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Corresponding addresses for Reviews: *Canadian* publications should be directed to Professor Ben Agger, Department of Sociology, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, N2L 3G1; *International* publications should be directed to Professor Allen Mills, Department of Political Science, University of Winnipeg, Winnipeg, Manitoba R3B 2E9./Adresses auxquelles il faut envoyer les comptes rendus: des publications *canadiennes* doivent être adressées au professeur Ben Agger, Département de Sociologie, Université de Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, N2L 3G1, des publications *internationales* doivent être adressées au professeur Allen Mills, Département de Science Politique, Université de Winnipeg, Winnipeg, Manitoba R3B 2E9.

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Preface

One purpose of this Journal is to publish writing which goes beyond the bounds of academic respectability to a dialogical encounter with the changing historical moment. The characteristics of such writing are depth of philosophical insight, commitment to the confrontation of truth and reality, and the willingness, on the basis of systematic inquiry, to draw conclusions which both stretch thought to its limits and, in an intellectually directive way, exhibit the limitations of particular perspectives in political and social theory.

The contents of this issue continue to fulfil this purpose. While the present inclusions are characterized by a diversity of objects of inquiry, they are commonly interwoven by a *critique* of life intellectually conceived. It is testimony to the sheer richness of the contemporary theoretical tradition that this critical sensibility is not limited to any single school of thought, but extends to include oppositional perspectives, ranging from analyses sympathetic to the conservative persuasion in Canadian politics to existential and experimental Marxian investigations of the world problematic of bureaucratic imperative coordination. The intrinsic value and, indeed, ontological significance of thought motivated by the will to critique cannot be discounted in a Canadian intellectual setting which is only now beginning to emancipate itself from the spiritual and epistemological sterility of categories of thought foreign to human freedom. But "dialogical" thought also has another merit. It results in intellectual statements which, once appraised carefully, provoke fundamentally new theses on the construction of social reality. Such theses can, and, in fact, should be criticized. For it is in the struggle of thesis and its critique that dialogical inquiry contributes best to the conduct of philosophical life. While life, philosophically exercized, has its end in the transformation of reason into the very fabric of civilization, it has its beginnings in the interrelationship of a diversity of perspectives, whether the sociology of knowledge, hermeneutics, or philosophical anthropology, around the point-counter-point of intellectual critique.

Thus, in the first article, "The Myth of the Red Tory", Rod Preece challenges the intellectual currency of a leading concept in the interpretation of Canadian conservatism. In contradistinction to dominant perspectives on Canadian conservatism, Preece contends that, today, conservatism and liberalism are but opposite sides of the same coin: a coinage that was struck by the dissolution of the remnants of nineteenth century toryism into the "conservatism" of Burkean Whiggism. For Preece, the possibility of Red Toryism in Canada presupposes the antecedent possibility of toryism itself; and toryism, Preece claims, while characteristic of reactionary absolutisms and political romanticisms, has not penetrated and, indeed, could

not penetrate the principles of conservative thought that have so shaped one important strand of Canadian politics. Consequently, Preece argues that the Red Tory is a myth and that the Progressive Conservative Party, by containing "no Hegelians, no romantics, (and) no corporate-organic-collectivist elements" binds together but various "proponents of different styles of Whiggery".

With Deena Weinstein's essay, "Bureaucratic Opposition: The Challenge to Authoritarian Abuses at the Workplace", the focus of inquiry shifts, quite dramatically, from political philosophy to critical social theory and, thereupon, from a retrospective analysis of the failure of toryism in Canada to a prospective consideration of resistance to formal organizational authority. Following eloquently in the tradition of Weber, Sorokin and Mills, Weinstein weaves together, in a new "synthetic ensemble", an in-depth critique of mainstream organization theory and an equally intensive examination of the material basis of bureaucratic oppositions. Noting that both functional and Marxian perspectives have failed to account adequately for the existence of informal resistance within large organizations to unjust authority, Weinstein adapts the categories of conflict theory to a provocative explanation of the origins, possible outcomes and institutional resistance to the formation of bureaucratic oppositions. Of particular importance is Weinstein's claim that while bureaucratic oppositions are not *necessarily* emancipatory in character, they are important sources of social change in a world increasingly dominated by the principle of imperative coordination.

The quest for possible sources of resistance to the organizational manifestations of imperative coordination continues with Ben Agger's article, "Dialectical Sensibility II: Towards a New Intellectuality". In an earlier article (see Vol. 1, No. 1), Agger developed a critique of the Frankfurt School on the basis of its inability to transcend the dialectic of negation to a more flexible attitude towards emancipatory tendencies in advanced capitalist societies. In the present essay, Agger describes a "new concept of radicalism": one which responds directly to bureaucratic imperative coordination by "democratizing" critical intellectuality. At root, radical intellectuality issues the master concept of "cognitive self-management": a concept which is likened to Marcuse's metaphor of "new science" and which is held to be the key to shattering the inherently dualistic character of late capitalism. While projecting a concept of intellectuality equal to the task of emancipating thought from its institutional bondage, Agger also pleads eloquently against the authoritarianism of the Left, particularly as imposed by the "mechanistic tendencies" of orthodox Marxism. In calling for the abandonment of Marxian structuralism and, hence, of "sacrificial models of change", Agger situates the dialectical sensibility in the vital impulse of an

"experimental" Marxism: a Marxism which generates a dialectical social order by attending to the silent tragedies of personal existences.

Ultimately, the new modes of praxis anticipated by the analyses of Weinstein and Agger require, for their inception, sustained metaphysical discourse on the *fundamentals* of the present public domain. Critical social theory and "principled" philosophical inquiry converge as but different vantage-points on the multidimensional and interrelated whole of human existence. Bureaucratic imperative coordination is embedded, albeit analogically, in the economistic principle of private property; and cognitive self-management finds its chief intellectual opposition in liberal-democratic thought which, while insisting on sympathy for the dispossessed, provides justificatory principles for the perpetuation of class differences. Orthodox Marxism is but one manifestation of "reactionary" anti-metaphysics in the contemporary world; and the emancipatory potential of bureaucratic oppositions is flawed by the same tendency that has plagued many libertarian movements, whether feminist, anti-colonial or environmentalist: the failure to make a radically new metaphysic of human action an *immanent*, and thus unnegotiable, principle of political action.

The conjunction of critical social theory and "grounded" philosophical discourse is *concretely* exemplified by the retrospective essays on Mary Wollstonecraft and R.G. Collingwood, grouped together in the common format of "On Metaphysics Lost". While differing in their intellectual orientations, the retrospective articles are drawn together, and explicitly so, by two shared attributes: a mutual commitment, unassisted by the presuppositions of apologia, to a direct examination of the fundamentals of two important philosophical mentalities; and a common willingness to transform their reappraisals of the "lost" metaphysics of Collingwood and Wollstonecraft into thoughtful critiques of public life, democratically envisaged.

Thus, Patricia Hughes, in her article "Mary Wollstonecraft: Stoic Liberal-Democrat" goes beyond the traditional interpretation of Wollstonecraft (as noteworthy principally for her contribution to women's rights) to an examination of her position in the history of political thought. Beginning with a perceptive analysis of the necessarily dualistic character of women's emancipation, Hughes finds the promise of radical potential in Wollstonecraft's attempt to interrelate the oppression of women and the poor as inevitable consequences of the relations of private property. Yet, in an elegant line of argumentation, Hughes formulates the thesis that Wollstonecraft's revision of liberty and equality into their "natural" counterparts in the Stoic tradition vitiates the radical potential of her theory: condemning, in the process, its liberatory promise to remain but a haunting remembrance of what *could* have been. In the following article, "Democratic Politics and Ideology: R.G. Collingwood's Analysis of Metaphysics in Political Philosophy and Moral

Civilization", Maurice Eisenstein examines Collingwood's achievement in developing a process of metaphysical inquiry which would be consistent "both with the traditional notion of metaphysics and with contemporary ideas of history, particularly with regard to the sociology of knowledge." In a fascinating series of passages, Eisenstein probes the interrelationships of philosophy, science and metaphysics. Claiming that metaphysics, for Collingwood, is a science of absolute presuppositions, Eisenstein proceeds to describe four oppositional modes of thought which strive to usurp the metaphysical function: pseudo-metaphysics and progressive, reactionary and irrational anti-metaphysics. The distinctions drawn among metaphysics and its "historical" oppositions ultimately provide the basis for an incisive commentary on Collingwood's understanding of the presuppositions, relative and absolute, of "moral civilization". In a concluding reflection, the spirit of which is redolent of Kant's *The Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals*, Eisenstein recommends Collingwood's affirmation of "reason, judgment and the human will" as the best of all possible principles for the struggle of the science of metaphysics and, consequently, of moral civilization against barbarism.

In conclusion, the articles in this issue, together with a reflective array of thematic review essays and more focused appraisals of recent publications, join together in struggling on the side of the philosophical imagination. If, indeed, the barbarisms of the modern age require for their rectification the redemption of ontology, if not a new phenomenology of the human sensibility, then surely such a process begins, in part, with the creation of theoretical 'space' devoted to the integrity and dignity of reason.

Arthur Kroker

Préface

Un des buts de cette revue est de publier des écrits qui débordent les cadres de la respectabilité académique pour amorcer un dialogue avec le moment historique. De tels écrits devraient faire preuve d'une profondeur de pénétration philosophique, s'engager à confronter vérité et réalité et, s'inspirant d'une enquête systématique, tirer des conclusions qui sont susceptibles à la fois d'amener la pensée jusqu'à ses limites et, suivant une méthode rigoureusement intellectuelle, faire ressortir les limitations de certaines perspectives de la théorie politique et sociale.

Le contenu de ce numéro se consacre à la réalisation de ce but. Tandis que les articles ci-dedans traitent de divers sujets d'enquête, elles ont en commun une critique d'origine intellectuelle de la vie. C'est un hommage rendu à la pure richesse de la tradition théorique et contemporaine que cette sensibilité critique, qui n'est pas donnée à une seule école de pensée, mais qui démontre un éventail de perspectives opposantes, embrassant des analyses sympathiques à la perspective conservatrice dans la politique canadienne, ainsi que des enquêtes existentialistes et experimentalistes, suivant la méthode marxiste, d'une problématique globale qui prévient des exigences de la coordination bureaucratique. Dans le milieu intellectuel canadien, qui commence maintenant à se libérer de la stérilité épistemologique et spirituelle des catégories de la pensée étrangères à la notion de la liberté humaine, on ne devrait pas méconnaitre la valeur intrinsèque, et en fait l'importance ontologique de la pensée. La pensée "interlocutoire" cependant a aussi un autre mérite. Des constatations en resultent qui, après avoir été évaluées, peuvent provoquer des thèses fondamentalement nouvelles sur la structure de la réalité sociale. On peut et en fait, on devrait émettre de telles thèses, car au cours de la lutte d'une thèse et de sa critique l'enquête interlocutaire fait sa meilleure contribution à l'exercice de la vie philosophique. Quoique l'exercice philosophique de la vie ait son but dans la transformation de la raison en l'étoffe même de la civilisation, il tire ses origines de la rencontre d'une diversité de perspectives; soit la sociologie de la connaissance, soit l'analyse hermeneutique, soit l'anthropologie philosophique qui gravitent autour du dialogue de la critique intellectuelle.

Ainsi dans le premier article "Le mythe du conservateur rouge", Rod Preece lance le défi à la valeur intellectuelle d'un concept fort répandu dans l'interprétation du conservatisme. A l'encontre des perspectives dominantes sur le conservatisme candien Preece maintient qu'aujourd'hui le conservatisme et le libéralisme ne sont que les deux revers de la même médaille: médaille qui a été frappée dans un moule formé par les restes du conservatisme du dix-neuvième siècle, et qui reparaît sous la forme du

"conservatisme" typique du libéralisme de Burke. Pour Preece la possibilité d'un conservatisme rouge au Canada préconise la possibilité du conservatisme lui-même: et selon Preece le conservatisme, tout en démontrant les traits des absolutismes réactionnaires et des romantismes politiques n'a pas pénétré et en effet ne pouvait pas pénétrer les principes de la pensée conservatrice, qui ont formé un élément si important de la politique canadienne. Par conséquent, Preece maintient que le conservateur rouge est un mythe et que le parti progressive conservateur ne retient que de divers défenseurs des styles différents du libéralisme "en n'incluant dans ses rangs ni Hégéliens ni romantiques, ni éléments corporatifs-organiques-collectivistes".

Dans la dissertation de Deena Weinstein "L'opposition bureaucratique. Le défi aux abus autoritaires aux lieux de travail", le centre d'intêret se déplace assez dramatiquement de la philosophie politique à la théorie sociale et critique at ainsi d'une analyse rétrospective de l'échec du conservatisme canadien à une considération prospective de la résistance à l'autorité de l'organisation formelle. Suivant éloquemment la tradition de Weber, de Sorokin et de Mills, Weinstein élabore dans un nouvel "ensemble synthétique" une critique profonde de la théorie courante sur les organisations et un examen également intensif de la base materielle des oppositions bureaucratiques. En faisant remarquer que les perspectives fonctionelles et marxistes n'ont pas pu justifier de façon adéquate l'existance de la résistance informelle dans les grandes organisations à l'autorité injuste, Weinstein rajuste les catégories de la théorie de conflit pour fournir une explication intéressante des origines, des résultats possibles et de la résistance institutionelle à la formation des oppositions bureaucratiques. D'un intêret tout particulier est l'argument de Weinstein que même si les oppositions bureaucratiques ne sont pas émancipatrices, elles sont des sources importantes du changement social dans un monde de plus en plus dominé par le principe des exigences de la coordination bureaucratique.

La quête des sources possibles d'une résistance aux manifestations de l'autorité bureaucratique dans une organisation continue dans l'article de Ben Agger "La sensibilité dialectique II: Vers une intellectualité nouvelle." Dans un article précédent (voir vol. I no. 1) Agger a developpé une critique de l'école de Francfort en se basant sur son incapacité de dépasser la dialectique de négation pour aboutir à une attitude plus flexible envers les tendances émancipatrices dans les sociétés capitalistes avancées. Dans cette dissertation, Agger décrit "un nouveau concept du radicalisme" qui répond directement aux exigences de la coordination bureaucratique par la "démocratisation" de l'intellectualité. A partir de l'intellectualité radicale évolue le concept dominant de l'intégration intellectuelle; concept à comparer à la métaphore marcusienne d'une "nouvelle science" qu'on regarde

comme la solution qui brisera la nature foncièrement dualiste du capitalisme avancé.

Tout en proposant une intellectualité égale à la tâche de libérer la pensée de la servitude institutionelle, Agger plaide éloquemment contre l'autoritarisme de la gauche, telle qu'il s'impose surtout dans les tendances mécanistes du marxisme orthodoxe. Agger situe la sensibilité dialectique dans l'impulsion vitale d'un marxisme experimental, demande l'abandon du structuralisme marxian et par conséquent l'abandon des modèles "sacrificatoires" du changement social: ce marxisme engendera un ordre social et dialectique en faisant attention aux tragédies silencieuses des existences personnelles.

En fin de compte les nouveaux modes du praxis anticipés par les analyses de Weinstein et d'Agger exigent d'ores et déjà des entretiens prolongés sur la métaphysique des principes du domaine publique actuel. La théorie sociale et critique et l'enquête fondée sur des principes philosophiques ne se rejoignent qu'en tant que points de mire différents de la totalité intégrale et multi-dimensionelle de l'existence humaine. Les exigences de la coordination bureaucratique sont enracinées quoique analogiquement dans le principe économistique de la propriété privée: et l'intégration personnelle trouve sa principale opposition intellectuelle sous forme de pensée libérale-démocrate, qui tout en exigeant de la sympathie pour les gens défavorisés fournit des principes justificateurs de la perpétuité des différences de classe. Le marxisme orthodoxe n'est qu'une manifestation d'une anti-métaphysique "réactionnaire" dans le monde contemporaine; et le potentiel émancipateur des oppositions bureaucratiques souffre de la même tare que bien des mouvements libertaires, féministe, anticolonial, écologique, à savoir l'incapacité de faire d'une métaphysique radicalement nouvelle de l'action humaine un principe immanent et partant non-négociable de l'action politique.

La conjoncture de la critique sociale et l'enquête ontologique se démontre d'une manière concrète dans les rétrospectives sur Mary Wollstonecraft et sur R.G. Collingwood groupées sous la rubrique de "A la recherche de métaphysiques perdues". Quoique d'orientations intellectuelles différentes, ces articles rétrospectifs partagent d'une manière explicite deux attributs communs: un engagement mutuel à faire un examen approfondi des principes fondamentaux sans vouloir en faire une apologie de deux mentalités philosophiques: et la volonté commune de transformer leurs évaluations des métaphysiques perdues de Collingwood et de Wollstonecraft en des critiques réfléchies de la vie publique en tant que démocratie.

C'est ainsi que dans son article "Mary Wollstonecraft: stoïque-libérale-démocrate", Patricia Hughes dépasse l'intérpretation traditionnelle de Wollstonecraft (remarquable surtout à cause de sa contribution au mouvement féministe) jusqu'à un examen de sa situation dans l'histoire de

la pensée politique. Hughes commence par une analyse perspicace de la nature forcément dualiste de l'émancipation des femmes pour trouver un certain potentiel radical dans la tentative de Wollstonecraft de comparer l'oppression des femmes à l'oppression des pauvres en tant que résultats inévitables d'une société structurée sur le principe de la propriété privée. Néanmoins, suivant un raisonnement élégant, Hughes propose la thèse que Wollstonecraft, en effectuant la transformation de la liberté et de l'égalité en leurs contre-parties naturelles selon la tradition stoïque, affaiblit le potentiel radical de sa théorie, en condamne la promesse émancipatrice de façon qu'elle ne reste qu'un souvenir de ce qu'elle aurait pu être. Dans l'article suivant "La politique démocratique et l'idéologie: l'analyse par R.G. Collingwood de l'ontologie dans la philosophie politique et dans la civilisation morale", Maurice Eisenstein examine la réussite de Collingwood d'avoir su développer un proçessus d'enquête métaphysique "qui fusionne la notion traditionnelle de l'ontologie et les idées contemporaines sur l'histoire, surtout à l'égard de la sociologie de la connaissance". Une série passionnante de paragraphes examine les rapports entre la philosophie, la science et l'ontologie. Eisenstein suggère que pour Collingwood la métaphysique est une science de présuppositions absolues et il continue en decrivant quatre modes opposants, qui s'enforcent d'usurper le rôle de l'enquête métaphysique — la pseudo-métaphysique progressive, réactionnaire et irréfléchie. Les distinctions faites entre l'ontologie et ses oppositions historiques fournissent en fin de compte, la base d'un commentaire incisif sur la lecture de Collingwood des présuppositions relatives et absolues de "la civilisation morale". Dans une réflexion finale dont l'esprit ressemble aux *Bases de la métaphysique et de la morale* de Kant, Eisenstein offre l'affirmation de Collingwood "de la raison, du jugement et de la volonté humaine" comme le meilleur des principes possibles sur lequel on puisse appuyer la lutte de la science métaphysique et par conséquent la lutte de la civilisation morale contre le barbarisme.

Pour conclure, les articles de ce numéro, accompangés d'une gamme de dissertations thématiques et de recensions plus spécifiques de publications récentes se rangent ensemble pour lutter du côté de l'imagination philosophique. Si à l'époque actuelle, il faut lutter contre le barbarisme en rachetant l'ontologie et même en allant jusqu'à fonder une nouvelle phénoménologie, alors il faudra sans doute amorcer le processus en créant un "espace théorique" consacré a l'integrité et à la dignité de la raison.

Arthur Kroker

To open the mind

Ludwig Zeller

Buried to the neck in the sands
I hear the shriek of humming propellers
And the sky is covered and forever
Do I see the net fall over the waters.

Then I hear stones being moved there on high
And hands descend upon my painted skull
And open it in half to expose its bitter fruit,
Bitter without consolation.

The ivory raven is featherless
And waters fall into the ignored abyss.
Will there be no skin, no hand to break the fall?
They blinded me with burning embers.

I have no more remembrance, they took away the light
Of that memory, I want only to descend, to be one with the earth
To forget, to be able to close the eye they opened in me
So that I will no longer see the sun that boils.

Ludwig Zeller, *When the animal rises from the deep the head explodes*, Mosaic Press/Valley Editions (Oakville, Ontario: 1976). Reprinted with the permission of author and publisher.

Prelude to Dialogue
Préliminaires au dialogue

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THE MYTH OF THE RED TORY*

Rod Preece

I

Rarely do abstract academic theories provoke immediate and contentious reaction in the pragmatic world of competitive party politics. Practical politics, it is commonly supposed, consist in compromise, brokerage, patronage and, above all, electioneering; the traditions and modes of political thought are considered alien to the immediacy of political experience.

Yet political commentators, practising politicians amongst them, enlivened the televised proceedings of the February, 1976 Progressive Conservative leadership convention with a sometimes banal, sometimes illuminating, discussion of the philosophical complexities of the Red Tory phenomenon. And one 1976 leadership candidate demanded the expulsion of the Red Tories from the party — because their philosophy resembled too closely that of the *Liberals*, while a prominent journalist countered with the claim that the Red Tories were the only laudable members of the parliamentary party. Moreover, 'chateau clique' Conservatives — and even some of their less extremist colleagues — use 'Red Tory' as an expletive to denounce fellow caucus members with an aversion to the laissez-faire doctrine.

In all the discussion and the vigorous invective, however, no clear picture of the Red Tory emerges. On occasion he appears as a benevolent Conservative devoid of the sterner virtues, on occasion as a Conservative who puts order before freedom. Sometimes he is seen as the defender of lower class rights, sometimes as the enemy of free enterprise. It is clear who the Red Tories in the Progressive Conservative Party are considered to be — Flora MacDonald, John Fraser and Gordon Fairweather are among the more obvious "Reds".[1] But it is not always as clear what distinguishing characteristics the Red Tories are deemed to possess, although "collectivist Conservative" and "socialist Conservative" are among the descriptions employed by their detractors inside the party and "compassionate Conservative" and "humanitarian Conservative" are epithets offered by their admirers.

What, then, is a Red Tory, and what importance does the concept have for understanding Canadian political practice? The term was employed by Gad Horowitz, and it received its widest currency in his *Canadian Labour in Politics*.[2] Horowitz considers traditional Tory ideas to be "corporate-organic-collectivist" while those of liberalism are "rationalist-egalitarian" and "in-

* The author wishes to thank the Canada Council and the Wilfrid Laurier University Research Grants Committee for welcome research funds.

dividualist''.[3] The Red Tory is ''a conscious ideological Conservative with some ''odd'' socialist notions . . . or a conscious ideological socialist with some ''odd'' Tory notions''.[4] Such Conservatives and socialists are seen to have significantly more in common with each other than either has with the Liberals. ''The tory and socialist minds have *some* crucial assumptions, orientations and values in common, so that *from a certain angle* they may appear not as enemies but as two different expressions of the same basic ideological outlook. Thus, at the very highest level, the red tory is a philosopher who combines elements of toryism and socialism so thoroughly in an integrated *Weltanschauung* that it is impossible to say that he is a proponent of either one as *against* the other.''[5] George Grant, as evidenced in his *Lament for a Nation*[6], is offered as an example of a thoroughgoing Red Tory, while W.L. Morton[7] and Eugene Forsey (the latter before his conversion to Trudeauesque Liberalism) are viewed respectively as Conservative and socialist proponents of the Red Tory position.

For Horowitz, the ''primary carrier'' of the Tory ideology in Canada ''has been the Conservative Party''. He concedes that ''It would not be correct to say that toryism is *the* ideology of the party or even that *some* Conservatives are pure tories . . . The primary component of the ideology of business-oriented parties is liberalism; but there are powerful traces of the old liberal outlook in the British Conservative party, and less powerful but still perceptible traces of it in the Canadian party.''[8] He adds that ''It is possible to perceive in Canadian Conservatism not only the elements of business liberalism and orthodox elitist-collectivist toryism, but also an element of ''tory democracy'' or ''tory radicalism'' — a paternalistic concern for the condition of the working class and a picture of the Conservative Party as their champion against unenlightened elements of the bourgeoisie.''[9]

The Horowitz thesis has by now become a part of Canadian academic conventional wisdom, it has had a significant influence on subsequent writings on Canadian political thought (W. Christian and C. Campbell's *Political Parties and Ideologies in Canada*[10] being the most notable recent example), and it serves to provide rationalizations for students who are unable to distinguish the behaviour of Canadian political parties. It is also entirely misleading with regard both to Conservative philosophy and Conservative practice and with respect both to the present and the past of Conservatism.

The thesis offered here is that Conservatism is *explicitly* more a form of Whig than Tory doctrine, and has been since its origins in the nineteenth century — and hence ''business liberalism'' is an integral not an alien aspect of Conservatism; that Grant, Horowitz, and Christian and Campbell confuse Conservatism with absolutism and romanticism; and that the Toryism they describe has had a negligible effect on English Canadian political practice, at least since the 1840's — and, for that matter, its influence on British Conservatism has been of only secondary significance.

II

The French Revolution was the catalyst not only of a new political order. As a rationalistic product of the radical Enlightenment, it transformed — some naively imagine that with Destutt de Tracy it introduced — political ideology. Henceforward, political philosophy would address itself to the assumptions, precepts and practices of the revolution. To be sure, the rationalist era had begun long before, with Bacon, Hobbes and Machiavelli. But the essentially individualistic elements of rationalism had appeared even earlier in the works of Aquinas, who, in his *Commentary on the Nichomachean Ethics*, had conceived of society not as analogous with an organism but as a unit of order which guaranteed and reinforced a significant sphere of individual independence.[11] And in the *Summa contra gentiles* Aquinas had noted further that there is not only a communal good but also a "human good which does not consist in a community but pertains to each individual as a self".[12] It would, of course, be unwarrantable to view St. Thomas as in any manner the father of revolution. Indeed, in the *Summa theologica* he espoused the traditional Catholic view of society as a system of ends and purposes in which the lower serves the higher and the higher directs and guides the lower.[13] Nonetheless, it is in St. Thomas' writings that we see the demise of feudal philosophy in which, to exaggerate the point, the individual existed solely for ends other than his own. It is indeed in Aquinas that we first witness the origins of the emancipation of the individual from feudalist fetters.[14] With Aquinas the stage was being set for a philosophical climate in which the individual's self-realization would become the criterion of a successful polity. It was this mode of thought and its attendant conduct which, in the manner in which it was developed in the writings of Condorcet, Helvétius, Voltaire and the Encyclopaedists as the emancipation of the passions, culminated in the French Revolution.

Three major oppositional strains emerged from the Revolution: the self-interested rationalizations of the threatened and the dispossessed — *absolutism; political romanticism*; and *Burkean Whiggism*. All three have been, and are, commonly labeled 'conservative', although they are discrete and usually contradictory phenomena. This commonality of label, however, has led to a continued misunderstanding of the nature of the conservatism which has influenced Canada, Britain and, to a lesser but not insignificant degree, the United States.

The longest-lived and most successful version of *reactionary absolutism* was in the successive and confused Germanic regimes of the nineteenth century. Despite the prevalence of liberal nationalist ideals, at least amongst the intelligentsia, the inability to overcome the petty particularism of the minor principalities forced liberal thinkers to be devoid of lasting influence or to side equivocally and despairingly with the Hapsburgs or the Hohenzollerns in order

to ensure the creation of some form of Germanic national state in which they — perhaps naively — believed their liberal ideals could be developed. The consequence, of course, was that Austria and Prussia could afford to ignore liberal philosophy and continue to conduct domestic politics almost as if the revolution had never occurred; and if they needed any intellectual sustenance it was to be found in the persuasive rhetoric of Friedrich von Gentz and Georg Hegel.

Von Gentz employed the "principle of legitimacy" to defend the regimes and practices of Metternich and the Holy Alliance. The principle of legitimacy amounts to no more than a resurrection of the mediaeval dictum that something is justifiable if it has been sanctioned by history; previous practice is itself a guarantee of appropriateness. *Prima facie* this resembles Burke's view of prescription whereby a constitution has legitimacy "because it is a constitution whose sole authority is that it has existed time out of mind."[15] The difference is that, for Burke, the prescriptive constitution was the appropriate vehicle for reform, albeit reform with a delicate touch; for von Gentz, the principle of legitimacy was the means to evade reform. Von Gentz stressed tradition, order and stability, as did Edmund Burke, but whereas Burke developed these principles as the means to liberty, von Gentz employed them to avoid the necessity of liberty. Indeed, von Gentz translated and popularized Burke's *Reflections on the Revolution in France* and added a commentary depicting Burke as a defender not just of the constitution of the *ancien régime* (which in some measure he was) but of its aims and values (which in good measure he was not). Von Gentz was, however, not a philosopher but a publicist, an employee of Prince Metternich and secretary to the successive congresses of Vienna, Aachen, Troppau, Laibach and Verona. His was the task of defending the interests of his masters, not the task of propagating values in themselves. It is, indeed, the tragedy of conservative philosophy that it lends itself to the ready rationalizations of the unscrupulous. H.M. Drucker is wrong to assert that, for Burke, "tradition *per se* is sacred" — as Burke himself notes, in that case the frequency of crime would be an argument of innocence — but Drucker is right to claim that through Burke we "get a defence useful to every established tyranny"[16], provided it is recognized that it is only through a dishonest — or at best unwitting — manipulation of Burke's words that such a defence is possible. It was such a defence that von Gentz provided — wittingly or unwittingly — to the benefit of the absolutist Hapsburgs and against the Burkean balanced constitution, derived from Locke and Montesquieu.

In Prussia the Baron vom Stein's reforms of 1807 — abolition of serfdom, free exchange and disposal of landed property, and the free choice of occupation — seemed to toll the death knell of the old absolutism, but after the defeat of Napoleon, the disillusionment engendered by the crop failures of 1816-17, and the economic crisis which followed the adoption of freer trade policies, reaction set in, vom Stein's reforms were nullified, and absolutism was

— more or less — restored. Prussia remained an unregenerate and unrepentant autocracy which found nourishment in the turgid but compelling prose of Hegel. Unlike von Gentz, Hegel was nobody's dupe but he wove such a tangled web of philosophical intrigue that freedom was fulfilled in its own negation. For Hegel, the state was the possessor of infallible knowledge, tolerance thus became a "criminal weakness", and the individual achieved his freedom in subordinating himself to the state, for the aggrandizement of which he existed and acted through "the cunning of reason", and which, as "God walking upon the earth", was the embodiment of morality, reason and spirit. There is, of course, much more to Hegel than his theory of the state — his justifiably renowned critical dialetic, for example. But in so far as Hegel was a conservative and in so far as German conservatives acknowledged their indebtedness to Hegel, it was Hegel's absolutist *Staatstheorie* which was significant. If Hegel was not the rationalizer of Hohenzollern dynastic interests, nonetheless the Hohenzollerns could have wished for no better champion.

With Hegel — at least with Hegel as he was interpreted by his contemporaries — we have the epitomized proponent of Horowitz' "corporate-organic-collectivist" philosophy, although there is no Red Tory element, no defence of the interests of the underprivileged. Indeed, for Hegel, no defence is necessary. The prince represents the spirit and will of the whole people. Universal freedom is achieved only when it is realized in an individual but there are no necessary conflicts among individuals or among classes. Distinctive classes exist as organic wholes, each with its own intrinsic honour, but the objective freedom of all is realized not in the mobility to transcend class, nor in the individual pursuit of excellence within a class, but in acquiescence in one's estate and submission to the absolute state in which all conflicts subside.

Hegel's thought was, indeed, grist to the mill of absolutism. However, insofar as Hegel's philosophy of the state may be described as conservative — though reactionary or absolutist might be more appropriate categories — it is not a conservatism which has had any influence on Canadian thought or practice. There were no British collectivist Hegelians to influence British North America or the nascent Canadian state. To be sure, British idealists such as Green, Bosanquet and Hobhouse owed a measure of acknowledged debt to Hegel, and Bosanquet espoused certain elements of his statism, but none could in any significant measure be described as "corporate-organic-collectivist".

To find a philosopher remotely representing "corporate-organic-collectivist" thinking in British ideational history, other *perhaps* than Bosanquet and Hobhouse (both of whom were liberals, not conservatives), one has to resort to work prior to the revolution of 1688, to the hapless Robert Filmer and his *Patriarcha* published in 1680. Filmer preached the divine right of kings and the duty of passive obedience to the monarch. Already an anachronism when it was written, *Patriarcha*'s only significance was the easy sport it afforded Algernon

Sidney and John Locke in refuting its every point. Probably the last reputable defence of mediaeval and feudal conceptions of society in Britain were Sir Thomas More's *Utopia* (1516), in which was advocated a cooperative commonwealth inimical to emerging capitalist principles, (whereby it was becoming morally laudable to "buy abroad very cheap and sell again exceeding dear"), and Richard Hooker's *Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity* (1594-97 and posthumously) in which were defended the rights of the established church via a necessary obedience of all citizens to the law for all time because "corporations are immortal". For Hooker, "There is no way in which a society can withdraw its consent from an authority which it has set up". It would nonetheless be an exaggeration to view these philosophies in Horowitz' collectivist terms, although collectivist elements are clearly contained within them.

After Filmer, English philosophy lost the remaining vestiges of its Tory ideas — at least if Tory meant "corporate-organic-collectivist". Certainly, Tory ideas might have continued to flourish without any sophisticated literature to bolster their cause. But already by the early eighteenth century Montesquieu was describing England as the nation *par excellence* of liberty and of capitalism and the nation where individualism abounded.[17] By our modern standards we might consider Montesquieu to have exaggerated the point, but it is clear that insofar as liberty, capitalism and individualism flourished more in England than elsewhere they were accompanied by a demise in that "corporate-organic-collectivist" ideology that would have denounced them. Toryism as a philosophy in Britain was moribund by 1688; as an ideology even, it was ceasing to have influence by 1789, though it would be revived in novel form in the Victorian era by Carlyle and Disraeli.

The *second* reaction against the French Revolution is to be found in *political romanticism* which had its origins in the French religious traditionalists: Joseph de Maistre, Louis de Bonald and Félicité de Lamennais. Theirs was the belief that all societal ills could be ascribed to the French Revolution and the radical Enlightenment which had spawned it. Theirs was a feudal belief in the virtues of absolutist royalism and paternalistic religion, in the need for man to be governed, and in the need for him to be governed according to transcendental, and usually ultramontanist, principles. Above all, they despised the unsatisfying pretentions of individual liberty, the greedy materialism of capitalism and the arrogant pretended omniscience of scientific thought.

The more elaborate political romanticism which emerged from traditionalism was developed mainly in the social, political and economic confusion that was Germany and took various forms in the writings of Schleiermacher, F.W. von Schelling and von Savigny, but its most complete and influential spokesman was Adam Muller who thought of the corporative society of mediaeval feudalism as an absolute ideal. Yet, like Hegel, he glorified the

state, describing it as "a moral personality" and as "the eternal alliance of men among themselves":

> The state is not a mere industry, an estate, an insurance agency or a commercial establishment; it is the earnest association of the total physical and spiritual needs, the total physical and spiritual property, the total domestic and external life of a nation in one great energetic, infinite and active whole.[18]

The political romantics denied the inherent equality of all human beings, rejected economic competition and its attendant law of supply and demand, and demanded the reimposition of the authoritarian constitutive principles of the pre-absolutist mediaeval state. As Kurt Reinhardt has expressed it, "The state was no longer considered as a mechanical aggregation of individuals but as an organic whole whose functions were not confined to the maintenance of law and order but included the political, social, moral, and religious education of its citizens. Human society in its concrete historic manifestations was to be strictly delimited by a community of linguistic, moral, and racial characteristics".[19]

It is this philosophy which most closely resembles Horowitz' Red Toryism; and which is akin to the ideas espoused by Grant in his *Lament for a Nation*. It rejects both industrialism — whereby, in Müller's words, the proletarian "loses the simple, natural feeling of well-being which is the hallmark of the uncorrupted peasant, and receives nothing in exchange"[20] — and capitalism. As a precursor to Marx, and in language later borrowed by Herbert Marcuse, Müller railed against the division of labour and the one-dimensional man it produces:

> When the division of labour in the large cities and manufacturing and mining regions dissects men — fully free men — into wheels, cogs, cylinders, spokes, spindles and the like, it restricts them to a totally one-dimensional sphere of the already one-dimensional sphere of the satisfaction of a single need.[21]

The fundamental difference is that, while Marx foresees a radicalization of the nature of industrial economy through a proletarian revolution, Müller rejects industrialism and eulogizes the feudal agricultural community.[22] Whereas

Marx considers the state to function as the executive committee of the bourgeoisie and to be destined as the temporary embodiment of proletarian interests before it withers away, for Müller it is an eternal alliance representing the interests of the totality of the people.

Political romanticism, then, involves a static conception of society in which order ousts liberty, solidarity replaces individuality and duties predetermine rights. The major proponent of this philosophy in Britain was Thomas Carlyle who attacked laissez-faire theory and parliamentary government and espoused the strong, paternalistic state. In his *Past and Present* (1843) Carlyle contrasted the disorder of contemporary society with the security and stability of twelfth century England. The English romantics (Coleridge, Southey, Kingsley and Ruskin among them) rejected modernity and its discomfiting economic practices. They wanted a return to the feudal agricultural community. Not so Burke, who recognized the worth of the eighteenth century land enclosures.

Like the romantics, Disraeli in his novels *Tancred, Sybil* and *Coningsby* espoused a philosophy of an organic feudal union of the classes of England under the leadership of the traditional landed aristocracy — which Burke had castigated as "an austere and insolent domination". After a period as a Radical with three promising but unsuccessful attempts against Whigs to secure a parliamentary seat Disraeli was accepted by the Tories and joined an anachronistic elitist group called 'Young England' whose "creed was an escapist, romantic belief in the virtues of the old feudal system under which, as they maintained, the nobleman and his peasants were bound by ties of mutual loyalty and benevolence, the Church was an integral part of society, and the monarch not only reigned but ruled".[23]

Disraeli was, indeed, a Tory, not a conservative, at least in his writings if not always in his political practice. His was the desire to resurrect the pre-1688 paternalistic state, to realize his image of a humanitarian feudalism which, in fact, had not previously existed, and to negate the recent British history so admired by Montesquieu, Locke and Burke. Conservatism, in the British sense, was a new phenomenon now castigated by Disraeli. Indeed, it was in response to the writings of Edmund Burke that a conscious principled conservatism first achieved any political influence. Burke's French disciples coined the term 'conservative' which was adopted by the new British party that was now a mixture of old Whigs and liberal Tories once the followers of Pitt and Portland had united.

The Conservatism which superseded Toryism was a synthesis of waxing Whig and waning Tory doctrines, sympathetic to the burgeoning capitalism, favourable to greater religious toleration and amenable to, if not enthusiastic about, the political emancipation of the middle classes. It was this novel phenomenon, inspired by Pitt's policies at the end of the eighteenth century and brought to fruition by Peel in the 1830's and '40's which was repudiated

by Disraeli. As he told the House of Commons, "a Conservative government is an organized hypocricy" — for abandoning its commitment to the "Gentlemen of England". Certainly, Disraeli was an anachronism in the British Conservative Party, a relic of a past that had died before the close of the eighteenth century and a phenomenon that was not to be repeated in the Conservative Party after the Victorian age of equipoise had closed, but he was an anachronism that has confounded the analysts of British conservatism. Thus W.H. Greenleaf, perplexed by the contradiction between a Disraeli type of collectivist conservatism and a Robert Cecil type of individualistic conservatism ("I have a fanatical belief in individual freedom", Cecil told the House of Commons in 1913, "I believe it is a vital thing for this country, and I believe it is the cornerstone upon which our prosperity and existence is built") is led to conclude that "a party's unity has to be found elsewhere than in its doctrines".[24] However, although there are statist and mildly organicist elements in the British Conservative Party, since Lloyd George's "collectivist" Liberalism in the early decades of this century, Conservatives have been consistently less statist than either Liberals or Labourites. The debate in the British Conservative Party has been about the *degree* to which individualism should be curbed, not about whether individual freedom and responsibility are in principle to be approved. And in Canada the Conservatives have been at least equally libertarian since the nineteenth century.

