quality of the printer and the monitor can be improved, the operating system and the network can be consolidated. In this technical sense, the transitional period can be overcome.

But what of the other transition period, that which relates to the character of written Japanese itself, the problem of conversion into *kanji-kana* writing? How will this contradiction just at the point of contact between technology and culture be resolved?

The time will come when computers will no longer, as they do now, offer up on their moniters *kanji* words which are in fact impossible. But the real problem has to do with the writing system itself.

No matter how computer technology progresses, it is difficult to see how a way can be found for the computer to convert a phonetic input into a *kanji-kana* output without changing the very structure of the writing system. The difficulty here is just the same as that faced by those who, whether for educational reasons, for efficiency, or to liberate the language from *kanji*, had argued for phoneticization in the past. However, the Japanese people seem to be strangely unaware of these difficulties. It is as if they believed that *the problems of the language and of culture can be solved by the computer.*

IV

The Computer Imperative

There are two ways by which the computer might solve the problems of the culture and the language.

The first is to change them so as to fit the computer. The "common sense" which defines everything which does not fit into the computer as irrational will be of assistance to this method.

The second is to develop a computer which can fully understand Japanese language and culture. This is the method advocated by those who believe that the computer will be able to fully comprehend Japanese.

Altering the language to fit the computer is no easy matter. It is, however, happening little by little.

The JIS industrial standardization of *kanji* is one example. If industrial standards such as these concerning Japanese continue to be put into use by the makers, and if the computer permeates every corner of Japanese society as has been predicted, then we can expect that the language will gradually become structured by industrial standards, and will be changed.

The most important point is *kana-kanji* conversion. At this point, the method is imperfect. The imperfection is that the judgement of the human being operating the computer is needed. If this human interference is to be dispersed away with the language will have to be changed, but at present the various computer manufacturers have not developed a unified set of standards for *kana-kanji* conversion. Each company has its own method. Should these methods ever become unified, that will amount to a set of industrial standards which will clearly alter the language.

On the other hand in May, 1983 at the Business Show in Tokyo (one of Japan's major computer shows) Gary Kidall, president of Digital Research, Inc., announced at a press conference that *kana-kanji* conversion is to be built into the operation system (OS) which has been developed and is being sold as software by his company. This may appear on the market within a few months.

In this fashion industrial standards (and in this particular case standards set by a U.S. company) gradually change Japanese, and Japan today moves in the direction of the industrialization of its language.

6. "The Computer Understands Everything"

In addition to the method of changing Japanese to fit the computer, there is another idea widespread in Japan, that since "the computer understands everything" there is nothing wrong with having it understand and manipulate Japanese.

I have described how difficult it is for the computer to take phonetic Japanese input and convert it into *kanji-kana* writing. If, however, the computer could be made to understand in the manner of a human being the meaning of the sentences, (which means to understand context) then the problem would be solved.

Can the computer, then, understand the meaning of sentences in a natural language like Japanese? Will the day come when computers can use natural languages like we do?

To make this argument actually requires much preparation, but if I may make a rough statement of my own thought, it is that the computer is entirely incapable of understanding the meaning of natural language in the way human beings do. Computers are able to use natural languages to a certain degree and in an extremely imperfect manner. *Seen from the outside*, the computer may appear to be "understanding" natural language. However the linguistic order used by the computer and the linguistic order which we use in our daily lives are two entirely different things. In the case of computer language the meanings of words are — just as in mathematical and symbolic games — fixed and set down clearly in advance. The case of natural language is entirely different. Here meaning is continuously redefined by the context in which the words are used. In natural language, meaning is born of context.

Whether the meaning of natural language can be expressed in computer language becomes the question of whether computer language can express this thing called context.

Certainly a part of the meaning of natural language can be put into computer language. But the assertion that it can express virtually all of the meaning contained in natural language — language which is connected to the very essence of this strange existence called the human being — is another question entirely.

There is a universe of meaning which can only be expressed in computer language, with its entirely different symbol system. It has some correspondence to the universe of meaning we use in the natural language of our daily lives, but at the same time the two are entirely different universes.

To say that this entirely different computer symbol system has the power to comprehend and express natural language is not a question of science but ideology. And if there is ever such a thing as computer fascism, this ideology will surely form its basis.

In Japan today, under state initiative, the ideology is being propagated that almost the entire meaning contained in natural language can be set down in the formal language of the computer.

In the software section of the *Fifth Generation Computer Development Plan*[1] (part of a ten-year plan being carried out under the auspices of MITI with the cooperation of both universities and computer producers), one important theme is the use by computers of natural language. The interface between the computer and natural language is one of the chief pivots of the plan. It is stated repeatedly, that the computer will indeed develop the capacity to "understand" human language.

For example, one major theme is mechanical translation by computer, and the report says that in ten years the computer will be able to translate foreign languages with 90% accuracy using a vocabulary of 100,000 words. The computer will not only solve the problem of writing Japanese efficiently, but also the problem of translation between Japanese and English and other European

languages (an area in regard to which the Japanese have long suffered from compulsions and complexes).

On the basis of this fanciful report, newspapers, magazines, television and other media are broadcasting the idea that perhaps the computer can do everything.

But what do the MITI officials, the university and industrial researchers, connected with the Fifth Generation Plan really think? If they truly believe in the goal of developing a computer which can manipulate and manage human language and culture, that is a frightening thing.

But it may be that they do not believe in the goal itself, but only in its ideological efficacy. Or it may be that they do not accept the ideology either, but only raise these chimerical themes and goals because they bring in money and allow them to do research. Or it may be that they are thinking of nothing at all other than catching up with and passing the U.S. Or perhaps it is none of these, or again all of them hazily mixed together.

Whatever the motivations of its authors, it is a fact that this Fifth Generation Computer Development Plan functions, and powerfully so, to spread throughout Japan the ideology that the computer has the capability of managing human culture.

7. Even Cultural Conservatives Cast Their Dreams . . .

How are the intellectuals — especially writers, language scholars, and educators — responding to this?

There has been no significant opposition. Nothing to compare to the debates which raged in the past over the question of limiting the number of *kanji*.

However, there have been several interesting reactions.

Fukuda Tsuneari, a playwright and scholar of English literature who has been one of the most vigorous and conservative critics of the postwar language reforms, offered this strange judgement in response to a question from an Asahi Newspaper reporter: "There is no reason to think that the language can be changed by a machine." [2] Isn't it precisely from a stuanch language conservative like Fukuda that we should expect the sharpest statements on the relationship between the language and the computer?

And then there are Maruya Seiichi, a well-known writer and a follower of Fukuda in his criticism of the post-war language reforms, and the famous linguist Ohno Susumu, both of whom have in recent writings given high praise to the computer's ability to use *kanji*.[3] Both seem to be overjoyed by the fact that the development of the computer's ability to use *kanji* has rendered meaningless the phoneticists' argument that the efficiency of the language could only be achieved through its phoneticization.

In this way, remarkably, the technological reform of the language is receiving the support of Japanese language conservatives. It is still to early to judge whether this is the result of ignorance or whether it reveals their true character.

With even the conservatives offering their approval, there are virtually no writers or other intellectuals in the cultural field with a proper grasp of the problem.

The computer and computer science were born suddenly and developed rapidly, slipping past established knowledge and philosophy to become a dominating presence. Most of the cultural intellectuals active today completed their education before the computer was fully developed. They have little basic knowledge about it, and their imagination apparently does not operate when thinking about it. They do not seem to be able to see through the ideological information about it spread by the mass media.

Those few who have offered warnings concerning the effects of computers on society have had their voices silenced both by the power of the existing computer itself and by the influence of the computer specialists.

And so the computer is running on alone.

Like the military, the computer contains within itself a peculiarly closed logic and a great capacity for violence. To keep the military from getting out of hand, there exists the concept and the institutions of civilian control. For the computer there is no parallel system of control.

In matters of culture a proper degree of conservatism is necessary (though determining what degree is "proper" is of course a problem). When culture encounters a powerful technology like the computer, it is then that its inherent conservatism should be displayed. Only then can new technologies and new powers find their place within and come into harmony with human society. However in Japan today this conservatism is seen nowhere. On the contrary, the language conservatives themselves are throwing their support behind technology.

The computer/efficiency ideology is industrializing the Japanese language. How far this will go, I cannot now predict. I feel both optimism and pessimism. However I believe that these developments will have a far more serious effect on Japanese than the centralized national television and radio networks have had on the spoken language. Unless the computer is quickly put under "civilian control," the matter is going to become very grave.

I have written this paper not as an analysis but as a report. I conclude with the hope that it will not become a new source of misunderstanding between the Japanese-speaking and the English-speaking people.

Notes

1. *Report on Development of Basic Computer Technology — Software Section: 1981* Ministry of International Trade and Industry Investigation Commission (March, 1982).

2. "The True Face of the Word Processer" *Asahi Shimbun*, April 18, 1983.

3. "History of Language Reform (Pre-war)" Ohno Susumu, in *The World of Japanese, 16 — Criticizing Language Reform* Chuo Koron-sha, 1983. "Language and Letters and Spirit" Maruya Seiichi, in the same.

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LIBERAL STILL:

NOTES ON THE POLITICAL THEORY OF C.B. MACPHERSON*

Alfonso J. Damico

I

C. B. Macpherson has defined his work as an effort to find some "common ground between Mill's and Marx's concern for individual self-development".[1] One of the more attractive features of this attempted reconciliation of liberalism and socialism is Macpherson's effort to persuade liberals in the tradition of J. S. Mill that the imperatives of their own principles make them natural allies of those who reject possessive individualism. Thus, there is a certain awkwardness in my rejection of Macpherson's overall project; one is more accustomed to radical criticism that seeks to dismiss liberalism than to effect a reconciliation. But Macpherson's statement of the terms of reconciliation collapses certain important distinctions between liberalism as a rights oriented theory and utilitarian justificatory theories. In fact, my hunch is that Macpherson's main target of criticism is Benthamite man or various utilitarian versions of liberalism, a target often aimed at by liberals as well.[2] It is not Macpherson's "downgrading of market assumptions and the upgrading of the equal right to self-development"[3] that divides him from other liberals. Rather, it is that he too quickly moves from Locke's understanding of the individual as a bearer of rights to Benthamite man as a consumer of utilities. This is to suggest that there is another world of liberalism, a third liberal ontology that fits neither of the two accounts of the liberal ontology discussed by Macpherson. What follows, then, are a series of comments, less exegetical, perhaps, than many assessments of Macpherson's writings, but appropriate, I trust, for exploring what it means to still be a liberal some twenty years after the publication of *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism*.

II

That liberalism's understanding of human nature is a central subject of Macpherson's various studies will not be news to any of his many readers. At least as early as 1954, in an article entitled "The Deceptive Task of Political Theory," he stated that the great question asked by political theory is "what state is most congruous with the nature of man?"[4] The adequacy of a political theory, he argued, turns in large measure upon its analysis of human nature. What gives this statement added significance is the sociological twist applied to it. The

adequacy of a theory's ontological postulates is said to depend on something more than the postulates themselves; it depends upon how they fit the imperatives of an existing society. This sociological twist makes Macpherson especially attentive to the ways in which the particular imperatives of a given society, once translated through a theory of human nature, appear in the guise of universal principles. It also explains Macpherson's non-rancorous indictment of various liberal thinkers for their narrowness. So long as such narrowness was really a function of the limited possibilities of their society, Macpherson faults the society and not the theorist. This method of critiquing the liberal ontology received its first elaborate presentation in the prize-winning *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism*.

"Tell me where you stand on possessive individualism" has almost become a new shorthand for focusing many of the issues about liberalism and its viability, testimony to the mastery with which the thesis of possessive individualism was first argued. Nevertheless, I am not going to explain where I stand on possessive individualism *per se*. Rather, I want to reconsider the critique of liberalism as possessive individualism, i.e., consigning liberal principles to the status of an ideology whose primary function is to justify capitalist exchange relationships with their attendant imbalances of power and inequalities, in light of certain themes that have become more conspicuous and prevalent in Macpherson's later writings. In such works as *Democratic Theory* and the more recent *The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy*, the chief target of Macpherson's criticism of early liberalism is Benthamite man: infinite appropriator, infinite desirer, and infinite consumer. In juxtaposing this conception of man to that version of the democratic ontology that understands the individual as a doer, an exerter of his capacities, Macpherson has sharpened some of the issues separating liberals and their left critics. But that sharpness has simultaneously blunted some of the issues dividing the liberal ontology of man as a bearer of rights, on the one side, from either liberal ontology of man as a consumer of utilities or as an exerciser of his capacities, on the other side.

Liberalism, I had been taught and come to believe, had its origins in those movements and currents of opinion towards the end of the seventeenth century that sought to control the powers of the state by insisting upon the primacy of the law-making or legislative activity in society. When Locke wrote that "Wherever law ends, tyranny begins," many felt that this captured the essence of liberal constitutionalism. Or, again with Locke, the demand that there be but "one rule for rich and poor, for the favourite at Court, and the countryman at plough" was seen as more of a juridical than an ontological principle, more of a political than an economic demand. Or if some conception of the individual's essential nature was being invoked, it was the most general liberal principle that it is a *prima facie* good for an individual to act on his own understanding of his wants and interests free from arbitrary interference by others. Whatever maximizing principle (e.g., of individual utilities) that might be implied was secondary to what could be termed a minimizing principle: limit the harm that rulers can do by securing the individual's natural right to liberty through a system of juridical defense.

Complementing the notion of liberalism as the rule of law was the understanding of liberalism as a rights-based theory. Postulating, as Hobbes did, that "when all is reckoned together, the difference between man and man is not so considerable, as that one man can thereupon claim to himself any benefit to which another may not pretend, as well as he," liberal individualism substituted contractual rights and obligations for the constraints of divine law, natural teleology, and ascriptive authority. One might worry, as did Burke, that liberal individualism undermines men's attachment to the values resident in society as a social whole, i.e., as a gradation of ranks; or, as did Rousseau, that the individual within liberalism is a caricature of real persons. What one did not doubt, prior to Professor Macpherson, was that it was the individual — rich or poor, Court favourite or country farmer — that was the bearer of rights within liberalism. Additionally, by "taking rights seriously" liberal morality was normally distinguished from utilitarianism. Both were individualist, but one evaluated forms of government and social rules according to whether or not they maximized the satisfaction of person's wants, the other according to the rights and duties they secured. What J. S. Mill labored to separate — liberty and utility — Macpherson has been required to put back together, so as to better develop his own radical critique.

This is not to accuse Macpherson of any sleight of hand; his own position has always been clear. Repeatedly, he has argued that the understanding of human nature is continuous from Locke to Bentham. Towards the end of *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism*, he wrote that the difference between these two versions of liberal individualism is not very great: " . . . when tastes changed, as they did in the eighteenth century, the facade of natural law could be removed by Hume and Bentham without damage to the strong and well-built utilitarian structure that lay within" the theories of Hobbes and Locke.[5] Or again, the protective model of democracy presented in a more recent work as the product of Bentham and James Mill is pictured as the possessive individualism of Hobbes and Locke with the addition of the democratic franchise.[6]

The advantages Macpherson's overall goal of reconstructing the meaning of liberal-democracy derives from this identification of Locke's and Bentham's ontologies is apparent in the 1967 essay "The Maximization of Democracy."[7] Where others have seen three doctrines of liberal individualism – natural rights, utility, and self-development — Macpherson argues that there are two. Translated into its political equivalents, the first doctrine of man as maximizer of utilities justifies, he argues, that "extractive power" that inheres in the continuous "net transfer of powers" at the core of capitalist exchange relationships. In other words, the capitalist class, through the wage relationship, appropriates part of the power of the working class. While this imbalance of power is presented as a key result of liberal-democracy in its Utilitarian version, we are reminded that it is "firmly embedded in the liberal tradition" as developed earlier by Hobbes and Locke.[8] The other version of liberal individualism, associated with J. S. Mill, is said to rest on a different maximizing claim, the claim to maximize "men's human powers, that is, their potential for using and developing their uniquely human capacities".[9]

There are, as many of Macpherson's admirers and critics have noted,[10] serious ambiguities in the notion of an individual's self-development. But I am more concerned with how this juxtaposition of the two maximizing claims within the liberal-democratic tradition alters the ways in which the traditional political rights associated with that tradition come up for treatment. To put it differently, it is the political consequences of Macpherson's interpretative maneuver, not its internal validity, that most interests me. There are two steps to the maneuver. First, Macpherson grants that such liberties "are certainly held to have a value apart from their instrumental economic value . . . they are less often thought of as *utilities*." Thus, the first or utilitarian maximizing claim can be handled as strictly an economic claim, setting aside consideration of the place of various political liberties within this version of liberal individualism. The next step is to shift the analysis of such liberties to their role in creating the "conditions for the exertion and development of individual powers".[11] Two important things have happened. First, the juridical features of liberalism have now been shifted aside in favor of the critique of possessive individualism and market societies, i.e., utilitarianism as economic doctrine. Secondly, when those more political liberal values reappear in Macpherson's work they do so as instrumental values, instrumental to the second maximizing claim of self-development. In neither instance are those values understood independent of their contamination by possessive market society or, alternately, of their contribution to some more constitutive value of self-development. The final effect of this scheme is to bolster attacks upon capitalist societies. By linking liberal ontology, first, to utilitarianism and, next, to self-development, Macpherson is in a strong position from which to argue that liberalism has either never been a theory of the "rights of the individual against the state but a defense of the rights of expanding property" or that the liberties it values for the sake of the individual's exercising his human capacities requires the abolition of the right to private property. Much of this is salutary, reminding us once again, but in new and interesting ways, how the inequities arising out of a production system organized around private ownership leads to serious imbalances in individual life chances. And, surely, part of Macpherson's persuasiveness is that he employs the language of liberal-democracy — utilities, rights, self-development — to refashion the implications of that language. All of this is appealing. Yet, as Locke might have said, there are certain inconveniences attached to this scheme of interpretation.

III

Obstructing Macpherson's attempted reconstruction of the meaning of liberal-democracy is the existence of a third liberal ontology: defining persons as bearers of rights with an equal capacity for autonomy or independence. There is a usage of rights (and a companion notion of freedom) within liberalism that is neither a rationale for the activities of an emerging capitalist system (possessive individualism and/or the maximization of utilities) nor identical with some other principle of the equal right to self-development. Demonstrating that this other or third version of the liberal ontology better fits the theories of Hobbes and Locke

is not critical to my current inquiry. While I believe that to be the case, what is more important is identifying the ways in which this liberal ontology of independence differs from the two maximizing principles argued for by Macpherson as definite of the liberal tradition.

Recalling that picture of liberalism which opened this essay, there are at least two ways in which this other account of liberal individualism differs as a theory of politics from those theories, utilitarian and developmental, based upon Macpherson's two maximizing principles. First, an important effect of what might now be termed the juridical version of the liberal ontology is that individuals are understood to possess certain rights prior to and independent of any utilitarian calculation of the greatest happiness of the greatest number. The significance of the priority of right over utility was well understood by Bentham who attacked the French *Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen* as "absurd and miserable nonsense".[12] Something more would seem to be involved here than just a "change in tastes." That something more is the way in which the independence of the individual comes up for treatment. Within utilitarianism the wants and interests of individuals are *collected together* such that a social rule or political decision is evaluated in terms of its effects upon the maximization of the interests of this aggregate, apart from the question of its good for any particular individual. In contrast, the liberal individualism of juridical theory pivots upon the independence of the individual; it presupposes and protects the value of individual thought and choice. And it also makes "use of the idea of moral rules, codes of conduct to be followed, on individual occasions, without consulting self-interest".[13] This non-utilitarian strain within liberalism feeds into the notion of the free person as one who is independent, not dominated by others.

Secondly, the liberal principle of autonomy or independence is distinct from the principle of an equal right to self-development, albeit less so than the contrast between right and utility. Macpherson properly insists that the concern of such liberals as J. S. Mill for individuality ties together the ideas of freedom as independence and as self-development.[14] More exactly, it might be argued that Mill does not usually make a very clear distinction between these two aspects of freedom. For Mill, the right to be free from arbitrary control by others and the good of self-development that he associates with the freedom of choosing are simply two ways of stating the same thing. What is clear, however, is that Mill would have been unwilling to use the concept of freedom as self-development to determine when individual autonomy was or was not a good thing: "That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his own will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant".[15] At times, when discussing woman's suffrage, Mill went further. On a quintessentially liberal note, Mill allowed that "Men, as well as women, do not need political rights in order that they may govern, but in order that they may not be misgoverned." And, noting the argument that women would only vote as dependents, as male relatives dictated, Mill added that "It is a benefit to human beings to take off their fetters, even if they do not desire to walk."[16] In short, individuals have rights, but

the having is not contingent upon whether or not they use those rights to develop their "essentially human capacities." What Mill keeps sight of here is the distinctly political problem of freedom. The free person at the center of his theory is assured a level of independence such that the laws and conventions of society will guarantee the individual a range of possible action, understood as rights, where a person has the chance to follow his or her own desires. This is not to defend those rights or that general claim to freedom on the basis that such persons, in Macpherson's language, will "make the most" of themselves as "exerters and enjoyers" of their own powers.[17]

There are, then, two seemingly similar but rather different ways in which the justification of individual freedom and choice can be undertaken. Following Mill's statement that "all restraint *qua* restraint is an evil," the justification of individual choice is surrounded by arguments to the effect that the person *qua* person merits equal consideration and is entitled to equal respect in the formation of the social rules that circumscribe individual freedom. But within theories of self-development, the justification of individual choice is replaced by the surrogate problem of whether or not a particular social formation makes possible the equal opportunity for every individual to "live a fully human life." Whether or not Macpherson will ever satisfy his critics who charge that the notion of individuals' "essentially human capacities" is elusive and indeterminate, the point here is that there is another defense of the civil and political liberties within the liberal tradition that rests neither upon utilitarian nor developmental claims. Living in a liberal society, each person should be free to form his or her own understanding of one's good (freedom of choice), to take part in shaping and reshaping the environment within which that self-understanding occurs (political rights), and be allowed room for a more personal life and special attachments (a right to privacy). The value of such a scheme is something more than the claim to maximize individual utilities and something less than the claim to maximize the essentially human capacities of each individual. The first claim confuses the possession of a right with the gratification of some desire or interest, the second claim makes the worth of such rights, given the opacity of human nature, seem dark and elusive.

IV

With a thinker as keen as Macpherson, one does not anticipate catching him off guard or pressing points that have not been pressed upon him before. His indictment of liberalism, finally, belongs to that stream of radical thought that has always employed some ideal of social harmony to deplore the competitiveness and conflict within liberal societies. Such a juxtaposition can be found in his critique of Isaiah Berlin's two concepts of liberty or in the essay on "Natural Rights in Hobbes and Locke".[18] Berlin's belief in the permanent clash of ends or the conflict of values, the inability, according to Macpherson, of either Hobbes or Locke to place men under a secure obligation to respect the rights of others: each failure is said to be due to that limited vision which assumes that man's nature is "predominantly contentious and competitive" and that society must

always be "conflict-ridden." Macpherson's final complaint about liberal individualism and the atomistic society that is said to sum its parts is made in the name of a more perfect social union where "there is not necessary destructively contentious opposition between the exercise of fully human capacities".[19]

We are now full circle, back to the questions about the picture of liberal society, especially its individualism, with which this paper started. Even if the liberal ontology is grounded in some larger Kantian understanding of the person as an autonomous agent, the radical critique holds that liberalism is either guilty of a failure of nerve — resigned to the clash of ends — or false heroics — manufacturing a right of recipience where none exists. These are serious charges, no less unpleasant for all of the considerable novelty and insights with which Macpherson presents them. Any satisfactory response would either need to show that within liberalism there is the potential for more communitarian experiences which make possible a right of recipience or that Macpherson's vision of a more harmonious society is simply not viable.

Some have, in fact, challenged the notion that the liberal understanding of the individual as a bundle of rights and duties necessarily loosens all close ties or participation in the practice of some common good. Richard Flathman, for example, in an important defense of the liberal principle of natural autonomy argues that, once that principle is socially embodied as a network of practices, the network itself becomes the site of some communitarian features:

> Rights provide the individual with at least some of the elements of a place, an identity, a role in the social milieu. . . . In its concrete manifestations the practice of rights consists of an elaborate and extensive pattern of such interdependences. It is quite possible to object to the tone or quality of the relationships of which the pattern consists, but it is . . . simply not cogent to argue that the practice of rights isolates participants from one another or is categorically destructive of social relationships.[20]

Perhaps, Macpherson would not quarrel with Flathman's argument that we do not face an either-or choice between liberal individualism and features more characteristic of community; but he does obviously insist that such individualism can only be communitarian rather than fragmenting and destructively competitive in a society where "diverse, genuinely human (not artificially contrived) desires can be simultaneously fulfilled".[21] The fairly casual characterization of some desires as genuine and others as non-genuine or "mindless" evidences Macpherson's belief that a more harmonious society is possible, albeit not assured, once the competitiveness and contentiousness endemic to capitalist society is overcome. About Isaiah Berlin's thesis that we live in societies where some ends will always clash, Macpherson argues two points. Berlin's definition of negative liberty is too narrow, sharply separating the individual's opportunity to choose and act from the presence of the conditions which enable the individual to exercise his freedom. It is this sharp separation between freedom as an

opportunity concept and as an exercise concept that Macpherson believes accounts for most of the conflict among values that Berlin sees as part of the social landscape. To refashion that landscape, Macpherson relies upon a notion of social harmony in which the consensus constitutive of a moral community makes the freedom of each the condition for the freedom of all, i.e., "capacities can be simultaneously fulfilled." Critical to this alternative, more communitarian society is the rhetorical question that asks how many conflicts among various values would still exist in a society without "class conflict and without scarcity?"

