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DEMOCRATIC POLITICS AND IDEOLOGY: R.G. COLLINGWOOD'S ANALYSIS OF METAPHYSICS IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND MORAL CIVILIZATION

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The necessity for grounding both knowledge and political action brings us to the examination of metaphysics. This requirement arises because without it there is no process of validation for knowledge and action and without validation there is not a basis, within philosophy, for certainty in knowledge, leading to a lack of comprehension of action except for *ex post facto* 'rationalizations'. The significance of knowledge and action is that they are attributes of practical activity, the knowing and the doing. Although metaphysics is certainly important for academic debates, its actual influence is in terms of consequences in social and political relationships, that is, in practical activity.

The problem of achieving certainty in knowledge involves the nature of reality and our awareness of it. Certainty about the nature of reality demands some form of universality in an individuated world. Certainty also follows from the need for a universal or consistent basis for specialized knowledge derived from each of the specific sciences. The claim made, especially during the early part of this century, that in actuality physics gives a foundation only makes physics into a metaphysics. Making physics the ground of reality does not resolve the metaphysical question about the nature of reality; it is only one possible answer to that question and an imperfect one at that, as will be shown later.

This demand for metaphysics is an attempt to resolve inconsistencies in man's knowledge and commitments: idea and matter, science and faith, the particular and the universal. It should be made clear that none of these inconsistencies has prevented action; but for the thinker, for the inquirer, each has prevented certainty. That is, awareness, through sophistication, of the metaphysical problem is what has made certainty difficult. For the individual unaware of the metaphysical problem ultimate uncertainty is not a problem. His certainty is a given, an unquestioned commitment.

This leads us to look at the metaphysical problem in political action involving the nature of ideology and the certainty of moral commitments. The attempt to ground moral commitments has always involved some metaphysical commitment, whether to theology, human nature, or to natural law.

Metaphysics has been the attempt to base moral commitments on some universality which can only depend on some consistent idea of the nature of reality. Ideology uncovers the problem of exclusivity of metaphysics. The religious fervor of ideologies, including experimental sciences, has involved their absolute certainty derived from a unique metaphysics. The violent disagreements of ideologies are derived not solely from conflict over values, but primarily from a conflict over the nature of reality. The central issue in the relationship between metaphysics and ideology is one of freedom. If there is a specifically definable nature to reality, if this nature requires a particular moral, epistemological and political commitment, and finally if these commitments are mutually exclusive by their very nature because they are derived from a mutually exclusive nature of reality, then the only meaningful freedom possible is freedom of taste. Is it possible to have freedom and metaphysics? Either it is possible to have freedom within a context of metaphysics or all freedom becomes an illusion. From a political perspective, the problem is how social relationships can be arranged to allow for diverse metaphysics. This is the essential dilemma of politics and freedom, not of particular ideologies, such as Marxism, conservatism or socialism, but of politics itself and freedom.

Philosophy has, from Aristotle on, continuously searched for a fundamental ground for knowledge and action, and their results, truth and certainty. This is what Aristotle called 'the First Science', a point of departure which is also the ultimate ending point. In terms of its other branches — epistemology, ethics, ontology and aesthetics — even philosophy itself views metaphysics as its own fundamental ground.

The idea of 'First Science' results from a notion of absolute priority for metaphysics. This priority is of a two-fold nature. The first is a logical priority. " 'First Science' is the science whose subject matter is logically prior to that of every other, the science which is logically presupposed by all other sciences."[1] All science, that is all knowledge must presuppose the subject of metaphysics although the actual study of metaphysics, historically, will occur after the development of a particular science.

The second aspect of the priority is the subject matter of metaphysics. Its priority not only involves form but also content. Although this is not an absolute distinction, it is significant especially as it applies to ideology. The subject matter of metaphysics is the absolute nature of reality, the nature of nature. The subject matter is what sets the parameters for the remainder of the philosophic or scientific system. It is not only logically prior but also its content restricts the possible subject of the rest of the system. It serves as an analogue of the economic system in Marx's ideology.

This priority of metaphysics is also applicable to ideologies. The traditional conflict of ideologies has presumed a disagreement about fundamentals. Fundamentals are ultimately grounded in metaphysics. The harsh contradiction

between ideologies is based on complete disagreement about the possible ground for having politics; not on the concluding values which are the result of the fundamentals. Disagreement about values and strategies frequently occur within the same political party, having a unified fundamental ideology, and also within the same political structure where fundamentals are accented. But, none of these lead to the severe conflict of ideology which results in the total breakdown of civil interaction. This only results from the disagreement about the basic fundamental ground for an ideology.

The logical priority of metaphysics in ideology derives from the fact that the categories of the fundamental ground are viewed as being mutually exclusive. The fundamentals of ideologies seem to be completely incompatible with each other. These metaphysical grounds, as philosophical categories, presume the exclusion of each other. Materialism as a metaphysical ground for the nature of reality, or for that matter realism, logically exclude the possibility of a metaphysical perspective derived from idealism. A Marxist dialectical economic perspective would logically exclude the possibility of atomistic individualism. In an ideological system of action, the place where one ideological perspective logically, i.e. absolutely, excludes another perspective is the fundamental ground of its metaphysics.

The resulting particulars of an ideological system, derived from its metaphysical ground, are not necessarily mutually exclusive and *may* lead to great areas of agreement and cooperation with other systems. Such resulting values as peace, cooperation and material wealth, can be areas of agreement for a period of time between ideologies. Nonetheless, their fundamental disagreement continues and must by the logic of metaphysics arise at another time. This is the consequence of the fact that values, as epiphenomena of fundamental structures, are not separate from those structures. This is why there can be some common goals between two ideologies which are nevertheless mutually incompatible in their basic structure.

The difficulty in taking metaphysics seriously has been the requirement that it be viewed necessarily as non-historical if it is to fulfil its function as the fundamental ground for a philosophy or for ideologies. The fundamental ground must become that which does not vary with history. History is movement and change; the fundamental ground, metaphysics, is the security which underlies the change and gives it unity. Although often acknowledged, this feature has not been emphasized as an aspect of, for example, Marxism, the metaphysics of which is non-historical. Marx was essentially ahistorical. Although his focus was on history and change, he, like Hegel, wanted to develop a system which would not change with time and historical development. In this he succeeded. His dialectical materialism and economic determinism are made the underlying, non-historical, form and content of human reality. It is significant to recognize that although Marx made history important, he was not an historian or in-

volved with the sociology of knowledge; rather, he was a metaphysician in the tradition of attempting to achieve a fundamental, non-historical ground for the continuously changing lived-reality.