The *third* type of oppositional strain against the French Revolution — and the one to have had the most profound effect on the politics of the English-speaking democracies — is epitomized in the writings of Edmund Burke and is one which was friendly to the ordered emancipation of individuality — diversity of human character, variety of human action, greater individual economic responsibility — if decidedly not to an aggressive individualism. Burke was revered by nineteenth century Liberals who "claimed him for their own"[25] and it is also generally accepted that "in so far as conservatism had a political philosophy it was derived from Burke".[26] American Conservatives, such as Russell Kirk and Peter Viereck,[27] regard him as their chief mentor, and George Sabine asserts, in admittedly less than convincing manner, that "the conservatism of Disraeli [is] derived substantially from Burke".[28]

If the Gladstonian Liberal Viscount Morley's laudatory biography of Burke[29], where the eighteenth century Ango-Irish philosopher-politician is applauded as a classical liberal thinker, and J.R. White's view of Burke as the philosophical founder of modern British Conservatism,[30] are compatible, then the current castigation of many modern Progressive Conservatives as unwitting classical liberals is unfounded,[31] for conservatism and classical liberalism may be merely different emphases within the same general doctrine.

In fact, in his *An Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs*, Burke is quite explicit on the classification of his own philosophy. He regarded it as the

philosophy of the old Whigs — the "Old Corps", as he called them — the philosophy of the moderate Revolutionaries of 1688, of those who understood that one reformed the errors of the past with due deference to the wisdom of the past, of those who understood that the iniquities of a monarchy demanded amendment not abolition. The supporter of the American Revolution and advocate of greater respect for the traditions of India and Quebec in their colonial government opposed the French Revolution because it failed to show due deference to French history, not because all of its reformist ideals were illusory but because a revolution which rejected its own history would produce, as Burke accurately predicted, a reign of terror rather than an effective institutionalization of liberty. "People will not look forward to posterity", he admonished, "who never look backward to their ancestors".[32]

Burke was adamantly not opposed to reform:

> A state without the means of some change is without the means of its conservation. Without such means it might even risk the loss of that part of the Constitution which it wished the most religiously to preserve. The two principles of conservation and correction operated strongly at the two critical periods of the Restoration and Revolution, when England found itself without a king. At both those periods the nation had lost the bond of union in their ancient edifice: they did not, however, dissolve the whole fabric. On the contrary, in both cases they regenerated the deficient part of the old Constitution through the parts which were not impaired. They kept these old parts exactly as they were, that the part recovered might be suited to them.[33]

Indeed, Burke espoused reform — a disposition to preserve and the ability to improve was his criterion of a good statesman — but he insisted that "A spirit of reformation is never more consistent with itself than when it refused to be rendered the means of destruction".[34]

It would be no great exaggeration to read Burke's writings as a corrective commentary on John Locke's *Two Treatises on Civil Government* — though they are, of course, not only that. Locke's *Two Treatises* anticipated the assumptions of the 1688 Revolution which Burke believed to provide the foundation of Britain's balanced constitution. Locke advocated limited monarchy; Burke was concerned that *further* diminutions of the monarch's powers might disturb the delicate balance of the constitution, though he was quick to de-

nounce George III's excesses and thus described the American revolution as "a revolution not made, but prevented". Locke emphasized moderation, tolerance and reason; Burke refined moderation into a sophisticated theory of cautious and pragmatic reform, noting that "every prudent act . . . is founded on compromise and barter"[35]; he reiterated the precept of tolerance, but warned that "There is, however, a limit at which forbearance ceases to be a virtue"[36]; and he railed against the abstract reason of the Enlightenment which was derived from "a certain intemperance of intellect [which was] the disease of the time, and the source of all its other diseases".[37] "It is with man in the concrete; it is with common human life, and human actions you are to be concerned".[38]

Locke developed a contract theory of society and Burke elevated it to a higher plane as:

> a clause in the great primaeval contract of eternal society, linking the lower with the higher natures, connecting the visible and invisible world, according to a fixed contract sanctioned by the invisible oath which holds all physical and all moral natures, each in their appointed place. This law is not subject to the will of those, who by an obligation above them, and infinitely superior, are bound to submit their will to that law.[39]

Locke espoused the principle of individual rights; Burke confirmed their importance but demanded that real rather than imaginary, concrete rather than formal and abstract grievances be remedied to ensure those rights. "Wise men", he exhorted, "will apply their remedies to vices, not to names". Locke and Burke concurred on the importance of private property and Locke advocated greater individualistic economic freedoms while Burke acknowledged his indebtedness to the laissez faire theories of Adam Smith. For Locke, rebellion "was justified, but only after a long train of abuses, not every little mismangement"[40], while, for Burke, tyranny should be opposed but "Governments must be abused and deranged indeed . . . before revolution can be thought of; and the prospect of the future must be as bad as the experience of the past."[41]

For Locke:

> liberty is to be free from restraint and violence from others, which cannot be where there is not law; but freedom is not, as we are told: a liberty for every man to do what he

> lists — for who could be free, when every other man's humour might domineer over him? — but a liberty to dispose and order as he lists his person, actions, possessions and his whole property, within the allowance of those laws under which he is, and therein not to be subject to the arbitrary will of another, but freely follow his own.[42]

For Burke, on the other hand, liberty is secured not only by law but by order and tradition, by Prescription and Providence. As Francis Canavan has expressed it:

> Burke conceived of men's rights and liberties as conrete parts of an actual social order on which their existence depended. Rights have meaning and effect only when they exist in a society structured by rank and property, ordered by law, and supported by long-standing sentiments and prejudices. In Burke's social philosophy, therefore, the idea of order is primary.[43]

Burke provides, indeed, a healthy measure of conservative restraint on the Lockean Whig ideals of individual liberty, individual rights, the power of human reason, and even to a degree on individuality itself. Burkean Conservatism restricts liberty by order ("manly, moral, regulated liberty", Burke calls it), rights by duties, individual reason by the wisdom of ages, and individuality by community. It espouses the sterner virtues of self-restraint — "constancy, gravity, magnanimity, fortitude, fidelity and firmness [which are closely allied to [the] . . . disagreeable quality [of] . . . obstinacy".[44] These "virtues which restrain the appetite" Burke contrasts with the values of the philosophers of the Enlightenment who:

> substitute a virtue which they call humanity or benevolence. But this means their morality has no idea in it of restraint, or indeed of a distinct settled principle of any kind.[45]

In the final analysis, Burkean conservatism is concerned with the balance among competing but objective goods[46]:

> We see that the parts of the system do not clash. The evils latent in the most promising contrivances are provided for as they arise. One advantage is as little as possible sacrificed to another. We compensate, we reconcile, we balance. We are enabled to unite into a consistent whole the various anomalies and contending principles that are found in the minds and affairs of man. From hence arises, not an excellence in simplicity, but one far superior, an excellence in composition.[47]

In Burke's various works the notion of a "corporate-organic-collectivist" philosophy is decidedly absent. Unlike the romantics who denounced a philosophy of individual rights and liberties, Burke only diminished them to make them more effectively realized. Unlike the romantics who abhorred the free market economy, Burke welcomed it, but noted that "Mere parsimony is not economy . . . Expense and great expense, may be essential part of true economy".[48] Unlike the romantics who espoused the strongest possible state, Burke asserted that while "abstractedly speaking, government . . . is good"[49] and while government is natural and the state is a divinely ordained moral essence, nonetheless "Whatever each man can separately do, without trespassing upon others, he has a right to do for himself".[50] If Locke is, as is commonly assumed, the stimulus for a moderate liberal Whiggism, Burke is the philosopher of a moderate conservative Whiggism.

III

It is undeniably true that in general Progressive Conservatives today espouse free enterprise principles significantly more enthusiastically than do Liberals. Indeed, any casual visit to a Progressive Conservative riding association meeting should convince the visitor that it is their espousal of individual responsibility, sterner virtues and free enterprise which the members believe distinguishes them from their political adversaries. And G.W. Baldwin, Alberta Progressive Conservative M.P., claims that the essential difference between Conservatives and others is that the Conservatives are more individualistic,[51] while what behaviouralist research has been done on party attitudes bears out this conclusion.[52]

If early Conservative philosophy was in some measure and manner "corporate-organic-collectivist" then we are forced to the conclusion that modern Conservatives deny their own heritage; they must be seen to be repudiating their own history. W. Christian and C. Campbell assert that

"toryism is one important strand of Canadian Conservatism, and is the most important element which distinguishes it from Liberalism. To the Liberal belief in individualism and freedom, the Conservative adds a belief in collectivism and privilege".[53] But surely, whatever the supposed founding philosophies of the parties, it is the Liberal who is less individualistic, who more willingly proffers collectivist solutions to social problems, at least if we are to believe everyday journalism and the conclusions of empirical research[54] which soothe the prejudices of our common sense observations. If Christian and Campbell's view is correct we are constrained to accept the improbable thesis not only that both parties have renounced their own past but that each has taken as its own the position formerly held by the other.

Common sense tells us that the Liberals are, in fact, the heirs to the moderate utilitarian liberalism of John Stuart Mill with its social democratic overtones, to the allegedly "collectivist" liberal ideas brought to early fruition by David Lloyd George in Britain and aired in Canada by Mackenzie King in his *Industry and Humanity*; and if those ideas remained unrealized for sometime in Canada it is in part because Mackenzie King appeared to believe that the humanitarian expression of an idea already entailed its implementation — but that is altogether another story. Canadian Conservatives, on the other hand, are — and have continuously been — the legitimate heirs to John Locke, to the Whigs, and to what we sometimes perhaps misleadingly call classical liberalism, by the way of Burkean restraints on the "new" Whiggism. And if there is little validity in that thesis then the claims of the many renowned Conservatives who have criticized the party at various times for not living up to its laissez-faire traditions — Lord Atholston, Sir William Mackenzie, Richard Bennett and Arthur Meighen amongst them — are not only exaggerations — which they undoubtedly are — but they must indicate also that such Conservatives had a surprisingly erroneous view not only of their own party's recent history but of the very political world they inhabited.

What evidence, then, do Horowitz and Christian and Campbell offer for their belief in the significant collectivist element in Canadian Conservatism? Horowitz tells us that "figures such as R.B. Bennett, Arthur Meighen, and George Drew cannot be understood simply as Canadian versions of William McKinley, Herbert Hoover and Robert Taft . . . The Canadian Conservatives lack the American aura of rugged individualism. Theirs is not the characteristically American conservatism which conserves only *liberal* values".[55] Yet Arthur Meighen asserted: "I am an individualist" and he denounced the increasing statism of Canada:

> There has spread through the world in recent times a creed that Governments must be the director and protector of

> everybody, and in some way bring about equalization by destroying self-reliance and self-responsibility . . . charity does not mean protection through life's storms. It does not mean shelter from the battle and a withering of the wrestling thews. It does not even mean benefaction, or bounty, or paternalism; and anyway, benefaction, or bounty, or paternalism are hardly ever of value . . . Paternalism can produce only greenhouse plants, and a greenhouse generation will surely go down in the battle of the strong.[56]

For Meighen, man's appropriate destiny lay in "self-reliance and self-responsibility"; the modern conflict was between "the Sate on the one hand and the free man on the other". From Bennett's correspondence we read:

> The difficulty . . . is that too much reliance is being placed upon the Government. The people are not bearing their share of the load. Half a century ago people would work their way out of their difficulties rather than look to a government to take care of them. The fibre of some of our people has grown softer and they are not willing to turn in and save themselves. They now complain because they have no money. When they were earning money many of them spent it in speculation and in luxury. 'Luxury' means anything a man has not an immediate need for, having regard to his financial position.
>
> I do not know what the present movement may be, but unless it induces men and women to think in terms of honest toil rather than in terms of bewilderment because of conditions which they helped to create, the end of organized society is not far distant.[57]

And George Drew announced that:

> Economic freedom is the essence of competitive enterprise, and competitive enterprise is the foundation of our democratic system . . . We believe in the widest possible measure of personal liberty consistent with law, order and the general welfare.[58]

If all three are not rugged individualists in the American manner they come perilously close to it.

Horowitz notes that "Morton exhorts Canadian Conservatives to embrace the welfare state on the ground that 'laissez-faire and rugged individualism' are foreign to 'conservative principles'."[59] And, indeed, a good case can be made that they are. On conservative principles "laissez-faire" must be subordinated to the national interest, to the principles of order. But this means only that free enterprise is *in principle* to be approved but restricted *when necessary*. As the conservative devotee of laissez-faire, Michael Oakeshott, has pointed out, the doctrine is frequently confused with "that imaginary condition of wholly unfettered competition", and it is perfectly compatible with the doctrine to believe that "undertakings in which competition cannot be made to work as the agency of control must be transferred to public operation".[60] Certainly, when the Conservatives first espoused some of the principles of the welfare state at the unofficial Port Hope convention of 1942 they thought them quite consistent with the adopted resolution that Conservatives should:

> strongly advocate the strengthening of the basic Canadian tradition of individual initiative and individual enterprise and opportunity and the freeing of economic activities from bureaucratic controls.[61]

Nor were they inconsistent; for *effective* individual initiative and enterprise may be seen to be dependent on a minimal equality whereby none is deprived *ab initio* of the opportunity to strive effectively.

Horowitz asks "Can one conceive of a respected philosopher of Republicanism denouncing 'rugged individualism' as foreign to traditional Republican principles?"[62] Indeed one can; at least if Republicanism is equated with American conservatism. And the more reputable the more likely. Russell Kirk, Clinton Rossiter, Harry Jaffa and Peter Viereck immediately come to my mind. To take but one instance at random, in his *Conservatism Revisited* Viereck denounces the excesses of Barry Goldwater's "Old Guard Republicanism" as inimical to the principles of American Conservatism.[63] The difference between the American and the Canadian Conservative is that the latter has more easily accepted the Burkean restrictions on radical Whiggism; and at least some American philosophical conservatives strongly regret Republican excesses. While it is certainly true that American conservatives are more inclined to aggressive individualism than their Canadian counterparts, the difference is one of degree not of kind, although that difference makes for a significantly different political practice. It is no unfathomable paradox that the

best-known contemporary American philosopher of conservatism, Russell Kirk, is a Burke scholar, an exponent of the principles of reverence, prudence and prescription, who frequently scolds the best-known contemporary British conservative philosopher, Michael Oakeshott, for being too deeply imbued with Thomas Hobbes and laissez-faire. Nor is it poor historiography when Kirk describes the conservatism of John Adams, John Randolph, John Quincy Adams and Orestes Brownson — to mention a few — as conservatism in — more or less — the Burkean manner.

In truth, Horowitz has chosen poor examples of his un-American Canadian Conservatives. He would have been better served by Macdonald and Borden. Nonetheless, even there, the conservative virtues of prudence, order, moderation and balance may be seen as infringements on individualism, not as essentially inimical to it. When Horowitz does turn his attention to Macdonald he demonstrates the immediate speciousness of his thesis. He asserts that "Sir John A. Macdonald's approach to the emergent working class was in some respects similar to Disraeli's".[64] In fact, Macdonald believed in a restricted middle-class franchise, though he was forced to concede almost manhood suffrage in 1885, and the legislation he introduced in 1872 to protect trade unions was an almost verbatim reproduction of *Gladstone*'s 1871 Trade Union Act in the United Kingdom. And the Gladstone who so admired Burke — he believed Burke was right on all the major issues of his time save the French Revolution — was the philosophical as well as the political opponent of Disraeli. If Macdonald's approach was "in some respects similar to Disraeli's", it was far more similar in approach to others.

As an example of the "tory touch" in English Canada Horowitz notes:

> the far greater willingness of English-Canadian political and business elites to use the power of the state for the purpose of developing and controlling the economy. This willingness is especially notable in the history of Canada's Conservative party, and is one of the primary characteristics differentiating Canadian conservatism (touched with toryism) from purely individualistic, purely liberal American conservatism. As George Grant puts it, conservatism uses "public power to achieve national purposes. The Conservative party . . . after all, created Ontario Hydro, the CNR, the Bank of Canada and the CBC."[65]

We have, however, already seen that laissez-faire theorists accept the desirability of public ownership in certain circumstances. In the case of Ontario Hydro

public ownership was undertaken to evade American ownership of our natural resources which may have proved beyond the resources of Canadian private capital to develop. In the case of the CNR nationalization was necessary to prevent a CPR monopoly. The choice, as Borden put it, was between "a railway-owned government and a government-owned railway", though, it must be conceded, Borden was more favourably disposed to public ownership in principle than previous or later federal Conservative leaders. In the case of the Bank of Canada the government was merely repeating what the supposedly solely liberal and individualistic Americans had done in 1912 with the Federal Reserve System. And in the case of the CBC the Conservative government watered down the "collectivist" recommendation of the Liberal-sponsored Aird Commission and permitted private commercial radio stations to broadcast alongside the CBC which, in turn, soon included advertisements in its own programmes.[66] It should be perfectly clear that the occasional use of the state by the Conservatives should give us no reason to believe that they had a "corporate-organic-collectivist" ideology, or any remnants of one.

Christian and Campbell use, as many have before, Macdonald's National Policy as an example of the collectivist aspect of "Macdonald's Conservative ideology" which, they claim, "was a skilful blend of toryism and liberalism".[67] However, as John Weir has pointed out:

> While Sir John A. Macdonald is best remembered as the architect of Canada's National Policy, it is not often emphasized that before its adoption Macdonald was an advocate of reciprocity with the United States. When the Washington Treaty was signed in 1871 between the United States and Great Britain, Macdonald attended to argue for a restoration of the reciprocal trade arrangements which had existed between Canada and the United States in the period 1854-1866.[68]

Clearly, on the face of it, there is a contradiction between the Macdonald of 1871 and the Macdonald of the "National Policy" of 1876, and also of the Macdonald of 1849 who proclaimed the principles of the British North American League as:

> Protection to native industry and home manufacturers — connection with Great Britain — Reciprocity with the United States in agricultural products — and Repeal of the Municipal and Tariff monstrosities of last session.[69]

Even after the National Policy had been decided upon and announced by resolution in the House of Commons on March 10, 1876 as the party's policy, Macdonald made it perfectly clear that the new policy was expedience not principle. As Macdonald told a picnic gathering of some twenty thousand in London in June, 1877:

> The question of the day is that of the protection of our farmers from the unfair competition of foreign produce, and the protection of our manufacturers. I am in favour of reciprocal free trade if it can be obtained, but so long as the policy of the United States closes the markets to our products we should have a policy of our own as well, and consult only our own interests.[70]

Again, there is nothing in the National Policy remotely to suggest a collectivist orientation.

IV

The Conservative Party in Canada is, it would appear, predominantly a Whig party and scarcely at all a Tory party. None of the evidence offered for a collectivist interpretation seems to support the case. What, then, is the Red Tory? In Horowitz' terms there would appear to be none — at least none who are politically active. George Grant, Gad Horowitz' apogee of the Red Tory, has denounced the party as inimical to what he views as conservative ideals. Eugene Forsey, seeing Pierre Trudeau as the saviour of Canada, has become a Liberal Senator — which at least hints the lie to the Horowitz thesis of the socialist Red Tory as one "who prefers the Conservatives to the Liberals".[71] Horowitz' first choice failed the first test. And W.L. Morton's belief in greater individual responsibility places him squarely in the Whig camp.

Yet surely the media and the public have some characteristics in mind when they employ the term, and they certainly appear to find politicians to whom they can effectively apply the label. In fact, there appear to be three types who fit into the general classification. The first is, quite simply, the individual who finds himself in the Conservative Party out of familial, regional or opportunistic chance and who would be equally, or perhaps more, at home in the Liberal Party. David MacDonald from Prince Edward Island would be an example. The second category would be those who believe that the first duty of government is to support the interests of the small businessman and of the farmer, of "the average Canadian", not merely to protect him but to ensure

that the small man is in a position to make his individual initiative and responsibility effective. The most obvious example would be John Diefenbaker.

The third category, and from a philosophical and historical standpoint the most interesting, is exemplified by Robert Stanfield. In Stanfield's writings, although he is critical of Burke's attitude to the French Revolution, he adopts nonetheless an explicitly Burkean stance towards the excesses of his radical "Whig" colleagues. His 1974 paper to the Progressive Conservative caucus, entitled 'Some Comments on Conservative Principles and Philosophy', is a simplified equivalence of Burke's *Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs.* (Burke was, of course, an "Old Whig" and the confusion in the title is because Burke wrote it anonymously and in the third person to disguise — quite ineffectively — its source).

Since the 1920's many Conservatives have become devotees of an unrestricted capitalism, of the weak state, of total competition among individuals. Although one must not press the analogy too far, they are the "new Whigs" of the late eighteenth century in Britain; they lack prudence, a sense of compromise, a notion of order; they are the "classical liberals", *who have always had a significant place* in the Conservative Parties in the United Kingdom and in Canada since their foundings in the nineteenth century.

To define Whiggism is not easy; it has eluded the efforts of many competent minds. But one can at least say that the Whigs were loyal monarchists who nonetheless denounced all forms of absolutism; they were linked with the commercial entrepreneurs of the day and welcomed England's emergence as a middle class and capitalist nation; they espoused freedom under law and a healthy measure of religious toleration, without accepting equality of religion; they believed in sterner virtues, liberty and low taxation; and they rejected democracy. In Burke's day, however, some Whigs seemed captivated by the liberté, egalité, fraternité of the Revolution, they were losing their sense of moderation and balance and it was to this that Burke offered his corrections.

Although Stanfield thinks his position is akin to that of George Grant, it is in fact more closely analagous to that of the old Whigs. Many present Conservatives indeed espouse an unrestrained version of the Whig values of the eighteenth century and, for Stanfield, these excesses must be restricted by a concern with order, as exemplified by traditional British Conservatives:

> British Conservative thinkers traditionally stressed the importance of order, not merely "law and order", but social order. This does not mean that they were opposed to freedom for the individual; far from it. They believed that a decent civilized life requires a framework of order.

> Conservatives did not take that kind of order for granted. It seemed to them quite rare in the world and therefore quite precious. This is still the case. Conservatives attached importance to the economy and to enterprise and to property, but private enterprise was not the central principle of traditional British conservatism.[72]

Stanfield does not however take up the position of the statist, does not become a romantic Conservative. "It is also", he says, "good Conservatism not to push regulation too far — to undermine self-reliance".[73] He continues at some length in this vein and concludes that:

> It would certainly be appropriate for a Conservative to suggest that we must achieve some kind of order if we are to avoid chaos; an order which is stable, but not static; an order therefore which is reasonably acceptable and which among other things provides a framework in which enterprise can flourish.[74]

In truth, Stanfield is no Red Tory. Like other Canadian Conservatives he is a Whig but one who recognizes with Burke that unrestricted free enterprise, individual initiative and striving and the weak state will produce only chaos and destroy the security and stability of society, which are prerequisites of a society "in which enterprise can flourish".

Indeed, in Canada, the Red Tory is a myth. The Progressive Conservative Party is a Whig party and within it there are various proponents of different styles of Whiggery. But none denounces the Whig tradition. There are no absolutists, no Hegelians, no romantics, no "corporate-organic-collectivist" elements. There are just Lockes, Hobbes and Burkes and the occasional Charles James Fox.

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Notes

1. Flora MacDonald has, however, made it clear that she has mixed feelings about the term being applied to her. See Alvin Armstrong, *Flora MacDonald*, Toronto: Dent, 1976, pp. 202-3.

2. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968, Chapter 1 'Conservatism, Liberalism and Socialism in Canada', pp. 3-57.

3. *Op. cit.*, p. 5.

4. *Op. cit.*, p. 23.

5. *Loc. cit.*

6. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, Carleton Library Series, 1968.

7. See his 'Canadian Conservatism Now' in Paul Fox ed., *Politics: Canada*, Third Edition, Toronto: McGraw Hill, 1970, pp. 233-6.

8. *Canadian Labour in Politics*, p. 19.

9. *Op. cit.*, p. 21.

10. Toronto: McGraw Hill-Ryerson, 1974.

11. I, 1, 5-6; VI, 7, 1200.

12. III, 180.

13. Ia, 2ae, 90-108.

14. I suppose one might make a prior claim for John of Salisbury in his *Policraticus* but his defence of tyrranicide and his subjection of the king to law contain only indefinite implications for individual emancipation.

15. *Works*, Rivington Edition, 16 Vols., London, 1803-27, X, 96.

16. *The Political Uses of Ideology*, London: Macmillan, 1974, p. 117.

17. *Spirit of the Laws*, Books XI-XIII.

18. *Von der Idee des Staates* (1809) reprinted in Albert Baumhauer et al., *Dokumente zur Christlichen Demokratie*, Eichholz, 1969, p. 33. Author's translation.

19. *Germany: 2000 Years*, New York: Ungar, 1974, Vol. II, p. 498.

20. Adam Müller, *Teilung der Arbeit*, in Baumhauer, *loc. cit.* Author's translation.

21. *Op. cit.*, p. 34. Author's translation.

22. *Agronomische Briefe* in Othmar Spann, *Die Herdflamme*, Jena, 1931, pp. 134ff.

23. R.N.W. Blake, *Disraeli*, London: Oxford University Press, 1969, pp. 18-19.

24. 'Modern British Conservatism' in R. Benewick et al., *Knowledge and Belief in Politics: The Problem of Ideology*, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1974, p. 208.

25. B.W. Hill, *Edmund Burke on Government, Politics and Society*, New York: International Publications Service, 1976, p. 7. For more detailed comments on Burke's influence on liberalism, see Kirk, *The Conservative Mind*, pp. 165ff.

26. George Sabine, *A History of Political Theory*, London: Harrap, Third Edition, 1960, p. 589.

27. *In The Conservative Mind*, London: Faber and Faber, 1954 and *Conservatism Revisited*, New York: Scribners, 1949, respectively.

28. Sabine, *op. cit.*, p. 616.

29. *Edmund Burke: A Historical Study*, London, 1867.

30. *The Conservative Tradition*, London: A&C Black, 1950, pp. 6-7.

31. See, for example, George Grant, *Lament for a Nation, passim*, and W. Christian and C. Campbell, *Political Parties and Ideologies in Canada*, Chapter IV.

32. *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, in Hill, *op. cit.*, p. 283.

33. *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, in Hill, *op. cit.*, pp. 285-6.

34. *An Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs*, in Hill, *op. cit.*, p. 367.

35. *Speech on Conciliation with America*, March 22, 1775.

36. *Observations on a Late Publication on the Present State of the Nation*, 1769.

37. *Works*, VI, 61.

38. *Correspondence*, Fitzwilliam and Bourke, eds., 4 Vols, London, 1844, III, 14.

39. *Reflections on the Revolution in France.*

40. Michael Curtis, *The Great Political Theories*, New York: Avon, 1961, Vol. I, p. 326.

41. *Works*, V, 13.

42. *Second Treatise*, in Curtis, *op. cit.*, p. 341.

43. In Strauss and Cropsey, *History of Political Philosophy*, Chicago: Rand McNally, 1972, p. 665.

44. *On American Taxation* in Hill, *op. cit.*, p. 145.

45. *Wentworth Woodhouse Papers*, I, 623.

46. For a detailed discussion of this point see R. Preece and W. Koerner, *The Conservative Tradition in Canada*, Ch. XII 'Toward a Conservative Ethic', Carleton Library Series, forthcoming.

47. *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, in Curtis, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 60.

48. *Letter to a Noble Lord*, 1796.

49. *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, in Curtis, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 49.

50. *Op. cit.*, p. 54.

51. See C. Winn and J. McMenemy, *Political Parties in Canada*, Toronto: McGraw Hill-Ryerson, 1976, p. 5.

52. See N.H. Chi, 'Class Cleavage' in Winn and McMenemy, *op. cit.*, pp. 89ff.

53. *Political Parties and Ideologies in Canada*, p. 76.

54. See N.H. Chi, *loc. cit.*

55. *Canadian Labour in Politics*, pp. 18-19.

56. *Unrevised and Unrepented*, Toronto: Clarke, Irwin, 1949, pp. 457-8.

57. *Public Archives of Canada*, R.B. Bennett Papers, Bennett to J.G. Bennett, 21, October, 1931.

58. *Declaration of Policy*, 1949 electoral campaign.

59. *Canadian Labour in Politics*, p. 21.

60. 'The Political Economy of Freedom', *Rationalism in Politics*, London: Methuen, 1962, pp. 55, 57.

61. *Port Hope Report*, September, 1942.

62. *Canadian Labour in Politics*, p. 21.

63. *Conservatism Revisited*, New York: Scribners, 1962, Revised Edition, pp. 133, 141.

64. *Canadian Labour in Politics*, p. 21.

65. *Canadian Labour in Politics*, p. 10.

66. For a detailed development of the historical evidence for these assertions, which lack of space forbids here, see Preece and Koerner, *op. cit.*, chapters 4&5.

67. *Political Parties and Ideologies in Canada*, p. 86.

68. 'Trade and Resource Policies' in C. Winn and J. McMenemy, *Political Parties in Canada*, p. 229.

69. *Public Records and Archives of Ontario*, Miscellaneous Papers, 1849, Macdonald to Stevenson, 5 July, 1849.

70. Quoted in George R. Parkin, *The Makers of Canada: Vol. XVIII, Sir John A. Macdonald*, Toronto: Morang Co., 1908, p. 223.

71. *Canadian Labour in Politics*, p. 23.

72. 'Some Comments on Conservative Principles and Philosophy' Leader of the Opposition's Office, November 14, 1974, p. 4.

73. *Op. cit.*, p. 5.

74. *Op. cit.*, p. 14.

On Imperative Coordination
Des exigences de la coordination bureaucratique

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BUREAUCRATIC OPPOSITION: THE CHALLENGE TO AUTHORITARIAN ABUSES AT THE WORKPLACE[1]

Deena Weinstein

Resistance to formal organizational authority by individuals or informal groups is an ignored phenomenon in the social sciences. Yet everyone who has worked in a complex organization (bureaucracy) has either participated in or is familiar with periodic power struggles and/or "whistle-blowing" that has been undertaken by those employed within the organization outside of and against official procedures for processing grievances. Probably those sociologists who describe the principles of bureaucratic harmony, who show the functional dilemmas of organizational practice, or who discourse on the qualities of leadership may themselves have engaged in ousting a department head or in battling to maintain academic "standards." Resistance to formal organizational authority, or bureaucratic opposition, is pervasive. The amount of time that it absorbs, the consequences that it has for instigating or intensifying "rationalization" of tasks, the functions or dysfunctions that it has for the individual personality, and its ethical import within a mass democracy are all issues that have not been addressed by mainstream or even by critical sociologists.

The reasons why it has gone unnoticed are both theoretical and social. From a paradigmatic viewpoint, the various forms of functionalism have stressed social adjustment of strains and dilemmas through adaptive structures within a single normative order, while the varieties of conflict theory, particularly Marxism, have emphasized macro-structural and inter-organizational tensions and strife to the near exclusion of intra-organizational struggle. Socially, until the 1960s both apologists and critics agreed that the society was one-dimensional, the pluralists calling attention to limited competition within normative consensus and the conflict theorists identifying patterns of elite domination. The explosion of pluralism in the 1960s, following the emergence of anti-colonialism throughout the world after World War II and leading to various other liberation movements and challenges to established institutions, have made obvious the tensions within complex organizations.

Bureaucratic oppositions have occurred in both private and public organizations and have been perpetrated by one person or small groups, utilizing any of

a number of tactics, and meeting with a wide range of possible outcomes. These attempts at change from below, coming from those without authority, are labelled oppositions because they are outside of the normal routine, and are challenges to authority. However, their aims are not to usurp the reigns of power but to alter practices and/or personnel. In general, there are *two* types of bureaucratic opposition. One of them, probably the most frequent but least reported, is the revolt against *authority* considered to be arbitrary, abusive, or unjust. Such opposition is normally motivated by perceived inequities of treatment and may aggregate a number of individual grievances into a movement against a supervisor, a department head, or a division chief. The second type is the protest against or exposure of *situations* or *practices* that are considered to be illegal, inefficient, or immoral. Since unjust authority may also be immoral, and immorality, inefficiency or illegality depends upon inequities to keep it under cover, the two types of bureaucratic opposition are often found combined. However, they have two distinctive and different thrusts. Normally, resistance against unjust authority aims at ousting a power holder while opposition against a situation is meant to change a practice. The first is usually a matter internal to the organization while the second is related to its function and tends to spill over into the "public" domain.

The model of a bureaucracy, classically described by Weber, is one in which the tasks are totally rationalized. The traditional assembly-line manufacturing procedure is an example of nearly complete rationalization in which the work is so routine that the labourers are merely extensions of the tools that they use and have no discretion over their activities. However, where work is not fully rationalized and made machinelike there are possibilities for different interpretations of what should be done, what aspects of the occupational role should be emphasized, what constitutes justice with regard to rewards and punishments, and when decisions about work become commentaries on the worth of the worker (problem of individual dignity).

Routinization or rationalization (used interchangably here) refer to the triumph of instrumental rationality in which the means to an end are related stepwise in a predictable pattern of cause and effect. Transferred to the realm of human beings, the triumph of instrumental reason means the substitution of administration for politics. Bureaucratic oppositions are indicators that this substitution has not occurred, because they are political processes growing out of conflicts over proper goals or ends, just distribution of resources, and the right principles of conduct. Often oppositions indicate resistance to administrative eclipse of politics, as in cases of dissent against practices aimed at "efficiency" which disregard individual differences, exclude worker consultation or decision-making, or circumscribe discretion.

Bureaucratic oppositions have, for the most part, been undertaken by white-collar rather than by blue-collar workers. While there are political conflicts be-

tween blue-collar workers and "management" they most often concern the financial and physical conditions of work and are regularized in negotiations through unions. (Unions themselves, however, consist of white-collar type jobs and opposition within them should be analyzed in that context, despite the members occupations.) Issues concerning distributive justice are supposed to be settled by the "contract", while grievances are handled by the shop steward. The role-definition of the blue-collar worker is relatively unambiguous and programmed by machinery or other tools, and opposition to possibly immoral consequences of production is excluded by the terms of the "bargain". Oppositions against foremen considered to be abusive are initiated by blue-collar workers, but they are limited by the interposition of unions and the legal machinery for enforcing the contract.

Despite the analysis of white-collar jobs which indicates their increasing "proletarianization",[2] there are still differences between blue- and white-collar work that encourages political activity in the latter. First, modern Western culture has tended to divide experience between the realms of things and persons (Descartes' division between thinking substance and extended substance, Kant's differentiation of the phenomenal world and the kingdom of ends). Within the realm of things the principles of efficiency and economy (instrumental reason or Zweckrational conduct) are supposed to apply, while in the realm of persons, principles of justice and respect (Wertrational conduct) are appropriate. Much of white-collar work still concerns the realm of persons in which differing interpretations of decision rules may be at stake and in which conceptions of duty may clash. For example, those who handle "claims" or "cases" are interpreting systems of rules and are likely to have their own "judicial ideologies" which may clash with those of their superiors. Moreover, much of white-collar work requires diffuse cooperative relations, which often breed envy, jealousy, and competition, all of which may take a political form. Insofar as the "product" of white-collar work is something intangible like a decision and the "relations of production" are diffuse, the work resists complete rationalization and is a potential breeding ground for political opposition.

White-collar work is also pervious to political processes, particularly above the middle-level of organizational hierarchies, because it concerns the decisions about routine and therefore, cannot be made routine itself. There may be conflict over alternative policies, but even more important there may be disagreement about whether a particular decision was "right" or in "the best interests" of the agency or sub-unit. Further complicating the matter are differences among interpretations of professional codes, proper repositories for loyalty, and estimates of "competence", all of which may generate political opposition and generally do not trouble blue-collar workers. Another aspect of white-collar work favouring the emergence of political processes is the

traditional "white-collar consciousness" of being different from the machinelike proletarian. White-collar workers are often willing to take lower salaries than comparable blue-collar workers just to avoid the occupational self-concept of being the extension of a machine. Resistance to proletarianization may be a source of opposition.

Two political dimensions of white-collar work are intensified and exacerbated wherever promotion and firing, as well as working conditions (for example, scheduling in hospitals or academic institutions) are not routinized in seniority systems and specific rules. Competition for preferment, "undermining" rivals, and resentment at being "passed over" are not bureaucratic oppositions, but may encourage, lead to, or deepen them.

Essentially, with few exceptions such as keypunch operators and typists who produce tangible products and have little possibility for promotion,[3] white-collar workers have not been and perhaps cannot be totally subject to an administrative process that excludes political conflict. Attempts to make things seem as though they are routine or that they are determined by "objective" standards of efficiency or productivity are rhetorical strategies with their own political import of minimizing challenges to authority. Despite all denials, white-collar workers exist within a political situation.

Traditionally, politics has been viewed as the realm of human activity in which decisions are made about such issues as the proper definition of function, policy and justice. Politics has meant the possibility of choosing among alternatives within a public situation; hence, discretion and the possibility for varying interpretations are essential aspects of political relations. Economic or instrumental activity can be programmed; this is not the case for political activity where contradictory values may be at stake, not to mention the element of human choice in particular situations. Politics as an activity should not be confused with what goes on in government or the state. For example, John Dewey and C. Wright Mills[4] both defined politics in terms of public consequences rather than institutions. Insofar as organizations put people in situations where they have discretion, where there can be different ideologies of role definition, where their dignity is involved in their work, where their commitment and "loyalty" is mobilized, where they are taught an "ethic of ultimate ends" (as in some professions) that may clash with administrative expediencey — in short, where everything cannot be programmed in advance as on an assembly line — there is every reason to expect that organizations will show the characteristics that have been observed in so-called "political systems." Among these characteristics is the phenomenon of "opposition" which seems to be ubiquitous in the political process. The following discussion will relate oppositional activities in bureaucracies to the categories of political opposition discussed in recent political analyses with appropriate modifications to suit contexts other than the state.

State and Organization

Social scientists concerned with topics such as rebellion and revolution provide a more fruitful context for the understanding of bureaucratic oppositions than do organization theorists. In general, mainstream organization theory has stressed the monocratic authority of organizations and has interpreted factors which would tend to "disorganize" this order as problematic: problems that social scientists should study and problems that top management must eradicate. The residual category of "disorganization" substitutes for conflict as a normal and, perhaps productive, social process.

A good case can be made for treating bureaucratic organizations as the equivalent in many respects to authoritarian regimes. Organization theory in the United States has tended to make the business corporation the model for all other organizations, but it is equally plausible to make the state the paradigm for specific purposes, such as the study of bureaucratic opposition. Although corporations have neither absolute control over a territory nor armed troops, they function politically by allocating resources through systems of power. Antony Jay notes that the board of directors is analogous to a government, shareholders to a propertied class, and employees to citizens.[5] Particularly with regard to the last analogy, subjects of an authoritarian regime do not fare so differently from most employees of a corporation. In neither case is there freedom of speech, the right to a trial, or participation in rule-making. The business corporation and state, of course, differ in the penalties that they mete out for insubordination, but being fired and sometimes blacklisted can be as harsh or even harsher over the long run than physical coercion; witness such metaphors as "being given the axe".

Like rebellions, bureaucratic oppositions are outside of the usual course of events. As William Korhauser notes, rebellions occur when there are no political structures capable of accomodating political demands.[6] Bureaucracies are not set up to handle internal conflicts, particularly when the statuses of those engaged in the conflict have great power differentials. Bureaucracies are hierarchical arrangements of authority, visualizable as flows of decisions downward, and obedience upward. Max Weber attests to the lack of means for those without authority to make changes: "The official is entrusted with specialized tasks and normally the mechanism cannot be put into motion or arrested by him, but only from the very top."[7] Bureaucratic authorities are different from standard political authorities in the one significant sense that they do not administer a system of law backed up by organized physical coercion (except for the enforcement bureaucracies of the state). They must call on state agencies to aid them if laws are broken, but cannot use coercion against their employees. Hence, bureaucratic authorities cannot legally employ force, an important means in the array of social control mechanisms, against their

employees. If the employees use force themselves, they will probably have to contend with the state. Bureaucratic oppositions thus tend to be non-violent. However, aside from the legal limitations, backed by courts, police, and prisons, bureaucratic oppositions are essentially no different than political oppositions. Of course, bureaucracies are not democratic. But then, most states are not democratic either.

Within the context of the state, oppositional movements have been extensively analyzed, particularly revolutions, although rebellions, internal wars and social protest movements have also been studied. An attempt will be made here to consider this literature's usefulness for studying the phenomenon of bureaucratic opposition. In general, there are three major issues: the conditions under which oppositions arise, the processes and problems of oppositional group formation and coherence, and analyses of the various strategies which they may employ.