It is not quite clear, however, whether we are being asked to agree that competition would disappear in a classless society without scarcity or, as seems more plausible, that such a society would not be "conflict-ridden." The state, for example, "will still be needed for the coordination of productive activities and probably for the adjudication of different individual interpretations of what rules and interference are necessary to maximize individual self-development".[22] But while this sort of disagreement and subsequent need for adjudication will continue, society will be much more harmonious because of the agreement (engendered by the end of scarcity and definitive of a classless society) that in settling such issues the principle of an equal right to self-development is to be controlling. The assumption here, of course, is that one person's trying to make the most of himself will not conflict with another person's effort to do the same. And Macpherson chooses to make that assumption largely because he prefers to take a "fundamentally optimistic view" of man's future.

About Macpherson's arguments on these issues, I want to make two points, one fairly short. The shorter point concerns Macpherson's apparent inability to decide whether we must presuppose that an equal right to self-development will bring about a more harmonious society or whether the right itself can be formulated in such a way as to include criteria for distinguishing between destructive and non-destructive (i.e., harmonious) exercises of the right. Initially, the argument is quite modest. We cannot really know that a classless society organized around the right to self-development will be substantially harmonious. It is a point that can only be proved or disproved "by trial." In short, we will simply have to wait and see how things turn out. All of this sensibly suggests that the principle of developing human capacities will itself be one of those essentially contested or politicized norms about which persons will press different claims and interpretations. And one certainly cannot quarrel with Macpherson for preferring to believe that the result of this experimental politics will be a clearer understanding that the essentially *"human"* capacities are also those that are non-destructive.[23] But this also means that such an understanding is not available to the state's officers ahead of time for determining how to adjudicate such conflicting claims. Yet, Macpherson seems often to make just this additional assumption. It seems to account, for example, for his lack of concern with the possibility that the state's officers will use their position "to extract benefit from the use of others' capacities." Speaking about the injustice of such extractive power, Macpherson assures us:

> One other non-capital kind of power may be noticed and dismissed as irrelevant here. Lawful and proper use of office gives some personal power to those with leadership and organizational talents. But if it is lawful and proper, i.e., used in the interests of those on whose behalf it is exercised and subject in some degree to their control, it is not extractive.[24]

Restricting our concern to just those cases where the state must decide which self-development claims are in the people's interests, what we need is some clear criteria for distinguishing between destructive and non-destructive demands for exercising human capacities. But it is just such criteria which Macpherson has previously said must await the outcome of a process of trial-and-error. In effect, we cannot really know when the state's officers are acting in the interests of their subjects or when they are exercising extractive power. And a thinker as sharp as Macpherson cannot be permitted the luxury of arguing that we must defer to the reality of a not yet realized condition to prove or disprove the postulate of greater harmony and simultaneously deploy that postulate as a criterion for regulating conflicting claims here and now — nor can it be used to define the "lawful and proper" exercise of state power.

Considering Macpherson's thesis from a different angle, one might grant for the moment that the principle of an equal right to self-development can be made sufficiently determinate so as to function as the site of a more comprehensive social interest. From this perspective, my inclination is less to quarrel with such a thesis than to insist that it is probably too true. That is, there are too many possible sites within which individuals might conceivably work out some understanding of what the principle of self-development entails. Self-development, of course, is not something that one does by one's self; it is a process that occurs in interaction with others. Self-development is a form of social intercourse; the individual cannot know what his capacities are — nor make some judgment about their fit with the claim of others to develop their capacities — except through experiences that are shared with others. Macpherson would admit, indeed, insist upon all of this. But the admission is a fairly large one, forcing us back to some fairly typical liberal claims. First, not just any experience is likely to lead individuals to identify the development of certain capacities as a good for themselves and others. That process does not occur, say, in society in general but within the particular social networks where the individual's participation and the presence of others is a tangible reality.[25] The case for self-development within liberalism is a case for meaningful patterns of participation. But, as J. S. Mill well understood, this is also then a case for associative freedom and the subsequent pluralism this entails. The liberal case suggests the further observation that the greater harmony produced by the awareness among persons that it is a good for each to be a doer or exerter of his capacities is inversely related to the number of persons involved in a given form of social intercourse. The more distant and impersonal the others with whom one is cooperating the less likely that such transactions will overcome the individual's attachment to his particular interests or, alternately, that such transactions will

be the site of some more comprehensive good. Neither the indifference nor the persistence of different and competing interests in such a society can plausibly be explained as just a function of scarcity or the existence of classes. It is as much a function of the special attachments persons form within their communities and the abstract nature of their relationship with others outside of those communities.

Nor is it clear how the principle of an equal right to self-development could overcome this tension between particular communities in which a sense of the good is shared and more impersonal forms of interaction in which understanding of the "essentially human capacities" are more likely to conflict. Even if we could anticipate the emergence of some more general awareness of the "non-destructive human capacities," some mechanism would still have to be found for making individuals care or have some degree of active sympathy for the *equal* development of such capacities in others.[26] And, at this point, liberalism is ready to settle for less; neither demanding nor expecting that individuals will get beyond equal respect for the rights of others to the radical's vision of a society marked by equal concern for the development of (anonymous) others. The latter vision is too elusive and the politics too dangerous: consensus must be achieved about what constitutes persons' essentially human capacities, a consensus that threatens individual and associative freedom.

But, perhaps, I have misunderstood. Macpherson has also written that:

> It is indeed true that each person's judgment of the direct satisfaction he gets or would get from different exercises of his own capacities is a subjective judgment, and is incommensurable with others' judgment about theirs . . . But what has to be measured here is not the satisfaction they get from any exercise of their capacities but their *ability* to exercise them.[27]

But this begins to sound very much like the traditional liberal strategy, distinguishing between the opportunity to act or exercise powers and the conditions necessary for their exercise and removing the external impediments to persons' equal opportunity to do whatever they want to do.[28] If this is the case, then we are all still liberals twenty years after the publication of *the Political Theory of Possessive Individualism.*

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Notes

* This is a revised version of a paper delivered at the 1982 meeting of The American Political Science Association. It was given on a panel honoring both Professor Macpherson and, more particularly, the twentieth anniversary of the publication of *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism*.

1. "Individualist Socialism? A Reply to Levine and MacIntyre," *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* (1976) VI: 195.
2. Two of the more obvious liberal criticisms of utilitarianism are John Rawls' *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971) and Ronald Dworkin's *Taking Rights Seriously* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977). A more explicitly political defense of non-utilitarian liberalism is John Plamenatz's *Democracy and Illusion* (London: Longman, 1973).
3. C. B. Macpherson, *The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 2.
4. Reprinted in *Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrieval* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), p. 202.
5. *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), p. 270.
6. *The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy*, pp. 23-43.
7. *Democratic Theory*, pp. 3-23.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
9. *Ibid.*
10. See K. R. Minogue, "Humanist Democracy: The Political thought of C. B. Macpherson," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* (1976) IX: 377-394; and Macpherson's reply, "Humanist Democracy and Elusive Marxism: A Response to Minogue and Svacek," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* (1976) IX: 424-430. For a discussion of Macpherson's thesis that relates it to other radical accounts of men's capacities or "needs," see Gary Thom, *Bringing The Left Back Home* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), passim.
11. *Democratic Theory*, pp. 6-7.
12. Bhikhu Parekh, ed., *Bentham's Political Thought* (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1973), p. 262.
13. Ronald Dworkin, *op. cit.*, p. 172.
14. *The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy*, p. 48.
15. J. S. Mill, *On Liberty* (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1951), pp. 95-96.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 391.
17. *Democratic Theory*, p. 32.
18. *Democratic Theory*, pp. 95-119, 224-237.
19. "Individualist Socialism," p. 199.
20. Richard Flathman, *The Practice of Rights* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), p. 188.
21. *Democratic Theory*, p. 113. Left critics of Macpherson have argued that he avoids the implications of his own analysis at this point; namely, that morally recalcitrant persons must be transformed through some sort of revolutionary breakthrough. See Victor Svacek, "The Elusive Marxism of C. B. Macpherson," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* (1976) IX: 395-422.
22. "Individualist Socialism," p. 197.
23. *Democratic Theory*, p. 55.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 43, n. 5.

25. In general, Macpherson's writings contain very little that might be described as a social psychology of man's character. Even the concept of possessive individualism seems most apt as an account of certain types of transactions within Macpherson's model of market society. How individuals engaged in those or other kinds of transactions acquire and retain the particular character traits needed for such relationships to work is not a subject about which Macpherson has written. For a work in social psychology that does explore the role of personal networks in shaping individual character — including the identification of one's own good with the good of the particular social whole of which one is a part — see Norma Haan, *Coping and Defending: Processes of Self-Environment Organization* (New York: Academic Press, 1977).

26. On the important distinction between knowing or understanding a universal moral rule and *caring* about that rule, see R. S. Peters, "The Development of Reason," in S. I. Benn and G. W. Mortimore, eds., *Rationality And The Social Sciences* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976), pp. 299-331.

27. *Democratic Theory*, p. 71.

28. Cf. Amy Gutman, *Liberal Equality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), pp. 152-153.

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COMMENTARY

THE POLITICS OF SELF-DEVELOPMENT

C.B. Macpherson

The novel point argued in "Liberal Still, Notes on the Political Theory of C.B. Macpherson" is that I have overlooked a third liberal ontology, different from both the two that I have found counterposed within the liberal tradition, i.e. the individual as maximizer of utilities (Hobbes to Bentham) and as exerter and developer of his/her human capacities, or maximizer of powers (J.S. Mill). The third concept is described as one which defines persons as "bearers of rights with an equal capacity for autonomy or independence" (p. 8, para. 2); it is also called "the juridical version of the liberal ontology" (p. 11, para. 2). This concept is quite evidently incompatible with a utilitarianism which subordinates individual rights to maximum aggregate utility of the whole society. But how different is it from the concept of the individual as exerter and developer of his/her human capacities?

The author allows "that Mill does not usually make a very clear distinction between these two aspects of freedom" (p. 9, para. 2), but insists that "Mill would have been unwilling to use the concept of freedom as self-development to determine when individual autonomy was or was not a good thing" (*ibid.*). He quotes the ringing assertion in *On Liberty*: "That the only purpose for which power can rightfully be exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his own will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant." He does not quote Mill's opening endorsement of Humboldt's equally ringing assertion: "The grand, leading principle, towards which every argument unfolded in these pages directly converges, is the absolute and essential importance of human development in its richest diversity."

The author appears to be arguing that Mill would have the individual free to develop him/herself *or not*. Yet only if we considered the negative liberty claimed in the first of these passages to be Mill's unqualified position, and neglected his belief in the essential importance of human development, could we say that he would leave the individual free to be a self-developer or not.

The question whether Mill gave priority to negative freedom or to self-development (or whether he was simply inconsistent in holding them equally essential) is, I think, less important than the question whether we can hope to overcome the unfreedoms of our present class-divided liberal-democratic societies without giving priority to the concept of self-development. I think that

we cannot, and I am not sure whether my critic agrees with me on this. His differences with me are perhaps only due to our addressing somewhat different problems. He is looking for an intellectually satisfying abstract principle: I am looking for a practical principle on which one can base a move to a more human society.

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THE IMAGE OF THE SELF IN WIM WENDERS' *THE AMERICAN FRIEND*

Stephen Snyder

> We live amid surfaces, and the true art of life is to skate well upon them.
> (Emerson, "Experience")

Structuralism and most recently Deconstruction have exerted immense influence in art and social criticism, partly by bringing into focus a disparate group of emerging attitudes whose common denominator has been dissatisfaction with the traditional notion of "self". For the Structuralists, particularly, the old vision of self as the centre of the personality has been replaced with a new functional myth in which self resides largely within social relationships: the self is relationship; there is no "I" outside of a "We". The worst side of the Structuralist claim is its tendency to become a Behaviorist psychology whose *tabula rasa* models of the mind are at odds with actual scientific work in area of brain chemistry.[1] The better side has been a clearing away of the values associated with the logocentric psychology of absolute self and a subsequent reassertion of the role of human creativity in reality. Derrida, for example, while equating consciousness with signification, sees the activity of signification as a play of "invention" over an otherwise absent universe.[2] The deconstructions of self in either of these systems (or of that in postmodernism) reject the notion of consciousness as a *privileged* "inner" event in favor of a view of it as a life field.

This rejection of consciousness as a sealed inner condition should logically find some validation in film studies, since film, by its persistence in clinging to the surface of man, of envisioning man as a "skin" with an epidermal relationship to his world, inevitably discloses human reality in terms of *exterial* visible relationships and processes. Unfortunately, in film studies, the result of this natural inclination has been the promotion of a film criticism (particularly among semiologists) obsessed with reducing films to a series of coded cultural ideologies. Subjective experience, being no longer a matter of common assumption, cannot be discussed at all: the subject becomes a linguistic text. Perhaps "Plato" has gone too far beyond "Socrates." It may be well to recall that the initial deconstruction of self which have shaped both Structuralism and Deconstruction are the writings of Nietzsche and, looming behind these, the work of his mentor, Emerson: figures who discuss the fictiveness of self as being no greater than that of universe in general. Subjective experience is no less authentic for being fictive, in fact its basis in "fiction" may be the source of its strength in a cosmos

which (as Derrida describes it) is a series of arbitrary, invented signs without origin.[3]

Wim Wenders' *The American Friend* draws much of its power precisely from its concern with the issue of self as it has been demarcated in the Twentieth-century. But the vision of self which emerges in this film is at once more tragic *and* comedic than that of Structurism or Post-structuralisms by virtue of the film's desire to hold fast to the facts of subjective experiencing in the face of the persistent sense of the dispersal of that subjective self around which experience seems to cluster. The self is not merely fictive but a series of fictions often generated without choice through the very act of relationship; while it may serve as a matrix of social texts, it is also a center whose social connections release energies and desires which could be neither foreseen nor understood prior to their emergence. Thus, in so far as the term can be used with meaning, *self* exists in Wenders' world as a succession of ghosts (and their subjective locus of origination) connected through memory, yet always, in their social context, threatening to explode out of control.

The Plot

Ripley, one of the film's two protagonists, is involved in a fraud scheme with a painter (presumably Henry Pogosh Derwatt) who produces paintings, inflated in value by his own presumed death.

Derwatt produces the paintings in a cheap flat in New York City and Ripley sells them at auctions in Hamburg. At one such auction Ripley meets a picture framer, Jonathan Zimmerman, who, disdainful of Ripley (by virtue of Ripley's reputation as a speculator) refuses to shake his hand. Offended by the snub and made aware by the auctioneer that Jonathan suffers from a terminal blood disease, Ripley directs a small time mobster, Minot, to Jonathan as a possible candidate for a murderer in Minot's private war with a group of New York pornographic movie makers. Jonathan, convinced by Minot that he has only a few weeks to live, is cajoled into murdering a member of a New York Jewish mafia, Mr. Brown, and eventually a second mobster, in order to earn a sum of money which he can bequeath to his wife and son. Ripley, attracted to Jonathan and his family visits the frame shop and allays Jonathan's dislike. Somehow divining Jonathan's inability to carry out the second job, Ripley rides the train with him and saves him from certain doom by killing the marked mobster and his bodyguard. In retaliation Ripley's house (a replica of the Whitehouse) is attacked by the remaining gang members, but Ripley and Jonathan, in their blundering fashion, dispose of the invaders. Ripley explains Minot's fraud to Jonathan and the two, accompanied by Jonathan's wife, transport the bodies to the seashore in their own ambulance in order to incinerate them. Jonathan in a final fit of hysteria tries to drive away without Ripley, but dies at the wheel of his car. Ripley is left alone on a pier singing Bob Dylan's "I Pity the Poor Immigrant".

The Complications

The bewildering character relationships have prompted viewers to reject the film as an exercise in pessimism, a political allegory, or a comment upon the chaos of modern life in which form and content unserendipitously merge.[4] And, indeed, the stress upon chaos in the film, coupled with its transfixed gaze upon incertitude and death, insures a degree of untidiness to the story, In addition, the behavior of the characters, prone to baroque inflections, poses a challenge to comprehension: are their motives ever commensurate with their behavior? WHile the actions of the gambler, Minot, and those of his enemies seem logical enough, those of Ripley are textured with unrelenting ambiguities. Indeed, the more we see of him the less we seem to know him. His participation in the intrigue against the picture framer, Jonathan, is given some basis by Jonathan's snub of Ripley at the auction, but the degree of Ripley's revenge seem out of proportion to the offense. Despite these peculiarities, the amorphous nature of his motivation assumes a disturbing credibility as the film ebbs its way toward its vision of the Protean self. For ultimately it is the personality as all-possible mystery which haunts the film, not as a ghost of fatalism but more a spectre of human possibility, tragic in the failure of the characters to achieve the relationships they need, comedic in its insistent affirmation of their freedom to become. Neither self-knowledge nor psychic determinism exist as moral touchstones for either the characters or the viewers; in Wender's film the self can only be discovered in motion, at the edge of unforeseen potential, a stranger to itself, crouched in preparation for metamorphosis, a criminal by its instinct to annihilate every preconception of what one thinks it should be.

To know oneself through a stable relationship to environment is a possibility largely denied the characters, and its contrary impulses, to deal with the radical unpredictability of one's world by understanding its patterns, or locating within oneself an absolute center, results in a detachment from life, and a self-enclosure, which impoverishes the individual and aggravates his sense of solitude. Even as we observe Ripley at his narcissistic rites of self-affirmation — recording his voice, or showering himself with instant polaroid self photographs — we are drawn relentlessly to feel that the underside of "identity," of "understanding" and "self-knowledge" may be as blank as the substructure of the pier on which he sits at film's end and equally vulnerable to innundation by unpredictable tides. The troubling incertitude of Jonathan's terminal illness looms over the film not only as a precipient metaphor of general human mortality, but more acutely as a projection of the collective "identity" anxiety of the characters, made manifest in the urge to establish within themselves a secure decoding structure capable of unsorting the knot of confusion which they profess to experience at an accelerating pace. "I know less and less about who I am" testifies Ripley, "or who anybody else is."

Much of what passes for confusion in the film grows out of the truculent stances taken by the characters toward each other. This hostility, of course is a response to the fear of loss of self, a way of securing one's borders. But these attempts to stave off self-destruction (Minot's scheme, Jonathan's wish to

preserve his memory, Ripley's protective "White House") conceal from the characters the murky interpenetrations of their respective psyches: it conceals from them the reality that possibilities of self may be ushered into being in the very act of relationship, that consciousness may be hungry for a larger piece of reality than can ever be anticipated, and that its consequent bewilderment may be the hallmark of increased experience rather than the entropic death implied in Derwatt's gloomy, "a little older, a little more confused."

Apperance as Reality

If Derwatt's seclusion does not strike us as abnormal, the reason may involve its evolution from the European tradition of the isolated artist which we have come to take for granted (Joyce's artist paring his nails in detachment) and with it the vision of self, as a sealed inner landscape, remote from a general life world. Wenders', however, is surely challenging the validity of this tradition.

While one consciousness may penetrate with varying degrees of success the inner worlds of itself or of others, what it finally lives with is the skin of the world. The more it looks to itself the more it looks through itself. What is peculiarly "inner" comes into being in relationship to what is "outer". Identity evolves "through things" in Wenders' phrase.[5] It is between surfaces that reality is somehow appropriated or given life. "We lack any sensitive organs for this inner world," writes Nietzsche in a phrase applicable to the film, "it is our relation with the 'outer world' that evolved it (consciousness)."[6] Or as Wenders' says: "perception depends on how much you allow yourself to perceive".[7] It is fundamental to the film that the events which set the narrative in motion emphasize the role of surfaces in life: the sale of a painting (suspect of fraudulence) and the parallel operations of some pornographers adventuring in the skin trade. In each case the individual's relationship to the surface of his world is portrayed as a malingering state of prostitution. In reducing the nutrients of consciousness, the visible world, to consumer products, the protagonists of the film mutually conspire in pretending that the external world has no role in their own psychic life. Indeed, each figure is attempting to live in a state of virtual hiding: Derwatt is sequestered in his New York studio, concealing both his identity and the age of his work; Jonathan is retreating from the modern world in his Nineteenth-century shop: Ripley is secluded in his replica American White House, and the Jewish mafia is holed-up in a two room office *cum* studio. To some degree the self-proclaimed identities of these figures, like their treatment of visible experience, are gestures of despair, attempts to protect a sense of self threatened by the instability of the general world. One protects himself by limiting experience and possibilities of growth. Jonathan tries to restrict his identity to the world of his shop, and Ripley, with his out-of-place hat, car, and house, to an archaic cultural identity of Cowboy. Derwatt, similarly, encloses himself in a protective role, pretending to be dead in order to imitate his own earlier work. Worth more dead than alive, he comprises a remarkable picture both of "identity" as self-imitation and of the relationship of consumerism to art, for his enterprise by its nature is an imitation of earlier work, precludes the possibility of personal

change. Converted to a business enterprise, creative energy negates its natural urge to grow and stumbles instead toward blindness and more perfect self-enclosure. Already limited to one eye, Derwatt, as his gestures imply, is becoming blind in his other eye as well. It seems to me that the issue, as presented, is not that these characteres aren't what they appear to be, but rather, that they wish to *limit* radically all that they might bring of themselves to the condition of appearance. Just as Derwatt's painted images are to remain eternally unchanging, so Jonathan will have his own self-image stay forever as he wishes it to be, "framed" in a kind of Pandora's box whose eventual disruption upsets his precarious sanity.

The arrest of Derwatt's images (which refuse, ironically, to resist change) reflects the arrest of spirit in Jonathan and Ripley. The result of this transfixion is made visible, first, in their foundering forms of self-affirmation. There is the strong suggestion that as the horizon of comprehensible self has receded, each character's capacity for empathy has been displaced into the urge to identify with sterile cultural symbols: Jonathan has his Germanic mechanical toys and Ripley his replica White House, replete with coca-cola machines, Wurlitzer jukeboxes and corn flakes. The tenants of his fragile "inner life," his reference points are imported symbols. It is perhaps this inflated need of both men to fix experience into symbolic moulds that endows their handshake adventure with such prodigious proportions: "You did that just because I wouldn't shake your hand" . . . "yeah."

But, if his inflation of the unaccepted handshake suggests Ripley's urge to hold fast to things, it manifests as well his deep desire to open himself to the world, to make an authentic contact with another human soul. It reveals the primordial condition of consciousness — that it comes to much of its being through relationship, that it is, in the philosophical sense of the word, "intentional," bound up with a universe from which it cannot be separated.[8] Such, at least is the implication of the film, for its web of inextricable connections which make detachment, finally, an illusion, also press one inevitably toward a sense that we are engaged in the question, "where are the borders to the self?" Ripley's dilemma is thus larger than any rational account of his "motives;" it discloses the urgency of life to connect with life. Ripley's resentment to Jonathan's snub involves all the nebulous emotional pressures of the conditions of existence itself.

To recognize the intentionality of one's personality, of one's "identity," is to recognize the potential of each human being to participate in or draw from oblivion dimensions of one's self. One senses such an act of mutual self-discovery in the relationship between Jonathan and Ripley. There is, first of all, a basic resemblance between the two. Certainly each manifests a passion to hold tight to stable forms: Jonathan with his narrow old world craftsman's life, Ripley in his imported American environment; Jonathan with his collection of mechanical devices whose attraction lies in their stability (the gyroscope) or controllability (his mechanical moving pictures), Ripley with his self-recording devices and his control of the painting operation (he clearly manipulates the bidding at the auction); and each with his protective seclusion. They relate to

each other as unrecognized alter egos, or, in more psychological terms, as the shadow side of each other,[9] entrepreneurs of a symbolically coded, and therefore static, world.