Heidegger recognized this conflict between history and metaphysics in his examination of a fundamental ontology or the ground of metaphysics.[2] The idea of either a fundamental or ground for something is language which used to be reserved for metaphysics. Heidegger recognized that what gives rise to metaphysics is historical. That is, the particular questions which arise and their solutions are brought forth and only have value in particular historical contexts. To resolve the problem of what is fundamental if all is changing, Heidegger developed a system of fundamental ontology which is based on the lived experience of what brings the metaphysical inquiry about. If metaphysics must change historically, then what brings metaphysics about must be the fundamental consistent ground. This is the reason why Heidegger comes close to generating a universal non-historical human nature, the phenomena of human existence. Either human existence fundamentally varies individually and culturally or it becomes a form of fundamental universal human nature. Although Heidegger recognized the problem of metaphysics and history, he could not resolve this problem; his fundamental ontology remained ahistorical.

A contemporary thinker who has involved himself with the problem of metaphysics and history is R.G. Collingwood who E.H. Carr characterized as "the only British thinker in the present century who has made a serious contribution to the philosophy of history."[3] This is Collingwood's essential significance. Although he was concerned with the central issues of philosophy, essentially metaphysics for our purposes, he was a trained and practicing historian. Being an historian, he recognized the fact that although history was a topic of inquiry for philosophy, it was also in direct contradiction to many of philosophy's cherished tenets, especially to any idea of universal philosophical knowledge or Truth, and to any attempt to gain a fundamental ground for reality. On the other hand, he recognized, like Heidegger, that there must be some underlying consistent reason for the continuous attempt to achieve such truth through all historical periods in the West. Collingwood's central project or goal was to develop a process of metaphysical inquiry which would be consistent both with the traditional notion of metaphysics and with the contemporary ideas of history, particularly with regard to the sociology of knowledge.

Collingwood was part of a movement in twentieth century philosophy which attempted to transcend the dilemma between continental idealism and the British reaction to it by, for example, Bertrand Russell and A.J. Ayer.[4] He viewed his philosophy as a movement beyond the historicism of continental idealism and the scientific empiricism of British positivism and analytic philosophy. Although Collingwood was opposed to both, he saw what was the intrinsic significance of each which gave rise to their development. European

historical skepticism presented the epistemological problem for philosophy. That is, how is it possible for philosophy to step out of history to establish criteria for truth in human affairs? In British positivism and analytic philosophy, Collingwood recognized the fact that the empirical sciences lead to genuine knowledge. Although these 'truths' were the basis of Collingwood's thought, he was vehemently opposed to either as a valid complete system, not only because they were wrong but also because they lead to irrationalism. This problem for him was epitomized in the then developing science of psychology which, while justifying itself in terms of the genuine knowledge legacy of science, necessarily develops historical skepticism because it rejects the very uniqueness of thought and reason which are the basis of science.[5]

Collingwood's achievement will be examined in the remainder of this article. Three essential aspects of his metaphysics will be developed. The first will show that the basis of philosophy is in metaphysics, which necessarily involves establishing the place of philosophy in its relation to other knowledge, specifically science. The second concern of this analysis will be to show what the nature of metaphysics is and how this relates, as a process of knowledge, to philosophy and science. Part of this analysis will look at how Collingwood viewed those who opposed metaphysics and how he applied his metaphysical analysis to political inquiry and to political theory. The final part will show how this concept of metaphysics directly relates to a moral society or in Collingwood's terms, 'Civilization', and to political action.

Collingwood's Metaphysics

Collingwood argues that if philosophy is to be viable in our century it must resolve the absolute distinction between itself and science. Science had overtaken philosophy as the source of knowledge and truth. Whatever may be its critique by philosophy, only science has moved beyond the sphere of pure speculation. For Collingwood, the resulting demise of philosophy has been the consequence of philosophy's own misconception of its role and its relationship to the dominant agent of knowledge, science. That relationship has been, with a few exceptions, one of antagonists; the attempt by philosophy, continually unsuccessful, to prove that the true source of knowledge is really not science but speculative philosophy. At the core of the relationship between science and philosophy is metaphysics, being both the fundamental science of philosophy and the determination of reality for science. For Collingwood, the base of the conflict between philosophy and science is metaphysical, from which epistemological concerns are derived. It is a debate over the nature of reality and the consequences of interpretations. Collingwood shows that the distinction between science and philosophy is neither in terms of the type of knowledge nor in terms of their respective validity, i.e. reality; rather, their distinction lies in their respective foci of inquiry.

Philosophy as Science

"Philosophical thought is that which conceives its object as activity; empirical thought is that which conceives its object as substance or thing."[6] Action is concerned with intention, thought, will and reason; it is what consciousness or mind does. Inquiry about activity is analysis of what people, interpreted as mind, have done under certain situations. To distinguish between substance and activity, Collingwood uses the example of 'conduct'. Conduct can be analyzed both as activity and as substance or thing. A philosophical science of conduct, which analyzes it as activity, is ethics. The empirical science of conduct is psychology. Although they are studying the same phenomena, their questions and solutions are distinct. 'Mind' as an action "refers to the self-critical activities called thinking."[7]

Inquiry by Collingwood's method presumes a similarity between philosophic and scientific questions. They both focus on experiential facts; therefore, they are both sciences. But whereas the experimental sciences focus on natural facts, the philosophic sciences inquire about mental facts. Collingwood argues that the experimental sciences and the philosophical or reflective sciences use a common investigative process to examine facts which are knowable, communicable, and verifiable. Natural facts are known through observation; mental facts are knowable through reflection. Both are communicable in that they can be made intelligable to other individuals. Finally, both can be validated through the observation or reflection of other individuals. Validation has, for philosophers especially, presented a problem; however, validation has almost never been a problem for experimental scientists. Scientists are usually faced with the initial problem of beginning the process, in other words, how to observe. Once observation is initiated, validation becomes a relatively simple process.[8] However, validation has been historically problematic for philosophers since they have confused speculation with knowledge and have not trusted in the commonality of human beings. Philosophers have tended to be elitist because they have been content with viewing unproductive speculation as the solid basis for their investigations.[9] Contradistinct to speculation, knowledge is a communal activity; it presumes intersubjective commonality of perspective. Knowledge is not possible in a community comprised, for example, of a scientist, a witch doctor and a medieval religious fanatic. This does not mean, however, that the development of learning from each other is impossible; revealing therefore that a commonality of perspective is developing. Validation in science and in philosophy can only depend on other individuals verifying either the observation or the reflection. "The science of mind . . . can tell us nothing but what each can verify for himself by reflecting upon his own mind."[10] Certainly much to the regret of philosophers, validation cannot be achieved in any other way. Regardless of the childlike obstinancy of some philosophers, there are not 'third persons' or entities outside other human individuals, e.g. logic, ra-

tionality, historical forces, or empirical materialism, which can validate knowledge.[11] This is also Camus' essential but often misunderstood point about the absurdity of man in his relationships to the demands of rationalism and empiricism.[12]

Collingwood does not intend to imply that knowledge accepted as valid cannot be wrong, mistaken, or changed over time. Validity does not necessarily presuppose Truth to be absolute; instead, it refers to a transitive truth which is acceptable as knowledge for the duration until it is falsified (invalidated) by the development of either new observations or reflection.[13] If absolute Truth were a possibility, there would not be any history which would include a past, either in science or philosophy.[14] Validation, outside the context of common experience, involves a logical contradiction. A being outside individual experience would be required for reference in the validation process; to be validated as that necessary reference can be accomplished solely by individuals. The process would require a *reductio ad absurdum* which would always return to common experience. To seek 'third parties' seems to mean that one finds human beings unacceptable and to prefer the knowledge of the gods who have only non-human concerns.