The Origins of Bureaucratic Oppositions

A distinction between "preconditions" and "precipitants", which has been developed to understand the conditions under which oppositions against the state arise[8], has direct relevance for analyzing organizational conflict. A precipitant is the last act in a sequence of tension-producing events which actually starts the "war". The preconditions, on the other hand, are both those prior events as well as the general circumstances that set the context, that charge the atmosphere, so to speak. The precipitant, the spark that ignites, the final straw that breaks the camel's back, does not seem to generate great interest among students of oppositions to the state. The same deemphasis would apply to bureaucratic oppositions where a one-shot offense does not seem to account for the ensuing action; there is usually a "long train of abuses".

Far more energy is spent by theorists of political oppositions in examining the preconditions. One popular hypothesis is that the weakness of the elite brings on the opposition. In a sense, the habit of public obedience to the established powers is somehow shattered and rebel leadership replaces the now defenceless elite. Pareto and other Italian elite theorists held, for example, that an elite which had the nerve to use violence decisively and efficiently could not be displaced. Such loss of nerve, however, is not a free-floating psychological phenomenon but may itself stem from the decline of legitimacy, the erosion of shared values, and generalized confidence in the community's superiority and destiny. William Gamson argues that such generalized sentiments as morale and loyalty are "slack resources" that leadership groups can mobilize in order to suppress challenges to their domination.[9] The disappearance of slack is both an indicator and a cause of political crisis in which effective leadership control is lost.

In a summary of various views of preconditions, Harry Eckstein divides them into intellectual, economic, social structural and political factors.[10] The first includes such elements as a regime's inadequate socialization program; for example, the observation that so-called Young Turks are more likely to be involved in many bureaucratic oppositions may fit here. Intellectual factors may also include the coexistence of contrary myths in a society; for example, are police supposed to help the public or have "cushy" jobs?[11] Under the category of social structure, Eckstein mentions the possibility of too much recruitment into the elite from non-elite groups, a situation which breaks the elite's internal cohesion. If one had a large sample of instances of bureaucratic oppositions where various controls could be instituted, this hypothesis could be readily evaluated. For example, where academic departments have "blown" and the heads have been deposed, does this happen more frequently when the faculty are recruited from comparatively less "prestigious" graduate departments holding the "prestige" of the observed "blown" department constant?

Among other possible causes of bureaucratic opposition is abusive or corrupt government; that in Parsonian terms, the function of goal attainment was inadequately performed. For states this might mean losing a war or being unable to cope with a depressed or inflated economy. For private corporations this might be measured in terms of profit. However, many bureaucratic oppositions are directed against heads of departments or sub-agencies, and performance in such cases is often difficult to measure. For non-profit (particularly governmental) organizations the whole concept of goal attainment is perhaps inapplicable. At best it may refer to getting desired appropriations.

Resistance

Regardless of all of the factors that make opposition a constant possibility in both states and bureaucracies, existent regimes have many means at their disposal for suppressing the public appearance of dissent and rebellion. These means fall under the general category of social-control mechanisms,[12] and range from violence to loyalty or what Parsons termed "value commitments."[13] While violence is not ordinarily an option for bureaucracies and strong and internalized sentiments of loyalty obviate the need for repression, there are many social-control mechanisms, some of them quite subtle, that fall between these two poles. Closest to outright violence are dismissal, geographical transfer, and sometimes blacklisting of personnel. Short of actual removal is the use of threats, sometimes aimed directly at dissenters and more often couched in terms of supposed dangers from other organizational competitors if internal unity is disrupted. The latter tactics may be reversed when elites foment interorganizational conflict to mobilize solidarity internally. Aside from negative

sanctions organizations can offer material rewards to dampen down dissent, attempt to co-opt rebel leadership,[14] and even require that their employees engage in conspicuous consumption so that they will become dependent on continued employment.[15] Of course, the use of rewards has narrow limits. Firstly, pay-offs to dissenters set a bad example that may encourage others to be disobedient so that they too get a bigger slice of the pie. Secondly, the strategy of elites is not to distribute the organization's wealth to employees, but to maintain their power through strengthening the organization.

Given the wide knowledge and use of a host of controls, it is even difficult to conceive of how bureaucratic oppositions arise at all. Yet they do occur.[16] Part of the solution to this mystery lies in recognizing that the modes of domination are only effective when people act in accordance with their so-called rational self-interest. But narrow-gauged self-interest within the limits of the structure (what Parsons calls "institutionalized individualism"[17]) is only one type of motivation for action; " . . . consciousness that does not transcend its rootedness in an economically competitive mode of production."[18] Weber himself was well aware of other varieties of motivated actions: "Less 'rational' actions are typed by Weber in terms of the pursuit of 'absolute ends', as flowing from affectual sentiments, or as 'traditional'."[19] Although Weber tends to associate different action types with different kinds of collective associations, it is unwarrented to conclude that other forms of action are not present in a certain type of social structure. Admittedly traditional action seems unlikely to motivate oppositions to authority. However, both action motivated by the pursuit of absolute ends and by affectual sentiments, together, or separately, certainly can, and does, actuate resistance. When employees "blow the whistle" on bosses because they are producing a product that is harming consumers, or they are misusing government appropriations, they are often motivated by a "higher reason" of absolute ends. Many of those participating in collective oppositions are actuated, at least in part, by affectual sentiments.

Bureaucratic oppositions, in contrast to those in the polity, do not require mass support, although it may sometimes be helpful. Nonetheless the dodge of foreign danger can be effectuated by stirring up interdepartmental rivalries or sentiments of interorganizational competition.

Mobilization and Tactics

Whether they term it revolution, challenge groups, or internal war, those concerned with the polity consider the opposition to be a group of people, rather than a lone individual. Because of the difference between political and bureaucratic opposition (appeal to other more powerful organizations is possible in the latter case), there are various strategies by which a person can go it

alone, and still be effective. This is particularly the case where the issue concerns the organization's function rather than abusive internal power. Despite the possibilities of individual opposition, there are compelling reasons for those involved in resistance to do it collectively. "Society" looks askance at those who march to "different drummers" and who point out that the "emperor has no clothes." Challenging the everyday notion of reality often brands one as mentally deranged, the modern equivalent of devil possession. Somehow if more than one person repudiates the official definition of the situation opprobrium is not usually as great. It is lonely to go it alone, because one very easily becomes a pariah at the work place. Further, more people mean possibly more ideas for action and more resources (such as connections with higher-ups, the media, etc.).

Groups rarely emerge spontaneously, despite widespread discontent. Someone needs to broach the matter of taking action and to mobilize others. To use Marxist terminology, a transformation of *Klasse an sich* into a *Klass fuer sich* is needed. Although griping and black humor are actions most useful for spreading discontent and delegitimizing authorities, they do not in themselves constitute oppositional movements. This is particularly the case where liberal ideology prevails and one is allowed to think anything and is given relative freedom of speech, limited only by seditious rousings. Yet despite lip-service to traditional legal guarantees of individual rights there is no sentiment that legitimates opposition within an organization. Quite the opposite, all habits of thought are those of obedience towards authority, even going so far as loyalty to and identification with the organization. These sentiments are usually reinforced and encouraged by the organization but are specifically taught by the major socializing institutions of the society: the family, the schools and the churches. This "natural" inclination towards obedience, this one-dimensional pattern of thought, is a major obstacle to getting others to take part in oppositions. Experimental studies by Milgram, although open to questions of validity, indicate that people are so willing to obey authority that they will inflict suffering on others simply because they have been told to do so.[20] In a sense, the more that bureaucratic oppositions are made public, the more likely are they to occur, because they present a hitherto "unknown" possibility.

Another hindrance to creating an opposition group is widespread fear of reprisals or alternatively, loss of possible rewards (in a bourgeois culture, "profits"). Blau's notion of "fair exchange"[21] and Homans' rule of "distributive justice"[22] (where one expects the profit to be proportional to the cost) give some insight into probable decisional influences on potential opposition group members. Most contemporary social thought, whether Marxist or functionalist, accepts that personal sacrifices must be motivated. Oppositional activity involves such sacrifices because it is dangerous. Fidel Castro and Mao Tse-Tung, for example, based much of their revolutionary theory and

practice on the use of "moral incentives" where "material incentives" are unavailable. Such moral incentives include, as James Downton has noted, comradeship, pride and purpose.[23] Gamson adds that commitment to a cause often allows the revolutionary to transcend the calculations of cost-benefit analysis.[24] Working under the principles of cost-benefit analysis alone, nobody would embrace an unpopular cause, but would allow others to make the sacrifices. In the case of political revolutionaries, moral incentives are often supplemented by expectations that their opposition will effect drastic changes in social and personal life, and that its members will rise to power. Bureaucratic rebels, however, must often rely on moral incentives alone. They frequently aim at making rather minor changes and even if they are successful, their personal lot would not appreciably improve. Indeed, the replacement of an ousted higher-level bureaucrat is usually *not* a leader of the opposition.

Once people begin to affiliate themselves with a protest group, a process of stigmatization, wherein "the rebel is depicted in negative terms by society, labeled 'irrational', 'degenerate', or at least 'irresponsible'," further pulls them into it.[25] When those participating in bureaucratic oppositions come "out of the closet", stigmatization often becomes even more effective in promoting solidarity among the dissenters, thereby backfiring against the authorities.

Of interest to those studying political revolt is the role of rebel leaders in organizing and directing opposition groups. They are described in terms of their ability to maintain commitment and direct effective action. Frequently there is a discussion of different types of leadership roles corresponding to various phases of the revolution. Hopper, for example, distinguishes the agitator (who makes others aware of abuses and injustices), the prophet (who has special knowledge and sense of mission), the reformer (who offers specific alternatives), and the statesman (who formulates and operationalizes new policy).[26] In a similar vein, Eric Hoffer indicates that "a movement is pioneered by men of words, materialized by fanatics and consolidated by men of action."[27]

The issue of leadership has a somewhat different focus when one is considering bureaucratic oppositions. For the most part the struggle groups are very small and are often made up of colleagues who find the creation of a formal hierarchy rather distasteful and unimportant to coordinating resistance. The organization of these groups would be better understood by reference to the various theories of face-to-face group interaction, exemplified in the classic collection entitled *Small Groups*.[28] Shared leadership seems to be the norm, ". . . the leadership role switches from one person to another (and) . . . there may be, in fact, many leaders in the same group if one follows its course of interaction from one moment to another."[29] Possibly the degree to which the situation is deemed critical would influence whether a leader emerged from the

group. Perhaps the importance " . . . of approaching the goal outweighs the dissatisfactions of being controlled."[30] However, if each stands to loose equally (there is an equal risk factor), relegating decisions to another might be considered as unfair.

The third major area of concern to those who study oppositions to the polity is the variety of strategies and tactics which are most effective in different cases. In general, the strategies adopted are a function of the goals sought and the structure of the political system. Goals can be differentiated in terms of some changes sought in policies, structures, or personnel. Some theorists use the terms revolution and rebellion to make a distinction among types of opposition, but there is so much inconsistency and relativity that the terms are not useful.

Coup d'états are clearly rebellions aimed at personnel changes, and they are infrequently accompanied by significant structural policy transformations. Most frequent in military dictatorships, they are not unknown within organizations. Bureaucratic oppositions directed against specific power holders focus upon their personal characteristics, as opposed to role definitions. In many instances their issue is one of abuse of power — the status has delimited rights and obligations and flagrant maximization of the former and/or minimization of the latter (role exploitation[31]) can inspire protest. Ordering a secretary to take dictation is within an executive's rights, as opposed to ordering her to work overtime without additional pay, provide sexual "favours", or to pad an expense account. The department chairman who fails to call meetings or inform the faculty of administrative requirements, the executive who is usually too drunk to work, or the Peter-principled bureaucrat who has reached his or her level of incompetence[32] are instances of minimizing duties. Most bureaucracies make little provision for dismissing employees for power abuse, particularly in the higher echelons. Weber states that "normally, the position of the official is held for life, at least in public bureaucracies; and this is increasingly the case for all similar structures."[33] Evaluation and threats of discharge come from those above, but frequently those in the best position to know of abuses of office are those working under the person in question. This disjunction between the capacity to judge and the ability to pass judgement accounts for much organization conflict and stress. There is no power of the ballot in most organizations. Intensifying the problem are norms or rules prohibiting underlings from "going over the head" of their immediate superiors. Where such practices occur, the strategy for bureaucratic opposition involves getting non-immediate superiors to take the reports of wrongdoing seriously. This is one of the most difficult phases of a struggle, since high-level officials have often approved the functionaries under attack, are anxious to avoid publicity, and may fear legal reprisals if they act in favour of the insurgents.

It is probable that both in the polity and within organizations, personnel

changes spurred on by those without power are easier to effectuate and have been more successful than structural or policy changes. The tactics which are used to attempt structural changes are many, and in part are influenced by how radical they are relative to the existing organization, the type of organization, and the resources available. R.H. Tawney writes that "revolutions, as a long and bitter experience reveals, are apt to take their colour from the regime they overthrow."[34] For example, bureaucratic opposition within a metropolitan police department (such as the struggle that Serpico led[35]) is apt to be more violent than one in a fire department because the police are involved with violence on a daily basis. Verbal strategies are frequent in most organizations, especially in academic situations, because symbols are the manager's and professional's stock and trade. Whereas political revolutions are usually violent, in terms of physical harm,[36] bureaucratic oppositions hardly ever resort to physical force. Rather than molotov cocktails and guns, their weapons are rhetoric, ideology and threat of exposure. Both political and bureaucratic oppositions do often try to manipulate the interorganizational context. For a bureaucratic opposition such foreign allies might be the press, legislative oversight committees, public interest advocates, or a regulatory agency. In those instances of whistleblowing where a person is alone in the struggle, the press has been a powerful ally.[37]

Conclusion

There are numerous strategies as well as typologies of oppositional struggles that fill the literature on political conflicts.[38] Many of these are useful to understanding bureaucratic oppositions, but it is not the intent here to do an exhaustive survey and a codification of the results. Rather, the above has been suggestive of a number of possible types of research that follow from the application of political categories to organizational analysis.

Aside from possible practical concerns, such as the encouragement of humane change in hierarchical organizations, the application of political categories to the study of bureaucracies is a sheer theoretical necessity in today's world. At present there is a sterile division in social theory between frameworks that describe macropolitical conflict and schema that treat of administrative coordination within organizations. This division reflects, perhaps, a world dominated by superpowers, in which the great conglomerates are at odds with one another while at the same time exerting repressive control over their subjects. There has as yet been no theory that addresses the strivings of those who must live in the shadows and under the control of mass organizations. The previous discussion has been an effort to synthesize political concepts and organizational analysis, with a view to overcoming the theoretical split. The

ultimate goal is that this theoretical nexus will help inform a praxis of liberation.

Students of revolutions, and of conflict in general, are interested in the results of such activity. While the most conservative and apologetic thinkers find nothing of positive value in opposition to constituted authority and often simply ignore it as a minor aberration in the pattern of social life, other theorists such as some functionalists do find conflict to be useful to the established order. A bureaucratic opposition which brings to light the illegal acts or abuses of power of an office holder " . . . brings together upright consciences and concentrates them," interpolating from Durkheim.[39] In other words, the official norms would be reinforced by the opposition. Lewis Coser, in books entitled *The Function of Social Conflict* and *Continuities in the Study of Social Conflict*, describes numerous possible functions: minimally "enacted desire . . . even if, in the absence of alternative channels, it be expressed through social violence, may help clear the air."[40] Claims that bureaucratic oppositions enhance the efficiency, or dialectically change the values embodied in the organization, are widely used justifications for them.[41] Hence, the latent functions of bureaucratic oppositions are at least equivocal; there is no assurance that they weaken the system, they may even strengthen it by purging it of gratuitous abuses, or actually lead to structual change.

Although it is impossible for a critical analysis of bureaucratic opposition to reach the conclusion that this phenomenon necessarily produces humane and liberating changes, such an analysis does reveal a significant dimension of contemporary social structure that is relevant to the issue of change. The great similarities between traditional political conflict and intra-organizational conflict point to the growing invasion of hierarchical control into all phases of human existence. Wherever such control appears the differentiation between the political and other spheres of life is lost and along with this loss goes the diminution of distinctive institutional autonomy. All organizations tend to become "conglomerates", organizing their members around the pursuit of abstract values, particularly control, which becomes the precondition of all other ends. Global political solutions, such as those proposed in nineteenth-century political sociologies and carried out in twentieth century super powers, depend upon politicizing the workplace, either directly (as in totalitarian states) or by analogy (as in mass democracies). Pitirim Sorokin called the social system of Western mass democracies "decentralized totalitarianism."[42] Each organization was, for him, an authoritarian state on its own account. The dangers, frustrations, and often contradictory consequences of bureaucratic oppositions, then, are merely exemplary of the problems of collective action in a world increasingly governed by abstract hierarchical control.

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Notes

1. This is a revised version of a paper presented at the meetings of the American Sociological Association in New York in August, 1976. The author wishes to thank Professors Marie Haug, Robert Perrucci, Arthur Kroker and Michael Weinstein for their helpful suggestions.

2. For a discussion of this trend see, for example, Martin Oppenheimer, "The Unionization of the Professional, "*Social Policy*, Vol. 5 (January/February, 1975): 34-40 and T.S. Chevers, "Proletarianization of a Service Worker," *Social Research*, Vol. 21 (November, 1973): 633-56.

3. For a study and discussion of those in such low level white-collar employment see Barbara Kirsch and Joseph Lengermann, "An Empirical Test of Robert Blauner's Ideas on Alienation in Work as Applied to Different Type Jobs in a White Collar Setting," *Sociology and Social Research*, Vol. 56 (January, 1972): 180-94.

4. John Dewey, *Reconstruction in Philosophy* (New York: Henry Holt, 1927); C. Wright Mills, *The Sociological Imagination* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958).

5. Antony Jay, *Management and Machiavelli: An Inquiry into the Politics of Corporate Life* (New York: Bantam Books, 1968) pp. 11-12.

6. William Kornhauser, "Rebellion and Political Development", in Harry Eckstein (ed.), *Internal War*, (New York: Free Press, 1964) p. 142.

7. Max Weber, "Bureaucracy", in H.H. Gerth and C.W. Mills (eds.), *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946) p. 228.

8. See Harry Eckstein, "On the Causes of Internal Wars", in Eric A. Nordlinger (ed.), *Politics and Society: Studies in Comparative Political Sociology* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1970) p. 291.

9. William A. Gamson, *The Strategy of Social Protest* (Homewood: Dorsey Press, 1974) p. 111.

10. Eckstein, *op. cit.*

11. The gory description of what happened to Serpico, the New York City patrolman who "blew the whistle" on the NYCPD, stresses this point. See Peter Mass, *Serpico* (New York: Bantam Books, 1973).

12. For an analysis of this phenomenon see Deena Weinstein and Michael A. Weinstein, *Living Sociology: A Critical Introduction* (New York: David McKay, 1964) chapter 10.

13. Talcott Parsons, *Politics and Social Structure* (New York: Free Press, 1969).

14. For a discussion of this point see Randall Collins, *Conflict Sociology* (New York: Academic Press, 1975) p. 301.

15. In a conversation with a South African executive, he indicated that, within somewhat broad limits, executives in his firm are paid according to their standards of living — the more they spend the higher their salaries.

16. Of a class of 29 evening students, only three did not encounter an example of a bureaucratic opposition where they work(ed). My files have dozens of examples culled from newspapers and magazines, as well as casual conversations with acquaintances, I have no idea of the extent of current bureaucratic oppositions, but because almost everyone who is asked readily admits to knowing of at least one, they are probably rather ubiquitous.

17. Parsons, *op. cit.*

18. Lewis A. Coser, *Continuities in the Study of Social Conflict* (New York: Free Press, 1967) p. 145.

19. H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, "Introduction: The Man and His Work", *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946) p. 56.

20. Stanley Milgram, *Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View* (New York: Harper and Row, 1974); for an excellent critique of this work see Martin Wenglinsky, "Review of Milgram: Obedience to Authority", *Contemporary Sociology: A Journal of Reviews* (November, 1975): 613-17.

21. Peter Blau, *Exchange and Power in Social Life* (New York: John Wiley, 1964).

22. George C. Homans, *Social Behavior* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1961).

23. James V. Downton, Jr., *Rebel Leadership: Commitment and Charisma in the Revolutionary Process* (New York: Free Press, 1973) p. 62.

24. Gamson, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

25. Downton, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

26. Rex D. Hopper, "The Revolutionary Process: A Frame of Reference for the Study of Revolutionary Movements," *Social Forces*, Vol. 28 (1950): 270-79.

27. Eric Hoffer, *The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements* (New York: New American Library, 1951) p. 113.

28. Paul Hare, Edgar F. Borgatta and Robert F. Bales (eds.), *Small Groups: Studies in Social Interaction* (New York: Knopf, 1955).

29. W.J.H. Sprott, *Human Groups* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1958) pp. 153-54.

30. Sprott, *ibid.*, p. 156.

31. For a discussion of the concept of "role exploitation" see Deena Weinstein and Michael Weinstein, *Roles of Man* (Hinsdale: Dryden Press, 1972) pp. 98-99.

32. Lawrence F. Peters and Raymond Hall, *The Peter Principle* (New York: William Morrow, 1969).

33. Weber, *op. cit.*, p. 202.

34. Richard H. Tawney, *The Acquisitive Society* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1920).

35. Mass, *op. cit.*

36. Mostafa Rejai, *The Strategy of Political Revolution* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1973), p. 8.

37. Charles Peters and Taylor Branch, *Blowing the Whistle: Dissent in the Public Interest* (New York: Praeger, 1972) and Ralph Nader, Peter J. Petkas and Kate Blackwell (eds.), *Whistle Blowing: The Report of the Conference on Professional Responsibility* (New York: Grossman Publishers, 1972).

38. See, for example, the works of Lewis Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict* (New York: Free Press, 1954); and Ralf Dahrendorf, *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959).

39. Emile Durkheim, *The Division of Labor in Society* (New York: Free Press, 1947), p. 102.

40. Coser, *Continuities in the Study . . ., op. cit.*, p. 110.

41. For an analysis of the justifications of violence see Kenneth W. Grundy and Michael A. Weinstein, *The Ideologies of Violence* (Columbus: Charles E. Merrill, 1974).

42. Pitirim Sorokin, *The Crisis of Our Age* (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1941).

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DIALECTICAL SENSIBILITY II: TOWARDS A NEW INTELLECTUALITY

Ben Agger

In the preceding article[1], I called for a new concept of radicalism, appropriate to late capitalist society. I returned to Marx's and Marcuse's concept of the advisory role of critical theory in its relation to existing alienation and to efforts to overcome alienation. In this article, I want to develop further the concept of "dialectical sensibility" as it might inform the activity of radical intellectuals.

Instead of submerging theory in the tactics of revolutionary preparation, I will argue for a theory which does not pretend that it is value-neutral in its orientation to the possibility of change. The dialectical sensibility, as I conceive of it, democratizes critical intellectuality as a way of creating social change "from within", countering what Weber so perceptively called bureaucratic "imperative coordination". In this regard I do not wish to imply that changing bourgeois concepts of scholarship is a sufficient form of practice today: we must still produce a theory which explains utopian possibilities contained in the empirical present.

Cognitive Self-Management

The dialectical sensibility begins to live the revolution. In this sense, intellectuals do not "merely talk" but exemplify in their own activities the order of a new society, refusing to be bound and determined by imposed standards of truth and value. What I call cognitive self-management involves the transcendence of ideology and imposed intellectual authority. But cognitive self-management implies more than mere thought; it also changes the very activity of cognition. The radical intellectual portrays dialectical sensibility, demonstrating to the powerless that they need not live forever under the tyranny of self-imposed ignorance and passivity. The radical intellectual begins to live the revolution by becoming *more* than an isolated intellectual, refusing to stay within the confines of the academic role. It is this multi-dimensionality of role-playing that I contend is revolutionary, challenging the very essence of technocratic society which counsels people only to consume (commodities and commands).

It would be hypocritical to preserve the role of the traditional Marxist intellectual while counseling others to destroy the division of labour. The dialectical sensibility must transform itself in the midst of efforts to transform society. Without developing this type of sensibility on the part of radical intellectuals, the notion of cognitive self-management would rest on precarious foundations: everyone but intellectuals would be exhorted to engage in the merging of theory and practice.

Cognitive self-management will take the form of what Marcuse calls "new science" or what I have called "radical empiricism". The idea of a new science is a metaphor which stimulates the imagination, furnishing a workable image of a dedifferentiated, demystified society. In this context, new science is an essential mode of free human activity, practiced for its own sake, without reference to externally imposed purposes. I have developed the notion that cognition can become a form of mental play, reiterating Marcuse's vision that alienated work can be eliminated and thus fundamentally transformed under a different social order. New science is crucial here because it stimulates human beings to take control of cognition in learning that cognition is an activity not reserved for experts.

I do not believe that modern capitalism is moving towards its inexorable collapse. This does not mean, however, that change is impossible or even improbable, for the psychic costs of domination are mounting rapidly, especially as capitalism is increasingly capable of satisfying basic material needs and yet people still go hungry and work at unsatisfying jobs. Marcuse has explicitly suggested that subversive forces are already being produced by capitalist society, albeit in forms which depart from orthodox Marxian models of change. I accept that this trend exists; the question facing critical theory today is how do we recognize and enhance these "ambiguous" forces, as Marcuse has called them.

At this juncture, the concept of a dialectical sensibility, engaging in cognitive self-management, is a reasonable place to carry on the struggle, both theoretical and political. Since the struggle is already happening in multifarious forms — as human beings attempt to overcome alienation in their own lives — this is a place for radical intellectuals to join the process of self-transformation. While this may be a painful and troubled process, I can think of no better way of contributing to social change than to transform the traditional disengagement of the lonely scholar, in the process creating an archetype of dialectical sensibility, engaged in revolutionary self-management.

As radical intellectuals carry out their own critical activity, they will necessarily engage in political education which explicates the possibility of cognitive self-management. Instead of merely revealing the *fact* of domination, political education will instead demonstrate potentials for changing society in feasible and comprehensible ways. In demonstrating these potentials, dialectical sensibilities will draw upon existing examples of rebellion and struggle, refusing to

invent unrealistic, improbable scenarios in acts of sheer projection. Political education will communicate with existing resistance to the present order in attempting to raise its radicalism to a higher, more theoretically coherent level.

The radical intellectual in this way will help to organize on-going efforts to resist the division of labour between expert and non-expert, encouraging revolutionary democracy as the most direct means of creating a new order and avoiding vanguardism. Although the radical intellectual is an "expert" of sorts, he is only too willing to abandon his expertise in the interest of liberating others — perhaps less theoretically and politically articulate — from the tyranny and hegemony of expertise. The radical intellectual is not opposed to specialized knowledge but only to the type of specialized knowledge which, through mystification, becomes politically dominating. Significant social change will only occur, I submit, when human beings become able to articulate reasons for alienation and the systematic possibility of a new social order. The radical intellectual helps to provide the language and theoretical system through which that type of revolutionary comprehension might take place.

At this time, political resistance is fragmented and scattered. This resistance may be organized by providing a model of change through which each — otherwise isolated and therefore impotent — pocket of resistance can be orchestrated. This type of orchestration can avoid the perils of vanguardism by encouraging rebellion and resistance to develop its own self-confidence and political freedom of choice: this is the emancipatory content of the phrase "cognitive self-management".

Freire's pedagogy of the oppressed was designed to raise political consciousness by teaching peasants the rudiments of literacy, giving them a new purchase on heightened self-esteem and thus political efficacy[2]. This can serve as an archetype of the political education which dialectical sensibilities will conduct. Instead of learning to read and write, people in advanced industrial societies will be shown the possibility of becoming "new scientists", free from the yoke of imperative coordination by experts. Indeed, Freire's literacy-techniques are precisely an example of cognitive self-management, revealing to human beings the practical opportunity to control their own intellectual, and implicitly political, destinies.

This type of political education differs from prior forms in that it *relates* human suffering and the resistance which it occasions to the visible, palpable prospect of a qualitatively different society. Instead of merely projecting a new order in speculative fashion, political education will articulate the dialectic between empirically discoverable struggle — no matter how reformist it may appear — and the prospect of creating a new order. The dialectical sensibility recognizes the subjective roots of objective social change: emancipation will not fall from the sky.

The dialectical sensibility does not shun on-going resistance, harbouring a preformed image of an "authentic" revolution. Indeed, the radical intellectual draws his own optimism precisely from that which he studies and assists in the process of self-emancipation. In the hands of Horkheimer and Adorno critical theory regrettably became a form of negative proof, vindicating its own historical pessimism by demonstrating that radicalism does not — and therefore cannot — exist. Instead, radical intellectuals will look to the existence of resistance as confirming their own suspicion that the system can be changed by purposeful, articulate human beings, suggesting that we need not await the millennium or an "automatic" revolution.

Theory becomes the practice of thinking and living the concept of radicalism; a new order cannot be separated from the movement to achieve it. I have said that the dialectical sensibility would become a living theorist, free from guilt about appearing politically inactive in the usual sense. This type of guilt plagued the original critical theorists, pushing them further away from living theory. Adorno wrote in his 1966 work, *Negative Dialectics*: "My thought is driven to [negative dialectics] by its own inevitable insufficiency, by my guilt of what I am thinking." The concept of dialectical sensibility entails a "sufficient" intellectuality, a dialectics which breaks out of the confines of isolated thought without losing the reflective moment. We can overcome critical theory's dichotomous approach to thought and action, reminiscent of philosophical dualism — the same dualism which Hegelian Marxism originally opposed.

Dialectical sensibility will perceive the positive within the negative, domination producing its transcendence: this is the foundation of the radical intellectuality which I am proposing. Horkheimer and Adorno were overwhelmed by the appearance of the negative totality: Adorno, paraphrasing Hegel, wrote that the whole is the untruth, meaning that everything is today equally reified and thus intractable. Even critical thought tends to be degraded into a commodity by market pressures and the cultural star-system. Adorno failed to recognize, however, that human beings do not — in the empirical here and now — always acquiesce in their bondage. Human beings have not surrendered. And it is the task of dialectical sensibility to locate that resistance within a conceptual totality which gives political voice to it, moving beyond its initial isolation and fragmentary quality.

Marx's analytic treatment of the Paris Commune is an example of this kind of intellectuality: he seized upon the Commune as the bell-wether of future world communism, not minimizing its importance merely because it began as an isolated movement. That the Commune failed to realize communism does not vitiate Marx's posture towards it. Opposition forces were stronger than the original communists. Dialectical sensibility must be analytically scrupulous in assessing the political potential of resistance: as often as not it will arrive at a

pessimistic conclusion, discovering that resistance and struggle is purely reformist, auguring no fundamental alternative to the present. However there is a difference between Adorno's pessimism and dialectical sensibility: Adorno could not see the positive penumbra surrounding the shadow of domination. The radical intellectual, by contrast, refuses to see only grey on grey, going beyond the appearance of heteronomy in search of alternatives produced from within the seemingly total darkness of the present.

Contra Orthodoxy

By stressing the initial importance of cognitive liberation we do not ignore more fundamentally material modes of change involving political and economic institutions. I have already redefined cognition as involving the "sensibility"[3] of the person: sensibility combines mental and manual activity. Thus, cognitive liberation goes beyond the traditional concept of disengaged intellectuality, auguring more than a purely cerebral freedom. This blossoming of mental into material liberation is what Marcuse intends when he argues that "social change becomes an individual need."

It may be objected that dialectical sensibility will fail to change the world because it remains isolated in the university or the study. Allegedly, we fail to consider the strategic question of how to produce a world of dialectical sensibilities: we are "idealists".

This type of criticism is a product of mechanistic tendencies in Marxism which dialectical sensibility opposes. Dialectical sensibility acts by thinking about how the division of labour and imperative coordination can be overcome — by thinkers and actors. Questions of strategy can only be answered in the particular contexts of contemporary existence and must not be resolved from above, and the solutions then imposed on mute actors. The point is that the revolution will always fail in its ultimate aims if socialism is imposed; dialectical sensibility *recreates* the revolution in counter-hegemonic institutions and thus heads off the self-perpetuating, self-institutionalizing tendencies of authoritarian socialism. Cognitive self-management guarantees that theoretical vanguardism will not crystallize in a dictatorship *over* the proletariat, as Karl Korsch called it.

Questions of strategy are not immaterial; but neither can they be resolved in the old, orthodox terms. It is not a matter of drawing up new blueprints of society, to be submitted to the "executive committee" of the Left and then automatically carried out.[4] Socialism must be lived in the present, even if it produces deep and unsettling contradictions between "old" bourgeois and "new" socialist existence. Counter-hegemonic institutions are not the end all and be all of critical theory; counter-institutions ultimately wish to become nor-

mal and pervasive in a new society, no longer being oppositional. But in the interim, between domination and freedom, counter-institutions can harbour fragile human beings and also augur a possible future.[5]

To "live the revolution" is deemed impossible by orthodox Marxists for whom change requires the destruction of private property. Since I do not equate exploitation only with private property I have a different vision of the new society. I contend that it is possible to live the revolution in terms of an interpersonal ethics rooted in mutual respect and care for humanity and nature. This type of ethics will not be superimposed on human beings but will *inhere* in their dialectical sensibilities. Orthodox Marxism has ignored ethics because it was concerned more with changing economic structures than with changing human beings: it assumed that humanity would automatically be transformed after private property had been abolished.

Dialectical ethics has a number of features. It involves respect and care for the being of others; it involves a "rationality of gratification", as Marcuse calls it, treating others as sensuous beings; it also involves a new relation between human and nonhuman nature — an ethics which governs our attitudes towards the environment. I submit that these features of ethical praxis are truer to Marx's vision of communism than the economistic notion that communism means only collective ownership of the instruments of production. (I believe that the notion of public ownership is implied in the type of ethics emanating from dialectical sensibility, and does not have to be introduced from the outside.)

A dialectical ethics does not concern only "idealistic" attitudes but is fundamentally materialist in its implications. Human beings are subject-objects who live in and through a sensuous world. Bourgeois concepts of ethics have ignored the sensuous world and man-nature relations, being concerned primarily with rights in the abstract legal sense. An emancipatory ethics goes beyond this conception and develops non-exploitative strategies for coexisting with others and with nature. Thus, an emancipatory ethics takes responsibility for political, economic and ecological as well as strictly "moral" dimensions of human existence, refusing to separate a person's social "fate" and his abstract legal rights and duties.

Orthodox Marxists ridicule the dialectical sensibility because in their own lives they respect the division of labour and the concept of their own specialized authority. They believe that their time is better spent on scholarship than in unifying their own fragmented activities. They fail to recognize that the dialectical sensibility does not abandon thought and theorizing but rather *integrates* thought and theory into the totality of human existence. The orthodox Marxist scholar rationalizes his disengagement by saying that conditions are not ripe for personal liberation; but today social change in a total sense begins with personal liberation. There is a dialectical dependence between human and institu-

tional change. Only by guaranteeing personal change can the authoritarian tendencies of traditional socialism be effectively challenged "from below".

Orthodox Marxists play the roles of traditional scholarship, separating their thought and action, because orthodoxy prescribes and sanctions the dictatorship of the proletariat and thus the concept of revolutionary professionalism. Allegedly, Marx sanctioned the traditional role of the professional scholar, thinking that the revolution would occur automatically and would then go through two distinct stages, with communism only to be reached in the distant future (when intellectuality could become generalized). Orthodoxy in this sense repeats orthodox social relations, trusting in the dualisms of contemporary experience. The orthodox Marxist admits that eventually dualisms will be overcome and new men produced. Yet he postpones that time because otherwise his own authoritative behaviour would lose its sanction.

I submit that the only way to create a new order is to begin with personal existences, creating new sensibilities capable of engaging in cognitive and political self-management. Historical pessimism can be reconciled with dialectical sensibility. Hegel taught that the dialectic reveals the universal in the particular. Today this means that domination must be read in the "fates" of people; and, further, that liberation must be conceived as involving struggling, frustrated human beings, not taking place behind their backs or on a cosmic, transpersonal level. We need not retain Hegel's fatalistic concept of the cunning of reason but can instead rely on his notion of the dialectic. Hegel suggested that the whole is the truth, indicating that the particular cannot survive without echoing the universal. Similarly, the dialectical dependence between personal and societal change cannot be abrogated. When Marxism becomes a living theory, a form of personality, the entire nature of scholarship will change, calling into question deep-seated emotional preferences and habits. The dialectic requires that thought think of itself as an activity, oriented to generating a truly democratic intellectuality as a route to significant social change.

The Dualisms of Oppression

Radical social scientists are engaged in *unifying* activity, uniting activities heretofore conceived as separate. These separations — between work and play, science and commonsense, reflection and action — protect dominant interests by legitimating structures of expertise and imposed authority. Knowledge is produced by experts and consumed by non-experts in advanced industrial society: this is the sense of Lukács' concept of reification as involving the transformation of mental processes and ideas into things, even commodities. Social change will result, I submit, from making non-experts producers as well as consumers.

In challenging certain dualisms, the radical intellectual does not go overboard and reduce everything to subjectivity. The dialectical non-identity between subject and object will be preserved: activity produces objectivity, creating a *continuum* between humanity and the world. The radical intellectual only attacks those dualisms such as oppressor and oppressed which are historical and can be eliminated. The dialectic between subject and object — man and world — is not a dualism and cannot be effaced. Theories which reduce everything to subjectivity gloss over contradictions and tensions in objective reality, pretending that the world can be changed in the mind of the thinking subject. Rather, the subject must interact with the world in transforming its historical character.

While radical intellectuals will engage in unifying activity — making non-experts experts, capable of comprehending and overcoming their own domination — they will preserve the elemental difference between subject and object which motivates social change. It is not enough that non-experts think that they are experts; they must *act* as experts, wresting control of cognitive and political processes from technocrats. In overcoming the dualism between the oppressor and the oppressed (the expert and the non-expert) we do not intend to eliminate the difference between man and the world. The communist person will be destined to an objective body and to space-time. Subjectivity will sustain itself by recognizing its dialectical dependence on the objective world, free — for the first time in human history — to interact with the world in its own chosen ways.

Dialectical dependence between subject and object is eternal. Domination, however, is non-eternal. Dialectical sensibility analyzes the difference between the eternal and the temporary in developing a concept of the *liveable life*, refusing utopia because it attempts to change everything — thus changing nothing.

I have developed the concept of cognitive self-management because I want to emphasize that a new order must be depicted in comprehensible, realistic metaphors. I do not oppose dualism *in toto* but only particular dualisms, such as oppressor-oppressed and expert-non-expert. The shape of the new society can be captured in images which borrow from present concepts: dialectical sensibility allows concepts to point beyond themselves, bringing out their hidden content in new, even unforeseen directions.

Critical theory in the hands of Horkheimer and Adorno has tended to portray the new order as entirely unimaginable by contrast to the present damaged life. I oppose this tendency because I believe it imperative to think through the concept of a new order, utilizing especially the concept of self-management. There will not be a quantum jump between the present and the future, as Engels suggested in his notion of the leap from necessity to freedom. Instead,

people in a new order will still be faced with complex problems of social organization and administration which they must face with seriousness.

Dialectical sensibility *works through* these problems. Damaged life will not automatically produce utopia; it will only produce alternative social forms, none of them ideal. Automatic Marxism has tended to endorse an image of automatic communism. Both concepts are irresponsible, neglecting the necessity of subjective choice and decision.

Experimental Marxism

This is to envisage an experimental Marxism, learning from the experience of creating a new order. Cognition is a vital factor in this process of theoretical self-education. Social existence is so complex as to prevent theorists from planning or predicting every detail of communist life; most of these details will have to be clarified in experimentation with alternative social forms, not foisted upon actors from the beginning. A salient example of experimentation in this sense regards the future of the family. It is difficult to state with certainty which forms of child-raising and adult cohabitation would be appropriate to a self-managed social order. We have insufficient long-term experience with forms like the kibbutz in Israel or the Serbian extended family (the *zadruga*) to project a communist family structure — if there is to be any family at all. Similarly, a psychoanalytically informed Marxism will recognize that the "pain" of personal maturation cannot be avoided under a new order; that mature adult life will require at least a modicum of what Freud called "repression" and "sublimation". As Marcuse stated in a debate with Norman O. Brown, the point is not to eliminate the reality principle but only particular realities such as domination and oppression. An experimental Marxism can determine what the psychological and socio-economic limits of change will be.

