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Contents/Sommaire

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ADVERTISING, NEEDS, AND "COMMODITY FETISHISM"

Stephen Kline and William Leiss

After reviewing the literature on consumer behaviour one is tempted to conclude that in no other domain has so much research yielded so little insight. Market researchers are everywhere, noting our responses to the latest inspiration from the product designer's imagination. Sometimes it seems that in the vortex of momentary consumer preferences all structured aspects of human needs have dissolved, and have been replaced by the mere succession of discrete and perfectly interchangeable wants. Most social scientists who do empirical research refrain from venturing critical comments on this situation. On the other hand, the familiar concepts used in the radical critique of market society — especially the notion of commodity fetishism — have had a purely rhetorical function, because so little attempt has been made to give them some empirical content. This article represents our first tentative steps toward an analytical approach that differs from both of these.[1]

The study was based upon a hypothesis about contemporary consumer behaviour developed in a recent book written by one of us.[2] This hypothesis suggests that we should expect to find increasing ambiguity and confusion in the sense of "satisfaction" that is experienced in the consumption process. We decided to look at the way advertisements are composed in order to determine whether we could refine and elaborate the hypothesis.[3] (Since our methodology is "diagnostic", it does not constitute a test of the hypothesis; we sought to clarify and elaborate the hypothesis through empirical investigations.) It is important to note at the outset that we do not view advertising as the *cause* of this presumed ambiguity and confusion. Rather, we were attempting to see whether advertisements present or reflect ambiguous "messages" to consumers.

Our study of advertising is intended to lay the basis, in part, for new approaches to a theory of social change. In the social science models that celebrate the "consumer society", general increases in consumption levels — understood as increased access to commodities — are regarded as *prima facie* evidence of social progress. Needless to say, we do not accept this view; and it is interesting to note (as discussed later) that this view is now being challenged from a variety

of standpoints. But we also reject the outlook that is found almost universally in the "radical" critique of capitalist society. This outlook has two principal features: (1) the sphere of consumption is "subordinate" to that of production; (2) "commodity fetishism" results in the manipulation of consciousness, and this false consciousness (and the false needs arising from it) inhibits the development of popular demands for realizing traditional socialist goals in industrially-advanced societies.

The final section outlines two ideas which we suggest as guidelines for further work. The first is that social tensions arising from efforts to define different structures of needs and need-satisfaction will constitute the main source of social change options in the coming years. The second is that whatever resolution emerges will be quite different from the expectations of both the apologists for the consumer society and the proponents of the traditional socialist visions.

I: Consumer Behaviour and Commodity Fetishism

In Section II below the notion of a "consumer culture" is outlined in rough fashion, in order to specify the objectives of our advertising study. This notion has been assembled from bits and pieces of several theories; it represents our understanding and reformulation of theories of marketplace behaviour that criticize the dominant paradigms found in conventional economics. First we shall present and comment on two recent studies, Tibor Scitovsky's *The Joyless Economy* and Fred Hirsch's *Social Limits to Growth*, and then we shall turn to the theory of commodity fetishism handed down in the Marxist tradition.

Scitovsky set out to undermine the economic theory of rational behaviour and consumer sovereignty. This is made up of the following propositions: (1) what the consumer chooses to do is an accurate reflection of his tastes, i.e., his behaviour is revealed by his preferences and *vice versa*; (2) the consumer develops his own tastes and preferences independently of those of other consumers; (3) without sufficient means to satisfy all of his desires, the consumer must "keep unsatisfied margins on all his needs and desires", in order to insure that "any extra dollar he spends on one thing yields him as much satisfaction as that extra dollar would if he spent it on any other thing."[4]

Scitovsky challenges his fellow economists by turning against them their most cherished value: he claims that the theory is *unscientific* in its portrayal of human psychology. He points out that the accepted theory simply cannot account at all for the obvious fact that the individual's preferences change over time — or, more precisely, that it cannot show *why* or *how* preferences change, as they obviously do. These changes are understandable only in relation to a social process of interpersonal relationships. Moreover, there is a reciprocal rela-

tion between changing preferences and changes in the sense of satisfaction derived from any particular activity; in Scitovsky's words, the dominant paradigm "overlooks the possibility that the same influences that modify our tastes might also modify our ability to derive satisfaction from the things that cater to our tastes."

Expressed in its simplest terms, Scitovsky's analysis attempts to explain why the expected correlation between greater happiness and rises in real income does not occur. He refers to empirical studies done in the U.S. between 1946 and 1970: "Over this period, almost twenty-five years, per capita real income rose by 62 per cent, yet the proportion of people who consider themselves very happy, fairly happy, and not too happy has hardly changed at all. Our economic welfare is forever rising, but we are no happier as a result."[5] He claims that the conventional economic paradigms cannot account for this, and he attempts to construct a theory that will do so.

There are four dimensions. First, there is empirical evidence that people derive satisfaction from status itself, that is, from relative social ranking or interpersonal comparisons that occur at *any* income level. Second, satisfaction is derived from work, but again largely as a function of the *relative* income and "prestige" attributes of a particular job in the social hierarchy. Third, satisfaction correlates positively with novelty in one's experiences, but our own culture tends to standardize experience and progressively reduce novelty. Fourth, material progress is translated primarily into increasing comfort. Comfort, however, is like addiction: we become accustomed to it and soon take it for granted; the presence of new comforts cease to give pleasure in themselves, and only being deprived of them makes us feel the pleasure of having them (central heating, indoor toilets, adequate quantities of food, for example). "Taken together", Scitovsky concludes, "they well explain why happiness should depend so much on one's ranking in society and so little on the absolute level of one's income."

The background context that makes sense of this "rank-happiness" is, of course, the market or commodity-oriented society. Most individual activity is directed at increasing income that serves as the access to purchasing goods and services. This context steadily depreciates the value of activities that do not serve this objective, including the intrinsic satisfactions that might otherwise be derived from work creativity or informal interpersonal relationships. No stable or permanent sense of satisfaction is achieved simply by virtue of the fact that most individuals have a higher "standard of living" than preceding generations had.

There are many other interesting aspects of Scitovsky's analysis that we shall not comment on here. What has been presented above is complemented, from a slightly different angle, by Hirsch's *Social Limits to Growth*. The basic similarity in the two books rests on the impact of changes in individual

preferences on the *social* consequences of economic growth. Hirsch argues that, once "basic material necessities" are met for the majority of the population in a market-exchange economy, there is intensified competition for what he calls "positional" goods. Since these goods are scarce by their very nature, the intensified competition for them yields no net benefits for individuals (the proportion of individuals in the population who get them remains roughly constant), and at the same time there is a high social cost incurred.

What are positional goods? These are goods which define social status differences among individuals; their value lies chiefly in the fact that some persons possess them and others do not. For example, to be able to move to a suburban community to escape a decaying urban environment can be such a good; those who can do so enjoy access both to city and countryside. But when and if many people become suburbanites the advantages are largely negated: the urban culture has declined so much that it no longer is worth visiting, and the nearby countryside has been swallowed up by the newer suburban developments. All that remains for most is the well-known emptiness of suburbia itself. Another example is access to scenic beauty or foreign cultures. When only a few persons have the means of access, the advantages to them are enormous, as is the social "distance" between them and those who cannot afford the costs. An increasing general level of affluence opens the gates, but at the price of sharply devaluing the experience, due to overcrowding and the resultant deterioration in the quality of the sites.

The deterioration of overcrowded sites is an example of the social costs resulting from positional competition. A better example can be drawn from the relationship between jobs and educational qualifications. It is a well-known fact that the level of educational requirements for jobs has been steadily increasing, and that in most cases this bears little or no relation to the requisite job skills. The flaw lies in individual assumptions about the correlation between formal education and high-paying jobs. The proportion of "top" positions in society remains approximately the same, but larger numbers of individuals now compete for them. Stiffer educational qualifications are one of the screening mechanisms used to sort out the competitors. The same proportion succeed now as in the past; but society pays the enormous cost of larger facilities for formal education for all the competitors.

In different ways both Scitovsky and Hirsch are concerned with one of the key aspects of a competitive, market-oriented society which has reached a certain general level of material affluence: the importance of the symbolic attributes of goods, and the ways in which rank and status are attached to them. This is by its very nature an intractable problem — within the self-imposed limits of that society. When *relative position* is at stake, then the society will and must create new scarcities at every turn — that is, new *symbols of success* to

be striven for. It matters little what is chosen to signify status differences. The important point is that there is no limit to the process.

Hirsch understands what he calls positional competition as intrinsically related to a commodity-oriented economy: one of his chapters is entitled "The New Commodity Fetishism". The positional economy is in fact largely an expression of a "bias to material commodities":

> The concept of a commodity bias, therefore, implies that an excessive proportion of individual activity is channeled through the market so that the commercialized sector of our lives is unduly large. A related concept which is suggested by this approach is a "commercialization effect" — meaning the effect on satisfaction from any activity or transaction being undertaken on a commercial basis through market exchange or its equivalent, as compared with its being undertaken in some other way.[6]

Hirsch uses the phrase "commodity fetishism" in a book which, while it is highly critical of our present society, is not "Marxist" in the usual sense. Yet of course this concept is one of the great hallmarks in the Marxist critique of capitalism. Most authors who write in the Marxist tradition continue to use it as a concept which accurately depicts key aspects of capitalist society down to the present day. On further examination, however, there appear to be serious difficulties in this approach. Marx used it in a very restrictive sense, and used in this sense it does not have very wide relevance for a critical assessment of contemporary society. Moreover, there is a basic flaw in Marx's conception that has gone largely unnoticed since his time.

Marx developed the concept of commodity fetishism from his prior discussion of use-value and exchange-value. The former constitutes the "matter" of the commodity, the latter its "form". The crucial aspect of this analysis is that the fetishism of which he speaks *arises only with respect to the form of the product*. The relevant passages are well-known:

> The mystical character of the commodity does not therefore arise from its use-value . . . Whence, then, arises the enigmatic character of the product of labour, as soon as it assumes the form of a commodity? Clearly it arises from this form itself . . . The mysterious character of the commodity-form consists therefore simply in the fact that

> the commodity reflects the social characteristics of man's own labour as objective characteristics of the products of labour themselves, as the socio-natural properties of these things . . . the products of labour become commodities, sensuous things which are at the same time supra-sensible or social.[7]

These passages are so familiar, so much taken for granted after repeated citation, that we rarely ask the obvious questions: What exactly is the "mystery" that is alluded to here? The division of labour has stamped the products of human activity with a social character as far back as our anthropological researches permit us to go. Was not the dual character of objects — as sensuous things and as objects whose significance is established by cultural forms — always quite obvious? Further: is Marx claiming that people actually are mystified by this duality? Or that people do not recognize the characteristics of their labour in the properties of produced objects?

Let us recall the subsequent passages to see whether further light is shed on these questions:

> . . . the commodity-form, and the value-relation of the products of labour within which it appears, have absolutely no connection with the physical nature of the commodity and the material relations arising out of this. It is nothing but the definite social relation between men themselves which assumes here, for them, the fantastic form of a relation between things. In order, therefore, to find an analogy we must take flight into the misty realm of religion. There the products of the human brain appear as autonomous figures endowed with a life of their own, which enter into relations both with each other and with the human race. So it is in the world of commodities with the products of men's hands. I call this the fetishism which attaches itself to the products of labour as soon as they are produced as commodities, and is therefore inseparable from the production of commodities.[8]

The analogy with religion makes clear what is the essential point about the commodity: it is a physical object that *appears* to have a "life of its own". This is consistent with the understanding of fetishes in "primitive" religion: a fetish

is an object which itself is thought to possess certain powers, thus differing from an idol, which only symbolizes the power of, say, a deity.

Three points are worthy of note. First, Marx states that the commodity form has "*absolutely* no connection with the physical nature of the commodity" (our italics). Thus it is not something arising out of the interplay of form and matter in the commodity — that is, the inherent duality of the commodity itself — that produces the mystery; its mysterious character is solely a function of the form alone. Second, the passage suggests that *all* systems of goods-exchange which are sufficiently extensive to require a separate commodity as a medium of exchange have this result: the fetishism of commodities bears no intrinsic relation to the capitalist mode of production. Third, Marx gives no indication *how* the fetishism occurs under capitalist relations. In other words, if the commodity *form* is the generalized fetish, what specific kinds of fetishistic activities occur?

In order to develop his point, Marx contrasts the medieval and modern periods. Economic relations in the former are largely "services in kind and payments in kind", and "the social relations between individuals in the performance of their labour appear at all events as their own personal relations, and are not disguised as social relations between things, between the products of labour". One might ask whether this is an accurate picture of medieval social relations, i.e., whether labour did "appear" as a form of *personal* relation, or whether the fundamental distinction between noble and non-noble (which may have been a kind of fetishism also) was not in fact the different disguise of that period.

There may be little disagreement with the suggestion that there are different forms of reification in social relations. The question remains: What exactly is the reification in capitalist commodity production? What exactly is "the whole mystery of commodities, all the magic and necromancy that surrounds the products of labour on the basis of commodity production?"[9] At the end of the chapter on commodity fetishism, Marx refers to what he regards as a series of conceptual errors by earlier economic theorists; and these are apparently the source of the fetishism. It seems somewhat of an exaggeration to speak of these as "magic" and "necromancy", but this may be merely quibbling. The important point is that the kinds of notions Marx refers to were gradually rejected in the further development of "bourgeois" economic theory — in other words, they reflect the immature phase of a discipline which was attempting to represent in conceptual terms the complex mechanisms of a generalized market exchange economy.

We would like to conclude only with a series of questions: (1) Did Marx's concept of commodity fetishism refer only (or chiefly) to "ideological" elements in economic theories up to his day? (2) Are there specific concepts in

contemporary non-Marxist economic theories that are expressions of commodity fetishism? (If so, what are they?) (3) Did Marx mean that "ordinary individuals" in the capitalist society of his day, as opposed to economists, were mystified —i.e., made mistakes in their choices or opinions — because of the way the system of commodity production operated? If so, what specific kinds of mistakes did they make? (4) Is it the case that individuals today make the same (or different) mistakes for the same reasons?

Our tentative conclusion is that one can give a clear affirmative answer only to the first of these questions. If this is the case, then the concept of commodity fetishism has a narrow range of application. Moreover, as Marshall Sahlins has argued, there is a crucial flaw in Marx's approach that weakens its critical thrust. Marx assumed that both needs and utilities are "objective" conditions that can be specified without ambiguity. Sahlins notes that for Marx the commodity as a use-value "is perfectly intelligible: it satisfies human needs". He refers to the passages in which Marx states that there is nothing mysterious in the properties of objects in so far as they are use-values, and he comments:

> But notice that to achieve this transparency of signification by comparison with commodity fetishism, Marx was forced to trade away the social determination of use-values for the biological fact that they satisfy "human wants". This in contrast to his own best understanding that production is not simply the reproduction of human life, but a definite way of life. From such (cultural) understanding it would follow that all utilities are symbolic. Insofar as "utility" is the concept of "need" appropriate to a certain cultural order, it must include a representation, by way of concrete properties of the object, of the differential relations between persons — as contrasts of color, line, or fabric between women's clothes and men's signify the cultural valuation of the sexes. The "system of needs" must always be relative, not accountable as such by physical necessity, hence symbolic by definition.[10]

The idea of the *symbolic constitution of utility* is indispensable for a critique of consumer behaviour in an industrially-advanced society.[11]

If the commodity *qua* commodity has an enigmatic character, i.e., if it has such a character solely by virtue of its form, then one of two conclusions must follow. Either there is no problem here, as the apologists for market society

claim; or, if there is a problem (as its critics say), there is no solution to it. For no industrial society, however dedicated to the ideals of communism, could abolish the commodity form entirely, at least not without running the risk of erecting a dictatorship of tastes in its place. If there is only direct production for use in small community groups, then each group can suit its peculiar tastes; but this restricts the assortment of goods to what handicrafts can produce. Industrial production depends on extensive exchanges; the expression of individual preferences and a pricing mechanism — which may be limited in its scope by express policies on the basis of welfare considerations — has a place in facilitating those exchanges.

But we cannot begin to understand how to design such policies — that is, how to limit the destructive effects of commodity-oriented consumption patterns — if we do not recognize the symbolic constitution of utility. It is the key to Scitovsky's dilemmas of rank-happiness, to Hirsch's dilemmas of the positional economy — and to the fetish of the commodity (*not* the commodity-form) as *the embodiment of psychologically-grounded attributes.* (For example, the association of automobiles with animals and the qualities conventionally ascribed to them.)

We agree with Sahlins that all utilities in all cultures are symbolic. In a society like ours, where large numbers of people participate daily in extensive market exchanges, there is a *double* symbolic process at work. One facet of it is the symbolism consciously employed in the manufacture and sale of the product, including the imagery employed in the advertising designs. The second facet is the symbolic associations selectively employed by consumers in "constructing" lifestyle models; the whole marketplace is divided into semi-autonomous sectors which respond to different cues or to the same cues in different ways.

We do not pretend to have developed adequately this concept of the double symbolic constitution of utility at this time. We hope to do so in the context of refining our advertising research design, a preliminary version of which is presented later in this paper. It is introduced by an overview statement on the consumer culture as a whole.

II: The Consumer Culture

The phrase "consumer culture" is used as a designation for the network of expectations and aspirations that form the broader context of specific consumption activities. Until recently the development of the consumer culture had been regarded as a "private" matter, i.e., one which involved only the individual citizen's judgments and preferences. This is no longer the case; in

Canada and elsewhere, governments claim that inflation is in part a function of accelerating expectations and they try to combat this acceleration of expectations with both rhetoric and policies.

The nature of the popular expectations associated with consumption activity is now seen as a major social problem, indeed as a problem which must be confronted by explicit social policies. In its crudest form this problem stems from the fact that market-based expectations — demands for goods and services — apparently had begun to rise much faster than the rate of growth in GNP. In the context of a remarkably stable configuration in income distribution in industrialized nations, this increase in expectations leads to social pressures requiring some form of government intervention.

The real difficulty posed by this development is that this "take-off" of expectations occurred after an exceptionally long period of real growth in GNP and in personal incomes. In other words, increasing affluence seems to lead not to a higher level of contentment, but rather to its opposite — a sense of *relative* deprivation that is no less "painful" than the visible poverty of earlier epochs. If market-based expectations rise at a rate faster than real growth in GNP, then there will be increasing social tensions at any rate of economic growth that can be reasonably expected to occur.

It has become customary to explain the main features of consumer behaviour on the basis of a postulate or axiom known as "the insatiability of human wants". This has been formulated in various ways, and perhaps the most common runs as follows: the satisfaction of a want simultaneously occasions the formation of other wants. This syndrome is supposedly rooted in the peculiarities of human psychology, and it is assumed that there is no natural limits to this process. Human wants, if left unchecked, will expand indefinitely. In order to improve our understanding of the consumer culture, we must take a closer look at the experience labelled "the satisfaction of wants", which is the key element in the axiom of insatiability.

When we say that the satisfaction of a want triggers new wants, we are assuming that what we call "the satisfaction of a want" is an identifiable experience with known properties. Is this indeed the case? For all practical purposes in today's society we can regard the marketplace as the context for want-satisfactions; that is, the objectives of wants normally are purchasable goods and services. To comprehend the experience of want-satisfaction, therefore, we must appreciate the specific features of its contextual setting.

Today's consumption process takes place in what may be called a "high-intensity market setting". This is a social setting wherein large numbers of individuals have access to a very extensive array of goods, and where the characteristics of goods are complex and are subject to frequent changes. The individual's wants are themselves complex states of feeling, encompassing both physiological maintenance and psychological well-being (self-esteem, ego-

enhancement, interpersonal comparisons, and so forth). In the marketplace, goods that he or she encounters combine what may be called "objective" characteristics — such as physical dimensions and performance capabilities — and "imputed" characteristics (symbolic associations with success, happiness, etc.)

In a market economy stocked with mass-produced goods there cannot be, for obvious reasons, a direct correlation for all individuals and all goods between the properties of an individual's wants and the properties of goods. Individuals continually shift their preference orderings in different ways, and producers are regularly shuffling the characteristics and the assortment of goods. In this fluid situation the common denominator is the individual's attempt to "match" the qualities of his wants with the characteristics of goods. When the matching is relatively "successful", we could take this as an instance of "the satisfaction of a want".

In a situation where both wants and goods are multifaceted phenomena, however, will there ordinarily be clear evidence of successful matching? This is a difficult question to answer. We think it is safe to assume at least that the outcome of attempts at want-satisfaction will be problematical. There is likely to be some feeling of satisfaction or success and simultaneously some feeling of dissatisfaction, the latter arising from the fact that *so many other untried options for possibly improving the degree of satisfaction* still beckon.

Given the fluidity of the contextual setting, individuals may become progressively more confused both about the nature of their own wants and about what are the best ways of attempting to satisfy them. The steadily increasing complexity in the makeup of wants and goods may result in, among other things, an increasing degree of ambiguity in the attempted satisfaction of wants. The outcome of the consumption act may be an ensemble of satisfactions and dissatisfactions, whose components are not clearly identifiable, rather than a determinate experience of either satisfaction or dissatisfaction.

Our conclusion is that we require a much clearer understanding of the individual's striving for the satisfaction of his or her wants. There are two reasons why improving our understanding in this regard is essential. One is that the problem of rising market-based expectations is certainly (at least in part) a function of distortions in the present patterns of want-satisfaction. The other is that the degrees of both satisfaction and dissatisfaction, and not merely the former alone, may rise with the individual's access to higher levels of consumption. When these are taken into account we have a much better picture of the implications of the insatiability axiom. We also have a way of analyzing the problem of expectations.

III: Advertising and Imagery

We do not yet have an adequate understanding of this "problem of expectations", nor do we presume to give an explanation here; however, we would like to offer a hypothesis that may help to clarify the nature of the problem. We suggest that today market-based expectations are a function of the symbolic properties of goods, and that these symbolic properties can best be understood through the examination of imagery in marketing, as it is conveyed through product design, packaging, store displays, fashion trends, peer-group influences, and media-based advertising. Although in this paper our conclusions are formulated from an examination of magazine and television advertising trends, we by no means assert that these other agencies of socialization are not also significant. The symbolic associations used in the circulation of goods permeate the marketplace, but they are more readily observable in media advertising than in other areas.

The research design that we have adopted in this study has grown directly out of the theoretical questions previously outlined. It attempts an alternative interpretation of the problem of rising consumer expectations within the specific context of the consumer culture. By focussing upon expectations, and hence upon advertising as the significant sign system, this approach departs from traditional lines of economic analysis. It starts from the readily observable common central theme of all contemporary advertising which fuses the field of human aspirations and desires with a means of satisfying them through material consumption. The analysis is deductive in nature. We broke down advertisements into constituent parts and attempted to determine whether there are any significant patterns in how they use images to present goods. We did not attempt to ascertain how individuals are affected (or how they think they are affected) by them, either in their attitudes or behaviour, although we hope to extend the research in this direction after further refining our analytic approach.

Even the most cursory glance at the world depicted in contemporary advertising would lead one to the conclusion that goods are much more than the sum of their physical properties. They are presented as capable of producing feelings of happiness and satisfaction in their users. Moreover, in an historical survey of advertising we have noted that there is an intensification of this process over the last fifty years.[12] The clarification of this observation was our central concern in deciding to focus our study on psychologically grounded associations. These expressions —such as family happiness, career success, youth or freedom — are instances of what we have called the symbolic properties of goods, and they are crucial to our understanding of the appearance of the commodity in the consumer culture.

In the backgrounds, settings, and user-representations of advertising imagery are incorporated lifestyle models and values. We suggest, without being able to develop the point here, that the lifestyle models are an important part of the dominant socialization patterns of contemporary society; the declining influences of family and religion have opened the way for the market-based lifestyle models to shape behaviour patterns. The specific values associated with them are difficult to identify, and in any case they change within short time cycles — and this is probably what is most significant about them.

Ewen's work[13] shows that in earlier periods, for example in the nineteen twenties, statements of values were commonly incorporated into the textual material in advertisements; today, it is not uncommon to encounter advertisements with merely a short slogan or indeed with no text at all. Thus, there are two parallel developments. One is the shift from explicit statements of value (business success, familial love) to the incorporation of implicit values and ambiguous lifestyle images; the second is the correlative decline of textual material and the shift to visualized images of well-being.

Although the process of the "symbolification" of commodities is a social process and not a media-based one, changes in the media play a crucial role in amplifying the forces within the marketplace and transforming the nature of the appearance of the commodity. Much contemporary advertising, especially on television, works almost exclusively through the use of imagery (as opposed to textual information); this development has emerged gradually in the history of advertising. The gradual pace of the transformation, the growing ambiguity and implicit nature of the associated values, and the difficult task of pinning down the significance of visualized communication may have all contributed to underestimating the import of this aspect of the "consciousness industry" — the growing domination of imagistic modes of communication. To be sure, the advertising industry itself is only now fully recognizing the importance of imagery in advertising technique.[14] Yet it is within this trend that we have located crucial features in the changing dynamics of want satisfaction in the consumption process. This communication-based interpretation places a greater emphasis upon what Stuart Hall has called the "effectivity of the superstructures".[15] The emphasis of most advertising until the early 1920's stresses the physical characteristics of the product, the price per quantity, and the practical utility (what the product does). Today this tends to be typical only of a very limited category of advertising for products which we call "Technological Equipment" (radios, stereos, garden equipment, power tools). However, in general, a transition beginning in the twenties and progressing from there transposes the emphasis from material characteristics and pragmatic utility into "psychological utility": the commodity appears designed for personalized use by fulfilling a *psychological* role. Commodities appear as personified expressions of human characteristics and relationships. Moreover, with the increasing

implicitness and ambiguity in advertising imagery, the commodity seems to become a "projective field" in which the human states of feeling achievable in consumption are fluidly superimposed upon the non-human, physical-sensory aspects of the commodity. Stretching the metaphor for a moment, the mask of the fetishized commodity, having incorporated the abstract qualities of promised human satisfaction, has more recently still become mirror-like, reflecting back the vague and distorted images of well-being to be achieved in consumption.[16]

Nor do we have to look very far to establish the motivations behind this trend. As modern marketing theorists state, the task of marketing was very quickly perceived to be that of making "modern goods recognized as psychological things symbolic of personal attributes and goals, as symbolic of social patterns and strivings".[17] The product was fortified by an image designed to be the basis of consumer choice, and destined also (we infer) to become characteristic of the redefinition of satisfaction derived in the consumption process.

However, the design of the product image did not occur in a vacuum. A considerable amount of consumer research had established the importance of these symbolic attributes of goods in the everyday thinking of the consumer, and had pointed out the relationship they bear to both the "personality" and "positional" frames of reference that the consumer brings to bear in purchase and consumption. Through careful design, the brands' image could be based upon the analysis of the "decoding" or "interpretive" predilections of the consumer. It is the dimensions of interpretation that are controlled by the advertiser through this process of market research, in which he attempts to refine the symbolic dimensions of his products to suit various segments of the market. Here then is the origin of the dual symbolic process. Depending upon marketing strategies, the brands' image can be developed either for mass markets by the use of open codes of interpretation, or for specific markets by the use of more restrictive codes.

To some degree, the trend towards implicit and visual product imagery can be identified with the need for increasingly open codes of interpretation for mass market selling. The task of the advertiser is to design the "package of stimuli so that it resonates with information already stored within an individual, and thereby induces the desired learning or behavioural effects".[18] What happens as a result of more than one-half century of this intense advertising activity? The result is a situation where the individual is surrounded with *things* that "resonate" with stored information. It is not that the world of true needs has been subordinated by the world of false needs, but that the realm of needing has become a function of the field of communication. Here perhaps is the chief fetishism in the consumer marketplace. The product of human labour is not hidden by the distorted yet seemingly objective qualities of a material-

sensuous product, but by the individualized and subjective images of well being projected into the commodity.

As a consequence the commodity takes on a role in the human dialogue, becoming a message in itself. Considered as information it is a means by which the consumer may communicate to others his relationship to a complex set of abstract social attributes — it identifies him or her within the social structure. The use of the commodity with particular symbolic qualities merges with the identity of the user. In this sense, *product images were never designed merely to increase purchases, but to transform the personal significance of the products' everyday use.*

From a communications perspective, this symbolification entailed reorganization on a number of levels of abstraction upon which the appearance and experience of the commodity is organized. The first level on which we notice this change is the sensible and immediate presentation of the product. Here, through packaging and product styling, the physical-utilitarian aspects of the product and its sensuous qualities as an object are de-emphasized, in order to harmonize its immediate experience with the image projected upon it and to facilitate the differentiation of brands. Where packaging is inappropriate, the visible dimensions of the product itself, through the elements of design and styling, become the means of conveying symbolic qualities (e.g., clothes, food colouring). For example, even the automobile, the original designs of which emphasized mechanical and physical properties (power, bulk, speed through streamlining), has more recently come to reflect the personified qualities typical of advertising images (comfort, sophistication, practicality).

The second major level, and the one upon which we have focussed our attention, is the *"product image"*. Here, through the processes of metaphorical association, the advertiser generates an equation between the particular brand and its symbolic attributes as a commodity. In the image advertising of the early twenties, this was usually accomplished by means of a verbal association between the brand and an explicit quality, usually encapsulated in a slogan (the sportsman's cigarette, the sophisticated perfume). However, as we have pointed out, the more recent trends in advertising reflect the accelerated use of visual modes of communication; the linkage is generated by means of the association of the brand name and package (the visual market for the product) with a background image designed to elicit a specific set of projected associations. As visual communications, these associations are developed in terms of the "grammar of representation" utilized by advertising, which includes the presentation of a) *abstract qualities* (frosty, sparkling, light) depicted through a background or setting, b) *personalized qualities* depicted by identifiable user groups (famous persons, beautiful, sophisticated, rich), c) *situational associations* (frequently role related) through the depiction of identifiable settings (natural scenes, kitchens, restaurants) and d) *lifestyle associations*, depicting a

particular type of person engaged in specific activities in particular settings (young/recreation/outdoor).

A third level of commodity imagery that we have noted in the current market setting is that of the *corporate image*. Here, the self proclaimed qualities of the corporate entity are the major associations of the range of products or services offered by the corporation (Eaton's "attitude" campaign, Texaco's "responsibility in progress"). An increase in the frequency of corporate image advertising, as suggested in our historical study, may indicate that our analysis — based on the predominance of the product image over the sensible appearance of the commodity — may already be in need of modification due to significant changes in the processes of product symbolification.

Before discussing some of our data and its implications from our study of current advertising imagery, we shall explain the basis for our assertion of the importance of "iconic" modes of communication in the process of communicating product imagery. The relative costs of advertising time and space reflect not only the "reach" of the media into the marketplace (in terms of the size and demographic features of the particular audience captured as potential customers), but also the potential effectiveness of media communication for changing consumption patterns. Amongst the various possible media, magazines and television emerge as prestige advertising vehicles because of their suitability for the transmission of both lexical and imagistic information. The inductive awareness by advertisers of the relative effectiveness of these media is corroborated by findings in the psychological literature on information processing.

In the first place, given the highly selective way in which persons are known to survey their environment, it becomes the task of the advertisement to break through the "attentional barriers" to insure acceptance by the audience. Design, layout, contrast, colour, striking and unusual imagery have all been shown to act as effective means of increasing the likelihood and duration of visual scanning. In addition, television affords the conjunction of sound and image, camera movement and various editing styles to secure and enhance attention. Furthermore, there is evidence which indicates that "iconic" information has a greater impact on the "affective-opinion" components of attitude[19]. A parallel processing model offers an alternative to the theories of subliminal perception. Iconic information has its effects upon opinions without being transliterated into "verbal" codes, and hence without full conscious awareness.

Beyond these attentional factors, the advertiser's intention is to increase the effectiveness of the differentiation of his product's image from other similar products, by enhancing the associational links between the brand and its image. The effectiveness of the ad, therefore, will be dependent upon the audience's retention of these associations. Some recent research in paired associates learning has illustrated the increasing latency in memory of iconic

over lexical information.[20] When an image is used as a "memory peg", the retention of the concepts hung on this peg is increased. For years, the catchy tune or jingle has been employed as a memory hook; now, these processes seem to be further enhanced when visual memory is invoked.

Several other factors are also worth noting here. First, unusual or absurd images seem to enhance retention. Secondly, the conjoining of separate elements of an image seems to be additive: a complex of attributes is more easily recognized and remembered than are single attributes. Thirdly, pictures seem to be more ambiguous than words or noun phrases in that they elicit a greater number of free associations.

The implications of such findings are obvious. Not only does the use of visual imagery increase the attention paid to the ad, possibly without awareness, but it also provides the basis for the efficient building of strong associational links to a greater number of qualities while retaining a high degree of ambiguity. The ambiguity of the imagery is significant not only for the facility with which symbolic qualities become infused within a wide variety of product categories and types, but in the resultant indeterminacy of the association. If we are asked to name the quality associated with Coke, we are likely to respond with "life", yet if we are asked to name a "lively product" we are likely to think of a wide variety of commodities. The fact that the product image is so open to varying associations and interpretations means that both advertisers and consumers can experiment freely to determine which combinations are most successful at any time. But there are so many possible combinations that one wonders whether a complete and lasting sense of satisfaction can ever be achieved under these circumstances.

IV: Results and Discussion

Our study first required a detailed analysis of the symbolic field of contemporary advertising which included the various "typified" presentations of persons, settings, and backgrounds, as well as the rhetorical forms employed in advertising. We shall only present here some general findings relevant to the argument presented above. A combined content analysis and structuralist technique was used to develop a "quantified semiological" analysis in our attempts to uncover the patterns of style and content in 313 Canadian magazine advertisements and 85 television commercials.

Our results indicated that the "textual" information composed less than a quarter of the display in magazine advertising and less than 10% of television commercials. Of the text that did occur, the slogan was the most prominant element (33%). Utility information (product use, product characteristics, use consequences) therefore composed a very minor portion of the total field of

advertising display. Of the utility information that did occur, the greatest portion describes the product's characteristics (tasty, blue, 442 horsepower). The specifications and modes of use, or the consequences-effects of its use, comprised an even smaller portion of the information, and tended to be specific to particular categories of products (medicines and technology). Textual information describing the lifestyle attributes associated with products (user characteristics and settings) is infrequent: the tendency is to transmit this information through imagery. This finding in itself lends credence to our emphasis upon the visual dimensions of advertising messages. Moreover, it underscores the poverty of the claim made by some defenders of advertising, with their assertion that advertising provides information to consumers which promotes "rational" product choice. How it accomplishes this task without providing any information about the qualities, reasons for use, performance or consequences of the commodities' utilization is a mystery to us.

The imagistic information is the crucial feature of the advertising field. In terms of prominence, it is divided approximately equally into four elements: persons, products, settings, and backgrounds. Of these elements, the product, depicted most frequently in terms of its package, appeared in 96% of all ads. We found that we could further distinguish the formats of these advertisements in terms of the relationships between the elements — that is, the way in which symbolic associations are created. We discerned three format styles: Product Qualities, Presenter and Lifestyle Formats.

The *Product Qualities* format generates an association between the product and a background that conveys these abstract qualitative associations. Although the images vary in their concreteness or abstractness, they usually retain a high degree of ambiguity and a corresponding lack of detail. We depict this format as follows:

Product = Background Associations

The *Presenter* format utilizes the primacy of the product-person relationship for defining the qualities of the product. Here a recognizable "persona" is depicted as standing in some positive relationship to the product (depicted visually as pleasure, the predominant emotion expressed in advertising). The equation is as follows:

Product = Presenter Qualities

The remarkable feature of these personae is that they appear as both easily recognizable and highly typical characterizations which embody abstract human qualities (youth, beauty, masculinity, sophistication) and yet at the same time, retain an ambiguity that allows multiple "identifications" (i.e., they are classless, jobless, etc.) The nature of the stereotyping seems to vary between two categories of personae; Ideal Types occur more frequently in magazine advertising with its well specified markets, whereas the John Doe Types are more characteristic of television.

The *Lifestyle* format is characterized by the explicit combination of a product, a person and a setting. This usually entails the use of the product by a persona in a specific setting, thus depicting an activity or way of living. We model this format as follows:

Product = Persona Qualities
\\ // = Lifestyle
Setting Qualities

Our data indicates that whereas magazines tend to use the Product Qualities and Presenter Formats, television favours Presenter and Lifestyle imagery. Furthermore, television commercials can be seen to have syntagmic as well as paradigmatic elements in their rhetorical form.[21] In the grammar of the static image based upon layout, relationships between the component elements are created by superimposition or juxtaposition. In television advertising, the images are also likely to be sequenced together in terms of a theme, story or "psychologic", and hence the basic formats had to be extended.

For television we found the Presenter format was pre-eminent; the world of television commodities is directly associated with personalized qualities (36%). These are composed of John Doe's (25%), known personalities (6%) and Ideal types (5%). The Lifestyle format composes about 30% of T.V. advertising, and tends to depict a limited range of recognizable lifestyle options — an image pool — consisting mainly of active recreation, familial and sexual love, personal maintenance, the good life, and the natural-historical (nostalgic) existence. Work plays a very minor role in the world of advertising: when it does appear it is usually as a source of stress or anxiety to be relieved. Product Qualities formats composed about 14% of T.V. ads, Problem-Solution appeals 14%, and other forms of "Rational" argument 6%. This contrasted with our magazine sample in which 40% were Presenter, 59% were Product Qualities, and 18% were Lifestyle formats.[22] Developing this understanding of the code by which associations are generated in advertising was important in enabling us to aggregate and compare the variety of advertisements that occurred in our sample. They revealed what we believe to be an integral feature of the advertising system, that is, a high degree of regularity and repetition in the "images of well being" with a corresponding lack of specificity in those images.

Having explored the processes by which the symbolic attributes come to be associated with commodities, and having detailed some of the regularity and ambiguity inherent in the rhetorical forms of presentation, we then examined the systemic implications of these features. As a working premise of this study we adopted the view that through an examination of the advertising system as a total information system, we might uncover the features of advertising relevant to the sense of satisfaction derived in consumption. We had been convinced by Leymore's argument, at the conclusion of a similar study of advertising, that

"it is the message of the system in toto, which is different from the private messages of each isolated representation which is truly significant in such studies".[23] It is to the interplay of these messages then, that we turn in order to provide a further interpretation of the system of advertising messages.

It is in this interplay that Leymore finds the structured myths common to past generations (e.g., life against death). Certainly it is necessary for the advertiser to enhance his product with qualities or images that are in fact easily recognizable and valued within the existing cultural system. However, in reducing the common denominators (six binary oppositions) in the "dialogue of signs" to such an elementary level, Leymore may have missed the specific cultural uses of mythology, in constructing abstractions of personified attributes of goods in the consumer culture. We would prefer to argue merely that there are cultural limitations placed on the "pool" of imagery and lifestyles depicted in advertising.

The need to use images from a common pool is in opposition to another force that is at work in the marketing process as we have described it, namely the need of the advertiser[24] to identify his product with a clearly recognizable and easily remembered image which differentiates his brand from other products of the same use type. This process would be expected to produce increasingly refined and differentiated brand images as new products establish themselves in the market. Shampoos will be differentiated from conditioners, and Shampoo X_1 will be associated with "beauty", X_2 with "youth", and X_3 with "sensuality". The effect then is to produce a broad range of divergent qualities associated with the product-type Shampoo. Uncertainty, defined as the range of possible alternative associations for a single product type, becomes a defining feature of the "product image" (as opposed to the brand image). The consumer is confronted by a wide range of symbolic attributes attached to a single product category.

In combination these twin tendencies characterize advertising strategy. Symbolic associations used to differentiate brand images are drawn from a common pool of images that convey or evoke valued lifestyles. Products can be characterized as brands (X_1) belonging to use-type (X) in a range of products (X,Y,Z) which are associated with a set of images (A,B,C). The overall effect of this system can be depicted as follows:



Such a model predicts a number of occasions where confusion and fluidity typify the consumption process. Not only does any one product type have a variety of desirable qualities associated with it, but the lifestyle images that

emerge as complexes of associated product images (sophisticated clothes, sophisticated drinks, sophisticated cars) are also presented in a system of opposition on a different level of abstraction. Advertising depicts a confusing array of lifestyle options as well as product qualities. In fact, in the fluid context of the current marketplace the major appeal of some advertisements now seems to be designed to span these lifestyle options: the successful businessman is depicted in settings that are natural and pastoral, the new improved product is linked to an image of a traditional society. In either case it seems that the advertising system as a whole is characterized by ambiguity in the products' symbolic attributes and confusion over the kinds of product matches that bring satisfaction.

Our study has suggested that there is more to the advertising system than the mere association of symbolic attributes with products. Advertising emphasizes the primacy of the world of commodities and transforms this world into symbols of both personalized qualities and contextualized attributes. Ultimately commodities become integral, if not defining, features of modes of human interaction as well as satisfaction. Three processes related to the appearance of the commodity in the consumer culture are at work. The first is the obfuscation, not only of the social labour "hidden" in the product, but of the material resources used as well. We can no longer overlook this in addressing the problems of rising material expectations and resource depletion. The second is ambiguity. Ambiguity arises from the shift from textual information to imagistic information, the carefully worked indeterminacy of the advertisement with its open codes of interpretation, and the abstractness of the symbolic product qualities. Finally, fluidity in the messages of the marketplace provides no straightforward and simple paradigms of commodity-satisfaction matches beyond the constant associations of satisfaction with material consumption.

V: Conclusions

The consumer marketplace confronts individuals each day with an enormous number of messages about their needs. The construction or design of these messages becomes more and more subtle. Department store window displays, for example, now are planned so as to illustrate current lifestyles, to tell a "story", or to comment on current events while presenting the goods for sale. In Montreal one day noontime news stories reported a possible bread shortage resulting from a strike, and a few hours later one clothing shop had stacks of bread arranged around its window mannequins. What *was* the message?

Individuals must strive to interpret both their needs and the appropriate modes of need-satisfaction in the context of this elaborate and subtle message system. Obviously the pressures are intense, but there are also many options;

we know that there are many frustrations, but we also know that individuals find enjoyment in the stimulation of their desires by marketing techniques. The high-intensity market setting is unconscionably wasteful of resources — both material resources and personal energies. It also gives individuals a sense of freedom and autonomy in the shaping of their own lives.

Viewing the consumer culture from this perspective does not permit us to accept either the liberal apologetic or the radical critique. Individuals do not develop their preferences autonomously; the intensified competition for positional goods brings inevitable frustration and discontent no matter how much real incomes rise. On the other hand, the theory of false needs and the manipulation of consciousness is based on the untenable premise that an objective set of "true" needs subsists beneath the manipulations. Moreover, the consumer marketplace is in our opinion the most influential socialization agency in our society today. If we regard the consumer experience as only an obstacle to the emergence of a liberated consciousness (the possibility of this free consciousness resting always and only in the "sphere of production"), then we will not be able to understand the social change possibilities in our society.

