TECHNOLOGICAL NATIONALISM

Maurice Charland

There was a time in this fair land
When the railroad did not run ...

Gordon Lightfoot

Picture clarity and intellectual clarity
are limited by electromagnetic resources.

H.A. Innis

In the opening sequence of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation's
production of the *National Dream* — Pierre Berton's history of the Cana-
dian Pacific Railway — the pristine majesty of the Rocky Mountains and
a lone Indian are confronted with the technological dynamo of a locomo-
tive.

This television image of a railroad as the "national dream" heroically
spanning the wilderness to fashion a state reveals in a condensed narrative
the manifold relations between technology and a Canada which can imag-
ine. Here, we are encouraged to see technology as constitutive of Canada,
and as a manifestation of Canada's ethos. The *National Dream* highlights,
of course, the role of space-binding technology in Canada's history. This
CBC epic reminds us that Canada exists by virtue of technologies which bind
space and that the railroad permitted a transcontinental economic and
political state to emerge in history. Furthermore, the *National Dream* is an
instance of the discourse of technology in Canada, of its rhetoric. The CPR
is presented as the archetypal instance of Canada's technological constitu-
tion. More significantly, the CPR is offered as the product of political will.
A nation and railroad were "dreamt" of by Canada's architects and then
consciously created. We see a Canada which imagined itself into existence.

Canada's imagination, a *Canadian* imagination, is manifest by the

National Dream itself. Berton's televised history is a rhetorical epideictic for a technologically mediated Canada. This rhetoric of a technological nation, basing itself on a romantic interpretation of history, equates the construction of the CPR with the constitution of Canada and praises each with reference to the other. Canada is valorized as a nation because it is the product of a technological achievement, and the railroad is the great product of heroic individuals who dreamt a nation. Curiously, the *National Dream* rearticulates a rhetoric which gave rise to its own materialization. That rhetoric is offered through a product of itself, the CBC. The CBC exists by virtue of a discourse of technological nation-building, and reproduces the rhetoric which legitimates it and the Canadian state when it invites us to join Berton and dream of nationhood.

In this essay, I will explore what I perceive to be a rhetoric of technological nationalism in anglophone Canada which ascribes to technology the capacity to create a nation by enhancing communication. As I will show, the rhetoric of the CPR becomes the power-laden discourse of a state seeking to legitimate itself politically by constituting a nation in its image. This is a significant rhetoric, for it underguirds Canada's official ideology and guides the formulation of federal government policy, at least in the area of broadcasting: the CBC is legitimated in political discourse by the CPR. Furthermore, I will argue that the rhetoric of technological nationalism is insidious, for it ties a Canadian identity, not to its people, but to their mediation through technology.

Rhetoric and Ideological Discourse

This is, then, a critical theorisation of the development of Canadian ideological discourse. With regard to the "method" of ideology-analysis, the study proceeds (1) by identifying how Canadian ideological discourse is grounded in the politics and economics of the early Canadian state; (2) by tracing out the rhetorical effect — the consequence — of that discourse on the Canadian political, economic and indeed popular mind, as it calls a certain Canada into being; and (3) by examining how this discourse creates the conditions of its own reproduction. I will demonstrate that the rhetoric of the CPR, seeking to constitute a state, becomes the rhetoric of the CBC, seeking to constitute a *polis* and *nation*. This rhetoric, the rhetoric of technological nationalism, is the dominant discourse of the official ideology of nation-building through state-supported broadcasting, and has been a significant (but not exclusive) determinant of the form of Canada's broadcasting system. It is also the dominant discourse of Canadian nationalism in anglophone Canada.

While my concern is with rhetoric and its significance, I will not simply study discourse. Such an approach would numb my critique, for rhetoric is precisely the form of discourse which projects outside of itself into the realm of human attitude and action. I will take a lead from Kenneth Burke who has rightly observed that while there exists a difference between things and words about things, words provide an orientation to things.[2] Thus, I will examine the relationship of words to things: specifically the relationship between two distinct but intertwined entities — the Canadian rhetoric of a technological nation, and the technology of the Canadian state. Both technology and rhetoric were necessary for Canada as a "nation" coming to be, but they constituted a Canada within a spiral of contradictions. I will seek to identify these contradictions. Indeed, my claim is that the contradictions between these two have produced the recurring crises in Canadian broadcasting policy and in the quest for a Canadian "identity." Technological nationalism promises a liberal state in which technology would be a neutral medium for the development of a *polis*. This vision of a nation is bankrupt, however, because it provides no substance or commonality for the *polis* except communication itself. As a consequence, technological nationalism's (anglophone) Canada has no defense against the power and seduction of the American cultural industry or, indeed, of the technological experience. Canada, then, is the "absent nation."

My analysis will take inspiration from James W. Carey's and John J. Quirk's application of Innis in their study of the rhetoric of electricity in the United States.[3] I will consider how what Innis terms the "bias" of communication technology undermines the promises of that technology's rhetoric, as Carey and Quirk put it:

> Innis uncovered the most vulnerable point in rhetoric of electrical sublime. ... Innis principally disputed the notion that electricity would replace centralization in economics and politics with decentralization, democracy and a cultural revival. Innis placed the "tragedy of modern culture" in America and Europe upon the intrinsic tendencies of both printing press and electronic media to reduce space and time in the service of a calculus of commercialism and expansionism.[4]

Following Michael McGee, I take rhetoric to be a necessary material condition of human social existence.[5] Indeed, rhetoric is a constitutive component of the social application of technology, for it guides its possible applications. Consequently, my aim is to consider the appropriateness of the rhetoric of technological nationalism in the face of Canadian exigencies.

Canada, Technology, and Technological Rhetoric

Canada is a technological state. This is just to say that Canada's existence as an economic unit is predicated upon transportation and communication technology. In addition, the *idea* of Canada depends upon a rhetoric about technology. Furthermore, we can understand the development of a Canadian nation-state in terms of the interplay between this technology and its rhetoric.

That Canada owes its existence to technologies which bind space is readily apparent. Canada is a sparsely populated territory in which rock, mountains, and sheer distance inhibit human contact between those who live in its several distinct regions. The telegraph and the railroad to a degree overcame these obstacles and permitted the movement of goods and information across what was, in the nineteenth century, an undeveloped wilderness. Indeed, as Harold Innis observes, "[t]he history of the Canadian Pacific Railroad is primarily the history of the spread of western civilization over the northern half of the North American continent."[6] Through the CPR, Innis points out, western Canadian territories became integrated into the economic and political systems which had developed in Eastern Canada.