Critical theory does not have a purely anticipatory element, awaiting a different *future*. People are already beginning to create a "different" society in their own lives. I have characterized this as unifying heretofore separate activities. Indeed, counter-hegemonic activity today takes the form of redefining the concept and practice of expertise. The world is changing as non-experts become experts, challenging the institutionalized dominance of technocrats and politicians.

The dialectical sensibility lives in the space between today and tomorrow, not entirely a creature of either present or future. The notion of a long road to communism is abandoned because the concept has traditionally legitimated severely hierarchical forms of transition and the institutionalization of the Communist Party. But neither is dialectical sensibility merely a parliamentary socialist sensibility for it lives a different society, refusing to postpone fun-

damental personal changes until that magic moment of parliamentary success. Bolshevik and parliamentary strategies end up changing nothing, eschewing fundamental personal transformation in favour of merely structural modification.

The dialectical sensibility cannot separate social structure from human existence. It interprets Marxian structuralism as an act of revolutionary bad faith. Instead, the dialectical sensibility translates the concept of structure into terms of lived-experience and vice versa, refusing to reduce the complexity of society to either purely objective or purely subjective terms.

Finally, dialectical sensibility is unwilling to delay revolutionary gratification, awaiting "future" liberation to be paid for by present suffering such as organizational discipline and even oppression. The concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat is unnecessary; it trades future benefits against present sacrifices. This sacrificial model of social change is renounced by the dialectical sensibility and in its place a more "self-serving" model of transition is conceived. *Why* must we await the millennium, when everything will allegedly be different, willing to suffer present domination? There is no plausible answer.

Emancipatory theory today confronts the question: how *different* will the future be? Economism and later critical theory both deny the hypothesis that a qualitatively different society may not appear to be entirely different from the present reality. Avoiding the question "how much difference?" will only lead to utopian quagmires in which human beings do nothing to change their own lives in the expectation that real change will only come from above: from the Communist Party or from the cosmic clash of self-contradictory economic structures.

The radical intellectual leans hesitatingly towards the future, recognizing that the preservation of his humanity (albeit "damaged" to some extent) requires that he not renounce suddenly everything he has been and known. How will our lives as individual producers and consumers change under a new order? How can we preserve aspects of present happiness? The critical theorist believes that nothing is worth saving; the orthodox Marxist believes that everything should be changed. The radical intellectual recognizes the truth of each of these positions, orchestrating them in order to produce a feasible strategy of emancipatory living. Emancipatory theory, linking together as it does an experimental Marxism with the principle of cognitive self-management, ultimately begins by reformulating what it means "to begin". In this way, the dialectical sensibility may produce a dialectical social order, a new order beyond the reification which today weighs so heavily upon all of us.

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Notes

1. See my "Dialectical Sensibility I: Critical Theory, Scientism and Empiricism", *Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory*, Vol. 1, No. 1, Winter 1977.

2. See Paulo Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, New York, Seabury Press, 1970. I must add that I do not think that Freire goes far enough towards politicizing his concept of radical pedagogy. He does not carry through his analysis of the dialectic between expert and non-expert to its ultimate conclusion, namely, an image of self-management and revolutionary democracy.

3. On the meaning of "sensibility" in this context, see Herbert Marcuse, *An Essay on Liberation*, Boston, Beacon Press, 1969, especially Chapter 2, "The New Sensibility". Also see Herbert Marcuse, *Counterrevolution and Revolt*, Chapter 2, "Nature and Revolution". "Far from being a mere 'psychological' phenomenon in groups or individuals, the new sensibility is the medium in which social change becomes an individual need, the mediation between the political practice of 'changing the world' and the drive for personal liberation." (p. 59). Marcuse's and my concept of sensibility thus involves a concept of "objective subjectivity", political subjectivity.

4. This alludes to the claim that the state is merely the "executive committee of the bourgeoisie". I want to suggest that authoritarian socialism and authoritarian capitalism are both hierarchical and impose authority from above.

5. Already in North America there are a few counter-hegemonic journals which eschew conventional criteria of academic commodity-production. Among these, *Telos* and *New German Critique* are the most important theoretical organs. However, the creation of counter-hegemonic journals such as these has been far from peaceful. It is very instructive to observe the efforts to introduce European Hegelian Marxism to North America. The recent history of these efforts reveals that counter-hegemonic institutions can quickly become as oppressive and authoritarian as established ones. In North American circles of left-wing scholarship "stars" have emerged, and even a productive work-ethic which resembles the old "publish or perish". In the pages of *Telos* certain of these difficulties have been articulated and debated. Russell Jacoby's recent "A Falling Rate of Intelligence?", in *Telos* No. 27, Spring 1976, pp. 141-146, describes the intrusion of commodity-fetishism into academic production. Also see the dispute between James Schmidt and Martin Jay on the subject of orthodoxy and revisionism, carried out in the context of Schmidt's response to a piece by Jay on Mannheim and the Frankfurt School published in *Telos* No. 20. In *Telos* Nos. 21 and 22, Schmidt and Jay battle it out, attempting to resolve the question of "dialectical loyalty". On this topic, see the dispute between Jay and Jacoby in the pages of *Theory and Society* concerning Jacoby's review in that journal of Jay's history of the Frankfurt School, *The Dialectical Imagination*. (See Jacoby's review of Jay's book in *Theory and Society*, I/2, Summer 1974; also see "Marxism and Critical Theory: Martin Jay and Russell Jacoby", *Theory and Society*, II/2, Summer 1975, pp.257-263.) People like Jay and Jacoby are attempting to prevent the fetishism and academicization of critical theory and the consequent creation of a new academic authority-structure rooted in a star-system. These disputes transcend partisan in-fighting and professional jealousy: they display the kinds of problems inherent in creating effective counter-institutions which do not themselves become controlled by an elite. It is a disturbing irony that certain Marxists are often highly scholastic and intellectually authoritarian, regarding "the tradition" as sacred.

On Metaphysics Lost
A la recherche de métaphysiques perdues

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MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT: STOIC LIBERAL-DEMOCRAT

Patricia Hughes

There has been in recent years a growing concern with the treatment of women in political theory and a growing awareness that we are not, after all, limited to the works of male theorists, that women themselves have indeed made a contribution to political thought. These two developments have been instrumental in renewing interest in Mary Wollstonecraft, for not only was she a (female) political theorist of note among the radicals of eighteenth century England, but also she dealt with the question of the status of women in theory and in society in a revolutionary way.

It is not surprising that most examination of Wollstonecraft's thought has been directed mainly to her discussions about women. She recognised the class status of women and understood that their dual roles as producers and reproducers are not incompatible. These are the significant contributions she has made to the question of the treatment of women in political theory. But her theory is valuable not only for what she did but for what she failed to do; it provides a model for strengths and weaknesses of political theory in its liberal-democratic form. She was less strong, for example, when she assumed a sentimental rather than a political view of women's reproductive role and when she failed to recognise the changes which must occur in society before women can become emancipated rather than merely equal.

This last point relates to more than her analysis of women's rights, for she fails to pursue fully her own recognition of the innate deficiencies of private property in so far as they relate to workers, as well. Thus important though her contribution has been in the area of women's rights, such a limited understanding of her thought has done her a disservice and has restricted the use of her work in our study of political theory generally: for in her political theory, she travels beyond an assessment of women's status to concern with the condition of both women and the poor within the broad framework of the impact of private property rights. My focus in this paper is not to analyse her views about women, but rather to establish her position in the history of political theory.

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I

Crucial to the achievement of equality by women is the recognition that they can successfully integrate the private and public spheres — the relations of reproduction and the relations of production. But if they are to gain emancipation, that is, real freedom, then there must be a transformation of the relations of production, one which will eliminate relations of dominance and subordination for both men and women and which will also permit the integration of the two relations of production and reproduction for women.

It has been commonplace throughout the development of political theory that most theorists have failed to see — or to accept — the importance of either of these two prerequisites for women's emancipation. Generally there has been little analysis of the treatment of women in political theory[1], although there have been various attempts to develop a political theory of women's liberation. What has been done in either respect, however, has tended to ignore or to deny women's dual role, a weakness which is apparent in some of the writings in the areas of the theoretical treatment of women and of women's liberation.

It is worth comparing, for example, two recent contributions to the body of scholarship on Plato, who (as a theorist who ostensibly promoted the equality of women) has encouraged rather more analysis on that question than most other theorists. Christine Allen's "Plato on Women"[2] is philosophical rather than political and that may explain why she fails to treat women in a class context. Arlene Saxonhouse[3], on the other hand, has shown clearly how difficult it was for Plato to reconcile women's full participation in both spheres; as warriors they were expected to deny their sexuality while as philosophers, they were required to deny their political natures (as were also the male philosophers, of course). She also points out that Plato denied the political implications of the role of reproduction, that is, the continuation or preservation of the city.

Kate Millett's examination of John Stuart Mill's contribution to feminist thought[4] failed to take into account Mill's reluctance to allow integration of the two spheres as a normal experience for women: only "exceptional" women should be able to pursue a career and care for a family. Millett also did not seem to realise that Mill advocated that even these "exceptional" women should operate within a capitalist economy and thus would have, at best, a limited and relative freedom.

Shulamith Firestone's *Dialectic of Sex*[5] was one of the more significant and radical contributions to the development of a theory of women's liberation. She clearly recognised the need for dramatic changes in the relations of production but she wished to eliminate the area of reproduction from the female essence. Her reasons make sense: the biological division was the first division of labour and women will never be free until that division is transcended; yet that approach once again, surely, ignores the political implications of reproduction which Saxonhouse discusses briefly in her article on Plato.

Second, it is essential that women writers be taken seriously, that their works be discussed analytically, on their own merit, and not as an extension of their personalities. A classic statement of the "bitch as theorist" perspective is H.O. Pappé's *John Stuart Mill and the Harriet Taylor Myth*[6] which purports to be a defence of Mill's independence from Taylor's influence. Taylor's greater radicalism is blamed on her "masochism", fulfilling Deutsch's view that women who identify with the oppressed are doing so as an expression of opposition to their own role. Wollstonecraft herself has been subject to this type of pseudo-analysis. A reviewer of Claire Tomalin's biography of Wollstonecraft[7] described Wollstonecraft as "silly", "egotistical", "envious", "rancorous", and "meddlesome" and suggested that Tomalin intended to write about "the political radical, the pioneer of women's rights, and the compiler both of travel books and of treatises on the education of girls. But what she has in fact produced is something far more interesting. Mary's claim to public recognition tends to be pushed into the background, and what we read is a fascinating account of a twisted and difficult personality". Wollstonecraft's life *was* "fascinating" but why is it more interesting than her political role and why does her political role have to be diminished by attributing her political views almost entirely to her personality traits?

It is equally wrong to delimit a theorist because we want her to perform a certain function for us, because, in this case, she is useful to the "movement". The usual approach to Wollstonecraft's work, to concentrate primarily on her views on women[8], has delimited her; it is important to see that the positive and negative aspects of her analysis of the position of women ran parallel to her analysis of the position of workers. Her theory shows us the consequence of not fully understanding the oppressed status of these groups.

II

Wollstonecraft's attempt to treat in parallel terms the two relations existing between private property and the condition of the poor and between private property and the condition of women as a distinct class is the source of much that is exciting in Wollstonecraft's work; yet it also lays the grounds for that which is ultimately disappointing. A theoretical framework which associates *both* these major forms of oppression with private property has radical potential; yet Wollstonecraft failed to flesh the radical skeleton with equally radical content.

Her failure to achieve a full synthesis of these two relations can be blamed in part on an event which occurred just because she was a woman: her death in childbirth left her theory forever in its formative stages. Yet we must look elsewhere for the major reason and that is to the theory itself: Wollstonecraft

was reluctant to depart sufficiently from the conventional view of property rights to ensure the transformation of society which she desired, in this she was foremost a liberal-democrat.

A brief examination of the more prominent and relevant of Wollstonecraft's works shows that while the tone and sophistication of her efforts may have changed over time, the political content followed a consistent pattern. She criticised the society, placed the blame for society's ills on private property, but then proposed only half-way remedies; she believed servants and workers to be treated deplorably but also believed them to be inferior and could not seem to conceive of a world in which no one was either servant or "mechanic"; she passionately condemned the futility of most women's lives — their oppression because of their sex — and called for all the opportunities of life to be opened to them, yet glorified motherhood to the extreme and in the end failed to bridge the gap between the economic classes.

Her views on women were, of course, most elaborately discussed in *Vindication of the Rights of Women* which appeared in 1792 and which is as passionate as it is analytically accurate. Yet her *Thoughts on the Education of Daughters: with Reflections on Female Conduct, in the more Important Duties of Life* (that is, those duties which relate to the woman's roles as wife and mother), her earliest book, published in 1787, very much foreshadowed *The Vindication of the Rights of Woman* in its stress on the woman's role and on the need for education for women.

Her censure of property is mainly to be found in her *Vindication of the Rights of Men* which was published in 1790 and in her *Letters written during a short residence in Sweden, Norway, and Denmark*, published two years later. Although the *Vindication of the Rights of Men* was a highly political tract while the *Letters* was more a literary work, the two works share much in common: her dislike of inherited property and her proposals for remedy involving small farms under the supervision of a paternal steward occur in both. It is important to remember that the *Vindication* was a response to Edmund Burke's *Reflections on the Revolution in France*; thus although Wollstonecraft was concerned about making a universal statement about liberty and its suppression because of property, she was also dealing with a specific situation, justifying a specific revolution. This fact helps to explain her predominant emphasis on landed property and hereditary honours; but this is not to say that she ignored the emerging capitalist economy: she berated that system also for its lack of humanity and for the ills to which it had subjected the world as she knew it. This is evident, for example, both in her novel *Maria, or the Wrongs of Women*, published after her death, in which she condemned industrial society, and in the *Letters*, where she was highly critical of commerce. Furthermore, her ambiguous views on servants were much the same in the *Letters* of 1792 as they had been in *Thoughts on the Education of Daughters* in 1787.

There is no gradual development towards a more progressive theory apparent in her works, but there is a *promise* in the theory she initially developed. Yet a significant element intervened to bend the flow of that initial development, an element which took the form of her use of the concepts "natural liberty" and "natural equality".

The intent of this article, then, is to defend the view that Wollstonecraft was a Stoic liberal-democrat through an analysis of the interaction among the variables most significant to her work: equality, liberty, reason and virtue, as they relate to workers and women.

Very clearly Wollstonecraft must be considered a liberal-democrat. She did not view the injustices connected with private property as unfortunate problems about which nothing could be done and which must be seen as merely a cost of the system of private property; rather, she shared the quandry of all liberal-democratic thinkers: she quite clearly saw the unequal distribution of resources among the members of society and made claims for rectifying that situation, but did not seem able to bring herself to carry that awareness through to a recognition of the necessary means of remedy. Her sympathies may have been for the servant "girl" and her condemnation reserved for the middle class woman; nevertheless, the force of her demand that women take their rightful position as equal members of society was severely diminished by the fact that within her scheme for reform, the servant remained servant and the mistress remained mistress. But Wollstonecraft cannot be explained simply by saying that she was a liberal-democrat. Her Stoic leanings must also be considered; her devotion to natural equality and liberty reduced the need, within her own framework, for her to resolve the conflict apparently inherent in liberal-democratic thought between commitments to both equality and private property.

III

Wollstonecraft's use of the concepts of liberty and equality echoed a tradition of a natural liberty and a natural equality not requiring completion by civil counterparts which began in late classical thought.

The Stoics argued for a natural equality, rejecting the notion of a "slave nature", so much a part of Aristotle's thought, and postulating that in basic terms there was no difference between the slave and the freeman, the noble and the commoner. This view provided the basis for the belief that all people should be equal before the law which slowly began to emerge during this period.

Such a postulate was perhaps an inevitable consequence of what Sabine has described as "a self-consciousness, a sense of personal privacy and internality",[9] paradoxically combined with a greater sense of belonging to the human

race, of universality. The Stoics argued that Virtue consisted in agreement with nature, an agreement of the internal aspects of a human being with the end for which human beings were intended: the exercise of reason.

This view of the importance of reason was an articulation of the difference between human beings and other animals: human beings were capable of reason while animals were not. In this sense, all human beings were considered to be more alike than dissimilar. This view, arising out of Stoic thought, permeated political theory and practice for centuries.

Internal liberty (or control) was thus highly prized, with the corresponding development that the effect of external factors was minimised: one could be put to death but one could die nobly, that is, rationally. The Stoics' argument that true liberty lay within, that right attitudes would render the effects of external pressures and dangers null, diminished the importance of worldly problems and civil inequality and in so doing removed the need for considering attempts to remedy civil inequality (even if such ineqalities were recognised as undesirable). But it did suggest that in a world city (fully expected by the Stoics), citizenship would be open to all, since citizenship depended on the exercise of reason. And reason was the foundation of this natural equality and liberty.

The Romans responded in practical terms to these theoretical assumptions by instituting world-wide Roman citizenship and by employing such assumptions as a justification for the Imperial government of the Roman Empire. There was, however, no commitment to any kind of political or economic equality; all people were subject to the same law — but this was a law which distributed rights and demanded fulfillment of duties according to one's station in life.

The later liberals began to question even the extent to which everyone enjoyed the ability to reason, making it clear that there was no inconsistency between assuming that all human beings could — by definition — reason and the fact that all people did not enjoy the same social and economic benefits.

Thomas Aquinas and John Locke agreed that "human being" was defined by reference to reason but they also agreed that differences in the capacity to reason or in the exercise of that capacity warranted elite rule. For Aquinas, this was in conformity to nature; it made sense that the most intelligent should rule. Locke associated the capacity to reason with property ownership and attributed the condition of the poor and of women to innate deficiencies in the reasoning ability.[10]

It remained to the liberal-democrats (the Diggers being perhaps the earliest and most radical example) to begin questioning this association between the exercise of reason and the ownership of property, at least for the poor and/or workers. Vividly denouncing civil inequality in all its forms, in a sense they turned Locke's argument around: civil inequality was not a proper consequence of varying rationality as manifested in private property ownership; rather

private property ownership led to inequality. But when these liberal-democrats had finally to consider the solution to this unjust situation, they withdrew somewhat from their condemnation of private property. Their solutions involved various forms of control on private property, perhaps some redistribution or some reduction in amounts of property required for participation in the state, certainly some changes in the way the institution operates — but never its abolition.[11]

Wollstonecraft's interpretation of the concepts of liberty and equality was closely associated with reason, also. It was the capacity to reason, which all people shared, which differentiated human beings from the "brutes" and enabled them to improve themselves and their condition.[12] At this basic level, all people were equal. No one could properly treat another person as a non-equal in this metaphysical or natural sense: she asserted that a person "who can see a fellow-creature humbled before him" "has lost his heart of flesh", for both persons have "the same infirmities". Individuals engaged in relations of inequality are "radically degraded by the habits of their life":[13] indeed, "man [and woman] is always debased by servitude, of any description:..."[14] Thus all people share their status as human beings with all the frailties and benefits deriving from that status.

In particular, people were equally entitled to liberty, to rights which they "inherit at their birth, as rational creatures".[15] Resulting "from the eternal foundation of right — from immutable truth . . . ", the rights constituting liberty could be overridden by earthly doctrines: civil law could not make people less entitled — in God's eyes — to liberty. Although Wollstonecraft termed this liberty "civil" and "religious", it seems evident that a more appropriate label would be "internal" or "natural" liberty, similar to that natural equality she referred to in the comments cited above. Yet although all people were entitled to natural liberty, they did not automatically possess it, for while reason did indeed lead to liberty, it did not lead *necessarily* to liberty; reason had to be activated through the medium of labour, through the quality of one's labour — through the attainment of Virtue.[16] Virtue derived from doing one's job — whatever it was — well; and liberty was not possible without virtue. Thus we have a sequence of reason leading to liberty through the medium of virtue: a sequence of means to ends equally available to all.

Again, however, this was equal liberty of a special kind: the Stoic inner freedom which all can enjoy regardless of external conditions. Neither natural equality nor natural freedom necessitated an equal political or economic liberty and Wollstonecraft did not really claim either of these kinds of freedoms for all strata in society. In fact, the notion that "God" considered all people equally provided a fine rationale for condoning or at least diminishing the effects of worldly inequalities.

Simply, it is not clear when Wollstonecraft meant natural liberty or natural

equality or when she actually was referring to, for example, economic equality. When she claimed that everyone was entitled to liberty, what kind of liberty did she mean: an inner freedom arising out of self-control or a freedom which came from not being dominated by the owners of property? This is the crux of the difficulty. Consequently, her natural versions of the two concepts tended to veil the significance of the civil inequality and lack of civil liberty; they permitted her to rationalise the most salient ramifications of the lack of political, economic, and social equality and liberty, a lack of which she was certainly well aware.

Thus two schools of political theory blend in the theory of Mary Wollstonecraft: she is, we may say, a Stoic liberal-democrat. Her "deviance" from this tradition is, of course, the important place women assumed in her work, a place almost totally lacking in previous analyses: but in a sense that is all her analysis of women remains — a deviance — for in the end, she held true to the tradition, and in so doing, failed to bring either women or workers to their rightful position.

IV

Wollstonecraft knew that various classes and the two sexes enjoyed different degrees of political and economic freedom and that the amount of freedom one enjoyed was related to the amount of property one possessed.

She perceived and deplored the wretchedness of the lives of the mechanic and servant, the lack of economic equality. The poor were the real victims of the property ethic which pervaded society, for they had to contend with unemployment and misfortunes which were "not to be warded off". The evils which she saw around her, she said, are "more gigantic than any of the infringements of property".[17]

The only property workers had — the ability to labour (the mechanic's "property is in his nervous arms") — was subject to the command of the rich. The necessity of the workers to alienate their ability to labour meant that they also had to give up their liberty. Here Wollstonecraft drew an insightful connection between property and liberty: control over one's property, at least of one's labour power, is a requisite of liberty *in the economic sense*.

The workers were also unequal socially, and this inequality Wollstonecraft did not seem to find unacceptable. She cautioned children not to show "cruelty to . . . inferiors" and to exhibit "condescension to inferiors";[18] there were, then, some people (servants, for example) who were not viewed as equal to other members of society (their employers, for instance): they were so clearly unequal that even children knew who they were. This could only mean that there was a generally recognised and accepted social inequality.

The source of these civil inequalities and the lack of civil liberty was to be found in property. The "demon of property" had prevented the full development of liberty and had distorted it to mean the protection of property. The following passage vividly illustrates Wollstonecraft's belief that most injustice in her society arose out of the existence of private property and hereditary rank:

> From the respect paid to property flow, as from a poisoned fountain, most of the evils and vices which render this world such a dreary scene to the contemplative mind . . . .
>
> One class presses on another: for all are aiming to procure respect on account of their property: and property, once gained, will procure the respect due only to talents and virtue . . . .
>
> [W]hat but habitual idleness can hereditary wealth and titles produce? For man is so constituted that he can only attain a proper use of his faculties by exercising them, and will not exercise them unless necessity of some kind first set the wheels in motion.[19]

Both classes were corrupted because "respectability is not attached to the discharge of the relative duties of life, but to the station": that is, it was status or position, not the quality of labour as it ought to have been that determined the worth of an individual.

Women had difficulties related to property which were peculiar to them. Regardless of class, they possessed no property rights: the men with whom they were associated were assumed to be the possessors of any fortune which may have come to the women and they could employ any means to obtain it. Because they did not own property, in disputes with their husbands, women were always in the wrong. Even more significant is the fact that women were actually as much men's property as were their animals, and just as men could treat their property in land or animals as they pleased, so could they treat their wives.[20] Furthermore, women were given homage just because they were women, deterring them from their roles as mothers and "useful members of society".[21]

V

It is surely not unreasonable to expect that Wollstonecraft's condemnation of private property's consequences would have led her to recommend abolition of private property and of wage labour. Yet the proposals she made did not

tend in this direction. Her recommendations for bettering the conditions of servants were designed to achieve her ideal of a benevolent, almost parental, relation between employers and servants. The employer, she believed, had a trust in regard to his servants and, although the servant's lack of education precluded equality (meaning, in this case, social equality), he should treat them with kindness: "how pleasing it is," she suggested, "to be consulted when they are at a loss, and looked up to as a friend and benefactor when they are in distress."[22]

The law of nature would have been better served by having farms scattered throughout the great estates and then "instead of the poor being subject to the griping hand of an avaricious steward, they would be watched over with fatherly solicitude, by the man whose duty and pleasure it was to guard their happiness.[23]

She favoured a redistribution of property (which she defined as the ownership of the fruits of one's own labour and the right of bequest), the breaking up of large accumulated estates into small farms. Property, she argued, should be "fluctuating", that is, divided more equally among the children (of those who have property) in order to prevent ever-increasing accumulation.[24]

Wollstonecraft was prepared, then, to restrict private property but not to abolish it, preferring instead a system of small but private agrarian holdings. Liberty was not to be found in all people's sharing property but rather in each owning a small amount. This would have helped to prevent the overaccumulation by the rich which had led to the constriction of liberty and equality.

But what about wage labour? Wollstonecraft had argued that as long as the workers had to give up their labour power, they gave up their (economic) liberty. Despite her own contention, she did not propose the abolition of the servant class (as a single woman writer with a child in the eighteenth century, such a proposal would have represented a remarkable transcendence of her own condition) or of a wage class generally.

Wage labour, then, would continue to exist. Thus it is necessary to discover to what extent membership in the wage class would be likely to be permanent: was it possible for people to "climb out" of that class? Social mobility requires, in part, equal access to the educational system. To some extent, Wollstonecraft did advocate equal education for both classes and sexes; however, she proposed that at the age of nine, those children "intended for domestic employments, or mechanical trades" should be sent to the appropriate schools where the two sexes would be separated in the afternoons; the children of "superior abilities, or fortune" would be taught other subjects, boys and girls together.[25] It is significant that before the age of nine, students of "all classes" studied together; after that age, we have to assume that the classes would have been separated. Nevertheless, there is still the implication that class would not have had a part to play in this division (ability is stated as a criterion determining the

kind of education a child would have); presumably, on the other hand, those children of superior *fortune* would not have had to possess superior abilities to attend the second type of school. There was also no guarantee that steps would be taken to ensure that any latent ability in children of workers be developed.

Even if we accept — for the sake of argument, for obviously Wollstonecraft qualified equal education both in terms of sex and class — the position that her comments did intimate that she did not view the class structure as static, that she did not expect that servants' children would necessarily have been servants or that the children of the wealthy would have remained wealthy, the fundamental question remains: is it really sufficient that the membership in the classes changes if the classes themselves remain?

VI

When we examine Wollstonecraft's thought, we find that she considered property to be undesirable because it made people act in nasty ways; it had bad effects on the family; "benevolence, friendship, generosity, and all those endearing charities which bind human hearts together . . . are crushed by the iron hand of property".[26]

This state of affairs bothered her more than the innate subordinate-dominant nature of the wage relation. We must ask, therefore, how serious Wollstonecraft thought the civil inequalities really were — did they matter if "friendly" relations could exist between economic unequals who were in another sense natural equals? In fact, her main concern seemed to be to establish a society in which people were nicer to each other; just how one would have exhibited this "niceness" seemed to depend on one's station in life. It would seem that she believed that the distribution of natural equality and liberty — for her, the more important forms of the two concepts — was virtually in direct contrast to the distribution of civil equality and liberty. For despite some ambiguity, we can conclude that she did believe that workers and women were able to reason and thus enjoy natural equality and that if they did their jobs well, could attain virtue and natural liberty, while people who owned property may have enjoyed natural equality — and economic, political, and social superiority — but not necessarily natural liberty.

It is true that she described servants as mean, vulgar, and cunning, as well as ignorant and thus provided possible substantiation for civil inequality. It is perhaps more profitable, however, to examine the issue of the relation between reason and independence, an independence that we can relate to internal or natural liberty.

She asserted that the degree to which one exercised reason determined the extent of one's independence; presumably, then, people who did not exert reason, whatever the cause, were dependent on others: but was this the only reason for dependence? In other words, did she assert a necessary relation between dependence and an inability to exercise the capacity to reason?

Women and workers (servants and mechanics) were all dependent on someone. Were they dependent because they were unable to reason, because they lacked the opportunity to reason, or for some quite distinct cause? Wollstonecraft would have answered that women were reasonable creatures and that their apparent failure to exercise reason was a consequence of environmental rather than biological factors. As for servants, she stated explicitly that they "act from the dictates of reason, and [their] understandings are arrived at some degree of maturity".[27]

Women and workers could exercise reason; they enjoyed natural equality. The next step was the attainment of virtue. The workers did have one advantage; they were already engaged in labour, the only means by which potential reason could become actual reason and virtue. As for women, she recommended that they be free to engage in employment. She suggested that women become doctors and midwives as well as nurses; they might "study politics" and "enter business of various kinds".[28] There was more "virtue" in poor women (who had the opportunity to exhibit excellence in their work) who had to maintain their families than in "gentlewomen" who were more concerned with their dress and other frivolous pursuits.

From the opposite perspective, "vulgar" was a term she used to describe not only the working class who had insufficient time "to cultivate their minds" but also "those who, born in the lap of affluence, have never had their invention sharpened by necessity".[29] The problem was that people were unlikely to labour unless they were forced to do so by need. This principle lay at the base of Wollstonecraft's aversion to wealth, for the rich, not needing — and, therefore, not desiring — to labour, could not attain virtue or, of course, liberty in the natural sense.

What all this means is that class was irrelevant for Wollstonecraft in relation to natural liberty and equality. Everyone possessed natural equality because they all — property-owners, the poor, and women — had the capacity to reason. Not all people possessed natural liberty, however; this was not because of class as much as it was a consequence of personality or of conditions which could be remedied without *fundamental* changes in the class structure. Women needed only to be given the opportunity and the rich needed only to exert themselves more, spurred on by a *reduction* of their riches and the abolition of hereditary honours. The essence of the wage relation was quite compatible with the extension of natural liberty.

VII

We are confronted in Wollstonecraft's work by condescension mixed with pleas for recognition of equality among all members of society. The confusion in her work can be disentangled if we conclude that her primary notions of equality and liberty owed more to natural influences than to political and that this enabled her to accept a class-divided society as long as it was recognised that all members of all classes are equally members of the human race. "Good" servants were equal to "good" employers and all those who were virtuous could rejoice in an internal freedom which was quite independent of economic or social liberty and equality. In taking this position, Wollstonecraft obscured the fact that one person is a servant — subservient through necessity — and the other is an employer — dominant through choice. The changes she proposed for women[30] would simply bring them full membership in this kind of relation. Wollstonecraft was, indeed, arguing for a "better" society, but it is still one in which some people must submit to others for their mere existence.

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Notes

1. A listing of courses on women or sex roles illustrates this point. One such listing includes none on political theory and only one on "Women and the Political Economy": it includes only references to socialist theory in a course on "Sexual Division of Labour in Industrial Society": *Canadian Newsletter of Research on Women*, vol. v (February 1976), pp. 55-75.

2. Allen, Christine Garside, "Plato on Women", in *Feminist Studies*, vol. 2 (1975), pp. 131-38.

3. Saxonhouse, Arlene W., "The Philosopher and the Female in the Political Thought of Plato" in *Political Theory*, vol. 4 (May 1976), pp. 195-212.

4. Millett, Kate, *Sexual Politics* (New York: Avon, 1970), esp. 88-108.

5. Firestone, Shulamith, *The Dialectic of Sex* (New York: Bantam, 1972), especially her "Conclusion".

6. Pappé, H.O., *John Stuart Mill and the Harriet Taylor Myth* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1960), esp. pp. 25-29. Cf., however, Gertrude Himmelfarb's "Introduction" to *Essays on Politics and Culture: John Stuart Mill* (Gloucester, Mass: Peter Smith, 1973); she comments negatively on Taylor's character but does not connect her theory with that character.

7. Cobb, Richard, "Claire Tomalin: *The Life and Death of Mary Wollstonecraft*", in the *Times Literary Supplement* (September 1974), pp. 441-44.

8. See Todd, Janet M., "The Biographies of Mary Wollstonecraft", in *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society*, vol. 1 (Spring 1976), pp. 721-34.

9. Sabine, George H. and Thomas L. Thorson. *A History of Political Theory*, 4th ed. (Hinsdale, Illinois: Dryden Press, 1973), p. 142.

10. On Aquinas, see d'Entreves, A.P., ed. *Aquinas: Selected Political Writings* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1965), p. 3 and p. 101 and on Locke, see Laslett, Peter, ed., *Two Treatises on Government* (London: The New English Library, 195), *Second Treatise*, sect. 61; W. von Leyden, ed. *Essays on the Law of Nature* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1958), Essay I, p. 115; "The Reasonableness of Christianity, as Delivered in the Scriptures", in Cranston, Maurice, ed. *Locke on Politics, Religion, and Education* (New York: Collier Books, 1965), p. 122 and p. 231.

11. See, for example, T.H. Green, Lectures on the *Principles of Political Obligation* (London: Longman's Green and Co., 1931), p. 218 and pp. 224-5; and J.S. Mill, *Principles of Political Economy* in Robson, J.M., ed. *Collected Works of John Stuart Mill*, vol. II (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1967), esp. Bk. II.

12. Wollstonecraft, Mary. *A Vindication of the Rights of Men* (Gainesville, Florida: Scholars' Facsimiles and Reprints, 1960 [1790]), p. 71 and p. 96.

13. *Ibid*, p. 156 and p. 149.

14. Wollstonecraft, Mary. *Letters written during a short residence in Sweden, Norway and Denmark* (London: J. Johnson, 1796), p. 176.

15. Wollstonecraft, Mary. *Rights of Men*, p. 8 and p. 22.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 29 and pp. 103-105.

17. *Ibid.*, pp. 152-153; also see *Posthumous Works of the Author of a Vindication of the Rights of Woman*, vol. I (Clifton: Augustus M. Kelley, 1972 [1798]), pp. 40-43; pp. 46-67 and pp. 78-127: here Wollstonecraft uses Jemima, a servant in a private madhouse to dramatise the double bind of women — as servants and as women.

18. Wollstonecraft, Mary. *Thoughts on the Education of Daughters: with Reflections on Female Conduct in the more important Duties of Life* (Clifton: Augustus M. Kelley, 1972 [1787]), p. 15 and p. 21.

19. Wollstonecraft, Mary. *A Vindication of the Rights of Woman* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1967 [1792]), p. 212 and p. 217. Wollstonecraft includes overenthusiastic commercial enterprises in her censure of wealth generally; she assails commerce as being against the "most sacred principles of humanity and rectitude: and she warns that while "England and America owe their liberty to commerce, which created a new species of power to undermine the feudal system", they must be aware of the consequences; the tyranny of wealth is still more galling and debasing than that of rank". (*Letters*, p. 157 and p. 170).

20. Wollstonecraft, *Posthumous Works*, pp. 40-47.

21. Wollstonecraft, *Rights of Men*, p. 54. This is, of course, a problem faced only by middle and upper class women; the woman in the working class was not allowed to sit on the pedestal — she would be too busy cleaning it.

22. Wollstonecraft, *Thoughts on the Education of Daughters*, p. 123 and p. 120.

23. Wollstonecraft, *Rights of Men*, p. 145.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 50, also see *Letters*, pp. 75-76 where she describes what she sees as the beneficial effects of small farms in Norway. The right of bequest, one of the elements of private proper-

ty, provides a means to the accumulation of property other than that derived from one's own labour; necessitating the receipt of the bequest, it can easily lead to the idleness Wollstonecraft deplores. Her reaction to this problem is to propose some limitation on the freedom of bequest (but not to eliminate it — to do so would also mean the end of private property) and redistributing large estates, as she suggests here, would aid in achieving this end.

25. Wollstonecraft, *Rights of Woman*, pp. 25-51.

26. Wollstonecraft, *Rights of Men*, p. 50 and p. 52.

27. Wollstonecraft, Mary, *Original Stories* (London: Henry Frowde, 1906), p. 51.

28. Wollstonecraft, *Rights of Woman*, p. 126 and pp. 221-22.

29. Wollstonecraft, *Rights of Men*, p. 28.

30. As already mentioned, she advocates greater access to education (to make women better mothers and better companions for their husbands since they will be able to be more independent) and increased occupational opportunities; in addition, she indicated a desire to extend the suffrage to women: although critical of the electoral process because of its excesses and the fact that it is a formality and not a real exercise of choice (*Rights of Men*, pp. 84-85), she nevertheless advances the notion that women ought to have representatives — I take this to mean the suffrage (*Rights of Women*, pp. 220-21) (this passage may also be *liberally* interpreted to mean that suffrage should also be granted to the workers).

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DEMOCRATIC POLITICS AND IDEOLOGY: R.G. COLLINGWOOD'S ANALYSIS OF METAPHYSICS IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND MORAL CIVILIZATION

Maurice M. Eisenstein

The necessity for grounding both knowledge and political action brings us to the examination of metaphysics. This requirement arises because without it there is no process of validation for knowledge and action and without validation there is not a basis, within philosophy, for certainty in knowledge, leading to a lack of comprehension of action except for *ex post facto* 'rationalizations'. The significance of knowledge and action is that they are attributes of practical activity, the knowing and the doing. Although metaphysics is certainly important for academic debates, its actual influence is in terms of consequences in social and political relationships, that is, in practical activity.

The problem of achieving certainty in knowledge involves the nature of reality and our awareness of it. Certainty about the nature of reality demands some form of universality in an individuated world. Certainty also follows from the need for a universal or consistent basis for specialized knowledge derived from each of the specific sciences. The claim made, especially during the early part of this century, that in actuality physics gives a foundation only makes physics into a metaphysics. Making physics the ground of reality does not resolve the metaphysical question about the nature of reality; it is only one possible answer to that question and an imperfect one at that, as will be shown later.

This demand for metaphysics is an attempt to resolve inconsistencies in man's knowledge and commitments: idea and matter, science and faith, the particular and the universal. It should be made clear that none of these inconsistencies has prevented action; but for the thinker, for the inquirer, each has prevented certainty. That is, awareness, through sophistication, of the metaphysical problem is what has made certainty difficult. For the individual unaware of the metaphysical problem ultimate uncertainty is not a problem. His certainty is a given, an unquestioned commitment.

This leads us to look at the metaphysical problem in political action involving the nature of ideology and the certainty of moral commitments. The attempt to ground moral commitments has always involved some metaphysical commitment, whether to theology, human nature, or to natural law.

Metaphysics has been the attempt to base moral commitments on some universality which can only depend on some consistent idea of the nature of reality. Ideology uncovers the problem of exclusivity of metaphysics. The religious fervor of ideologies, including experimental sciences, has involved their absolute certainty derived from a unique metaphysics. The violent disagreements of ideologies are derived not solely from conflict over values, but primarily from a conflict over the nature of reality. The central issue in the relationship between metaphysics and ideology is one of freedom. If there is a specifically definable nature to reality, if this nature requires a particular moral, epistemological and political commitment, and finally if these commitments are mutually exclusive by their very nature because they are derived from a mutually exclusive nature of reality, then the only meaningful freedom possible is freedom of taste. Is it possible to have freedom and metaphysics? Either it is possible to have freedom within a context of metaphysics or all freedom becomes an illusion. From a political perspective, the problem is how social relationships can be arranged to allow for diverse metaphysics. This is the essential dilemma of politics and freedom, not of particular ideologies, such as Marxism, conservatism or socialism, but of politics itself and freedom.

Philosophy has, from Aristotle on, continuously searched for a fundamental ground for knowledge and action, and their results, truth and certainty. This is what Aristotle called 'the First Science', a point of departure which is also the ultimate ending point. In terms of its other branches — epistemology, ethics, ontology and aesthetics — even philosophy itself views metaphysics as its own fundamental ground.

The idea of 'First Science' results from a notion of absolute priority for metaphysics. This priority is of a two-fold nature. The first is a logical priority. " 'First Science' is the science whose subject matter is logically prior to that of every other, the science which is logically presupposed by all other sciences."[1] All science, that is all knowledge must presuppose the subject of metaphysics although the actual study of metaphysics, historically, will occur after the development of a particular science.