The consumer culture is no paradise of freedom, justice, and reason — but it is also no mere den of deception. For the first time in history large numbers of people have had an opportunity to explore their understanding of their own needs. There are definite risks involved, and one ought to expect that all of us will make many mistakes in the process. The great task for social theory now is to grasp, as precisely as possible, the process of need-interpretation and need-satisfaction in the consumer culture. When we have achieved some clarification of this process, we can then decide how policies for modifying its regressive features can be presented for public debate.

In our view, changes in capitalist societies in the last twenty-five years have created a gap between this and preceding periods which is likely to be permanent. One of its main features is that work is viewed almost exclusively as a means of securing income, and personal objectives for life-satisfaction are rooted more and more in private consumption activities. We expect that labour organizations and policies will be directed primarily at securing economic benefits, particularly employment security and gains in real income. We do not expect that the labour process will or can be the great socialization experience that is set out in socialist theory, or that a commitment by many persons to traditional socialist goals will be forged there. We expect that the officers of labour organizations will participate increasingly in new bureaucratic decision-making forums with government and big business.

Tensions originating in the consumer culture will therefore be the focus of social conflict and debates over appropriate public policies. If Scitovsky, Hirsch, Heilbroner, and other recent commentators are correct, the realization that (in

Heilbroner's words) "economic success does not guarantee social harmony" must sink in at some point. As public management of the economy grows, more attention will have to be paid to modifying the commodity-oriented structure of expectations. How this can be done while also promoting social justice policies is not yet clear. If the acceleration of expectations can at least be slowed, so that we do not test the resource limits and regenerative capacities of our habitat too severely, we may win the necessary breathing space for considering our next moves. It is not an especially dramatic social vision; but we may be much better off if we satisfy our appetite for drama outside the theory of social change.

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Notes

1. The paper incorporates some materials from a report prepared by the authors for the Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, Ottawa, in September 1976. Arlin Hackman and Judy Wright worked with us as research associates in developing and executing the research design for the analysis of advertisements. We would like to express our thanks to them.

2. William Leiss, *The Limits to Satisfaction* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1976).

3. In a forthcoming study Judith Williamson uses an approach derived from structuralist theory to analyze advertisements and their messages, which may be compared with the one developed for our study. Judith Williamson, *Decoding Advertisements* (London: Marion Boyars, 1978)

4. Tibor Scitovsky, *The Joyless Economy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), pp. vii, 7, 64-65.

5. *Ibid.*, pp. 134-135.

6. Fred Hirsch, *Social Limits to Growth* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976), p. 84. Robert Heilbroner's *Business Civilization in Decline* (New York: Norton, 1976) is a superb essay which incorporates some of the points made by Scitovsky and Hirsch into a broad perspective on the future of capitalism.

7. *Capital*, vol. I, tr. Ben Fowkes (London: Penguin, 1976), pp. 164-165.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 165.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 169.

10. Marshall Sahlins, *Culture and Practical Reason* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), pp. 149-150. An illustration of Marx's own "best understanding" is his remark (*Capital, op. cit.*, p. 275) that man's necessary requirements "depend therefore to a great extent on the level of civilization attained by a country; in particular they depend on the conditions in which, and consequently on the habits *and expectations* with which, the class of free workers has been formed" (our italics).

11. Jean Baudrillard's writings are relevant on this point, but they tend to be rather chaotic. Works by Roland Barthes are the best starting-point for the semiotic approach. A clear and useful summary of it is given in Judith Williamson's book (*supra* note 3).

12. This study is in progress.

13. Stuart Ewen, *Captains of Consciousness* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1976).

14. See article by Edward Clifford in the *Globe and Mail*, Report on Business, September 21, 1977, p. B5.

15. Stuart Hall, "Re-thinking the 'Base-and-Superstructure' Metaphor," in J. Bloomfield (ed.), *Class, Hegemony and Party* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1977).

16. As this passage indicates, we believe that it is preferable to distinguish between *fetishized and non-fetishized* commodities, rather than to use the phrase "fetishism of commodities" as a blanket description for a market exchange economy. In future work we hope to give a more fully developed exposition of this distinction.

    We also have serious difficulties in attempting to fit our observations into another conceptual mould employed in the radical tradition, namely the concept of reification. To illustrate our problem we will cite the definition by Berger and Luckmann (*The Social Construction of Reality* [N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1967], p. 89): "Reification implies that man is capable of forgetting his own authorship of the human world, and further, that the dialectic between man, the producer, and his products is lost to consciousness. The reified world is by definition a dehumanized world."

    Given the way in which the consumer culture systematically binds human emotions to products, is it possible to say of this culture and its products that its authorship is forgotten, or that the dialectic of producer and product is lost to consciousness? In what sense is it a dehumanized world, since human emotions are its currency?

    We expected to be reminded (politely, we hope) that these emotions are false and manipulated, not *truly* human. We believe that it is only with a greater understanding of the mechanisms of manipulation that this debate should be rekindled.

17. Sidney Levy, "Symbols by Which We Buy", in Lynn H. Stockman (ed.), *Advancing Marketing Efficiency* (Chicago: American Marketing Assoc., 1959), pp. 409-416. See also J. Densenberry, "A Theory of Consumption", in S. Ottesar *et al.* (eds.), *Marketing: The Firm's Point of View* (N.Y.: The MacMillan Co., 1964), pp. 125-132.

18. Tony Swartz, *The Responsive Chord* (N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1974).

19. For a more complete treatment see Stephen Kline, *The Characteristics and Structure of Television News Broadcasting: their effects upon opinion change*, Ph.D. Thesis, L.S.E. 1977.

20. For example see Sydney Segall, *Imagery: Current Cognitive Approaches* (N.Y.: Academic Press, 1971) or Peter Sheehan, *The Function and Nature of Imagery* (N.Y.: Academic Press, 1972).

21. For television advertising we added two syntagmic categories: Problem Solution ads created an association between the reduction of anxiety caused by a problem situation and the use of a commodity, and Rational Argument ads presented statistics or "Brand X" experimental demonstrations of the efficacy of the product. In this study, we limited the development of the categories for television's rhetorical form in order to facilitate cross-media comparisons. This area of research, we believe, will provide fertile ground for the examination of the manipulative techniques used in advertising.

22. These categories add up to more than 100% because many magazine advertisements use split photographic imagery.

23. V.L. Leymore, *Hidden Myth: Structure of Symbolism in Advertising* (London: Heinemann, 1975).

24. We are implying here a segmentation of the functions in the production-marketing process. 'The advertiser' refers here to the control of the communication dimensions in marketing. This division of roles is crucial in explaining the arbitrariness in the relationship between product and image.

Emancipatory Theory

Truly, I live in dark times!
The guileless word is folly. A smooth forehead
Suggests insensitivity. The man who laughs
Has simply not yet had
The terrible news.

What kind of times are they, when
A talk about trees is almost a crime
Because it suggests silence about so many horrors?

. . . .

Bertolt Brecht. *To Those Born Later*

When evil-doing comes like falling rain, nobody calls out 'stop!'

When crimes begin to pile up they become invisible. When sufferings become unendurable the cries are no longer heard. The cries, too, fall like rain in the summer.

. . . .

Bertolt Brecht. *When Evil-Doing Comes Like Falling Rain*

Recent developments in the political economy of North America have cast into sharp relief the problematic character of human emancipation. Deflationary economic tendencies combined with the spectre of cultural depression have effectively nullified traditional strategies of radical humanism. The present retrenchment of public bureaucracies and the apparent dissolution of liberal- and social-democratic states into a vacant nihilism have undermined accepted estimations of critical political thought, pointing to the sheer necessity

for a debate on the implications for human liberation of fundamental transformations in advanced capitalist society, the very object of emancipation-inspired theories of social change.

The present collection of essays on emancipatory theory is intended to initiate such a debate. While commonly taking as their point of departure Marx's theory of capitalist contradictions, the essays which follow sharply diverge from Marx's particular empirical models of crisis and breakdown, developing new images of a re-energized radical humanism. Each of the essays, in different ways, carries on an internal dialogue with Marx and Marxism, attempting to come to grips with the socialist heritage. It is fair to say that none of the essays abandons Marx's theory of class-struggle but, recognizing the historical and ontological transformations effected by late capitalism, they represent a concerted attempt to move Marxism into the 1970s and beyond. Emancipatory theories remain Marxist because they accept Marx's theories of alienation and of deep-seated internal contradictions. They surpass the Marxism of the Second and Third Internationals because they are willing to revise models of crisis and strategies of appropriate class-radicalism. In this sense, it is possible to distinguish between the logic of internal contradictions, which still remain, and the empirical manifestations of these contradictions. The contradictions intensify, while crisis-forms differ, requiring new types of radical praxis, optimally democratic in character, formulated by emancipatory theories of socialist transformation.

Emancipatory theory, preserving as it does Marxian formulations concerning fatal contradictions which ultimately capitalism cannot contain without anticipating its own negation, seeks to transcend classical Marxism in coming to terms with the social upheavals of the second half of the twentieth century. For emancipatory theorists, the project becomes one of recovering the radical humanism of Marxism while exploring, in an imaginative way, the psychoanalytic, phenomenological and historical dimensions of human bondage.

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MERLEAU-PONTY'S CRITIQUE OF MARXIST SCIENTISM

John O'Neill

In the immediate postwar period of hardening East-West relations, Merleau-Ponty began to re-think Marxism from a phenomenological perspective. In *Humanism and Terror*, he studied the Soviet Trials, in order to understand from the standpoint of the revolutionaries their notions of individual and collective responsibility. He also opened up the larger study followed in *Adventures of the Dialectic* in which Marxist scientism is criticized in terms of a Leninist and Weberian conception of the philosophy of history. In the following essay, these arguments are set out descriptively, or as nearly as possible in Merleau-Ponty's own terms. I have, of course, organized the arguments and made explanatory comments where necessary. Merleau-Ponty did not write in the discursive style favoured by the social sciences. This reflects the difference between hermeneutical and causal analysis. Rather than reduce Merleau-Ponty's thought to a mode of discourse of which he was extremely critical, not only on epistemological grounds, but also because of its attempt to reduce the autonomy of language and style, I have chosen to preface the argument with some analytic reading rules that I believe underlie its construction. I believe that a discussion over the responsibility of reading and writing would not be alien to Merleau-Ponty's thought and would also contribute to the critique of literary scientism.

Analytic Reconstruction of the Following Argument

Merleau-Ponty's argument relies upon the history of Marxism, while at the same time claiming that Marxism confers upon history a meaning without which history would be sheer violence. *Humanism and Terror* announces in its very title the twin birth of man and violence. In *The Rebel* Camus has argued that the birth of man is the beginning of endless violence. When Merleau-Ponty makes the *Adventures of the Dialectic* his topic, he has again to find a thread to history, avoiding the extremes of premature closure or of senseless ups and downs. It may be said that, after all, both *Humanism and Terror* and

Adventures of the Dialectic are topical works outside of the interests of political philosophy. But then we have surrendered the world to violence in order to preserve the harmony of history. Alternatively, we may risk the face of philosophy in search of truths that will be found to be partial, and possibly even destructive, when held in competition with other values and beliefs. Merleau-Ponty is a valuable thinker because he refused to separate politics and philosophy. He could do this because as a philosopher he was not wedded to the ideal of absolute knowledge, and because in politics he was just as opposed to historical fatalism as to senseless violence. Merleau-Ponty struggled to comprehend his times. He was not withdrawn. Nor did he surrender himself to aesthetic revulsion. He claimed no privileged theory of action, and so he avoided sloganizing the issues of rethinking Marxism at a time when positions were hardening in the East and West.

I want now to formulate the narrative that follows in the form of a number of rules of procedure which I believe furnish an analytic reconstruction of the arguments of Marxist humanism. These are the rules that I believe can be abstracted from the history of rethinking Marx in terms of Hegel, in order to provide a critique of Marxist scientism. By the same token, these rules may be interpreted as rules for anyone participating in the community of argument since Lenin read Marx in the light of Hegel. We may then think of the Marxist tradition as a set of rival reading practices that have to be understood as the very issues of Marxist politics, and not simply as glosses upon events intelligible apart from such practices. I consider this the basic postulate of Marxist humanism. It is challenged by Marxist scientism, such as that of Althusser, inasmuch as the latter espouses a conception of historical events whose life would be independent of the hermeneutical continuity of rival interpretations.

I Thus, in the first place, we must subject our own discussion of Marxism to the *humanist rule* that the nature of Marxism is not given to Marxists as the simple negation of bourgeois liberalism and capitalism. This is the Marxism of Commissars. It lacks its own voice. In other words, Marxism has no monopoly over criticism. Humanist Marxism must keep itself in question and it can only do this by means of a lively recognition of the limitations facing both socialist and liberal discourse.

II We may then treat the first rule as a procedure for reconstructing the history of Marxist thought since Marx himself read Hegel, through Lenin, into the Hegelian Marxism of Lukács and Kojève (we should also include Korsch who is closer to Kant) as the work of eliciting the Hegelian dialectic of recognition as:

(a) an ideal telos of history
(b) a method of hermeneutical analysis

III The test of these rules is offered in Merleau-Ponty's treatment of violence. We cannot consider violence as limited to either communism or capitalism, nor can we be sure that proletarian violence is only a temporary revolutionary expedient. For where the Party intervenes to bring the proletariat into history, there is always the risk that the Party will subject the proletariat to its own rule.

(a1) history and politics are made by men;
(a2) men themselves must be made human in the objective course of history and politics;
(a3) let us call the Party the action of bringing together (a1) and (a2) and the tension between (a1) and (a2) the field of justice and violence.

Thus, a phenomenological approach to the Soviet Trials will proceed hermeneutically, so as to avoid false antitheses in the construction of the member's *praxis* in trying to resolve the double commitment to historical inevitability and political responsibility.

(b1) The Trials are not to be treated *a priori* as illegal or corrupt justice;
(b2) nor can we justify collectivization *ex post facto*;
(b3) we must let stand member's rival readings of the primacy of economic and political decisions.

IV In light of the preceding rules we are necessarily engaged in a double task.

(a) the critique of Marxist scientism
(b) a hermeneutic of history and politics

V We may treat both tasks as the elicitation of an historical and political norm of *intersubjectivity*, specifically, the question is, How are free men to be

led to freedom? Marxist humanism is thus (broadly conceived) a *pedagogical problem*. Consequently, all future Marxist discussion should contribute to the development of socialist education and to an understanding of the relationship between truth and justice.

Waiting For Marx

It is impossible to think of modern political history apart from the Russian revolution. At the same time, it is hard not to be ambivalent towards the history and politics of Marxism itself. In the days before Communism ruled a major part of the world, one could believe that Communism would shunt all forms of political and economic exploitation into the siding of pre-history. In those days Marxism was emancipatory knowledge wonderfully scornful of the "iron laws" of history and economics. This is not to say that Marxist critique failed to recognize the weight of historical structures. Indeed, we owe Marx much of the credit for a structuralist analysis of historical development. By the same token, there has always been an uncertain relation between Marxist analysis of the determinism of historical structures and its prophecy of a proletarian fulfillment of historical law. Prior to the actual experience of the Revolution, it was easy enough to think of it as a temporary, albeit violent, intervention on the side of justice against a moribund but destructive ruling class. But the revolution is itself an institution and it soon acquires a history of its own, leaders and enemies, priorities and policies that could not be foreseen. In view of these complexities, Communist practice inevitably hardened and Marxism soon became the intellectual property of the Party abandoning the education of the proletariat in favor of slogans and dogma. This is the context of what we call Marxist *scientism*[1]. That is to say, once Marxism became Party knowledge and a tool for the industrialization of Soviet society, Marxism identified with economic determinism and the values of scientific naturalism at the expense of its own radical humanism. This is variously described as the difference between Communism and Marxism, the difference between theory and practice, or the difference between the early, Hegelianized Marx and the later, scientific Marx.[2]

Today socialism and capitalism are equally in question insofar as the same ideology of technological domination underlies their apparently opposed political and ideological systems. We can no longer assume that Marxism challenges capitalism and justifies the sufferings of revolution unless we can be sure that Marxism possesses the philosophical resources for rethinking the logic of technical rationality and the Party practices that have forced this logic upon the proletariat in the name of the Revolution. The task we are faced with is a reflection upon the very *logos* of western rationality. It is only against this broad

background that we can understand the historically specific goals and ambitions of western Marxism. In particular, it is in this way that we can best understand the phenomenon of recent attempts to rethink Marxism in terms of Hegelian phenomenology in order to liberate Marxist praxis from the limitations of positivist knowledge.[3] To rethink Marxism, however, means that we put it in abeyance as the only "other" answer that we have to the uncertainties of our times. In other words, it means that we need to examine the categories of Marxist thought such as man, nature, history, party and revolution, in order to recover a proper sense of their dialectical relations so that they are not organized around a simple logic of domination. What this will involve is a recovery of the relation between the already meaningful world of everyday life and the specific practices of science, economics and politics through which we attempt to construct a socialist society mindful of the historical risks and responsibilities of such a project. In short, by placing Marxism in abeyance while we rethink the meaning of socialism we educate ourselves into a permanently critical attitude towards the Party and History as guarantors of socialist rationality and freedom.

Merleau-Ponty's critique of Marxist scientism cannot be well understood unless we situate it in the intellectual history of France and the post World War II rejection of Communism by Leftist intellectuals who at the same time turned to the revival of Marxism.[4] This renaissance of Marxist thinking in part reflected the task of catching up with Central European thought — Korsch and Lukács — as well as with German phenomenology — Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger, not to mention Weber and Freud. The task was to separate the radical humanist philosophy of Marx from the Engels-Lenin orthodoxy of positivism and scientism.[5] In practice this meant reading Hegel anew and on this basis interpreting Marx's early writings. Merleau-Ponty was among many like Sartre and Hyppolite[6] who listened to Alexandre Kojève's lectures[7] on Hegel's *Phenomenology of Mind*. It was not until the mid-1950's that the rift between Communism and Marxism — a difficult distinction for outsiders, let alone insiders — became wide open. Apart from other broken friendships, the friendships of Merleau-Ponty and Sartre and of Sartre and Camus were destroyed in the wake of *Humanism and Terror, Adventures of the Dialectic* and Camus's *The Rebel*.[8] Later, in his *Critique de la raison dialectique*, Sartre attempted to learn from this the "lesson of history", as he himself puts it, in a massive effort to construct an adequate Marxist history and sociology.

It is much easier for us thirty-two years after World War II to consider capitalism and socialism as subcultures of industrialism rather than as mortal antagonists. But in 1945 it was possible to hope that Communism was the solution to the capitalist syndrome of war and depression. For Leftist intellectuals in Europe the Soviet war effort and the Communist resistance promised a renewal of life once peace came. But peace never came, except as what we call the Cold War. In such an atmosphere, intellectual attitudes were forced to harden.

Capitalists and socialists increasingly blamed each other for all the violence and oppression in the world. The price of loyalty either to socialism or capitalism became a blind and uncritical faith.

The argument of *Humanism and Terror* is especially difficult to understand if the radical alternative forced upon French politics by the Cold War split between America and the Soviet Union is accepted without question. In 1947 there was still a chance, at least in mind of a non-Communist Leftist intellectual like Merleau-Ponty, that France and Europe would not have to become a satellite either to America or the Soviet Union. The hopes of the Resistance for immediate revolutionary change after the war had withered away in the tripartist tangles of the Communists, Socialists, and Christian Democrats. In March 1947, the Truman doctrine was initiated and in April the Big Four discussions on Germany failed. The introduction of the Marshall Plan in June of the same year, condemned by Molotov's walkout on the Paris Conference in July, hastened the breakdown of tripartism. Suspicion of the anti-Soviet implications of the Marshall Plan caused many of the Left to look towards a neutralist position for Europe, but made them uncertain whether to build this position around the Socialist Party, which had failed so far to take any independent line, or the Communist Party, which could be expected to follow a Soviet line. But the drift was towards a pro-Western, anti-Soviet European integration led by the center and right elements of the French Third Force, including the Gaullists. Within two years, the formation of the Brussels Treaty Organization, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the Soviet Cominform brought down the iron curtain of which Winston Churchill had spoken in his Fulton Speech in March of 1946.

The intellectual French Left was in an impossible situation which no combination of Marxism or existentialism seemed capable of remedying. French capitalism was bad, but American capitalism was even more anathema to the Left, if only because it was in the rudest of health internationally, though perhaps not at home. At the same time, French socialism was anything but independent and its chances looked no better with Communist help. In such a situation it was impossible to be an anti-Communist if this meant being pro-American, witnessing the Americanization of Europe, and foreswearing the Communists who had fought bravely in the Resistance. On the other hand, it was not possible to be a Communist if this meant being blind to the hardening of the Soviet regime and becoming a witness to the Communist brand of imperialism which broke so many Marxist minds. It is not surprising that many on the Left as well as the Right were unable to bear such ambiguity and therefore welcomed any sign to show clearly which side to support, even if it meant a "conversion" to the most extreme left and right positions.

I want to argue that in *Humanism and Terror*[9] Merleau-Ponty does more than illustrate the fateful connection between revolution and responsibility as it

appears in the drama of the Moscow Trials. I think it can be shown that Merleau-Ponty develops a theory of the relations between political action, truth and responsibility which is the proper basis for understanding his approach to the problem of the relation between socialist humanism and revolutionary terror. *Humanism and Terror* was prompted by Koestler's dramatization of the Moscow Trials in *Darkness at Noon*. Merleau-Ponty's reply to Koestler's novel takes the form of an essay in which he develops a phenomenology of revolutionary action and responsibility in order to transcend Koestler's confrontation of the Yogi and the Commissar. The argument depends upon a philosophy of history and truth which draws upon Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of perception, embodiment and intersubjectivity. Here I shall restrict myself to the political arguments without entering into the structure of Merleau-Ponty's philosophical thought which in any case is better revealed in a certain style of argument rather than through any system.[10]

> Politics, whether of understanding or of reason, oscillates between the world of reality and that of values, between individual judgment and common action, between the present and the future. Even if one thinks, as Marx did, that these poles are united in a historical factor — the proletariat — which is at one and the same time power and value, yet, as there may well be disagreement on the manner of making the proletariat enter history and take possession of it, *Marxist politicis is, just like all the others, undemonstrable*. The difference is that Marxist politics understands this and that it has, more than any other politics, explored the labyrinth.[11]

It is typical of Merleau-Ponty to speak factually whereas he is addressing an ideal that his own work brings to reality. It needed Merleau-Ponty among others to take Marxist thinkers through the labyrinth of politics for them to understand the true nature of political trial and error. The philosopher of ambiguity,[12] as Merleau-Ponty has been called, prefers to raise questions rather than offer answers. This is not because he is nerveless but precisely because he wishes to bring to life the historical presumptions of Marxist thought. It is not literally the case that Marxists consider their knowledge undemonstrable. From the *Communist Manifesto* to the Russian Revolution there is a fairly straight line — at least doctrinally. But in fact such a line represents a colossal abstraction from the doctrinal debates and historical contingencies that shaped these debates and in turn were interpreted through them. Merleau-Ponty believed it

was possible to discern in the terrible reality of the Moscow Trials the places where the life of Marxist thought was larger than the simplistic moral antithesis of the Yogi and the Commissar. Of course, Merleau-Ponty's purpose is easily misunderstood. Koestler's *Darkness at Noon* is certainly true to Soviet practice from the time of the Trials to the later revelations in the Cominform Campaign against Tito, the Rajk-Kosov trials, the Soviet labor camps and mental hospitals. Like many on the Left, Merleau-Ponty himself had to open his eyes to Communist practice. Yet at the same time he begins to rethink Marxist philosophy of history and politics along the lines that have led to a renaissance of Marxist-Hegelian thought while only the most blind could have held on to the romance with Soviet institutions.

In *Humanism and Terror* Merleau-Ponty is concerned with revolution as the genesis of political community and with the dilemma of violence which in the name of fraternity becomes self-consumptive. This is the moral dilemma to which the Yogi responds by spiritualizing political action and which the Commissar handles by objectivizing his conduct in the name of historical forces. These alternatives, as posed by Koestler, are rejected by Merleau-Ponty on the grounds that they lose the essential ambivalence of political action and revolutionary responsibility. The science and practice of history never coincide. Because of this contingency, political action is always the decision of a future which is not determined uniquely by the facts of the situation. Thus there enters into political conduct the need to acknowledge responsibility and the fundamental terror we experience for the consequences of our own decisions as well as for the effects of other men's actions upon ourselves.

> We do not have a choice between purity and violence but between different kinds of violence. Inasmuch as we are incarnate beings, violence is our lot. There is no persuasion even without seduction, or in the final analysis, contempt. Violence is the common origin of all regimes. Life, discussion and political choice occur only against a background of violence. *What matters and what we have to discuss is not violence but its sense or its future.* It is a law of human action that the present encroaches upon the future, the self upon other people. This intrusion is not only a fact of political life, it also happens in private life. In love, in affection, or in friendship we do not encounter face to face "consciousness" whose absolute individuality we could respect at every moment, but beings qualified as "my son", "my wife", "my friend" whom we carry along with us into common projects where they receive (like ourselves)

> a definite role with specific rights and duties. So, in collective history the spiritual atoms trail their historical role and are tied to one another by the threads of their actions. What is more, they are blended with the totality of actions, whether or not deliberate, which they exert upon others and the world so that there does not exist a plurality of subjects but an intersubjectivity and that is why there exists a *common measure* of the evil inflicted upon certain people and of the good gotten out of it by others.[13]

Yet Merleau-Ponty refuses to draw the sceptical conclusion that violence and conflict derive from the essentially anti-social nature of the human passions. In his essay on Montaigne[14] which allows us to anticipate here his differences with Sartre, he interprets Montaigne's scepticism in terms of the paradox of embodied consciousness, namely, to be constantly involved in the world through perception, politics or love and yet always at a distance from it, without which we could know nothing of it. The sceptic only withdraws from the world, its passions and follies, in order to find himself at grips with the world having, as it were, merely slackened the intentional ties between himself and the world in order to comprehend the paradox of his being-in-the-world. Scepticism with regard to the passions only deprives them of value if we assume a total, Sartrean self-possession, whereas, we are never wholly ourselves, Merleau-Ponty would say, but always interested in the world through the passions which we are. Scepticism and misanthropy, whatever the appearances, have no place in Marxist politics for the reason that the essential ambivalence of politics is that its violence derives from what is most valuable in men — the ideas of truth and justice which each intends for all because men do not live side by side like pebbles but each in all.

Marxism does not invent the problem of violence, as Koestler would suggest, except in the sense that it assumes and attempts to control the violence which bourgeois society tolerates in the fatalities of race, war, domestic and colonial poverty. The Marxist revolutionary is faced only with a choice between different kinds of violence and not with the choice to forego violence. The question which the revolutionary poses is not whether any one will be hurt but whether the act of violence leads to a future state of society in which humanist values have been translated into a common style of life expressed as much in low levels of infant mortality as in solipsistic, philosophical and literary speculation. If consciousness were a lonely and isolated phenomenon, as it is pictured in the individualist tradition of philosophy and the social sciences, and above all in Sartre, then the Yogi's horror at a single death is enough to condemn a whole regime regardless of its humanist or socialist aims. But this is an assumption

which Marxist-Hegelianism challenges. We never exist even in splendid philosophical isolation let alone social isolation. We exist through one another, in specific situations mediated by specific social relations in which we encroach upon others and are committed by others so that our intentions are rarely entirely our own any more than their results. In these exchanges we necessarily prevail upon one another and one generation necessarily commits the future.[15]

The Marxist revolutionary starts from the evident truth of the embodied values of men and of the evil of human suffering. Only later does he learn that in the course of building the economic foundations of a socialist society he has to make decisions which subject individuals to forms of violence upon which the future of the revolution may depend. Marxism does not create this dilemma; it merely expresses it. Koestler, on the other hand, poses the problem in such a way as to miss the essential ambivalence of the subjective and objective options of the Yogi and the Commissar. The values of the Yogi are not simply the reverse of those of the Commissar because each experiences an internal reversal of the subjective and objective values whenever either is assumed as an absolute end. It is for this reason that Commissar Rubashov once imprisoned experiences the value of the self in the depths of its inner life where it opens up to the White Guard in the next cell as someone to whom one can speak. The tapping on the prison walls is the primordial institution of human communication for whose sake Rubashov had set out on his revolutionary career.

In the debate over the alternatives of industrialization and collectivization there were facts to support the various arguments of Stalin, Bukharin and Trotsky. But their divergences arose within the very Marxian conception of history which they all shared. Each regarded history as a reality made through action in line with yet altering the shape of social forces, just as a landscape is progressively revealed with each step we take through it.

> History is terror because we have to move into it not by any straight line that is always easy to trace but by taking our bearings at every moment in a general situation which is changing, like a traveller who pushes into a changing countryside continuously altered by his own advance, where what looked like an obstacle becomes an opening and where the shortest path turns out the longest.[16]

But the leaders of a revolution are not on a casual stroll. They walk on the wild side and must accept responsibility for the path they choose and to be judged by it as soon as they open it up. For this reason Merleau-Ponty argued that the Moscow Trials have to be understood in terms of the Marxist philosophy of

history in which history is a drama open towards the future in such a way that the significance of the action at any point of time is never unequivocal and can only be established from the futurist orientation of those in power. The Trials therefore never go beyond the level of a "ceremony of language" in which the meaning of "terrorism", "wrecking", "espionage", "defeatism", "responsibility" and "confession" has to be sensed entirely in the verbal exchanges and not through reference to an external ground of verificiation.

The Trials reveal the form and style of the Marxist revolutionary. The revolutionary judges what exists in terms of what is to come; he regards the future as more vital than the present to which it owes its birth. From this perspective there can be no purely subjective honor; we are what we are for others and our relation to them. So often in the Court Proceedings the "capitulators" while presenting themselves in the light of enemies of the Party and the masses at the same time hint at the discrepancies between the subjective and objective aspects of their careers. Their statements are to be understood not as formulations of the facts alleged in them except reflectively and by means of certain rules of translation. Consider the following exchange between Vyshinsky and Bukharin:

Vyshinsky: Tell me, did Tomsky link up the perpetration of a hostile act against Gorky with the question of the overthrow of the Soviet government?

Bukharin: In essence he did.

Vyshinsky: In essence he did?

Bukharin: Yes, I have answered.

Vyshinsky: I am interested in the essence.

Bukharin: But you are asking concretely . . .

Vyshinsky: Did your talk with Tomsky provide reason to believe that the question of a hostile act against Alexei Maximovich Gorky was being linked up with the task of overthrowing the Stalin leadership?

Bukharin: Yes, in essence this could be said.

Vyshinsky: Consequently, you knew that some hostile act against Gorky was under consideration?

Bukharin: Yes.

Vyshinsky: And what hostile act in your opinion was referred to?

Bukharin: I gave no thought to the matter at all at that time and I had no idea . . .

Vyshinsky: Tell us what you did think.

Bukharin: I hardly thought at all.

Vyshinsky: But was it not a serious matter? The conversation was about what?

Bukharin: Permit me to explain in a few words. Now, *post factum*, now, during the investigation, I can say . . .

Vyshinsky: Not during the investigation but during your conversation with Tomsky.

Bukharin: But this was only a fleeting conversation, a conversation which took place during a meeting of the Political Bureau and lasted only a few seconds.

Vyshinsky: I am not interested in how long this conversation lasted; you could have spoken to Tomsky for a whole hour somewhere in a corner, therefore your arguments are of no importance to me. What is important to me are the facts, and these I want to establish.[17]

It is not possible to understand these verbal plays apart from the Hegelian-Marxist expressions of the hypostases through which the logic of social forces reveals the essence of a situation or fact and its relevance for revolutionary action.[18] They will otherwise only seem to be the result of a corrupt legal process and as such the pure expression of Soviet terror. If *Humanism and Terror* were merely engaged in an *ex post facto* justification of Stalinism then Merleau-Ponty would simply have been doing bad historiography. But he understood himself to be involved in trying to comprehend Stalinism *ex ante* or from the political agent's standpoint, in other words, in the subjective terms of a Marxist philosophy of history and not just a Stalinist rewrite.

Responsible History

It is, then, Merleau-Ponty's interpretation of the Marxist philosophy of history that must concern us. His method of presentation in this case, as elsewhere, involves the familiar alternatives of determinism and voluntarism. As a complete alternative, determinism is incompatible with the need for political action, though it may be extremely effective in the rhetoric of politics to be able to reassure one's comrades that history is on their side; and similarly, a voluntarism that does not take into account the social preconditions of revolution is likely to waste itself in abortive action. Political reflection and political action occur in a milieu or interworld which is essentially ambiguous because the facts of the situation can never be totalized and yet we are obliged to act upon our estimation of them. Because of the double contingency of the openness of the future and the partiality of human decision, political divergences, deception and violence are irreducible historical phenomena, accepted as such by all revolutionaries.

> There is no history where the course of events is a series of episodes without unity, or where it is a struggle already decided in the heaven of ideas. History is where there is a logic *within* contingence, a reason *within* unreason, where there is a historical perception which, like perception in general, leaves in the background what cannot enter the foreground but seizes the lines of force as they are generated and actively leads their traces to a conclusion. This analogy should not be interpreted as a shameful organicism or finalism, but as a reference to the fact that all symbolic systems — perception, language, history — only become what they were although in order to do so they need to be taken up into human initiative.[19]

Marxism is not a spectacle secure from its own intervention in our common history. Marxists need a philosophy of history because human history is neither open in an arbitrary way nor so closed that we are relieved of the responsibility of reading its signs and implementing our own chances. The future is not stillborn in the present nor does the past lie unalterably upon the present. Between the past and the future there is the presence of ourselves which is the chance we have of testing our limits. In the human world men cannot be the object of their own practice except where oppression rules — that is to say, where some men subject others to the rule of things. Yet men need leaders as much as leaders need men. Thus there arises for Marxism the dreadful problem, once men are determined to be free, of how it is free men are to be led along the path of freedom. For freedom is not the absence of limits which would make knowledge and leadership unnecessary. Freedom is only possible in the real world of limits and situated possibilities which require the institution of thoughtful and responsible leadership.[20]

In confronting the problematic of freedom and truth, Merleau-Ponty reflected upon man's options in terms of Max Weber's response to the historical task of understanding. He saw in Weber one who tried to live responsibly in the face of conflicting demands of knowledge and action. This was possible, in the first place, because Weber understood that history is not the passive material of historiography any more than the practice of historiography is itself free of historical interests and values. There is no neutral material of history. History is not a spectacle for us because it is our own living, our own violence and our own beliefs. Why then are revolutionary politics not an utterly cynical resort to violence and nothing but a sceptical appeal to justice and truth? For the very reason, says Merleau-Ponty, that no ones lives history from a

purely pragmatic standpoint, not even he who claims to do so. Scepticism is a conclusion which could only be reached if one were to draw — as does Sartre — a radical distinction between political knowledge and political action. But allowing that we only experience things and the future according to a probable connection does not mean that the world lacks a certain style or physiognomy for us. We live in terms of subjective certainties which we intend as practical and universal typifications that are in no way illusory unless we posit some apodictic certainty outside the grounds of human experience. We do not experience uncertainty at the core of our being. The center of our experience is a common world in which we make appraisals, enlist support and seek to convince sceptics and opponents, never doubting the fundamental permutation of subjective and objective evidence.[21]

If we accept the Marxist view that there is meaning in history as in the rest of our lives, then it follows that Marxist politics are based upon an objective analysis of the main trends in history and not simply on the will of the Communist Party. In other words there is a materialist foundation to Marxist politics. At the same time, the trends in history do not lead necessarily to a socialist society. History is made through human action and political choices which are never perfectly informed and thus there is always a contingent factor in history. It is necessary to avoid construing these materialist and ideological factors too crudely. Marxian materialism is not the simple notion that human history consists in the production of wealth; it is the project of creating a human environment which reflects the historical development of human sensibility. Similarly, the Marxist claim that ideological systems are related to economic factors is not a simple reductionist argument; it is the claim that ideological factors and the mode of production are mutually determining expressions of a given social order. At any given moment the mode of production may be the expression of the ideological superstructure just as the physical movements of the body may express a person's life-style. But in the long run it is the economic infrastructure which is the medium of the ideological message — just as our body is the structure underlying all our moods. Because we do not inhabit the present as a region totally within our survey, nor yet as a zone of pure possibility, history has familiar contours for us, a feel that we recognize in our daily lives where others share the same conditions and the same hopes. This daily life is something we shape through our desires and which in turn acquires an institutional reality which conditions the future limits and possibilities that are our life chances. In short, we bring a life-style to political action, a life-time of suffering, with others and for others, and together, for better or worse, we decide to act. But it is neither an open nor a closed calculation. It is more like the decision to live from which we cannot withdraw, a decision which we never make once and for all and yet for which we are uniquely responsible. And like the decision to live, the choice of a politics entails the responsibility for the con-

tingency of violence which is the "infantile disorder" in our private and public lives.

> One can no more get rid of historical materialism than of psychoanalysis by impugning 'reductionist' conceptions and casual thought in the name of a descriptive and phenomenological method, for historical materialism is no more linked to such 'causal' formulations as may have been given than is psychoanalysis, and like the latter it could be expressed in another language . . .
> There is no one meaning of history; what we do always has several meanings, and this is where an existential conception of history is distinguishable from materialism and spiritualism. But every cultural phenomenon has, among others, an economic significance, and history by its nature never transcends, any more than it is reducible to, economics . . . It is impossible to reduce the life which involves human relationships either to economic relations, or to juridical and moral ones thought up by men, just as it is impossible to reduce individual life either to bodily functions or to our knowledge of life as it involves them. But in each case one of the orders of significance can be regarded as dominant: one gesture is 'sexual', another as 'amorous', another as 'warlike', and even in the sphere of coexistence, one period of history can be seen as characterized by intellectual culture, another as primarily political or economic. The question whether the history of our time is pre-eminently significant in an economic sense, and whether our ideologies give us only a derivative or secondary meaning of it is one which no longer belongs to philosophy, but to politics, and one which will be solved only by seeking to know whether the economic or ideological scenario fits the facts more perfectly. Philosophy can only show that it is *possible* from the starting point of the human condition.[22]

The foundations of Marxian history and politics are grounded in the dialectic between man and nature (domination) and between man and his fellow men (recognition). It is the nature of human consciousness to realize itself in the world and among men; its embodiment is the essential mode of its openness

towards the world and to others. The problems of conflict and co-existence only arise for an embodied consciousness driven by its basic needs into the social division of labour and engaged by its deepest need in a life and death struggle for identity through mutual recognition and solidarity. Embodied consciousness never experiences an original innocence to which any violence would do irreparable harm; we experience only different kinds of violence. For consciousness only becomes aware of itself as already engaged in the world, in definite and specific situations in which its resources are never entirely its own but derive from the exploitation of its position as the child of these parents, the incumbent of such and such a role, or the beneficiary of certain class and national privileges. We rarely act as isolated individuals and even when we seem to do so our deeds presuppose a community which possesses a common measure of the good and evil it experiences.

The problem which besets the Marxist theory of the proletariat is that the emergence of truth and justice presuppose a community while at the same time the realization of a genuine community presupposes a concept of truth and justice. The Marxist critique of the liberal truth as a mystification which splits the liberal community starts from the exposure of its lack of correspondence with the objective relations between man in liberal society. By contrast, Marxism claims to be a truth in the making; it aims at overthrowing liberal society in the name of an authentic community. However, the birth of communist society is no less painful than the birth of man himself and from its beginnings communism is familiar with violence and deception. It might be argued that the violence of Marxist revolutionary politics arises because the Party forces upon the proletariat a mission for which history has not prepared it. The proletariat is thus the victim of the double contingency of bourgeois and communist deception and exploitation. The constant shifts in Party directives, the loss of socialist innocence, the reappearance of profit and status in community society may be appealed to as indications of the failure of Marxism to renew human history. Merleau-Ponty was aware of these arguments and indeed explicitly documents them with findings on conditions in the Soviet Union, including the shattering discovery of the labour camps.[23]

Nevertheless, Merleau-Ponty argued that the proper role of Marxist violence is as the midwife of a socialist society already in the womb of capitalist society. The image is essential to his argument. For it was intended to distinguish Marxist violence from historically arbitrary and authoritarian forms of violence.[24] The image of birth suggests a natural process in which there arises a point of intervention which is likely to be painful but is aimed at preserving a life which is *already there* and not entirely at the mercy of the midwife. In the language of the *Communist Manifesto*, the argument is that the birth of socialist society depends upon the full maturation of capitalism which engenders a force whose transition from dependency to independence is achieved through a painful

transition in which dramatic roles are assigned to the bourgeoisie, the proletariat, and the Party. There are, of course, features of the imagery of birth that lead to outcomes rather different from those which Merleau-Ponty wishes to draw. The human infant achieves maturity only after a long period of tutelage in which if anything social dependency becomes far more burdensome than umbilical dependency, as we have learned from Freud. Understood in this way the image involves a greater political dependency of the proletariat upon the Party and its commissars than is compatible with the aims of socialist humanism. Merleau-Ponty's ideal for the childhood of the revolution is the period of Lenin's frank and open discussions with the proletariat concerning the reasons for NEP. This was a time when words still had their face meaning, when explanations for changes of tactics were given which left the proletariat with an improved understanding of events and with heightened revolutionary consciousness.

> . . . Marxist Machiavellianism differs from Machiavellianism insofar as it transforms compromise through awareness of compromise, and alters the ambivalence of history through awareness of ambivalence; it makes detours knowingly and by announcing them as such; it calls retreats retreats; it sets the details of local politics and the paradoxes of strategy in the perspective of the whole.[25]

Marxist violence is thus an integral feature of the theory of the proletariat and its philosophy of history. To be a Marxist is to see meaning taking shape within history. Anything else is to live history and society as sheer force. To be a Marxist is to believe that history is intelligible and that it has a direction which encompasses the proletarian control of the economic and state apparatus, along with the emergence of an international brotherhood. Whatever the lags on any of these fronts, it is the Marxist persuasion that these elements delineate the essential structure or style of communist society. It is this structure of beliefs which determines the Marxist style of historical analysis and political action.

Even before he turned to Max Weber for his conception of responsible history, Merleau-Ponty had anticipated those adventures of the dialectic which had made it necessary to rethink Marxism as a philosophy of history and institutions. Unless this task is undertaken, Marxism must either continue to hide from its own history or else see its universal hopes thrown into the wasteland of historical relativism. Only an absolutely relativist conception of history as the

milieu of our own living can keep alive what Merleau-Ponty called "Western" Marxism.

