NIHILISM, POLITICS AND TECHNOLOGY

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It was the young Karl Marx who informed us in his doctoral dissertation that philosophy could never be the same after Hegel. Since Marx's utterance, the reception of the words of Hegel, after largely being ignored for more than three quarters of a century, have come back to us and have been received with the enthusiasm that the term revival best captures. This Hegel revival began in the first quarter of our century and shows no sign of abating, for the words of Hegel were written for us, the inhabitants of the "New World", as Hegel called it.

Among those who came after Hegel and who took his claims seriously was Nietzsche. And it was Nietzsche who passed down to us the lament that our age is one in which "all foundations are breaking up in mad unconscious ruin and resolving themselves into the ever flowing stream of becoming." His statement typifies the pathos and concern of some who have become aware of what Hegel has left us, and adumbrates the playful yet deadly serious knell in Kojève's pronouncement that history has ended or Heidegger's poetic dirges about our life in this Eveningland. We, along with other post-Hegelians such as these, actually live in the "New World" that Hegel described. Nietzsche, because he was one of the first to take Hegel at his word, called his own "thoughts out of season" a philosophy for the future. For his declaration of our murder of God is but an afterthought on Hegel's recognition of his death, the subsequent embalming of his thoughts "forever" in the Hegelian system and the resurrection of his spirit through the elaboration of its principles in the form of planetary domination. But Nietzsche, while taking Hegel's claims seriously, announced that Hegel failed, and Nietzsche's agony is a testament to Hegel's failure. In one sense Nietzsche knew that Hegel was correct, that the "New World" Hegel described belongs to us, but he also knew that the citizen of this world is not a sage possessing wisdom, rather he is a Last-man or a Nihilist. Thus it was Nietzsche's contention that Hegel brought with him the most bleak of "ideologies". His melancholy is wrought of the condition in which "everything is permitted", resulting in our words and deeds, the stuff of politics, vanishing along with the self-devaluation of the highest values that have heretofore undergirded them. And even though Mann was correct in a curious way when he stated that the destiny of our times would resolve itself in political terms, we are left to search among the debris of our ever changing history for standards by which to judge our actions and speeches or merely to
revel in the Zeitgeist joyfully and unconsciously, consuming it as fast as it appears.

In order to understand in a specific way what Nietzsche means by Nihilism, one could go to his scattered texts. But in general, there are two types of nihilists, both differentiated by their levels of self-consciousness. In this sense one could say that one is passive, the other active. The passive nihilist, the most despicable type for Nietzsche, is none other than the Last-man. He does not know that he is a nihilist for his consciousness goes no further than the life of his body. He is an unconscious consumer, himself the end product of the calculating rationality, the culmination of the noble tradition of the West in the baseness of utilitarianism. He is a gourmand whose consumption does not discriminate beyond the taste buds of his palate, whether the object of consumption be the newly prepared yet dead values generated before him, or the equally inert products gathered from the earth below him. But the active nihilist knows who he is. His is not a life of the body, but of the psyche alone. He is a gourmet who not only can distinguish between values as well as among the fruits which we force the earth to yield, but knows that the former are just as man-made as the latter, and that one can command the will that creates both if only he can give up his revenge for the past and happily accept his role as commander.

But one does not have to go directly to Nietzsche, or to Heidegger to learn of this split of “humanity” into the separate selves of body and psyche. He can follow Kojève and look at Hegel “in close up”, as it were, and thereby gain an understanding of why such post-Hegelians as Nietzsche and Heidegger see a need to grope for, or either wait for, a new beginning. But this beginning would be willed, neither from the void surrounding the darkness of the Newzeit nor through the ersatz illumination of the planet through technology. Rather a new beginning must take both the darkness of nihilism and the willing will of technology seriously, for this in itself is a beginning.

Politics, Power and Wisdom

“The state is the Divine Idea as it exists on earth.” — Hegel

As already noted, Kojève bluntly states that with Hegel history or time stopped. Also he says that the ‘bringing together’ of time and eternity constitutes the goal of History which is, at the same time, the appearance of the State and of the ‘System’. In this context we will examine the relationship of the State to the ‘System’, or the relationship of Power and Wisdom, and this, as it pertains to the problem of time.

First, it might be noted that while at the end of History there is the final State, the advent of the State is not its final goal, for the goal of history is Wisdom. This Wisdom is to be achieved by what Kojève has described as a
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“double criterion”. Kojève reasons that the one who has Wisdom, or Absolute Knowledge, “must be a citizen of the Universal and Homogeneous State” because the knowledge that he has, in order to be complete, must be circular. He concludes from this that “wisdom can be realized... only at the end of History”. Power, then, the State, must bring an end to History before Wisdom, the goal of History, can be reached. The key here is to know that the Wise-man is a citizen of this “Universal (i.e., non-expandable) and homogeneous (i.e., non-transformable) State”, for the State is the “basis for the circularity of the System (Wisdom) itself.” Thus, “the citizen of this State, as active citizen, realizes the circularity that he reveals as contemplative Wise-man, through his System”. Next Kojève discusses both aspects of this “double criterion”, the State and the ‘System’, i.e., (1) “If the current state of this actually corresponds to what for Hegel is the Perfect State and the end of History, and (2) if Hegel’s knowledge is truly circular.” Now to talk about the fact of the actual existence of this state is to refute common sense, and Kojève dismisses this approach by saying that the important thing is whether or not this State is “impossible in principle”. His conclusion here is that the possibility can neither be proved nor disproved, that since the State exists as a possibility and since a possibility can neither be proved nor disproved (can neither be truth nor error), then the State exists as an “ideal”. This “ideal”, which is neither true nor false, however, can be transformed into truth through negating action which brings the world into accord with the ideal. But the end of History brings forth the end of action, for here man is satisfied and action is no longer necessary or possible, for satisfaction depends on the elimination of desire, which takes place in the existence of a State which recognizes universally the particularity of individuals. Again we are thrown back upon empirical verification or fact, but Kojève claims that if the ‘System’ can be proved to be circular then we can believe in the existence of the Universal and Homogeneous State despite the conflict of this belief with our common sense. Accordingly, if we see that Hegel’s system actually is circular, we must conclude in spite of appearances, that History is completed, and consequently, that the State in which the System could be realized is the perfect State. And from this we can conclude, as Kojève does, that if the Phenomenology can be proved to be circular then the “dual criterion” for the advent of Absolute Knowledge, i.e. the actual existence of the Wise-man as a citizen of this State, is satisfied.

Here we can appeal to two areas, first, the relationship of Napoleon to Hegel; and, second, the relationship among other symbols which emerge from this association.

Kojève reminds us that the Historical facts of the Phenomenology are important for our understanding of that book, and that the existence of Napoleon is one of these historical facts, but a fact taken as fact remains nothing more than an event in time without significance. Hence the
Phenomenology "explains" the meaning of facts to us; it, in effect, provides us with the essence of events which exist in history. So before the Phenomenology can be written, before the essence of the historical facts can be revealed to us, the facts themselves must exist. This is another way of saying that power must exist before wisdom, or that Napoleon, who represents complete power, in that he is the completely satisfied man, must precede Hegel, who represents complete knowledge, in his knowing Napoleon to be the completely satisfied man. Taken by itself, then, the existence of Napoleon, while being a satisfied existence, is a mere "fact", but, as we noted, taken together with Hegel, this combination, this "dyad" of Napoleon-Hegel, or power-wisdom, constitutes the satisfied and perfect man. As Kojève explains here, Napoleon cannot "say" this; thus, the saying is Hegel's role as part of this dyad. To repeat Kojève: "Hegel is somehow Napoleon's self-consciousness".11

Now what does this mean? How can one be another's self-consciousness? Since Hegel provides Napoleon's existence with an essence, we can say that in part this role has to do with 'meaning,' and in this case the "recollection of meaning", or memory. There are two forms of memory to reckon with here, both a "naive memory" and 'memory' as "understanding". The first has to do with the memory of "being in time" or real History, and the second has to do with "Being as Eternity" or Real Being, or the first with being as becoming, which has an existence but whose essence is 'relative' because it changes, and the second with being which has become, Being which has an existence which corresponds to its essence and is therefore, Absolute. The account of Napoleon, taken by itself, has to do with this naive memory or with Facts, this fact included, a fact without significance, existence without essence, but the existence of Napoleon taken together with the essence (which Hegel provides through his philosophical "recollection") renders the becoming of Being of which Napoleon is a part, integrated into Being which has become, through Hegel's explanation of it in the form of the Phenomenology. Speaking of these facts (of the becoming of Being) Kojève says: "The Phenomenology explains them or makes them understandable, by revealing their human meaning and their necessity. This is to say that it reconstructs ("deduces") the real historical evolution of humanity in its humanly essential traits."12

This understanding is the Aufhebung of History and in its revealing the essence of the becoming of Being speaks Being which has become, or Real Being (existence = essence). With this speaking we have 'Science', or the Phenomenology preserved in and elevated into the Logic. This speech is circular because, first, it is not relative, and, second, because it is not relative, it is complete. This is the case because the 'Science' is dependent upon the existence of the essence of man. Thus, the 'Science', in explaining the essence of the existence of man, is complete speech about being that has become. Man qua finite man, is all there is, and this is why Kojève says that the
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Phenomenology radically denies transcendence or the Infinite. But “This is to say that the Infinite in question is Man’s infinite”. Man’s Infinitude is realized as such through his becoming conscious that all there is and has been is Man, and that his knowledge of this is all that can be said; but at the same time, if man says all there is to be said then he speaks complete speech, or speaks Eternal Truth; and ‘circular’ Truth, Truth which points only to itself. To speak Eternal Truth is to know all, and to know all is to be God, and this God is both finite and infinite. He is the God incarnate in the existence of the dyad Napoleon-Hegel who reveals himself as conscious of himself in the form of the eternity of the System.