The second aspect of the priority is the subject matter of metaphysics. Its priority not only involves form but also content. Although this is not an absolute distinction, it is significant especially as it applies to ideology. The subject matter of metaphysics is the absolute nature of reality, the nature of nature. The subject matter is what sets the parameters for the remainder of the philosophic or scientific system. It is not only logically prior but also its content restricts the possible subject of the rest of the system. It serves as an analogue of the economic system in Marx's ideology.

This priority of metaphysics is also applicable to ideologies. The traditional conflict of ideologies has presumed a disagreement about fundamentals. Fundamentals are ultimately grounded in metaphysics. The harsh contradiction

between ideologies is based on complete disagreement about the possible ground for having politics; not on the concluding values which are the result of the fundamentals. Disagreement about values and strategies frequently occur within the same political party, having a unified fundamental ideology, and also within the same political structure where fundamentals are accented. But, none of these lead to the severe conflict of ideology which results in the total breakdown of civil interaction. This only results from the disagreement about the basic fundamental ground for an ideology.

The logical priority of metaphysics in ideology derives from the fact that the categories of the fundamental ground are viewed as being mutually exclusive. The fundamentals of ideologies seem to be completely incompatible with each other. These metaphysical grounds, as philosophical categories, presume the exclusion of each other. Materialism as a metaphysical ground for the nature of reality, or for that matter realism, logically exclude the possibility of a metaphysical perspective derived from idealism. A Marxist dialectical economic perspective would logically exclude the possibility of atomistic individualism. In an ideological system of action, the place where one ideological perspective logically, i.e. absolutely, excludes another perspective is the fundamental ground of its metaphysics.

The resulting particulars of an ideological system, derived from its metaphysical ground, are not necessarily mutually exclusive and *may* lead to great areas of agreement and cooperation with other systems. Such resulting values as peace, cooperation and material wealth, can be areas of agreement for a period of time between ideologies. Nonetheless, their fundamental disagreement continues and must by the logic of metaphysics arise at another time. This is the consequence of the fact that values, as epiphenomena of fundamental structures, are not separate from those structures. This is why there can be some common goals between two ideologies which are nevertheless mutually incompatible in their basic structure.

The difficulty in taking metaphysics seriously has been the requirement that it be viewed necessarily as non-historical if it is to fulfil its function as the fundamental ground for a philosophy or for ideologies. The fundamental ground must become that which does not vary with history. History is movement and change; the fundamental ground, metaphysics, is the security which underlies the change and gives it unity. Although often acknowledged, this feature has not been emphasized as an aspect of, for example, Marxism, the metaphysics of which is non-historical. Marx was essentially ahistorical. Although his focus was on history and change, he, like Hegel, wanted to develop a system which would not change with time and historical development. In this he succeeded. His dialectical materialism and economic determinism are made the underlying, non-historical, form and content of human reality. It is significant to recognize that although Marx made history important, he was not an historian or in-

volved with the sociology of knowledge; rather, he was a metaphysician in the tradition of attempting to achieve a fundamental, non-historical ground for the continuously changing lived-reality.

Heidegger recognized this conflict between history and metaphysics in his examination of a fundamental ontology or the ground of metaphysics.[2] The idea of either a fundamental or ground for something is language which used to be reserved for metaphysics. Heidegger recognized that what gives rise to metaphysics is historical. That is, the particular questions which arise and their solutions are brought forth and only have value in particular historical contexts. To resolve the problem of what is fundamental if all is changing, Heidegger developed a system of fundamental ontology which is based on the lived experience of what brings the metaphysical inquiry about. If metaphysics must change historically, then what brings metaphysics about must be the fundamental consistent ground. This is the reason why Heidegger comes close to generating a universal non-historical human nature, the phenomena of human existence. Either human existence fundamentally varies individually and culturally or it becomes a form of fundamental universal human nature. Although Heidegger recognized the problem of metaphysics and history, he could not resolve this problem; his fundamental ontology remained ahistorical.

A contemporary thinker who has involved himself with the problem of metaphysics and history is R.G. Collingwood who E.H. Carr characterized as "the only British thinker in the present century who has made a serious contribution to the philosophy of history."[3] This is Collingwood's essential significance. Although he was concerned with the central issues of philosophy, essentially metaphysics for our purposes, he was a trained and practicing historian. Being an historian, he recognized the fact that although history was a topic of inquiry for philosophy, it was also in direct contradiction to many of philosophy's cherished tenets, especially to any idea of universal philosophical knowledge or Truth, and to any attempt to gain a fundamental ground for reality. On the other hand, he recognized, like Heidegger, that there must be some underlying consistent reason for the continuous attempt to achieve such truth through all historical periods in the West. Collingwood's central project or goal was to develop a process of metaphysical inquiry which would be consistent both with the traditional notion of metaphysics and with the contemporary ideas of history, particularly with regard to the sociology of knowledge.

Collingwood was part of a movement in twentieth century philosophy which attempted to transcend the dilemma between continental idealism and the British reaction to it by, for example, Bertrand Russell and A.J. Ayer.[4] He viewed his philosophy as a movement beyond the historicism of continental idealism and the scientific empiricism of British positivism and analytic philosophy. Although Collingwood was opposed to both, he saw what was the intrinsic significance of each which gave rise to their development. European

historical skepticism presented the epistemological problem for philosophy. That is, how is it possible for philosophy to step out of history to establish criteria for truth in human affairs? In British positivism and analytic philosophy, Collingwood recognized the fact that the empirical sciences lead to genuine knowledge. Although these 'truths' were the basis of Collingwood's thought, he was vehemently opposed to either as a valid complete system, not only because they were wrong but also because they lead to irrationalism. This problem for him was epitomized in the then developing science of psychology which, while justifying itself in terms of the genuine knowledge legacy of science, necessarily develops historical skepticism because it rejects the very uniqueness of thought and reason which are the basis of science.[5]

Collingwood's achievement will be examined in the remainder of this article. Three essential aspects of his metaphysics will be developed. The first will show that the basis of philosophy is in metaphysics, which necessarily involves establishing the place of philosophy in its relation to other knowledge, specifically science. The second concern of this analysis will be to show what the nature of metaphysics is and how this relates, as a process of knowledge, to philosophy and science. Part of this analysis will look at how Collingwood viewed those who opposed metaphysics and how he applied his metaphysical analysis to political inquiry and to political theory. The final part will show how this concept of metaphysics directly relates to a moral society or in Collingwood's terms, 'Civilization', and to political action.

Collingwood's Metaphysics

Collingwood argues that if philosophy is to be viable in our century it must resolve the absolute distinction between itself and science. Science had overtaken philosophy as the source of knowledge and truth. Whatever may be its critique by philosophy, only science has moved beyond the sphere of pure speculation. For Collingwood, the resulting demise of philosophy has been the consequence of philosophy's own misconception of its role and its relationship to the dominant agent of knowledge, science. That relationship has been, with a few exceptions, one of antagonists; the attempt by philosophy, continually unsuccessful, to prove that the true source of knowledge is really not science but speculative philosophy. At the core of the relationship between science and philosophy is metaphysics, being both the fundamental science of philosophy and the determination of reality for science. For Collingwood, the base of the conflict between philosophy and science is metaphysical, from which epistemological concerns are derived. It is a debate over the nature of reality and the consequences of interpretations. Collingwood shows that the distinction between science and philosophy is neither in terms of the type of knowledge nor in terms of their respective validity, i.e. reality; rather, their distinction lies in their respective foci of inquiry.

Philosophy as Science

"Philosophical thought is that which conceives its object as activity; empirical thought is that which conceives its object as substance or thing."[6] Action is concerned with intention, thought, will and reason; it is what consciousness or mind does. Inquiry about activity is analysis of what people, interpreted as mind, have done under certain situations. To distinguish between substance and activity, Collingwood uses the example of 'conduct'. Conduct can be analyzed both as activity and as substance or thing. A philosophical science of conduct, which analyzes it as activity, is ethics. The empirical science of conduct is psychology. Although they are studying the same phenomena, their questions and solutions are distinct. 'Mind' as an action "refers to the self-critical activities called thinking."[7]

Inquiry by Collingwood's method presumes a similarity between philosophic and scientific questions. They both focus on experiential facts; therefore, they are both sciences. But whereas the experimental sciences focus on natural facts, the philosophic sciences inquire about mental facts. Collingwood argues that the experimental sciences and the philosophical or reflective sciences use a common investigative process to examine facts which are knowable, communicable, and verifiable. Natural facts are known through observation; mental facts are knowable through reflection. Both are communicable in that they can be made intelligable to other individuals. Finally, both can be validated through the observation or reflection of other individuals. Validation has, for philosophers especially, presented a problem; however, validation has almost never been a problem for experimental scientists. Scientists are usually faced with the initial problem of beginning the process, in other words, how to observe. Once observation is initiated, validation becomes a relatively simple process.[8] However, validation has been historically problematic for philosophers since they have confused speculation with knowledge and have not trusted in the commonality of human beings. Philosophers have tended to be elitist because they have been content with viewing unproductive speculation as the solid basis for their investigations.[9] Contradistinct to speculation, knowledge is a communal activity; it presumes intersubjective commonality of perspective. Knowledge is not possible in a community comprised, for example, of a scientist, a witch doctor and a medieval religious fanatic. This does not mean, however, that the development of learning from each other is impossible; revealing therefore that a commonality of perspective is developing. Validation in science and in philosophy can only depend on other individuals verifying either the observation or the reflection. "The science of mind . . . can tell us nothing but what each can verify for himself by reflecting upon his own mind."[10] Certainly much to the regret of philosophers, validation cannot be achieved in any other way. Regardless of the childlike obstinancy of some philosophers, there are not 'third persons' or entities outside other human individuals, e.g. logic, ra-

tionality, historical forces, or empirical materialism, which can validate knowledge.[11] This is also Camus' essential but often misunderstood point about the absurdity of man in his relationships to the demands of rationalism and empiricism.[12]

Collingwood does not intend to imply that knowledge accepted as valid cannot be wrong, mistaken, or changed over time. Validity does not necessarily presuppose Truth to be absolute; instead, it refers to a transitive truth which is acceptable as knowledge for the duration until it is falsified (invalidated) by the development of either new observations or reflection.[13] If absolute Truth were a possibility, there would not be any history which would include a past, either in science or philosophy.[14] Validation, outside the context of common experience, involves a logical contradiction. A being outside individual experience would be required for reference in the validation process; to be validated as that necessary reference can be accomplished solely by individuals. The process would require a *reductio ad absurdum* which would always return to common experience. To seek 'third parties' seems to mean that one finds human beings unacceptable and to prefer the knowledge of the gods who have only non-human concerns.

Collingwood argues that the approach of the experimental sciences is to classify natural facts into distinct categories, ones which have a clear border and are mutually exclusive. This approaches the ideal of Formal Logic. For the philosophical sciences, that approach is not possible. "In dealing with concepts, however, we are dealing with thoughts dialectically related to one another and therefore with material more akin to that of history than to that of natural sciences."[15] History, here, as before, means the science of mind for Collingwood. Classification, as an inquiry into judgment and the clarification of experience, requires categories which both flow into each other and are mutually exclusive, e.g., reason and irrationality, freedom and necessity. For the logician, categories are mutually exclusive; for existence as judgment they only have value if they are mutually co-existent.

"If it is by historical thinking that we re-think and so rediscover the thought of Hammurabi or Solon, it is in the same way that we discover the thought of a friend who writes us a letter . . . It is only by historical thinking that I can discover what I thought ten years ago . . . or what I thought five minutes ago, by reflecting on an action that I then did . . . In this sense, all knowledge of mind is historical."[16] The science of human nature or of the human mind, the ideal of philosophy according to Collingwood, must be based on the same insights and methods as history. It must focus on thought or consciousness in its contemporary environment and analyze through reflection what mind has actually done in certain situations; its facts.

According to Collingwood, the object of philosophy should be to develop a science of the mind which will continue the work begun by Hobbes.

Philosophic science of mind clarifies and analyzes both the functions of the mind and their association with historical cultural developments. The modern mind is a highly complex datum. "I mean, complex not of many *gesta* (though it is that too) but of many *functions*, where function means not a single act but a type of activity."[17] This knowledge of mental facts is accomplished through reflection. The experimental science of mind has natural facts as its object, not mental facts. Its method is one of observation not reflection. "All science is based on facts. The sciences of nature are based on natural facts ascertained by observation and experimentation; the sciences of mind are based on mental facts ascertained by reflection"[18] Much of the debate in social science with regard to its scientific status is the result of confusing mental and natural facts. The social sciences *qua* science can answer important questions and have significant concerns of their own; nonetheless, they are always derived from the philosophical sciences. For example, behavioural psychology can answer questions about the effect of certain types of lighting or a certain poverty level on the creative process. This it can do through observation, which is not a concern of philosophy. But, psychology must first understand what the creative process is and what its significance is. This can only be accomplished through reflection since creativity is a mental function. This would hold true for the other social sciences: for example, Economics, Sociology and Political Science. This can also be shown historically by the fact that the great philosophical works, unlike works in other disciplines, have involved the other branches of knowledge, e.g. philosophy of science, social philosophy, political philosophy. Thus, no branch of knowledge is excluded from philosophy.[19]

Collingwood recognized that a philosophical science of mind was not a new goal. Historically, it began with Thomas Hobbes and the early British empiricists. "(T)he science of human nature was a false attempt — falsified by the analogy of natural science — to understand the mind itself, and that, whereas the right way of investigating nature is by the method called scientific . . . the right method for such an inquiry is the historical, plain method."[20] What sidetracked their projected goal of understanding mental facts is that Hobbes and those who followed him equated the science of mind with experimental science; that is, Hobbes believed that it could be achieved through observation. Science of mind through observation is the purpose of psychology.[21] Philosophically, mental facts can only be known through reflection.

Science of Presuppositions

Collingwood argues that any particular thought or thinking process necessarily includes other thoughts which are not verbalized and may not even be reflectively known. These thoughts are not just the context of the original idea or statement; they are its presuppositions. They are what comes before the original thought and more than that are what necessarily give rise to that idea.

The priority of presuppositions is a logical rather than a temporal one. Temporally, presuppositions may be known either before, during or after the idea to which they give rise. As a matter of fact, their logical priority is not disturbed by the many situations in which they may not be known reflectively at all.

These presuppositions do not have to be consciously known for the thinking process to occur. Knowledge of presuppositions usually only occurs through a process of reflective analysis. "Only by a kind of analysis, when I reflect upon it, do I come to see that this was a presupposition I was making, however little I was aware of it at other time."[22] This, Collingwood argues, is the distinction between casual or everyday thinking and what is called science, orderly and systematic thinking. "In unscientific thinking our thoughts are coagulated into knots and tangles . . . Thinking scientifically means disentangling all this mess, and reducing a knot of thoughts in which everything sticks together anyhow to a system or series of thoughts in which thinking the thoughts is at the same time thinking the connexions between them."[23] Most of everyday life involves non-scientific thought. This is not because individuals are lazy but rather because it is absolutely unnecessary; for that matter, detrimental. This is true not only for reflective science but also for experimental science. There is no more reason for a father to reflect scientifically on the presuppositions he may be making when he tells his children that he loves them than there is for a mechanic to scientifically analyze a motor car everytime he turns the ignition to drive the car to go shopping. When I prepare an essay for presentation there are certain presuppositions which I am making such as that my audience understands the English language. Knowledge of this presupposition or the lack thereof does not in any way prevent the activity from going on. The only reason it comes up is because I am thinking about presuppositions; it would never arise if I was writing exclusively about, for example, ethics. If someone asked me to 'prove' that my presupposition is correct, unless they set some limited criterion such as a sample survey, proof would ultimately have to depend upon belief, trust in the other's work or faith. It must be recognized though that the significant value of this presupposition lies not in the proof of its truth or falsity; but only in the fact that I, and other essay writers, presuppose it so that we become capable of producing our particular inquiries. Scientific inquiry as a specific type of thinking is applicable only to the particular questions which one is attempting to answer; not to all possible questions which may arise. A pathologist looking for the cause of a particular disease is presupposing that it has a cause and that there is such a thing as cause. These, though, are not and should not be his concern to inquire about; his concern is to complete his scientific search which is necessarily brought about by having these presuppositions.

Although philosophers, especially logicians, have developed and worked out many of the connections between thoughts, Collingwood argues that "(t)he

theory of presuppositions they have tended to neglect."[24] Metaphysics, for Collingwood, is necessarily based on the theory of presuppositions. The fundamental ground which the metaphysical science attempts to understand is the basis for ideas and thought processes. The nature of thinking involves presuppositions; the focus of metaphysics as reflective science is to develop the connections between and to clarify the content of these presuppositions.

Relative and Absolute Presuppositions

Although all particular thinking involves presuppositions, not all presuppositions are equally important for metaphysics. Metaphysics, for Collingwood, is the scientific inquiry into the fundamental ground for a particular knowledge. To understand the relationship between the fundamental ground and presuppositions, it is necessary to develop Collingwood's distinction between two types of presuppositions, relative and absolute, and more generally his theory of presuppositions.

All propositions for Collingwood are an answer to a question. The question may be assumed but nonetheless it is there. For example, the proposition that poverty leads to an increase in crime is the answer to an original question, leading to the inquiry, which asked what leads to an increase in crime. Any question which is the ground for a particular proposition "involves one presupposition and only one, namely that from which it directly 'arises'."[25] This immediate presupposition has as part of its constellation other presuppositions to which the original question is indirectly related. Returning to our previous example, what leads to an increase in crime presupposes that there is an increase in crime and that something leads to it. It is indirectly related to the presupposition that there is a distinction between criminal and non-criminal behaviour.

The fact that a presupposition causes a particular question to arise Collingwood calls its "logical efficacy."[26] Certain statements, presuppositions, necessarily give rise to a particular question. The statement 'something is causing crime to increase' causes the inquiry 'what is causing crime to increase?'. Either to assume it or 'to suppose the statement for the sake of argument' does not affect its logical efficacy. It would still necessarily cause the inquiry to be begun. Whether 'something is causing crime to increase' is stated as a true proposition or only supposed or assumed still will lead to the inquiry of what is causing crime to increase. The logical efficacy of a supposition is identical, according to Collingwood, with the logical efficacy of it as a proposition.

Assumptions are a particular type of supposition which are necessarily achieved by an act of free will. To assume rests on the idea that one is conscious that he (she) is equally free to assume something else. This is quite frequently its use in mathematics and very openly in economics. In mathematics, statements like 'assume $X = 10$' recognizes that one is free to assume that 'X' is equal to something else. This is not the case with all presuppositions. One is not free to

choose to assume causation; its acceptance is usually not an act of free choice. The same is true of one's belief in God. One either does or does not presuppose either alternative but one is not free to choose the other.

The logical efficacy, according to Collingwood, of a particular supposition does not depend on it being true or false only on it being supposed. This is not to say that its correctness may or may not be important; only that for a particular scientific inquiry to be induced, it is important that it be supposed. This is not a trivial point; it has been central in preventing the development of both a contemporary theory of metaphysics and a meaningful relationship between philosophy and experimental science. Philosophy, more specifically metaphysics, has been essentially a search for truth or correctness. Metaphysics has only recognized the truth of a particular presupposition as being of value; never recognizing that its primary value is derived from being supposed not propounded.

Collingwood uses the example of requesting a receipt for a sum paid as showing that even in practical affairs the logical efficacy of an assumption and therefore the validity of the argument are not effected by the truth of the assumption. A person being asked for a receipt is not offended by that request although he recognizes that it is based on the assumption that in the future he could become capable or even is capable of acting dishonorably. For the requester to assume this is not the same as for him to believe it to be true. Neither party, Collingwood believes, has difficulty in distinguishing between the necessary assumption and the belief of it to be true.

Collingwood argues that all presuppositions are either relative or absolute. Both types develop logical efficacy upon being assumed but relative presuppositions are open to being propounded. Absolute presuppositions only have value because they are supposed and thus lead to a particular inquiry; they are not open to the arguments of truth or falsity. Collingwood means, therefore, by presuppositions that which is being presupposed not the act of presupposing.

Relative presuppositions can be verified and are open to the inquiry of whether they are either correct or incorrect, or true or false. Relative presuppositions, therefore, can be stated as propositions which by their very nature are verifiable. "Each is both a presupposition and a proposition."[27] These presuppositions are relative to one inquiry as its presupposition and simultaneously relative to another inquiry as its conclusion. To use a previous example, my supposition that my audience understands English stands as a presupposition of my present inquiry; but it also stands as a proposition which is the conclusion to the inquiry 'do they understand?' which I and others would accept as open to verification. Whether this verification is undertaken or not does not change its status as a relative presupposition of my present inquiry.

Absolute presuppositions stand relative to all questions arising as a result of

their logical efficacy, never as answers. They do not have an underlying presupposition of which they are a consequent. Any particular inquiry will have a singular absolute presupposition; although absolute presuppositions exist both in individuals and as definitions of activity as a constellation of absolute presuppositions. A constellation is the situation wherein each absolute presupposition stands on its own but has a direct connection of meaningful support with other absolute presuppositions.

An example of an absolute presupposition is the notion of 'causation' in the practical sciences such as pathology or engineering. The absolute presupposition of causation is necessary for the whole inquiry to proceed. It was never historically or logically an answer to or proposition of a previous inquiry. That is not because no one thought of attempting it but rather because one cannot envision an inquiry to find the idea of cause without already presupposing cause. 'Causation' as an absolute presupposition is valuable for its logical efficacy not for its validity. The validity which is applicable to it is whether it is an absolute presupposition of a particular science not whether it is, in and of itself, valid.

It must be acknowledged, according to Collingwood, "that the logical efficacy of an absolute presupposition is independent of its being true: it is that the distinction between truth and falsehood does not apply to absolute presuppositions at all, that distinction being peculiar to propositions."[28] Absolute presuppositions are by nature not verifiable but not because it is problematic to verify them; rather, the question of verifiability does not apply to them. The central difficulty of contemporary metaphysics, besides its failure to acknowledge absolute presuppositions, is philosophy's insistence that absolute presuppositions be validated. This is the mistake of trying to prove that an absolute presupposition is true.

Collingwood argues that he is not sure what the demand that absolute presuppositions be intrinsically validated could mean. If its logical efficacy is not sufficient to validate it, then what would be the criteria of validation outside of the science or inquiry to which it gives rise. In pathology, for example, a favourite example for Collingwood, what would it mean to validate the absolute presupposition of causation without reference to the causes (e.g., viruses, bacteria, etc.) which the inquiry has developed? What 'validates' absolute presuppositions is their logical efficacy and the inquiry which depends on them; not their capability of being independently validated, this latter being the function of relative presuppositions.

If this doctrine seems to have certain similarities to pragmatism, then this points to the degree of truth which the pragmatists acknowledge about the nature of thinking and explains their conflict with other contemporary philosophies. The 'doing' of scientific thinking is accomplished before philosophy intervenes and attempts to understand any particular science. Science is understood through a logical reconstruction of the ideas of that

science. The search for causes was ongoing independently for example of Hume's attempt to understand what causation was for his time. Similarly, Greek political practices were functioning independently of Plato's or Socrate's attempts to understand their relative and absolute presuppositions. Pragmatism understood that philosophy has no independent criteria for proving anything; philosophy can only achieve understanding, the goal of reason. This is also shown quite dramatically by the fact that absolutely no philosophic system can be invalidated. No philosophical system has ever been subject to tests of truth or falsity, right or wrong: Marxism being a classic example. The frustration of critiques which attempt to show that Marx was wrong, in the presence of political systems principled by his thought, arises from the fact that these critiques confuse the purpose of philosophy, which is to achieve understanding, with the purpose of experimental science which is to validate through observation.

The value of absolute presuppositions to science is not their independent validity, but solely that they are presupposed: their logical efficacy. They are not answers to questions. Their logical efficacy is independent of their status of being true or false. Therefore, their purpose is not to be propounded as proposition; it is only to be presupposed.

A Science of Absolute Presuppositions

Metaphysics for Collingwood is the attempt to think systematically about the absolute presuppositions being made by other systematic inquiries. "Systematic or 'orderly' thinking . . . is orderly in the sense that it deals with things in their logical order, putting what is presupposed before what presupposes it."[29] Metaphysics attempts to understand what particular constellation of absolute presuppositions is made; not to validate these presuppositions. They have already been validated by their 'logical efficacy.' "Metaphysics is the attempt to find out what absolute presuppositions have been made by this or that person or groups of persons, on this or that occasion or group of occasions, in the course of this or that piece of thinking."[30] This points to another essential factor of Collingwood's idea of metaphysics. It is an historical science. Earlier the conflict between metaphysics as a search for fundamentals and history was discussed. Collingwood argues that this conflict is the result of what he calls pseudo-metaphysics. For him, pseudo-metaphysics is a "kind of thought in which questions are asked about what are in fact absolute presuppositions, but arising from the erroneous belief that they are relative presuppositions, and therefore, in their capacity as propositions, susceptible of truth or falsehood."[31] Pseudo-metaphysics is an attempt to validate absolute presuppositions. Kant came the closest to recognizing this problem of metaphysics when he searched for the necessary structure for thought. Collingwood argues, however, that "Kant, whose gigantic effort at a synthesis of all existing

philosophies here, unless I am mistaken, overreached itself."[32] It overreached itself by attempting to end history by turning absolute presuppositions into propositions while forgetting what Collingwood calls the "metaphysical rubric." The metaphysical rubric makes a metaphysical supposition into an historical proposition. ' "In such and such a phase of scientific thought it is (or was) absolutely presupposed that . . .' This formula I call the 'metaphysical rubric'."[33] A metaphysical proposition, an absolute presupposition of a particular thought process, can only be validated in terms of its historical truth or falsity. The metaphysical proposition "that Newtonian scientists presuppose that some events have causes"[34] is only valid in its relationships to an historical 'event', Newtonian physics. Without its particular historical metaphysical rubric an absolute presupposition, 'some events have causes', is not amenable to validation except as to its logical efficacy. There are essentially two things which can be done with absolute presuppositions. "You can presuppose them, which is what the ordinary (experimental) scientist does; or you can find out what they are, which is what the metaphysician does (reflective science) . . . When I say that this is what metaphysicians do I mean that this is what I find them doing when I read their works from Aristotle onwards."[35] For Collingwood this is what metaphysicians had developed for their own periods, although not until the clash with successful experimental science and the demise of philosophy did this function become clearer as the necessary purpose of metaphysics.

Anti-Metaphysics

Pseudo-metaphysics, for Collingwood, is nonsense because it attempts to do what cannot be done. Nonetheless, it is an attempt, although a false one, to inquire about the fundamentals of knowledge. Alongside pseudo-metaphysics has grown up a movement that Collingwood characterizes as "anti-metaphysics." By anti-metaphysics, Collingwood means "a kind of thought that regards metaphysics as a delusion and an impediment to the progress of knowledge, and demands its abolition."[36] Although metaphysics, as a science of absolute presuppositions, is not in opposition to the interests of knowledge, nonetheless, this is the argument which is frequently made by anti-metaphysicans. Collingwood argues that it is "absurd to maintain that the interests of knowledge could be served by the abolition of metaphysics. But absurdities exist, and anti-metaphysics among them."[37] He argues that in contemporary society there are three different conditions which can serve as a basis for opposing the metaphysical inquiry. These three conditions Collingwood calls progressive, reactionary and irrational anti-metaphysics.

Progressive anti-metaphysics results from the situation where the necessary work of metaphysics is done by those who are practicing 'ordinary' science as a

result of the loss of contact between metaphysicians and the practitioners of 'ordinary' science. It is the situation where 'ordinary' knowledge has outdistanced metaphysics. Metaphysicians "may fail to do the kind of work which is required of them by the advance of ordinary or non-metaphysical thought because their metaphysical analysis has become out of date, i.e. presupposes that ordinary thought still stands in a situation in which it once stood, but in which it stands no longer."[38] Metaphysicians become concerned about developing and analyzing absolute presuppositions which were true in previous historical periods but which no longer form the basis for ongoing systematic thinking. The result of this is that ordinary science has to do its own metaphysics. That is, it has to develop and clarify its own absolute presuppositions while people who claim for themselves the title of metaphysicians or philosophers are concerned in principle "with 'eternal' or traditional problems, which in practice means the problems of the last generation, not the problems of this generation."[39] The work which is done by ordinary science in developing absolute presuppositions Collingwood calls "amateur metaphysics".

> . . . if anybody wishes to judge for himself the extent to which amateur metaphysics has flourished in the soil of recent European thought, let him take a few score of large-scale works on various branches of natural science, history, law, economics, and soforth . . . and examine them, especially their introductory chapters, for metaphysical propositions . . . A person who acquaints himself in this way with a sample of amateur metaphysics will be struck . . . by the fact that a far larger quantity of it exists than he had supposed.[40]

Two things need to be made clear at this point. The first is to recognize that Collingwood uses the term science in a broad sense to describe a form of thinking which has many applications, especially practical ones. "The term science is regarded as covering (a) not natural science alone but orderly and systematic thinking on every subject, (b) not orderly and systematic 'theoretical' thinking alone but orderly and systematic 'practical' thinking as well, such thinking as we refer to when we speak of man thinking out a way of making a table or organizing a secretarial staff or defeating an enemy."[41] The second point that requires clarification is that Collingwood's comments about metaphysics and its opposition is applicable to the whole enterprise called philosophy and its attributes. For example, Collingwood's conception of pseudo-metaphysics as the

inquiry into the 'eternal' problems or issues, is also characteristic of a certain view of the purpose of philosophy generally and of ethics or political philosophy specifically.

An example of progressive anti-metaphysics is the relationship of economists, managers and, therefore, of politicians to philosophy and metaphysics. They essentially view the philosophical project as obscurantist and as a hinderance to progress, because philosophy is still essentially analyzing the absolute presuppositions of private and public property. These were issues for the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In contemporary society, private versus public property is a moral issue decided in terms of consequences, not an absolute presupposition. Present presuppositions probably focus on technological advancement, economic development and the distribution of wealth. Societies which view the issue of private and public property in relation to their contribution to wealth, rather than in terms of natural right (that is, as an historical development rather than a natural one), have little patience dealing with thinkers such as C.B. Macpherson who will want to debate the issue in terms of Lockean principles.[42]

Reactionary anti-metaphysics is essentially the reverse of progressive anti-metaphysics. In this case metaphysics has advanced in its analysis beyond the point to which a particular group or even individual has progressed. The difference between individual and group is solely in terms of its political consequences; the reaction is the same for both. In reactionary anti-metaphysics, the group involved in 'ordinary' science wants to protect its position, which is involved with the presuppositions of past generations, against the discoveries of metaphysicians. These new presuppositions are the result of inquiries by metaphysicians which detected new forms of thought in a particular society. An example of reactionary anti-metaphysics is the Soviet government's attitude toward philosophy. The government's power and particular situation is based on absolute presuppositions developed no later than the turn of the twentieth century, i.e. the nature of economics, politics (the dictatorship of the proletariat), and the place of Western countries in the world of international relations. A threat to any of these through the recognition by metaphysicians of a new mode of thought (not necessarily anti-Marxist) involving new presuppositions is a significant threat to the rulers (in this case) and to their positions. They view the whole process of metaphysical inquiry as a waste of time and as a threat to the progress of knowledge.

The final anti-metaphysics for Collingwood is irrationalism. It is for him the most dangerous threat in contemporary society; a threat to the idea of civilization based on reason. Whereas progressive and reactionary anti-metaphysics oppose metaphysics on the ground, however incorrectly, that it is an obstruction to scientific inquiry and reason, irrational anti-metaphysics opposes the whole enterprise based upon science and reason. Even though they are incorrect, pro-

gressive and reactionary anti-metaphysicians believe that they are protecting a civilization based upon reason; irrational anti-metaphysicians want to destroy that civilization and reason which goes with it. "An 'irrationalist' movement of this kind would aim at the ultimate abolition of systematic and orderly thinking in every shape . . . (this) in order to bring into existence a form of human life in which all the determining factors should be emotional."[43] Collingwood is not essentially arguing against the value of emotion or feeling; only that the hallmark of Western civilization, and especially science, has been that the determining factor in all affairs should be reason, which includes the understanding of, rather than the control by, emotions.

Collingwood uses as a central example for irrational anti-metaphysics psychology and psychotherapy viewed as a science of thought. Two other possible examples are the counter-culture movement of the 1960's and mass-party political fascism. Psychology, as a science of thought, disguises what it actually is, a science of feeling removed from the realm of thought because it has no criteria for judgment. "Psychology cannot be a science of thought, because the methods it has developed in its history as a science of feeling preclude it from dealing with the problems of criteriology. It has nothing to say about truth and falsehood."[44] That this development occurs is not surprising when one realizes that those who traditionally claim to represent the science of thought, i.e. reflective science or philosophy, refuse to face the issue of rational criteria for judgment in both practical activity and science; they insist upon continuing the honoured search for the grand issues of humanity.

The central contradiction of psychology is its claim to be a science while its attempt to do this is based on the denial that such an activity is possible. Psychology historically developed as a science of feeling. This required a distinction between thought and feeling. "It arose from the recognition that what we call feeling is not a kind of thinking, not a self-critical activity."[45] Thinking as a self-critical activity can only be known through reflection. Behavioural psychology denies that this kind of knowledge is possible and bases its 'science' upon the observation of feeling. If this kind of knowledge is not possible, then the whole enterprise of science upon which psychology claims to be built, being based upon this self-critical activity, is also impossible. Science is based on this self-critical activity, because it, also being a rational activity, develops criteria of judgment.

Political science has aspects which are dominated by either pseudo-metaphysics or irrational anti-metaphysics. Its pseudo-metaphysics develops from the attempt to gain a fundamental ahistorical model of politics. By ahistorical is meant forgetting the metaphysical rubric. This would apply to such theories as, for example, structural-functionalism and systems theory. Theories of this order claim to have the capability to do what no science has ever claimed: to find the absolute base of reality. Structural-functionalism was not

developed to be just a model of politics and society at a particular place and time; it is supposed to be equally applicable to both primitive society and modern nation-states, or to both democracies and military dictatorships. Historical differences should not change the model. This is probably why there are so many absolute models.

The irrational aspect in political science results from the influence of behavioural psychology. Behaviourism in political science envisions political relationships as based on feeling or response stimuli (i.e. instinct, desire, appetite). This is not meant to critique such inquiries as public opinion polls which are historical sciences inquiring about opinions at a particular, limited time. Rather, it is directed against the behavioural models which have been developed at times from such studies.

Behaviourism does not attempt to understand that ongoing self-critical activity known as the political process. Not only does it not attempt to understand, behaviourism does not even recognize the self-critical aspect of politics, the rational attribute of politics. At its best, political science as a science of mind should attempt to understand the *rationally* developed system of relationships between individuals and groups which is politics.

Even from the perspective of Collingwood's science of mind a great degree of significant work has been accomplished in 'empirical' political science. Therefore, this is not an argument that what 'empirical' political science does cannot or ought not be done. It 'only' argues that what the best 'empirical' political science accomplishes is limited in scope; it does not explain all of politics any more than physiology explains all that is human. At its worst, by rejecting reason and the philosophical science of mind it cannot do what it claims to do, understand politics.

Metaphysics and Science as a Moral System

It has already been argued that metaphysics, inquiry about presuppositions and science are based on a type of thinking called reasoning. Reason is known through the achievement of understanding and its highest attainment is the the capability of acting from understanding rather than from desire or instinct. Here it will be argued that reason is a moral value and is therefore dependent upon a particular moral civilization. Reason as an aspect of metaphysics is essentially a moral system if one recognizes that morality distinguishes between the necessary and the possible. Morality can only concern the possible because it is here that choice and man's volition or reason can operate. Metaphysics is a possibility not a necessity; a possibility which is tied directly to a civilization's moral commitments to reason. The achievement of understanding is the indirect indication of reason. "Scientific thinking, systematic, orderly thinking, theoretical and practical alike, pursued with all the energy at his command and

with all the skill and care at his disposal, was the most valuable thing man could do. In such a civilization every feature would be marked with some peculiar characteristic derived from this prevailing habit of mind and not to be expected in a civilization differently based.''[46]

In his later works, Collingwood reserved the term 'civilization' for only those societies and political systems based upon reason.[47] This was a recognition of the derivation of civilization from the concept of 'civility'. Civilization is a process with civility as its ideal. ''The essence of this process is the control of each man's emotions by his intellect, that is, the self-assertion of man as will.''[48] The basis of this system is in the ''spirit of agreement.''[49] Agreement is the desire to develop cooperation for the situation of non-agreement. Non-agreement results from diverse metaphysics.

Civility is not only necessary for relationships between individuals of diverse presuppositions but also for the whole enterprise of 'experimental' science of nature.

> What connexion is there between a spirit of civility toward our fellow-man and a spirit of intelligent exploitation towards the world of nature (experimental science)? . . . Civility as between man and man . . . is not only what constitutes the civilization of that community . . . it is also what makes possible that community's civilization relative to the natural world.[50]

Civility is not only necessary for a particular type of relationship among individuals in society; it is also necessary for the development of reason and science. As discussed earlier, reason and science depend upon a cooperative community for their validation and development. Why civility? Because there are no absolute Truths, and reason develops dialectically through relationships of inquiry and validation by groups with diverse metaphysics. Reason therefore as a moral value is directly tied to those types of social and political relationships characterized by Collingwood as 'civility'. It presupposes a lack of agreement (rather than disagreement) as a result of diverse metaphysics, but it requires 'civil' relationships for the development of reason and will, where the self acts from understanding rather than from passion.

The development of these 'civil' relationships has been central to the history of the Western political system (Collingwood's limitation because of familiarity). These are not procedural relationships to attain politics; they are political relationships to attain reason. They only make sense procedurally in their relationship to reason and to a rational metaphysics. They can only be justified in

terms of the metaphysical science of absolute presuppositions and the science of absolute presuppositions can only have value as the understanding of reason and its functions. For reason itself there is not an extrinsic justification. It must justify itself, i.e. its own logical efficacy and the action from understanding, *will*, which it produces.

One liberal procedural relationship which has been historically developed is democracy. Democracy cannot be simply a procedure by which the *will* of the people expresses itself.[51] It can only be understood as an expression, on the political plane, of the workings of reason. J.A. Schumpeter described procedural democracy as "a political *method*, that is to say, a certain type of institutional arrangement for arriving at political — legislative and administrative — decisions and hence incapable of being an end in itself."[52] This definition, if complete, leaves the practical justification for democracy unanswered. Democracy cannot be an end in itself because *reason* is, and it is reason that produces decisions not institutions. The justification can only be that democracy actualizes the working process of reason and can only function in a civilization committed to reason. Schumpeter hints at this possibility but since he starts with democracy rather than reason he cannot complete it. To repeat what has been stated previously, democracy as well as reason cannot imply that all will be cooperative or moral, far from it. That would be utopian not rational. Given the fact that reason and democracy are historical, it is what is morally possible.

Collingwood's ideal of civilization is the process of actualizing relationships in all aspects of society which promote the development of reason. He presents that ideal in the following way:

> Religion would be predominantly a worship of truth in which the god is truth itself, the worshipper a seeker after truth, and the god's presence to the worshipper a gift of mental light. Philosophy would be predominantly an exposition not merely of the nature of thought, action, etc., but of scientific thought and orderly (principled thought-out) action, with special attention to method and to the problem of establishing standards by which reflection and truth can be distinguished from falsehood. Politics would be predominantly the attempt to build up a common life by the methods of reason (free discussion, public criticism) and subject to the sanction of reason (i.e. the ultimate test being whether the common life aimed at is a reasonable one, for men who, no matter what differences divide them, agree to think in an orderly way).[53]

Given this vision, the contemporary public situation is not overpoweringly civilized. This Collingwood realized. Although the ideal of civilization remains always only more or less approximated in different historical periods, it is in this century that Collingwood saw the overwhelming threat to the very idea of civilization. He was not enough of an 'idealist' to believe an ideal, no matter how desirable, could not readily vanish or be destroyed. This consequence is what he called "barbarism".

Barbarism relates directly to anti-metaphysics in the contemporary public situation. Barbarism, or non-civility, denotes the context wherein individuals are treated in terms of force (physical and manipulative) rather than by persuasion. Manipulation as force, rather than promoting activity (the consequence of reason and individual will), encourages the nonrational to be expressed in particular individual behaviour. Behaviour results from passion and instinct; activity or action results from the developed domination of reason and will. The former leads to barbarism and the end of science; the latter to the ideal of civilization based on reason and science.

