THE DARK SIDE OF ENLIGHTENMENT

David Cook

"... and the den nam'd
Horror held a man
Chain'd hand and foot, round his neck an iron band,
hid from the light, as in a cleft rock:
And the man was confin'd for writing a prophetic: in
the tower nam'd Darkness was a man ..."

William Blake,
The French Revolution

The turning back into the past in an effort to get to the root, or if one prefers
the genealogy of the problems of the twentieth century has proceeded recently
along the lines of placing explosives under the conventional reading of the
tradition. This activity has been particularly intense in the re-readings of the
works of the Marquis de Sade, or rather in the progressive transformations of
what Sade is understood to be. The question raised by Simone de Beauvoir in
1955 of "Must we burn Sade?" has yielded to the more authoritarian injunction
that we must read Sade.

These injunctions often direct the reader to see Sade in the guise of an early
Freud on the one hand, or with the persona of the insane asylum on the other
hand. In doing so Sade is lifted out of his time becoming in each case what he is
not. As a result his thought suffers from being both more and less than it is. Sade
should be returned to the discourse of the Enlightenment. A return that will be
argued here depicts what William Blake so clearly understood that the dawn of a
new world required the release of the incarcerated imagination. With an irony
that penetrates to the core of eighteenth century society Sade's imprisonment in
the tower of liberty of the Bastille symbolizes the unfreedom of the dominant
political and religious myths. Through the locking up of the imagination prisons
had appropriated the title of reason while being founded in unreason. The
forceable acceptance of this logic destroyed both the body and the mind. It
created monsters of the imagination that Goya transcribed to canvas. Sade true
to his world of victim/victimizer is one of these creations.

The contrast between the claims made here for Sade's importance to the life of
the imagination and his work is complete. There is almost universal agreement
that Sade's writings are boring and repetitive and that the philosophy expressed
is second rate. The obvious uneasiness of these views resting together has called
for explanation, for example in the recent biography of Sade by Ronald
Hayman, or in the works of Roland Barthes. The biographical stance of Hayman although providing many interesting clues to the enigma reduces Sade to the frailties of everyday life. One must turn to Sade’s work itself, and in the beginning to the manner in which Sade theorizes. For this task Barthes’ critique is a useful starting point.

Barthes attempts to rescue Sade in his examination of the ‘Text’; that is through the works themselves. Through what Barthes calls the pleasure of the text one witnesses “the amicable return of the author” as the reader becomes engaged in the discursive unity of the theatrical world found in the writings. The stress placed on the theatrical is important in understanding Sade for however much his work misses as great literature it still must be read from the perspective of a deliberate presentation. It is not guided by description of reality, but by the creation of images. Hence Sade’s threat to the world he lived in, or to the world which continued to repress his works following his death is located, as Barthes correctly suggests, not in the shocking examples of his characters’ actions. Indeed if taken alone these actions are in a sense in bad taste and boring. Sade’s danger lies rather in his exceeding the ideology or myths that sustain the social order. The re-presentation of the bourgeois world through the mask that unmasks.

A reading of Sade must, to use Freiderich Durrenmatt’s phrase, render his text dangerous. Barthe’s own reading locates this in the “paradoxical (pure of any doxa) discourse”; in effect the creation of a new language. One is struck, though, not with the creation of a new language, for Sade did not invent, for example, either the word or the concept of sadism. Sade is caught more within the language of his time from which he did not escape. Here alone is a significant source of the boredom and repetition. However Sade was capable of a contraposition to the prevailing ‘doxa’ through the use of language’s double, the imagination.

If one turns to the examination of the structure of Sade’s writings one is struck immediately by the similarities in this structure to other writings in which political critiques and utopias have been presented. Though Barthes does not take his reader in this direction Sade’s use of the negative utopia is strikingly traditional while achieving a revolutionary impact. It is clear that even in a more straightforward political tract such as Yet another effort, Frenchmen, if you would become Republicans that Sade has a work such as Thomas More’s Utopia not far from his mind. Once turning to the more literary works the comparison in structure to Plato’s Republic, is an example though clearly not to the level of thought, is even more pronounced. The Sadian castles such as Silling in The 120 Days of Sodom must be read as a variant of the Platonic cities of The Republic. Sade’s exploration of virtue and vice is through the founding in the imagination a society which bears a similar relation to the exercise of founding cities in Plato’s dialogue. The fact that Sade presents only half of the dialogue focusing on the negative city of crime has led commentators to assume that Sade is to be interpreted literally. Yet Sade, like Plato, gives ample warning in each of his major works that they require interpretation. One is struck with the fact that Sade explicitly structures the novels as works of ‘education’. Again referring to
The 120 Days Sade gave as its sub-title "l'Ecole du libertinage". Education, in distinction to science, requires the storyteller whose lessons or parables must be of the super natural.