At this point we must further investigate the meaning of this conclusion, the seemingly absurd claim that the synthesis not only marks the completed goal, and therefore, the end of time or history, but also that the monad is God incarnate. In order to find an answer we should first ask who are these two consciousnesses? What principles do the existence of Hegel and the existence of Napoleon embody? The most obvious answer is that Napoleon is active; his actions bring about the objectification of the principle of freedom in the world, and that Hegel realizes the significance of Napoleon’s action. Napoleon then embodies the notion of historical praxis and Hegel the notion of theory. This is to say that Hegel, through his being able to recollect (theorize) all the moments of history in relation to the advent of Napoleon, has closed the gap between theory and practice. Now since historical praxis is active, Napoleon, then, is the active principle, and theory (theoria), the passive principle, descriptive of a beholding (Anschauung)\textsuperscript{13} which alters nothing, is embodied by Hegel. This is why it can be said that the synthesis of Napoleon-Hegel constitutes the obliteration of the tension between the active and passive, praxis and theory.

More can be drawn from Kojève’s conclusion. To be active is to do something and to do something is to be conscious, or a something is an object for the doing — something must be the object of consciousness. But to do something, while it entails consciousness, is not necessarily self-conscious doing, for in order for this “doing something” to constitute self-consciousness it must be related back to the doer through self-reflection. In self-reflection nothing of the real is altered, but the consciousness of he who does the reflecting is altered, and this consciousness in reflecting itself into itself becomes self-consciousness. This is why Kojève has said that “somehow Hegel is Napoleon’s self-consciousness”.

When consciousness reflects itself into itself it finds an abyss and this abyss is a Nichts. Thus we can say that to talk of a synthesis of Napoleon-Hegel is at the same time to talk of an interplay between the something (Ichts) and the nothing (Nichts), and therefore, the merging of these two principles, the active and passive, practice and theory, constitutes a dialectic culminating in a
synthesis between the Ichts and the Nichts. The strange usage, Ichts, is employed by Kojève, Hegel in his exposition of Bôhme in the History of Philosophy, and by Bôhme himself.

This dialectic between Ichts and Nichts is necessary for the synthesis of these opposite principles and their elevation into the 'monad' descriptive of the Wise-man. This dialectic marks a radical step away from traditional ontology which merely seeks to describe the substance of given-Being and which in its description totally loses the subject of the ineffable nothing of given-Being. Here discourse revealed through the negating action of the externalizing ego is absorbed in the substance of Being (nothing), but also the subject of Being (something) must be described. And this is what Hegel means when he says in the Phenomenology of Spirit that: "In my opinion, which can be justified only through the exposition of the system itself, everything depends on this, that one expresses or understands the true (Wahre) not only as substance, but rather just as much as subject." 14

To describe something as the substance of the real is to say what the something is not, for the something is something other than the given-Being that has been transformed through negating action. Thus, to describe the something as the substance of the real is not a true description, but merely a linguistic extension of the consciously negating (mediating) action itself. But to say what something is not is a step in the direction of saying what is. It is a step toward describing the nothing, the opposite of the something. The something is the result of the action of the externalizing ego. The action of the ego posits the particular something (für sich sein) as a universal for others, and thereby elevates itself above its own particular existence for the sake of others. "I is this I, but equally a universal one." 15 This universalization of the particular ego is at the same time a sacrifice of the isolated and particular ego, a suicide of the ego, and a sharing of its meaning with others. It is the death of the particular and determinate something, but the recognition of the universality of the ego. This is to say that the particularized content of the ego is accepted as universal by others, by the community. This is another way of saying that only in a community can recognition take place. This universalizing of the particular is the Truth that the Wise-man describes. The description gives an account of how the particular Word is revealed as universal Word. What is described is the Truth of being (substance), but also the process of the revelation of being (subject), and in this way the account of the True is described. 16 The latter accounts for the progressive death of the ego which asserts itself through discourse, and is an explanation of how a description of the Truth is possible at all. Without this account we are left with either a philosophy of nature which merely describes substance, but which cannot give an account of its ability to describe it, or we are left with an anthropology (negating action) which only can describe what the substance of
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its truth is not. In order to at once describe subject and substance, the true and the Truth, is to assert that the essence of the existence of one is the essence of the existence of the other. It is to say that each has its truth in its opposite. The subject (the ego) creates itself through its negating action and gives an account of itself through reflecting itself into itself. This account is a recollection of the significance of its previous actions (theory) and is the externalization of the nothing in the form of discourse. But in discourse something is revealed and this something is the progressive revelation of Nothing, the progressive death of the ego, which, in finally giving up its particularity in a bloody fight for recognition (revolution), brings about the community for which it has sacrificed itself.

This account of the nothing is of man in his negating action and is a revelation of death as his essence. The truth of man is death because his negativity, which allows him to transform given-Being, is also the revelation of his finitude as his essence. In transforming the given (nature or God) he progressively frees himself from it, sets himself apart from the boundless infinity of it, and in doing so, his essence is increasingly revealed as his freedom from the given, from infinity, and man comes to realize himself as a being other than he is, a being which is other than a part of infinite nature. He realizes himself as a mortal (historical) being. His mortality is the condition of his freedom, for if he does not reveal himself as mortal then he is not free from the infinity of the given. To be human is to oppose the given, it is to be free, but it is also to accept death as a condition of humanity. To accept death is the same thing as the sacrifice of the isolated particularity of the ego. It is to risk one's life in the fight, for recognition. Full recognition is accepting the particularity of a finite ego as a universal and infinite value. It is to accept man, a being who dies, as the incarnation of the Word. Kojève has even gone so far as to identify Napoleon as the epitome of this incarnation of the Word. He calls Napoleon “the Logos become flesh.” This is said because Napoleon exemplifies the man who embodies the ideals of freedom articulated by the French Revolution, and that the final risk of life is undertaken by him on behalf of these principles. Napoleon, in risking his life, sacrifices his particular ego for these principles. The sacrifice of the particular ego is a sacrifice to have the particular ego recognized as universal not by some transcendent God but by other men; it is to have the value of finite man recognized as infinite. This is to say that Napoleon is the epitome of man as free and hence mortal, man as characterized by Death (bloody revolution). And it is through Napoleon, the embodiment of man as Death, that man also finds life. But this life, life through death, is not a life in the Beyond, rather life on earth, life in the Universal and Homogeneous State.

For Hegel death is the way to life. The death (crucifixion) of anthropomorphic man constitutes the birth (resurrection) of pro-theomorphic ‘man’. Anthropology becomes mythology, a divinization
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(apotheosis) of man-in-the-world, the externalization of time and the
temporalizing of eternity.

Kojève does not dwell on the manner in which this metastasis takes place.
But what he does say about it reveals a difficult problem concerning the final
synthesis (the Aufhebung) of the opposites. Kojève puts it this way:

Napoleon is turned toward the external world (social and
natural): he understands it because he acts successfully.
But he does not understand himself (he does not know
that he is God). Hegel is turned toward Napoleon but
Napoleon is a man, he is the ‘perfect’ Man by his total
integration of history: to understand this is to understand
man, to be understood oneself. By understanding (=
justifying) Napoleon, Hegel achieves, therefore, his
consciousness of self. Thus he became a Sage, a
‘completed’ philosopher. If Napoleon is revealed God
(der erscheine Gott) it is Hegel who reveals him.
Absolute Spirit = plenitude of Bewusstsein and of
Selbstbewusstsein, that is of the real (natural) world that
implies the universal and homogenous state, realized by
Napoleon and revealed by Hegel.18

Briefly, Hegel has recognized Napoleon but the problem is that Napoleon
has not recognized Hegel. Thus, the dyad remains a dyad rather than
becoming a single “We,” a monad. And, for the metastasis to be complete,
Napoleon (who implies the State) would have to recognize Hegel (who implies
Wisdom or Hegelian Science).

What is lacking is a recognition that Hegelian ‘Science’ comprises the
Truth, and this recognition which is absent on the microlevel of Napoleon is
also absent on the macrolevel of the Universal and Homogeneous State which
he implies. Logically we can say that becoming Being, human history, which is
accounted for in the Phenomenology has not yet recognized Hegelian science
as Truth, and if this is the case, then the Aufhebung which unites the
Phenomenology (time) with the Logic (eternity) also is not yet complete, or
becoming Being is not yet Being having become. Thus, the Phenomenology
remains but a linear account of becoming Being. But, if the ‘circularity’ of the
‘System’ can be proved, and if the existence of the Universal and
Homogenous State, on which the qualification of circularity must rest does
not need to be empirically verified, but can be considered as an ‘ideal’ (which
is neither false nor true), then the system can not be wrong. On the other hand,
the world, or the world’s opinions, concerning Hegelian science can be wrong,
and must, through action (force), be brought in line with the “ideal”, thus, the
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'system' itself becomes political propaganda for the obliteration of adverse opinion, an arbiter through which Science is recognized as Truth, and an element of social control for the realization and the maintenance of a State (power) fully integrated into the System (wisdom). Until this time, until full recognition by the State of the Truth of the System, those in the State can not know the significance of the fact that they are, for without full recognition of the 'Science', there is no "recollection of meaning," no Aufhebung, thus, those who are unwilling to recognize become the they who cannot see beyond the fact that they are those 'unenlightened' ones. Here is a they opposed to a "We" who supposedly can 'remember' the significance of this "fact," because the "We" possesses absolute, circular knowledge, through the recognition of the truth of the 'System'.