> History is not only an object in front of us, far from us, beyond our reach: it is also our awakening as subjects. Itself a historical fact the true or false consciousness that we have of our history cannot be simple illusion. There is a mineral there to be refined, a truth to be extracted, if only we go to the limits of relativism and put it, in turn, back into history. We give a form to history according to our categories; but our categories, in contact with history, are themselves freed from their partiality. The old problem of the relations between subject and object is transformed, and relativism is surpassed as soon as one puts it in historical terms, since here the object is the vestige left by other subjects, and the subject — historical understanding — held in the fabric of history, is by this very fact capable of self-criticism.[26]

We have to understand how it is that Marxism which arises as a movement within history can be the fulfillment of history rather than a phase subject to its own laws of historical transition. How is it possible that men who are driven by material circumstances in general and the proletariat in particular are capable of the vision of humanity freed from exploitation and alienation? However these questions are answered, we have to face the fact that the proletariat is given direction by the Communist Party and that with respect to this relationship we face new questions about Marxist knowledge and the freedom of the masses. In his analysis of these questions Merleau-Ponty extended his reading of Weber through Lukács' studies in Marxist dialectics.[27] In terms of this reading Merleau-Ponty came to a reformulation of Marx's historical materialism. If materialism were a literal truth it is difficult to see how the category of history could arise. For matter does not have a history except by metaphorical extension. Men live in history. But their history is not external to themselves in the same sense that the history of a geological strata might be available to observation. Men inhabit history as they do language.[28] Just as they have to learn the specific vocabulary of Marxism, so they have to bring their everyday experiences of poverty, power and violence under the notion of the "proletariat" and to interpret their experiences through the projection of "class consciousness" and "revolution". Thus "class consciousness" does not inhere in history either as a pre-existing idea or as an inherent environmental force. What we can say is that

despite all its contingencies the history of society gathers into itself the consciousness that is dispersed in all its members so that it fosters their consciousness as civic knowledge:

> As a living body, given its behavior, is, so to speak, closer to consciousness than a stone, so certain social structures are the cradle of the knowledge of society. Pure consciousness finds its "origin" in them. Even if the notion of interiority, when applied to a society, should be understood in the figurative sense, we find, all the same, that this metaphor is possible with regard to capitalist society but not so with regard to precapitalist ones. This is enough for us to say that the history which produced capitalism symbolizes the emergence of a subjectivity. There are subjects, objects, there are men and things, but there is also a third order, that of relationships between men inscribed in tools or social symbols. These relationships have their development, their advances and their regressions. Just as in the life of the individual, so in this generalized life there are tentative aims, failure or success, reaction of the result upon the aim, repetition or variation, and this is what one calls history.[29]

Despite its detours and regressions, Merleau-Ponty retains his conviction of the overall meaning of human history as an emancipatory process but allows for the successes and failures in this project to lie in one and the same historical plane. History is the growing relationship of man to man. This does not mean that all previous societies are to be judged by today's standards because at every stage history is threatened with loss and diversion. What we can properly regard as today's developments really only take up problems that were immanent in the previous period. Hence the past is not merely the waste of the future. If we can speak of an advance in history it is perhaps only in the negative sense that we can speak of the elimination of non-sense rather than of the positive accumulation of reason. The price we must pay for history's deliverance of reason and freedom is that freedom and reason never operate outside of the constraints of history and politics. Therefore Marxism cannot simply claim to see through all other ideologies as though it alone were transparent to itself. Indeed, Marxism is itself open to the danger of becoming the most false ideology of all inasmuch as its own political life will require changes of position that can hardly be read from the state of its economic infrastructure.

If Marxism is not to degenerate into a willful ideology and yet not claim absolute knowledge, it must be geared to the praxis of the proletariat. But this is not an easy matter since the proletariat does not spontaneously realize its own goals and by the same token the Party cannot easily avoid a specious appeal to the allegedly objective interests of the proletariat. If like Sartre we force the distinction between theory and praxis, then the Party is either reduced to a democratic consultation of the momentary thoughts and feelings of the proletariat or else to bureaucratic cynicism with regard to the gap between the present state of the proletariat and the Party's idea of its future. So long as we think of consciousness as a state of individual minds then we cannot get around the problem of locating the synthesis of knowledge in an absolute consciousness, called the Party. This means that the proletariat is really not the subject of its own deeds but the object of what the Party knows on its behalf. To understand Merleau-Ponty's critique of Sartre's "ultrabolshevism" we need to have some notion of how they were divided even over a common philosophical background. The opposition between Sartre and Merleau-Ponty derives in the first place from their fundamentally opposite phenomenologies of embodiment. For Sartre the body is a vehicle of shame, nausea and ultimate alienation caught in the trap of the other's look.[30] In Merleau-Ponty the body is the vehicle of the very world and others with whom together we labour in love and understanding and the very same ground to which we must appeal to correct error or overcome violence. In Sartre the body is the medium of the world's decomposition, while in Merleau-Ponty the body symbolizes the very composition of the world and society. In each case there follows radically different conceptions of political life. In Merleau-Ponty, the extremes of collectivism and individualism, labour and violence are always historical dimensions of our basic social life. To Sartre, nothing unites us with nature and society except the external necessity of scarcity which obliges us to join our labour and individual sovereignty into collective projects which are always historically unstable.

> The "master", the "feudal lord", the "bourgeois", the "capitalist" all appear not only as powerful people who command but in addition and above all as *Thirds*; that is, as those who are outside the oppressed community and *for whom* this community exists. It is therefore *for* them and *in their freedom* that the reality of the oppressed class is going to exist. They cause it to be born by their look. It is to them and through them that there is revealed the identity of my condition and that of others who are oppressed; it is for them that I exist in a situation organized with others and that my possibiles as dead-possibles are strictly

> equivalent with the possibles of others; it is for them that I am a worker and it is through and in their revelation as the Other-as-a-look that I experience myself as one among others. This means that I discover the "Us" in which I am integrated or "the class" *outside*, in the look of the Third, and it is this collective alienation which I assume when saying "Us". From this point of view the privileges of the Third and "our" burdens, "our" miseries have value at first only as a *signification*; they signify the independence of the Third in relation to "Us"; they present our alienation to us more plainly. Yet as they are nonetheless *endured, as in particular our work, our fatigue are nonetheless suffered*, it is across this endured suffering that I experience my being-looked-at-as-a-thing-engaged-in-a-totality-of-things. It is in terms of my suffering, of my misery that I am collectively apprehended with others by the Third; that is, in terms of the adversity of the world, in terms of the facticity of my condition. Without the Third, no matter what might be the adversity of the world, I should apprehend myself as a triumphant transcendence; with the appearance of the Third, "I" experience "Us" as apprehended in terms of things and as things overcome by the world.[31]

In Sartrean Marxism it is therefore the role of the Party to unite an ever disintegrating proletariat to which it plays the role of the other or Third analogous to the role of the capitalist as the Other who unites the atomized labour of the workshop or assembly line. In effect, Sartre constructs the Party as the sole source of historical intelligibility because he denies any basis for inter-subjectivity to arise at other levels of conduct. The result is that Sartre is obliged to idealize the notions of fact, action and history as nothing but what is determined by the Party. Hence the Party is subject to permanent anxiety since it is deprived of any middle ground between itself and a proletarian praxis from which it might learn to formulate, revise and initiate plans that do not risk its whole life. Because he can only understand expression as pure creation or as simple imitation, Sartre loses the real ground of political communicaton.

> If one wants to engender revolutionary politics dialectically from the proletarian condition, the revolution from the rigidified swarm of thoughts without subject, Sartre

> answers with a dilemma: either the conscious renewal alone gives its meaning to the process, or one returns to organicism. What he rejects under the name of organicism at the level of history is in reality much more than the notion of life: it is symbolism understood as a functioning of signs having its own efficacy beyond the meanings that analysis can assign to these signs. It is, more generally, expression. For him expression either goes beyond what is expressed and is then a pure creation, or it copies it and is then a simple unveiling. But an action which is an unveiling, an unveiling which is an action — in short, a dialectic — this Sartre does not want to consider.[32]

Properly speaking, praxis is not divided between theory and practice but lies in the wider realm of communication and expression. Here Merleau-Ponty's argument already anticipates Habermas' later correction of Marx's confusion of the emancipatory orders of labour and symbolic interaction.[33] The everyday life of the proletariat makes the notion of a class a possibility long before it is formulated as such. When the occasion for the explicit appeal to class consciousness arises, its formal possibility does not lie in the power of the Party's theoreticians but in the ordinary capacity of men to appraise their situation, and to speak their minds together because their thoughts are not locked behind their skulls but are near enough the same in anyone's experience of exploitation and injustice. Of course, the Party has to give these thoughts a political life, to realize their truth as a common achievement in which the proletariat and the Party are mutually enlightened. "This exchange, in which no one commands and no one obeys, is symbolized by the old custom which dictates that, in a meeting, speakers join in when the audience applauds. What they applaud is the fact that they do not intervene as persons, that in their relationship with those who listen to them a truth appears which does not come from them and which the speakers can and must applaud. In the communist sense, the Party is this communication; and such a conception of the Party is not a corollary of Marxism — it is its very center."[34] Thus we see that the heart of Marxism is not just the communalizing of property but the attainment of an ideally communicative or educative society whose icon is the Party. At the same time, this ideal society of labour and speech is obliged to resort to violence since its truths reflect only a reality that has to be brought into being. Marxist truth is not hidden behind empirical history waiting to be deciphered by the Party theoreticians. Ultimately, the issue here is the question of the education of the Party itself in its role of educating the masses. It was first raised by Marx himself in the Third Thesis on Feuerbach. If the Party is not above history then it is inside

history like the proletariat itself. The problem is how to relativize the opposition between Party and proletarian consciousness so that their mutual participation in history is not organized in terms of a (Party) subject and (proletariat) object split. The argument between Sartre and Merleau-Ponty parallels the difference between the political practices of Lenin and Stalin, at least insofar as Merleau-Ponty like Lukács can argue for a period in Lenin's own use of the Party as an instrument of proletarian education and party self-critique. In his book, *Lenin*,[35] Lukács argues with respect to Lenin's political practice much the same thesis that Merleau-Ponty later espoused, namely, that it must not be confused with *realpolitik*. "Above all, when defining the concept of compromise, any suggestion that it is a question of knack, of cleverness, of an astute fraud, must be rejected. 'We must,' said Lenin, 'decisively reject those who think that politics consists of little tricks, sometimes bordering on deceit. *Classes cannot be deceived.*' For Lenin, therefore, compromise means *that the true developmental tendencies of classes* (and possibly of nations — for instance, where an oppressed people is concerned), which under specific circumstances and for a certain period run parallel in determinate areas with the interests of the proletariat, are exploited to the advantage of *both.*"[36] In the postscript to his essay on Lenin, Lukács repeats the argument for the unity of Lenin's theoretical grasp of the political nature of the imperialist epoch and his practical sense of proletarian politics. In trying to express the living nature of that unity in Lenin's own life, Lukács describes how Lenin would learn from experience or from Hegel's *Logic*, according to the situation, preserving in himself the dialectical tension between particulars and a theoretical totality. As Lenin writes in his *Philosophic Notebooks:* "Theoretical cognition ought to give the Object in its necessity, in its all-sided relations, in its contradictory movement, in- and for-itself. But the human Concept 'definitively' catches this objective truth of cognition, seizes and masters it, only when the Concept becomes 'being-for-itself' in the sense of practice."

It was by turning to Hegel that Lenin sought to find a way to avoid making theory the mere appendage of state practice, while reserving to practice a more creative political role than the retroactive determination or revision of ideology. But this meant that Marxist materialism could never be the simple enforcement of political will, any more than political will could be exercised without a theoretical understanding of the specific class relations it presupposed. Thus Lenin remarks that "The standpoint of life, of practice, should be first and fundamental in the theory of knowledge . . . Of course, we must not forget that the criterion of practice can never, in the nature of things, either confirm or refute any idea *completely*. This criterion too is sufficiently 'indefinite' not to allow human knowledge to become 'absolute', but at the same time it is sufficiently definite to wage a ruthless fight against all varieties of idealism and agnosticism." Of course, in these later Hegelian formulations Lenin is modify-

ing his own version of Engels' dialectical materialism as set forth in *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, thereby rejoining the challenge set to this work by Lukács' own *History and Class Consciousness,* as well as by Karl Korsch's *Marxism and Philosophy*, both published in 1923. Lukács' essay on Lenin was published on the occasion of Lenin's death in 1924. What died with Lenin was Orthodox Marxism, although its dead hand was to be upon socialism for another thirty years or more. But while it is clear that scientific socialism was not ready for Lukács, the same must be said of the West, where only today is the critique of scientific praxis entering into a properly reflexive or critical social science. What *History and Class Consciousness* made clear was that living Marxism is inseparable from its idealist and Hegelian legacy. The Hegelian concept of totality furnishes a matrix for the integration of ethics and politics through the restless dynamics of man's attempt to measure his existential circumstances against the ideal of his human essence, which he achieves through the struggle against self and institutional alienation. The Hegelian Marxist totality is thus the basis for the integral humanism of Marxist social science.[37]

What Merleau-Ponty adds to Hegelian Marxism from his own phenomenology of perception is an unshakable grasp of the "interworld" (*intermonde*) of everyday living and conduct which is far too dense and stratified to be a thing of pure consciousness. This is the world of our species-being, a corporeal world whose deep structures of action and reflection are the anonymous legacies of the body politic.[38] The interworld is never available to us in a single unifying moment of consciousness or as a decision whose consequences are identical with the actor's intentions. But then none of us thinks or acts outside of a life whose ways have moulded us so that what "we" seek is never entirely our own and therefore borrows upon the very collective life which it advances or retards. Thus we never have anything like Sartre's absolute power of decision to join or withdraw from collective life. What we have is an ability to shift institutions off center, polarizing tradition and freedom in the same plane as creativity and imitation. Our freedom, therefore, never comes to us entirely from the outside through the Party, as Sartre would have it. It begins inside us like the movements of our body in response to the values of a world which it opens up through its own explorations and accommodations. It follows that Sartre's conception of the party expropriates the spontaneity of all life in the name of the proletariat, having first separated the proletariat from what it shares with men anywhere engaged in the struggle for life.

> The question is to know whether, as Sartre says, there are only *men* and *things* or whether there is also the interworld, which we call history, symbolism, truth-to-be-made. If one sticks to the dichotomy, men, as the place

> where all meaning arises, are condemned to an incredible tension. Each man, in literature as well as in politics, must assume all that happens instant by instant to all others, he mus be immediately universal. If, on the contrary, one acknowledges a mediation of personal relationships through the world of human symbols, it is true that one renounces being instantly justified in the eyes of everyone and holding oneself responsible for all that is done at each moment. But since consciousness cannot in practice maintain its pretension of being God, since it is inevitably led to delegate responsibility — it is one abdication for another, and we prefer the one which leaves consciousness the means of knowing what it is doing.[39]

The universality and truth towards which political consciousness aims are not an intrinsic property of the Party. They are an acquisiton continuously established and re-established in a community and tradition of knowledge for which individuals in specific historical situations call and to which they respond. Understood in this way, history is the call of one thought to another, because each individual's work or action is created across the path of self and others towards a public which it elicits rather than serves. That is, history is the field which individual effort requires in order to become one with the community it seeks to build so that where it is successful its invention appears always to have been necessary. Individual action, then, is the invention of history, because it is shaped in a present which previously was not just a void waiting to be determined by the word or deed but in a tissue of calling and response which is the life of no one and everyone. Every one of life's actions, insofar as it invokes its truth, lives in the expectation of a historical inscription, a judgment not only of its intention or consequences but also of its fecundity which is the relevance of its "story" to the present.

> History is the judge — not History as the Power of a moment or of a century — but history as the space of inscription and accumulation beyond the limits of countries and epochs of what we have said and done that is most true and valuable, taking into account the circumstances in which we had to speak. Others will judge what I have done because I painted the painting to be seen, because my action committed the future of others; but neither art nor politics consists in pleasing or flattering others. What they

> expect of the artist or politician is that he draw them toward values in which they will only later recognize their own values. The painter or politician shapes others more than he follows them. The *public* at whom he aims is not given; it is a public to be elicited by his work. The others of whom he thinks are not empirical "others", nor even *humanity* conceived as a species; it is others once they have become such that he can live with them. The history in which the artist participates (and it is better the less he thinks about "making history" and honestly produces *his* work as he sees it) is not a power before which he must genuflect. It is the perpetual conversation woven together by all speech, all valid works and actions, each according to its place and circumstance, contesting and confirming the other, each one recreating all the others.[40]

Merleau-Ponty returns Marxist politics to the flux of the natural and historical world, rejecting its compromise with the ideals of objectivism which have made the tradition of rationality an enigma to itself. Henceforth, politics must abide in the life-world where Husserl found its roots and from there it must recover its own ontological history.

Today history is hardly more meaningful because of the advent of socialism in the Soviet Union or elsewhere. Indeed, the potential nuclear confrontation of world ideologies has brought human history to new heights of absurdity. Marxism has become a truth for large parts of the world but not in the sense it intended. The question is what conclusion we should draw from this. Writing in 1947 and the decade following, Merleau-Ponty was afraid that the West would try to resolve the Communist problem through war. To this he argued that the failures of Communism are the failures of Western humanism as a whole and so we cannot be partisan to it, far less indifferent. The Marxist revolution can lose its way. This is because, as Merleau-Ponty puts it, it is a mode of human conduct which may be true as a movement but false as a regime. But it is the nature of political action to offer no uniquely happy solution. Political life involves a fundamental evil in which we are forced to choose between values without knowing for certain which are absolutely good or evil. In the Trojan wars the Greek gods fought on both sides. It is only in modern politics that, as Camus remarks, the human mind has become an armed camp. In this situation Merleau-Ponty wrote to overcome the split between good and evil which characterizes the politics of crisis and conflict. Above all, he raised the voice of reason which despite scepticism and error achieves a truth for us that is continuous with nothing else than our own efforts to maintain it.

For the very moment we assert that unity and reason do not *exist* and that opinions are carried along by discordant options which remain below the level of reason the consciousness we gain of the irrationalism and contingency in us cancels them as fatalities and opens us to the other person. Doubt and disagreement are facts, but so is the strange pretension we all have of thinking of the truth, our capacity for taking the other's position to judge ourselves, our need to have our opinions recognized by him and to justify our choices before him, in short, the experience of the other person as an *alter ago* in the very course of discussion. *The human world is an open or unfinished system and the same radical contingency which threatens it with discord also rescues it from the inevitability of disorder and prevents us from despairing of it*, providing only that one remembers that its various machineries are actually men and tries to maintain and expand man's relations to man.

Such a philosophy cannot tell us *that* humanity will be realized as though it possessed some knowledge apart and were not itself embarked upon experience, being only a more acute consciousness of it. But it awakens us to the importance of daily events and action. For it is a philosophy which arouses in us a love for our times which are not the simple repetition of human eternity nor merely the conclusion to premises already postulated. It is a view which like the most fragile object of perception — a soap bubble, or a wave — or like the most simple dialogue, embraces indivisibly all the order and all the disorder of the world.[41]

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Notes

1. The critique of Marxist scientism was first advanced for English readers (if we leave aside the earlier and then untranslated work of Karl Korsch, *Marxism and Philosophy* and Georg Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*) by Karl Popper in his *The Open Society and its Enemies* and *The Poverty of Historicism*. I have examined this debate in John O'Neill (ed.), *Modes of Individualism and Collectivism*, London, Heinemann and New York, St. Martin's Press, 1973.

2. In a number of essays I have argued for the unity of Marxist humanism and science. See my "For Marx Against Althusser", *The Human Context*, Vol. VI, No. 2, Summer 1974, pp. 385-398; and "The Concept of Estrangement in Early and Late Writings of Karl Marx" in my *Sociology as a Skin Trade*, Essays towards a Reflexive Sociology, London, Heinemann and New York, Harper and Row, 1972, pp. 113-136; and "Marxism and Mythology", *Ibid.*, pp. 137-154.

3. George Lichtheim, *From Marx to Hegel*, and other Essays. London, Orbach and Chambers, 1971.

4. George Lichtheim, *Marxism in Modern France*, New York and London, Columbia University Press, 1966 and *from Marx to Hegel*, London, Orbach and Chambers, 1971.

5. Alfred Schmidt, *The Concept of Nature in Marx*, London, NLB, 1971.

6. Jean Hyppolite, *Studies on Marx and Hegel*, Edited and Translated by John O'Neill, New York, Basic Books and London, Heinemann, 1969.

7. Alexandre Kojève, *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel*, New York, Basic Books, 1969.

8. Richard Crossman (ed.), *The God that Failed*, New York, Harper and Row, 1949; Michel-Antoine Burnier, *Choice of Action*, Translated by Bernard Murchland, New York, Random House, 1968.

9. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Humanism and Terror*, An Essay on the Communist Problem, Translated and with an Introduction by John O'Neill, Boston, Beacon Press, 1969.

10. John O'Neill, *Perception, Expression and History:* The Social Phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1970 and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology, Language and Sociology*, Selected Essays, Edited by John O'Neill, London, Heinemann, 1974.

11. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Adventures of the Dialectic*, Translated by Joseph Bien, Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1973, p. 6. My emphasis.

12. Alphonse de Waelhens, *Une philosophie de l'ambiguité*, L'existentialisme de Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Louvain, Publications Universitaires de Louvain, 1967.

13. *Humanism and Terror*, pp. 109-110. My emphasis.

14. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "Reading Montaigne", *Signs*, Translated by Richard C. McLeary, Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1964; John O'Neill, "Between Montaigne and Machiavelli", in *Sociology as a Skin Trade*, pp. 96-110.

15. John O'Neill, "Situation, Action and Language", in *Sociology as a Skin Trade*, pp. 81-93.

16. *Humanism and Terror*, pp. 100-101.

17. *Report of Court Proceedings in the Case of the Anti-Soviet "Bloc of Rights and Trotskyites"*, Moscow, March 2-13, 1938. Published by the People's Commissariat of Justice of the U.S.S.R., Moscow, 1938.

18. Nathan Leites and Elsa Bernaut, *Ritual of Liquidation*, The Case of the Moscow Trials, Glencoe, The Free Press, 1954.

19. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Themes from the Lectures at the Collège de France, 1952-1960*, Translated by John O'Neill, Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1970, pp. 29-30.

20. John O'Neill, "Le Langage et la décolonisation: Fanon et Freire", *Sociologie et Societés*, Vol VI, No. 2, Novembre 1974, pp. 53-65.

21. John O'Neill, *Making Sense Together*, An Introduction to Wild Sociology, New York, Harper and Row and London, Heinemann, 1974.

22. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, Translated by Colin Smith, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962, pp. 171-173.

23. "The U.S.S.R. and the Camps", *Signs*, pp. 263-273.

24. "There is indeed a Sartrean violence, and it is more highly strung and less durable than Marx's violence." *Adventures of the Dialectic*, p. 159.

25. *Humanism and Terror*, p. 129.

26. *Adventures of the Dialectic*, pp. 30-31.

27. Georg Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, Studies in Marxist Dialectics, Translated by Rodney Livingstone, London, Merlin Press, 1971.

28. John O'Neill, "Institution, Language and Historicity", in *Perception, Expression and History*, pp. 46.64.

29. *Adventures of the Dialectic*, pp. 37-38.

30. Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, Translated and with an Introduction by Hazel E. Barnes, New York, Washington Square Press, 1969, Part III.

31. *Being and Nothingness*, pp. 544-545.

32. *Adventures of the Dialectic*, p. 142.

33. "In his empirical analyses Marx comprehends the history of the species under the categories of material activity *and* the critical abolition of ideologies, of instrumental action *and* revolutionary practice, of labour *and* reflection at once. But Marx interprets what he does in the more restricted conception of the species' self-reflection through work alone. The materialist concept of synthesis is not conceived broadly enough in order to explicate the way in which Marx contributes to realizing the intention of a really radicalized critique of knowledge. In fact, it even prevented Marx from understanding his own mode of procedure from this point of view. Jürgen Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests*, Translated by Jeremy J. Shapiro, Boston, Beacon Press, 1971, p. 42. Cf. Jürgen Habermas, *Theory and Practice*, Translated by John Viertel, Boston, Beacon Press, 1973, Ch. 4, Labor and Interaction: Remarks on Hegel's Jena *Philosophy of Mind*.

34. *Adventures of the Dialectic*, p. 52.

35. Georg Lukács, *Lenin. A Study on the Unity of his Thought*, London, NLB, 1970.

36. *Lenin*, p. 79.

37. This much has been established in the academic debate over the early and later writings of Marx. One would have thought that it is no longer arguable that Marxism can be separated from its Hegelian sources. Yet, recently this argument has reappeared in the influential contributions to critical theory developed by Habermas and by the structuralist readings of Marx fostered by Althusser. I have considered these arguments in my essays, "Can Phenomenology be Critical?", and "On Theory and Criticism in Marx", in *Sociology as a Skin Trade*, pp. 221-236 and pp. 237-263.

38. John O'Neill, "Authority, Knowledge and the Body Politic", in *Sociology as a Skin Trade*, pp. 68-80.

39. *Adventures of the Dialectic*, p. 200.

40. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *The Prose of the World*, Translated and with an Introduction by John O'Neill, Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1973, p. 86.

41. *Humanism and Terror*, pp. 188-189.

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MARCUSE AND THE PROBLEM OF HAPPINESS

Charles Rachlis

In 1955, Herbert Marcuse published *Eros and Civilization*, subtitled "A Philosophical Inquiry Into Freud". The preface begins with the claim that "psychological categories . . . have become political categories." It goes on to argue that "the traditional borderlines between psychology on the one side and political and social philosophy on the other side have been made obsolete by the condition of man in the present era . . ."[1], a claim that receives its most provocative formulation in Marcuse's hypothesis of a non-surplus-repressive civilization. This hypothesis is a radical revision of Freud's well-known pessimism regarding the prospects for happiness in modern society. In addition, however, it is a twentieth century version of a conception as old as Western philosophy — that is, that freedom, necessity and happiness can coincide in human existence.

The importance of Marcuse's attempt to integrate the two great conceptual realms distinctive to twentieth century thought — Marxism and psychoanalysis — is that it takes the form of a critical dialogue with Marx and Freud which turns on the problem of happiness.[2] In this article, I will be concerned to elaborate the problem of happiness as it emerges from this dialogue, and to relate it to the broader tensions and polarities which animate both Marcuse's work and twentieth century political thought in general: those of theory and practice, reality and appearance, freedom and necessity.

This elaboration will proceed in five sections. The first three are concerned to develop the problem of happiness, which is conceived negatively as the problem of domination and the occluded pre-history of humanity, and positively as the prospects for liberation and the construction of a free existence. The last two sections expand the discussion by drawing out the implications and psychodynamics of liberation in Marcuse's terms, and by clarifying some theoretical and political implications of the Marcusean analysis, with particular reference to the issues of true and false needs, and the relationship between theory and practice.

CHARLES RACHLIS

Freud and the Political Economy of Repression

> As a natural being . . . man is on the one hand equipped with *natural powers*, . . . these powers exist in him as dispositions and capacities, as *drives*. On the other hand, as a natural, corporeal, sensuous, objective being, he is a *suffering*, conditioned and limited being, . . .
>
> Karl Marx

A generation before *Eros and Civilization*, in *Civilization And Its Discontents*, Freud remarked that

> it is impossible to overlook the extent to which civilization is built up upon a renunciation of instinct, how much it presupposes precisely the non-satisfaction . . . of powerful instincts.[3]

Against this view, Marcuse argues for a reconceptualization premised on the differentiation of history from ontology. Such a revision is validated by two sets of considerations. First, it produces an internal historicization of Freud's analysis, with the result that the fateful continuum linking progress in civilization with progress in repression is grounded historically, and thereby rendered subject to historical eclipse. Second, it permits traditional Marxist analysis to incorporate a psychoanalytic dimension, the metapsychological structure of which is consistent with traditional Marxian concerns.

Accordingly, Marcuse draws a distinction between "basic-" and "surplus-repression"; surplus repression is defined as that portion which is in excess of the level necessary to sustain a specific civilization at a given time.[4] Underlying this distinction and, in fact, the concept of repression itself, is the notion of scarcity. Marcuse criticizes as un-historical Freud's view of repression as an undifferentiated response to the material scarcity which characterizes human existence. In his view, Freud's analysis fails to distinguish the biological and historical elements of socially-imposed repression, because it hypostatizes scarcity as an "eternal, primeval exigency of life".[5] Scarcity, Marcuse argues, is a social phenomenon; hence, the effort to explain it in anthropological terms ignores the historical sedimentation of civilization into social structure. And, consideration of this dimension reveals that scarcity is neither undifferentiated nor primeval; rather, it is organized and imposed as a hierarchical distribution. Thus, the Freudian view, in which the necessity of repression is contained in the very notion of civilization,

> is fallacious in so far as it applies to the brute *fact* of scarcity what actually is the consequence of a specific *organization* of scarcity, and of a specific existential attitude enforced by this organization.[6]

Accordingly, Freud's fatalism regarding happiness is unfounded; the seeming rationality of prevalent levels of repression presupposes an ideological collapsing of a given *form* of civilization — patriarchal, class-stratified, surplus-repressive society — into civilization *per se*.

The ideological legitimation of surplus-repression is accomplished in advanced industrial society by the "performance principle". Defined as "the prevailing historical form of . . . [Freud's] reality principle"[7], the performance principle defines the relationship between social necessity and instinctual gratification. And, in exemplifying the ethos of productivity, renunciation and sacrifice, in the midst of a social order capable of universal affluence but characterized by an appallingly-skewed distribution of that affluence, the performance principle reflects for Marcuse the social rationality of domination.

Domination is a form of oppression distinguished by its totalizing character and by its virtual invisibility. It is a "new, improved" form of subjection, in that it operates not "from above", but "from within". Because the regime is sustained by the internalization and reproduction of the performance principle, its subjects meet tyrannical demands without experiencing oppression; their actions are happily voluntary. In Marcuse's view, domination

> is in effect whenever the individual's goals and purposes and the means of striving for and attaining them are prescribed to him and performed by him as something prescribed.[8]

In social terms, domination is revealed within the structure of the relations of production and reproduction,

> insofar as social needs have been determined by the interests of the ruling groups at any given time, and this interest has defined the needs of other groups and the means and limitations of their satisfactions.[9]

As a systemic form of oppression in advanced industrial society, domination embodies an irrational logic which is apparent in the hierarchical distribution of scarcity and in the imposed surplus-repression which support it. This irrationality is evidenced at two levels. First, in absolute terms: to the extent that the imposition of surplus-repression serves to maintain a hierarchical distribution of scarcity and thus also of the social product created by scarcity-induced labour, the rule of the performance principle subordinates the collective prospects for the free development and satisfaction of needs to the private interests of a privileged minority. In addition, the irrationality is relative: to the extent that societal needs and interests are defined by a privileged few, a fundamental discrepancy is maintained between the historically-constituted potential of a given society and its particular mode of organization and level of performance. Just as the distinction between basic- and surplus-repression expresses the discrepancy between socially necessary repression and repression required to sustain domination, so the performance principle expresses the discrepancy between hierarchically-distributed scarcity as a "bad" historical solution to natural scarcity, and the same distribution of scarcity as an institution of social domination. This latter discrepancy exists, Marcuse claims, because ". . . the achievements of the performance principle surpass its institutions . . ."[10]. By this he means that advanced industrial society has the technological and productive capacity to eliminate scarcity — that the prevailing scarcity is a man-made and deliberately perpetuated institution of domination. Equally this irrationality pervades and animates individual experience, via the goals and cultural patterns that support a society premised on needlessly-competitive economic performance. And here, the experience of domination is most bitter: in the brutalization of men and women in stultifying jobs, and in the miserable poverty and unemployment generated by the constraints of "free enterprise". These phenomena are not unrelated. Nor are they "economic" as opposed to "psychological" issues; common to both is a systematic degradation of humanity most strikingly apparent in the ease with which men and women come to view their well-being and happiness in strictly instrumental terms — as the incidental consequences of their productive activity.

Paradoxically, the patent irrationality of domination serves to further the interests of those who rule. Two factors apply here, both of which relate to the socio-epistemic function of ideology. The first is that the rule of the performance principle is irrational in a substantive, as opposed to a formal sense.[11] Thus, its unreasonableness is a function not of an internal logical inconsistency, but rather of its suppression of human potential and its denial of gratification. Beneath the material abundance of advanced capitalism lies a "political economy of repression", which generates psychic winners and losers according to a calculus of needs derived from the functional imperatives of domination. But its totalizing character enables a perverse inversion of norms and expecta-

tions, and the creation of an internalized system of invisible surplus-repressive controls. Thus, the fact that the system is irrational, inasmuch as it promises freedom and happiness at the same time as it delivers misery and exploitation, is experienced not as an indictment of the system, but as evidence of personal failure and a need for renewed self-discipline on the part of dominated men and women. Here, as elsewhere, the winners make the rules — and legislate normality. This form of control permits an equation to be drawn, in the minds of winners *and* losers, between their performance and their inherent claims on the game itself. A self-validating logical circle surrounds the relationship of performance and fulfillment, which tends to preempt any attempt to connect misery with its social origins.

The second factor is that the totalization inherent in the performance principle necessarily articulates a political universe. The combined effect of advanced capitalism's interpenetration of public and private life, and instrumentalization of personal experience is to produce a situation in which external and internal performances become interchangeable, and in which means and ends tend to merge. The individual as worker performs according to standards demanded equally of individuals in their private lives; increasingly, men and women relate to themselves as if to other people: one reads one's emotions as those of an intimate stranger. Response is calculated, efficient; satisfaction a matter of matching category with function. Together, these factors accentuate the fundamental contradiction embodied in the surplus-repression imposed under the performance principle: the technological achievements of advanced industrial society enable intensified oppression, but they simultaneously illustrate "the extent to which the *basis* of civilization has changed (while its *principle* has been retained)"[12].

Art as Form of Reality

In advanced industrial society, domination is evidenced in the irrational disparity which is maintained between actuality and possibility, and the imposition of surplus-repression that this implies. As the twin processes of public rationalization and private instrumentalization advance, it becomes increasingly apparent that the perpetuation of this social order demands the forcible suppression of universal potential — in other words, that the prevailing social rationality is rational only for the maintenance of the status quo. This betrayal of human potential is accomplished by the performance principle, which describes a totality within which surplus-repression can be rationalized: under the performance principle, what is pleasurable is equated with what is normal and socially useful.[13] As a result, the articulation of a negative, or critical, dimension increasingly becomes a utopian undertaking. Not surprisingly: the

continued expansion of productive and technological capacities beyond the level necessary to provide for a humane existence, and with it, the increasing obsolescence of the performance principle, requires a correspondingly steady mobilization against the spectre of liberation.

The effect of such mobilization, and the progressive tendency it reflects toward "the closing of the universe of discourse" is to restrict liberation, at least initially, to claims advanced in and by the imagination. In this sense, the struggle to articulate a reality principle based on gratification rather than sacrifice parallels artistic expression. The parallel lies in what Marcuse calls "the power of negative thinking" — the ability to pierce the reified given-ness of immediate experience, and posit, at least negatively, an "other" existence. The articulation of this other existence — a universe founded on the claim of the whole individual — traditionally has occurred in art; over the historical span of bourgeois culture, the aesthetic realm has been a refuge for transcendent conceptions of freedom and enjoyment. Art offers the possibility of reconciling the perennial conflict between happiness and reason, of reconciling the claims of necessity and gratification. Therefore, in Marcuse's view, the artistic portrayal of a pleasurable existence premised on an integral humanity embodies an essential aspect of the struggle for a different reality principle.

In addition, art has the ability to capture non-distorted dimensions of human existence, to represent aspects of humanity which are denied historical realization — thereby preserving, "between memory and dream", the promise of happiness. For this reason, art as a cognitive form has a special significance for Marcuse. In the artistic realm, he says, ". . . the relation between the universal and the particular manifests itself in a unique and yet representative form".[14] For Marcuse, what is represented and preserved in the negative moment of artistic expression constitutes an imaginative subversion of historical reality. The artistic "promesse de bonheur" (Stendhal) exposes not only the relegation of sensuous enjoyment to the artistic realm; in a society where realism is a mask for madness, the "utopianism" of art bears eloquent testimony to the distance separating its claims from the demands of surplus-repressive society. Against the bland assent of affirmative culture, imagination "retains the insoluble tension between idea and reality, the potential and the actual."[15]

The preservation of this tension is increasingly problematic in advanced industrial society because, Marcuse argues, "irrationality becomes the social form of reason" at the same time as it is manifestly a form of *social unconsciousness*. In addition, because domination implies the manipulation of individual and social factors *within* individuals, liberation is more complex than the notion of consciousness suggests. Domination is more than oppression operating "behind the backs" of men and women. It is, as Kontos puts it, "a satanic thief" — a specific set of institutional and psycho-sexual controls which

mediate and constrain roles and perceptions. Accordingly, the links between consciousness and action, social change and personal liberation, have to be specified inclusive of the needs and drives which operate in the instinctual structure, and which establish the psycho-sensual foundation of the individual. Here, Marcuse argues, "the closing of the universe of discourse" is paralleled in the historically-produced "second nature" of man. Second nature refers to socially-defined human nature, as distinct from the biological and ontological capacities and potentialities it overlays. Thus, it describes the pattern of "revealed preferences" which exist in the instinctual structure, as the result of the internalization of social values.

The notion of liberation is, therefore, dialectical. Because dominated men and women's self-experience is socially manipulable, the relationship between critical consciousness and material interest constitutes a paradox. On the one side, the workings of the performance principle ". . . have created a second nature of man which ties him libidinally and aggressively to the commodity form." As constitutive of second nature, "the needs generated by this sytem are . . . the counterrevolution anchored in the instinctual structure."[16] On the other side, however, the internal dynamics which are presupposed in this notion of "inorganic human nature" would seem to provide the simultaneous basis for transformation. As Jacoby notes, "second nature is first nature refracted through but not altered by history; it is as unconscious as first nature with the difference that this unconsciousness is historical not intrinsic."[17] Accordingly, the primordial potentiality which is suspended in this refraction, and which is the target of such intensive efforts at neutralization on the part of the culture industry, is the raw material of freedom. Ironically, ontology is preserved within historical amnesia.

From this perspective, the power of the imagination is also the power of memory: the ability to "re-collect" and reassemble "the bits and fragments which can be found in distorted humanity and distorted nature."[18] And memory, as Orwell has shown, is essential to liberation; it alone preserves the awareness of betrayal. In this sense, art can retrieve aspects of human "nature"[19] which have been repressed: the aesthetic experience, as memory, can reanimate the individual awareness of historical amnesia. And, for Marcuse, the significance of art as negative representation lies in just this possibility: the reanimation of suppressed possibility — a "return of the repressed". The positive significance of this negative moment lies in the awakening from amnesia it can produce — once, among individuals, in pre-history; again, and collectively, at the advent of human history.

What remains problematic in this preliminary conceptualization of liberation as imaginative subversion of the world-as-given, is the relationship between the individual awareness of domination that can occur through art, and the dynamics of social transformation. As Marcuse noted in "The Affirmative

Character of Culture'' (1937): ''This is the real miracle of affirmative culture. Men can feel themselves happy even without being so at all.''[20] Thirty years later, he returned to this problem in the notion of ''the new sensibility''.

''The new sensibility'' is Marcuse's term for the socio-psychological transvaluation of values presupposed in and manifested by liberation. Liberation, from Marcuse's point of view, is not a project carried out within current conditions; rather, it involves a restructuring of those conditions — a restructuring of human existence. Liberation constitutes a rupture within the historical continuum of domination, which leads to a radical change of experience, and not to the ''ever bigger and better'' perpetuation of ''mutilated human experience''[21].

However, the fact of surplus-repression and the ''voluntary'' reproduction of servitude it bespeaks, operate as a powerful counter-tendency to the historical rupture envisioned in the notion of liberation. From Marcuse's point of view, liberation as a qualitative change in the infrastructure of society equally refers to a qualitative change in the infrastructure of man.[22] The new sensibility is ''. . . the mediation between the political practice of 'changing the world' and the drive for personal liberation''[23], and is thus the positive correlate of second nature, with regard to instinctual needs. While the second nature of dominated man reflects ''the counterrevolution anchored in the instinctual structure'', the new sensibility connotes the instinctual basis of revolution in the name of human freedom — in Marcuse's provocative phrase, ''the biological basis for socialism''. By this he means the emergence of a new reality principle, characterized not by surplus-repressive instinctual organization and the ''cult of rewarded efficiency''[24], but rather by a relation between man and nature that he terms an ''aesthetic ethos''.

Thus constituted, the relationship of man and nature would be one of pacification[25] — a relationship in which the self-determination and self-realization characteristic of free human activity become universal. And, fundamentally, this implies for Marcuse ''. . . the liberation of nature as a vehicle for the liberation of man''[26], and hence a transcendence of the alienation and reification which characterize the relationships among dominated individuals and between both human and non-human nature.

This totalization is conceived by Marcuse as an aesthetic ethos for two reasons. First, an authentic liberation from surplus-repressive historical conditions presupposes an emancipation which cannot properly be called ''political'' in Marcuse's terms. Indeed, this is his criticism of all past revolutions: by failing to effect a break with established patterns of needs and satisfactions, they guaranteed the reproduction of ''the old Adam'' in the new society. In contrast, the emancipatory change envisioned by Marcuse would result in a changed perception of needs and their content — a change at once individual *and* social, political *and* pre-political. In this sense, Marcuse uses the term

"aesthetic" to refer to the broader realm in which this change would occur — the realm of sensuous experience.

The second reason for conceptualizing liberation in terms of an "aesthetic ethos" has to do with the status of art as historical phenomenon. In Marcuse's analysis, liberation is validated by the construction of an existence in which theoretical and practical reason on the one hand, and joy and beauty on the other, achieve reconciliation. Such a reconciliation is "utopian" relative to prevailing historical arrangements *and* in an etymological sense as well; it could be realized only within a free human existence, and such freedom "is nowhere already in existence"[27]. Hence, the aesthetic dimension of liberation: the construction of a free existence is an aesthetic undertaking in that it is guided by criteria which traditionally have characterized works of art. The sensibility implicit in this process is aesthetic in the additional sense that it is societally repressed, and is prevented expression as a dimension of historical reality, except in a highly sublimated form. The construction of a free existence would thus constitute the historical realization of art: the conscious development and elaboration of ontological possibility — art no longer signifying just the form of imagination, but rather art as the form of reality.

