In the opening pages of his book, Hwa Jol Jung states: "the present study is, I believe, the first systematic treatise on phenomenology in political inquiry or the phenomenological philosophy of political science which hopes to introduce phenomenology to those political scientists who wish to be self-conscious of what they are doing" (p. xiv). So far as the argument of the book goes, it may serve as an introduction to a phenomenological political science. Whether the author’s hope that it satisfies a desire for self-consciousness is fulfilled, we shall have to enquire further. The aim of the book is limited: "it covers primarily one aspect of, or is a prolegomenon to, the phenomenological critique of politics as a new way of thinking" (p. xv). Likewise the modest conclusion: "the present study is a pathfinding effort in a small measure to impress this message on the conduct of political inquiry, which must be continued in any future comprehensive work on the phenomenological critique of politics" (p. 175). It is not simply a prelude to, or promise of, greater things, however. The title reminds readers of Edmund Husserl’s Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, delivered as a series of lectures in 1935 and first published in 1953. Like Husserl, Jung observed a crisis; his own work “is a phenomenological response to the crisis of political understanding today” (p. 3). It is, then, one of a number of responses, to be ranked with those of Germino, Spragens, Bauman, Gunnell, Tinder, Blum, and many others. But again like Husserl, Jung did not see phenomenology as merely one choice among several. Like most phenomenologists, he declared his approach to be “a revolutionary or a new paradigm in man’s understanding of himself as both knower and actor in the world” (p. xiii), but more importantly, it is the one “capable of synthesizing philosophy and science, fact and value, and knowledge and action. In other words, phenomenology claims to be a complete philosophy of man and of social reality. It is capable of synthesizing theoria and praxis, the tension of which has been the twilight zone of Western political theorizing since its inception in ancient Greece” (p. 174). In a similar mood, Husserl saw his own work as an apodictic beginning (Anfang) that would complete the primordial foundation (Urstiftung) of Greek philosophy. We shall consider shortly the meaning of this far from modest claim.

"Qu’est-ce que la phénoménologie?" Brunschvicg once upon a time asked his pupil and young colleague Merleau-Ponty. "Il peut paraître étrange,"
Merleau-Ponty replied, in the famous prefatory essay to this thesis, "qu'on ait encore à poser cette question un demi-siècle après les premiers travaux de Husserl." Yet is is also perhaps not so odd. Certainly, it has become nearly obligatory for every phenomenologist to provide his own answer. In Jung's index, for example, there are eighteen entries of the type "phenomenology as...” One may well conclude there are almost as many phenomenologies as phenomenologists, and that Jung's telltale "as" indicates that he, like the rest of them, has great difficulty in saying what he is doing. This would not be an entirely unsound conclusion. Indeed, phenomenology would support it, though characteristically for its own reasons. In the first place, phenomenology is a logos, a descriptive account, of phenomena, of what appear. Now, the things that appear must appear to somebody. That is, one cannot account for phenomena, or more generally, for meanings, without also accounting for the consciousness that experiences the phenomena / meanings that way, namely as apparently meaningful. In order to undertake this kind of writing, phenomenologists have developed their own colourful idiom. Unless one reads rather a lot of it, the metaphors and unusual words can be baffling. Jung has clearly mastered the language, and writes with great confidence about various turns, elements, textures, correlates, transcendences, dialectics, disclosures, conditions, mediations, institutions, constitutions, horizons, embodiments, integrations, quiddities, interfusions, autopsies, topographies, and sedimentations. The purpose of such language should not be misconstrued: there is no attempt to hide emptiness behind a cloud of images. Rather, the language strives to express the lived and concrete immediacy of experience - and fails for the perfectly obvious reason that the expression of experience in a language that tries to account for itself is also the mediation of experience by language.