Progressive, reactionary and irrational anti-metaphysics reject, directly or indirectly, the possibility of reason in public affairs. Progressive anti-metaphysics, exemplified by the objectification of all knowledge in the (natural) scientific paradigm, requires that the rational activity of individuals, which is necessarily *not* objective, be rejected as knowledge. The nineteenth century idea of 'cause', whereby all events are held to be the necessary result of some antecedent object, is endemic to reactionary anti-metaphysics: an anti-metaphysics which *is* reactionary precisely because of its defence of a notion of 'cause' currently valid only in medicine and engineering. By manipulating variables so as to produce particular behaviours, reactionary anti-metaphysics creates methodological principles for the manipulation of individual human beings. By rejecting the process of persuasion and, with it, the attempt to convince individuals by appeals to reason, this methodology of manipulation reduces human existence to force — the threshold characteristic of barbarism. Although progressive and reactionary anti-metaphysics equally, *and erroneously*, identify themselves with the protection of science and, thereby, of truth, they are closely allied with irrational anti-metaphysics, specifically with the triumph of psychology. Whereas irrational anti-metaphysics incorporates the concepts of objective science and causality, it is ultimately grounded in the assumption that passion, feeling and instinct — rather than activity and reason — are dominant features of human existence. If the presence of manipulation precludes the possibility of reason and will, then psychology *as a science*, being inherently manipulative in character, encourages the possibility of barbarism.

While the three anti-metaphysics identified by Collingwood as being present in the contemporary public situation can be distinguished both analytically and sociologically, they are, nonetheless, interrelated by a shared rejection of

reason, judgment and the possibility of human will. It is, indeed, a fitting and sombre conclusion that the anti-metaphysics which so typify the public domain are drawn together by a mutual hostility to the very principles that Collingwood found to be the basis of civilization through his examination of the science of metaphysics.

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Notes

1. R.G. Collingwood, *Essay on Metaphysics*, (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1972), p. 5.

2. See Martin Heidegger's *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, Ralph Manheim, trans. (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1961), *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, J.S. Churchill, trans. (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1969) and his, "The Way Back Into the Ground of Metaphysics", Kaufmann, trans., in Walter Kaufmann, *Existentialism* (New York: Meridian, 1957).

3. E.H. Carr, *What is History?*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967) p. 23.

4. B. Russell, *Mysticism and Logic*, (London, 1918) and *Our Knowledge of the External World*, (Chicago, 1914). A.J. Ayer, *Language, Truth and Logic*, second ed. (New York: Dover Publications, Inc. 1951).

5. Most of Collingwood's biographers divide his intellectual life by his reaction (acceptance or rejection) to idealism. [See T.M. Knox, "Editor's Preface," R.G. Collingwood, *The Idea of History*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1956); and Alan Donagan, *The Later Philosophy of R.G. Collingwood*, (Oxford, 1962).] This may not necessarily be wrong; rather, it misses the significance of Collingwood's work which was to move beyond this dichotomy. After his youthful philosophic period, Collingwood focused his 'so called' mature idealism (1927-1937) upon the establishment of the proper study of history and its place in the scheme of the special sciences. Throughout this period, from his *Faith and Reason* where he removed reason from the confinement of idealist rationalism by establishing both the interconnection of reason with faith and its very basis in faith, to his *Idea of History* and *Essay on the Philosophic Method* where, in the former, he argues that rather than psychology, concrete reason as historical fact is the proper study of historians; and where, in the latter, he presented philosophy's function as being the satisfaction of reason by thinking through the meaning of particular activity, Collingwood was concerned with developing a meaning to history and, therefore, to philosophy which would not deny the possibility of truth and falsity. If this period is a form of idealism, it would be called an 'empiricist idealism'.

   In the last part of his intellectual life, 1937-1943, Collingwood's central project was showing that not only the special sciences but also history achieves genuine knowledge. Although it has been argued that this was a period in which he rejected idealism, actually he was demonstrating that historical and philosophical knowledge, when they transcend the idealist-empiricist dichotomy, achieve the same genuine knowledge as the experimental sciences. In the *Essay on Metaphysics* both the scientific necessity and scientific status of metaphysics and, therefore, philosophy is shown; and in *The New Leviathan* Collingwood presents a theory of mind based on a history and a philosophy focused upon reason and action as knowable facts.

6. R.G. Collingwood, "Economics as a Philosophic Science", *Ethics*, Vol. 36 (January 1926) p. 162.

7. Collingwood, *Metaphysics*, p. 110.

8. Philosophy of science has continuously attempted to view science as a search for truth rather than as a practical activity. The justification of science being that it is True. This is why it has

found the problem of scientific method, observation and falsifiability difficult to resolve. Science as all thought, is a process of practical activity. Its justification is that it works to resolve practical problems. The *utlimate* justification and explanation of science is not Truth or correctness; rather it is engineering. If it was not for engineering no one would indulge in science.

9. Academic inquiry is not a search for knowledge. It does not have the practical attribute of decision and action. Its sole practical aspect is practice for facing 'real world' problems. This confusion, especially in the social sciences and humanities, has led to the situation that they have become completely impotent in their effects.

10. R.G. Collingwood, *The New Leviathan*, (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co. 1971), p. 7.

11. This was recognized by classical political theorists. The significance of rhetoric in Aristotle arises because validation for him was a process of convincing. The demise of rhetoric points to either totalitarian ideology, i.e. the Catholic Church, or the ascent of scientific Truth into philosophy.

12. See Albert Camus' *Myth of Sisyphus* and his interview in *Lyrical and Critical Essays*, (New York: Random House, 1968), p. 356. This is also very similar to Maurice Merleau-Ponty's analysis in the *Phenomenology of Perception* of intellectualism and empiricism and his rejection of both in favour of the primacy of perception. The difference between the two is that Merleau-Ponty is concerned with ontology and Camus with moral action.

13. This it seems to me is Karl Popper's central point about falsifiability. Falsifiability is part of a dialectical process of attaining validation not Truth; especially since truth is solely a transitive validation. See his *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*, esp. Chs. 1 & 4. Nonetheless Popper still does not recognize the basis of science, even theoretical, in practical activity. See his "Normal Science and Its Dangers" in *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge*, I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave, eds., where he distinguishes between 'applied science' and 'pure science' being in favour of the latter because it solves problems rather than puzzles.

14. The historical problem in science inherently brings up the problem of whether science is cumulative, a notion rejected by T. Kuhn. Kuhn is right that science is not cumulative in terms of truth, i.e. on truth built upon the last. The problem is that there is a form of cumulation in science for most observers. What is cumulative in science is not truth but the problems solved. That is to say it solves present problems while keeping the ability to solve past problems.

15. T.M. Knox, "Editor's Preface", R.G. Collingwood, *The Idea of History*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1956), p. ix.

16. *Ibid*, p. 219.

17. Collingwood, *The New Leviathan*, p. 62.

18. *Ibid*, p. 281.

19. It is interesting to note that while philosophy takes an intense evaluative interest in all other branches of knowledge, i.e. philosophy of science, social philosophy, political philosophy, etc., there is no reciprocity. The other branches of knowledge neither want nor find it necessary to pay any attention to what philosophy is doing. This is because philosophy has abdicated its role as a clarifier of meaning in favour of the concept of true knowledge. Philosophy's role is undertaken by the various branches of knowledge themselves. How well they achieve this role is another question.

20. Collingwood, *Idea of History*, p. 209.

21. Collingwood views psychology's proper scope of inquiry as the whole gamut of irrational forces which work upon man's action. "They are not body; they are mind, but not rational mind or thought . . . These irrational elements are the subject-matter of psychology." *Idea of History*, p. 231. What has actually occured since Collingwood's writing is that psychology rather than philosophy has undertaken the project of making man more rational. Whether it can succeed is another problem.

22. Collingwood, *Essay on Metaphysics*, p. 22.

23. *Ibid*, p. 23.

24. *Ibid*.

25. *Ibid*, p. 25.

26. *Ibid*, p. 27.

27. *Ibid*, p. 40.

28. *Ibid*, p. 32.

29. *Ibid*, p. 39.

30. *Ibid*, p. 47.

31. *Ibid*.

32. *Ibid*, p. 328.

33. *Ibid*, p. 55.

34. *Ibid*, p. 59.

35. *Ibid*, p. 54.

36. *Ibid*, p. 81.

37. *Ibid.*

38. *Ibid*, p. 82.

39. *Ibid*, p. 86.

40. *Ibid.*

41. *Ibid*, p. 85.

42. See C.B. MacPherson, *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962) and his *Democratic Theory: Essays in Retieval*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973).

43. Collingwood, *Essay on Metaphysics*, p. 83.

44. *Ibid.*

45. *Ibid*, p. 109.

46. *Ibid*, p. 133.

47. See Collingwood's *The New Leviathan*.

48. *Ibid*, p. 307.

42. See C.B. Macpherson, *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962) and his *Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrieval*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973).

43. Collingwood, *Essay on Metaphysics*, p. 83.

44. *Ibid.*

45. *Ibid*, p. 109.

46. *Ibid*, p. 133.

47. See Collingwood's *The New Leviathan*.

48. *Ibid*, p. 307.

49. *Ibid*, p. 302.

50. *Ibid*, p. 303.

51. See for example Macpherson's *The Real World of Democracy*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966).

52. Joseph A. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, (New York: Harper & Row, 1950), p. 242.

53. Collingwood, *Essay on Metaphysics*, p. 134.

Exchange/Echange

EXCHANGE/ECHANGE

". . . an ontology of stoned concepts"

William Leiss

If Alkis Kontos does no more than to reinvigorate our arid social theory with his carefully-compounded rhetorical balm (he will do much more), he will have put all of us in his debt. No author could ask for a better review of his work.[1] It is a pleasure to try to respond.

To one who voluntarily submitted to the initiation rites of Hegel's *Logic*, an accusation that he has prescribed a dose of "pure empiricism" for his readers must come as a rude shock. Although I am tempted to reply with a jocular reference to the "identity of opposites" in dialectical thought, I will refrain and instead take up the substantive issue raised by Kontos.

My essay on needs and commodities has three objectives: (1) to place the discussion of human needs in the context of the interaction between man and environment (or between human and nonhuman nature); (2) to argue that the postulate known as "the insatiability of human wants" is an implausible heuristic model for modern social thought; (3) to suggest that radical social theory give the moribund notion of "commodity fetishism" a decent burial, so that it could consider more precisely the implications of recent trends in the state-managed variants of capitalism and socialism.

Obviously this is an ambitious undertaking. My stance in the essay is indeed tentative, in view of the bewildering complexity of the issues and the high risk of error. I am pleased that Kontos regards the environmentalist twist of my argument as a valuable new contribution, and I hope others will as well, no matter how they estimate the particular way in which I handled it. On the second point, I am not so naive as to believe that in the near future the postulate of insatiability will be presented in a more sophisticated manner in economics textbooks: That discipline is especially jealous of its prerogatives, and others better versed than I in the technical literature will have to take up the challenge.

The third point will prove especially troublesome, on account of the well-known propensity of radical theorists to expend their best energies on disputing fine points of doctrine with each other. I have suggested in a recent note (*Telos*, Fall 1976) that critical social theory has adopted a rather prudish attitude toward consumer behaviour in capitalist society, shielding its glance at the marketplace with a rigid notion of "false consciousness". The words which buttress the theory tumble out all too easily: manipulation of desire,

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1. *Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Winter, 1977) pp. 127-132.

heterogeneous impulses, false needs. Like the multiplying epicycles of pre-Copernican astronomy, the elaborated but unregenerate critical apparatus threatens to disintegrate of its own weight.

The rejection of the true needs-false needs dichotomy in my essay is also a provisional position, taken in order to see whether critical theory's "emancipatory" interests could be better served by a different line of argument. From an analytical point of view this requires a suspension of disbelief that anything other than "inherent contradictions" in the "production process" could be the source of emancipatory drives (let us forget for a moment the stubborn search for "revolutionary class consciousness"). Thus in the section entitled "negative aspects of intensified commodity circulation", I introduced the notion of a "destabilization" of traditional categories of needing and associated tendencies: ambiguity and confusion in the sense of satisfaction and well-being, repression of qualitative-intensive, as opposed to quantitative-extensive, elements in the consumption process, and increasing environmental degradation.

This approach seemed to require a methodology which isolated "structural" aspects of contemporary consumer behaviour; if technical terminology were necessary, it could have been labelled a critical phenomenology of consumption, rather than (as Kontos would have it) a "pure empiricism." In a way it tries to follow up that curious, neglected suggestion by Marx, namely that no social form decays before all its potentialities have been revealed. I understand this to mean that we should at least take seriously the possibility that the predominant tensions of nineteenth-century capitalism, in relation to which critical theory's concepts and expectations were formed, may have been overcome (as the *principal* sources of social contradictions) in the further development of capitalism itself. If this is regarded seriously as a *possibility*, it does *not* follow that the social system of capitalism thereby becomes "closed". It does not follow that we are presented with a "totally administered society" — and I do not believe that we are — which is impervious to emancipatory thrusts.

What this approach does assume to be the case is that, due to its unique flexibility and adaptability among the range of historical types of class-based societies, capitalism gives rise to new sources of emancipatory potentiality. It assumes the possibility that one of these new sources is the market-based consumption process, which is now far more central to the overall system of social reproduction than it was even in the early part of the twentieth century. The task set by this approach is to investigate the tensions between the transformed patterns of domination, and the emancipatory possibilities, in the high-intensity market setting.

I must confess that this new locus of social tension has not been depicted adequately in my essay. The reason for this is, I believe, that at the time of writing I did not yet see clearly the full implications of my own argument. This is

reflected in the obvious imbalance of the discussion: the section on the negative aspects of intensified commodity circulation should have been accompanied by a complementary section on its positive aspects. (Curiously enough, this would have meant following Marx's lead more closely, in terms of his alienation-individuality model for his discussion of expanding market exchange.)

In this respect Kontos is one of the Sirens, calling us back to the purely abstract negation of our situation. The "dominated individual" and the "monstrously defaced humanity" of which he speaks *is* present in that situation — but there is more, much more, and much that is good and, yes, liberating, both actually and potentially. Kontos knows this (I think), but does not say it. Must we leave all of that to the others, the spokesmen for the happy robots, for whom every new gadget is fresh proof of humanity's conquest of nature?

This is not the place to remedy the defect in the essay and to present the more balanced critique which I now think is required. I hope to develop this in an essay being prepared for the Winter 1978 issue of this *Journal*, which is part of a research project on lifestyle imagery in contemporary advertising undertaken in association with my colleague Steve Kline. As a result of the work done so far, I suspect that the received notions of commodity fetishism and reification in radical theory may be largely obsolete. So far as our general perspective is concerned, we are attempting to identify the potentially emancipating features in the sphere of consumption behaviour and to determine how these might be joined with related developments in work and production.

The fundamental objection in Kontos' review has not yet been addressed, however. He contends that one cannot formulate a critique of consumer behaviour without a normative framework rooted in a "historical ontology". Since I share his appreciation of the rationalist tradition in political thought from which this contention is derived, I would like to agree with him. He writes: "The term false needs refers to a political denial of a potentially other and humanly appropriate quality of life." Presumably we do not have to assert that the existing situation is inhuman and inappropriate in all respects. Having modified the proposition, we must ask: Where does the normative theory go from here?

Kontos has accepted the challenge; I look forward to the result, and not merely as an innocent bystander. For he might have been less charitable, and he might have remarked that my categories of destabilization, ambiguity, and confusion embody an implicit normative posture: an ontology of needs founded on the somewhat dubious values of stability and clarity. There are indeed some difficulties here, and I confess that I cannot resolve them to my own satisfaction at present.

It would be fair to say from a "rigorous" perspective that in *Limits to Satisfaction* I have given a descriptive account of stages in a historical process

wherein relatively stable forms of need-satisfaction were undermined and replaced by an extremely fluid, market-dominated socialization pattern. I believe that there were both positive and negative features in that older setting and the the contemporary form possesses a very different alignment of both. The underlying purpose is to detail the specific reasons why individuals are prevented from realizing some of their own most highly-valued objectives by the very character of the intensified needs-commodities interplay itself. But is there also a measure outside that process by which to judge it? And if so, where is it grounded — in philosophy, anthropology — or poetry, as Kontos suggests?

The necessary work remains to be done. But a precautionary note must be sounded at the outset. In such undertakings we should pay heed to the force of Hegel's metaphor: truth emerges from a bacchanalian whirl of concepts in which no member remains sober. (Hegel himself might have done it more justice, for at the end of his exercises his own concepts always appear to emerge without so much as a mild hangover.) The concepts that shore up our normative edifice should bear the marks of immersion in the world's revels, and take their chances along with the rest of us. If it is ontology we must have, then let it be an ontology of stoned concepts.

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Review Articles
Comptes Rendus

SENSIBILITY, SELF-UNDERSTANDING, AND SELF-REDEMPTION

F. Mechner Barnard

Isaiah Berlin, *Vico and Herder: Two Studies in the History of Ideas,*, London, Hogarth Press, 1976, pp. xvii, 228 £6.00 cloth.

There is no real equivalent for *Einfühlungsvermögen* in the English language. Its closest rendering as "the capacity to feel oneself into" the minds, motives, moods, purposes and aspirations of other people, is an awkward circumlocution, while "empathy", its less awkward rendering, is too lifeless and wooden, too clinical, if not sterile, to convey the vividness and imaginative sweep of the German word — its essential flavour is lost in translation. Characteristically, this could serve as a telling illustration of what, in essence, Vico and Herder are about. That we cannot assimilate one culture to another; that, consequently, we cannot fully render the meaning of a word in one culture in terms of another; that every such translation involves an inescapable loss: this is the heart of their joint message. Each language, on this theory, expresses a certain form of life, a uniquely particular way of viewing the world, a distinct *Weltanschauung*. The fact that the German language readily embraced this highly evocative term — which Herder is said to have coined — suggests that it manifestly (or at least latently) felt a need for it, whereas the English language, apparently, was perfectly content to make do with a highly arid substitute, this suggesting in turn a fundamental difference of attitudes within two distinct cultures. What to one is rich in content is dangerously elusive to the other.

To hard-nosed empiricists (not uncommon among Anglo-Saxon thinkers) the notion of a *sensibility* of understanding — which of course must be sharply distinguished from "sense perception" — is rather unpalatable, for it smacks too suspiciously of fancy, irrationalism, and wilful subjectivism. Vico and Herder saw in this attitude an ill-founded prejudice, as inimical to true understanding as purely deductive rationalism. There is a process of understanding, they insisted, that is inherently different from the two established methods of enquiry into knowledge, from deductive a priori reasoning and empirical a posteriori induction or generalization. It consists in grasping connections *imaginatively*, by bringing a combination of different modalities of the mind into play. Deduction and induction might offer the possibility for observation, description or classification, particularly in external nature, but they are inadequate — and at times inapplicable — for the study of men and the world of human actions and creations. Here imaginative insight or, as Vico put it, a reconstructive *fantasia* is indispensable. This is the startling discovery which the two thinkers, whose ideas Sir Isaiah Berlin explores in his recent book, wished

to proclaim from the rooftops of every city of learning. Indeed Vico, to whom the larger part of the book is devoted, claimed for this "third method" the status of a new science.

It is a *science* by virtue of *not* being fanciful, mystical, or subjective. Only a mind extended by imaginative sensibility can render existential data of the human world intelligible in the form of *Verstehen*, and not merely in the form of *Wissen* and do so in a manner that is both empirical in origin and objective in content. But it is a science not easily accomplished. To gain understanding as well as knowledge about what men do and did, when, why, and how, requires the most arduous effort, the marshalling of one's entire range of mental capacities; nonetheless, it is achievable, at least in principle, and achievable to a degree superior to that attainable in the natural sciences. This is Vico's boldly affirmed conviction. What men have made, other men, possessing minds like them, can reflectively penetrate or "enter into". In history we are the actors; in the natural sciences we are merely spectators. "I know what it is to look like a tree, but I cannot know what it is to be a tree. But I do know what it is to be a mind, because I possess one, and create with it." (p. 25) This is at the root, as Berlin interestingly observes, of Hegel's celebrated distinction of *an sich* (in itself) and *für sich* (for itself); it is the doctrine, above others, on which, according to Berlin, "Vico's claim to immortality must rest." (p. 67) There is no suggestion, however, in either Vico or Herder, that this kind of "understanding" is a matter of super-natural discovery, of quasi-mythical divination, or a wholly intuitive act, although it is not entirely clear, especially with Vico, what role revelation or grace plays in attaining it. Berlin takes Collingwood rather sharply to task for evidently misinterpreting the source of historical understanding, of reading into Vico (and Herder) metaphysical and transcendental notions that were foreign to both.

Although Herder, unlike Vico, recognized that in the last analysis *Verstehen* entailed an inescapable subjective element, he in no way saw in this a denial of objectivity, for what "objectivity" in history can conceivably mean, according to him, is first and foremost the resolve toward impartiality, a readiness to look upon acts and events from perspectives other than exclusively one's own, to engage what Kant subsequently was to call an "enlarged mentality". And it was Vico's and Herder's crowning achievement to urge men to use and develop their imaginative sensibility in this pursuit, in this quest for self-understanding and — as Herder hoped — self-redemption. To this achievement Berlin's book pays eloquent tribute.

II

Berlin's essay on Vico, revised and expanded from its original version, published in 1960, centres almost exclusively on Vico's theory of knowledge

and on the chief sources on which it presumably drew.

Despite his immense admiration for Vico's intellectual achievement, Berlin makes no secret of the fact that the reader of Vico's writings faces no easy task. In order to gain some measure of clarity he has to pick his way most carefully. Obscurities abound; Vico's thought and style are like a tangled forest; clear and confused insights mingle in lavish profusion; hence Berlin rightly remarks that it is "constantly necessary to sift the chaff from the grain", to sort out an "ill-assorted mass of ideas, some lucid and arresting, others shapeless or obscure, bold and novel thoughts cluttered with trivial fragments of a dead scholastic tradition, all jostling each other in the chaos of this astonishingly fertile, but badly ordered and overburdened mind." (p. 67) No wonder, therefore, that Vico is "constantly rediscovered and as constantly laid aside. He remains unreadable and unread." (p.95)

Stripped of its stylistic encumbrances, however, an arresting and novel doctrine emerges, revealing a number of exciting themes as original in their day as they are still relevant in ours. I shall single out two of which this can be said without the slightest reservation: Vico's epistemology of "*Verstehen*" and his conception of Natural Law. Both themes are treated in detail and with infinite skill in Berlin's study, and all I can attempt here is to summarize the salient points and briefly comment on these.

According to Berlin, Vico's epistemology distinguishes four types of knowledge: (1) *Scienza*, which is knowledge yielding *verum*, that is, a priori truth, attainable only to the full in those instances in which the object of enquiry is wholly the product of one's own creation, one's own artefacts or fictions, such as logical and mathematical constructs, or poetic and artistic works; the external world of nature, therefore, is fully knowable only to God, its sole creator. (2) *Conscienza*, which refers to the type of knowledge gained from the observation of overt "behaviour" of men, animals, plants and things. This is the most common type of knowledge men have, to which Vico applies the term *certum*; factual propositions of this kind, though exceedingly clear (in the sense of seeming wholly self-evident) could, Vico declares, yet be false. (3) This category of knowledge, to which Vico applies no specific term, comes closest to the Platonic notion of universals, of eternal truths and principles, though how we can discern these, without grace or revelation (both of which Vico wholly accepts as sources of valid knowledge) is not made clear. Finally, and evidently Vico's prime concern, (4) man's self-understanding, the awareness he has of his own activities and of those of other men, by being not merely an observer from outside — as he is when he thinks of trees, rivers, or earthquakes — but a participant who knows from inside what it is to have purposes, hopes, or fears. This form of knowledge Vico refers to as knowledge *per caussas* (Vico's spelling) which we obtain by attending to the *modificazioni* of our *mente*; these help us to disclose "what men, or societies, or cultures are *at*, that is, not merely what

happens to them, or of how they react or behave as casual agents or "patients", but of those internal relationships and interconnections between thought and action, observation, theory, motivation, practice, which is precisely what observation of the external world, of mere copresences and successions, fails to give us." (p. 106)

In the light of this fourfold distinction, our knowledge of the world of nature is, contrary to what the Cartesians (and their diverse present-day followers) maintained, incapable of serving as the paradigm of science per se. The humanities, involving self-understanding, and the natural sciences, involving the observation of the external world, differ, for Vico, in kind and not merely in degree: their methods, goals, and knowability are fundamentally different; they are two distinct worlds, two dissimilar fields of scientific enquiry. Although the world of man is not entirely of his own making, in the sense mathematics is, it is nonetheless knowable in a different and additional sense from that in which non-human things and events are knowable. Although Augustine had already advanced the doctrine that nature is truly knowable only to God, its creator, it was Vico who fully brought to light (in Berlin's view) the concept of *"Verstehen"*, of understanding through internal causes as a mode of intelligibility.

"Verstehen", in this sense — which has become celebrated largely owing to the importance that has since been given to the concept by Herder, Dilthey, Max Weber and others — is possible because of man's sensibility of *Einfühlung*, of having the capacity of "entering into" the thought and feelings of others, their motives, intentions, ideals, interests, their gestures, works of art, or sense of humour. In his autobiography (*Unfinished Journey*), recently published, Yehudi Menuhin recalls playing a violin sonata to Bela Bartok, the Hungarian composer, which the latter had specially written for him. Bartok, known to be pitilessly severe with his comments, was delighted; he did not think, he said, music could be played like that until long after the composer was dead. Menuhin is recalling this occasion not in order to boast; but the knowledge that he succeeded in penetrating to the very heart of a composer through his music, and that he, the living man, knew that it was understood was an experience of infinite worth to him. This kind of knowledge cannot be assimilated to Gilbert Ryle's famous classification of knowledge in terms of "knowing that" and "knowing how", for it is indeed *sui generis*, confined to the world of human thought and human feeling. Vico was the first modern thinker, according to Berlin, to grasp this important fact and to deny the possibility of assimilating the methods of the *Geisteswissenschaften* to those of the *Naturwissenschaften*, and vice versa.

Vico's challenge and denial of the notion of an unchanging human nature and of the idea of absolute and unalterable values is the second momentous achievement which Berlin records. This questioning of the ancient foundations

of Natural Law theories caused tremors in the prevailing structures of thinking about man and his world. Men, Vico asserts, continuously transform themselves in transforming their world; only the pattern of the flow is constant, not its substance; there are no human or cultural essences which remain identical through change. True natural law is not the natural law of the philosophers, not a set of universal rules, but the continuous emergence of new laws of the *nascimento*, "the coming to birth of a thing at certain times and in certain fashions." (*New Science*, 147) In place of the "natural law of the philosophers" Vico advances his "Natural Law of Nations", where "natural" does not mean fixed or static, but growing and changing, and where "nations" is not taken as a given, but (from *gentium*) as something constantly evolving in the process of self-generation, "each generation bearing its successor on its shoulders". One cannot abstract what is common to the constitutive phases of a continuous transformation, just as it is impossible "to abstract what is common to all shapes, or colours, or all human faces or lives, and to pronounce that to be the basic or natural shape, or colour, the basic or natural human face or life. That is why it is idle to seek to abstract common unaltering beliefs and call them natural law." (p. 85)

Berlin is doubtless right in calling Vico's attack on the established conception of natural law a "very bold undertaking", (p. 86), but it would be mistaken, I think, to see in Vico a thoroughgoing relativist or to infer that he wholly abandoned the notion of universality. Like his "successor" Herder, Vico never repudiated the oneness of humanity in moral or anthropological terms. Both thinkers are characterized by an ambivalent tension in this as in other respects of which, as deeply religious men, they may or may not have been aware. Such ambivalence clearly invites diverse interpretation. It seems to me that Vico was not aware of advancing in effect not one theory of human development (in socio-political and cultural terms), but two: a relativist and pluralist theory of independent multiple origins, *and* a universalist and monistic theory of common origins and common institutions, such as some form of religion, marriage, and burial, or some "universal and eternal principles . . . on which all nations were founded and still preserve themselves." (N.S. 332) Similarly, Vico could scarcely have put as much faith as he did in the possibility of "understanding" (in the sense of *Einfühlung*) had he not assumed, as Berlin acknowledges, that "men can think of others only as being like themselves" in their basic propensities and sensibilities. (p. 23) Finally, in view of his providential conception of the cosmic design and man's divinely ordained place in it, he could hardly have rejected all aspects of the ancient, and particularly Christian, natural law tradition. To be sure, as a celebrant of man's conscious individual and social self-enactment, Vico was a true humanist forerunner of subsequent socialist, populist and anarchist endeavours in this direction. But Vico was a decidedly pious celebrant, and no secularist, contrary to what Michelet and others since

would have us believe. Vico was no more of a secularist than he was an eighteenth-century progressivist or a nineteenth-century evolutionist. Human purposes, though self-chosen, were not autonomous for him, but integral constituents of a providential design with its own inscrutable purposes, of which men may get but an inkling. (N.S. 338-60)

Although Berlin is by no means unaware of these ambivalent tensions in Vico's thought, he appears to doubt that they impinged on his relativism and pluralism — and the same can be said about his position on Herder's relativism and pluralism. As to Vico's political convictions, Berlin justifiably wonders if he had any at all or if he simply lacked the courage of his convictions, but I am unable to judge if political issues of Vico's age were generally less clearly seen or less profoundly felt than those of earlier or later times, as Berlin suggests. All I can say with some assurance is that in this respect the truly striking affinities between Vico and Herder find no common expression, for, while Vico admired authority and despised democracy, Herder admired democracy and despised authority, and while Vico bowed and scraped for support and recognition, Herder remained a stiff-necked and intrepid rebel throughout his life.

III

The astounding similarity between several pivotal themes in the writings of the two men is all the more remarkable in that it cannot be traced to any direct influence. Vico, of course, knew nothing of Herder, having died in the year (1774) Herder was born. Herder, in turn, heard of Vico for the first time when most of his major ideas had taken shape. It seems therefore that Herder, quite independently of Vico, generated strikingly similar ideas, beset by similar problems, in an entirely different environment from that of seventeenth-century Naples. And, like those of his "predecessor", Herder's ideas entered into the texture of European thought, and, as they did, transformed it.

Perhaps the most obviously common feature characterizing their thought (and clearly evident from what has been said so far) is the idea that diversity is something to be treasured and nurtured rather than deplored or stifled. The apothesis of diversity no doubt derived its impulse from a broader vision than that commonly encompassed in the notion of the political. Yet in the case of Herder — unlike probably that of Vico — a decisively political sensibility was at work from the earliest intellectual period. All bureaucratic attempts and centralizing schemes toward uniformity aroused his ire and provoked some of his most bitter laments over Prussia, his native soil, to which he never returned. And he never tired of denouncing multi-national empires and the suppression of native cultures by European imperialists. This politically tinged celebration of diversity in turn provided the doctrinal source of a variety of political

"isms", such as nationalism, liberalism (J.S. Mill's in particular), populism, and anarchism. That Herder was vastly more influential in these directions than Vico had been may well have something to do with time, geography, and other conditions that were more propitious to the reception and dissemination of the former's ideas. But the temptation for *post hoc* rationalization should not too easily be discounted. No doubt, differing circumstances played their part; conceivably, too, the time *was* riper for Herder than it was for Vico; still, the contrasting impact of Vico's and Herder's thought must in large measure be attributed to the latter's undeniably superior literary talent, to his prolific writings, and, not least, to his combining the roles of poet and thinker, of *Dichter* and *Denker*, so prestigiously in vogue in eighteenth-century Germany, and so caustically satirized and pilloried subsequently by Heine and Marx. Thus, while Vico has only recently been re-rescued from oblivion, Herder has enjoyed international renown almost continuously since his first writings appeared in print.

Some of Herder's renown (as I have argued elsewhere and Professor Berlin confirms) has been undeserved and would thoroughly have disgusted him. For neither fanatical nationalism, nor irrational romanticism, racism, let alone anti-Semitism, had any part in his thought and work. Less undeservedly, he is celebrated as the begetter of linguistic ethnicity, of nativism, romanticism, relativism and historicism, as a rebel against classicism, rationalism, progressivism, and all that is most typically seen as the French expression of the Enlightenment, in particular the ideas of Voltaire, d'Alembert, Helvetius, and Holbach. This deeply entrenched view of Herder — often accpeted from commentators without direct familiarity with Herder's writings — is not necessarily false, but like all crude simplifications it is highly misleading. For Herder was a most complex thinker, as he was a most complex personality. This complexity, this inner tension is lost in such facile categorizations. Fortunately, Berlin succeeds in avoiding these worn cliches; with refreshing sweep, acute perceptiveness and *Einfühlung* — few among contemporary interpreters of ideas have attained greater mastery in this — Berlin brings to life the authentic Herder, with warts and all. This essay, too, has been previously published (in 1965) but, unlike the piece on Vico, only slightly expanded.

After informing the reader in his characteristic manner what he is *not* going to do, Berlin singles out three themes as "cardinal ideas" in Herder's thought: Populism, Expressionism, and Pluralism. He wants to do justice, primarily, not to Herder's influence, but to his originality. Originality, however, is no less thorny an issue than "influence". Surveying the sources on which Herder has drawn, or might have drawn, Berlin has no difficulty in showing that no single sword in Herder's intellectual armoury was wholly of his own making. More often than not, he states, "Herder began with something that had by that time become established as a traditional German attitude." (p. 151) Although I

find this a somewhat hyperbolic statement, it is a timely correction to the oversell-approach in which through and through originality is claimed for every idea of a thinker as a justification for his admittance to the galaxy of the great. This is not Berlin's approach. For he recognizes that "if one were called upon to show what is strictly original in the individual doctrines of Locke or Rousseau, Bentham or Marx, Aquinas, and even Hegel, one could, without much difficulty, trace virtually all their doctrines to antecedent 'sources'. Yet this does not derogate from the originality and genius of these thinkers." (p. 152) What proved highly original and seminal in Herder's case was the creative synthesis forged by him out of the most disparate material around him. Berlin finds its most profound expression in the three "isms" mentioned above; each of these "isms" has, he feels, wholly maintained its interest and relevance to political and social theory. Curiously, he stresses, however, that all three of them are unpolitical in source and motivation. Without wishing to claim the polar opposite — that Herder was first and foremost a political thinker, or politically motivated thinker — I find this view hard to accept. Herder was, indeed, in a real sense anti-political in outlook, but he was scarcely apolitical or unpolitical. Berlin may well be closer to the mark in identifying Herder's *Nationalgeist, Volksseele*, and even his concept *Nationalismus*, with populism rather than nationalism (especially in its power-political and bellicose connotation), yet this must not disguise the fact that of all States the nation-State was for Herder the most natural or the least unnatural form of political association, nor wrongly suggest that historical Populism was free from violence.

Even a casual glance at the "isms" (which Professor Berlin discerns as Herder's most original contribution to the history of ideas) will reveal that they are made to carry meanings which do not readily correspond with the sense in which they are widely understood. Thus "populism" is intended to mean — as Berlin makes perfectly plain — a gut feeling or sentiment of belonging, of having roots in a collectivity of fellow-men, based on language, a shared memory of the past, common customs and traditions, and the countless, elusive forms of life which Sumner called folkways. "Belonging" must not, however, be confused with political citizenship. To be conscious of being a German does not entail being a citizen of the *Bundesrepublik*, or a past citizen or supporter of Hitler's or Wilhelm's *Reich*, just as the sense of being a Quebecois does not entail a demand for Quebec's separate existence as a sovereign State. Indeed, the very opposite is implied by the notion: a perfectly mature, fully developed sense of belonging no longer *requires* the trappings of institutional statehood, of political government. Populism, thus understood, is therefore not so much non-political or apolitical, but quite decidedly *anti*-political, in its pronounced hostility to all political rule and organization. Berlin does not say so, but it would, I think, not be altogether fanciful to associate certain strands in the North-American farmers' movements in the prairies with this conception of

democratic and peaceful populism.

"Belonging" is indeed, as Berlin maintains, "at the heart of all Herder's ideas". (p. 195) Neither "expressionism" nor "pluralism", as employed by Berlin, is intelligible if abstracted from the notion of belonging. For "expressionism", in this context, refers not to any specific school of art, literature, or music, but to all forms of human activity that *constitutively* derive from a person's consciousness of being a member of a distinctive group or collectivity. When, therefore, we speak of (or search for) a distinctive Canadian "identity", we would have to envisage some constitutive characteristic by means of which we recognize who or what belongs to Canada, for, presumably, it *expresses* what only Canadians would do, feel, believe, expect, and aspire. But there is an even deeper significance in the link between "populism", in the sense of *belonging*, and "expressionism", in the sense of distinctive *being*. To appreciate it to the full, a distinction has to be made between derivativeness in origin and derivativeness in purpose. While "expressionism" presupposes a distinctively derivative source — a particular social collectivity — it postulates, at the same time, a strictly non-derivative end or purpose. For whatever characterizes an activity as "expressionistic", in the sense indicated above, does so by virtue of being done for its own sake, and not in order to produce this or that result — commodities or services. Men do what they do in order to *be* what they *are*, out of an inescapable need for self-expression. Each such expressive activity carries its value and justification within itself. Finally, since every act of self-expression is made contingent on the existence of a sentiment of being a member of a distinct social configuration (*Gestalt*), it follows that self-expression (and thus self-realization as well) requires a socio-cultural context to which the individual can relate. Self-enactment is a function of belonging or, what amounts to the same, "belonging" is the indispensable condition of "expression" per se. Although Berlin does not formulate things quite the way I have done here I hope to have captured the spirit of his exposition of "expressionism".

"Pluralism" is the notion that is obviously closest to Berlin's own heart. It denotes, for him, not merely multiplicity, but the incommensurability of each distinctive form of "expression", since the centre of gravity, Herder's *Schwerpunkt*, lies *within*. Its nature and value can, accordingly, be understood only in its own terms, through an act of imaginative *Einfühlung*. Incommensurability means, moreover, that we cannot assume some absolute standard or hierarchy of values. Different ideals may be equally valid for different men, under different circumstances, at different periods. This, in turn, implies a recognition of the contestability of values, and their potential incompatibility. Thus, what "pluralism" in Berlin's intended sense clearly negates is the classical notion of absolute ideals, the idea of a model man or a model society. He remarks therefore quite correctly that on this view such notions become "intrinsically

incoherent and meaningless''. (p. 153) Equally clearly, ''pluralism'' in this context is something altogether different from the interest group theory of American pluralism which many of its critics regard as the very definition or expression of pluralism, a term that it may well have appropriated with rather doubtful credentials.

IV

''*Die vollständige Wahrheit ist immer nur That*'' (Complete truth is always only the Deed) Herder wrote in 1774, before Fichte or Hegel — as Professor Berlin significantly adds in a footnote. This was the basic article of faith in all his intellectual endeavours, as it was Vico's before him. But while Vico largely confined himself to the discovery of an epistemological basis for this faith, Herder sought to enlist it as a battle cry for changing the world, urging man to be ''his own god upon earth''. (*Werke*, VI, 64) Both men saw in man's imaginative sensibility a vital key to knowledge, and both saw it threatened by the unimaginative application of the established methods of scientific enquiry, by mere data collection and rational dissection. But whereas Vico was content to enlarge human self-understanding, Herder had hopes for human self-redemption. Running through the three ''isms'' which Berlin selected as Herder's supreme achievements is the doctrine of active being through active cooperation (*Zusammenwirken*), of individual creativity in and through social existence. And where Vico threw out hints, leaving their diverse interpretations to his posthumous commentators, Herder boldly and clearly spelled out the political and social implications of this doctrine, as he saw them.

It is better for man to actively participate in the forging of his social existence, whatever the result, than to be efficiently (or stupidly, or criminally) governed; for creative faculties rot if they are not used. Man is only truly man when he no longer requires a master to rule him. Everybody should be a ''somebody'', a master in some sphere, but no one should be a master in all spheres. It is the most blatant example of unreason in the history of human reason that those unborn should be destined to rule over others not yet born because of wealth or dynastic pedigree. There is no such thing as a ''father of the nation''; a wife requires a husband, a child parents; a herd a leader: these are natural relations; the notion of a father, however, who keeps his children permanently under age, is not. Nor is it natural for Europeans to subjugate other continents, to defraud and plunder them. There is no *Favorit-volk*. Men lose their humanity by living on others and by the labour, ideas, and creativeness of others. If men exist only to serve others or the state they rob themselves of something essential, of themselves.