And what is the nature of this "civilization?" It is one based in the circulation or communication of commodities and capital. The civilization the railroad extended was one of commerce as the CPR extended eastern economic interests. The railroad reproduced and extended a state apparatus and economy which concentrated power in metropolitan centres, permitting the incorporation and domination of margins. If the CPR was a "national project," it was so first and foremost as an economic venture. The railroad was built with a combination of public and private capital for the advantage of the state and merchants, and the former, like the latter, saw its interests in terms of economic development. The nineteenth century British-style state was, after all, a state of capitalists.

The railroad did more though than enhance trade. It permitted the development of a political state and created the possibility of a nation. It did so by extending Ottawa's political power: it permitted Ottawa to exclude a powerful American presence from western Canada and thus establish its political control over the territory.[7] Specifically, the CPR fostered immigration into the Western plain, effectively discouraging Minnesotans from moving northward and annexing a sparsely populated area; the CPR permitted Ottawa to establish its military presence in the west, as it did when suppressing the Métis rebellion, and, of course, eastern Canadians no longer had to travel through the United States in order to reach British Columbia. Furthermore, this physical spanning of the country permitted Canadians, including those in Quebec, to unite in patriotic sentiment, as they

did when militia from Nova Scotia, Quebec, and Ontario fought side by side against Riel's supporters in Saskatchewan.[8]

In a sense, the power the CPR extended could become the object of a "national" experience; the CPR offered those in Canada the experience of a technologically-mediated political unity as a common denominator.

My point here is that the CPR permitted more than the physical linking of a territory. Apart from joining the country to facilitate commercial intercourse and political administration, the CPR offered the possibility of developing a mythic rhetoric of national origin. Following McGee's arguments on the development of collectivities, I would argue that such a rhetoric is necessary to the realization of the project of Canadian nationhood.[9] That rhetoric is necessary both as a *legitimation* of a sovereign united Canada within the discursive field of parliamentary government, and as an *inducement* for those in Canada to see themselves as Canadian; for Canada to be legitimated, a myth is necessary. The CPR is well suited to such mythologization because (1) its construction in the face of political, economic, and geographic obstacles can be presented as an epic struggle; (2) the CPR was a state project and thus can be represented as the manifestation of a *Canadian* will to survive politically; and (3) the steam engine itself offers Canadians the opportunity to identify with a nationalized icon of power. In sum, the CPR is significant not only as a mode of transportation and communication, but also as the basis for a nationalist discourse. The technological nation is discursive as well as political. Furthermore, the very existence of the CPR can be understood as a moment in the nationalist rhetoric it renders possible, for it was a symbolic strategy in the face of political exigencies.

To put it bluntly, the CPR's existence is discursive as well as material, for it stands as an articulation of political will. While the CPR proved economically profitable for its backers, the linking of Montreal to Vancouver was not a happenstance or the result of a private entrepreneurial venture, rather the road was built under the auspices of Canada's federal government for the explicit purpose of extending spatial control over a territory. That is to say, the determination of Canada to remain British in character rather than be absorbed by the United States preceded the railway's construction. Furthermore, the construction of the Pacific Railway was not even a necessary condition to British Columbia's entry into Confederation: That Pacific colony had demanded only that Ottawa build a wagon road. Thus, the CPR was part of a rhetorical ploy. Cartier and MacDonald offered more than was necessary, a rail link to the west coast within ten years of British Columbia's joining the Dominion.[10] Consequently, the CPR cannot be viewed as the product or manifestation only of economy. The construction of the railroad was more than an overdetermined response to material and political exi-

gencies; a will to statehood preceded it. It was an element of a strategy based in the belief that a nation could be built by binding space. As the materialization of belief and of political will, the railroad is the consequence of political rhetoric, of discourse which constitutes power. As John A. MacDonald put it, speaking in the House of Commons:

> The road will be constructed ... and the fate of Canada, will then as
> a Dominion, be realized. Then will the fate of Canada, as one great
> body be fixed.[11]

This epideictic oratory reveals that the railroad project exists as a moment in a species of rhetoric: technological nationalism. This rhetoric is evident in MacDonald's discourse above, for it links Canada's fate to a technology. Sir Charles Tupper, for example, could refer to the CPR as a "our great national work."[12] This rhetoric presents the railroad as material condition of possibility for the existence of Canadian nation, and it finds its contemporary echo in Berton's treatment of Canadian history, as he features MacDonald as a mythical hero and asserts:

> [I]t was Macdonald's intention to defy nature and fashion a nation
> in the process. His tool, to this end, would be the Canadian Pacific.
> It would be a rare example of a nation created through the construc-
> tion of a railway.[13]

The myth of the railroad, or of the binding of space technologically to create a nation, places Canadians in a very particular relationship to technology.[14] In Kenneth Burke's language, this rhetoric privileges "agency" as the motive force for Canada's construction.[15] Canada's existence would be based in a (liberal) pragmatism in which technology is more potent and more responsible for Canada's creation than the so-called "Fathers of Confederation." In the popular mind, Canada exists more because of the technological transcendence of geographical obstacles than because of any politician's will. Thus, technology itself is at the centre of the Canadian imagination, for it provides the condition of possibility for a Canadian mind.

The import of "agency" or technology in Canada's official popular culture also can be seen, for example, in Gordon Lightfoot's "Canadian Railroad Trilogy," where the CPR fuses with an entrepreneurial spirit and heralds the truly modern project of expansion and "progress":

> But ... they looked in the future
>   and what did they see?
> They saw an iron rail running
>   from the sea to the sea ...

The song of the future has been sung,
   All the battles have been won.
We have opened up the land,
   All the world's at our command ...
We have opened up the soil
   With our teardrops and our toil.

In the rhetoric and construction of the CPR, we see the genesis of technological nationalism as a component in the project of building the national state. This project has two components: one, physical, the other, discursive: (1) The existence of a transcontinental Canada required the development of a system of transportation facilitating territorial annexation, colonization, and the implantation of a military presence. (2) The existence of this Canada also required the development of a rhetoric which ideologically constituted those in Canada as Canadians, united in the national project and under the political authority of a national government.

For the moment, let us focus on the rhetorical component of technological nationalism. The Canadian tradition of parliamentary public address, which Canada inherited from Britain, places particular demands on the rhetoric of the Canadian state. In this "Whig Liberal" tradition, political power is legitimated by a rhetoric of the "people."[16] That is to say, attempts to discursively secure legitimacy will argue that a national "people" exists which authorizes the state's power. For Ottawa to successfully exercise the power the CPR extended, it must counter arguments in favour of provincial autonomy or, conversely, annexation by the United States by persuasively representing those in Canada as forming a Canadian people. Indeed, the existence of such a pan-Canadian collectivity was asserted by Georges Etienne Cartier in defense of Confederation.[17] Without such a persuasive rhetoric of "national" identity and "national" interest, Ottawa's power would dissolve.