The shadowing of identity embraces the entire community in the film, revealing itself in the individual actions of the characters as well as in their relationships. Metaphorically, at least, Minot's unscrupulous schemes shadow Ripley as the darker side of the latter's own manipulations. Moreover, the progeny of their scheme returns to haunt Ripley in the figures of the Jewish mafia from whom he must eventually defend his bastion of retreat. Accordingly, Ripley literally shadows Jonathan, keeping tabs on his movements and appearing unexpectedly on the train at the moment of Jonathan's greatest vulnerability. In Ripley is projected the amoral potential of Jonathan which the latter has concealed from himself under a guise of sanctimonious distate for those who "speculate". In Jonathan is projected the dimension of Ripley which esteems life-orderliness as embodied in the home-life of Jonathan. Again, the shadow relationship is not merely dialectical. Both Jonathan and Ripley are shadowed by Minot who makes visible the criminal and huckster in each of them. And yet Minot too "is what he is". His suave manners are less a facade for a determinable hidden "self", than a depiction of his chameleon soul. His proposition to Jonathan is not only extraordinarily "up front" but proves uncannily accurate regarding Jonathan's term of life. Minot is, of course, himself shadowed by the New York pornographers who bomb his apartment. He is liberated from their ambulance accidentally as a by-product of Ripley's efforts to defend his domain from invasion. In the community of thieves, Minot and Ripley carry forth actions which, though taken with the intent of mutual exclusion, remain, nevertheless, reciprocal. The shadow side of each figure is thus, not so much a determined sub-structure but a potential made flammable by each character's supression of his potential creative life.

In the fluid yet collective psyche of the film, the pornographers, although they do not precisely shadow Derwatt, exist as the spectre of his own retreat from the life-world. The commercial filaments in his marketing of imagination, attain a full illumination in the open machinations of their pornography business. Yet like Derwatt they are characterized by their growing blindness. Angie blinded in his dark glasses becomes an easy victim of Jonathan on the ledge of Ripley's house. The Sam Fuller Character, restricted to the backward glance of his rear view mirror falls victim to Ripley disguised in Angie's jacket. His goliath blond body guard, with eyes locked straight ahead, is quickly rushed through the door of a moving train. This decay of seeing is reflected as well in the progression of television screens being turned off (rather than turned on) and in the unattended monitors in the Metro on which Wenders' camera lingers as Jonathan negotiates his escape from the murder of Mr. Brown. Wenders' world is one strenuously editing out visual energy from the life of its consciousness.

The slow extermination of seeing introduces a related dimension of the film which might be characterized as the demise of verbal communication. The break with life symptomized in the cancellation of sight seems to engender the impossibility of language to re-establish connections. Indeed, spiraling on

negative energy, words promote the isolation of the characters instead of abating it. In their most poisonous form words, consigned to the nebulous realm of rumor, are instrumental in initiating Jonathan's paranoia. An unsupported telegram from his friend Allen remarking upon the growth of Jonathan's disease launches Herr Zimmerman on a quest for absolute yet unattainable certitude. Aggravated by his unreflecting faith in Minot's verbal blandishments, the search opens him to the darkest sides of his potential for violence. Jonathan is destroyed, in a significant sense, by a leap into a verbal insubstantiality much like that he had sought to avoid in his life. Thus, his baseless floating state of mind is both characteristic and product of the reality of rumor, of words divorced from the life of experience.

As one of our prime senses, hearing plays a significant role in our consciousness second only to seeing. But the opposition of the two senses makes possible the use of metaphor on Wenders' part in terms of the operations of eye and ear. In that trope the ear by its particular attunement for spoken words is associated with the conceptualizing of experience in roughly abstract terms which imply judgments and the positing of value in rationally verifiable truth, thought to reside outside the realm of change. It is the model to which Jonathan tries to conform his life. In the logic of the trope, to live through the ear is to live in detachment from the immediate experience of the world. This is the metaphysical counterpart to Derwatt's retreat. In the other half of the metaphor, the eye is receptive only to the non-abstract flow of the visible world. It is by nature attuned to change and appearance, the elements which constitute the raw food of consciousness. If Jonathan may be used as an example, the decay of seeing begins with a "blind" surrender to the reality of words, but words, more precisely, taken as keys to the eternal and unchanging. When Jonathan sniggers to Ripley at their introduction, "I've heard of you," he metaphorically discloses his disposition to perceive the world through verbal preconceptions, largely evolved through hearsay. What, in fact, lies behind his urge to treat language as reality rather than function is probably his fear of death and nothingness. He becomes a true Structuralist, a figure, to borrow an Aldous Huxley phrase, for whom

> words are not regarded as standing, rather inadequately, for things and events; on the contrary, things and events are regarded as particular illustrations of words.[10]

We must suppose that our reality is larger than any set of verbal qualifiers can describe. We must suppose that our "self", in all its "intentional" possibilities, must forever elude our verbal hypotheses. We pass, as though in the rear car of one of Wenders' trains, into a reality which always needs to be named anew. The language of 'what is' proves forever unsatisfactory to the reality of 'what becomes'. By the negation of "seeing", of that becoming, we perceive only through the eyes of an already calcified language.

The Narrative Development

Quickly establishing his preponderant urge to gain the interior of things, Ripley makes his appearance in the film by exiting from a cab and coming inside Derwatt's apartment. The composition of the interior is revealed in a peculiar "depth shot": in the foreground we see Derwatt placing a hand over each of his eyes alternately, while in the far background a television screen glows strongly enough to divide our attention. With either subject we encounter a diminution in seeing: Derwatt is losing his sight, the television set goes blank. Large canvasses of sheer blue furnish the room — the color which will betray Derwatt and become associated at film's end with the ocean against which Ripley will sit and Jonathan will die. Derwatt's greeting to Ripley, "you son of a bitch", documents the truculent tone by which their relationship and all others are poisoned in the film. The exchange assumes a more friendly tone as Ripley produces money, certifying himself as a "serious man". The two men seem, at least, conspiratorially friendly yet distrustful of each other. Ripley leaves with the warning, "Don't be too busy for a dead painter". The background to this relationship is almost entirely absent, a matter of implication. The presentation of leads us to focus more upon its quality, an ambivalent interaction of repulsion and attraction, than its source. As with Jonathan's disease, the hostility has no source other than the very anxiety for the self which is so much the subject of the film.

The sense of ambiguity increases as Wenders cuts without conventional transitional devices to Jonathan walking with his child. Our sense of perspective (mimicked in the depth shot of Derwatt's apartment) is further challenged and further upset as we cut immediately to a stark overhead shot of Ripley sprawled drunkenly across some red satin sheets. The cutting not only conflates the three locations but introduces a gradual erosion in perspectival vision (in the ordered appearance of things) which will eventually culminate in the erasure of subject/object distinctions of which it provides an illusion. Wenders reveals the visible world to be militating against our urge to place it squarely in time and locale. The interpenetration of space suggests the merger of consciousness already underway. As though to affirm this inarticulate fusion as well as the troubled emotions of a human caught in an experience larger than himself, Ripley speaks to his cassette recorder: "December 6, 1976. There is nothing to fear but fear itself . . . I know less and less about who I am or who anybody else is". There is no perspective available on oneself; what passes for identity is without the temporal certitude Ripley's preface hopes to impose. We are eavesdropping upon the inner sanctum of Ripley; and appropriately, as though in answer to his remark, we cut to a shot of Jonathan sitting in the eerie light of his shop. He places a picture frame around his head and checks his safe, the innermost sanctum of security. His action, like Ripley's words, suggests an attempt at self-definition, a pinpointing of self in space as opposed to Ripley.s fix in time, but equally characteristic of the urge to locate borders of definition to one's being. Where does the self begin or end? Seemingly, everywhere in this film.

The precarious yet ineluctable connection of lives in the film finds a model in the auction scene. The articulations between characters establishes itself almost clandestinely. Jonathan talks to Allen; Ripley overhears, he in turn signals to a partner to raise the bidding. Thus, Allen unsuspectingly participates in Ripley's fraud. Soon we see that Gantner, seated at the action table, is also connected as is Jonathan's wife who maintains a low profile while observing Gantner and Ripley talk; a fact she does not reveal to Jonathan later when the information might change his course of action. Unknown to each other the characters are already part of each other's world, working with each other, connected unwittingly even in their attempts to deny the power of the other to affect him or her. The disruption of these illusory territorial borders is aggravated by Jonathan's very attempt to affirm them. Hence, his snub provokes Gantner to apologize to Ripley in such a manner that he violates Jonathan's privacy. Yet Jonathan, in refusing contamination by Ripley, testifies to his advanced infection by rumor (a puncture of the sealed self) by his loaded remark, "I've heard of you".

The penetration of one hermetic world by another gives birth to an extended process of self-rupturing which dominates the rest of the film. Following the violation of Jonathan's secret, we cut to an image of Minot trying to break into Ripley's house in the dark through a basement window. The darkness, the secretiveness, the remoteness of the window resonate with suggestions of unconscious penetration, psychic merger; Ripley's paranoic reaction suggests his sublimated dread of losing his sealed coded self through penetration, the fear which infects so many of the characters. They can invade each other only in the least visible way as it conceals the act and allays the potential anxiety of merger. However, in regard to Minot, at least, anxiety is the one characteristic he lacks. His insousience is almost alarming. As Ripley beards down upon him in the dark with a ferocious demeanor and a loaded gun, Minot smiles carelessly and prattles along with a nonchalant "Hi Tom". Tom's threat to "blow him away" is accepted with equal imperturbation. Minot's defense against life, his personal shelter, is a complete dismissal of its threats; this disregard has the surprising power of disarming those threats. But in being invulnerable to threat he also becomes invulnerable to connection and growth. His final image will discover him half bound and alone, physically debilitated, creeping off into the night. Nevertheless, in his first appearance Minot penetrates Ripley's domain and within a few minutes coerces Tom into abetting him. An unconfessed degree of mutual identification joins these men. Minot, perhaps, projects that thoroughly amoral potential of oneself which we would like to believe does not exist and which we fear. At the same time, as he enters Ripley's world from the outside, he evokes, and not merely represents, Ripley's amoralism. In fact, it may be that in this manner he eventually exhausts that capacity by making it visible as one exhausts a wound by lancing it. Accordingly, the departure of Minot from the film may be seen as the emancipation of Ripley, in part, from an unknown inclination within himself. The ambulance of dead criminals Ripley chauffers to the ocean can be understood as vanquished extremes of the theatricality for which he has been an eloquent apostle. The enclosure within the van of a group

of male figures identified as sexual chauvinists, power hungry capitalists, and shadowy figures, like Derwatt, seeking seclusion suggests Ripley may have, like a good cowboy, rounded up a herd of his most destructive alter egos. That he explodes it by the film's end suggests a tentative though unresolved step forward in curing his disease.

If he succeeds in drawing from Ripley his potential for "amorality", Minot virtually catalyses Jonathan's capacity for directly "immoral" action. More than this, Minot's blandishments initiate an unfolding process in Jonathan, not only in regard to his personality but also in terms of his literal relations to the world around him. Thus, in a significant sense, Jonathan's forays to Paris or Munich carry with them the psychological rupture of his sequestered sense of identity. In his "voyage out" he becomes unrecognizable to himself. Wenders captures his de-centering of personality at times in the style of shooting. We see Jonathan packing for his trip to Paris. The camera then assumes a slow tracking shot through the airport, ostensibly, or so we expect, from Jonathan's point of view. As the camera moves in upon a passenger we recognize the person to be Jonathan. The subjective point of view is without a subject; the subject, like his sense of identity, is expelled from his assumed point of reference into the world at large. The shot works almost as an evacuation of internal content, thus embodying the erosion of Jonathan's self-bounded comprehension of his life. This cinematic "blowing of his mind" nearly becomes literal when on his second journey we discover Jonathan with a gun jammed into his mouth with the hammer cocked. The resemblance of this scene to Ripley's earlier posture with his polaroid camera compels us to see that the natural trajectory of narcissistic enclosement is direct self-destruction.

With the killing of Brown the film begins to assume an almost allegorical dimension, a parallel to Hitler's purge. Jonathan, a good solid German citizen (although a Swiss immigrant), for reasons he does not wholly fathom, finds himself killing Jews: Brown, Angie, two Jewish mafiosi and finally the Sam Fuller character. This almost unintentional killing snowballs into a sense of holocaustal nightmare. Virtually hypnotized by his fear of death, his desire to leave an inheritance, and Minot's authoritarian persuasion, Jonathan is no longer able to distinguish between the reality of words and the probabilities of life. His day ends at a Paris bar whose exterior lighting is so obviously artificial as to suggest his complete leap into nightmare fantasy. On returning home he quickly spirits his wife and son to an amusement park as fantastic as the Paris bar. If all this intimates the quality of Jonathan's hitherto repressed fantasy life, that life, at least its pivotal images, is banal and childish. It is not too much to conclude that he is so vulnerable to Minot because he is so immature, that his minatory posture of moral anchorite is an adolescent fear of growing up. His condition supplies inherent criticism of the German mentality in modern history; but, as well, of the morality of inner self-containment as an arrest of growth and form of suicide.

Jonathan's naivety coupled with the stress on Americanism in the film (Ripley's cowboy garb and home) also, invites speculations regarding the film's concern with American male sexuality. The affair between Jonathan and Ripley, while never becoming openly homosexual, forms a Western love story of sorts

on the model of the Lone Ranger and Tonto. In the America depicted in the film women seem almost totally absent from male lives. Woman exists only in the commercial venture of the pornographers where she resides as a peculiar *image* — not even a sex object, but a provocative *image* whose lack of object status is all the better since she cannot be touched. Curiously while women are realizing their nature as "image", males see in their act only an opportunity for commercial gain; women finally counter by walking away into the night. The bonding of male to male suggests not only a fear of women but of growth generally. The all male "buddy" relationship is one particularly germane to adolescence. In evading women man protects himself from a fall into complicated sexuality. He also retains the illusion of a unified personality, a single identity, by denying the female side of himself.

The German side of the coin does not offer a better alternative. The conventional marriage of Jonathan and Simone is as mechanical as Jonathan's many toys. The inability of Simone to tell Jonathan about seeing Ripley converse with Gantner, the inability of Jonathan to speak openly to Simone of Minot's propositions, suggests a great deal of mutual distrust and fear. On what level do these people relate to each other? Is their marriage a vacuous ceremony of mechanical steropticon rituals? Jonathan is embarrassed that his wife is compelled to "work". His perception of sexual roles is basically primordial and betrays, as well, a leisure culture attitude toward working which denies it a part in self fulfillment and condemns it as something that shouldn't exist. Again, since working can become self-growth, and as a marriage without idealized, cliched role functions fosters personal growth, Jonathan, and with him the German middle class, show themselves to be juvenile delinquents, immature by their very conservatism and desire to retreat from active engagement with human beings. In their affection for each other Jonathan and Simone are not charged cells of Whitmanesque libido stammering profusions of love to each other. Marriage European-style is almost as empty as marriage American-style — which seems to exist only between members of the same sex. The question arises, how can men and women, within such sexual identity structure, give anything to each other beyond biological satisfaction? — only, of couse, by emptying themselves of suppressed possibilities and the desire to exist as an enclosed inner event.

For Jonathan and Ripley the externalizing of the suppressed potential of self means first the confrontation with and elimination of oversized male sexuality which on some level conditions their relationships. The second murder thus involves fighting an even larger male figure than the rather humongous Mr. Brown. Sam Fuller's bodyguard is a blond gorilla, a life-sized embodiment of the masculine ghosts (cowboys and lordly husbands) which haunt their dreams. This fellow proves difficult to be rid of. Resilient, he survives his dive from the train to reappear wrapped like a mummy in Sam Fuller's ambulance with enough strength to hinder Minot. He meets his sure demise only at film's end when, with Angie, he is immolated in the ambulance by Ripley. This conflagration of male ego ignites Jonathan's final attempt at returning home to be the person he once was. His effort is a last attempt to assert his independence from his

world, from his relationship with a part of himself. His urge to return home is the desire to find the insular safety of the past life which was illusory to begin with. Cinematically it is this final rupture which provokes Jonathan's death. His Volkswagon skids over the tide wall onto the beach; he dies in the land of "non-structure" which he has carefully sought to avoid.

Jonathan by his occupation as a framer, offers himself as a trope of the modernist view of art which argues that art orders experience. In Jonathan's story this is reduced to placing frames on pictures that, in fact, change under one's eye, even as Derwatt's "blue" does. Ripley, in the same vein, stands as a new kind of artist: someone who shoves you into chaos. And indeed, the power of art more likely lies in its forcing one to experience the disorderly quality of life than in finding some kind of rational code, a soporific comfort which at this point in history may be as illusory as the value of order in a telephone book. Art, Wenders implies, entails not the fixing of self-identity but the destruction of it and in that destruction the ignition of the discovery in each person of the possibilities of himself in others.

Thus we meet in the people that we meet, potentialities of ourselves, potentials recognized only on a preconscious level. We are impelled by motives which we cannot be aware of, motives which may have been called forth almost from nothing. The conscious conceptions we have of who and what we may be incommensurate with our Orphic nativity wherein is concealed a thousand forms, waiting birth. The self, because it is not something lived only between walls of skin and bone, is as large as the world, as large as the possibilities of consciousness through which it may be called into being. In some degree every man is born perpetually anew through interaction. The soul is like an eye gazing out upon a universe in whose creation it participates and in whose unutterable permutations there is always something more to be seen. This is certainly why one can never "go back" in life, as much as he might desire to do so, for the operation would require an amputation of consciousness — of unconsciousness — which cannot be negotiated without killing the organism. But there is also tragedy here for man must suffer himself to being called forth from sources he cannot know and do so or wither. His being in the world retains everything in the sense that he and it have conspired in the creation of something which demands its own life, which, like Derwatt's paintings, change against his will. Man the creator is no longer man the "orderer" of society. The new image of man emerging in films like *The American Friend* suggests, indeed, that he must give birth to many self images, that the demands of birth make his "criminality" almost a necessity, for whatever consciousness demands will predicate exceeding the laws of definition of self. Dangerous literal crime haunts Jonathan because he cannot commit psychological murder against an inherited "framed" idea of who he is. Ripley, contrawise, initially hides in an identity of the past (cowboy) but sheds this "frame" gradually as the movie progresses: his assertion, "I know less and less about who I am or who anybody else is", becomes, by film's end more a symptom of liberation than a cause for depression. I would like to suggest that what Wenders has tapped into in his film, in all its complex ambiguities, is the sense that the new image of the artist we have generated in the 20th century is that of the artist as criminal. The

one destroys ways of seeing, the other society's laws. The latter is to a degree the moral co-efficient, the failure of the former to achieve his job, a deflection of the artistic impulse. The artist murders stable forms (DaDa) and is allied to the criminal in the sense that each feels intuitively the reality of the self to be far greater than can be contained or defined within the given social system. Ripley and Derwatt, the criminal and the artist, are closely allied. In fact, all Wenders' criminals are played by film artists.

The archetypical figure here is perhaps Jean Genet:

> . . . I wanted to be myself, and I was myself when I became a crasher.[11]

The discovery of wholeness emerges as a rebellion against the increasing inter-changeability of people in a world marked by increasing repetition and similarity. Anonymity is the disease from which the experiencing subject seeks liberation and yet anonymity is the key to financial success. Jonathan, because he is unknown, makes a perfect murderer. Derwatt in order to increase profit, converts himself into an assembly line and creeps into comfortable anonymity. It is only Ripley who seeks to live out the human desire for individuation, for the sense of being wholly alive. In this sense he is the real artist of the film and his medium develops from simple con game shows to larger dramas in which he must play the leading role, as well as the function of director, to the destruction of the theatre metaphor itself in the demolition of the ambulance and its "staged" occupants. The criminal/artist realizes a sense of self as fulfilled potential while he eradicates the very notion of identity as either a "stable centre of the personality" or a structuralist vision of an ambiguous text. He makes of himself not a lamentation of signs but a succession of vital images.

The suppression of his fear of growth, which Jonathan nearly attains, capsizes his mind and cauterizes the emotions. Breaking the world into manageable pieces, placing a distance between action and emotion, destroys the illusion he seeks to protect: the immutable self. In some sense the borders of the self can only exist in the imagination, yet that is the source of the peculiar power of self-growth and of the power for one's release from the prison of identity. Self-awareness requires experience, but experience generates new selves or aspects of self, the knowledge of which can never be complete. Although the subject is real enough, his form is not only opaque but always in motion. He is in a significant sense that which he brings into visibility from the abyss over which he glides.

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Notes

1. For example Nobel prize winner Roger Sperry "Some Effects of Disconnecting the Cerebral Hemispheres" *Science* 217 (September, 1982), 1223-1226 and his book *Science and Moral Priority: Merging Mind, Brain and Human Values* (Columbia University Press, 1982) both of which argue for a need to restore the notion of "self" to the study of psychology. "The events of inner experience, as emergent properties of brain processes, become themselves explanatory causal constructs in their own right interacting at their own level with their own laws and dynamics." ("Effects", p. 1226)

2. I refer to Derrida's view of traditional Western metaphysics which he calls "the metaphysics of presence" or the "logocentric tradition" which assumes that "signifieds" exist prior to a human consciousness in which they have value. Derrida upsets the chain of priorities including not only those of existentialism but structuralism, as well; signification is, like everything else, arbitrary, a dance of the mind over nothingness. Language (including image making) is a trace of something which never existed. The universe thus becomes an arbitrary linguistic fiction, present only through our "sign-making" of it, but sign-making not as a code-making which points to an ultimate decodable presence. For Derrida reality, while a system of signs, is not decodable in any absolute way. See, for example, *Positions* or *Of Grammatology* in any edition. Self, as a difference of meanings, is no more or less real than anything else.

3. See specifically, *Of Grammatology* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976) pp. 159, 167, 163.

4. Most essays on the film explore it as a political allegory. Michael Covino, "Wim Wenders: A Worldwide Homesickness," *Film Quarterly* 32:1 (Winter, 77-78), 9-19; Timothy Corrigan, "The Realist Gesture in the Films of Wim Wenders," *Quarterly Review of Film Studies* 5:1 (Winter, 1980), 205-216; Marsha Kinder, *"The American Friend," Film Quarterly* 32:2 (Winter, 78-79), 45-48; Karen Jaehne, *"The American Friend," Sight & Sound* 47:2 (Spring, 1978) 101-103; Jurgen E. Schlunk, "The Image of America in German Literature and in the New German Cinema: Wim Wenders' *"The American Friend," Literature/Film Quarterly* 7:3 (1979), 215-222.

5. Wenders' direct comments upon the issue of identity can be found in an interview with Jan Dawson, *Wim Wenders* (New York: New York Zootrope, 1976); on page 12 he notes:

> ... the idea of man as an identity started in this century. And I think the cinema is the only adequate way of pushing this idea. Cinema is in a way the art of things, as well as persons, becoming identical with themselves. And foreigness for me is just a throughway to a notion of identity. In other words, *identity is not something you just have, you have to go through things to achieve it. Things become insecure in order to become secure in a different way.*

   Things certainly do become insecure, but one will look long through Wenders' work to see a film in which they become secure in a new way.

6. *The Will to Power*, translated by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1968), p. 283.

7. Dawson, page 12.

8. Especially Edmund Husserl, *Ideas: General Introduction to Phenomenology*, translated by W.R. Boyce (New York: Macmillan, 1931). There is, of course, a Structuralist critique of this as that in Claude Levi-Strauss, *The Savage Mind* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966) and a critique of both Levi-Strauss and Heidegger in Jacque Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, translated by G.C. Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976) who asserts the nihilistic stance: "that which words name have already escaped, have never existed," p. 159.

9. The term is borrowed from Carl Jung, *Basic Writings of Carl Jung*, ed. by V. De Lazlo (New York: Macmillan, 1959): "The meeting with oneself is, at first, the meeting with one's own shadow." p. 305.

10. Aldous Huxley in the "Forward", to Jiddu Krishnamurti, *The First and the Last Freedom* (New York: Harper Row, 1954), p. 10. This is, of course, the tradition against which Derrida argues i.e. that "things" are ultimately an absolute presence. Huxley has a point, however, that the presence of "symbols" is equally suspect as guarantor of reality.

11. Jean Genet, *The Miracle of the Rose*, translated by Bernard Frechtman (New York: Grove Press, 1966), p. 27.

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MARXIST DESPONDENCY

Eugene Victor Wolfenstein

Richard Lichtman, *The Production of Desire: The Integration of Psychoanalysis in Marxist Theory* (New York: The Free Press, 1982).

In Doris Lessing's *The Golden Notebook* one of the characters writes a novel in which a member of the F.L.N. is having a discussion with a French prisoner, whom he has tortured. The Frenchman "complained he was in an intellectual prison-house. He recognised, had recognised for years, that he never had a thought, or an emotion, that didn't instantly fall into pigeonholes, one marked 'Marx' and one marked 'Freud'."[1] He envied the Algerian his freedom from the dictates of "Grandfathers Freud and Marx."[2] The Algerian, on the other hand, recognised in himself the lack of such expectations. He was free to feel what he wished. But he felt nothing.

The torturer was overheard talking with his prisoner. Both men were executed.

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The project of joining psychoanalysis and Marxism is uneasily suspended between obscurity and orthodoxy. In the former regard, the project is not of interest to most Marxists or most psychoanalysts, and certainly not to liberal social scientists. It is not even the central preoccupation of critical theorists, structuralists, deconstructionists, and the like. In the latter regard, we have lived so long with both Marxism and psychoanalysis that they no longer frighten or excite us. They appear to be integrated components of the existing world order, not a threat to it. It hardly seems worth the effort to attempt to join them or, for that matter, to keep them apart.