Liberation

> . . . but occasionally, from out of this matter, there escapes a thin beam of light that, seen at the right angle, can crack the shell . . . .
>
> Tom Stoppard, *Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead*

As the foregoing presentation indicates, a central problematic in the analysis of domination is that of reality and appearance. And, as I have suggested, it is manifested at two analytically-distinct levels: (1) at what has been termed the socio-epistemic level, which refers to the Marxian dialectic of ontology within history; and (2) at the level of instinctual organization, which I prefer to term biological. Further, Marcuse's analysis indicates that the links between Marxian ontology and Freudian biology are historical; in advanced industrial society, they are revealed in the second nature of dominated men and women. Through this "inorganic human nature", individuals reproduce an internal political economy of repression, which is governed by the performance principle, and which consists of a set of cultural and institutional controls manipulated by those who dominate. The mode of this control is psychological; by internalizing the surplus-repressive values of the performance principle, dominated men

and women unwittingly transform a falsified version of historical reality into the perceived "natural order of things". This refashioning of history into nature occurs within an affluent and technologically sophisticated universe that is mobilized against the coming to consciousness and articulation of alternative modes of existence. The result is an insidious flattening of the distinction between reality and possibility — the phenomenon of one-dimensionality.

From this perspective, the concept of domination warrants special attention. It is established on psychological grounds, but it is not neurosis; there is no flight from reality. It dehumanizes by suppressing ontology within historical development, but yet is not alienation; unlike the proletariat in Marx, those who are its victims do not actively embody the negation of their predicament.[28] Rather, domination — as oppression by the manipulation of needs, perceptions and sensibilities — is better interpreted as a form of ideology, which constitutes a two-fold revision of the Marxian conception.

In Marx, ideology is distinguished from objective truth by its partial character. Because capitalist society subsumes individuals under classes and negates the naturally creative basis of their existence by appropriating the product of their labour, their world views are constrained by their reduction to reified factors of production. And, because the creative power of labour is appropriated by the capitalist in the form of surplus-value, while the worker receives as wages only the monetary equivalent of the use-value of his labour, the structure of capitalist exchange obscures its exploitative content. This discrepancy is the unspoken truth behind the "free exchange of equivalents" that capitalist production is claimed to represent, which claim in the Marxian sense is ideological, both as a partial representation of a true event (i.e., at the level of appearance) and, by virtue of not telling "the whole truth", a deliberate falsification of the real dynamics of production. In the case of domination, however, the obscuring of reality is more drastic.

In addition, the "technification of experience" characteristic of advanced industrial society complicates the tension between ideological part-truths and the reality of oppression. The decisive shift is that the extraordinary productive and technological capacities of advanced industrial society permit a simultaneous *deepening* of the truth/ideology antithesis *and* highly-effective efforts at its erasure from awareness. Because dominated men and women reproduce the rationality of this social whole through surplus-repressive socialization, the perception of these tensions is undermined by the legitimacy accorded the totality. Again, the paradox noted by Marcuse: "Men can feel themselves happy even without being so at all."

There are two differences between ideology in the Marxian sense and the view of domination advanced here. First, the productive capacity of advanced industrial society enables it to continue to "deliver the goods" despite its fundamental irrationality. This provides not only a material basis for the establish-

ment of surplus-repressive needs and satisfactions — Marcuse's "false needs" — but also a profound obstacle to the consciousness of oppression. After all, "we never had it so good". Second, this material and technological capacity extends the ideological falsification into the psycho-sexual foundations of the individual. Accordingly, material interest constrains ontological potential and the perception of such constraint in a more basic sense than Marx envisioned. As Marcuse notes, ". . . personality and its development are *pre*-formed down to the deepest instinctual structure, . . ."[29]

As a form of ideology, domination consists in the falsification of reality by particular social interests, and the substitution of this falsehood for reality via the surplus-repressive controls embodied in the performance principle. And, as ideology, domination suppresses ontology by screening it behind an exploitative and historically false "reality" which concomitantly is elevated to the status of nature in the instinctual-sensual constitution of its victims.

It follows that liberation, as the harbinger of a new social reality, must be situated at the nexus of historical consciousness and instinctual need. For if, as Jacoby argues, the maintenance of mutilated human reality depends on the legitimation of obsolescent necessity and surplus-repression through the mediations of second nature, then the consciousness sufficient to crack the shell of domination must embody *both the awareness of historical amnesia and the beginnings of a transformed sensibility*. Cognition is a necessary but not sufficient condition for liberation; the struggle for liberatory gratification must originate in *and* transcend dominated reality. Accordingly, the predicament that domination poses for liberatory awareness is well-expressed by Adorno's remark, that ". . . it is not ideology in itself which is untrue but rather its pretension to correspond to reality."

After the Deluge

Liberation implies the elimination of surplus-repression, and the replacement of the performance principle by a non-surplus-repressive reality principle. It also implies, as far as is technologically possible, the minimization of basic-repression. Thus, both individually and socially, liberation would lead to a transformation in the realm of sensuous needs and satisfactions, produced simultaneously by the emancipatory "un-binding" of instinctual drives, and a drastic attenuation of administered reification. This transformation marks the psycho-sexual precondition and the first step in the process that Marx calls the "free development of individualities"[30]. And, clearly, the movement from a change in consciousness to a transformation in sensibility and the reconstruction of reality involves fundamental political, as well as psychological change. In this regard, Marcuse is unambiguous: liberation as the seed and fruit of a

changed consciousness is only initially private; beyond transformed awareness, ". . . the fight for life, the fight for Eros, is the *political* fight."[31] The inherent promise of liberation — that of freedom — is necessarily a product of revolutionary struggle, of a revolution in the name of the freedom and happiness of whole individuals.

But, because liberatory consciousness precedes *and* follows social transformation, there are two aspects to the emancipation implied in the concept of liberation, corresponding to the two levels of organization within the instinctual structure. The first is a negative aspect which corresponds to the "historical layer" of surplus-repression, and which involves a relaxation of the hyper-aggressive and possessive individualism fostered under the performance principle. Second, and more significant, is the positive aspect. Liberation in a positive sense implies for Marcuse the free human appropriation of nature, conceived here as external nature *and* as the underlying "biological layer" in the instinctual structure.[32] This positive aspect implies the historical redefinition of the relationship between man and nature, according to what William Leiss has termed

> the non- [surplus-] repressive mastery of nature, that is a mastery that is guided by human needs that have been formulated by associated individuals in an atmosphere of rationality, freedom, and autonomy.[33]

The basic implications of this are captured in three related themes in Marcuse's work. These are (1) the liberation of Eros; (2) the transformation of sexuality into Eros; and (3) the redefinition of the relationship between freedom and necessity.

The liberation of Eros captures Marcuse's insistence regarding the totalizing nature of liberation, manifest in the claim that it involves "a new mode of being" — an existence where being is essentially a striving for pleasure. Therefore, by "the liberation of Eros", Marcuse means transforming human existence from its present organization around "the cult of rewarded efficiency", to an existence whose basis is Eros. Such an existence could be characterized as embodying the pursuit of happiness, where, in Marcuse's words, "the reality of happiness is the reality of freedom as the self-determination of liberated humanity in its common struggle with nature."[34]

A basic element in this transformation is the elimination of surplus-repression achieved by the dissolution of the performance principle, and its replacement by a non-surplus-repressive reality principle. However, even though this transformation would inaugurate a human relationship with nature

that is "pacified", as against its pre-history of domination, still it would be "determined by necessity and mundane considerations"[35]. Therefore, the liberation of Eros does not mean an end to labour, but rather an end to the instrumentalized definition of existence by (alienated) labour. Concretely, Marcuse views the reduction of the working day to a technologically-rationalized minimum as the first prerequisite for freedom.[36] As he notes, this would likely cause a reduction in current standards of living; however, he is adamant that such standards be viewed relative to the possibilities they now fail to deliver. From this perspective, the notion of "bigger and better" performs a vital ideological function: the diversion of people's attention "from the real issue — which is that they could both work less and determine their own needs and satisfactions."[37]

The implications of eliminating surplus-repression are several. First, to the extent that surplus-repressive reality requires a quantitative diversion of instinctual energy to the performance of alienated "necessary" labour, the liberation of Eros involves a corresponding release of libidinal energy — energy available for the free development of individual needs beyond the realm of necessity. Second, this release of energy is produced by the collapse of previously-imposed restraints. In the wake of their collapse, the release of instinctual energy and the opening of experiential realms hitherto forbidden by surplus-repressive controls converge; within the emancipatory un-binding of surplus-repressive ego structures, these two forces are mutually-reinforcing.

The effect is a radically restructured experience of reality, produced by a qualitative shift in the *basis* of social existence. The reality principle engendered by the "libidinal economy of reason" reflects for the first time a uniquely human reality, because the "free play of human faculties" made possible by the rational conjunction of the pleasure and reality principles belongs to a realm essentially distinct from that of blind necessity. This other realm — freedom — is the realm of human fulfillment and, as Marcuse argues, "it is the definition of the human existence in terms of this sphere which constitutes the negation of the performance principle."[38]

For Marcuse, the redefinition of social labour under a gratificatory reality principle means a reduction of reification in social relations. And, just as the quantitative release of energy produced by the elimination of surplus-repression effects a qualitative reordering of those relations, so Marcuse posits a parallel in the libidinal realm. Work as alienated labour is the fundamental societal institution through which surplus instinctual repression is exacted. It follows, therefore, that the disappearance of surplus-repression would drastically alter the character of work, now organized into a minimal quantum of socially-necessary labour. Indeed, according to Marcuse, eliminating the surplus-repressive organization of work tends to redefine the *nature* of the historical conflict between necessity and pleasure in the performance of labour.

This redefinition results from a two-fold transformation of the libido, produced by the elimination of surplus-repression. And, in Marcuse's analysis, its significance is that of a transvaluation of libidinal values. First, it consists in a reversal of the desexualization of the body which occurs under conditions of alienated labour. Accordingly, "the body in its entirety would become an object of cathexis, . . . an instrument of pleasure." This would be manifest in the "reactivation of all erotogenic zones and, consequently, in a resurgence of pregenital polymorphous sexuality and in a decline of genital supremacy"[39]. The second aspect of this transformation is what Marcuse calls the "self-sublimation of sexuality", which refers to the non-surplus-repressive character of economic necessity under a social rationality of gratification.

With the elimination of surplus-repression, the socially-necessary functions of basic-repression would be performed by the ego without the imposition of additional controls. For Marcuse, this implies changes in the psycho-sexual constitution corresponding to the changed experience of nature — external and human — brought about by the transformation of "alien" necessity. These changes reflect "the restoration of the primary structure of sexuality" — that is, the substitution of Eros for domination as the ordering principle of individuation. Accordingly, "the organism in its entirety becomes the substratum of sexuality"; ". . . the field and objective of the [sexual] instinct becomes the life of the organism itself"[40]. The result is not only a changed experience of historical existence: the very struggle for existence is altered by this "transformation of sexuality into Eros".

If Marcuse is correct in this regard, the struggle for existence undergoes redefinition as a result of the *changed instinctual value* of previously-performed tasks and functions. As he notes:

> A transformation in the instinctual structure . . . would entail a change in the instinctual value of the human activity *regardless of its content*.[41]

Therefore, Marcuse argues that liberation from the rule of the performance principle makes possible the emergence of a realm of freedom which, although it is contingent upon a realm of necessity (socially-necessary labour), effects an experiential transfiguration of this relationship.

For Marcuse, labour is an ontological category of human existence, an existence animated by scarcity of the means of survival, and hence by the necessity of production. Scarcity is historically relative; however, for Marcuse, as for Marx, labour remains a constant aspect of human existence. Indeed, Marcuse remarks that to posit its elimination is to repudiate the Marxian conception of

man as natural being.[42] Nonetheless, his claim significantly alters Marx's analysis. For Marx, necessity — as the realm of socially-necessary labour — can be reduced, but never abolished. It persists as a haunting substratum beneath all possible futures. Freedom, on the other hand, is the realm of the "free development of individualities", distinguished from the mundane compulsion of the former by the fact that free activity is an end-in-itself, self-realization in fulfillment of individual and social needs.

Marx's conception is unsatisfactory to Marcuse, because the relation between necessity and freedom as "the two great realms of the human reality" is static; he contends that even Marx's qualitative distinction, lacking as it does an internal psychodynamic which is afforded by psychoanalytic categories, tends to collapse into a quantitative differentiation. Thus, as against Marx's seemingly temporal dichotomy, Marcuse counterposes the solidity of lived experience — in other words, he asks how it is that an individual performs his quota of socially-necessary labour, and then fulfills freely-developing needs outside this sphere of activity, within one existence.

Marcuse directly challenges the Marxian conception — according to which freedom and necessity remain distinct — rejecting Marx's polarity on the grounds that technological advance can permit a libidinal transvaluation of necessity. This possibility, from Marcuse's perspective, indicates that the Marxian analysis is "not radical enough and not utopian enough"[43]; accordingly, he argues for the alternative division of freedom/alienation, which in his view more accurately reflects the liberatory implications of this reappropriated "necessity". Against Marx's view that necessity at best can be experienced as rational "un-freedom", Marcuse maintains that the current level of productive capacity suggests the possibility of "freedom *within* the realm of necessity". Existing technology could produce a quantitative reduction in labour time, sufficient to result in a qualitative change in the experiential nature of necessity. In the wake of this revolution in the libidinal economy, ". . . the potentialities of human and nonhuman nature would become the content of social labour" and, for the first time in human existence, one would witness "the union between causality by necessity and causality by freedom."[44]

Prospects

> The power to restrain and guide instinctual drives, to make biological necessities into individual needs and desires, . . . the 'mediatization' of nature, the breaking of its compulsion, is the human form of the pleasure principle.[45]

It is at this point and with this possibility that Marcuse in my view exits the dialogue with Marx and Freud, and reenters the realm of Marxist thought. But,

if my interpretation is correct, he does so neither uncritically nor without having altered our understanding of basic theoretical conceptions. Of particular interest vis-à-vis a concern with human happiness are (1) the question of true and false needs; and (2) the notion of theory and practice that is contained in Marcuse's analysis of domination and liberation. These issues are of vital significance not only in a narrow theoretical sense, but also to our broader self-understanding in the struggle against domination.

The question of true and false needs, needs characteristic of freedom and domination respectively, recently has come under critical scrutiny by William Leiss, in his *The Limits to Satisfaction*, in this *Journal*, and elsewhere.[46] Leiss's examination reopens the issue of needs and satisfactions in a refreshing and stimulating manner; despite my reservations, his critique is a valuable contribution which can only hone the acuity of the discussion. Fundamentally, Leiss's objections are to (1) what he sees as the objectivistic positing of a standard against which current practice is judged; and (2) an alleged substitution of cultural elitism for critical analysis, produced by the historical ambiguity of the notion of truth. In what follows, I hope to clarify these objections and indicate a response to them, in terms of the analysis presented so far.

In a general sense, the objection to "true" and "false" as terms adequate to the analysis of socialization, is correct, and non-controversial. To the extent that all societies define and interpret instinctual impulses, and transmit them as needs through socialization, any society which is not free in the sense of realizing human universality would create "false needs". In this sense, the notion is synonymous with Marxian pre-history. However, this is to abstract culture from its socio-historical horizon, which for Marcuse is the basis of evaluation. In contrast, the judgment that the needs of dominated men and women are false is a two-fold evaluation, corresponding to the double illusion perpetrated by domination — that is, that what is real is rational, and that what is real (and thus rational) conforms to the inherent possibilities of current existence. It follows that false needs — false in reflecting this illusion — are built in at every level of dominated historical existence, from the ecological blindness of public policy planning to the frenzied acquisition of new objects of consumption.

According to my interpretation, this accords with Leiss's analysis. Where it differs is in the grounding of these processes. As opposed to the possibility of historical ontology, Leiss limits himself to a "critical phenomenology of consumption".[47] In doing so, he does not falsify; indeed, the complexity of his argument preserves for consideration many details lost in other presentations. However, despite their shared basis in the rationalist tradition, Leiss distances himself from the Marcusean analysis by his rejection of ontology — or, in the case of Marcuse's Freudian component, of the notion of the unconscious. This factor, in my view, traps him in the problematic of consciousness and the

historical mediation of needs and satisfactions.

Leiss argues that the thesis of manipulated needs attributes a false homogeneity to the experience and satisfaction of needs, and is itself part of a more general puritanism regarding the sphere of consumption activity. Thus, whether individual needs are judged vis-à-vis an objectivistic standard of "truth", or simply branded as "false" by an "ill-concealed snobbery"[48] relative to mass culture, the judgment of their falsehood reflects a basic prudishness with respect to consumption, and an aristocratic denial of liberatory potential in market activity.

The weakness of this approach is that it tends to subsume satisfactions as a moment in the process of needing, as opposed to dialectically relating needs and satisfactions as twin moments in the instinctual-sensual constitution of the individual. This relates directly to the problem of domination. If the view of domination advanced here is accepted, then the cultural mediation of instinctual drives acquires a transformed significance, as does the unconscious. Corresponding to the dialectic of individual and society in the definition of culture, there must also be a dialectic of society and individual in the transmission of culture. But, this latter dialectic is intrapersonal; it connotes the psychocultural definition of the individual which occurs in socialization, and which is the core of all behaviour, autonomous or heteronomous. Thus, its significance is that it establishes a psychodynamic within which the conflict between the id's undifferentiated demand for gratification and the rationality of social necessity can be located, both ontogenetically and phylogenetically.[49] This dynamic links the notion of true and false needs to the problem of domination, for as Agnes Heller has noted,

> (Radical — i.e., "true" — needs) . . . are not the 'embryos' of a future formation, but 'members' of the Capitalist formation: it is not the *Being* of radical needs that transcends capitalism, but their satisfaction.[50]

Therefore, Leiss is correct to reject the quasi-Heideggerian notion according to which the historical dross of domination would be washed away by liberation, revealing the true, autonomous individual. But, this is not the consequence of the position tentatively outlined here. Rather, the notion of true or autonomous needs is a negative conception; as Marcuse notes, "In truth, an *a priori* element is at work here, but one confirming the historicity of the concept of essence. It leads back into history rather than out of it."[51] True needs, therefore, are "true" relative to human universality and happiness — these constitute the *a priori* element — and the historical possibilities for realizing

this notion of freedom. Accordingly, it follows that the need for frenzied consumption in advanced capitalism, with its resultant over-development and ecological destruction, is false (1) because it degrades the humanity of its subjects; and (2) because the realization of their humanity — the *satisfaction* of the "need" for freedom — is historically possible. In contrast, the need for a conserver society would be a "true" need. But note: the "historical-ontological" truth of the conserver society is defined by the *objective possibility of the satisfaction of human needs*.

Together, these two aspects of the needs-satisfactions relation define the problem of happiness — in Marcuse's phrase, as "the historically possible extent of freedom."[52] Hence, true needs are those which foster the development of human universality, given the achieved level of material and intellectual resources; false needs those which blindly reproduce the irrational necessity of current domination. In this respect, Marcuse's claim, that dominated individuals are not competent to judge the truth or falsehood of their needs[53], reflects the paradox of dominated consciousness, rather than overweening elitism. Just as the revolutionary class in Marx is constituted "in-itself" by the material contradiction of its existence, but only comes to exist "for-itself" through *consciousness* of this contradiction, so true needs are defined by the *conscious* appropriation of *objective* historical possibility — a process which implies the struggle not only for happiness, but also for awareness.

This notion of true and false needs does not resurrect a mechanistic model of subjective and objective factors. In linking needs *and* satisfactions to historical practice, it embodies a praxis-based conception, which conforms to Marx's opening remarks in *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*. Accordingly, the identity of development and progress is denied, a non-identity which permeates the conception of surplus-repression, and is articulated directly in Marcuse's claim that the performance principle is an obsolete artifact of domination. This claim rests on the historical evidence that scarcity is no longer a legitimate element in "the natural order of things", and it is *this* factor which indicts the irrational rationality of the performance principle, and which indicates the possibility of liberation from pre-history. Thus, strictly speaking, it is not the "need" for freedom which invalidates pre-history, for previous to the eclipse of natural scarcity, the realization of such needs could result only in rational "un-freedom" in the realm of necessity. Nor does the invalidation occur in the area of the satisfaction of needs; the hierarchical distribution of scarcity has always meant luxury for the privileged few. True needs — true in their potential for articulating a free humanity — *are* produced under domination; their denial defines the falsehood of historical reality.

Of course, even if one accepts this interpretation, one is a long way from answering Leiss's request that critical theory begin specifying true needs. But even though the non-programmatic nature of all critical theory imposes a cer-

tain negativity on the analysis, some observations can be made. First, to the extent that domination is not simply a matter of false consciousness, the "need" for liberation necessarily involves contingency; the fact that the foundations of domination's hegemony are psychological implies that even horribly oppressive social conditions may be inadequate as the impetus to transformed awareness. (Nor should one underestimate the efforts on the part of those who dominate to block, repress and obscure critical reflection.) In this regard, the experience of the Women's Movement is instructive; the psychological shift to a critical consciousness is difficult, painful and risky. And, even having accomplished it, one is only at the threshold — having pierced the ideological veil, the vista of oppression is revealed, not transformed. Nor is changed consciousness necessarily sufficient: a false, often comfortable happiness is a constant alternative.

The fundamental implication of this example is that the issue of domination must not be allowed to become a problem of and for consciousness: such a formulation mystifies even as it attempts to clarify. Consciousness must be built, supported and expanded, but each of these stages implies changing the social conditions that impose surplus-repression and fuel domination.

What, then, are true human needs relative to the historical obsolescence of the performance principle? In the broadest sense, they are straightforward — they are needs for the free development of human faculties, for the happy deployment of individual and collective desires, for the rebuilding of the natural and built environments, and so on. And, as these are expressed concretely (albeit negatively) in the distortions engendered by capitalism, it follows that they would include, among others, needs expressing the eclipse of capitalism — for example, needs for an end to private property and class stratification, and for the automation of soul-less repetitive work. But even such elaborations as these suffer from abstractness — an abstractness that follows, I think, from a failure to grasp the distinction in the passage quoted from Agnes Heller, above. The defining characteristic of true needs, she argues, is that their satisfaction transcends capitalism. And this, I take it, is precisely Marcuse's point when he argues that ". . . the achievements of the performance principle surpass its institutions . . .".[54] The struggle for liberation is not a matter of promoting needs which are somehow inherently inimical to capitalism — this sort of thinking is rightly the object of Leiss's sarcasm regarding "Havana cigars, French wines, and first-class European hotels"[55] — but rather a matter of conceptualizing, and therein attempting to articulate alternatives to, the current constraints and distortions. That these are expressed primarily in the ideological realm of advanced capitalism does not mean a lapse into idealist *kulturkritik*; as Joel Kovel shrewdly notes, with reference to the dialectic of individual and society within the notion of base and superstructure, ". . . what is 'base' for society is 'superstructure' for the individual"[56].

The forms that such struggle takes are as diverse as the ideological representations which they oppose. In current advanced capitalist society, I would think they include:

(a) breaking down the work-income nexus as the ordering principle of social identity. This is an enormously variegated project, ranging from the politicization of work relations in terms that aim beyond the impasse of economism, and which Gorz has attempted to elaborate in his *Strategy for Labour*[57], to activities which combine organizational and ideology critique. Here, I would include various forms in which collective structures can replace imposed individual atomization, such as workers' control, cooperative enterprises and, more generally, the demystification of expertise. Notwithstanding the inherent limitations of such activities, they serve a valid function not only in penetrating the ideological opacity of power and its exercise in capitalist society, but also in advancing demands that challenge what Habermas calls "the Achievement Ideology"[58]. Developments in this direction can be seen in immanent criticism of "free" enterprise, and of the defense of socio-economic privilege by supposed equality of opportunity, as well as in the rejection of received wage hierarchies that presuppose a capitalist division of labour.

(b) challenging the irrational subordination of individual existence to imposed definitions of social necessity. One of the clearest examples is the struggle against sexism and the dual oppression of women through their sexuality and their exclusion from "productive" activity. Here also the mediations of pseudo-existence are most problematic. As Juliet Mitchell and others have argued, the psychology of the domination of women is neither a matter of biological destiny nor a microcosmic reflection of economic structures. Rather, the domination of women has its basis in the prevailing cultural definition of individuality, and accordingly its overcoming must be both part of and distinct from efforts to transform the nature of capitalist social necessity.[59]

Concretely, this implies alterations in consciousness and the fostering of counter-organizations and oppositional groups, within which this struggle is defined and given focus. Additionally, such efforts would have to be accompanied by changes within existing institutional structures, which would be sup-

portive of a break with traditional feminine roles. These would include such things as abortion-on-demand, equal-pay-for-work-of-equal-value coupled with affirmative action programs, universal day-care, and so on.

(c) As a related, though not strictly analogous project to (b), restructuring our relationship to external nature.[60] This would involve breaking the irrational imperative of economic productivity, ending the alienation characteristic of our conceptions of nature — environmental impact has the status of an "externality" in the neo-classical economic analysis of production — and breaking down the reification of nature typified in most current business thinking.

While these observations demonstrate the centrality of the problematic relationship between theory and practice, and suggest some preliminary strategic considerations, systematic treatment would require extended analysis. Here, I can only indicate the distance separating my position from the notion of "dialectical sensibility", outlined in this *Journal* by Ben Agger.[61] From my perspective, this conception results only in rhetoric and obscurantism. The conception is marked by utter nominalism, which is evidenced in its juggling of the notions of "constitutive subjectivity" and "radical empiricism", and which results in the analytical implosion of the theory/practice relationship. Moreover, its conceptually loose and fancy free substance is coupled with a pernicious form of expression — a declamatory style sufficiently convincing apparently to have persuaded the author that what he wishes to be so, is so. This produces, in my view, an insensitivity to the desperate contingency of liberation, and an ingenuous severing of liberation from the historical structure of dominated reality. What follows is not dialectical response, but naive celebration: opposing ". . . inhumanity in different songs of joy."[62]

Against such mystifications, we must preserve distinctions necessary to the historical differentiation of reality and appearance within the flow of history; the alternative is the relinquishing of critique, and the unwitting screening of the potential for freedom from its subjects, who remain thereby "hidden from history". More than ever, as Adorno knew, "the almost insoluble task is to let neither the power of others, nor our own powerlessness, stupefy us."[63]

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Notes

*The development of many of the arguments used in this paper was assisted greatly by discussions with David Wolfe, to whom generous thanks are extended.

1. Herbert Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization. A Philosophical Inquiry Into Freud* (Boston, 1955), xvii. Hereafter cited as *E&C*.

2. For an analysis of Marcuse's political thought in terms of this dialogue, see my "Freedom, Necessity And Happiness: An Introduction To The Political Thought Of Herbert Marcuse", unpub. mimeo, Toronto 1976.

   In what follows, I am aware that this interpretation is problematic for some students of Marx, who object that although Marx speaks of freedom and reason, he ". . . never adopted the idea of happiness as a goal." (George Lichtheim, review, *American Political Science Review*, 63, 2, p. 593). This objection, in my view, is both overly restrictive and potentially misleading. First, it focuses on Marx's concern with exploitation and misery (products of alienated labour and its fragmentation of existence), while giving insufficient attention to the possibilities inherent in an historical existence not premised on such alienation.

   But more importantly, it fails to incorporate Marx's own demand in the "Theses on Feuerbach". In contrast to previous materialism, in which ". . . the thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the *object or of contemplation*, but not as *sensuous human activity, practice*, not subjectively", Marxian materialism is to concern itself with "the active side . . . real, sensuous activity as such." (*Early Writings*, Colletti, ed., Harmondsworth, 1975, 421).

   From this perspective, and given Marcuse's attempt to incorporate psychodynamics into the Marxian analysis, the idea of reason and its realization under freedom would seem to warrant renewed consideration. Indeed, I interpret Marcuse as suggesting that in the absence of the misery that is derived from exploitation, a non-surplus-repressive "sensuousness" — approximating "the free play of human faculties" — would establish the instinctual-sensual precondition for the positive (happy) appropriation of the human existence. In this sense, I interpret Marcuse's concern with happiness not as indicative of a break with Marx, but rather as an attempt to elaborate Marx's conception from within.

   That this attempt incorporates the Freudian dynamic of instinctual repression and social necessity is, in my view, more than adequate protection against the charge of Feuerbach-ian regression levelled by Lichtheim; in any event, the necessary premise for Marcuse is that the free realization of human universality would result in happiness. This does not imply the elimination of human tragedy or the eclipse of poetic imagination (Frye's "motive for metaphor"), but rather the rationally-effected freedom from misery.

3. (New York, 1962), 44.

4. *E&C*, 32.

5. Freud, *Introductory Lectures On Psychoanalysis* (Harmondsworth, 1974), 353-4.

6. *E&C*, 33.

7. *Ibid.*, 32.

8. *Five Lectures. Psychoanalysis, Politics, and Utopia* (Boston, 1970), 1.

9. *Ibid.*, 2-3.

10. *E&C*, 141. Cf. Frances Moore Lappe and Joseph Collins, "Four Myths About World Hunger", *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, 116, 21, (May 22, 1977).

11. Cf. Theodor Adorno: ". . . it is not ideology in itself which is untrue, but rather its pretension to correspond to reality", *Prisms* (London, 1967), 32.

12. *E&C*, 126.

13. *Ibid.*, 46; Cf. Marcuse, *Negations* (Boston, 1968), 184-9.

14. "Theory and Therapy in Freud", *The Nation*, 185, 9 (Sept. 28, 1957), 201.

15. Marcuse, *Counterrevolution And Revolt* (Boston, 1972), 70. Hereafter cited as *CR&R*.
At the risk of anticipating the later discussion, but in order to prevent misunderstanding at this point, the relationship between art and political action should be specified in terms of this tension. Art is the figurative expression of the perpetual difference between potentiality and actuality; as aesthetic form, it exhausts neither the source nor the need for poetry in human experience. Conversely, the confrontation between poetry and reality which occurs in philosophy, clarifies the limits of political action and the empirical boundaries of the imagination. But philosophy, like art, neither does away with politics, nor eliminates the tension between idea and reality, Art reconciles, but only via an *artistic* reconciliation. The movement from imagination to action is the step into politics. It can be animated, guided and corrected by the imagination, but the political and the aesthetic never achieve identity. Art is conceivably the *form* of reality, never its content.

16. *An Essay on Liberation* (Boston, 1969), 11.

17. Russell Jacoby, "Towards a Critique of Automatic Marxism: The Politics of Philosophy from Lukács To The Frankfurt School", *Telos*, 10, 144. The term "inorganic nature" is from Hegel, *The Phenomenology Of Mind* (New York, 1967), 90.

18. *CR&R*, 70.

19. ". . . culture becomes nature as soon as the individual learns to affirm and to reproduce the reality principle from within himself, through his instincts." *Five Lectures*, 11.

20. *Negations*, 122.

21. *An Essay on Liberation*, 45.

22. *Ibid.*, 4.

23. *CR&R*, 59.

24. In an address at the University of Toronto, "Aesthetics and Social Change", Oct. 6, 1976.

25. *An Essay on Liberation*, 31.

26. *CR&R*, 59.

27. *Five Lectures*, 69.

28. Alkis Kontos, "Domination: metaphor and political reality", *Domination*, Kontos, ed., (Toronto, 1975), 222, and *passim*.

29. *E&C*, 230.

30. *Grundrisse. Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy* (Harmondsworth, 1973), 706.

31. *E&C* (2nd ed; Boston, 1966), xxv.

32. *CR&R*, 64 for these two aspects. The metaphor of levels comes from *E&C*, 120, and is elaborated in *An Essay on Liberation*, esp. ch. 1. The spectre of ontological deformation raised in *E&C* cannot be dealt with here.

33. *The Domination of Nature* (Boston, 1974), 212.

34. *Negations*, 199.

35. Marx, *Capital* (New York, 1967), III, 820.

36. *E&C*, 138.

37. *Ibid.*, 91.

38. *Ibid.*, 142.

39. *Ibid.*, 183-4.

40. *Ibid.*, 187.

41. *Ibid.*, 196.

42. As he argues: "I believe that labor as such cannot be abolished. To affirm the contrary would be in fact to repudiate what Marx called the metabolic exchange between man and nature. Some control, mastery, and transformation of existence through labour is inevitable." *Five Lectures*, 70.

43. Marcuse, "The Obsolescence of Marxism", *Marx and the Western World*, Nicholas Lobkowicz, ed., (Notre Dame, 1967), 413. Cf. *E&C*, 203-4; *An Essay on Liberation*, 18-22.

44. *Five Lectures*, 66; *An Essay on Liberation*, 22.

45. *E&C*, 35.

46. *The Limits to Satisfaction: An Essay on the problem of needs and commodities* (Toronto, 1976); ". . . an ontology of stoned concepts", *Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory*, 1,2 (hereafter cited as *CJPST*); review in *Telos*, 29.

47. *CJPST*, 1,2, 104.

48. *Telos*, 29, 208.

49. Accordingly, both dialectics are presupposed in Marcuse's remark that "history rules even in the instinctual structure". *Five Lectures*, 11.

50. *The Theory of need in Marx* (London, 1976), 76-7.

51. *Negations*, 75.

52. *E&C*, 81. See footnote #2, above.

53. For example, *One-Dimensional Man. Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society* (Boston, 1964), 6.

54. *E&C*, 141.

55. *Telos*, 29. 210.

56. Review in *Telos*, 27, 192.

57. (Boston, 1967).

58. *Legitimation Crisis* (Boston, 1975), 80-3. The notion of "the Achievement Ideology" expresses the functional legitimation of possessive individualism.

59. In particular, Juliet Mitchell, *Woman's Estate* (Harmondsworth, 1971), and *Psychoanalysis and Feminism* (New York, 1975); Sheila Rowbotham, *Women, Resistance and Revolution* (Harmondsworth, 1974), and *Woman's Consciousness, Man's World* (Harmondsworth, 1973).

60. See Leiss, *The Domination of Nature* for a critical analysis of this relationship. Also, his "The false imperatives of technology", *Thinking about change*, David Shugarman, ed., (Toronto, 1974).

61. "Dialectical Sensibility I: Critical Theory, Scientism and Empiricism", *CJPST*, 1, 1, and "Dialectical Sensibility II: Towards a New Intellectuality", *ibid.*, 1, 2.

62. Ben Agger, "On Happiness and the Damaged Life", *On Critical Theory*, John O'Neill, ed., (New York, 1976), 32.

63. *Minima Moralia. Reflections from Damaged Life* (London, 1974), 57.

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REIFICATION AND RECOLLECTION: EMANCIPATORY INTENTIONS AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE[1]

James Schmidt

The sociology of knowledge is the spectre which haunts Marxism, or so it would seem from the amount of ink spilled in efforts to exorcise the demon. Beginning with the publication of *Ideology and Utopia* in 1929 Marxian critics have attempted time and again to indicate what precisely it is which distinguishes the study of ideology initiated by Mannheim from that proposed by Marx.[2] At its worst the debate has shown the remarkable extent to which Marxism can remain non-problematic to itself, an exercise which has long since reached a type of scholastic perfection with Soviet Marxism. But, at its best, the presence of the sociology of knowledge has forced reflection on what constitutes the emancipatory intentions which Marxism claims to embody. By showing how such allegedly critical concepts as "ideology" and "class" could be appropriated into a non-Marxian frame of reference, the sociology of knowledge has forced its more acute Marxian critics to define the emancipatory core of Marxism which remains unassimilated in Mannheim's project.

This article proceeds from a basic sympathy towards the efforts of a few of the sociology of knowledge's critics: most specifically Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno. Yet a repetition of their position would be disloyal to the most important insights of their critique. Since the 1930s both the sociology of knowledge and society itself have altered. And the critical theory of society they proposed, which defined itself in opposition to Mannheim in its early years, has changed also, becoming more suspicious of its own premises, more critical of the emancipatory potential present even in the original Marxian program. Thus a reexamination of the sociology of knowledge cannot ignore recent efforts at reformulating the program of a sociology of knowledge, nor can the evaluation of Mannheim's work made in the 1930s by Horkheimer and Adorno be taken over without reexamination.

The main thesis explored in this essay is that while the sociology of knowledge, as Mannheim conceived it, manifested what could be termed a "practical" or even "emancipatory" intent, these intentions were projected in a way which could not be preserved in more modern versions of the theory.

Through a comparison of Mannheim's work with that of two of his more recent heirs, Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, it is possible to outline the limits of one conception of "emancipatory theory", Mannheim's notion of "conjunctive thought". The more sympathetic critics of Mannheim's work, such as Kurt H. Wolff and David Kettler, have demonstrated the extent to which Mannheim's original intentions were a response to a constellation of problems in ethics, philosophy, and social theory.[3] An examination of the present status of the sociology of knowledge, as evidenced by Berger and Luckmann's *The Social Construction of Reality*[4] reveals that these intentions have to a large extent vanished. The aim of this essay is to question if there is not at the heart of Mannheim's conception of the practical intent of the sociology of knowledge a disposition which leads to the problematic result of Berger and Luckmann's work.

I have chosen to focus on *The Social Construction of Reality* as a major current work for four reasons. First, the book is symptomatic of a resurgent concern among social scientists with the possible contribution of phenomenology to a revitalization of social theory, an interest at the heart of many recent discussions. Second, unlike some of the works which have appeared as a result of this interest, it encompasses a fairly broad range of theoretical issues and does so in a presentation which is lucid enough to promote real criticism rather than simple misinterpretation. Third, the work concerns itself quite explicitly with the relationship between actor-meaning analysis and social-structural analysis, thus striving to avoid the onesidedness characteristic of many studies. Finally, and not of least importance, I doubt if there are many people today even vaguely concerned with these issues who have not at one time or another read, or even admired, the book. Any work which can claim this type of audience deserves an examination.[5]

In what follows I begin by discussing the way in which the relationship between individual and society is posed both by Mannheim and by Berger and Luckmann. This rather abstract discussion will serve to situate more precisely the importance of "knowledge" in their works, the theme which will be discussed in the next section. I will then consider the function which social theory plays within this context and indicate the sense in which Mannheim's project can be said to have "emancipatory" intentions. In the final two sections I will raise two objections to both Mannheim and Berger and Luckmann, first with respect to their conception of social reproduction and second with respect to their conception of the role of theorizing.

The Social Cultivation of the Individual

An attempt to restore the original impetus behind the treatment of thought and society in the sociology of knowledge forces reflection on a classic problem

in social theory, the problem of how individual development is to be conceptualized within a social collectivity. In the German humanist tradition this question was explored through a discussion of the nature of *Bildung*, which must be translated rather poorly as either "cultivation" or "formation," there being no good English equivalent save "education" in the global sense.[6] The question was eventually developed within a historical-philosophical framework by Hegel in his *Phenomenology*, resulting in the reconciliation of two prevalent divergent conceptions of cultivation: cultivation as the development of pre-given individual qualities and cultivation as the process by which the individual is formed in accordance with an external idea.[7] Hegel overcame this dichotomy by viewing cultivation as a series of interactions between consciousness and world which result in the modification of both the subjective and objective moments of the process.[8] This dialectical conception of cultivation is preserved in the work of both Mannheim and Berger and Luckmann in the form of an argument which, when abstracted, postulates three interrelated moments in the cultivation process: 1) an active positing subject, 2) a posited object, 3) a mediation of the subject by posited objects.

In Berger and Luckmann these three moments appear explicitly as an attempt to apply the Hegelian notion of cultivation to society through the use of the concrete social analyses of Marx, Durkheim, and Weber, and the moments are designated as "Externalization", "Objectification", and "Internalization".[9] In the first and second moments, individuals produce cultural and social artifacts, giving their intentions a sense of permanency by creating enduring objects that are accessible to others. In the analysis of society, this operation is called "Institutionalization", which is defined as the means by which humanly produced social products partake of an objective quality without becoming inhuman "things".[10] This process of institutionalization occurs "whenever there is a reciprocal typification of habitualized actions by types of actors".[11] Taking the second and third moments together, we find that these typifications, once objectified, exert a return force on individuals. "Socialization" is this process whereby a humanly created objective reality shapes and creates the individual as a social product.[12] This process, which bridges the second and third moments of the triad, is accomplished by an individual's " 'taking over' of the world in which others already live."[13]

The pivot of the entire process rests on the moment of objectification since here we find a phenomenon which is both the *creation* of individuals (externalization-objectification) and the *creator* of individuals (objectification-internalization). This duality in objectification permits us to avoid positing the cultivation process either as a simple externalizing of pre-given qualities (as would be the case if only the first two moments were present[14]) or as a simple taking-over of an image which completely transcends individual consciousness. Nevertheless, because of the temporal asymmetry of the process between the

social and individual levels and the primacy of internalization in the life of the individual, there is a decided slant in the latter direction.[15]

Mannheim's relationship to this tradition is less immediately clear, especially given his curious reception into the English-speaking world. Through accident as well as design English translations of Mannheim have tended to replace a terminology deriving from German idealism or from the neo-Kantian tradition with a language less objectionable to Anglo-American social science.[16] The price of this effort at making Mannheim "more accessible" to an earlier generation of social scientists has been the current remarkable neglect of a thinker whose work stands at the cross-roads of those aspects of German social theory (existentialism, hermeneutics, and Western Marxism) which have of late become of interest to Anglo-American social science. Ironically the "German Mannheim" is probably of more relevance to contemporary English speaking social scientists than the translated one.

In Mannheim's early essay "Soul and Culture" (1918), a work which more expressly spells out his concerns than later efforts, the three moments are developed in terms similar to those employed by his teacher Georg Simmel in his studies of culture.[17] For Simmel, "culture" was "the path from closed unity through unfolded multiplicity to unfolded unity" which serves to mediate subjective consciousness and cultural products (objective *Geist*) into a cultivated, subjective *Geist*.[18] "Soul and Culture" is firmly based on this general outlook, even to the point of borrowing characteristic expressions and examples from Simmel.[19] In this version of the process the first two moments again represent an externalization of human intentions into the world in the form of a creation of objects, but the example of aesthetic creation is usually employed, rather than the process of institutionalization described in Berger and Luckmann.[20] The movement from the second to the third moments, again depicted in aesthetic terms as the appreciation of an artistic object, is a process by which the multiplicity of the object is returned to a meaningful unity, a unity which is no longer the enclosed unity of the creative artist, but rather the unfolded unity of an object possessing an intersubjective, cultural significance.[21] As was the case in Berger and Luckmann, the pivot point is the second moment, which Mannheim designates as the "Work". The Work enables the soul to find fulfillment through producing an externalization in an alien medium which is recognizable by other souls as containing human significance.[22] Again, the alternatives of a simple externalization of pre-given qualities which are intuitively captured by other subjects, or of a simple treatment of cultural objects as objects on the same level as things of nature, are rejected.[23] Given the formal similarity of the conceptualizations of the cultivation process present in the writings of Mannheim and Berger and Luckmann, it is important now to examine the specific attributes which are assigned to the moment of *objectification* so that the differences between their works may be appreciated.