Yet, this very failure to be clear and distinct alerts one to what a phenomenologist is trying to do, namely express the actual participation of consciousness in a reality experienced. Because meanings cannot be said to appear in the absence of a consciousness for which they are meaningful, this personal element can never be expunged. Accordingly, phenomenologists often feel compelled to make a personal, and generally obscure, statement about what phenomenology "is," that is, what it is to that particular person. This is not a flaw. As Merleau-Ponty wrote, "l'inachèvement de la phénoménologie et son allure inchoative ne sont pas le sign d'un échec, ils étaient inévitable parce que la phénoménologie a pour tâche de révéler le mystère du monde et le mystère de la raison." Because human consciousness is a participation in reality experienced, no final interpretation can be given. This is true also for political theory. Accordingly, "political theory, like any theory, is an effort to discover an intimate connection between meaning and existence" (p. 17). Here one finds stated another commonplace among phenomenologists, namely: theoretical or scientific endeavours reveal one's commitments. A commitment is neither a conscious or subjective intention nor a deeper or hidden motivation. Rather, it is the expression of one's understanding of the world; it is an ontological not a psychological term. To be committed to a theoretical or scientific understanding of politics is to confront oneself and others in an ongoing dialogue. One must
listen attentively if one is to hear; one must do more than look if one is to see. No doubt. But how?

In the seeming innocence of that one question lies the whole difficulty of understanding what phenomenology entails. To begin with, for phenomenology there exists no external meaning that methodical or systematic procedures could uncover. The very requirement of attention and commitment means that one cannot formulate an exhaustive set of rules the assiduous application of which would bring to light the meaning of it all. On the contrary, for phenomenology, meanings exist only insofar as they are experienced by a specific and concrete consciousness with an equally specific and concrete attitude. To hold to the opinion that there exists a world “out there” whose meaning is clear and distinct or could be made that way by following an explicit rule of procedure, was named by Husserl the “natural attitude.”

He described it as follows: “I find continually present and standing over against me the one spatio-temporal fact-world to which I myself belong, as do all other men found in it and related in the same way to it. This ‘fact-world,’ as the word already tells us, I find to be out there, and also take it just as it gives itself to me as something that exists out there.” One may doubt this or that aspect of it; one may reject part of it, but that in no way means one has given up the general thesis: “The world as fact-world is always there; at the most it is at odd points ‘other’ than I supposed; this or that under such names as ‘illusion,’ ‘hallucination,’ and the like, must be struck out of it, so to speak; but the ‘it’ remains ever, in the sense of a general thesis, a world that has its being out there.” Within the context of our ordinary everyday attitude, Husserl was saying, there are some things that simply are not questionable. We do not question that there is a world and that it is accessible to everybody. It is real. It is essentially the same for all sane people. It is essentially the same at all times. It is typical. Whatever is unknown about the world is continuously related to what is known: in principle, what is to be discovered is more of the same world.

Sometimes, however, even the most ordinary experience is transfigured. A bureaucrat may wonder why there is government at all; a teacher may realize she has something important to say but cannot; one may wake up one fine morning to realize that one has turned twenty-five or even fifty! In short, from time to time, the ordinariness of the world may be shattered. No longer familiar, it becomes uncanny, sour, decomposed, or very strange. For Husserl, these are precious glimpses of the problematic of worldliness. They let us know that things could be different; more than that, that everything could be different. In short, the meaning of the world is inseparable from our believing in it. The natural attitude, therefore, expresses a particular (and, to the phenomenologist, problematic) unity of belief and what is believed in. It follows that the task of phenomenology is to overcome the commonsense ordinary way we live our daily lives, and make of it a topic for theoretical scrutiny. In this way, with the existence of the world problematic - or, as Husserl said, when its existence is placed within brackets - the essential structures of the world may appear to a consciousness whose attitude is “theoretical” rather than natural, ordinary, or everyday. One cannot, for example, simply enjoy the pleasures of life or suffer its
disappointments and at the same time be self-consciously aware that this is happening. Likewise, one cannot think about what the pleasures or disappointments of life mean at the same time as they are happening to oneself. To make the natural attitude a topic of reflection, then, means that one no longer shares it. The description of the experience and its relation to the account of it constitute the pith and substance of phenomenological analysis.