From Speculative Magic to Technology

"Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic."

Arthur C. Clark

To reiterate the argument: Kojève says that Napoleon, because he epitomizes human Freedom, is therefore "the total integration" of all the moments of the logos of History. Because of this, Napoleon is perfect, the "perfect man". To understand Napoleon is to understand Man in general, therefore, if a man understands Man in general then he has complete self-knowledge. This is what Kojève claims that Hegel has done: "By understanding (= justifying) Napoleon, Hegel achieves, therefore, his consciousness of Self." Hegel reveals Napoleon as the revealed God. "Thus Absolute Spirit, plenitude of Bewusstsein and of all Selbstbewusstsein, that is of the real (Natural world) that implies the Universal and Homogeneous State, realized by Napoleon and revealed by Hegel."19 Here we have a consciousness belonging to one man and a self-consciousness belonging to another, a dyad that "somehow" becomes a monad despite the fact that Kojève points out "Hegel does not like dualisms". It is obvious that in order for the metastasis of this dyad into a single monad to take place, and hence produce the actual principle which will allow for 'Science', the final tension between the consciousness of Napoleon and the self-consciousness of Hegel must be erased. We have already discussed the possibility of equal recognition as a solution to this difficulty, but this solves only part of the problem. Recognition of Napoleon by Hegel, as noted before, has to do with the recognition of the Science of Hegel (theory) by the world Napoleon's action has founded in principle. This is the final step that makes the Aufhebung, which became possible in principle, a concrete reality, for only with this scenario do we have Reality equalling Concept. Thus there is an immediate step which allows for this "somehow" to take place in principle. At first, this
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step may seem quite elementary, for it is simply this: in order for one to be self-conscious he must possess a Self and all Selves have physical bodies. Now it is argued that the self-consciousness of Hegel, which also implies that Hegel has a Self and a body, "somehow" merges with the consciousness of Napoleon. Well, first, what happens to this self-consciousness when it becomes part of the monad? And what becomes of the Self and the body that gives it up? Part of the answer is that the Self and body dies, for philosophy (the realizing) is equivalent to the act of death, at least in the Socratic sense. First, perhaps we need to remind the reader that as Kojève says, Hegelian "Science is the eternity which reveals itself to itself." Hegelian Science then is pure self-consciousness, and this self-consciousness, as Kojève has said, is eternity. Men do not exist in eternity, they have Selves and bodies and bodies and Selves exist in time. But how can one say that this self-consciousness derived from the metastasis of the two separate men exists in eternity? Kojève has an answer:

The result of the action (realization) of the wise-man is, on the other hand perfect. It does not change and it cannot be gone beyond or exceeded: briefly it has no future properly so called. Consequently, this action is not an historical event properly speaking, it is not a true moment in time. And to say so is to say that it is no longer a human reality. Once again, the empirical existence of science in the world is not man but Book (the Phenomenology of Spirit) . . . Certainly this existence is empirical and as such it has duration: The Book endures, itself; it deteriorates, it is reprinted, etc. But the tenth edition in no way differs from the first edition: one can modify nothing in it, one can add nothing to it. All the while changing, the book remains therefore identical to itself.21

Here is part of the answer to the problem. This self-consciousness that reveals itself to itself through the metastasis of Hegel and "somehow" becoming Napoleon's self-consciousness does not take place in the world of bodies, Selves and time, but in the eternity of the Phenomenology. But where does this Science exist and where does the metastasis take place before the last (empirical) step of recognition? The answer to this question is to be found in the Phenomenology. "Spirit, which, when thus developed, knows itself to be Spirit, is Science. Science is its realization, and the kingdom it sets up for itself in its own native element."22 In whatever this native element might be, we may be assured this is where the metastasis occurs, for Hegel is emphatic. "A self
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having knowledge purely of itself in the absolute antithesis of itself, this pure ether as such, is the very soil where science flourishes, is knowledge in universal form.” If we have established this, then what is this “native element” that Hegel calls “the pure ether as such”? What does this mean . . . is Hegel speaking of aithér, that imaginary substance, thought by the ancients to fill the space beyond the moon, the spaces occupied by the stars? In order to answer this question yet another problem must be solved. If the metastasis of these two self-consciousnesses takes place in the Book, and, if the Book is “eternity,” and if this necessarily circumvents the problem of the original empirical existence of the two egos that comprise the dyad, then to whom does this self-consciousness belong? It cannot belong to Napoleon nor can it belong to Hegel, both were in time, both are dead, and besides, since it is in the Book it is “eternity”. At this stage, the stage of its occurring in “principle”, the answer would have to be that the self-consciousness belongs to no one, for what else other than Science can “exist in its own native element”? This is to say that the self-consciousness belongs to the ‘System of Science’. “Science on its side requires the individual self-consciousness to have risen into this high ether, in order to be able to live with science, and in science, and really feel alive there.” From this one can conclude that the self-consciousness belongs to the ‘System of Science’ and the ‘System of Science’ also exists in this ether.

We have been told by Kojève that if the ‘System’ could be proved to be circular, then it is in “principle” true. I am contending that the metastasis that “somehow” comes about to establish the principle of Science is the same thing as saying that the ‘System’ is in this way established in “principle”. Now principles do not have empirical existence, just as angels existing in the ether do not have empirical existence; principles belong to no one, as the self-consciousness in the ether of the ‘System of Science’ belongs to no one. This is the case until the second and final step, that of recognition, establishes the principle in actuality; until the Science, through its being recognized by the actual world, descends from the ether of the Concept and becomes manifest through its being recognized by the actual world as Truth. At this point, Kojève does tell us to whom this self-consciousness will belong. It will belong to the community of believers whose existence will harbour the essence of this Science. Here we have the “New World” of ‘Hegelian Science’ with its community of believers.

In order for Science to become actual, Kojève like Hegel, must admit of real History as the arbiter of the Concept. The Aufhebung of which he speaks
merely occurs in the ether of the system, not in the reality of the world. Kojève knows that according to the Phenomenology, the period that harbours the birth pangs of a new era is one of total Zerrissenheit, and that this total dismemberment exists until the new age is established concretely. Also, Hegel has told us, and Kojève has told us after him, that the most extreme form of Zerrissenheit is equivalent to Death or I = I. He must know that this extreme stage is a “necessary” pre-requisite to the birth of a new (if even final) era. Between the advent of the phenomenon of the Historical Jesus and that of the Christ, there was this most extreme form of Zerrissenheit, and figuratively this is equivalent to Christ's descent into Hell. And Hegel’s philosophic “action” which allegedly resulted in his self-consciousness becoming Napoleon’s, amounts to death. Indeed, philosophy has been called the study of death.  

Kojève calls Hegel the Sage, perfect and satisfied, or he calls him a God. Since Kojève considers Hegel a God, he must admit that his divinity has only been established in principle, that is in the ether of the System, for as Kojève says, the system only has been proved in “principle”, and the final means through which it will become actual will be purely political. If, as Kojève contends, Hegel is truly the figure who “reveals” Napoleon as the “revealed” God (der erscheinende Gott), if in other words, Hegel is the new Historical Christ (God the Son) who reveals (justifies) Napoleon (God the Father) through explaining that the essence of his action (Freedom) redeems the suffering of man, and if he contends that this is established only in principle (or in the ether of the ‘System’), until political action makes the principle manifest, then what is one to conclude? Since, as Kojève has pointed out, Hegel is dead, and the Science is “eternity” because its Spirit will forever live in the form of the Book, one can say that the result of the political action that establishes the Universal and Homogeneous State would be the resurrection of Hegel in the form of the spiritual community of the “New World”. But since this political action has not yet occurred, and Hegel’s spirit has not yet been resurrected, and we are in that non-time between his crucifixion and resurrection, then one must ask of Hegel’s whereabouts. If Kojève is correct about Hegel’s identity, and if Kojève’s Hegelian dialectics are accurate, then, at least in the figurative sense, the answer must be that Hegel, after his descent into Hell, has ascended into the ether of the ‘System’.

Despite the fact that Hegel is in the ether of the system of science, in the Phenomenology of Spirit he speaks of the necessity of the descent. This pertains to the phenomenon of Zerrissenheit.

Death, as we may call this unreality, is the most terrible thing and to keep and hold fast to what is dead demands the greatest force of all . . . But the life of mind (Spirit) is not one that shuns death . . . it endures death and in death
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maintains its being. It only wins to its truth when it finds itself utterly torn asunder (Zerrissenheit).