Collingwood argues that the approach of the experimental sciences is to classify natural facts into distinct categories, ones which have a clear border and are mutually exclusive. This approaches the ideal of Formal Logic. For the philosophical sciences, that approach is not possible. "In dealing with concepts, however, we are dealing with thoughts dialectically related to one another and therefore with material more akin to that of history than to that of natural sciences."[15] History, here, as before, means the science of mind for Collingwood. Classification, as an inquiry into judgment and the clarification of experience, requires categories which both flow into each other and are mutually exclusive, e.g., reason and irrationality, freedom and necessity. For the logician, categories are mutually exclusive; for existence as judgment they only have value if they are mutually co-existent.

"If it is by historical thinking that we re-think and so rediscover the thought of Hammurabi or Solon, it is in the same way that we discover the thought of a friend who writes us a letter . . . It is only by historical thinking that I can discover what I thought ten years ago . . . or what I thought five minutes ago, by reflecting on an action that I then did . . . In this sense, all knowledge of mind is historical."[16] The science of human nature or of the human mind, the ideal of philosophy according to Collingwood, must be based on the same insights and methods as history. It must focus on thought or consciousness in its contemporary environment and analyze through reflection what mind has actually done in certain situations; its facts.

According to Collingwood, the object of philosophy should be to develop a science of the mind which will continue the work begun by Hobbes.

Philosophic science of mind clarifies and analyzes both the functions of the mind and their association with historical cultural developments. The modern mind is a highly complex datum. "I mean, complex not of many *gesta* (though it is that too) but of many *functions*, where function means not a single act but a type of activity."[17] This knowledge of mental facts is accomplished through reflection. The experimental science of mind has natural facts as its object, not mental facts. Its method is one of observation not reflection. "All science is based on facts. The sciences of nature are based on natural facts ascertained by observation and experimentation; the sciences of mind are based on mental facts ascertained by reflection"[18] Much of the debate in social science with regard to its scientific status is the result of confusing mental and natural facts. The social sciences *qua* science can answer important questions and have significant concerns of their own; nonetheless, they are always derived from the philosophical sciences. For example, behavioural psychology can answer questions about the effect of certain types of lighting or a certain poverty level on the creative process. This it can do through observation, which is not a concern of philosophy. But, psychology must first understand what the creative process is and what its significance is. This can only be accomplished through reflection since creativity is a mental function. This would hold true for the other social sciences: for example, Economics, Sociology and Political Science. This can also be shown historically by the fact that the great philosophical works, unlike works in other disciplines, have involved the other branches of knowledge, e.g. philosophy of science, social philosophy, political philosophy. Thus, no branch of knowledge is excluded from philosophy.[19]

Collingwood recognized that a philosophical science of mind was not a new goal. Historically, it began with Thomas Hobbes and the early British empiricists. "(T)he science of human nature was a false attempt — falsified by the analogy of natural science — to understand the mind itself, and that, whereas the right way of investigating nature is by the method called scientific . . . the right method for such an inquiry is the historical, plain method."[20] What sidetracked their projected goal of understanding mental facts is that Hobbes and those who followed him equated the science of mind with experimental science; that is, Hobbes believed that it could be achieved through observation. Science of mind through observation is the purpose of psychology.[21] Philosophically, mental facts can only be known through reflection.

Science of Presuppositions

Collingwood argues that any particular thought or thinking process necessarily includes other thoughts which are not verbalized and may not even be reflectively known. These thoughts are not just the context of the original idea or statement; they are its presuppositions. They are what comes before the original thought and more than that are what necessarily give rise to that idea.

The priority of presuppositions is a logical rather than a temporal one. Temporally, presuppositions may be known either before, during or after the idea to which they give rise. As a matter of fact, their logical priority is not disturbed by the many situations in which they may not be known reflectively at all.

These presuppositions do not have to be consciously known for the thinking process to occur. Knowledge of presuppositions usually only occurs through a process of reflective analysis. "Only by a kind of analysis, when I reflect upon it, do I come to see that this was a presupposition I was making, however little I was aware of it at other time."[22] This, Collingwood argues, is the distinction between casual or everyday thinking and what is called science, orderly and systematic thinking. "In unscientific thinking our thoughts are coagulated into knots and tangles . . . Thinking scientifically means disentangling all this mess, and reducing a knot of thoughts in which everything sticks together anyhow to a system or series of thoughts in which thinking the thoughts is at the same time thinking the connexions between them."[23] Most of everyday life involves non-scientific thought. This is not because individuals are lazy but rather because it is absolutely unnecessary; for that matter, detrimental. This is true not only for reflective science but also for experimental science. There is no more reason for a father to reflect scientifically on the presuppositions he may be making when he tells his children that he loves them than there is for a mechanic to scientifically analyze a motor car everytime he turns the ignition to drive the car to go shopping. When I prepare an essay for presentation there are certain presuppositions which I am making such as that my audience understands the English language. Knowledge of this presupposition or the lack thereof does not in any way prevent the activity from going on. The only reason it comes up is because I am thinking about presuppositions; it would never arise if I was writing exclusively about, for example, ethics. If someone asked me to 'prove' that my presupposition is correct, unless they set some limited criterion such as a sample survey, proof would ultimately have to depend upon belief, trust in the other's work or faith. It must be recognized though that the significant value of this presupposition lies not in the proof of its truth or falsity; but only in the fact that I, and other essay writers, presuppose it so that we become capable of producing our particular inquiries. Scientific inquiry as a specific type of thinking is applicable only to the particular questions which one is attempting to answer; not to all possible questions which may arise. A pathologist looking for the cause of a particular disease is presupposing that it has a cause and that there is such a thing as cause. These, though, are not and should not be his concern to inquire about; his concern is to complete his scientific search which is necessarily brought about by having these presuppositions.

Although philosophers, especially logicians, have developed and worked out many of the connections between thoughts, Collingwood argues that "(t)he

theory of presuppositions they have tended to neglect."[24] Metaphysics, for Collingwood, is necessarily based on the theory of presuppositions. The fundamental ground which the metaphysical science attempts to understand is the basis for ideas and thought processes. The nature of thinking involves presuppositions; the focus of metaphysics as reflective science is to develop the connections between and to clarify the content of these presuppositions.