These are but celebrated samples of Herder's socio-political application of his doctrine of *Zusammenwirken*. And while Vico treated political issues like

dolphins treat a ball, Herder doggedly adhered to his political convictions throughout his entire life. In this regard there certainly is incomparably greater unity and continuity in Herder's thought than in that of Vico. But it is a moot point if, in either case, we can meaningfully speak of "the unity of theory and practice" as an analytic description of their shared faith in truth through the deed or in knowing through doing. Professor Berlin seems to think that we can, and that, presumably, when Marxists speak of the unity of theory and practice they are but echoing Vico and Herder. Similarly, when he approvingly quotes (p. 114) Professor M.H. Fisch (the eminent authority on Vico) as saying that Vico shares with the Marxists "the positive view that the essence of humanity is the ensemble of social relations", I fail to see what, precisely, is being said. Moreover, I believe that Professor Berlin would concur in the view that Vico's and Herder's achievements can stand on their own. The prevailing thrust of his exposition certainly lends support to this assumption. His book is a masterly example of scholarship devoid of dullness. It not merely opens to us a panorama of intellectual peaks; it incites us to climb them.

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CHEAP THRILLS IN THE LATE SEVENTIES

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Russell Jacoby, *Social Amnesia, A Critique of Conformist Psychology from Adler to Laing*, Boston: Beacon Press, 1975, pp. xxii, 191. $8.95 cloth, $3.95, paper.

The appearance of Russell Jacoby's *Social Amnesia* two years ago was in many ways like a breath of fresh air amidst the ever increasing haze produced by a rising "cult of subjectivity". This cult has appeared on at least two levels: first, as a cultural movement that permeates everyday existence, and second, as a new ideology which, like other movements, has its intellectual vanguard which attempts to render the movement plausible.

Social Amnesia argues that various strains of contemporary psychology reinforce the bondage of the individual by providing idealistic cures for patently material forms of exploitation. Here, Jacoby draws upon the Freudian Marxism of the original Frankfurt School theorists, most notably Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer and Herbert Marcuse. Jacoby suggests that a return to Freud would enable us — in the damaged historical present — to appreciate the deep-seated nature of modern domination. Jacoby argues for a remembrance of a forgotten past — specifically the seminal psychological insights of Freud — as a counterforce to current recipes for liberation as involving only a good attitude and a future-orientedness which refuses to examine the materiality of the present. Here *Social Amnesia's* primary concern is to show how the theoretical weakness of much contemporary psychology leads to an ideological reproduction of the inhuman. Conformist psychology is theory which has its common denominator in a naive glorification of the individual, being unequipped and unwilling to find the alienating social and economic determinates of that very individuality. In breaking the individual out of the historical dynamic of individuation, conformist psychology freezes a moment in the process of individuation, taking historically-given inhumanity as ontologically-given humanity.

Sociologically, the cult of subjectivity has exhibited tendencies of social reintegration in that the "retreat" of the Left into subjective politics corresponded to some degree to the discovery of the "human" by the nonrevolutionary establishment. For most, the rediscovery of the "human" appeared as a new individuality, a new ideology of the good life to supplement the material good life that had increasing difficulties in compensating for the ravages of the anxiety and alienation that accompanied, and still accompanies, the combined pressure and boredom of late capitalist existence, especially in the more cybernated and advanced sectors. On the Left, where the cult often took different forms, it seemed a retreat from the austerity and difficulty of political life, an existence made psychologically strenuous by the immovable solidarity of the

"silent majority". The discovery of the "human", however, was not a discovery at all, but rather a kind of return to the refuge of interiority against an imposing reality, a return to mysticism designed to make an emotionally impoverished life bearable. The general phenomenon is reflected in the rush of other sectors and classes back to the womb of religion after less than enthusiastic religious participation in the 1960's no less than in the encounter-group, primal therapy and yoga of the "enlightened" affluent.

The result of the resurrection of the "inner strength" of the human against an alienating world is a seemingly willful forgetting of that world's existence. The double damage incurs where the individual, failing to realize that his or her humanity is something of a hollow shell within which social forces have set up housekeeping, glorifies that very reflection of alienation as humanity itself. Here, as T.W. Adorno and other Frankfurt School theorists have pointed out, "the most individual is the most general".[1] Where inhumanity becomes humanity, the vital tension between is and ought, thought and reality, is lost. Specifically, the repression of the individual and collective modes of retaining the past — the memory and history which allow a critical function of the mind — ensnares the individual within the present in such a way as to steal the ability to transcend the present through consciousness. False consciousness is consciousness that is overwhelmed by the present, as the leitmotif behind the theme of Jacoby's book reminds: "all reification is a forgetting.".[2]

The cult of subjectivity is not an isolated phenomenon, but rather is symptomatic of broader social and economic developments. The problematic of late capitalist society is this: can monopoly capital, which relies increasingly on planning and administration, allow for the irrationality and spontaneity of active individuality? This is more than a rhetorical question; it is a serious theoretical problem, for it concerns real power relations. This problematic lies at the heart of the critical theory of the Frankfurt School, with Marx and Freud as points of departure for locating the dialectical interaction and mutual reproduction of individual and socio-economic environment of subject and object. My purpose in this review is not simply to comment upon Jacoby's critique of the ideology of the cult of subjectivity, but also to use his critique to suggest a slightly different approach to the concept of the individual.

The process of turning critical thought into uncritical ideology, Jacoby suggests, is a willful forgetting of the critical insights of the past (Chapter I). Specifically, psychologists of all political persuasions have played the ostrich with respect to the critical thought of Freud. The new psychological theories that "discover" alienation, and then proceed to cure the problem with a little "self-help" or ethical preaching, Jacoby takes care to note, are really the ideological reflections of the broader social phenomenon of the reification of existence. The forgetting of critical insights of the past is paralleled in everyday life by the necessary forgetfulness of reified existence, with its total immersion

in the awe-inspiring present. Jacoby argues rather for a "dialectical loyalty" to the past which appropriates and transcends critical thought. In the case of contemporary psychology, this would entail a critical examination of the essentials of Freudian theory: repression, the unconscious and infantile sexuality, postulates which deserve better than to be trashed without substantive comment.

The ego-psychology of Alfred Adler and his followers, for example (Chapter II), is a case in point. Adler, as others, posits the subject (the ego) as a pregiven entity which statically reacts to its environment; this surface-psychology casts aside the unpleasantries and complexities of the instinctual dynamic. The Freudian conception of the ego is that of a dialectical entity whose character is molded through instinctual conflict, repression and the demands of the unconscious, and whose function is to mediate between the demands of internal and external nature. Adler's ego-psychology becomes ideology where the concept of the ego loses this social and instinctual history, which collapses present and past, and allows the fragile and weak ego to be taken as a strong and fully individual one. The additional insult is that the surface ego is now put forth as *a priori* "fully human" by those that would cure social ills through positive thinking. With the post-Freudian humanist pscyhologists, Jacoby duplicates his analysis. In the psychological "insight" of Maslow, Allport, May and Rogers (Chapter III), one finds the perfection of what one might call the "bootstraps" theory of the spiritual realm, with its pop existentialism and therapy that relies primarily on the power of positive thinking. "The individual is led to believe that with a little self-help alienation will be washed down the drain like dirt in a sparkling sink," Jacoby succinctly sums it up (p. 67).

Turning to the problem of interpreting Marx and Freud (Chapter IV), Jacoby points out that totally objective theories of society (notoriously, Marxism reduced to scientific determinism[3]) end up hypostatizing the subject by forgetting that subjectivity itself becomes history through its objectifications. In the spirit of the rest of the work, Jacoby argues that theory must retain a logic of society *and* a logic of the psyche, which must coexist without reduction or simplification until such time as the material contradiction of individual and society is resolved. The logic of the psyche Jacoby dubs "negative psychoanalysis", or, a psychoanalysis that analyzes and criticizes the subject, probing its damaged interior until it reveals its social and objective determinates, using the fundamentally critical and dialectical Freudian categories to understand the reproduction of the existing order within the individual's psyche. To this subject I will return, since nothing less is at stake than the way in which theory is to regard the means and ends of history itself: the individual.

In extending his critique to the politics of the New Left (Chapter V), Jacoby finds the same uncritical acceptance of individuality in its damaged forms. Both the empty sloganeering of the professed political types and the Left's ver-

sions of the cult of human sensitivity lack the theory to see that "freedom", "equality" and the immediacy of human sensitivity derive their content from the inhuman order itself; escape from domination must begin with a cataloging of the damages in order to salvage the positive. Finally, Jacoby points to the distinction and necessary tension between social praxis and individual therapy (Chapters VI and VII). While the individual victims of alienation must be treated, the origins of psychic damage are to be found in social processes that transcend the individual, necessitating a political praxis that must detach itself from the individual's problem in order to achieve the cure. Laing and Cooper are taken to task for a confusion of this point, specifically in their treatment of family dynamics as if they were identical with social dynamics. The mistake sees the family as causal, rather than as a point of mediation between individual and society, which leads to a confusion of family therapy and political praxis. This repeats the positivistic mistakes of other psychologists by superficially treating family relations as they exist as if they were family relations as such.

My purpose here, as mentioned, is not to be comprehensive in presenting or reviewing the contents of Jacoby's basically well-written, well-argued and hard-hitting critique, but rather to address the concept of subjectivity itself, for I believe that in some ways the theoretical universe sketched by Jacoby is inadequate to the task faced by critical theory.[4]

Taken at face value, the problem appears in Jacoby's tendency to totalize the power of the social universe so that theory is left in a purely negative stance. Theory here becomes critique without recourse to affirmation, due to the nature of the immediacy with which it is confronted, an immediacy which is *not immediate at all*, but rather is mediated and permeated by the universal nature of exchange relations in all of its unabashed nihilism and impoverishment. The *truly immediate* is a term that ought to be reserved for "that which bad immediacy can be", rather than indiscriminately applied to all social "facts" in their appearance to the unimpressed eye of the social scientist. This bad immediacy of facticity is, after all, nonimmediate in the best sense, for it is most often molded by the unreal, phantom objectivity of reification. With true human immediacy, reflected in the aesthetic, the passions, the timeless and the gestalt, one leaves the realm of positivistic science, which has never been equipped to make distinctions between the qualities of facts anyway. And with good reason, for positivistic science was the science appropriate to the leveling induced by the expansion of exchange relations. This negative stance towards immediacy Jacoby borrows from Adorno; the dilemma is inherited from the social condition.

"The whole is the false", Adorno grimly noted in 1944 in *Minima Moralia*, a work which might be considered the classical and comprehensive statement about the eclipse of the subject in an exchange economy and commodity culture.[5] This situates Hegelian-inspired thought in a precarious position vis-à-

vis its object, for essence now becomes the negation of untrue appearance, left with the hope that if pressed by history and critique, the object will relinquish the truly immediate and essential in the future. Hence Jacoby's use of the term "negative psychoanalysis"; psychoanalysis proper must be said to be obsolete in the sense that the bad immediacy of the self is no longer the "bourgeois individual" consisting in a psyche of id, ego and integrated superego (always problematic, Jacoby correctly notes), but is, rather, the post-individual consisting psychologically in an alliance of id and externalized superego with a weak and regressive ego.[6]

Jacoby states of critical theory's stance towards psychoanalysis:

> Psychoanalysis as a science of the individual survives exactly as long as the individual survives; it is historically situated where the individual is situated. It was unknown where the individual was yet to emerge as a semiprivate being, and it is becoming unknown and forgotten in the "post" bourgeois order where the individual is superfluous. (pp. 37-38)
>
> [Negative psychoanalysis is] a study of remnants; it explores a subject whose subjectivity is being administered out of existence . . . Negative psychoanalysis knows only a negative relationship; it examines the psychic forms that have diverted, impeded or dissolved a historical or class consciousness. (p. 99)
>
> Negative psychoanalysis is psychoanalysis in the era of synchronized capitalism; it is the theory of the individual in eclipse . . . Negative psychoanalysis is "twice" objective in that it traces at first the objective content of subjectivity and second, discovers that there is only an objective configuration to subjectivity. Today there is "no" subjectivity. (p. 80)

The neatness of Jacoby's argument is appealing insofar as the description of the phenomenon contains a great deal of truth. As a general tendency, the average ego increasingly finds itself in a regressive stance towards externality. Shattered by confrontations with damaging realities, the critical mediating functions of the ego are given up as it returns to the illusory perceptions and gratifications offered by the hallucinations of the primary process. Where the

ego gives up its functions in favour of regressive relations to the external world, the masses indeed appear massified, as a sleepy and hypnotic false consciousness passively accepts never-ending fixes of television, underarm deodorant and new cars as if they were the offerings of mother herself (although we should be careful to note that ego-function is retained in a shallow, calculating manner that is not without its consequences[7]). What has been noticed, together with rampant false consciousness, are objective trends that increasingly seem to turn ego into id, reversing Freud's dictum about the progress of civilization: where id, now ego. This supplies fertile psychological soil for the cult of subjectivity to prey upon, yet, having noticed the phenomenon, the analysis of subjectivity is not exhausted.

To claim that subjectivity is fully objective at this point would be to avoid the analysis of the development of social antagonisms and their contradictions as reflected within the subject itself. It would constitute a failure to address historical process as reflected in the psychodynamic contradictions of the "whole" psyche, id, ego and superego; in consciousness and the unconscious in their historical modifications.

The same problem arises with respect to the project of *Social Amnesia* itself. Jacoby's book is a critique of the ideology of conformist psychology, claiming to be limited in scope, attempting to remain critique and negation. If the ego itself is in the process of dissolution, the project of ideological critique, where it seems to claim sufficiency for negation, begins to lose significance. Critique of ideology under these conditions is necessary, but insufficient. Where the commodity becomes its own ideology, where the gratification becomes its own justification and where there is an illusory identity between individual and social needs, the realm of ideology as a set of coherent intellectual propositions against which a particular reality can be measured begins to dissolve. Indeed, the statement made by the North American social science establishment that we have reached "the end of ideology" ironically contains this truth. Where the ego loses its grip against the power of blind social forces, ideology begins to appear as nothing more than rationalization; a simple, mechanically performed psychic function that attempts to smooth over the injured narcissism of the ego for reasons of psychic comfort. Since ideologies are not what they used to be, they cannot be dealt with as they used to be. With respect to the ideology of commodity gratification, we may revive some of the Frankfurt School's comments concerning fascist propaganda. "The critique of totalitarian ideologies," they write,

> has not its task to refute them, for they make no claim to autonomy or consistency at all, or only in the most transparent fashion. What is indicated in this case is rather

> to analyze on what human dispositions they are speculating and what they wish to evoke from these — and this is hellishly far removed from such official declamations. Furthermore, there remains the question, why and in what manner modern society produces human beings who respond to such stimuli, and whose spokesmen to a large extent are the "Führers" and demagogues of all varieties. The development which leads to such changes in ideology has the character of necessity and not the content and coherence of the ideologies themselves.[8]

The ideology of the commodity, as well as the ideology of endangered "psychic property" — the cult of subjectivity — are totalitarian in this sense: they speak not to the ego, but to the id. Or, rather, they speak to an ego that regresses to the id under the pressure of the externalized superego. The ego becomes the degraded inheritor of the project of rationalizing what has already been decided, while it continues as an agency of repression, masochistically imposing upon itself what it knows from experience to be forthcoming from the environment, and graciously accepting the administered (repressive) desublimation that makes its sleep less fitful in response to the laws of libidinal economics.

Where this ego-function takes the place of the critical capacity, psychoanalysis, having announced the dissolution of the ego, inherits another project, as suggested by the Frankfurt position. One might call this a "critique of the interest of the libido", to correspond to critiques of the interest of the repressive whole. It is a project beyond the critique of the realm of ideology. Critique of ideology itself becomes degraded where ideology is too obviously apologetic, too obviously contradictory and too obviously desparate, as a function not of thought, but of "coping" with anxiety, frustration and trauma.

As critical theory moves from critique of ideology proper to critique of the interest of the libido, its use of psychoanalysis in negatively probing the remnants of the subject encounters the seeds of its positive function, the utopian wish of the id — the ultimate intention of the primary process. By pushing the negative to its limits, we find the seeds of its dissolution in the recesses of the psyche.

The dialectic of the subject could be restored for theory by taking Jacoby's category of the reified psyche, as distinct from reified (false) consciousness, to its logical conclusion. "Reification in Marxism", says Jacoby,

> refers to an illusion that is objectively manufactured by society. This social illusion works to preserve the status quo

> by presenting the human and social relations of society as natural — and unchangeable — relations between things. What is often ignored in expositions of the concept of reification is the psychological dimension: amnesia — a forgetting and repression of the human and social activity that makes and can remake society. The social loss of memory is a type of reification — better: it is *the* primal form of reification. (P. 4)

Jacoby points here to a psychodynamic process that "underlies" false consciousness, something that goes deeper than the historically-given appearance of the consciousness of the subject. We may say that false consciousness itself forms the kernel within the individual that corresponds to the cultural forms of reification (ideology, for example). False consciousness, to borrow from Joseph Gabel, is very closely tied to the individual existential situation described as "schizophrenic" in the phenomenological sense.[9] Schizophrenia describes an existential universe which has lost its dialectical qualities; being fractured, externality has lost its "ego-qualities" in psychoanalytic terms. It is a universe in which the ego does not recognize objects as its own, thus lacking the means of its own confirmation. Such a universe is socially manufactured by the flux, mobility and outright theft of the wage-labour process and by its complementary cultural forms (universalized exchange relations) which culminate in reified human relations. Socially manufactured schizophrenia, the impoverishment of existence by depriving it of its means of confirmation, necessarily affects individual perception. As Lukács has noted, the contemplative stance taken by the worker towards the technological apparatus is marked by a consciousness that "reduces space and time to a common denominator and degrades time to the dimension of space."[10] The schizophrenic consciousness is an *ahistorical* consciousness: ideology as the social production of illusion in the collective is paralleled by the social production of schizophrenic, "sub-real" perception in individual consciousness. However, behind the phenomenon of the fractured existential universe with its schizophrenic attributes, however, lies a psychodynamic process that attempts to cope with this state of affairs through reunification. Psychoanalysis calls this the normal form of neurosis, the general form that the reified psyche assumes in the twentieth century.

The normal neurotic displays a sickness as a result of the objective inaccessibility of the environment to the demands of the body-ego. This inaccessibility exists both as the complications of internalized instinctual conflict (which is only as individual as modes of child-rearing) and as the general phenomenon of the renunciation required by adult life, which combine to form patterns of defensive regression. The attempt at "self-cure" through

regression exists as the "psychic territory" which is susceptible to exploitation by social forces. The ego, to review briefly a form that such a psychodynamic process of reification might take, is charged with the responsibility of gratifying the demands of the id, and therefore exercises its functions by probing reality in an attempt to find gratification. Libido is flexible; the ego transforms and neutralizes it in such a way as to suit available objects. Available objects are those that allow gratification of the instincts as well as lead to a confirmation of the narcissistic needs of the ego; they are objects with ego-qualities. Where reality lacks such objects and becomes inaccessible to the ego, the ego represses the demands of the id. Where the demands of the id are persistently frustrated, the ego spends most of its energies repressing, and learns (especially in childhood) to co-opt the forthcoming displeasure by masochistically giving up the ego as an agency capable of imposing its will upon externality.

However, the demands of the instincts are not foregone; the primary process operates under its own rationality of libidinal economics. The pleasure principle opts for illusory gratifications where true ones are not obtainable; the neurotic individual manufactures ties to externality in imagination where true ones are damaged, and the mechanism at work is regression to earlier fixations and memories that exist in the unconscious. Narcissistic libido, having lost its object, now spills over onto an introjected, external superego, a superego which has lost its appropriate position as an appendium of the now regressed ego, recalling its original identification with an authority figure. Through identification with the external superego, the illusion is gained of a dialectical and gratifying relation to objects, as is the illusion of gratification of narcissistic need through the new confusion with the identified object (movie star, image of the playboy, etc.). As the ego regresses to infantile memories, the neurotic individual here takes on the character of the narcissistic, oral type that is common in late capitalist society.[11]

The point of the above example is to suggest that while identity is achieved in consciousness, the demands of the id are not fully malleable. The subject, in the sense that he or she is the embodiment of drives, is not susceptible to eclipse; indeed, the more illusory are the gratifications, the more precarious is the psychic balance. The utopian wish of the id ultimately is intolerant of social necessity. Adorno, writing in the context of the psychodynamic success of fascist propaganda, suggested that certain social forces (collectivization, institutionalization) would require increasing phoniness in the illusory identifications offered to the injured ego by society:

> Socialized hypnosis breeds within itself the forces which will do away with the spook of regression through remote control, and in the end awaken those who keep their eyes shut though they are no longer asleep.[12]

Furthermore, with respect to commodity society, it might be suggested that where ideology is heavily dependent upon supplies of commodities (therapists included), ideology becomes heavily dependent upon economic fluctuations, making it as fragile as the psychic balance that complements it.[13]

Recognizing that the subject taken in the sense of the emancipatory demands of the id is not susceptible to eclipse, however, should not obscure the fact that such a subject existed as the psychic territory exploited by Third Reich national racism no less than by late capitalism attempting to get rid of its surplus production in a repressive manner. The theoretical point remains a theoretical point insofar as the surface phenomena continue to appear one-dimensional. Nevertheless, theory finds within the reified psyche (vis-à-vis reified consciousness) a material basis for contradiction, preserving both the repressive identity of individual and society with its analysis of the objective molding of individual desire (Jacoby's negative psychoanalysis) *and* the ultimate nonidentity of individual and society that resides in the material contradiction between the utopian wish of the id and the gratifications provided by a surplus repressive order. Jacoby, to be sure, mentions this second use of psychoanalysis in a few phrases (e.g., p. 100, p. 117), but as rhetorical afterthought rather than as an intrinsic part of critical theory's use of psychoanalysis. The negativity required of thought by critical theory is here materialized as the utopian reason of the pleasure principle as against the rationality of exchange value; historical tensions find their embodiment in the contradictions of the psychodynamic process itself. "He alone," Adorno said of Freud, "who could situate utopia in blind somatic pleasure, which, satisfying the ultimate intention, is intentionless, has a stable and valid idea of the truth."[14]

The problem of a subjective dialectic reappears in some of Jacoby's suggestions concerning the rise and fall of the subject as a process of historical development. Insofar as the subject of the autonomous ego is concerned, (whose past existence we must take care not to glorify, since it probably existed only in certain more privileged classes and sectors), Jacoby's pronouncements are probably correct. Yet this eclipse of the bourgeois ego, whose birth remains significant in the history of individuation, is not an eclipse of subjectivity *per se* inasmuch as our concern is with the development of the *body-ego*. Here Jacoby's emphasis upon critique and negative psychoanalysis (p. 150) tends to be to the detriment of the analysis of historical process that ends in critical theory. One wishes to uphold the usefulness of Marx's proposition that, in certain ways, history behaves much like a sewer, in which "nothing can emerge at the end of the process which did not appear at the beginning. But, on the other hand, everything also has to come out."[15] One wishes to appraise critically both the organization *and* development of the instinctual dynamic, for capital both creates and colonizes the soul of the social individual.[16] This is not the place for any such analysis, but rather merely to offer an example by way of suggesting

that without its positive, utopian moment, psychoanalysis is in no position to carry out a progressive-regressive analysis of the historical process, such as Jacoby himself offers in a plea to the Left to retain the progressive content of the monogamous marriage (pp. 107-115).

Of particular importance for the analysis of the instinctual dynamic as historical process should be the institutionalization of childhood in the twentieth century, since psychoanalysis holds childhood as predominant both in the development of the infantile (utopian) wish and in forming, individuating and repressing the instincts, thereby becoming a locus for both individuation and regression. Otto Fenichel offers a dialectical formulation of the progressive-repressive content of this aspect of the subjective dynamic:

> Probably the same circumstance which has to a great degree made possible the differentiation and higher development of man — viz., the long period of physiological dependence of the child — has also provided the possibility that if his ego runs up against difficulties it may give up its function and activities and long for, or magically try to bring back, the time in which there was an all-powerful being in the outer world who gave to him love and food and by so doing smoothed out all difficulties.[17]

The social reproduction of neurotic madness within the individual presupposed the development of an individual with new and different, yet confused, instinctual needs, which could only be the product of a socially-determined childhood, and which are then organized by social interests in correspondingly new and different ways. Neurosis, which takes the form of a kind of narcissistic frigidity and desire in the "post" bourgeois order, is still a product of the development of the socio-economic tendencies of capital.

The concept of subjectivity as I have been using it, as psychic reification made to cough up the remainders of the positive subject, as utopian wish and repression, lodges the estrangement from reality required by critical thought within the material development of history itself — where it belongs. It materializes by making self-conscious the theorist's stance towards reality insofar as the object is always read by the theorist through (more or less perverse) combinations of symbol and desire, originating in the primary process itself. Although the conception of the utopian wish is abstract, as the primary process itself is abstract, it serves as a standpoint from which to judge the quality of individual immediacy. Critical theory need not simply resist "the lure of the immediate which becomes irresistible as society hardens and rigidifies", as Jacoby

would have it (p. 150), for the issue is not immediacy or spontaneity as such, but good or bad immediacy, spontaneity that is individual and liberatory or spontaneity that reeks of exchange-value and its ravages, play and praxis or the frozen gestures and expressions of the reified ego.

Not wishing to be unfair to Jacoby on this point, it should be noted that his remarks concerning New Left subjectivity implicitly contain a conception of good immediacy and good praxis, yet they remain unnecessarily mystical to the extent to which they lack a foundation in the emancipatory reasoning of what we might call a "materially utopian consciousness", a consciousness that takes cognizance of the aesthetic of the pleasure principle by finding it at the root of every psychodynamic process, while not retreating from existent one-dimensionality. It must have involved a certain amount of wishful thinking (not bad in itself) for Marcuse to have published *Eros and Civilization* (the standpoint from which I have been arguing) in 1955. Yet it served as a premonition, an abstract utopianism that had at least the potential to become concretized in attempts at praxis by certain New Left segments. Theory that proclaims that "liberation is so close that it can almost be tasted; and it is no longer comprehensible why it is not here" (p. 151), cannot afford *not* to judge from the standpoint of a materially utopian consciousness. Jacoby's failure to mention Marcuse's *An Essay on Liberation* and *Counterrevolution and Revolt*, whatever mistakes may have been made there in judgement of historical currents, is indicative of a historical rupture and transcendence made all the more mystical.

What was inconceivable after Auschwitz, namely utopian pronouncements concerning individuality, seems somewhat more conceivable after the 1960's attempts at praxis, although hope occurs only against the background of Attica (Jacoby's closing image), Kent State, the October Crisis in Québec, Viet Nam, Indonesia, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Iran and countless other examples of domestic and exported terror, together with the amnesia that necessarily affirms these ongoing incidents. Even Adorno, in a radio lecture shortly before his death concerning the culture industry and leisure-time, tentatively concluded:

> It seems that the integration of consciousness and leisure time is not yet complete after all. The real interests of individuals are still strong enough to resist total manipulation up to a point. This analysis would be in tune with the prognosis that consciousness cannot be totally integrated in a society in which the basic contradictions remain undiminished.[18]

The cult of subjectivity may have its moments of truth as do other mass cultural phenomena, but theory must be able to recognize the real thing, singling out the historically latent from the mediations of seemingly endless and monotonous conformity with which we are confronted at present. Jacoby's book, however, remains a powerful reminder of the presently victorious forces that would trivialize and banalize thought, willingly or unwillingly aiding and abetting the social reproduction of the inhuman. One hopes that such ego as we are left with will, without being seduced in its imagination or frozen into abstract negativity, react critically to the cheap thrills of the late seventies.

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Notes

1. Theodor W. Adorno, *Minima Moralia, Reflections from Damaged Life*, London, New Left Books, 1974, p. 45.

2. Jacoby takes this from Max Horkheimer and T.W. Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, New York, Herder & Herder, 1972, p. 230. The statement is improperly rendered by the translator of this volume.

3. See Jacoby's excellent "Towards a Critique of Automatic Marxism: The Politics of Philosophy from Lukács to the Frankfurt School", *Telos*, no. 10, Winter 1971.

4. See especially Erica Sherover's review of *Social Amnesia, Telos*, no. 25, Fall 1975 and Joel Kovel's comments upon the same in "Freud the Revolutionary", *Psychoanalytic Review*, vol. 63, no. 2, 1976. Sherover's comments concerning the relationship between theory and therapy would tend to cast doubt upon Jacoby's interpretation of Laing and Cooper.

5. T.W. Adorno, *Minima Moralia*, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

6. On this point see especially Herbert Marcuse, "The Obsolescence of the Freudian Concept of Man", *Five Lectures*, Boston, Beacon Press, 1970; T.W. Adorno, "Sociology and Psychology", *New Left Review*, no. 46, Nov.-Dec. 1967 and no. 47, Jan.-Feb. 1968; and Sigmund Freud, *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, New York, W.W. Norton and Co., 1959.

7. This is the ego of the legitimation crisis. A dwindling of "external supplies" could cause a rude psychological awakening. See Jürgen Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*, Boston, Beacon Press, 1975; and Alvin Gouldner's version in *The Dialectic of Ideology and Technology*, New York, Seabury Press, 1976, esp. pp. 257-264.

8. Frankfurt Institute for Social Research, *Aspects of Sociology*, Boston, Beacon Press, 1972, p. 191.

9. Joseph Gabel, *False Consciousness, An Essay on Reification*, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1975. "Schizophrenia" is an ambiguous concept. Gabel's usage is broader than the psychoanalytic usage. Taken especially from Minkowski, Gabel's usage of the term refers existentially to a fractured universe and its parallel consciousness. In psychoanalysis, schizophrenia is a psychotic mechanism of defence; a schizophrenic breaks off relations with the world in a particular way. The neurotic, on the other hand, attempts to cope with a split universe by hallucinating relations to reality, keeping relations to the world, but in damaged form. Gabel uses clinical examples of schizophrenia in particular to highlight attributes of false consciousness and ideology in general. The cultural phenomenon of reification, for Gabel, has a schizophrenic structure: schizophrenia in the clinical manifestation is reification *par excellence*.

10. Georg Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, Cambridge, Mass., M.I.T. Press, 1971, p. 89. Lukács is Gabel's point of departure.

11. See, for example, Christopher Lasch, "The Narcissist Society", *New York Review of Books*, Sept. 30, 1976.

12. T.W. Adorno, "Freudian Theory and the Pattern of Fascist Propaganda", in Paul Roazen, ed., *Sigmund Freud*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1973, p. 102.

13. Especially with respect to Gouldner's thesis, *op. cit.*

14. T.W. Adorno, *Minima Moralia*, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

15. Karl Marx, *Grundrisse*, Middlesex, Penguin, 1973, p. 304.

16. An excellent summary of this process is given by Joel Kovel, "Therapy in Late Capitalism", *Telos*, no. 30, Winter 1976-77.

17. Otto Fenichel, "Ego Strength and Ego Weakness", *The Collected Papers of Otto Fenichel, Second Series*, New York, W.W. Norton and Co., 1954, p. 79.

18. T.W. Adorno, *Stichworte: Kritische Modelle 2*, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp Verlag 1969, p. 65. Quoted in Andreas Huyssen, "Introduction to Adorno", *New German Critique*, no. 6, Fall 1975, p. 10.

REVIEWS/RECENSIONS

Fernand Dumont, *The Vigil of Quebec*. Tr. Sheila Fischman and Richard Howard. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977, pp. XVII, 131, $3.50 paper, $10.00 cloth.

Originally published in 1971, to which a prefatory "Letter to my English-speaking Friends" was added for this edition, Dumont's collection of articles, some of which date from a decade earlier, has in no way been overtaken by history. The events of November 1976, as those events six years earlier, are significant punctuation; they help give form to a sentence but do not constitute its meaning. The author's concern is less with political forces than with "the attitudes I ought to adopt" to the changes of Quebec during his generation. His book is both personal and public, it combines autobiographic reflection and sociological analysis. In a word, it is philosophic, a meditation, or, as Dumont indicated by his title, a kind of vigil. To be vigilant is to stay awake during a time generally given over to sleep. One keeps a vigil because one expects something to happen, because one sees it happening where others do not. Today even politicians beyond the borders of Quebec are awake and in their excitement are forever dinning in our ears the message that something is going on. This little book may help English Canada to understand what has happened during their unwakefulness.

It was originally written for Quebec readers and consequently there is a problem of translation. I refer not to the job rendering French into English prose nor even to reflecting the subtleties of Dumont's rhetoric, so redolent of a Ricoeur or a Merleau-Ponty. Here Fischman and Howard, and their editor at the University of Toronto Press, have done their task well. The problem lies in the tacit dimension of any communication, in the web of assumptions and signs that express indirectly, contextually, and, as it were, invisibly, its poetic and subliminal sense. It is a problem because, let us admit frankly, most of us, French and English, are "relatively indifferent" to one another. We have neither hatred nor fascination. Unlike those two sorts of hyphenated Americans, Southern- and Afro-, we have not really shaped each other but tolerated each other, and whatever the virtue of toleration, it is not enough, Dumont reminds us, to make a country. Memories of France and Britain, and

fear of the United States, no longer suffice. How could they be when our present immigrants have no memories of France or Britain and think they are coming to America? Bilingualism, we should add, is only a convenience that "connects us at the surface of our respective languages." Politically, the problem of translation is this: is there anything of depth we can offer each other?

The seriousness of this question is indicated in Dumont's rejection of the conventional liberal answers. On the one hand, we cannot begin with a hearty "let's forget about the past and build for the future" because we must evoke the past to come together at all. That is why we are *here*, after all. "Strategy cannot take the place of dialogue." Nor can we disregard culture in favour of economic functionalism and liberal homogeneity, for the generation of forces leading to that functional equality so cherished by liberals (regional equalization grants, Anglophone bilingualism, and so forth), presupposes a commitment to Canada as its chief motive, whereas the Canada that would be created by those commitments and presumably would benefit, would be no more than a province of a universal and homogeneous liberal society. That we have difficulty understanding Quebec (though watching the enthusiasm of supporters of the Parti Québécois, this descendant of Ontario Orangemen caught a glimpse of his great-great-grandfather's distrust of Catholic Frenchmen) is a measure of our liberalism and a limit to our imagination. Let us at least try to see how Dumont formulated the attitudes he has adopted.

From before the Conquest, the French in North America owed their coherence to something other than imperial ties and so were able to switch allegiance with minimal disruption. Only with British immigration did one society face another, in the same land, but with different social structures and pursuing different social purposes. Mutual contempt maintained the distinctiveness of the two societies — our famous two solitudes — and, when we came together, we simply reversed the sign, as in algebra. French traditionalism, so lately despised, became the quaintness of Old Quebec that made us not-Americans; English commercialism in turn became the model for "adapting" to modernity. This old dialectic, painfully familiar, broke down sometime during the 1960's. Dumont's attitudes were formed from his experience that the strategy of adapting was no longer possible, even as an idea.

Consider, to begin with, the dimensions of the change: "from at least seeming religious solidarity to rapid dechristianization, from ignorance to mass education, from Duplessis to independentism, from the challenges of *Cité libre* to the tutelage of Trudeau." There was a clear spiritual narrowing from the euphoria of the Lesage regime to Bourassa's technocrats. The Olympics were not a bigger and better version of Expo because the October crisis came between them. In 1976, everyone knew about Montreal's sewage, and roads, and public housing, and construction scandals, and somehow that detracted from the fun we were supposed to be having. Seriously to pursue the strategy of

adapting means the certainty of more war measures and hollow fêtes. But these are general remarks. They indicate a dimension and suggest a tone but are essentially tropes to be expanded by analysis and description. Here one can only suggest the richness of Dumont's thought.

His "short account of our affections" begins with reflection on the formative encounters with the literature of his youth in the 1930's. The dessicated concepts "urbanization" and "industrialization" that described Cantonville badly covered the raw experiences expressed in poetry, song, and fiction. Dumont has the rare gift of combining a meditative immediacy with conceptual control. This latter skill he learned from his teachers in the social science faculty at Laval, an institution that forged the new intellectual tools needed to understand this "society . . . being converted to its future." And Dumont insisted that social science was as necessary as poetry. Something discursive was needed to replace traditional Catholic analyses grown debased and trivial and turned into ideological pretexts by Duplessis. The *Tremblay Report* (1954), for example, is a fine-sounding piece of political theory, but what did words such as "religion and culture thus meet in humanism" mean to the Chief? The central question, which preoccupies both the poet and the sociologist, concerns "the significance of economic progress. How do we rise above the wretched dreams of abundance?"

Let us probe further. Why is abundance a wretched dream? Is not the poet out of touch with the sociologist? Or better, is this anything more than the fond intellectual, wallowing (not for the first time) in his sentimental, idealized vision of the proletariat? I mean, after all, surely, we all wish abundance. Dumont does not deny it, but he does alter the terms of our question. Consider the option: "When Mr. Marchand emphasizes that we are in the era of technology which, basically, recognizes no frontier, he gives me a useful reminder of the obvious. But he brakes the development of his reasoning too rapidly. In this universal perspective, I do not see what makes him stop at the Canadian border. Why should our children not simply be American?" This question has been raised in English Canada as well, but I have not seen it seriously maintained, with evidence, that "men, especially poor men, want more than a prosperous society. They desire a fraternal society where they can share not merely the fruits of economic growth but an ideal as well." Dumont can cite in defence of this proposition the behaviour of certain of Quebec's trade-union leaders whose ideals and purposes were learned from traditional Catholic teaching. And who can deny that the CNTU is unlike the IWA or the UAW? That is, there exists in Quebec an as yet confused, but nonetheless real, "transposition of traditional values into values of the future." And those traditional values, we know, are not the values of a universal and homogeneous *liberal society*.

We in English Canada have been warned, by George Grant, for example, of

the enormous spiritual costs of that liberal society. We may understand the present situation in Quebec as a refusal to pay the cost. This brings me to a final point, the "teutelage" of Ottawa. A liberal society, Dumont wrote, is one "without concern for custom and beyond conflicts, where atoms raised to the status of personality would cement a variety of associations under an impulse that might be called freedom — this, it was believed, was an absolutely democratic ideal." And yet, as Professor Trudeau once wrote in a famous article, there were some obstacles to democracy, that is, to liberalism, in Quebec. By doing his part to remove those obstacles, by repudiating his own past, the Prime Minister has, in his own way, convinced thoughtful people in Quebec of the soundness of independence. "Five years ago many of us had not yet reached the solution of independence: we would have devoted the greatest interest to a consideration of a program of constitutional reform. If we have come to separation, it is because Mr. Trudeau and his friends have refused to consider that the questions being asked by most Québécois might possibly have some basis." For the Prime Minister and his friends, universalism may be obtained directly. Do we not have the testimony of Mr. Marchand? How can such things as a concern for custom, tradition, and community be allowed to interfere with the orderly unfolding of the liberal mind? That too we have known now for nearly seven years. For Dumont however, "obtaining access to the universal is first of all choosing for oneself the doorway that leads in."

What, then, for the future? With Dumont, one can say "we have at least one certain duty: to speak out." One can even admit, "I am not too sure why. Perhaps it is in order not to betray some mysterious ideal which comes from my illiterate ancestors, and which, even if it were never to take on a clear form, leads back to the most desperate definition of honour." A sense of honour is proof against the blackmail of liberal conformity, but more than defence is required: "For a small people like ours, the duty of welcome and assembly is a hard one. But it must be undertaken in terms of our lives' justification, as the highest proof that liberty is turned towards others. We must look patiently for interlocutors." It is possible they will be found in English Canada, for if anything is clear from the victory of the Parti Québécois it is that some kind of restructuring is in order. Dumont concluded his prefatory letter on a hopeful note: "It is in regaining its own essential equality that Quebec can best contribute to building something else in northern America than an outwork for the empire of the United States. You cannot escape such a challenge. And is it not in following the search for ourselves, each of us on his own, that our two peoples can make a new alliance?" It is hard to resist half a century of seductive liberalism but, if Dumont's meditations are sound, that appears to be what the continuing "crisis in Confederation" is about. Dumont is surely right in this: the challenge, however formulated, is inescapable. If we in English Canada do not respond creatively, it may well mean the end of both our societies. The

meaning of that double end, however, will not be identical: Quebec alone will have perished nobly, with honour, and clear about its purpose. Dumont at least knows the attitude he ought to adopt.