In Canada, the constitution of a "people" of individuals united under a liberal state requires that the barriers between regions be apparently transcended. As it permits mastery over nature, technology offers the possibility of that apparent transcendence. Consequently, in order to assert a national interest and unity, Ottawa depends upon a rhetoric of technological nationalism — a rhetoric which both asserts that a technologically mediated Canadian *nation* exists, and calls for improved communication between regions to render that nation materially present. In other words, Canada is a state which must constantly seek to will a *nation* in its own image, in order to justify its very existence. The CPR can be understood as one manifestation of this necessity, but as a form of *economic* communication, it gave rise neither to a common Canadian culture, nor to a Canadian "public" of

citizens capable of participating in the country's political will formation. At most, it offered those in Canada the possibility of jointly participating in the rhetoric of the national project. Primarily, the CPR enmeshed Canada within a series of networks of domination. As Innis observes and the suppression of the Métis uprising of 1885 makes manifestly clear, space-binding technologies extend power as they foster empire.[18] Because of the CPR's inability to create a people or nation, another technological instrument was necessary, an instrument which would permit the representation and actualization of some form of Canadian "public" and common Canadian culture. Both the rhetoric of national identity and the fact of a Canadian political community required a *cultural* rather than economic form of communication. Technological nationalism required radio, and the advent of the broadcasting era advanced the project of a technologically-constituted nation.

Technological Nationalism in the Broadcasting Era

The development of electronic communication, and in particular broadcast technology, permitted a new articulation of the rhetoric of technological nationalism. Technological nationalism became a major factor in the development of the structure of broadcasting in Canada, as radio and television were enlisted into the national project. However, this rhetoric of a technologically-mediated Canada is contradictory.

Significantly, Canada's first national radio network was established by a railway. While local radio had been pioneered by private entrepreneurs, national radio was the product of a state agency, the CNR. The national railway saw in radio a means to foster immigration, to enhance its own image, and to support the project of nationhood.[19] CNR radio, which initially broadcast to railroad parlour cars, developed in 1924 into a network of stations in major Canadian cities from Vancouver to Moncton. It offered symphony broadcasts, comic operas, special events, and in 1931, a dramatic presentation of Canadian history.[20] State-supported radio, following the railroad's path, presented those who live in Anglophone Canada with an image of Canada.[21] CNR sought to bind Canada with information just as rail had bound Canada economically. Thus was forged the link in the official Canadian mind between railroad, radio, and national identity. As the official biographer of Sir Henry Thorton, the CNR's president and instigator of its radio services, writes:

> As a direct result of Sir Henry's abilities to see the possibilities
> inherent in a new medium of expression, the railway did for Canada
> what she was to apathetic to do for herself. ... He saw radio as a great
> unifying force in Canada; to him the political conception tran-

scended the commercial, and he set out consciously to create a sense
of nationhood through the medium of the Canadian National
Railway Service.[22]

The rhetoric of technological nationalism had incorporated radio. It
sought to enlist another space-binding technology in the project of consti-
tuting a nation in the image of the state. Furthermore, this vision of an
electronically constituted Canada did not remain Thorton's, but became that
of the national government. Thus, one of the first "live" national broadcasts
was a celebration of Canada. Prime Minister MacKenzie King's voice was
heard across the country as he spoke from Ottawa on July 1, 1927, Con-
federation's anniversary. Commenting on that moment a month later at the
Canadian National Exhibition, the Prime Minister presented radio, a gift of
science, as the means whereby Canada would develop a "people" or "public"
to justify its government:

> On the morning, afternoon and evening of July 1, all Canada
> became, for the time-being, a single assemblage, swayed by a com-
> mon emotion, within the sound of a single voice. Thus has modern
> science for the first time realized in the great nation-state of modern
> days, that condition which existed in the little city-states of ancient
> times and which was considered by the wisdom of the ancients as
> indispensable to free and democratic government — that all the
> citizens should be able to hear for themselves the living voice. To
> them it was the voice of a single orator — a Demosthenes or a
> Cicero — speaking on public questions in the Athenian Assembly
> or in the Roman Forum. Hitherto to most Canadians, Ottawa had
> seemed far off, a mere name to hundreds of thousands of our people,
> but henceforth all Canadians will stand within the sound of the
> carillon and within hearing of the speakers on Parliament Hill. May
> we not predict that as a result of this carrying of the living voice
> throughout the length of the Dominion, there will be aroused a
> more general interest in public affairs, and an increased devotion of
> the individual citizen to the commonweal?[23]

King's statement preceded a national radio policy by five years. However,
it can be understood as a charge to future policy makers. Certainly, it
articulated the major themes of technological nationalism in the broadcast-
ing era. In particular, it reveals the paradoxical promise of democracy and
domination inherent to the rhetoric of technological nationalism. MacKen-
zie King's speech reduces Canada to a community or small city which does
not suffer from the isolating effects of distance, regionalism, or cultural
diversity. Here, technology would create a *polis* where the proximity of

speaker to audience would promote "freedom" and give rise to a "democracy" of a public sharing a commonweal. As MacKenzie King also put it: "It is doubtful if ever before ... those in authority were brought into such immediate and sympathetic and personal touch with those with whom their authority is derived."[24] As such, technological nationalism is a form of liberalism. It proposes the electronic *polis* and affirms no value save the communication of the people's voices as expressed in Parliament. However, this vision of a society in and through communication is undermined by technological nationalism's other goal, that of creating a *united* Canada. This second goal is also implied above. Note that the speech identifies an interest in public affairs with "devotion," and that the community called into being is but an audience, subject to a voice. Radio, if it offers community, also offers domination, as Innis observes in counterpoint to MacKenzie King:

> The rise of Hitler to power was facilitated by the use of the loudspeaker and radio. ... The radio, appealed to vast areas, overcame the division between classes in its escape from literacy, and favoured centralization and bureaucracy. A single individual could appeal at one time to vast numbers of people speaking the same language. ...[25]

MacKenzie King's remarks capture the spirit of the rhetoric of Canadian government policy towards broadcasting as a means of binding space from his own time until the recent flirtations with cultural continentalism. As with rail service in Canada, broadcasting was consciously regarded as a means of *creating* a Canada with sufficient commonality to justify its political union, while simultaneously, it was also considered a means of simply enabling Canadians to be aware of each other and their already constituted values and identity. Such a contradictory role for broadcasting was articulated in various government reports dealing with the problems posed by broadcasting technology including the 1929 *Report of the Royal Commission on Broadcasting*, and the 1932 *Report of the Parliamentary Committee on Broadcasting*. These and subsequent reports offered a rhetoric which asserted the existence of a distinctly Canadian (and thus unitary) consciousness which required technological mediation and also charged broadcasting with the task of realizing that consciousness and its nation.