The Role of Knowledge in the Process of Objectification

At this point it is clear what concern Mannheim and Berger and Luckmann have with "knowledge". Rather than being an attempt to apply an already formulated methodology to a new problem area (i.e. intellectual objects), the sociology of knowledge is a means of exploring the functioning of society itself. "Knowledge", far from being an effect deduced from the causal analysis of social processes, is viewed as the key element in the process of social reproduction.[24] Thus, "knowledge" is considered to be that peculiar objectification which is both a human product and a producer of humans.

Berger and Luckmann stress that in contrast to much of the traditional literature in the field, they are dealing with "non-theoretical knowledge" or "everyday common-sense" rather than with cultural products or the knowledge of intellectuals.[25] It is possible to simplify their presentation without undue distortion by saying that there are two types of knowledge discussed as factors in the cultivation process: 1) explicit knowledge in the form of "symbolic universes", "finite provinces of meaning", and "legitimations"; that is, practices which express the cultivation process theoretically, permit movement from activity to activity within the process, and provide a rationale for continuing to participate in the process; and 2) a more primordial type of knowledge which is rarely thematized explicitly; the knowledge which is contained in the *Lebenswelt*.[26] This second type of knowledge, which is the distinctive contribution of Alfred Schutz's social phenomenology, is employed by Berger and Luckmann as a means of indicating the most primary set of objectifications on which the cultivation process depends.[27] The objectifications of the *Lebenswelt* exhibit a dual participation in the institutionalization and socialization processes. Within the former, the *Lebenswelt* objectivations "program" the process of externalization through language and a commonly held stock of knowledge given to individuals on a taken-for-granted, common-sense level.[28]

The power of the *Lebenswelt* in this account, a power which will become even clearer once we note the problems Mannheim has in the absence of such a concept, lies in the fact that it is a type of knowledge which only rarely can be placed in question.[29] While theoretical knowledge may be doubted and refuted, it is impossible to question the *Lebenswelt* without leaving it for the realm of highly abstract theorizing.[30] The *Lebenswelt*, existing as it does on a mundane atheoretic level and dominated by a pragmatic rather than a theoretical consistency, provides the basis which even abstract theorizing must presuppose even at the very moment it attempts to question its validity.[31] In short, the *Lebenswelt* performs all of the tasks which were once assigned by Husserl to the transcendental ego: it grounds all aspects of conscious human

endeavor, and even resolves that most problematic of Husserl's dilemmas, the knowledge of the Other.[32]

In Mannheim's conception of the process of cultivation the category of "knowledge" refers to intellectual and cultural objectifications rather than to common sense knowledge. It is only at a thematic level that objectifications exist which are suited to the type of reflection which Mannheim terms "conjunctive thought": the derivation of ethical-practical orientation through the contemplation of objects.[33] Mannheim contrasts "conjunctive" with "communicative" thought in a manner analogous to the distinction between *verstehen* (understanding) and *erklären* (explanation) or between the *Geisteswissenschaften* (cultural sciences) and *Naturwissenschaften* (natural sciences). Conjunctive thought deals with a world of human meanings which must be understood, rather than with natural objects which are only explained with the end of technical manipulation in mind. In opposition to communicative thought, which proceeds by breaking objects into their component parts for analysis, conjunctive thought utilizes an *Einheitsschau*, a "comprehensive intuition", which ties meanings together into a unity. Conjunctive thought cannot claim the abstract precision of communicative thought nor is it as universally communicable; it is thus situationally relative to a particular community. Hence, any attempt at practical intervention by intellectuals must avoid a simple rejection of conjunctive thought as muddled or imprecise if it is to accomplish more than a move to communicative thought, which, while precise, is devoid of practical intentions. Mannheim thus proposes that intellectuals must relativize and appreciate such cultural expressions and, thereby, surpass them with a more comprehensive hermeneutic.

Putting this in the context we have been exploring, it appears that as before cultural objectifications are seen as uniting two contradictory aspects: they are objects in the spatio-temporal world and yet also expressions of human intentions and meanings. Conjunctive thought must preserve both sides of this duality or any hope of gaining orientation will be lost, leaving only disorganized facts or reifications of human processes.[34] It is important to note that while Berger and Luckmann require a similar dual vision (social reality as meaning and as object), they ground this vision in the everyday practices of the *Lebenswelt*. But for Mannheim there is no assurance that this synthesis actually takes place, rather, its achievement being both problematic and contingent; the sociology of knowledge arises in reponse to this problem.

Consequently, Mannheim's main concern is not the regular, orderly, everyday bridging of the two processes in the life world of practical activity, but rather the problem of what an individual has to do to continue living in a culture which can no longer provide an unproblematic ethical and practical orientation. This loss of orientation is traced by Mannheim, at different points in his career, to two separate sources. In his earlier works the problem of

historical flux seems to be the major threat to the ability to comprehend the "ethos" of cultural objectifications.[35] But later this was coupled with the insight that not only the relativity of temporal and historical situations but also the conflicting nature of class situations and the resultant development of "debunking" practices robbed the intellectual world of any universal meaning.[36]

Thus for both Mannheim and Berger and Luckmann the object which the sociology of knowledge investigates is that "knowledge" without which the normative order of society could not survive. But this normative order is conceptualized differently in each case. For Berger and Luckmann social norms are encoded on a pre-thematic level which remains profoundly non-probelmatic, with the exception of marginal cases. For Mannheim the normative order remains a task to be achieved, an imperative which still must be decoded and which calls for a theory with a practical and emancipatory intent.

The Function of Social Theory

From these differing conceptions of the way in which "knowledge" functions as a moment in the process of cultivation issue two different perspectives on the functions of the sociology of knowledge. If one assumes that the cultivation process does not confront fundamental contradictions, the sociology of knowledge can maintain a contemplative attitude towards the process. But if the cultivation process itself seems to be threatened, and if the disruption of the process is conceptualized in such a way as to allow social theory itself to have an impact on cultivation, then social theorizing can manifest a "practical" or even "emancipatory" intent.[37]

Mannheim views cultural objectifications as partial aspects of a truth which remains present despite altering historical and social perspectives.[38] History is conceived as a process which leads through a series of dialectical negations of partial truths, negations which are viewed neither as simple reposings of the same problems nor as simple linear progressions, but rather as a constant recentering of problems which incorporates all of the previous moments within a new setting.[39] The carrier of this type of process in a society is ultimately designated as "the utopian mentality" in *Ideology and Utopia*, and the problematic nature of the present day process of cultivation finds its social origins in the disappearance of utopian thought as the result of ideological "debunkings".

Mannheim's conception of the tasks to be performed by the sociology of knowledge must be placed in this context. As David Kettler has shown, Mannheim's early search for "conjunctive knowledge" remains a constant theme in his attempts to come to terms with the crises of his age. The classic pattern,

which recurs throughout Mannheim's works, has been outlined by Kettler as consisting of a

> . . . diagnosis of a crisis, with its implicit threat and promise, produced by necessary historical forces, the renovating mission of a group needing to become conscious of itself, and the requirement that the group carry out the dictates of the historical moment without attemptting to anticipate future development.[40]

Mannheim considered that the dictates of the time demanded a "dynamic intellectual mediation" of cultural phenomena. The sociology of knowledge attempted to provide this by going beyond one-sided, ideological views to the total truth which lies beyond the competing ideologies.[41] This mediation took the form of an evaluational critique which surpasses the limitations of the various perspectives by indicating a more inclusive synthesis.[42]

No such practical task presents itself to the sociology of knowledge proposed by Berger and Luckmann, since, for them, the process of cultivation takes place in a non-problematic fashion, supported and sustained by the non-problematic *Lebenswelt*. The primary problem facing this sytem — that is, the only "crisis" in the process of cultivation which they foresee — consists of shocks which threaten the individual's sense of the legitimacy of the world which is to be assimilated. The coming of new generations, the diversity of individual experience because of the division of labour, and the individual "marginal experiences" of death fears, insanity, and ecstacy all threaten the functioning of the system and call for a resolution which will keep the social totality from dissolving into a series of non-legitimated demands and institutions. For the sake of convenience we may analyze the two major types of procedures Berger and Luckmann discuss ("legitimations" and "universe maintaining" activities) together, since both address the problem of creating or restoring a meaningful assimilation of objectified institutions by individuals.[43]

In both cases the manner in which society achieves integration is far less a Mannheimian synthesis of conflicting perspectives than a reduction of the individual problem to a particular aspect of an already existing whole. In other words, *my* vivid nightmare or *my* fear of death are explained as merely "a nightmare" or "a death fear" — i.e. everyday occurrences which are not viewed as anything extraordinary. Similarly, the entry of each new child into the society is not a totally contingent occurrence but rather a particular incident in the general metamorphosis of sociéty. Hence, individuals who have doubts about the legitimacy of the normative order are reintegrated through processes

which rewrite each deviant occurrence in the language of an accepted symbolic universe or through nihilation processes which dismiss the deviant events and perceptions as unreal.[44] In both cases concrete particularity is absorbed into formal identity.

Consequently, an intervention by social theory to preserve the process of cultivation is unnecessary, since according to the model proposed by Berger and Luckmann the process draws its strength from the pre-thematic store of meanings encoded in the *Lebenswelt.* Should this primordial *Lebenswelt* be disrupted, no amount of theoretical intervention by intellectuals could restore the balance. The sociology of knowledge is thus a theoretical rather than practical discipline. It carries out a phenomenological analysis of the way in which cultivation proceeds, but this process of theorizing has no impact on the actual cultivation process.[45]

I have stated the contrasts here between the ways in which Mannheim and Berger and Luckmann understand the intentions of the sociology of knowledge. But we have also seen in an earlier section that the model of the cultivation process which each employs is structurally the same. What I would now like to argue is that the loss of a practical role for the sociology of knowledge in Berger and Luckmann's presentation is not an accidental feature of the theory but is rooted in the very conception of the cultivation process which they share with Mannheim. In short, I want to argue that Mannheim's notion of cultivation cannot support his practical project.

Idealized Cultivation and the Tropism Towards Identity Theory

The view of the cultivation process which is shared by Mannheim and Berger and Luckmann is susceptible to criticism on the grounds that it distorts in a fundamental way the character of social reproduction. Above all, one should be suspicious of the way in which the term "knowledge" is used — the term is adapted to such a wide range of phenomena that it obfuscates rather than explicates the manner in which social identity is maintained. In both cases we find that "knowledge" can be assigned a major constitutive role in the society only at the price of expanding the term far beyond what can reasonably be covered by it in any ordinary sense. Despite the fact that Berger and Luckmann charge that their predecessors in the sociology of knowledge overestimate the significance of "theoretical ideas"[46] (i.e. knowledge in the most literal sense), one finds a blurring of the boundaries of the term present even in Mannheim's work. In his 1921-22 paper "On the Interpretation of *Weltanschauung*" Mannheim explicitly states that the *Weltanschauungen* which constitute the basis of all cultural objectifications are "irrational" and "atheoretical", and in his 1925 paper "The Problem of a Sociology of Knowledge" he insists that the

ultimate "substructure" on which the intellectual "superstructure" rests is not "matter" but rather a "mind-in-the-superstructure" or "milieu".[47] Thus, although Mannheim does assign the primary responsibility for the functioning of the cultivation process to "intellectual ideas", he nevertheless roots these ideas in a pre-theoretic type of knowledge.

But Mannheim's basic allegiance to the liberal ideal of rational criticism prevented him from assigning the *total* task of social reproduction to the pre-thematic level.[48] A society which could offer no rational legitimation of its practices would strike him as a society in crisis. Yet Berger and Luckmann's model of cultivation takes the step Mannheim backed away from, thus completing the process of idealizing social reproduction by transforming the *Lebenswelt* into an ordering mechanism which is still "knowledge", albeit "knowledge" which is no longer capable of accounting for itself rationally. Since the concept of *"Lebenswelt"* undergoes an interesting evolution from Husserl, through Schütz, and finally to Berger and Luckmann, an examination of its metamorphosis will help to illustrate how the cultivation process is idealized.

Husserl employs the term *"Lebenswelt"* in the *Crisis* to denote a "realm of original self-evidences", that original experiential world (*Erfahrungswelt*) which precedes every philosophic or scientific category.[49] For Husserl, the concept has a primarily critical function in that it acts as a negation of formal abstractions and called for an examination of the particular concrete activities which precede that theorizing. But this negative significance is lost as later theorists concentrated only on the "positive" aspects of the *Lebenswelt*, i.e. its alleged regular structures, an impetus which is to be sure present in Husserl, but tied as it is to the still present project of a transcendental egology, manifests a different intention than that of contemporary phenomenological sociology. In the work of Alfred Schutz the *Lebenswelt* has become characterized as a field of primordial *meanings*.[50] And in Berger and Luckmann's discussion of how language structures the *Lebenswelt* through fundamental categories, the process of converting the term from a negation of formal structure to a positing of a *new level* of formal structuring is completed.[51]

Hence, in the case of Berger and Luckmann and, to a lesser extent, in that of Mannheim this expansion of the domain described as "meaning" is carried out through the use of a category which leads a rather shady existence as "pre-knowledge". It is like theoretical knowledge in the sense that it contains meanings and works on reality through symbolic practices, but it is not as explicit, as fully articulated, or as logically structured as theoretical knowledge. It is not an exaggeration to describe the category as functioning as a "quasi-transcendetal" guarantee that any temporary problems of integration will be solved through primarily symbolic means. We are given a series of intellectual phenomena (Mannheim's cultural objects, Berger and Luckmann's finite provinces of meaning) which must be linked together into a unity. This unity is assured by

arguing that if these phenomena are present at all, they must partake of a deeper symbolic unity which is either actually and non-problematically present or given as a task to be realized.

It is in its critique of these assumptions that the analysis by Horkheimer and Adorno is still of importance today. Horkheimer's 1930 review of *Ideology and Utopia* questioned whether such a description of the cultivation process does not lead to an account of the present which mystifies the actual process of social reproduction. Real poverty and suffering are concealed under the codewords "need and crisis" and the social and political crisis of the present is turned into a problem facing "categories of the absolute".[52] Horkheimer claims that the resultant transformation of social conflict into a clash of "worlds" recasts complex issues of the organization of processes of social reproduction into a form more easily suited to mediation by the intelligensia.[53] Social harmony is viewed as merely a problem of elite education and rational planning. As Adorno later noted,

> Mannheim's use of the concept of the social totality serves not so much to emphasize the intricate dependence of men within the totality as to glorify the social process itself as an evening-out of the contradictions in the whole. In this balance, theoretically, the contradictions disappear.[54]

These criticisms of Mannheim's work are even more applicable to Berger and Luckmann, who have carried out a similar idealization of society while arguing that their approach avoids the intellectualism present in Mannheim's approach. For the most part, crises are presented in their work as problems of socializing deviancy, that is, as a problem of a lack of argreement on how a situation is to be defined. The problem here is not that "deviance" carries a negative connotation, rather the question I would raise is whether their notion of deviance can be at all useful as a model of social conflict. What is particularly problematic is their discussion of the enforcement of social norms. Berger and Luckmann argue that "the integration of an institutional order can be understood only in terms of the 'knowledge' that its members have of it." This knowledge consists of "'what everybody knows' about a social world, an assemblage of maxims, morals, proverbial nuggets of wisdom, values and beliefs, myths, and so forth . . ."[55] Adorno, in contrast, suggests that the ultimate foundations of the social order cannot be described in terms of "proverbial nuggets of wisdom" but rather requires an approach sensitive to non-intellectual psychological correlates of the social structure, such as fear.

> *Fear* (Angst) constitutes a more crucial and subjective motive of objective rationality. It is mediated. Today anyone who fails to comply with the economic rules will seldom go under straight away. But the fate of the declasse looms on the horizon . . . In the course of history this fear has become second nature . . .[56]

What is lost when one discusses the process of individual cultivation in terms of a model which places "knowledge" at the fulcrum is this sense that behind knowledge, society and culture, nature still exercises a blind force. Freud's recognition that a hermeneutic of consciousness had to be supplemented by an "energetics" of desire[57] serves as a sign that social reproduction cannot be adequately conceptualized within a single logic. The logic of individual and social development remains a logic of non-identity, a non-identity which a conjunctive hermeneutic would falsify. The parallel between conjunctive and communicative thought and between *verstehen* and *erklären* must be questioned, since *verstehen* alone seems inadequate to comprehend the unintended meanings which permeate social reality.[58] The framing of a social theory with practical intentions in terms of such a hermeneutic fails because it ignores the extent to which the *verstehen/erklären* and *Natur/Geist* distinctions are abstract. Socio-cultural reality cannot be approached as if it were *Geist* since it is shot through with a nature-like necessity. It is this face of socio-cultural reality which Mannheim's approach has not adequately conceptualized. Nor do Berger and Luckmann seem to do much better.[59]

The model of cultivation which both Mannheim and Berger and Luckmann share remains attached to the ideal of "identity theory", the one legacy of German idealism which is not confronted critically in their work.[60] Both conceptualize the cultivation process as primarily an enrichment of identity. Mannheim, drawing on Simmel's definition of culture as a passage from "closed" to "unfolded" unity shows a loyalty to the classical German notion of self-cultivation, while Berger and Luckmann trace a passage from the pre-thematic unity of the *Lebenswelt* to the more explicit and articulated social unity of institutions. While undoubtedly the reestablishment of identity (individual and social) is an important component of any process of social reproduction, it is questionable whether such a logic can deal adequately with the relationship of personal and social identity in periods of social disintegration.[61]

Since my concern in this essay is to discuss the fate of the emancipatory intentions of the sociology of knowledge, I will not dwell on the problem of establishing an adequate scheme to explain how individual and social identity are achieved in society. What is important to me about the models I have sketched in Mannheim and Berger and Luckmann is that they help to explain

why Mannheim's emancipatory intention has vanished from Berger and Luckmann's work. In pursuing this point we must examine the limitations of "conjunctive knowledge" as an ideal for emancipatory social theory.

Reification and the Limits of Conjunctive Knowledge

I have suggested that the absence of a practical intent in Berger and Luckmann's work may be traced to a basic inadequacy in the theory of social reproduction they share with Mannheim. Having indicated some of the problems of this theory as an account of social reproduction it remains to be shown how this model vitiates Mannheim's project of a sociology of knowledge with a practical intent. This can best be done by examining how both Mannheim and Berger and Luckmann approach the problem of reification, since in different ways the concept is central to their work.

In Adorno's famous definition, "all reification is forgetting" — we would do well to inquire what each theorist feels is "forgotten" and what each sees as in need of recollection by social theory. In Mannheim's work, the danger of reification, discussed in the closing pages of his essay on Utopia, is that it represents the loss of an important aspect of the cultural objectification which is to be internalized. As I have noted above, cultural objectifications in Mannheim are unities of material and ideal aspects which permit our grasping them as having not only an object-like status or an ideal-expressive status, but also an *ethos*: an orientation granting aspect. Reification threatens to rob objectifications of their expressive, human value, reducing them to mere things devoid of sense and orientation.[62] In Berger and Luckmann reification is dangerous because it might lead individuals to misinterpret an essentially human process such as that of cultivation as an interaction of structures independent of human will.[63] Thus, while for Mannheim reification leads to an inability of the cultivation process to maintain itself, since cultural hieroglyphs have turned into mute things, for Berger and Luckmann reification does not halt the reproduction process, but rather makes it appear as a process devoid of human will.

To the extent that social reproduction continues, despite the crisis Mannheim envisaged in the 1930s, Berger and Luckmann's position has been vindicated. But the vindication is surely a bitter one, as Adorno has noted.

> Men have come to be — triumph of integration! — identified in their innermost behaviour pattern with their fate in modern society. In a mockery of all the hopes of philosophy, subject and object have attained ultimate reconcilation.[64]

The practical intent of Mannheim's project has evaporated in the work of Berger and Luckmann because — in a mockery of Mannheim's hopes — it has been realized. No longer need one fear that encounters with objects will be devoid of an orienting ethos; rather the danger today is that it is difficult to free objects from a non-problematic context. The problem with "conjunctive thought" is that it seems capable of finding the most banal (and therefore ironic) realizations. Like the often reactionary complaint that the modern age lacks a unified cultural style, the notion that orienting meanings have been lost gives too little credit to the ability of modern industrial societies to rationalize even the production of a unifying ethos. Adorno and Horkheimer's provisional study of the "culture industry" in America in the late 1940s already noted the extent to which nothing seems free from being smothered by prefabricated meanings. Even sunbeams "almost beg to have the name of a soap or toothpaste emblazoned on them . . ."[65] This production of meanings throws into question the separation between *verstehen* and *erklären* for here we have cultural objects which owe their origins to instrumental strategies yet which produce their effects in the sphere of symbolic interaction. Faced with such a situation, "conjunctive knowledge" must resign the field; a relativizing and surpassing of the various claims made by political candidates leads to no more comprehensive political position. At best it can only iron out the differences in the styles recommended by the public relations firms hired by the candidates. And even if one attempted to transform this "conjunctive" sociology of knowledge into a "debunking" one, the potential power of the insights gained is not at all clear. When ideas can no longer be separated from the immediate process of social reproduction, pointing out this fact quickly begins begging the obvious.

What is thrown into question is the validity of the model of how individual and social identity are achieved which Hegel proposed in the second decade of the nineteenth century. Hegel's discussion of "civil society" in the *Philosophy of Right* not only shattered the identification of "political society" and "civil society" which had dominated western political thought since Aristotle,[66] and thus recognized the significance of a realm of human activity which produced a universal, though unintended, will ("society" in the modern sense), it also displaced the classical idea of *paideia* from the "political" domain to the domain of civil society. His discussion of the significance of *Bildung* in civil society in paragraph 187 of the *Philosophy of Right* removes "cultivation" from the domain of pedagogy and suggests that this end is achieved not through the asocial interaction of tutor and student, shielded from the domain of material production, but rather takes place at the heart of civil society as independent *Bürgers* interact to satisfy their wants. Civil society, conceived as the realm of particular, subjective needs and wants thus assures that *individuality* and *subjectivity*, the great advances which distinguish the modern world from antiqui-

ty, will be embodied and preserved within a rational state. But Hegel's paean to civil society does not uncover the ground of property and non-property which makes this play of interests possible.[67] Marx's inquiry into the structures which ground civil society anticipates the Frankfurt School's investigations of the changing structure of civil society in advanced industrial society. The response of the Frankfurt School to Mannheim cannot be understood unless one sees how an alteration of the function of civil society radically calls into question a strategy of "emancipatory theory" which merely transposes "Marxian" categories without asking if they are still applicable once the anatomy of civil society has been transformed. Once the exchanges in civil society have been rationalized *from above* (a possibility already latent in Hegel's model), civil society loses its characteristics of individuality and particularity. *Bildung* no longer is achieved through individuals shaping their willing, knowing, and acting in a universal way, as Hegel suggested, affirming the ideal of the individual as an autonomous, calculating ego within the sphere of exchange. Rather, with the rationalization of circulation and exchange individual wants and needs are directly aligned to the universal and the "labour of *Bildung*" becomes a direct shaping of interests and needs by the "culture industry". In such a situation, attempts to establish an "orienting ethos" through conjunctive thought miss the point: integration is not so much to be achieved as to be *avoided*. Any emancipatory strategy would first have to restore some measure of autonomy before it could even begin to worry about creating a community of interests.

Adorno's approach to socio-cultural phenomena is cognizant of this altered situation. Indeed, his procedures are so antithetical to those of Mannheim that one could well call his a "*disjunctive*" approach. His efforts do not deny that cultural phenomena are intimately tied to social reproduction; such a connection is his starting point.[68] But his method rarely remains content with noting a functional correspondence of ideas and social reality. Rather, he proceeds *against* the identity to record the extent to which this correspondence is always a forced and, hence, ambivalent one. For instance, it is not enough for Adorno to note that Beethoven's *Missa Solemnis* "corresponds" in some fashion to the crisis of individual and society in the early bourgeois era. Such a vacant identity misses the far more important aspects of the work for Adorno. The contradictory unity of the *Missa Solemnis*, when explored in its own right, displays part-whole tensions, frustrated attempts at integration, and the still present hopes for reconciliation which tell us far more about social reality than any attempt at "class imputation" possibly could.[69] In approaching each phenomenon as a totality in its own right, Adorno explodes the contradictions of the macrocosm from within the microcosm. By apprehending reality as a concrete totality, each of whose parts throws light on the whole, Adorno is able to avoid any flirtation with conjunctive or integrative approaches which would surpass the particular

from some transcendent Archimedian point. That such a task is not an easy one is made abundantly clear by Adorno's own worst efforts: e.g. his lumping of something imprecisely termed "jazz" into the pigeon-hole waiting for it in the theory of the regressive character of modern audiences or his failure to grasp the specific relationship of Stravinsky's music to a non-Germanic tradition.[70] Yet his failures confirm his central insight — Adorno is led to disaster by foresaking a careful micrology for a more global and superficial attempt at imputation.[71]

I began this essay by suggesting that the sociology of knowledge haunts Marxism. In view of the demons which Marxism has bred within its own house, perhaps this outside aid should be welcomed since it provides a chance to see the consequences of a simple preservation of Marxian catch-phrases without a careful analysis of their role within the theory itself. Mannheim's attempt to utilize the notions of ideology and imputation of social class without examining the extent to which such notions are in turn dependent on a particular constellation of social factors (i.e. a civil society distinct from the state) and the consequent loss of a practical intent in recent efforts in the sociology of knowledge suggest that the emancipatory potential of Marxian categories is always context dependent. A reformulated critical theory of society, devoted to securing some measure of individual autonomy in the face of increasingly direct intervention and rationalization from above, even if it appeared to abandon the most sacred of Marx's concepts, would remain more loyal to the emancipatory intentions at the heart of Marx's work than an unreflective continuance of their use.

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Notes

1. This is a revised version of a paper first read at the meetings of the International Society for the Sociology of Knowledge held during the Eighth World Congress of Sociology in Toronto in 1974. I have since benefitted from criticisms and suggestions by Russell Jacoby, David Kettler, and Bertell Ollman. My exchange with Martin Jay in *Telos* (cited below), though heated, also generated some light. My work in this area is indebted, in particular, to Kurt H. Wolff.

2. For an overview of the reception of *Ideology and Utopia* see Volker Meja, "The Controversy about the Sociology of Knowledge in Germany (1928-1934)," *Cultural Hermeneutics*, 3 (1975). Among the more interesting criticisms of Mannheim are Herbert Marcuse, "Zur Wahrheitsproblematik der Soziologischen Methode" in *Die Gesellschaft* VI:10 (Oct. 1929) pp. 356 ff., Max Horkheimer, "Ein neuer Ideologiebegriff?" (1930) reprinted in his *Sozialphilosophische Studien* (Frankfurt, 1972) pp. 13 ff., Theodor Adorno, "The Sociology of Knowledge and Its Consciousness" (1937) reprinted in his *Prisms*, trans. Samuel Weber (London, 1967) pp. 35 ff., and "Ideology" in Frankfurt Institute for Social Research, *Aspects of Sociology* (1957) trans. John Viertal (Boston, 1972) pp. 182 ff. For a different evaluation of the importance of the Frankfurt School critique of Mannheim, cf. Martin Jay, "The Frankfurt School's Critique of Mannheim" in *Telos* #20, pp. 72 ff., my rejoinder "Critical Theory and the Sociology of Knowledge" in *Telos* #21, pp. 168 ff. and Jay's response "Crutches vs. Stilts" in *Telos* #22, pp. 106 ff.

3. Kurt H. Wolff, "The Sociology of Knowledge and Sociological Theory" in *Symposium on Sociological Theory* ed. Llewellyn Gross (Evanston, 1959) pp. 567 ff., and "A Preliminary Inquiry into the Sociology of Knowledge from the Standpoint of the Study of Man," in *Scritti di sociologica et politica in onore di Luigio Sturzo* (Bologna, 1953) Vol. III pp. 585 ff. These two essays along with others on the sociology of knowledge are now available in Kurt H. Wolff, *Trying Sociology* (New York, 1974). David Kettler, "Sociology of Knowledge and Moral Philosophy: The Place of Traditional Problems in the Formation of Mannheim's Thought," *Political Science Quarterly* LXXXII pp. 400 ff., and "Political Theory, Ideology, Sociology: The Question of Karl Mannheim" in *Cultural Hermeneutics* 3 (1975). Kettler's work is particularly important in showing the extent to which Mannheim is representative of what Kettler terms a "moral-philosophic syndrome", an earlier manifestation of which may be found in the Scottish moralists, cf. Kettler, *The Social and Political Thought of Adam Ferguson* (Columbus, Ohio, 1965) and which also marks a crucial element of the liberal tradition cf. Robert Denoon Cumming, *Human Nature and History* (Chicago, 1970). This approach permits a more illuminating characterization of Mannheim's work than that of George Lichtheim, who sees *Ideology and Utopia* as a "positivist's rejoinder to *History and Class Consciousness*", *The Concept of Ideology and Other Essays* (New York, 1967) p. 40, since it shows at least one set of concerns which unite Mannheim with critical theory, the effort to renew the classical conception of politics and political knowledge as practical, rather than technical, disciplines in the context of modern "civil society". Cf. Jürgen Habermas, "The Classical Doctrine of Politics" in *Theory and Practice*, trans. John Viertal (Boston, 1973). To note shared concerns is, of course, not to identify approaches, but rather to make *meaningful* distinctions possible.

4. Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality* (Garden City, New York, 1967).

5. I have not ventured beyond this book in the present discussion. Certainly a discussion of Berger's work on the problem of modernization is also of interest, particularly as a counterfoil to Mannheim's later writings on planning. But since Berger claims that his later work derives from the approach outlined in *The Social Construction of Reality* it seems permissable to concentrate on this work. Cf. Peter Berger, Brigitte Berger, and Hansfried Kellner, *The Homeless Mind* (New York, 1974) pp. 11-12 and 63-82, and Peter Berger, *Pyramids of Sacrifice* (New York, 1976) pp. 183 ff.

6. I have briefly discussed the origin of the idea, its first formulations and problems in translation in *From Tragedy to Dialectics: On the Theoretical Significance of Lukacs' Path from Simmel to Marx* (unpublished PhD dissertation, Political Science Department, M.I.T., Cambridge, Mass., 1974).

7. These two aspects are developed in a study by an associate of Mannheim's, Hans Weil, *Die Entstehung des Deutschen Bildungsprinzips* (1930), (Bonn, 1967).

8. For a discussion of this time in Hegel and its bearing on Marx cf. Karl Kosík, *Dialectics of the Concrete* trans. Karel Kovanda and James Schmidt (Dodrecht, Holland, 1976) pp. 110-111.

9. Berger and Luckmann, pp. 61, 187. Berger and Luckmann would, I assume, argue that analytic aspects of the *Bildung*-process can be detached from its "moral-philosophical" aspects.

10. *Ibid.* pp. 60-61, 18. It is this last point, the retention of the sense of human origins, which distinguishes the term "objectification" from reification, p. 89.

11. *Ibid.* p. 54.

12. *Ibid.* p. 61, 89.

13. *Ibid.* p. 130.

14. Berger and Luckmann explicitly reject a notion of a pre-given "human essence" in the form of a specialized, highly developed series of drives or needs, pp. 47-52.

15. *Ibid.* p. 129.

16. It has long been known that the translation of *Ideology and Utopia* is misleading, but recently David Kettler has discovered that many of the alterations in meaning were proposed in letters from Mannheim to his translators Louis Wirth and Edward Shils. Among other problems in the Anglo-American Mannheim reception is the failure to publish Mannheim's important 1924 writings on Heidegger and Lukács, discussed by Kettler in his *Political Science Quarterly* article and the failure to make available the unpublished German original of Mannheim's *Sociology of Culture*. Cf. Wolff's Introduction to *From Karl Mannheim* p. lxxxvii.

17. Mannheim, "Seele und Kultur", trans. from the Hungarian by Ernest Mannheim, in Mannheim, *Wissenssoziologie: Auswahl aus dem Werk*, ed. Kurt H. Wolff, (Berlin, 1964): pp. 66 ff. For this discussion, the most significant of Simmel's works are "Die Begriff und die Tragodie der Kultur", (1911) in *Philosophische Kultur* (Leipzig, 1911), and "Von Wesen der Kultur" trans. by Donald N. Levine as "Subjective Culture" in Simmel, *On Individuality and Social Forms* (Chicago, 1971). Kettler, "Sociology of Knowledge . . ." pp. 406-407 stresses the importance of this early work for an understanding of Mannheim's later efforts.

18. Simmel, "Begriff und Tragodie . . ." pp. 274, 256.

19. Mannheim, "Seele und Kultur" pp. 66-67, 69, 70, 74-75.

20. Simmel, "Begriff und Tragodie . . ." pp. 253 ff.

21. Cf. Simmel's contrast between objects of aesthetic and natural beauty. *Ibid.* pp. 256-257.

22. Mannheim, "Seele und Kultur", p. 70, also cf. Kettler, "Sociology of Knowledge . . ." p. 410 for a discussion of this point.

23. On the final point see Simmel, "Begriff und Tragodie . . ." p. 247, "Subjective Culture" p. 230, as well as Mannheim's discussion of the need to go beyond a simple interpretation of "actor meaning" in "On the Interpretation of *Weltanschauung*" (hereafter "Westangschauung") (1921-22) in *From Karl Mannheim* pp. 18-22 and developed in various forms in "Structural Analysis of Epistemology" (1922) in Mannheim, *Essays on Sociology and Social Psychology* (London, 1953), p. 46 and "The Ideological and Sociological Interpretation of Intellectual Phenomena" (hereafter "Interpretation") in *From Karl Mannheim*, pp. 126-131. On the second point see Simmel, "Subjective Culture" p. 232 and *Philosophie des Geldes*, 4th ed. (Berlin, 1922), p. 532 as well as the Mannheim works cited above.

24. Perhaps this tendency to convert the sociology of knowledge into a causal type analysis can be found even in the way "Wissenssoziologie" has been translated. The form "sociology *of* knowledge" makes "knowledge" appear as an object of study rather than permitting sociology to stand modified by the term "knowledge" as is the case in "empirical sociology", "formal sociology", etc. cf. Wolff, 'The Sociology of Knowledge and Sociological Theory", p. 568.

25. Berger and Luckmann, *op. cit.* pp. 1, 13, 15.

26. This type of knowledge is discussed at length in *Ibid.* Ch. I, which is a summary of Schutz's work on the subject.

27. *Ibid.* p. 20.

28. *Ibid.* p. 66.

29. *Ibid.* pp. 92-96, 25-26.

30. Cf. Schutz's concept of the *epoché* of the natural attitude — a suspension of doubt about its own validity which constitutes the decisive feature of this reality. *Collected Papers I*, (The Hague, 1971 reprint) pp. 229, 233.

31. Berger and Luckmann, pp. 23-24, 42.

32. *Ibid.* pp. 29-30, and Schutz, "The Problem of Transcendental Intersubjectivity in Husserl", *Collected Papers* III.

33. The term "conjunctive thought" explicitly occurs in an unpublished manuscript from 1924 discussed by David Kettler, "Sociology of Knowledge . . .", pp. 420-424. The discussion which follows is based on Kettler's account. The theme of the need for orientation occurs throughout Mannheim's work, see Kettler, p. 406, Wolff, "The Sociology of Knowledge and Sociological Theory", pp. 573-587, Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia* (hereafter *I&U* (1929) trans. Louis Wirth and Edward Shils (New York, 1955), pp. 138, 260, 35, also "The Problem of a Sociology of Knowledge" (hereafter, "Problem"), in *From Karl Mannheim*, p. 101.

34. Mannheim, *I&U* pp. 253, 262-63. The previously mentioned requirement that analysis aim not merely at expressive but at documentary meaning is not explicitly discussed here, but must be presumed to be still in effect since by the time of *I&U* Mannheim had identified the sociology of knowledge with the tasks earlier assigned to conjunctive thought.

35. See especially "Historicism" (1924) in Essays on the *Sociology of Knowledge* (London, 1952), pp. 84-85 and "*Weltanschauung*" pp. 36-37, 42, 47, "Structural Analysis . . ." pp. 39-41, "Historicism" pp. 127 ff., and "Interpretation" p. 118.

36. See "Problem", pp. 106-107, 62-64. The theme dominates *I&U*.

37. A theory with a "practical intent" is one which sees itself as part of systems of practical or social learning, cf. Jürgen Habermas, *Theory and Practice*, pp. 1-3, 41 ff. To the extent that Mannheim views the sociology of knowledge as freeing individuals from the domination of ossified symbolic structures it is possible to attribute to him an "emancipatory intent" in the sense employed by Habermas in *Knowledge and Human Interests*, trans. Jeremy Shapiro (Boston, 1971) pp. 189 ff.

38. In "Historicism" this truth is said to be "identical in itself" p. 105 but a dynamic rather than a formal absolute, p. 130. In "Problem" it is described as a "dynamic, genetic totality", p. 86, while in *I&U* it is a fundamental "flux" or "becoming".

39. This is a constant theme in Mannheim's discussions of both intellectual and social progress. See "Review of Georg Lukacs' "Theory of the Novel" in *From Karl Mannheim* p. 5, "Structural Analysis", pp. 16-17, 25, "Weltanschauung" pp. 11, 22, 44-45, "Historicism" pp. 88-89, 90, 115-116, 226, *I&U*, pp. 68-69, 91-92, 112.

40. Kettler, "Sociology of Knowledge . . .", p. 412.

41. *I&U* pp. 189, 81, 151, 152, "Problem" pp. 98, 114-115.

42. *I&U* pp. 46, 188-89.

43. For Berger and Luckmann's discussion see pp. 105-106, 58, 103.

44. *Ibid.* pp. 112-115. Individuals may also be "incompletely socialized" hence the possibility of a clash of *Lebenswelten* discussed in Berger's later work, cf. P. Berger, B. Berger, and H. Kellner, *op. cit.* pp. 63-82. This idea of mutually incompatible *Lebenswelten* seems to fly in the face of the Schutz inspired analysis of the *Social Construction of Reality*.

45. This founds Berger's belief that it is possible to have an "objective" or "value-neutral" study of social interaction which is spelled out most explicitly in his *Facing Up to Modernity* (New York, 1977) pp. x-xix. If one assumes that social theorizing is intimately connected with the process of social reproduction, then this type of distinction is much more difficult to draw, as Habermas' distinction between "technical" and "practical" interests has made clear.

46. Berger and Luckmann, pp. 13, 5.

47. Mannheim, "Weltanschauung" pp. 12-18, "Problem" pp. 121-122.

48. On Mannheim as a representative of the "liberal tradition" cf. Kettler's article in *Cultural Hermeneutics, op. cit.*

49. Edmund Husserl, *The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, all editions. Section 34d.

50. Schutz, *Papers I*, pp. 57, 127, 133, 149.

51. Berger and Luckmann, pp. 34-46.

52. Horkheimer, p. 31, cf. Adorno, p. 38.

53. Horkheimer, p. 28.

54. Adorno, p. 38, cf. Horkheimer, pp. 22, 27.

55. Berger and Luckmann, p. 65.

56. Theodor W. Adorno, *Aufsätze zur Gesellschaftstheorie und Methodologie* (Frankfurt, 1970) p. 12.

57. On "energentics" and "hermeneutics" cf. Paul Ricoeur, *Freud and Philosophy* trans. Denis Savage (New Haven, 1970) pp. 65 ff. Ricoeur's distinction strikes me as a more accurate way of posing the significance of Freud for social theory than Adorno's own discussions of "second nature".

58. For a concise exposition of the problems facing an *exclusively "verstehende Soziologie"* cf. Alasdair MacIntyre's review of Peter Winch's *The Idea of a Social Science*, which is reprinted (among other places) in Alan Ryan, ed. *Philosophy of Social Explanation* (Oxford, 1973) pp. 15 ff. Habermas' work takes a similar point of departure. For his earliest statements of the shortcomings of approaches of this sort see *Zur Logik der Sozialwissenschaften* (Frankfurt, 1970), pp. 184-251.

59. Their rejection of Freud as unsuitable for Hegelian-Marxian inspired approaches is symptomatic. Cf. Berger and Luckmann, pp. 193-94. By coming to a halt before Freud's "biologism" they miss the real importance of Freud's discoveries: the recognition that communicative interaction is burdened with a significance which is not reducible to the actor's conscious intentions but is rather grounded in repressed aspects of the actor's corporeal existence. As Ricoeur, Lacan, and Merleau-Ponty have realized, such a dimension is important for the construction of any hermeneutic of social action.

60. Cf. Theodor Adorno's discussion in *Negative Dialectics*, trans. E.B. Ashton (New York, 1973) pp. 22-24, 146 ff.

61. Cf. Habermas' discussion in *Zur Rekonstruktion des Historischen Materialismus* (Frankfurt, 1976) pp. 63 ff.

62. *I&U*, pp. 262-263.

63. Berger and Luckmann, pp. 89-90, 187.

64. Theodor W. Adorno, "Society" trans. F.R. Jameson, *Salmagundi* no. 10-11 (1969-70) p. 152.

65. Max Horkheimer, "Art and Mass Culture" in *Critical Theory* (New York, 1972) p. 281. Cf. Henri Lefebvre's discussion of "publicity" in *Everyday Life in the Modern World* (New York, 1971) pp. 90 ff. and more concretely, Stuart Ewen, *Captains of Consciousness* (New York, 1976).

66. This point is well demonstrated in Manfred Riedel, "Hegels Begriff der 'Bürgerlichen Gesellschaft' und das problem seines geschichtlichen Ursprungs" in his *Studien zu Hegels Rechtsphilosophie* (Frankfurt, 1969) pp. 135 ff.

67. Karl Marx, "Critique of Hegel's Doctrine of the State" trans. by Rodney Livingston in Marx, *Early Writings* (New York, 1975) pp. 146-147.

68. Cf. Gillian Rose, "How is Critical Theory Possible?" *Political Studies* XXIV:1, esp. pp. 73-75 and Susan Buck-Morss, "T.W. Adorno and the Dilemma of Bourgeois Philosophy" *Salmagundi* No. 36 (Winter 1977), esp. pp. 88 ff. Martin Jay's use of Werner Stark's distinctions between "functionalist" and "Elective Affinity" conceptions of the connection between ideas and reality still seems inaccurate with respect to Adorno, despite Jay's clarifications in *Telos* #22, p. 109. Stark's notion of "Elective Affinity" implies that "there is a gradual convergence between substructures and superstructures, not coherence *ab initio*. Like will search for, and when found, link up with, like." Stark, *The Sociology of Knowledge* (London, 1958) p. 257. I have difficulties in seeing how anything in this resembles Adorno's position in *Negative Dialectics* (as Jay claims in Telos #20, pp. 87-88). If anything Adorno proceeds in the opposite direction — from an affinity (assuredly more *forced* than "elected"!) he searches for traces of a utopia which, far from being a synoptic view on a reconciled totality, would be a "togetherness in diversity" cf. *Negative Dialectics* p. 150. That Adorno had no illusions about his own views not being equally threatened by their immersion in an oppressive reality is evident throughout *Minima Moralia* (London, 1974), cf. especially "On the morality of thinking" pp. 73-75.