It follows that, whatever meaning appears, appears first to "me" and not to "us." The phenomenological voice is solo not choral. But it is not for that reason arbitrary or irrational inasmuch as all verification involves a consciousness that sees and understands for itself. Of the several implications that may be drawn from this observation, possibly the most important is that meanings are dynamic. Like a traveller whose passage through a landscape alters its aspect, the commitments of consciousness to the world change the world. In its simplest terms this means no more than that consciousness is historical and so, therefore, is the world whose meaning it seeks to understand. But again, this does not imply any kind of historical relativism but rather the awareness of theorizing as a continual interrogation, a continual self-questioning.

Subtending both the naive and immediate experience of the world in the natural attitude and the theoretical interpretation of it, is what Husserl called the life-world (Lebenswelt), what Alfred Schutz termed "social reality." Such terms refer to the ultimate horizon of meaning within which co-exist several "sub-worlds" of work, of theory, of play, of madness, and so on. These are "provinces" of meaning divided from each other and from participating conscious human beings by space and time, proximity and distance. That is, social reality is multi-dimensional, heterogeneous, and internally articulated. Phenomenology, then, contradicts the belief, still widespread if not triumphant, that self-understanding is most truly found by way of mathematical or quasi-mathematical formalism, which is called by its exponents, "objectivity." When one turns from a concern with the reality of a conscious subject to the formal constructions of one's mathematical imagination, a two-fold absence is imposed. First, experienced reality is transmogrified into the opaque irrationality whose operations are completely unintelligible; second, the logic of calculative reason, which is crystal clear to itself, finds itself helpless to express the subtle, the ambiguous, the historically weighted, connotative meanings of life that give it, precisely, typicality and continuity.

These general remarks on phenomenological philosophy, which are in no way original, suggest the context of Jung's argument in the volume under discussion. Given the current configuration of commitments by political scientists to quasi-mathematical approaches to political reality, the initial task of a phenomenological political science is to bring to light the meaning of those commitments and thereby their limitations. And so, for example, Jung criticizes the notion of "political development," a widely favoured conceptual approach to comparative politics: "In the familiar terminology of modernization, the scientific, technological, and industrial civilization of the West is superior to the nonscientific, nontechnological, and nonindustrial culture of the non-Western world. Although it is an ideological phantom, the 'third world' is more than a
phenomenology: it is indeed a moral ordering” (p. 81). Even if the non-Western world is rapidly losing its heterogeneous moral order, it once expressed an autonomous meaning, which could not have been reduced to an obstacle to modernization without violating the integrity of that order. Of course such violations have taken place. How else could one describe the last century of Western imperialism? Any chatter about the “modernization” of Africa or China that ignores the systematic application of bureaucratic violence directly by the West or inspired by Western examples, is simply an alibi and bad political science.

More broadly, a phenomenological critique of behaviouralism, that successful protest movement which, for a generation now, has performed a rich and comic repertoire, brings to light the limitation of reducing the projective meaning of activity to its external manifestation, to its expression, to an event the significance of which must be imposed by one’s conceptual framework. In short, for a behaviouralist, political action becomes passive, its meaning the result of the investigator’s activity. Construing science as method, the behaviouralist misunderstands his own intervention as merely following rules. That is, he understands himself also as passive, and not as an interventionist at all. But this means the investigator is unable to account for his own actions. The two points are obviously bound together: the behaviouralist method is plausible only because the behaviouralist ignores political action in order to attend to the rules by which behaviour may be observed. Accordingly, the behaviouralist must violate the completely commonsensical assumption that “epistemology presupposes ontology. In the context of this work, this means that a critique of political knowledge presupposes a phenomenological ontology of man. In other words, how to know human action must be based on what human actions is” (p. 59). Granted, then, that the behaviouralist is reluctant to recognize himself as a knowing subject in the life-word, the better to conceive himself as an epistemological subject in the conceptual world of (his) science, a phenomenological criticism also insists that this reluctance is not innocent. There is more than an external similarity between the bureaucratic political practitioner, who merely follows rules, and his scientific counterpart. Both share identical commitments to a regular, smoothly functioning and predictable cultural order that truly behaves itself. Behaviouralism is, so to speak, the spiritual aroma of bureaucratic regularity, an ideological dream where the administration of things (perhaps guided by properly stratified random sample surveys) actually does replace the governance of men.