Thus this descent into Death, or into the total destruction of the soul, is a pre-requisite to Science. For "mind (Spirit) is this power only by looking the negative in the face, and dwelling with it. This dwelling beside it is the magic power that converts the negative into being." This power about which Hegel speaks is the thinking subject, or consciousness, which through its subjection to Zerrissenheit or Death, discovers its own "determinations" or necessity. In other words, the essence of the soul discovers itself in the being of the soul, and in this "cancels abstract immediacy" found in Being, and "by so doing becomes the true substance, becomes being or immediacy that does not have mediation (reflection, consciousness) outside it, but is this mediation itself."

This is the conversion from immediate Being, found only in the total finitude of Death, to the life of consciousness. In this conversion, the eternity of the unconscious is mediated by the time of consciousness. The result is first the completion of the circle, a tying together of the threads woven by an archeology of being and a teleology of thinking, resulting in self-consciousness. Second, the tying together of the broken pieces of the dismembered soul with the threads of self-consciousness, and third, a turning about of the soul toward the sunlight of Science.

It is apparent that there is a parallel between the nature of this conversion and the metastasis of the two empirical egos of Napoleon and Hegel. In fact, both take place in the ether of the system, but, too, as Hegel has said "actual history" must make the metastasis or conversion concrete. Since Hegel claims to have already performed it in the ether, the Science remains, as Kojève has pointed out, merely a possibility. But since thought cannot overstep its own determinations, the metastasis already had to have taken place in concrete reality, and Kojève says, that, in principle it has. If we grant this, then we must conclude that the System is true, for the ideas in the substance that is the ether of the system are "in principle" identical to the actual reality of which the system speaks. Too, the new Science is eternal in the Book read by the Spiritual Community of the "New World." But since the Universal and Homogeneous State talked about by Kojève is not immanent except in principle, then how will it become actual in practice? The answer is that the Book in which the principles are contained will be the tool for its realization. First, the solution is political. As already noted, the Book can be used as propaganda. Next, one must not forget that Kojève is a Marxist and no good Marxist forgets his master's famous words: "Until now the philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point, however, is to change it." But with these words that could come from the mouth of any left-Hegelian, one must remember Hegel's own words: "Philosophy escapes from
the weary strife of passions that agitate the surface of society into the calm region of contemplation."

The above are the kind of statements upon which left and right Hegelianisms are made, for left-Hegelianism locates the essence of man in the labour of his body, while right-Hegelianism locates it in his reasoning mind. The whole point of the Science of Hegel, however, is to abolish this tension of the body and the psyche, being and thinking. Kojève is aware of this, for otherwise he could not have told us all that he has. Nevertheless, if the conversion and the metastasis that does take place in the ether of the system is used for furthering the principles of the Universal and Homogeneous State, then this self-consciousness which belongs to no one in particular, will belong to every one universally, for everyone in this homogenous and actual world will be a Hegelian. But strangely enough, to attempt to operate in this substance that is the ether of the system in such a way as to influence the reality of the phenomenal world is tantamount to magic. But is magic beyond the reach of men? If we take him at his word, Hegel must not have thought so when he told his students at Jena:

Every single (person) is a blind link in the chain of absolute necessity, on which the world develops. Every single (person) can extend his dominion over a greater length of this chain only if he recognizes the direction in which the great necessity will go and learns from this cognition to utter the *magic word* which conjures up its shape. This cognition which can both embrace in itself the whole energy of the suffering and the antithesis which has ruled the world in all the forms of its development (*Ausbildung*) for a couple of thousand years, and can raise itself above it all, this cognition only philosophy (Science) can give.\(^{31}\)

But one can utter this "*magic word*" only if he has the "*magic power*" which Hegel later elaborated in the *Phenomenology*. The procedure discussed in connection with the conversion is an explanation of this *magic power*, that will establish ‘Science,’ and raise us, through our “cognition,” above the suffering and antithesis of humanness. Traditionally only those possessive of divinity or perhaps alchemy are said to perform magic, but while in our post-modern age divinity may account for few followers, such acts have many open adherents.

The best way to get at the heart of the meaning of the symbol of magic and the magic word (*Zauberwort*) is to consider what would entail performing the
act of magic and the uttering of magic words. Magic for man, just as everything else he attempts to do or utter, must be an act or a speech. Man can act or speak because, and only because, he is in the world; for man, this being who is in the world, this being in Being, also has time in him. This man, this Being who has time in him, lives among other beings, and because of this, and only because of this, speech and action are possible. But to act or to speak is to cast one's self from one's being into Being, or into the world, and this casting of one's self into Being is in the form of acts and speeches. It is to cast Time into Being. But we men, while we possess the common quality of action and speech due to our common Being, do not possess the same being. Thus, our acts and our speeches are as unique as the uniqueness of the being from which they originate. Man cannot know in what his acts will result, nor can he know exactly the meaning that will be taken from his speeches. But if one's actions could be performed and his words uttered from the standpoint of eternal Being rather than from the standpoint of his being in Time, then the intention of his acts would correspond with their end, and his utterances, in the form of the facticity of his words, would coincide with the meaning he has intended for them. Is would equal ought, fact would equal meaning. But in order to do this, one would have to 'act' and 'speak' not from the standpoint of Time, but from the standpoint of Eternity. Put another way, only if there were no time, or if somehow time were stopped, could 'man' perform such 'acts' and utter such 'speeches.' Moreover, if one, from the standpoint of Eternity, could utter the word that would stop time, then, while time would stop in the form of speech, time would continue in the form of action. But if one could at once perform the act that magically would stop time together with uttering the magic word that would stop time, then, indeed time would stop. This, however, would be a reverse of the Creation, for in the Beginning was the word or deed that created the World, Being, and from Being, man, as the animal who speaks and acts, became possible.

If the 'System' is the final speaking of the significance of the final act, and both the act and the significance are to be continued in the “ether of the System,” or in Eternity itself, then to speak the 'System' is the equivalent of attempting to speak from the standpoint of Eternity, or from the standpoint of pure Being, identical to itself, or to attempt to speak from the standpoint of God. But this works both ways, and it does so because man, or Time, is also in the 'System' (the 'System' = the identity of identity and non-identity).

Voegelin, in his article, “Hegel: a Study in Sorcery.”32 has claimed that Hegel attempts to perform magic, but here he does not go through the necessary steps that would allow one to see exactly in what sense the symbol Magic is to be taken in relation to the man Hegel. I am reluctant to call Hegel a sorcerer, despite the association of his thoughts with the thoughts of Böhme and other mystics. My reason is as follows: To be a sorcerer is to perform
magic, and Hegel, among many who have attempted it, has not performed it. However that the *hypothetical* results of his ‘System’ are tantamount to magic, I have no doubt.

But the results are *hypothetical* in the same way that the system is perfect and final, if indeed it can be proved to be circular. However one cannot say that Hegel is a sorcerer because Hegel did not do anything. He merely described the world as it had come to be. Jacques Ellul has talked of magic and has said that while the attitude is identical with other forms of technology, the only difference between primitive magic and modern technology is that one works and the other does not. And it was Heidegger in his “Der Staz Von Grund” who talked of technology as a calling forth of everything both human and non-human to give its reasons, and through the calling forth turning the world into “standing reserve” to be at the disposal of our creative wills. His idea of technology is circular just as is Hegel’s system. Both are a merging of the heretofore separate realms of thought and action whereby not only does the “logos become flesh”, thereby phenomenologizing thought in the world, or coupling logos with techné. But this is not techné as mere production, although the first part of Heidegger’s definition does pertain, but better techné comes to be a “discovery” or a “making present.” Also, it is circular in another way: Whatever is willed becomes mere reserve for a further expansion of the system. The coupling of techné and logos is the phenomenal manifestation of the system, a homeostasis of wholes and parts, yet a whole that is more than its parts. It is the uniting of unity and disunity, the unity of eternity and time, the identity of identity and non-identity. It is a homeostasis of desire and need. This system, as Ellul notes, expands not arithmetically but geometrically. The process is self-generating, “technique engenders itself”. It is the expansion of the principles of the modern state into world history, the topic that closes the *Philosophy of Right*. This merging of reason with history is what brings about the “New World”, the name that Hegel gave to the new dawn in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*.