Recognition of this manner of theorizing immediately removes the objection of so many readers that Sade was not realistic. The cataloguing of sexual acts in The 120 Days is not science anymore than the encyclopedia of the philosophies was for Sade a compendium of truth. In fact Sade is quite explicit in proceeding via way of the primacy of the conceptual over the factual. The order of the Silling castle is to have the storyteller first recount in speech an activity which once established in theory is enacted. Variations on themes are improvised and one is always mindful of the surroundings, a fascination that Barthes satisfies with a picture of the theatre of debauchery. Yet the basic demand to set forth action first in speech is honoured. This sets the progress of Sade's writing not, as is frequently remarked in literary criticism in terms of development of characters or plots, neither of which exist in any complete sense, but rather in the gradual escalation of the demands of the storyteller. This ends in absurd demands not unlike some of the absurd endings of Platonic speech. The rule of the philosophers is no more to be taken literally than the rule of the libertines. The exaggeration in each case serves to establish the limits of the concept and is integral to the manner of theorizing. Thus the degeneracy into mass slaughter and necrophilia is not something to "leave aside (as) removed from the 'normal inclinations of his heroes" as Maurice Blanchot one of Sade's first modern critics suggests.

Thus there is a sense that Barthes' claim that Sade was founding a new language through the opening of a discursive site should be honoured. Yet it is also clear that in reading Sade one must not repeat the hermeneutical incarceration of the work in its own universe which appears to be Barthes' ending point. Sade has been locked up enough. Barthes states that "it might almost be said that imagination is the Sadean word for language." There is a difference between language and imagination. It is this difference which leads to the placement of Sade within the ideological imagination of the Enlightenment. This returns Sade's work to the tradition while recognizing the paradoxical side of his speech. It is in this sense one can argue that Sade's work contributes to the darker side of the Enlightenment. One may also advance the position that Sade's failure to radicalize the Enlightenment indicates the domination of the subject is not only one of physical imprisonment but also of the imaginative universe. The ultimate sterility of Sade is the sterility of the dominated imagination.

Sade's link to the Enlightenment can be seen in his attempts to turn inside out part of the ideology that he encountered. In doing so Sade's universe represents not so much a renunciation of the prevailing views as he understood them, but a re-stating of the world that was coming apart. This activity, as many commentators have suggested, ends in Sade's political conservatism despite his support of the French Revolution. He remained an aristocrat almost in spite of himself.

Consider the central concept of the Enlightenment, reason itself. Under this broad concept it is apparent that there existed considerable diversity amongst
the views expressed by those who Peter Gay has defined as the central figures of the Enlightenment. Gay quite rightly rejects the characterization of the period as the Age of Reason owing to this diversity. In the case of Sade the emphasis on finding an ordering principle, in effect to bring reason to bear on activity, is common to virtually all his writings. The reader finds injunctions given by the libertines to bring order to the pursuit of pleasure such as is illustrated by the passage below which forms the opening pages of *Juliette*.

>'One moment', Delbène panted, wholly ablaze, 'one moment my dears, we had best introduce a little method into our pleasure's madness: they're not relished unless organized!'13

The role of this debased form of reason is central enough to lead commentators such as Jacques Lacan to see Sade as the logical completion of Kant and, in particular, Kant's *Critique of Practical Reason* rather than in the guise as a precursor of Freud.14 This is to suggest that Sade was searching for a form of the categorical imperative that would be able to order experience independent of the content of the experience. In short whatever the action as pleasure, as opposed to the Kantian action as duty, Sade called for a 'reasonable' rule. The maxim turns out to be something like 'all orifices should be filled'; a maxim aside from its vulgarity, that as best falls short of reason degenerating into a form of mechanistic rationality. In works such as *Juliette* this mechanistic approach leads to the instrumentality of the machine which carries out the pleasures with the subjects only as appendages.15 This debasement of a type of 'pure reason' illustrates the core of unreasonableness in reason which leads to the elimination of the subject.