The Development of a Broadcasting Policy of Technological Nationalism

The 1932 Broadcasting Act followed rather than anticipated broadcasting's development. Canada's first commercial radio station was licenced in

1919. A decade elapsed before the Royal Commission on Radio Broadcasting, chaired by Sir John Aird, former president of the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, issued a report calling for exclusive government control of broadcasting, including the nationalization of existing privately owned outlets.[26] The Commission's stance was one of "defensive expansionism," as Margaret Prang would put it, for it pointed to the threat of Americanized airwaves and called for protective federal initiatives.[27] Of course, the Commission asserted that the airwaves must be protected from an American expansion driven by market forces. More significantly, the Aird Report also echoed MacKenzie King as it asserted that radio must become a means for developing Canadian hegemony and fostering a unified culture in the face of geography and regionalism:

> At present the majority of programs heard are from sources outside of Canada. It has been emphasized that the continued reception of these had a tendency to mold the minds of young people in the home to ideals and opinions that are not Canadian. In a country of the vast geographical dimension of Canada, broadcasting will undoubtedly become a great force in imparting a national spirit and interpreting national citizenship.[28]

The official Canadian mind conceives of Canada as a nation which must come to be in spite of space. Thus, even though the Aird Commission did not seek to establish a repressive single Canadian discourse, but called for a broadcasting system in which programming would be provincially controlled, it sought to create an extended community in which common Canadian interests would be articulated and a shared national identity could emerge. The popular mind, like the land, must be occupied. Note, however that technological nationalism only defines Canadian ideals and opinion by virtue of their not being from foreign sources. This is significant because, in its reluctance or inability to articulate a positive content to the Canadian identity — an identity still to be created — technological nationalism is a form of liberalism, privileging the *process* of communication over the substance of what is communicated. Consequently, if radio were to bring forth a nation by providing a common national experience, that experience would be one of communication, of sheer mediation. This is the first contradiction of technological nationalism: The content of the Canadian identity would be but technological nationalism itself.

Ottawa did not, of course, permit a great deal of provincial autonomy in broadcasting. Nor did it, ultimately, establish a state monopoly. The 1929 Depression began weeks after the Aird Report's publication and the government turned to more urgent matters. Meanwhile, several provinces, led by Quebec, challenged Ottawa's jurisdiction over broadcasting in the courts.

This delayed the implementation of a Canadian radio policy. Canada's Supreme court upheld Ottawa's jurisdictional claim in 1931. The British Privy Council rejected Quebec's appeal of that ruling in 1932. Only then did Ottawa act.

Prime Minister Bennett, who considered radio "a most effective instrument for nation building," established in 1932 a special committee of the House of Commons to examine broadcasting and draft appropriate legislation.[29] The 1932 report echoed both the rhetoric and the recommendations of the Aird Commission. More strongly than before, radio was presented as heir to the railroad's mission. Thus, the chairman of the 1932 Parliamentary committee, Dr. Raymond Moran, asserted:

> Had the fathers of Confederation been able to add this means of
> communication to the ribbons of steel by which they endeavored to
> bind Canada in an economic whole, they would have accomplished
> a great deal more than they did, great even as their achievement
> was.[30]

The committee realized that national radio service, like national rail service, would not develop without state direction and capital. The Canadian culture and unity sought after would not spring from unbridled commerce, but would have to spring from the state itself. Thus the committee, linking radio to railroad, called for the creation of a radio commission empowered to nationalize private broadcasting stations. The hoped-for result would be a united Canada. The Commons committee's report led to the 1932 Radio Broadcasting Bill. That bill was introduced to the House by Prime Minister Bennett. As he presented the legislation, he charged radio with the task of creating national unity and serving the Empire. Radio, like the CPR, would permit a technologically mediated state and *nation*:

> Without such (Canadian) control radio broadcasting can never
> become a great agency for the communication of matters of national
> concern and for the diffusion of national thought and ideals, and
> without such control it can never be the agency by which national
> consciousness may be fostered and sustained and national unity still
> further strengthened. ... Furthermore, radio broadcasting, con-
> trolled and operated in this way, can serve as a dependable link in
> a chain of empire communications by which we may be more closely
> united one with the other.[31]

Bennett's rhetoric appropriated for Ottawa the right to create a consciousness. Certainly, his discourse is apparently liberal, for it presumes that

national concerns and thoughts pre-exist radio and need only to be "communicated" and "diffused." However, Bennett's address also reveals that without the common denominators of radio and state, there would be no nation, for it is a nation dependent upon technology to be created and sustained. Radio was to be a means of socialization, diffusing the ideal of the nation to be constructed, the ideal of communication. In other words, the process of communication would legitimate the state and the (British) empire whose power it extended.

The Contradictions of
Economic and Cultural Communication

Canada did not end up with the exact broadcasting system these reports envisaged, of course, for the abstract principles of policy are not easily realized. In particular, the development of both communication and transportation infrastructures are based on technologies and economic forces which exist somewhat autonomously from the state. Indeed, from the outset, radio offered little promise of creating or strengthening the Canadian state or *nation,* since American signals penetrated Canada's borders far more easily than steel rails. By 1930, Canadians were more likely to receive American than Canadian signals: nearly all Canadians were within reach of an American station, while only 60% could receive a signal originating in Canada.[32] Furthermore, American-made programs were very popular among Canadians. At least 50% of Canadian listening time was devoted to United States programming.[33] While the CNR at that time operated a national network service (albeit of limited scope), it could not compete with American programs, be they distributed in Canada by Canadian stations, or by powerful stations based in the United States. In consequence, Margaret Prang points out, as I observed above, that Canadian broadcasting policy has been characterized by "defensive expansionism." It has been sensitive to American expansion, and has called for a concerted state effort to use technology both as a form of defense and as a means of establishing Canadian hegemony over its territory. Canada had secured its western territory through space-binding technology; it had not, however, secured its cultural territory. Thus the Canadian Radio Broadcasting Commission, and its successor, the CBC, were instituted to occupy and defend Canada's ether and consciousness.[33]

While various governments in Ottawa could rhetorically call for a technologically mediated *nation,* they were in no way assured of success, especially since radio, like rail, is an extension of an economic system dominated by American capital. In spite of Prang's "defensive expansionism," and the conscientious work of broadcasters at the CRBC and CBC, anglophone

Canada found itself saddled with a model of broadcasting as entertainment largely developed outside of the country, and with a timetable for its development over which Ottawa had little control. Canada was the subject of what Boyd-Barrett terms "media [as opposed to cultural] imperialism."[34] And, of course, both of these could only be countered through major government expenditures. Technological nationalism thus encountered its constraint.