Thus, the entrée to the description of Hegel’s “new world” is the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. One follows its moments diachronically, for the moments are those of a teleology that progressively reveals reason as spirit erupting into time. Because of the teleological character of the *Phenomenology*, the past and present are explained in terms of the future. But when the explanation is finished, Hegel, in the language of *is* rather than ought describes the present and the future in terms of the past. As he tells us in the *Philosophy of Right*, the past is “the event grown old”. The advent of Napoleon and Hegel’s explanation of his action has brought the straight arrow of *telos* back upon itself, making synchronic (complete) speech possible. Thus the resolution of the dual character of the *Phenomenology*, the diachronic and synchronic elements, the appearance of wholes and the
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explanation of parts, allows Hegel to talk about the area of the system that is political science. But to talk of the present and the future in terms of the past is to speak not from the standpoint of teleology but from that of techné. It is to describe principles involved in the making present of an already actualized end. Techné resembles telos in that both produce an end, but telos differs in that the knowledge of the purpose only can be seen with the previous knowledge of the principles that explain (justify) the end produced. Telos implies epistémé but techné implies artifice. Its description is bound up with the use to which the product can be put, the “logic of the product”. In itself techné does not imply self-consciousness or intentionality but neither does teleology as such imply this. This is why no matter what the citizens of the state do, and whether or not they know the reasons for their “actions”, they serve the state, and also why the state whose institutions are made actual by Napoleon’s actions becomes revealed only through Hegel in his explanation of his revelation of Napoleon as the logos of history. For Christian philosophy the logos equals the second person of the Trinity and its functions are identified with the creative activity of Christ. It is Hegel who reveals that Napoleon is the logos become flesh. But flesh becomes spirit, the third trinitarian principle, through this revelation, and the state is the spiritual manifestation of the logos (the system) on earth. Like all else on earth, it is either natural or artificial, but the Hegelian state is both natural and artificial, it is the oneness of physis and the separateness of nomos. It is of logos and techné. It is the self-elaboration and self-control of the principles of the system. It is cybernetized Hegelianism. It belongs to the completion of time as history concretized in that part of the system that is the state. Hegel talks not of Prussia, rather of a planet united under the principles of the monad Napoleon/Hegel. This final society emerged in principle because the final word (logos) had appeared in time as history. This is why philosophy had to come to its end. “The owl of Minerva spreads its wings only with the falling of the dusk”. But the dusk is the eclipse of light illuminating the West. The planet in principle has been infused with western techné - logos, harnessing the earth herself in principle, yet unleashing man from the light of the world.

Nietzsche reacted overtly to this inescapable conclusion, the only conclusion that can be reached if man has thought the principles of his historical existence to their end. Nietzsche informs us that this is why modern men are epigoni, or at least think themselves as such. And his despair for the “historical sickness” easily can be understood. That which is most characteristic of modernity is technology and if one thinks technologically he thinks time as history. Because time is history the creation of the “future” is out of nothing and from nothing. This is bound up with forgetfulness because reflection requires self-consciousness and self-consciousness implies not only a future but a past from which to forge one. Without reflection one has no past
and the "future" into which he flings himself is but a void of new possibilities. Thus man is left only with his will, for the seat of the will is the moment of choice and the moment of choice is always the present. Hegel teaches us that liberalism and the ideologies of which it is a parent are produced of this will become *technē*. Herein is embodied the principle of freedom in the fullness of time as history. But Nietzsche taught us that these products amount to secularized versions of Christianity—and while the tombs of the dead God are but old churches, the monument to the new god is the everchanging landscape of the technological empire whose post-historical citizens are precisely those Last-men and nihilists alluded to by Nietzsche.

**The "New World": Described**

"only a god can save us". — Heidegger

Kojève himself has speculated on what life in this new world is like. In a long and queer footnote often remembered as one of Kojève's more outrageous pronouncements and rarely taken seriously, he deals with two possibilities. The first is the reanimalization of man, the second is what he calls the "Japanization" of man. Here I will quote a large portion of the note for it is too astounding to ignore:

If one accepts 'the disappearance of Man at the end of History,' if one asserts that 'Man remains alive as animal,' with the specification that 'what disappears is indefinitely: arts, love, play, etc.' If man becomes an animal again, his arts, his lovers, and his play must also become purely 'natural' again. Hence it would have to be admitted that after the end of History, men would construct their edifices and works of art as birds build their nests and spiders spin their webs, would perform musical concerts after the fashion of frogs and cicadas, would play like young animals, and would indulge in love like adult beasts.43

Kojève then says that this new 'man', will be "content" rather than happy. This is understandable, for happiness is something fraught with contradiction, and contentment is a 'pure' state which, because it is restricted to itself, does not engender the presence of its opposite.44 Happiness is a stage-along-the-way of fulfilled anticipations, it belongs to historical man, contentment is the complete fulfillment of anticipation, the obliteration of anticipation, it truly belongs to post-historical 'man'. It is the same as satisfaction.
Kojève also says that this ‘man will play’ or that the “constructing” and the “works that man undertakes will be ‘natural again’”. Is not this the same as saying that work (since there is no more work to be done) will become play? And is this not understandable since the gods are often seen at play? The only difference here is that after the primeval age the gods usually played on Olympus or in some other aethereal realm, but the abode of “natural man” is the earth, and the earth in this case, which has become the Universal and Homogeneous State which has usurped the profane realm of working man, has become an intermundane yet aethereal Olympus, the sacred realm of playing gods.44b

There is more to this interesting note:

The definitive annihilation of Man properly so-called also means the definitive disappearance of human Discourse (Logos) in the strict sense. Animals of the species Homo Sapiens would react by conditioned reflexes to vocal signals or sign ‘language’, and thus their so-called ‘discourses’ would be like what is supposed to be the ‘language’ of bees. What would disappear, then, is not only Philosophy or the search for the discursive Wisdom, but also that Wisdom itself. For in these post-historical animals, there would no longer be any ‘(discursive) understanding of the World and of self.”45

The disappearance of discourse and of wisdom? This is understandable since these reanimalized ‘men’ “communicate” in signals or signs. It is not surprising that to communicate in Signs is to lose “understanding of the world and Self” because to communicate in signs is to equate signifier with his object, thus understanding is lost because there is no difference between World and Self. The Self is one with the Fact of his existence in the world; as the world is natural, so is man.

But how does this square with the playing post-historical ‘men’ which we have identified with gods? How can this new ‘man’ be a god if he can not think much less have Wisdom? Since man as we have known him has been eliminated through his wanting for nothing, the middle term, man, between a sacred god and a profane world has been eliminated. Thus, we have this misty world of the sacred intermixed with the profane where gods roam the earth in the form of sacred animals.

Kojève ends this portion of his speculation with a discussion concerning the means by which the pre-revolutionary (revolution of Robespierrian Bonapartism) world has been “eliminated”, or if you will, ways in which the
Universal and Homogeneous State has been elaborated. After talking about this elimination in the U.S.S.R., China, and Western Europe, he concludes by saying that “the American way of life” prefigures the ‘eternal present’ future of all Humanity, and “that Man’s return to animality appeared no longer a possibility that was yet to come, but as a certainty that was already present.”

The remainder of this long note is even more intriguing because, as Kojève tells, visits to Japan between 1948-1958 have led him to abandon the above thesis concerning the reanimalization of man, because on these visits he found an entirely different society which “had for almost three centuries experienced life at the ‘end of History.’” Here he claims to have found a class of nobles “who ceased to risk their lives (even in dual) and yet did not for that begin to work . . .” and comments that this existence is “anything but animal.” He contends that this society is devoid of the institutions of morals or politics “in the European or Historical sense,” but that the society upheld “disciplines” which nevertheless negated the natural or animal. These “disciplines” are, according to Kojève, created by Snobbery. He concludes by reasoning that “no animal can be a snob” and therefore that “every ‘Japanized’ post-historical period would be specifically human.” This is indeed astonishing. What is this queer term “Snobbery” which had led Kojève to abandon his previous thesis? He does not tell us much about it here except that the discipline which it engenders generates values which are both formalized, and, at the same time, “empty of all ‘human’ content in the historical sense,” and because of this man can commit a “perfectly ‘gratuitous’ suicide.”

By formalized values we can take him to mean values given a definite form or shape in terms of prescribed customs, ceremonies, or laws, and that their being “empty of human content” has to do with their being absent of any practical (human) content such as in our saying “How do you do?” This is why, when practising them one can commit a “perfectly gratuitous suicide,” that is a suicide from which the victim expects no payment, and a suicide committed simply because doing so is the right, or decent, or proper thing to do according to the prescribed values or customs to which “Snobbery” leads. The word “gratuitous” is our key here for it comes from the Latin root gratus, from which our English word grace is derived. Grace, among other things, is a privilege, and he who can commit this “gratuitous suicide” is one who is privileged. This is why he is a snob. Now to be a snob is to think oneself better than someone else, to be richer, more knowledgeable, more powerful, or more virtuous than someone else. It is to be aristocratic. The analysis of Kojève’s footnote on “Snobbery” is supported by a further elaboration of the term made by him in an interview with Gilles Laponze in 1968. In the context of a discussion on the post-historical world and Japanese culture Kojève exclaims that:
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By nature snobbery is the prerogative of a small minority. Now, what we learn from Japan is that it is possible to democratize snobbery. Japan is eighty million snobs. After the Japanese people, English high society is a bunch of drunken sailors.51

Here I will suggest that Kojève's “snobbery” has to do with the Greek term aidôs which pertained to a practice of the aristoi.52 Aidôs, in terms, of a practice, has to do with (1) “A moral feeling, reverence, awe, respect for the feeling or opinion of others . . .”. (2) It, therefore, has to do with “shame, self-respect, a sense of honour, sobriety, moderation”. (3) It also refers to “a regard for friends.” (4) “The term is personified as reverence.” Briefly, Snell, in his Discovery of Mind, says that aidôs “originates as the reaction which the holy excites in man” and that its secularized form is close to “the refined climate of the court or polite society.” He adds that “a deep conservatism is the keynote for a call to aidôs.”53 E.R. Dodds in his The Greeks and the Irrational puts his emphasis on another element, respect for public opinion. He says that aidôs is characteristic of a culture where “anything which exposes man to the contempt or ridicule of his fellows, which causes him to “lose face,” is felt unbearable.”54 Those who have commented on this term agree that the experience which gives rise to aidôs is basically religious. It is an “ancient feeling” which goes back to what Dodds has identified as a “shame-culture” as opposed to a “guilt-culture.”55 These culture types are derived from the anthropologist Ruth Benedict, and her particular usage has reference, strangely enough, to modern Japan as opposed to the West.