Of course, these circumstances do not effect the purely intellectual dimension of the project. But precisely for these two theories, intellectual engagement is not enough. Each in its own way falls under the aegis of the eleventh thesis on Feuerbach: "the philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to change it."[3] Marxism is distinguished from academic social theories — including Marxological ones — by its commitment to political practice. In parallel fashion, what separates psychoanalysis from a host of academic psychologies is its claim to clinical efficacy. Moreover, when it is properly practiced, clinical psychoanalysis is a

process of self-transformation, not just transformation on the self. Just as self-activity is the essential element in the struggle for social emancipation, so it is the *sine qua non* of the struggle for liberation from personal (intra-psychic) domination. If, therefore, a Marxist psychoanalytic theory does not join the emancipatory practices of each theory, or at least add to the practical efficacy of one or the other of them taken independently, then its possibility or impossibility is a purely scholastic question. No Marxist *or* psychoanalyst need be concerned with it. Obscurity is its rightful fate. Conversely, if such a theory does have practical consequences for one or both of the initial positions, then Marxists and/or psychoanalysts ought to be interested in it. Their disinterest might then be interpreted as a defensive orthodoxy, a resistance to learning something about themselves they prefer not to know.

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I presume that Richard Lichtman would accept some such statement of the problem and project of Marxist psychoanalytic theory. His starting point in *The Production of Desire* is the "stultification of the dialectic (of progressive historical transformation) in contemporary capitalist society,"[4] a stasis he attributes to the presumed fact that *"people come to want what is destructive to their need."*[5] This fact results in "Marxist despondency" and so a "turn to Freud."[6] Freud provides a possible explanation for such a self-destructive tendency, hence also a possible remedy for Marxist despondency. But the relationship between Marxism and psychoanalysis is problematical. Various questions would have to be resolved before the Marxist patient can take the Freudian cure. Of these, the "most important" has to do with the "political dimension": if "we cannot answer this . . . question, the others are of little consequence."[7] Hence his subtitle, "the integration of psychoanalysis into Marxist theory." One could take exception to this formulation. It precludes *a priori* the integration of Marxism into psychoanalysis, or the aim of a unified theory that transcends its opposing moments. But in its scientific aspect, psychoanalysis is not a political theory, while in its ideological aspect it falls within the liberal *weltanschauung*. The only reason for integrating Marxism into psychoanalysis would thus be to de-politicize it, to transform it into just another manifest content for which psychoanalysis provides the latent meaning and the appropriate therapeutic response. And *if* one identifies the project of human emancipation with Marxism, then any attempt to transcend it must be interpreted as an escape from the political struggle. I think Lichtman makes this identification. It establishes the boundaries of his inquiry.

Lichtman approaches his task in both a critical and a constructive fashion. In the latter respect, he attempts a reformulation of psychoanalytic concepts upon the foundation of a Marxist anthropology and theory of history. I will briefly describe this attempt in a moment. In the former respect, Lichtman's method is to subject each essential component of psychoanalytic theory and practice to critical scrutiny. He does not try to swallow psychoanalysis whole. That would result in Marxist indigestion. Nor does he try to pick out useful pieces of psychoanalysis, thinking that they can be attached with hooks and

wires to a mechanical version of Marxist theory. Instead he views psychoanalysis as a unified structure of concepts and practices, which must be worked through in the manner of Marx's critique of bourgeois political economy. Thus the object of his critique is not Freud's metapsychology *or* his approach to clinical practice *or* his conception of social reality. It is the unity or totality of these three parts. Some of his most effective criticisms are directed at those writers who are desirous of "saving the good Freud,"[8] e.g., preserving the practice while discarding the metapsychology. In Lichtman's opinion, such writers ignore the ideological unity of Freud's project: the "relationship between Freud's metapsychology and his clinical practice was mediated by his sociopolitical assumptions regarding human nature."[9] But these assumptions are not without value. Once we establish the "social meaning" of these apparently "natural" categories, they help us to understand the pathological, individualist individuals of our society.[10] Consequently it is only a systematic critique that can preserve what is of value in psychoanalysis.

What does Freud's individual look like? In the beginning s/he is all id, an accumulation of blind sexual and aggressive drives (instincts or tendencies) seeking satisfaction through discharge. The life of the organism is regulated by the pleasure principle. In time the ego is differentiated from the id, and the super-ego from the ego. The ego must then mediate the contradictory demands of the id, external reality, and the super-ego. For this purposes it employs various defenses, of which repression is the most notable. Through its employment the ego wards off any conscious awareness of specific drive derivatives or their ideational representatives. It frees itself from unbearable anxiety and conscious conflict, but at the expense of losing the use of some of its own energies. Moreover, repression is both natural and necessary. It is virtually the defining feature of the human species. Human beings are neurotic animals.

By contrast Lichtman argues that "our distinguishing characteristic as human beings is our capacity to give ourselves specific determinations in social time"[11] Human beings are self-productive animals. Collectively self-productive: it is not meaningful to speak of the human individual, but only of "human beings in specific social relations transforming the natural environment through historically determinate technology."[12] In transforming the world, we transform ourselves. Even our instincts and defenses are social products".

> An aspect of mental life becomes a defense to the extent that the inclination it is employed to structure is defined as socially prohibitory. And an originally amorphous inclination becomes a determinate unconscious motive, drive, or "instinct" to the extent that it is defined as "censorable," and so forced away from the self-consciousness of the self and into the literally alien province of the id-unconscious.[13]

Where Freud views the self as formed from the inside to the outside, and society in turn from the self, Lichtman views the self as formed by society, and the interior of the self as a derivative of the socially formed self. The individual is

divided and self-contradictory because it mirrors social reality. "The repressed unconscious is the repository of the irreconcilable conflicts between . . . capitalist reality and bourgeois appearance," between what Lichtman terms the "structural unconscious" and the forms of consciousness characteristic of bourgeois society.[14] The structural unconscious is (more or less) a way of denoting the fetishism of commodities, i.e., the inversion of the roles of people and things in capitalism. In the capitalist mode of production, "individual, private independence 'frees' the social process to exercise its distinct autonomy as a system of alienated structures independent of individual control; . . . the phenomenal form of freedom maintains the structure of domination which makes individual freedom impotent except as a means to the reproduction of domination."[15] Domination has a long history. What is unique to capitalism is domination in the phenomenal form of freedom and equality, "the belief that individuals freely select their own social status."[16] Psychoanalysis ontologizes these self-deceived individuals, and provides them with a "cure" that leaves their self-deception intact. Therapy facilitates the process through which individuals take personal responsibility for social ailments. "That is why psychoanalysis is so crucial a form of social control, and why it is so appropriate to the bourgeois order."[17] It even controls the clinicians who practice it. They take personal responsibility for therapeutic failures, even when these outcomes demonstrably result from social causes.[18]

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My critical reactions to *The Production of Desire* are of two, opposing kinds. On the one hand, Lichtman's inquiry is framed in a clear and politically self-conscious manner; it is not only rich in insight, but also systematic in both its critical and reconstructive dimensions; and it results in a Marxist conception of psychoanalysis. On the other hand, I do not believe Lichtman's integration of psychoanalysis into Marxist theory solves the psycho-political problem with which he began: his turn to Freud does not produce a satisfactory response to Marxist despondency.

Lichtman's argument is based upon the Marxist premise that "the human essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individual," but instead "is the ensemble of the social relations."[19] The strength and originality of his analysis proceeds from his uncompromising adherence to this notion. Drives and defenses, the essence of the Freudian individual, are treated as social products. He rejects as "mistaken at its root" the idea that "different societies provide different channels for the expression" of "inborn human needs and drives."[20] Society and human nature cannot be treated as if they were independent, externally related variables. Society is not the manifestation of an essence existing outside of and before it. We are social and political to the core.

Surely Lichtman is on firm methodological ground in not granting the individual, much less the essence of the individual, an *a priori* existence. Except in theological fantasies, the world did not begin with just one of us. But he slips into the converse error: society exists in advance of the individual. Individuals are viewed as determined from the outside in, so that their inner lives are never more than mediations of external forces. If we wished to conceptualize the

matter in a more complete dialectical fashion, however, we would have to begin with the definitional identity, society = a collectivity of individuals. Neither side of the initial position could be granted priority or privilege. Then, in developing the opposition of the two sides, we would have to say that the drives of the individuals and the requirements of social action are both mutually determining and mutually exclusive. Drives are socially constituted and resist social determination. Society is constituted by individual drives and stands in opposition to them. The outcome of this two-fold opposition might then be stated: the *defenses* of individuals = the inward expression of social *demands*, while social *demands* = the outward expression of the defenses of individuals. Social laws and character structure (taking character structure to be a totality of defenses) cohere as the joint product of external and internal determination.

Lichtman might reject my reformulation of his methodological position by saying that I am slipping the essence of the individual in through a back door. I am not arguing for an individual essence, however, but rather for a notion of sensuous and psychological attributes common to all human individuals. Lichtman accepts, as did Marx, that all human individuals have certain things in common: we are sensuous beings who are potentially capable of self-conscious activity; we develop this potential through the labor-process ("the universal condition for the metabolic interaction between man and nature, the everlasting nature-imposed condition of human existence"[21]); and in working upon nature we are simultaneously transforming ourselves — for better or for worse. But (a) we also have certain things in common with other sensuous, especially animate, beings and (b) this is not all we have in common as human beings. Freud's conception of sexual and aggressive drives, along with the pleasure and reality principles, brings us into contact with these other elements. To be sure, as Lichtman justly contends, Freud's views require reformulation. But his own reformulation throws out the baby with the bathwater. He wages such successful war upon the essence of the Freudian individual that nothing remains of it. Consequently the psychoanalysis he integrates into Marxism has form but no content. We are offered notions of drive, defense, and unconscious conflict *sans* psychic pain, love, hate, or the Oedipus complex. When human drives are thus emptied of their content, however, it becomes possible to picture individuals so permeated by oppressive social meanings that they are completely one-dimensionalized. The project of the revolutionary transformation of capitalist society then comes to an end. Lichtman does not want to accept this possible implication of his own premises. He contends that capitalism cannot "succeed in gratifying the needs it has itself brought into existence."[22] No matter how "strangled in its self-reflection, the desire for communal recognition is ineradicable."[23] But the ineradicable quality of this desire cannot be derived from Lichtman's anthropology. He can maintain his anthropology and surrender the notion that such a desire is necessary; or he can revise his anthropology and maintain the notion. He cannot have it both ways.

It might be rejoined that there is a polemical advantage to be gained from the rejection of the conventional content of psychoanalytic notions. It was Freud himself, after all, who initiated the ideological attack of psychoanalysis upon

Marxism in *Civilization and Its Discontents*. In that essay he argued that in "abolishing private property we deprive the human love of aggression of one of its instruments, certainly a strong one, through certainly not the strongest; but we have in no way altered anything in its nature."[24] Lichtman's position precludes this ideological misuse of psychoanalytic concepts. It effectively turns away the Freudian attack — but at the expense of defending Marxism from a reality it needs to confront. Although we do not have a "love of aggression" of the kind postulated by Freud, we do have an inherent propensity to react to pain by fighting it or fleeing from it. This simple anthropological point has two important historical and political implications. First, not all pain is the product of social domination. Even in a socialist society there would be human suffering and aggression. Along with suffering and aggression comes some repression and some division of the self. Recognizing this fact counters the tendency towards Marxist naivete. But surrendering the naive hope for a world without pain or hatred is no reason for despair. For — this is my second point — the fight-flight response to actual or threatened pain is the emotional well-spring of rebellion. A working class revolutionary movement proceeds, in the first instance, from objective circumstances, i.e., from the negation of working class interests in capitalist society. But interests without motives are as abstract as motives without interests. Revolutionary motives are, on the one hand, a feeling of solidarity (aim-inhibited sexual feelings, Freud would say) with members of one's own class or group and, on the other, an antipathy towards or hatred of the oppressing class. Identification with the oppressor inverts these rational political motives. Oppressed individuals hate themselves instead of their class enemies. Breaking the identification with the oppressor, inverting the inversion of emotional values, is a necessary condition for revolutionary action.[25]

I might add this further point. Lichtman follows the predominant Freudian-Marxist tendency in viewing psychoanalysis as an individual psychology. There are certainly reasons for so doing, but these are not pressing from a Marxist standpoint. Marxism does require a psychology. It does not particularly need a theory of the individual. Which is to say, a psychology and a theory of individual activity are not the same thing. The latter can be (a) anthropology — answering the question, what do all human individuals have in common; (b) biography — analysis of the lives of specific, actual people; or (c) critique of, e.g., bourgeois individualism. Marx's Marxism is quite adequate in each of these regards, so long as individuals are considered objectively, that is, solely in relationship to their productive activity. It is not adequate with respect to human subjectivity, i.e., our emotional lives and desires. More specifically, it lacks a theory of *collective* emotional activity. Freud provides the starting point for such a theory in his *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*. Properly developed it provides the subjective complement to class analysis, explains in particular the falsification of class interests in collective consciousness, and makes possible a simultaneously objective and subjective analysis of mass movements.[26] It thus has implications for practice at the level of action characteristic of Marxist politics.

If we shift our focus from the individual to class struggle and mass

movement, we can put forward an alternative explanation for "Marxist despondency." This mood, and the theory proceeding from it, are attributes of the radical intellectual who has been isolated by the ebb-tide of the revolutionary movement. At such times and at such moments, there is a tendency to construct an image of human nature mirroring the temporary absence of manifest class struggle. The workers of the world are seen as so penetrated by false consciousness that their desire for freedom and will to revolutionary action have been destroyed. Feelings of hopelessness and defeat are thereby given a theoretical rationalization. Conversely, when the mass movement is at high tide and the left intellectual is swept along by its currents, a kind of Marxist euphoria is projected into the anthropological foundations of social theory. Thus Marx, immersed in and enamoured with the worker's movement in Paris in the 1840's, identified human nature with creativity and self-production. The riddle of human history seemed already to have been solved.[27] Subsequent events demonstrated that the solution was more difficult of achievement than it at first appeared.

A Marxist psychoanalysis must stand within and in a critical relationship to these swings of political mood. As Max Weber correctly observed, politics is "a strong and slow boring of hard boards."[28] It shares this quality with clinical psychoanalysis. To be sure, the sense of duration is relative to social history in the one case, individual life history in the other. But each enterprise involves a disciplining of character, the ability to interpret processes of transformation from within, and patience. The psychoanalytic experience, moreover, can be of heuristic value for the vocation of politics. Whether one is in the role of analyst or patient, it teaches one to bear the anxiety attendant upon the uncertain process of self-liberation; and it develops in each participant the willingness to recognize and struggle with one's own resistance to learning from experience. These qualities are vital for the rationality of, especially, revolutionary action. For as Marx observes, just when people are "engaged in revolutionising themselves and things, in creating something entirely new, precisely in such epochs of revolutionary crisis they anxiously conjure up the spirits of the past to their service and borrow from them names, battle slogans and costumes in order to present the new scene of world history in this time-honoured disguise and this borrowed language."[29] Marx intended this description of psychical defense against political anxiety for the bourgeois leaders of the French revolution of 1789. But it is equally applicable to working class revolutionaries.

In sum: *The Production of Desire* is a significant contribution to the project of unifying Marxist and psychoanalytic theories. It requires a more psychoanalytic psychoanalysis, however, to counter the tendency toward Marxist despondency with which Lichtman is concerned.

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In John Steinbeck's *The Grapes of Wrath*, Tom Joad kills a deputy who murdered his friend Preacher Casey. By that act he becomes an outlaw, but a self-conscious one. He plans to follow Casey's example by joining in the struggle to organize migrant workers against large-scale farm owners. His mother is afraid he also will be murdered. He tells her:

"Well, maybe like Casey says, a fella ain't got a soul of his own, but on'y a piece of a big one — an' then (maybe one man's death) don' matter. Then I'll be aroun' in the dark. I'll be ever'where — wherever you look. Wherever they's a fight so hungry people can eat, I'll be there . . . "[30]

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Notes

1. Doris Lessing, *The Golden Notebook* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963), p. 549.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 550.
3. Karl Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach," in Robert Tucker, ed., *The Marx-Engels Reader* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1978), p. 145.
4. Richard Lichtman, *The Production of Desire: The Integration of Psychoanalysis into Marxist Theory* (New York: The Free Press, 1982), p. 13.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 1.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 13.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 99.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 112.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 174.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 69.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 64.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 192.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 252.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 222-223.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 171.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 170.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 282-283.
19. Marx, *op. cit.*, p. 145.
20. Lichtman, *op. cit.*, p. 87.
21. Karl Marx, *Capital* (New York: Vintage Books, 1977), I, 290.
22. Lichtman, *op. cit.*, p. 287.
23. *Ibid.*

24. Sigmund Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents*, in James Strachey, ed., *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* (London: Hogarth Press, 1961), XXI, p. 113.

25. I explore this theme in some detail and in the context of a Marxist psychoanalytic theory of collective action in *The Victims of Democracy: Malcolm X and the Black Revolution* (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1981).

26. See Sigmund Freud, *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, in *The Standard Edition . . .*, Volume XVIII; W. R. Bion, *Experiences in Groups* (New York: Basic Books, 1959); and Chapter 2 of *The Victims of Democracy*.

27. Karl Marx, *The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, in Tucker, *op. cit.*, p. 66 ff.

28. Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," in H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, *From Max Weber* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 128.

29. Karl Marx, "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte," in Tucker, *op. cit.*, p. 595.

30. John Steinbeck, *The Grapes of Wrath* (New York: The Viking Press, 1972), p. 570.

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RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR WOLFENSTEIN'S REVIEW OF *THE PRODUCTION OF DESIRE*

Richard Lichtman

As Professor Wolfenstein notes in his very generous review, my purpose in *The Production of Desire* was to preserve what is of lasting value in psychoanalysis by re-situating its tenable claims within a Marxist anthropology. Toward this end I follow Marx in emphasizing the self-productive character of human nature and treat the basic constituents of Freud's view of human nature and treat the basic constituents of Freud's view of human nature as socially derived. Professor Wolfenstein seems quite sympathetic to much of my thesis but significant differences remain. Either I do not make myself sufficiently clear or Professor Wolfenstein's greater attachment to psychoanalytic theory has led him to misconstrue my meaning. In either case I offer the following clarification.

I purportedly commit two basic errors: first, maintaining that "society exists in advance of the individual"; and second, viewing individuals as "determined from the outside in." These are both important criticisms, for they go to the heart of the relationship between the individual and society. And yet, neither seems sufficiently clear to be capable of affirmation or denial. Let us begin with the first point and Professor Wolfenstein's contention that dialectically "society = a collectivity of individuals."

It is true that *society* and *individuals* are dialectically related (though what I in fact argue, as Professor Wolfenstein himself notes at one point, is that "society and *human nature* cannot be treated as if they were independent variables.") What I regard as "mistaken at its root" is the notion that an identical human nature receives different channels of expression in different societies. There is no identical human nature because, as Marx correctly noted, human nature, including its needs, drives and defenses, is formed through a social order in the process of appropriating socially constituted objects which are, of necessity, variable.

But is not the social order constituted out of individuals and is not Professor Wolfenstein therefore correct in insisting that neither society nor the individual can be granted priority; that they are, in fact, dialectically related? I asserted much the same proposition myself a number of times in *The Production of Desire*. However, reflecting on Professor's Wolfenstein's thoughtful review has forced me to the conclusion that as it stands, the dialectical assertion of social-individual identity is formally true, but substantively either false or seriously misleading. Without further clarification the assertion leads to the following difficulty: if individuals and society are "mutually determining and mutually

exclusive" (note the shift from equivalence to reciprocal determination) we must be able to define them independently of each other. For only separably definable entities can interact. But if we can so distinguish them, the individual must be definable independently of society; yet this is precisely the position Professor Wolfenstein credits me with avoiding. How are we to escape this dilemma? We must reflect more carefully on the assertion that society and individuals constitute a dialectic.

While human nature (the nature of individual human beings) and society are dialectically related, it is not true that each contributes equivalently to the constitution of the dialectic. Their modes of being and the order of their priority are distinct. In terms of the potentiality of being, individual human nature is prior. However, in terms of concrete actuality, society is prior. Human nature is "privileged" as the abstract possibility always precedes its realization. Nothing can be found in society which in some sense does not exist as a human potentiality. But for this privilege the abstract possibility pays a heavy price in being; it cannot determine its own realization, for which it remains dependent on the concrete social order through which it is concretized.

Actuality is logically prior to potentiality because the notion of "being in condition A" is logically prior to the *possibility* of "being in condition A." But actuality is also prior in the important sense that potentiality cannot actualize itself, a consideration which Marx, following Aristotle, utilized to demystify Hegel. Finally, as Aristotle noted and Marx reiterated, since the nature of a being is its realization, it is the concrete goal or end which is normatively prior. As human beings are only fully human as concretely social, their realized nature precedes their potentiality. Nothing in these reflections denies the relevance of "human nature" or "human potentiality" as such. However, potentiality is a transit of being; at some point it must alight. It is in the terrain of reality that it comes to rest.

When these universal relations are viewed in the light of human nature their significance becomes even clearer. The manner in which an acorn becomes an oak is essentially different from the manner in which an infant becomes an adult. For while an infant has a nature at birth, it has no properly human nature. And it cannot acquire one without the continuous participation of other fully formed human beings. This situation does not hold for the acorn's passage to an oak. The difference liest in the very fact of human potentiality — the fact of the abstractness of human beings at birth. We become human as we become concrete, specific and determinate. That is precisely why a given human infant can become any of an indefinitely large number of possible human beings.

What distinguishes us from the remainder of nature, as Marx insisted, is that we construct our nature out of material which has been bequeathed us. We reconstruct ourselves through our capacity to engage in a second-order, meta-praxis. Of course, this reflective praxis of the adult is determinate in relation to the infant's unformed potentiality. And that is again why among all the characteristics of human beings we wish to ascribe to human nature, we can find no concrete instances which are universal. There are no specific instances of eating, dreaming, dying, speaking, loving or thinking which can be universally

designated as human. Rooted in nature, for instance, all human beings decay and "die". But there is no universal meaning to death; only the specific meaning which has been so variously ascribed to it in the enormous range of human cultures. Or, to take one of Professor Wolfenstein's examples, it is of course true that pain is universal, and "not all pain is the product of social determination".But it is also true that the *meaning* of pain is the product of "social determination", as cross-cultural, ethnic and class differentiated studies have indicated. No matter how brute any fact of the human condition, no matter how "demanding" or "intrusive", it has no human significance until it has been humanly signified, a status it can only acquire in the concrete community of human agents.

But, if "drives are socially constituted" how do they "resist social determination"? There is no abstract, universal answer to this question. In some societies there is no resistance. In other societies the social order is itself conflictual or self-contradictory, and in educating the individual to its needs, it is forced to inculcate and deny simultaneously, with the result that the individual is able to use the social order again itself. We learn that to succeed we must look out for ourselves and compete ruthlessly for advantage. But we also learn simultaneously that human dignity consists in compassion and concern, and that the realm of the spirit is superior to the laying up of material treasures on earth. We can resist resentment with affection or love with hatred. But this is not because it is *our nature* to be divided or to be so constituted that something in us at birth is necessarily antagonistic to society: the persistent Freudian paradigm.

This point leads to the second criticism which Professor Wolfenstein has directed against me: that I treat individuals as "determined from the outside in" ("the defenses of individuals = the individual expression of social demands"). To begin with, I reject the notions of "inward" and "outward" as mystifying reflections of Cartesian dualism. In fact, it is only with a highly privatized society that such a metaphor could gain ascendency. But the basic difficulty lies in the rather Lockean impressionism which is attributed to me and which I totally reject. Holding that individuals are "determined from the outside" conjures up archaic images of blank slates and signet rings pressed upon wax. It is theoretically meaningless to regard anything as "determined from the outside", least of all human beings. For if a being had no nature of its own, a kind of being which distinguished it from other beings, it would have no way of accepting, reflecting or deflecting the influences which were brought to bear upon it. Steel cannot be determined from the outside in the manner of glass precisely because of its nature "in itself". If individuals had no unique way of receiving social influence they would have no mode of being in the world, and no way of being influenced or determined. It is only when we speak to humans that we receive speech in return. If only humans can so respond it is because of their "inner" capacity to engage in symbolic communication. But this capacity itself cannot be specified independently of the specific community of speakers in which the individual is engaged. For even if theories of innate human speech competence were true and the sheer form of language could be separated from its particular

meanings, it would remain equally true that 1) such competence would consist in the meta-capacity to order specific utterances, 2) whose particular meaning would depend upon the variable social intentions of determinate communicative communities. If one cannot live by bread alone, how little can one live by the sustenance of pure transformational grammar.

