will no longer meekly produce both cannons and cannon fodder, they are claiming that they have insights and values which could take away the need for cannons and cannon fodder, and they are demanding a primary place for these principles.

I hope to live to see the day when men ask for instruction in feminist theory and for training in feminist practice. Like most of the authors of this book, I do not want them excluded when that happens; for me, indeed, that will be the time to think about using the word humanism. Meanwhile, here is a book which makes a good starting point, flawed and incomplete as it may be. Male theorists are challenged to read it.

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FROM MARX TO MOTHERS


Feminist debates on the nature of female identity have recently turned to psychoanalytic theory in an effort to understand the psychological roots of oppression. In a recent article in Signs, Marianne Hirsch outlines current debates between feminist theorists working out of Neo-Freudian, Lacanian and Jungian traditions. While theorists of each group share different assumptions, all are committed to developing a psychological understanding of male domination and to discovering possibilities for the eradication of patriarchal relationships. In North America, French feminists (of the Lacanian school) have been criticized for their reliance on what is considered a phallocentric psychology and for their insistence on the structural definition of woman as "other", as "absence". Feminists of the Neo-Freudian persuasion are less concerned with philosophical descriptions of female identity (or lack of identity) and more intent on explaining how it is that we assume this negative status in the first place.

Two theories which have initiated an important debate with traditional Freudian accounts of female psychology are those of Dorothy Dinnerstein and Nancy Chodorow. The central question addressed by both authors is, how can we account for women's collusion in their own oppression? While rejecting Juliet Mitchell's analysis (in Psychoanalysis and Feminism) of the female's repressive submission to the power of the father, Dinnerstein and Chodorow contend the
turn to the father is a necessary retreat from the (threatening) power of the mother. This shift in emphasis is a major one: from father to mother, from Oedipus complex to pre-Oedipal relations, and from gender-blind to gender-conscious psychoanalytic theory.

Curiously, there remains a reluctance on the part of many feminists to consider explorations of psychological issues relevant to questions of domination and oppression. However, it is my contention that, regardless of the particular merits of any given theory, the very realization that our social, economic, and political organization depends on and reflects certain psychological predispositions is a step in the right direction. In the book under review, Issac D. Balbus demonstrates how the psychoanalytic theory developed by Dinnerstein and Chodorow can furnish the basis for a critique of sexual, political and technological domination.

Armed with a new understanding of the roots of domination, Balbus’ strategy is to undermine the explanatory power of Marxist and Neo-Marxist theories of oppression. His extensive analysis of various theorists proceeds from what he takes to be Marxist insufficiencies to the assertion that Marxist theory partakes of the very structures of domination from which it promises liberation. While reminiscent of the typical Freudo-Marxist dilemma of whether the individual or the mode of production is the determining factor of human consciousness, Balbus’ theory denies causal primacy to either one. Instead, what he calls “the Instrumental mode of symbolization” (an all-pervasive instrumental rationality) is seen to originate not in the capitalist mode of production, but in a specific, mother-dominated “mode of child rearing.” While this theoretical perspective may appear to valorize individual psychology, the emphasis actually rests on the formal aspects of child rearing practices. Dinnerstein’s psychological theory, once placed in historical perspective, is meant to account for the roots of domination as well as to provide the means of liberation.

Balbus attempts to create an anti-capitalist theory which distinguishes itself from Marxism by providing an explicit critique of bureaucracy, patriarchy and repressive technology. In his view these three structures are the product of an Instrumental mode of symbolization and so is capitalism, yet one could substitute a socialist mode of production for a capitalist one without disturbing the Instrumental mode of symbolization: “…patriarchy, the state, and repressive technology are not functions of, but rather relatively autonomous from the capitalist mode of production.” If the capitalist mode of production and structures of domination are determined by the instrumental logic ingrained in unconscious character structures, a transformation of the mode of production alone will not guarantee the abolition of repressive structures. Furthermore, Balbus argues that Marxist and Neo-Marxist theories of the state, patriarchy and technology fail to provide a genuine theory of liberation precisely because they insist that the mode of production is the determining factor.