69. Theodor Adorno, "Alienated Masterpiece: Missa Solemnis" (1959) in Telos #28 (1976) pp. 113 ff.

70. Adorno, "Perennial Fashion — Jazz" in *Prisms*, pp. 119 ff. and "Stravinsky and Restoration" in *Philosophy of Modern Music*, trans. by A.G. Mitchell and W.V. Blomster (New York, 1973) pp. 135 ff.

71. Since such a micrology is grounded in the object itself, it remains somewhat contingent, as Adorno himself realizes in "The Culture Industry Reconsidered" in *New German Critique* #6 (1975) pp. 12 ff. Obviously a more comprehensive theory of social evolution, such as that with which Habermas and his associates are now engaged, would serve to clarify the significance of critical endeavors such as Adorno's. But it is naive to think that all efforts at critical interpretations must halt until the entire edifice has been grounded.

CONFERENCE

MARX AND MARXISM RECONSIDERED

Sponsored by the Conference for the Study of Political Thought and to appear in the Fall 1978 (Vol. 2, No. 3) issue of the ***Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory/Revue canadienne de théorie politique et sociale***

PROGRAM INFORMATION

Thursday, March 23:

Chair: William Leiss (York University)
Paper: "Reification and Commodity Fetishism Revisited" John Burke (University of Washington)
Commentary: Stanley Moore (University of California, San Diego).

Chair: William Leiss
Paper: "Marxism and the Reification of Politics" Ronald Perrin (University of Montana).
Commentary: Herbert Marcuse (University of California, San Diego).

Friday, March 24:

Chair: Ronald Perrin
Paper: "Through a Glass Darkly, Ontology and False Needs" Alkis Kontos (University of Toronto).
Commentary: C.B. Macpherson and William Leiss.

Symposium: "What Directions for Marxism"
Chair: Erica Sherover
Participants: John Burke, Alkis Kontos, William Leiss, C.B. Macpherson, Herbert Marcuse, Stanley Moore, Ronald Perrin.

The proceedings will be held at the Jack Tar Hotel in San Francisco, California, March 23-24, 1978. The conference occurs in conjunction with the Western meetings of the American Philosophical Association.

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TOTALITY, TEMPORALITY, AND PRAXIS: EXISTENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGY AND CRITICAL POLITICAL THEORY

Herbert G. Reid

Initially this article presents three key concepts: totality, temporality, and praxis. Praxis is understood in terms of the dialectics of *totality* and *temporality*. *Praxis* as a concept of history as lived, requires an emphasis on the temporal basis of all dialectical projections of historical totalities (e.g., U.S. corporate capitalism). While time as a dialectical dimension of the totality is subject to dissociation and reification, time is more fundamentally the form and ground of praxis. Praxis is a counter-concept to *hegemony* as the reference to reification implies. Ideology critique is the chief mode of praxis adopted by this article. Given the Frankfurt support of ideology critique, the focus of criticism becomes *instrumental rationality*. In other words, just as ideology critique is considered a fundamental mode of praxis, so is instrumental rationality portrayed as the dominant mode of the *hegemonic liberal tradition* (or "mainstream" culture) of the United States. The resulting argument is that a dialectical understanding of praxis in the United States clarifies not only the major institutional setting of industrial capitalism but also the latter's dominant cultural horizon, the *technological world-view*. Instrumental rationality as the favoured method of American liberal thought must be situated historically in relation to the subject-object dualism of the technological world-view, particularly as dualistic modes of experience are structurally mediated by the corporate capitalist state. This fundamental cleavage of the objective dimensions from the subjective in human experience entails the reification of time (whatever the milieu: alienated labour, trivialized leisure, etc.) which in turn facilitates the techno-bureaucratic appropriation of action. This struggle over the shaping of temporal experience is of vital importance to emancipatory theory. Among the latter's tasks is understanding praxis and critique in terms of the integral *life-world* and its temporal horizon out of which concrete totalities are discovered and projected from the tensions of essence and appearance in the politics of experience. A major problem, both practical and theoretical, is that "life-world" is often misunderstood in subjectivist terms.

Appropriately this paper's introductory emphasis is on the human space-time *as lived*, of our being-in-the-world, or in other words our participation in *time's body* — granting access to the pre-objective temporal ground which allows development of derivative formations of time as a categorical construction of the self, as a typical modality of the cultural system, and so on.

My pursuits in the study of American political economy and culture have led me to search the works of twentieth century phenomenology, hermeneutics, and dialectics for perspectives that illuminate a genuinely critical theory of our industrial society and its political tradition as the horizon of our cultural self-understanding and misunderstanding.[1] The sense of *interplay* among certain perspectives in these three fields of theory (especially those of Merleau-Ponty, Ricoeur, and Kosik) has opened up a most promising yet challenging path for the project. One of existential phenomenology's most fundamental contributions to the development of a critical social science is summed up in Georges Gusdorf's observation that all "understanding of a human fact assumes a prior comprehension of human space-time."[2] It is the phenomenological comprehension of lived time and space in human activity and experience to which I call the attention of political theorists.

Numerous studies in phenomenological psychology and philosophy have clarified the fundamental role of pre-objective temporality for historical human life and, in particular, the situation of culture as the dialectical process of time-binding, or forming, grounded in the historical condition that characterizes human existence.[3] John O'Neill has come to speak of this dimension as the universal culture of "time's body".[4] But the hidden infrastructure of intersubjectivity which provides the foundation for the human sciences is never *discovered* except in the multiple contexts of concretely historical social and political institutions and personal situations. No recent philosopher has sounded the interface of phenomenology and the social sciences more deeply than the late Maurice Merleau-Ponty and it is on O'Neill's rendition of one of his human development perspectives that I invite reflection:

> Human behaviour, which is essentially symbolic behaviour, unfolds through structures or gestures which are not in objective space and time, like physical objects, nor in a purely internal dimension of consciousness unsituated with respect to historical time and place.
>
> Merleau-Ponty calls the objects of perception "phenomena" in order to characterize their openness to perceptual consciousness to which they are not given *a priori* but as "open, inexhaustible systems which we recognize through a certain style of development." The

> matrix of all human activity is the *phenomenal body* which is the schema of our world, or the source of a vertical or human space in which we project our feelings, moods and values. Because the human body is a "community of senses" and not a bundle of contingently related impressions, it functions as the universal setting or schema for all possible styles or typical structures of the world. These, however, are not given to us with the invariable formula of a *facius totius universi* but through the temporal synthesis of horizons implicit in intentionality. "For us the perceptual synthesis is a temporal synthesis, and subjectivity, at the level of perception, is nothing but temporality, and that is what enables us to leave to the subject of perception his opacity and historicity." The cognitive approaches to child development overlook the *tacit* subjectivity which does not constitute its world *a priori* nor entirely *a posteriori* but develops through a "living cohesion" in which the embodied self experiences itself while belonging to this world and others, clinging to them for its content.[5]

This rich passage provides a basis for understanding Merleau-Ponty's profound development of the *life-world* as the central theme of phenomenology which involves, among other accomplishments, a radical reworking of the intentionality concept of idealist phenomenology. His interrogation of the field of perceptual presence between the mind's body and the world involved transposing the format of intentionality into the essence of an indeterminate corporeality, thus rendering to theoretical consciousness the latent intersubjective symbolism grounding our existence in a common historical world. His thematization of corporeal intentionality involved an investigation of that primordial "kinship" between the being of the earth and that of our bodies which Husserl *began* in his later writings by sketching the description of those pre-objective *forms* which are the correlates, the invisible hinge that is the consequence, and the guarantee of our belonging to a common historical world.[6] Previously intentionality for classical phenomenology had been a transcending of the sensible; it now "becomes a power of the sensible", as Alphonso Lingis so aptly says.[7] The import of Merleau-Ponty's explorations of the sensuous aspect of things (our perceptual openness which he put in continuity with our openness to the cultural world and its instruments) is partly that he deepens some insights of Marx into the socio-cultural history of the senses and the roots of praxis. In the working notes for *The Visible and the Invisible* he speaks of the "*sensible world*" as "this perceptual logic, this system of equivalences . . .";

the "perceived world . . . is the ensemble of my body's routes and not a multitude of spatio-temporal individuals."[8] Merleau-Ponty's reflections may make more sense when considered, for example, in terms of psychologist Frank Barron's agenda for an "ecology of consciousness" which, in its own way, is mindful of the temporal process of:

> Forms characteristic of the earth itself (which) are inherent in the design of man. Man's being emerged out of a cosmic matrix whose morphic aspects man himself expresses. These forms and their functional interrelationships are the very conditions of consciousness.[9]

At first this may be perplexing for those of us reared in our liberal-utilitarian culture, the socialization processes of which have put such unique valuation on modes of instrumental rationality and objects-of-use. This is not surprising, for any theory of fundamental social change (and a serious ecological movement) must situate precisely this culture as a crucial dimension for transformation. We are back at the neglected interface of Marx's work and that of Merleau-Ponty; we confront the difficult and treacherous path to the realm of politics (in Lukacsian language, the problem of totality). Merleau-Ponty, exploring what he called the "transcendental geology" of the bond of temporality and incarnation, illuminated this path — also taken by Ricoeur and Paci — of time as freedom's *endeavor*, of time as the essential form of praxis. In my article on critical phenomenology, dialectical anthropology, and the problem of foundations for social change, I have formulated this perspective on the meaning-structures of consciousness as essentially:

> *instituted* (better to say than "constituted") in this presence of the perceiving body to the world, with its active and passive syntheses. Beneath the order of the idealized or categorical constructs of cognition, the other person and I, as body-subjects (embodied subjects), are perceptually open, through fundamentally similar modes, to a shared world.[10]

O'Neill's reference to the modes of embodiment at the foundations of intersubjectivity as a "prepolitical suffrage"[11] indicates the critical significance of this level of analysis in a hermeneutics of the temporal forms of the body politic

as existential structures of political experience. I hope to make the significance of belabouring this level of analysis more apparent by outlining my concept of political education as the recovery of temporality and the dis-covery of the totality in the socio-historical dialectics of praxis. But it must now be emphasized that the latent intentional modalities in question are not *identical* to the intentional representations of common sense in everyday life.[12] What is required of the understanding is a sense of the levels to the modalities of the life-world whose time-forms provide the "texts" for our critical hermeneutics of the body-politic. The multiple levels to the structures of the life-world must be understood further in terms of a dialectic of sedimentary forms and spontaneous meaning.[13] There is also the dialectic of essence and appearance which my previously cited article sketches in the conflictive configurations of the play element of everyday life that are manifested in the contemporary politics of time. The significance of this "play element of everyday life" for the emancipatory *telos* of critical political theory lies especially in its proximity to the polymorphous space and time of the infrastructure of intersubjectivity.[14] Critical theorizing applied to emancipatory interests will generate dialectical perspectives that avoid the dissociation of cognitive and sensory modes of the life-world.

A post-modern theory of political change will — against the immense technocratic pressures of scientism, professionalism, and so on — assume "its conventional debts to the great traditions of our senses, manners, and natural reason."[15] But such debts are not to be "repaid" except through historically specific projects of dialectical praxis which reconstitue the pre-scientific and pre-organizational forms of everyday rationality in effective structures of political action and social change. In other words, the "move from ontology to political practice" is a question of the concretely historical dialectic of the temporal formations of the life-world as these are intertwined with projects of socio-historical praxis. "Theory and action are grounded in time as an intersubjective hinge *beneath the subject* for whom it affords the basis of an historical world, and *beyond the subject* as a network of intentional strivings."[16] The *Lebenswelt* then is a temporal structure of experience that is reified when reduced to its partial aspect of subjective appropriation. Dialectics of temporalization and totalization are fundamental to the life-world as a *forum* of the politics of experience.

The life-world is so elusive to reflection because it is the open or ambiguous dialectical structure of inter-sociality centered by the subject through which we may simultaneously discover the sense of the world as totality and recover our sense of self as temporality a totalization in process that is both concrete and infinite. What should be made explicit here is the critical phenomenologist's warning against any notion of the totality as a system of closed temporality. The pre-dialectical ontological legacy of representational thought has embalmed

the totality concept of much Marxist theory of mechanistic or structuralist varieties.[17] As Karel Kosik put it, when "historicity was not consistently linked with the individual . . . Marx's most important philosophical discovery, the notion of Praxis, was interpreted more or less as a social substance *outside* the individual and not as a structure of the individual himself and of all individuals."[18] The problem, as illuminated by Lukács, Kosik and Gabel, as well as by Merleau-Ponty and Ricoeur is not only to discern time as a dialectical dimension of the totality subject to dissociation and reification, but also to advance the meanings of time as the form and ground of praxis.[19]

In this age of extremes, radical critics of reification sometimes have been driven to picture man (or most people) in an "iron cage" cut off completely from their history. In the journals, *Dialectical Anthropology* and *Cultural Hermeneutics*, I have attempted to formulate the general requirements for a dialectical critique of reification and hegemony at the fundamental levels of temporality and totality. Let me recall the essential thrust of these arguments by quoting Paul Ricoeur discussing history and hermeneutics and then Karel Kosik on praxis or what I think of as the dialectic of totality and temporality. Ricoeur observes "that, in fact, human relations throughout history are, to a considerable extent, reified to the point that the course of history is no longer distinguished from the flow of things, defines history's misfortune, not its primordial constitution."[20] How may we account for the growing modern blindness to the roots of praxis in lived history: its processes of primordial constitution? Modern capitalist and technocratic institutional designs and policy emphases on nature as nothing but the *other* of freedom have promoted the loss of our capacity for dialectical sensibility with nature as its *primordial mediation*.[21] Ricoeur's hermeneutical phenomenology of history, nature, and freedom helps to account for the deformations of the concept of praxis (e.g. "praxis" reduced to labour or to technology) as discussed in Karel Kosik's *Dialectics of the Concrete*. As Kosik puts it, "In the concept of praxis, socio-human reality is discovered as the opposite of givenness, i.e. at once as the process of forming human *being* and as its specific form." Later, in articulating the sense in which man is "an anthropo-cosmic being," Kosik adds: "Praxis is not man's being walled in the idol of socialness and of social subjectivity, but his openness toward reality and being."[22]

The roots of praxis lie in time as humanly experienced, and it is from this level of history's primordial constitution that the forms of praxis are generated. But in the modern era the temporal basis of dialectical projections of the totality has been clouded over by the technological world-picture. (We refer to the dominant cultural horizon of industrial elites, not a "mere philosophic doctrine" but a complex historical process of various but closely related institutional formations. This should give pause to any so-called Marxists inclined to trot out a narrow or naive label such as "superstructure".) The technological

world-view rests upon an objectivist ontology of dead being that sacrifices man to the ontological status of subjectivist self. "Domination of nature" was the goal or bargain, but to the extent that the active meaning of being has been lost, we have thrust nature outside the scope of genuine freedom and action, i.e. praxis. A truly dialectical theory for socio-historical praxis cannot get by with a one-sided concept of subjectivity, but must "account for the 'element of otherness' (Adorno) in terms of a non-subjectivist theory of 'subjectivity', i.e., the theory of the lifeworld and material, concrete *a priori*."[23] That "element" (or, better said, the dialectic of nature and freedom) must be illuminated within the *outer horizon of the lifeworld* in the cultural objects of everyday life, in the dialectic between the mode of the real and the mode of the possible, hence avoiding a rigid differentiation of the negative and positive aspects of the dialectic.

The radical theory of social change must integrate its critique of the technocratic approach to nature and the liberal concept of subjectivity, and seek its developmental norms in the lifeworld's infrastructure of inter-subjectivity.[24] The totality as projected in the technological world-view involves much more than what a contemporary psychologist once described as the theorist's "epistemological loneliness", for this is but a symptom of the modern Western drive to uproot praxis from its seedbed of human space-time. Merleau-Ponty's political phenomenology must be seen as an attempt to uncouple Western Marxism from this tendency.

Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of embodiment and its modes opens up the Hegelian-Marxist dialectic of critical theory to that inter-subjective field of time "beneath the subject" which conditions and passively constitutes us and yet provides the pre-objective ground of our situated freedom and its projects. Merleau-Ponty's work, along with that of other twentieth century European scholars such as Helmuth Plessner, Erwin Straus, and Paul Ricoeur, constitutes a post-modern response countering those developments in modern science and philosophy in which:

> the living body became an exterior without interior, subjectivity became an interior without exterior, an impartial spectator. The naturalism of science and the spiritualism of the universal constituing subject, to which reflection on science led, had this in common, that they levelled out experience: in face of the constituting I, the empirical selves are objects.[25]

But in the critical phenomenologist's post-modern perspective:

> knowledge and the communication with others which it presupposes not only are original formations with respect to the perceptual life but also they preserve and continue our perceptual life even while transforming it. Knowledge and communication sublimate rather than suppress our incarnation, and the characteristic operation of the mind is in the movement by which we recapture our corporeal existence and use it to symbolize instead of merely to coexist (in the sense of "live side by side").[26]

We must thank Merleau-Ponty, Paci and Baudrillard for a fuller or deeper sense of language as a sedimentary praxis which renders *possible* the renovation of the meaning and function of our modes of production and their reconstitution in the intentional structures of inter-subjective life. Nonetheless, the linguistic code which operates in our institutionalized modes of science, technology, and economy prevails this side of its master sign of Nature as an implacable necessity, "the alienation of man's own body." For example, the "standard of living" fetish in American culture hides this fundamental separation. Interest group squabbles over the distribution of rights of ownership seldom shed light on the fundamental reifications of the body as productive *machine* and as sexual *property*, beyond which lies that "other world" of Nature as the inter-subjectively shared "inorganic body of man". But insofar as we can recapture the sense of these conflicts in the dialectical language of "body politics", we should be more thoughtfully on the way to truly emancipatory dimensions of political encounter and coexistence.

The modern difficulty in conceiving of the body (or of the body-politic for that matter) as anything other than a pure object must be read as a key chapter in that continuing work of instrumental rationality dramatically staged as the "domination of nature" on the set of the technological worldview with its historically-specific institutional conditions. This drama involves a fateful recasting of the temporal horizon of the life-world (of its actors), according to which its author, Man, is translated as outside the rest of the production of Nature — the essential elements of which are projected as a mathematical structure. Not concerned to deny the capitalist institutional auspices for the modern version of this drama, Horkheimer and Adorno opened up dialectical critique to the "pre-history" of this totality, its archaeology of enlightenment *and* domination. What must be underscored in their work is the probing of the mythical roots of the *Dialectic of Enlightenment* as a form of authoritarian de-

mystification facilitating domination. The U.S. social sciences' support for instrumental or technical rationality is integrated in a structure of authority that has not only a horizontal dimension (corporate state structures) but also a vertical dimension (rooted deeply in western religion and myth) clarified brilliantly by Horkheimer and Adorno. This is why the Frankfurt "critique of instrumental rationality" is best understood, not as a replacement for the critique of corporate capitalism, but as a fundamental contribution toward a genuinely dialectical theory of this system and its deep-structured cultural horizon which overshadows (at certain thematic levels) the so-called "anti-capitalist" bloc as well. What has yet to be thoroughly understood is the achievement of the first generation Frankfurt School in helping to show that the institutionalization of a critical, democratic socialism removes the cultural yoke (or horizon) of the technological world-picture.[27]

The hegemony of the power systems that dominate world politics is oriented toward technological world-domination through the "conquest of nature", the bureaucratization of reason, and the industrialization of culture. This fundamental perspective must be maintained along with an appreciation of the historically specific socio-cultural forms by which these systems have institutionalized the technological world-view and its dualistic modes of instrumental rationality. Indeed, this concept of the technological world-picture as the predominant cultural horizon of contemporary elites deepens comprehension of the historical dynamics of industrial capitalism as a totalizing force in the world arena. Wherever radical democratic praxis engages the hegemonic structures of the world's techno-corporate states, its emancipatory telos must be transformation of the time structures of human-historical life as well as its social spatial conditions.

Dialectic of Enlightenment, understood in this perspective, illuminates common historical depth-levels of technocratic Marxism and technocratic liberalism. Up to this point my discussion has emphasized the temporal foundations of the problem of totality as it is manifested in technocratic Marxism. The problem of totality (and praxis) instituted in the hegemonic liberal tradition of the United States, upon which we now focus, was also clarified by *Dialectic of Enlightenment*.[28] However what is needed on the American Left is a critical hermeneutics that combines dialectically the *demystification* of the dominant ideological tradition and system of power, and a *restorative*, reinterpretative movement of recovery and *renovation* of the pre-categorial, temporal intersubjective foundations of culture and politics.[29] There are definite limits to which the American experience of the early Frankfurt School thinkers may be taken as a theoretical model for praxis.

Hence it is from a critical phenomenological perspective on the "body-subject" and the body-politic that we can best comprehend what amounts to Horkheimer and Adorno's exploration of the depth-levels of the institu-

tionalization of the technological world-view with its mediations of historically variant forms of the subject-object dualism. Beneath and beyond these mediations of today's techno-corporate state lie the temporal horizon of the life-world within which its fundamental meanings may be disclosed. How we participate in the body-politic's dialectic of meaning and violence is crucially related to our capacity for situating instrumental acts within the dialectical totality as temporal horizon. To the extent that this horizon is eclipsed for the collective historical consciousness, we have lost — or better said — misplaced the normative basis for genuinely political life. A growing number of critical studies of the American social sciences' response to protest in the last decade and their relationships to public policy in the era of Vietnam and Watergate confirm a process of degeneration into technocratic apologetics and an academic "grab-bag" of "strategic specialties" which has contributed to the larger culture's dialectic of technologism and moralism. The situation in political science merits special attention.

Mainstream political science in the United States may be thought of as a house with foundations set squarely in the tradition of American liberalism — our variant of that essentially bourgeois ideology so uniquely ascendant in American history. For the most part, the disputes between mainstream political scientists and the Caucus for a New Political Science (founded in 1967) have been arguments between "conservative" landlords and "radical" tenants of this common house of liberal theory. Both groups are aware that the foundations seem to be crumbling, that there is a "crisis of American political legitimacy." Among both groups it is not difficult to find articulation of the sense that the American polity may be in a momentous era of transition. Fundamental questions and choices of professional identity and political ideology seem to be lurking in the shadows of socio-cultural change. Yet these issues of identity and ideology, of science and politics in their most fundamental meanings, seem stubbornly resistant to analytical dislodgement from their larger, concealing matrices of psycho-cultural and intellectual change.

Part of the problem has been that prevailing concepts of "ideology", "liberalism" and "crisis" have been shallow, too close to the surface of change and chaos. In fact, these concepts have tended to reflect the fragmented public dimensions of our social life-world. It has not been appreciated by the mainstream "landlords" or by many of the Caucus "tenants" that the crisis of liberalism as a legitimation system for the United States in its advanced industrial or late capitalist phase of development is the leading manifestation of the crisis of the technological world-view with its dialectic of enlightenment and domination now engaging the possibility of universal destruction. Conventional assumptions about the "political" and the "ideological" fail to tap these deeper roots of the crisis. The critique of liberalism, inasmuch as it has seldom been genuinely radical, has failed to probe these levels.[30]

TOTALITY, TEMPORALITY AND PRAXIS

The problem of developing a critical concept of ideology and the difficulties in focusing the critique of liberalism on fundamental levels of analysis are complementary facets of a common problem. This problem may be thought of as the weak sense of the *totality* in American social science which seems to testify to the domination in our modes of perception, conception, and evaluation of the pattern of *instrumental rationality* which de Tocqueville identified as central to the American method of orientation and thought. It also serves as the underlying socio-cultural link in the recent *technocratic* turn of liberalism as the appeal of scientism has grown in face of the increasing difficulties of traditional political methods. These difficulties in the broadly defined liberal tradition and the social science grounded by it — with major themes of the "totality" such as "alienation" and "community" — are integrally connected with problems of socio-historical time and collective memory. The critique of the hegemonic modes of *instrumental rationality*, as institutionalized in the life-dualizing terms and demands of the corporate state and its favoured horizon of technological world-domination, enables the dis-covering of the totality. But this discovery involves a dual movement: the historicizing of the concrete totality *and* a simultaneous recovery and renewal of inter-subjective temporality as the ambient of social praxis and human development. Now I shall outline a few implications of this concept of political education for a critical social science:

We need a program of critical political education that grapples with conditions of the techno-corporate state such as the inability of "most policy professionals . . . to deal with the rhythms and moral aspirations of everyday life, save as abstract values to be plugged in after a strategic calculus is completed."[31] Graduate study in politics instead often seems to cultivate development of more "hyperstrategic personalities" who have little sense of any but an instrumentalist concept of the body politic. It is not the social or political behaviourist's infatuation with computer, calculator, etc. technology *per se* that is the problem, but rather the impoverished theoretical conception of its applicability. In short, it is a problem of acquiescence to a mode of instrumental rationality which begs fundamental questions of totality and temporality in politics and education. The political behaviourist's commitment to instrumentalism is generated out of his ensnarement in the dialectic of objectivism and subjectivism which is the dynamic principle of configuration for the structure of authority and domination within which he acquiesces as one more functionary.

Phenomenological critics of scientism sometimes stress the problem of ontological objectivism over the issue of subjectivism. However, a critical phenomenology will have nothing to do with blanket appeals to "subjectivity" as the "way out." The behaviourist's stance within the horizon of the technological world-view — from which the deployment of instrumental modes of intelligence follows — is a subjectivist posture unable to account for itself in terms of the field it purports to master. The behaviourist attempt to

reduce political studies to a quantitative research project of instrumental rationalization has generated disconnected bodies of so-called technical knowledge insufficient for hermeneutical engagement with the socio-historical forms of consciousness expressing the symbolic-communicative life of the general public. As Charles Taylor put it, "What the ontology of mainstream social science lacks is the notion of meaning as not simply for an individual subject; of a subject who can be a "we" as well as an "I".[32] The immediate point is that the movement of political theory "beyond objectivism" must also involve a movement out of subjectivism as we rediscover the *life-world* auspices of our activities and responsibilities as theorists of the body-politic.

In the hermeneutic phenomenological perspective, the polity may be thought of as a transpersonal, transtemporal form of coexistence. Political participation always implies a sharing of a larger system of temporality. The time of the polity enables history, the history-making activities that someone had in mind when they said that democracy is an attempt to make the world safe for the telling of stories. But from a critical perspective it may be added that a socio-cultural system of political economy oriented in quest of a timeless, mechanistic polity undermines the capacity for historical and critical consciousness of social life and political change. Nevertheless, past and future are constantly undergoing reconstitution in and out of the present, the "living present", as comprehended by the founders of twentieth-century phenomenology. "Political science", in one vital aspect, must be regarded as a hermeneutics of the polis. The temporal character of social and economic history calls for a political science that is hermeneutic. This would facilitate critical validation of the relations of *power* and justice with which it is concerned.

The way in which politics is grounded in society is shown through thematizing socio-historical time as the formative medium of consciousness and action in which society is constituted as a structure of identity and coexistence (on the level of consciousness by embodied minds) and materially instituted as socio-cultural space (on the level of action by minded bodies). Our society is constituted or reconstituted by us through temporal forms which are integral to our own self-formation developing in a society already constituted although never in any finally fixed way. At the same time, we exist in a temporally irreversible structure of needs and satisfactions; our conscious life is *embodied* through a series of institutional matrices or "modes of production of material life" which dialectically mediate the constitution of our intersubjective and subjective relations with nature and with others. Political theorizing must engage the concretely intentional structures of meaning by which the "living body of language" illuminates the intersubjective relations of man, work and nature in the politics of time.[33]

TOTALITY, TEMPORALITY AND PRAXIS

In an earlier work I attempt to develop the theme of mainstream ideology as a hegemonic system of modes in the politics of experience in our liberal/technocratic capitalist society.[34] Here I am exploring American political culture as a system of historically and temporally constituted *modes* for perception, conception, and evaluation of "the political" in the politics of experience. One version of this topic or task is stated in the following terms:

> Existential Dimensions of American Politics: Some American Modes in the Politics of Experience
> 1. The American Life-World: The Self and Its World
> 2. Americans and Nature: The Self and its Environment
> 3. Americans and Machines: "Technological Egos" and Machine Ideals in Utilitarian Culture
> 4. Americans and "Un-Americans": The Intergroup World of the Visible and the Invisible
> 5. Americans and Other Peoples: Inter-National Dimensions of "World-Openness": The Questions of "Counter-Revolutionary America" or Toward Cultural Tribalism or Renovation?

A phenomenological hermeneutic analysis, integrated with more commonly understood critical-historical methods, requires "excavating" and examining the historically constituted modes for "being-in-the-world" which are central to the ongoing social construction of political reality and national identity patterns. Concepts of "institutionalization", "sedimentation", "reinterpretation", and "modalization"[35] are useful to examine major ways in which historic sources of influence have been reconstituted in; (1) meaning-structures grounding the institutional routines and activities of everyday life; (2) the assumptive forms persons acquire and develop for perception and orientation within changing experience; and (3) symbolic patterns of historical self-interpreation, e.g., collective time imagery and memory schemata. One version of this topic or task follows:

> Origins: Intellectual and Psycho-cultural Foundations of American Political Consciousness
> 1. Metaphysical Foundations of American Ideology as a Cultural System: The Mechanistic World-Picture

2. Puritanism, Possessive Individualism, and the "Agentic Strategy": Formation of Modern Work and Citizenship in Capitalist Society
3. The Lockean-Liberal Ideology as a Cultural System: Its Paradigmatic Role in the Social Construction of Political "Reality" and National "Identity"
4. Swimming Against the "Mainstream": The Agony of the American Left and the Problem of Cultural Hegemony and Political Domination.

The re-examination of "origins", as analyzed and clarified in various noted works by Tocqueville, Marx, Weber, Whitehead, Burtt, Merton, Hartz, Gramsci and others, will be made with special attention to the background of the crisis of order in the early development of modern industrial society. Surprisingly, studies of American political culture have yet to benefit to the extent they might from this perspective. Summarizing drastically, there will be a treatment of the patterns of belief legitimating and stimulating the development of an industrialized, bureaucratized, "secularized" way of life. In particular, the concern will be with the new cultural "logics of decision" and rationale systems and new conceptions of human action and social organization. The discussion will attempt to focus in more significant ways on the early modern background to fundamental political and moral problems of twentieth century science and technology and their ongoing institutionalization. Especially challenging will be the question of the development of modern modes by which nature, rationality, objectivity, control, efficiency, self, and other concepts and forms of life have been typically constituted. Those major presuppositions and themes of the historically hegemonic ideology which has provided the primary cultural foundation for variations in response to the shifting dimensions of the crises of legitimacy in our capitalist system of political economy will be traced throughout. Thus one task will be to indcate how the conceptual synthesis of historical origins of influence is mediated by systemic processes with the life-world modes of experience. From critical primary observations and a variety of disciplines engaged in social, political, and literary critcism, it is possible to draw out the modes and structures of existence in everyday life. Obviously, the challenge is not a descriptive summary of the immediate appearances of daily life and the typical patterns of the social life-world. Rather, the phenomenology of American culture as a system of modes in the politics of experience that I have in mind has as its *telos* the critique of any aspects of the politico-economic tradition and current discourse that are *ideological* in the sense of concealing or contradicting those universal, essential structures of the

life-world on which the real achievements and potential projects of the American people have been or may be founded. An important dimension of this task will be to demonstrate how the ideological patterns fail to adequately account for and communicate the deeper social forms of our human development and cultural strivings. This ideology critique of the meaning-structures of everyday life and the "common sense" modes of social interpretation aims at facilitating critical, historical consciousness of that fundamental existential, perceptual field in which our institutions were born, and on which their reinterpretation and democratic transformation depend.[36]

From such historical sources as ascetic Protestantism, possessive individualism and Newtonian mechanistic science, the culture of an emergent industrial capitalist society increasingly constituted the milieu for the institutionalization of the *subject-object dualism* (or "dialectic of subjectivism and objectivism") grounded in the technological world-view. Any critical phenomenology of the life-world modes of experience, political modes manifesting the turgid play of meaning and violence, must thematize and interpret the dialectical relations through socio-cultural space-time of the institutional features of industrial capitalism and their dominant cultural horizon, the technological world-view. Note that this world-view as the *dominant* cultural horizon does not exhaust the symbolic order out of which fundamental processes of institutionalization and de-institutionalization proceed or change. Neither are the temporal forms of the life-world ever completely institutionalized, which is *not* to say that they are "unsocialized", that behind the model or concept of "socialization" there lurks the "state of nature" of liberal theories of social contract. A critical phenomenology tills the fundamental spatio-temporal ground, or what O'Neill calls "time's body", out of which persons and groups may cultivate a situated, perspectival or non-sovereign freedom to transform the social meanings of vocational time and public life in a more or less open dialectic of conscious historical change. In more familiar terms, the institutionalization of science and technology is ultimately grounded in the socio-historical temporality of the life-world. However, after Marx, Lukács, and Husserl the point to stress is that the mediations to this dialectic of totality and temporality obscure its meaning-fundament insofar as they successfully promote (1) the subjectivization of individual self-understanding and expression and (2) the reification of existing institutions. As I have argued in *Cultural Hermeneutics:*

> Critical political theory pursues these mediations which found reifying processes . . . in the totality, thus giving the lie to the technocratic celebration of instrumental rationality (as hypostatized 'technological imperatives' and so on) as the basis of social progress. In the critical recovery

> and reconstruction of these mediations there is disoccluded the intersubjective foundation developed partly through science and technology from which, under the sway of domination and its knowledge, intentional, emancipatory social development has been sidetracked.[37]

A fundamental project of phenomenological analysis has been a certain indecisive illumination of the universal structures of human projective life, orientation, and action: lived-space, lived-time, the elementary structures of face-to-face situations, the biographical-historical subscript to all experience and so on. However, this task is inseparable from that of a critical analysis of the *historically variant* patterns of the social life-world *typical* of American political culture as manifested in everyday life. It seems that only if the philosopher could leap over his shadow might we dispense with a fundamental ambiguity in the politics of experience. As Merleau-Ponty put it in *The Visible and the Invisible*, there is no space or time of culture surveyable from above and no "essences without place and without date" (geography and history). " . . . I the seer am also visible."[38] The question for political theorists is how we will participate in the vertical/horizontal/dialectical formations of this underlying structure of intersubjectivity or "interexistence" rooted in primodial, pre-objective time. As Merleau-Ponty commented in "Phenomenology and the Sciences of Man", I have to:

> discover a temporality and a historicity that I am. My reflection is taken over from preceding reflections and from a movement of existence which offers itself to me. But, Husserl said, it always involves a certain degree of naivete. It never lifts itself out of time.[39]

Reflectively engaging the body politic's problems of "accumulation" and "legitimation" from our historicity *embodied* in its intentional structures, we take over "cultural operations begun before our time and pursued in many different ways," which become our responsibility to "reanimate" and "reactivate".

In his essay on Max Weber, Merleau-Ponty makes two comments that state succinctly the situation of the political philosopher. "Knowledge and action are two poles of a single existence. . . . History is a strange object, an object which is ourselves."[40] Elsewhere, he does speak of philosophy as "action at a distance". But what I wish to emphasize here is the connection between his in-

terest in Weber's renewal of the concept of "historical matter" and in Husserl's phenomenology of the material *a priori* which situates our historical responsibilities for the crucial linkages of economy and polity including issues of "accumulation" and "legitimation" which a truly dialectical critique refuses to bifurcate between "base" and "superstructure". His interrogation and reinterpretation of Weber's work explores a significant *opening to the base* and leads him to generously conclude that it is this "Weberian Marxism" that allows new insight into the "adventures of the dialectic."[41]

Perhaps the disquietude this occasions for the political and social theorist reared in American liberal culture is that Merleau-Ponty has situated the political dialectic of meaning and violence within the ambiguous origins of truth and justice where the birth of reason from unreason allows the oppressed a principle of hope but one that finds its ambit in temporalizing praxis. The norm of intersubjectivity does not have for Merleau-Ponty (or for us) the status of a law of history that at some "point in time" (sic) enables us to dispense with the essential ambiguity of political action. According to Merleau-Ponty, these are the great lessons to be learned from Machiavelli and Marx. Social and political theorists still courting, however coyly, the modern ideal of total objectivity and starting out with the categorical antithesis of fact and essence fail to confront Merleau-Ponty's "phenomenological alternative" when they ask for a "positive vision that would definitely give . . . the essentiality of the essence."[42]

According to Merleau-Ponty, Husserl — in his last years and especially in the unpublished manuscripts:

> perceived that philosophical activity cannot be defined as reflection concerned with essences, as opposed to practical activity concerned with existence. In order to see things more clearly than he had been able to see them in the past, what was of primary importance now seemed to him to be historicity.[43]

While phenomenology begins to focus the essentially universal structure of the human way of being-in-the-world as central for genuine understanding of concrete historic facts, it does so through deepening the correlation of reflection and historicity in the life-world dialectics of totalization and temporalization (involving sedimentation, modalization, institutionalization, reinterpretation, etc.). But these dialectics of praxis, while they may and do jeopardize and overcome specific structures of the totality, never once and for all take leave of the

tension between essence and appearance, reification and recovery, or the fundamental questions of the politics of human experience. This is at least *a* direction of Husserl's thought, for it is the path taken by Merleau-Ponty, and trod today by critical phenomenologists such as Rovatti[44] and O'Neill. From this phenomenological perspective, *ideology critique* of the relations of economy and polity promotes resistance to external and internal domination by temporalizing social space and political life through the imaginative *recovery and renewal* of the world-in-common which we bear intersubjectively in our co-constitution of it as historical beings. As John O'Neill puts it, the task "is to relate particulars to wholes, which are masked in inessential relations that determine immediate practice, but which can be seen historically to be disproportions . . . of the true development of man."[45]

The essential tasks of "ideology critique" flow from the focus on those operative forms of institutional mediation of the culture's symbolic order interpenetrating the primary perceptual experience of persons which foster the reification of human space-time, primarily through the instrumentalization of work and the controlled trivialization of play, in the interest of the structure of power. Of particular interest within this process of cultural reproduction is the development of those typical or dominant modes of political "reasoning" which also serve as the basis for dimensions of a collective or national "identity" assumed by individuals. For example, the so-called "pragmatic genius of American politics" must be laid open to reveal the bourgeois-liberal roots of corporate state hegemony, roots running much deeper than most of our radicals have ever realized. So we may find in the experiential structures of mainstream politics the interplay of instrumentalism and moralism, pluralism and patriotism, scientism and subjectivism.

One important dimension to these processes is the symbolic violence promoting the deterioration of historical consciousness which has attended the repression of incipient groups attempting to find the communal roots of socio-historical praxis with its essential temporal forms.[46] At the same time, it must be added that one tragi-comic aspect of the "agony of the American Left" (Lasch) is the cultural production of an ideological type that is perhaps characterized succinctly as the "Lockean Marxist". As Merleau-Ponty put it, "The destruction of beliefs, the symbolic murder of the others and of the world, the split between vision and the visible, between thought and being do not, as they claim, establish us in the negative; when one has subtracted all that, one installs oneself in what remains, in sensations, in opinions."[47]

But if that is where the radical intellectual finds the rag-tag American Left today, then that is one place to begin seeking the roots of *new* forms of political praxis. Not, in other words, by "Waiting on History" while castigating the alleged ahistoricity of the everyday. But by helping generate the counter-hegemonic projects that will destroy, as Kosik says, the "pseudoconcrete of the

alienated everyday life . . . through *estrangement*, through *existential modification*, and through *revolutionary transformation*."[48] As O'Neill has perceived, the "waiting" and the "withdrawal" are actually complementary modes, and what remains to be done is take up our situation in Merleau-Ponty's "*intermonde*". Tasks of critique and remembrance engaged within a "structure of care and concern" for "time's body" are most likely to generate or facilitate forms of praxis reducing violence and exploitation.

The hegemony of a historical power bloc is *fundamentally* changed through the socio-historical transformation of *both* institutional setting (totality — largely of industrial capitalism) and cultural horizon (temporality — chiefly bounded by the technological world-view).[49] I am well aware that analysis of the structural dimensions of the institutional matrix has been largely presupposed, for the task conceived here is to reopen to critique precisely those issues which have been mystified by undialectical notions of "superstructure", "subjectivity", and so on. A "critique of political economy" unable to probe the deepest roots of hegemony is unlikely to issue in an effective "philosophy of praxis", as Antonio Gramsci argued.

As Marek Siemek's argument for the relevance of phenomenological hermeneutics to critical Marxism shows, the question is whether the latter "is not only a *theory of history* but also *self-knowledge of the historicity* of its own thinking and acting."[50] The great unrealized legacy to which Marx and Gramsci made essential contributions, and which Merleau-Ponty's interrogations seek to put on our political agenda, lies not in terrorism or in structuralism but in a temporalizing praxis forming communities of human development and dialectical sensibility beyond the shadow of the technological world-view and the institutions embodying it.

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Notes

1. Three recent studies in which these pursuits are reflected are: "Toward a Post-Modern Theory of American Political Science and Culture: Perspectives from Critical Marxism and Phenomenology", *Cultural Hermeneutics*, Vol. 2 (August, 1974). 91-166; "Ideology Critique and Problems of Student Consciousness in the United States", *Ibid.* Vol. 3 (1976), 217-244; and "Critical Phenomenology and the Dialectical Foundations of Social Change", *Dialectical Anthropology*, Vol. 2 (1977), 107-130.

2. Georges Gusdorf, "Project for Interdisciplinary Reserach", *Diogenes*, No. 42 (1963), 119-142, at p. 137.

3. In the words of Cornelis A. van Peursen, "The structure of time draws the furrow of human history through the field of the world. Nature becomes fruitful as culture, and the domain of reality turns out to be real precisely through this intense relationship with man." *Phenomenology and Reality* (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1972), p. 234.

4. See *Making Sense Together* (New York: Harper Torchbook, 1974).

5. John O'Neill, "Embodiment and Child Development: A Phenomenological Approach", in Hans Peter Drietzel, Editor, *Recent Sociology No. 5: Childhood and Socialization* (New York: Macmillan, 1973), pp. 69-70.

6. See Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Themes from the Lectures at the College de France, 1952-1960*, translated by John O'Neill (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), Chapters 8 and 9, especially pp. 82-83, 86-87, and 98; and Merleau-Ponty's unfinished work *The Visible and the Invisible*, translated by Alphonso Lingis (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968).