And yet, Professor Wolfenstein notes that I accept that "all human beings have certain things in common." I hope my response is predictable. "Things," no; general dispositions, meta-capacities and forms of self-reconstitution, yes. We all require material sustenance, but there is no universal material "thing" which supplies it. We require human recognition, but again there is no universality in its appropriate modes of engagement. Professor Wolfenstein charges that while I accept conflict, drive and defense, I eliminate "pain, love, hate, and the "Oedipus Complex." I leave it to the reader to determine whether *The Production of Desire* is devoid of an awareness of human suffering. I believe that the real difference between Professor Wolfenstein and myself is suggested by his reference to the Oedipus Complex, which I do in fact deny as a universal occurrence. It is in my view derived from Freud's particular, substantive theories of sexuality and aggression, itself a reification of bourgeois family life, which was deeply rooted in a hypostatized vision of individual-social conflict. For psychoanalysis to be integrated into Marxism it must be conspicuously devoid of Freud's concrete view of human nature. What needs to be preserved is Freud's view of unconscious transformation (i.e. the defense mechanisms which he several times referred to as the cornerstone of psychoanalysis): a human capacity which "precedes" society as a potentiality, but which is only engaged under specific conditions of social conflict.

Professor Wolfenstein contends that in eliminating the defects in Freud's instinctual theory of human nature, I have simultaneously eliminated the sensuous, practical and desiring substance of that nature. Those who emphasize the social construction of human nature and point to the possibility of its radical transformation are often criticized along these lines. We supposedly forget the brute facticity, the very naturalness of our nature. I have no doubt that individuals would "suffer" under socialism. I cannot gauge whether they would suffer more or less; I am reasonably sure they would suffer differently. The feeling of solidarity with one's class to which Professor Wolfenstein cogently refers is a complex derivative whose extension to an entire society would transform it in ways I cannot envision. Perhaps under these conditions we would suffer with the distress of a far greater number of our fellow human beings. Perhaps, on the other hand, as lives were more fully lived, even their eventual end would bear less the imprint of futile rage. One thing is reasonably clear to me: the language of psychoanalysis, whether it be the 'aim-inhibited sexuality' Professor Wolfenstein is decorously forced to bracket, or the Hobbesean individualism that underlies even *Freud's Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*[1] is one of the profound strands of bourgeois ideology which elevates individualism above communal passion.

This brings me to the last point, the political significance of the differences between us. Professor Wolfenstein is concerned that as I empty out the individual I

remove the grounds of rebellion against current injustice. The corrective to a debilitating one-dimensionality purportedly lies in the natural responses, cultured to be sure, of the "fight-flight" reaction to pain. I am not sure what this phrase intends. it would seem that revolutionary movements must be a response to some order of inhumanity which has no "natural" basis in our given nature and which far transcends anything inherent in the notion of native pain. The suffering against which we rebel is a suffering which has itself been created in society. And such rebellion is possible because: 1) we are not, I have insisted, *tabula rasa*, but being with our own tendencies, laws, forms and constitution. However, all these potentialities are articulated through concrete social formations. When once we come to recognize our human self-creation in the form of a more profoundly gratifying existence we can, under specific conditions, resist the threat to its continuation or further development. We can, in short, struggle against those social forces that would dehumanize us.

But there is 2) another factor at work which moves the possibility of rebellion in the direction of a necessity, morally considered. Capitalism cannot "succeed in gratifying the needs it has itself brought into existence," because capitalism is inherently a contradiction between its prevailing structure of power (capitalism, in fact) and the legitimizing ideology of bourgeois rights and expectations (liberalism) which cannot but condemn the source and possibility of its own promise. The desire for communal recognition is necessary to human nature in the sense that it is only through community that we can become human. It is immanent in capitalism because the particular form in which capitalism elicits this recognition — through the necessary contradiction between reality and ideology — is inseparable from capitalist power. We can only fulfill the promise of this society by transcending it and we can only transcend it because our nature is constituted by powers which are of necessity self-transformative and forever retain the potentiality of humane self-determination. So long as we continue to look to something basically resistant in human nature to protect us from one-dimensionality we shall continue to mire in despondency. Nothing in our native constitution impels us toward resistance or revolution. A brief look at human history bears tragic witness to this anguished absence. Once having caught some sight of our fuller humanity, however, no matter how vaguely adumbrated, it is unlikely we will wholly relinguish our pursuit. What is most compelling is not what drives us from an ancient past of previous suffering, but what draws us toward a future still ours to make in the process of self-transformation.

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Notes

1. I refer to such comments as these: "If the individuals in the group are combined into a unity, there must be something to unite them." This is Hobbes, again, who also could not understand that individuality is a social creation rather than the brute starting point of social amalgamation. *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* translated by John Strachey, Liveright Publishing Company, New York, 1951, p. 7.

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DAY FOR NIGHT: MARXISM IN FRANCE

David MacGregor

Arthur Hirsh, *The French Left: A History and Overview*, Montreal: Blackrose Books, 1982.

Michael Kelly, *Modern French Marxism*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982.

D. S. Bell and Eric Shaw, *The Left in France: Towards the Socialist Republic*, Nottingham, Spokesman, 1983.

The history of French Marxism really starts with Hegel whose early appearance in France helps account for the rich tradition of Gallic social theory. Yet the powerful socialist current which facilitated the entry of Hegelian notions worked against those of Marx. Until the 20th century Marxism was only one of a variety of socialist schools of thought, and the philosophical range of Marx's followers in France was no match for the subtlety of Italian, German and Russian strains of Marxism. The lone French theorist whose work stands comparison with that of Labriola, Kautsky, or Plekhanov was Georg Sorel, and his major contribution, *Reflections on Violence*, is anarchist rather than Marxist.

Two of the volumes under review concentrate on the development of the forms of modern French Marxism which have had such a remarkable impact on Marxist thought. Hirsh's book follows the development of Marxism in postwar France while Kelly's more ambitious study reaches back to the 19th century and offers a detailed analysis of Marxism from the 1920s onwards. Even where they cover the same period, however, their contrasting perspectives afford an entirely different subject matter. Hirsh is concerned with the threads of New Left thought which came together to produce the explosion of May 1968 and then unravelled in the 1970s. The adventures of orthodox dialectical materialism and especially its uneasy relationship with Hegel constitute the chief issues of Kelly's philosophically-oriented account.

The victory of Mitterand's Socialists (PS) in 1981 and the frightful performance of the French Communist Party (PCF) since it abandoned the Union of the Left in 1977 constitute a perplexing backdrop for the intellectual histories of Hirsh and Kelly. But these events, along with the evolution and structure of the two massive contenders for power on the left, are marvelously documented and explained in Bell and Shaw's *The Left in France*. This thin volume is an indispensable handbook for anyone wishing to penetrate the mysteries of contemporary French politics and the labyrinth of twists and turns that has been the enigmatic legacy of politics to French social theory.

Marxism thrived in the embattled atmosphere of 1930's France and produced a number of memorable works. Paul Nizan's *The Watchdogs* was typical in its enthusiastic attack on bourgeois ideology and relative lack of theoretical sophistication. The doctrinaire tendency of this period was powerfully reinforced by the publication in 1938 of Stalin's hackneyed and enormously popular textbook, *Dialectical and Historical Materialism*. The appearance in the same year of Lenin's *Conspectus on Hegel's 'Science of Logic'* encouraged and leant added weight to innovative studies on the place of Hegel in the Marxist tradition and on the writings of the young Marx published throughout the tenure of the Popular Front by Auguste Cornu, Henri Lefebvre, and Norman Guterman.

Luckily for the Communists, who were caught supporting the fascists because of the Hitler-Stalin pact, they were outlawed and forced into hiding in 1939 by the French government. After the 1940 Nazi invasion, the circulation of Marxist literature was punishable by imprisonment or even execution. (It is sobering to reflect that a copy of *The Holy Family*, a doubtful acquisition at the best of times, meant certain death under the Germans.) The stock of Marxist books and journals in the country was almost totally destroyed and revolutionary intellectuals dispersed to help form the Resistance (they were joined by Communist militants only after May 1941 when the Blitzkrieg crossed over into Russia). Paul Nizan, George Politzer and Jacques Decour were among those who died, but Rober Garaudy, Lefebvre and Cornu survived to extend and deepen Marxist theory after the Liberation, emphasizing the relevance of Hegel and the young Marx for dialectical thought. The Cold War stopped these experiments in their tracks and by the early 1950s all three men had recanted their positions under severe criticism from Party ideologues who saw any interest in Hegel as a sop to fascism.

With official Marxism bedazzled by Stalin and frozen into place first by the Occupation and then the Cold War, the development of Marxism was in the hands of its critics on the left among Hegelians, existentialists and renegade Marxists (*gauchistes*). Liberals and progressives were given relative freedom by the Nazi occupiers to print and circulate their views; Camus published *The Myth of Sisyphus* in 1942 and Sartre's *Being and Nothingness* reached the public a year later. After the war existentialism grew rapidly and prompted bitter attacks from Communists like Georg Lukács and Henri Lefebvre. As its leading figure, Jean-Paul Sartre was also a main target of existentialism's Communist antagonists. Always a leftist, Sartre pursued as varied and contradictory a career as anyone in a country where loyalty to principles is viewed as a political liability. Playing the Bohemian intellectual in the 1930s he eschewed organized politics, studied under Kierkegaard in Nazi Germany and took advantage of the discount fares offered by Mussolini to attract tourists to Rome's fascist Exposition. Together with Simone de Beauvoir and Merleau-Ponty, Sartre attempted to form an independent partisan group during the war but it collapsed and he was not admitted to the Resistance until 1943 when the Communist Party finally dropped its objections to him.

Criticized for its individualist and ahistorical themes (problems later admitted by Sartre himself) *Being and Nothingness* probed questions of authenticity and

bad faith considered diversionary by official Communism and by most Marxists outside the Party as well. De Beauvoir's existentialist *The Second Sex* transcended Sartre's limited view (along with its pervasive sexism) and also raised important objections to Engels's account of female oppression. Its publication in 1949 stung the patriarchy. De Beauvoir was actually living the alienated experience of the Other in her relations with Sartre who delighted in writing her juicy accounts of his latest flings while she was being pilloried by Communists and conservatives alike. François Mauriac villified *The Second Sex* as pornography and with typical masculine duplicity exclaimed in private that "(de Beauvoir's) vagina has no secrets for me." Her friend Camus accused de Beauvoir of "making the French male look ridiculous." (Hirsh, pp. 39-40) It is symptomatic of the unselfconscious chauvinism of Michael Kelly's study that it includes no account of de Beauvoir's work and dismisses *The Second Sex* as "probably the least successful of her writings." (p. 217)

Isolated by the Cold War and rapidly losing the high status gained through their leadership in the Resistance, the theorists of the Communist Party were also buffeted by telling criticism from ex-Trotskyists gathered around the journal *Socialisme ou Barbarie*. This initially rather obscure publication won a receptive audience when French intellectuals turned to its critique of socialist bureaucracy for an explanation of the dramatic worker revolts in East Germany in 1953 and then Poland and Hungary in 1956. The journal's leading writers Cornelius Castoriadis and Claude Lefort argued that a truly socialist society required worker self-management (*autogestion*) and a democratic system of workers' councils. The anti-Marxist standpoint adopted by the journal after de Gaulle's electoral triumph in 1958 contained little that was new but its Weberian critique of bureaucracy influenced many of the intellectuals who were to play a leading role in the climactic events of 1968.

The revival of official Communist theory from its Cold War stupor began three years before Kruschev's 1956 'secret speech' denouncing Stalin's crimes. The Communists were returning to an alliance with the Socialists after a series of widening postwar splits and the thaw registered in a number of Party conferences devoted to theoretical questions, especially that of Marx's relation to Hegel, who was no longer avoided as a forerunner of fascism. In 1953 Louis Althusser, then an inconspicuous young professor of philosophy, wrote two articles in a journal of education on Marxist philosophy outlining the basic principles he would present in a much more novel and suggestive form twelve years later in *For Marx*. Communist thinkers published articles disputing existentialism's stake in the Hegelian tradition and reaffirming Marx's claim to have overcome Hegel by transcending his philosophy.

Two of these theorists, Henri Lefebvre and Roger Garaudy were leading interpreters of Marx in the 1950s but Lefebvre's writings drifted dangerously closer to Hegel until he was finally expelled from the PCF. Lefebvre is perhaps French Communism's most fascinating writer and his treatment by Kelly and Hirsh illustrates the differences in their approach. Kelly is censorious of Lefebvre's 'abstract and Hegelian position' and applauds his expulsion by the PCF. 'Lefebvre thought ideas led the world; he increasingly forgot that they must

reflect it. If ideas do not begin by submitting to the world's (sic!) harsh discipline, they invariably fall victim to it later in their course.' (pp. 105-106). Once Lefebvre leaves the Party he vanishes from Kelly's text, whereas Hirsh follows Lefebvre more closely, observing that his trenchant critique of modern consumer society suggested the slogans for 1968: 'Let everyday life become a work of art! Let technical means be employed for the transformation of everyday life!' (p. 105)

The revival of official Marxism coincided with Sartre's massive commentary on historical materialism, *Critique of Dialectical Reason* published in 1960. Sartre's study is not entirely successful, which perhaps explains why the promised second volume failed to appear in his lifetime — he turned instead to an equally massive work on Flaubert. The most splendid images in the *Critique* are also rather unconvincing, e.g., two workers separated by a wall and unaware of one another are linked in 'totalizing praxis' by a daydreaming Sartre gazing at both from the balcony of his holiday flat; a queue of commuters waiting for a bus confront the alienation of what Sartre calls, a 'group in series', and so forth. The leading concepts of the *Critique* are problematic; the project of human history is to alleviate scarcity, a category without theoretical elaboration. The notion of freedom which informs the *Critique* is left unspecified in a text that never quite gets beyond the rationalist dualism of Descartes. Sartre's delineation of the links between thought and action, individual and society, theory and history, is important, and his criticism of the concepts of class and class consciousness demonstrates the limits and abstract character of Marxist theory. "Sartre's critique of Marxism," observes Hirsh, "was to prove quite fruitful as a philosophical foundation for the emerging new left social theory." (p. 80)

Sartre's rejection of a dialectic of nature fueled a controversy that culminated in 1961 with Sartre and Jean Hyppolite together debating Roger Garaudy and Jean-Pierre Vigier before an audience of 6,000 people keen to discover whether the dialectic could be applied to nature as well as to history. Neither side won but the debate confirmed Sartre and Garaudy as the acknowledged interpreters of Marx in France.

A humanist who favoured rapprochement between the PCF and Christianity, Garaudy was in the forefront of the Hegelian revival in the early 1960s; Louis Althusser was its nemesis. They fought for the position of chief Party theoretician throughout the decade with Garaudy holding a decisive edge until his criticism of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and applause for the revolutionaries of 1968 created great disfavour in the PCF leadership. He was expelled from the Party in 1970, and Louis Althusser, after keeping low during the May events, ascended to the Communist purple.

The enormous student and worker uprising in May 1968 shattered the Stalinist bureaucracy of the PCF and utterly dissolved the old Socialist party, the SFIO. Traditional Marxist theory could offer nothing to explain the amazing events taking place across France. The winners were New Left theorists like Sartre, Lefebvre and Castoriadis who had been diagnosing for years the problems of alienation and bureaucracy that precipitated the May revolt. Paradoxically the success of the New Left theorists prepared their immediate eclipse just as the events of May culminated in another electoral triumph for de Gaulle. By the time

Mitterand had succeeded in drafting a Common Programme for the rejuvenated Socialist Party and the PCF, the structuralists had attained supremacy in the field of Marxist theory.

Althusser's spell-binding essays in *For Marx* and other masterful pieces in *Lenin and Philosophy* and elsewhere established his preeminence in theory not only among the Communists but across a broad spectrum of Marxist intellectuals. By completely severing Hegel from Marx and while professing the humblest fealty for the orthodox tradition, Althusser was able to introduce truckloads of concepts and principles from a range of trendy disciplines. Stunned by the clarity and wit of Althusser's prose readers forgot to check whether the magus had actually read Hegel (he had not, though he did translate selected works from Feuerbach in 1960, but that is not the same thing). Levels were added to levels, forms of thought fed on other forms which generated still other ones. The result was a social theory that somehow resembles the PCF as described by Bell and Shaw: "closed, secretive, bureaucratic, Stalinist and thoroughly difficult to deal with." (p. 129) The extreme intellectualism of the Althusserian project was deftly integrated with a wild-eyed Maoism.

While Althusser's theoretical abilities declined precipitously throughout the 1970s attention shifted to his disciple Poulantzas whose brilliant, though often obscure and tendentious, theoretical interventions kept the Althusserians alive. Oddly enough Kelly fails even to list Poulantzas in the index but Hirsh offers a sharp discussion of his contributions. Poulantzas constructs a structuralist theory of the state, the major strength of which is recognition of the state's 'relative autonomy' from the capitalist economic system. His theory points to reform rather than destruction of the state and is in line with the political strategy of Eurocommunism in Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece which seeks broad alliances with socialists and progressives. In his last and most promising book, *State, Power, Socialism*, Poulantzas abandoned doctrinaire structuralism and welcomed certain new left themes such as worker self-managemen which he had previously resisted.

The spectacular crack-up of Althusserian structuralism at the beginning of the 1980s paralleled the PCF's turn to Moscow (as George Marchais on TV live from the Soviet Union defended the invasion of Afghanistan before the French public), its adoption of blatantly racist policies during the 1980 elections, and its miserable performance at the polls. After the eclipse of Althusser, Lucien Sève, the heir apparent, advanced from the wings with a version of orthodox Marxism that underlined the importance of Hegel to the entire Marxist project. Other pro-Hegelians in the PCF such as Jacques D'Hondt and Solange Mercier-Josa have contributed original insights about the importance of Hegel for the work of Marx. As Hegel would say, the Idea has returned to itself.

The dialectic would not be what it is if it did not produce ironies, paradoxes and contradictions. In France where Socialism is installed in government and the Communists have four cabinet ministers, theoretical marxism is a dead letter. In its stead Hirsh offers three allied social movements: self-management, feminism and ecology. The first is a strategy not a theory, and the prospects of the third in France, where almost everyone is in favour of nuclear installments of

some sort, is not promising, nor is ecology likely in any case to revive Marxism as we know it. Feminist theorists in France (and everywhere else) are moving rapidly away from Marxism rather than toward it. Kelly, in the doctrinaire style that marks his book, admits that research in Marxism is at an end and that the time has come for education of the masses in Marxist principles. "The reversion" to education he declares hopefully, "is not necessarily a regression." (p. 232) A book that concludes with a call for no more research is certainly refreshing and the reader must share Kelly's exhaustion and sense of hopelessly spinning wheels (a sense reflected in his chapter headings: New Beginnings, Innovations, Explorations, Changes, New Directions,etc.). Hirsh's volume is more tightly written and ultimately much more optimistic but equally unconvincing about the future of French Marxism. In France it appears the owl of Minerva has had its wings clipped just as the dusk is gathering.

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GORZ'S EXORCISM

Alan Lewis

André Gorz, *Farewell to the Working Class*, Boston, Mass: South End Press, 1982.

While the various social, political and economic crises of the seventies and eighties continue to fuel the women's movement, peace movement, ecological activism, and episodic industrial militancy, the traditional left has failed to grow. It has failed to grow either in practical political terms or in the intellectual and cultural development of a vision and programme of liberation. The new right has been more successful than the left in seizing upon popular discontents and dissatisfactions arising from the stagflation of the seventies. As the new right's reactionary agenda has become more exposed and distasteful, however, political choice still remains restricted to that of threadbare liberalism or passivity. In this context Gorz analyses the gap between the Marxist tradition and the structure, and more importantly, the experiences generated by that structure, of "post-industrial" society.

In *Farewell to the Working Class* Gorz continues his career as the gadfly to the Marxist left, criticising the rigidities and dogmatism of the inherited conventions. For Gorz, capitalist contradictions are reflected in the often intensely alienating experiences, tensions and disaffections of everyday life. Such experiences do not manifest themselves in orthodox expressions of class consciousness but in a great variety of historically shifting patterns of personal problems, anxieties and perceptions which are often overlooked in socialist theory and practice. Consequently Gorz has attempted to regenerate socialist theory and politics by confronting actual history and the actualities within history. In *A Strategy for Labour* Gorz argued that the affluent capitalism of the post-war period necessitated a socialist strategy focused on qualitative issues pertaining to the organisation, control and goals of production, and a shift away from the merely distributive and quantitative traditions of reform socialism. His essay *Ecology as Politics* points out that the rise of ecological concerns presents conceptions of physical constraints on production without clear political resolutions, and poses some directions for socialist solutions to ecological issues. *Farewell* . . . looks at the impact of the latest round of technological changes on employment and job satisfaction. The potential persistence of massive unemployment combined with the nearly total destruction of craft work creates mass detachment from and disaffection with productive work. This situations provides an opportunity to revivify socialism through the development of a programme of economic reform

based upon the maximum reduction of necessary work. In the course of developing this thesis Gorz directs a withering stream of criticism at some of Marxism's most sacrosanct precepts.

To most critical Marxists, Gorz's (albeit elegantly written and extremely lucid) pastiche of ideas drawn from Marcuse, Sartre, Illich and Schumacher will not be news. I also doubt whether his exposés of Marxist dogmatism will sway the Mitterand technocrats or the PCF from their fixed orbits around the French state. After all, the criticisms of Marxist party ambivalence over the working class as the subject of history or of the party; the tyranny of productivism; the deforming consequences of merely seizing and not transforming power; the subordination of individual desires, wants, and satisfactions to collective necessities, etc., have a long and honourable history within and outside the Marxist left without effecting the theory and practices of socialist and communist parties in or out of power. Even so, Gorz's struggle to renovate the socialist vision does contain some useful correctives to both traditional and libertarian Marxist positions.

Socialism in essence, for Gorz, aims at the liberation of time and the abolition of work. This fundamental element is entirely lost in the obsession with production which has dominated "scarcity socialism." In reaction the libertarian left has tended to idealise primitive communities, feudal craft guilds, or self-sufficient rural communities as models for socialist organisation. Such communities are, in reality, much more restrictive and intolerant of the forms of individuation and autonomy which characterise advanced capitalist societies, let alone those which should characterise socialist societies. Moreover, contemporary technology which actually makes possible massive reduction of labour involves larger scale, flexible, interconnecting organisations quite unlike idyllic, isolated communities (and also unlike contemporary capitalist or soviet macro-bureaucracies). Socialists cannot depend on historically available models of social organisation but have to work to develop non-oppressive social relations in the interstices of contemporary society. This involves an acknowledgement that even in a socialist world there would be unpleasant, boring and physically uncomfortable tasks to be routinely performed. Socialist organisation involves the reduction of this "realm of necessity" to the minimum and distributing these tasks rationally and justly within the community. This is a more reasonable vision than either the stakhanovite exhaltation of work as life, or the paradisaical view of life as a permanent Saturday afternoon. It is, however, difficult to translate this principle of organisation into an activating political programme. Gorz chooses the easier path of arguing for its technical feasibility, drawing on Illich, Lovins and Schumacher.

Throughout the essay Gorz echoes Sartre in asserting the irreducibility of the existential and ethical moment in socialist politics. Individual consciousness and autonomy is both the root and purpose of liberation. This assertion is, of course, a critique of orthodox Marxism's emphasis on the party, or the collective subject as the entity endowed with consciousness, reason and morality. For Gorz this position leads to the totalitarian vision where individual consciousness is replaced by state morality, and obedience to rules and regulations exhausts the

moral obligations and rights of the individual.

More importantly in the current context, the everyday experience of contemporary society is profoundly depersonalising. The machine-like operations of the state apparatuses and the economy renders us all subject to impersonal forces and abstract rules and regulations beyond our control. In this functional system of power "it's no longer people who have power; it's the positions of power which have their people."[1] The pervasiveness of impersonal power in contemporary society generates a permanent, diffused form of fascist ideology. Fascist ideology promises the replacement of a system of functional domination by the continuous promotion of the most able; the replacement of class monopolisation of power by the personal power of a redeeming leader; and the elimination of state and bureaucracy in favour of mass organisations unified by a single social vision, thus eliminating social conflict and tension. The experience of impersonal power in societies pervaded and dominated by macro-bureaucracies provides opportunities for the growth of a new right which has effectively utilised popular discontent in the pursuit of retrograde aims. The current discontent with "big government" is a deformed expression of and yearning for personal autonomy. The productivist and statist biases in socialism renders it difficult for the left to effectively speak to this yearning. Unfortunately Gorz does not pursue the fundamental issue at stake here: the historical success of conservative and reactionary programmes in exploiting mass dissatisfaction with bureaucratic impersonality by appealing to the "individual will to power" and how the left's appeals would be systematically different. What is required is an exploration of the ways in which diffuse dissatisfaction can be "moralised" to provide a genuine libertarian politics rather than a left fascism which celebrates any and every act of violence as a blow for freedom.