Balbus’ major objections are to Marx’s dialectical theory of freedom and necessity, and to his concept of production. While Marx believed capitalism would furnish the preconditions for the establishment of socialist society, Balbus argued these very conditions militate against any such transformation.
In alllying itself with repressive technology, in substituting the administration of things for political decision-making, and in neglecting the problem of patriarchy, Marxist theory may reinforce technological, political and patriarchal domination. The familiar dilemma of how the political consciousness necessary for a truly social society can originate in capitalist society is raised in this context. Yet Balbus mistakenly interprets Marx's description of reification in capitalist production as objectification which is inevitable to all "productive" activity. By failing to appreciate Marx's critique of commodification and alienation Balbus can only read his analysis as a confirmation of oppressive structures.

Despite his "Neo-Hegelian" pretensions, Balbus fails to entertain a dialectical theory of history where individual consciousness and material production might be seen as mutually determining forces. Given this perspective, both Marxist-Feminist and Freudo-Marxist theorists are assumed to privilege one term to the detriment of the other. Thus Marxist-Feminist theories are inadequate because they fail to acknowledge the independence of male domination from any particular mode of production. For Balbus, patriarchy is a "male dominated sexual division of labour" which may assume different forms (according to the mode of production) while remaining male dominated. One of the problems with Freudo-Marxists then, is the tendency to subsume the question of male domination under the question of the sexual division of labour. Since, in Balbus' view, capitalism is not responsible for the identification of sexual difference and sexual oppression, feminist critics ought to focus their attack on the origin and reproduction of this equation rather than on the capitalist mode of production. The feminist movement, in combination with ecology and participatory-democratic movements, would be anathema to both capitalism and patriarchy.

We now reach the heart of the argument. If patriarchal, political and technological domination depend on an instrumental mode of symbolization originating in the mode of child rearing, then feminist, participatory-democratic and ecology movements depend on the existence of a non-instrumental mode of symbolization originating in a different mode of child rearing. Since these kinds of movements already exist, Balbus has to argue that the existing mode of child rearing allows for the possibility of a non-instrumental mode of symbolization: "Our task is to develop a non-Marxist but nevertheless materialist theory of the origins, persistence, and limits of the Instrumental mode of symbolization...".

Relying heavily on Dinnerstein's theory, Balbus contends that patriarchy is a reaction to the overwhelming and unbearable power of the mother. Patriarchy, plus the ideological and economic forms it assumes, are to be explained as the result of one's inability to deal with the painful fact of separation from the mother. Having posited a universal human inability to accept death (mother-separation), Balbus describes how the "perverted death instinct [of] modern, Instrumental cultures" results in a denial of dependence on the mother. Although it is unclear why this perverted formation occurs, it is certain that Balbus' theory depends (as do Dinnerstein's and Chodorow's) on a theory of the
mother as the repressive and resented other: "the modern child resolves its ambivalent feeling [toward the mother] in favor of hate."9 The subsequent idealization of an identification with paternal authority as an escape from maternal power maintains the gender-directed division of ambivalence:

The child's self-recognition can be achieved only at the price of unconscious recognition of the mother as an object of domination, an unconscious structure of recognition that sets the stage for the adult's recognition of all subsequent others as objects of domination as well.10

Given this unconscious character structure, adult relationships become either those of domination or those of submission. Since mothers are unconsciously feared and hated, both men and women collude in the oppression of women. One's unconscious need to deny one's connection to the mother is also projected onto nature as the all-powerful other which is a constant reminder of one's mortality. Both sexes support political domination as "an externalization of paternal identification"11 because it fulfills the need for dependency denied with respect to the mother.