Special attention is devoted to cybernetics, “the apex of political behaviouralism as scientific epistemology” (p. 109). With cybernetics the neutered behaviouralist becomes self-conscious. Here he actually is what he always has potentially been, an activist technician. Shorn of its touching but juvenile faith in liberal decency, “the cybernetic model of man is the culmination of technological rationality” (p. 110). Again, a phenomenological criticism must consider both the pragmatic and the theoretical aspects. “Through technology the annihilation of man in the atomic age is already an external possibility. As technology the cybernetic model of man is an internal threat to the being of
man” (p. 111). Atomic or other poisoning, as is well known, could have the practical consequence of ending human life on the planet. Theoretically, a thoroughly cybernetic self-understanding of existence would endow human life with an artificial, unhuman, and indeed unnatural meaning. The most obvious appearance of nature for human beings is through one’s body; accordingly, the most obvious neglect of cybernetics is the embodiment of cognitive intelligence, to say nothing of emotions, gestures, feelings and excellences. When intelligence is reduced to the binary logic of an electrical switch, all ambiguity vanishes, all action and performance ends, all interpretation is superfluous. Or rather, the cyberneticist claims these things. The claim, however, is fraudulent not least because it is based upon the untenable assumption that externally imposed criteria, not experienced realities, constitute meaning. But since any political community, however organized, is a community of embodied subjects, “the objection raised here is based not on the human pride of superiority but on the way in which man in his embodiment thinks and behaves qualitatively differently from any other organism or any mechanism whatsoever” (p. 121).

Behaviouralism and the quasi-mathematical vision of political reality is not the sole alternative to a phenomenological political science. In particular, Jung discussed the theories of C.B. Macpherson and Leo Strauss. The writings of both Macpherson and Strauss show that their admiration for behavioural political science is firmly under control. Nevertheless a phenomenological reading of their works may bring to light certain limits that otherwise may not be apparent.

According to Jung, Macpherson’s political theory may be described as “sociologistic Marxism.” Now Marxism and phenomenology have had a productive association, especially in France, for the last forty years or so. Macpherson’s approach was, therefore, accorded its due phenomenological applause. Its chief glory is its great power to unmask ideologies, especially the liberalism of Hobbes and Locke, which Macpherson accurately described as “possessive individualism.” Their liberalism, Macpherson argued, reflected the nascent and then more mature market societies of their own times so that, to the extent that this attitude and the assumptions that sustain it persist into the present, camouflaged as giveness or neutrality, it is an ideology of the status quo and imperfectly expresses the changed significance of contemporary public life. Jung pays his respects to Macpherson’s approach, but argues that unmasking ideologies is not enough. Sociologistic Marxism is “inadequate to replace possessive individualism with a new ontology the endeavour of which must necessarily be normative and projective” (p. 13). By conceiving theory “solely as a critique of ideology or the reduction of theory to a sociologistic orientation,” Macpherson thereby “undermines the normative construction of his own democratic ontology for the purpose of filling the ‘essence of man’ beyond the postulates of possessive individualism both now and in the future” (pp. 132-3). That is, if theorizing is chiefly dependent upon socio-economic changes, any genuinely creative theorizing would be impossible, insofar as it would be limited to the conditions or contingencies of its own genesis. “In order to change the world, we must first change the very thought of the world: the demand to transform the world by doing involves first the transformation of it by thinking.”
Macpherson’s theory, by this account, seems to make the thinker not a participant and so not involved in the same world that he “thinks.” Whether this criticism of Macpherson’s work is valid may at least be doubted: certainly it strikes one as odd to have Macpherson’s theory criticized for not seeking to transform the world. One would have thought that was either one of its great strengths or its most grievous fault.