Relative and Absolute Presuppositions

Although all particular thinking involves presuppositions, not all presuppositions are equally important for metaphysics. Metaphysics, for Collingwood, is the scientific inquiry into the fundamental ground for a particular knowledge. To understand the relationship between the fundamental ground and presuppositions, it is necessary to develop Collingwood's distinction between two types of presuppositions, relative and absolute, and more generally his theory of presuppositions.

All propositions for Collingwood are an answer to a question. The question may be assumed but nonetheless it is there. For example, the proposition that poverty leads to an increase in crime is the answer to an original question, leading to the inquiry, which asked what leads to an increase in crime. Any question which is the ground for a particular proposition "involves one presupposition and only one, namely that from which it directly 'arises'."[25] This immediate presupposition has as part of its constellation other presuppositions to which the original question is indirectly related. Returning to our previous example, what leads to an increase in crime presupposes that there is an increase in crime and that something leads to it. It is indirectly related to the presupposition that there is a distinction between criminal and non-criminal behaviour.

The fact that a presupposition causes a particular question to arise Collingwood calls its "logical efficacy."[26] Certain statements, presuppositions, necessarily give rise to a particular question. The statement 'something is causing crime to increase' causes the inquiry 'what is causing crime to increase?'. Either to assume it or 'to suppose the statement for the sake of argument' does not affect its logical efficacy. It would still necessarily cause the inquiry to be begun. Whether 'something is causing crime to increase' is stated as a true proposition or only supposed or assumed still will lead to the inquiry of what is causing crime to increase. The logical efficacy of a supposition is identical, according to Collingwood, with the logical efficacy of it as a proposition.

Assumptions are a particular type of supposition which are necessarily achieved by an act of free will. To assume rests on the idea that one is conscious that he (she) is equally free to assume something else. This is quite frequently its use in mathematics and very openly in economics. In mathematics, statements like 'assume $X = 10$' recognizes that one is free to assume that 'X' is equal to something else. This is not the case with all presuppositions. One is not free to

choose to assume causation; its acceptance is usually not an act of free choice. The same is true of one's belief in God. One either does or does not presuppose either alternative but one is not free to choose the other.

The logical efficacy, according to Collingwood, of a particular supposition does not depend on it being true or false only on it being supposed. This is not to say that its correctness may or may not be important; only that for a particular scientific inquiry to be induced, it is important that it be supposed. This is not a trivial point; it has been central in preventing the development of both a contemporary theory of metaphysics and a meaningful relationship between philosophy and experimental science. Philosophy, more specifically metaphysics, has been essentially a search for truth or correctness. Metaphysics has only recognized the truth of a particular presupposition as being of value; never recognizing that its primary value is derived from being supposed not propounded.

Collingwood uses the example of requesting a receipt for a sum paid as showing that even in practical affairs the logical efficacy of an assumption and therefore the validity of the argument are not effected by the truth of the assumption. A person being asked for a receipt is not offended by that request although he recognizes that it is based on the assumption that in the future he could become capable or even is capable of acting dishonorably. For the requester to assume this is not the same as for him to believe it to be true. Neither party, Collingwood believes, has difficulty in distinguishing between the necessary assumption and the belief of it to be true.

Collingwood argues that all presuppositions are either relative or absolute. Both types develop logical efficacy upon being assumed but relative presuppositions are open to being propounded. Absolute presuppositions only have value because they are supposed and thus lead to a particular inquiry; they are not open to the arguments of truth or falsity. Collingwood means, therefore, by presuppositions that which is being presupposed not the act of presupposing.

Relative presuppositions can be verified and are open to the inquiry of whether they are either correct or incorrect, or true or false. Relative presuppositions, therefore, can be stated as propositions which by their very nature are verifiable. "Each is both a presupposition and a proposition."[27] These presuppositions are relative to one inquiry as its presupposition and simultaneously relative to another inquiry as its conclusion. To use a previous example, my supposition that my audience understands English stands as a presupposition of my present inquiry; but it also stands as a proposition which is the conclusion to the inquiry 'do they understand?' which I and others would accept as open to verification. Whether this verification is undertaken or not does not change its status as a relative presupposition of my present inquiry.

Absolute presuppositions stand relative to all questions arising as a result of

their logical efficacy, never as answers. They do not have an underlying presupposition of which they are a consequent. Any particular inquiry will have a singular absolute presupposition; although absolute presuppositions exist both in individuals and as definitions of activity as a constellation of absolute presuppositions. A constellation is the situation wherein each absolute presupposition stands on its own but has a direct connection of meaningful support with other absolute presuppositions.

An example of an absolute presupposition is the notion of 'causation' in the practical sciences such as pathology or engineering. The absolute presupposition of causation is necessary for the whole inquiry to proceed. It was never historically or logically an answer to or proposition of a previous inquiry. That is not because no one thought of attempting it but rather because one cannot envision an inquiry to find the idea of cause without already presupposing cause. 'Causation' as an absolute presupposition is valuable for its logical efficacy not for its validity. The validity which is applicable to it is whether it is an absolute presupposition of a particular science not whether it is, in and of itself, valid.

It must be acknowledged, according to Collingwood, "that the logical efficacy of an absolute presupposition is independent of its being true: it is that the distinction between truth and falsehood does not apply to absolute presuppositions at all, that distinction being peculiar to propositions."[28] Absolute presuppositions are by nature not verifiable but not because it is problematic to verify them; rather, the question of verifiability does not apply to them. The central difficulty of contemporary metaphysics, besides its failure to acknowledge absolute presuppositions, is philosophy's insistence that absolute presuppositions be validated. This is the mistake of trying to prove that an absolute presupposition is true.

Collingwood argues that he is not sure what the demand that absolute presuppositions be intrinsically validated could mean. If its logical efficacy is not sufficient to validate it, then what would be the criteria of validation outside of the science or inquiry to which it gives rise. In pathology, for example, a favourite example for Collingwood, what would it mean to validate the absolute presupposition of causation without reference to the causes (e.g., viruses, bacteria, etc.) which the inquiry has developed? What 'validates' absolute presuppositions is their logical efficacy and the inquiry which depends on them; not their capability of being independently validated, this latter being the function of relative presuppositions.

If this doctrine seems to have certain similarities to pragmatism, then this points to the degree of truth which the pragmatists acknowledge about the nature of thinking and explains their conflict with other contemporary philosophies. The 'doing' of scientific thinking is accomplished before philosophy intervenes and attempts to understand any particular science. Science is understood through a logical reconstruction of the ideas of that

science. The search for causes was ongoing independently for example of Hume's attempt to understand what causation was for his time. Similarly, Greek political practices were functioning independently of Plato's or Socrate's attempts to understand their relative and absolute presuppositions. Pragmatism understood that philosophy has no independent criteria for proving anything; philosophy can only achieve understanding, the goal of reason. This is also shown quite dramatically by the fact that absolutely no philosophic system can be invalidated. No philosophical system has ever been subject to tests of truth or falsity, right or wrong: Marxism being a classic example. The frustration of critiques which attempt to show that Marx was wrong, in the presence of political systems principled by his thought, arises from the fact that these critiques confuse the purpose of philosophy, which is to achieve understanding, with the purpose of experimental science which is to validate through observation.