In passing the 1932 Radio Broadcasting Bill, Parliament sought to empower the discourse of technological nationalism. However, while talk may be cheap, its transmission by radio is not and Parliament was ultimately unwilling to advance the funds necessary for the new radio service, the Canadian Radio Broadcasting Commission (CRBC), to nationalize existing stations or establish many new facilities.[35] The federal government, under John A. MacDonald's leadership, had been willing to subsidize the CPR, but that project ultimately would promote Canadian commerce and the Canadian accumulation of capital. State radio, on the other hand, offered no financial benefits. On the contrary, state radio would always be a drain on the public purse, particularly if it were to avoid commercialization and seek to "uplift" its audience, rather than transmit popular (and predominantly American) programmes.

We see here a fundamental difference between the railroad and radio. While both were and are called upon to help create a nation, the railroad's nation is economic, while radio's is cultural and ideological. That the CPR would carry American goods, or that its Canadian cargo would be undistinguishable from American freight, was unimportant. Canadian commerce could be identical in content to its American counterpart and remain Canadian. Conversely, radio is not a common carrier and is thus quite unlike rail service. If radio were treated as a common carrier, like the railroad, its content would be irrelevant. Radio would be successful if it were profitable. However, radio is Canadian by its content, and is thus quite unlike the CPR. *Canadian* radio must create its own "freight," and find a market for it as well. However, before Canadian radio had developed into a mature form, the nature of demand in the radio market had already been constituted by the distribution of American programmes. Consequently, Canadian radio, unlike Canadian rail, could be either profitable or Canadian, not both. We see here then the second contradiction of technological nationalism: it identifies a medium ultimately based upon a foreign economic and programming logic as the site for Canada's cultural construction.

The CRBC's main failure was its inability to compete successfully with commercial broadcasters and so transform the airwaves into a medium fostering nationhood. This failure was not unique to the CRBC, but is endemic to Canadian broadcasting's history. The Canadian Broadcasting

Corporation, established to succeed the CRBC in 1936, faced the same dilemma. From its creation until the advent of television in Canada in 1952, the CBC did, to a degree, offset the influence of American broadcasting in Canada. Certainly, without state-sponsored radio, the airwaves in Canada would have become but another market for American networks. In particular, the CBC did offer to Canadians a common experience and its popularity increased during the second world war, as Canadians sought information on Canada's war effort. Nevertheless, American programming remained popular in Canada — Toronto and Montreal had US network affiliates, and the CBC's most popular programme were American productions such as "Fibber McGee and Molly" and "Edgar Bergen and Charlie McCarthy."[36]

Communication technology, heralded as the means of promoting Canadian statehood and nationhood, paradoxically offered those in Canada a common "national" experience which included cultural commodities from the United States. This phenomenon was intensified with the development of more sophisticated and expensive media. New media, as they accelerated the binding of space and the rise of empire, increasingly drew Canada into the American cultural system. Thus, when CBC television was born in 1952, there were already 146,000 receiving sets in Canada with antennae pointing south.[37] Television as a medium, with expensive genres of programming, styles of production, and a star system, was already developing in the United States. Canadian television could scarcely compete. Only the CBC's monopoly over Canadian TV network programming and the still poor penetration of cable television preserved a Canadian presence on Canadian screens. Thus, the 1957 Royal Commission on Broadcasting observed that Canadian television could not be Canadian and turn a profit, and reasserted the state's role in constructing a national identity:

> The choice is between a Canadian state-controlled system with some flow of programs east and west across Canada, with some Canadian content and the development of a Canadian sense of identity, at a substantial public cost, and a privately owned system which forces of economics will necessarily make predominantly dependent on American radio and television programmes.[38]

As in previous decades, the threat of American expansion is presented as warranting state action. And, as in the past, this 1957 report articulates the imperative of technological nationalism: It likens broadcasting to the CPR as it affirms that "the building of the first Canadian railway was only the first of many devices to pull together into a nation the vast expanse of Canadian territory."[39] It then asserts that without public expenditures, a Canadian nation could not exist. Within the logic of a technologically

mediated nation, the committee's observations are, of course, "true." More significantly, as an argumentative justification for a public policy of nation-building, their import is rhetorical. The need to support Canadian television is based upon a vision of technology as a means of creating and maintaining a nation at will. Significantly, this rhetoric sees a Canadian *nation* and identity as exegetic of the state itself. Ninety years after Canada's political constitution, a *national* identity is still so ephemeral that the state, and its agencies, feel compelled to create it. Technological nationalism refuses to consider that Canada is not a nation but a state, and that Canadian cultures could exist outside of their technological mediation.

Canadian television initially offered a varied menu which included many high quality programmes. The CBC's schedule was marked by acclaimed dramas, musical programmes, and documentaries.[40] However, as television "matured," it increasingly failed to create the nation that the rhetoric of technological nationalism envisaged. As early as 1956, only 45% of programming on CBC English-language television was of Canadian origin.[41] The CBC, in order to fill its schedule, raise advertising revenue, and respond to viewer demand, offered what it considered to be the best of US programming. Writing the research report for the 1957 Royal Commission, Dallas Smythe wondered whether the CBC was not its "own worst enemy," offering the "best" in US programmes and so arousing a desire for more of them.[42] The economics of the technology whose mission it was to consolidate Canadian unity permitted the diffusion of American culture into Canada. Furthermore, as television expanded in Canada, the number of hours of American productions viewed on Canadian screens steadily increased. In particular, as television developed, it increasingly offered the potential for profit. Thus, private interests were anxious to gain access to Canada's major markets and compete with CBC stations.

In 1958, a new broadcasting act removed from the CBC the power to regulate broadcasting and established a new agency for that purpose. In 1961, the Board of Broadcast Governors (BBG), yielded to business and viewer demand and licensed second-television services in Montreal, Toronto, Vancouver, Calgary, Winnipeg, and Halifax.[43] The creation of the CTV television network increased Canadian viewer choice, and so further extended US television into Canada. In retrospect, the BBG's decision might seem to have been ill-advised. Certainly, it did not promote Canadian unity and identity as broadcasting was charged to do. However, the technological imperative is not the exclusive property of the state. The technological and economic possibility of offering a second television service to Canada begat a desire for it both among an audience mesmerized by television's delights and entrepreneurs eager to turn a profit. Television, as a key vehicle of consumer culture, gave rise to a desire for itself.