As with many concepts in Sade's world reason must be seen as the nexus of reason-unreason where the alteration between the two is always on-going. This process is not dialectical nor progressive. It resides at the centre of society as seen and as created by Sade. It is the basis of his critique of the Enlightenment's own monolithic use of reason.

Sade then proceeds to challenge both Christianity and the ideal of freedom under contract theory on a similar basis. Each myth is exposed in terms of its unreasonableness through the imaginative overturning or turning inside out of the myth. Another form, albeit in a form of parody, of the dramatic upsetting of Kant by Hegel under the sign of domination rather than freedom. Though Sade's work did not form part of the tradition the rejection of the claim to freedom made by Kant was, as is well known, central to the theoretical work of Hegel and for that matter Marx. Moreover many other post-Kantian writers retained the centrality of freedom in face of the pratical evidence to the contrary. Sade is again, in this sense, more radical for his undertaking of the restructuring of society was from the perspective of enslavement through a republic of crime. In a similar manner to reason's relation to unreason Sade proceeds to illuminate
freedom through unfreedom. In the logic of this unfreedom Sade finds the root of the liberal theory of society. The power of Sade's approach to social contract theory resides in part in his marked eclectic approach. Sade's originality, as we have seen, was not in terms of the development of the positive political myth. He accepts as a starting point the various forms of the myth that he encounters in the works of Hobbes, Montesquieu, and Rousseau. Thus one is dealing with an almost unadulterated form of liberal ideology profound precisely for its unoriginality. To this, if one takes a simplistic approach, Sade adds Machiavelli, the most frequently quoted theorist in Juliette. Here one has a re-enactment on a rather small stage of the tension expressed in moral terms between good and evil faced with the necessary expediency of the political world.

Sade's intent in examining contract theories of society was to show that his precursors' attempts at justification of the social order have correctly set forth the condition of man in the 'pre-societal state', the state of nature, only to deny precisely what they have postulated in moving to political society. In enumerable instances in Sade's work the state of nature is painted in the familiar terms of the state of war as Coeur de Fer's description in Justine suggests.

But the result, you will object, will be a state of perpetual war. So be it, is this not the state of Nature? Is it not the only state that truly becomes us? Men were all born alone, envious, cruel and despotic, desiring to possess everything and surrender nothing, and perpetually struggling to maintain either their ambitions or their rights...

The similarity of this description to that of Hobbes' picture of English society in part one of the Leviathan is striking. So also is the conclusion that Sade draws from the description which occupies a central place in his work. Human nature in the state of nature is manifested in desires and more specifically in the pursuit of pleasures.

If egoism is the first law of Nature, it is surely above all in the lustful pleasures that this celestial mother desires it to be our sole motive.

Sade takes Hobbes seriously and in doing so places the most powerful of the bourgeois philosophers at the core of his own philosophy. Desire when linked with power is the sovereign principle of the Leviathan and of the Sadian castles. Sade's critique focuses on the logic of this relation which serves to upset any notion that the social contract arises out of a sense of free and equal men acting in
a reasonable manner. According to Sade the initial differences amongst men of "brute strength" immediately created an inequality. This inequality structured the first social relations which were ones of exploitation, or to use Sade's words; "In the beginning, then, was theft." 19 Because theft had its origin in the natural differences between men it was seen as being in accord with nature, and according to the familiar argument if nature had not intended man to steal she would have provided "man a fair share in the things of this world...and would thus have prevented anybody from enriching himself to the detriment of his neighbor." 20 Sade then goes on to postulate that the formation of society was to institutionalize the origins of inequality.