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Essays on Politics and Society by John Stuart Mill. Edited by J.M. Robson, University of Toronto Press, 1977, pp. xcv, 780, 2 vol., $60.00 cloth.

No one more than John Stuart Mill was struck by the difference in temperament between himself and Jeremy Bentham. Indeed, in his rather uncharitable essay, "Bentham" (1838), Mill describes his mentor as an emotionally impoverished, unsympathetic and unimaginative man. Mill had none of these defects, and as well his writing in contrast to Bentham's exhibits a non-dogmatic tentativeness. On substantive issues such as qualitative differences in pleasure or the heuristic value of social contract theory, Mill appears to advance utilitarianism both in terms of plausibility and humaneness. But as the present volumes demonstrate, Mill is a Benthamite philosophically if not at heart. Where he goes beyond Bentham, he goes beyond what can be rationally defended given his basic presuppositions. This is not to say that Mill's non-Benthamite claims should be dismissed, but rather that they require a firmer foundation than that provided by Mill.

These two volumes, *Essays on Politics and Society*, represent the latest results of Professor Robson's and the University of Toronto Press' ambitious project, the publication of J.S. Mill's collected works. And, like the earlier volumes in the series, they maintain a very high standard of scholarship and publishing. Robson's textual introduction, both meticulous and clear, renders this the definitive edition of Mill's writings on political themes. The contents, in addition to Mill's major monographs "On Liberty" and "Considerations on Representative Government", include otherwise inaccessible review articles on important theoretical and practical political works of the day. It is in these that one is struck by the persistence of dominant themes which give coherence and continuity to Mill's political thought. For, although much has been made of the divergence of Mill's later from his earlier writing, what is more striking is his long-term consistency regarding the fundamental nature of political theory and the good society. Thus his misgivings concerning popular democracy eloquently stated in "On Liberty" (1859) appear substantially in the same form in

the neglected essay "Civilization" (1836). In the early review article "Use and Abuse of Political Terms" (1832), Mill states the principles — largely ordinary language principles — of correct definition that he retains throughout the many editions of his *System of Logic*. Thus on such basic and determinant issues as the standards of meaning of core concepts in our political vocabulary, Mill's position is constant. But of much greater significance is the striking similarity between Mill's views on meaning and those of Bentham. In criticism of the vagueness of French political theory Mill wrote: "It proceeds from an infirmity of the French mind which has been one main cause of the miscarriages of the French Nation in its pursuits of liberty and progress; that of being led away by phrases and treating abstractions as if they were realities . . .". These are not merely Bentham's sentiments, they are almost the words he employs in *Anarchical Fallacies*. It would, I think, be a mistake though to ignore the very real differences between Mill and Bentham. Indeed, an adequate account of the reasons for these differences — if such exist — would be an important contribution to the history of ideas.

Three approaches to Mill and orthodox utilitarianism present themselves: one can stress the consistency between them, one can explain their differences in terms of the rational development of utilitarian principles, or one can argue that Mill's richer appreciation of social and political reality is the result of non-rational accretions to Benthamism. Alexander Brady, in his extensive and scholarly introduction, takes this third tack. Brady cites historical evidence of, and psychological explanations for Mill's disaffection with the cold mechanism of Bentham's social vision. The image Brady presents is of a man who supplemented his utilitarian political reason with the communal sensibility of Carlyle's and Coleridge's romantic toryism. And, of course, conclusive evidence for this view exists in Mill's own writing, not only in the essay "Bentham", but throughout his mature works, and most strikingly in his *Autobiography*. But I think that Brady, in describing the later Mill as an eclectic liberal makes too much of the rift, for in a discursive contest between sensibility and reason, it is reason that inevitably prevails. And Mill's chosen medium was the philosophic essay, not poetry. Thus, for all Mill's hankerings after tradition and community, it is the satisfaction of individual interests that is the *raison d'etre* of political action. All else is but a means to this end.

From a purely philosophical perspective, one would be hard pressed to justify this fine new edition of Mill's works. In epistemology, psychology and logic Mill really makes no great advance on Hume, James Mill or his other predecessors in the empiricist tradition. And, if it is true that his social and political writing is really disguised Benthamism, then it would seem that there are no compelling reasons for this lavish attention. The explanation for the sustained interest in Mill in Canada, and thus the justification for the present series is, of course, that Mill, more than any other thinker, represents the actual

political theory and practice of this country. Historically, the connection between Mill and Canada can be seen in his enthusiastic support of Lord Durham. The "Report on the Affiars of British North America" and *Considerations on Representative Government* are companion pieces. Further, Mill's detailed discussion of nationality and federalism in this work are naturally of interest here. But, most significantly, Mill's theoretical perspective in all its tension and apparent contradiction is a mirror of Canada's psyche. For, if Professor Horowitz's account of Canada as an amalgam of liberal and tory fragments has any validity, then it is to be expected that Mill, who attempts to meld liberal and tory principles, would find a receptive Canadian audience. To paraphrase Plato's happy metaphor, Canada is Mill writ large.

Although through judicious selection both democratic socialists and Libertarians can find theoretical support in Mill's works, it is generally held that as Mill matured he tended towards a socialist view of the human condition. Unsurprisingly, socialists see this as a humane development away from narrow individualistic Benthamism. But if, as I have argued, Mill's departure from Bentham is more apparent than real, then perhaps a socialism based on Mill is necessarily defective. For to ground socialism in individualistic hedonism is an unlikely project. In the *Autobiography*, Mill presents what L.T. Hobhouse has described as the best summary statement of Liberal Socialism that we possess:

> The social problem of the future we considered to be, how to unite the greatest individual liberty of action, with a common ownership in the raw material of the globe, and an equal participation of all in the benefits of combined labour. (Everyman ed., p. 196).

These words could be included in the "Regina Manifesto" with no sense of anomaly simply because the founders of the C.C.F. owe their basic societal view to Mill and his Fabian followers. This is most obvious in the political life and work of the Manifesto's chief draughtsman, Frank Underhill. Throughout his career, Underhill maintained a consistent commitment to Mill's views, so much so that at the end of it he could say, "John Stuart Mill I have never got beyond, he is the ultimate truth" (as quoted in *Canadian Forum*, Nov. 1971, p. 13). Underhill's critics might claim that he showed no such consistency in practice, moving as he did from the radical socialism of the Thirties to the establishment liberalism of the Sixties. But in any case, what is clear is that Mill's ideas are sufficiently encompassing to ground a large part of the spectrum of political practice in Canada. Thus, no one who has the slightest pretensions to the understanding of political thought in Canada can legitimately ignore Mill.

There is a widespread belief, especially in countries with a liberal tradition, that persons who have gained power have compromised their political principles. But in the case of Underhill, it is a defect in his principles, not his character, that explains his drift from his early socialism. Indeed, his apparent duplicity can be accounted for in terms of his commitment to Mill's political theory. For both Underhill and Mill, community and group solidarity are not ends in themselves, but are rather means for the achievement of individual interests. While one's party is powerless — as in the case of the early C.C.F. — this feature of liberal theory is inevitably obscured because one tends to identify one's present political activity with political reality. Thus, during the formative years of the co-operative movement or of labour unionism, the union or co-op is treated by its members as an intrinsic, and not merely an instrumental good. But to the extent that one succeeds in acquiring political and economic power, given the logic of liberal theory, it becomes less relevant to stress the worth of the means, and more important to focus upon the end, *viz.* individual satisfactions. This makes sense of why liberals out of power appear more committed to communal goods than the same people are once the elections have been won. It is not simply true that liberals who gain power have sold out their ideals. Rather, their change in circumstance has made clear what their ideals really are. Means are circumstantially variable, not absolute, and thus, for a liberal, communal values are always negotiable. This analysis also explains how it is possible for a successful candidate who had campaigned on the merits of participatory democracy to become an elitist with neither remorse nor embarrassment. To be a liberal out of power in Canada today is to be allowed the luxury of those sentimental aspects of Mill's philosophy which makes it at one and the same time more attractive and less obviously consistent. Incidentally, it provides one with the credentials for being a member in good standing of the New Democratic Party.

On deeper analysis, then, the apparent contradiction between tory and liberal elements in Mill's theory can be resolved. For, at bottom, all values save the satisfaction of individual interests are only of instrumental worth. But the consistency thus obtained hardly makes Mill's liberalism more palatable. For, if communal values really are of intrinsic worth, then to be a liberal is necessarily to be guilty of self deception, or simply deception. And the humane face of Mill's liberalism can be seen as nothing but attractive make-up unconsciously applied and casually removed once the wooing is over.

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RECENSIONS

John O'Neill, ed., *On Critical Theory*. New York: The Seabury Press, 1976, pp. 265, $14.95 cloth.

The relationship between philosophy and history is a fundamental theme in western thought, the articulation of which is central to philosophical self-understanding. In this regard, the twentieth century is unique; we have access to elaborations ranging from the Platonic to the irrational and the totalitarian — from, in Horkheimer's terms, the apogee of objective reason to the nadir of subjective reason. However, a peculiar unease characterizes the relationship between contemporary self-images and those of the past; the profound discontinuities in the historical experience of this century are paralleled in theoretical reflection. As a result, attempts to articulate the contemporary human condition confront a double problem: under conditions of advanced capitalism, the fragmentation of experience dissolves traditional understandings as it destroys the apparent possible sources of collective identity. What becomes problematic, therefore, is the ability critically to conceptualize the historical experience of the dissociation of social being and social consciousness, and the fragmentation of memory.

Accordingly, the self-image appropriate to critical theoretical discourse is one embodying a profound sensitivity to its own vulnerability. This should not lead to isolation, but rather to efforts aimed at encouraging intellectual dialogue and exchange. Such a sensitivity animates this collection of essays edited by John O'Neill. The twelve articles here address a variety of concerns within critical theory, seen both as a mode of post-Marxian social theorizing and as an actual body of work produced by the "founding fathers" of the Frankfurt School.

In his opening article, "Critique and Remembrance", O'Neill argues that "forgetfulness closes history whereas remembrance keeps open both the past and the utopian future of man" (p. 4). Domination, in his view, produces an "apocalyptic separation of the past from the future" (p. 2), with the result that cognition and sensibility are severed within lived experience. The prospects for liberation — of reintegrating these dimensions of human existence — are dependent, therefore, on a prior, painful fidelity to the historical experience of domination. In this regard, O'Neill upholds Marcuse against Habermas; in his view, Marcuse "preserves the power of suffering and its redemption to mobilize social criticism and political action" (p. 4). Further, he argues that Paulo Freire's "pedagogy of the oppressed" is the practical expression of emancipatory praxis. Thus, he urges a radical reconstruction of existence and its theoretical expression, based on the dialogical process of "conscientization". Only then will theory grasp existence "scientifically".

In contrast to O'Neill, Ben Agger argues for new theoretical formulations "responsive to the altered nature of the socio-cultural world" (p. 12). Against

Adorno, whom he identifies (incorrectly, in my view) with abject resignation and sterile aestheticism, Agger argues for a more concrete and structurally less negative conception of opposition to domination. He is especially critical of Adorno's alleged freezing of the dialectic, by which is meant the illegitimate collapse of hope. Instead, he endorses Marcuse's "new sensibility" and O'Neill's "wild sociology" which, because they reflect still-present currents of prepolitical protest, preserve a kernel of positive hope. For Agger, what is needed is a critical theory which can break the silence of domination, which can "oppose inhumanity in different songs of joy" (p. 32).

Unfortunately, despite the perceptiveness and enthusiasm of the author, the article falls prey to what can be called "nominalism for the insider", evidenced here by an overzealous orchestration of concepts and categories. As a result, some valid concerns expressed in the article are blurred unnecessarily, and others appropriated misleadingly.

Christian Lenhardt's "The Wanderings of Enlightenment" is a detailed examination of Horkheimer and Adorno's analysis of Odysseus in their *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. There, the portrayal is allegorical; the wanderings of Odysseus are recast against the precarious journey of subjective reason in its emancipation from myth. Lenhardt argues that the allegory is valid and of continuing significance inasmuch as the dialectic it identifies between myth and enlightement is still unresolved, but that two factors are responsible for its seeming distance from current experience. Fear of death, he says, and the dread it warrants in the face of the technification of experience, appear to have been eclipsed by emotional frigidity; consequently, even direct assaults on human sensibility are perceived only fragmentarily. Furthermore, the attempt to articulate this eclipse confronts an illusory silence, behind which is the experience of the unthinkable: the reality of Auschwitz. Especially in Adorno, Lenhardt argues, the desperate refusal to relativize this experience becomes problematic in that it tends to embrace a quasi-religious totalization of evil.

According to Paul Piccone in his "Beyond Identity Theory", the Frankfurt thinkers' theoretical synthesis is a frozen philosophical reflection of the 1930s, in that their hostility to Edmund Husserl's early work blinded them to the value of subsequent developments in phenomenological theory. In his view, the critical theorists' rejection of phenomenology precluded their being able to bridge methodologically the disjunction between being and consciousness, and led to what he alleges is the social impotence of critical theory. Piccone further argues that the failure to adopt phenomenology as the epistemological foundation of a reconstructed collective subject left Marcuse and Adorno "with the old Hegelian dialectic and all of its traditional problems" (p. 140). Therefore, a critical appropriation of the Frankfurt School's heritage, from his perspective, would move beyond identity theory — as embodied both in the Hegelian dialectic and in the form of methodological critique which uses the "logic of

the essence'' as its principle weapon.

Curiously, Piccone makes no mention of differences between Adorno and Marcuse. Specifically, in Marcuse's later work, hostility to identity theory increasingly is tempered by speculation regarding human nature. In addition, the suggestion in *An Essay on Liberation* of a ''biological foundation for socialism'' would seem to offer the basis for circumventing many traditional epistemological concerns by focussing on the issue of human needs.

A rambling essay on Erich Fromm by Ken O'Brien and an interesting discussion of Walter Benjamin and the aesthetic problem of temporality by Ioan Davies fill out the thematic first half of the collection. To a greater or lesser extent, the remaining articles deal with the work of Jürgen Habermas, some directly, others indirectly. The articles by Jeremy Shapiro and Shierry Weber are reconstructions of traditional themes in critical theory, the former concerning itself with the Marxian dialectic of nature and history, and the latter with the relationship between self-reflection and aesthetic experience. Shapiro offers an essentially Marcusean reading of Marx, relying on the concept of ''embeddedness in nature'', which describes the domination of the present by the past. His substantive concern, however, is to argue for adoption of Habermas' communication theory of society, on the grounds that it can provide simultaneously an analysis of prehistorical domination and an evolutionary account of the emancipatory rupture with prehistory.

Similarly, Shierry Weber argues that in providing an inter-subjective grounding of domination *and* emancipation in the processes of self-reflection, Habermas' model provides a new basis for relating liberation and the aesthetic. Hence, what is needed, according to her, is a reconstruction of aesthetics which locates its emancipatory power both in the autonomy and reciprocity it presupposes for subject and object, and in the intersubjectivity of self-reflection entailed by aesthetic experience.

Dieter Misgeld and Friedrich Sixel provide accounts of ongoing debates between Habermas, Hans-Georg Gadamer and Niklas Luhmann. These formidably dense articles have the value of making more readily accessible a series of discussions regarding the relationships between critical theory, hermeneutics, and systems theory, which have exercised German-speaking theorists in recent years. However, their very status as introductory summaries imposes serious limitations. The level of abstraction inherent in these debates virtually forbids easy access; at the same time it creates the paradoxical situation in which the utility of introductions is eclipsed by the necessity of direct reference to the original works. For the reader unable to follow the debates in German, the situation is even more problematic in that the relevant literature only now is beginning to be translated.

The articles by H.T. Wilson and Albrecht Wellmer are probably the most rewarding of the twelve, and the most difficult, in that they attempt to bring to

bear recent developments in critical theory on a series of issues ranging from the epistemological reconstruction of Marxism, to the problem of formal and substantive rationality articulated by Max Weber. The core of Wellmer's elegant presentation is Habermas' "epistemological explication of historical materialism" which, in Wellmer's view, provides a critical approach to the problem of instrumental rationality, while avoiding the residual positivist reductionism he alleges to exist in Marx and the first generation of Frankfurt theorists. By grounding emancipatory knowledge in a theory of communication, Wellmer believes that Habermas is establishing the epistemological basis of a future materialist version of the *Phenomenology of Mind* — in other words, a theory realizing the Marxian project of a simultaneous unification and transcendence of idealism and materialism.

Against this view, I would argue that Habermas' communication theory is inappropriate as an emancipatory model in that the central role it allocates to therapeutic "dialogue" tends to vitiate its concern for the restoration of subjecthood and autonomy. First, it abstracts the process of the social construction of reality from the historical content of that reality. I accept as non-controversial the notion that the distortion of humanity by domination is reciprocally related to the distortion of communication. What is problematic is that naming historical reality as domination does not sanction a quasi-Kantian retreat into the realm of the understanding via the hypothesis of the ideal speech situation. At the very least, this fails to counter the possibility of ontological deformation by historical experience. Additionally, the deflation of the public realm effected by such a strategy has serious implications for locating the dynamics of domination. The way out of a "political economy of repression" lies not, I would suggest, in a return to a mythical realm of perfect competition, for the very structure of reified exchange is but a seeming equivalence cloaking substantive inequality. In this sense, the therapeutic dialogue is asymmetrical; the alleged reciprocity embodied in it is purely formal, constituted by the authority and expertise of the analyst.

Wilson examines Habermas' critique of Marcuse's "new science", and attempts to draw out the implications of both positions regarding the Weberian problem of rationality. Additionally, he is concerned to situate this debate in the context of the 1960s debate between Popper and members of the Frankfurt School. He accuses Habermas of misinterpreting Marcuse's position and consequently of arguing that science is inherently instrumental at the level of its formal epistemic structure. For Wilson this is symptomatic, on Habermas' part, of a broader tendency toward an empirical redefinition of Marxism. The implications of such a redefinition, according to Wilson, are a diminished role for theory, and a practical position dangerously close to the piecemeal social engineering approach advocated by Popper. Thus, he argues, " . . . these re-

cent developments in his thinking clearly portend the end of critical theory" (p. 226).

This collection of essays contains a good deal of interesting material, touching a wide variety of issues in and relating to critical theory. Yet to the extent that the increasing availability of the relevant texts has tended to create a readership for critical theory, it has also, I think, diminished the overall utility of introductory compilations. Thus, while this volume is adequate as an introduction, I hope that theorists will move beyond introductions and into the sort of sustained theoretical inquiry that the literature invites.

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James Mallory, *Social Credit and the Federal Power in Canada*. University of Toronto Press, 1977, second edition, pp. xviii, 204, $5.95 paper.

The immediate national preoccupation amongst Canadians about the nation's future has brought into the open more divisive factions than we normally care to acknowledge. Although the conflicts can be analyzed from numerous perspectives, sooner or later attention is focussed on the federal government. Can it respond to problems of regionalism, poverty, multiculturalism, bilingualism, energy and economic expansion? If so, what is the most appropriate response?

Since Canadian academics have long been preoccupied with both the constitution and the Québec question, there is no shortage of books and articles on these subjects. If anything, intellectuals within English Canada have been overly concerned with the stability of the Canadian national system, applauding any move by the federal government to strengthen its position within Confederation. They have argued that Canada's existence depended largely on a strong central government. One such book, *Social Credit and the Federal Power in Canada* has recently been re-issued in paperback, twenty-two years after the original edition.

This is not an age in which it is popular to support the federal government. First, and perhaps most foremost, the national Liberal Party has lost its public appeal. It is aging and while it is still capable of partisan manipulation that knows no decency, there are no new leaders emerging from the ranks. Luckily for them, the other three parties are in equally desperate straits so that voters are being forced to support governments that would otherwise be unattractive.

Secondly, the Liberals are becoming less a force at the provincial level and might soon disappear altogether from that level of government. As political scientist John Wilson has argued, if we develop into a British-style two-party system, there will be no place for Liberals. At present, Liberals govern two small provinces, Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island, which have little influence on national politics. As a consequence, when federal-provincial negotiations take place, Liberals face an array of provincial politicians who would dearly love to see them out of office.

The third factor is that the important issues of today are more often than not provincial problems as defined by the B.N.A. Act. The financial troubles of our cities, urban transit, housing, education and social welfare are provincial responsibilities whereas other areas such as regional disparity, resource development and conservation, transportation and communications are spheres that are either shared or disputed in the courts. In other words, if the federal government wants to remain visible, it finds itself constantly fighting with provincial governments to share political credit. Incentive programs are the primary leverage as the federal government offers a share of its wealth if programs are carried out on its criteria. Needless to say, provinces resent this coercion and do everything within their power to minimize the federal presence.

Fourthly, the mood of the times is distinctly conservative insofar as citizens are rejecting the concept of a large and aggressive government. Instead there is retrenchment away from reform, away from new programs, away from state intervention. The desire for decentralization is not only evident in the Canadian system but also in the U.S. and in Britain. Decentralization is a response to facilitate local control of institutions viewed as irresponsible and out of touch with political demands.

The crisis brought on by the election of the Parti Québécois comes at the most inopportune time for the national government. Outside of Trudeau, whose strength and determination is still widely admired, Ottawa has no moral or political basis for responding to Quebec. The life and vigour of the best and brightest Québécois are on the side of Levesque. His supporters have gained power at a time when most people do not like Liberals, the federal government, its method of operating nor its size. People just want to be left alone. The magical, subliminal message of the Parti Québécois appeals to this impulse, to create an enclave and to be left alone.

Notwithstanding this fatalistic scenario, the federal government can react to the crisis with confidence that history is on its side. Mallory reflects this positive, optimistic approach. "There is nothing inevitable about the survival of Canada as a political entity. It will not be easy to adjust to the present difficulties. But then it never was." (p. XVIII) The withdrawal of Québec from Canada would quickly destroy the Liberal Party, a fact clearly understood by all concerned. Hence it is fighting for its survival as with all the cunning strategy

its masters can muster. Given its history for pulling off the most contrived stunts, this situation is not insurmountable.

Apart from these partisan interests, there is the question of the federal government's constitutional obligation to make sure that the nation continues and that it protects the public interest from internal and external disruptions. The stability of the state, and the responsiveness of federal institutions, has been a central theme in Canadian political science literature; thus, there have been several good treaties over the years on the problems now being faced. Professor Mallory's work lies within this tradition by investigating the effect of a regional political demand on the solidity of the federal system.

The setting in this study was the Aberhart government first elected in Alberta in 1935. At the time Social Credit was thought to be a radical political force, the leaders of which with their strange ideas about monetary policy would destroy the Canadian economic system. The book covers a lot of ground that is now essentially taken for granted. However, the author reviews a time during which the federal government had no qualms about exercising its authority. As Mallory points out, challenges to the federal government were systemic, indicating populist responses to the inequalities inherent in both political and economic structures.

Ottawa's authority has been challenged consistently by provincial governments because of contradictory partisan interests, policy objectives and class interests. Professor Mallory argues that more often than not the provinces have generated new political demands (p. 180) in almost every area of social and economic policy which have forced the federal government into the position of reacting against regional activities. Viewing themselves as sources of innovation and reform, the provinces have resisted federal intervention and fought for greater autonomy.

The power of disallowance was the sledge hammer used by the federal government whenever it needed to ensure the continuation of the national interest over provincial or regional interests. It was invoked primarily against the West (p. 169), a part of the country long recognized for its radical, if at times somewhat oddball, schemes. The best known case was the disallowance in 1937 of Alberta's effort to control its own fiscal policy. Ottawa's firm position was that this was clearly federal jurisdiction. While they were willing to bargain and to assist with the expanding depression era provincial debt, the federal cabinet resisted surrendering their jurisdictional dominance in economic and fiscal matters.

The federal cabinet, moreover, has never responded favourably to provincial legislation that in any manner threatened its own view of national stability. Perhaps they shared Mallory's viewpoint that:

> There are those who regard it as a happy feature of Canadian federalism that the provinces are laboratories of social experiment in which a part of the Canadian people are free to explore novel avenues of public policy. Laboratories in unskilled hands may lead to unheralded explosions. The power of disallowance, in conjunction with other conservative forces in the consitution, minimizes the possibility of such disasters. In liberal theory the desirability of a variety of human experience may be a self evident proposition, but the laboratory technicians in such experiments are too often cast in the image of William Aberhart. (p. 180)

Thus Mallory writing in the fifties shared the attitude common in Canadian political science that Ottawa was the senior government, wiser and more responsible than the provinces. He was, of course, a product of his times as few researchers were involved in original field work in the provinces. We still lack a great deal of scholarly investigation of provincial and municipal politics in the first half of the century mainly because academics considered them peripheral to events in Ottawa, in every sense the nation's capital.

Disallowances were very common in early federal provincial relations particularly in the first twenty years until Laurier's government in 1896. The federal cabinet exercised its power (under section 56 and 90 of the B.N.A. Act) to disallow 112 provincial acts. They justified their actions on four grounds: (a) that the legislation was *ultra vires*, (b) that the act was prejudicial to a particular group such as a racial minority, (c) that it was prejudicial to private interests or (d) it was contrary to the federal notion of sound and responsible government action. Since the provinces reacted strenuously to these interventions, many challenged the federal government in the courts. Many judicial decisions particularly in the late nineteenth century favoured the provinces and gradually these "lesser" governments established grounds for their demands for legislative independence to develop their own policies.

The Canadian federal system has operated differently since the thirties inasmuch as we are all probably more familiar with televised conference confrontation, federal-provincial agreements and all provincial gatherings than with arbitrary federal action. It is no longer feasible from a political perspective at any rate for the federal government to thwart a provincial program by exercising its power of disallowance. Richard Simeon's argument (in his *Federal-Provincial Diplomacy*) is that the bargaining strategy amongst civil servants accounts for the resolution of most inter-governmental disputes. If this is the case then disallowance is far too extreme a weapon where the objective is consensus,

not conflict. Finally, the fact is that many of the important spheres of activity have shifted to the provinces so that the national government can no longer pretend to be the sole actor. In fact, more often than not, it must negotiate its way into provincial domains through its phenomenal wealth vis-à-vis the provinces.

In this context, Mallory's work is an exceptional study of the resolution of constitutional conflict at a time when Ottawa politicians and public servants had little difficulty in convincing themselves of their role in the future of the nation. The West felt the brunt of these interventions and as the writer points out, that region has never forgotten or forgiven the eastern establishment for developing the hinterland in its own image. The book is written to give the reader a feeling for the challenge afforded by the growth of third parties. Their origins in the hinterland were alien to both Liberals and Conservatives. Neither party had a grasp of the significance of populism as the westerner's gut reaction to national policies. However, their arguments against Confederation were always advanced within existing institutions whose survival amazed observers. Mallory's weakness stems from sharing this fascination with Ottawa's survival. While he admits in a new forward that the legitimacy of the federal government has been severely challenged in the past, Mallory comments that "the emergency of some externally generated threat has persuaded Canadians that strong central authority over economic policy is essential to survival. The effectiveness of this role will present a challenge to the resources of political leadership in Canada." (pp. XVII-XVIII)

The past is no simpler than the present. To hope to solve the present crisis with yesterday's strategies and weapons is a false premise for a federal strategy. For those who would like to see the federal government move with determination and overrule Québec legislation, Mallory's book is no comfort. Disallowance has been applied against the West, not against Québec. Instead the Liberal governments since the thirties have bargained or argued in the courts for consensus. If one party does not want to bargain, then it is not at all clear what the federal government can do about it.

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Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, with a commentary by Bernard Brodie, Princeton University Press, 1976, pp. 717, $18.50 cloth.

Carl von Clausewitz's great treatise, *On War*, like other modern classics by such theorists as Adam Smith, Darwin and Marx, is a book often cited but

seldom read, even by specialists in the field of military history. The original works being adjudged difficult and the modern student being deluged by the new material that rolls off the presses every year, one prefers later writers' commentaries on the great seminal thinkers, pre-digested and interpreted. Often the original works *are* difficult, written or translated in a dated style and requiring considerable investment in time and energy to read. *On War* is a good example of this. The first edition appeared in 1832 after the author's death in November, 1831, from a heart attack precipitated by cholera. The second German edition, published in 1856, introduced changes into the text which obscured or misrepresented the meaning and which were retained in subsequent editions. The first English translation, by the British Colonel J.J. Graham in 1874, worked from the altered text, contained many obscurities and inaccuracies, and the second, by Professor O.J. Matthijs in 1943, although clearer, continued to be based on the altered German text rather than on the original.

To provide a more accurate and up-to-date translation of Clausewitz's great work in response to a growing interest in his writings, we now have the third English translation of *On War*. This impressive new edition was translated from the 1832 text by Peter Paret, Professor of History at Stanford University, and Michael Howard, Fellow of All Souls, Oxford, under the auspices of the Center of International Studies, Princeton University. Both men are experts in the field of nineteenth-century military history and are therefore well-qualified to interpret the ambiguities and obscurities in Clausewitz's writing while retaining the flavour of the original style and vocabulary. The result is a clear, readable text which encourages the reader to discover Clausewitz's ideas on war through the Prussian's own words. To clarify these ideas further, the third collaborator on this edition, Bernard Brodie, Professor of Political Science at the University of California at Los Angeles, has contributed a useful commentary to guide the reader through the text, book-by-book, chapter-by-chapter. Each collaborator has also written an introductory essay exploiting his respective field of expertise to comment on the origins, the impact and the continuing influence of *On War*.

In the opening essay, "The Genesis of *On War*," Professor Paret discusses Clausewitz's career, and the influences which caused him, after the conclusion of the Napoleonic wars, to begin a collection of essays "which gradually coalesced into a comprehensive theory that sought to define universal, permanent elements in war on the basis of a realistic interpretation of the present and the past." It is Clausewitz, the realistic, pragmatic observer of war, rather than the dogmatic, systems-maker, that Paret stresses. Having encountered his first battlefield as a thirteen-year old ensign in the Prussian infantry, served under both Scharnhorst and Gneisenau in the age of Prussian military reforms after the disaster at Jena in 1806, transferred to the Russian army in 1812, and taken

part in the final defeat of Napoleon in 1815, when his corps of Prussians tied down Grouchy's force until the issue at Waterloo had been decided, Clausewitz wrote about war from first-hand knowledge, and the influence of the great Napoleon fills his pages.

Clausewitz's experience in war led him to three conclusions which were developed in *On War*. He rejected any single standard for fighting wars, since military institutions and the manner in which they were used were linked with the social, political and economic conditions of individual states. Clausewitz therefore also rejected the prevailing dogma that victory could be won by observing binding rules for warfare: each case had to be considered on its merits and the influence of chance could not be obviated by following the procedures laid down by the eighteenth-century strategists. Elasticity rather than dogma forms the pattern for success as Clausewitz describes the full range of possibilities on the battlefield. Finally, he began developing his idea that war was a political phenomenon and that everything that went into war should accord with war's political purpose. "Just as war and its institutions reflected their social environment, so every aspect of fighting should be suffused by its political impulse, whether this impulse was intense or moderate." Thus Clausewitz rejected the efforts of those, like Bülow and Jomini, who attempted to turn war into a predictive science, and instead sought a higher truth, stressing violence, political factors, and human intelligence, emotion, and will, as forces dominating the field of battle.

Although Clausewitz eschewed a rationalist (or systematic) approach to war, he was, as Paret points out, saved from "the anarchy of pure pragmatism" by his method which employed an interplay between observation (small details led to an understanding of large forces), historical interpretation (Scharnhorst taught him that military theory was dependent upon history), and German speculative philosophy (the search for absolute truth and the regulative idea). His method, as Rothfels pointed out in 1943, was coordination of philosophy with experience. Above all, Paret stresses that Clausewitz was interested in cutting to the core of reality about the phenomenon of war; and his method "transformed reality into analyzable form . . . ." Paret uses the development of the concept of friction — imponderable factors, such as ignorance, human error, bad weather, politics, which interfered with the effective application of force — as an example of Clausewitz's ability in this direction; through friction he rendered the important element of chance subject to theoretical analysis. Unlike his eighteenth-century predecessors, Clausewitz welcomed chance, believing that a genius could exploit it positively through initiative on the battlefield.

Also in line with his penchant for reality was Clausewitz's emphasis on violence as the essence of war. To overcome Rococo theory of bloodless conflict, he advocated extreme violence in waging war; yet he understood that extreme

violence was impossible because in the real world friction would ameliorate abstract violence. Hence he developed the dual nature of war in which history served to provide examples of graduations of violence. History is therefore a key to Clausewitz's intellectual system: history depicted reality and theory's role was to help one understand history.

Michael Howard examines the influence of Clausewitz to the present day and asserts that "later writers were to quarry ideas and phrases to suit the needs of their own theories and their own times." The elements that most impressed posterity were the intrinsic violence of war and the importance of chance; Clausewitz's other great principle, the necessity to subordinate war to political purposes, was neglected, partly, Howard claims, because Clausewitz died before making the revisions which would have emphasized it. The distorted view of *On War* gained acceptance throughout Europe but particularly in Germany before World War One. German strategic planning for war took little account of political factors and, in turn, politicians sought not to interfere with the military planners. The Schlieffen Plan, which turned a Balkan dispute into a world war, is an example of the primacy of military over political ends; but, after war had been declared, the supremacy of battle actuated all of the belligerent powers.

Between 1914 and 1918 the generals continued to be selective in their reading of Clausewitz. They ignored his teaching on the superiority of the defence to the offense, preferring his ideas on the importance of moral forces (which sent thousands of young French soldiers to death in the summer of 1914) and of destroying the enemy in battle (which justified millions of casualties in Flanders, the Somme and Verdun). Policy seemed to have lost its control over war. Hence, in the general tide of disillusionment following the war, Clausewitz's reputation suffered in the English-speaking world, particularly at the hands of Sir Basil Liddell Hart, whose criticisms Howard calls "distorted, inaccurate and unfair."

Howard treats Clausewitz's influence on World War II in one short paragraph, which is disappointing, since in a war of movement on a vast scale it would have been interesting to know his influence on the German Panzer generals, like Rommel and Guderian, and allied generals, like Montgomery, Eisenhower and Patton. Howard is more provocative, however, when it comes to the Korean war which he credits with leading to a revival of Clausewitzian studies since it forced the United States government to grapple with Clausewitzian problems: the relation between civilian and military power (Truman vs. MacArthur) and the conduct of a war for limited aims. Although Howard points to the primacy of political aims and limited war in the contemporary world, he does not explore the experience in Vietnam in the light of Clausewitz's teaching, although Clausewitz understood the principle of "escalation".

The purpose of Bernard Brodie's introductory essay, "The Continuing Relevance of *On War*," is to help the reader avoid misunderstanding the work. He warns of the real or imagined difficulties in reading *On War*, and asks whether, in the Nuclear Age, it is worth the trouble. It is, he answers, because "Clausewitz's work stands out among those very few older books which have presented profound and original insights that have *not* been adequately absorbed in later literature." Moreover, his stands alone as "the only truly great book on war." But any reader who expects formulae or axioms as guides to action will be disappointed: "Clausewitz, on the contrary invites his readers to ruminate with him on the complex nature of war, where any rule that admits of no exceptions is usually too obvious to be worth much discourse." Expect insights into the essence of war but prepare also to stop for reflection. It is with this challenge that Brodie invites the reader to begin *On War*.

Before his death Clausewitz had succeeded in revising to his satisfaction only the first chapter of Book One of the eight books that comprise *On War*. In 1827 he wrote that, "If an early death should terminate my work, what I have written so far would, of course only deserve to be called a shapeless mass of ideas. Being liable to endless misinterpretation it would be the target of much half-baked criticism . . . ." The present edition seeks to correct the misunderstandings and rescue Clausewitz's reputation from historians like Liddell Hart and Major-General J.F.C. Fuller, the latter of whom wrote in 1961 that Clausewitz "indirectly was largely responsible for the vast extension of unlimited warfare in the twentieth century." Although the new translation is crisp and clear, only the dedicated specialist will sit down to read *On War* from cover to cover. It *is* long, it *is* repetitious, and much of it *is* fragmentary and inchoate. Yet here is a book which one can dip into with great profit and return to again and again for the brilliant insights it offers into the nature of war. It is, in short, a book which no student of general or military history can ignore.

For *On War* is two things: it is a treatise on the phenomenon of war and a present-minded handbook prescribing the means for a state like Prussia to survive in an age of revolutionary warfare. The stark definition of war ("War is . . . an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.") and the repetition of the theme of violence and bloodshed was meant to overcome the lingering Enlightenment theories of the bloodless battlefield. "Kind-hearted people might of course think there was some ingenious way to disarm or defeat an enemy without too much bloodshed, and might imagine that this is the true goal of the art of war. Pleasant as it sounds, it is a folly that must be exposed . . . ." Clausewitz reacts too against the eighteenth-century idea that war, like the rest of man's activities, is solely a product of man's reason. Rather, "If war is an act of force, the emotions cannot fail to be involved." Indeed, even the progress of civilization does not obviate "the impulse to destroy the enemy," a fact which improvement in weaponry substantiates. Having demolished the

Enlightenment belief in progress and civilization, Clausewitz asserts that in the act of war, there can be no logical limit to violence.

But Clausewitz is above all a realist. He states clearly that his absolute war of utmost violence, "a pure concept of war," is for purposes of argument only, an extreme belonging to the field of abstract thought. In practice, absolute war is mitigated by "the probabilities of real life."

> If we were to think purely in abstract terms, we should avoid every difficulty by the stroke of a pen and proclaim with inflexible logic that since the extreme must always be the goal, the greatest effort must always be exerted. Any such pronouncement would be an abstraction and would leave the real world quite unaffected.

Clausewitz thus denies the possibility of absolute military solutions to political problems in terms as applicable in the second half of the twentieth century, in Vietnam or the Middle East for instance, as when he wrote. In the real world, war should be subordinate to political policy: it should never be considered "as *something autonomous* but always as an *instrument of policy*," in the famous phrase, "a continuation of political activity by other means." This was the clear message that his nineteenth-century admirers chose to neglect and Clausewitz cannot be blamed for their action. Indeed, he understood that war is "a province of social life," and nineteenth-century ideas of conflict, Social Darwinism, and glorification of military values determined attitudes to war, not Clausewitz. He was used to justify and lend weight to ideas in existence and passages that did not accord with prevailing ideas were regretted or ignored. In fact, *On War* contains warnings against a light-hearted or irresponsible attitude to war: Clausewitz asserts that war is a deadly business and shows an appreciation for the dangers of the battlefield and suffering of combatants lacking in the general staffs of Europe prior to World War One. Of course, men like Schlieffen, Foch, and Wilson had never witnessed the horrors of total war as had Clausewitz.

Yet, by 1914 European society had altered drastically from Clausewitz's time. Democratic government, mass literacy, and surging nationalism placed great strain on his dictum that state policy should dominate war. Without popular involvement in war, political aims could dominate, statesmen could take decisions free from public opinion and the gap between reality and absolute war would be very wide. The Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars had gone a far way toward changing that state of affairs. Between 1914 and 1918, however, war became truly total and Clausewitz has the explanation: "The

more powerful and inspiring the motives for war . . . the closer war will approach its abstract concept . . . the more closely will the military aims and the political objects of war coincide, and the more military and less political will war appear to be." The Second World War, with strategic bombing of cities, extermination camps, unconditional surrender, and atomic bombings, furthered the trend. We should not, however, like Fuller, blame Clausewitz; rather, he helps us understand why war developed as it did. Furthermore, in the age of nuclear stalemate, he also helps us understand why wars, like the Korean and Vietnamese, were limited insofar as the generals were restrained from "winning" by political factors, political factors which, in turn, render absolute war (one hopes) more than ever an abstraction.

In defining the role of war vis-à-vis political policy and war as a social institution, a product of man's civilization, always with us, *On War* is not therefore a dead classic, but as relevant today as it was in the nineteenth century. Indeed, the experience of two world wars should cause twentieth century strategists to heed its lessons more than did their nineteenth-century predecessors: war is dangerous, each case must be approached on its own merits, and national policy must dominate military policy. The great issues that Clausewitz described with such brilliance are still with us; and because of nuclear weapons, his concept of pure war assumes a special significance. This attractive new edition, with its useful introductory and explanatory material, is therefore particularly welcome at this time. It should encourage the reader to read Clausewitz for himself rather than to depend upon the often distorted views of his interpreters.

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