In my view, Balbus' account of mother-monopolized child-rearing entails not only a structural relationship but also one which presupposes culturally defined, gender-specific expectations. How is it possible for females to identify with the mother to the extent of wanting to become mothers themselves, if she is the dreaded and hated object? Moreover, if females at the Oedipal stage are supposed to identify with the father as refuge from the mother, how does one account for the female's heterosexual desire? It would appear that Balbus has overemphasized the pre-Oedipal relationship in an attempt to make the primacy of the mother accountable for a misogyny which is culturally based and learned by both sexes at the Oedipal stage. Yet Balbus is not entirely unaware of these requirements: "normal masculine development demands that he [the male child] define himself in active opposition to his mother"12 while normal feminine development requires females who "are impelled . . . to fulfill their richer relational needs through mothering their children and nurturing their men."13

Whether child rearing is shared by both parents (Balbus' solution) or not, it does not follow that the requirements of masculine development (self-definition in opposition to mother) or those of feminine development (self-definition in relation to mother) will be affected. The need to overcome one's primary identification with either parent remains a precondition for the development of self-consciousness. Furthermore, the painful experience of separation and the ambivalence it entails would remain a part of human development. However, it is possible that if the father did not appear in the abstract, non-relational, wordly-wise role, and if the mother did not appear as the emotionally dependent, threatening caretaker, that identification with the one would not entail the repression and denial of the attributes of the other.

One final and puzzling feature of Balbus' argument is his conviction that
women's participation with men in destroying the Instrumental mode of symbolization is crucial precisely because women were never really a part of it:

... men of contemporary patriarchal society are typically oriented to the manipulation of objects — to an instrumental relationship with the world — and lack the expressive or relational orientation that women possess. 14

It is my contention that neither men's unconscious need to dominate others, nor women's tendency to submit to such a relationship, can be explained by a theory of mother-monopolized child rearing. Yet, if women do acquire a non-instrumental, nurturant orientation to others, why should they combine their efforts with men at all? Balbus' pessimistic conclusions concerning his own proposal of male consciousness raising justify one's scepticism. Speaking for men, he claims “we will never be able entirely to undo the misogynist effects of our mother-monopolized child rearing.” 15 Speaking for women, I think we are well aware of such "effects" and of the necessity to struggle against misogyny in all its various forms.

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Notes


4. Marxist theorists discussed by Balbus include Marx and Engels, L. Althusser, N. Poulantzas; Neo-Marxists and Marxist-Feminists include N. O. Brown, J. Habermas, H. Marcuse, J. Mitchell, G. Rubin, W. Reich, A. Wilden and E. Zaretsky.


6. Ibid., p. 66.

7. Ibid., p. 291.

8. Ibid., p. 297.
RECENSIONS

10. Ibid., p. 345
11. Ibid., p. 323.
12. Ibid., p. 342.
13. Ibid., p. 338. Much of the criticism here applies to Dinnerstein and Chodorow as well who also fail to account for culturally defined, gender characteristics.
15. Ibid., p. 397.

WOOLF'S REFUSAL


In 1909, when Sigmund Freud spoke about the new science of the mind at Clark University, in Worcester, Massachusetts, U.S.A., he brought with him several disciples. One of them was Carl Gustav Jung. Much has been made of the encounter: a variant of The Son Slays The Father — and lives to outdo him. Freud had the qualities of self-annihilation a Jew would have in a German culture, especially one incubating The Final Solution. Though Swiss, Jung was equally Germanic. One proselytizing Atheist who claimed to be German; one God-worshipping Christian who is suspected of Nazism! Each has a similar, seamy sexual past that will not bear scrutiny. They are so clearly halves of one whole — we need them both, and we have them both, and now our job, the task of those who live in their wake, is to marry together their ideas.

The areas of major disagreement between Freud and his former student Jung are not about female illnesses, but about human will, power, God, and, thus, the methodology of cure. For Sigmund Freud, God was a lesser Freud with whom he contended. Freud’s relation to God is, simply stated, that which he attributed to Moses in Moses and Monotheism: an atheist to the last, he inherited the failures of male body-denial and anthropomorphic delusion from Descartes. Because he felt he knew all, Freud was offended and fearful of his unconscious content. For Jung, God was the cornerstone of an integrated sense of one’s real size in the cosmos. If one is willing to let be, to accept, to know that one is ultimately but a cipher for a larger figuration, one is less tyrannical in one’s treatment of clients — especially female clients. Rightly related to his own size, ability and place on the planet, Jung did not deride or trivialize his unconscious content. Thus Jung is