The value of absolute presuppositions to science is not their independent validity, but solely that they are presupposed: their logical efficacy. They are not answers to questions. Their logical efficacy is independent of their status of being true or false. Therefore, their purpose is not to be propounded as proposition; it is only to be presupposed.

A Science of Absolute Presuppositions

Metaphysics for Collingwood is the attempt to think systematically about the absolute presuppositions being made by other systematic inquiries. "Systematic or 'orderly' thinking . . . is orderly in the sense that it deals with things in their logical order, putting what is presupposed before what presupposes it."[29] Metaphysics attempts to understand what particular constellation of absolute presuppositions is made; not to validate these presuppositions. They have already been validated by their 'logical efficacy.' "Metaphysics is the attempt to find out what absolute presuppositions have been made by this or that person or groups of persons, on this or that occasion or group of occasions, in the course of this or that piece of thinking."[30] This points to another essential factor of Collingwood's idea of metaphysics. It is an historical science. Earlier the conflict between metaphysics as a search for fundamentals and history was discussed. Collingwood argues that this conflict is the result of what he calls pseudo-metaphysics. For him, pseudo-metaphysics is a "kind of thought in which questions are asked about what are in fact absolute presuppositions, but arising from the erroneous belief that they are relative presuppositions, and therefore, in their capacity as propositions, susceptible of truth or falsehood."[31] Pseudo-metaphysics is an attempt to validate absolute presuppositions. Kant came the closest to recognizing this problem of metaphysics when he searched for the necessary structure for thought. Collingwood argues, however, that "Kant, whose gigantic effort at a synthesis of all existing

philosophies here, unless I am mistaken, overreached itself."[32] It overreached itself by attempting to end history by turning absolute presuppositions into propositions while forgetting what Collingwood calls the "metaphysical rubric." The metaphysical rubric makes a metaphysical supposition into an historical proposition. ' "In such and such a phase of scientific thought it is (or was) absolutely presupposed that . . .' This formula I call the 'metaphysical rubric'."[33] A metaphysical proposition, an absolute presupposition of a particular thought process, can only be validated in terms of its historical truth or falsity. The metaphysical proposition "that Newtonian scientists presuppose that some events have causes"[34] is only valid in its relationships to an historical 'event', Newtonian physics. Without its particular historical metaphysical rubric an absolute presupposition, 'some events have causes', is not amenable to validation except as to its logical efficacy. There are essentially two things which can be done with absolute presuppositions. "You can presuppose them, which is what the ordinary (experimental) scientist does; or you can find out what they are, which is what the metaphysician does (reflective science) . . . When I say that this is what metaphysicians do I mean that this is what I find them doing when I read their works from Aristotle onwards."[35] For Collingwood this is what metaphysicians had developed for their own periods, although not until the clash with successful experimental science and the demise of philosophy did this function become clearer as the necessary purpose of metaphysics.

Anti-Metaphysics

Pseudo-metaphysics, for Collingwood, is nonsense because it attempts to do what cannot be done. Nonetheless, it is an attempt, although a false one, to inquire about the fundamentals of knowledge. Alongside pseudo-metaphysics has grown up a movement that Collingwood characterizes as "anti-metaphysics." By anti-metaphysics, Collingwood means "a kind of thought that regards metaphysics as a delusion and an impediment to the progress of knowledge, and demands its abolition."[36] Although metaphysics, as a science of absolute presuppositions, is not in opposition to the interests of knowledge, nonetheless, this is the argument which is frequently made by anti-metaphysicans. Collingwood argues that it is "absurd to maintain that the interests of knowledge could be served by the abolition of metaphysics. But absurdities exist, and anti-metaphysics among them."[37] He argues that in contemporary society there are three different conditions which can serve as a basis for opposing the metaphysical inquiry. These three conditions Collingwood calls progressive, reactionary and irrational anti-metaphysics.

Progressive anti-metaphysics results from the situation where the necessary work of metaphysics is done by those who are practicing 'ordinary' science as a

result of the loss of contact between metaphysicians and the practitioners of 'ordinary' science. It is the situation where 'ordinary' knowledge has outdistanced metaphysics. Metaphysicians "may fail to do the kind of work which is required of them by the advance of ordinary or non-metaphysical thought because their metaphysical analysis has become out of date, i.e. presupposes that ordinary thought still stands in a situation in which it once stood, but in which it stands no longer."[38] Metaphysicians become concerned about developing and analyzing absolute presuppositions which were true in previous historical periods but which no longer form the basis for ongoing systematic thinking. The result of this is that ordinary science has to do its own metaphysics. That is, it has to develop and clarify its own absolute presuppositions while people who claim for themselves the title of metaphysicians or philosophers are concerned in principle "with 'eternal' or traditional problems, which in practice means the problems of the last generation, not the problems of this generation."[39] The work which is done by ordinary science in developing absolute presuppositions Collingwood calls "amateur metaphysics".

> . . . if anybody wishes to judge for himself the extent to which amateur metaphysics has flourished in the soil of recent European thought, let him take a few score of large-scale works on various branches of natural science, history, law, economics, and soforth . . . and examine them, especially their introductory chapters, for metaphysical propositions . . . A person who acquaints himself in this way with a sample of amateur metaphysics will be struck . . . by the fact that a far larger quantity of it exists than he had supposed.[40]

Two things need to be made clear at this point. The first is to recognize that Collingwood uses the term science in a broad sense to describe a form of thinking which has many applications, especially practical ones. "The term science is regarded as covering (a) not natural science alone but orderly and systematic thinking on every subject, (b) not orderly and systematic 'theoretical' thinking alone but orderly and systematic 'practical' thinking as well, such thinking as we refer to when we speak of man thinking out a way of making a table or organizing a secretarial staff or defeating an enemy."[41] The second point that requires clarification is that Collingwood's comments about metaphysics and its opposition is applicable to the whole enterprise called philosophy and its attributes. For example, Collingwood's conception of pseudo-metaphysics as the

inquiry into the 'eternal' problems or issues, is also characteristic of a certain view of the purpose of philosophy generally and of ethics or political philosophy specifically.