The BBG, while presiding over the Americanization of Canadian airwaves, could only echo faintly the rhetoric of technological nationalism and promulgate a series of ineffective Canadian programming content regulations. Needless to say, except for news, public affairs, and hockey, Canadians preferred programs produced by the American media empire. Canadian broadcast technology had become primarily a channel for American cultural products. Television was increasingly like a railroad, for it was primarily a delivery system for standardized commodities produced in the United States. Furthermore, television's tendency to integrate Canada into the cultural system of the United States was accelerated by the cabling of Canadian cities. Cable television rendered the idea of a *Canadian* mediated culture nearly obsolete.

By 1976, close to 50% of Canadian homes were served by cable and 71% of Canadian English viewing time was devoted to programmes of foreign origin.[44] This was, in fact, noted by the BBG's successor, the Canadian Radio Television Commission (CRTC), which asserted: "we now have in place a distribution system more effectively oriented to the development and distribution of more foreign programming than to the creation and evolution of distinctly Canadian works."[45] Clearly, space-binding technology has not permitted the development of an authentic Canadian culture, shared by the majority of Canadians, which is autonomous from American culture. Communication technology has perhaps offered Canadians a shared experience, but only as it has also included them in the American cultural market. If regionalism has been softened by technology, the identity or culture fostered is hardly a distinctive Canadian one. Furthermore, it could be argued, as does Bernard Ostry, that efforts by Ottawa to develop cultural unity have fueled demands in Canada for regional autonomy.[46] In the face of a discourse of nation-building, a turn away from a technologized culture in the image of the federal state would hardly be surprising.

Nevertheless, federal policy-makers continue to dream a nation and rhetorically assert the legitimacy of their efforts through technological nationalism. For example, in 1977 CBC president A.W. Johnson announced the corporation's plan to "Canadianize" its programming. He characterized the American cultural "onslaught" as "rape" and likened today's CBC to Confederation's CPR:[47]

> Our forefathers were prepared to pay the premium as they supported John A. MacDonald with his and our national dream. They paid the premium building East-West communication links which have been the life-giving arteries of our nation from the time of the voyageurs, the Hudson Bay trappers, and Van Horne to the contemporary connective series of railroads, telephones, airlines, pipelines,

> radio, and television. Without these East-West links Canada would
> not survive, for effective communications and transportation sys-
> tems are far more significant factors in the existence of Canada as
> a political and social entity than for any other nation on earth.[48]

Johnson here depicts Canada as a technologically constituted society.
Without technology, there would be no Canada. Indeed, Canada does not
emerge out of the land, but out of its conquest by technology and political
will. And, for Johnson, technology and political will must again, as always,
counter the American threat.

The Contradictions of Culture and Technology

While, certainly, the Canadian economic state depends upon technology,
we should question whether technology constitutes or regenerates a Cana-
dian culture. Technological nationalism offers Canadians a common experi-
ence of signs and information in which culture is disembodied. Thus,
technology promotes a cultural experience which is not grounded in a
region or tradition, particularly if it is in the service of some "national"
interest. Because the state itself is the basis of a Canadian commonality, its
national consciousness would be the product of a bureaucratic cultural
apparatus. Once a culture is associated with television, and technology
generally, the nature of the American subordination becomes clear. Ameri-
can culture (or, what's the same: intense commodification) is imposing
itself on Canada through the very technologies which should be constitutive
of the Canadian experience and essence. Furthermore, America's presence
on Canadian screens is a curious form of subordination, for Canadians enjoy
American cultural products, even while recognizing the cultural invasion,
or what, in broadcast industry jargon, is referred to as "market penetration."
It seems, then, more accurate to say that Canadians are being seduced by
American cultural commodities designed for a technology capable of elicit-
ing desire.[49] This points to the third contradiction of technological national-
ism: The mediated culture which is imperative to Canadian statehood has
within its logic the seduction of technology itself.[50] American television
exploits the seductiveness of the technological experience.

Even in the ideal world of Canadian television envisioned by the CBC, the
Canadian experience would remain an experience of technology, of the
state, and of power. In its 1978 submission to the CRTC, the CBC asserts
that Canada's shared experience includes Paul Henderson's 1972 winning
goal for Team Canada against the USSR, the televised drama of the Mont-
real Olympics, and Peter Kent's reporting of federal election results.[51] Note
that each of these moments of experience are "media events" where
national identity is inscribed in a mythos of power, and where official state

culture is celebrated. Each of these elements of our "national experience" exists precisely as an absence of a non-technologized commonality. The Canadian imagination, according to technological nationalism, is a technologically mediated one which derives from the state and is in opposition to nature as well as regionalism. But, in the face of the American presence and regional cultures, traditions, and history the discourse of the Canadian state and its institutions can only offer mediation itself as the ground for unity, as I have earlier observed. Just as the CPR would be our "national dream," so the CBC would be our common cultural ground. Thus, the CBC can assert that its purpose is "the *creation* of our national consciousness" (my emphasis).[52]

As is obvious to even the casual observer of Canadian broadcasting, and as the CBC and CRTC have at times complained, electronic delivery systems cannot, in themselves, create a culture. As the 1956 Royal Commission on Broadcasting observed, what is important is the programming. In order to give rise to a Canadian identity, communication technologies must carry Canadian products. However, to simply berate Parliament for its unwillingness to better fund Canadian television, to criticize commercial interests for their unwillingness to sacrifice profit for the sake of a national culture, or to attack the CRTC for lacking the courage to halt the development of cable systems, is in large measure to miss the point. The failure of technological nationalism lies not in Parliament, CTV, or the CRTC, but in contradictions inherent to technological nationalism itself.

Conclusion

Rail and radio differ. The latter binds space much more efficiently than the former. The railroad depends upon the physical domination of geography to join distant points. Radio, on the other hand, does not so much bind space as annihilate it. The railroad binds space one-dimensionally as it links east to west; radio renders space insignificant across two or three dimensions as all points become proximate. Thus, radio, and electronic technology in general, will tend to ensnare Canada within an American web of information. The advocates of Canada's continual technological reconstitution seem to have intuitively, but naively, grasped what Innis observed, that technologies of communication extend and strengthen empires. They sought to favour the Canadian (and British Empire) domination of a geographic and cultural territory, but they failed to realize that such technologies were not merely the tools of political will permitting control over a region. As Innis saw, space-binding technologies favour and transform existing centers of power. They are not the political, economic, and cultural equivalents of string and tape, which can patch together a territory. They are media which extend power, and for Canada in the twentieth century, power is based in

the United States. Thus, as broadcasting developed in Canada, it adopted the form and content of American programmes.