7. Alphonso Lingis, "Intentionality and Corporeity", in A.T. Tymieniecka, Editor, *Analecta Husserliana*, Vol. I (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1970), p. 84.

8. *The Visible and Invisible*, p. 247. One of the best studies of Merleau-Ponty's social phenomenology is John O'Neill's *Perception, Expression and History* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970). See especially Chapter 4 on "Corporeality and Intersubjectivity."

9. Frank Barron, "Towards an Ecology of Consciousness", *Inquiry*, Vol. 15 (1972), pp. 95-113. In my 1977 *Dialectical Anthropology* article, I have called attention to the significance of Edith Cobb's studies of "The Ecology of Imagination in Childhood" which is reprinted in *The Subversive Science: Essays Toward an Ecology of Man* edited by Paul Shepard and Daniel McKinley (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969), pp. 122-132. Barron's theme, as I have presented it, has its obverse in the horrifying vision of Jules Laforgue:

   Earth's course is run, its loins are able no more.
   And its miserable children, thin, bald, and pallid.
   With pondering the everlasting problems too much.
   Contemplate with empty eyes . . .

   As quoted by Sylvia Ashton-Warner in *Spearpoint: "Teacher" in America* (New York: Vintage Books, 1972), p. 41.

10. "Critical Phenomenology and the Dialectical Foundations of Social Change", p. 125.

11. O'Neill, *Perception, Expression, and History*, pp. 71-72.

12. For a strong criticism of notions of the life-world "as a one-level reality" and a keen affirmation of the life-world's "universal historicity", see Gerd Brand, "The Structure of the Life-World According to Husserl", *Man and World*, Vol. 6 (May, 1973), 143-162.

13. See, for example, the important study by Robert Welsh Jordan, "Husserl's Phenomenology as an 'Historical' Science," *Social Research 35* (Summer, 1968), 245-259.

14. "Critical Phenomenology and the Dialectical Foundations of Social Change," pp. 122-126.

15. The phraseology is from John O'Neill's *Making Sense Together*, p. 48. It is a misunderstanding of O'Neill to assume that he is appealing to some "conventional wisdom" of people *per se*. The thrust of his argument is twofold, first, to emphasize the dependence in public life of science upon rhetoric and, second, to cultivate a creative interplay between public rhetoric and a critical social science attuned to "*the collective focus of seeing and being seen*", an obvious rendition of Merleau-Ponty's understanding of intersubjectivity in *The Visible and the Invisible*.

16. "Critical Phenomenology . . .", p. 122.

17. Cf. my discussion of the "dualistic pattern of modern representational thought" in "Ideology Critique and Problems of Student Consciousness in the U.S.", p. 220.

18. Karel Kosik, "The Individual and History", in Nicholas Lobkowicz, Editor, *Marx and the Western World* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967), p. 188.

19. The time dimension is emphasized by Joseph Gabel in *False Consciousness: An Essay on Reification*, translated by Margaret and Kenneth Thompson (New York: Harper and Row, 1975).

20. Paul Ricoeur, "History and Hermeneutics", *Journal of Philosophy LXXIII* (Nov., 1976), pp. 688-689.

21. See Paul Ricoeur's "Nature and Freedom" translated and reprinted in David Stewart and Joseph Bien, Editors, *Political and Social Essays* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1974), pp. 23-45, and my reconstruction of the theme in "Critical Phenomenology and the Dialectical Foundations of Social Change."

22. Karel Kosik, *Dialectics of the Concrete*, trans. by Karel Kovanda with Jas. Schmidt (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1976), pp. 133-140.

23. This is drawn from my appreciative critique of Adorno in *Dialectical Anthropology*, Vol. 2 (1977).

24. Compare my appreciative critique of Habermas in "Critical Political Theory and Moral Development . . ." (with E.J. Yanarella) in *Theory and Society*, Vol. 4, No. 4 (Winter, 1977).

25. Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception* (London: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1962), p. 56.

26. Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964), p. 7.

27. For further development of this discussion of Horkheimer and Adorno, see my *Dialectical Anthropology* article previously cited and my commentary on Habermas in the *Theory and Society* essay which focuses on the question of moral development.

28. For the critique of instrumental rationality in American culture, see my "American Social Science in the Politics of Time and the Crisis of Technocorporate Society", *Politics and Society*, Vol. 3 (Winter, 1973), pp. 204-211 especially, and an article in the *Review of Politics* (with E.J. Yanarella) Vol. 37 (July 1975) entitled "Political Science and the Post-Modern Critique of Scientism and Domination."

29. Cf. my discussion in the concluding section to "Critical Political Theory and Moral Development", *Theory and Society*, Vol. 4, No. 4 (Winter, 1977).

30. I have presented some materials for this project in *Up the Mainstream: A Critique of Ideology in American Politics and Everyday Life* (New York: David McKay, 1974).

31. Josiah Auspitz and Clifford Brown, Jr., "What's Wrong with Politics", *Harper's Magazine*, Vol. 248 (May, 1974), 51-61. See also Marlis Krueger and Frieda Silvert, *Dissent Denied: The Technocratic Response to Protest* (New York: American Elsevier, 1975).

32. Charles Taylor, "Interpretation and the Sciences of Man", *Review of Metaphysics*, Vol. 25 (September, 1971), p. 32.

33. Cf. Herbert G. Reid, "The Politics of Time", *The Human Context*, Vol. IV (Autumn, 1972), 456-483, and the concluding section to the *Review of Politics* article.

34. See Part I of *Up the Mainstream*.

35. A brief but enlightening discussion of some of these concepts will be found in Robert Welsh Jordan's *Social Research* previously cited. For example, he notes the interplay of "modalization" and "sedimentation" in the life-world.

36. Cf. the discussion of ideology critique and political education in the United States system of higher education in the *Cultural Hermeneutics* article with Randal Ihara (1976).

37. "Toward a Post-Modern Theory of American Political Science and Culture", p. 133.

38. *The Visible and the Invisible*, pp. 105-129.

39. *The Primacy of Perception*, pp. 92-93, 88-90.

40. *Ibid.*, p. 195. The essay is, of course, "The Crisis of the Understanding."

41. *Ibid.*, p. 210, p. 95.

42. *The Visible and the Invisible*, p. 112.

43. *The Primacy of Perception*, p. 88. The passage appears in one of the late essays "Phenomenology and the Sciences of Man."

44. As, for example, in Pier Aldo Rovatti's "A Phenomenological Analysis of Marxism: The Return to the Subject and to the Dialectic of the Totality", *Telos*, Number 5 (Spring, 1970).

45. John O'Neill, "The Responsibility of Reason and the Critique of Political Economy", in Maurice Natanson, Editor, *Phenomenology and the Social Sciences*, Vol. 2 (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), p. 285. O'Neill develops this point (out of Marcuse) in "Critique and Remembrance" in his collection *On Critical Theory* (New York: Seabury Press, 1976).

46. See my *Up the Mainstream*, especially Part IV.

47. *The Visible and the Invisible*, pp. 105-106.

48 Kosik, *Dialectics of the Concrete*, pp. 48-49.

49. See my argument — drawing upon Gramsci — in "Toward a Critical Theory of Peace Research in the United States: The Search for an 'Intelligible Core' ", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. XIII, No. 4 (1976), pp. 315-341 (with E.J. Yanarella).

50. Marek Siemek, "Marxism and the Hermeneutic Tradition", *Dialectics and Humanism*, Vol. 11, No. 4 (1975), p. 92.

Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory/Revue canadienne de théorie Politique et Sociale, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Winter/Hiver, 1978).

DOMINATION AND LIBERATORY POLITICS

Doug Torgerson

"What do we do now,
now that we are happy?"

— Beckett, *Waiting for Godot*

Alkis Kontos (ed.), *Domination* (Essays for the University League for Social Reform), Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1975, pp. ix, 228. $15.00 cloth, $5.95 paper.

Liberal theory links its cause with common sense. Freedom is conceived in terms of its opposite: the absence of overt oppression. A person is considered free to the extent that he can follow his felt desires. To suggest that doing what one wants may be a token of bondage rather than freedom is regarded not only as erroneous, but as morally suspect: for we verge on the absurdity of forcing men to be free.

Let us consider, however, the story which Camus tells of Spartacus and his revolt.[1] This slave rebellion occurred "as the ancient world was coming to an end"; beginning with a small group of gladiators, the uprising swelled into a massive slave army which eventually threatened Rome itself. But Camus emphasizes that, in revolt, the slaves failed to advance a "new principle": the vision of liberation mirrored the life and world of the masters. The aspiration of the slave was to become like his master. Rebellion became a reaffirmation of bondage, paying homage to the constraints on imagination that were forged by a world of oppression and servitude:

> Spartacus' army marches to lay siege to a Rome paralyzed with fear at the prospect of having to pay for its crimes. At the decisive moment, however, within sight of the sacred walls, the army halts and wavers, as if it were retreating before the principles, the institutions, the city of the gods. . . . The army retreated without having fought . . . .

The ancient distinction between freeman and slave reflected a manifest reality: slaves were different. Burdened with the cares of necessity, they lacked the capacity for freedom. As they purportedly exercised reason in the sole sense of understanding and following commands, their status was justly subordinate; they existed for the sake of the higher, to be ruled. But this ancient notion erred by viewing the historical mutilation of human potentialities as something essential in the being of a slave. Slighting the historical origins of slave mentality and behaviour, this view confused facticity with ontology, allotting the slave an inferior position in a cosmic hierarchy. Aristotle was aware, however, that some men were enslaved by virtue of historical contingency, not essence. And he glimpsed, as well, the true necessity for bondage: to provide others with the chance for freedom.[2]

The slave served others in a cosmos harmonized with their interests. Even in rebellion his actions reflected his bondage. In the tale told by Camus at least, the slave failed fully to shed the habits of servitude. His imagination could not transcend the boundaries of a social world founded on hierarchy and slavery. His quest for liberation remained haunted by phantoms which, today, reappear and are unveiled in psychoanalysis and the critique of ideology.[3] But the slave at least did not confound his own condition with freedom.

The volume *Domination* opens enigmatically in a brief, dramatic series of aphorisms. Composed by the editor, Alkis Kontos, these introductory passages stand in vivid contrast to the scholarly, systematic nature of the articles which follow. The aphoristic introduction and the essays of the volume thus together form a paradox.

One response to paradox is passive bewilderment. Another is an active search for the meaning which the paradox promises. As an ancient master of aphorism and paradox, Heraclitus gained a reputation for obscurity. He also received the condemnation of Aristotle, as Nietzsche ironically observed, for having sinned allegedly against the "law of contradiction".[4] But, for Heraclitus, truth did not reside in a correspondence between distinct objects and the discrete categories of thought and language. In a chaotic world of shifting, ambiguous phenomena, truth pertained to a hidden order, both immanent and transcendent, which was more concealed than revealed in the thought and language of common sense. The moving world, he believed, could be known only by what was in motion. Paradox was the device he employed to shatter the stable complacency of everyday appearances. What Heraclitus grapsed was the essence of dialectical thought, which denies the abstraction and reification of static categories — which conceives "one notion turning into another", revealing "contents which at first seem alien and even opposed to" itself.[5]

The aphorisms by Kontos open on a note of contradiction and paradox. We find an image of the modern scholar confronting an eternal riddle. In both form and substance here, Kontos is expressing the idea, also emphasized by

George Grant, that scholarship is not identical with thought. Kontos seems as well to suggest that scholarship can and does constrain insight. He does not reject the possible benefits of scholarship; nor does he ignore the importance of precise, rigorous, systematic thinking. But Kontos has emphasized the inevitability of poetry in political philosophy because he regards the imagination as central in the quest for truth: "The articulation of imaginative vision reveals the limitation and necessity of language and renders poetry inevitable".[6] And he has suggested that "the truth always speaks . . . in parables and metaphors". Perhaps he is exaggerating, but the very exaggeration pays tribute to what someone else has said: that truth resides in exaggeration. Only exaggeration can penetrate the haze of delusion to reveal what has been concealed.[7] Kontos challenges both the conventional wisdom of scholarship and the common sense notions of the man on the street. In doing so, he remains true to the issue at hand. For domination, as Kontos conceives it, is sustained largely through the medium of common sense.

The articles in *Domination* are striking in their diversity. Ranging in topic from the international to the individual, the psychological and literary to the economic and ethnic, embracing the levels of biography, history, and ontology, the essays seem to have no clear, common focus. The articles all deal with "domination" in some sense of the idea, and there are recurring themes. The topics, moreover, are not simply arbitrary; they exhibit an underlying coherence deliberately stemming from a concept of domination elaborated by the editor in a closing article. Still the range of topics and the variety of approaches render an easy summary of the book impossible.

A characteristic contrast is evident in the first two contributions.

O. Weininger's lead article "Dominance in Children" is based largely on clinical experience. For Weininger, the individual's effort to achieve dominance is initially aimed at creating coherence and stability in an otherwise inexplicable and threatening world:

> Children are not consciously trying to control others or to have "every action taken to be that which they suggest". Rather there is an air of survivial necessity in the young child's often frantic attempt to order a chaotic world, to make the behaviour of siblings and adults predictable, consistent, and safe for himself.

Weininger suggests that the "need to dominate" in later life is linked to a persistent failure to make sense of the world, to an underlying anxiety — "a basic insecurity".

Elizabeth Brady's "Towards a Happier History", which follows, deals with the issue of "women and domination" through an interpretation of three works by women in Canadian literary history. Brady suggests that the struggle of women against domination should not be focussed simply on gaining equality with men in the existing socio-economic framework. The fight against domination should, rather, be a fight for the humanity which is systematically denied by this order. Concluding with Margaret Atwood's *The Edible Woman*, Brady emphasizes that the prevailing context of domination is contemporary capitalism and its consumer culture. She quotes Atwood's central character: "Production-consumption. You begin to wonder whether it isn't just a question of making one kind of garbage into another kind. The human mind was the last thing to be commercialized but they're doing a good job of it now . . . ." The title of the article is perhaps somewhat ironic. On one level, the idea of moving to a "happier history" reflects the positivist notion of historical progress. Indeed, Brady suggests that there has been progress for women in history, but she indicates that this progress has been a development of consciousness, as exemplified by Atwood's central character. From here, progress does not occur — as positivism would have it — within the prevailing order. A woman's realization of "her creative potential as a total person" is dependent on her economic situation. Similarly, the liberation of women as full human beings must be linked to the transformation and humanization of the economic order as a whole. Brady is perhaps also suggesting that the alleged happiness of our past and present history is less than believable.

The next scene shifts to R.T. Naylor's "Dominion of Capital", a masterful, succinct discussion of Canadian economic history in terms of international investment. Concern with the international sphere recurs in R. O. Matthews' "The Third World", which successfully contrasts the widespread, conflicting images of underdeveloped nations as either "powerful or powerless". Emphasizing the diversity of Third World nations, their differing weaknesses, strengths, and opportunities, Matthews formulates a perspective which suggests potential avenues for action in a world characterized by neither complete freedom nor absolute bondage.

C. B. Macpherson's "Liberalism and the Political Theory of Property" is a significant extension of the author's famous critique of liberal-democratic theory. As he has done in other works, Macpherson here emphasizes the contradictory images in liberal thought of man the consumer and man the creator. The development of the human creative potential, he argues, is not a universal possibility when property rights are defined entirely in terms of the individual's right to exclude others. Macpherson suggests, instead, a notion of property embracing the right of individuals *not* to be excluded from what is common. This expanded view of property, he contends, is necessary for the full realization of that vision, at the heart of liberal theory, which sees man as a creative being.

DOMINATION AND LIBERATORY POLITICS

If it is possible to identify a thematic core in the book, this is perhaps to be found in a series of interpretive articles, each dealing in turn with one of three phenomenological thinkers: Monika Langer's "Merleau-Ponty: The Ontological Limitations of Politics", Keith McCallum's "Domination and History: Notes on Jean-Paul Sartre's *Critique de la Raison Dialectique*", Ato Sekyi-Otu's "Form and Metaphor in Fanon's Critique of Racial and Colonial Domination". Each of these sensitive studies focuses in a different way on the tension between the individual and the collectivity in a world of violence. The critique of ideology advanced by Critical Theory informs two articles. In "Magic and Domination", Christian Lenhardt stresses the interpenetration and mutual reinforcement of the irrational and the rational. With reference particularly to James Frazer's *The Golden Bough*, Lenhardt examines the relationship between instrumental rationality and myth in the rule of the magician king. He suggests that the liberatory potential of reason has been fatally marked in an association with irrationality and charisma, with the interests of domination. In conclusion, he re-states the central theme of Horkheimer and Adorno's *Dialectic of Enlightenment:* "while freeing man from fear and uncertainty, reason has also served to perpetuate domination, thus being at once anti-magical and magical". This issue is pursued further in Ben Agger's "On Science as Domination". Defending Critical Theory against the challenge of "scientific" Marxism, Agger emphasizes the cultural dimension of domination in industrial civilization: the scientistic aversion to self reflection, the *rigor mortis* and amnesia of reification, the rigid gulf between individual and environment that arises in a will for universal mastery and penetrates to the deeper levels of psyche and sensibility. With its cultural focus, Critical Theory reaffirms the inextricable link between theory and practice; the prospect of a liberatory practice is tied to the realm of imagination, sensibility, the vision of liberation which underlies critical consciousness. Agger closes with a striking passage from Adorno's *Negative Dialectics:* "Dialectics is the self-consciousness of the objective context of delusion; it does not mean to have escaped from that context. Its objective goal is to break out from within".

Then in "Albert Camus' *Caligula:* The Metaphysics of an Emperor", David Cook suggests a link between the absurd and the tyrannical that is perhaps later illuminated in the remarks on tyranny which Kontos makes in the final essay, "Domination: Metaphor and Political Reality".

Domination is diverse in style as well as substance, ranging — for example — from the intriguing blend of systematic exposition and poetic imagery in Kontos to the measured precision of Macpherson, from Sekyi-Otu's powerful eloquence to Langer's patient and evocative subtlety. Though some are perhaps more sober than others, the various themes and voices may give the impression of a bacchanalian revel. It should be mentioned that this impression may be intentional. "Each essay", the editor writes in a preface, "stands as an individual

voice, a perspective, deriving its full strength from the orchestrated theme of the volume as a whole, for which I carry sole responsibility''. The book stems from a ''common concern with the dimensions and modalities of human bondage and, inevitably, the chances of freedom''. It is ''an exploratory exercise''.

The exploratory rather than definitive nature of the volume is suggested by the aphoristic form of the introduction and is echoed in the editor's concluding article. Here Kontos alludes to various themes in the book and sketches a general orientation to the problem of human bondage. But he refrains both from a systematic survey and from an attempt to create a false unity of perspectives. He advances no comprehensive, definitive conclusion arising from the whole. He orchestrates the voices, but does not constrain them. In this way, the book as a whole remains open-ended, inviting interpretation and reflection.

In his closing essay, Kontos distinguishes various forms of human bondage. What he offers is no mere typology, but an attempt to reveal the phenomenon in its depth and complexity. He centers initially on the idea of tyranny.

Arguing that tyranny is a form of oppression characterized by arbitrary rule, a disruption in the ''normal state of affairs'', Kontos seeks both to restore the term to its classical meaning and to underscore the limitations of the concept. He apparently also alludes to Cook's preceding essay on *Caligula*: for it is there that we confront the apotheosis of tyranny. In Camus' play and Cook's sensitive interpretation, a discordance between man and cosmos originates in the emperor's recognition of absurdity. Through the bizarre, apparently arbitrary character of his rule, this discord penetrates and disrupts the entire social order.

Tyranny, Kontos insists, is but one extraordinary form of oppression. To limit our notion of human bondage to the idea of tyranny would be to distort social reality and to deny the potentialities of freedom. Specifically, it would be to blunt social criticism by ignoring the phenomenon of domination as Kontos elaborates it:

> Domination, compared to all other modes of oppression, is unique in that the dominated remain oblivious to their domination. The establishment and maintenance of domination is effected on psychological grounds: the dominated internalize the external social structure, which achieves a reorientation of their energies, desires and perceptions. The world of the dominated is a falsified reality that has been granted the semblance of the natural, which in turn grants it an aura of rationality and legitimacy.

In this formulation, domination is a mode of oppression that is unfelt, invisible

to the victims. The restriction of human freedom fades into the background of accepted routine; chains are not seen as chains because they accord with the natural order.

Kontos implicitly rejects the liberal conception of freedom as the simple absence of restraint on felt desires. For such a conception masks the nature and complexity of human bondage. As a corollary to his view of domination, moreover, Kontos has written elsewhere on the issue of human essence:

> To evaluate what a society does and does not do to its members, a concept of human essence is needed as the external criterion. It is against such a concept that the quality of social existence can be measured. Only in the light of such a concept can a social critique be developed and social inadequacies be made visible.[8]

Drawing together these threads in his thinking, we can grasp his fundamental concern. Kontos is suggesting that at times — and especially in our time — the extent and very existence of unfreedom is hidden from view. Bondage becomes visible only against the backdrop of freedom, not conceived merely as a lack of restraint, but envisioned as a form of existence fulfilling the human essence. He thus exposes himself to a common liberal objection: To deny that freedom consists entirely in overtly unrestrained acts is to lend credence to the absurd and dangerous notion that men might be forced to be free. But unfortunately the issue is not as simple as liberal common sense suggests.[9]

Merleau-Ponty provides a starting point for an investigation into the full complexity of human freedom and unfreedom. As Monika Langer emphasized in her brilliant article, the central notion of his thought is that of the human being as incarnate subjectivity inhabiting the world, immersed in it, and sharing with it a common texture — the same "flesh". A constant, primordial communication flows between the subject and its world. In a word, the individual is *continuous* with this world, related to the shifting fabric of nature, human artifact, and other people — engaged now in mutual support, now in antagonism, but constantly involved in an on-going exchange of influence, in an interconnected pattern of formation and transformation. Being *of* the world, the subject can never step beyond it; he remains immersed, his bodily presence to the world echoed by the world's living presence to him. And society, the world of other people, the domain of intersubjectivity, is no exception. The continuity and communication of subject and world is accentuated in the social realm. Indeed, the world known to the subject is essentially a social one, grasped through the medium of shared understanding, through culture. These

considerations lead us to the heart of the problem of freedom. In her account of Merleau-Ponty, Langer formulates the central issue with precision:

> By virtue of being flesh, human beings are not self-enclosed units divided from one another and free in the isolation of that self-enclosed existence. Rather, the permeability of their texture dictates that human subjects inherently participate in an undivided existence, such that each influences, and is influenced, by the others. Freedom cannot exist in abstraction from this common life in which all share. . . .Only in such human coexistence can freedom or fulfillment be found.

Contained in a pattern of social life, human interaction is characterized by a ceaseless flow of influence among individuals. Self and other not only inhabit a common world, but inhabit each other through both "invasion" and "intimacy". The interaction, Langer stresses, may be an "*encroachment*" or an "*enrichment*". But freedom is conceivable only within this realm, not beyond it.

From Langer's account, the fate of the subject in Merleau-Ponty appears to be that of total immersion in the contingency of body and world. Freedom as autonomy seems to be an impossible notion. Paradoxically, however, Merleau-Ponty suggests not only the possibility, but the inevitability, of autonomy. He refers to the subject not as the product of physical and social determinants, but as "the absolute source"[10] which perceives the world and lends it meaning. He speaks of "the radical subjectivity of all our experience as inseparable from its truth-value".[11] Contingency is known only from the standpoint of a centering of awareness, a sense of identity, which cannot be reduced to any set of determinants, which is ultimately inexhaustible, miraculous.

Here, then, we come to the heart of the matter, a paradox of contingency and autonomy: "Man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains".[12] To understand the paradox is to mediate consciously between the extremes of fatality and total licence, to grasp the limits and inescapable necessity of action. Indeed, as the "absolute source" of meaning, the subject is not fundamentally passive, but necessarily active, engaged in the world by virtue of his very existence. But this awareness is not necessarily shared by all. For the possibility of awareness is entwined in the individual's sense of his felt presence to the world. This sense of identity always contains a political element.

Central to the paradox of contingency and autonomy is the fact that an individual's sense of identity always reflects his social context. Societies typically

teach their members who and what they are, locating them in a cosmic order, inscribing their given identities in the very nature of things. The loyal and obediant individual knows his place and keeps it. To question one's identity is, depending on the situation, a mark of insanity, idiosyncracy, or rebellion.

A passive self image, a sense of subservience and dependence, the feeling that one is an insignificant thing in a world of things — these characteristics typify the identity of the oppressed. For the oppressed to question their identity is, at once, a political and philosophical act. The questioning itself assumes a measure of autonomy, signifies already a change in identity, and orients the individual to an active posture. At the philosophical level, moreover, the quest to redefine oneself involves a consideration of others who share one's predicament; it raises the question of human essence.

Kontos characterizes the world of domination as false and actively falsified. The dominated not only have a false sense of themselves and their real desires; they also are deluded concerning the structure of the social world and its past. For domination has a history. Being preceded by overt modes of oppression, domination advances gradually. As the past is forgotten and as a happy amalgamation is achieved between victim and master, domination comes to prevail.

While a measure of falsification may characterize various forms of human bondage, Kontos' conception of domination addresses a phenomenon which is historically specific. He refers to the contemporary period of industrial capitalism. Clearly, his discussion owes much to Marx and, especially, Marcuse. Suggesting that domination may originate, under scarcity, in the desire of some to shift the burden of toil onto others, Kontos refers to the idea of domination as "an expansive transformation of Marx's concept of alienation". In alienation, man's "ontological creativity" is disfigured, taking the form of a labourious existence sapped of vitality. A life of alienated labour is a life for others, relieving them of the necessity of toil and reinforcing their power. But Kontos carefully distinguishes between domination and alienation. While alienation is fundamentally an economic condition which underlies ideological falsification, "domination emphasizes the psychological-cultural features of social life which embrace the totality and cement its structural patterns". Domination cannot be isolated; it permeates the whole of social life:

> Domination is an all-pervasive condition which cannot be traced back to any single activity. The world and the images which sustain it *are* the constituent parts of domination. The distorted, falsified world *is* the context of domination and no mere byproduct of it.

He insists that domination embraces the whole of society but does not achieve a "systemic autonomy". "The masters", he argues, "act consciously, willingly, as power holders who know that they must procure obedience, docility, and active passivity and remain invisible as well". He does not claim that they are thus free and truly human; he does deny that they are simply trapped by "systemic forces". Here Kontos vacillates between two possible uses of the term domination. It is a vacillation rooted in the ambiguities of the present historical period.

In using the term domination, Kontos refers both to prevailing historical tendencies and to the nightmarish culmination of these tendencies. In a series of metaphors, he evokes images of the regulated body and mind thoroughly absorbed in a universe of duplicity and delusion. But Kontos warns us against taking these metaphors too literally as reality: he fears their "numbing finality". He emphasizes that his portrayal is of "ideal-types, vivid signals of ongoing tendencies, of a propensity but not a finalized crystallization". With the metaphor of "troubled sleep", Kontos suggests that the subjects of domination "are not fully convinced of their earthly paradise". There persists a tension, which can perhaps never be eliminated so long as true human freedom is denied.

In rejecting the idea that domination constitutes an impersonal, automatic system, Kontos agrees that a system exists; "but it has been brought into existence", he says, "by its masters". As he describes "the prevailing aura and texture of the dominant culture", however, these masters tend to fade into the background:

> It is an irony that the more vividly one criticizes domination the less political it appears; the less immediate, the more alien it becomes. Other forms of oppression concretize and personalize the enemy. Domination denies a visible figure; it offers only a systemic universe.

Yet by referring to the masters of the system, he does seek to identify, to visualize and personalize, an enemy. His ability to do so recalls the origins of domination in overt oppression, in the blatant antagonism of the oppressor and the oppressed. In pointing to domination as the successor to other forms of oppression, Kontos identifies its novel feature as the gradual dulling of this antagonism. In his most extreme formulations he envisions a depersonalized, "systemic universe", devoid of visible masters. But he does not go so far as to say that the masters could become invisible to themselves. This is, in fact, what he vigorously denies. His insistence on this point reflects a hesitancy to regard the present predicament as closed and finalized.

DOMINATION AND LIBERATORY POLITICS

The advent of domination as a new form of oppression reflects a change in the relationship between oppressor and oppressed. Awareness of the real situation is lost to the dominated, but not, according to Kontos, to those who dominate. Yet, with a shift in the overall relationship, we might reasonably expect a change in the consciousness of both. Kontos would no doubt agree that generally the dynamics of social life betray elements of regularity which are both automatic and conscious, unplanned as well as planned. As the overt antagonism between oppressor and oppressed diminishes, less vigilant control is required. As the condition of domination becomes progressively engrained in personal habit and social routine, in patterns of thought and behaviour, more and more can be left to automatic regularities. With overt oppression giving way to domination, the self awareness of the masters, as masters, can be less acute. No doubt their awareness remains acute in the present period, giving rise at times to problems of conscience and legitimation. But this is a token of the fact that — as Kontos insists — domination is not (yet) complete; the frightening metaphors expose our reality but do not accurately describe it. If we conceive domination as an ideal-type fully to be realized in the future (if ever), then we can see that our current situation remains a transition, perhaps, from overt forms of oppression to domination. In domination as an ideal-type, there are no rough edges; social relations are false but smooth, and every conscience is easy. The oppressors both look friendly and feel themselves to be friendly. Sleep is untroubled. The cosmos is complete.

Whether such a condition is conceivable as an historical possibility depends ultimately on our view of human essence. But conceived simply as an analytical ideal-type, this notion of domination leads to a significant consideration. The consciousness of the rulers and consciousness of the ruled are *both* subject to historical changes which need not alter the fact of subordination. Between our past and our present, in the transitition from oppression to domination, we can expect to find such changes.

Kontos emphasizes the role of the masters in order not to render them invisible. He fears that their invisibility would make the system of domination even less vulnerable to liberatory politics. He wishes to avoid the image of a thoroughly diffuse, impersonal system with no target for political action.

Political action does, indeed, require targets in the sense of precisely conceived means and ends that serve as a focus for effort. But to develop any strategy, it is necessary to identify weakness as well as strength, to determine what in the system is carefully controlled and what is left to take care of itself, to know what the dominant elements understand and what they fail to grasp, to decide how self conscious and united these elements actually are. The direction and very prospect of a liberatory politics turns on these issues.

Domination can be overcome, Kontos emphasizes, only through politics, through collective action guided by a thorough grasp of the forces which sustain

oppression and domination. He does not provide a program and does not believe that it is the role of political philosophy to do so. But he does raise considerations which should precede the formulation of any strategy. The feature of domination which distinguishes it from other forms of oppression renders the dimension of consciousness central to a liberatory politics. Kontos denies that an existence in bondage promotes consciousness of a liberatory vision; for, especially in domination, delusion and lack of imagination are themselves constituents of bondage. He questions, in particular, the Marxian reliance on the liberatory role of the proletariat: ". . . the fact that a particular condition mirrors the universal historical predicament of negated, damaged life does not necessarily imply that those who actually live it will recognize it as such". Freedom is not a motor reflex of unfreedom. Here Kontos' discussion parallels Sekyi-Otu's interpretation of Fanon: With respect to the colonial situation, Fanon denies that the history of bondage is a prelude and preparation for liberation. The politics of liberation does not emerge, immanently, from within the social order; rather, it springs, seemingly, from nothing — not welded from lingering vestiges of humanity, but asserted in the face of the denial, the masking of humanity.[13] For both the metropolis and the colony, these considerations raise the central problem: the source and identity of the agents of liberation. Kontos does not attempt to identify these agents, but he does not deny that they may emerge. He alludes only to the "troubled sleep" of the dominated, implying perhaps that a movement for liberation is always a possibility, that the quest for an essentially human existence can never completely be bought off. The emphasis on culture and consciousness is not unfounded, but it may be a cause for exasperation. Whatever its weaknesses, the strength of Marx's approach was in his attempt to identify structural instabilities in the system of oppression that could bring the system to a point of crisis. No one who has read a newspaper in the last decade could deny that crisis, of some sort, is a recurring feature of the present system. It is still important to consider the nature and possibility of crises,[14] especially with respect to how they might affect the sleep of the dominated.

The abolition of scarcity is, for Kontos, a prerequisite for the full actualization of the human essence. This does not imply an incessant acceleration of the motor of production in order to keep it in tune with desires that persistently expand into infinity. Indeed, Kontos regards the fervent consumerism of "the high intensity market setting" as a token of domination.[15] The desires promoted by the prevailing consumer culture are false because they keep individuals collectively bound to the productive machine, both as bored producers and as restless consumers. This effectively forecloses the social alternative of a limitation to both consumption and production which, while universally satisfying real needs, would loosen this bond and allow time and energy for other dimensions of experience and existence.

For a thorough discussion by Kontos of the issue of human essence, we must await his future writings. But he has indicated that he is not oblivious to the problems which the issue raises: "The most imperative aspect of any attempt to establish a valid perspective on human essence is the need to distinguish ontology from history." But to state this does not overcome a remaining "paradox" and "challenge": "to differentiate ontology from history within the flow of history itself".[16] As a starting point, Kontos has suggested a focus on the aesthetic dimension of human existence, emphasized in Marx's *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts* and elaborated in the work of Marcuse. Some would see this as a highly depoliticized vision. Whatever the validity of such an interpretation, we can acknowledge this as a possible tendency. But Kontos emphasizes time and again the centrality of the political, not only as a necessity for the transformation of society, but also as an essential dimension in the relationship between individual and collectivity in any conceivable society. The private and public realms are simultaneously, paradoxically both separate and joined together:

> Social change aiming at the humanization of the world must presuppose and demand the possibility of a dimension where the individual and the collective are so joined together in common destiny and inpenetrable solidarity as to safeguard them without the one asphyxiating the other.[17]

Politics has historically been practised in the context of oppressive social structures. Unable to imagine politics in any other setting, liberal theory has sought to differentiate clearly between the public and the private, to erect protective fences for the individual. But, in doing so, liberalism left an oppressive social structure untouched; the boundaries were a faint thread in the fabric of social life. Kontos is aware of this mistake; he knows that freedom is possible only within society, in a realm where others simultaneously enroach upon the individual and enrich his existence. One lives with other people; the relationship can be a stifling bondage or a bond that promotes fulfillment. The difference resides in the texture of the relationship between self and other, a problem that is political as well as personal. But upon what possible basis does one pronounce the desires of another to be false, a violation of what is essentially human? Kontos has, as yet, not satisfactorily answered this question. Let us consider briefly what is at stake. Liberalism fears a relentless encroachment, a social movement which would deny freedom in the name of freedom, both in its quest for power and in the new order it would construct. But Kontos would

reply that the existing order is one of domination, which *does* deny freedom in the name of freedom, which *is* a relentless encroachment. Only a notion of human essence can cut through this web of delusion and call it by its real name.

To speak of a human essence, true humanity, the truth and falsity of needs and desires — this presupposes epistemological judgments. The problems of illusion and delusion and the corresponding quest for certainty have always been at the heart of philosophy. The idealist solution has been to identify a locus of absolute certainty which, as an autonomous subject, transcends all contingency. In Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology, however, we have noted a paradox of autonomy within contingency. He refers to the incarnate subject as the "absolute source". Beset by a welter of phenomena, incessant and ambiguous, the subject cannot escape from giving meaning to the world; he is, in Merleau-Ponty's phrase, "*condemned to meaning*".[18] Yet the world he knows and attempts to understand contains an ambiguity which is not peripheral, but central. The objects of perception are always partial, shifting, somewhat indistinct; self and world are inexhaustible, and the past does not guarantee the future. Faith and risk, then, are ultimately central to all knowing, to all judgment.[19] Herein lies a basis for both confidence and humility:

> It means two things to say that our experience is our own: both that it is not the measure of all imaginable being in itself and that it is nonetheless co-extensive with all being of which we can form a notion.[20]

Merleau-Ponty rejects any "[r]ecourse to an absolute foundation" beyond the incarnate subject: ". . . my own opinions, which remain capable of error no matter how rigorously I examine them, are still my only equipment for judging". To try to make my truth into an absolute truth is to "drop the prey to catch its shadow".[21]

> If, on the other hand, I have understood that truth and value can be for us nothing but the result of the verifications or evaluations which we make in contact with the world, before other people and in given situations of knowledge and action, that even these notions lose all meaning outside of human perspectives, then the world recovers its texture, the particular acts of vertification and evaluation through which I grasp a dispersed experience resume their decisive importance, and knowledge and ac-

> tion, true and false, good and evil have something unquestionable about them precisely because I do not claim to find them in absolute evidence.[22]

As we shall see, these epistemological considerations have an immediate relevance for politics.

We are, as Merleau-Ponty says, "*condemned to meaning*". Out of the welter of non-sense, a sense necessarily emerges, dissolves perhaps, and re-emerges. But the sense, the meaning, to which we are all initially condemned is common sense. The catechism of the journalist reflects the commonsensical, political lesson which all societies teach their members: who, what, when, where, why and how they are. The significance of this lesson becomes obvious when we recall Kontos' notion of domination. All evaluation of social life is grounded, moreover, implicitly or explicitly, in a notion of human essence. There is no escape through feigned agnosticism; this merely signals a victory of common sense. Liberal fears would, indeed, blunt a serious critique of common sense. Still, it is important how we understand the idea of essence.

Politics is inevitable to the extent that a difference, a certain tension, persists between self and others, the individual and the collectivity. Kontos envisions political life beyond the domain of oppression. He conceives a politics which would not only allocate values but which would be valued for itself — a realm of action necessary, perhaps, for the actualization of what we take to be essentially human. Characterized by an egalitarian norm of reciprocity, political relationships would mirror the mode of human interaction typical of a non-oppressive social structure. But the creation of such a politics and such a society is itself a political act, executed in a world of oppression. Here the mutual respect, the reciprocity of person to person, is peripheral if it exists at all. The other is reified, reduced to a thing to be manipulated or destroyed in a struggle for power. In this context, everything is subject to manipulation, including philosophy. The notion of human essence can be used as a tool of oppression, both by oppressors and would-be liberators. But such manipulation would violate the spirit of a liberated or liberatory politics.

The quest for liberation is both collective and individual. Similarily, the philosophical attempt to grasp a human essence necessarily involves a human subject seeking to understand its identity. Common sense has no quarrel with a search for personal identity, but here the search necessarily ends in the relativism of unique individuals. Personal insight does not reveal a collective predicament. Hence a condition of domination necessarily remains veiled.

Still, caution at this point is not without foundation. Here we might recall the earlier remarks on Merleau-Ponty's epistemology. We noted his rejection of the idealist attempt to lodge human understanding in an absolute foundation

transcending the incarnate subject. For Merleau-Ponty, this epistemological judgement contained implications for political practice. He glimpsed an Orwellian prospect in the quest for absolute certainty: If I claim knowledge with a foundation beyond myself, "my judgments take on a sacred character"; indeed, in the realm of practical affairs I become immune to the criticism of others because I have the means to transfigure my actions: "the suffering I create turns into happiness, ruse becomes reason, and I piously cause my adversaries to perish".[23] Thus, in rejecting an absolute, transcendent ground to knowledge, Merleau-Ponty also denounced the theocratic elements of religious and secular crusades. But we can accept this view without being condemned to relativism.

The incarnate subject remains the ground of judgment, but he is also immersed in a world which he actively and necessarily endows with meaning. Self reflection is not the sole source of his understanding. Kontos has stressed the central role of the imagination in grasping the human essence, but the imagination is nurtured by the whole range of human experience. The individual's world is a world populated by others as well as himself. He experiences their presence and, with some of them, achieves communication, a sense of mutual understanding. It is partly out of the interpretation of such experience that he can fashion a notion not only of his own identity, but of the identity, the nature, the essence of his kind. Surely, there remains ambiguity; self and other are inexhustible; the vision of the whole is predicated on fragments. But while the pattern may be somewhat indistinct — a faint image on the horizon — it is not beyond sight.

Through communication, moreover, individual insights may coalesce in a collective understanding. The vision may become shared, public, cultural — and, as such, political. Indeed, within the context of domination, a notion of human essence must inform a liberatory politics. This is not to deny all risk. Bondage often persists after the day of alledged liberation; the tyranny of dubious liberators is well known. In this regard, Kontos approves of Camus' attempt to moderate, without destroying, the impulse of rebellion. A liberatory politics is indeed a fragile affair because it must look not only to the present, but also to the future it seeks to create. The present means must somehow embody the distant ends. Those who would liberate humanity, according to Merleau-Ponty, must be "capable of recognizing other men as such and being recognized in turn".[24] It is not absurd, philosophically or politically, to tell another in discussion that what he takes for freedom is actually bondage. Such an act may promote a mutual understanding of a common predicament, a shared vision of liberation. Yet it may not. Discussion must sometimes end; often, perhaps, it cannot even begin. At these times, a liberatory politics must find its way in a political realm founded on oppression. Not everything is acceptable, but in this context, no serious politics can renounce coercion and

manipulation in all forms. And one need not equate coercion with freedom in order to claim that coercive measures are sometimes taken for the sake of freedom. Surely, this involves risk, but it is not absurd. The means must embody the ends, but means and ends cannot suddenly be collapsed as one.

Liberatory politics seeks the liberation of political life from the domain of oppression. This prospect is linked to the possibility of absolishing both coercion and the pressure of scarcity as prevalent features of social organization. But the domain of oppression is an infernal quagmire. In its struggle to escape, liberatory practice risks sinking deeper and, in any case, cannot avoid being soiled. The solution, if there is one, is a balance which promotes effective action but does not undermine the goal of liberation. To achieve this balance is a practical task that requires theoretical reflection. An ethical code may aid the endeavor, but the practical balance of liberatory politics cannot be created or maintained sheerly through a code. Liberatory practice is necessarily tied to a corresponding vision. More fundamentally, both practice and vision must be rooted in liberatory impulses. Political action has to be entwined with the development of a liberatory culture, involving both aesthetic sensibility and a mode of human interaction founded upon reciprocity.

The domain of oppression makes a mockery of liberatory vision. The exigencies of practical politics threaten to engulf and pervert liberatory impulses. Not only is there a danger of dehumanizing the enemy; in a realm of scarcity and oppression, the potential liberators may dehumanize their allies and themselves. This is the nightmare which concerns Sartre and which Keith McCallum emphasizes in his discussion of the *Critique de la Raison Dialectique*. McCallum suggests that "the possibility of abolishing the inhuman in human history once and for all remains almost inconceivable under present-day conditions". He may be right. In an earlier period, Machiavelli emphasized the difficulties and dangers in simply bringing about a new order of things — not to mention in abolishing the reign of violence. He conceived politics largely on the model of warfare and praised the prince who was always ready to do battle. Still, Machiavelli may contain a lesson for our present predicament. He was attuned to the sudden shifts of Fortune and taught that if men could not control this force, they could, with preparation, be able to guide it. Domination appears as a closed universe, and this is part of its power. It is not simply a desperate hope, however, to believe that Fortune may offer opportunities for which a liberatory politics should be prepared.