An example of progressive anti-metaphysics is the relationship of economists, managers and, therefore, of politicians to philosophy and metaphysics. They essentially view the philosophical project as obscurantist and as a hinderance to progress, because philosophy is still essentially analyzing the absolute presuppositions of private and public property. These were issues for the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In contemporary society, private versus public property is a moral issue decided in terms of consequences, not an absolute presupposition. Present presuppositions probably focus on technological advancement, economic development and the distribution of wealth. Societies which view the issue of private and public property in relation to their contribution to wealth, rather than in terms of natural right (that is, as an historical development rather than a natural one), have little patience dealing with thinkers such as C.B. Macpherson who will want to debate the issue in terms of Lockean principles.[42]

Reactionary anti-metaphysics is essentially the reverse of progressive anti-metaphysics. In this case metaphysics has advanced in its analysis beyond the point to which a particular group or even individual has progressed. The difference between individual and group is solely in terms of its political consequences; the reaction is the same for both. In reactionary anti-metaphysics, the group involved in 'ordinary' science wants to protect its position, which is involved with the presuppositions of past generations, against the discoveries of metaphysicians. These new presuppositions are the result of inquiries by metaphysicians which detected new forms of thought in a particular society. An example of reactionary anti-metaphysics is the Soviet government's attitude toward philosophy. The government's power and particular situation is based on absolute presuppositions developed no later than the turn of the twentieth century, i.e. the nature of economics, politics (the dictatorship of the proletariat), and the place of Western countries in the world of international relations. A threat to any of these through the recognition by metaphysicians of a new mode of thought (not necessarily anti-Marxist) involving new presuppositions is a significant threat to the rulers (in this case) and to their positions. They view the whole process of metaphysical inquiry as a waste of time and as a threat to the progress of knowledge.

The final anti-metaphysics for Collingwood is irrationalism. It is for him the most dangerous threat in contemporary society; a threat to the idea of civilization based on reason. Whereas progressive and reactionary anti-metaphysics oppose metaphysics on the ground, however incorrectly, that it is an obstruction to scientific inquiry and reason, irrational anti-metaphysics opposes the whole enterprise based upon science and reason. Even though they are incorrect, pro-

gressive and reactionary anti-metaphysicians believe that they are protecting a civilization based upon reason; irrational anti-metaphysicians want to destroy that civilization and reason which goes with it. "An 'irrationalist' movement of this kind would aim at the ultimate abolition of systematic and orderly thinking in every shape . . . (this) in order to bring into existence a form of human life in which all the determining factors should be emotional."[43] Collingwood is not essentially arguing against the value of emotion or feeling; only that the hallmark of Western civilization, and especially science, has been that the determining factor in all affairs should be reason, which includes the understanding of, rather than the control by, emotions.

Collingwood uses as a central example for irrational anti-metaphysics psychology and psychotherapy viewed as a science of thought. Two other possible examples are the counter-culture movement of the 1960's and mass-party political fascism. Psychology, as a science of thought, disguises what it actually is, a science of feeling removed from the realm of thought because it has no criteria for judgment. "Psychology cannot be a science of thought, because the methods it has developed in its history as a science of feeling preclude it from dealing with the problems of criteriology. It has nothing to say about truth and falsehood."[44] That this development occurs is not surprising when one realizes that those who traditionally claim to represent the science of thought, i.e. reflective science or philosophy, refuse to face the issue of rational criteria for judgment in both practical activity and science; they insist upon continuing the honoured search for the grand issues of humanity.

The central contradiction of psychology is its claim to be a science while its attempt to do this is based on the denial that such an activity is possible. Psychology historically developed as a science of feeling. This required a distinction between thought and feeling. "It arose from the recognition that what we call feeling is not a kind of thinking, not a self-critical activity."[45] Thinking as a self-critical activity can only be known through reflection. Behavioural psychology denies that this kind of knowledge is possible and bases its 'science' upon the observation of feeling. If this kind of knowledge is not possible, then the whole enterprise of science upon which psychology claims to be built, being based upon this self-critical activity, is also impossible. Science is based on this self-critical activity, because it, also being a rational activity, develops criteria of judgment.

Political science has aspects which are dominated by either pseudo-metaphysics or irrational anti-metaphysics. Its pseudo-metaphysics develops from the attempt to gain a fundamental ahistorical model of politics. By ahistorical is meant forgetting the metaphysical rubric. This would apply to such theories as, for example, structural-functionalism and systems theory. Theories of this order claim to have the capability to do what no science has ever claimed: to find the absolute base of reality. Structural-functionalism was not

developed to be just a model of politics and society at a particular place and time; it is supposed to be equally applicable to both primitive society and modern nation-states, or to both democracies and military dictatorships. Historical differences should not change the model. This is probably why there are so many absolute models.

The irrational aspect in political science results from the influence of behavioural psychology. Behaviourism in political science envisions political relationships as based on feeling or response stimuli (i.e. instinct, desire, appetite). This is not meant to critique such inquiries as public opinion polls which are historical sciences inquiring about opinions at a particular, limited time. Rather, it is directed against the behavioural models which have been developed at times from such studies.

Behaviourism does not attempt to understand that ongoing self-critical activity known as the political process. Not only does it not attempt to understand, behaviourism does not even recognize the self-critical aspect of politics, the rational attribute of politics. At its best, political science as a science of mind should attempt to understand the *rationally* developed system of relationships between individuals and groups which is politics.

Even from the perspective of Collingwood's science of mind a great degree of significant work has been accomplished in 'empirical' political science. Therefore, this is not an argument that what 'empirical' political science does cannot or ought not be done. It 'only' argues that what the best 'empirical' political science accomplishes is limited in scope; it does not explain all of politics any more than physiology explains all that is human. At its worst, by rejecting reason and the philosophical science of mind it cannot do what it claims to do, understand politics.

Metaphysics and Science as a Moral System

It has already been argued that metaphysics, inquiry about presuppositions and science are based on a type of thinking called reasoning. Reason is known through the achievement of understanding and its highest attainment is the the capability of acting from understanding rather than from desire or instinct. Here it will be argued that reason is a moral value and is therefore dependent upon a particular moral civilization. Reason as an aspect of metaphysics is essentially a moral system if one recognizes that morality distinguishes between the necessary and the possible. Morality can only concern the possible because it is here that choice and man's volition or reason can operate. Metaphysics is a possibility not a necessity; a possibility which is tied directly to a civilization's moral commitments to reason. The achievement of understanding is the indirect indication of reason. "Scientific thinking, systematic, orderly thinking, theoretical and practical alike, pursued with all the energy at his command and

with all the skill and care at his disposal, was the most valuable thing man could do. In such a civilization every feature would be marked with some peculiar characteristic derived from this prevailing habit of mind and not to be expected in a civilization differently based.''[46]

In his later works, Collingwood reserved the term 'civilization' for only those societies and political systems based upon reason.[47] This was a recognition of the derivation of civilization from the concept of 'civility'. Civilization is a process with civility as its ideal. ''The essence of this process is the control of each man's emotions by his intellect, that is, the self-assertion of man as will.''[48] The basis of this system is in the ''spirit of agreement.''[49] Agreement is the desire to develop cooperation for the situation of non-agreement. Non-agreement results from diverse metaphysics.