The second general shortcoming of Macpherson’s approach seems to be at variance with the first in that Jung argues that Macpherson is, in fact, compelled to rely on, and so become part of, a movement that does indeed change the world, and change it for the worse, namely technology. Beginning with his study of Hobbes, it is argued, Macpherson systematically underestimates the importance of technology and scientism by treating it “as a surface structure or superstructure - if not a false consciousness or an epiphenomenon - of the market society” (p. 135). Macpherson is not simply in error, of course, but rather, “what he says of technology is inadequate in its depth and scope, that is his view of technology as merely instrumental to the ontology of man is deficient to understand fully the all-inclusive nature of the technological rationality of our time” (p. 136). Consequently, Macpherson’s advocacy of the development of all human faculties to the greatest possible extent “is now inseparable from the anti-humanistic tendencies of technocentric culture” (p. 139). The reason for Macpherson’s blindness, Jung remarks in a short demythologizing exercise of his own, is that, like most Marxists, Macpherson has been focally concerned with the relations among human beings, and not with the relations between human beings and nature. He does not view Marx as a penseur de la technique, and so does not see the anti-humanist core of technology for what it truly is.

Accordingly, a humanism “that ignores the antihumanistic tendencies of technocratic rationality cannot be fully humanistic” (p. 144).

It is clear that Jung respects Leo Strauss. But it is even clearer that he has grave reservations about Strauss’s political science. Jung deals hardly at all with Strauss’s major works, namely his careful reading of ancient Greek texts. His commentaries on, and interpretations of, Plato, Aristotle, Xenophon, Aristophanes, and Thucydides, formed the heart of his mature reflections, and constituted the most important salvo in what he, at least, considered a still existent war between ancients and moderns. To fail or refuse to deal with Strauss on his own terms is certainly to violate Strauss’s cardinal interpretative principle, to try to understand an author the way he understood himself. It also violates the first principle of a phenomenological hermeneutic, namely that an interpreter must believe with the believer, must imaginatively recapitulate the believer’s experience within his own critically aware consciousness. This is especially important when the topic at issue is historicism, the opinion, or rather, “the assertion that the fundamental distinction between philosophic and historical questions cannot in the last analysis be maintained.” Two legitimate options seem to be open to any critic of Strauss’s views. First, one could argue that his definition of historicism was inadequate. Jung, however accepted it. Indeed, he quoted with evident approval (p. 271) the judgement of Emil Fackenheim that Strauss’s definition of historicism was “classical.” Secondly,
one could argue that, in fact, it is impossible in the last analysis to maintain the fundamental distinction between philosophical and historical questions. That is, one could argue that the distinction is not, in truth, fundamental. Jung did not do this.

What Jung does do is argue that his own assumptions are not those of Strauss, which can hardly be in doubt. He does so, moreover, in a deplorably inelegant way. To begin with, he labels Strauss’s “position” as “essentialism” or “ontological objectivism.” By this he means “the version of ‘human nature’ which is predetermined, unchanging, and universal” (P. 147). According to Jung, “Strauss defines the nature of man as ahistorical and immutable;... ‘human nature’ is a fixed, determinate, and finished essence subject to no historical vicissitudes and vectors whose eternity alone certifies knowledge or ‘truth’” (pp. 166-7). In contrast, Jung affirms that, “contrary to the traditional view of ‘human nature,’ (the human being) has no fixed and predetermined properties like a thing: indeed he is becoming - not a being that is always to be” (p. 29). As so often seems to occur when criticism of this sort are hurled about, textual citations are rare. The reason is not that a critic is moved by a charitable desire not to embarrass, but that he encounters large, perhaps insuperable, difficulties in trying to show how intelligent and subtle minds appear to hold imbecilic opinions. One knows, for example, of no writing, certainly not by Strauss and probably not even by a behaviouralist, that maintain that human beings are things.