In a post-historical world, of Japanized snobs, guilt no longer operates as a social control, here guilt does not exist, for sin does not exist. Sin cannot exist because action does not exist, for with the absence of action, we have the absence of possibility, which eliminates the element of temptation, which makes sin, and, therefore guilt impossible. This is why “formalized values,” as opposed to guilt, a product of the conscience, become the “disciplines” of a “Japanized” world. Also, in a shame culture acts (both irrational and rational) can be projected to an external force which can be seen as the “causes”. Consequently, there is no need for the actor to be expunged of wrongdoing, thereby making catharsis an unnecessary and impossible prerequisite for cleansing the conscience. A clear conscience would not be a value here, but the enjoyment of public esteem would be, and public esteem would be acquired in the practice of the “formalized values.” In the history of the West, guilt and the need for catharsis arose with a separation of body, as that which acts, and the psyche, as that from which the act originates, and thus, in this case, it is impossible to project blame on an external force. This marks the emergence of guilt as a social control, whereby the notion of divine temptation is
transformed into a punishment and God becomes the embodiment of divine justice. But with the absence of action, hence, possibility, temptation and guilt, then *aidôs* becomes a sociological force as an agent for order and maintenance.

As said before, to be a snob is to conceive of oneself as better than others, because of one’s superior wealth, knowledge, power or virtue. Could this not be why Kojève says that under the influence of this snobbery the subject still opposes the object and hence remains human, but that this opposition is not an attempt to transform the given, but rather to “oppose himself as a pure ‘form’ to himself and to others taken as a ‘sort’.”\(^{56}\) Is it possible that Kojève means here that the snob is a snob because he thinks himself to have superior knowledge (Wisdom), because he can “speak in adequate fashion of all that is given to him,”\(^ {57}\) and that he opposes himself in that he competes among other snobs for the arete that is won by *aidôs*?\(^ {58}\) But, who are these “others” to whom he is opposed, these others taken as a “content”? Are they not those who have not yet become snobs? Could these others not be a “they” as opposed to a “we” who think themselves to be superior which makes them snobs? It seems possible that these “others” are those untransformed animalized creatures who have not become the planetary *aristoi* of the ‘Japanized’ state.

In the case of our two life forms presented by Kojève, at least in whatever realm they exist, we do not yet advance to a revelation of the concept and the Universal and Homogeneous State, for revelation takes place within history, and as Kojève has informed us, history has ended. The conflict then does not lead to the progress of self-consciousness which is a result of recollecting all previous moments in the form of the Concept, but rather, being devoid of both history and the Concept, the conflict leads to forgetfulness and silence.

Here then as regards the Japanized form of life, we can say that this is a revolt against culture or a revolt against speech as a form of vindicating honour and an embracing of the silent honour of death. This is a revolt against the West because it is the West that exemplifies the principle of self-preservation, and self-preservation is exemplified by the principle of work in the form of speech. The West is represented by the Russo-American way of life, and because of its exemplifying the principle of self-preservation at the expense of honour, it evolves into the reanimalized form of life. This reanimalized form of life, therefore, now has Life, as opposed to Death, as its principle, and one could say its major concern is with the elaboration of this principle. The elaboration of this principle can be called “collective housekeeping,” which puts the life of the body above all else. Here we have baseness as a pure type and it is opposed to the pure type of nobility which, in embracing Death (honour) over self-preservation has as its major concern not “housekeeping,” but “homemaking”\(^ {59}\) or nation-building. The first form is characterized by expanding internationalism, the other by centralized
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ethnocentric nationalism. They are archetypical forms of opposition and this is why Kojève has said that the path of the future is "to Japanize the West or to Americanize Japan." Kojève does not speak of a synthesis between the two, but rather the "or" of this statement alludes to what one only could describe as a planetary 'dialectic': a bloody fight between East and West. But how can one speak of a dialectic without history? Here is one way. We will discuss the other shortly. The paradigmatic dialectics of Master and Slave require first that neither or both of the adversaries in the struggle be annihilated, for if one or both is killed then there is no one to recognize the other. When Kojève speaks of the impossibility of synthesis he is speaking of the impossibility of recognition, for to recognize is to synthesize the meaning of one's self from his relation to the other. This is the case because when he speaks of the impossibility of a synthesis he speaks of our specifically modern condition of existing in a world of competing ideologies whose political powers possess Atomic weapons, a world where ideological clashes seem irreconcilable through the usual diplomatic and military channels. Ours is a world where the latter produces either a 'zero sum game' where all lose, or a world where one completely obliterates his opponent by 'beating him to the bottom' technologically or by completely undermining him through propaganda so as to completely absorb him after his internal deterioration. Either of the three would surely mean the end of history, for the first is merely to blow ourselves into a state of perpetual 'forgetfulness', and the second and third would produce a non-expandable, non-transformable form of life that would erase succession in history from 'human' experience exchanging it for the total equivalence of perpetual duration.

Also, it is curious to note that adiós, snobbery has to do with wonder or awe, and that wonder or awe is the feeling which Hegel names in his Ästhetics as engendering the first phase of art. But, while awe here has to do with awe for the natural universe, awe in this instance has to do with awe for a cultural universe represented in the form of "formalized values". Again we return then in this post-historical world to the beginning. It, in this case, is not the world of Signs through which the animalized "other" communicates, but a stylized and formal world of the Noh Theatre, and the Japanese poets. Adiós is the social glue for the world, as it was for the Homeric world of the Greek heroes, and poetic language, the language of Image, is its form of articulation. It is a remythologizing language where all points to itself as a series of mirrors. This language is the language of those privileged Snobs who have become "Japanized".

Strauss mentioned the reasonableness of the "change from the universal-homogeneous monarchy to the universal-homogeneous aristocracy", but unfortunately, does not elaborate on it. Nevertheless, cannot we say that what Kojève has speculated on here adumbrates a distortion of aristocratic
conscience of the Nietzschean Overman who, through a “Perfectly gratuitous suicide”, of *amor fati*, strives to overcome the “last man”. And although he intends to extend grace to himself for the sake of the eruption of the dawn of a New World created *ex-nihilo* from his own will, he does not know how to utter both the “yes” with the “no” and is like those from whom Zarathustra walks away at the end of the poem.

The symbol of Hell regarding the Hegel of Kojève is revealing when applied to some of the conclusions drawn from Kojève’s sketches of what he takes to resemble post-historical ‘man’. Summarizing the previous argument: the first form of life, re-animalized man, does not work, he plays. He does not engage in discourse, for discourse involves the use of symbols and symbols surpass themselves. Since there is no surpassing, and he does not communicate symbolically, then he communicates “naturally”, or does so in signs, a medium of discourse that does not distinguish between subjects and objects. He wants for nothing, and is thus contented, which is not only a characteristic of animals but also of gods. This is the world returned to “natural man”, a realm inhabited by the *soulless bodies* of sacred animals. The second form of life is what Kojève has called “Japanized-man”. The language of this other-directed ‘aristocracy’ of “Snobs” is a language “devoid of any human content”, and this language, because it has no human (practical) content, leads to a perfectly “stylized way of life”. Here I equate the language of the ‘Snob-culture’ with the language of the chattering sycophant, the language of pure culture. And since a language without content is a language of pure form, or a language with no objective referent, I have said that this language is one of images. Remember that the two forms of life are archetypes of pure mastery (nobility) and pure slavery (baseness) in the unconscious psyche, and the unconsciousness knows no time. It too is eternal.

What if time could be brought to the eternity of the unconscious; what if this unconsciousness could be mediated with the time of consciousness? Would this not be tantamount to the arresting of the tension between the *Nichts* and the *Ichts*, or the meeting of the circle of the archeology of the soul that uncovers being, and the teleology of soul that uncovers Time. Would not this be the metastasis of Being and Time resulting in pure self-consciousness? The answer is yes, Hegelian science, in that it is eternal, is located in that element in which Science “feels at home”, in the ether of the Concept, but the unconscious forms of life are located in the opposite realm — the abode of the ‘underworld’ of ourselves.

The symbols used by Homer in the eleventh book of the *Odyssey* to describe the inhabitants of Hades are identical to those that describe Kojève’s two forms of life. The inhabitants are portrayed as images and shadows. But the inhabitants of our underworld are not only the souls without bodies of Homer’s Hades, but too they are their opposite, the bodies without souls of Plato’s cave.62
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Hades is the bottom of the abyss of the soul. It is the I = I, Death or total Zerrissenheit, and it represents the infinite depth of an internal dialectic of a soul in the doldrums of its own non-time.

Thus in this bottomless pit of non-time dwell Kojève's archetypes, re-animalized “last-men” and Japanized nihilists. With the first, meaning pertains exclusively to the realm of the calculating rationality, the rationality of facts that aspires through technology to a homeostasis of desire and need. This control of both human and non-human nature, through the manoeuvring of accident from the human condition and the concomitant eradication of the fear of the future, through the obliteration of the future, aims at changing human nature itself through the elimination of the 'problem' of temporality, thereby allowing 'man' to enjoy a satisfied existence in a completely cybernetic system wherein his metabolism is one with Nature's.