Gorz has performed a useful task in bringing together otherwise disparate components of libertarian critiques of Marxist socialism but his essay is both flawed and limited. It suffers from a mode of abstraction which, although perhaps necessary for a critique of socialism as an intellectual tradition, fails to concretely apprehend contemporary political processes and events. Gorz's analysis of post-industrial capitalism is not significantly different from Marcuse's *One Dimensional Man*, and his identification of the new subject of history, the "non-class of non-workers" is very similar to Marcuse's chosen replacement for the political torpid working class. But the historical context of these two works are so vastly different as to require considerable reworking of categories analysing contemporary capitalism. Both economic stagnation and technological change have drastically reduced the size and significance of traditional manufacturing and contributed to the strangulation of white collar and professional employment in the state sector. Consequently a combination of proletarianisation of middle levels of management and state workers is occurring side by side with a massively growing "welfariat" still largely working class in "recruitment" but increasingly drawn from every employed layer. Both the social processes and the political requirements arising from this political economic situation need more detailed analysis than Gorz provides. This inattention permits him to evade the issue of translating alienation from work and other wide-spread dissatisfactions

into a political programme involving demands, activities and organisations which could exert real leverage for actual social change. Without such concretisation the work remains a utopian critique.

Although Gorz's focus on the liberation of time and the abolition of work was essential as a point of entry for the demolition of socialist dogmas, it ultimately entraps him within the political economic boundaries of orthodox socialism. This undermines his capacity to expand the socialist vision to meet issues which are an essential part of any programme for a humane and just social order. Concerning the issues, political style, organisational forms and theoretical contributions of the women's movement, peace movement, ecology movement, and human rights movement (the latter is extremely diffuse, but was an emerging political current in the seventies and a crucial one at that, to be nourished by all who would claim a progressive political identity) Gorz is virtually silent. Yet these movements are surely partners in the struggle for a better world, and their ideas are of immense significance in overcoming the deformations and blindspots of orthodox socialism? Gorz's exorcism, then, turns into a display of the strength of the spectre of traditional socialism.

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Notes

1. Gorz, page 57.

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CLASS, SPORTS AND TELEVISION

Rob Beamish

R.S. Gruneau, *Class, Sports and Social Development*, Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1983, 208 pp.

Ralph Miliband once noted that even though a Marxist sociology of sport may not be the most pressing of theoretical tasks, it is not an insignificant one either.[1] Now, even though Richard Gruneau's *Class, Sports, and Social Development* is not a Marxist work, it is a theoretically sophisticated, critical study of the relationship between class power and sport and, ironically, the study goes further towards meeting Miliband's challenge than most so-called radical work in sport study.

Gruneau's book, however, is not written with just the sport sociologist in mind — by drawing upon the work of Giddens, Williams, Willis, Bordieu and others, Gruneau places the study of sport in the broader context of cultural studies. In fact, one of the book's major objectives is to "develop a set of guidelines for reorienting studies of the nature and role of sport in western capitalist societies" and demonstrate that future work in sport study must break out of its parochial sub-disciplinary confines and locate itself in what C. Wright Mills identified as the classical tradition.[2] This dimension of the book makes it germane to social and political theorists because Gruneau successfully demonstrates not only how sport study can benefit from the classical tradition but also how central questions in the tradition receive refreshing new insight when examined in the context of sport.

Class, Sports, and Social Development is organized around two central problems in social and political life: (1) the question of human agency (or freedom versus determinism), and (2) the problem of class inequality and structural change.[3] The question of human agency is explored with great profit in a study of the paradoxes inherent in play, games or sport. Gruneau reviews Johan Huizinga's *Homo Ludens*, Michael Novak's *The Joy of Sports*, Jean-Marie Brohm's *Sport: A Prison of Measured Time*, and Allen Guttmann's *From Ritual to Record* and demonstrates how ludic activity (i.e. play, games or sports) can deliver special insight to the problems surrounding freedom and determinism.

In the context of his review, Gruneau examines all three forms of ludic activity.[4] He demonstrates that even play, which seems totally free, spontaneous, immanently creative and unstructured, is not immune to social

determination. When one examines play carefully, its constraints begin to emerge quite clearly. First, even play requires 'rules' to exist. "When people organize their play in order to play with or against others," Gruneau argues, "they create rules whose expressed purpose is to define standards for playing that are binding on all the players and insulate the activity from the society at large."[5] These self-imposed regulations, however, are not spontaneous creations; they stem from the lived experiences of the players "embedding play deeply in the prevailing logic of social relations and thereby diminishing its autonomy."[6] Thus, at a deeper level of analysis, an apparently generic activity — which seems to transcend social history — is shown to be no more autonomous than many other cultural practices. The prevalence of a dominant social logic is even more pronounced in the more institutionalized forms of ludic activity — games and sports — that are ostensibly played. Gruneau's discussion demonstrates a progressive curtailing of freedom and subjection to alienated forms of social practice as one moves from play through games to sport although he also notes that none of the forms of ludic activity is totally free and spontaneous.

In opposition to the bulk of sport literature which views sport as a voluntaristic realm of expressive freedom and creativity, Gruneau maintains that play, games and sports represent progressively limited constitutive social practices of individual or collective agents which are indissolubly linked to the social context in which they occur. Furthermore, these practices constitute the agents in particular ways and socially construct ludic activities into determinate historical forms. Consequently, the study of sport must recognize that agents, faced with expanding and/or contracting opportunities, exercise their expanding and/or contracting abilities to constitute sport closest to their perceived best interests.[7]

This leads to Gruneau's second major theme — the problem of class inequality and structural change. In this section of the book, the influence of Giddens and Williams is marked and while these theorists provide a sophisticated strength to Gruneau's argument, their positions also tilt the subject/object dialectic in a subjectivist direction.

With reference to the class theme, Gruneau points out that "people make history in the face of, or in conjunction with, previously established significative schemes (e.g. symbolic systems such as language) and habitualized patterns of social action."[8] The notion of signification is crucial because the symbolic meaning of sport is a dominant theme in Gruneau's analysis of its relation to class power. In essence, he maintains that ludic activities are the constitutive processes/products of meaningful agency rooted in previously existing signification schemes. These schemes in turn are linked to broader ideological systems. The habitualized patterns of ludic activities tend more often than not to reconstitute the now fetishized dominant meanings. Finally, the ability to alter (or maintain) either the habitualized/institutionalized patterns of ludic action or the symbolic meaning of the 'played' activity is unequally distributed in a class society, although this ability may change over time.[9]

Dominant meanings, interpretations, and patterns of action are not easily reconstituted over and over again and Gruneau is careful to point out a number of

ways in which cultural hegemony in the realm of sport is always somewhat fragile.[10] In the end, he notes,

> We are led to focus on two issues (1) the nature of dominant, residual, and emergent cultural practices and interpretations, including the limits and pressures associated with each; and (2) how all of these practices, interpretations, limits and pressures appear to be incorporated into the hegemonic process at any given historical moment.[11]

With his theoretical apparatus in place, Gruneau proceeds to a case-study based outline of the development of sport in Canada from the colonial period to the present. In essence, this empirical overview "focuss(es) upon the capacity of certain classes and class fragments to structure the playing of games and sports in certain ways, and to mobilize particular forms of bias through this structuring."[12] Thus, for example, Gruneau argues that colonial games contained "deep" meanings that were "indissolubly connected to imported continental traditions of ascription, folk culture and class domination."[13] However, as the Canadian middle class grew in size and power, it used the technological developments in transportation and communication associated with industrialization and the ethos of rational-utilitarianism to create a new framework within which sport forms were constituted and understood.[14] Nevertheless, the new liberal meritocratic ideology was not well suited to open competition because the lower classes could view victory in the contest as proof of their equality (or even superiority!). Hence the establishment of an amateur/professional distinction which successfully distanced the upper class elite from the lower class 'professionals'. Circumscription of this latter category also created a potential pool of talent for entrepreneurial exploitation, although commercial sport would not be viable until the turn of the century.[15] In the post World War I period, it became necessary to incorporate as clubs and sport businesses. The National Hockey League, set up in 1917, was the first league to shift from an individual entrepreneurial orientation to one of full corporate cartelization, a process achieved by 1930.[16] Gruneau writes that,

> . . . for the working class, the change from the bi-national *player-controlled*, or *club-oriented* commercial sports that one occasionally found in the late nineteenth century to the slick American-dominated corporate sports of the present day, has been something of a cultural betrayal. . . . Actual working class influence on decision making became limited as mobility into executive positions became restricted to individuals with capital; working class athletes generally became transformed from journeyman players to contractually bound labourers; and what began as a dramatization of meritocracy and greater freedom revealed itself, paradoxically, to also be an abstract symbolization of constraining commodity relations.[17]

In the final section of the chapter Gruneau overviews the movement of the state into the area of international, high performance sport and surveys the consequences of upper class hegemony here as well.

Gruneau's study is more informative than most about sport and its socio-historical structuration and in the formulation of the analysis, he also sheds new light on the broader issues of human agency and class domination. But as I mentioned earlier, the subjective bias of his theoretical framework creates some problems for his analysis — mostly problems of omission. I will mention three.

First, even though Gruneau is careful to point out in a number of places that working class groups did not passively accept the transformation of their leisure practices, he does not go very far at all in addressing Gareth Stedman Jones' claims that struggles over leisure were often no more than epilogues to struggles fought out in the work place.[18] The introduction of new work processes changed the whole rhythm and structure of social life and it is only through a detailed understanding of these objective changes — more detailed than Gruneau's discussion of the shift from mercantile to industrial capitalist domination allows — that we really understand how habituated practices resisted, modified and/or eventually gave way to ascendent work/leisure patterns.

Second, although Gruneau spends considerable time early in the book looking at the freedom and constraints involved in play, games and sports, he never looks at any specific instances of the objective practices of particular sports to elucidate how that dimension prepares players to accommodate to, or resist, dominant forms. Two examples will make my point.

Although hockey was incorporated in 1917, cartelized by 1930, and was the first sport to take full advantage of the broadcast media, there was no movement to unionize players until the Doug Harvey initiative of 1957. Why? A large part of the answer, I suspect, would be revealed by a study of hockey at the level of the social relations of its production. First, as Harvey noted, the intense rivalries within the league made it almost impossible for the players on different teams to even *think* they shared common interests. Second, while it is not true that at training camp sixty players compete for thirty spots — rather thirty-four compete for four spots and twenty-six are relatively assured of returning to the team — there is a constant turnover of players and a stratification of players at various points of progression in short careers (averaging less than five years at the major league level). Thus, powerful individual interests divide each team internally creating problems for unified action. In addition, any labour dispute has the potential of wiping out substantial *career* earnings (National Football League players lost ten percent of their career earnings in their fifty-seven day strike in 1982). Furthermore, a single long term union contract, which in most industries can be built upon several times during a worker's career, is likely the only one an athlete will work under. There is no incentive to bargain collectively in the same way that there is in other industries. Finally, as Ken Dryden notes, sport is not centred around language or abstraction; sport is constituted physically by each player every game.[19] The objective production of a hockey game is the *skilled act* of wage earners and it is this exposition of skill that ensures a player ice time and

the team victory. The full dynamic needs to be worked through more fully, but *individual* skill is the root of each player's presence on the team and the criterion of individual performance — in some cases obviously and in others arbitrarily evaluated — creates an inertia away from collective solidarity rather than towards it.

My second example comes from the Workers' Sports Movement (WSM).[20] Wheeler points out that the movement was confronted by a fundamental paradox. As a leftist, overtly political organization, the WSM had few resources; yet if its political dimension was downplayed in order to increase its athletic programme then there was no reason for the movement to continue because athletic opportunity existed elsewhere.[21] To some extent, Gruneau's discussion of the struggle over rules and resources is helpful in understanding this dilemma but again, by underplaying the objective side of resource creation, he provides only partial insight into the movement's struggle over resources both in the field of sport and more importantly in the work place. Furthermore, the political dimension of the WSM was only partially directed at the critique of bourgeois sport; a far more significant dimension was the struggle for control of the objective processes and procedures of resource creation and allocation. Here Stedman Jones' admonition about the danger of studying leisure relatively autonomously because it tends to ignore the primacy of the work place is one that must be heeded more fully.[22]

My final reservation concerns the relationship of modern sport to television. Because monopolies and oligopolies compete through the sales effort and not at the level of price, television rapidly became an adequately developed medium to reach large numbers of consumers with a technical capacity to convey particular forms of information. It is the limited technical capacity of television that needs further analysis because not only does sport represent Canadian content to television producers,[23] but many sports — though not all — are activities that are highly suitable to the medium's limited technical capacity. What I am suggesting is that to fully understand the resources that accrue to sports from television, we need to start thinking of sport and broadcast more as divisions *within* the same industry. The live gate does not sustain sport or structure its product. The bulk of revenue for the National Football League, the United States Football League and major league baseball comes from television; television revenues constrain the Canadian Football League and the National Hockey League. Thus the *constitutive practices* which yield sport are becoming progressive more like loosely scripted, highly ad lib forms of studio audience soap opera. Understanding this development requires a deeper analysis of how the broadcast commodity is produced and structured, and not just an analysis of its symbolic meaning for participants.

Despite these reservations, however, *Class, Sports, and Social Development* deserves careful attention both by the sports studies community and by those interested in socio-political theory. For the former, Gruneau has shown how a sophisticated sociological approach rooted in the classical tradition can illuminate sport in ways not fully exploited by the majority of sports researchers. For the social theorist, Gruneau's work in a frequently ignored realm of social life adds

to our sense of its complexity and forces some re-thinking. Sport, he suggests, is not merely drawn into the prevailing logic of social praxis, but provides a kind of generative paradigm for it. In examining the interplay between rule and exception we do more, therefore, than illuminate the structure of organized play, for we make possible a clarification of such fundamental social issues as those related to the puzzles of agency, inequality and change.

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Notes

1. R. Miliband, *Marxism and Politics*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1977, p. 52.
2. R. Gruneau, Class, Sports, and Social Development, Amherst, University of Massachusetts Press, 1983, p. 3.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 19.
4. For the purposes of Gruneau's discussion, play, games and sports are best thought of as forms of physical activity across a continuum which represents progressive institutionalization, rationalization, and instrumentalization. Play is participant generated, with considerable freedom to innovate and the sensory-motor schemes enjoyed are ends in themselves, although, as Gruneau points out, all of this activity is embedded in and circumscribed by a socio-historical context. Games are more estranged from the participants; they are habitualized forms of activity, legitimated by tradition and ritual-like in character. *A* way of playing has become *the* way. Sport is a wholly modern form of activity which is characterized by its highly institutionalized, bureaucratic regulation, instrumentally rational in character and alienated from its participants' control. Sport is a part of mass culture sold to mass publics which has lost virtually all of its play character.
5. Gruneau, *op. cit.*, p. 20.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 21.
7. *Ibid.*, pp. 50-51.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 55.
9. *Ibid.*, pp. 54-59.
10. *Ibid.*, pp. 60-68.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 70.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 133.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 97, see pages 94-96.
14. *Ibid.*, pp. 99-102.
15. *Ibid.*, pp. 109-117.
16. *Ibid.*, pp. 119-120.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 121.

18. G.S. Jones, "Class Expression vs. Social Control? A Critique of Recent Trends in the Social History of Leisure," *History Workshop*, 4, 1977, p. 169.
19. K. Dryden, *The Game*, Toronto, Macmillan of Canada, 1983, pp. 20-27.
20. Gruneau, *op. cit.*, pp. 125-28.
21. R. Wheeler, "Organized Sport and Organized Labour," *Journal of Contemporary History*, 13, 1978, pp. 203-7.
22. Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 170.
23. Gruneau, *op. cit.*, pp. 122-25.

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IDEAS OF CANADA

Vincent di Norcia

Leslie Armour, *The Idea of Canada and the Crisis of Community*. Steel Rail Press, Ottawa: 1981; pp. xvii, 142. Notes, bibliography, no index.

Leslie Armour is an exceptional Canadian philosopher both for having studied the history of Canadian philosophy and then relating it to Canada's "crisis of divided community" (ix). Regrettably, his rambling formulation of a conservative idea of Canadian political community is neither cogent nor comprehensive.[1] His discussion of regionalism (5f) is blind to the contradictions in Canadian reflections on space. Goldwyn Smith's regionalist continentalism opposes Creighton's centralist Laurentianism; but both rest on the *same principle*: geographic determinism. Armour's discussion of technology unsystematically elides economic, spatial, political and cultural concerns (ch. 3).

Nonetheless we can gain some insight from the deficiencies of Armour's approach to an organic idea of Canada, its polity, and its cultures — notably in the primacy he gives to cultural community —.

Organicism

Armour derives his conservative organic model of Canadian society from nineteenth century Scots and *Canadien* philosophers like John Watson and Louis Lachance.[2] He seeks a "communalist" path between Marxism and individualism which shows the individual and society as symbiotic (x, xiii, 12), — a quest he shares with liberals like Henri Bourassa, L.-J. Papineau, Eric Kierans, and indeed the Bi-Bi Commission.

But Armour's conservative model of Canadian thought and its problems neglects the rich liberal and socialist veins in her ideological tradition.[3] His organic Idea of social harmony rests on a traditionalist model of historic continuity. He rejects enlightenment liberalism because of its revolutionary excesses and individualism. But freedom is an old Canadian, and *Canadien*, virtue: *habitants* were notoriously independent. English and French both rebelled against London's vexatious rule. Socialist movements have long opposed class, regional, and foreign dominion.[4] Our traditions moreover bespeak change as well as continuity, conflict as well as harmony. And if, as Armour suggests, the Canadian polity has remote roots in the Roman empire and Plato's Athens (25,

45), they were mediated by Roman republicanism and the contractual democracy of the Italian communes.[5] Only by evading Canada's democratic traditions, then, can Armour transpose his opposition to liberal contract theory and individualism into an abstract Idea of organic order (48f).

Armour's organic idea of Canadian society's "collective relationship to nature" (117) involves a holistic model of society which paradoxically excludes evolution. The nineteenth century liberal opponents of Armour's conservative sources, however, accepted evolution.[6] It is a fundamental of both liberal gradualism and socialism, indeed of modern society's ambiguous dynamism.

Armour accepts the somewhat liberal notion that a "plurality of communities" may legitimize" some common institutions (x, ch. 2), to which he posits the correlative thesis that a community "shows itself in the institutions it legitimizes" (15). Such common institutions, he seems to say, legitimize the public authority of government by their shared traditions (19, 26), and the harmonious "community of meaning" they express (77). Such institutions should not be too many, too large, and should not conflict (16f). The polity is legitimate, if I understand Armour correctly, inasmuch as it expresses the harmonious community of meaning in different social institutions.

There are however two relationships to which this model applies: among social institutions and between them and government. Their common meaning is not easily discerned. And, as Armour's central concern itself indicates, deep conflicts cleave Canadian society. They must be fully and fairly articulated, if they are to be resolved. This, as Canada's liberal and socialist traditions have long maintained, entails the democratic demand that governments should openly articulate social conflict. These conflicts are not resolved but exacerbated to the extent that public authorities follow an elitist idea of organic order and social harmony. Legitimacy has to be won. Loyalty is not a one-sided duty of the subject to the state. Rather, the tradition of participatory democracy stretching back to Athens itself holds that political obligation is mutual.[7]

Political Order

Armour offers scattered criteria for evaluating the Canadian state (9f, 16f, ch. 7): it should embody communal order, rather than individual freedom. Legitimization should be expressive rather than contractarian. It must be culturally pluralist. It should avoid the extremes of statism and regional or cultural fragmentation (29). He alludes to Charles de Koninck's (a Quebec Thomist) opposition to *le grand état* (135) and the Tremblay Report's philosophic paean to decentralism; but he neglects to note the illiberal provincial statism which imbued that report.

Despite his talk of cultural communities as the basis of a renewed federation (ch. 6) Armour does not broach a classic Canadian federal ideal of democratic cultural politics: a voluntary pact between the Canadian and *Canadien* cultures and/or the provinces.[8] This is probably because of a conservative aversion to any social contract. Instead Armour offers a corporatist model of a culturally plural state. He rejects the universal state favoured by Scots idealists like John Watson,

in favour of Lachance's traditional *Canadien* view of government as the superordinate public authority which coordinates less sovereign non-public institutions such as the family church, and cultural or national communities (89f). Armour is silent about the authoritarian bias of *Canadien* corporatism, which it shares with liberal models of a business/government partnership.

Armour appears to deny that moral values are embodied in political systems. He cites Lachance's view that the state is value neutral: it is not a moral agent and has "no goals of its own" (129). Its goals come from subordinate institutions. The state only seeks power (129); but, I note, private institutions, too, seek power for itself. He appears also to accept Watson's liberal belief that the state may set rules for all groups as long as it does not interfere with the individual's private life (89f). But surely political systems are not value neutral in their function of setting rules for subordinate institutions; and they must express society's goals, whether as Watson's "common reason" or Lachance's "common good" (cf 83f).

A corporatist approach might, I suggest, be appropriate to articulating and resolving society's conflicts, but only if it is structured democratically, with federal forms of representation, accountability, and especially popular participation. For the polity to define a society's common good, it must perform the ethical tasks of fully and fairly airing its social tensions.

Culture and Community

Only a common culture with a "sufficient unity" (12), Armour writes, can be the basis of political community. Community is based on a particular social culture as containing "everything which gives meaning to our lives" (140). His concept of culture is ambiguous. It refers to both "descriptive" or particular social cultures (e.g., Italian, French), and to "evaluative" culture (19f, 79). Specific symbols, rituals embody the shared values of a social culture (20f, cf. ch. 6), to which a society's arts, literature and intellectual works give articulate expression (17f, cf. ch. 2). But 'art', Armour holds (following Arnold) discloses a universal evaluative culture which transcends class divisions and cultural differences. The closest Armour comes to recognizing democratic notions of popular culture,[9] is his view that Canadians should be able to recognize themselves in their popular media (24f). His cultural theory is essentially elitist. And a 'universal' elite culture would homogenize particular cultures.

Indeed, cultural and regional *fragmentation* is Armour's bête noire: but he barely alludes to cultural dominion, viz, of whites over Indians, English over French, the empires over Canada itself, and he is silent about the racism of his conservative sources.[10] His solution is to search for some shared or universal values, amongst Canada's different regions and cultures, and especially in the conservative Scots and French roots of her intellectual culture (xiv, 12).

But, in the cultural sphere dominion means homogenization and democracy means diversity. Armour does favour some democratic constitutional protections for cultural community rights, but neglects to support individual freedoms (130f). Nor does he distinguish between the fundamentally different cultural

claims of aboriginal peoples, Canadian cultures, and immigrants. Aboriginal rights are just that: the rights of *pre-Canadian* societies. But Canadians and *Canadiens* are *national* communities claiming their rights as citizens; and immigrant groups merely seek ways of preserving some of their *non-Canadian* ways, as befits the Canadian commitment to a cultural mosaic.

Armour remarks on Jacob Schurmann's liberal talk of national self-determination (103). But he nowhere recognizes this basic principle of cultural democracy in regard to aboriginal or Canadian cultural communities. The nation, he obscurely holds, is "the moral structure of the community" (99; cf. ch. 7). Somehow, "the culture itself is the ideal coordinator" of social institutions, not the value-neutral state (129). Armour does not demonstrate moreover, how the neutral super-ordinate corporatist state which coordinates all other institutions, including cultural communities, can derive its values from the nation (or nations?) as a moral community.

In fine, Armour's conservative approach to a Canadian social theory is disappointing and unclear. It inhibits the perception of popular culture and its practices of democratizing everyday life. Yet a democratic cultural politics would better articulate, and more likely emancipate a culturally diverse Canadian community. From it a non-homogenizing politics of Canadian culture is far more likely to arise. The organic conservative idea of Canada, I conclude, cannot offer Canadians hope for developing their society. It does not disclose the richness of our distinctive intellectual, ideological and cultural traditions.

There is no 'Idea' of Canada. Nor should there be.

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Notes

1. George Grant's *Lament for a Nation* still offers a more persuasive conservative view of Canada; but it, too, is flawed: see my "Beyond the Red Tory: Rethinking Canadian Nationalism", in the forthcoming winter issue of *Queen's Quarterly*.

2. Pp. 12, 80f. See A. B. McKillop, *A Disciplined Intelligence*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's: 1979; C. Berger, *The Writing of Canadian History*. Toronto: Oxford, 1970; S.E.D. Shortt, *The Search for an Ideal*. Toronto: Univ. of Toronto, 1976); and Y. Lamonde, *Historiographie de la philosophie au Québec 1853-1971*. Hurtubise; Montreal, 1972; for more accurate pictures of Canadian intellectual history.

3. As found in W. Christian & C. Campbell, *Political Parties and Political Ideologies in Canada*. Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1974) and Pat Marchak, *Ideological Perspectives on Canada*. 2d ed., Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1981.

4. See Denis Monière, *Ideologies in Quebec*. Toronto: Univ. of Toronto, 1981, pp. 41f; N. Penner, *The Canadian Left*. (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1977), chs. 4,7; and G. Baum, *Catholics and Canadian Socialism*. Toronto: Lorimer, 1980, ch. 1.