When the first laws were promulgated, when the weak individual agreed to surrender part of his independence to ensure the rest of it, the maintenance of his goods was incontestably the first thing he desired, and...The powerful individual assented to these laws which he knew very well he would never obey...two classes: those who yield up a quarter of the loaf in order to be able, undisturbed, to eat and digest what was left, and those who, eagerly taking the portion proffered to them and seeing that they'd get the rest of the bread whenever they pleased..." 21

This argument is, of course, not original for it is found in a more compelling version in Rousseau's A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality. Similarly Rousseau's protest in the last pages of Emile that: "In vain do we seek freedom under the power of the laws. The laws "Where is there any law? Where is there any respect for law? Under the name of law you have everywhere seen the rule of self-interest and human passion" 22 could easily have been from the hand of Sade. But Rousseau is hardly confused with Sade; witness two works on education: the Emile and Sade's Juliette which prepare their students for two very different worlds. Sade could not have written Rousseau's famous phrase that "God makes all things good, man meddles with them and they become evil." 23 For in the phrase Rousseau at least holds out the possibility of laws that will exist to minimize the damage. The social contract nor Nature herself, for Sade, ever reaches towards the virtuous or the moral.

In an argument, again reminiscent of the argument in Leviathan, Sade claims that government's "unique morality" must be to it continuance. Surrounded by a nature that is not benign but rather at war "the means to its preservation cannot be imagined as moral means (emphasis Sade's), for the republic will preserve itself only by war, and nothing is less moral than war." Faced with this political fact Sade again concludes with a rhetorical question which denies the moral basis of the social contract. 'I ask how one will be able to demonstrate that in a state rendered immoral by its obligations, it is essential that the individual be
moral?" 

As a consequence in the Sadian critique law is always the institution which prescribes the relation of the desires to the desired, and not the agent of a moral sentiment. Hence it always represents the order of domination or coercion. Michel Foucault has expressed a similar view in claiming that "humanity installs each of its violations in system of rules and thus proceeds from domination to domination."  

Again the presentation made by Sade is not original for the controlling of the passions or desires by law is pretty standard. To use Rousseau's *Emile* as a reference, the task of society can be see, in one guise, as "decreasing the difference between our desires and our powers in establishing a perfect equilibrium between the power and the will."  

Rousseau elects to use power linked to will as the means whereas power is much more closely aligned in Sade's writings with the desires. Rousseau then continues in the *Emile* to identify the source of this problem in the imagination which "enlarges the bounds of possibility...and therefore stimulates and feeds desires..." The conclusion Rousseau draws follows logically in the controlling of the imagination; a conclusion that sets him diametrically opposed to Sade. To reference again the *Emile*.  

The world of reality has it bounds, the world of the imagination is boundless, as we cannot enlarge the one, let us restrict the other; for all the sufferings which really make us miserable arise from the difference between the real and the imaginary.  

Rousseau's thought cannot be exhausted by the simple reduction of his thought to a formula for the restriction of the imagination. Yet Rousseau's ascription of a menacing role for the imagination closes off an entry into liberal ideology which could explode it facade. Rousseau is nevertheless far more penetrating in the conceptualization of the imagination than the reductionism which runs through the tradition from Hobbes, Locke to writers as diverse as Burke. Here the imagination is viewed primarily in terms of an uncreative empiricism.  

Sade's reaction to the falsity of the tradition is to portray the society created under its auspices in a series of negative moments. Moments which have at their core the radical suppression of the individual. The progressive loss of the subject becomes both the plot structure of Sade's books as well as the reality for Sade of the world. This reality becomes apparent through the establishment of the imaginative societies where the logic implicit in the social contract is made explicit. The playing out of the Sadian critique required the Sadian castles. That is Sade's claim that conventional society called everything by its opposite necessitated the construction of negative utopias. In a manner similar to George Orwell's in 1984 Sade systematically identifies opposites in a parody of the
philosophical claim of the unity of identity and difference. The relations in society are expressed through the concept of the negative but not as dialectical relations. There is no reconciliation as in Hegel. There is merely the negative.

As an illustration, Sade consciously reverses the claim to freedom in the establishment of the setting of the *120 Days*.

I am alone here, I am at the world's end, withheld from every gaze, here no one can reach me, there is no creature that can come nigh where I am, no limits, hence no barriers; I am free.28

While Sade's work must be read with a view to his irony and black humour there is a seriousness to the theoretical constructions. The castle begins without the order of God29 or without laws; that is without the repressive structure of society. This situation allows Sade to re-enact the founding of society through the establishment of codes and statutes as they 'truly' are. If one takes either the code of laws governing Silling30 or other examples such as the Statutes of the Sodality of the Friends of Crime31 Sade explicitly forbids political discourse; the sign again of his removal of the false mask governing society. This frees Sade to work out the logic of desires which is encrusted in the political ideology of the social contract.