The Americanization of Canada's airwaves should hardly be surprising, for the American industry of cultural production has economic, technical, and human resources which Canada could not match. Sheer economic forces favoured the integration of English Canada's cultural market to the American one. This is particularly so because the penetration of American over-the-air signals into Canada during broadcasting's early years established the form of media in Canada. Broadcasting, the technology called upon to form a Canadian cultural identity, became a form of spectacle and entertainment.[53] American signals defined what radio and television would be in the popular mind. Thus, from the outset, radio and television were media dedicated to the distribution of cultural commodities. In the "cultural" marketplace, a Canadian industry could hardly compete. Indeed, private broadcasters, acting with great economic rationality, largely contended themselves with distributing cultural products produced elsewhere rather than attempting to create their own.

The economic forces drawing Canada into the American system of cultural production, as accelerated by technology, perhaps could have been undermined by a very powerful political will. One could argue, as does Johnson and the CBC, that just as Canada did build the CPR against great odds, it could have created a *Canadian* broadcasting system through high levels of public expenditure. Certainly, with sufficient funding, an all Canadian CBC would be possible. However, this view fails to consider that for television to offer a "national" *experience*, it would of necessity need to integrate itself into the logic of the cultural commodity system.

A Canadian culture would depend upon Canadian audiences, and would therefore have to attract viewers in a market defined by the American cultural system. And, for Canadian products to be consumed in the cultural commodity marketplace, they would have to become "Americanized," either to compete with American signals straying into Canada, or to compete in either the American or USA-dominated "world" markets. Indeed, recent initiatives by the Department of Communication and the CBC to promote the international marketing of programs suggests a recognition that media products are commodities, that the culture system is an industry.[54] This abdication to the logic of space-binding technology leads us to competitive Canadian cultural products such as *Porky's*, set in Florida, the *First Choice* Pay TV Canadian content offerings such as features starring Red Skelton and Robin Williams, and a documentary on US General Douglas McCarthur. Canada's prowess in developing space-binding technology, celebrated as a national achievement in the *National Dream*, ironically serves now to undermine Canada's cultural autonomy.

In the absence of the American (culture as commodity) presence, it is doubtful whether the logic of technological nationalism would be any more successful. Technological nationalism, as a form of liberalism, presumes that communication will reveal a common interest uniting Canadians in spite of their differences: The CBC would both express Canada's diversity and promote a (singular) Canadian identity; Telidon would be tomorrow's soapbox and town meeting hall.[55] Technological nationalism presents technology merely as a neutral medium facilitating nationhood. However, it is hardly so benign, for it locates the state's very *raison d'être* in the experience of technological mediation. Indeed, as Innis observed, space-binding technologies establish dominions of power by extending markets and the commodity system. Radio and television, and other communication technologies, may appear unlike the CPR or the system of trade because they distribute information rather than goods. However, the content of media are commodities which are produced, bought and sold, and electronic media extend the economic and cultural influence of centres of production over marginal areas. Most importantly, media promote the cultural dependency of margins. While the rhetoric of technological nationalism promises a public in which Canadians would share their commonality and participate in political will formation, it offers ultimately a state in which listeners are subject to a discourse which can only be produced by specialists. Technological nationalism's liberalism ideologically conceals a set of power relations. This is apparent in McKenzie King's comment on his 1927 Diamond Jubilee address: Canadians, under technological nationalism would be *subject* to a voice. They would form an audience to a media product which would be the basis for their common experience and identity. Technological nationalism undermines the possibility of a community of participation. As Carey and Quirk note:

> Modern media have, however, a common effect: they widen the range of reception while narrowing the range of distribution. Large audiences receive but are unable to make direct response or participate otherwise in vigorous discussion. Consequently, modern media create the potential for the simultaneous administration and control of extraordinary spaces and populations. No amount of rhetoric will exorcise this effect. The bias of technology can only be controlled by politics, by curtailing the expansionist tendencies of technological societies and by creating avenues of democratic discussion and participation beyond the control of modern technology.[56]

Broadcast communication technology does not create the site of a true *polis*. Furthermore, just as MacKenzie King was also the embodiment of the

Canadian state and its power as he addressed Canada, Canada's discourse on itself would be the discourse of technologized power, for Canada's national dream is a dream of technology.

Canada is a country whose *national* experience follows its state experience. Consequently, a Canadian identity and culture would be rooted in the state itself, for it is through the state that Canada's populace is constituted as a people. Technological nationalism therefore cannot but offer the empty experience of mediation. Not only do communication technologies favour centers of power and promote the suppression of marginal experience, but they transform culture into the experience of commodities and of technology itself. Thus, even if technological nationalism could offer a Canadian experience and promote a national identity across space, that identity would become a disposable one.

To conclude: Technological nationalism's promise is suspect because the commodified culture it would constitute would have no stability, and would be but another instance of the culture of technological society. As Innis observes: "Stability which characterized certain periods in earlier civilizations is not the obvious objective of this civilization."[57] Our space-binding culture, also a commodity culture, changes rapidly — fashions, music, politics, are celebrated and then their value is exhausted.[58] A technologically mediated Canadian culture, based in the experience of media commodities, would contribute little to a Canadian self-understanding. Rather than interpreting some supposedly Canadian experience, and offering "a sense of balance and proportion,"[59] technological nationalism can only offer itself in a constantly mutating form. We must develop new rhetorics about and for ourselves, and create our cultures otherwise and elsewhere. The national dream offers only the dark sun of alienation.

Notes

1. The *National Dream*, based on Pierre Berton's history of the CPR, was originally broadcast during the 1973-1974 television season as an eight-part series. The series was rebroadcast in 1982 and 1985.

2. Kenneth Burke, *The Rhetoric of Religion: Studies in Logology* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961), p. 18; *Language as Symbolic Action: Essays on Life, Literature, and Method* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966): 362-373.

3. James W. Carey and John J. Quirk. "The Mythos of the Electronic Revolution," *American Scholar* 39 (1, 1970): 219-251; 40 (2, 1970): 395-424.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 238.

5. Michael Calvin McGee, "The Ideograph: A Link between Rhetoric and Ideology," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 66 (February 1980): 4-9.

6. Harold A. Innis, *A History of the Canadian Pacific Railway* (1923; rpt. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971), p. 287.

7. I am subscribing to a "metropolitain" interpretation of Canadian history. This perspective is central to Innis' analysis and is discussed in J.M.S. Careless, "Frontierism, Metropolitainism, and Canadian History," *The Canadian Historical Review* 35 (March 1954): 1-21.

8. Quebec initially supported, albeit with some reservations, Ottawa's decision to put down militarily the 1885 Métis uprising. Popular support in Quebec for Riel developed subsequent to his defeat. See, Robert Rumilly, *Histoire de la Province de Québec*, vol. 5 (Montreal: Editions Bernard Valiquette, 1942): 1-108.

9. Michael Calvin McGee, "In Search of the 'People': A Rhetorical Alternative," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 66 (February 1980): 1-16.