5. See Quentin Skinner, *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1978, 2 vols.

6. See McKillop, op. cit., pp. 128ff, 154ff, 186f; and Shortt, op. cit., pp. 20, 84, 104, 133. Of the authors referred to all but one (MacMechan) of those born in Canada (Schurmann, LeSueur, Macphail, MacMechan, and Adam Shortt), accepted evolutionary theory and liberalism.

7. See C. Pateman, *Participation and Democratic Theory*, Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1970, and *The Problem of Political Obligation* (Wiley: New York, 1970).

8. See chs. 4-7 of E.R. Black's *Divided Loyalties, Canadian Concepts of Federalism*. McGill-Queen's: Montreal, 1975, and my "Fédéralisme, l'état et la démocratie," *Philosophiques* (avril, 1981).

9. On which see S. Crean and M. Rioux, *Two Nations*. Lorimer: Toronto, 1983, ch. 3.

10. See C. Berger, op. cit., pp. 116f, 129f, 147f, 226f; McKillop, 197; in Shortt: 35 (Macphail), 74 (Cappon), 89 (Hutton) and 113f (Adam Shortt).

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THREE DIFFERENT CONCEPTS OF IDEOLOGY IN MARX? A REJOINDER TO MÁRKUS

Jorge Larrain

I

Gyorgy Márkus's interesting article on Marx's concepts of ideology raises important points which must be discussed.[1] In short, he argues that three different meanings of ideology can be found in Marx's writings which are used in different contexts and for different purposes. Márkus recognises that these three meanings of ideology are not completely independent from one another. But he is not very clear as to what are the common elements they share apart from stating that there is a vague unity in their practical intent and ultimate theoretical presuppositions. It is rather surprising that Márkus does not emphasise the most obvious common factor which, on his own implicit account, is the critical or negative character of the three meanings. This is only explicitly mentioned for the first 'unmasking' concept of ideology which designates "theories which conceive ideas and their systems as the mainspring of historical progress".[2] And yet when he analyses the second meaning, ideology is shown "to explain away (and thereby apologise for) the most widely encountered experiences that contradict the seeming self-evidence of fetishistic categories".[3] Similarly, the third concept of ideology refers to an alienated form of self-consciousness which "brings historical conflicts to awareness only by transposing them into what appears to be a sphere of mere imagination and thought".[4]

In fact it would appear that, on Márkus's own account, the mechanism of ideology remains more or less the same for the 'three meanings' in so far as in all ideology one finds a form of 'masking', 'concealing', 'transposing' or 'explaining away'. The only difference seems to be the degree of generality of the cultural forms to which the same mechanism is applied: a specific theory in the 'first meaning', 'branches of cultural production' in the 'second meaning', and the whole culture in the 'third meaning'. So the three concepts of ideology differ not so much in their basic *modus operandi* as in the kinds of social consciousness they affect. But if the mechanism of ideology is the same and the forms of social consciousness are partially inclusive — a specific theory is part of a cultural branch and this, in its turn is part of the whole culture — is there any sense in talking about three different concepts of ideology? I do not think so.

But even if we agreed that it would be preferable to speak of a single concept of ideology in Marx, it does not seem to me that Márkus's implicit account of it fully represents Marx's views. My disagreement with Márkus has to do with four

related points: a vagueness or lack of specificity concerning what ideology masks or conceals; a mistaken explanation of what 'unmasking' entails: a serious problem with the extension of the concept of ideology; and finally, a misunderstanding of the relationship between science and ideology.

II

The first meaning of ideology according to Márkus underlines ideology as a form of idealism because it conceives ideas as the driving forces of historical evolution and supports the supremacy of spirit in history. But the context in which Marx first developed his concept of ideology is more precise than that. The criticism which Marx levels against the Young Hegelians is not so much that they conceive of ideas as the mainspring of historical progress as the fact that they conceive mistaken ideas as the source of the problems of humankind and therefore confine themselves to criticising ideas in the hope to solve those problems. The Young Hegelians want to fight against illusions of consciousness but "they forget, however, that to these phrases they themselves are only opposing other phrases, and that they are in no way combating the real existing world when they are merely combating the phrases of this world".[5] It is only in this precise context that one can understand what ideology masks: by concentrating on mistaken religious or theological ideas ideology conceals the real sources of the problems of humankind which are the material contradictions of social reality. Religious ideas are not the case of the problems but are a consequence of the very existence of contradictions and oppression. Thus religion is for Marx an ideology inasmuch as it masks, and diverts the people's minds from, the real antagonisms existing in society. But the Young Hegelian's critique of religion is ideological too insofar as it conceals the real sources of religion in social contradictions and pretends that religious ideas by themselves constitute the problem of society.

Márkus asserts that ideology in its second meaning explains away those experiences which destroy fetishistic categories. I entirely agree with his analysis that the market does not ensure the undisturbed reproduction of social relations and that in periods of crisis 'appearances' tend to fade away. But he does not clarify what are those 'experiences' which can destroy the sway of fetishistic appearances and which need to be 'explained away'. Marx is quite clear about this: "in the crises of the world market, the contradictions and antagonisms of bourgeois production are strikingly revealed".[6] It is the experience of these contradictions which have come up to the surface that ideology tries to conceal.

Márkus then affirms that ideology in its third meaning transposes historical conflicts into a sphere of mere imagination. Again for Marx those historical conflicts make reference to contradictory and inverted social relations, to the fact that the process of objectification "appears as a process of dispossession from the standpoint of labour or as appropriation of alien labour from the standpoint of capital", and hence to the fact that "this twisting and inversion is a *real (phenomenon)*, not a merely *supposed one* existing merely in the imagination of the workers and the capitalists".[7] This basic inversion at the level of production

is nevertheless concealed at the level of circulation by "the final pattern of economic relations as seen on the surface"[8] which shows the opposite, and this determines the emergence of ideology because "the distorted form in which the real inversion is expressed is naturally reproduced in the views of the agents of this mode of production".[9]

This means that ideology is not a simple error and that it entails more than a vague and general form of masking. In order for an error to become ideological it has to explain away the contradictions of society.[10] This clarifies the function of ideology. By concealing the existence of the antagonism it helps preserve the antithesis and checks the revolutionary action of the negative side of the contradiction (the proletariat) which seeks to abolish it. In this sense all ideology serves the interests of the ruling class insofar as this class being the conservative side of the antagonism seeks to reproduce the contradiction. Furthermore, my interpretation shows that if all ideology entails a distorted form of consciousness not all forms of false consciousness are ideology. This is why ideology is a restricted concept which cannot be equated with a general and vague notion of false consciousness. I shall come back to this point further below.

III

We are now in a position to assess what the 'unmasking' of ideology means. For Márkus 'unmasking' has to do with the demonstration of the social determination or social genesis of ideas and more concretely it consists "in the reduction of systems of thought to the conscious or unconscious social interests which they express. To discover behind the haughty phrases about the transcendent power or external rule of ideas, the hidden sway of well-defined — but completely unthematized — narrow class or group interests is to radically refute their validity".[11] This is of course a Mannheimian way of understanding 'unmasking', but it has very little to do with Marx. According to Mannheim[12] the consciousness of all parties and classes is ideological inasmuch as social determination affects all of them. The fact that systems of thought are socially determined and therefore ideological, ultimately limits the claim to validity which they can posit; in other words, social determination means that all positions are partial and can lay no claim to exclusive validity. If all forms of consciousness are ideological and limited because they are socially determined, it is only natural that the unmasking of ideology should take the form of showing the particular interests to which each system of thought can be traced. In this way their validity is, if not totally refuted, at least partially impaired.

But Marx did not equate the negative character of ideology with the social determination of knowledge. If ideology serves the interests of the ruling class it is not necessarily because it has been produced by that class. The relationship between ideology and ruling class interests need not be genetic. Other classes too can produce ideology insofar as by being involved in a limited material mode of activity they try to solve in consciousness contradictions which they cannot overcome in practice. This leads to distortions which mask those contradictions. So their thought may be ideological, not because it serves their own interests,

but because the concealment of antagonisms objectively works in favour of the ruling class interests. This means that, by definition, there cannot be an ideology which serves the interests of dominated classes.

Yet the fact that ideology necessarily works for the ruling class does not mean that all ideas that serve the ruling class are ideological. Marx never meant to assert that all bourgeois ideas masked contradictions even though they may be all connected with bourgeois interests. Even more, Marx accepted and recognized that his own ideas wanted to serve the interests of the proletariat, but that was no reason for him to call his ideas ideology. In fact ideology has not to do with ideas serving the interests of different classes but with ideas which, by concealing contradictory relations, work for the dominant class. Hence the unmasking of ideology is not related to discovering the real interests which lie behind systems of thought. For Marx the unmasking of ideology is related to showing how certain ideas distort reality by explaining away its contradictory nature.

Marx did not only criticise forms of ideology produced by the ruling class but he also tried to unmask ideologies which were either produced by, or purported to serve the interests of, the proletariat. For instance he unmasked the theories of Ravenstone and others because they perceived the problem of capitalism as lying in the existence and development of machinery, natural science, art, etc., which depend on capital and are therefore produced in opposition to the workers. Of them Marx writes that "they share the narrow-mindedness of the economists (although from a diametrically opposite position) for they confuse the *contradictory* form of this development with its *content*. The latter wish to perpetuate the contradiction on account of its results. The former are determined to sacrifice the fruits which have developed within the antagonistic form, in order to get rid of the contradiction"[13] This was also the weakness of the Luddite movement, which showed a clear-cut example of early working-class ideology. According to Marx "it took both time and experience before the work-people learnt to distinguish between machinery and its employment by capital, and to direct their attacks, not against the material instruments of production, but against the mode in which they are used".[14] In both these cases the real contradictions of capitalism are displaced out of sight and a different cause is highlighted which seems to be responsible for the workers' problems. But of course the struggle against that seeming cause cannot lead to the solution of the true contradictions of capitalism.

IV

In Márkus's account Marx's concept of ideology suffers a process of inflation: it progressively covers specific theories, entire cultural branches and finally the whole culture of society. Does the evidence from Marx's writings support such an extended scope for the concept of ideology? I do not think so. Márkus's main argument to identify ideology with a cultural branch is based on the 1859 'Preface' where Marx speaks of the "ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out".[15] This is a notoriously difficult

passage to interpret because of its succinctness, and it seems to me to be inappropriate to sustain a whole argument about the extension of ideology unless one can find corroborative evidence elsewhere. Márkus does not supply such evidence.

Granting that the text is ambiguous, it is also possible to try an alternative interpretation which is not all-inclusive. Marx is not saying that the whole of philosophy, politics and aesthetics are ideological, he is just opposing his analysis of the economic conditions of production to some specific legal, religious, economic, political and philosophic forms which are ideological and in which men become conscious of the conflict. He includes there only those political, legal and philosophic forms which up to his time happened to be ideological. For ultimately, his own theory contains political, philosophical and economic elements which are not ideological. He is not trying to oppose science on the one side against philosophy, aesthetics and politics as totally ideological on the other side. When Marx says that he and Engels wanted to "settle accounts with our erstwhile philosophical conscience"[16] he does not mean that all philosophy of whatever kind is irretrievably ideological, only the idealist and metaphysical philosophy they knew in their time. This is why Engels writes that "as soon as we realised . . . that the task of philosophy thus stated means nothing but the task that a single philosopher should accomplish that which can only be accomplish by the entire human race in its progressive development — as soon as we realise that, there is an end to all philosophy *in the hitherto accepted sense of the word*".[17]

Márkus confidently asserts that "Marx repeatedly and emphatically states that bourgeois economy as a whole is a form of ideology".[18] Political economy therefore is yet another cultural branch which becomes ideological. But Márkus offers no textual support for this assertion. I have not found a single quotation in Marx's writings which bears this out. On the contrary, Marx is always very careful to distinguish between vulgar political economy which is ideology and classical political economy which is science.[19] Márkus accepts this distinction between the apologetic pseudo-science of vulgar economy and the scientific economy of the classics, but then he insists in calling both of them ideology. So classical political economy is at the same time ideology and science. This makes sense from the point of view of a positive Leninist concept which equates ideology with the ideas which serve the interests of a class: political economy is ideology insofar as it is bourgeois. But this does not make sense from the point of view of Marx's negative concept of ideology.

Marx never condemned the whole of bourgeois thought as ideological. This is not to deny that classical political economy despite its scientific achievements made several mistakes which Marx wanted to correct, some of which were ideological or became ideological. Yet not all the scientific inadequacies of Ricardo were ideological. As Marx conceived it, Ricardo's lack of precision and most of his errors and confusions result from his method, which despite being deficient, is historically justified.[20] But at the same time Ricardo's theory insofar as it could not account for, or simply denied the existence of, crises and contradictions, became ideological the moment these crises and antagonisms

emerged. However, these ideological distortions by no means compromise the whole of Ricardo's analyses. In this sense the difference between classical political economy and vulgar political economy is one between a science which may have some ideological distortions and mere ideology pretending to have scientific status. To the extent that ideology has a negative meaning, the ideological and the scientific are mutually exclusive enterprises which cannot overlap in the main thrust of their activities but which can, of course, contain limited 'enclaves' from the opposite.

Márkus's further extension of the concept of ideology to cover the whole culture of society has no support whatsoever in Marx's writings. The only quotation that Márkus uses to uphold his case does not refer to ideology at all but rather to the more general principle of the social determination of knowledge.[21] What that quotation says is simply that thoughts, ideas and language are not autonomous but are expressions of real life. It is indeed true that the culture of society is socially determined. But this is very different from saying that it is ideology. This does not make sense for a critical concept of ideology such as Marx's because it would entail that the totality of the cultural production of society is somehow impaired including, of course, the thought of the critic himself. This is contradictory. Marx's thought has been often accused of dogmatism precisely because of the belief that he criticises the whole culture as ideological with the exception of his own thought. But as we have seen this is not the way Marx understands ideology. For him ideology is not a blanket concept used to indict a whole culture or even the whole of bourgeois thought simply because they represent bourgeois interests. This is why he can distinguish between "the ideological component parts of the ruling class" and "the free spiritual production of this particular social formation".[22] The latter means intellectual production free from ideology although not necessarily free from class determination.

Hence, ideology for Marx is not only a negative concept, but it is also a restricted concept. It is restricted in a double sense: on the one hand it does not cover whole cultural branches or entire cultures insofar as it seems absurd to believe that they, in their totality, mask the contradictions of society. On the other hand it does not cover all kinds of errors and distortions apart from those which have to do with the misrepresentation of social antagonisms. It is because Márkus over-extends the scope of ideology that he can conceive of "Marx's rather strange combination of a radical philosophical criticism of the total culture of bourgeois society as alienated-ideological with the unquestioned acceptance of the validity of inherited cultural criteria, above all those of the sciences".[23] As it stands this combination is a paradox, a contradiction in terms. But this is so only because Márkus has started with the mistaken assumption that Marx questions the whole culture as ideological. Marx does not do that and has no problem in appreciating the scientific and artistic progress which the bourgeoisie has brought about. Even more, as we saw, he is critical of the ideological position of those adversaries of capitalism who want to get rid of the scientific and artistic fruits of capitalist development, because they throw away the baby together with the bath water.

V

This leads us to the problem of Marx's understanding of science and to the vexing question of the relationship between science and ideology. I have not got the space to go into these matters in any great depth. But I can touch on the following points. Márkus affirms that Marx has a rather uncritical attitude toward the cultural form of the natural sciences and wants to follow its model.[24] One cannot deny that on the whole Marx considers science as a progressive and liberating element in society and conceives of his own theory as scientific. Yet this does not prevent him from being aware of the shortcomings of natural sciences, nor does he fully understand his own intellectual enterprise in conformity with the cultural model of the natural sciences. At the very least he is aware of some differences, the most important of which has to do with the exclusion of history in natural sciences. In *Capital* Marx argues that "the weak points in the abstract materialism of natural science, a materialism that excludes history and its process, are at once evident from the abstract and ideological conceptions of its spokesmen whenever they venture beyond the bounds of their own speciality".[25] Marx accepts that a non-historical method applied to nature can discover its laws whereas the same method applied to society produces ideological deceptions insofar as it can only reduce social relations to the state of autonomous nature facing men from without.

For Márkus Marx's supposedly uncritical attitude toward natural sciences is coupled with an essentially 'negativistic' conception of everyday consciousness. It is true that Marx's analyses in *Capital* provide the basis for understanding why both capitalists and workers may be trapped in the fetishistic world of appearances which they encounter in their daily activities. Both workers and capitalists tend to be "blinded by competition" and the fetishistic inversion of subject and object "necessarily produces certain correspondingly inverted conceptions, a transposed consciousness which is further developed by the metamorphoses and modifications of the actual circulation process".[26] Márkus following Korsch denies that Marx ever applied the term ideology to the phenomena of everyday consciousness. It seems to me that this 'transposed consciousness' is precisely an example of ideological forms which arise in the spontaneous consciousness of men and women as a result of their daily practice. But whether or not we call those spontaneous forms ideology, it is clear that for Marx the phenomenal forms or appearances of social relations do not produce by themselves a univocal form of deception or mystification. The practical standpoint of the subject is crucial. Phenomenal forms are spontaneously reproduced in consciousness, not as an unavoidable automatic result, but as a likely consequence of men's limited daily practice of reproduction. Other forms of practice which one may call revolutionary determine different forms of consciousness. This political practice and its subversive forms of consciousness can emerge because also in their daily practice men experience its contradictory nature. This at least Márkus recognises.

So the everyday consciousness of the masses is *not bound* to be ideological and mystified although it may tend to be. This depends on how latent or apparent

contradictions have become and on the way in which people experience them. It is important to emphasise this point for although Marx's theory of class consciousness may not be as advanced as Gramsci's, it cannot either be assimilated with Althusser's and in general the Leninist idea that the spontaneous consciousness of the proletariat is inevitably deficient and can only be changed by the importation of a science which has been fully worked out by intellectuals from without the class. This is not the way Marx understands the relationship between science and ideological consciousness. The discovery of the labour theory of value is for Marx a momentous scientific achievement but he knows that "by no means dissipates the mist through which the social character of labour appears to us to be an objective character of the products themselves".[27] Ideology cannot be overcome by science, it cannot be "dissolved by mental criticism . . . but only by the practical overthrow of the actual social relations which gave rise to this idealistic humbug . . . ".[28] When Márkus affirms that "the Marxian theory of ideology therefore in fact assimilates the relationship of critical theory and its addressees into the model of 'learning a science' "[29] he makes a mistake. Marx did not have a "programme of overcoming the 'illusions of ideology' through a simultaneous 'scientisation and popularisation' of theory . . . "[30] The relationship between science and ideology cannot be construed as the opposition between truth and error. For Marx revolutionary practice is the only way to overcome ideology at its roots by solving the real contradictions which give rise to it.[31] If mere ideas or illusions were the real chains of men, as the Young Hegelians believed, then a scientific critique of those illusions would suffice to dispel them. But distorted ideas cannot be detached from the material conditions of their production. Only by revolutionising these conditions can ideology be destroyed.

In any case it seems to me that Márkus is wrestling with a very crucial question when at the end of his article he sees problems in both the position which does not reflect upon itself as determined and which as a theory "can locate the emancipatory impulses of its own subject and addressee, the working class, only in the form of unarticulated needs, frustations and anxieties"[32] and the position that directly challenges "the autonomy of high culture in the name of social emancipation".[33] Yet I am not happy with the way in which this question is solved or rather left unsolved with a vague final invocation to apply the theory of ideology to the theory of ideology itself. I have already argued that Marx is not totally uncritical about science, but what is more important, he does not see in it the cure to all problems and ideology in particular. What Márkus misses seems to me is Marx's emphasis on a liberating practice. The emancipatory impulses of the working class Marx sees not in the form of mere frustations and unarticulated needs, but in its real struggles which he first encounters during his exile in Paris. This encounter is crucial for the development of Marx's theory and he readily recognises this fact. This means that Marx accepts that his own theory is determined and that he has become a theoretician of the proletarian class because the actual struggles of the proletariat are sufficiently developed and have assumed clearer outlines.[34] So Marx's conception of the emancipatory impulses of the proletariat was not at all 'negativistic'. If anything, perhaps his

view was a bit too 'optimistic'! Marx's science wanted to express a movement which was going on, it was not as in Lenin an attempt to 'import' a scientific theory separately constructed into the inevitably deficient consciousness of the class. Yet at the same time there is no doubt that Marx's theory is not an automatic outcome of class struggle and that it maintains its relative autonomy.

Marxism has clearly outlived the original situation in which it was produced and this has happened because the validity of its ideas, as is the case with many other theories, is not fully tied up with their social genesis. But this does not mean that a theory can survive purely on the basis of a supposedly immanent force. Social determination of thought must be understood as a continuous process of re-animation of ideas in the context of new practices, as a process whereby even old ideas can become forms through which men or women can live and formulate their new problems and struggle for their solution. No theory can survive if this reference to practice does not exist. Márkus seems to believe that Marxism not only was not originally aware of its own determination but, even worse, it survives today in a total divorce from practice. As he puts it "Marxist theory enjoys an unprecedented 'scientific' (i.e. academic) respectability, while at the same time its theoretically 'respectable' (intellectually honest and serious) forms have no impact or connection with radical social movements of any kind".[35] This statement is really striking for its total blindless to recent contemporary history. Did Marxism have nothing to do with the independence of Angola and Mozambique, with the liberation of South Vietnam and Nicaragua from corrupt regimes, with the short-lived democratic experiment of Popular Unity in Chile? Has Marxism no connection with Eurocommunist parties, with peace movements and women's movements all over the world? One can, of course, disagree with particular aspects or policies of these movements. One can and indeed must be more drastically critical of the totalitarian aspects of other experiences which also claim to follow Marxism in Eastern Europe, and here, perhaps, also doubt whether Marxism itself subsists as an intellectually honest and serious enterprise. But Márkus cannot seriously maintain that a respectable and honest Marxism has no impact or connection with radical social movements of any kind without at the same time depriving himself of the basis on which alone can be understood why Marxism has survived as an academically respectable theory.

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Notes

1. Gyorgy Márkus, "Concepts of Ideology in Marx", *Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory*, Vol. 7, No. 1-2 (Hiver/Print. 1983).
2. *Ibid.*, p. 85.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 90.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 95.
5. K. Marx & F. Engels, *The German Ideology* (Part One), C.J. Arthur (ed) Lawrence & Wishart, London, 1974, p. 41.
6. K. Marx, *Theories of Surplus-Value*, Lawrence & Wishart, London, 1969, Vol. II, p. 500.
7. K. Marx, *Grundrisse*, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1973, p. 831.
8. K. Marx, *Capital*, Lawrence & Wishart, London, 1974, Vol. III, p. 209.
9. K. Marx, *Theories of Surplus-Value*, op, cit., Vol. III, p. 453.
10. See on this J. Larrain, *The Concept of Ideology*, Hutchinson, London, 1979 especially chapter 1; and *Marxism and Ideology*, Macmillan, London, 1983, especially chapters 1 and 4.
11. G. Márkus, op. cit., p. 86.
12. See on this K. Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1972.
13. K. Marx, *Theories of Surplus-Value*, op, cit., Vol. III, p. 261.
14. K. Marx, *Capital*, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 404.
15. K. Marx, 'Preface' to *A contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, in Marx-Engels, *Selected Works in One Volume*, Lawrence & Wishart, London, 1970, p. 182.
16. *Ibid.*
17. F. Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy*, in Marx-Engels, *Selected Works* . . . , op. cit., p. 590 (my emphasis).
18. G. Márkus, op. cit., p. 91.
19. See for instance K. Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy*, Martin Lawrence, London, 1966, p. 43: "Ricardo's theory of values is the scientific interpretation of actual economic life . . . Ricardo establishes the truth of his formula by deriving it from all economic relations, and by explaining in this way all phenomena, even those . . . which at first sight seem to contradict it; it is precisely that which makes his doctrine a scientific system."
See also *Capital*, Vol. III, p. 830: "it is the great merit of classical economy to have destroyed this false appearance and illusion . . . this personification of things and conversion of production into entities, this religion of everyday life"; and *Theories of Surplus-Value*, Vol. II, p. 106: " . . . to examine how matters stand with the contradiction between the apparent and the actual movement of the system. This then is Ricardo's great historical significance for science".
20. K. Marx, *Theories of Surplus-Value*, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 164.
21. G. Márkus, op. cit., p. 94: "(T)he autonomisation of thoughts and ideas is only a consequence of the autonomisation of personal relations and contacts between individuals . . . (N)either thoughts, nor language constitute a realm of their own; they are merely *expressions* of real life".
22. K. Marx, *Theories of Surplus-Value*, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 285.
23. G. Márkus, op. cit., p. 100.
24. *Ibid.*
25. K. Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, p. 352 (note).
26. *Ibid.*, Vol. III, p. 45.
27. *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 79.
28. K. Marx & F. Engelts, *The German Ideology*, op. cit., pp. 58-9.
29. G. Márkus, op. cit., p. 101.