Everyone who has had any contact with Sade knows that the desires are played out through the sexual domain. The originality and force of this claim has undoubtedly been responsible for the interest in Sade. There is a sense being argues here that this claim deliberately passes over Sade.

In examining what Sade says it is clear that the context of 'desires' is linked to the sense of 'wanting' or 'lack'; to the concept of negation. If there is a Sadian ontology it is structured as Pierre Klossowki remarks on non-being and negation rather than strictly on the sexual. In an important passage in The *120 Days* the libertines inform the reader of the dynamic of the desires which always places the consummation of desire outside itself and outside of the subject.

How can you be happy if you are able constantly to satisfy yourself? It is not in desires' consummation happiness consists, but in the desire itself, in the hurdling the obstacles placed before what one wishes. Well what is the perspective here? One needs but wish and one has. I swear to you', he continued, 'that since my arrival here my fuck has not once flowed because of the objects I find about me in this castle. Every time, I have discharged over what is not here, what is absent from this place and so it is.32
The sense of estrangement carried within the postulate of infinite desires has been borne out in the incipient nihilism of a society structured on the state of nature as the state of war. The point of desires is never to be fulfilled in the dynamics of repression and domination.

However, the point of Sade's attack was much more explicitly the ideology of Christianity than the realm of exploitation which Marx was to lay bare as the basis of the desire-desired relation. Sade as always was most backward at the time he was most forward. The concepts of privation and lack in Christian dogma were the evidence of the nothingness of evil in contrast to the fulness of the Lord. The ascription of evil to a form of non-being is central to Christian metaphysics. Etienne Gilson in his *The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine* expressed this in the following manner: "Evil is the privation of a good which the subject should possess, a failure to be what it should be and hence a pure nothingness." As all individuals were sinners, in the logic of unreason, all individuals were in essence nothing. The Christian myth then established the dynamic of emptying yourself to recognize one's 'true' relation to the Lord. Then one was ready to receive the fulness of the Lord. This for Sade was analogous to the origin of repression in contract theories. The state of nature was the state of the fall which was everyday life.

The unfolding of this myth symbolized the movement of the desiring-desired relation for Sade. Again as the reader knows the primary activity of the libertines was to void one's bowels, and, to use Sade's phrase, "to shed one's fuck". The receptacles of this operation are the inhabitants of the castle all of whom are empty shells awaiting to be filled or to fill in their turns; preferably as in *Juliette* to be filled on the altar or by the pope. The progressive elimination of those shells through torture or mutilation is a natural course in the logic of the castle because there is 'nothing' there. This follows the logic of Christianity which ascribes non-being to man and which sanctifies such things as the inquisition as a means of conversion. Ultimately the subjects are all eliminated because in a sense they never existed; they were all found wanting.

Both Sade's critique of contract theory and his attack on Christianity end in the unremitting violence characteristic of his depiction of nature. The dictum to the individual is likewise an unrepentant hedonism based on the calculus of pleasure and pain, of the sensible, which social myths rationalize. The overall prevailing social relation becomes the master-slave. It forms an invariant substructure to society replacing the heavenly version, the Lord-sinner relation, and denying the false claims to equality of contract theory. Injected with violence the master-slave takes on the appearance of reciprocity in the circular Sadian staircase of the tortured-torturer leading quite appropriately to the bowels of the earth rather than to heaven.

Simone de Beauvoir in commenting on the master-slave relation suggests "that, quite unlike the conflict described by Hegel the process involves no risk for the subject. (ie. the master). His primacy is not at stake, regardless of what happens to him, he will accept no master. If he is defeated, he retires to solitude which ends in death, but he remains sovereign." Beauvoir is correct in that there is no risk in the sense that the masters have always been masters and for Sade it is
an illusion to suggest otherwise. Where the subjects are not real, that is as creations of the imagination, there is no ground for advancement in the dialectic, hence death has no meaning. The closest Sade comes to an existential consideration is in the Dialogue between a Priest and a Dying Man which ends with the conversion of the priest to the world of the libertine. This denial of the existential in favour of the Sadian polemic against the church, however justified, severely limits Sade's challenge to the Hegelian dialectic. On the other hand the logic of the sovereignty of desire founds society on reciprocal nothingness, on relations of denial and annihilation. The masters are endemic to the system. They cannot escape, or realize themselves expect through the logic of destruction, or the logic of the imagination.