With the second, meaning does not pertain to manipulation and control of external phenomena, but rather pertains exclusively to the subject. Here meaning is drawn into the self, as with vampish characters of Munch paintings and Strindberg plays. There is no manoeuvring of accident from existence through the external manipulation of cause and effect. There is no progression of parts tied together through the relations that cause and effect establishes. There is no beginning and no end. Objective phenomena, however heterogeneous as to their difference in quality or in their order of appearance, is given coherence through experiencing them together. This simultaneous experience of the appearance of what externally would be mere accident becomes the equilibrium from which contradictory parts receive a unity. But the unity is not found through the succession of events that establishes coherence through the relation of qualities but rather it is a unity of duration. Thus we have not the succession of cause and effect, the stuff which leads to understanding and mastery of the natural world through changing the future while swallowing it up. Rather we have an arrest brought about by acute attentiveness to experience, thereby imploding anticipations and memory, future and past, into the present in such a way that change or difference is given a unity in an eternal present. As found in haiku verse, the theatre of the absurd, the pataphysical text or in truly terrorist politics, there is a unity in the simultaneous experience of contradiction, yet no synthesis or unity of the phenomena experienced.

The apparent absurdity of Kojève's explanation of Hegel's legacy through this presentation of these archetypes cannot be understood apart from this. The prudential reasons adduced for Universal Homogeneity belong to the technological rationality of the last man. But the mere appearance of the active Nihilist, a type in total contradiction to the first, is an appearance of the 'logos' of absurdity itself. This is why the ironic Kojève is simultaneously grave and frivolous.
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There is no arresting the tension between the two types except through technological supremacy of one type over the other or through an ersatz arrest offered by the 'understanding' of this a-logic. There is no synthesis, either it is a stand-off, a clash or a resignation to and reverie in the absurdity of the Spirit of the time. But this feasting on Spirit is not a reenactment of a symbolic eucharist, rather, for the post-modern soul-less body it is the reduction of this feast to a mere fact of consumption, and for our latter-day body-less souls, an animation of the consumed gods with their own dirempted spirit. With the latter, the symbolic meaning is relegated to the image of the intense and spontaneous frenzy of a bacchanalian festival, and for the former, is signified by animals consuming a corpse at the foot of Golgotha.

Conclusion

As we exist in this world we must participate in it in order to know anything about either our world or ourselves; we must be conscious, but this consciousness of ourselves and the ground upon which we walk comes and goes. When it does come, it does so because our experience as men in the world is differentiated from ourselves and the world in which we exist, and this experience of being a man finds its meaning through symbols that give significance to this experience. These symbols can take many forms, but whatever form they take, they establish for us this difference between ourselves and the world in which we exist, and in one form or another express the order of this difference we see before us. Our symbols order the world and us in relation to each other, or one could say that to be conscious of existence as man-in-the-world orders the existence of humaness. There are degrees of differentiation, and the degree to which one can differentiate and order this experience of existence determines the character of the symbols that give meaning to his existence.

Symbols have a specific character that set them apart from other modes of articulation. With symbols as opposed to signs and images, the subject is not identical to the object of experience. The symbol, while it can more accurately differentiate and order its objects, cannot express exactly the objects of experience. Thus man, the animal symbolans, is not identical with the earth as are the other creatures, who live, die and are reborn again in the eternal metabolism of Nature. Unlike the other animals, man dies. He dies simply because he knows that he will die, whereas the other animals know nothing of death, for death, until it occurs to man always will take place tomorrow, but for the animal there is no tomorrow, hence no knowledge of death. But man who knows of death, and knows that it will occur tomorrow, is unique, for not only is he different from the other creatures in that he knows death, each one of him is unique in that each knows that when death does come to him that it will be specifically his. Thus, his death is uniquely his, and while he is like other
men in that all men die, yet he is different from all others in this respect. But not only is each man's death uniquely his, it is the same for his life, for to know death is to know of a future in which death will occur, and to know of a future is to know of a past and a present. This is so because, if one knows of death he knows that it entails the disintegration of at least physical existence. To die is for the body to cease to exist, but to be able to know that the body will cease to exist is to know what the existing body is that will no longer be, and to know what this body is, is to know what it was before today. If one knows that he will always die tomorrow, he must know it today, for today is now, and this present along with the one who exists in it, is different from what it was and will be. Everyday we know that tomorrow we will die, for each day is different and difference itself is death.

If difference is Death, then the symbols with which we articulate this experience of death to ourselves, since they produce difference, are also Death, and this is why Death, since from it we gain our uniqueness and consciousness of our temporal dimension in which we were, are, and will cease to be, is the same as difference, or is the same as the Symbol. To symbolize is to be conscious of time, for the Symbol has the structure of time, and this is why the animal symbolans is not one with the earth that is an object of his experience.

Because man differentiates himself from the earth, and orders this difference in the form of symbols that articulates his being-in-the-world, man is never quite at home in the world. He knows for a fact that he exists, but when he tries to decipher the meaning of this fact in the form of symbols, he is left in ambiguity. The ambiguity arises out of difference between the symbol and its intended meaning, between the difference of his existence and his essence. If essence is expressed in the form of the symbol, and the symbol has the form of time, then one could say that his ambiguity is produced by the tension between Being and Time.

This tension between Being and Time is precisely what Hegel sought to abolish, for it, in its extreme form, is Zerrissenheit, or what popularly often is called alienation. If, however, one could abolish this tension, the abolition would mean the destruction, not only of the ambiguity that is the seat of the experience of Zerrissenheit, but also would abolish the symbols through which the experience of this tension is expressed. If one abolishes the Symbol, one abolishes time, for as said before, time is the form of the symbol because the symbol arises out of the consciousness of Death, and Death is the arbiter to Time. If the tension is abolished and along with it the Symbol, Time and Death, then 'man' would not die, for he would have no future in which to die, and because he would have no future and no Death, there would be no difference between him and the world in which he exists. He would be at home in the world. Animals are at home in the world for they do not die; they are
forever one with the world, and Gods also do not die. Since it has been said that the world was made by God and the theistic notion of God entails difference between God and the world, then God could be at home in the world only if he were one with the world. So, in order for God to be at home in the world, he would have to know Death, but Death is only in the world and is only known by men, thus God would have to become man. Consequently, in order for God to become man, he would have to do what man, properly so-called, does, experience Death; he would have to become an animal symbolans: he would have to participate in humanity in the form of an incarnation, whereas, in the opposite dialectic, man must participate in divinity in order to become God.

This double movement of the descent of the infinite and the ascent of the finite, while it may culminate in both man and God being at home in the world, would abolish man qua man and God qua God altogether. It would mean Death to man qua man (Death to Death) and it would mean Death to God in that through Death the eternity of God would become temporalized. God would be man and man God. In this state of total equivalence between Man, World and God all would be at home in nature whose time is the eternity of the cycle of birth, maturation and deterioration.

This tension that is the ground for the experience of the difference between Man, World and God, is the Metaxy. It is this in-between fact of existence and the meaning of existence, between Life and Death, Being and Time that defines the nature of man as the creature who uses symbols to articulate the meaning of his existence to himself. If this tension were not part of his nature, then neither alienation, nor its most intense form, Zerrissenheit, would occur, but too, if one were to abolish alienation, he would have to abolish the animal who differentiates the order of his existence through symbols. One would have to eradicate the nature of humaness altogether. This is true for several reasons. First, to dwell in-between is to exist, in mythical term 'half-way between the animals and the Gods.' Animals are totally ignorant and gods are totally wise. Thus, to eradicate the in-between of properly human existence is for 'man' to cease to differentiate experience in symbols of incomplete knowledge which is philosophy and to condemn him to the complete ignorance of animality, or to elevate him to the place of total wisdom, the place reserved for gods.

But as Nietzsche put it in the Use and Abuse of History, God's “becoming transparent and intelligible inside Hegelian skulls”, is the same as the murder we have symbolically committed. And God's supposed sojourn on Earth is the eclipse of the sky over us. It is through our thinking time as eternal that we have come to think of time as History. As far as man is concerned, it is to admit with Nietzsche that “a first nature was once a second and every conquering second nature becomes a first”. And it is to ask as he does in
Zarathustra: “Who has enough courage for that, who deserves to be the masters of the earth?”

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Notes


2. The revival goes as far back as the availability of the Lasson edition of the Jenenser Logik; 1922; Lukacs' History and Class Consciousness, 1923; Köner's Von Kaut bis Hegel, 1924, and Marx's Paris Manuscripts, 1932. It further was spurred by Kojève's lectures on Hegel delivered at Paris between 1933 and 1939, published in 1947 as Introduction à la Lecture du Hegel.


5. Ibid.


7. Loc. cit.

8. Intro, p. 96.

9. Man appropriates nature because he desires, and his ultimate satisfaction (= complete recognition) depends on his ability to order nature to the extent that his desires are fully satisfied. Man attends to his desires through negating given-being and this is carried out first through naked violence on nature and then in the more subtle form of violence called technology. Now Kojève contends that technology is to be used as an end to accomplishing this complete satisfaction (= complete recognition), that technology is only a means to this end and is not an end in itself. See Geo. Grant, Technology and Empire, Toronto: House of Anansi, 1969, p. 100.