30. *Ibid.*

31. This does not diminish the important contribution of science to the unmasking of ideology. But science is no substitute for revolutionary practice. In Marx's terms we might say that science contributes to the 'theoretical collapse' of ideology but cannot by itself bring about its collapse in practice. See K. Marx, letter to Kugelman, 11 July, 1868, *Selected Correspondence*, Progress, Moscow, 1975, p. 52.

32. G. Márkus, op. cit., p. 100.

33. *Ibid.*, p. 101.

34. See K. Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy*, op. cit., p. 117: "science, which is produced by the historical movement and associating itself consciously with it, has ceased to be doctrinaire and has become revolutionary".

35. G. Márkus, op. cit., p. 101.

Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory/Revue canadienne de théorie politique et sociale. Vol. 8, No. 3, (Fall/Automne, 1984).

THE POWER OF REASON AND THE LEGACY OF KEYNES

Harold Chorney

It is fashionable these days to announce that "Keynesianism is dead". Both the right and the left have been trumpeting this conclusion with ever increasing volume. Robert Campbell's "Post-Keynesian Politics and the Post Schumpeterian world"* incorporates this notion as the starting-point for his analysis and critique of the eclipse of Keynesianism and the current state of the political economy of public policy.

Perhaps a clear disavowal of past orthodoxy is a healthy beginning to the process of constructing a new and improved theory of the complex political economy of advanced capitalism. Such a new theory is all the more important in light of the current depression, the recrudescence of previously bankrupt ideologies about the virtues of laissez-faire, the apparently successful ideological revival of nineteenth-century market liberalism and the tragic circumstances of the unemployed. But in our haste to dispose of the corpse of Keynesianism we may well be discarding prematurely a number of extremely valuable insights associated with the original theorist, as opposed to with his interpreters.

As is often the case in human endeavour and, in particular in intellectual work, progress is rarely linear. Rather, it moves in a lurching step function manner. Furthermore, the inevitable, if regrettable tendency to distort ideas once they have left the hand of their original developer must be taken account of in any wholesale abandonment of ideas or conceptual system. This is critical in particular where the perilous state of economic theory is concerned.

It is precisely this problem of distorted interpretation that surrounds the work of John Maynard Keynes. It is always, of course, much easier to rely upon preconceived conceptions or accepted conventional sources of interpretation than to return to the original source in any attempt to deal with the work of an original thinker. The currently fashionable dismissal of Keynes by contemporary philistine technicians of neo-classical economics notwithstanding, Keynes was above all else a great thinker. His unwillingness to be bound by any artificial disciplinary borders and his capacity for employing imagination in the search for truth ensured that he would be no mere mechanic in the practice of the discipline of economics. Having said this any interpretation of Keynes' writings

* Ed.'s Note: See *CJPST*, Vol. 8, Nos. (1-2) 1984, pps. 72-91.

is bound to be altered by the peculiar prisms through which an interpreter encounters his work. It could not be otherwise. Furthermore, precisely because Keynes was a great thinker as well as a great polemicist his ideas were in a constant state of flux.

It is not surprising therefore that there are contradictory tendencies in his work. This is to be expected in the work of someone who was emerging out of one dominant paridigm and beginning the process of establishing another. As it turned out this alternative paridigm was an aborted revolution. It fell victim to the forces of reaction, both intellectual and political, that shaped the reception of Keynes' work. The fact that Keynes' ideas were never truly implemented was masked as it were by the particular circumstances of the post-war period. The destruction of the competitive Japanese and European national capitals that occured in the Second World War permitted the post-war period of reconstruction and the long boom of the business cycle recovery that lasted more or less uninterrupted until the early 1970s, despite the failure to implement Keynes' ideas.

In order to understand why it is misleading and ultimately damaging to the cause of social reform to speak of Keynes as Campbell does as a "hyper rationalist" who believed that "a little clear thinking" was all that was required, and to hold him accountable for the bureaucratization of economics and the "trivializing and tranquilizing" of political life, it is necessary to recover the core of his original argument. In doing so we must place it in the context of his personal biography and that of his times.[1] Only by doing this can we appreciate just how badly Keynes' project was distorted and deformed by his interpreters, in particular those neo-classical economists who popularised Keynesianism as it came to be taught in the standard economics text books and understood by governments. What began as a truly revolutionary challenge to orthodoxy within the walls of the establishment, rather quickly and perhaps not surprisingly was shorn of its radical content. Insofar as Keynes' work represented a radical challenge it is not surprising that the establishment and ruling class were unwilling to participate in their own euthanasia. Nevertheless, the fact that governments in varying degrees did accept, albeit reluctantly a role for state intervention in the economy in the interests of economic stabilization did give observers the illusion that Keynes' ideas were actually implemented. As such, once the work of Keynes had become transformed into Keynesianism the die was cast for the inevitable discrediting of Keynes once the business cycle returned with a vengeance.

The distortion of Keynes into what Joan Robinson called bastard Keynesianism[2] is a matter of more than purely hermeneutic importance. As Keynes himself argued ideas are important: both in terms of the role they play in influencing actual policy making and in terms of their hegemonic power. Once a given ideational system has been established and entrenched it is extremely difficult to dislodge it. This is all the more critical in times of social crisis when ideas once vulgarized have a way of becoming embodied in social and political movements and thereby assuming a dynamic of their own.

The willingness of neo-conservatives to master this lesson more thoroughly than the left explains in part their extraordinary success in recent years. There is

perhaps nothing more deadly and disarming that the economistic orientation shown by certain analysts on the left towards ideas as distinct from material forces. For peculiar historical reasons, including the Anglo-American antipathy to continental marxist and social-democratic thought, the very real threat posed by Keynes to the ideological dominance of classical laissez-faire as the principal explanatory system for the operation of the "free market" economy ought not to be under-estimated. Had Keynes' ideas been communicated in an undistorted form and absorbed by those who were part of the socialist and social democratic movement in the post-war period it is quite likely that social democratic politics would have developed in a very different fashion than was in fact the case. Of course, one cannot ignore the role which other powerful cultural and environmental factors played in shoring up the ideological hegemony of the prevailing social order. Nevertheless, as Michal Kalecki long ago argued,[3] Keynes' full employment economic policies could never have been implemented without fundamental change in the capitalist social order. It was just because of their radical nature that they were to be bastardized and a "political" cycle of unemployment complete with the appropriate neo-classical rationalizations established.

It is in the above sense that Robert Campbell and others are correct in arguing that ultimately the solutions to the economic crisis lie in the realm of politics rather than technique, but incorrect in asserting that Keynes' prescription was purely technocratic and hyper-rationalist. To be sure Keynes did believe in a kind of Edwardian liberalism in which the eventual triumph of good will assisted by a neutral state beholden to no one particular class, but dedicated to the public good was assured. Nevertheless, his proposals involved the definite restriction and eventual elimination of upper class wealth and power.[4]

Campbell chooses to interpret Keynes in terms of two versions of Keynesianism, supply side and demand side. Neither of these versions as they are described are undistorted variants of Keynes' work. In reality, Keynes approached the operation of the capitalist economy from a far more holistic point of view in which both the insufficiency of aggregate demand and the instability of the investment function were key ingredients in the diagnosis of the causes of economic depression. Keynes was able to show that full employment, rather than being an expected outcome, was actually an accidental outcome of the system. The explanation for the tendency of the economy to produce less than full employment and for the business cycle itself lay deep within the structure of the capital accumulation process. It thus makes little sense to speak of Keynes as a demand side or supply side theorist. In reality he was *both*. Furthermore, he was not a believer in the idea that has come to be associated with his name, namely that simple state intervention in the economy on the side of demand stimulation in the absence of other more fundamental changes would be sufficient to sustain cycle free economic growth.

In order to better understand the critical role that the investment process played in Keynes' theory it is necessary to understand in some detail his personal background. As is generally well known Keynes was the product of an upper class background. His father was a well established professor of economics at Cambridge. Unlike many of those who were born to privilege Keynes was also

brought up with a profound commitment to reason and truth, and no less importantly to social responsibility and justice. Because of his intellectual talents which were considerable and went far beyond his brilliance in economics Keynes rather early on became a star in the British establishment. As such he was a man who had access to ministers of the crown, bankers and diplomats. Thus when he did break with the establishment of the economics profession it was an event that automatically received considerable attention.

Keynes was also an expert in matters of logic and probability. Indeed, he wrote a major dissertation on the logical foundations of the theory of probability. Finally, Keynes had an intimate knowledge of the capital accumulation process and in particular, its highly speculative, uncertain and risk taking character. Indeed, he made a fortune out of speculating in the commodity markets. He was also successfully involved in running a major British insurance company. Keynes' intimate knowledge of the financial side of capitalism, his connections with the British political and business establishment and his intellectual training equipped him to understand better than most of his contemporary economists how inherently risky, uncertain and prone to miscalculation the process of capital accumulation might be. In much the same way as Marx regarded capitalism as grounded in the anarchy of private production Keynes eventually came to view the capital accumulation process as fundamentally irrational and therefore incapable of producing socially rational results.

One of the bastions of economic orthodoxy that Keynes struggled to demolish was Say's law. Despite Keynes' best effort Say's law has recently resurfaced again with the revival of laissez-faire. Why should the economic theories of an otherwise obscure early nineteenth century French economist, Jean Baptiste Say, still be influential in economic theory and thereby indirectly in public policy? The ironies of history are many. Say achieved lasting fame in economic theory on the basis of a small aspect of his *Treatise on Economics*, the notion that supply creates its own demand. Despite it becoming the target of considerable criticism at the time of its original formulation it has continued to trouble economics to this very day. The reason is not hard to find. If supply truly did create its own demand then a free market economy would tend toward a full employment equilibrium. Gluts of unemployed resources such as labour could be eliminated so long as they were prepared to adjust their price, that is their wage, downwards to the point where they would be hired. Hence, the claim that we still hear today — if only workers would ask for more reasonable wages all would be well. This notion which still has considerable currency rests upon the fanatasy that simply adding up all the buyers and sellers in a market and adjusting the prices of the goods bought and sold appropriately will result in a market clearing equilibrium.[5] Should temporary gluts appear the explanation is less than perfect foresight in judging the correct price. In such circumstances the solution is easily at hand. Cut the price of the goods in excess supply until the market clears. Thus Say's law has has enormous ideological appeal because it supports the free market fantasy: the perfect vision of eighteenth century enlightenment, the frictionless equilibrium, the idyll of capitalist goodness.

Of course, reality was far more unkind and unforgiving. Persistent gluts of

unemployed workers appeared and reappeared throughout the history of capitalism. Attempts to solve the problem by cutting wages often only prolonged the depression. In the face of the depression of the thirties classical economists simply retreated further into their cocoons spinning new and more elegant refinements of Say's law. Serious critics of the tendency toward gluts of unemployed workers were banished as cranks or outsiders.[6]

It was to this traditional classical orthodoxy that Keynes addressed himself when he broke from their blindness to reality in the face of the moral crisis surrounding the massive market failure and catastrophic unemployment that struck England as early as the late 1920s. The first major proposition that Keynes overturned was Say's Law. He showed precisely that a cut in real wages would not necessarily clear a glut on the employment market. In other words, even if wage prices are flexible downwards unemployment may persist. This is one of the first propositions that Keynes established in his work *The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money*. And yet this is precisely what the neo-classicists refused to acknowledge in their bastardized interpretation of Keynes' work. Instead they argued that Keynes' theory was really a special case of the more general classical model in which prices were flexible. In other words they claimed that Keynes' argument rested upon rigid money wages, something that Keynes explicitly refuted.[7]

Keynes was able to show in his work that even if workers accepted wage cuts there was no guarantee that the level of employment that would be offered would correspond to the full employment level. Indeed wage cuts would just as likely result in price cuts without any expansion of employment. For Keynes, the explanation as to why wage-cutting was not a solution lay in the fundamental character of capital accumulation itself.

All investment decisions which ultimately are associated with employment creation involve, according to Keynes, a very firm, specific or even individual calculation of the expected rate of return, the turnover time for the invested capital: in other words how long it takes to make back the initial outlay, the risk involved, and the degree of uncertainty about whether the expected rate of return will actually occur. Each economic actor makes this calculation alone, as opposed to in concert with others. Thus, there is absolutely no guarantee that when we add up or aggregate all these private autarkic decisions that they will total up to economic activity resulting in offers of jobs corresponding to the level of full employment. (This is true irrespective of the nature of technological labour displacement associated with new capital investment.) Indeed, the full employment result is quite simply a random one among many other alternative outcomes. Much like a lottery the chances of any one set of decisions resulting in the jackpot are statistically low.

Furthermore, the investment decision is complicated by what Keynes rather unfortunately chose to call the marginal efficiency of capital. This notion corresponds to that rate of return on capital that will just induce wealth holders to invest their savings in a project of capital accumulation. If the marginal efficiency of capital is very high — it will always be a few percentage points above the rate of interest — there is a risk that capitalists will choose not to invest their savings because there are not enough projects with a sufficient rate

of return in which to invest. Instead, they may hoard their money or speculate with it in a non-productive manner. This hoarding potential increases as the degree of risk and uncertainty increase in the economy. It was here that Keynes' intimate knowledge of the commodity markets served him well. Unlike his contemporaries Keynes developed a speculative theory of the investment process which linked it to the financial markets.[8]

It was on account of these factors and the psychological traits associated with the act of consumption that Keynes was able to show that contrary to the classical economists savings did not automatically translate themselves into productive investment. Instead, hoards of unproductive wealth could be and were amassed in the form of jewelry, real estate, *objets d'art* or simply held as cash. Hence, it was a critical aspect of Keynes' theory that the social class which most closely was bound up with hoarding and speculation, the *rentier* class, excercised far too much power in the economic system. It was this enormous power that had to be broken if capitalism ever were to be reformed.

In Keynes' view, the "euthanasia of the rentier class" could only come about after a long period of full employment in which state intervention and the specific targeting of investment would produce an economy in which there was no longer any shortage of capital and the marginal efficiency of capital therefore would tend toward zero. Keynes believed, rather naively it would seem, that a period of twenty to thirty years of full employment might produce sufficient abundance of capital invested in productive capacity of a peaceful as opposed to military nature that would bring about this result. Here Keynes quite clearly misread the growth and consumerist fixation of modern capitalism.

Furthermore, Keynes argued strongly for a serious structural redistribution of wealth and income so as to ensure the weakening of *rentier* power. Keynes, understood in his own terms, did represent a serious challenge to capitalism. While it is a serious distortion of his views to see him as a radical socialist, the fact is his "saviour role" for capitalism has hidden the extent to which his ideas represented a very fundamental reform of the power and class structure of capitalist society.

Hence, Kalecki's warning that Keynes would never be implemented precisely because of his radicalism makes sense. Indeed, given the fact that a fundamental redistribution of wealth income and power has not taken place in the post-war period, and that the power of the *rentier* class is greater than ever, aided by a number of perverse "reforms" designed to stimulate saving and accumultion by the upper class, it is no wonder that the business cycle has returned with a vengeance. Of course, much has changed since Keynes wrote the *General Theory*. The transnational nature of capital and the disruptive nature of new technologies certainly complicate the problem of achieving full employment. But we ought to remember that neither of these factors are totally new. Indeed they were both powerful factors in the 1930s.

I am not arguing that all will be well if we simply return to Keynes properly understood. Nor am I suggesting that a new theory of economic management is not required. Nor am I suggesting that we ought not to consider developing an economic system that enables us to detach ourselves from the irrationalities of

constant growth and the alienation of commodification. Nor, finally, am I suggesting that a far less bureaucratic and much more participatory mode of political and economic organization than that associated with the post-war welfare state ought not to be developed.

in the end if we are to be successful in reconstructing a new vision of a better society it is rather important that we pay proper respect to the courageous personal and intellectual efforts of those who have come before us. It is in this sense that it is quite essential to understand that Keynes however imperfectly, and however much a member of the establishment, did grasp the essentials of what was flawed in the capitalist system. It is true, of course, in the end that power and politics can never be banished by appeals to reason. And yet it is also true that reason does play a critical role in history. For it is the power of ideas and the visions of justice that accompany them, rather than brute force or crass privilege that come back time and time again to inspire and inform political action. it is an ancient legacy that we would do well to respect.

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Notes

1. The following are particularly useful in this regard:

   D. Moggridge, *Keynes*, London: Macmillan, 1976.

   E. & H. Johnson, *The Shadow of Keynes*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978;

   Fausto Vicarelli, Keynes: *The Instability of Capitalism*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1984.

   For the theoretical controversies surrounding his work see:

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2. See J. Robinson, *Economic Heresies*.

3. See M. Kalecki, "Political Aspects of Full Employment" 1943 in *Selected Essays on the Dynamics of the Capitalist Economy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971.

4. See J.M. Keynes, *The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money*, London: Macmillan, 1964, bk. IV, ch. 16, p. 221; bk. V, ch. 20, p. 290, ch. 19, p. 262; bk. VI, ch. 24, pp. 376.

5. See discussion of Say's law in J. Schumpeter, *History of Economic Analysis* N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1954.

6. See ch. 23 in Keynes' *General Theory* and Keynes' note on Marx pp. 81-83 and his letter to J.A. Hobson pp. 210-211 in vol. XXIX, *The Collected Writings*.

7. See the discussion of this in A. Leijonhufvud, *On Keynesian Economics*; For a classic example of contemporary distortion of Keynes see M. Parkin, *Modern Macro-economics*. Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1982. This is a Canadian text from a monetarist point of view which is becoming a standard offering in undergraduate courses. The text suggests that unemployment is caused by minimum wage laws, labour unions and excessive unemployment compensation. A case of "rigid wages" with a vengeance. This "rigid wage" approach however persists in even non-monetarist texts see for example, R.V. Cherneff, *Macro Economics: Theory & Policy*, Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1983, pp. 69, 203-204, 221-222.

8. See H. Minsky, John Maynard Keynes and *The General Theory*, Bk. IV and ch. 22 and reference to Marx (see note 6) in Collected Writings.

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"IMAGINARY MARXISMS" VERSUS CULTURAL MATERIALISM*

Rosaire Langlois

Russell Jacoby's criticisms of my review of his recent work provide little reason for me to modify my position, all the while curiously attributing to me views that I do not hold.

I am unrepentant in my view that Jacoby's concept of the "dialectic of defeat" is of little help in understanding the dynamics of success and failure in the socialist movement. Jacoby would have it that Marxists in the West have made a "fetish of success" and that the effort "to replicate Soviet and Chinese successes has proven politically and theoretically disastrous". Such a notion overlooks the concrete socio-economic factors that played a greater role in assuring the success or failure of the theories of Kautsky, Bernstein, Lukács, Luxemburg in varied environments.[1] Secondly, to put the matter bluntly and at the risk of some very considerable oversimplification, the "grim record" of socialism in the West has almost certainly much more to do with fact that capitalism had not — and has not — as yet reached the limits of its enormously productive potential, and precious little to do with the acceptance or rejection of Soviet or Chinese or "Western Marxist" political strategies by left-wing parties and splinter groups. Even non-Marxist social democratic parties have hardly met with universal success. Neither orthodox Communists nor "Western Marxist" theoreticians had a grasp of the real situation. As Coser has written of Rosa Luxemburg: "she thought that she represented the vanguard of the European proletariat, while in fact, the alleged renegade Bernstein had a better grasp of the shape of things to come".[2]

Moreover, Jacoby supposes that, at some time in the future, the "experience and theories of a defeated Marxism" — from Rosa Luxemburg to Marcuse — may yet prove more significant than those of a "victorious Marxism". Although this may seem "clear" and uncontroversial to Jacoby, an example may suggest how doubtful it is. While Jacoby provides no basis to suppose that serious social change is imminent, there are some indications that in the decades to come capitalism — under the twin impact of the creation of new productive forces (computer technology and its potential for social dislocation)[3] as well as the destruction of old productive forces (environmental degradation, resource depletion) — may well reach its ecosystemic limits,[4] a factor which could trigger

* See *CJPST* Vol. VII: Number 1-2 (1983) p. 235.

the kind of massive re-thinking and broadly based social support needed to create new and vibrant forms of social organization, perhaps some form of "market-socialism".[5] If indeed such a scenario is not entirely implausible, it is worth noting that recent Western Marxists have been all but silent on the question of the ecology crisis and its potential for radicalization.[6] This omission is quite puzzling unless one considers that a serious analysis of this crisis in the "productive forces" would contradict "humanistic Marxism" with its emphasis on "production relations". Others, in the meantime, like Barry Commoner — not constrained by ideological blinders — have pioneered the way with scrupulous analyses of the crisis and of the need for fundamental changes in existing capitalist and socialist societies. In light of such considerations it is not self-evident that Western Marxist theoreticians — old or new — will prove to be useful guides in understanding present or future crises.

Jacoby rejects the claim that "old-fashioned" Marxism is a relatively coherent social theory. "What coherence?", he asks, and why then did Western Marxism emerge, he wonders — as though the mere emergence of critics is inherent proof of the invalidity of a doctrine. Since Jacoby dismisses — without critical discussion — the empirical works in history and anthropology to which I referred, he might find more convincing Gerald Cohen's *Karl Marx's Theory of History*[7] which provides a rigorous demonstration of the plausibility of the classical approach.

According to Jacoby, the central issue on which we disagree springs from fundamentally different "underlying historical judgements". From his perspective the history of Marxism is not "pretty", whereas, in my view — he alleges — "the junkyard of orthodoxy is a lovely park". Since I happen to share the view that the history of Marxism is not at all "pretty", and since nothing in my review suggests the contrary I am not only astonished but also at a loss to understand the basis of these remarks.

Furthermore, Jacoby presents me as a representative of an orthodox Marxism as outdated as Engels' *Anti-Duhring*. Again one wonders on what basis such a conclusion was reached. Did I not explicitly state my position as one akin to Harris' "cultural materialism"? Had he bothered to check my reference, he would have found, incidentally, that cultural materialism is especially unsympathetic to *Anti-Duhring*. Cultural materialism, as propounded by Harris, has some fairly obvious limitations, and yet I find it — at present — a useful theory to work with and to try to develop. I have no desire, like some Western Marxists, to construct "imaginary Marxisms" — to borrow a phrase of Raymond Aron's[8] — out of some mysterious need to cling to Marx's name all the while rejecting the substance of what he attempted to do. One ought to give Marx his due, but advance beyond his work altogether.

Jacoby's final flourish, the accusation that I am "waiting for Godot" is an odd one. Given the events of this century, it might be levelled at all socialists including each and every Western Marxist as well! The real issue here, it would seem, rests on whether or not our futurological projections are based on adequate data and concepts. The approach I've sketched above — one which is not

naively optimistic[9] — perhaps merits serious consideration. Ironically enough, Jacoby's approach in "class Unconsciousness" provides only pious hopes, summed up when he writes, "In the recesses of the blackest pessimism pulsates a secret optimism".[10] Perhaps in future, Jacoby will spell this out with great profundity, but as it stands it is neither convincing nor enlightening.

Toronto

Notes

1. Lewis Coser, "Marxist Thought in the First Quarter of the Twentieth Century", *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 78, No. 1, July 1972.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 184.

3. See for example, Clive Jenkins *The Collapse of Work* (London: Methuen 1981). An older study of the effects of automation on employment along with some still provocative recommendations, can be found in Robert Theobald (ed) *The Guaranteed Income* (New York: Doubleday 1967).

4. Barry Commoner, *The Closing Circle* (New York: Knopf 1971) and *The Poverty of Power* (New York: Knopf 1976). Substantial portions of the latter work were serialized in *The New Yorker*, which suggests the widespread appeal of Commones's arguments beyond that of the traditional working class. See also Jeremy Rifkin, *Entropy* (New York: Viking Press, 1980.) Recently, Soviet dissident, Rudolf Bahro, in *Socialism and Survival* (London: Heretic Books, 1982) has presented an argument with which I am, in spite of differences of detail, in broad agreement.

5. It should go without saying that many other factors would be at work in bringing about such a transformation. The point here is simply that the ecology crisis could conceivably be the most critical factor, whereas discussions of "legitimacy crisis" have not given it serious consideration. The economic issue normally raised, that of "the fiscal crisis", is arguably only a side issue, related to the current world recession: see Hugh Mosley "Is there a fiscal crisis of the state?," *Monthly Review* Vol. 30, Number 1, May 1978.

6. This view of an ecology crisis leading to radicalization across social classes, does not necessarily imply, it seems to me, a mechanistic view of human action. The reasoning here is analogous to that of Wittfogel's in *Oriental Despotism* (New Haven: Yale University Press 1957) pp. 15-16.
With regard to the silence of neo-Marxism on the issue of ecology and "limits to growth", see Tom Boltomore "Sociology" p. 139-140 in David McLellan (ed) *Marx: the First Hundred Years* (London: Fontana 1983)

7. Gerald A. Cohen, *Karl Marx's Theory of History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978).

8. Raymond Aron, *Marxismes imaginaires*, (Paris: Éditions Gallimard 1970).

9. Richard Rubinstein, *The Age of Triage* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1983).

10. Jacoby, *The Dialectic of Defeat*, page 126.

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

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