Civility is not only necessary for relationships between individuals of diverse presuppositions but also for the whole enterprise of 'experimental' science of nature.

> What connexion is there between a spirit of civility toward our fellow-man and a spirit of intelligent exploitation towards the world of nature (experimental science)? . . . Civility as between man and man . . . is not only what constitutes the civilization of that community . . . it is also what makes possible that community's civilization relative to the natural world.[50]

Civility is not only necessary for a particular type of relationship among individuals in society; it is also necessary for the development of reason and science. As discussed earlier, reason and science depend upon a cooperative community for their validation and development. Why civility? Because there are no absolute Truths, and reason develops dialectically through relationships of inquiry and validation by groups with diverse metaphysics. Reason therefore as a moral value is directly tied to those types of social and political relationships characterized by Collingwood as 'civility'. It presupposes a lack of agreement (rather than disagreement) as a result of diverse metaphysics, but it requires 'civil' relationships for the development of reason and will, where the self acts from understanding rather than from passion.

The development of these 'civil' relationships has been central to the history of the Western political system (Collingwood's limitation because of familiarity). These are not procedural relationships to attain politics; they are political relationships to attain reason. They only make sense procedurally in their relationship to reason and to a rational metaphysics. They can only be justified in

terms of the metaphysical science of absolute presuppositions and the science of absolute presuppositions can only have value as the understanding of reason and its functions. For reason itself there is not an extrinsic justification. It must justify itself, i.e. its own logical efficacy and the action from understanding, *will*, which it produces.

One liberal procedural relationship which has been historically developed is democracy. Democracy cannot be simply a procedure by which the *will* of the people expresses itself.[51] It can only be understood as an expression, on the political plane, of the workings of reason. J.A. Schumpeter described procedural democracy as "a political *method*, that is to say, a certain type of institutional arrangement for arriving at political — legislative and administrative — decisions and hence incapable of being an end in itself."[52] This definition, if complete, leaves the practical justification for democracy unanswered. Democracy cannot be an end in itself because *reason* is, and it is reason that produces decisions not institutions. The justification can only be that democracy actualizes the working process of reason and can only function in a civilization committed to reason. Schumpeter hints at this possibility but since he starts with democracy rather than reason he cannot complete it. To repeat what has been stated previously, democracy as well as reason cannot imply that all will be cooperative or moral, far from it. That would be utopian not rational. Given the fact that reason and democracy are historical, it is what is morally possible.

Collingwood's ideal of civilization is the process of actualizing relationships in all aspects of society which promote the development of reason. He presents that ideal in the following way:

> Religion would be predominantly a worship of truth in which the god is truth itself, the worshipper a seeker after truth, and the god's presence to the worshipper a gift of mental light. Philosophy would be predominantly an exposition not merely of the nature of thought, action, etc., but of scientific thought and orderly (principled thought-out) action, with special attention to method and to the problem of establishing standards by which reflection and truth can be distinguished from falsehood. Politics would be predominantly the attempt to build up a common life by the methods of reason (free discussion, public criticism) and subject to the sanction of reason (i.e. the ultimate test being whether the common life aimed at is a reasonable one, for men who, no matter what differences divide them, agree to think in an orderly way).[53]

Given this vision, the contemporary public situation is not overpoweringly civilized. This Collingwood realized. Although the ideal of civilization remains always only more or less approximated in different historical periods, it is in this century that Collingwood saw the overwhelming threat to the very idea of civilization. He was not enough of an 'idealist' to believe an ideal, no matter how desirable, could not readily vanish or be destroyed. This consequence is what he called "barbarism".

Barbarism relates directly to anti-metaphysics in the contemporary public situation. Barbarism, or non-civility, denotes the context wherein individuals are treated in terms of force (physical and manipulative) rather than by persuasion. Manipulation as force, rather than promoting activity (the consequence of reason and individual will), encourages the nonrational to be expressed in particular individual behaviour. Behaviour results from passion and instinct; activity or action results from the developed domination of reason and will. The former leads to barbarism and the end of science; the latter to the ideal of civilization based on reason and science.

Progressive, reactionary and irrational anti-metaphysics reject, directly or indirectly, the possibility of reason in public affairs. Progressive anti-metaphysics, exemplified by the objectification of all knowledge in the (natural) scientific paradigm, requires that the rational activity of individuals, which is necessarily *not* objective, be rejected as knowledge. The nineteenth century idea of 'cause', whereby all events are held to be the necessary result of some antecedent object, is endemic to reactionary anti-metaphysics: an anti-metaphysics which *is* reactionary precisely because of its defence of a notion of 'cause' currently valid only in medicine and engineering. By manipulating variables so as to produce particular behaviours, reactionary anti-metaphysics creates methodological principles for the manipulation of individual human beings. By rejecting the process of persuasion and, with it, the attempt to convince individuals by appeals to reason, this methodology of manipulation reduces human existence to force — the threshold characteristic of barbarism. Although progressive and reactionary anti-metaphysics equally, *and erroneously*, identify themselves with the protection of science and, thereby, of truth, they are closely allied with irrational anti-metaphysics, specifically with the triumph of psychology. Whereas irrational anti-metaphysics incorporates the concepts of objective science and causality, it is ultimately grounded in the assumption that passion, feeling and instinct — rather than activity and reason — are dominant features of human existence. If the presence of manipulation precludes the possibility of reason and will, then psychology *as a science*, being inherently manipulative in character, encourages the possibility of barbarism.

While the three anti-metaphysics identified by Collingwood as being present in the contemporary public situation can be distinguished both analytically and sociologically, they are, nonetheless, interrelated by a shared rejection of

reason, judgment and the possibility of human will. It is, indeed, a fitting and sombre conclusion that the anti-metaphysics which so typify the public domain are drawn together by a mutual hostility to the very principles that Collingwood found to be the basis of civilization through his examination of the science of metaphysics.

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Notes

1. R.G. Collingwood, *Essay on Metaphysics*, (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1972), p. 5.

2. See Martin Heidegger's *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, Ralph Manheim, trans. (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1961), *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, J.S. Churchill, trans. (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1969) and his, "The Way Back Into the Ground of Metaphysics", Kaufmann, trans., in Walter Kaufmann, *Existentialism* (New York: Meridian, 1957).

3. E.H. Carr, *What is History?*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967) p. 23.

4. B. Russell, *Mysticism and Logic*, (London, 1918) and *Our Knowledge of the External World*, (Chicago, 1914). A.J. Ayer, *Language, Truth and Logic*, second ed. (New York: Dover Publications, Inc. 1951).