10. G.P. de T. Glazenbrook, *A History of Transportation in Canada*, vol. 2 (1934; rpt. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1964), p. 47.

11. Canada. House of Commons, *Debates*, 17 January 1881, p. 488.

12. Canada. House of Commons, *Debates*, 14 December 1880, p. 50.

13. Pierre Berton, *The National Dream* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1970): 11.

14. Various rhetorics of technology are possible. Canada's rhetoric is rooted in its colonial origins and state-supervised development. In the United States, where local development preceded the federal state, a different rhetoric of technology arose. There, "clean" electrical technology was heralded as a means to restore the pastoral ideals of a democratic community and harmony with nature. See, Carey and Quirk, pp. 226-235, *passim*.

15. Kenneth Burke, *A Grammar of Motives* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1945), pp. xv-xxiii, 275-317.

16. McGee, "In Search of the 'People.'"

17. Georges Etienne Cartier, address to the Assembly of Lower Canada, 7 February 1865, in *Le manuel de la paroles: Manifestes Québécois*, vol. 1 (Sillerey: Editions du boréal express, 1977), pp. 53-61: "Les nations sont formées maintenant par l'agglomération de divers peuples rassemblés par les intérêts et sympathies, ceci est notre position dans le moment actuel. Une objection a été suscité au projet maintenant sous notre considération [Confederation], à cause des mots 'nouvelle nationalité'. Lorsque nous sommes unis, si toutefois nous le devenons, nous formerons une nationalité politique indépendante de l'origine nationale, ou de la religion d'aucun individu."

18. The interests of empire in the CPR are quite evident: Great Britain took an interest in the CPR's construction, Canadian Pacific instituted steamer service from its western terminus to Australia and the Orient in order to link British territories, and the railway came to be considered part of the Empire's system of communication and received a British postal subsidy. See, John Murray Gibbon, *Steel of Empire* (London: Rich & Cowen, Ltd., 1935): 355.

19. Frank W. Peers, *The Politics of Canadian Broadcasting 1920-1951* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969): 23-24.

20. *Ibid.*

21. CNR radio did offer some French-language programming on its network, much to displeasure of many in Western Canada who objected to the French language being on the air outside of Quebec. As Innis observes of radio: "Stability within language units became more evident and instability between language units more dangerous." Harold A. Innis, *The Bias of Communication* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1951): 82.

22. Darcy Marsh, *The Tragedy of Sir Henry Thorton* (Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada Limited, 1935): 115-116.

23. William Lyon MacKenzie King, address at the Canadian National Exhibition, July 1927, in *Signing On: The Birth of Radio in Canada* (Toronto: Doubleday Canada Limited, 1982): 190.

24. *Ibid.*

25. Innis, *Bias of Communication*, p. 82.

26. Canada. *Royal Commission on Broadcasting, 1929 (Aird Commission), Report*, pp. 12-13.

27. Margaret Prang, "The Origins of Public Broadcasting in Canada," *The Canadian Historical Review* 46 (1, 1965): 11-31.

28. Aird Commission, p. 6.

29. Reprinted in Peers, p. 78.

30. Reprinted in *Ibid.*, p. 97.

31. Reprinted in *Ibid.*, pp. 101-102.

32. Prang, p. 3.

33. *Ibid.*, p. 4.

34. Oliver Boyd-Barrett, "Media Imperialism: Towards an International Framework for the Analysis of Media Systems," in *Mass Communication and Society*, edited by James Curran, Michael Gurevitch, and Janet Woollacott (London: Open University Press, 1977): 116-135.

35. The CRBC's funding problems are discussed in E. Austin Weir, *The Struggle for National Broadcasting in Canada* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1965): 173-177.

36. *Ibid.*, p. 281; Peers, p. 283, 285.

37. Canada. *Royal Commission on Broadcasting*, 1957 (Fowler I), *Report*, p. 313.

38. *Ibid.*, p. 10.

39. *Ibid.*, p. 9.

40. Weir, pp. 368-402.

41. Fowler I, p. 365.

42. Dallas Smythe, "On the Comparative Availability of United States TV Network Programmes in Communities with TV Service in Canada and in the United States," in *Ibid.*, p. 403.

43. Second service television stations were licenced in 1960 and 1961. The CTV network was licenced in 1961. See, Canada. Board of Broadcast Governors, *Annual Report*, 1960, p. 8; 1961, pp. 7, 12.

44. Canada. Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission, *Special Report on Broadcasting in Canada*, vol. 1, pp. 19, 49.

45. Canada. Canadian Radio Television Commission, *Policies Respecting Broadcasting Receiving Undertakings (Cable Television)*, 16 December 1975, p. 3.

46. Bernard Ostry, *The Cultural Connection* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1978): 25-26, 61.

47. A.W. Johnson, *Touchstone for the CBC*, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, June 1977, pp. 4, 10.

48. *Ibid.*, p. 8.

49. For a discussion of the seduction of technological experience see, Arthur Kroker, *Technology and the Canadian Mind: Innis/McLuhan/Grant* (Montreal: New World Perspectives, 1984 and New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985), 53-74; and Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (New York: The Continuum Publishing Company, 1969): 138-147.

50. *Ibid.*

51. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, *The CBC — A Perspective: Submission to the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commissions in Support of Applications of Network Licences*, May 1978, p.1.

52. *Ibid.*

53. Of course, electronic technologies are in themselves spectacular. Radio's initial appeal, for example, lay not in its programming, but in its ability to invisibly and magically connect distant points.

54. For instances of the recent competitive strategy for what ironically are now termed "cultural industries" see, Canada. Department of Communications, *Towards a New National Broadcasting Policy*, February 1983; and Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, *The Strategy of the CBC*, 1983, pp. 79-80.

55. Canada. Ministère des Communications, *Notes pour une allocution du Ministre des communications l'honorable Francis Fox devant l'association canadienne des communications*, Ottawa, 5 June 1982, p. 17: "Il est indéniable que les technologies nouvelles ont le pouvoir de nous atomiser, de faire de nous des isolés reliés individuellement à un centre informatique multimédia. Mais elles ont aussi le pouvoir de nous rapprocher, de donner naissance au village global, ou plutôt à la ville globale dont Télidon serait la place publique, le crieur et le conteur."

56. Carey and Quirk, p. 240.

57. Innis, *Bias of Communication*, p. 141.

58. For an enlightening exploration of the implications of the ephemerality and impermanence of "space-bound" contemporary culture see, James W. Carey, "Harold Adams Innis and Marshall McLuhan," *The Antioch Review* (Spring 1967): 29-35.

59. Innis, *Bias of Communication*, p. 86.