Jung’s second argument appears at first sight closer to the mark, though it contradicts the first. After making the point that what was at issue between them is a “fundamental constitutional or ontological difference,” Jung declares that his own phenomenological ontology “is an affirmation of the open future in the passage of time, whereas essentialism is a fidelity to the past” (p. 148). But surely the past belongs to the realm of becoming and is not, therefore, “always.” Jung seems to have turned Strauss from a simpleton who thought humans were things into a historicist who found all meaning sedimented in past prior history, and none in the projected future. But when Strauss identified our “oblivion of eternity,” our “estrangement from man’s deepest desire and therewith from the primary issues” as “the price which modern man had to pay, from the very beginning, for attempting to be absolutely sovereign, to become the master and owner of nature, to conquer chance” — in short, as an important constituent element of historically modern political existence — he was not referring simply to our forgetfulness of Xenophon’s political science. Eternity, one would think, is more than a long time or even a long time ago. One need not know what eternity is in order to see that Strauss thought one could learn something about it by assiduously studying those writers for whom the term did not just mean old.

The discussion devoted to Strauss’s contention that modern political science is radically different from ancient political science is also skewed. Jung is doubtless correct in his summary that modern political science “attempts to bridge the lacuna between philosophy and the polis by two innovations: (1) the identification of the aim of philosophy with that of the city and (2) the diffusion of philosophical results among the men of the city . . .”(p.154). Jung does not
question the historical accuracy of Strauss's contention, that the dichotomy between ancients and moderns is the overriding configuration of meaning in the entire history of Western political thought. Nor does he question the soundness of Strauss's argument concerning the comparative truthfulness of ancient as compared to modern political science. Rather, Jung's criticism flattens into the charge that Strauss misconstrued Husserl. But surely the issue is greater than whether Strauss has seen the degree to which the later Husserl has abandoned the dream of phenomenology as a rigorous science.

His discussion of the relationship of Strauss to Heidegger seems to be skewed in the opposite direction. He rightly emphasizes Strauss's respect for Heidegger as a thinker, and so as an adversary that Strauss could recognize as his peer. But their conflict was not simply over whether one may "revise" Greek philosophy rather than "preserve" it (p. 149). If one reads What is Political Philosophy? as a political as well as a philosophic reply to the Introduction to Metaphysics, one may catch a glimpse of what was involved. Strauss was in deadly earnest in a way that today is not easy to imagine: their quarrel was also between Nazi and Jew.

Finally, in Jung's summary of the correspondence between Gadamer and Strauss, he endorses Gadamer's view that interpretation is both reproductive and productive. Strauss, he says, was naive "in not suspecting or examining his own prejudice, that is, [the prejudice that] truth . . . [is] 'unhistorical'" (p. 160). Fortunately, the correspondence to which Jung refers has since been published, and those interested in such matters can decide the issue for themselves. 14 It is, however, rather shocking to think that Jung seriously believed that Strauss was naive. One would have thought that precisely the opposite was true, that his political science was "graceful, subtle and colourful." Has Jung learned nothing from Strauss's studies of other "naive" but polite writers?

I shall conclude by placing Jung's argument in a larger context. Contrary to the thrust of his polemic, phenomenology will not overcome the crisis of political understanding, nor will it change the world. These are harsh words. One should, therefore, soften them with the obvious qualification that in many respects Jung has written an excellent book. One refrains from praising its many merits however, because political science is seldom served by agreement and applause. And yet, one must say plainly, this is a useful book. Political scientists can be instructed by its intelligent discussion of temporality, natality, incarnation, language, and so on — all themes that have been prominently discussed in the writings of phenomenologists. It is, therefore, a good introduction. That is a more limited objective than Jung had set for himself, but it is one well met.