Thus both the course of the desires and the ideological trappings of the Christian and political worlds that force Sade's attention towards the realm outside; towards that which does not exist. In a sense the libertines must choose destruction while being inhabitants of the castle just as the social world for Sade has chosen destruction. The unsatisfactory nature of these choices is apparent even while they are being lived out. Salvation, if one can use this word in any sense with Sade, is through the denial of the negation in the conceptualizing of what is outside which in one sense does not exist, on the other hand, which has more reality or being than the empty shells in the castle. To again refer to the 120 Days and more specifically to the code governing life in the castle the "object is to inflame the imagination." This constant refrain is Sade extends to the centre of Sade's own most intense pleasures.

...lo, there is your ass, Juliette, there before my eyes, and beauteous it is to my contemplation; but my imagination, a more inspired architect than Nature, a more cunning artisan than she creates other asses more beautiful still; and the pleasure I derive from this illusion, is it not preferable to the one which reality is about to have me enjoy?

Sade's own entrappment in the world of the flesh, in the most visible form of non-being in the dogmatic scale of Christian metaphysics, is itself a limitation all too explainable in terms of his psychic problems. Yet the denial of the body is central in the master-slave relation. There is a perfect logic for Sade in the entrappment of the body, of the individual subject, in the working out of the theories governing the political realm. The negation of this negation through the imagination is itself ephemeral, for Sade cannot escape the circularity of the master-slave relation that has been constructed. Sade's politics as a consequence become as ideological as the Christianity he exposed.

But if one steps back from the practical, literal reading of Sade it is clear that the body's liberation is linked to the frantic attempt Sade makes to escape from the subjection of his imagination under the theological and political theories of
his time. The imagination is entrapped in the same way Sade was in the tower of liberty of the Bastille. There was a price to pay for Sade and his work in the prolonged stays in prison. His imagination, as for example evidenced in the creation of the castle of Silling, ultimately did not go beyond the asylum of Charenton where he spent his last days. Sade's prodigious effort to find reason, to find the intelligible order related to the sensible, never allowed him to listen to the unreason of his situation. Hence, in part, the repetitious and boring aspect of the Sadean corpus.

History also found it easier to ignore Sade in the development of the Enlightenment. Even Marx's reaction to Hegel in a sense passes him by. Recently the recognition of the darker side of the tradition has become more prominent. The uncovering of the imaginative universe has occurred through the works not only of Sade but of the poets and playwrights. Here literature and art join in the search for the replacement of the executed king or dead God. In a way this is a call to my mind for the return of theory as vision which the progress of the Enlightenment has forgotten.

Notes

4. For example Sade's esoteric reading of letters to him to find a clue to his release date. See Hayman, *op. cit.*, p. 122.
5. There are some critics such as Peter Gay in his study of the Enlightenment dismisses Sade in a sentence and as a consequence would find little to approve of in this resurrection.
7. Durrenmatt's own fascination with crime is not unlike Sade's in that justice for each is found outside society's laws.
9. All selections from Sade have been taken from the Grove Press edition of his works unless otherwise noted. See "Yet another effort, Frenchmen, if you would become republicans" in *Philosophy in the Bedroom*, p. 323.
16. Simone de Beauvoir has pointed out Sade's view of the social contract as a myth which in reality is a bourgeois hoax. *op. cit.*, p. 47.
20. *Ibid*.
26. *Emile*, p. 44.
29. Pierre Klossowski in his study of Sade entitled “Nature as a Destructive Principle” reprinted in *The Marquis de Sade: 120 Days of Sodom* correctly sees the role given to nature by Sade but incorrectly assumes an identity between nature and God in Sade’s work. See p. 71.
33. The importance of Christianity in Sade is recognized in Albert Camus’ study of Sade found in his *The Rebel*, Vintage Books, N.Y., 1956.