5. Most of Collingwood's biographers divide his intellectual life by his reaction (acceptance or rejection) to idealism. [See T.M. Knox, "Editor's Preface," R.G. Collingwood, *The Idea of History*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1956); and Alan Donagan, *The Later Philosophy of R.G. Collingwood*, (Oxford, 1962).] This may not necessarily be wrong; rather, it misses the significance of Collingwood's work which was to move beyond this dichotomy. After his youthful philosophic period, Collingwood focused his 'so called' mature idealism (1927-1937) upon the establishment of the proper study of history and its place in the scheme of the special sciences. Throughout this period, from his *Faith and Reason* where he removed reason from the confinement of idealist rationalism by establishing both the interconnection of reason with faith and its very basis in faith, to his *Idea of History* and *Essay on the Philosophic Method* where, in the former, he argues that rather than psychology, concrete reason as historical fact is the proper study of historians; and where, in the latter, he presented philosophy's function as being the satisfaction of reason by thinking through the meaning of particular activity, Collingwood was concerned with developing a meaning to history and, therefore, to philosophy which would not deny the possibility of truth and falsity. If this period is a form of idealism, it would be called an 'empiricist idealism'.

   In the last part of his intellectual life, 1937-1943, Collingwood's central project was showing that not only the special sciences but also history achieves genuine knowledge. Although it has been argued that this was a period in which he rejected idealism, actually he was demonstrating that historical and philosophical knowledge, when they transcend the idealist-empiricist dichotomy, achieve the same genuine knowledge as the experimental sciences. In the *Essay on Metaphysics* both the scientific necessity and scientific status of metaphysics and, therefore, philosophy is shown; and in *The New Leviathan* Collingwood presents a theory of mind based on a history and a philosophy focused upon reason and action as knowable facts.

6. R.G. Collingwood, "Economics as a Philosophic Science", *Ethics*, Vol. 36 (January 1926) p. 162.

7. Collingwood, *Metaphysics*, p. 110.

8. Philosophy of science has continuously attempted to view science as a search for truth rather than as a practical activity. The justification of science being that it is True. This is why it has

found the problem of scientific method, observation and falsifiability difficult to resolve. Science as all thought, is a process of practical activity. Its justification is that it works to resolve practical problems. The *utlimate* justification and explanation of science is not Truth or correctness; rather it is engineering. If it was not for engineering no one would indulge in science.

9. Academic inquiry is not a search for knowledge. It does not have the practical attribute of decision and action. Its sole practical aspect is practice for facing 'real world' problems. This confusion, especially in the social sciences and humanities, has led to the situation that they have become completely impotent in their effects.

10. R.G. Collingwood, *The New Leviathan*, (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co. 1971), p. 7.

11. This was recognized by classical political theorists. The significance of rhetoric in Aristotle arises because validation for him was a process of convincing. The demise of rhetoric points to either totalitarian ideology, i.e. the Catholic Church, or the ascent of scientific Truth into philosophy.

12. See Albert Camus' *Myth of Sisyphus* and his interview in *Lyrical and Critical Essays*, (New York: Random House, 1968), p. 356. This is also very similar to Maurice Merleau-Ponty's analysis in the *Phenomenology of Perception* of intellectualism and empiricism and his rejection of both in favour of the primacy of perception. The difference between the two is that Merleau-Ponty is concerned with ontology and Camus with moral action.

13. This it seems to me is Karl Popper's central point about falsifiability. Falsifiability is part of a dialectical process of attaining validation not Truth; especially since truth is solely a transitive validation. See his *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*, esp. Chs. 1 & 4. Nonetheless Popper still does not recognize the basis of science, even theoretical, in practical activity. See his "Normal Science and Its Dangers" in *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge*, I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave, eds., where he distinguishes between 'applied science' and 'pure science' being in favour of the latter because it solves problems rather than puzzles.

14. The historical problem in science inherently brings up the problem of whether science is cumulative, a notion rejected by T. Kuhn. Kuhn is right that science is not cumulative in terms of truth, i.e. on truth built upon the last. The problem is that there is a form of cumulation in science for most observers. What is cumulative in science is not truth but the problems solved. That is to say it solves present problems while keeping the ability to solve past problems.

15. T.M. Knox, "Editor's Preface", R.G. Collingwood, *The Idea of History*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1956), p. ix.

16. *Ibid*, p. 219.

17. Collingwood, *The New Leviathan*, p. 62.

18. *Ibid*, p. 281.

19. It is interesting to note that while philosophy takes an intense evaluative interest in all other branches of knowledge, i.e. philosophy of science, social philosophy, political philosophy, etc., there is no reciprocity. The other branches of knowledge neither want nor find it necessary to pay any attention to what philosophy is doing. This is because philosophy has abdicated its role as a clarifier of meaning in favour of the concept of true knowledge. Philosophy's role is undertaken by the various branches of knowledge themselves. How well they achieve this role is another question.

20. Collingwood, *Idea of History*, p. 209.

21. Collingwood views psychology's proper scope of inquiry as the whole gamut of irrational forces which work upon man's action. "They are not body; they are mind, but not rational mind or thought . . . These irrational elements are the subject-matter of psychology." *Idea of History*, p. 231. What has actually occured since Collingwood's writing is that psychology rather than philosophy has undertaken the project of making man more rational. Whether it can succeed is another problem.

22. Collingwood, *Essay on Metaphysics*, p. 22.

23. *Ibid*, p. 23.

24. *Ibid*.

25. *Ibid*, p. 25.

26. *Ibid*, p. 27.

27. *Ibid*, p. 40.

28. *Ibid*, p. 32.

29. *Ibid*, p. 39.

30. *Ibid*, p. 47.

31. *Ibid*.

32. *Ibid*, p. 328.

33. *Ibid*, p. 55.

34. *Ibid*, p. 59.

35. *Ibid*, p. 54.

36. *Ibid*, p. 81.

37. *Ibid.*

38. *Ibid*, p. 82.

39. *Ibid*, p. 86.

40. *Ibid.*

41. *Ibid*, p. 85.

42. See C.B. MacPherson, *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962) and his *Democratic Theory: Essays in Retieval*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973).

43. Collingwood, *Essay on Metaphysics*, p. 83.

44. *Ibid.*

45. *Ibid*, p. 109.

46. *Ibid*, p. 133.

47. See Collingwood's *The New Leviathan*.

48. *Ibid*, p. 307.

42. See C.B. Macpherson, *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962) and his *Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrieval*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973).

43. Collingwood, *Essay on Metaphysics*, p. 83.

44. *Ibid.*

45. *Ibid*, p. 109.

46. *Ibid*, p. 133.

47. See Collingwood's *The New Leviathan*.

48. *Ibid*, p. 307.

49. *Ibid*, p. 302.

50. *Ibid*, p. 303.

51. See for example Macpherson's *The Real World of Democracy*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966).

52. Joseph A. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, (New York: Harper & Row, 1950), p. 242.

53. Collingwood, *Essay on Metaphysics*, p. 134.