Phenomenological language, like any language, expresses and articulates the experiences of participation of consciousness in the life-world, social reality or, simply, reality. By attending to the form of language as well as to its rhetoric and significance, one can imaginatively reconstitute the essential features of reality experienced by an author. In this way one can bring to light the meaning of a text as well as the limitations it has set for itself, the outer edge of its coherence. For readers already familiar with phenomenological styles, Jung has well expressed the myth of nature that constitutes the experiential ground of thoughts that are expressed in phenomenological terms. The language is borrowed from
Heidegger, but the reverential mood, appropriate to express a true myth, was Jung's. "The natural luminescence of Being is cast on beings and unveils their whereabouts. Mortal man, earth, sky, and gods are the elemental *topos* [sic] of Being—its fourfold unity." Thinking really is thanking, an act of piety; questioning really is the piety of thinking, "a holy vision on things both natural and cultural" (pp. 6-7). And yet, the limits to Jung's discussion may be more narrowly drawn than the topic he has chosen; his words may not express fully the amplitude of piety or acknowledge the full range of human experience. Human being, he maintains in good phenomenological fashion, is being-in-the-world, where world meant society, nature, and technology (pg. 19). But where is sky? Where are gods? Where is his account or even acknowledgement of what Ricoeur, an author Jung relies on extensively, calls the wholly other that draws near? Or what Fackenheim, whom he also cites authoritatively, calls the ultimate other, which situates man humanly?  

For Jung, as for other phenomenologists, most notably Merleau-Ponty, whom Jung cites more often than anyone else, such experiences and their symbolizations fall silently away. One wonders why. Are they imaginary? Do the gods have no relationship at all to the worlds of society, nature, and technology? Jung is silent about these things. All one can say is that Ricoeur and Fackenheim (and several other phenomenologists, many of whom have been published by the same university press as Jung) consider experiences of the divine and their symbolizations important even for the world-immanent themes Jung does discuss. Moreover, his account of the significance of worldly activities seems incomplete. To act, he says, "is to have a project, and to have a project is to choose a goal or purpose" (p. 23). But what of play? We do not reach into the future or think of it in the future perfect tense. Time seems suspended; one hardly thinks at all. Yet surely one acts. Indeed, the first common meaning of actor is one who acts in a play. Daniel Bell, whose post-industrial vision of games people play Jung thought worthy enough to mention, can hardly be considered an authority.  

Neither play nor gods are terms to be found in the index. There seems to be something terribly serious about all this worldly humanism. Myth-dwelling has its own dangers, even when undertaken in the full lucidity of phenomenological consciousness. 'Properly understood, caring is letting things be as they are and appreciating their intrinsic value. It is reverential in that it respects the natural way of worldly things. ... To dwell with care is for man to spare and save worldly things'" (p. 56). Jung's words are seductive and exquisite, and not a little cunning. But they betray one into softness. Now, it is true, as Aristotle said, that friendship and justice are human realities closely bound to one and another. But who has friends has enemies. Or even if one has no enemies, one's friends may have them. When, therefore, one speaks of friendship within the context of celebrating "the sacrament of planetary coexistence among all beings and things" (p. 56), one no longer speaks of friendship, but of something else, soft and warm perhaps, like the ample bosom of mother nature. But friendship exists as much by the hardness of exclusion as it does by accepting others. Justice certainly demands that political science look at hard things as well as soft ones. Justice is often said to be hard, and often it is. That is why it is softened or tempered by mercy or by equity. Jung's attitude is
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merciful and equitable, but it must be stiffened by justice.