This subject is discussed at length in the above source which outlines the debate between Kojève and Leo Strauss on this matter. Here Grant notes that Strauss contends that technology, rather than being a mere means to an end, is an end in itself. Grant sums up his contention in this manner: “it would appear to me that technological progress is now being preserved not first and foremost to free all men from work and disease, but for the investigation and conquest of the infinite spaces around us. The vastness of such a task suggests that modern society is committed to unlimited technological progress for its own sake.” Ibid., p. 101. Furthermore, Grant notes that "Hegel-Kojève" substitutes universal recognition, which depends on technology, for the classical doctrine of virtue, and that by lowering the goals of human attainment, an optimism concerning the satisfaction of desires in a Universal and Homogeneous State became manifest along with an unleashing of the passions through which this goal is to be attained. Ibid., p. 105. The differences between the classical and modern notions of the relationship of man to nature are indeed striking. They are outlined in this source and at bottom Kojève's "assumption" rests on whether or not his essentially modern understanding of this relationship is correct and whether or not man negates nature as a means to fulfilling desires or as an end in itself. We will return to this subject.
10. Intro, p. 98.
11. Ibid., p. 70.
12. Ibid., p. 166.

13. The Anschauung has to do with an intuition with a quality of directness and immediacy. See Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. M. Muller, New York: Doubleday, 1966. "... we shall separate from this all that belongs to sensation (Empfindung) so that nothing remains but pure intuition (reine Anschauung) or the mere form of the phenomena . . . ." pp. 22-3.


15. Ibid., p. 530.


19. Ibid., pp. 574-75.

20. Ibid., p. 383.


22. *The Phenomenology of Mind*, p. 86.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid., p. 87.


27. *The Phenomenology of Mind*, p. 93.

28. A separate work could be written on the phenomenon of the descent in not only Hegel's philosophy but in the history of philosophy. Regarding the relationship between this key notion in Hegel's thought and the western philosophical and religious tradition, one should note the great debt the *Phenomenology of Spirit* owes to Pauline thought. Not only is the descent equal to death, but this journey into the Hell of ourselves is at the same time the ordeal whereby the "deep things of God" are discovered (I Cor. 2:10). This facing death is a prerequisite to these "deep things of God" or Wisdom. Death, pure negativity or Ego = Ego, will be overcome with the attainment of Wisdom. The attainment through an ascent is the supersession of the "depth" (Ph. p. 808) or as Paul tells us in I Cor. 15:26 "The last enemy that shall be destroyed is Death." At this point one attains Wisdom, complete self-consciousness or Absolute knowledge. It is as Hegel says, "Spirit knowing itself in the shape of spirit..." (Ph. p. 798) or as Paul says, Wisdom is "comparing spiritual things with spiritual" (I Cor. 2:13).


30. Loc. cit.


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35. Ibid., p. 13.


37. The Technological Society, p. 87.

38. The Phenomenology of Mind, p. 75.

39. “The Question Concerning Technology”, Heidegger shows the separation of techné and epistémé to have taken place with Plato. “Aristotle ... (Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. VI, Chs. 3 and 4), distinguishes between epistémé and techné and indeed with respect to what and how they reveal ... It reveals whatever does not bring itself forth and does not yet lie here before us.

40. Heidegger, through a discussion of ‘the four causes’, ties together telos, techné, and logos. Logos is related to the causa efficientis, that “which brings about the effect ...” It means “to consider carefully ... to bring forward into appearance”. Also note that Heidegger says that the translation of telos as aim or purpose is too narrow. Telos also has to do with a “circumscribing” which “gives bounds to the thing. With the bounds the thing does not stop ...”, p. 8. As I relate cybernetics to planetary domination and Hegelianism, I am not referring just to such works as those of Deutsch which represent political systems to self-adjusting mechanisms. A better example is to be found in the so-called “new cybernetics” which attempts to move away from the cybernetics of Wiener. Whereas the “old” cybernetics is still tied to the image of the machine, that is physics, the “new” adheres to the image of organism, or biology. The main task of the “new cybernetics” is to overcome entropy through using “noise” as positive feedback. In Heideggerian terms “noise” too would become ready-reserve. E. Morin, the major spokesman for the “new” cybernetics has stated “Of course living things combat entropy by supplying themselves with energy and information from outside, from the environment, and by casting out into the environment as waste the deteriorated residual materials which they cannot assimilate. However, at the same time life is reorganized, as a result of entropy exercising its lethal, disorganizing effect within. Without entropy there can be no negentropy. Thus we do not have here a simple Minichaean opposition between two antagonistic principles, as is too often supposed. On the contrary, we have a complex relation, complementary, competitive and antagonistic at the same time. This essential quality of biological complexity was adumbrated in exemplary fashion by Heraclitus: ‘Life from death and death from life.’ Hegel too came very near the concept of negentropy with his ‘magic force (Zauberkraft) causing the Negative to return to Being’.” Strangely enough the section of the article from which the quote is taken is called “Life from death, death from life”. See “Complexity” in The International Journal of Social Science, Vol. XXVI, No. 4 (1974), pp. 563-565. Heidegger, in his famous interview in Der Spiegel said that cybernetics was the “new philosophy”, and here he also said “that only a god can save us”.

41. For Heidegger Earth and World are opposed yet related terms. Whereas the World owes its existence to mortals, what they bring into appearance must be rooted in the Earth. We stand between the two in a curious way: “The coming to presence of technology threatens revealing, threatens it with the possibility that all revealing will be consumed in ordering and that everything will present itself only in the unconcealedness of standing reserve.” “The Question Concerning Technology”, p. 33.

42. The Use and Abuse of History, p. 49.

43. Intro, p. 159.

44b. Here 'Man' plays and in his play he does not alter the given for he is completely oriented in it, but what does he do mentally? He fantasizes. If play-thoughts produce theories they are of the type akin to what Alfred Jarry calls "Pataphysics". This completely non-serious 'theory' was named by André Breton in *Anthologie de l'humour noir*. See Ihab Hassan, the *Dismemberment of Orpheus*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1971, pp. 48-53. Here "fact is equivalent to dream, past to present, reason to madness, space to time, and self to other . . . Pataphysics is the science of nonsense", p. 51. Here play is completely frivolous, as opposed to *Paideia*. The latter is serious play, for only the Gods can engage in this enterprise. Plato, *Laws* (VII, 803).

45. *Intro*, p. 160.


47. *Loc. cit.*


49. *Intro*, p. 162.


56. *Intro*, p. 162.

57. *Loc. cit.*

58. In the aforementioned interview of Kojève, examples are given of this type of *areté*. "Don't forget that snobbery goes a long way. One dies through snobbery as with Kamakazes", These are examples of *areté* as "mainly virtue" or what Kojève calls "gratuitous negativity".

59. I am inviting the reader to think about not only Engels' famous words about the "administration of things", the 'state' as collective housekeeping but also asking him to reflect on: (1) the discussion of technology in Grant, cf. Footnote 12 (2) Bakunin's statement in his debate with Marx on the subject of life at the end of History, "The people is not learned, so it will be entirely freed from the cares of governing, wholly incorporated into a governed herd". Marx, *Werke*, Vol. 18, Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1962 and (3) Section 56, Part II of Tocquevilles *Democracy in America*. This is something of what Heidegger has to say on the subject. Einführung in die Metaphysik, Tubingen: Max Neimeger Verleg, 1953, pp. 28-9. "This Europe in its godless dazzling, constantly leaping to stab itself, is situated today between the great tongs of Russia on the one side and America on the other. Russia and America are both metaphysically equal in the same desperate madness of unchained techniques and bottomless organization of the normal men. Whenever the most distant corner of the globe will be conquered and exploited technically, whenever any event, at any place and at any time, in any speed becomes attainable, whenever an attempt on the life of a king of France and a symphony concert in Tokyo simultaneously can be 'experienced,' whenever time is only speed, instantness, and simultaneity and time as befalling it gone out of the *Dasein* of all nations, whenever a boxer is considered the great man of a nation, whenever a meeting numbering a
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million is a triumph — then, yes then the question remains as spectre over all this phantom — what for, where to, and what then?"

60. Hegel, Asthetick.

61. On Tyranny, p. 222.

62. These archetypes can be recognized today in other forms. First in the ‘ideology' of surrealism, we have the ideology of the bodyless soul that would hold that the imagination alone is real. Next, among the many examples of the ideology of the soulless body is the literature of Marquis de Sade and his successors.

63. The obliteration of succession through the simultaneous grasping of contradictory appearance is close to what Jung calls Synchronicity, but it is perhaps closer to Nietzsche's notion of Eternal Return of the identical and will to power. For example, in the last book of Zarathustra Nietzsche deals with the problem of cause and effect and the embracing of accident as the first step in overcoming the utilitarianism of last men. Nietzsche calls this gaming (Spielen). It is a type of play as contest. It has long been noted that this attitude is common to the various art forms in post-modern culture. For specific sources see Paul Valéry "Méthodes", Mercure, mai, 1899, and Joseph Frank "Special Forms in Modern Literature", The Sewanee Review, Spring, Summer, Autumn, 1945. An excellent general source dealing with this attitude, viz. the arts, is Roger Shattuck The Banquet Years: The Origins of the Avant-Garde in France, 1885 to World War I, Random House, New York, 1968.


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