Since antiquity, a central current of Western thought has identified the *telos* of the human being with fulfillment, true satisfaction, happiness. The way may be twisted and uneven, marked by delay, detour, perversion, and sinful error; the end may slip from sight, but a fulfilled existence still remains the ultimate aspiration and, as such, renders the human predicament both comprehensible and communicable.

A desperate, restless, unbelievable happiness pervades the world of domination. The limits of this happiness are revealed in an underlying discontent, the psychopathology of everyday life, the troubled sleep of the dominated. Upon awakening, domination is exposed as a punishing reality, and one is faced with the irresistable question: What is to be done? Even if it does not become conscious, this question echoes in the dreams and day dreams of the dominated individual.

In the context of domination, the impulse for liberation tends to remain scattered, isolated, individual. But inasmuch as domination is a collective reality above and beyond the individual, there is no chance for a private escape. Liberation is fundamentally a political, collective task.

With these considerations, it may be tempting to suggest an identity between freedom and happiness. But this equation has frightening political implications. Here we glimpse an essential limit to any collective solution of the human predicament.

An element of tension must persist if there is to remain a distinction between self and others.[25] This tension is the source of politics. The dream of a liberated politics envisions a tension among individuals which, guided by mutual recognition and respect, remains limited, contained — which does not normally degenerate into coercion or violent conflict.

The reciprocity characteristic of a liberated politics would require a tolerance of the other. We may view other people as misguided, confused, or ignorant, and we may be right. Still, the texture of human interaction must be founded on an overall sense that each individual is capable of judging his best interest, of ultimately choosing his own path to happiness. A liberated politics would thus distinguish between freedom and happiness, establishing a range of individual choice and risk as a cultural norm. The individual may be coaxed, but he cannot be compelled to be happy. Such compulsion would threaten the very foundation of collective liberation, the spirit of reciprocity. Others may accompany the individual, but at certain points he must also stand alone and choose.[26] Liberal theory errs by assuming that this individual already exists in the common man. A liberatory politics would be founded on the belief simply that this individual wants to be born.

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Notes

1. *The Rebel: An Essay on Man in Revolt*, trans. Anthony Bower, New York: Vintage, 1956, pp. 108-110.

2. Aristotle, *The Politics*, trans. Ernest Barker, London: Oxford University Press, 1969, Bk. I, Chps. III-VII, XIII. Also see Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965, pp. 27-37.

3. See e.g., Herbert Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud*, New York: Vintage, 1955, ch. 4; Jürgen Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests*, trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro, Boston: Beacon Press, 1971, ch. 10.

4. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks*, Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1962, p. 52. The relevant passage from Aristotle's *Metaphysics* is included in the section on Heraclitus in Philip Wheelwright (ed.) *The Presocratics*, New York: Odyssey Press, p. 80. Also see, generally, Wheelwright's *Heraclitus*, New York: Atheneum, 1964.

5. The quoted material is from a brief exposition of Hegel given in Herbert Marcuse, *Soviet Marxism: A Critical Analysis*, New York: Vintage, 1961, p. 124.

6. "Between Memory and Dream" in David P. Shugarman (ed.) *Thinking About Change*, Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1974, p. 54.

7. On truth, exaggeration, and common sense, see Theodor W. Adorno's contributions to Adorno et al., *The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology*, trans. Glyn Ady and David Frisby, New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1976, esp. pp. 33, 35, 82, 110. On common sense, see Max Horkheimer, *Eclipse of Reason*, New York: Seabury Press, 1974, pp. 24-30. Despite everything, cf. Martin Heidegger, "The Essence of Truth" in Heidegger and Warner Brock, *Existence and Being*, Chicago: Henry Regnergy, 1949.

8. "Between Memory and Dream", p. 55. Cf. Herbert Marcuse, "The Concept of Essence" in *Negations: Essays in Critical Theory*, Boston: Beacon Press, 1969.

9. Liberal thought should be viewed within the wider context of bourgeois thought as a whole. As C.B. Macpherson has emphasized, liberalism developed two contrasting images of man: as the "possessive individual" and as the active creator. Liberal freedom was designed initially to protect the possessive individual. This conception prevailed until after Bentham. In the nineteenth century, however, the image of man the creator was strongly asserted. In J. S. Mill, liberal freedom is designed both to protect the possessive individual and to promote the creative dimension of the human spirit. It is to this dual end that the individual becomes "sovereign" over himself. Macpherson has suggested two reasons for this shift: (1) a reaction of sensitive intellectuals against the crass image of the possessive individual, and (2) the necessity of a moral vision to defend the bourgeois order against the emerging strength of the working class. With T. H. Green and Bernard Bosanquet, British neo-Hegelianism followed Mill in the assertion of a new vision of man but demolished his fiction of the insular individual. Even Mill had his doubts about this fiction, but common sense liberalism still clings

to it. On a more sophisticated level, Isaiah Berlin's "Two Concepts of Liberty" defends the more plausible assertion that only negative liberty, the freedom from overt restraint, deserves the name of *political* freedom. This contention is not without some foundation. (See the conclusion to the present essay.) But his attempt to draw a clear distinction between forms of freedom is unsettled when he confronts the problem of totalitarian brainwashing. Though he does not recognize it, the whole structure of his argument here verges on collapse. Failing utterly to grasp the phenomenon of domination, his perspective accords with the end of bourgeois legitimation. (See his *Four Essays on Liberty*, London: Oxford University Press, 1969, esp. the second part of the introduction.) My interpretation of liberalism is influenced by Macpherson, particularly *Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrival*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973, Essays I-V. Also see Herbert Marcuse, *Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory*, Boston: Beacon Press, 1968, the first part of the Conclusion.

10. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, trans. Colin Smith, London: Routeledge and Kegan Paul, 1962, p. ix.

11. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "The Metaphysical in Man" in *Sense and Non-Sense*, trans. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Patricia Allen Dreyfus, Northwestern University Press, 1964, p. 93.

12. Paradox is at the heart of Rousseau — reflected in his most famous propositions and underlying the very structure of his thought. The parallels between Merleau-Ponty and Rousseau on the issue of contingency and autonomy could form the basis of a separate article. This possibility is suggested by the interpretation in Ernst Cassirer's *The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau*, trans. Peter Gay, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1963. On the issue of forcing men to be free, see Carole Pateman, *Participation and Democratic Theory*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975, pp. 22-27.

13. This view of Fanon is, according to Sekyi-Otu, what the Marxian conception rejects. (There is a serious discrepancy between the original of his article and the published version. A phrase at the bottom of p. 157 incorrectly reads that this is "precisely what the Marxian conception suggests". *Suggests* should read *rejects*.

14. In this regard, there have been a few significant attempts to come to terms with the implications of ecology and energy questions. See Hans Magnus Enzenberger, "A Critique of Political Ecology", *New Left Review*, No. 84, March-April, 1974; Colin Stoneman, "The Unviability of Capitalism" in Malcolm Caldwell et al., *Socialism and the Environment*, Nottingham: Spokesman Books, 1972. Also see Vincent Di Norica, "From Critical Theory to Critical Ecology", *Telos*, No. 22, Winter, 1974-75; Murray Bookchin, "Ecology and Revolutionary Thought" in *Post-Scarcity Anarchism*, San Francisco: Ramparts Press, 1971.

15. See William Leiss, *The Limits to Satisfaction: An Essay on the Problem of Needs and Commodities*, Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1976; the Review by Kontos, this *Journal*, Vol. 1, No. 1, Winter, 1977; and the Reply by Leiss, this *Journal*, Spring-Summer, 1977, Vol. 1, No.2.

16. "Between Memory and Dream", p. 56.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 60.

18. *Phenomenology of Perception*, p. xix.

19. See Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "Faith and Good Faith" in *Sense and Non-Sense*. Also see his "The Primacy of Perception" in *The Primacy of Perception* (ed.) James M. Edie, Northwestern University Press, 1964.

20. "The Metaphysical in Man", p. 93.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 95.

22. *Ibid.*

23. *Ibid.*

24. *Humanism and Terror*, trans. John O'Neill, Boston: Beacon Press, 1969, p. 154.

25. See the exchange between Herbert Marcuse and N. O. Brown in Marcuse's *Negations*.

26. The relationship between freedom and happiness is not exhausted by these remarks. In a strict sense, we could say that, in the fully "enlightened" individual, a unity of freedom and happiness has been attained. We could also argue that, inasmuch as happiness constitutes a basic aspiration of all, "enlightenment" is a prerequisite for true freedom. But this merely reaffirms a necessary distinction between the individual and the collective. A liberated collective life would abolish ideology in the sense of socially imposed delusion. Liberation could encourage enlightenment. But collective liberation could not ensure or enforce enlightenment. A mutual respect in the texture of collective life demands that the notions of enlightenment and happiness remain somewhat ambiguous, open-ended, left to the individual.

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CONTENTS

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PHILOSOPHIA

PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY OF ISRAEL

Editor: Asa Kasher

Vol. 8, No. 1-2

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RATIONAL EGOISM AND THE LIBERAL STATE

David Milne

Tom Settle, *In Search of a Third Way*. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1976, pp. 208. $4.95 paper.

Tom Settle's book, *In Search of a Third Way*, originated, as he explains it, in work begun for the Science Council of Canada. He discovered there that certain "presuppositions in our political and economic life militated against the promotion of what we think to be right." His book seeks to draw out those presuppositions in liberal capitalism and to subject them to analysis. Specifically, Settle wants to determine whether a society predicated upon the assumptions of liberal capitalism (especially the necessary premise of rational egoism) can ever be expected to promote the public good. Having discovered, not surprisingly, that liberal capitalism violates his understanding of the public good, Settle undertakes a more challenging task: to suggest the presuppositions of a desirable form of political economy including an "ethos which helps people rather than hinders them to do what is good."

With Settle's first contention, namely that the premises of liberal capitalism are incompatible with the promotion of the public good, I intend to be brief. Settle shows quite successfully in my view shortcomings in liberal capitalist claims: neither freedom, nor equality, nor democracy — nor ultimately the public good — can be achieved in any practical sense in an unreformed liberal capitalist society. The practical consequences of liberal capitalist presuppositions lead, on the contrary, to unacceptable divisions of rich and poor, to oligopolies and bureaucratic manipulation, and to underdevelopment and regional disparities. Most of all, they lead to a bankrupt ethical theory and to a truncated sense of the public good.

Now if this list of ills sounds familiar, it should occasion no surprise. Most of these insights are by now rather firmly embedded in the critical landscape of our time. They have been raised and acknowledged with varying degrees of theoretical consistency by thinkers of almost all political hues for a century or more. For this reason, the author's evident surprise at the misalignment of our

theory and practice and his extensive effort to refute capitalist presuppositions seems curious.

Settle is correct of course to insist that the idea of ethics and especially a viable notion of the public good be restored to a central place in any acceptable theory of a political economy. This is by far the strongest and most valuable part of his work. It shows that contemporary liberal theory, in spite of the prominence of Nozick and Rawls, has not entirely lost touch with the humane liberalism of Kant, J.S. Mill, Green or Hobhouse. What is not clear, however, is how far attacks on the moral theory of nineteenth and pre-nineteenth century liberal theory is pertinent to the capitalist state today. The increasing role of state planning in the name of individual welfare, equality of opportunity, and regional equity already shows capitalist adjustments to the moral arguments advanced by Settle, even if the adjustments seem more to defuse or disguise than to overcome these problems. In other words, an adequate critique of the current theory of the advanced capitalist state may have to tackle a much more complex and elusive body of theory than that which Settle treats.

Be that as it may, Settle's critique is, on the whole, a clear and effective attack upon long-standing liberal capitalist presuppositions though, he does at times slip by pressing his case too far. In his skirmishes with utilitarianism, for example, and especially with theories of power, he wrongly charges them with being incapable of treating moral issues. Though there is a good deal of substance to Settle's charge that utilitarianism is unduly constrained by a merely instrumental morality, it goes too far to say that, short of adopting Settle's own theory of categorical obligation "public policy formation is cut off from moral considerations in its appraisal of aims." In his argument with theorists of power, Settle charges Machiavelli with "ignoring the moral dimension both in the choice of ends and in constraints on means." No close reading of Machiavelli nor familiarity with recent scholarship on this thinker would of course sustain such a judgment. But these are excesses stemming from an honest attempt to place certain absolute moral principles at the centre of political economy and to demand that a "morally principled" political economy enshrine and uphold them.

Settle wants to advance arguments for a "morally principled" capitalism — arguments compelling both the rational egoist and bureaucrats in both private and public organizations to recognize an obligation to respect persons as subjects. If he can show that "obligation is a natural social relation, an integral component of a person as a social animal", Settle believes that he is well on the way to finding that "ethos which will help rather than hinder people to do what is good." Settle is able to show an obligation 1) for benevolence toward persons, 2) for democracy, 3) for a democratized family, 4) for equality and justice, 5) for independent public-spirited government, and 6) for morally sensitive bureaucrats in all sorts of private and public organizations. The solution

then to "a morally principled political economy" is deceptively simple: replace rational egoism with rational respect. Settle presses for an improved personal morality (reflected, where necessary, in law to convince otherwise reluctant capitalists to respect benevolent ethics) to ensure in Canada the public good without violence or major institutional changes.

Approached as ethical theory, Settle's argument no doubt shows the deleterious effects of rational egoism and utilitarianism, even if it doesn't present an altogether compelling or logical case for his own theory of natural obligation. What troubles me more, however, is the assumption that this kind of enquiry takes us very far into the *possibility* of a "third way". Despite the promising subtitle, "Is a morally principled political economy *possible*?", the book totally fails to take up the issue. This is not so much a question of proposing a "full blown theory of political economy" as it is of establishing some practical relation between his principles and any new structure of political economy.

Settle seems to think that a political economy operates largely in response to its own underlying principles or presuppositions. This is why he expends so much energy on treating morality and so little on political theory. But this is to err on both accounts: thinking political decisions on equality, regional disparity and so on merely a logical outcome of underlying moral principles both overrates the rationalist elements in any political order and ignores the distinctiveness of politics altogether. The same confusion affects the remedies which the author offers. Lifting up the prospect of a "morally principled capitalism", Settle thinks he can graft his rational principles of respect onto a capitalist economy, thus curbing its dynamic tendency towards inequality and exploitation. As he says: "By contrast with Marx, my solution to those problems [exploitation, alienation] is not to eliminate the institution of private property but to eliminate egoism as the mode of operation of the economy."

This confidence in the power of moral principle and law even in the face of a hostile political economy must surely represent a highwater mark in theoretical confusion and political innocence. On the level of theory, Settle fails to see that a capitalist political economy (even one which makes some room for co-operatives) *requires* the premise of rational egoism which he is at pains to reject and could not function for long with those principles of benevolence which he wishes to advance. (Though it is fully capable of limiting or mitigating the worst effects of such egoism by mild mannered remedial state action.) Politically, it is simply fatuous to think the taming of the forces at work in a society is primarily a matter of eliciting and applying moral principles. However much we may wish it, the political universe will not be subdued or remade in the philosopher's parlour. Discarding these darker truths or casting up a veil of illusion around thinkers like Machiavelli who have tried to wrestle with the twin

ironies of morality and power amounts to a well-intentioned disservice. When the moralist enters the problematical world of politics, perhaps his chief ethical responsibility is clear-sightedness: "to represent things as they are in real truth, rather than as they are imagined."

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VOLKSGEIST AND THE REDEMPTION OF ASSOCIATIONS

Jack Vowles

Otto Gierke, *Associations and Law: the Classical and Early Christian Stages.* Translated, edited, and with an interpretative introduction by George Heiman, Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto press, 1977, pp. 166. $15.00 cloth.

Otto Friedrich von Gierke (1841-1921) was a noted German legal theorist and, in the latter part of the nineteenth century, was one of the leading exponents of the views of the 'Germanist' wing of the School of Historical Law. Gierke's major work, *Das Deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht* (the German Law of Fellowships) was published, in four successive volumes, in the years between 1868 and 1913. The most part of this massive work has never been translated into English but a section of volume three appeared edited, translated, and with an introduction by F. W. Maitland in 1900 under the title *Political Theories of the Middle Age*. In 1934 Ernest Barker translated some sections of volume four under the title *Natural Law and the Theory of Society, 1500-1800.* George Heiman's translation of further sections of volume three is, as he puts it, 'an attempt to close the circle by returning to Gierke's treatment of associations and corporations in classical antiquity and early Christianity'. (p. 3)

Additionally, almost half of the book consists of an interpretative introduction to the whole of Gierke's thought (sixty-five pages). Having consulted a number of Gierke's other writings his most recent editor and translator can claim with justice to have 'carried the examination to its full conclusion'. These essays and lectures were in most cases contributions to the ongoing debates about the nature and substance of the German Civil Code of 1896. While Barker in particular was not unaware of the existence and importance of at least one of these essays, (see Barker pp. xxix-xxxiv) the introductory essay in this, the most recent study of Gierke, breaks new ground at least within the English-speaking world. Gierke's theoretical postulates and their sources in the discussions of his time have been somewhat more clearly delineated.

The German School of Historical Law was an important part of the nineteenth century reaction against what was seen as the rationalism, universalism,

and individualism of the natural law tradition. Legal scholars like Hugo, Eichhorn, and Savigny argued that law was the product of an organic communal life that was expressed in the 'spirit of the people' (*Volksgeist*). This spirit was composed of the consciousness of a people as it had developed through history. From this position, 'Germanists' like Eichhorn and Gierke went on to claim that the German 'reception' of Roman law during the Renaissance had introduced legal conceptions that had frustrated and distorted the spirit of the German people. In this view, it was not only the theory of natural law that should be abandoned. Roman law also was seen as individualistic and absolutist and its adoption had led to the enforcement of severe restrictions on the autonomy of 'intermediate groups' such as associations, corporations, and 'fellowships'. The very right of association had been repressed. Roman law, it was argued, had promoted a form of 'absolute sovereignty' that was opposed to the mixed and constitutional form of government that had been the true German tradition. A more 'diffuse' form of sovereignty was advocated. The Germanists therefore saw themselves as political liberals in oppostion to the centralising and potentially authoritarian implications of the legal doctrines of the 'Romanists'. Gierke's massive work of legal-historical scholarship in effect pursued this conflict, as he viewed it, through the legal codes and doctrines of two millenia. Only with such a polemical purpose, perhaps, could Gierke have taken such a path which, he once admitted, had led, 'in part, at any rate, through utterly desert regions' (Barker, p. x).

The work of the School of Historical Law is best understood in the broad context of the German Romantic movement and, in particular, with reference to the political doctrines of Hegel. It is one of the many merits of Heiman's essay that a useful comparison is made between Hegel's doctrines and those of Gierke (p. 53-54). More specifically, it is in the context of the Hegelian cast of aspects of nineteenth century German thought that Gierke's well-known concept of the 'personality of groups' can be situated. If 'the state is the march of God through the world' represents, as Charles Taylor has claimed, a mistranslation that distorts Hegel's real meaning, nevertheless Hegel's theory of the state attributes a certain 'divinity' to the institutions of political authority (Charles Taylor, *Hegel*, Cambridge, 1975, p. 366-7). For Hegel, the integration of individual living beings into the universal life of the state was necessary for the progress of 'spirit'. Encouraged by Hegel's view that in intermediate groups lay the 'proper strength of the state', Gierke asserted that these groups were 'real persons' as opposed to the *personae ficta* of Roman law. Gierke wanted not only to protect and promote the autonomy of such associations, but in addition, he wanted to claim for them an 'organic' and natural status, as had Hegel for the state. One overblown theory, in other words, led to another. Gierke's construction was at least relatively more modest than that of Hegel.

Heiman presents a more balanced picture of Gierke's enterprise, for more sympathetically than Barker, he identifies the source of Gierke's organicism. Gierke is explained, as it were, from within his own tradition. For Gierke, both fantasy and faith played an essential part in establishing a doctrine whose 'real nature' remained undiscovered in any natural or empirical sense. So it is that 'faith, bolstered by metaphysical speculations, accounts for the inner life and unity of the group' (p. 10). The 'reality' as opposed to the 'fiction' of group personality can only be understood within a conception of the 'real' that, 'includes the transcendetal realm where empirical speculation yields to Hegelian idealism' (p. 16). The analysis is therefore in one sense, more sympathetic, and in another, more telling.

But Heiman goes on to offer a qualified defence of Gierke's organicism. He notes that 'to advocate the view that law is the result of social relationships as they develop over history is far from being a fantasy'. Gierke's 'faith' is also supported by a 'substantial dose of juristic sobriety'. Any conception of law must presuppose ideas of justice but these can only be derived from some form of 'ideals' and not from the empirical world. In other words, if a society is to function without coercion alone as the basis of order,some form of confidence or faith in an ideal of justice must be widespread. This form of faith is indeed one that all 'normative' political theorists must share. One point Heiman fails to make is that Gierke himself saw this 'sovereign independence of the idea of justice' as having been historically secured by the 'old conception of natural law' and in this sense, despite his criticisms of the theory of natural law, Gierke continued to adhere to the 'core' and 'undying spirit' of the natural law tradition (Barker, p. 1). But, to continue with Heiman's line of argument, for those whose interests are metaphysical the assumption of the existence of an organic whole may be but one small step further than a belief in some ideals of justice. More specifically, however, one might note that there are less rarified arguments for the autonomy of groups than that which assumes their 'real personality'. And as Heiman observes, 'whether it is possible to build a valid juristic system on such an assumption is a matter of conjecture' (p. 66).

One could, perhaps, take issue with Heiman's characterisation of Gierke as taking 'a position between' the two models of monism and pluralism. This is because Gierke 'does not subscribe to the pluralist rejection of the concept of sovereignty' and therefore cannot be 'ranked with the pluralists' (p. 52). First, the monist/pluralist debate is no longer a live one — arguably, it was misconceived in the first place — and modern 'pluralism' is a different and more contestable concept than its early twentieth century relation. Modern pluralists no longer reject the concept of sovereignty but either ignore it or simply assign it symbolic status. Like Gierke, a generation of North American political scientists saw in the humble intermediate group a symbol of their democratic ideals in empirical form. Somewhat facetiously, one might assert

that pluralism was the *volksgeist* of North American political science. But more to the point, even the pluralism of 'discreditors of the state' such as Figgis or Laski owed considerable debts to Gierke. At the very least one can argue, with David Nicholls, that 'there is certainly a sense in which Gierke was a pluralist' (David Nicholls, *The Pluralist State*, London, 1975, p. 5). And if Gierke took an 'intermediate' position between the two extremes, then it was one that was considerably closer to pluralism especially as modern pluralist thought has, in a significant sense, moved closer to Gierke.

Gierke's section of the book has been divided into three chapters. All are focused on the concept of 'association' and successively relate its development, first, in the ancient philosophy of Greece, second, in Roman jurisprudence, and, finally, in early Christian thought. Gierke's own position obviously militates against a positive appraisal of Roman corporatism, and we are warned by the editor that our reading of Gierke must here be tinged with reservations. Nevertheless, Gierke's treatment of the legal and political history of the concept of association in the early centuries of western civilisation is not without considerable interest to the legal and political theorist. Perhaps sociologists and political scientists might also benefit from a reading of this small section of a major work of legal-historical anthropology. In particular, Gierke's work further illuminates our understanding of the origins of the concept of pluralism. The meaning of the currently more fashionable term 'corporatism' might also be a little better understood with the aid of the rich historical perspective to be found in Otto Gierke's *Association and Law*.

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TRADE UNIONS, THE WORKING CLASS AND THE STATE

Alvin Finkel

An encouraging feature of the confrontation on "The State and Political Economy" was its emphasis upon a broader problematic for political economy than the usual discussions of the 'relationship between the economic and the political'. In particular, some discussants emphasized the role of both state and non-state institutions within capitalist society in ideological or cultural reproduction. It was also pointed out that, while the Canadian state has shown considerable capabilities for repression, it has also demonstrated itself able to intervene in the economy to legitimize the existing set of capitalist economic and social relations.

Several of these key theoretical points might have been brought to bear upon the discussion of the "working class" and the trade union movement. I was not particularly convinced by the responses of Leo Panitch and Wally Clement to a question posed by Harold Chorney: "Is there, in fact, a working class that actually articulates interests, or are there institutions which articulate supposed interests of the working class and are therefore defined as working class institutions?" Panitch, while admitting that unions "mediate the demands of the working class" nevertheless regards unions as "indigenous working class institutions". I think, however, that this formulation ignores Panitch's earlier dictum that the state "be understood in the context of class struggle". The state and the capitalists did not stand idly by while workers freely associated in unions of their choice. Had they done so, there is every possibility that the revolutionary syndicalism of the Industrial Workers of the World, United Brotherhood of Railway Employees and the Western Federation of Miners, which flourished in pre-World War One British Columbia, would today be that province's dominant trade union philosophy. The popular One Big Union movement, which swept the Prairie provinces into the revolutionary camp after the war would predominate in that region. The OBU refused to accept that property ownership conferred upon people certain 'rights' to exploit their workers and relied upon the sympathetic general strike as the means of dealing with recalcitrant employers and ultimately as the means to overthrow the entire

system of capitalist production relations. And, had the state remained neutral, the communism of the Workers' Unity League of the 1930's would have added the workers of northern Ontario, garment workers in Montreal and Toronto and Cape Breton coal miners into the left-wing fold. In practice, all these movements were repressed out of existence — though the case of the WUL is more complicated — by the determined actions of the capitalist state. The trade unions that the state *did* allow to survive were those that would conform to a set of rules imposed by the state. These rules, as consolidated by order in council P.C. 1003, in 1944, involved the acceptance by union leaders of the responsibility of enforcing contracts, of recognizing a wide area of exclusive management rights and of curtailing the right to take industrial action. While the unions that conformed to such legislation, in the process purging themselves by generally undemocratic means of 'communists', cannot be labelled 'company unions', it is ahistorical to see them totally as "indigenous" working class institutions. They are the result of a long process of class struggle in which genuine workers' organizations, fighting for the total emancipation of working people, lost out and the bourgeois state, while unable to crush unionism altogether was able to impose a version acceptable to itself of the "working class movement".

It would be facile to say that repression alone was the only instrument employed by the bourgeoisie in the class struggle. The very fact that the state allowed any trade union movement to exist at all is evidence that the capitalist class sought to control the workers as much by co-option as by repression. But the essential victory so far of the bourgeois state with regard to class conflict lies in the creation of the necessarily bureaucratic trade union organizations required to conform to state standards of 'proper' working class organization. These organizations, while of a mass character in numbers, have a tiny percentage of active rank-and-filers, with most members cynically regarding their "indigenous" organizations as only slightly less parasitic than the corporations and the state. While the lot of the workers would be far worse with no unions at all, it is clear that the trade union movement as it has evolved in Canada and elsewhere was not solely an affair indigenous to the working class and without the interest or involvement of the bourgeoisie and their state.

One of the key roles the state performs in capitalist society, both in terms of its accumulation and legitimation functions, is the establishment of a stable environment for capital. If investors are edgy for whatever reason, the process of capital accumulation slows down, employment begins to fall and soon what begins as an accumulation crisis can become a legitimation crisis as well. The provision of a predictable trade union movement which accepts most of the rules of the game and plays accordingly is an important element of this process. William Serrin describes this process well with regard to the United Auto

Workers, a union generally seen as more politically 'progressive' than its counterparts in other industries:

> What the companies desire — and receive — from the union is predictability in labour relations. Forced to deal with unions, they want to deal with one union, one set of leaders, and thus they have great interest in stability within the UAW and in a continuation of union leadership. They also want to have the limits of the bargaining understood and clearly subscribed to. "G.M.'s position has always been, give the union the money, the least possible, but give them what it takes", says a former negotiator. "But don't let them take the business away from us." The union has come to accept this philosophy as the basis of its relationship with the companies: it will get money, some changes in work procedures, usually nothing more. "We make collective bargaining agreements", Reuther once declared, "not revolutions". Both the unions and the companies, a mediator says, have one major goal: "They want to make cars at a profit." (Serrin, *The Company and the Union*, New York, 1973, pp. 156-7).

What working-class institutions, untampered by the bourgeois state, are possible? In Canada, outside Quebec, one sees few examples of working-class institutions, economic or cultural, that stand outside of the integrative mechanisms of capitalism and which reconstruct as "class" experience what appears to most people as "private" problems of day-to-day life. It is this fragmentation of people's experiences that is a far more effective barrier to the emergence of a class conscious of itself as capable of transcending capitalist "political economy" than is the existence of the sectoral fragmentation that Clement emphasizes.

Yet, such fragmentation has at times been broken down. In France in May, 1968; in Italy, sporadically since the 'hot summer' of 1969; at times in various automobile plants in Michigan; in pre-junta Chile; workers' councils that invite mass participation and ignore state limitations on the right to protest management "prerogatives" have become active. Working-class newspapers, plays, radio stations and books have become more common in Western Europe and Quebec. The hegemony of the bourgeois state is still, in the final analysis, based on its tremendous ability to reproduce the false consciousness that

obscures class loyalties and reduces people back to their previous fragmentation. Ethnic divisions and the all-embracing propaganda for the American Dream, along with liberal doses of repression, leave the Canadian state in the happy position of still being able to face a working class which, while it may exist 'objectively' as a class in the heads of Marxist intellectuals, persists in asserting itself, on most occasions, as a random collection of bourgeois individuals. The re-emergence in Canada of institutions in which workers — and, I admit that I have omitted discussion of the issue of defining the 'working class' — begin to challenge the notion that ordinary people are unable to take charge of their own lives has yet to begin. That such institutions have existed here historically and now exist in other capitalist countries should be cause for at least some optimism that in the next round the bourgeois state will not be able to crush or remold working-class organizations into a familiar pattern.

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POLITICAL ECONOMY: A QUESTION OF THEORY

Henry Veltmeyer

Last issue's initial confrontation with the question of "The State and Political Economy" is very welcome.* Hopefully it will open up a debate that places a reviving interest in political economy into a theoretical perspective, as well as direct research to conditions that apply in Canada. In this hope I would like to make some observations about what seems to be the two key issues involved: the class basis of the state in capitalist society and the specific features of the Canadian state.

In regard to these two issues I would disagree with Wally Clement's suggestion that the basic theoretical problems have been thoroughly aired and that the major problem now is one of methodology (77). It seems to me that asking 'the right questions' is essentially a problem of theory, not methodology. It is true that the four commentators share a well-placed emphasis on the value of Marx's theory for directing analysis to the most relevant questions. However, there are a host of unsettled questions about Marx's theory based on the concept of the state as 'the executive committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie'. The various assumptions by which the state can be defined as a concept are still very much at issue, and except for Panitch's reference to the Miliband-Poulantzas debate, not even brought into focus. This is a real issue in that the problem as to which questions are asked about the state in capitalist society can be traced back to one's operative concept of the state. To define the state as a complex of institutions in the public sector is to develop an analysis quite different from that based on Poulantzas' broader structuralist definition. At the very least, the contrary assumptions and theoretical implications for the kind of questions asked should be addressed.

Be this as it may, the four commentators clearly appreciate the vital connection that Marx's theory makes between the state and the class structure of its economic basis. However, the theoretical and methodological conditions of this connection are not nearly as clear as one would think. On the one hand, Cle-

* *Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory*, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Fall, 1977). All parethetical page references pertain to Vol. 1, No. 3.

ment rightly situates the state in its socio-economic context. On the other hand, he misleadingly talks of 'creating a theory of society' (73) as if one was not very much at hand. Part of the problem is below the surface. Clement's own work is valuable precisely because it follows Marx in analyzing political and economic relations not as separate systems but in terms of conditions created by society's group structure. The question is how do we specify the conditions of this structure. On the one hand, there is an ultimate (and too distant) reference to Marx's theory of capitalism. On the other hand, there is the ambiguity of two concepts (the ruling *class*, the corporate *elite*) defined by quite different assumptions. Simple references to class as a 'relational concept' (79) won't do. I think it would be useful to confront this question more directly (recent studies by the various commentators notwithstanding) as a systematic analysis of the Canadian state based on Marx's principles of class analysis still awaits us.

Another issue brought into sharper focus is that of the role of the state in the Canadian context of dependent capitalist development. As stated by Panitch and generally supported, this is indeed the central problem for questions of theory and research. The problem itself is clearly brought on by the increasingly large and visible role of the state. What is not so clear (except for Panitch's opening comment) is that this problem requires a careful distinction between the structural features of the capitalist state in general, and features specific to Canada. Without such a distinction, Chorney's comment that "the Canadian state has not thoroughly developed the features necessary for a modern capitalist state" (73) is useless if not meaningless — as is his seemingly misplaced emphasis on the bureaucratic form of the capitalist state. Admittedly, Marx himself left no systematic theory of the capitalist state, but its principles of analysis[1] are clear enough and Poulantzas for one has attempted to formalise them into a general theory of its structural conditions. Elements of this theory are picked up by O'Connor as well as by Chorney and Panitch in their reference to the state's role in terms of specified functions (accumulation, legitmation, repression). It is obvious that the class basis and structural (invariant) conditions of this functioning can be specified by a general theory of the capitalist state which is perhaps already available. What is required (and here I am in complete agreement with Clement) is a concrete analysis of its historically variable conditions in Canada.

As to the state's specific features, the four commentators each in his own way are quite sensitive to the problem involved, although some of the questions raised about this problem seem to be misplaced or disputable. It can be granted that 'the foreign presence' in Canada and the changing role of the state have to do with a process of capital accumulation and a class struggle based on condi-

1. In fact, Marx outlined the principles for several quite distinct theories of the state. On this see my 'Marx's Two Methods of Social Analysis' (*Sociological Inquiry*, forthcoming) and 'Marx's Theory of Revolution' (*Journal of Socialist Studies*, in projected first issue, 1978).

tions so produced. However, what connection is there between these conditions and the interesting question raised by Philips and Clement (80) about the state as employer? Why, as Phillips argues, is the whole historical debate over capitalism and the national question in Canada so irrelevant? Whether or not the national policy favoured both merchant and industrial capital, as here suggested, or merchant capital alone, as suggested by Naylor and others, the connection between state policy and its class basis is highly relevant. It could and has been argued that the distinction on which Naylor's thesis is based is false, but even so the questions it raises remain important.

This, of course, gets us back to our first problem: the theoretical principles for asking the most relevant questions are not clearly established. This is even more urgent than Clement's legitimate concern over questions of methodology.

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TORY MYTH AND CONSERVATIVE REALITY: HOROWITZ REVISITED

Rod Preece

It is scarcely surprising that Professor Gad Horowitz should choose to defend his thesis of the significance of the Red Tory in Canadian politics against the arguments and evidence adduced against that thesis.* What is surprising is that Horowitz should choose to defend his thesis in a manner which, in effect, concedes everything which any opponent may wish to contest.

I doubt it is an unfair criticism to claim that in his attempted rebuttal of my arguments Horowitz chose to avoid the most telling evidence against his thesis and to concentrate on the whole on peripheral matters. In order to be scrupulously fair to Horowitz, however, I shall deal with his defence entirely in his own terms, in which Horowitz's position, though perhaps at its strongest, may still be shown, I believe, to be essentially untenable.

Let me then deal with what appears to be the two sole substantive points which Horowitz makes in his response with regard to the nature of Canadian conservatism. "I have never denied", he writes, "that Meighen, Bennett and Drew were business liberals. Preece can therefore quote their individualistic rhetoric . . . without refuting my statement that 'theirs is not the characteristically American conservatism which conserves *only* liberal values' ". Does Horowitz not remember that in his *Canadian Labour in Politics* he described American conservatism as "purely individualistic, purely liberal" [1] and that it was this individualistic characteristic which, he claimed, differentiated American from Canadian conservatism? [2] Surely, Horowitz must deny individualism to Meighen, Bennett and Drew, for otherwise his thesis has certainly no significance and probably no meaning (i.e. in principle nothing is allowed to stand as evidence against the thesis). Horowitz must logically either deny, that Meighen, Bennett and Drew are individualists or he must relinquish his claim that they are in some degree "corporate-organic-collectivists" — a degree which must be greater than that present among Canadian liberals to carry the significance Horowitz intends for his thesis. Horowitz must either claim that the individualistic rhetoric of Meighen, Bennett and Drew is a facade — *and* he must tell us what lies behind that facade — or he must accept that they have far more in common with their American counterparts than his thesis can afford to

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* "The 'Myth' of the Red Tory?", *Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory*, Vol. I (Fall, 1977): 87-88 in response to Rod Preece 'The Myth of the Red Tory', *Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory*, Vol. I, (Spring-Summer, 1977): 3-28.

allow. Certainly, at face value, Horowitz's present acceptance of Meighen, Bennett and Drew as business liberals concedes precisely what he denied in *Canadian Labour in Politics* when he contrasted them with "purely individualistic, purely liberal" American conservatives. [3] Indeed, Horowitz's plea sounds suspiciously like *noli contendere*, which is not an evasion of guilt but a refusal to countenance it. Horowitz ends his refutation of 'The Myth of the Red Tory' with the assertion that "the discussion of Robert Stanfield as a Burkean, with which Preece concludes his piece, is not a refutation but a confirmation of my argument." Thus we are expected to believe that Stanfield is an example of the Red Tory phenomenom — a real, live, practising politician of the "corporate-organic-collectivist-variety" in our midst.

But what behaviour patterns, what attitudes should we expect of a "corporate-organic-collectivist"? One would scarcely expect him to be a friend of private enterprise. Yet, for Stanfield, although private enterprise is not "the central principle of conservatism", nonetheless he attaches importance "to the economy and to enterprise and to property". [4] He opposes measures which would "undermine self-reliance" [5] and considers one of the functions of government to be to provide for a social order "in which enterprise can flourish".[6] These are not the words of an economic collectivist who would in principle prefer public to private ownership and control.

Horowitz's use of the term "corporate-organic-collectivist" has been restricted almost entirely to the economic sphere and thus in adopting the term I have always used it in quotation marks in order to signify that I am accepting Horowitz's restricted usage. The term, however, does have more interesting connotations when applied in the broader spectrum.

Thus we may ask whether Stanfield is a corporate-organic-collectivist when we apply the term to the nation or the family. Someone who thinks of the nation as analogous with an organism would believe that no constituent part of the whole has the right to secede, whatever the wishes of the individual members of that constituent part. Stanfield is, however, rather more *liberal* than most of his Progressive Conservative colleagues on the Quebec issue, on the *right* of Quebec to secede if it so chooses. In other words, from the perspective of the nation, Stanfield is rather less of a collectivist than are his more economically individualistic colleagues.

Someone who regards the family as an inviolable unit, as an organic whole, would be intractably opposed to legal divorce, would at least consistently condemn any attempt to introduce easier divorce laws. Again, Stanfield is more *liberal* on the issue — and hence less of an organicist — than the majority of his colleagues. We might thus fairly conclude that either on a broad or a narrow interpretation of Horowitz's "corporate-organic-collectivist" philosophy Robert Stanfield simply doesn't belong.

At this point, however, the perceptive reader is entitled to wonder whether

in my denial of the organicist label to Stanfield, I am not thereby attributing it to other members of the Progressive Conservative caucus. Is Preece not now implying, it may be fairly asked, that certain Canadian Conservatives are indeed corporate-organic-collectivists and that Horowitz's error lies only in ascribing the label to the wrong Conservatives? Certainly, many Canadian Conservatives are collectivists — if that is the right word — about the family and the nation, although they are decidedly not so in economic matters. But the point of departure for their apparently collectivist ethic is not some abstract organicist philosophy but a belief in discipline, authority and sterner virtues.

Be that as it may, the point at issue here is the supposed contrast which Horowitz detects between American and Canadian Conservatives. Insofar as it makes sense to talk of Canadian Conservatives as collectivists because of their belief in the inviolability of the nation and the family, so American Conservatives are collectivists *a fortiori* — and the crux of the Horowitz thesis is the belief that American Conservatives "conserve *only* liberal values", in that they are "purely individualistic". Thus, if one were to accept the label 'corporate-organic-collectivists' for certain Canadian Conservatives it would not in any manner involve concurrence with the Horowitz thesis, for those to whom it would be applied are those who correspond most closely to their American counterparts.

In a nutshell my point is this: *insofar as* American Conservatives are economic liberals, so too are Canadian Conservatives, although the latter are generally more tempered with Burkean pragmatism and moderation. *Insofar* as American Conservatives are national and familial collectivists, so too are Canadian Conservatives, although again the latter are generally more tempered with Burkean pragmatism and moderation. In short, Horowitz fails to understand *both* Canadian and American Conservatism.

John A. Macdonald set the tone for the future of Canadian Conservatism in a speech at St. Thomas concerning the coalition of 1854. "It is well known, sir," he said "that I have always been a member of what is called the Conservative Party. I could never have been called a Tory . . . I have always been a Conservative-Liberal".[7] In order to understand the nature of Canada's liberal-conservatism since the 1840's it is worth contrasting the European liberal-conservative tradition with the feudalist tradition of thought.

Would not every Canadian conservative, just as much as every American conservative, side in principle with Montesquieu's preference for equilibrium based on the separation of powers against the Vicomte de Bonald's argument for the unity of power? Béla Menczer may have exaggerated when he wrote that, "*L'Esprit des Lois* was, of course, the great book of 1789 and of almost the whole Liberal School of the nineteenth century".[8] But it is at least clear that liberal-conservative thought had a role to play after the liberal revolution without it being thought of as a negation of that revolution. To be sure, it is

unlikely that Montesquieu would have stood alongside even the moderate revolutionaries had he lived that long, and the liberal-conservatism of Edmund Burke found its strongest expression against that revolution. But it is not surprising that the revolutionaries found Montesquieu's writings a handy lexicon and that they fondly expected Burke to be one of their greatest admirers. Indeed, in the opening months of the revolutionary age Burke was quoted often and with admiration — sometimes without attribution — in the political speeches of revolutionary leaders.

Thus I find it impossible to accept Horowitz's contention that "there is no major disagreement between us on the question of the character of British and Canadian Conservatism". Canadian Conservatives, of whatever hue, have more in common with Liberals than they have with socialists. Common sense, we might say, is once more vindicated against the abstractions of fabulous philosophy.

Political Science
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Notes

1. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968, p. 10.

2. Loc. cit.

3. Op. cit., pp. 18-19 and 10.

4. 'Some comments on Conservative Principles and Philosphy', Leader of the Opposition's Office, November 14, 1974, p. 4.

5. Op. cit., p. 5.

6. Op. cit., p. 14.

7. *Public Archives of Canada*, Macdonald Papers, Vol. 158, 64021.

8. *Catholic Political Thought 1789-1848*, London: Burns Oats, 1952, pp. 38-39.

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