From what has already been said of his discussion of the behaviourally persuaded and the cybernetic revolutionaries, it is clear that his criticism of the attitudes and work of those practitioners is sound. Yet, behaviouralism and associated movements are not simply mistakes. It is true that they are too hard and “scientific,” too precise, brittle, and cold to express adequately the reality of politics. But, if what was said of the myth of nature underlying Jung’s phenomenology was accurate, it would appear that his approach is too soft and unscientific, too imprecise, malleable and warm. In short, there exists a dialectic between “scientific,” quasi-mathematical behavioural analyses and phenomenology. The issues raised explicitly by Jung as well as the limitations of his argument that I have tried to bring to light lead one into this most general of interpretative questions. No more than a few brief suggestions of what is involved can be made here.17

The constituent elements of this final dialectic may be identified as reminiscence and demythologization. On the one side reality is experienced as a genuine appearance of meaning, and on the other it is experienced as a mere show behind, or beyond, or above which the truth lies. With the first approach, endorsed by Jung, interpretation is a recollection of a manifest meaning that is addressed to one personally; with the second, endorsed by the behaviourists and all their more and less respectable fellow-travellers, the task of interpretation involves purging the psyche of illusions that grow, from the ambiguities of consciousness. Only an unambiguous method, beyond doubt, can be relied upon. Opposed to Jung and his holy vision of things both natural and cultural is the iconoclastic school of suspicion ever alert to unmask the works of guile and mystifications, and committed to bringing lies, ideals, and idols into the clear light of truth where they may be seen for what they are. Between these two strategies it is foolish to choose: to obey or to doubt? One must do both, yet one cannot do both at once, no more than one can be both warm and cool, soft and hard. Yet, self-consciousness, which also seeks self-certainty or self-knowledge, must grasp both moments. It can do so only insofar as they are constituents of a single dialectical process. Phenomenology can open one to truth experienced; science, including behaviouralism, at least in principle, can lead one away from illusion. Neither is privileged. One suspects the crisis of political understanding may well be part of political understanding.

Notes

1. The argument itself is divided into 175 pages of text and 43 pages of notes. That is, about a quarter of the book is citation, elaboration, and qualification. An additional 33 pages of bibliography and index reduces further the discursive proportion.

2. These works and the bibliographies they contain form a big collection of responses to a crisis variously identified with positivism, behaviouralism, scientism, historicism, nihilism, and so forth. Most discussants agree with Jung in relating our apparent problems in political science with the agonies of contemporary politics. See Dante Germino, Beyond Ideology: The Revival of


4. Ibid., p.xvi.


7. One should add that not all the practical consequences of a cybernetic conception of human activities are either disastrous or potentially so; one does rely on the TTC or the CNR to be integrated systems, resplendent with servomechanisms, feedback loops, input buffer devices, and so forth. One would like to rely on the post office that way too.


11. As authority for his assertion that Strauss "assumed ... that the unchanging structure of physics assures the certainty of objective and universal knowledge of the intelligibility of the good" (p.148) Jung cited an article by Samuel J. Todes and Hubert L Dreyfus, "The Existentialist Critique of Objectivity," in James M. Edie, Francis H. Parker, and Calvin O. Schrag, eds., Patterns of the Life World: Essays in Honor of John Wild, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970, pp.346-87. In that article Plato and Kant are named but hardly discussed with anything like the detail necessary to make sense of the meaning of physics.


13. In order to understand Strauss's argument one must see that, for him, political philosophy means both the attempt to replace opinion with knowledge about political things—i.e. that it is part of philosophy dealing with politics—but also that it is political philosophy, philosophy written in such a way that it is intelligible to the men of the city.


16. One would have thought that Dunand, Kutzner, Caillois, the phenomenologist Fink, or even old Huizinga would have been more reliable guides to the topic than the "sociologist and futurologist" Jung relied on.

17. Ricoeur's Freud and Philosophy is the most complete exposition, using a vast range of
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